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LR
ESS Y
R VI W
One
of
the
things
thatdistinguishespersonsfromanimals
isthat,for
reasonsfamiliar
enough,
personscannotsimply
live:
theymusthave,or
must
feelthattheyhave,some
reason
fordoingso.
In
other
words,men,women,
andchildren
must
:
have
some
senseand
significance
in
and
,for
their
lives.
 
they
do
nottheyperish.Hence,
I
believe
that
those
whorobpeople
of
themeaning
and
significance
they
have
given
theirlives
kill
them
and
should
be
ThomasSzasz
consideredmurderers,
atleastmetaphor-
ically.
B
F.
Skinner
is
such
a
murderer.
Likeall
mass
murderers,hefascinates-especially
his
intended
victims.But,it
maybeobjected,Skinnerhasno
political
ormilitary
power
athis
command.
How,
then,could
he
inflict
such
a
graveinjuryonmankind?Theanswer
isas
simple
asis
Skinner smentality.Man
qua
organism
is
ananimal;
to
destroy
it,
onemust
killit.
Manqua
person
is
theanimalthatuseslanguage;
to
destroy
him,
onemustdestroyhis
language.
This,
it
seems
tome,is
whatSkinner
is
out
to
accomplish.
Perhaps
morethanany
of
his
earlier
books,
 out
Be
 viorism
makes
this
crystalclear.
It
is
notreally
a
bookat
all,
but
a
dictionary:
it
furnishes
us
withtheequivalents,inSkinnerese,
of
ordinary
English
words.
Simply
put,
whatSkinner
is
out
todoisto
destroy
ordinary
lan
guage
and
to
substitutehisownlanguage
forit.
It
isa
sort
of
one
man
Esperanto
effort.
Skinnerputs
itthisway:
 I
consider
scores,
if
not
hundreds,
of
examples
of
mentalistic
usage.
They
are
takenfrom
current
writings,
but
I
have
not
cited
thesources
 
Many
of
theseexpressions
I
 translate
into
behavior. That
is,
indeed,whatthewholebook
is
about:
translation-from
Englishinto
 be
havior. Skinner s
pride
at
citing
what
others
havesaid
without
giving
theirnames
isof
interestin
this
connection.
 I
amnot
argu
ingwiththeauthors,
he
explains,
asif
referencesserved
thewhole
purpose
of
identifyingenemies.
It
seems
to
methathisnotnamingnames
is
consistentwithhisgeneral
thesis
that
there
are,
and
shouldbe,
no
individuals.
Books
withoutauthors
are
simply
a
part
of
Skinner s
grand
design
ofacts
without
actors-his
masterplan
for
worldconquest.WhataboutSkinner sown
acts,
hisspeaking
and
writing?Is
he
notan
agent
andan
author?
Not
really,
says
Skinner.Inthe
first
place,you
and
I
may
speakand
write,
but
notSkinner;Skinner
ex
hibits
 verbal
behavior. I
amnot
kidding.
 Finally,
a
word
about
my
own
verbal
behavior,
he
writesin
a
chapter
titled
 The
Causes
ofBehavior.
Skinnerthusdisclaimswritingin
a
language,
which
is
asserting
a
falsehood,
orhaving
astyle,
which
is
asserting
a
truth.Instead,
he
claims
to
be
exhibiting
physiological
behavior,which
is
reductionism
of
thestupidest
sort.Butthisis
what
he
espouses: Forpurposes
of
casualdiscourse,
I
see
no
reason
to
avoidsuchanexpression
as I
have
chosen
todiscuss
 
(thoughI
questionthe
possibility
of
free
choice)
 
When
itis
important
to
be
clearaboutan
issue,
nothing
but
a
technicalvocabulary
willsuffice.
It
will
often
seem
forcedorroundabout.
Old
ways
of
speaking
areabandoned
withregret,
andnew
ones
areawkwardand
uncomfortable,
but
thechangemust
be
made. To
what?
To
Skinnerese.
Why?To
aggrandizeSkinner.
H
EREIS
anothersample
of
how
Skinnerseestheworld
and
proposes
.to.explain
 ~
Asmall
part
of
the
un ~ rs
iscon
tained
WIthIn
the
skInof
each
ofus.
There
IS
no
reasonwhy
it
should
have
anyspecialphysicalstatus
because
it
lieswithin
this
boundaryand
eventuallywe
will
have
a
completeaccount
ofit
fromanatomy
and
physiology. So
whatelse
is
new?
Physicalism,
biologism,
reductionism,
scientism-all
have
had
muchmore
elo-
6
 OUT
 H
ByB F
quent
spokesmenthanSkinner.
Why
all
the
fuss
about
him,
then?
Perhaps
because
he
isa
Harvard
professorwho
is
ignorantboth
of
his
ownsources
(for
example,
Auguste
Comte)
and
of
themany
im
portant
criticsof
scientism
(fromJohn
Stuart
Millto
Friedrichvon
Hayek),thus
making
itnot
only
possiblebut
positively
respectable
formillions
to
believethatthedrivel
between
the
covers
of
his
bookis
both
newand
good.
Skinner
loves
anatomy
and
physiology,although,so
far
asI
canmake
out,
he
knows
nothingabouteither.
Perhaps
thisallows
him
to
thinkthatthese disciplines cansomehowexplain
everything.
Howelse
are
we
to
account
for
suchstatements
asthese:
 Thehuman
species,
likeall
other
species,
is
theproduct
of
natural
se -
lection.
Each
ofits
members
is
anextremelycomplex
organism,alivingsystem,
thesubject
of
anatomy
and
physiology.
What
isthis,
anexcerptfrom
abiology
lecture
to
brightsecondgraders?
No.
It
is
Skinner sintroduction
to
hisexplanation
of
 innate
behavior.
There
is
more,much
more,
ofthis.Two
moresentencesshould
suf
fice:
 Butwhat
isfelt
orintrospectivelyobserved
is
notanimportant
part
of
the
physiology
which
fills
thetemporalgapinan
histor
icalanalysis.
The
experimentalanalysis
of
behavior
isarigorous,
extensive,
and
rapidlyadvancing
branch
ofbiology
 
EXT,
WECOME
to
Skinner s
keyconcepts:
 operant
behavior
and reinforcement.
A
positive
reinforcer,
he
ex
plains,
 strengthensany
behavior
thatproduces
it:aglassof
water
ispositively
reinforcing
when
we
are
thirsty,
and
i
wethen
drawand
drink
aglassof
water,we
are
more
likely
todoso
againonsimilar
occasions.A
negativereinforcerstrengthensanybehaviorthat
reduces
orterminates
it:
when
we
take
offa
shoethat
ispinching,
thereduction
of
pressure
is
negatively
reinforcing,
and
we
are
more
likely
todoso
again
when
a
shoe
pinches. Well,I
simply
do
not
understand
this,
but
thatmay
be
because
I
have
notgraspedthe
fine
points
of
Skinner s
language-excuse
me,
 verbal
behavior.
Waterrelieves
thirst.
Taking
offatight
shoerelievespain.
Why
call
one
a
 positive
reinforcer and
theother
a
 nega
tive
reinforcer ?
I
have
no
satisfactory
answer
to
this
question.
Skinner
thinks
he
does,
and
I
herewith
quote
it:
 The
fact
that
operant
conditioning,
like
allphysiological
processes,
isa
product
of
natural
selectionthrows
light
onthequestion
of
what
kinds
of
consequences
are
reinforcing
and
why.
Theexpressions
 I
likeBrahms,
I
love
Brahms,
I
enjoyBrahms,
and
 Brahmspleasesme, mayeasily
be
taken
to
refer
to
feelings
buttheycan
be
taken
as
statementsthat
themusic
of
Brahms
isreinforcing. Well,Ilike
Brahms,
but
Ido
notlikeSkinner.
Butdo
not
be
mis
led:
thisis
neither
anexpression
ofmyill-feelings
towardSkinnernoran
actof
criticism
of
his
work.Ill-feelings,as
Skinnerhimselfhas
just
explained,
do
not
eixst;soI
merelyexperienceSkinner
as
 negativelyreinforcing.
And
in
view
of
Skinner s
definitionofa
 forcefulact, mine
is
surelynot
a
critical
one.
 Depriving
a
person
of
something
heneeds
orwants
is
not
a
forceful
act,
he
assertswithoutany
qualifications.
Depriving
a
person
of
propertyor
of
libertyoreven
of
air
are
thus
notforceful
acts.
Skinnerdoes
nottellus
what
is
a
forceful
act.
Althoughforce
maynot
be
Skinner s
forte,
he
feels
very
confident
aboutbeingable
to
explainwhypeoplegamble,climbmountains,orinvent
things:
 Allgamblingsystems
arebased
onvariableratioschedules
of
reinforcement,althoughtheir
effects
are
usually
attributed
tofeelings
 
The
same
variable-ratio
schedule
affects
thosewhoexplore,prospect,invent,conduct
scientific
research,
and
composeworks
ofart,music,
or
literature
 
Theirony
ofitallis
thatSkinnerkeepscontrastinghimselfwith
Freud
whom,intheserespects,
he
resembles
and
imitates.
Freud
attributedcreativ
ityto
therepression
and
sublimation
ofall
sorts
of
nasty
 drives
from
anality
to
homosexuality.Skinnerattributesthem
to
 sched-
 
[AVIORISM
.
Skinner
ules
of
reinforcement.
Anything
willdo,so
long
asit
reduces
theartist
to
thelevel
of
robotorrat.
As
Skinnerwarms
to
hissubject,
he
revealsmore
and
moreabout
his
~illin n ss
to
do
away-in
his
science
and
perhaps
else
where-wIth
personsqua
agents.
 In
a
behavioral
analysis,
he
wri.tes,
 a
person
is
an
organism,
a
member
of
the
human
species,whIch
hasacquired
a
repertoire
of
behavior.
In
a
word,
an
animal.
He
thencontinues:
 Theperson
whoassertshis
freedom
by
saying,
 
determinewhat
I
shall
do
next,'
is
speaking
of
freedomin
or
~r
a
current
situation:the
I
whothus
seems
to
havean
option
 S
the
product
ofa
historyfromwhich
itis
not
freeand
whichin
fact
determineswhat
it
will
now
do.
That
takes
care
ofmy
personal
responsibility
for
writing
this
review.
I
did
not
write
itatall;a
 locus
did.Ido
not
believe
that,
butSkinnerevidently
does:
 A
person
isnot
an
originating
agent;
he
isalocus,a
point
at
which
many
genetic
andenvironmental
conditionscome
to
getherin
a
joint
effect.
Skinnerhas
an
absolutely
unbounded
love
for
the
idea
that
thereare
no
individuals,
no
agents-that
thereare
onlyorganisms,animals:
 The
scientific
analysis
of
behavior
must,I
believe,
assumethat
a
person'sbehavior
is
controlled
byhisgenetic
and
environmental
histories
rather
than
bythe
personhimself
as
an
initiating,
creative
agent. This
viewleadsinexorably
to
hislove
affair
withtheimage
of
every
human
being
asa
controlled
object,
with
noroom,
orword,
for
either
controllingothers
(e.g.,
tyranny),or
for
controlling
oneself
(e.g.,
self-discipline).
The feeling
of
freedomcreates
some
problems
forthis
scheme,butSkinner
talks
hiswayout
ofit,at
least
to
hisownsatisfaction.
He
explainsthat
 the
important
factis
notthat
we
feel
freewhen
we
have
been
positively
reinforced,
but
that
we
do
not
tend
to
escapeor
counter
 tt ck
[Italics
Skinner's.]Feeling
free
is
animportanthallmark
ofa
kind
of
controldistinguishedbythefactthat
it
doesnot
breed
countercontrol.
 
T
ISIN
the
chapter
titled
 TheQuestion
of
Control that
Skinner
explains
how
inthe
world
he
is
designing
everyone
will
be
controlled,
everyone
will
feelfree,
and
mirabile
visu
no
one
willcontrol Asthisis
thecapstone
inthe
triumphalarchleading
to
hisUtopia,
Iwill
quoteSkinner
rather
than
try
to
paraphrase
whathe
says-for
he
is
after
all,
quiteunparaphrasable:
The
design
of
humanbehavior
implies,
of
course,control
and
pos
siblythequestion
most
oftenasked
of
the
behaviorist
isthis:Whoisto
control?
The
question
represents
the
age-old
mistake
oflookingto
the
individual
rather
than
to
the
world
in
whichhe
lives.
 t
willnot
be
a
benevolent
dictator,
a
compassionatetherapist,
a
devotedteacher,or
a
public-spiritedindustrialist
who
will
design
a
way
of
lifeinthe
interests
of
everyone.Wemust
look
instead
at
the
conditions
underwhichpeople
govern,give
help,
teach,
andarrange
in
centive
systems
in
particular
ways.
In
other
words,wemust
look
to
the
culture
asasocial
environment.
Willa
culture
evolve
inwhich
no
individual
will
beable
to
accumulate
vast
powerand
use
itfor
his
ownaggrandizement
inwayswhich
areharmful
to
others?
Willa
culture
evolve
in
which
individualsare
not
so
muchconcerned
with
their
ownactualization
and
fulfillment
that
theydo
not
give
seriousattention
to
thefuture
of
the
culture?These
questions,
andmanyothers
likethem,
are
thequestions
to
beasked
rather
than
who
will
control
and
to
whatend
r To
onestepsoutsidecasual
stream.
No
onereallyintervenes.
No
one
 intervenes.
Everyone
is
an
 effect. Amen.
But
enough
is
enough.
I
wrote
at
thebeginning
ofthis
review
that
human
beingscannotlivewithoutmeaning;thatthey
eithercreateor
destroymeaning;
and
that,
in
myopinion,
Skinner
is,
oraspires
to
be,
one
of
thegreat
destroyers
of
meaning,and,
hence,
of
man.This
is
thenoteon
which
I
nowwant
to
elaborate
and
onwhich
I
want
to
end.Althoughlanguages,George
Steinerobserved
inLanguage
andSilence
have
great
reserves
of
life, these
reservesare
notin-exhaustible:
 
there
comes
a
breaking
point.Use
a
language
to
conceive,organize,
and
justifyBelsen;use
itto
makeout
specificationsforgasovens;
use
it
to
dehumanizemanduring
twelve
years
of
calculated
bestiality.Somethingwill
happen
to
it....
Something
of
thelies
and
sadism
willsettle
in
the
marrow
of
the
language.
Others-in
particular,
Orwell-have
suggestedthat
whathas
happened
to
the
German
language
under
theinfluence
of
nazism
has
happened
to
othermodern
languages
under
theinfluence
of
bureaucratization,
collectivization,
and
technicization.
Skinnerese
is
accordinglyjust
one
of
the
depersonalized,
scientisticidioms
of
our
age-a
member
of
thefamily
of
languages
for
loathing
andliquidating
man.Whatdistinguishes
Skinnerese
from
its
sister
languages-such
as
legalese,
medicalese,
or
psychoanalyse-is
the
naivebut
infectious
enthusiasm
ofits
author
for
world-destruc
tion
throughtheconscious
anddeliberate
destruction
of
language.
Skinner
devotes
a
whole
chapter
of
 bout
Behaviorism
to
lan
guage.
Aptlytitled
 Verbal
Behavior,
itis
devoted
to
thedestruc
tionof
the
idea
of
language.
 Relativelylate
in
its
history,
Skinner
begins,
 thehuman
species
underwent
a
remarkable
change:
itsvocal
musculaturecame
under
operant
control.
Skinnerthen
ex
plains
why
he
wants
to
get
rid
of
the
word language : Thevery
difference
between
'language'
and
'verbalbehavior'
is
an
example
ofa
wordrequiring
'mentalistic
explanations.'
Language
has
the
character
ofathing,
something
a
personacquiresand
possesses
 
A
much
moreproductiveview
is
that
verbalbehavior
is
behavior.
 t
has
a
specialcharacter
only
because
itis
reinforced
by
itseffects
on
people
 
Translation:
Do
not
say language
i
you
want
to
be
positively
reinforced
by
Dr.
Skinner.
P
ERHAPSREALIZING
that
much
of
what
he
says
is
anattempt
to
replace
a
generallyacceptedmetaphor
with
a
metaphor
of
hisown
choosing,
Skinnerreinterpretsmetaphor
aswell:
 In
verbalbehavior
one
kind
of
response
evokedby
a
merely
sim
ilar
stimulus
is
calledmetaphor. Heevidentlyprefers
this
to
Aristotle's
definition,
according
to
which
we
use
metaphorwhenwe
give
something
a
name
thatrightlybelongs
to
something
else.
Finally,
Skinner
redefines
 truth
itself.
This
definitionisso
revealing
of
his
effort
and
so
repellentin
itseffect(at
least
on
me),
that
I
shall
end
my
series
of
quotationswith
it:
Thetruth
ofa
statement
is
limited
by
thesources
of
the
behavior
of
the
speaker,
thecontrol
exerted
bythe
current
setting,
the
effectsof
similar
settingsin
the
past,
the
effects
uponthelistenerleading
to
precision
or
to
exaggerationor
falsification,
and
soon.
Honest
toGod,thisis
whatSkinner
says
is
truth.
He
doesnot
say
what
is
falsehood.
Orwhat
is
fakery.
He
doesnot
have
to:
he
dis-
plays
them.These,then,
are
the
reasons
why
I
considerSkinner
to
be
just
another
megalomaniacaldestroyer,orwould-bedestroyer,
of
man
kind-one
of
many
fromPlato
to
TimothyLeary.
But
Skinnerhas
the
distinction,
in
this
company,
of
being
more
simple-mindedthan
most.
andhencebeingable
to
advocate
a
politicalsystem
no
onehas
thought
of
before:
namely,
onein
which
all
areruled
and
noonerules Plato
envisioned
a
Utopia
inwhichpeopleareper
fectly
ruled
by
perfect
philosopher-kings:
here
everyone
was
destroyedqua
person,
save
for
therulers.Lenin,
Stalin,
andHitler
had
their
ownversions
of
Utopia:likePlato's,
their
Utopias
werecharacterized
bythedestruction,actual
or
metaphorical,
of
largeclasses
of
mankind;
but
someindividuals
were
still
considered
to
be
agents.
Skinner
hasgone
all
of
these
one
better.
Hehas
con
structed
a
world
ofacts
without
actors,of
conditioningwithoutconditioners,
of
slaveswithoutmasters,
ofpolitics
without
politicians,of
the
good
lifewithout
ethics,of
man
withoutlanguage.
 t
is
anachievement
worthy
ofa
Harvard
professor.
REVIEWED
BY
THOMAS
S.
SZASZ
/
 sy hology
(256
pages)/
 
ri e
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