Wilson Briefs l October 2014

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Frozen in place
Despite the ceasere on September 5, 2014, separatists in Ukraine continue to make gains
against the Ukrainian army around Donetsk airport. After suffering signicant defeats in late
August and early September, Ukraine is not in a position to reclaim the separatist regions in
2014, and cannot defeat Russian forces in a conventional battle.
The only reason that Russia has not taken more territory is that it did not want tocertainly
not in an overt conventional war. Russias public support could weaken with growing
casualties, and Russia has confronted increasing costs from Western sanctions. Moscow has
Weapons Are Not the Answer
to Ukraines Military Woes
by Michael Kofman
Ukraines military, recently defeated in its Anti-Terrorist Operation against
separatists in the east, must address massive materiel, training, and
leadership deciencies. Having suffered years of budgetary and administrative
neglect, its armed forces and defense industrial complex cannot hope to ght
Russia in their current state. U.S. security assistance to Ukraine should focus
in the short term on supplies to sustain its troops over the winter and in the
medium term on support for comprehensive military reform, but providing
American weapons would engender a proxy war with Russia without really
improving Ukraines combat capability.
SUMMARY
WILSON BRIEFS 2
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
Ukrainian Army Ukrainian Volunteers Separatist Forces Russian Army
no interest in further conquests now that it has taken Crimea and established a separatist
territory in eastern Ukraine. More land delivers little additional benet, but Russia will keep its
military deployed to prevent the separatists from losing.
Winter weather will soon prohibit offensive operations, and the conict will freeze into an
uneasy truce along established lines of control.
Ukraines military
Ukraines military has spirit, manpower, and artillery, but lacks the leadership, reliable
equipment, intelligence, logistics, and supplies to sustain the battle.
On paper, there are 130,000 military personnel. The most motivated troops likely are not
professional soldiers, but some three dozen volunteer battalions numbering around 7,000.
Following the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukraine called up reserves, conducted
mobilization drives, and reinstated conscription, but could not properly support or equip even
a fraction of the men on the books and so added nothing to its actual combat capability.
In launching the Anti-Terrorist Operation, Ukraine still had an impressive arsenal, but fell short
in reliability and tactics. The serviceable part of the air force and helicopter eet sustained
considerable losses, in part because pilots had little recent ight training and because aircraft
were sent headlong into enemy air defense. A sizeable armored force, with some of the
best tanks from the former Soviet Union, was used to little effect and lost probably a quarter
of its equipment. Consequently, the operation has depended largely on artillery, including
Deployed in the Donetsk Area
In Combat During September
Estimates of the disposition of forces
WILSON BRIEFS 3
inaccurate rockets often used in and near populated areas. Ukraines infantry has liberated
some towns, but mostly because separatists abandoned them.
The popular narrative among regional experts is that corruption is to blame for the state of
Ukraines military, but the reality is that two decades of neglect have left it in ruinous shape.
Defense was starved because the country experienced persistent economic woes but faced
no credible conventional threats. Of the consistently inadequate defense budget, more than
80 percent went for upkeep and personnel costs, leaving paltry amounts for training and
equipment. Even the basicsrations, uniforms, tents, and body armorwere in short supply.
Ukraines defense industry survived through exports alone, selling off most of the best
hardware inherited from the Soviet Union. It has been subsisting on sales of armor and
aircraft upgrades to other countries, and extensive defense cooperation with Russia and
China. Production capacity is low and of mixed quality; it is unclear what Ukraine can produce
indigenously without Russian components and technology.
Ukraines needs
Now on the defensive, Ukraines only hope is to make further separatist gains costly. It should
be commended for its willingness to defend its territory, but its army needs a complete
overhaul to become a successful ghting force. Even then, it could not win against Russia.
Ukraine has vast amounts of hardware and some of the best repair and modernization
facilities in the former Soviet Union. In time, it can repair, refurbish, and replace both its stocks
and some of its losses. Ammunition and parts can be acquired from friendly former Warsaw
Pact countries. What Ukraine lacks is not patrol boats, counter-battery radars, or antitank
weapons, but funding, training, and military reform.
U.S. assistance
Ukraines military cannot absorb Western weapons or use them effectively, and the volunteer
battalionsoften loosely subordinate to the government and ideologically incompatible with
each othermight use them irresponsibly. Moreover, introduction of American weapons
could engender a proxy war with Russia and tempt Ukraines elites to pursue military
solutions, provoking Moscow with disastrous consequences.
U.S. security assistance efforts, however, do not seem to recognize these truths. President
Obama has committed $116 million in equipment and training, and the Senate has authorized
another $350 million in various defense articles and weapons. These articles include basic
supplies that Ukraine desperately needs, like radios, rations, uniforms, and body armor, but
also high-tech items like night vision goggles dubiously connected to war efforts.
Balance of Forces
Ukrainian Army 130,000 personnel
Ukrainian Volunteers 7,000 personnel
Russian Army 700,000 personnel
Separatist Forces 10,000-12,000 personnel
WILSON BRIEFS 4
The best answers to this conict are a political solution between Kyiv and Moscow and
a long-term realignment of relations between Russia and the West. What Ukraine needs
most is a considered policy that does not pander to its elites political needs or its publics
understandable emotions.

The United States should focus on providing basic necessities to support Ukrainian
forces through the winter, and work with allies from former Warsaw Pact countries to
replenish Ukraines military hardware.

U.S. policymakers should refrain from supplying weapons and limit visible U.S.
involvement in the conicts military aspects.

Diplomatically, the United States should demonstrate its support without leading
Ukraines leaders to believe that assistance will let them pursue a military solution
rather than a political one.

Overall, U.S. efforts should create a sustainable defense, rather than enable Ukraine to
reacquire lost territory.
The Wilson Center
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Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
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Michael Kofman
Public Policy Scholar
michael.kofman@wilsoncenter.org
Kofman is a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center whose reseach centers on security
issues in the former Soviet Union, focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe. He has been a
program manager and subject matter expert at National Defense University, advising senior
military and government ofcials on Russia/Eurasia and Pakistan.
The opinions expressed in this article are soley those of the author.