Eighteen Years In Lebanon And Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force And The U.S. Army Operational Environment
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Major Richard D. Creed Jr.
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Eighteen Years In Lebanon And Two Intifadas - Major Richard D. Creed Jr.
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Text originally published in 2002 under the same title.
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Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment
A Monograph
by
Major Richard D. Creed Jr. Armor
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
Abstract 7
CHAPTER ONE — Introduction 9
Relevance 9
Methodology 10
CHAPTER TWO — The U.S. Army's Contemporary Operating Environment 11
Trends 11
Characteristics of Military Operations 14
Operations on complex and urban terrain 14
Information warfare and information operations 14
Space Operations 15
Power Projection from the Continental United States (CONUS) 15
No homeland sanctuary available 15
Limitations on Force Capabilities 15
Complex relationships 16
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 16
Media 16
Constrained resources 17
Ambiguity 17
Rapidity 17
Asymmetry 18
Force Protection 18
Summary 18
CHAPTER THREE — The IDF Operational Environment Since 1982 20
Lebanon 21
The Palestinian Intifadas 22
Characteristics of the IDF Operational Environment Since 1982 24
Operations on complex and urban terrain 24
Information Warfare and Information Operations 24
Space Operations 26
Power projection 26
No homeland sanctuary available 27
Limitations on Force Capabilities 28
Complex relationships 29
Rules of engagement 31
Media 31
Constrained resources 32
Ambiguity 33
Rapidity 34
Asymmetry 34
Force Protection 36
Summary 36
CHAPTER FOUR — IDF Adaptation 38
IDF Adaptation to the Trends in its Operational Environment 39
IDF Adaptation to the Characteristics of Military Operations 40
Operations on complex/urban terrain 40
Information warfare and information operations 42
No homeland sanctuary available 44
Complex relationships 45
Constrained resources 46
Ambiguity 46
Rapidity 47
Asymmetry 48
Force protection 49
Summary 50
CHAPTER FIVE — Implications and Recommendations for the U.S. Army 52
General 52
Complex and Urban Terrain. 53
Information Warfare and Information Operations 53
No Homeland Sanctuary Available 54
Constrained Resources 55
Rapidity 55
Asymmetry 55
Force Protection 56
CHAPTER SIX — CONCLUSION 57
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 59
APPENDIX A — Definitions of Terms 60
APPENDIX B — Environmental Variables 61
BIBLIOGRAPHY 63
Books 63
Periodicals 64
Websites 66
Government Documents 67
Abstract
"Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment" by Major Richard D. Creed, Jr., Armor.
This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army. The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S. Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee
), the IDF discovered that there were no peer competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF operational environment became much more complicated, because while it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection.
This paper summarized the trends and characteristics of the U.S. Army's Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and used them as the basis of comparison with the IDF operational environment. IDF operations in Lebanon and the two Palestinian Intifadas represented the trends of the IDF operational environment. All of the COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment in some form. Nine of the fourteen COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment to a significant degree. The comparison between the two operational environments was valid.
Having determined that the two operational environments were similar, the remainder of the paper analyzed how the well the IDF adapted to its operational environment. The goal was to determine whether there were lessons relevant to the U.S. Army as it undergoes Transformation. The IDF was at least partially successful adapting to seven characteristics: asymmetry, constrained resources, force protection, information operations, rapidity, homeland sanctuary, and complex and urban terrain. IDF adaptation to those seven characteristics had implications from which it was possible to make recommendations about the course of Transformation.
This paper recommended that the U.S. Army pay particularly close attention to the way that the IDF adapted its mechanized and armored units to survive in complex and urban terrain. The IDF's operational environment in Lebanon was so hostile that information superiority had negligible impact on force protection. Since everyone was potentially a threat, successful enemy attacks were inevitable over time. Vehicle survivability provided force protection, which in turn gave Israel's political leadership policy options. The IDF experience confirmed that homeland sanctuary is no longer possible, and that the effort must be joint and multi-agency.
The ability to adapt to the rapidity of the operational environment demanded real time intelligence. More importantly, it required both the will and the authority at the proper levels to act on that intelligence while it was still of value. The U.S. Army needs to incorporate asymmetry into its gunnery and tactical training. It also needs to ensure that the opposing forces at the training centers be used to determine likely asymmetric methods of attack against friendly forces and use them so that friendly units can determine countermeasures. None of the findings of this monograph were revolutionary or breathtaking. There were no IDF adaptations that the U.S. Army could not improve upon, as long as it has the will to do so.
CHAPTER ONE — Introduction
Relevance
United States Army Transformation is motivated largely by the recognition that the world has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The current Army force structure, and until the recent publication of FM 3.0, its doctrine, were designed to defeat enemies equipped and trained like the Red Army. The collapse of European communism, the crushing military defeat of Iraq, and lukewarm relations with China led to a shortage of enemies willing or able to fight the United States 'the old fashioned way' in a conventional war. There are still enemies to fight, as the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated. They are, however, not willing to deliberately fight U.S. using methods that the U.S. Army is best suited to defeat.
The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) recognizes that other nations find U.S. superiority in the western method of conventional war too overwhelming to directly challenge in the near future. It is possible to argue that the U.S. Army has become a victim of its own success. Because of its technological and operational superiority in mechanized combat, potential enemies increasingly seek to achieve military or political objectives differently as a simple matter of survival. States have learned by experience (Iraq) or observation that fighting America on its own terms is not the path to success. What formerly was considered irregular