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Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951
Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951
Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951
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Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951

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This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the U.S.’ Eighth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway’s command, from late Dec. of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway’s Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and re-establish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel, Thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of “initiative” at the operational level of war.
...In sum, this monograph uses classical theory, current doctrine, and history in evaluating Ridgway’s operational design, planning and execution during the Eighth Army’s withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations. This case study examines the linkages between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war are employed as a framework for analysis. Several insights emerge from this case study including the significance of: gaining and retaining the initiative in the conduct of both defensive and offensive operations; seeking tactical and operational success, even in the absence of clear strategic aims; building an army’s will to fight and win, and the overriding importance of the moral domain; conducting realistic and deliberate planning, and the difficulty of transitioning from the operational defense to the operational offense; and using strength against weakness. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this study reveals the importance of the operational commander and the genius of Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateAug 15, 2014
ISBN9781782899136
Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951

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    Book preview

    Wrestling The Initiative - Major Joseph R. Cerami

    This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

    To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com

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    Text originally published in 1988 under the same title.

    © Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

    Publisher’s Note

    Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

    We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

    Wrestling The Initiative: Ridgway As Operational Commander In The Korean War, December 1950 To April 1951

    by

    Major Joseph R. Cerami

    Field Artillery

    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    Contents

    TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

    ABSTRACT 5

    I. INTRODUCTION 6

    II. INITIATIVE IN AIRLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE 7

    The Physical domain and the battle; setting or changing the terms of battle by action 7

    The cybernetic domain and the duel: gaining freedom of action 7

    The moral domain and will: leadership, the offensive spirit, and the commander’s intent 7

    Linking initiative in tactics, operations, and strategy 8

    III. INITIATIVE IN CLASSICAL THEORY: Clausewitz 10

    IV. RIDGWAY’S OPERATIONAL ART; CAMPAIGN DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL COMMAND 15

    Phase I -Eighth Army’s Retreat—A Mission Vacuum 15

    Phase II— Eighth Army’s Defensive— Ridgway Takes Charge 16

    Phase III - Eighth Army’s Counteroffensive - Gaining and Retaining the initiative 19

    V. CONCLUSIONS 26

    BIBLIOGRAPHY 28

    REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 30

    ABSTRACT

    This monograph examines the conduct of operations of the United States’ Eighth Army under the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway in the Korean War. During the period of Ridgway’s command, from late December of 1950 through April of 1951, the Eighth Army stopped an offensive campaign being conducted by Chinese Communist Forces. After completing a successful withdrawal and defense, Ridgway’s Army mounted a series of offensive operations to regain lost territory and re-establish a defensive line along the 38th Parallel, Thus, this case study examines the campaign of an operational commander who successfully wrested the initiative back from the enemy and illustrates the significance of the AirLand Battle tenet of initiative at the operational level of war.

    The monograph is divided into four major sections. After an introduction in Section I, Section II discusses the current doctrine concerning the tenet of initiative as described in Field Manual 100-5. Operations. Section III examines the theoretical foundations of the concept of initiative as expressed in the writings of Clausewitz. Section IV describes Ridgway’s conduct of withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations in early 1951. The concluding section evaluates Ridgway’s operational design using the key concepts found in FM 100-5—centers of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating points.

    In sum, this monograph uses classical theory, current doctrine, and history in evaluating Ridgway’s operational design, planning and execution during the Eighth Army’s withdrawal, defensive and offensive operations. This case study examines the linkages between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. The physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war

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