Fighting on the Brink: Defense of the Pusan Perimeter

(From the original front cover flap)

REVIEWS

You have done a magnificent job of research. The book rings with authority and integrity. It is the most definitive account of the first four months of the Korean War that I have seen, towering over the U.S. Army’s official combat history of that time period. Congratulations.

–Clay Blair,

author, The Forgotten War

I read every page and found it fascinating, with compelling accounts of action and heroism, many of which had never before been told. You are to be congratulated, not only for a tremendous piece of historical research but also for the manner in which you combined and sorted, deciding what happened when and what goes where.

– COL Harry J. Maihafer, USA, Ret.,

author, From the Hudson to the Yalu

Fighting on the Brink is a worthy addition to the history of the Korean War. It is the most detailed account of the first four months of the Korean War available.

– LTC Arthur W. Connor, Jr.,

Army Advisory Group

Maxwell AFB, AL

Fighting on the Brink stands alone in its importance to the military history of the Korean War, and places Uzal Ent in the front rank of military historians.

– COL Robert W. Hill, USA, Ret.

Tropic Lightning Flashes,

25th Infantry Division publication review

Fighting on the Brink provides very useful information about the first four months of the Korean War. The level of detail you furnished on both individual soldiers and events is extremely valuable to the International Commemorations Committee, especially as we plan events honoring those who served in defense of the Pusan Perimeter.

– LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA, Ret.

Deputy Under Secretary of the Army

(International Affairs)

FIGHTING ON THE BRINK:

DEFENSE OF THE PUSAN PERIMETER

by Brig. Gen. Uzal W. Ent (Ret.)

TURNER PUBLISHING COMPANY

TURNER PUBLISHING COMPANY

412 Broadway

P.O. Box 3101

Paducah, KY 42002-3101

(502) 443-0121

Copyright © 1996 by Uzal W. Ent

All rights reserved.

Publishing Rights: Turner Publishing

Company

This book or any part thereof may not be reproduced without the written consent of Turner Publishing Company.

Turner Publishing Company Staff: Coordinator: Julie Agnew Thomas Designer: Lora Ann Lauder

Library of Congress

Catalog Card Number: 95-60552

ISBN: 978-1-56311-209-6

Additional copies may be purchased directly from Turner Publishing Company.

This publication was compiled using available information. The publisher regrets it cannot assume liability for errors or omissions.

Table of Contents

Dedication

Introduction

Publisher’s Message

PART ONE — BEFORE THE EVENT

1. Occupation Duty

2. The Development of the North and South Korean Armed Forces

PART TWO — INVASION!

3. Cross Border Attack and Fighting Retreat

4. Task Force Smith

5. Ordeal of the 24th Division — Pyongtaek to Suchon-ni

6. Walker Takes Command

7. Ordeal of the 24th Division — Kum River and Taejon

8. First Battles — 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions

PART THREE — DEFENDING THE PERIMETER

9. On the Southern Front

10. Forming the Perimeter

11. Mobilization and Deployment of Reinforcements

12. Task Force Kean

13. The First Battle of the Naktong Bulge

14. Meeting the Threat in the East

15. On the Taegu Front

16. The Southern Front Again

17. Buildup and Future Plans

18. Pohang to Taegu, Aug. 27-Sept. 15

19. The Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge

20. Breakthrough at Haman

PART FOUR — BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT

21. Breakout

22. Exploitation

APPENDICES

A— Prisoners of War and Missing in Action

B— Strength Accounting and Losses

C— Medical Support

D— Slang Words and Expressions

Sources and Acknowledgements

Basic Military Map Symbols

Abbreviations

Index

Dedication

Brig. Gen. Uzal W. Ent

Penna National Guard (Ret.)

This book is humbly dedicated to the men who served and fought in defense of the Pusan Perimeter (and the battles leading to its formation) during the Korean War.

I have eaten your bread and salt,

I have drunk your water and wine,

The deaths ye died I have watched beside,

And the lives that ye led were mine.

I served in a rifle platoon in the Pusan Perimeter. This excerpt of a poem by Rudyard Kipling aptly expresses my relationship to the other soldiers and Marines who were there.

Uzal W. Ent

January 1994

Introduction

For more than 20 years I have been a student of the Korean War. I realized that, except for the official Army and Marine histories, little which is definitive had been written about one of the most critical campaigns of the entire war — the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. In the 40-odd years since it was fought, only one book has been written about that bloody, epic struggle, Edwin P. Hoyt’s The Pusan Perimeter. This was a popular history, taken from books in print at the time.

A number of books and studies have been published on other aspects of the Korean War, but this campaign, which was vital to the U.S./U.N. success in the war, almost has been overlooked. Had we failed in this campaign, there would have been no Inchon landing... there would have been nothing more. The war would have been lost at the outset!

I have set out to correct that omission. My research has included all the standard books, many newspaper and magazine articles of the time, official records, plus special reports and studies. But of more importance are the recollections and experiences of the men who fought those early battles. This book includes hundreds of these.

This book will include:

What occupation duty in Korea, Japan and Okinawa was really like.

The development of the North and South Korean armed forces.

The Republic of Korea Army’s (ROKA) delaying actions in the first few weeks of the war.

American battles leading to the formation of the Perimeter.

The defense of the Pusan Perimeter, including GEN Walton H. Walker’s plan for the defense and why it couldn’t be implemented.

The breakout from the Perimeter.

Within this narrative are woven the experiences and recollections of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and Marines who fought the battles. I hope I have brought the human element into what otherwise would be a dry recounting of historical facts and figures. What will make this book live are the accounts of those men who took part in the life-and-death struggles of that long-ago war.

In short, this book examines aspects of the early Korean War battles and the Perimeter defense and breakout, neither of which have never before been adequately explored or explained. Hopefully, this examination will put a different perspective on the first three months of the Korean War.

PART ONE

BEFORE THE EVENT

To make an army victorious in battle it is necessary to inspire them with confidence, so as to make them believe the victory will be theirs under any circumstances. But to give such an army confidence they must be well-armed and disciplined, and the men must know each other.

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses

CHAPTER ONE — Occupation Duty

The Occupation of Japan

COL Charles Tench, of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s staff, with a contingent of 30 officers and 120 enlisted men landed on the battle-scarred runway at Atasugi, Japan on Aug. 28, 1945, beginning the U.S. occupation of Japan. When Tench and his party arrived, the Japanese Armed Forces numbered over 6.9 million men. Of this number, 3.5 million were located in the home islands. They were supported by hundreds of ships and over 6,000 combat aircraft. It would seem apparent that an armed invasion of Japan before the war’s end would have led to great slaughter on both sides.

Japan consists of four large islands: Hokkaido in the north; the main island of Honshu in the center; Kyushu and Shikoku in the south. There are over 3,000 smaller islands. Nearly three-quarters of the total area of 142,771 square miles is covered by extremely rugged hills and mountains. Over 250 peaks rise above 6,500 feet; with the highest, Mount Fuji, at 12,385 feet.

The Americans discovered that Japanese leadership almost had been destroyed. Further, heavy U.S. bombing had killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and injured even more. Fire-bombing had leveled vast areas of Tokyo, killing more people as each of the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There was no organized medical care, food distribution or emergency aid for the sick, injured and homeless. Factories and rail systems were in shambles. The economy was crippled. Japan and the Japanese were in horrendous condition, and in no position to help themselves.

Richard G. Jones (HHC, 25th Div.) arrived in Japan shortly after the occupation began. He recalled that it took three days to go by train from Yokohama to Osaka, because of the damaged rail system. Once the lines were repaired, a trip could normally be made in less than a day.

The Japanese were very wary of the Americans, expecting them to loot, steal, rape their women and kill all the men. They were unprepared for the generosity and friendliness of American soldiers, who helped distribute food, blankets, medical supplies and other goods to the civilian population. GIs handed out chocolate bars, chewing gum and other goodies to Japanese children. There were other humane acts. In one case, three U.S. soldiers gave first-aid to a girl who had been badly injured by a Japanese street car and were said to have taken her to a hospital. These kinds of actions won over the Japanese and went far to ensure a peaceful, happy relationship with the Americans.

Donald L. Massey enlisted in the Army in 1946 at the age of 17. He had just four weeks of basic training before being sent to Japan and Battery C, 64th Field Artillery Battalion (FAB) at Nara, in south central Honshu. Massey remembered the first haircut he and his buddies got by a Japanese barber: The straight razor seemed to be as big as a sword and we were concerned he might decide to take one of us out for his Emperor.

When a fire broke out in an old Japanese barracks used by the 64th FAB, the local Japanese fire department attempted to respond. The engine, propelled by steam, could not negotiate the slight hill leading to the burning barracks. The firemen tried, without success, to push the engine up the hill. The old barracks burned to the ground.

Once, Massey’s unit was called out for a reported riot. They arrived in full combat gear only to hear that the riot was only a pushing match between two political opponents. The U.S., under the leadership of GEN Douglas MacArthur and his Occupation Military Government staff provided governmental, economic, public health, welfare, security and scientific direction to and for the Japanese from the outset of the occupation.

GEN MacArthur is often characterized as an aloof, proud, vain man, but with great imagination, initiative (sometimes to a fault) and great ambition, who was convinced that he was always right. His service to the U.S. and its Army is difficult to assess. Most people remember him for his I shall return speech to the Filipinos during World War II. Others recall his island-hopping counter-offensive against the Japanese later in the war. There are those who praise the Inchon landing, or curse his division of forces in Korea between the U.S. Eighth Army and the U.S. X Corps at a critical time in the Korean War.

Perhaps MacArthur’s greatest achievement was his conduct of the occupation of Japan. He combined his innate aloofness, absolutely correct demeanor and behavior with an uncanny sense of what would work and would not work in Japan, a proud warrior-nation which had been crushed in a horrible, bloody war. He skillfully promulgated common-sense rules and regulations for the conduct of his troops, and created a strict, yet kind, humane and orderly life for the people of Japan. He demonstrated a vision, combined with the will and means, to set Japan on a new course, ultimately bringing it into a position of world commercial and industrial leadership. It is often said that both the U. S. and Japan were exceptionally fortunate that a man of MacArthur’s vision, courage and drive was there to lead the occupation.

One of the first tasks for Occupation authorities was the location and rehabilitation of Allied prisoners of war (POW). By the end of September 1945, 32,624 POWs had been freed in Japan.

Occupation authorities oversaw the demobilization of Japan’s armed forces. By July 31, 1948, they had returned almost 6.4 million Japanese servicemen to civilian life, including those who had been in Korea, Manchuria, China and the various islands of the Pacific.

These authorities also oversaw the collection and disposal of Japanese war materiel. Most aircraft, tanks, mortars, artillery pieces, ships and other weapons were destroyed. Some small arms, binoculars, sabers and bayonets were retained for issue as souvenirs to U.S. soldiers of the occupation.

Since the Japanese were impoverished, all Japanese stores of food, extensive stocks of uniforms, rubber boots, garrison coats, medicines, blankets and other items were returned to the Japanese government. (This included 21 million pairs of socks, 7 million woolen blankets and more than 5 million pairs of leather shoes.)

Coincident with the repatriation of Allied POWs, demobilization and disarmament of the Japanese armed forces and the destruction of their war materiel, Occupation authorities also oversaw the repatriation of Japanese civilians from Korea and other areas of the world, as well as the return of Korean civilians from Japan.

In September 1945 there were approximately 1,356,400 Koreans in Japan. By May 1947, 935,370 had been returned to Korea. Between Oct. 1, 1945, and Dec. 31, 1946, 5,103,300 Japanese were repatriated. Occupation authorities supervised their return, and made arrangements to assimilate them into the population with a minimum of confusion and loss of time.

A small number of American officers and enlisted men, plus some civil service personnel, were assigned to military government duties. This Military Government organization, known later as Civil Affairs, was designed to first fill the Japanese civil government void, then to assist Japanese civil authorities as the latter took over more and more authority and responsibility. U.S. military occupation troops were deeply involved in supporting and assisting civil affairs officials.

Emerging from their fear of U.S. soldiers, the Japanese planned restaurants, theaters, dance halls, recreation centers and other entertainment facilities for American soldiers. Occupation authorities, in cooperation with the American Red Cross and Army Special Services, set up clubs, snack bars, took over hotels, theaters, golf clubs, parks and other facilities to provide a variety of supervised recreational outlets for occupation personnel.

Many historians and others, writing about the early days of the Korean War, maligned and slandered the soldiers of the U.S. Eighth Army in Japan as soft and ill-trained, or dismissed them all as beer-guzzling skirt-chasers.

Perhaps there were too many means of recreation and diversion available to the young occupation soldier. But, whatever they were in 1949 and 1950, these soldiers were the product of their leadership and training. This is particularly true of the leadership which set the policy and missions of the Army in Japan. Soldiers are not responsible for their state of training; that is the duty of their leaders, starting at the policy/mission level. The American soldiers in Japan were no better or worse than other young U.S. servicemen all over the world. But their state of individual and unit training was not at a satisfactory level for combat.

The mission of both the U.S. Sixth and Eighth Armies in Japan was occupation duty, to support military government and its policies and procedures. As the number of troops was reduced in Japan, the Sixth Army was deactivated. All combat troops there were placed under the command of Eighth Army. Prior to 1949 more than 90 percent of the average soldier’s duty time was devoted to fulfilling the occupation mission. Only some range firing and other low-level training, such as military courtesy and discipline, were conducted through these years, sandwiched between occupation responsibilities. Many units attempted to go beyond these basic military subjects, but they were often frustrated by factors over which they had no control.

Records provide some insight into the variety of tasks the men were called upon to perform – all of which served to degrade their combat effectiveness. The experiences of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, are fairly typical:

The 7th Cavalry’s first mission in Tokyo in 1945 was to take control of central city then locate, investigate and report all Japanese installations that had contributed to the nation’s war effort, including all arsenals, factories, barracks and storage areas. In addition, the Division was helping to demobilize the Japanese armed forces and inventorying all lumber mills in its zone to determine production capacity and lumber stocks on hand.

The location and destruction of weapons, aircraft, ammunition and other war supplies and equipment was continued into 1946. The 7th Cavalry also manned guard posts at the Imperial Palace grounds. The strength of the regiment continued to decline. Many of the few replacements received had not undergone a complete basic training course, but were integrated into the regiment’s training program. Meantime, the Cavalry Division’s area of control in central Honshu was expanded from four to eleven prefectures when the 97th Infantry Division was inactivated. Occupation continued to be the primary mission in 1947.

By the beginning of 1948, records show, organizational strength of commands in Japan fell dangerously low, hampering them in carrying out occupational patrols and sentry duties. The Cavalry performed occupation tasks as diverse as seizing and transporting under guard over 1,000 carats of diamonds, and the surveillance of Japanese labor demonstrations. Training was squeezed between non-military occupation duties again this year.

In February 1948, 1st Cavalry Division sent a recruiting team back to the U.S. Between March 15 and May 7, 1948, the team enlisted 3,384 men specifically for the 1st Cavalry Division.

The experience of 1st Cavalry Division in loss of personnel was not unique. Two factors seriously hampered both occupation and training efforts throughout Japan, Korea and Okinawa:

1. Far East strength was allowed to fall. Starting in 1945 with some 400,000 men, by June 1950, it stood at 108,500 men. The four combat divisions remaining in Eighth Army at that time numbered a mere 47,050 men. Those divisions were short 28,150 men of full strength, less than 2/3 the strength they should have to go to war.

2. The annual personnel turnover rate between 1945 and 1949 was 43 percent. In 1950, prior to the Korean War, the Far east Command continued to experience the same turnover rate!

The experience of Richard G. Jones points up the results of this rapid turnover of personnel and decline in strength. When he arrived in Japan in 1946, he was assigned as Chief Clerk in the G1 Section (Personnel and Administration) of the 25th Infantry Division in Osaka. I was just 19 years old, he wrote, and had only a few months in the Army and took over the job from a Technical Sergeant who was going home. He was given the job because he had worked after school for three months in a bank and, therefore, was considered to have some office experience. Several other raw recruits, just out of basic training, were assigned to me at the same time, he said.

Finally in 1949, GEN MacArthur recognized that the Japanese were now able to assume more and more of the civilian administration of their country, and that he needn’t rely so heavily on combat units to support occupation tasks. In April he changed the troop mission from that of sternly rigid occupation to one of friendly protective guidance. The Eighth Army’s combat divisions were progressively relieved of occupation duties and directed to undergo training which would lead to an effective, integrated air-ground-sea fighting team.

The date of July 31, 1950 was set for Army divisions in his command to complete Regimental Combat Team (RCT) field exercises and develop effective air-ground combat procedures. A battalion of each division was to complete amphibious landing exercises by Oct. 31.

These proficiency levels were to be attained:

1. Dec. 15, 1949 — Company (battery) level.

2. May 15, 1950 — Battalion (squadron) level.

3. July 31, 1950 — Regimental level.

4. Dec. 31, 1950 — Division level.

5. Combined and joint operations training (including amphibious exercises) were to take place concurrent with RCT and division level training.

This was an excellent program of progressive training, allowing plenty of time to attain each phase — on paper. But too many factors continued to severely hamper the realistic attainment of the projected levels of training:

1. Personnel turnover remained too high.

2. All commands were considerably understrength.

3. Many officers and enlisted men were absent on special duty (SD), detached service (DS) or temporary duty (TDY). Many occupation duties remained, requiring personnel from line units be detailed to these tasks. Also, each division ran special schools and refresh-courses for their officers and enlisted men, requiring men from line units to run these schools. Then there were unit athletes, who often were excused from military training.

4. Divisions and subordinate commands did not have all their units authorized under tables of organization and equipment. (Eleven of the 12 infantry regiments in Eighth Army had only two of their three battalions. None of the regiments had its tank company. Division tank battalions had only one of three authorized tank companies. These tank companies were equipped with light tanks, not the authorized heavy M-26 type. These light tanks were no match for the Russian T-34s they soon would face in Korea. Artillery battalions had only two of three authorized firing batteries. In short, each division could deploy only two-thirds of its wartime infantry and artillery firepower and only 14 percent of its tank firepower.

5. There were severe shortages of certain crew-served weapons and equipment. For example, Eighth Army had only 21 of its authorized 226 recoilless rifles. Radios, mortars and spare machinegun barrels all were in short supply.

6. Troops in training had a great amount of unserviceable weapons and equipment: 10,000 of 18,000 jeeps were unserviceable. Only 4,441 of the 13,780 two and one-half ton trucks on hand could run. Ninety percent of weapons and 75 percent of automotive equipment in the four divisions had been rebuilt from WWII Pacific battle leftovers, and too much of it was still unserviceable. Further, according to BG Eugene M. Lynch, USA, Ret., who served in Japan before the war, priority of rebuilt equipment at that time went to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan and the French in Indochina (Vietnam). Lynch became GEN Walton Walker’s pilot during the Korean War.

7. Many of the training areas were too small for proper training. Most could accommodate platoon and company operations, a few up to battalion-size. No areas existed for organizational training above the regimental level.

On Aug. 8, 1949 a training area was acquired on the slopes of Mt. Fuji. This could barely accommodate regimental-sized exercises, but with no live firing. The relatively small number of training areas required some units to undergo some training out of sequence. For example, the 7th Cavalry Regiment had to complete battalion tests before completing individual basic training, in order to use the division’s only large-enough training area at Mt. Fuji.

Because of constraints on the Army’s training program at the time, soldiers often arrived at their assigned unit without completing basic training. As a result, unit officers and NCOs had to devote time and attention to teaching these young soldiers the skills which they already should have learned.

Another problem was with the intelligence and character ratings of many replacements arriving in the Far East Command in 1949. In April 1949, 43 percent of the enlisted personnel in that command were rated in Class IV and V on the Army Classification Test, the lowest levels of aptitude. Commands in Japan often had to resort to evaluating and discharging men as unfit, necessitating the appointment of so-called 368 Boards to evaluate individuals for dismissal from the Army for undesirable traits of character. This produced a further drain on the time of officers who should have been with their units in training. One two-battalion regiment was discharging two to three men per week via these boards.

Most enlisted men were several years younger than their WWII counterparts. It came as no surprise to discover that a young man had enlisted at the age of 17, or even as young as 15. This could have been a factor contributing to their getting into trouble and ending with a Bad Conduct Discharge for undesirable traits of character.

A third was the Army’s Career Guidance Program for officers and non-commissioned officers. Many officers who possessed the leadership and training abilities necessary for the proper development of combat units had been given directed military occupation specialties (MOS) that prohibited them from commanding troops where they were needed. Likewise, experienced enlisted men could not be reassigned from one career field to another. In spite of this, most units had good, experienced leaders. Many commands lost these leaders in their first or second battles in Korea, then suffered terrible casualties when inexperienced men tried to fill in.

A fourth was the mandatory requirement for Troop Information and Education. These sessions, usually conducted by a platoon leader or NCO, lasted about an hour, but required prior preparation by the session leader. The sessions dealt with current events or some other topic deemed of importance or interest by higher authorities, but often did little except infringe on already limited training time.

The divisions of Eighth Army were deployed in regimental- or battalion-sized garrisons throughout the country, generally near metropolitan areas. With the Japanese economy in shambles, and the 1950 exchange rate of 360 Japanese Yen to one U.S. dollar, even a private’s pay of $50 a month was princely.

Recreational activities, some of which could be classified as vices, occupied the soldiers’ during off duty time. These included cabarets, sightseeing, movies on base, USO Clubs, sports, shacking up, bar-hopping, or just getting together with comrades. Many temptations faced the young occupation soldier. Prostitution was then legal in Japan. Every city had a number of cabarets catering to the men with many prostitutes frequented these establishments. A few men worked the black market by selling their cigarettes to the Japanese. Some men became involved with drugs.

Some commands sometimes made an effort to provide the men with supervised recreation in the form of platoon parties. For example, a platoon party in the 27th Infantry, Camp Sakai, worked like this:

The platoon would request the platoon leader to sponsor a party, to be held in one of the cabarets in Osaka from 9 p.m. to midnight, usually on a Friday or Saturday. These parties rarely occurred more than two or three times a year in any one platoon. The platoon leader was required to write a letter to the Division Provost Marshal (PM) in Osaka, identifying the platoon, the officer sponsoring the party and where and when the event would take place. The PM is the equivalent of a community chief of police. The letter had to be approved at the company, battalion and regimental levels, but the PM could disapprove the request if the platoon had been unruly or had any incidents during its last party. If approval was granted, the platoon leader donated $10 and each of the 36 men or so $5 to buy snacks and soft drinks from the PX and rent the cabaret. This rental granted exclusive use of the dance hall by the platoon, a band and beer in liter bottles; whiskey was prohibited. About half the men had their own girlfriends, so typically, a 36-man platoon needed to hire only about 18 girls as dance partners. The total cost for these additional girls was only a few dollars.

The company First Sergeant was always invited to these affairs, with the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and other senior NCOs acting as chaperones. The men and girls had to stay in the dance hall or adjoining restrooms. No hanky-panky was permitted.

The platoon was transported to and from the party in 2 1/2-ton trucks. The girls dressed up in gowns and had a great time. Most of them did not drink beer; that’s why soft drinks were brought along.

In spite of the distractions, often unserviceable or improper weapons and equipment, inadequate training areas, personnel shortages and turnover, the men took tactical training very seriously and tried to do the job right. Because most of them never took part in live-firing unit exercises, they never experienced the sounds of battles. The training was unrealistic.

The recollections and experiences of some of the officers and enlisted men who were members of the Eighth Army in Japan before the Korean War will give some idea of what duty there was really like.

In Dec. 1949, CPT Logan Weston was assigned to Co. D, 17th Infantry Regiment in Sendai, part of the 7th Infantry Division, garrisoning the island of Hokkaido.

Weston had just 63 men in the unit. Full TO&E called for 160. Co. D was the battalion’s heavy weapons company and included a machine gun platoon with both heavy and light .30-cal machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle platoon and an 81mm mortar platoon.

From December 1949 to June 1950, I was never able to muster more than 48 men, he wrote. We had to juggle men from machineguns to recoilless rifles to mortars for our annual tests. Needless to say, we did poorly. The balance of my assigned strength was away on (other) duty type activities. They were on detached service, by orders of higher authority, performing duties which had nothing to do with the weapons company. This was typical in 1948 through 1950. The practice was crippling to unit integrity, cohesion and training.

CPT Joseph W. Bill Terman arrived in Japan in early July 1949. Like Weston, who was a member of Merrill’s Marauders in WW II, Terman was also a combat veteran, having served in the 150th FAB, 38th Infantry Division in the Pacific. Although a Reserve officer, not Regular Army, Terman was a professional and had high standards.

He was assigned to the 31st FAB, 7th Division, which was at Chitose, Hokkaido. The division’s heavy tank battalion, the 77th, equipped with light tanks, was also at Chitose. In a few months he was given command of Battery B.

In a letter to his parents, he once wrote: We have a very real problem in welding together a good, efficient military team over here. It certainly is a sharp contrast to the problem we had in 1941 and ’42 and with more difficulties.... The quality of the men we have, with some outstanding exceptions, is so terribly inferior to the men we had then, the procuring of supplies and equipment erratic and inadequate, and, perhaps most discouraging, the virus of insidious bureaucracy permeating the voluminous paper administration is time-consuming in the extreme....

CPT Terman is not making a personal attack on his men, but he knew that most of the men in his battery had not completed grade school and only seven had completed high school. He believed that was the most in any battery of the battalion.

Shortly after she arrived in Japan to join her husband, Terman’s wife, Leota, began teaching remedial reading and arithmetic to uneducated soldiers on the post. In a letter home, she wrote, The grade level ranges from one to fourth grade. We are attempting to get all men to fifth grade level.

As with all other commands in Japan at the time, there was a large turnover of officers at Chitose. In mid-May 1950, there were only four officers at the post who had been there longer than Terman, who had been there nine months. This rapid and frequent turnover of leadership undermined the pursuit of effective training programs throughout the commands of Eighth Army.

The experience of LT Posey L. Starkey is remarkably similar to that of CPT Terman. Starkey was assigned to Co. D, 27th Infantry Regiment at Camp Sakai, Honshu, in July 1949. The 27th was part of the 25th Infantry Division. His platoon was composed of mostly 18- to 20-year-olds. I recall there were several who were not literate, he wrote, and their squad leaders would read and write their mail for them.

Starkey: "Our training at Sakai seemed to be largely garrison drills in subjects that were little advanced from advanced individual training.... We spent countless hours in gun drill... and similar elementary subjects. It was not until we went to the Fuji training area that I recall much tactical training. We did some firing but it seemed to be mostly 1,000-inch range work along with individual weapon qualification.

We had our first real tactical training and field firing at Fuji.... We didn’t talk about ‘grazing fire,’ we actually did it. We walked final protective lines and drew range based on real terrain. And we were away from the distractions of Sakai and garrison life.

1SG George S. Hearn was also a combat veteran of WWII, having served in China. He was assigned to the 27th at different times between 1947 and 1950.

In February 1947, he was transferred from Beijing to Co. B, 27th Infantry. Most of the members of the company were 18-month enlisted men. There were only two senior sergeants in the company and some platoons were led by privates first class (PFCs). Early in 1948, he recalled, the regiment was down in strength and Service Company and Regimental Headquarters were the only active companies.... The 1st Battalion was inactive with [a] lieutenant, a supply sergeant and [Hearn] as 1st Sergeant.

Hearn came to the U.S. in mid-July 1948, but returned to Japan in December. He was assigned as 1st Sergeant of Company B. He discovered that the 1st and 2d Battalions had filled with new re-enlistees and... NCOs.... Most of our training was parade-ground type, with maybe two weeks field training during the summer," he said.

Harold E. Dill entered the Army in the Spring of 1945. On Jan. 25, 1949, he won a direct commission and an opportunity to become a Regular Army officer. In early Summer 1949, he was assigned to Co. B, 21st Infantry, Camp Wood, near Kumamoto, Kyushu, part of the 24th Infantry Division, garrisoning Kyushu. His battalion training included air transportability and passing its field test.

Entrance to Camp Sakai, Japan. Home of the 27th Infantry Regt. (Courtesy of Richard S. Majcher, C/27 Infantry)

A view looking northeast from a hill near Camp Gifu, Honshu, Japan, 1948. (Courtesy of William Gott, former CPT 24th Infantry)

Pup tents at Camp McNair, 1949. (Source: Skirmish, Red, White and Blue, Ed Daily. Turner, 1992)

Wakiyama Rifle Range, June 1950. L-R: PVT Hulbert (blown up in Korea by a direct hit by an artillery round); PVT Tolbert; PFC Bell; Daniel Cooper. Cooper had just tied a 2/27th Inf record with the rifle. (Courtesy of Daniel Cooper, G/27 Infantry)

Guard Mount Inspection Co. A, 29th Infantry Regiment, Camp Napunja, Okinawa, 1949. (Courtesy of Jesus Rodriguez, A/29 Infantry)

Mt. Fuji Training Area near Gotemba, for elements of the 25th Infantry Division, 1949. (Courtesy of Harold Lederer (Deceased), A and C/27 Infantry)

Men of Btry B, 31st FAB, 7th Division prepare for inspection, Spring, 1950. (Photo by CPT Joseph W. Terman [KIA aug. 22, 1950]) (Courtesy of Dr. james W. Terman, M.D., son of CPT Joseph W. Terman)

Japanese K.P.s, Camp Sakai, May 1950. (Courtesy of Daniel Cooper, G/27 Infantry)

Osaka PX building about 1948, during the time the 25th Division Headquarters was in Osaka. (Courtesy of Milton Melhourn, Jr., 28 MP Co.)

Bolo Point, Okinawa, 1949. Left to Right: Man on left unidentified; Jesus Rodriguez; Alfredo [no last name given]; Manuel Gonzolas [KIA. Korea]. All were members of Co. A, 29th Infantry Regt. (Courtesy of Jesus Rodriguez, A/29 Infantry)

James W. Dodgen, who enlisted in 1948 at the age of 16, was a member of Co. B, 7th Cavalry Regiment, part of the 1st Cavalry Division in northern Honshu. His battalion also underwent air transportability training, plus some amphibious warfare training just before the outbreak of the Korean War.

Company cooks usually worked one or two days, then were off one or two days. But these work days were very long — 12 hours or more. Gerald Gingery was the honor graduate of his cooks’ and bakers’ class at Ft. Knox, KY, in 1949. Sent to Japan in June, he became a cook in Co. H, 5th Cavalry Regiment, Camp McGill, Takayama, Honshu, part of the 1st Cavalry Division. As a cook, he recalled, he had considerable free time. At first, he said he was apprehensive about the Japanese people, but soon befriended a number of them. Gerald spent much of his free time visiting shrines, temples and other sights. All in all, he considered that this was probably the very best of times in my Army life.

Twice between June 1949 and June 1950, his outfit went on maneuvers at Camp McNair, the 1st Cavalry’s training area at Mt. Fuji.

About the only positive factor in getting the men out for training was that all Army garrisons in Japan employed Japanese nationals. Barbers, tailors, carpenters, kitchen police (KP) in unit mess halls, etc., were all handled by Japanese civilians. The men of each unit contributed money to pay KPs. In Gingery’s unit, it was $10 per month per man. Without these paid KPs, four to six soldiers would have to be detailed daily to this task from every company or battery.

This, then, is a snapshot of occupation duty in Japan. Hampered in proper training by a multitude of factors, over which regimental, battalion and unit officers and NCOs had no control, most of them tried to do the best job possible.

The Occupation of Okinawa

The island of Okinawa is the largest island of Japan’s Ryukyu Island chain, which extends from Japan to Taiwan. Okinawa is 67 miles long and ranges from 2 to 16 miles wide.

At the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. Army garrison included one combat organization, the three-battalion 29th Infantry Regiment. Like all Far East commands, the 29th was under-strength.

Regimental HQ, 1st and 3d Battalions was located at Camp Napunja, near Ishikawa, in the narrow 2-mile wide part of the island. The 2d Battalion was stationed at Awashi, a town some 8 or 10 miles south of Ishikawa. The men lived in quonset huts, constructed of curved sheets of corrugated metal, forming a building which resembled a half-circle when viewed from the ends. Each end of the building was pierced by doors and windows, and some huts also had a few windows along the curved walls.

Parts of Okinawa had been destroyed in the heavy fighting for the island in 1945. The people of the island were in about the same state as those in Japan. By 1949, however, they, too, had partially recovered.

The 29th, by this time, was dividing its time between low-level training and occupation duties. Okinawa was considered a hardship tour, somewhat over a year, but with no dependents. The same problems as in Japan inhibited the accomplishment of both training and occupation missions.

Frank F. Byrne (MSG, USA, Ret.), assigned to Co. K, had only five men in a squad that should have numbered nine. Three of the five were jocks — athletes. As a result, he wrote, when we mustered for the day’s training, I had two riflemen. He found out later the rest of the command [regiment] was the same as my squad — under-manned, under-trained, under-equipped.

Harold Gamble, a Navy corpsman (medic) with the Marines in WWII during the invasion of Okinawa, was assigned to the 29th Regiment’s Medical Company in April 1950. Little had changed, he recalled, Some rebuilding; the people were quite poor. The cities of Naha [capital of the island] and Shuri [a nearby town] were rebuilding.... Okinawa was a hardship tour....

Dennis R. Nicewanger arrived on Okinawa as a new 2LT in January 1950. Duty was boring to him. Leisure consisted of swimming or touring the island in a jeep, visiting WWII battle grounds. The daily routine... rotated around two events... either on guard duty... or conducting individual and small unit training, he declared. The 29th was the only Infantry command on the island, and was therefore called upon for security missions — to the detriment of training. [We] found ourselves walking and conducting guard duty[at ammo dumps, supply depots, vehicle parks and other logistical centers] about every four or five days, he continued. Each battalion was required to provide a company sized unit, 150 or so men, for guard duty, about every 4 or 5 days.

Training consisted of individual, squad and section exercises, and the preparation of bunkers and foxholes. Nicewanger’s unit was able to conduct just one exercise between January and July 1950 in which they fired their weapons.

The experiences of these men show there was little difference between duty in Japan and duty in Okinawa; in both, training did not achieve the top priority that it should have had.

The Occupation of Korea

Korea is a mountainous peninsula of some 85,000 square miles, which juts from the Asiatic land mass like an ill-shapen thumb. It is bounded on the north by the Yalu and Tum-en Rivers, on the east by the Sea of Japan, the Korea Strait in the south and by the Yellow Sea on the west. Some 500 miles of China and 11 miles of Russia border Korea in the north, along the rivers.

Korea is about the size of Utah but is shaped somewhat like Florida. The east coast is characterized by high mountains, which end abruptly in deep water. There are few harbors and little tide. On the west coast, however, the irregular shore line provides many harbors, and a tide of some 32 feet at Inchon.

The high Taebaek Range runs down the east coast like a massive spine. The range gradually falls in elevation as it trends southward. Almost all of Korea south of the narrow waist from Pyongyang to Wonsan slopes westward from Taebaek. As a result, the drainage and direction of flow of all sizable rivers is generally southwest.

At the time of the U.S. occupation and the Korean War, every mountain valley, no matter how small, was terraced, irrigated and cultivated. Even so, only 20 percent of Korea was arable land, mostly in the south and west. Rice, barley and soybeans, in that order, were the principal crops. Most rice was grown in the south, where the climate permitted two crops annually.

The country’s population in 1950 was about 30 million. Of these, 21 million lived south of the 38th parallel and 9 million resided north of it. North Korea comprised 58 percent of the land area in 1950.

Summers in Korea are hot and humid, with a monsoon season generally from June to September. Winters are very cold, due to the winds coming from the interior of northern Asia. At the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea in December 1950, the Marines and soldiers experienced -40 degree temperatures.

Korea, also known as the Hermit Kingdom, or Chosen, The Land of the Morning Calm, had been successively ruled by China and Japan. From 1904 until 1945, Japan occupied Korea in a ruthless stranglehold, annexing the country as a colony in 1910. Only Japanese was taught in schools, although only 20 percent of the Korean people at the time could read or write. Japanese colonization of Korea was encouraged. They exploited the people and the land, and integrated Korea’s industry with that of Japan.

The Japanese did attempt to modernize Korea, building roads, bridges, railroads, dams and factories. In spite of their efforts, most roads were dirt. A one-and-a-half-lane dirt road was considered a highway. The 750,000 Japanese residing in Korea were complete masters of the country, its people, its economy and its government. Koreans were dominated and exploited in their own country by the hated Japanese.

Most South Koreans at the time were farmers. Everyone in the family who could, worked in the paddies or fields. Rice was planted by hand, one plant at a time, pushed into the mud at the bottom of the paddy. It also was harvested by hand with a small sickle.

In rural areas people often relieved themselves by the side of the road, or in the fields where they worked. Waste boxes were provided in the cities of both Japan and Korea. These were public toilets consisting of an open ditch about 18 inches wide and 3 to 4 feet long. When the ditch got full, a honey dipper would empty the accumulated material into a bucket. These buckets were picked up by wagons resembling a huge barrel on four wheels, called honey carts or honey wagons. They carried their cargo to the country to be used as fertilizer in the paddies and fields. Farmers stored this product in shallow honey wells for future use. The smell of human feces was pervasive in the summer throughout much of Japan and Korea.

Farm houses and village dwellings were one story buildings constructed of mud and small sticks. Wooden rafters supported thatched roofs. Usually, the kitchen was at one end of the house and a few feet lower than the other one or two rooms. The kitchen fire kept the remainder of the house warm in winter (and summer) because the chimney ran under the floor of the room(s), then up the outside wall at the opposite end of the house. Some houses had an overhang to form a porch. A low wall often connected the house to outbuildings for oxen and the family toilet. There was no running water or electricity. One or two oil lamps, which gave off ribbons of black smoke, usually provided what light was necessary.

Most of this agrarian population had never been more than a few miles from their ancestral home areas. As a result, they had absolutely no concept of anything beyond their narrow, parochial lives. Forty years of repression and cruelty by the Japanese had further sapped any glimmer of independence or initiative from most Koreans.

As a result, the arrival of the Americans, with their fast-paced ways, vast wealth, food, jeeps, tanks and other trappings was overwhelming to the Koreans. On the other hand, the primitive and backward condition of the country, coupled with alien religions, philosophies and language was somewhat of a shock to the Americans. Further, the country smelled bad!

While the Soviet Union considered Korea to be of strategic value after WWII, the U.S. did not. The country had a relatively small population and no important industries or natural resources. Russia sought to control all of Korea and opposed the influence of any other country in that nation. The Soviets entered the war against Japan on Aug. 9, 1945, defeating Japanese troops in Manchuria. The proximity of Russian troops to Korea there and in Siberia forced U.S. planners to hastily accept the surrender of Japanese troops in Korea.

The U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) met in Washington, D.C. on Aug. 10, 1945, in order to issue appropriate orders to GEN MacArthur. Finally, the Chief of the War Department’s Operations Division Policy Section, COL Charles H. Bonesteel, was given 30 minutes to make a recommendation on how this could be done. Looking at a map, he noted that the 38th parallel cut Korea approximately in half, so he, therefore, proposed that the U.S. accept surrender of Japanese forces south of that line and the Soviets handle surrenders north of it. His recommendation was adopted and carried out. No one at the time envisioned that the 38th parallel would serve any other purpose — least of all to delineate the border between two nations — North Korea and South Korea. But that is exactly what it did. Families were split and provinces divided arbitrarily by this line. No thought was given, nor expected to be given, to defensible terrain on either side of this line. The 38th parallel, like other longitudinal and latitudinal lines, exists on maps solely for geographic and navigational purposes.

When GEN MacArthur, commanding all U.S. forces in the Far East, received this order, he designated LTG John R. Hodge’s XXIV Corps (6th, 7th and 40th Infantry Divisions) to occupy the area of Korea south of the 38th and accept the surrender of all Japanese troops in that area. Subsequently, the Corps became a military occupation force in South Korea. The force, under LTG Hodge, was designated U.S. Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK). A small Corps advance party landed at Kimpo Airfield near Seoul at about noon on Sept. 4, 1945. Most of the Corps landed at Inchon four days later.

The 40th Division was deactivated in early 1946, leaving the 6th and 7th to carry on. Duties of these two divisions included handling the military government of South Korea, the establishment of a civil government composed of Koreans, the establishment and training of a civilian police force (constabulary), as well as a national defense organization. In addition, the two divisions were tasked with security along the border with North Korea and the internal security of the South. Training to maintain and sharpen military skills was subordinated to these occupation missions.

Both the 6th and 7th Divisions were deployed over wide areas of South Korea. The 7th Division’s 32d Infantry Regiment was sent to guard the 38th parallel. At first, the relationship with Soviet troops across the border was very cordial, but soon the border became an iron curtain, manned on both sides by armed troops.

The 38th parallel was outposted by a series of reinforced rifle squads of about 14 men each. The men lived in quonset huts. Gasoline-driven pumps provided running water, and stand-up generators were ready to provide electricity when power from the North was shut off. Rations, mail, PX and other supplies were delivered periodically by truck. Each of these tiny units manned outposts, listening posts and patrolled a segment of the border. Patrols also came from the parent company. Many of these companies were located by themselves, isolated in tiny unit enclaves. They guarded against wholesale movement of goods to the North, provided guides for escapees from there and detected Northern guerrillas and raiders. Outpost duty was rotated frequently among commands of the occupying force. The men on outpost duty had to be alert and soldier. Theirs was a very important mission. Behind them were companies, battalions and regiments, ready to reinforce, when necessary.

U.S. authorities did what they could to bring a little stateside atmosphere to the men. A number of service clubs, operated by the Red Cross and Army Special Services, helped somewhat. Seoul boasted the Hourglass Club, Marble Hall, Lanyard Lodge, Quadrangle Club and Leisure Lodge. Camp Uijongbu, north of Seoul, had Hillside Hut and Munsan Club Munsan. Further south at Taejon were the Chunchon Club and Club Attu.

With the establishment of a South Korean Constabulary came missions for the 6th and 7th Divisions to organize, and staff training schools for Constabulary recruits. By 1948, for example, the 6th ran a weapons school at Taegu and a cannon school at Chinhae. The 7th had another cannon school for the Constabulary at Seoul.

Coincident with these activities by the occupying force, the U.S. was establishing what became known as the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG — pronounced Kay-mag). Initially, these men served as advisers to the Constabulary, and later, the South Korean Army. By the time of the Korean War, KMAG was authorized 181 officers, seven warrant officers, a nurse and 283 enlisted men.

The experiences and recollections of some former members of the Korean occupation forces provide some concept of what duty there entailed in 1948 and 1949.

Richard H. Stinson served in the Korean occupation in 1948 and 1949 as a member of Battery C, 48th FAB. The government of South Korea, under President Syngman Rhee, was just forming. Pro-Communist elements in the country were attacking military installations and trains carrying supplies, so Americans had to provide armed guards on these supply trains.

The guard details were composed of men from the 31st Infantry, 48th and 57th FAB and the 13th Combat Engineer Battalion. Usually, a detail of about five men was sent from each organization to the Seoul railyards. Each man was armed with an M2 automatic carbine for artillerymen and engineers or an M1 rifle for infantrymen, and carried a full field pack. The combined force was divided and placed on boxcars. Each car-group was given C-rations a 5-gallon can of water — and ample ammunition.

The train traveled by way of Suwon, south through Osan to Taejon, then southeast to Taegu and south from there to Pusan. The route was reversed on the way back to Seoul. The round trip took from 10 to 14 days.

The Army guards stayed in their assigned cars during the trip. If a train was attacked, as they often were, the defenders attempted to get the attackers in a cross-fire — which they often did. On one trip Stinson was stabbed in the back. He was treated at the Wonju hospital and put back on the train. Although he went back to Korea in 1950 as a member of the 555th FAB and again in 1951 with the 196th FAB, this is the only wound Stinson suffered.

On another trip, Korean bandits (or guerrillas) hit the train at a curve near a mountain. They came down from the mountain, shooting and carrying torches, Stinson wrote. But like rehearsal, we caught them in a crossfire and shot the ____ out of them. Word got out that we meant business....

Occupation forces also set up unannounced roadblocks along the main roads, with the objective of retrieving stolen U.S. property and equipment.

In the 48th FAB, a gun crew, without its howitzer, and an auto mechanic usually were employed on a roadblock. When a Korean vehicle was pulled to the side of the road and inspected, every piece of U.S. or GI equipment found on the vehicle was removed on the spot. They had everything, Stinson recalled, from tires, radiators, generators, starters, batteries, [engine] blocks, transmissions, etc.

Occasionally, an entire 2 1/2-ton truck or jeep (1/4-ton) was stopped and taken from the Korean driver. On one occasion, an electric generator large enough to supply a house with lights was retrieved. When a truck was seized or a vehicle made inoperable because of the removal of American parts, the occupants had no recourse but to continue their journey on foot. If a Korean employee of an American installation was found to have stolen goods, his identification card was taken and he was fired on the spot, and his card was sent to where he had worked. When South Korean security forces were trained, they took over road-block and train-guard duty.

In 1948, occupation duty in Korea was a no-nonsense job, even on a pass into town. In the 48th Field, the orders were to go in numbers of 5 or more. The shuttle bus to town had an armed guard riding shotgun.

Robert B. Hardin enlisted in the Army in February 1948 and arrived in Korea in May. He was assigned to the U.N. unit which guarded the Duk Soo Palace in Seoul, the home of Korea’s ancient rulers. Later, he was assigned to Company I, 32d Infantry Regiment. Duties included guard duty all over Seoul, he observed, mixed with some training.

Gene McClure also arrived in Korea in May 1948. He had enlisted in the Army on Dec. 18, 1947, when only 15 years old. Between May 1948 and May 1949, he served successively in the 506th Post Engineers (6th Division) in Taegu, the 31st Infantry (7th Division) at Seoul, the 7th Division stockade at Seoul (as a guard) and when it was activated, the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). McClure subsequently served in Korea with Co. H, 5th RCT.

The pro-Communist movement’s agents in South Korea often attempted to foment disorder. On one occasion in 1948, they incited a mutiny in a South Korean Constabulary unit. The mutineers attacked McClure’s camp. One U.S. soldier was killed, but the firing alerted the garrison, and infantrymen manned the camp’s perimeter until South Korean police arrived and quelled the mutiny.

Another time, McClure and a buddy were walking back to camp from town. As they approached the camp, a soldier ran from a side street, followed by a large crowd of angry Koreans and a Korean policeman with a carbine. The policeman called to the fleeing soldier, but he kept running and tried to climb over the camp fence. The policeman fired one shot, hitting the soldier in the head, killing him instantly. McClure and his friend jumped into a drainage ditch along the road as the policeman stood waving his carbine about and pointing it in their general direction. He soon left.

An American Army sergeant, who had been posting guards at the camp’s front gate ran up. When told what happened, he followed the Korean into the police station and seized him. The sergeant then marched him into the Army camp at gunpoint. Investigation revealed that the dead soldier had been accused of cheating a Korean merchant out of some money and was running away.

Seventeen-year-old Sal Napolitano arrived in Korea in January 1948 and was assigned to the 31st FAB, which was performing military police duty. He recalled that the most serious problems for the occupation authorities were prostitution, theft, the black market and civilian riots.

As 1948 turned into 1949, the troops in Korea spent more time in training than heretofore. In the 48th Field this included what artillerymen call the Cannoneer’s Hop. In this exercise, members of an artillery gun crew rotated jobs on command. In this way, the crew cross-trained in the different tasks of each member. There were also classes in forward observation and the operation of a Fire Direction Center (FDC).

South Korea held a general election on May 10, 1948, forming a 200-representative National Assembly. During its first meeting on May 31, the Assembly elected Syngman Rhee chairman. On July 12, they adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Korea (ROK-pronounced ROCK). On July 16, the Assembly elected Rhee president of South Korea. On Aug. 15, 1948, the government of South Korea was formally inaugurated and the U.S. Military Government in Korea ended. On Aug. 24, President Rhee and LTG Hodge signed an interim