Evolutionary Learning in Strategy-Project Systems

Evolutionary Learning in Strategy-Project Systems

A PMI Research Monograph

Paul Gardiner

Adil Eltigani

Terence Williams

Richard Kirkham

Lixiong Ou

Antonio Calabrese

Jonas Söderlund

Foreword by Ed Hoffman

Technical Editor – David Ling

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for.

ISBN: 978-1-62825-484-6

Published by: Project Management Institute, Inc.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

Foreword

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Chapter 3: Pilot Study

Chapter 4: Refining the Conceptual Framework

Chapter 5: Research Methodology

Chapter 6: Results and Data Analysis

Chapter 7: Discussion

Chapter 8: Conclusions

References

Appendix 1: Interview Protocols

Appendix 2: Full Set of Data Analysis Tables

Appendix 3: Data Analysis Cards

Glossary

Acknowledgments

The authors express their sincere gratitude to the Project Management Institute (PMI) for the award of the sponsored research grant to enable them to undertake the research reported here. The authors are also grateful to the British University of Dubai and the National Research Foundation of the United Arab Emirates for earlier seed funding, which supported the pilot work conducted as a precursor to the international research project reported in this monograph.

As always, a major research project involves many helpers along the way without whom the project may never have finished or may have fallen well short of the aim and objectives established at the start. We are particularly grateful to the reviewers of our original research proposal submitted to PMI; to our project liaison, V. K. Narayanan; and for the ongoing help and support from Carla Messikomer, Kristin Dunn, and Jake Williams of PMI who always listened to us when plans were hit by uncertainty. We also acknowledge the many staff at SKEMA Business School who were involved in the administrative and financial management of the research program, and our friends and families who helped to keep us going to the end.

Abbreviations

APM – Association of Project Management

CKO – chief knowledge officer

ERM – enterprise risk management

ISO – International Organization for Standardization

PMI – Project Management Institute

PPPM – project, program, and portfolio management

RBV – resource-based view

UAE – United Arab Emirates

VRIO – valuable, rare, inimitable, organization support

Foreword

There is a saying at NASA that the safest launch is no launch. It is a cryptic, reality-based acknowledgment that you can never be certain when it comes to the complex factors involved in launching a rocket. There is an implicit message for objectivists who search for standards of perfection to align before agreeing about the suitability for action. The quote lends recognition that what may be desired in theory will not hold up in practice.

The tension between knowledge management and the learning of organizational lessons provides a similar bind. There is a noticeable contrast between objectivist theoretical epistemology of knowledge and a practice-based perspective (Hislop, 2013; Nicolini, 2011). Specifically, the latter is typically unseemly, with much more uncertainty. It is the difference between the project management student and the project professional who is left to wonder why reality never proceeds like a textbook.

There is often skepticism between those who practice and those who research. The pressures in both fields are driven by somewhat different perspectives. Thus, the knowledge practitioner is responsible for circumstances that paint knowledge in unique colors. As NASA’s chief knowledge officer (CKO), I faced powerful factors that drove my focus and the solutions I wanted to implement. The theoretical foundations offer a direction, but putting knowledge into practice is a journey largely determined by existing barriers and the layout of the organizational terrain. There is certainly a strong connection between knowledge management research and practice. However, with the increasing importance of knowledge capability for project and organizational success, it is important to be aware of their differences.

What Makes Practice-Driven Knowledge Management Different from Theory and Research?

Organizations are driven by strategy and mission. In a mission-based environment like NASA, anything that is not considered mission related has a hard time being noticed. For this reason, knowledge in practice must stay closely focused on critical knowledge as a function of the business or the mission of the organization. In a place such as NASA, project failure can have devastating effects. This immediately places concepts, processes, and methods associated with improved learning and lessons learned in a place of importance and emphasis. Specifically, the type of lessons learned that are valued will be those that can practically help a current project increase its probability of success. The more removed or generic a method of learning lessons is from the goal of increasing current project success, the less it will typically be supported. It is for this reason that there is such a split reaction to lessons learned in an organizational setting. It is not simply the learning of lessons that is the important factor; rather, it is the learning that can have value within the context of the mission or project success.

This first factor, the power of organizational strategy and mission, can never be ignored in practice if a knowledge program is going to survive. Knowledge management separated from mission can survive and perhaps thrive in some grassroots, nongoverned manner, taking an emergent path to knowledge and learning, but it can never survive in a formal and systematic way. It will suffocate from a lack of resources and support.

When asked to accept the position of NASA’s CKO, I made three asks or requests. First, it was important that there would be a knowledge lead at each of the nine NASA field centers and four mission directorates. (The original concept was to have one CKO at the headquarters level.) Second, I requested a quarterly presentation in front of the NASA senior leadership for reviews and to ascertain the status of knowledge activities and accomplishments. Third, I requested travel funding to ensure that the distributed team could meet at least two times a year. Each of these requests was an attempt to measure the leadership commitment and executive sponsorship toward the knowledge program. It was also an attempt to set up a structure that could focus as directly as possible on strategy and mission across the entire system.

A second characteristic of practitioner-driven knowledge management is recognition that the only type of knowledge that is valued is that which contributes to the organization’s business. Many theoretical approaches consider knowledge as the end state. In a working organization, such boundary-less definitions lead to failed programs. There is only one kind of knowledge that matters within a working context: knowledge that drives business success. In my case at NASA, knowledge management was being focused within the domain of engineering and program and project management. This focal point from NASA leadership was a vital direction, as it limited the scope from areas that would eat resources and confuse the goal. It also defined the target audience and the ultimate recipients of service and support. Knowledge efforts that are undefined and poorly focused typically lead to confusion, weak goals, and loss of leadership support. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is fine in philosophical circles, but within the economics of work, its boundaries must be defined.

A third reality of knowledge in organizations is the importance of social capital (Cohen & Prusak, 2001; Cross & Parker, 2004). Social capital is all about the relationships and networks within an organization. Consider this from the perspective of risk management. Projects are accustomed to considering risk largely from a technical or economic perspective. However, the most significant risk to a project is the social risk of project factors that are based on individual competence, team capability, and organizational capacity for learning through recognition of problems and the ability to adapt. People, politics, social norms, and relationships determine every aspect of importance within a social structure, and that includes knowledge. Reality in an organization is defined by people. That can be a good thing—or a nightmare. However, too many knowledge programs seem determined to value processes, measures, technologies, and structures over people. It is as if there is a fear that too much focus on people will render a program weak and soft. In my experience, the only programs that succeed are those that recognize and value the importance of the human element.

To this point, I refer back to my requests once appointed NASA’s CKO: that each center and mission organization select a local knowledge officer or lead, and that they have travel funds for periodic meetings. In addition to promoting enterprise-wide integration and alignment to the NASA mission, these requests also ensured powerful social capital across and around the organization. The act of coming together for conversation, ideas, and argument is vital for the design and execution stages of a functional program.

The most successful knowledge-sharing strategy at NASA is the use of stories and conversation forums. This can create heartburn for those who consider conversation a weak knowledge method, but people exchange knowledge predominantly through talking, arguing, laughing, and socializing. Bringing together project practitioners to share their experiences through narrative stories is a very powerful mechanism for identifying critical knowledge, sharing knowledge across the organization, and promoting a culture of professional reflection and open communication. Conversation also impacts on the cultural components of an organization in ways that maximize performance success.

The fourth factor of significance for knowledge practice is the importance of strong integration of culturally embedded dimensions. This is a nagging problem, as what works in one work setting or team may very well fail in another. Organizations are complex systems and they respond in different ways to the same stimulus. For this important reason, a successful knowledge practitioner must value agility and adaptability over prescription and method. Work systems, whether they are project teams or larger enterprises, will react in unique ways. Unique systems can only be handled through unique solutions. Knowledge management in an organization is mostly dependent on cultural components such as trust, leadership, communication patterns, social networks, learning tendencies, and technology preferences.

What to do about the breadth of cultural factors? This requires an appreciation of political issues and their management, coupled with respect and inclusion. Within the first week of my appointment as CKO, I was making phone calls and setting up meetings with the owners of corporate cultural domains. Human capital, legal, acquisition, safety and risk, engineering, information technology, and about a dozen other organization leaders needed to be integrated and engaged in the knowledge strategy. This is the most overlooked reality in knowledge management and creating an environment of learning. The preference seems to be working a knowledge initiative as a lone wolf. However, cultural factors determine the success and failure of such efforts, and culture is owned widely across an organization structure.

What Does a Successful Practitioner Do?

People and politics must determine the path of a knowledge and learning program. Ultimate success and failure will have more to do with this reality than any formal methodology or process. The methodology must accommodate and adapt to the organizational pressures and social dynamics. The practical aspects of knowledge management have significant implications for the type of strategy and tactics that are taken. In my experience, I would pay attention to five factors.

Ensure Close Engagement with Executive Sponsors, Practitioners, and Key Stakeholders

Much has been written about the importance of leadership engagement and this cannot be overstated. Knowledge is defined by the nature of the business. Leaders and the executive core determine the strategy, mission, and what matters in an organization. It is essential to have an active and honest conversation with the executive sponsor about what success looks like and the boundaries that the program will inhabit. It is equally important to listen to workforce practitioners and external stakeholders or audit communities that will voice support or criticism for the effort.

In starting up the NASA knowledge program, I first met with senior executives to listen and hear what they specifically expected from the effort. At this level, it was communicated that designing a formal, integrated program with low cost (frugal innovation) was paramount to my leadership. In conversation with the NASA advisory panel that was heavily invested in this effort, the goal was for a formal, structured program that was strongly integrated across the entire organization. The importance of a sound, improving program and project capability that would be sustainable for the long term was a major emphasis. In discussion with engineers and project practitioners, a different variable for success was highlighted. This community was more than aware of the importance of learning and knowledge for the success of a mission. They wanted assurances that they would drive the specific program (which would, after all, impact them the most) that would focus on knowledge services as opposed to knowledge management. It was also heavily emphasized that this community was concerned about such a program making projects more difficult as opposed to improved and agile.

There were three different communities—senior executives, the NASA advisory panel, and the engineers and project practitioners—all with different goals. To help ensure success, the conversations between them must happen early, often, and they must determine the design and method.

Build a Powerful Team

A good idea is more a function of a strong supporting team than of a brilliant idea. In an age of distributed talent, it is critical to consider the necessary ingredients for success and strongly cultivate a powerful team. During the first week of my appointment, the overwhelming majority of my time was spent calling, meeting, and asking people to help. Any discipline that could build a successful knowledge program would need to have someone representing it and acting as a leader of that community. These people would spend time courting and encouraging a team that would be diverse and would have a stake in success. In the case of a knowledge program, this would include human capital, information technology, safety and risk management, and a dozen other communities. The importance of a powerful team is another reason that communities of practice are a vital aspect of a knowledge program.

One signal of success came several months after our kickoff. I received a call from the lead of NASA acquisition. Because he was a longtime colleague with whom I had collaborated over the years, I was surprised that he was calling to complain. The complaint was that I did not call him to request a knowledge lead from the procurement community. I immediately expanded the team to respond to that accurate criticism; at the same time, it was a sign that we were seen as a beneficial and vibrant team. At our meetings, the 14 formally appointed knowledge leaders would typically be joined by another 20 or so volunteers representing diverse disciplines.

Promote Conversations, Stories, and Forums

There are hundreds of knowledge and learning activities that can be embraced by an organization. I will say that one component that should be a significant aspect of every program are forums that bring together leaders and practitioners to exchange stories and conversations. The nature of project managers and engineers is that they typically are involved in complex challenges. This may lend to a tendency to be good storytellers, and to enjoy the conversation of a community of their peers. Perhaps this is not as meaningful in other disciplines; however, my experience is that there is nothing so powerful as bringing together people to share their stories. At NASA, we would use such methods for learning lessons from 30 years of the Shuttle Program to building project management capability among science principal investigators from universities. Much more consideration should be given to identifying the most effective research to find effective ways to let people talk, innovate, learn, and improve performance.

Design Knowledge Maps and Visual Representations

In building any program, the early years are the most dangerous. That is when people will question the value and be most aggressive in forming opinions about whether the effort should continue or be killed. It is for this reason that it is important to have something to show. A year one initiative at NASA was the design and development of a knowledge map. The map was intended to be a one-place stop to find the categories of NASA knowledge strategies (we would start with six defined categories and areas of focus) and find out what was being done and who was leading in such efforts. The knowledge map immediately required us to develop a common language of knowledge that was soon adopted across NASA. It also naturally promoted a sharing and exchange of approaches and movement of practice across the enterprise. Simply having such a map led to an exploration of what was being done, and created a desire for people and advocates to promote their activities on it. Communication of strategy, services, and activities is best accomplished through easy visual representations that can be conveyed to executives, practitioners, and stakeholders.

Govern with a Federated Structure

It is possible to have a very successful knowledge effort at a grassroots level. In fact, there are major advantages to having time to innovate, iterate, explore, and have fun with an emergent effort. At a certain point, such a program will run into weaknesses of poor coordination, inconsistency, lack of enterprise integration, and questions of mission alignment.

For a formal and systematic