Cops in Kabul: A Newfoundland Peacekeeper in Afghanistan

Flanker Press Limited

St. John’s

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Malone, William C., 1965-, author

Cops in Kabul : a Newfoundland peacekeeper in Afghanistan / William C.

Malone.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Issued in print and electronic formats.

ISBN 978-1-77117-666-8 (softcover).--ISBN 978-1-77117-667-5 (EPUB).--

ISBN 978-1-77117-668-2 (Kindle).--ISBN 978-1-77117-669-9 (PDF)

1. Malone, William C., 1965-. 2. Afghan War, 2001- --Personal narratives,

Canadian. 3. Police--Newfoundland and Labrador--Biography. 4. Royal

Canadian Mounted Police--Biography. 5. Police training--Afghanistan.

6. Peacekeeping forces, Canadian--Afghanistan. 7. Afghan War, 2001-. I. Title.

DS371.413.M35 2018 958.104’7092 C2018-903521-8

C2018-903522-6

———————————————————————————————— ——————————————————————

© 2018 by William C. Malone

All Rights Reserved. No part of the work covered by the copyright hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic or mechanical—without the written permission of the publisher. Any request for photocopying, recording, taping, or information storage and retrieval systems of any part of this book shall be directed to Access Copyright, The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency, 1 Yonge Street, Suite 800, Toronto, ON M5E 1E5. This applies to classroom use as well. For an Access Copyright licence, visit www.accesscopyright.ca or call toll-free to 1-800-893-5777.

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Illustrated by Albert Taylor Cover photo by Chris LeDrew

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We acknowledge the [financial] support of the Government of Canada. Nous reconnaissons l’appui [financier] du gouvernement du Canada. We acknowledge the support of the Canada Council for the Arts, which last year invested $153 million to bring the arts to Canadians throughout the country. Nous remercions le Conseil des arts du Canada de son soutien. L’an dernier, le Conseil a investi 153 millions de dollars pour mettre de l’art dans la vie des Canadiennes et des Canadiens de tout le pays. We acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Department of Tourism, Culture and Recreation for our publishing activities.

Dedication

To my parents, Bill and Exie Malone, I love you and miss you. There is not a day that goes by that I do not think about you.

To my wonderful family—Nola, Brittany, Taylor, Sydney, Laura, Jeannette, and Ty—I love you all.

To all of the men and women in the Canadian policing community and their families who volunteered and served our country with distinction, it was an honour to be counted among you

CONTENTS

Introduction

Chronology of Key Historic Events

Chapter 1: The Mission

Chapter 2: Preparing to Deploy

Chapter 3: Afghanistan

Chapter 4: Wheels Up

Chapter 5: Kabul

Chapter 6: Sisyphus Had it Easy

Chapter 7: Too Many Grindstones, Not Enough Noses

Chapter 8: Green Is Not Blue

Chapter 9: Clear and Present Danger

Chapter 10: It Wasn’t All Bad

Chapter 11: We Did Our Best . . . It’s Time To Go

Chapter 12: Decompression

Chapter 13: Arriving Home

Chapter 14: Was It Worth It?

Epilogue

Suggested Reading

Annex A: List of All Canadian Police Officers Who Served

Annex B: Joint Coordination & Monitoring Board Letter

Annex C: Afghan National Police Assessment Questions

Annex D: Firefighting in a Firefight (Sgt. Mike Cook, Ret’d)

Acknowledgements

Index

Introduction

Everyone remembers where they were on September 11, 2001. I was in northern New Brunswick as part of the RCMP Public Order Team in the midst of a lobster fishing dispute in Burnt Church. As I was getting ready for work, I was watching CNN and saw two planes slam into the World Trade Center. It certainly piqued my interest, and my immediate thought was that it was some sort of a trailer for an upcoming movie. As I continued watching, I realized that the events I had just witnessed were real and were going to change the world forever. Little did I know at that time that ten years later I would be at the very epicentre of terrorism, in the country where Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had trained and prepared nineteen hijackers to fly four planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a farmer’s field in Pennsylvania.

A great deal has been written since those horrible events. The attacks that occurred that day will go down in history as some of the most heinous crimes ever committed on North American soil. It changed our world and made us realize that we were not beyond the reach of terrorism. It was no longer something that happened over there or to someone else—it was happening right here on our doorstep. Ever since that day, the Western world has been on high alert, at DefCon 1,¹ so to speak, in a perpetual state of hyper-vigilance, studying the adversary and taking the offensive to groups like al Qaeda and other like-minded entities. This heightened sense of vigilance has not dissipated over the years and still continues today.

This one event galvanized the Western world, and everyone, including Canada, rallied around the cause, mobilizing its military and police personnel and sending them to the coal face of the terrorist threat in Afghanistan. This effort was to help stem the tide of insurgency and build the capacity and the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces² to handle this ongoing threat.

The term CivPol is the acronym used to describe civilian police who have been deployed to the many trouble spots around the globe. Canada’s first civilian police mission took place in 1989 when we sent a contingent of officers to the newly formed country of Namibia. The purpose of that deployment, and every one since, including Afghanistan, has been to help bring about peace, security, and the rule of law by training indigenous police forces in policing techniques that are used in democratic societies. Our police training has always tried to incorporate the cultural attributes of the countries in which we have worked, and this has not always been easy. The underpinning of these peacekeeping and training missions has always been based on the nine principles of policing developed by Sir Robert Peel in the early 1800s.³ These tried and tested principles are considered the foundation in building the public trust between the police and those they have been sworn to protect.

When I thought about volunteering for the mission, I broached the issue with a number of friends and colleagues, who were not shy in providing feedback. They asked me, Why are you going over there? It’s a mess! Or, It’s a complete waste of time. They’re completely uncivilized. A few folks looked at me and bluntly asked, Are you out of your mind? It wasn’t the first time I’d heard those types of sentiments. I heard the same thing when I decided to serve on a United Nations mission in Haiti in 1996. But once the bug of international policing and peacekeeping gets into your blood, you are hooked and you want to help as many people as you can, regardless of where that may take you.

The underlying motive for most of us who worked in Afghanistan can be directly linked to the initial reason that we all became police officers, which is the desire to help others, regardless of race, colour, creed, sexual orientation, or socio-economic status. It’s in our DNA. It is what we do and who we are, regardless of where that help may be needed. Canada has always been known as a country of peacekeepers and peacemakers, and we wanted to carry on with this time-honoured tradition. Many of the officers from the Afghan mission were of the view, Our Afghan police colleagues need our help, so let’s go and try our best to help them.

There are a number of people who believe the entire mission was a waste of time and that all the progress and advances we made will not be sustainable. Perhaps. But I am of the view that if we do not go to places like Afghanistan to render assistance, the problems they are facing, such as terrorism, insurgency, and organized crime, will inevitably come to visit us on Canadian soil. We would be naive to think otherwise. We have already seen the devastation and suffering that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001. I firmly believe that the military, the diplomats, the police, and the financial resources deployed by the Canadian government and our allies have made a difference. The work done by Canada and its international partners has and will continue to make a difference in the lives of many Afghans if they remain committed to improving their own country. Whether or not that difference is sustainable remains to be seen. History will be the judge of that.

Since returning from Afghanistan in June of 2012, I have listened to politicians and ordinary Canadians talk about the great and courageous work of the Canadian Armed Forces, which is indeed warranted and well-deserved. They fought valiantly in very difficult conditions and spent a great deal of time and energy to bring about peace to this far-off land. Their efforts continue today as they battle against ISIS in places like Iraq and Syria. Much to my surprise, I have heard very little about the contribution of the other men and women in uniform—the Canadian civilian policing community—who, along with their military and diplomatic counterparts, did exceptional, tireless, and courageous work since the initial deployment in 2003. The Canadian police mission and the contributions of the nearly 300 police officers⁴ from across our great nation have been relegated to a footnote in most historical accounts of the Canadian mission. For some reason this has gotten lost along the way. It is my hope that this book will help Canadians and others around the world to better understand and appreciate the complexities and difficulties of the environment and the hard work done by Canadian police officers and our international counterparts who served during the eleven-year mission. In the pages that follow, I hope that you, the reader, will gain a greater understanding of Canada’s contribution to the Afghan police training mission.

Note: Any views, opinions, errors, or omissions expressed in this book are solely those of the author. They are based on the author’s experiences and best recollection of events and do not reflect those of the Government of Canada, the North American Treaty Organization, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any other Canadian police agency who participated in this mission.

1 Defence Readiness Conditions used by the United States Armed Forces;

DEFCON Scale 1-5, 1 being the highest

2 ANSF includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.

3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Peel

4 See Annex A for a list of all Canadian civilian police officers who served in Afghanistan.

Source: International Police Operations Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Chronology of key

historic events

⁵

1747 The country of Afghanistan was founded as a modern state by Pashtun Ahmad Shāh Durrānī. He built the country by including parts of Iran, Central Asia, and parts of present-day India.

1776 Afghan capital moves from Kandahār to Kabul.

1839–1842 First Anglo-Afghan War.

1857 Indian mutiny. British imperial rule is established in India, replacing the Mughal Empire. This leads to a crisis in Islamic politics within the subcontinent.

1878–1880 Second Anglo-Afghan War. The war ends with the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak.

1880–1901 Reign of King Abdur Rahman (a.k.a. The Iron Amir).

1919 Third Anglo-Afghan War. Kabul attempts to recruit tribes on the British side of the Durand Line. Afghanistan ultimately gains its independence.

1919–1929 Rule of Amānullāh Khān. He attempted to push through reforms too quickly, which resulted in tribal uprisings that he could not control. As a result, he abdicated his throne in 1929 and went into exile. He was later assassinated.

1933–1973 Reign of Mohammed Zahir Shah. He was later overthrown by his cousin, Mohammed Daoud Khan, in a bloodless military coup in 1973.

1973–1978 Rule of Daoud Khan.

1978 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) stages a coup.

1979 Soviet troops arrive. Babrak Karmal installed as the new Afghan leader.

1985 Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet president, decides to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.

1986 Babrak Karmal is replaced by Mohammed Najibullah.

1988 Agreement is reached between the US and Soviet Union in Geneva on the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

1989 On February 15, the last Soviet troops leave Afghanistan, which leads to an intensified civil war.

1992 In April of 1992, the Najibullah government falls and mujahideen forces enter Kabul.

1994 The Taliban occupy Kandahār.

1996 May: Osama bin Laden is invited by the mujahideen to return to Afghanistan and takes up residence in the Taliban heartland of Kandahār.

September: Kabul falls to the Taliban.

2001 After the September 11 attacks, the United States demands that Osama bin Laden be turned over to them. The Taliban refuse. In October, US President George W. Bush launches attacks on Afghanistan. The Taliban are ousted from power, and the Bonn Agreement is signed in December of that year.

2002 January: Operation Anaconda is launched. The military pressure causes the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgents to retreat from Afghanistan into Pakistan.

March: Initial International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops begin to arrive in Kabul. June: Transitional government installed in Kabul.

2004 Hamid Karzai (Pashtun) is elected president of Afghanistan.

2009 March: US President Barack Obama authorizes a surge of 19,000 additional US troops. In November, President Karzai is re-elected to a second five-year term in office. In December, the US sends an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan.

2011 May 2: Osama bin Laden is killed by US Navy SEALs in Abbottabad, Pakistan. President Obama announces the withdrawal of 33,000 US troops by September of 2012.

2013 March: Canadian police and military mission in Afghanistan concludes.

2014 September 21: Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Pashtun) is elected president of Afghanistan.

5 Source: Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground by Jonathan Steele

Chapter 1

The Mission

A small body of determined spirits fired by an unquenchable faith in their mission can alter the course of history.

— Mahatma Gandhi

For NATO forces, the Taliban initially appeared to be a disorganized and primitive rabble of black-turbaned nomads. However, over the course of the Afghan conflict, the West has learned that their initial impressions could not have been further from the truth. These men were a battle-hardened, elusive group who have proven to be a very worthy, intelligent, and dangerous adversary. They constitute a complex and asymmetric threat because they do not wear uniforms and are able to blend in easily with their fellow Afghans. They frequently launch guerilla-type attacks during the day and then resort to the delivery of night letters⁶ to their fellow citizens, warning them not to work or co-operate with foreigners (a.k.a. infidels⁷) or any Afghan government agencies. Their use of asymmetric warfare tactics in the course of the conflict has been very effective and deadly. Afghans who join the police, as well as their families, are especially vulnerable to these constant threats of violence. Despite the threats, Afghans and the international community know that it is vitally important to recruit, staff, train, and retain a competent and professional police force in order to maintain a safe and secure environment. This has proven to be easier said than done.

Similar to the approach in Iraq, the US counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan has been clear, hold, build, and return to the Afghans. On the face of it, it seems like a straightforward strategy. However, the challenge has been in the implementation, which is where most strategies have failed. The primary goal was to bring services to ordinary Afghans within a few weeks. In principle it sounds great, but it is patently unreasonable to expect to have basic services, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law in such a short time frame. While the military approach was noble in its intent, it was unrealistic. You could not simply add water and poof: an instant infrastructure, a competent police force, and an organized community ecosystem appears in which everyone is now enlightened and understands and follows the rules. I’d had a similar experience with the Haitian National Police in the mid-1990s, so I knew that the commitment would have to cover a longer term, at least a generation, in order to have any chance of systemic change and having a positive impact on the country, its people, and its institutions. One of the biggest hurdles to overcome would be the building of trust between the community and the police. In the absence of this, it all becomes an exercise in futility.

One of the primary guiding documents for the Afghan mission has been the Bonn Agreement, which was negotiated and signed in Bonn, Germany, in 2001. The meetings in Germany were attended by eighty-five countries and fifteen international organizations to broaden the co-operative arrangement between Afghanistan and the international community. From 2015–2024, this road map is designed to take them from transition to transformation, reaffirming commitments to building regional co-operation, human rights, governance, security, rule of law, and developing social and economic institutions.

As part of this framework, a number of countries made specific commitments to lead the Security Sector Reform and the rebuilding efforts of Afghan institutions. The division of labour regarding Security Sector Reform among the international community resulted in Italy focusing on the judiciary, the United Kingdom overseeing counter-narcotics, the Germans and European Union Police (EUPOL) taking on the responsibility of the police, and the United States concentrating on the military. While these were the designated lanes, there was an overlap of training programs among the donor countries. This was a challenging environment given the numerous training programs and initiatives to be tracked and coordinated. In retrospect, this division of labour and burden sharing between nations was done with little attention to expertise, experience, or resources, and there was no mechanism to ensure a coordinated approach to reform efforts.⁸

The guiding policy document for the deployment of Canadian police officers to Afghanistan was the Canadian Police Agreement, otherwise known as the CPA. The purpose of Canada’s participation in the mission was to ". . . help Afghans rebuild their country as a stable, democratic, and self-sufficient society." Canada, along with dozens of others nations and international organizations, was engaged at the request of the democratically elected Afghan government to work within the United Nations (UN)–mandated, North American Treaty Organization (NATO)–led mission to bring about security, peace, and the rule of law in the Central Asian nation.

Canada’s participation in this mission started in October 2001 with the Canadian Special Forces Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2). In late January, early February 2002, our special forces were followed by Canadian regular forces who set up shop in Kandahār. The Canadian policing community entered the mission in 2003, and we were initially deployed to Kabul as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission—Afghanistan (UNAMA) and then into Kandahār Province in 2005 to reinforce the basic policing skills of the Afghan National Police as part of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). During their time in Kandahār, Canadian police officers worked on the front lines with their Canadian military counterparts and the Afghan National Police. This approach was very effective. However, this deployment structure was significantly modified in July of 2011 when the Government of Canada decided that the military/combat mission in southern Afghanistan would come to an end. From that point onward, Canadian police officers would continue the training mission from the Afghan capital, Kabul, and additional locations in the northern part of the country.

Canada’s police had made significant investments in reforming the Afghan National Police in the Kandahār area, and it was essential that strategic consideration be given to ensure that these efforts were sustained during and after the transition from Kandahār to Kabul. A great deal of blood, sweat, and tears had been expended to bring about change in the policing environment in southern Afghanistan. Everyone wanted to make sure that the gains Canada had made were not lost. The unfortunate reality was that as soon as Canadian police officers left southern Afghanistan, our influence began to wane and eventually disappear because we were no longer there to look after the programs that had been instituted.

Our country brought a lot of expertise to the police reform efforts in Afghanistan. This expertise was highly valued by our key allies and partners, as well as the Afghan government. Throughout the mission, Canada had deployed upwards of 300 civilian police officers who had worked at the national, provincial, and district levels. This work garnered Canada a reputation for good-quality civilian police training and professionalism, contributing to positive judicial reform.

The forte of the Canadian policing community is our ability to train and our expertise in community-based policing. This philosophy would be instrumental in helping build trust between the Afghan public and its police. With this in mind, Canada’s engagement focused on several niche areas.

Leadership and Management Training

It was evident from the onset that little attention had been paid toward the development and professionalization of the Afghan National Police’s (ANP) non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officer-level personnel. This oversight, intentional or otherwise, had significantly inhibited and undermined the capacity of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), and impeded police reform. Fortunately, this set of circumstances changed, and Canada was able to contribute to the development and professionalization of the ANP through its work in Kandahār, Kabul, and other communities throughout Afghanistan. Much of this training was delivered through the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM—A) with additional contributions by the European Union Police (EUPOL).

Specialized Policing:

Advanced Investigational and Anti-Corruption Policing

The National Policing Strategy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan had identified the development of specialized policing skills, such as the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC), anti-corruption, organized crime, Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), and counter-narcotics, as the primary areas of focus. All these areas were well within the wheelhouse of the Canadian police trainers being deployed. However, the more basic police training had been provided by military personnel, primarily the US military, which has proven problematic because the military trainers lacked the requisite civilian policing expertise. Having the military train the police in Afghanistan would be an ongoing issue because it created an Afghan police force who were thinking like soldiers and not as police officers. Some would argue that a military mindset was necessary because of the counter-insurgency issue. However, the truth is the military, not the police, should have been the ones on the front lines of the counter-insurgency. Once security had been established by the military, the police would move in to maintain order through the rule of law.

Ministry of the Interior Reform

Ministerial reform was crucial to the success of the Afghan National Police and the establishment of a safe and secure environment. The Ministry of the Interior has the remit of providing support, policy development, strategic guidance, and oversight for the ANP. This work in progress will continue for many years to come, given its weak institutional capacity, centralized decision-making model, educational deficiencies, and rampant corruption. One of the challenges within the ministry is the lack of separation between its political role and its operational police command and control. By separating these functions, it will help minimize corruption and political interference as well as enhance the independence and impartiality of police investigations, ergo strengthen the rule of law. With the current arrangement, some Afghan officials seem to be more equal than others in the eyes of the law. Any cases that touched on high-level government or police officials mysteriously had a way of disappearing or never making it to court.

There were several key players contributing to police reform in Afghanistan, and each of them brought a different approach and area of expertise, which added complexity and made the coordination of these efforts very difficult. The challenge for Canada would be in demonstrating our value added among the litany of current initiatives, and applying our knowledge in the areas that would have the most impact. Identifying these key areas would be crucial in helping Canada maintain a position of influence and ensure that our contribution would provide a positive and tangible impact.

Since the inception of the mission, there have been many different actors contributing to police reform. The majority of these police capacity-building resources had come from the military, which resulted in a militaristic training approach. As previously mentioned, this is not what the Afghan National Police required. Canada was one of the few countries that also provided civilian policing expertise to the Ministry of the Interior, as well as to the senior levels of the Afghan National Police. Our goal was to demonstrate to the ministry and the ANP that the provision of a modern professional police service to the local population would not only address the community’s security concerns, but help build trust between the Afghan people, the police, and the Afghan government. The primary goal was to provide a level of training and support to help them build a stable, professional, and effective police agency.

The renewal of the Canadian Police Agreement in 2011 meant that Canada would contribute up to forty-five police officers as part of the security, rule of law, and human rights pillars. From 2011 to 2014, Canadian police officers would be based out of Kabul and work within the Ministry of the Interior as well as several multilateral missions, such as the NATO Training Mission—Afghanistan (NTM—A), Combined Security Transitional Command—Afghanistan (CSTC—A), and the European Union Police (EUPOL) Training Mission. Canada also provided assistance under the Counterterrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCB), which, as the name suggests, provided funding, training, and expertise to nations such as Afghanistan in the area of counterterrorism. This program targeted counterterrorism investigators in the areas of terrorist financing, national security-type investigations, developing legal frameworks, and anything else with a nexus to counterterrorism-enforcement efforts.

It was evident from the previous Kandahār-centric mission that Canadian police officers had provided significant leadership in a number of areas. The 2011 mission extension would continue to build on the successes of our predecessors. A solid policing foundation in Afghanistan would be a key element in developing the long-term exit strategy for the international community. The provision of effective police services to the Afghan public would help alleviate security concerns and also build trust between the police, the population, and the Afghan government. Unfortunately, the primary focus of the international community was building the capacity of the Afghan National Army (ANA), which has unintentionally left the Afghan National Police (ANP) lagging behind in its development and operational preparedness.

In my role as the deputy commander for the Canadian police contingent, I was responsible for monitoring the day-to-day activities of all Canadian police officers to ensure they were operating within one of the four operational pillars and that they were doing it in as safe and secure a manner as possible. As we prepared for our mission, I told a number of the people on several occasions that we all walked on the plane to get there and that we’re all going to walk off the plane to go home, meaning do your best to make a difference, however the most important goal is for everybody to complete their mission and go home safe.

In terms of expectations, I had a small advantage over some of my Canadian colleagues in that I had previously worked a six-month United Nations mission in Haiti back in 1996. Many of the challenges that I had experienced there, i.e. disease, abject poverty, lack of infrastructure, and violence, were similar to those we would see in Afghanistan, albeit at elevated levels. Everyone, including me, had to temper their expectations, because if we thought we were going to change the world, we were going to be in for a rude awakening. The overall goal was to continue moving the yardsticks forward as much as possible in the hopes that some improvements would be made.

As part of the command staff, there were times when I was made aware that members of the contingent were not always happy with their assignments, or their assigned roles were not what they had expected. They wanted to do the same type of work as their predecessors, many of whom had served as part of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahār. Prior to July 2011, Canadian police officers were embedded with the Canadian military. Their activities brought them out into the field, outside the wire, throughout southern Afghanistan to train and patrol with the Afghan National Police. A number of people in our contingent kept asking why we couldn’t go out and do the same type of work. On more than one occasion I had to remind them that we were not soldiers and that the nature and mandate of the mission had changed with the discontinuation of the Canadian combat mission and our departure from Kandahār. Some members immediately understood and got on with the mission at hand, but there were others who continued to push the issue despite the clear direction from the Government of Canada.

One of the many difficulties in undertaking training missions such as this was to fully understand that we could not and must not try to instill our own value system on the Afghan people and Afghan institutions. The policing model that we have in Canada, or the Western world, for that matter, could not be imposed on the Afghan people. The model for Afghanistan had to reflect the values and the culture of the Afghan people, not the culture of visiting nations from the West. This required a major shift and adjustment in our mindset and approach. We had to be true to our values and beliefs while at the same time being mindful of the values and the culture of our Afghan hosts. Having been involved in previous international police training efforts, I knew that our success was contingent upon the type of approach that we took.

Prior to our deployment, we had all followed the news and seen numerous photos of Afghanistan and its people. There was no doubt that our