Hybrid Warfare: Future and Technologies

Book cover of Hybrid Warfare

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Insititut für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität zu Köln, Köln, Germany

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Editor

Ralph Thiele

Hybrid Warfare

Future and Technologies

1st ed. 2021

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Editor

Ralph Thiele

StratByrd Consulting, Nickenich, Germany

Edition ZfAS

ISBN 978-3-658-35108-3e-ISBN 978-3-658-35109-0

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35109-0

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Foreword

In the context of international tensions or low intensity conflicts, the term hybrid warfare has increasingly gained prominence. Even though a viable definition of this term has not yet been established internationally, this book makes a remarkable proposal in this regard. In particular, it not only helps to shed light on the wide spectrum of means of hybrid warfare, it also outlines how this new form of conflict will change the nature of war in the next decades.

Hybrid wars often root in conflicts owing to overpopulation, religious differences, the struggle of ethnic and religious minorities for self-determination and independence or related to the destruction of the natural foundations of life. Such conflicts are also the breeding ground for the great powers’ struggle over zones of influence and regional powers’ proxy wars over regional dominance.

The Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov is considered the spiritual father of the concept of hybrid warfare. As early as in 2013, he pointed out that uprisings and internal conflicts are the initial spark for hybrid wars. This warfare is characterized by a wide spectrum of military, paramilitary and economic measures as well as the offensive use of information technology. His respective conceptual considerations have become known as the Gerasimov doctrine. The application of the Gerasimov Doctrine has been observed in the conflicts in North Africa, the Near and Middle East and in Ukraine.

Due to the dramatic advances in information technology, the focus in hybrid warfare has shifted to the use of Cyber Attacks in recent years. Cyber ​​Attacks in connection with emerging and disruptive technologies give hybrid warfare a new quality. Globalization, digitalization and advanced technologies have improved the standard of living, particularly of the United States and Europe. At the same time, new vulnerabilities of open and democratic societies have been created. It is these vulnerabilities that opponents target and exploit.

With these new possibilities, hybrid war has become an essential tool in conflicts between the great powers. As the rivalry between these powers, namely the United States, China and Russia intensified in recent years, the application of hybrid war intensified. The exponential advances in digitalization primarily benefit China and the United States. Russia has also made significant progress. Hybrid warfare has the major advantage that it can be employed below the threshold of open war, as measures can be adapted to the respective situation in terms of the means used, the intensity and the degree of damage to be inflicted on the other side.

The pertinence of this development is illustrated by the fact that the United States accuse Russia of having penetrated a large number of U.S. government agencies and of undermining NATO through intimidation and active measures. Only a few days after taking office, US President Biden raised the profile of cyber affairs in the American government by appointing the first Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber ​​and Emerging Technology. In addition to that, he launched an urgent initiative to improve the capability, readiness and resilience in cyberspace.

Massive attacks of disruption against political systems, governments, the economy, transport, energy and information systems of open societies are able to partially or completely paralyze a country or an alliance. This is an undeclared war, and the enemy cannot—or at least not immediately—be identified. The attack can be limited and selective, but it can be expanded and reinforced at any time. A response in kind, however, is no effective option.

Hybrid warfare can be more successful in the long run than the use of military forces. In the past few decades, the strategic principle of deterrence has been an integral part of Western strategy. Deterrence works when a potential aggressor faces greater disadvantages than possible advantages from a conflict. In hybrid warfare, deterrence does not work. It is therefore important to invest in new technologies in order to strengthen the economic power and thus the resilience predominantly of the European Union and NATO member states. There is a plethora of emerging and disruptive technologies. NATO considers data, artificial intelligence, autonomy, space, hypersonics to be predominantly disruptive, whereas quantum computing, biotechnology and advanced materials are rather emerging, the latter hence requiring more time before their disruptive effect is felt in military capabilities. (NATO STO 2020).

Emerging and disruptive technologies make it possible to initiate hybrid warfare with the aim of achieving already decisive advantages over an adversary before military combat operations of open war have started. They also create the necessary prerequisites to achieve comprehensive situational awareness and information superiority. Through the targeted use of cyber and information technologies to deceive and confuse up to the elimination of the opposing command and information systems, the opponent can be weakened in the initial phase of a war to such an extent that the following military measures can be carried out with significantly lower risk and higher chances of success.

In all wars, exponential technological developments have played a major role, if they decisively changed at least one of the strategic factors of time, space and power for the benefit of a warring party. In the 20th century, it was airplanes that changed time and space and were employed with the aim of destroying the enemy’s industrial and economic base. The invention of missiles had an even greater influence, given their intercontinental range and as a carrier system for nuclear warheads with immense destructive power, which enabled the strategy of deterrence through a second-strike capability. As effective as this strategy is to this day, it is morally dubious.

Robotics, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and hypersonic weapon systems will be decisive in high-intensity military conflicts of the future. While missiles follow a ballistic trajectory and can therefore be detected by early warning systems and thus also fought, hypersonic weapon systems are manoeuvrable and can either be programmed accordingly or change their course spontaneously. They can carry nuclear warheads or conventionally destroy their targets using the kinetic energy of their speed. Due to their high speed, manoeuvrability and low altitude, hypersonic weapon systems are difficult to detect and to date practically impossible to defend against.

With this book, Ralph Thiele has created a standard work on hybrid warfare. It is comprehensive in showing how political rivalries and conflicts will be carried out in the future using a wide range of emerging and disruptive technologies. The author also outlines how open societies, and especially Western democracies, can protect themselves against hybrid attacks and actively defend themselves. The European Union and NATO should take up these proposals as soon as possible. For Europe, this is a decisive prerequisite for a policy of political, economic and military self-assertion in the new power arithmetic of the global rivalry between the great powers.

General (ret.)Harald Kujat

Preface

Hybrid Warfare is an old phenomenon, which today is significantly empowered by new technological developments. New technologies, with their disruptive potential, have a catalytic effect on hybrid means, methods, tactics and strategies. They improve the starting conditions for hybrid action, expand the arsenal of hybrid players and thus help to increase the reach of their activities as well as their prospects of success. It is worrying, that they provide offensive options in particular. At the same time, new technological developments may offer options to better identify, understand, defend against and counter hybrid attacks. Most importantly new technological trends increasingly turn technology into a ‘battlespace’ for hybrid confrontation as such. Against this backdrop, technology constitutes an additional domain and a possibility for hybrid actors to horizontally extend the ‘battlespace’. The technological domain may even turn into the centre of gravity in a hybrid confrontation. In order to prevent, defend against and—if necessary—counter and outmanoeuvre hybrid opponents, it is therefore important for political, civilian and military leaders and decision-makers, as well as for industry and academia, to develop a common and comprehensive understanding of the implications of new technologies in a hybrid threats/warfare context.

With this in mind, the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) and its Community of Interest on Strategy and Defence (COI S&D)¹ initiated and conducted the Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies (HYFUTEC) project with the primary goal of delivering recommendations to Western policymakers regarding the crucial intersection of technology and the hybrid threats/warfare-complex. The project aims at enhanced awareness and understanding of the implications of new technologies and their disruptive potential in a hybrid threats/warfare context. This is considered to be particularly important for political, civilian and military leaders, decision-makers and conceptual planners, as well as for industry and academia. In this sense HYFUTEC provides a bridging function between the technological revolution on the one side and the world of hybrid threats/ warfare on the other, with translation efforts in both directions.

Four modules have structured the project: First, a broad future & technology horizon scan, second, the respective assessment regarding hybrid warfare and related strategies based on own conceptual work, third, a special focus on selected most relevant trends and finally, the deduction of implications for security policy, military and defence for EU, NATO and member states. It was launched in 2019 with a series of events in Helsinki, Berlin, Vienna and Stockholm. Within its broad future & technology horizon scanning, the project has identified 19 technological trends with urgent and profound implications for the evolution of hybrid threats, conflict and warfare. In 2020 and 2021 HYFUTEC was successfully tested as an educational tool at the Baltic Defence College in Tartu. Main findings of the project were presented and discussed in the ‘Mind the Gaps’ HYFUTEC online symposium in September 2020. This symposium marked the finalization of the HYFUTEC project-phase and the transition to HYFUTEC as a continued work strand for COI Strategy & Defence.

During the course of the project, experts and practitioners from a wide range of backgrounds, including chancelleries, ministries of defence, interior and foreign affairs; diplomats; the intelligence community; other governmental and international agencies, such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Joint Research Centre (JRC); further national and international research centres; think tanks; academia; and the private sector shared insights, inputs, presentations and information and discussed findings in a series of workshops throughout Europe. Their wealth of knowledge ensured that the findings are based upon profound, comprehensive expertise. Altogether, the HYFUTEC network assembled more than 260 experts from academia and industry from 27 participating states as well as representatives from NATO and EU institutions.

This monograph reflects findings of the project Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies commissioned and chaired by the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE) and its Community of Interest Strategy and Defence (COI S&D) in close cooperation with StratByrd Consulting from December 2018 until September 2020. It takes a look at the broader context of hybrid warfare based on conceptual considerations as outlined in chapter two "Introduction to Hybrid Warfare". It identifies likely hybrid actors and their approaches. It highlights the role of digitalisation and how the evolving Revolutions in Military Affairs may affect—and will likely further develop within—the hybrid threats/warfare context.

A future & technology horizon scan delivers a broad perspective on relevant trends; disruptive potential; threats, risks and actors; the use of force and warfare options; and the potential for security and defence. Particular relevant trends are followed-up in 19 selected technologies and assessed in the light of hybrid warfare and related strategies. Five of these technologies—fifth generation technology standard for cellular networks (5G), artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, quantum sciences and new developments in space—are additionally covered in more depth in the annexes. The assessment regarding hybrid warfare and related strategies puts focus on conceptual perspectives of manoeuvring in the hybrid conflict/warfare space to include activities in operational and strategic domains, such as land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber. Implications for security policy, military and defence are analysed. Conceptual, technological and organisational recommendations are derived to further in NATO, EU and member states governmental, academic and private sector perspectives on the issues of hybrid warfare.

Driven by the catalytic effect of new technologies, hybrid threats and hybrid warfare can be expected to become long-term strategic challenges. It is therefore paramount to develop a comprehensive understanding of their technological dimension. As the technological revolution unfolds with unprecedented speed, this requires continued efforts and a flexible and comprehensive approach of all relevant stakeholders in a whole of government, state and society approach. For this reason, it is important for EU, NATO and member states with all relevant players, entities and stakeholders to develop a solid understanding of new technologies, their future trends and disruptive potential for hybrid scenarios, before—hopefully not—being confronted with their hybrid warfare implications. The HYFUTEC project as reflected in this monograph intends to provide a contribution in this sense.

We are grateful to everyone who contributed to this project, supported its events, enabled discussion and exchange of minds and provided input and expertise from various fields. Special thanks go to Marina Dane, ie-editing.​com, for manuscript editing and project support and to Colonel Dr. Anton Dengg for supporting the project as subject matter expert. The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed in this monograph belong solely to the authors.

Dr.Johann SchmidDirector COI Strategy and Defence (COI S&D), The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), Helsinki, FIN

Ralph ThieleManaging Director, StratByrd Consulting, Andernach, GER

Summary

At a time of global competition for security architectures, trade and investment regimes, and leadership in new technologies, hybrid scenarios below the threshold of war are gaining rapidly in importance. Hybrid warfare has evolved into an effective, apparently low-risk instrument of power. Russia, China, Iran and further governmental and nongovernmental actors are making skilful use of inexpensive, commercially available, emerging technologies to further their own ambitions and power objectives. They integrate civil and military competition at every level, including the development of their international trade, investment, national technology base, and political and diplomatic activities. Not only great powers are challenged, but simply everyone—larger and small states, businesses, societies and ordinary citizen. Peace and freedom, rules-based order and democracy, prosperity and a self-determined way of life are at stake.

China and Russia have narrowed their technological gap over the past two decades, in some cases by turning to commercially available technologies more quickly and effectively than their Western competitors and by accelerating their own innovation in the armed forces. In particular China has undertaken impressive steps towards technological leadership. It already has a head start on AI and 5G and is well underway to dominating other technologies such as microelectronics and quantum computing. Together with Russia it is playing a sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing own goals without having to resort to war.

The panoply of dynamic, and especially digital technological developments on the horizon indicates that the portfolio of hybrid threats will expand rapidly. Future & technology horizon scanning has identified 19 technological trends relevant for the evolution of hybrid scenarios as well as for possibilities to counter hybrid adversaries, namely: artificial intelligence; 5G; autonomous systems; biotechnology; cloud computing; communications; cyber and electronic warfare; distributed ledger; directed energy, extended reality; hypersonics; internet of things; additive manufacturing; microelectronics; nano-materials; quantum sciences; nuclear modernisation; space assets; and ubiquitous sensors. It is important to understand that these technologies become particularly powerful in their mutually reinforcing systemic interplay.

Emerging technologies have been extending the battlespace as they strengthen hybrid actors by not only create new vulnerabilities but also facilitate their exploitation. The return of mass to the battlespace via swarms of drones and virtual cyber robots illustrates the revolutionary dimension of impending change. In particular dual/multiple use technologies with miniaturization and automatization have been key drivers of this development. Many of these are accessible, affordable, easy to handle, to transport, to hide and to use. This enables hybrid strategies that exploit ambiguities and avoid direct confrontation e.g., by weaponizing social media, using proxy-actors, or disrupting the enemy’s cognitive and trust system. As these technologies are available also for non-state or even individual actors this tendency may even further increase the number of hybrid actors.

In conjunction with globalization, not only the spectrum of hybrid actors is growing, but also the impact and reach of their activities. Attackers in particular will benefit from the innovation dynamic. We can expect disruptive technologies to provide a variety of actors with additional, powerful options for targeting in the context of hybrid campaigns people, assets, critical infrastructures, complex systems and processes virtually and physically, with little risk of attribution or immediate retaliation. Those who are best able to anticipate and exploit technological developments will have a clear advantage.

Effective countermeasures and resilience are still struggling to find their bearings. Resilience requires a whole-of-society approach and a comprehensive design that permanently seeks to reduce weak and fractured areas and strengthens social cohesion. This has become even more important, as in key technologies—with a few exceptions, such as nuclear, hypersonic, and electronic warfare—the commercial sector drives technology areas that are critical to security and defence, such as 5G, autonomous systems, biotechnology, cyber, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, laser technologies, quantum technologies, robotics, and space technologies. In Western democracies, the required spin-off is not yet well organized in terms of defence technologies. Judgment in this regard is still on shaky ground, leading to inadequate mission concepts and requirements documentation.

Serious Western capability gaps have emerged, both at the lower (hybrid threats) and the upper (hypersonic and advanced nuclear weapons) ends of the conflict spectrum. They open the door for coercion and blackmailing. Opponents such as Russia, China or Iran will foreseeably use political, informational, criminal, and infrastructural means, as well as economic intimidation and manipulation, to discover and exploit Western vulnerabilities.

However, digitalization and new technologies do not only come with negatives. They have been driving the creation of wealth globally. They also provide effective options to better identify, defend against and counter hybrid challenges. For example, AI could contribute to improve multi-domain situational awareness in a hybrid conflict/warfare environment. It broadly enables modelling of own vulnerabilities or hybrid attack vectors. Disruptive and radically improved technologies will enable networks of sensors and effectors to vastly accelerate the cycle of multi-domain target detection, evaluation, decision-making and action. They also support the employment of serious gaming to better prepare decision-makers to effectively deal with emerging complex, hybrid systems-of-systems challenges.

While we can expect hybrid warfare to become a long-term strategic challenge, the avantgarde of innovation is already setting course for a post-digital era. Neither the European Union nor the USA will be able to win the technological competition on their own. Transatlantic partners should meet Russia's technological challenges and China’s technological rise together. The EU, NATO and member nations would be well advised to reflect their strategic ambitions not only in economic strength, but also in the technological portfolio of their armed forces. The capability of NATO, the EU and member nations to accelerate innovation would form an integral part of strengthening democracy and ensuring prosperity, security and defence.

Abbreviations

5G

Fifth Generation technology standard for cellular networks

A2/AD

Anti-Access/Areal Denial

ACT

Allied Command Transformation

AI

Artificial Intelligence

AIS

Automatic Identification System

AM

Additive Manufacturing

AR

Augmented Reality

ASAT

Anti-Satellite

AUV

Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

BMI

Brain–Machine Interface

BMS

Battlefield Management System

BRI

Belt and Road Initiative

C2

Command and Control

C4I

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

C4ISR

Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

CDE

Concept Development & Experimentation

CEO

Chief Executive Officer

C-IED

Counter Improvised Explosive Device

CIS

Combat Information Systems

CoE

Centre of Excellence

CoG

Centre of Gravity

COI

Community of Interest

COI S&D

Community of Interest Strategy & Defence

COMINT

Communications Intelligence

COPD

Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive

COTS

Commercial Off-The-Shelf

COVID-19

Coronavirus Disease 2019

CSAR

Combat Search And Rescue

CSBA

(US) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

CSIS

Center for Strategic and International Studies

DARPA

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DC/AC

Direct Current to Alternating Current

DEW

Directed-energy Weapons

DIME

Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic

DLT

Distributed Ledger Technology

DNA

Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DoD

Department of Defense

DOTMPLF

Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities

EDA

European Defence Agency

ELINT

Electronic Intelligence

EMP

Electromagnetic Pulse

EMS

Electromagnetic Spectrum

EO

Electro-Optic

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EU

European Union

EW

Electronic Warfare

FIN

Finland

FSB

Federalnaja sluschba besopasnosti Rossijskoi Federazii

GAN

Generative Adversarial Networks

GEO

Geostationary Orbit

GEOINT

Geospatial Intelligence

GIS

Geographic Information Systems

GNC

Guidance, Navigation and Control

GNSS

Global Navigation Satellite System

GPS

Global Positioning System

GRU

Glawnoje Raswedywatelnoje Uprawlenije

GSM

Global System for Mobile Communications

HALE

High Altitude Long Endurance

HMT

Human-Machine-Teaming

HYFUTEC

Hybrid Warfare: Future & Technologies

Hybrid COE

European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats

ICT

Information and Communication Technology

IISS

International Institute for Strategic Studies

INF

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

IO

Illuminator of Opportunities

IoBT

Internet of Battle Things

IoT

Internet of Things

IP

Intellectual Property

IR

Infrared

IRGC

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps

IRCM

Infrared Countermeasures

ISAR

Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar

ISIS

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

ISTAR

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

IT

Information Technology

JEDI

Joint Enterprise Defence Infrastructure

JRC

Joint Research Centre

JSTARS

Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System

LED

Light-Emitting Diode

LEO

Low Earth Orbit

MASINT

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

MCM

Mine Countermeasures

MDA

Maritime Domain Awareness

MEO

Medium Earth Orbit

MR

Mixed Reality

M&S

Modelling & Simulation