ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISIM IN INDIA The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement

Ahsan Akram

History and Development of Islamic Political Thought Saeed Khan December 7, 2012

Akram 2 Introduction The Khilafat movement, beginning in 1919 and ending in 1924 is viewed as a flash in the pan movement in Indian history. Its causes can be debated ranging from purely political and nationalistic to unequivocally theological. Many papers have debated the true nature of the movement along with its lasting impact on the constantly evolving Indian subcontinent. This paper will attempt to dissect the underlying causes of the Khilafat movement along with focusing on the presiding framework in the Indian subcontinent that allowed for such a movement to occur. It is important to first define the word Khalifa. Khalifa derives from the Arabic root khalafa, which means to follow or to come after.1 It means successor in the sequential sense, not in the sense of inheritance of properties or qualities.2 In the terms of Islam, the Khalifa was the sequential successor of the Prophet Muhammad after his death. As a result, Abu Bakr was a Khalifa of the prophet, therefore Khalifat al-Rasool Allah. His successor would be labeled in a literal term as Khalifat al-Khalif al-Rasool Allah. Instead of using the title of Khalifa, Abu Bakr and his subsequent three elected successors utilized the title of Amir al-Muminin or the Commander of the Faithful.3 After the rise of the Ummayad Empire, the title of the leader was again in question. In order to provide legitimacy to the new monarchy established under the Ummayad Dynasty, the title of Khalifa was adopted. In this sense, it did not signify a successor, as the monarchy was a new phenomenon after the rule of the Khulafa-e-Rashidun. The term Khilafa was now transformed to represent an emperor or monarch, not a successor as the original meaning had
1

H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 4 2 Ibid, 4 3 Ibid, 4

Akram 3 intended it to be. This claim to the term Khalifa provided the Umayyad Dynasty the legitimacy they were seeking as it connected their monarchy to the original leadership of Islam following the death of the Prophet. As a result, it is necessary to understand that the title of Khalifa throughout the Ummayads, Abbasids, and Ottomans was as a term representing the monarch, not successor as originally intended. Particular to the Khilafat Movement, the term Khalifa essentially expands and holds a different defination for each class of society. The term is no longer associated or viewed specifically as defining a leader, successor, or monarch. Instead, it stands as a symbol of Islam. For the Ulema, the Khilafat represents a role of leadership as pertaining to the Islamic sharia. For the western-educated leaders of the Khilafat movement, the term holds an abstract idea of self-determination for the Indian Muslims. Finally, the general masses that were for the most part ignorant of what Khilafat actually meant, viewed the Khilafat as the direct representation of Islam. This plays a major role in the mobilization of the masses during the Khilafat movement. Connection Between the Ottoman Khalifa and the Indian Muslims After the death of the Prophet in 632 AD, the budding Islamic state of Medina was faced with a dilemma of what style of governance should be utilized. The Rashidun Caliphs tried to maintain the traditional simplicity of Islam and the tribal values of an earlier age.4 By the abrupt conclusion of Alis caliphate, the Islamic state transitioned into a monarchy beginning with the Umayyad Dynasty. Arab expansion and wars of conquest resulted in a tremendous increase in their wealth and the monarchy (caliphate) by the time of the Abbasids developed a succession from God ideology.5 Social hierarchies developed as a result, the caliphate wearing the political

M. Shakir, Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims During 1919-1947 (Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970), 3 5 Ibid, 3

Akram 4 crown and simultaneously wielding a spiritual influence over the general population. This model of the social and political hierarchy extended to the Indian subcontinent in the form of Mughal shahs. In pre-British rule, the Mughal emperors occupied themselves with political governance while the Ulema handled Islamic jurisprudence in a favorable manner to the Shahs ideology.6 As a religion, Islam was spread to the common man through regional Sufis and Pirs rather than the Ulema.7 This key point is very important in later understanding the process of Muslim mobilization in India. Despite the separations in region, linguistics, class, and sects, the Muslim minority was held together by the common religion of Islam and the connection to the religion of the ruling Empire.8 This commonality, although not visible in everyday life for the common Muslim, was a strong point in keeping a direct loyalty to the Muslim Shah. Minority status for the Muslims allowed for the extraterritorial loyalty to the community of Islamic believers.9 The Muslim Mughal Empire held social, political, and economic power in India prior to the British Raj. For example, the British East India Company derived authority in India from the Mughals.10 In religious terms, the Mughal Shahs name was used in the weekly sermon during Friday jumma (congregational prayer). At face value, the divided Muslim minority shared the common denominator of Islam amongst themselves and with the Shah. When this focal point of connectedness was lost after the fall of the Mughals, the Muslims turned their association to the Ottoman Empire and its hold on the Islamic Caliphate.

6 7

Ibid, 11 A.F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Univ of South Carolina Press, 1998), 169 8 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (Allen & Unwin London, 1967). 9 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2 10 Ibid, 5

Akram 5 The legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate in the Indian subcontinent is a topic worthy of discussion. By the late 19th century, the Ottoman sultans decided to lay claim to the Universal Caliphate.11 In order to establish legitimacy, the Ottoman Empire launched a campaign of the mythical transfer of the Caliphate to Selim by al-Mutawakkil in 1517.12 The Ottomans had to show that the transfer of the Caliphate was a legitimate process from the Abbasids, the former owners of the position of Caliph. Heavy propaganda was distributed in India through Urdu journalism, the main form of Muslim media. During this time period, Indian Muslims were devoid of a symbolic religious commonality after the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1857. As a result, the story of the transfer of Caliphate power from al-Mutawakkil to Selim was generally accepted in India without much questioning or backlash. Two groups of thought did emerge on the topic of the Ottoman Caliphate. The first group subscribed to the Barelvi tradition, refusing to accept the legitimacy of the Ottoman claim on the Caliphate by not questioning the story, but by affirming the Prophets saying pertaining to the title of Caliph staying within the Quraysh clan.13 The Ottomans, not being of Qurayshi descent, failed to qualify for the position of Caliph. The second group however believed and readily accepted the story presented by the Ottomans. This allowed for the void of the Mughal figurehead to be replaced with one from the Ottoman Empire. Growing Ottoman sympathies from India were demonstrated with Imams beginning to use the Sultans name in Friday congressional prayers. Muslims launched funds to provide for

11

H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 2 12 Ibid, 2 13 Ibid, 3

Akram 6 Turkish relief during the Turkish War of 1877-78 and during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.14 This developing support for the Ottoman Empire was a clear sign of the religious alliance forming within Indian Muslims towards Turkish causes. When it was claimed that the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent owned allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, no British or Hindu eyebrows were raised and the claim was accepted at its face value.15 Sultan Abdul Hamid II also became very active in flexing his proverbial caliphate muscles in order to gain pan-Islamic support from India and abroad against encroaching European powers. Ultimately, Muslims in India began to view the Ottoman Caliphate and as an extension, the Ottoman Empire as the symbol of Islamic unity and international power. Dynamics Between the Indian Muslims and the British The relationship between the British rulers and English residents of India with the Indians was a strained and distant one. Imperial domesticity was believed superior to native Indian domesticity for the English.16 Areas with British population had detailed set of rules and regulations enacted that upheld a British standard in English homes along with maintaining a superiority complex with the native Indians. British individuals prevented their children from spending too much time with other Indian children or with their ayah (nanny) in fear that their children would learn the Hindi language.17 The Hindi or Urdu languages were looked down upon along with the people who spoke such languages. Surprisingly, English-speaking Anglo-Indians

14

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 5 15 I. Rome Sultan, "The Role of the North-West Frontier Province in the Khilafat and Hijrat Movements," Islamic Studies 43, no. 1 (2004), 51 16 Blunt Alison, "Imperial Geographies of Home: British Domesticity in India, 1886-1925," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999), 422 17 Ibid, 434

Akram 7 were not considered equals either as they were often deemed untrustworthy or castigated for their distinctive accent.18 Despite all of this hostility towards the locals, it is surprising that the Indian Muslims were still somewhat supportive of the British prior to the beginning of World War I. Although there was a Muslim mutiny in 1857 against the British, the Muslims largely were not militantly rebellious to the British. They were more concerned with purifying their own religion against a backdrop of threats from Hinduism and Christian Missionaries. The development of the local sufi sects after the decline of the Mughals created an initiative to promote a purer vision of Islamic life and society.19 Along with Islamic reforms domestically, the Ottoman Empire also played a role in increasing Muslim Indias support for the ruling British. During the mutiny in 1857 for example, the Ottoman sultan called Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British rule.20 A direct intervention by the Caliphate allowed for the settling of the mutiny. A divergent result was that the antiwestern Ulema lost power and influence over Indian Muslims after the fall of the Mughals.21,22 Due to the political alliance of the Ottoman Empire and Britain during the time period, the Muslims viewed the British as an entity that was attempting to help maintain the Ottoman Dynasty and as a derivative, the Muslim Caliphate. Thus, the British were not viewed in a negative light.

18 19

Ibid, 434 R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 31 20 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 6 21 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 43 22 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)

Akram 8 Muslim opposition to the British began to grow in the years 1911-1913 when the Balkan wars became another source of anxiety to Muslims.23 Muslims began to believe the conspiracy that encroaching Christians were ultimately pursing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and along with it, the Islamic Caliphate. With the loss of another major Islamic identifier, Indian Muslims were highly nervous of losing their Islamic identity with the large Ottoman Empire and ultimately losing out to the majority Hindus. The rift between Indian and British relations further splintered in 1912 when the British Empire refused to grant Aligarh Muslim University the licensure to become an educational institution. The Aligarh movement originally displayed a firm loyalty to British rule.24 Students of Aligarh were considered westernized products from the education received at the institution. Surprisingly, many of these westernized students were the ones to denounce their loyalty to the British Crown and instead begin supporting an anti-British stance. Many of these rebelling students would go on to begin the foundations of the Khilafat movement and help it become mainstream in Indian society. These Aligarh products included Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abdul Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, and Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad.25 It is important to note the distinction of the Islamic schools of thought that each individual belonged to and the developing cooperation and unity between the different sects in order to attain their goals. Aligarh Muslim University The shift in alliance of the Muslim University against the British Raj can be attributed as the biggest chain reaction that helped kick-start Muslim political activism. It makes sense to
23

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 10 24 Ibid 25 Ibid

Akram 9 breakdown the leadership of the Aligarh Muslim University and understands why it became the roots of a major movement in India. The attempted creation of a Muslim University was an effort on the part of the founders to create an all-India Muslim constituency and to carve out for it a decisive piece of political power.26 The Western-educated founders of the University believed that it was necessary for the cultivation of cultural and philosophical ideals in an institution grounded to an internationally recognized political and educational powerhouse. The University would also serve as a direct challenge to the British control of the educational access to power.27 The education establishment would also serve as a factory in developing the next generation of Muslim political thinkers. It was becoming a priority for the Muslim leaders in India to establish a social and political hub and stake their claim in the discourse of developing Indian politics in order to prevent marginalization by the Hindu majority. Thus, it was necessary to develop an educated youth in order to maintain autonomy in the political scene. The Muslim leaders understood that the minority Muslims could only stay relevant and with specialization in their social and political ranks. The Muslim University was created to function as a base for emerging leaders of Muslim India. There was no distinction set for the cultural or political identities that each individual could choose. The proposed university would be modern, but it would be universally Muslim.28 These ground rules from the University establishment allowed for the spread of ideas and

26

Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (1974), 145 27 Ibid 28 Ibid, 149

Akram 10 inadvertently resulted in bitter factionalism, which became a chief characteristic of the University.29 Aligarh served as a hotbed for ideologies from differing sects of Islam. For example, students of the Deoband and Firangi Mahal schools of thoughts both studied at the University. The differing religious viewpoints resulted in divisions in the University. The rifts in ideologies led to the formations of leagues within the University, ultimately nurturing future development of political parties such as the Muslim League. These parties would later go on to play a role in the political landscape of India post-British Raj and into the partition arguments. In 1911, the Government of India submitted a request for Aligarh Muslim University to be recognized as an official international University in the British Empire. Britain instead decided that the University should instead remain a federal university of closely neighboring colleges.30 The British also were not keen in including the term Muslim in the title of the University, rather preferring it be named The University of Aligarh. The Muslims representing Aligarh University quickly grew impatient and took to the Urdu newspapers in demanding the development of the University on their own terms. Muhammad Ali, the head of the Old Boys Association at Aligarh, reiterated the demand for an all-India affiliating institution run by Muslims with minimum of government interference in his newspaper Comrade.31 By June 1912, the British Empire had decided to reject the University proposal according to what the Muslim leaders of Aligarh were demanding. The Muslim University movement had aimed at the development of a distinguished educational institution which would be the outward and visible sign of Indian Muslim cultural and political regeneration as well as the center of an

29 30

Ibid, 145 Ibid, 169 31 Ibid

Akram 11 autonomous network of Muslim educational institutions throughout India.32 By rejecting the proposal for the University, the British reaffirmed their authority over the Muslims and inadvertently stripped the minority Muslims of their attempted establishment of a source of identity. The British were not supporting Islam in India as the Indian Muslims once thought, instead they were taking away the identity marker and grounding establishment the Muslims were trying to claim. This event, along with the growing British threat towards the Ottoman Empire helped create a massive push towards heavy anti-British sentiment in Muslim society. Development of the Khilafat Movement Following the breakdown of the establishment plans for Aligarh University, the divided Muslim community of Aligarh gradually became united under the banner of anti-British rule. Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan emerged as the leaders of the anti-British movement.33 The Ali brothers along with Abdul Bari and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan took a theological approach against the British. They believed politics could not be divorced from religion unlike what western thought presented.34 The post-Aligarh political activism obtained a new rally point against British Raj after the Ottoman Empire declared war on the British during World War I. Indian Muslims began to believe their religion was on a decline due to expanding western powers. Fazlul Haq, President of the annual session of the Muslim League in 1918 said the future of Islam in India seems to be wrapped in gloom and anxiety. Every instance of a collapse of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political

32

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 54 33 Ibid, 10 34 Ibid, 56

Akram 12 importance of our community in India.35 There was a direct threat on the Muslim identity and political strength in India due to the dwindling political powers of their international Islamic associates. To make matters worse, the symbolic head of Islam was now under attack from Britain during World War I. It became the duty of the Indian Muslim to not only take a stand for their symbolic head in Istanbul, but also fight to maintain their own weakening identity. Although this identity crisis was taking center stage for Muslims in India, it is important to realize that this was not the case for the rest of the world. Most Muslims outside of India rejected the pan-Islamic ideology. For example, developing Arab nationalism resulted in Arabs having no desire to be ruled by Turkey and felt no allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey as their Khalifa.36 Even inside the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism led by the Young Turks was developing, resulting in the idea of having a sovereign Turkish state without ties to the rest of the Muslim world. On the contrary, the Muslims in India were not familiar with the concept of Nationalism because of their isolation in the Indian commonwealth along with the resistance against British cultural influence. As reiterated before, the Muslims in India were devoid of a social or political identity, thus seeking to connect themselves with extra national entities such as the Ottoman Khalifa. It is from this non-connectedness on the part of the Indian Muslims that an attempt to save the Ottoman Khalifa, their only identity marker, emerged. The main catalysts for the development of the Khilafat movement were the Aligarh educated Ali brothers. Both Muhammad and Shaukat Ali took upon roles as Maulanas and began preaching their anti-British ideologies through khutbas at jumma prayers. The brothers would reiterate the message of objections against the government and pray for God to grant

35

Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 38 36 Ibid, 39

Akram 13 victory and succor to the caliph.37 In some instances, the Ottoman Sultan would be praised and prayers offered for the success of his sword and his armies and the destruction of the infidels.38 The British, although aware of such actions, did not act against the Ali brothers due to the sensitive issue of tampering with religious sermons. As a result, the Ali brothers were able to spread their message through local mosques without much resistance from the British. The Ali brothers stated the Indian Muslims demands for the Khilafat to Britain through a series of letters. They demanded that: there should be no attempt by non-Muslims to interfere in the free choice by the Muslims of the Khalifa, the sovereignty of the Khalifa over the Holy places should not be dismembered even among Muslim governments, Egypt and the other territories of the Ottoman Empire should be restored to the Khalifa, Muslim religious places should not be occupied or controlled by non-Muslims, Muslims should not be asked to assist in the prosecution of war against the Khalifa, no Muslims should be punished for promoting sympathy with his brother Muslim, and the British Government should pay more respect to the sentiments of Muslims in India.39 The failure of the British government to respond to these demands touching the fate of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the emergence of the Khilafat Movement.40 In order to increase Hindu awareness for the Khilafat cause, the Ali brothers decided to enlist the support of Gandhi, a Hindu lawyer. Although neither Muhammad nor Shaukat Ali were able to personally contact Gandhi, they were able to communicate with him through their spiritual mentor and fellow Aligarh alumnus Abdul Bari.
37

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 55 38 Ibid 39 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 40 40 Ibid, 41

Akram 14 With support from Gandhi, it became easier for the Muslims and Hindus to begin talks for an alliance against the British. In 1916, the Muslim League, with Muhammad Ali in representation, and the Indian National Congress met in order to discuss the potential selfgovernment goals of India. The resulting Lucknow pact allowed for the control of all Indias internal affairs by these legislatures through the power of the purse and furthermore, agreed that Muslims, who comprised a minority of some 21 percent, should have constitutional safeguards in form of separate electorates with weighted seats.41 The pact not only insured that the Muslim voice would be heard in the developing all-India governing body, but helped the Muslims gain a larger voice then their collective minority population would normally allow for. Although this caused some nervousness within the Hindu community leading to riots and Hindi uprisings, it essentially put both Muslims and Hindus on a level playing field in the game of politics. The concerns of the Muslim minority would now have to at least somewhat have an impact on the national conversation of India. After the enactment of the Lucknow pact, tensions between the Muslims and Hindus heightened. In September 1917, Hindus began objecting the Muslim slaughtering of cows in Shahabad, resulting in riots erupting throughout the city.42 Relations between the Hindus and Muslims continued to deteriorate in October of 1917 when the Hindu festival of Dussehra and the Shia Muslim observance of Muharram coincided.43 Further violence and protesting erupted from this exchange between the two faiths. The Muslim Ulema, now headed by Abdul Bari claimed that there was oppression of Islam resulting from the Hindus. These riots and protests

41

Hugh F. Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact," The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1972), 561 42 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 58 43 Ibid, 59

Akram 15 caused two changes to occur in the political landscape of Muslim India. First, the Muslim population began to look to the Ulema for leadership and guidance (a first since the 1857 mutiny) instead of the Muslim League. The Muslim population placed some of the blame on the occurrences of rioting on the Muslim League because it was their Lucknow pact that began the animosity of Hindus towards the Muslims. Second, the Muslims again affirmed their alliance towards Istanbul, as they no longer viewed themselves as an autonomous group among the infidels in India. Following the increasing animosity and rioting between Hindus and Muslims between 1917 and 1919, one major event occurred in 1919 that helped unify the bickering sides along with uniting them on a common goal. On March 18, 1919, the British government passed the Rowlatt Act. Rumors about the Act spread throughout India. It was said that the police would be free to search and arrest whomever they pleased and keep him under lock and key without trial, and that the law abolished the right of appeal and imposed new and severe taxation.44 All aspects of Indian society, whether it was the prince or peasant, Hindu or Muslim, were fervently opposed to the passage of the Act.45 These bills helped unite the divided Indian population towards one goal of eliminating British rule and establishing Indian independence. The one symbol that quickly connected both Hindus and Muslims was the Khalifa. The symbolic Khalifa was the epitome of anti-Britishness. The Hindus embraced the symbol because it represented an enemy to the British Raj. The Muslims on the other hand continued their support of the symbol because it was symbolic of their religion identity. If the Khilafat was to be damaged by the British, so to were the Muslims. The Muslims needed the assistance of the

44 45

Ibid, 69 L. Rai, The Political Future of India (BW Huebsch, 1919), xi

Akram 16 Hindus in mounting an agitation to bring pressure on the British while the Hindus could not build an all-embracing national movement without the cooperation of the Muslims.46 Gandhi was quick to act on the connecting point of the Caliphate. He turned to the Ali brothers camp to gain their support in his satyagraha (non-violence) technique of resistance and was also quick to enlist Abdul Bari and the Ulema to his principles of satyagraha.47 Gandhi was intelligent in understanding that not only was he enlisting the support of the western political activists in the Ali brothers, he was also insuring the support of the Muslim masses through the now allied Ulema. Gandhi also viewed India as a whole, thus it was necessary for both the Hindus and Muslims to act together because without one, there was no whole.48 On September 21, 1919, a conference of Muslim leaders was held in Lucknow pertaining to the developing Khilafat movement. The group set October 17 as Khilafat day, a day of fasting and prayer.49 Gandhi also urged Hindus to join the observation, stating, Their sorrows must be our sorrows.50 Throughout India, Muslims and Hindus both observed Khilafat day, symbolizing the beginning of a political collaboration between Hindus and Muslims. October 17, 1919 can also be viewed as the official beginning of the Khilafat Movement. Hindu-Muslim relationships were forged along with adapting Muslim-Muslim relationships, allowing for the powerful beginning of the movement.

46

Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 47 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 69 48 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 575 49 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 50 Ibid

Akram 17 Within the Muslim community, the Ulema and Western-educated politicians drew closer together after the beginning of World War I and continued the relationship into and throughout the Khilafat Movement. The old Muslim League was soon replaced with the All-India Khilafat Committee, a politically oriented party, and Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, an Ulema influenced party. In February 1920, the Khilafat Conference, led by Shaukat Ali, established the Khilafat Manifesto listing the goals of the Khilafat Movement.51 The constitution of the All-India Khilafat Committee spelled out four aims of the organization: to preserve the Khilafat as a center for the Muslim world, to keep the jazirat al-Arab free from non-Muslim control, to work in India for the attainment of self-government, and to organize Indian Muslims for religious, educational, social, and economic benefit.52 These claims first and foremost laid out a plan for the establishment of Muslim identity and sovereignty in the developing Indian social, political, and economic climate. Second, the pan-Islamic connection was also necessary for Muslim identity and the preservation of the Khilafat along with Khilafat control over Arab lands maintained that. Finally, the All-India Khilafat Committee acknowledges the establishment of India as a sovereign nation, mainly in order to align themselves against British rule. These set goals somewhat overlap with the demands presented by the Ali brothers during the outbreak of World War I. Role of the Ulema in the Khilafat Movement Although the Ali brothers were powerful in the terms of leading the Muslim League, helping push the All-India Khilafat Committee, create alliances with Gandhi, and become the strategists behind the Khilafat movement, the Ulema played a massive role in the mobilization of the masses.

51

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 93 52 Ibid

Akram 18 For the majority of Muslims in India, neither the state of the Ottoman Empire nor the description of the caliphate mattered. What mattered was the connection to the symbolism of Islamic figures, sanctuaries, and holy places in the area known as Jazirat al-Arab.53 The Khilafat played a role as the symbolic head of Islam and the protector of the holy places of Islam. This figurehead was the all-encompassing earthly entity that a Muslim could look towards in relating with pan-Islamism. Any danger presented to these symbols or sanctuaries by foreign influence such as the British was a motivating factor in rebelling against such transgressors. The Ulema played a heavy influential role for most Muslims because they were directly involved with the weekly sermons, daily prayers, and religious identity on a local level. They were also teachers, writers, and preachers in the local communities. The leaders of the Khilafat Movement made it a point to urge Maulanas, Sufis, and local Pirs to lead their congregations and spread the message of the Khilafat Movement.54 The Ulema developed a powerful political mobilization from the use of religious rhetoric. Jamat al-Ulama-e-Hind developed as a political party bringing together different schools of though for the Ulema and allowing for the unification of voice and ideas. Leaders of the Ulema, such as Maulana Abdul Bari emerged with the reins of politics in their control. Abdul Bari along with the Ulema and its associations with local pirs helped bring the Khilafat Movement from the western-educated and middle-class Khilafat campaigners to the isolated rural Muslims.55

53

Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981) 54 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 130 55 Shabnum Tejani, "Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and Its Aftermath, 19191927," South Asia Research 27, no. 3 (2007), 253

Akram 19 The Ulema and local pirs issued fatwas (juristic ruling) calling on thousands of spiritual disciples to participate in demonstrations and boycotts.56 Fatwas became a major tool for implementing control over the Muslim population. There was a proliferation of the direct issuing of fatwas from the Ulema to the believers.57 For example, in order to rally Indian Muslims following the Barelvi tradition of rejecting the Ottoman Caliphate, Maulana Abdul Bari issued a fatwa in February 1919 laying down rules clarifying that Qurayshi descent was not a necessary condition for the Khilafat.58 The Ulemas support also allowed for the strengthening of Gandhis non-cooperation movement in the Muslim community after the passage of fatwas by Abdul Bari, considering it Islamically unlawful to buy foreign goods.59This allowed for Barelvi Muslims to join the forces with the majority in upholding the Ottoman Caliphate. The support from the Muslim Ulema allowed for the Khilafat Movement to gain a strong and influential religious tone. This was not only appealing to the masses, but also to the Westernized Muslims leading the Khilafat movement. These men began to grow a beard and otherwise conform to the tenants of orthodoxy.60 For example, a picture taken of Muhammad Ali in 1913 shows him in a Western style dress along with a large moustache. By 1921, he was wearing a full beard with traditional Indian clothing in his portrait. The shift in attention to religious affiliation and symbolism was very prominent from the way the style of clothing and appearance changed dramatically. The beard and traditional dress became memes for the Khilafat Movement and representation of Islam.
56 57

Ibid R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 35 58 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 6 59 Ibid 60 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)

Akram 20 The Hindu-Muslim Alliance In order for any powerful activism to occur in India, both the Hindu and Muslim population realized that they needed the support of each other. Although the Hindus were the majority religion, they could not stage an all-Indian movement without including the largest minority present in the country. Similarly, Muslim political activism in support of the Khalifa would not contain any weight if they created powerful demands from the position of a minority. It became necessary for the cooperation of both sectors of society and leaders from both sides understood this. Thus, the opportunity for an alliance emerged within these circumstances. The major figures forming the Hindu-Muslim alliance were Mohandas Gandhi and Muhammad and Shaukat Ali. Gandhi took the Ali brothers as his own brothers during the course of the movement in order to set an example for the Hindu population.61 Gandhi understood that the unity of the nation was important in order to represent a powerful and undivided force acting against the British. In order to gain the trust of the Muslims, Gandhi picked up the idea of saving the Khilafat in Turkey, despite knowledge of the Ottoman Empire falling apart and newfound Turkish nationalism finding no use for the Ottoman sultan.62 Although Gandhi claimed that the Muslims goal is a Hindus goal, it seems he was only playing on religious emotions to create alliances. The Muslims, in return of Gandhis extension for alliance, symbolically made him president of the first All-India Khilafat Conference held in Delhi on November 23-24, 1919.63 Whether or not the Muslim leadership understood the level of Gandhis genuine attachment to

61

K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 578 62 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 63 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 42

Akram 21 their cause, they knew that Hindu support was necessary in order to gain ground. The Muslims made appearances at Hindu temples and participated in their worship while the Hindus began visiting Muslim mosques.64 The alliance became more known for their superficial acceptance of each other, masking the tensions hidden underneath symbolic gestures. The Khilafat and the Cow became interchangeable collective representations in the terminology of Indian nationalism.65 The major opposition Gandhi and the Ali brothers faced in the formation of the HinduMuslim alliance was Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Gurudev Tagore. Jinnah claimed Gandhi was bringing religion into politics, saying it was a method likely to backfire.66 Jinnah understood that although Gandhi was upholding Islamic symbols in order to appease the Muslims, his switch to Hindu symbols to maintain majority Hindu support would cause massive paranoia in the Muslim population. The Muslims were likely to begin fearing a Hindu Raj following the overthrowing of the British Raj.67 Tagore also was vocal in claiming that Gandhis movement would also tend to divide the Hindus from Muslims and create deep fissures in Indian society.68 Tagore argued that nationalism tended to created emotions of exclusion and separation based on differences, not commonality.69 Despite the claims against Gandhis political ideas, which would prove to be correct after the collapse of the Khilafat movement, the Muslim leaders remained in support of Gandhi. They
64

K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 65 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 66 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 66 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 24 67 P. Kidambi, "Nationalism and the City in Colonial India Bombay, C. 1890-1940," Journal of Urban History 38, no. 5 (2012), 962 68 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 25 69 Ibid

Akram 22 viewed Gandhis policies as an infallible way to gain British attention and put pressure on Britain. Gandhi was skilled at speaking in accepted British terms to a British audience, leaving them uncomfortable with their own conscience.70 His non-cooperation movement allowed for demonstrations to occur without having entered into a war against Britain. The Muslims were not attempting to break away cleanly from British rule as the Hindus were, they were instead attempting to maintain their sovereignty and identity in the social and political landscape in India and internationally through the Ottoman Empire. By participating in a national movement allied with the Hindus, the Muslims could voice their opinion with a greater authority and not fear discrimination in favor of the Hindus as the British rule previously did against Muslim uprisings.71 The Muslims understood that their role in the non-cooperation movement put them on the proverbial loudspeaker and gave them leverage by having the power to potentially disrupt Britains own colonial rule. Urdu Media and its Role in Mobilization Despite Muslim alliances with within themselves and with the Hindus, the true essence of the Khilafat movement spread through the Urdu media, allowing for mass mobilization of the people. Major political figures such as Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, and Maulana Abdul Azad were able to spread their ideas to the Muslim masses through Urdu newspapers such as Comrade, Hamdard, Al-Hilal, Al-Balagh, and Zamindar.72 These papers were widely read by the Muslim middle-class, the major actors at the political forefront. They became a means of communication between political elites in a public atmosphere. The middle class, on both the

70

Vithal Rajan, "Gandhi: The Colonising Object," Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 15 (2006), 1426 71 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 28 72 ijaz Ahmad, "Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India," Social Scientist 33, no. 1/2 (2005) 23

Akram 23 Hindu and Muslim side were the western-educated lot who were in position to take over the government positions that would be vacated from the departure of colonial rule.73 They stood to gain the most from these movements and thus were open to the ideas presented by the Ali Brothers and religious leaders such as Maulana Abdul Azad and Maulana Abdul Bari. The religious Ulema, also active in publications, were the means used to communicate with the majority lower class through published fatwas and religious essays. One major literary technique the political activists and the Ulema used in obtaining support for the Khilafat Movement was Urdu poetry. Poetic recitation became a part of political mass meetings; poetry became a means of communicating between the politicized elite and their common audience.74 Poetry also spoke to the emotions, resulting in the connection forged with the hearts of Muslims who prior to the poetic recitation were uninterested in the political movements. These forms of communication allowed for the public discourse between political leaders of the Khilafat movement and between the leaders and the rest of the community. Fall of the Khilafat Movement As predicted by Jinnah and Tagore, the Hindu-Muslim alliance was built on an unstable religiously symbolic base, resulting in an easy break in the association from a few violent setbacks. Although Gandhi called for non-violence in his non-cooperation movement, he failed to realize that any violent threat to the Hindu or Muslim commonwealth could result in a pushback to maintain their place in society. Gandhi also was relying on the fact that the majority Hindu and minority Muslims would maintain a balanced alliance without allowing for their

73

Sukumar Muralidharan, "Religion, Nationalism and the State: Gandhi and India's Engagement with Political Modernity," Social Scientist 34, no. 3/4 (2006), 14 74 Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry During the Khilafat Movement," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 4 (1974), 461

Akram 24 majority/minority status to interfere. The alliance enjoined by a thread came crashing during the Mappilla Rebellion. In the South Indian Malabar district, this disparity in the balance of power between the landlord Hindus and peasant Muslims (Mappillas) was at a high tension in 1921. On August 20, the Hindu police raided a mosque to find the Khilafat leaders who were claimed to have a hand in a recent burglary of a Hindu landlords house. A rumor spread of the desecration of the mosque, causing a rebellion by the Muslim pheasants. During the rebellion, Khilafat flags were in evidence and in a couple of villages, Khilafat kingdoms were proclaimed.75 Although the name of the Khilafat was used as a reason for rebelling, the true reason behind the pheasant rebellion was social and religious unrest between the two groups resulting from distress caused by recent monsoon and resulting famine. The Hindus throughout the country began to fear a massive Muslim rebellion while the Muslims were again uneasy about their delicate position in society. Further weakening the movement was the arrest of the Ali brothers in the month following the Mappilla rebellion. Without a strong leadership, the Khilafat movement began to unravel. Maulana Abdul Azad took over leadership of the Khilafat movement, yet he did not have a clear goal or vision of where to take the movement. Gandhis plans for his Civil Disobedience demonstration was put on indefinite hold because of various outbreaks of violence and escalating arrests in November 1921.76 Furthermore, a money scandal erupted in the Khilafat movement leading to distrust developing within the leadership. After Gandhis arrest and sentencing in 1922, the movement lost its only link with the Hindus, resulting in widespread riots

75

G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 147 76 Ibid, 177

Akram 25 and unrest throughout the country. A large power vacuum developed with the absence of the Ali brothers and Gandhi, resulting in the destabilization of the political structure. Post-Khilafat Movement On March 3, 1924, the newly established Republic of Turkey formally passed a motion for the abolition of the Caliphate.77 The original goals of maintaining the Ottoman Khalifat and control of the Ottoman Empire over the jazirat al-Arab had both failed. What was left of the Khilafat Movement was not only thunderstruck, but also unable to take a strong new position. The Khilafat Committees new leadership decided to transition into a pro-Indian movement. The Ulema however maintained that the goal should still be the implementation of a new caliphate according to sharia.78 This caused a major divide in the movement: first removing the purpose of the movement for which it was named after, and second losing support of the masses which looked to the Ulema for guidance. With the loss of support from the Ulema, the Khilafatists were reduced to an isolated faction.79 Further divides rocked the fragile Khilafat committee after Sharif Husain of the Hijaz claimed the caliphate. Husain was viewed as an instrument of the West, thus resulting in his damnation by one side of the committee. The other side was supportive of Husain however due to the reestablishment of the caliphate. Further bickering tore the committee apart, ultimately resulting in the death of the Khilafat Movement.

77

"The Destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate," Advocate of Peace through Justice 86, no. 4 (1924), 215 78 Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashd Ri's Ideas on the Caliphate," Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 2 (1997), 273 79 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 206

Akram 26 Conclusion Although the Khilafat Movement seems to be a failure in creating a united Muslim front in India, upholding the power of the Ottoman Khilafat, and erecting a permanent Hindu-Muslim alliance, it played a major role in helping mobilize the Muslim masses for radical changes further down the road. The major debate pertaining to the Khilafat Movement is whether it was a religious or nationalistic movement. In my opinion, the Khilafat Movement was more religious than nationalistic. Although the phenomena of nationalism was spreading through the Arabs and in Turkey, the Indian Muslims were not privy to that idea. If it was not for religious fatwas for supporting nationalist mobilization, the movement would have died a while before the abolishment of the Ottoman Khilafat. Further, when the Ulema pulled their support from the movement after the change of vision to nationalism in 1924, the movement lost its legs and was more or less considered dead. The Muslims of India were desperate for a connection to a body of power that they could relate to while living as a minority in a Hindu dominant country. After the fall of the Mughal Empire in India, the Muslims felt marginalized in their own homes. The only stable structure that was visible to them was the Ottoman Khilafat. By utilizing the idea of equality in Islam, Indian Muslims took upon the pan-Islamic ideology not to challenge the British or Hindus for their own power, but rather develop their own identity as a force in the social and political discourse backed by the international Muslims powers. Once the Khilafat was abolished, the Muslims hit a dividing wall. The Ulema continued to fight for authority by demanding the reconnection to a pan-Islamic religious identity while the westernized Muslim leaders began to view national freedom as the only opportunity to gain leverage in visibility in a Hindu dominant

Akram 27 country. This nationalistic attitude further cultivated into the development of an all-Muslim state called Pakistan. Although the Khilafat Movement began and maintained itself as a majority religious movement, it planted the seeds for future nationalistic mobilization. The movement allowed for Indian Muslims to cultivate their own sense of nationalism over the course of Muslim-Hindu alliances and further Muslim-Hindu turmoil. It was necessary for the cultivation of the idea of nationalism to occur for the Muslims in order for there to be an understanding of a postCaliphate world without a pan-Islamic identity but a nationalistic identity. For the majority of Muslims, the use of religious symbolism allowed for the mobilization of masses, resulting in a first hand experience of entering the social and political discourse, rather than being isolated as was the case pre-Khilafat Movement. Although the Khilafat Movement did not attain its set of goals, the activists were successful in incubating the raw idea of nationalism through a religious oriented movement, resulting in a minority Muslim population gaining a new, yet mature independent identity.

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