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1 DELEUZE I
EDITED BY At-rnnr\r HAKr(

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Th is is t he f ir s t d i c ti o n a ry d e d i c a te d to th e ' w ork of Gi l l es D el euze. It provides an in-depth and lucid introduction to one of the most influential figuresin coniinentalphilosophy. The dictionary defines and contextualises more than 150 ter-rnsthat relate to Deleuzel philosophy including concepts such as 'becoming','body without 'decerritorializatiqn','differenre','repetition','rhizome''schizoanalysis'. organs', and The clear explanations also-address the main intellectualinfluences Deleuze on as well as tl're influence Deleuze has had on suDiects such as feminism, cinema, postcolonial theory, geographyand cultural studies.Those unfamiliar with Deleuze will find the dictionary a user-friendly tool equippingthem with definitions and interpretations both as a study and/or a teaching aid. The entries are written by some of the rnost prominent Deleuze scholars inciudingRosi Braidotti,Claire Colebrook,Tom Conley,EugeneHollarrdand Paul Patton.Thesecontributors bring their expert knowledgeand critical opinion to bear on the entries and provide an enrichingtheoretical context for anyone interestedin Deleuze. Adrian Parr is Professor of contemporary art and designat the Savannah College of Art and Design. She is the editor, with lan Buchanan,of Deleuze ond the ry Contemporo World, f orthcom i ng from Edinburgh U n iversity Press.

IS BN 0-7 186-1899-6 S

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Th e D e l e u ze Dicti onarv
Editedby Adrian Parr

EdinburghUniversity Press

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C ontents

@ in this edition, Edinburgh University Press,2005 @ in the individual contributions is retained by the authors Edinburgh University PressLtd 22 George Squarg Edinburgh Typeset in Ehrhardt by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Longsight, Manchester,and printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts A CIP record for this book is availablefrom the British Library ISBN 0 7486 18988 (hardback) ISBN 0 7486 18996 (paperback) The right of the contributors to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentsAct 1988.

Acknowledgements Introduction Claire Colebrooh Entries A-Z Bibliography Notes on Contributors

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308 315

A ckn o w l e d g e ments

Intr oduc ti on

First I would like to thank all rhe authorswho contributedto this proiect. Without you this dictionary would never have come into existence. Everyonewho hasentriesincludedhereand my editor,JackieJones, have beentremendouslycooperative and helpful in more waysthan one.I would like also to thank Keith Ansell-Pearson, Ronald Bogue, Paul Patton and Williamsfor their comments and suggesgions, of which havecerall James tainly strengthened theoreticalrigour of this dictionary; any shortthe comingsareentirelymy own. I am very gratefulto MonashUniversityand Savannah Collegeof Art and Design for their continuingsupport.Lastly, the strongintellectand generosity Ian Buchanan of and Claire Colebrook havebeena wonderfulsource inspirationfor me and I would iust like to of extend my warmestthanksto you both; this project would neverhaveseen the light of day without your continuingencouragement support. and Adrian Parr

Claire Colebrook Why a Deleuzedictionary?It might seema particularly craven,disreprojectto form a Deleuzedictionary. spectful,literal-mindedand reactive Not only did Deleuze strategicallychangehis lexicon to avoid the notion that his texts consistedof terms that might simply name extra-textual or truths, he alsorejectedthe idea that art, science philosophycould be understoodwithout a senseof their quite specificcreativeproblem. A philosopher's concepts produce connections and styles of thinking. existingset Concepts intensive: are they do not gathertogetheran already of things (extension);they allow for movementsand connection.(The conceptof 'structure' in the twentieth century, for example,could not be of isolatedfrom the problem of explaining the categories thinking and the is the effect of a conceptual imageof an impersonalsocialsubjectwho system;similarly, the concept of the 'cogito' relatesthe mind to a movemeasurable matter,and to a ment of doubt, to a world of mathematically a thought and the body.)To translate term or to define distinctionbetween of corpus involvesan understanding a more any point in a philosopher's generalorientation, problem or milieu. This does not mean that one explainingDeleuze's reduces philosophyto its context- say, a 'nomadism' or On to a asa reactionagainst rigid structuralism linguistics. the contrary, philosophy as the creation of a plane,or as a way of creating understanda someorientation by establishingpoints and relations,meansthat any philosophyis more than its manifestterms, more than its context. In addition to the producedtexts and terms, and in addition to the explicit historical presuppositions, thereis an unthoughtor outside- the problem,desireor life of a philosophy.For Deleuze,then, reading a philosopherrequires going beyond his or her produced lexicon to the deeper logic of producitself This sense of tion from which the relationsor sense the text emerge. all the canneverbe said;in repeating recreating milieu of a philosopher or another said. Even so, it is this strivwe can do is produce another sense, Sq ing for sense that is the creativedrive of readinga philosopher. when philosl)eleuzereadsBergsonhe allowseachterm and moveof Bergson's ophy to revolvearound a problem: the problem of intuition, of how the habituated humanobserver can think from beyondits own constituted, rrndall ttxl humanworld,

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It would seem,then, that offering definitions of terms in the form of a dictionary- as though a word could be detached from its philosophicallife andproblem- would not only be at oddswith the creativerole of philosophy; it would alsosustainan illusion that the philosophicaltext is nothing more thanits 'said'andthat becoming-Deleuzian wouldbe nothingmorethanthe adoption a certainvocabulary. we,in systematising of Do Deleuze's thought, reduce eventand untimelyprovocation onemore doxa? an to If Deleuze's writings aredifficult and resistant this cannotbe dismissed asstylistically unfortunate, asthough he really oughtto havejust sat down and told us in so many words what 'difference in itself' or 'immanence' really meant.Why the difficulty of style and vocabularyif there is more to Deleuzethan a way of speaking? preliminary answerlies in the nexusof A conceptsof 'life', 'immanence'and 'desire'. The one distinction that Deleuzeinsistsupon, both when he speaks his own voicein Dffirence in Repetitioz and when he creates sense the history of philosophy, and, his of is the 'imageof thought'. Philosophy beginsfrom an imageof what it is to think, whetherthat be the graspof ideal forms, the orderly receptionof senseimpressions,or the social construction of the world through language.The concepts of a philosophy both build, and build upon, that image. But if the history of philosophy is a gallery of such images of thought - from the conversing Socratesand mathematicalPlatq to the doubting Descartes and logical Russell- some philosophers have done , more than stroll through this galleryto add their own image.Somehave, in 'schizo' fashion, refused to add one more proper relation between thinker and truth, and havepulled thinking apart. One no longer makes one more step within thought - tidying up a definition, or correctinga seemingcontradiction.Only when this happensdoesphilosophyrealiseits power or potential. Philosophyis neither correct nor incorrect in relation to what currently countsas thinking; it creates new modesor stylesof thinking. But if all philosophyis creation,rather than endorsement, an imageof thought, of havetried to givea sense conceptto this creationof somephilosophers or thinking: not one more imageof thought but 'thought without an image'. Deleuze's celebratedphilosophersof univocity confront the genesis, rupture or violenceof thinking: not man who thinks, but a life or unthought within which thinking might happen.When Spinozaimaginesone expressive substance, when Nietzsche imagines one will or desire, and when Bergsoncreates the conceptof life, they go someway to towardsreally asking aboutthe emergence thinking.This is no longerthe emergence of of thc thinker,or one who thinks, but the emergence somethinglike a of minintrrl rclation, cvcntor pcrocption thinking, of fronrwhich'thinkcrs' arc thcn cll'cctctl.'l'his nlcruls thrrtthc rcrrlhistoryof'plrikrsophy rcquircs

producesingularpoints,or the orienunderstanding way philosophers the tations within which subjects,objects,perceiversand imagesare ordered. Any assemblage such as a philosophicalvocabulary(or an artistic style, or a set of scientific functions) facesin two directions. It both givessome sort of order or consistency a life which bearsa much greatercomplexto ity and dynamism,but it alsoenables from that order - the creationof further and more elaborate orderings. philosophical A vocabulary such as givessense orientationto our world, but it alsoallowsus to Deleuze's or producefurther differences and further worlds. On the one hand, then, a Deleuzianconcept such as the 'plane of immanence'or 'life' or 'desire' cstablishes possiblerelation betweenthinker and what is to be thought, a giving us somesort of logic or order. On the other hand, by coupling this conceptwith other concepts, such as taffectt'concept'and tfunctiont,or and 'planeof transcendence' 'imageof thought',we canthink not just about life or the planeof immanence alsoof how the brain imagines, but relates pictures, to, styles, represents ordersthat plane.This is the problemof and how life differsfrom itself,in itself.The role of a dictionaryis only one side of a philosophy.It looks at the way a philosophy stratifiesor distinguishes its world, but once we haveseenhow 'a' philosophythinks and movesthis should then allow us to look to other philosophiesand other worlds. There is then a necessary fidelity and infidelity,not only in any dictionirry or any reading,but also in any experience any life. Life is both or cffected through relations, suchthat thereis no individual or text in itself; rrtthe sametime, life is not reducibleto effected actualrelations. or There rre singularities given.This or'powersto relate'thatexceed what is already is the sense the singularityof a text. Sense not what is manifestlysaid or is rrr denoted;it is what is openedthrough denotation.Sq we might saythat we needto understand meaningof Deleuze's the terminology- how 'territorialisation' is defined alongside 'deterritorialisation','assemblage', 'llody without Organs' and so on - and then how thesedenotedterms cxpress what Deleuzewantsto say, intention of the Deleuziancorpus. the llut this shouldultimately then leadus to the sense Deleuze,which can of only be giventhrough the productionof anothertext. 1 can say, here,that the sense Deleuze's of worksis the problemof how thinking emerges from life, and how life is not a being that is given but a power to give various scnses itself (what Deleuzerefersto as'?being'). in saying of But this I have producedanothersense. Each definition of eachterm is a different path from a text, a different productionof sense that itself opensfurther paths lirr definition.So, far from definitionsor dictionaries reducing forceof the itn iruthoror a philosophy, they createfurther distinctions. 'l'his clocsr.rotmcfln, as ccrtirin popular vcrsionsof Frcnch poststructuralism might irrclicrrtc, tcxtshuvclro nrcanings thrt onc ctn thilt rnd

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make anything mean what one wants it to mean.On the contrary, the life or problem of Deleuze's philosophy lay in the event: both the event of philosophical textsand the eventof worksof art. The eventis a disruption, oneself, using of or violence dislocation thinking.To readis not to recreate alreadyhabitthe text asa mirror or medium through which one repeats ual orientations.Just as life can only be lived by risking connectionswith other powers or potentials,so thinking can only occur if there is an encounterwith relations,potentialsand powersnot our own. If we take Deleuze'sdefinition of life seriously- that it is not a given whole with unfold through time, but is t airtual power to potentials that necessarily potentialsthrough contingentand productiveencounters then this create We will relatedirectlyto an ethicsof reading. cannotreada thinker in order for to find what he is saying'tous', asthoughtextswerevehicles exchanging information from one being to another.A text is immanent to life; it new stylesfor thinking and new imagesand ways new connections, creates of seeing.To read a text is to understandthe problem that motivated its The assemblage. more faithful we are to a text - not the text's ultimate but message its construction,or the way in which it producesrelations and alreadyexisting vocabuamong concepts,images,affects,neologisms laries - the more we will havean experienceof a style of thought not our stylesassuch. of own, an experience the powerto think in creative and productivecontributionsof Deleuze's One of the most consistent thought is his theory and practiceof reading,both of which are grounded in a specificqonceptionof life. If there is one understandingof philosophy and as andgoodreading groundedin consistency doxa,which wouldreturn Deleuze logicandallowthoughtto remainthe same, a text to an assimilable of places himself in a counter-tradition distinctionand paradox.Neither philosophynor thinking flowsinevitablyand continuouslyfrom life; reason of is not the actualisation what life in its potentialwasalwaysstriving to be, vitalismor More than any other thinker of his time Deleuzeworksagainst servea function or somehow thinking and concepts the idea that reason, purposeof life, a life that is nothing more than changeor alteration for the sakeof efficiencyor self-furthering. If there is a conceptof life in Deleuze it is a life at oddswith itself, a potential or power to createdivergentpotendicto tials.Admittedly,it is possible imaginethinking, with its concepts, againstthe forcesof chaosand tionariesand organon,as shoring 'man' dissolution,but we can also- when we extendthis potential- seethinking to as asa confrontationwith chaos, allowingmore of what is nrt ourselves thought has'majorito transformwhat we takeourselves be.In this sense both a movementtowardsreducing tarian' and 'minoritarian'tendencies, and chnoticdiffcrcnccto uniformity and samencss a tendcncytowards I)clcuzc' inconrprchcnsion, to opcning lhoscsrmcunitics n'stttttcring'or

far from believingthat one might return thought to life and overcomethe submissionto system,recognises that the creation of a systemis the only way one canreally live non-systemically. One creates minimal or dynamic a order,both to avoidabsolute deterritorialisation the one hand and reacon tive repetitionof the already-ordered the other.In this sense, on Deleuzeis a child of the Enlightenment. Not only does he inhabit the performative self-contradiction, 'Live in such a way that one's life diverges from any givenprinciple,'healsodeduces this 'principlethat is not one' from life. If one is to lioe, theremust both be a minimal connection exposure the or to outsidealongside creationor perception that outside,with perception a of being a difference. Deleuze's ontology- that relationsareexternalto terms- is a commitment to perceiving life; life is connection and relation,but the outcomeor eventof thoserelationsis not determinedin advance intrinsic properby ties. Life is not, therefore,the ground or foundation differentiatedby a set of ternls, such that a dictionary might provide us with one schema order of amongothers.The productionor creationof a systemis both an exposure to thosepowersof difference already not constitutedasproper categories of recognising'man' and a radical enlightenment.Enlightenment is, defined dutifully, freedom from imposed tutelage - the destruction of masters. Deleuze'sdestructionof masteryis an eternal,rather than perpetual, paradox. Rather than defining thought and liberation against anothersystem, with a continualcreationand subsequent destruction, the challengeof Deleuze's thought is to createa systemthat containsits own aleatoryor paradoxicalelements, elementsthat are both inside and outside, orderingand disordering. This is just what Deleuze's greatconcepts serve to dol life is both that which requires some form of order and system (giving itself through differencesrhar are perceivedand synthesised) and, that which also opens the system,for life is just rhat power to d.ifferfrom which concepts emergebut that can neverbe includedin the extension of any concept. We canonly begin to think and live when we losefaith in the world, when weno longerexpecta world to answer and mirror ourselves our already to and constituteddesires. Thinking is paradox,nor because is simple disobediit enceor negation orthodoxy, because thinking hasany forceor disof but if tinction it hasto work againstinertia.If a body wereonly to connectwith whatallowedit to remainrelativelystable and self contained in imageof the autopoieticsystemthat takesonly what it can masterand assimilate then the very powerof life for change and creation would be stalled exhausted or by self-involved formsthat livedin orderto remainthe same. life Despitefirst appearances a dictionarycanbe the openingof a self-enclosed system. we If nrc faithfulto thc lifc of Dclcuzc's thought- rccognising as n crcation it

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rather than destinedeffectof life - then we canrelive the production of this as systemand this response an imageof production in general. (I by must createa systemor be enslaved anotherman's'- so declares and chaoticagonisticsof his great Blake'sidealpoet in the highly contested libwereindebtedto an enlightenment poemJerusalem.Blake's aphorisms itself in a seeminglyparadoxicalstructure. If we are erationismthat found thenwe caneitherinhabitit pasto condemned live in someform of system to submission a system our or sivelyand reactively, we canembrace seeming proBlake'searlyresponse not of relations our own and respondcreatively. to the inescapabilityof the categoricalimperative vided an alternative and act asa moral beingthen which still hauntsus today:if I am to speak I can neither saynor do what is particular or contingent for me; living with othersdemands that I decidewhat to do from the point of view of 'humanity in general'.To speakor to live is alreadyto be other than oneself,and so Such recognitionof an initial submission. morality demands necessary a or a final consensus intersubjectivity may neverarrive, but it hauntsall life paradoxical eternalaffirmationof and Deleuze's nevertheless. contrast, By begins from the inescapabilityof a minimal system- to perceive creation or live is alreadyto be connected,to be other - but far from this requiring or a striving for a systemof consensus ideal closure,this producesan infinimperative- abandon ite opening.It might seemthat the Enlightenment all externalauthority - comesto function asyet one more authority, and it might alsoseemthat a fidelity to Deleuzeis a crime againstthe thinker of from thought is iust this passage But difference. the problemof Deleuze's . contradiction to paradox To not be oneselfis contradictory if one must be eitherthis or that, if life must decideor stabiliseitself (form a harrative or by imageof itself). 'Becoming-imperceptible', contrast,is an enablingand in productive paradox.One connectsor perceives order to live, in order to not be,but this very tendencyis alsoat the sametime a becoming-other: a nonbeingbut a?being.A Deleuziandictionarycomesinto beingonly in open the systemof thought its use,only when the thoughts that it enables to the very outsideand life that madeit possible.

ACTIVE/REACTIVE Lee Spinks The distinction between active and reactive forces was developed by Friedrich Nietzsche in his Oz the Genealogy Morality and rhe notes of posthumously collectedas The Will to Power.In his seminalreadingof Nietzsche, Deleuzeseizedupon this distinction (and what it madepossible) and placed at the very heartof the Nietzschean it revaluation values. of For Nietzsche,the distinction betweenactiveand reactiveforce enabledhim to present'being' asa process rather than 'substance'. The world of substantial being,he argued,is producedby the recombinationof multiple effectsof forceinto discrete ideas, images and identities. There is no essential 'truth' of being;nor is there an independent'reality' beforeand beyondthe flux of appearances; everyaspect the realis already of constituted quantities by and combinationsof force. Within this economy of becoming,every force is relatedto otherforcesand is definedin its character whetherit obeys by or commands.What we call a body (whether understoodas political, social, chemical biological) determinedby this relationbetween or is dominating and dominated forces.Meanwhile Deleuze maintains that any two forces constitute bodyassoonastheyenterinro relationship. a Within this bodythe superior or dominant forcesare describedas 'active'; the inferior or dominatedforces described are as'reactive'. Thesequalities ofactiveandreactive forceare theoriginal qualitiesthat definethe relationshipof forcewith force. If forcesare defined by the relative differencein their quality or power, the notion of quality is itself determinedby the differencein quantity betweenthe two forces that come into relationship. The characterof any relation,that is, is producedthrough forces.There are no intrinsic properties that dctcrmine how forccs will relate:a masterbecomes master a throughthe act <lfovcr.powcring, thc-cncountcr In bctwccnforccs, each

ACTI VE, / REACTI V E

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force receivesthe quality that correspondsto its quantity. Forces are dominant,or dominated, depending upon their relativedifference quanin as tity; but they manifest themselves active or reactiveaccordingto their in the difference quality.Once the relationhasbeenestablished quality of forces- dominant or dominated- producesan activepower (that commandsthe relation) and a reactiyepower (definedby the relation).The differencebetweenforcesdefined accordingto their quantity as active or An reactiveis describedin terms of a hierarchy. activeforce is the stronger are term and goesto the limit of what it can do. Its characteristics domiand commanding. The expression activnating,possessing, subjugating of unconscious; consciousness all ity is the expression what is necessarily of doesis express relation ofcertain reactiveforcesto the activeforcesthat the dominatethem. Active force affirmsits difference from everythingthat is weakerthan and inferior to itself; meanwhilereactiveforce seeksto limit it upon it, and to recast in the spirit of the activeforce,imposerestrictions negative. forcecannottransformitself into a fully active Crucially reactive force; nor can a collection of reactiveforces amalgamate themselves into gainspower,or who bonds greater who something thanactiveforce.A slave will remain a slaveand can only be freed from slaveryby with other slaves, remains what it is, and is unlike abandoningconsciousness. Consciousness represents and recognises the active force of difference. Consciousness activeforces, therebyseparating activity from what it cando. Suchseparation constitutesa subtractionor division of activeforce by making it work against the power of its own affirmation. The remarkablefeature of the it to becoming-reactive activeforceis that historically hasmanaged form of principle of the the basisof an entire vision of life. This vision embodies a 'ressentiment': movementin which a reactiveand resentfuldenial of higher life begins to createits own moral systemand account of human The reactivetriumph expressed movementsof consciousin experience. nesslike ressentiment, bad consciousness the asceticideal depends and upon a mystification and reversalof activeforce: at the core of thesenew interpretations of life reactive force simulatesactive force and turns it against itself.It is at precisely historicalmomentwhen the slave the begins to triumph over the master who has stoppedbeing the spectreof law, virtue, morality and religion. An active force becomesreactive when a reactive force managesto it of separate from what it can do. The historicaldevelopment reactive predicated forcesis itself upon the affinity between reactionand negation, an affinity which is itself a weakform of the Will to Powerin so far asit is of Thc an cxprcssion nihilismor thc will to nothingncss. will to asceticism of rlr wrlrld-rcnunciittion lftcr rrll, still itn cxprcssion rpil/. 'fhus, is, il whilc rcnctivclirrccsrtrc wcnkcrthnn rctivc firrccs,thcy rlso posscss

potentiallysublimeelementin as much as they are ableto advance new a interpretation of life (the world of moral ideas, for example) and they supplyus with an original,althoughnihilistic,versionof the Will to Power. By inventinga transcendent of life in orderto judgelife, reactive idea forces separate from our power to createvalues;but they alsoteachus new feelus ings and new waysof being affected. What needsro be understood that is there is a variation or internal difference in the disposition of reactive forces;theseforceschangetheir character and their meaningaccording to the extentto which they developtheir affinity for the will to nothingness. Consequently of the greatproblems one posed interpretationis to deterto mine the degree development of reactive forceshavereached relationto in negationand the will to nothingness; similarlywe needalways attendro to the nuanceor relativedispositionof activeforce in terms of its development of the relationbetween actionand affirmation. Connectives Bergson Genealogy Nietzsche Will to Power

ACTUALITY Claire Colebrook It might seemthat Deleuze's philosophyis dominatedby an affirmarionof the virtual and is highly critical of a wesrerntradition that hasprivileged arctuality. a certainextent this is true, and this privilegecan be seenin To the way philosophyhastraditionallydealtwith difference. First, rhereare deemed be actualterms,termswhich areextended time- havingconto in tinuity - and possiblyalsoextended space. in Theseterms arethen related to eachother, so differenceis something possible an alreadyactualised for entity. Difference is betweenactual terms, such as the differencebetween consciousness its world, or is a differencegroundedupon actuality, and such as somethingactualbearingthe capacityfor possible changes. This understanding actualityis thereforeried to the conceptof possibility. of Possibilityis somethingthat can be predicated or attributedto, a being of, which rcmains the same.Now againstthis understandingof actuality, l)clcuzcscts diffcrentcouplc: r actuality/potenriality.thereis something If rctualit is not bccirr.rsc it trrkcs timc,nor bccausc up timc is that whichlinks

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from of or containsthe changes actualbeings;rather,actualityis unfold'ed' seethe actual not as that from which changeand potentiality. We should differencetake place,but asthat which hasbeeneffectedfrom potentiality. or Time is not the synthesis continuity of actualterms, as in phenomenconstitutestime by linking the past with the ology where consciousness Rather,time is the potential for variouslines of actualpresentand future. ity. From any actual or unfolded term it should be possible (and, for Deleuze,desirable)to intuit the richer potentiality from which it has emerged. to empiricistDeleuzeseems be committedto the primacy As an avowed to of the actual:one should remain attentiveto what appears, what is, without invoking or imagining some condition outside experience. empiricismaffirmslife and experiHowever, while it is true that Deleuze's he he refuses restrict life to the actual.In this respect overturnsa to ence, potential and virtual that defines the history of western metaphysics We accordingto alreadypresentactualities. should not, Deleuzeinsists, forms. So we define what somethingis accordingto alreadyactualised what it is to think on the basisof what is establish not, for example, should generally actuallythought.Nor shouldwe think that the virtual or usually, those things that, from the point of view of the is merely the possible: empiriactualworld, may or may not happen.On the contrary,Deleuze's itself. of is that of the Idea,and it is the essence the Idea to actualise cism potentialor power to think, There is, therefore,an Idea of thinking, the in which is then actualised any singlethought. We can only fully underthe standand appreciate actualif we intuit its virtual condition, which is alsoa real condition.That is, real conditionsarenot thosewhich must be that for any thought there presupposed the actual- such as assuming by the must be a subjectwho thinks- rather,realconditionsare,for Deleuze, potentials life from which conditionssuchas the brain, subiectivityor of mind emerge. a if For example, we want to understand text historicallywe needto go but beyondits actualelements not iust what it says alsobeyondits manFor ifestcontext- to the virtual problemfrom which anytext is actualised. Lost (1667)as a hiswe instance, should not readJohn Milton's Paradise torical documentrespondingto the English revolution,a revolutionthat century. by we might understand readingmore textsfrom the seventeenth Rather,we needto think of the potentialor Ideaof revolutionassuch:how fully different,of the problemof Milton's text is a specificactualisation, itscl[,of how individuals of how powermightrealisc how we might bc free, Any scrvituclc. lctu:rltcxt or cvcnt tirlm imposccl rclclscthcmsclvcs rrright il hrrs rcrrlity l virtuitldintcttsion, powcrto cxprcss orrly is p<lssiblc bccirusc tltc rcvolttlion, l"r'cnch thc rrctuirlitics: l',nglislr tlill'crcrrt itscll'irrirlwirys

rcvolution,the Russian revolution,are specificand differentonly because rrctuality the expression an Ideaof revolutionwhich can repeatitself is of infinitely. Connective Virtual/Virtuality

AFFECT Felicity J. Colman Watchme: affectionis the intensityof colour in a sunseton a dry and cold autumnevening. Kiss me: affectis that audible,visualand tactiletransformation producedin reactionto a certain situation, event or thing. Run irwayfrom me: affected the bodiesof spectres are when their space disis turbed. In all thesesituations, affectis an independentthing; somerimes described terms of the expression an emotionor physiological in of effect, but all the while trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and autonomous. Affect is the change,or variation,that occurs when bodiescollide, or come into contact. As a body, affect is the knowable product of an cncounter, specificin its ethicaland lived dimensions and yet it is alsoas indefiniteas the experience a sunset,transformation,or ghost. In its of largestsense, affect is part of the Deleuzianproject of trying-to-understand,andcomprehend, express of the incredible, and all wondrous, tragic, painful and destructive configurations things and bodiesastemporally of mediated, continuouseyents. Deleuzeusesthe term'affection'to refer to the additiveprocesss, forces,powersand expressions change. of Affectcanproducea sensory abstract or resultand is physically and temporally produced.It is determinedby chance and organisation and it consistsof a variety of factorsthat include geography, biology,meteorology, :rstronomy, ecologyand culture. Reactionis a vital part of the Deleuzian concept of affectivechange.For instance,describingBaruch Spinoza's study of the transformationof a body,a thing, or a group of things over a period of spaceand time, Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plu,teaus: iA.ffects becomings'(D&G 1987:256).Affect expresses are the modificationof experiences independent as things of existence, when one produccsor rccognises consequences movementand time for (corthe of porcirl,spiritual,:rnimirl,ntincral,vcgctlblcand or c<lnceptual) bodies. Afl'cct not only itttcxpcricntial is lirrcc,it crrn bcconrc nrirtcriirl rr thing,irncl

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history, of it assuch,asDeleuzedescribes, cancompelsystems knowledge, power. memoryand circuitsof through his entire oeuvre.In his Deleuze'sconceptionof affectdevelops the discusses and, study of David Hume in Ernpiricism SubjectiaityDeleuze ideas, habitsofthought, ethics,patterns,and repetitions between linkages all of systems; the while describingthe relationshipbetweenaffect and differencein terms of temporally specificsubjectivesituations.Empiricism and,SubjectioityalsosignalsDeleuze'sinterest in Henri Bergson,a key book of development a theoryof affect.Bergson's thinker in the Deleuzian the corporeal condition of what he terms Matter and,Memory addresses (D the l7). 'affection'inrelationto perception 1988a: Deleuzealsoengages and of and the latter'saddress affections affectin termsof work of Spinoza 'On a modality of 'taking on' somethingin the Ethics(1677).In his essay affect of Anglo-AmericanLiterature', Deleuzedescribes the Superiority as verbs becoming events- naming affectsas perceivableforces,actions, he and activities. In relation to art in What is Philosophy? and Guattari experience cognition. Through art, or describeaffectsasmore than sensate that affectscanbe detachedfrom their temporal and geowe can recognise entities. graphicoriginsand become independent In accounting for experiencein a non-interpretive manner, Deleuze's that tendsto structure the of conception affectexposed limits of semiotics Undeniably responses aestheticand physicalexperiences. to emotional of a romantic conceptwithin his discussion the regulation and production of desire and energy within a socialfield, Deleuze'swritings of affect enablea material,and thereforepolitical, critique of capital nevertheless its operations. Within a Deleuzian framework, affect operates as and meaningand relato a dynamicof desirewithin an assemblage manipulate tions, inform and fabricate desire, and generateintensity - yielding different affectsin any given situation or event.Perceptionis a non-passive continual moulding, driven and given by affect. of concepts 'multiplicity','expeand Guattari's linkedto Deleuze Closely in of the rience'and 'rhizomatics', concept 'affect'shouldalsobe considered as offlight'. Situated part of'arborescence'and'lines relationto theconcepts of thresholds bodiesand the of of the Deleuzian'and' becoming, molecular happenings; affective in by are thingsasevents described Deleuze terms of wherethings and bodiesare altered.To this end, affectdescribes occasions world, production the contemporary in behindall formsof social the forces and physiological cognitive, ontological, forces'ethical, and theseaffective work with Guattari,affective andcollaborative powers. Deleuze's singular In tacit or as arc firrccs clcpicted reactive activc(followingFriedrichNietzsche), powcr cirnbe utilisedto As or pcrfrlrmccl. l)clcuzc portrtys it, nffcctivc rrtc, limbrrrcc tnd crcntivity, cotttrol rrbility,'rruthrlrity, cnrrhlc

Connectives Active/Reactive Arborescentschema Becoming Experience Hume Lines of flight Multiplicity Rhizome

ARBORESCENT SCHEMA CIiffStagoll The arboreal schemais one of Deleuze's many potent and prominent is His criticism,and his useof the schema, biologicaland organicimages. philosto his scattered across corpus,at varioustimestargetingapproaches ophy psychiatry literature, science,theoretical criticism and even everyis day living. The notion of an arborescent tree-likeschema Deleuze's or tencounterpointto his model of the rhizome,which he usesto challenge denciesin thinking and to suggestwaysof rehabilitating 'thought' asa creativeand dynamicenterprise. to Deleuze'smodel of the tree-likestructure appears be quite simple. Typically, at its top, is some immutable concept given prominence either by transcendental theorising or unthinking presumption. In Deleuze's works on epistemologyand ontology, he identifies Plato's Forms, the modelsof the subjectespoused Ren6Descartes ImmanuelKant, as by and well as the 'Absolute Spirit' of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as cxamples. other concepts particularsare organised All or verticallyunder The ordering is strictly this conceptin a tree/trtnk/root arrangement. hierarchical, from superior to subordinate,or transcendentto particular, suchthat the individual or particularelementis conceived lessimportas powerful,productive,creative interestingthan the transcendent. rrnt, or The subordinate elements, once so arranged, are unable to 'move' lrorizontallyin such a way as to establish creativeand productiveinterlclationshipswith other concepts,particularsor models. Rather, their position is final, accordingto an organisingprinciple implied or deterrnincd by the superiorconcept. lfurthermorc, thc trcc is a self-contained totality or closedsystemthat is cqual just to tlrc sum of its parts.Rclations bctwccnclcmcntsof the

t4

ARBO RESCENT

SCHEMA

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l5

systemare interior to and inherent within the model. They are stableor even essentialin so far as, first, the superior concept is the all-powerful the of definingforcethat dictates positionor meaning all elsein the system and, second,the tendency is to think of the systemeither as complete in in itself or elseunconnected othersystems anymeaningfulway.The tree to is 'fixed to the spot' and static. Any remaining movementis minimal and the internal to the systemrather than exploratory or connective.Because creativepotential of disorder and inter-connectivityis precluded, the potentialinherentin conceptualising thinking in this manneris very and limited. Deleuze's modelcallsto mind the porphyriantree,a deviceusedby the philosopher Porphyry to show how reality and our conceptsare ordered proceeds. The conceptof'Substance'can and how logicalcategorisation branchingat eachlevel be placedat the top of the tree,and dichotomous by difference suchthat, at the lowestlevel,some obtained addinga specific individual canbe identifiedasa sub-setof 'Substance'. This versionof the arborealmodel alsohighlights somethingof its complexity and ontologicalimportancefor Deleuze.The differenceevident betweenparticularsis subsumedby the similarity that definesthem in terms of superior concepts in general and the transcendent concept (Substance) particular.Rather than deriving conceptsfrom individual in particulars(or interactions between them), an abstractconceptis usedto organiseindividuals and determine their meaning relative just to the hierarchy. Differencehasto be addedbackto eachelement organisational in order to define it asa particular,rather than having individual elements Deleuze holds In serve the startingpoint for conceptualisation. contrast, as that lived experiencecomprisesparticularity and uniquenessin each moment, experienceand individual, the inherent differencesof which By ought always to be acknowledged. positing the concept over the particular, thinking of the arborealkind abstracts from lived experience in its very structure. superior For Deleuze,thinking in such a way stiflescreativity,leaves conceptsrelatively immune to criticism and tends to closeone's mind to particularityand change that is evidentin lived experience. the dynamism, it to Not only is suchthinking necessarily abstract, alsoserves protectthe status quo and relieve dominant conceptsand positions from productive critique. Conncctives Rhizomc Sullsllncc

ART Felicity J. Colman Deleuze'sdescriptionsof art remind us that it is one of the primary mediums with which humans learn to communicateand respond to the world. Art excitedDeleuzefor its ability to createthe domainsthat he saw,felt, tasted,touched,heard,thought, imaginedand desired.Besides publishing bookson singular writers and artists,including making specific of concerning asa category criticalanalysis, art manifesto stylestatements Deleuze'sspecificactivitiesin respectto art extendedto writing short for cxhibition catalogueessays artists (for exampleon the French painter music(with RichardPinhas). and G6rardFromanger), makingexperimental a encompassed range preferredart works for his discussions Deleuze's of mediums, including music and sounds (birdsong), cinema, photography,the plastic arts (sculpture,painting and drawing), literature and lrchitecture. Deleuze's philosophical interests also led him to discussa from anthronumberof performative and theatrical works,usingexamples pologyto makecultural and philosophical Deleuzeaddresses distinctions. and perceptualterms of art through distinctive polemthe visual,aesthetic such as biologicalevolution, ical methodologies drawn from the sciences, geological and mathematics. formationsand concepts, of Deleuzeleansupon a critical assortment art history critics, film critics, criticsandmusical criticsthroughouthis philoliterarycritics,architectural sophicalpractice: Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, Paul Claudel, Clement Andr6 Duthuit, GregoryBateson, LawrenceGowing,Georges Greenberg, literaryprellazin,ChistianMetz, and Umberto Eco.As a writer,Deleuze's Critical and'Clinical). His clccessors figure prominently (seework in Essays philosophical fathers from his adopted towardart comes cognitive approach In including Immanuel Kant, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche Philosophy,Deleuze employs'art' asa categoryof 'Critique', and. but trrking Nietzsche's observation that the world is emotiveandsensory, on rrny analysisof this world is bound by epistemologicalstructures. For l)cleuze,the descriptivenature of art lies with art's ability not merely to rcdescribe; rather art has a material capacityto evokeand to question by throughnon-mimeticmeans, producingdifferentaffects. including Byzantine,the Gothic, l)eleuze treatsplastic art movements and Primitive,Japanese, Art Brut, t hc Baroque, Romanticism,Classicism, rrstrans-historical conceptsthat contributeto the field of art through their and propositionsand development forms, aesthetics associated of virri<lus includingWilliam Blake, rrll'ccts. ilrtists,writcrs irnd composers Singulrrr .Klcc, 'Ihom:rs (iogh, lhul (l6zrrnrrc, Hardy, Maric Vinccnt Virn Prtul

l6

ART

AXIOM ATIC

T7

Henri-Beyle Stendhal, Samuel Beckett, Antonin Artaud, William S. Burroughs, Lewis Carroll,Leopoldvon Sacher-Masoch, FranzKafka,and Alain Robbe-Grillet are critically absorbedby Deleuze in terms of their respective enquiriesinto the creationof art forms that translate, illustrate and perform the forces of the world (such as desire), by making them visible. Deleuze mentions in passingan enormous range of artists of variousmediumsto makea point or an observation from Igor Stravinsky to Patti Smith, from Diego Vel6squezto Carl Andre. The means and methods which art is ableto transformmaterialinto sensory by experience is of course part of the modernist contribution to art in the twentieth century.In his discussions concerning Deleuzeis thus a contributorto art, the twentieth-century modernistcanon. The methodology art forms the core of Deleuze'sstudy of Marcel of perdu (1913-27), a book that examProust's work A lo recherche temps du inesaspects temporality desireand memory. in his bookco-authored of As with Guattari on KaJba,in Proust,Deleuzeunderstandsart asbeing much more than a medium of expression. Deleuze'sbook FrancisBacon: TheLogicoJ'Sensation works through the complicated connections Deleuzeand Guattari'sBody without Organs of (BwO) and English painter FrancisBacon'streatmenrof the power and rhythms of the human body, to a discussionof the differencesfrom and similaritiesto the work of French painter Clzanneof Bacon'sown work. In this book,Deleuzeprivileges paintingasan art form that affordsa concreteapprehension ofthe forcesthat rendera body. In Deleuze'sfinal work co-authoredwith Guattari, What is Philosophy? a 'art' is accorded privilegedpositionin their triad of philosophy, and art science. Art is an integral componentof their three level operationsof the qualityof things(thebrain-becoming-subject).this book,'art' as cerebral In a categoryhasdeveloped into the means which Deleuzeand Guattari can by operateaffect, temporality,emotion, mortality, perception and becoming. The active, compounding creativity of artists' work are described as aggregates sensation live beyondtheir cre'percepts'- independent of that ators. Deleuze Guattarisignificantly and comment that theinspiration art for is givenby sensations; affectof methods, the materials, memories objects: and and 'We paint,sculpt,compose, write with sensations'(D&G 1994:166). Connectives Affcct llacon l')xpcricncc Knlkrr

ARTAUD, ANTONIN (1895-1948)- refer to the entries on 'art', art', 'Bergson','Body without Organs','ethics', 'becoming* performance * of 'feminism'r'Foucault fold','hysteria','Lacan'and'lines flight f art * politics'.

AXIOMATIC Alberto Toscano Plateaus'axiomatic' is Proposed Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, by capitalismwithin universal usedto definethe operationof contemporary and Originatingin the discourse science of history and general semiology. mathematicalset theory in particular, 'axiomatic' denotesa method that neednot providedefinitionsof the terms it workswith, but rather orders a givendomainwith the adjunctionor subtractionof particularnorms or (axioms). and whose Axioms thus operate elements relations on commands They areindifferentto the properties qualor natureneednot be specified. ities of their domain of application and treat their obiectsas purely functional, rather than as qualitatively differentiated by some intrinsic or Axiomsarein turn accompanied theorems, modelsof realby character. isation,which apply them to certainempiricalor materialsituations. by of An axiomaticsystemdiffers from systems codingand overcoding its directlyon decoded flows. thisrespect, In whilstit implies capacity operate to and ubiquity is far greaterthan a form of capture,its degreeof immanence of or thatof codingsystems, of whichrequireaninstance externality tranall scendence. That is why Deleuze and Guattari defend the thesis of a formations: latter the difference kind between in capitalist and pre-capitalist without coding. Within universal while the former operates code flows, of history the immanentaxiomaticof capitalismis activatedwith the passing at l threshold decoding and deterritorialisation, the momentwhen, folof capital. klwing Karl Marx, we areconfrontedby barelabourand independent and The axiomaticmethod,asinstantiated contemporary by capitalism juxtaposed schizoidpractice,which is capable royal science, be to of can flowswithout the insertionof axioms, well asto the as combiningdecoded problematic method in the sciences, which is concernedwith eventsand singularpoints rather than systemic consistency. of the bolderclaims One mlde by Deleuzeand Guattari is that we shouldnot think of the axiomatic to irsir notion analogically exportedfrom science illustratepolitics.On the to with contrary,within science itself the axiomaticis deemed collaborate thc Statc in thc fixation of unruly flows, diagrams and variations. rgcncythat subordinatcs the lisscntinlly is rrstrrrtifying scmioticising it or

t8

AXIOM AT IC

BAcoN,

FRANcr s

( t gog- gz)

t9

transversal communications conjunctions flowsto a system fixed and of of pointsand constantrelations. As Deleuze and Guattari indicate,the unity of an axiomatic system and of capitalismin particular,is itself very difficult to pin down, since the opportunisticcharacterof the adjunction and subtractionof axioms opensup the question of the saturationof the systemand of the independenceof the axioms from one another. Moreover, though their dependence the axiomsmakesmodelsof realisationisomorphic (for on exampleall statesin one way or anothersatisfythe axiom of production for the market),thesemodelscan demonstrate considerable amountsof heterogeneity and variation (suchassocialist,imperialist,authoritarian, social-democratic, 'failed' states).The axiomaticsystemis therefore or not a closed dialectical totality, since it also generates'undecidable propositions' that demand either new axioms or the overhaul of the system,and it is interrupted by entities(for examplenon-denumerable infinite sets)whosepower is greaterthan that of the system,and which thus open breachesto an outside. It is the capacityto conjugate and control flows without the introduction of a transcendent agency (a totaliser) that makes the capitalist axiomatic the most formidable apparatus domination. of Deleuzeand Guattariinsistthe capitalist axiomatic establishes relations decoded flows,that are otherwise incommensuand connections between rableand unrelated,and subordinates theseflowsto a general isomorphy, too, such as the subjectwho must producefor the market.In this sense pointsto a resurDeleuze and Guattaridiscernthat the capitalist axiomatic gence machinicenslavement, that is all the morecruel because its of one of (its impersonality beyondforms of citizenship, sovereignty and legitimation). In as much as its mode of operationcan entirely bypass subjective suchan axiomatic movesus from belief or the codingof humanbehaviour, a societyof disciplineto a societyof control,wherepoweractsdirectly on Deleuzeand Guattariarecareful a decoded dividualmatter.Nevertheless, and evenoverto note,it is not simplythe case that flowscontinueto evade powerthe axiomatic, that the globaland non-qualified but subjectivityof and capitalneverattainsabsolute deterritorialisation, is alwaysaccompanied by forms of socialsubjection,in the guise of nation-states, and a panoplyof territorialisations the levelof its modesof realisation. at Conncctives ( lrrpitrrlisrl Mirrx ,Sr'lt rtrrlv izort sis

BACON, FRANCTS (t909-92) John Marks Deleuze's in Francis aim Bacon:TheLogicofSensation,as all his other with work on art, is to producephilosophical conceptsthat correspondto the aggregates' that the artist hasproduced.The 'logic of sensation' 'sensible that Deleuzeconstructsshowshow FrancisBaconuses'Figures' to paint sensations aim to act directlyon the nervoussystem. that here, 'Sensation', refers to a pre-individual, impersonal plane of intensities.It is also, Deleuzeclaims,the oppositeof the facileor the clich6sof representation. It is at one and the sametime the human subjectand alsothe impersonal event.It is directedtowardsthe sensible rather than the intelligible. In developingthe use of the 'Figure', Bacon pursuesa middle path between abstractand the figural, between purely optical spaces the the of abstract and the purely 'manual'spaces abstract art of expressionism. The 'Figure' retains elements that arerecognisably human;it is not a representationalform, but rather an attempt to paint forces. For Deleuze,the vocation of all non-representational is to make visible forcesthat would art otherwise remaininvisible.It is for this reason that Bacon'sfiguresappear to be deformedor contorted,sometimes passing through objectssuch as washbasins umbrellas:the body seeks escape or to from itself. There are cven somepaintingsin which the 'Figure' is little more than a shadow within a 'scrambledwhole', as if it has been replacedentirely by forces. ln short, Bacon'spaintingscan be considered an artistic expression as of l)eleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof the Body without Organs. Generallyin his work, Deleuzeseeks contradictthe received to wisdom that artistssuchasBaconor FranzKafka arein somewayexpressing deep a tcrror of life in their art. For this reason,he is at pains to point out that llacon hasa greatlove of life, and that his paintingevinces extraordinan rrryvitality.Baconis optimistic to the extentthat he'believes' the world, in but it is a very particularsort of optimism. Baconhimself saysthat he is ccrebrallypessimistic in that he paintsthe horrors of the world - but ar thc sametime nervouslyoptimistic. Bacon'swork may be imbued with irll sorts of violence,but he manages paint the 'scream'and not the to 'lrrlrror'- thc violcnce the sensation of ratherthantheviolence thespecof litclc- rnd hc rcpro:rchcs himsclf whcn hc feelsthat he haspaintedtoo 'l'hc filrccs tttttclr horrot'. tlut cirusc scrcirnr tlrc shouldnot bc confirscd with

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F R AN c Is

(tgog-gz)

BEC OM IN G

2l

inviscaptures The scream beforewhich one screams. the visiblespectacle because they lie beyondpain and which cannotbe represented, ible forces, feeling. So, cerebrally,this may lead to pessimism,since these invisible forcesare even more overwhelming than the worst spectaclethat can be However,Deleuzeclaimsthat, in making the decisionto paint represented. the scream,Bacon is like a wrestler confronting the 'powers of the invisHe a ible', establishing combat that wasnot previouslypossible. makesthe He to activedecision amrm the possibilityof triumphing overtheseforces. allows life to screamat death, by confronting terror, and entering into of on it. combatwith it, ratherthan representing The 'spectacle' violence, and divertsus, renhand,allowstheseforcesto remaininvisible, the other beforethis horror. deringus passive It is for these reasonsthat Deleuze talks at some length about the importanceof 'meat' in Bacon'spaintings.For Deleuze,Baconis a great to painterof 'heads'rather than 'faces'.Baconseeks dismantlethe strucof tured spatialorganisation the facein order to make the head emerge. Similarly, Baconsometimesmakesa shadowemergefrom the body asif it werean animal that the body wassheltering.In this way,Baconconstructs betweenman and animal, but rather azoneof not formal correspondences indiscernibility. The bonesare the spatialorganisationof the body,but the to flesh in Bacon's paintings ceases be supported by the bones.Deleuze for remarksupon Bacon'spreference prone'Figures'with raisedlimbs, This flesh,or meat,conto which the drowsyfleshseems descend. from stitutesthe zone of indiscernibilitybetweenman and animal.The head, what Deleuzecallsthe 'animalspirit' of man.Bacondoes then, constitutes not askus to pity the fate of animals(althoughthis could well be one effect that every human being who of his paintings),but rather to recognise suffersis a pieceof meat.In short, the man that suffersis an animal,and the animal that suffersis a man. Deleuzetalks of this in terms of a 'relito paintings, a religiousdimensionthat relates but gious'aspect Bacon's in that we areall brutal realityof the butcher'sshop.The understanding the meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, for Deleuze,a moment of true becoming.The separationbetweenthe spectator and the spectacleis broken down in favour of the 'deep identity' of becoming. Connectives Art Becoming Intcnsity Scnsitlion

BECKETI

tspace'. 'minoritarian * cinema' and

SAMUEL (190G89) refer to the entries on 'art', -

BECOMING CliffStagoll 'logether with 'difference', 'becoming' is the key theme of Deleuze's corpus.In so far as Deleuzechampionsa particular ontology,thesetwo concepts its cornerstones, are servingasantidotesto what he considers to be the western tradition's predominant and unjustifiable focus upon beingand identity.This focusis replicated,Deleuzeargues, our everyin day thinking, such that the extent of the variety and changeof the experienced world has been diluted by a limited conception of difference: difference-from-the-same.Deleuze works at two levels to rectify such habitual thinking. Philosophically,he developstheories of difference, rcpetition and becoming. For the world of practice, he provides challcnging writings designedto upset our thinking, together with a range of 'tools' for conceivingthe world anew.At both levels,becoming is critical, fbr if the primacy of identity is what defines a world of re-presentation (presenting the same world once again), then becoming (by which l)eleuze means 'becoming different') defines a world of presentation rlnew. Taking his lead from Friedrich Nietzsche's early notes,Deleuzeuses thc term 'becoming' (deoenir) describethe continual production (or to 'rcturn') of difference immanent within the constitution of events, whetherphysical otherwise. or Becomingis the pure movement evidentin changes particularevents. between This is not to saythat becomingreprescntsa phasebetweentwo states, a range of terms or statesthrough or which something might passon its journey to anotherstate.Ratherthan a product, final or interim, becomingis the very dynamism of change,siturtlcd betweenheterogeneous terms and tending towardsno particular goal rlr cnd-state. llecoming is most often conceivedby comparing a start-point and an crrd-pointand deducingthe setof differences between them. On Deleuze's irccount, this approach meansfirst subtracting movementfrom the field of rrctionor thinking in which the statesare conceived, and then somehow rcintroducingit as the meansby which anotherstaticstatehas 'become'. l'irr l)cleuze,this approachis an abstractexercise that detractsfrom the liclrncssof our cxperiences. For him, bccomingis neither merely an rttlrillutc nor tn intcrmcditrybctwccn ofl cvcnts, ir charirctcristic thc but of

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BEC OM IN G

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23

existsbetween It very productionof events. is not that the time of change one eventand another,but that every eventis but a unique instant of proThe only evident in the cosmos. duction in a continualflow of changes thing 'shared'by eventsis their havingbecomedifferent in the courseof their production. kind of conentailsa special The continualproductionof uniqueevents tinuity: they are unified in their very becoming.It is not that becoming 'envelops'them (since their production is wholly immanent) but that becoming'movesthrough' everyevent,such that eachis simultaneously start-point,end-point and mid-point of an ongoingcycleof production. Deleuze theorisesthis productive cycle using Nietzsche'sconcept of of a 'eternalreturn'. If eachmomentrepresents uniqueconfluence forces, of the cosmosis to move continually through states and if the nature might be then becoming towardsany particularoutcome, without heading as conceived the eternal,productivereturn of difference. that eachchangeor becominghasits own duration, Deleuzebelieves a measureof the relativestability of the construct,and the relationship between forces at work in defining it. Becoming must be conceived time, nor as a kind of neither in terms of a 'deeper' or transcendental ls backdrop'againstwhich changeoccurs.Becoming-different 'temporal occur.This time which does real time in which changes itsown time, the unfold is not a Kantian a priori form not changebut in which all changes Rather dependingupon attributesof a particularkind of consciousness. and becomingand conit is the time of production,foundedin difference sequent to relations between internal'and external differences.For Deleuze,the presentis merely the productivemoment of becoming,the As moment correlatingto the productivethresholdof forces. such,it representsthe disiunction betweena past in which forces have had some of effect and a future in which new arrangements forceswill constitute per seis Deleuze'sversionof pure In new events. other words,becoming and empty time. tradSuch a view of the world hasimportant implicationsfor concepts any It centralto philosophy. undercuts Platonictheory considered itionally For Deleuze,there is no that privilegesbeing, originality and essence. as world 'behind appearances', it were.Insteadof beingabouttransitions that somethinginitiates or goes throggh, Deleuze'stheory holds that of things and states are prod'ucts becoming.The human subiect, for rationalindividual' experias ought not to be conceived a stable, example, but remaining,principally,the sameperson.Rather,for encing changes assemblage changing as l)eleuzc,one'sself mustbe conceived a constantly of lilrccs, rn cpiphcnomcnonarising from chanceconfluences lanof' stl litwsitncl tln. cxpcctrttitlns, rlrgrtnisms, socictics, Hurl11c$,

Connectives l)uration Nietzsche

B E CO MI NG + M U S I C
Marcel Swibod,a 'Becoming' and 'music' are two terms that can be brought together such that a becoming is capable of proceeding through music, for example through the musical operation known as 'counterpoint', or the interweaving of several different melodic lines horizontally where the harmony is produced through linear combinations rather than using a vertical chordal structure or setting. Counterpoint might most usually constitute a specifically 'musical' case in that when one speaksof musical counterpoint the ilssertions made regarding the term usually refer back to a given musical cxample: in short, counterpoint is something that we normally hear. However, when counterpoint describes the interweaving of different lines rs something other than what we can hear, then it opens up to a different function, a function that frees the term from a direct relation to properly musical content. Consider the work of the ethologistJakob von Uexkiill on the relationship between animal behaviour among certain speciesand the cnvironments inhabited by these speciesthat led him to propound a theory of this relationship based on a conception of counterpoint. To this extent, nature - in the very ways in which it can be figured through the interrction of different lines of movement, between animals and their environments, or between and across different species of animals - can be tunderstoodas constituting a counterpoint in a sensethat extends beyond rrstrictly metaphorical deployment of the term. From the perspective outlined here, music enters into a relation of proximity to nature where music hccomes nature. If the term 'nature' is somewhat problematic as a rule in cultural theory, it is to the extent that it cannot be unquestioningly presupposed as having rrny objective existence beyond the terms which define it, terms which are often loaded. In the present case,the term aims at neither an objective conccption nor a discursive one. Rather, this description attempts to restore to 'nilture' a material dimension that extends beyond the confines of discoLfrse,to the extent that discourse implies material processesthat cannot lrc rcduccd to intcrpretation or the status of fixed objects.To im-ply, in this irrstirncc, to cn-{irld, whcrcby langurgc can in somc instrnccsbc dcploycd is

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PERFO R M A N C E

ART

BEC OM IN G

PER FOR M AN C E

AR T

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in waysthat foregroundits enfoldingof materialprocesses. Implicationin is this sense illustratedby the useof the term 'counterpoint',a term which haslargely beenretainedby Deleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus process. was it because is highly amenable a thinking orientedtowards to As mentioned earlier, term is mostoftenusedin a musicalcontextto figure the of the (harmonic)interactions melodiclines.As such it doesnot describe a fixed object and the term's linguistic or semanticsenseis insufficient to accountfor whatactuallyhappens when counterpoint takesplaceasit draws its contingentconnections differentmelodiclines. between makesit amenable the task of conThis characteristic the term of to structing a different conception of nature, in that it is detachable from its strictly musicalcontext in such a way that it still retains its capacityboth to describe and at thesame timeto imply, or enfold process. This capacity is what allowsus to usethe term to describe non-musical well asmusical as givesway interactions,wherethe ideaof the melodic line, strictly speaking, suchasthosetakingplace to an expanded conception oflinear interactions, betweenthe bodies of different animals,animal species, their environThis expanded the term permitsthe conments) and oneanother. sense of struction of a renewedconceptionof nature that puts it in proximity to music, where na,turebecomes music.hn example of this proximity is embodiedin the work of the French composerOlivier Messiaenwho famouslytranscribed songs differentbird species the of beforeincorporating them into his musicalcompositions. The territorial codingsbetween and acrosscertain bird speciesand their environments(transcodings)are carriedover into the music in the useof birdsong,such that therecan no distinctiondrawn betweenthe produclongerbe a binary or hierarchical tculturetand thoseof 'naturet. tions of Music becomes na,ture naturebecomes and musicand their resulting indiscernibility is the product of a philosophicallabour: to select termsbest suited prlcess.Counterpoint is such a term tash of thinhing and,d,escribing to the it because is capableof putting music and nature into proximity and describingthe material implications that orient thought towardsprocess.

BECOMING + PERFORMANCE ART Ad,rian Parr The early era of performanceart from the mid-1960sand through the 1970s includcd such figures as Allan Kaprow, Vito Acconci, Bruce Nirunrirn,(lhris llurdcn, Adrian Pipcr, Lauric Anderson,Lacy lnd in ancl | ,lhowitz,I lannrrlt Wilkc,( llrolcc Schnccnrirnn, AnirMcndictrr thc

United States; JosephBeuys,Marina and Ulay, Valie Export, Hermann Nitsch and the Vienna Actionismusin West Europe;Jan Mlcoch, Petr Stembera,Milan Knizak, Gabor Attalai, TamasSzentjobyin EastEurope; Stuart Brisley,and Gilbert and Georgein England;and Jill Orr, Stelarc has and Mike Parr in Australia.More recentlyperformance become siga Examples nificant, if not primary, ingredient of many artistic practices. include but are not restricted to: Coco Fuscq Guillermo G6mez-Pefra, Ricardo Dominguez, Santiago Sierra, Franco B., VanessaBeecroft, Matthew Barney, TehchingHsieh, and AndreaFraser. Fluxus Stronglyinfluenced Antonin Artaud, Dada,the Situationists, by and Conceptual Art, performance art in its early days tended to define itself as the antithesisof theatre,in so far as the event wasnever repeated the sameway twice and did not havea linear structurewith a clearbeginning,middleandend.More importantly though,all performance interart rogatesthe clarity of subjectivity,disarrangingthe clear and distinct positions that the artist, artwork, vieweq art institution and art market occupy. Trying to articulatethe changedrelationshipbetweenartist, artwork rnd viewer that performanceart inauguratedcan at times be difficult but the Deleuzian concept of 'becoming' is especiallyuseful here in that it allowsus to considerart in terms of a transformative experience well as as conceptualise the processof subjectificationperformanceart sustains. of 'Becoming'points to a non-linear dynamic process changeand when usedto assistus with problems of an aestheticnature we are encouraged not just to reconfigurethe apparentstability of the art object as 'object' definedin contradistinctionto a fully coherent'subject' or an extension of that 'subject' but rather the conceptof art's becomingis a fourfold bccoming-minor of the artist, viewer, artwork and milieu. It is in this promptsus to consider productionandapprercgardthat performance the ciation of art away from the classicalsubject/object distinction that prcvailed and largeup until the 1960s. by A good example of this would have to be Acconci's Following Piece (1969)that beganwith a propositionrandomly to follow peoplein New Yrrrk.The ideawasthat the performance would independently arriveat a krgicalendpoint,regardless the artist'sintention and despitethe 'goal' of ot'the work beingachieved. Instead,it wasthe personbeingfollowedwho lrrought the work to its final conclusion,such as when she enteredher irl)ilrtmentor got into her car and droveoff. In this instance work was the grrovisionally structuredby a proposition,'to follow anotherperson',but tlrc cvcntualform the work took wasstructuredby the movements the of bcing firllowcd.In fact, hcre the art can be considered a process as l)crson scnsitivc its own trrnsfilrmation; thc artistwaslcd lround thc city at to as

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else. There is a propositionto do 'X' then the activthe whim of someone ity of doing 'X' activatesnew previously unforeseen organisationsto take place;the art is in the 'becomingof art' that is in itself social.Art of this kind may be bestarticulatedas 'art without guarantees'; is because this it entirelyin durationand amidstthe playof divergent forces exists that typifiesDeleuze's understanding 'becoming'. of What is more,with performance artisticvalueis producedsocially; art it processitself. is not an abstractvalue that is imposedoutside the creative Hence,what we find is that this kind of artisticpractice proconcomitantly videsa radicalchallenge against wholeconceptof labourin a capitalist the context.Valueis not decidedaccording profit marginsand the market, to rather it is a particular kind of socialorganisation. For example,when Beuysarrivedat the Ren6Block Galleryin New York (May 1974) wherehe lived with a wild coyotefor sevendaysin the gallery,the art wasin how the two slowly developed sense trust in the other to the point wherethey a of The meaningthat emerged of the eventually sleptcurled up together. out piecewas not universal,nor was it absolutely relative;as an a-signifying process this wasan art practiceoccurringat the limits of signification. given,the art wasboth socially producedand conceived In the examples in terms of 'social formation', one that convergeddifferences their in mutual becoming. Hence,what this demonstrates that performance is art turns its backon the opticalemphasis oncegoverned Instead, that art. such practicesaim at producing an encounteror event, not in the simplistic sense that it'happened' at a particularmomentin time, but in so far asit aspiresto bring a variety of elementsand forces into relation with one another.Ultimately, performanceart involvesa multiplicity of durations, eachof which is implied in the art work asa whole. The crucialpoint is that performance cannot described art be within tradparameters itional aesthetic that reinforcethe validity of subject/object distinctions, consequently conceptual the apparatus 'becoming'offersus is descriptive. It helps us describe the processof change indicative of performanceart; an event that in its singularity concomitantlyexpresses a multiplicity of relations,forces,affectsand percepts.

BERGSON, HENRI ( 1859-1941 ) Felicity J. Colman Frenchphilosopher I )clcuzchm bccncrcditedwith restoring Henri Bergson gcncration, Bergson's of'his Io lhc crrnon of'kcy thinkcrs and work continnlcnlory rucs irnprirct l0 irllon disciplincs conccrncd with timc, movcmcnt,

andperception. Along with the thoughts GottfriedWilhelm von Leibniz, of Baruch Spinoza,Friedrich Nietzsche,David Hume, Antonin Artaud, Guattari and Lucretius, Deleuzeengages Bergson'sempiricism as a challengeto the rigidity of philosophy, especially its useof transcendental in elements,phenomenological assumptions, the questfor 'knowledge' and and philosophical interestin Bergson manifoldand central is 'truth'. Deleuze's to his entire oeuvre.Although neglected philosophical in canonsof the secondhalf of the twentieth century,in the early decades that century, of Bergson'swork was well known and widely discussed many artistic and in literaryarenas, from the FrenchCubiststo the Englishwriter T E. Hulme. In BergsonDeleuzefinds an intellectualpartner for someof his core philosophicalpursuits: conceptsand ideasof temporality,the affective nature of movementand duration, the political implicationsof multiplicity and difference,the morphologicalmovementof genetics, and the temporal causality eventsashabitualand associated of series. Deleuzesignals his interest in Bergsonin his essay Hume, Empiricismand Subjectiaity. on publishedhis book Bergsonism, which he called Then, in 1966, Deleuze in for 'a return to Bergson',through an extendedconsideration what he of sawasBergson's three key concepts: intuition asmethod,the demandfor an inventionand utilisationof a metaphysical orientationof science, a and logicalmethodand theoryof multiplicities.Bergson only questions not the logisticsof existence terms of movement,but his writing indicateshis in genuinefascinationwith the subjectsand objectsof life - appealingto Deleuze's own propositions concerningvitalism. Bergson's conceptsare influentialfor Deleuze'swork in Dffirence and Repetition, where Deleuze developsideas of differenceand repetition, memoryand repetition,the intensive and extensive forms of time, and the physicalmovements time; all of which are indebtedto Bergson's of disparadoxicalmodalitiesof time in his book, Matter and cussionof the proposes movingmodelof MemorylMatiire etMimoirel (1896). Bergson a duration - a conceptof duration that is not spatiallypredetermined but continually alters its past through cognitive movement.Then, later in CreatioeEoolutionBergson incorporatesthe cinematic model into his philosophical expression,noting the cinematographicalcharacter of irncientphilosophyin its apprehension the thought of ordinary knowof lcdge(B 19l 1: 331-33). From this model(andthe Kantiannotionof time, rrndHegelianconception thought and movement) Deleuzedevelops of his cxplicationof how the perceptualrecognitionof moving imagesof the cincmaticscreen operates through the apprehension that movement, not of br.rtthrough specificmoments of sound and optical registration.This f )clcuzcdiscusscs lcngthin his two books the cinema, at on Cinema : The I ()inL'ma :'l'hc'l'irnc-I inuga. trtttt t crnut itncl 2 l-image

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blendingof perceptual of as Memory is conceived by Bergson a temporal hypothesis his discusin centralto Deleuze's imageryandthis ideabecomes importanceof cinema.In his secondbook on sion of the philosophical Deleuze draws from Bergson'sinterest in the cinema, The Time-lmage, d6ji-vu, and different types of possiblememory states- dreams,amnesia, fantasy, halluDeleuze addsa breadthof memoryfunctions: death.To these where we make a conceptof 'promise-behaviour' cinations,Nietzsche's (nowaspast), theatre, for memoryof thepresent the futureuseof thepresent wherethe porAlain Robbe-Grillet's conceptof the 'recognition'process and and others. is trayalof memory throughinvention elimination, numerous how the perceptual cognitive and Deleuzedescribes FollowingBergson, or abilitiesof the dreamor wakefulreceptorof memoryevents imageryare in dependentupon a complexnetwork of factors.As Bergsondiscusses of attentionare contingentupon Matter andMemory,systems perceptual the 'automatic'or 'habitual'recognitionof things.Thesedifferentmodes of rememberingare further temperedthrough the degreeof attention givenin the perception things,affecting only the description the not of of object, but the featuresof the object itself. From Bergson,Deleuze's and multiplicitiesof mature conceptionof duration and the movements time aredeveloped. Connectives Cinema Difference Duration Hume Memory Multiplicity

BLACK HOLE Kylie Message is that Deleuze Guattaribelieve the roleof philosophy to inventnewconand philosophy itselfis written andformulated. cepts that challenge waythat the and from thoseof a multiBecause this, they draw both from new ideas of plicity ofalreadyexisting disciplines, includingbiological earthsciences, and coverage designed make is to theirphiloandphysics. This interdisciplinary rlr projcct signiticancc cffcct(n<l mattcrhowsmall) sophicll h:rvc concurrcnt itttd rritl thitt witlrirrthc lickl ol'r:ont:cpl ttritlriccs thcylloth lpprollriltc li'ottt

contribute to; philosophical or otherwise. These engagementsare at times fleeting and at times more sustained,and contribute to their strategy of preventing their position from stabilising inro an ideology, merhod, or single metaphor. In other words, they encouragephilosophy to occupy the spaceof slippage that exists between disciplinary boundaries, and to question how things are made, rather than simply analysing or interpreting the takenfor-granted final result or image. This provides the foundation for the work presentedin I nti-oed'ipusandA Tkousand Plateaus,andthe seriesof renewed terms proposed by these texts (including schizoanalysis, rhizomatics, pragmatics, diagrammatism, cartography,and micropolitics). Appearing predominantly in A Thousand, Plateaus,the term .black hole, has been sourced from contemporary physics. Referring to spaces that cannot be escapedfrom once drawn into, Deleuze and Guattari describe the black hole as a star that has collapsed into itself. while although this term exists literally rather than as a metaphor (becauseit maintains an effect that is fully actualised, affective and real), it has been relocated away from its original source in scientific discourse.As with many of the terms appropriated by A ThousandPlareaus,it is presented as being engaged in its own processof deterritorialisation that is independent from the text that it has been woven into; these concepts do not exist for the newly bricolagedtogether text, but happen to come into contact with it or move through it as l condition or processof their own moving trajectory or line of flight. In the context of A Thousand. Pleteeus, the black hole is presented as being one - unwanted but necessary- outcome for a failed line of flight. l)eterritorialising movement strays away from the concept and state of molar identity and aims to force splinters to crack open into giant ruptures rrnd cause the subsequent obliteration of the subject as he becomes cnsconcedwithin a processof becoming-multiple. Engaged in this process, the subject is deconstituted, and becomes a new kind of assemblagethat occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call the 'plane of consistency', which is a spaceof creativity and desire. However, becausethis plane is also that of death and destruction, traps are scattered throughout this process. l')xisting as micro-fascisms across this plane, black holes threaten selfconscious acts of transcendence and self-destruction alike, which is why l)cleuze and Guattari advise nomads to exercise caution as they disorganise themselvesaway from the molar organisations of the State. So, in sirlple terms, the black hole is one possible outcome of an ill-conceived (which oftcn equates to overly self-conscious) attempt at deterritorialisation thirt is cirused by a threshold crossed too quickly or an intensity lrcconrcdangcrousbcciruscit is no longer bcarable. Arrotlrcrway of'thirrking lbout thc blrrckholc is in tcrms of how Deleuze i ttttl (i ttl tl ti tt' i r cwr it c lhc r clit t iot t shipphilosophyir nclpsychoir r r alysis s hir

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with desire and subjectivity. If the black hole is one possibleoutcome faced by the overly convulsive, self-consumed desiring subject, then it works to illustrate their contention that every strong emotion - such as consciousness or love - pursues its own end. As a potential outcome for both paths of transcendenceand destruction, the lure of the black hole indicates the subject's attraction toward an absolute (lack) of signification. This expressesthe absolute impossibility of representation at the same time as it actively works to show how grand narrative statementscontinually intertwine subjectivity and signification. In appealing to a deterritorialising activity, Deleuze and Guattari problematise the processof subjectification which, they claim, results either in self-annihilation (a black hole), or re-engagement with different planes of becoming. In addition to presenting the black hole as a possibleend-point to certain acts of deterritorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari use it as a way of further conceptualising their notion of faciality. In this context, black holes exist as the binary co-requisite of the flat white surface, wall or landscapethat nominally symbolises the generic white face of Christ. In order to break through the dominating white face,or wall of the signifier, and avoid being swallowed by the black hole, one must renounce the face by becoming imperceptible. However, Deleuze and Guattari advise caution when embarking on such a line of flight. Indeed, they claim madnessto be a definite danger associatedwith attempts to break out of the signifying system represented by the face.We must not, they warn, entirely reject our organising boundaries becauseto do so can result in the complete rejection of subjectivity. Recalling the slogan of schizoanalysis,they tell us not to turn our backs on our boundaries, but to keep them in sight so that we can dismantle them with systematiccaution.

Connectives Molar Schizoanalysis Space

BODY Bruce Baugh of wherethese its 'liocly'tirr l)clcuzcis clcfinccl irnywholccomposed parts, lilr rtncl sl:rrrtl sorrrc rclirtiorr onc rlnothcr, hrs r citpacitv to irr tlc(irritc llrrlls
Irt'in g:rlli't'tt'rl lr v ot lr c l lr or lic s . ' l' lr t ' lt t t r t t r t r t l l r x l v i s j t t s l o t t c c x i t t t t g l l t 'o l '

such a body; the animal body is another, but a body can also be a body of work, a social body or collectivity, a linguistic corpus, a political party, or even an idea. A body is not defined by either simple materiality, by its occupying space('extension'), or by organic structure. It is defined by the relations of its parts (relations of relative motion and rest, speedand slowness), and by its actions and reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu and to its internal milieu. The parts of a body vary depending on the kind of body: for a simple material object, such as a rock, its parts are minute particles of matter; for a social body, its parts are human individuals who stand in a certain relation to each other. The relations and interactions of the parts compound to form a dominant relation, expressing the 'essence'or a power of existing of that body, a degree of physical intensity that is identical to its power of being affected. A body exists when, for whatever reason, a number of parts enter into the characteristic relation that defines it, and which corresponds to its essenceor power of existing. Since nature as a whole contains all elements and relations, nature as a whole is a body, a system of relations among its parts, expressing the whole order of causal relations in all its combinations. Deleuze is fond of quoting Baruch Spinoza'sdictum that'no one knows what a body can do'. The more power a thing has, or the greater its power of existence,the greater number of ways in which it can be affected. Bodies are affected by different things, and in different ways, each type of body being characterised by minimum and maximum thresholds for being affected by other bodies: what can and what cannot affect it, and to what degree. Certain external bodies may prove insufficient to produce a reaction in a body, or fail to pass the minimum threshold, whereas in other cases,the body being affected may reach a maximum threshold, such that it is incapableof being affected any further, as in a tick that dies of engorgement. A body being affected by another, such that the relations of its parts are the effect of other bodies acting on it, is a passivedetermination of the body, or passion. If an external body is combined or 'composed' with a body in a way that increasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this transition to a higher state of activity is experienced as joy; if the combination decreasesthe affected body's power of being affected, this is the irffect of sadness.It is impossible to know in advance which bodies will compose with others in a way that is consonant with a body's characterist ic relation or ratio of its parts, or which bodies will decompose a body by c:rr.rsing parts to enter into experimental relations. its Whcther the effect is to increaseor decrease body's power of acting and a bcing 1ll'cctccl, onc body affecting; anothcr, or producing effectsin it, is in rcrrlityrrcrlnrbinirrgirnclrr mixing of thc tw<lb<lclics, m<lstoficn 'bit by irncl bi l ' , or pru' t b y l) iu't . Sonr ct int cst his nr ixing lr llu's onc ol'lhc bodics

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(as when food is alteredin being assimilated, when a poison destroys or a body's vital parts); sometimes altersboth and producesa composite it (as relationof partsthat dominates relations both components when the of chyleand lymph mix to form blood,which is of a differentnaturefrom its components); sometimes preserves relationof partsamongthem and it the both, in which casethe two bodiesform parts of a whole. The characteristic relationthat resultsfrom harmoniously combiningthe relationsof the into a'higher individual'or'collective person',such two component bodies as a community or an association, corresponds a collectivepower of to beingaffected, and resultsin collective communalaffects. or Since a body is a relation of parts correspondingto an essence, or a degreeof physical intensity, a body need not have the hierarchical and dominatingorganisation organswe call an 'organism'.It is rather an of reality,differentiated the maximumand minimum thresholds intensive by of its powerof beingaffected. Connectives Body without Organs Power Space Spinoza

BODY WITHOUT Kylie Message

ORGANS

A phraseinitially takenfrom Antonin Artaud, the Body without Organs (BwO) refersto a substrate that is alsoidentifiedasthe planeof consistency (as a non-formed, non-organised, non-stratifiedor destratifiedbody or term). The term first emergedin Deleuze'sTheLogic of Sense, and was further refined with Guattari in Anti-Oedipusand A Thousand Plateaus. The BwO is proposed a meansof escaping as what Deleuzeand Guattari perceive the shortcomings traditional(Freudian,Lacanian)psychoas of analysis. Rather than arguing that desireis basedon Oedipal lack, they claim desireis a productive-machine is multiple and in a stateof conthat psychoanalysis stant flux. And whereas proclaimsclosureand interprettrtion, their critique of the three terms (organism, significanceand sr.rbjcctiticrrtion) organiseand bind us most effectivelysuggests that the possibility of'opcnings sp:rccs thc crcation ncw modes cxpcrinnd ftrr of of crtcc'. l{itlhcr tltiin llrrrcccding dircctly to invcrt rlr dcc<lnstruct lcnlls

dominant in the production of identity and consciousness, suggest they that implicit within, between,and all around theseare other - possibly more affective fieldsof immanence of and states being. (a Attention is refocused awayfrom the subjectivity term which they feel is too often mistaken the term 'consciousness') for traditionallyprivileged by psychoanalysis Deleuze and Guattari challenge the world of the as articulating, self-defining and enclosed subject.The BwO is the proposed antidote(aswell asprecedent, antecedent evencorrelate) this articuand to late and organised organism;indeed,they claim that the BwO hasno need for interpretation. The BwO doesnot exist in oppositionto the organism or notionsof subjectivity, and it is nevercompletelyfree of the stratified exigencies proper language,the State, family, or other institutions. of However, it is, despite this, both everywhereand nowhere,disparateand homogeneous. terms of this, there are two main points to note: firstly, In that the BwO existswithin stratifiedfieldsof organisation the same at time as it offers an alternative mode of being or experience(becoming); secondlgthe BwO doesnot equateliterally to an organ-less body. In referenceto the first point, Deleuze and Guattari explain that althoughthe BwO is a process that is directedtoward a courseof continual becoming,it cannotbreak awayentirely from the systemthat it desires from. While it seeksa mode of articulation that is free from the escape binding tropesof subjectification and signification, must play a delicate it gameof maintainingsomereference thesesystems stratification, to of or elserisk obliteration reterritorialisation or In backinto these systems. other process. words,suchsubversion a never-completed is Instead,it is continuous and oriented only towardsits process moyementrather than toward or point of completion.Consistent any teleological with this, and in order to (or to have affect)it must exist - more or less- within the be affective systemthat it aimsto subvert. Deleuzeand Guattari take Miss X as their role model. A hypochondriac, sheclaimsto be without stomach,brain, or internal organs,and is left with only skin and bonesto give structureto her otherwisedisorganisedbody.Through this example, they explainthat the BwO doesnot refer literally to an organ-less body. It is not produced as the enemy of the organs,but is opposedto the organisation the organs.In other words, of BwO is opposed the organisingprinciplesthat structure,defineand the to speakon behalf of the collectiveassemblage organs,experiences of or privileges'lack' as the singular statesof being. Whereaspsychoanalysis lnd productiveforce that maintainsdesire,Deleuzeand Guattari claim that by binding and judging desirein this way,our understanding and rclati<lnship with the real or Imaginarybecomes furthcr removedand cornpromiscd.

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the Elaborating further on the natureof the BwO, Deleuzealsoinvokes and his 'theory of the germplasm' German biologist,August Weismann, (1885,published1893) contendthat - like the germplasm the BwO is to alwayscontemporarywith and yet independentof its host organism. from Weismannbelievedthat at eachgeneration,the embryo that develops (the for the zygotenot only setsasidesomegermplasm the next generation producesthe cells that will inheritanceof acquiredfeatures)but it also view, developinto the soma- or body - of the organism.In Weismann's to the somaplasm simply providesthe housingfor the germplasm, ensure of nourished and conveyed the germplasm the oppoto that it is protected, generation.What comesfirst, the site sex in order to createthe next Weismann would insistthe chickenis simply oneegg's chickenor the egg? device for laying another egg. Similarly, Deleuzepresentsthe BwO as to equivalent the egg;like the egg,the BwO doesnot exist beforeor prior' of to the organism,but is adjacentto it and continuouslyin the process constructingitself. fields of the norm and its Insteadof slotting everythinginto polarised us antithesis,Deleuze and Guattari encourage to remove the poles of organisationbut maintain a mode of articulation.They advisethat in seeking makeourselves BwO, we needto maintaina mode of expresto a of sion, but rid language the central role it has in arbitrating truth and desireaway real.Relocating reality againstmadness the pre*symbolic and Deleuzeand Guattari presentit from a dichotomous linguistictrajectory, offered by the BwO by as being contextualised the field of immanence As field of language. such, desireis always rather than by the conclusive in of alreadyengaged a continuousprocess becoming.However,despite (and in somecases or embodying) field of immanence a plane a occupying decoded and as ofconsistency which areoften described beingdestratified, (whoseprindeterritorialised, BwO hasits own modeof organisation the ciples are primarily derived from Baruch Spinoza).Rather than being as matter form, the body is morecorrectlydescribed uncontained a specific parts. or a collectionof heterogeneous

BREUER, JOSEPH (I8+2-I925) - refer to the entrieson 'hysteria'and tfeminismt.

BURROUGHS,WILLIAM (1914-97) refer'to the entries on tart' * and'post-structuralismpolitics'.

CANGUILHEM, phrenia'.

GEORGES (1904-95)-referto theentryon'schizo-

CAPITALISM Jonathan Roffe In the periodbeforehis death,Deleuzeannounced an interviewthat he in would like to compose work which would be called TheGrand.eur Marx. a of positiveattitudetowardsthe philosoThis fact clearlyindicates Deleuze?s phy of Karl Marx, which he neverabandoned despitealteringmanyof its fundamental elements. Certainlythe most important of theseelements is capitalism.The Marxism of-Deleuzecomesfrom his insistence that all politicalthought must take its bearings from the capitalistcontextwe live in. While mentioningcapitalismin passing a number of places, is the in it two volumesof Caphalismand Schizophrenia which contain the most sustainedand radicaltreatmentof this theme. Deleuze and Guattari insist any given social formation restricts or structuresmovementsor flows. They claim that theseflows are not just the flows of money and commoditiesfamiliar to economists, can be but seenat a variety of levels:the movementof peopleand traffic in a city, the flows of words that are bound up in a language, flows of genetic the code betweengenerations plants, and even the flow of matter itself of (the movementof the ocean,electronsmoving in metals,and so forth). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari's political ,thought begins with the prcmissthat nature itself, the Whole of existence, at once a matter of is fkrws,and that tny s<lcicty must structrlretheseflows in ordcr to subsist. All Stltc rncl prc-Strtc socictics rrllthoscwhich irccording Murx lrc to -

Connectives Becoming Body Desirc Lacirn l)sychorrnrrlysis Spinozit

lL-

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pre-capitalist on DeleuzeandGuattari'saccount, havesucha restriction of flows astheir basicprinciple. Deleuzeand Guattari call this processof restriction, or structuring, 'coding'. They conceivecoding as at once restrictive and necessary. Societies, regimesof coding,aim to bring about certainfixed waysof as existing(living, talking,working,relating)while denyingother more malleable ways. However, without some structure - our own coherent individuality and agencyfor example,which Deleuzeand Guattari considerspecific eachsocialformationand always to oppressive therewould be no basisupon which to challenge and attemptto alter the givencoding regime.Both Anti-Oed,ipus A Thousand, and Plateaus include lengthy analysesof differentkinds of societies the waysin which they codeflows. and is Capitalism the radicalexception this basiccentralunderstanding to of the nature of society.There are four featuresto this exceptionalstatusof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari. First, insteadof working by coding flows,capitalism a regimeof decoding. is Second, and in tandemwith this, the recodingthat would takeplacein non-capitalist societies recapture to decoded flows is replaced the process axiomatisation. example, by of For the coding of sexualrelationsthrough marriage,the church, moralsand popularculture - which in different societies locatethe practiceof sexin certaincontexts, whetherthat is marriage, prostitutionor youth culturehasbeendecoded capitalistsocieties. in This is first of all, for Deleuzeand Guattari, a good thing, making possiblenew kinds of relations that were excluded the codingregimes question.In capitalism, by in however, cora relativeaxiomatisation takenplacemaking possible saleof sex as has the a product (what Karl Marx called a 'commodity'). Axioms operate,in short, by emptyingflows of their specificmeaningin their codedcontext (sexasthe act of marriage, mealasthe centreof family life, and so on) the and imposing a law of generalequivalence the form of monetary value. in Theseflowsremaindecoded sofar asthey arefluid partsof the economy. in They cannot,ascommodities, bound to a certainstateof affairsto have be value - for food to be a product it must be possibleto eat it in a context other than the family home,or tribe. The third important aspectof capitalismfor Deleuzeand Guattari drawingon Marx - is that this process decoding,/axiomatisation no of has real limit. Given that all such limits would be codes,this movement effectivelyand voraciously erodesall such limits. This accountsfor the sensein capitalistsocieties perpetual novelty and innovation, since of codcd flows are continuallybeing turned into commoditiesthrough this proccss, furthcr cxtcncling realmof monetaryequivalence. the suclrir proccss I krwcvcr, coulclncvcr bc total.Thus, fourthly,thc fact thrrtcrrllitirlisl srrcicty in not rrnd ;rrocccds this waycklcs mcanfor I)clctrzc

of It Guattari that codedelements socialformation are entirely absent. is rather the casethat certain fragmentsof Statesociety(in particular) are put to work in the serviceof capitalism.Obviously,structureslike the governmentand the family still exist in capitalism.As they note, there could be no total decodedsociety- an oxymoronicphrase.Governments and monarchiesremain,while having their real juridical power substantially reduced,asregulativemechanisms stabilisingthe growth of decoding/ axiomatisation.The nuclear family in particular, the kind of coded entity that one might imagine would be dissolved by the decoding/ axiomatising movementof capitalism, for Deleuzeand Guattari the site is of a surprisingminiaturisationof Statesociety, where the father takesthe position (structurally speaking) the despoticand all-seeing ruler. of None of thesepoints, howeveqmakesfor a celebrationof the liberatory effectsof capitalism.Deleuze and Guattari remain Marxists in so far as.they consider real freedom to be unavailablein the world of monetaryequivalence enacted capitalism.While imitating the decodby ing that makespossiblethe freeing up of flows and new ways of existing, capitalist society only produces a different, more insidious, kind of unfreedom. Connectives Freedom Marx Oedipalisation

CAPITALISM EugeneHolland

+ UNIVERSAL HISTORY

DeleuzeandGuattariarealoneamongpost-structuralists resuscitate to the notion of universalhistory. But by drawing on Karl Marx rather than GeorgWilhelm FriedrichHegel,they insistthat this is an'ironic'universal history,for three reasons: is retrospective, it singularand critical. [t is retrospective that the perspective schizophrenia in of only becomes available yet at the sametime, capitaltoward the end of history,under capitalism; ism doesnot representthetelos ofhistory, but rather a contingentproduct of fortuitous circumstance. This confirms the singularity of capitalist socicty: is not somehiddensimilaritybetween it capitalism and previous s<rcill firrmsthrt makcs but rathcrwhat M:rrx (in thc clpitrrlism univcrsirl, Orunilrisse\ cirllsthc 'csscntirtl difl'crcncc' bctwccrrit arrd thc othcrs: it

il

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CAPIT AL ISM

UNIVERSAL

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exposes source the ofvalue that previoussocieties kept hidden.And hence capitalismoffers the key to universalhistory because with capitalism, societycan finally becomeself-critical. Capitalistmodernity represents key turning point in this view of the universalhistory,for a crucial discoveryis madein a number of different fields:by Martin Luther; by Adam Smith and David Ricardo;somewhat laterby SigmundFreud,who will therefore considered'the be Luther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry'.The key discovery that valuedoesnot is inhere in objects but rather gets invested in them by human activity, whether that activity is religious devotion, physicallabour or libidinal desire.In this fundamental reversal perspective, of objectsturn out to be merely the support for subjective value-giving activity.Yet in eachof the threefields,the discovery ofthe internal,subjective natureofvalue-giving activity is accompaniedby a resubordination of that activity to another externaldetermination: the caseof Luther, subjective in faith freed from subordination the CatholicChurch is nevertheless to resubordinated the to authority of Scripture; in Smith and Ricardo,wage-labourfreed from feudal obligationsis resubordinated private capital accumulation; to in Freud, the free-form desireof polymorphouslibido is resubordinated to heterosexualreproduction in the privatised nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex.To free human activity from theselast externaldeterminationsis the task of world-historicalcritique: Marx providesthe critique of political economy to free wage-labourfrom private capital; Friedrich Nietzsche providesthe critique of religionand moralismto free Will to Power from nihilism; Deleuzeand Guattari provide the critique of psychoanalysisto free libido from the private nuclear family and the Oedipuscomplex. If capitalismmakeshistory universal,this is ultimately because proit motes multiple differences, because the capitalistmarket operatesas a For 'difference-engine'. Marx, the key human universalwas production: the species-being humanity was defined in terms of its ever-growing of ability to produceits own meansof life rather than simply consumewhat nature offered.For Deleuzeand Guattari, the key universalis not just production(not evenin the very broadsense they grant that term inAntiOedipus), specifically production of difference but the free from codification and representation. The marketfostersan increasingly differentiated network of socialrelationsby expandingthe socialisation production of alongwith the divisionof labour,eventhough capitalextractsits surplus from thc differentialflowsenabled this network,by meansof exploitaby ti<lnirnclthc ncvcr-cncling repaymcntof an infinite debt. Even though the rlifl'crcrtcc-cnginc crrpitrrl of' fails firlly tu rcllisc universalhistory, it noncthclcss tttitkcs possiblc; putsit on lhc lristoricirl trrrivcrsrrlity irgcndrr. L

So while the capitalist market inauguratesthe potential for universal history in its productionof difference, is the eliminationof capitalfrom it the market that will multiply differenceand realisethe freedom inherent in universal history.

CAPTURE Alberto Toscano The conceptof 'capture'is usedby Deleuzeand Guattari to dealwith two problems relationality:first, how to conceive the connection of of between the State,the war machineand capitalismwithin a universalhistory of politicallife; and second, how to formulatea non-representational account of the interaction of different beings and their territories, such as to ground a thinking of becoming.In the first instance, capturedefinesthe operation whereby the State (or Urstaat) binds or encaststhe war machinb, therebyturning it into an objectthat canbe madeto work for the State, to bolster and expand its sovereignty. Apparatusesof capture constitutethe machinicprocesses specificto Statesocieties. They can be conceived being primarily a matter of signs;whencethe figure of the as One-EyedEmperor who binds and fixes signs,complemented a Oneby Armed Priest or jurist who codifiesthesesignsin treaties,contractsand laws.Capturecanbe understoodasconstitutinga control of signs,accompanying the other paradigmatic dimension of the State, the control of tools.The principalontologicaland methological issuerelatedto this conceptionof capturehasto do with the type of relationbetween captureand the captured (namely in the caseof the war machine as the privileged correlateof the apparatus). Deleuzeand Guattari'snotion of universalhistory evades any explanation by strict causality or chronological sequence.Rather, it turns to notionsdrawn from catastrophe theory and the sciences complexityto of revivethe Hegelianintuition that the Statehasalwaysbeenthere- not as an idea or a concept,but as a thresholdendowedwith a kind of virtual efficacy, evenwhen the Stateas a complexof institutionsand as a system of control is not yet actual.The logic of captureis such that what is cappresupposed generated the act of capture, tured is simultaneously and by appropriated produced.Deleuzeand Guattari return to many of the and key notions in Karl Marx's critique of political economyto bolster the thcsis of a constructivecharacterof capture,arguing, for instance, that surpluslabourcanbc unclcrst<xrdcngcndcr to labourpropcr(th<lugh can it irlsobc urrdclslood tlrc irttcrrrpl llkrckrlr nranipulatc:r irs to constitutivc

40

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flight from labour). Capture is thus both an introjection and determination of an outside and the engendering of the outside as outside of the apparatus. It is in this regard that capture is made to correspond to the Marxian concept of primitive accumulation, interpreted as a kind of originary violence imposed by the State to prepare for the functioning of capital. Here Deleuze and Guattari are sensitive to the juridical aspectsof the question, such that State capture defines a domain of legitimate violence, in as much as it always accompaniescapture with the affirmation of a right to capture. In its intimate link to the notion of machinic enslavement,the apparatus of capture is proper to both the initial imperial figure of the State and to fullblown global or axiomatic capitalism, rather than to the intermediary stage represented by the bourgeois nation-state and its forms of disciplinary subjectivation. The notion of capture can also be accorded a different inflection, this time linked to the privileging of ethological models of intelligibility within a philosophy of immanence. Here the emphasis is no longer on the expropriation and appropriation of an outside by an instance of control, but on the process of convergence and assemblagebetween heterogeneous series, on the emergence of blocs of becoming, such as the one of the wasp and the orchid. What we have here is properly speaking a double capture or inter-capture, an encounter that transforms the disparate entities that enter into a joint becoming. In Deleuze and Guattari's KaJha, such a process is linked to a renewal of the theory of relation, and specifically to a reconsideration of the status of mimesis, now reframed as a type of symbiosis. Under the heading of capture we thus encounter two opposite but entangled actions, both of which can be regarded as schemata alternative to a dominant hylomorphic mode of explaining relation: the first, understood as the political control of signs, translates a co-existence of becomings (as manifested by the war machine) into a historical succession, making the State pass from an attractor which virtually impinges upon non-State actors to an institutional and temporal reality; the second defines a co-existence and articulation of becomings in terms of the assemblage of heterogeneous entities and the formation of territories. What is paramount in both instancesis the affirmation of the event-bound and transformative character of relationality (or interaction), such that capture, whether understood as control or assemblage, always an ontois logically constructive operation and can never be reduced to models of unilateral causation.

CAPTURE + POLITICS
Paul Patton Deleuzeand Guattari deny that the Stateis an apparatus which emerged asthe resultof prior conditionssuchasthe accumulation surplusor the of emergence privateproperty.Instead,they arguethat Stateshavealways of existedand that they are in essence alwaysmechanisms capture.The of earliestforms of Stateinvolvedthe captureof agricultural communities, the constitution of a milieu of interiority and the exerciseof sovereign power. The ruler became'the sole and transcendentpublic-property owner,the masterof the surplusor stock,the organiser large-scale of works (surpluslabour),the sourceof public functionsand bureaucracy' (D&G 1987:428).Historically the most important mechanisms capturehave of products,upon labourand money. beenthoseexercised upon land and its Thesecorrespond Karl Marx's 'holy trinity' of the modern sources to of capitalaccumulation,namely ground rent, profit and taxes,but they have long existed other forms.In all cases, find the same in we two key elements: general the constitutionof a space comparison of and the establishment of a centre of appropriation.Together,these define the abstractmachine which is expressed the different forms of State,but also in non-state in mechanisms capture such asthe captureof corporealrepresentationby of faciality, the captureof political reason public opinion. or by Consider first the capture of human activity in the form of labour. Deleuzeand Guattari arguethat 'labour (in the strict sense) beginsonly with what is calledsurpluslabour' (D&G 1987:490). Contraryto the widespreadcolonial presumption that indigenouspeopleswere unsuited for primitive societies not societies labour,they point out that 'so-called are of shortage subsistence to an absence work, but on the contraryare or due of societies freeactionand smoothspace of that haveno usefor a work-factor, anymorethan they constitutea stock'(D&G 1987:491).Inthesesocieties, productiveactivity proceeds under a regimeof 'free action' or activity in continuousvariation.Such activity only becomes labour once a standard of comparison imposed, the form of a definitequantityto be produced is in or a time to be worked.The obligationto providetaxes,tribute or surplus labourimposes suchstandards comparison, therebyeffectingthe transof formationof freeaction into labour. The sametwo elements presentin the conditionswhich enablethe are extractionof ground rent, which Deleuzeand Guattari describeas 'the vcry modcl of an apparatus capture' (D&G 1987:441).From an ecoof nomicpoint of vicw,thc cxtrtrction grouncl rcnt prcsllpposcsmcans of r of prlrtirlns llrrrcl thc ol'dill'crcnt of' conrpirrirrg prtlcluctivity sinrrrltirrrcorrsly

Connective ( lrr rrlisnr pit

42

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L Ew IS

(r832-98)

C H A OS

+3

exploited,or of comparingthe productivity of the sameportion successively exploited. The measurement productivity provides a general of qualitative portions space comparison; measure of a of differences between of the earth'ssurfacewhich is absentfrom the territorial assemblage of hunter-gatherer society. Thus, 'labour and surpluslabourare the apparaof tus of captureof activityjust asthe comparison landsand the appropriof ation of land are the apparatus captureof territory' (D&G 1987:442). in One further condition is necessary order for ground rent to be (D&G the in mustbelinkedto a landowner extracted: difference productivity 1987: 441). In other words, from a legal point of view, the extraction of ground rent is 'inseparable from a processof relative deterritorialization' because of 'instead peoplebeingdistributedin an itinerantterritory,pieces people quantitative of landaredistributed among according a common to criterion' (D&G 1987:441). The conversion portionsof the earthinhabited of primitivepeoples by so-called into an appropriable exploitable and resourte juridicalcentreof appropriation. requiresthe establishment a of therefore The centreestablishes monopolyover what has now becomeland and a assigns itselfthe right to allocate to ownership portionsof unclaimed of land. This centreis the legalsovereign and the monopolyis the assertion of sovereignty over the territoriesin question.That is why the fundamental jurisprudentialproblemof colonisation the mannerin which the terriis into a uniform space toriesof the originalinhabitants become transformed of landedproperty.In thosecolonies which wereacquired and governed in accordance with British common law, the sovereign right of the Crown privaterightsand meantthat it hadthe powerboth to create andextinguish interests land. In this sense, in Crown land amountsto a uniform expanse of potentialreal property which coversthe earth to the extentof the sovjurisdictions, common-law the ereignterritory.It followsthat, within these legalimpositionof sovereignty constitutes apparatus capturein the an of precisesense which Deleuzeand Guattari give to this term. The imposition ofsovereignty effects instantaneous an deterritorialisation ofindigenas ous territoriesand their reterritorialisation a uniform space Crown of land centredupon the figureof the sovereign.

CHAOS Alberto Toscano in This term canbe saidto receive maintreatments the work of Deleuze two In and Guattari,one intra-philosophical, other non-philosophical. the the first acceptation, chaos designates the type of virtual totality that the philosophyof differenceopposes the foundationaland self-referential to In totalities proposedby the philosophiesof representation. polemical juxtapositionto those systems thought that lie beyond the powersof of in differences are representation, Deleuzianchaos, which all intensive this - is equivalent the ontoto contained 'complicated' but not 'explicated' Put logicallyproductiveaffirmationof the divergence series. differently, of chaos envelops distributes, and without identifying,the heterogeneities that makeup the world. In other words,Deleuzianchaosis formlessbut not undifferentiated.Deleuze thus opposesthis Joyceanand Nietzschean in simulacrafor their diverchaosmos, which the eternal return selects gence) the chaos to that Platoattributesto the sophist,which is a privative Moreover, considers he sucha chaosmos the as chaos non-participation. of principal antidoteto the trinity sustaining philosophies representaall of tion and transcendence: world, God and subject(man). In A Thousand, Plateaus,having moved away from the structuralistinspiredterminologyof series(which chaoswasseento affirm), Deleuze and eternal return as and Guattari provide a critique of both chaosmos an insufficientbulwark againsta (negative)return of 'the One' and of representation. Against this they proposethe conceptsof 'rhizome' and in 'plane of immanence'.When chaosmakesits reappearance What is Philosophy? is asthe shared it correlateof the threedimensions thought of (or of the brain), alsodesignated chaoids;science, and philosophy. as art In this context,chaos not definedsimply by the mannerin which it conis tains (or complicates) differences, by its infinite speed,such that the but particles,forms and entities that populate it emergeonly to disappear immediately, leavingbehind no consistency, reference any determinate or consequences. is It Chaos thus definednot by its disorderbut by its fugacity. is then the philosophy, the drawingof planes immanence, of invention taskof through personae composition concepts, giveconsistency of to to of conceptual and its is chaos whilst maintaining speed and productivity. Chaos thus both the as intimatethreatand the sourceof philosophical creation, understood the for a imposition onto the virtual of its own typeof consistency, example conby or Phiklsophy can sistcncy othcrthrn thoscprovidccl frrnctir)ns percepts. of'iln cthicsof'chiuls, pitrticular it wrtyof'livirrg with it1 thusbc tccirst tcrtrts

CARROLL, LEWIS (1832-98) referto the entries on'art'and 'incorporeal'.

(lt'lZANNIi, PAUL (ltl39-1906)- rcfcr to rhc cnrricson 'irrr', 'sclrs:rt liort',trtd 'scttsltlioit c:ittcrttlt'. L

+4

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chaos- and againstthe sterile clich6sof opinion (doxa)- by creating conceptual formscapable sustaining infinitespeed chaos of the of whilst not succumbing the stupidity,thoughtlessness folly of the indeterminate. to or Philosophical creation thus poisedbetween, the one hand,the subjecis on tion of the planeof immanence somevarietyof transcendence would to that guarantee uniqueness its and, on the other, the surging up of a chaosthat would dissolve consistency, durabledifference structure. any any or Chaosand opinion thus provide the two sources inconsistency of for thought, the one determinedby an excess speed,the other by a surfeit of of redundancy. Though chaos a vital resource thought,it is alsoclear is for that the struggleis twofold through and through, in as much as it is the inconsistencyor idiocy of a chaotic thought that often grounds the recourse to the safety and identity of opinions. In the later work with Guattari it is essential the definition of philosophical to practiceand its demarcation from and interference with the other chaoids, that chaosnot be considered simply synonymous with ontological univocity,but that it is accorded suigeneris a statusasthe non-philosophical dimensiondemanded by philosophical thought. Connectives Plato Representation Thought

CINEMA Constantine Verezsis Following his work on A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze'sCinemabooksCinemal: The mooement-image Cinema2: The tirne-image underand stand film as a multiplicity, a phenomenon simultaneouslyoriented toward a network of reproductive forces, which make it a-signifying totality (a 'being-One'), and equally toward a network of productiae forces, that facilitate the connection and creation of an encounter (a 'becoming-Other').The first interpretation of film finds its clearesr expression two Breatmechanisms cinematicovercoding historical in of poeticsand textualanalysis that havedominatedanglophone, academicisccl film intcrprctationsincethe mid-1970s. Eachof theseapproaches turrdcrstrrncls rcpctitionas a kind of rcdundirncy, that contril'rutcs one to lhc. huhiluul rccttgttitioltof'tlrc sllnlc: ilr.rindustrirl rcprcscrrtirtiorrirl

model, a symbolic blockage. Within these totalising and homogenising approaches to film, repetition (redundancy) functions as a principle of unification, limiting - but never totally arresting - cinema's potentially active and creative lines of flight. In place of these nomalising - informational and/ or symbolic - accounts of cinema, another approach develops an experimental-creative understanding of film in which an attentive misrecognition abandons representation (and subjectification) to sketch circuits - and . . . and . . . and - between a series of images. The latter describes Deleuze's 'crystalline regime', an intensive system which resists a hierarchical principle of identity in the former present, and a rule of resemblance in the present present, to establish a communication betweentwo presents (the former and the present) which co-exist in relation to a virtual object - the absolutely different. This direct presentation of time - a becoming-in-the-world - brings cinema into a relation not with an ideal of Truth, but with powers of the false: opening, in the place of representation, a sensation of the present presence of the moment, acreative stammering (and . . . and . . . and). These two critical interpretations of film correspond to, yet cut across' the separateaspectsof cinema dealt with in each of the Cinema books. In Cinema 1, Deleuze identifies the classical or 'movement-image' as that which gives rise to a 'sensory-motor whole' (a unity of movement and its interval) and grounds narration (representation) in the image. This movement-image, which relates principally to pre-World War II cinema, contributes to the realism of the 'action-image', and produces the global domination of the American cinema. In Cinema 2, Delguze describes a post-war crisis in the movement-image, a break-up of the sensory-motor link that gives rise to a new situation - a neo-realism - that is not drawn out directly into action, but is 'primarily optical and of sound, invested by the senses'(D 1989: 4). As Deleuze describesit, even though this opticalsound image implies a beyond of movement, movement does not strictly stop but is now grasped by way of connections which are no longer sensory-motor and which bring the sensesinto direct relation with time and thought. That is, where the movement-image and its sensory-motor signs are in a relationship only with an indirect image of time, the pure optical and sound image - its 'opsigns' and 'sonsigns' - are directly connected to a time-im age- a 'chronosign' - that has subordinated movement. Appealing to Henri Bergson's schemataon time, Deleuze describesa situation in which the optical-sound perception enters into a relation with genuinely airtualelements. This is the large circuit of the dream-image ('onirosign'), a type of intensive system in which a virtual image (the 'diffcrcnciittor') bccomes actual not directly, but by actualising a different in i nri tgc,w hi ch it sclf plays t hc r r llc of t hc vir t uit l im agc bcing r t ct ualiscd

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another, and so on. Although the optical-sound image appears to find its proper equivalent in this infinitely dilated circuit of the dream-image, for Deleuze the opsign (and sonsign) finds its true genetic element only when the actual image crystallises with its own virtual image on a small circuit. The time-image is a direct representation of time, a crystal-imagethat consists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and its own virtual image so that the two are indiscernible, actual and,virtual at the same time. Deleuze says:'what we seein the crystal is time itself, a bit of time in the pure state'

(D 1989: 82). In a brief example, Chinatown(1973) is a perfectly realised(neoclassical) Hollywood genrefilm bur one that exhibitsan ability to exceed itself. Chinatzwncanbeunderstoodasa representational symbolictext and - a detective film and an Oedipaldrama.But its subtlepatterningof repetitions- the motifsof waterand eye- while contributingto the film's narrative economysketch the complementary panoramicvision of a large circuitindifferentto the conditionsof meaning and truth. Additionally,the film's final repetition- a woman'sdeathin Chinatown- brings the detective Gittes'pastandpresent togetherwith hallucinatory exactitude form to a smallcircuit in which the virtual corresponds the actual.The final act to gestures towardneithera diegeticnor oneirictemporality, a crystalline but temporality. Connectives Crystal Lines of flight Time imase

CINEMA + WERNERHERZOG
Alberto Toscano Deleuze's affinity with WernerHerzog exceedsthe explicit references to the German filmmaker in the Cinema volumes. Herzog's films and documentaries of the 1970sare unmatched as contemporary representativesof a heterodox fidelity to romanticism, separating the latter from its Kantian presuppositions and Hegelian consequences order to discover a dimenin sion in which materiality and ideality, nature and production, become irrdisccrniblc.'l'his is thc kincl of romanticism which, in the referenceto lf rrclrrrcr thc vcry ot.ltscrt ,'lnti-Octlipus, a progcrritorof thc schiz<lirt ol' is r t t t r t lv l ' s liln(' c . it

This thinking of the impersonal, of an earth beyond man, is given remarkable,albeit divergent expression in films such as Fitzcarraldo (1982) or Stroszek(1977), where it is accompaniedby the depiction of figures that approximate what Deleuze called structuralist heroes: pure individuals or larval subjects capableof sustaining their habitation by pre-individual singularities and deformation by spatio-temporal dynamisms, attaining a point of non-distinction between man and nature. Herzog immerses the viewer in the (micro- and macro-) cosmosof sensationborne by beings of remarkable fragility (akin to Bartleby) and great hallucinating, doomed visionaries.The cinematic ideasextracted from the work of Herzog intervene at two very significant moments in Deleuze's confrontation with cinema, first in terms of the large form and the small form of the action-image in Cinerna 1, then in Cinema2 with the momentous introduction of the crystal image. Herzog's 'action films' provide two extreme realisationsof those cinematic schematapreoccupied with the transformative interaction of action and situation. In the idea (or vision) of the large form (SAS'), a situation (S) poses a problem to a character requiring an action (A) whereby the initial situation (and the character herself) will be transformed (S'). Herzog's variation on this schemaentails the staging of actions whose delirium is to try to transform situations that does not make any such requirement on the character. These are in turn split between a sublime or hallucinatory aspectthat seeksto equal an unlimited nature, and a heroic or hypnotic one, which tries to confront, through an excessiveproject, the limits imposed by nature. What Deleuze isolatesin Herzog is thus a pure idea of the large, staged as a mad attempt to delve into the abyssof nature by linking man and landscapein the creation of a sublime situation. While Herzog operateson the large form by excess,making the two situations (S and S') incommensurable, he transforms the small form (ASA ) by weakening it to the extreme, such that the actions and the characters bearing them are stripped oftheir intensities (whether in use, reduced to entirely inoperative and defenceless Kinski's foetal figure in Nosferatu (1979) or in the films starring the schizophrenic actor Bruno S.). Sublimity and a kind of bare life are the metaphysical foci of Herzog's implementation of the action image, which reaches its most accomplished moments precisely when it stages their reversibility (the sublimity of bare life in Kaspar Hauser (1975), the destitution of visionary greatnessin Aguirre (1972)). The metaphysical import of Herzog's work is even more prominent in Cinema 2, where he is accorded the rare praise of having best realised the crystal image: the smallest possible circuit joining, in a kind of perpetual oscillation irnd indiscernibility, the actual and the virtual. This point of irrdisccrnibility signrrls il purc cxpcriencc of timc (indisccrnible from ( ctcrni t.y) i rr r d ol' c: r cr r t ion indiscclr r iblc lir r r r t lhc int p: t ssivc) .I I cr z. og's

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Heart of Glass(1976) is the key locus for the cinematic manifestation of this exquisitelymetaphysical type of image.Following on from an intuition of Gilbert Simondon,Deleuzeunderstands film in terms of the this relation betweena germ capable crystallisation of and a milieu of application which is qualified as actually amorphous.But this amorphousnessis not that of a mere prime matter,sincefrom anotherperspective it is a virtually differentiatedstructure; and the germ, initially qualified a virtual image,is understood actual.Thus, thoughactualand virtual are as ultimately indiscernible,they can be distinguishedby the perspecive taken on the relation at hand (for example germ/milieu). Heart of Glass is, in Deleuze'seyes,a kind of alchemicaladventure,haunted by the uncertainty of the crystal, in which what is at stake is the encounter between red crystalglass the and the world, suchthat the former canpass from virtual to actualimageand effectthe passage the latter from actual of amorphousnessto virtual and infinite differentiation. We can thus see how the crystalimageis not simply a matter of a certainkind of intuition, but involvesthe construction of scenarios with their own very special kinds of actions, revealing Herzog's genius for joining the most deprived and infinitesimal of creatures with the most cosmic and grandioseof projects,an inspiration that can perhapsbe tracked elsewhere in Deleuze'soeuvre.

COGITO James Williams Deleuze'scritical approachto the cogito of Ren6Descartes; 'I think, the thereforeI am' from the Discourse Methodor the 'I think, I am' from the on Meditations,can be divided into a critique of the Cartesiananalytic method, a critique of the self-evidence the cogitoand an extension of of the Cartesian view of the subject. Descartes'foundationalmethod is the rationalist construction of a systemof analytictruths. That is, he believes that certainpropositions are true independentlyof any others and that thereforethey can stand as a ground for the deductionof further truths according reason. to Deleuze's synthetic and dialectical method, developedin Dffirence and,Repetition, depends the view that all knowledge partial and opento revision. on is Thus, any relativetruth is open to extensionthrough syntheses with further discoveriesand through further experiments.The relation bctwccn thcsctruths is dialectical rathcrthananalytical foundational, and 'fhcrc is r rcciprtrcirl proccss rcvisionand changcbctwccnthcm, as of

t"

opposedto Cartesianmovesfrom secureand inviolable basesout into the reason the heart of his method,as unknown.Where Descartes situates at shownby the role of thinking in the cogito,Deleuzeemphasises sensation. Sensation resistantto identity in representation. is Thought must be responsive sensations to that go beyond its capacityto representthem. Thesepoint to a realmof virtual conditionsdefinedasintensities Ideas and (the capitalindicates that thesearenot ideasto be thought of asernpirical things in the mind, rather they are like Kantian Ideasof reason). Deleuzeholdsthat no thought is freeof sensation. The cogitocannotbe self-evident, because sensation alwaysextendsto a multiplicity of further conditionsand causes. The Cartesian hope of defeatingsystematic doubt through the certaintyof the cogitomust therefore fail. Deleuzeoften turns to dramatisations from art, literature and cinemato convinceus of the insufficiency of the cogito. Wherever we presume to have found pure thought,or pure representations, expressivity the ofthe artspointsto sensationsand deeperldeas. A thought, such as the cogito,is thereforeinseparable from sensations that themselves bring a series intensities Ideasto bearon the subject. of and The 'I' is therefore independent carriesall intensities not but and all Ideas with it. These are related to any singularthought in the way it implies differentarrangements intensitiesand differentrelationsof clarity and of obscuritybetween Ideas. You do not think without feeling.Feelingdefinesyou as an individual. That singulardefinition brings someintensitiesto the fore while hiding greatercaring,lessjealousy). turn, these others(morehating,lessanger, In intensitieslight up Ideas in different ways making somerelationsmore obscureand others more distinct (The Idea of love for humanity took centre stage,after their sacrifice). The subjectis thereforeextendedthrough the sensations singular of individualsinto virtual intensitiesand Ideas.Unlike the Cartesian cogito, positedon the activity of the thinking subject,Deleuze'sindiwhich is vidual has an all-important passive side.We cannot directly chooseour sensations, are thereforepassive with respectto our virtual 'dark prewe cursorst. Deleuze'sphilosophydependson Descartes' rationalistcritics,notably BaruchSpinoza, the syntheticmethodandfor the oppositionto the free for activity of the subject, and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, for the extension the subjector monad to the whole of reality.Deleuzeis not of rather, he extendsthe activesubjectthrough passimply anti-Cartesian; sivity and through the conditionsfor sensation. The cogitois an important moment in philosophy, it requirescompletingthrough syntheses but that bclic its indcpcndcncc,

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CONCEPTS CliffStagoll Deleuzeunderstands philosophyas being the art of inventingor creating concepts, putting concepts work in new ways. doesnot consider or to He it to be very useful or productive,however, when it creates and usesconceprs in themannerthathethinkshastypifiedmuchof western philosophy date. to Too often, Deleuzeargues,philosophyhas used real experience merely as a source extracting deducing for or abstract conceptual means categorisfor ing phenomena. hastendedthen to employthese [t same concepts eitherto determineor express essence phenomena, elseto order and rank the of or them in termsof the concept. example Plato'sconceptof Forms,the An is absolute and changeless objects and standards knowledge of against which all humanknowledge but an inferior copy.Sucha conceptdoesnot help is us appreciate contributeto the richnessof lived experience, or Deleuze argues, only to order,labelandmeasure but individuals relative anabstract to norm. It is true, he argues, that concepts help us in our everyday lives to organise represent thoughtsto others, and our makingcommunication and opinion-formationsimpler; but Deleuzeinsists such simplicity detracts from the varietyand uniqueness evidentin our experiences the world. of For Deleuzeand Guattari, conceptsought to be meansby which we movebeyondwhat we experience that we canthink of new possibilities. so Ratherthan bringing things rogetherunder a concept,he is interested in relatingvariables according newconcepts asto create to so productiveconnections.Conceptsought to express states affairsin terms of the conof tingent circumstances dynamics and that leadto and follow from them, so that eachconceptis relatedto particularvariables that change ,mutate' or it. A conceptis createdor thought anew in relation to every particular event,insight, experience problem,therebyincorporatinga notion of or the contingency the circumstances eachevent.On sucha view,conof of ceptscannotbe thoughtapartfrom the circumstances their production, of and so cannotbe hypothetical conceived priori. or a l)clcuzc'stheoryof concepts part of a potentcriticismof much philis osophy drrtc. is arguing to Hc thilt iuryphikrsophy frriling rcspcct parto thc tictrlitlilyol' coltsc-iottsncss irr lirvoulol' broirdcorrccpluirl skctchcs is

illusion. The application of abstractconcepts subject to metaphysical merely gatherstogether discrete particulars despite their differences,and privilegesconcepts to over what is supposed be explained.For example, thereby of one might understand things as instances Being or usefulness, privilegefor the conceptof presupposing ontological epistemological or an By 'Being' or 'utility' that is not evidentin immediateexperience. bearing in mind that the conceptat work relatesjust to this being or this useful thing, hereand now,suchillusionsareavoided. In Deleuze'swork, conceptsbecomethe meansby which we move so beyond experience as to be able to think anew.Rather than 'standing a apart' from experience, concept is defined just by the unity that it In must heterogeneous elements. other words,concepts expresses amongst descriptive simor be creative activerather than merelyrepresentative, or plifying. For this reason,in his work on David Hume, Deleuzegoesto is conceptby explainsomelengthsto showhow causation a truly creative and anticipateoutcomes beforethey occur, ing how it brings us to expect anticipatory at and evenoutcomes that we don't observe all. In suchcases, creationis so powerfulthat it becomes normal part of life, and causation a the creationof other conceptswithout the is a conceptthat represents perceptions ground them. requirementfor sense to Moving from a reiterative history of philosophyto the practiceof philoin sophymeansengagingwith inherited concepts new ways.This means in for Deleuzethat philosophers ought to engage new linesof thinking and particularideas, and arguments fieldsof specialnew connections between isation.Only then doesphilosophytakeon a positivepower to transform numerous our waysof thinking. In his own work, Deleuzereappropriates of concepts inheritedfrom the greatphilosophers the pastin termsof new of problems, Henri Bergson's concepts duration uses, terms and theories. and intuition, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz's monad,Hume's associationism, and numerousconceptsfrom literature,film, criticism, science and evenmathematics reworkedand put to work in new and creative are ways. The apparent inconsistencyof their meaningsand uses,whilst refusalto giveany concept for is a challenge his reader, a sign of Deleuze's a single purpose or referent. By cutting routinely acrossdisciplinary be boundaries, Deleuzeabidesby his proposalthat concept-creation an conceptsthat are as such that philosophycreates ended'exercise, 'open as accessible usefulto artistsand scientists to philosophers. and Connectives llcrgson |)urrtion

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CONCEPTS + UTOPIA EugeneHolland, The centralactivityof philosophy Deleuzeis the creationof concepts, for and it is an activity forcedupon rather than initiated by the philosopher. What is it that befallsphilosophers forces that them to think?In the course of his career, Deleuze giventhreekindsof answer this question. his has to In early works,it is paradoxthat provokes thought; here,the provocation to thoughtis internalto thoughtitself.In the latercollaborations Guattari with (and perhapsbecause that collaboration), locus of the stimulusto of the thought shifts steadilyoutsideof thought, and eventually evenoutsideof philosophy. The second kind of provocation consists topicsor problems of (no within philosophy longerlimited to logicalcontradictions paradoxes) or philosopher, that, in the estimation a creative of have beenpoorlyconceived and hencedemandto be reconceived. The third kind of provocation arises from the connectionbetweenphilosophy and its socio-historicalcontext; herethe problems not strictly speaking originallyphilosophical, are or but provoke philosophical theynonetheless thoughtto furnishsolutions or at tq leastnewand improvedarticulations thoseproblems solutions articof, or ulationsthat areindeedphilosophical. Here,philosophy does respond not to problems its own', but to problems presented it or forcedupon it by of to its real-worldmilieu. And it is this kind of connection, philosophy between and socio-historical context that Deleuzeand Guattari will call utopian: 'utopiais what links philosophywith its own epoch'(D&G 1994:99). One of Deleuzeand Guattari'smain concerns to distinguisha propis erly philosophical relationbetweenconceptand context from the betterknown scientific(or socialscientific)relation basedon 'representation'. philosophyis creative, Unlike the socialand natural sciences, servingas a kind of relaybetween one practicalorientationto the world and another, new and improvedone.Philosophyresponds problemsthat arisewhen to givenmodeof existence practicalorientationno longersuffices. a or Such problems realenough, they arenot reducible reality. are but to The purpose of philosophyis not to representthe world, but to createconcepts, and thcscconccptsservenot to replicateaccurately discourse in specificsegrrcntsof thc w<lrkl it rc:rllyis (m scicncc rrs ckrcs), to proposc but articulations ol'itttd/rlr soltttiorrsto problclns,to oll'cr rrcw ancl clill'crcnt pcrsgtcctivcsrlricrrlrlions ort l()wilr(l wrlrlcl, llrc

philosophyand its socio-historical So the connection between milieu is essentially diagnostic ratherthan representative-scientific. Sciences to aim graspstates affairsasthey are;the point is to get reality right, to settle of on a correctunderstanding the world. Philosophyaimsneverto settle, of but on the contraryalways unsettleand to transformour understanding to of certainproblems, because they arethought to havebeenbadly posed, or not posed all, by previous at thinkers,and/or because problems histhe are toricallynew or havechanged radicallyover time asto renderprevious so responses inadequate. HenceDeleuzeand Guattari insist that philosophy for them 'doesnot consistin knowingand is not inspiredby truth. Rather it is categories Interesting,Remarkable, Important that determine like or or is [its] success failure' (D&G 1994:82).The creationof concepts thus cruciallyselective well as(or aspart ofbeing) diagnostic, in extractas and ing a philosophical conceptfrom a historicalstateofaffairs, philosophical thoughtidentifies certainaspects that stateof affairsasproblems of requiring new solutions. The utopianvocationof concept-creation thus consists in proposingsolutionsto the pressingproblemsof the time; in this way, philosophybecomes politicaland 'takesthe criticismof its own time to the highest level' (D&G 1994:99).

CONTROL SOCIETY John Marks Deleuzedevelops notion of the 'control society'at the beginningof the his 1990s. the 1970s In Michel Foucaultshowedhow, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a d,isciplinarysociety had developedthat was based on strategiesof confinement.As Deleuze points out, Foucault carriedout this historicalwork in order to showwhat we had inheritedof the disciplinarymodel,and not simply in orderto claim that contemporary societyis disciplinary. This is the sense the actualin Foucault's of work, in the senseof what we are in the process differing from. Deleuzeuses of Foucault's insightsasa startingpoint to claim that we aremoving towards control societies which confinement no longerthe main strategy. in is Deleuze reminds us that disciplinary societies succeeded 'sovereign' societies, that they concentrated the organisation life and proand on of duction rather than the exerciseof arbitrary entitlementsin relation to thesetwo domains. Disciplinarysocieties developed networkof sitesand a institutions - prisons,hospitals,factories,schools,the family - within which indivicluals wcrc locatcd, traincd ancl/<lrpunishcclrt vlrious tinrcs thcir lifc. Irr this wiry, figurcof'thc'po;rtrlirtior.r'cnrcrgcs irr thc irsan

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observable, measurable object, which is susceptible various forms of to manipulation. Essentially, disciplinarysystem one of contiguity:the the is individual movesfrom site to site,beginningagaineachtime. In contrast to this, societiesof control - which emerge particularly after World in War II - are continuous form. The variousforms of control constitute a network of inseparable variations.The individual, in a disciplinary society, placedin various'moulds' at differenttimes,whereas indiis the vidual in a contemporary control societyis in a constantstateof mod,ulation. Deleuze uses as an examplethe world of work and production. The factory functioned accordingto somesort of equilibrium betweenthe highest possibleproduction and the lowest possiblewages. Just as the worker was a componentin a regulatedsystemof massproduction, so unions could mobilisemassresistance. control societies, the other In on hand,the dominantmodel is that of the business, which it is more frein quently the task of the individual to engage forms of competitionand in in continuingeducation order to attain a certainlevelof salary. There is a deeperlevel of modulation, a constantvariation, in the wagespaid to workers.In generalterms) the duality of massand individual is being brokendown.The individualis becoming a'dividual',whilst the mass is reconfigured terms of data,samples in and markets. Whereas disciplinary individualsproducedquantifiable and discrete amountsof energy, 'dividuals' are caught up in a processof constantmodulation.In the caseof medicine, which claimsto be movingtowardsa system'withoutdoctorsor patients',this means that the figurein the individualis replaced a dividby of ual segment codedmatter to be controlled. Although he is in no way suggesting that we shouldreturn to disciplinary institutions, Deleuze clearly finds the prospectof the new control societyalarming.In the domainsof prison,education, hospitals and business,the old institutionsare breakingdown and, althoughthesechanges may be presentedasbeingmore closelytailored to the needsof individuals, Deleuzesees little more than a new systemof domination.It may evenbe he the case, suggests, we may cometo view the harshconfinements that of disciplinarysocieties with somenostalgia. for One reason this is obviously that techniquesof control threatento be isolatingand individualising. We may regret the lossof previoussolidarities. Another reasonwould be that we areconstantly coerced into forms of 'communication'. This means that we aredeniedthe privilegeof havingnothing to say, cultivatingthe of particularkind of creative solitudethat Deleuzevalues. appears It that we will incrcasingly lack a space creative for He that 'resistance'. suggests the movc towarcls continuous:lsscssmcnt schoolsis bcing cxtendedto in socicty gcncral, irt with thc cll'cct that muchof lif'ctrrkcs thc tcxturc<lf on or llrc Hnrncslrow lhc nrrrrkclirrg sc,rnirrirr'.

The critiqueof contemporary societies the notion of controlsociety that in work, giventhat it entailsmight in somewaysbe unexpected Deleuze's sometimeslooks like a conventionaldefenceof the individual threatened One might expectDeleuzeto forcesof globalcapitalism. by the alienating which do awaywith the constraints be in favourof a movetowardssocieties of individuality.However,it is the preciseway in which control societies dismantlethe individual that alarms Deleuze.Rather than encouraging with the pre-personal, they turn the individual a real socialengagement no to into an objectthat hasno resistance, capacity 'fold' the line of modof ulation.Although the Body without Organslacksthe discreteness what know asan individual that is not to sayit doesnot have we conventionally by resistance. the contrary,it is a zoneof intensity.It may be traversed On forces,but it is not simply a relay for those forces. Connectives Body without Organs Fold Foucault Intensity

CONTROL SOCIETY + STATE THEORY Kenneth Surin says In his shortbut prescient essay'Postscript ControlSocieties'Deleuze on (asopposed the disciplinary sociof to that in the ageof the societies control capital by etiesof the previous epochfamouslyanalysed Michel Foucault), that is ableto harorganisation' hasbecome vast'internationalecumenical a forms even assemblage the most disparate moniseinto a singleoverarching (commercial, In this new disreligious, artistic,and so forth) and entities. pensation,productivelabour,dominatednow by the myriad forms of intelprovision, expanded covereverysegment of has to lectuallabourandservice with the extended scope capitalis coterminous of society: exponentially the Human consurplus-value. constant availability everythingthat creates of play,andsoon, areno longerleft to'private' domains but sciousness, leisure, The of directlyencompassed the latestregimes accumulation. by areinstead increasingly blurred, as home and workplace becomes boundarybetween labour. work and'casual' Capitalism doesthe demrrcation between 'regular' ()apitalism's hx telos infilrmrrliscd, asit bccomcs cvcn ubiquitous. bccomcs of oldcrthrt will bclrlllc dispcnsc to irrvolvcd crcirti<ln irnccon<lmic thc irlwnys

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with the State,and in its current phasethis telos becomemore palpably has visible. WhereDeleuze concerned, development is this doesnot requirethe Stateandits appurtenances beabolished. to Rather, traditional the separation between Stateandsociety nowno longersustainable. is Society State and now form one all-embracing matrix, in which all capitalhasbecome translatable into socialcapital,and so the productionof socialcooperation, undertaken primarily by the serviceand informationalindustriesin the advanced economies, become crucial one for capitalism. has a This needto maintainconstant control overthe forms of socialcooperation in turn requiresthat education,training, business, never end: the business time-scale now '2+/7'so that the Tokyo stockexchange is opens when the one in New York closes, an unendingcycle;training is'on the in job' as opposedto being basedon the traditional apprenticeship model (itself a holdover from feudalism); and education becomes'continuing education', that is, something that continues throughout life, and is not confined to those aged six to twenry-rwo. This essentially dispersive propensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation, whereproduction is now meta-production,that is, no longer focusedin the advanced economies the useof raw materialsto producefinished goods, on but rather the sale of services(especiallyin the domain of finance and credit) and already finished products. Social control is no longer left to schoolsand police forces,but is now a branch of marketing, asevenpolitics hasbecome'retail politics', in which politicians seekdesperately an for imageof themselves market to the electorate, to and when public relations consultants are more important to prime ministers and presidentsthan goodand wisecivil servants. Recording,whetherin administration or business,is no longer basedon the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on bar-codingand other forms of electronictagging. The implications the above-mentioned of developments statetheory for are momentous. The state itself has become fragmented and compartmentalised, and has accruedmore power to itself in somespheres while totally relinquishingpowerin others.However, the Statehasmutatedin if the era of control societies, retainsthe function of regulating,in conit junction with capital,the 'accords'thatchannelsocialand politicalpower. In his book on Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Deleuzemaintainsthat stateand non-stateformationsare constitutedon the basisof such 'concerts' or 'accords'. These 'accords'are organising principleswhich make possiblethe grouping into particular configurations whole rangesof of personages, events, processes, institutions,movements) so forth, such and that the resultingconfigurations become integratedformations. a setof As govcrning accords rcgulatc opcrations the rtcc<lrds axioms rlr the that thc of vnrious componcnts ln immcnscly of powcrfhlnndcomprchcnsivc systcm L

capital is situatedat the crossing-pointof all kinds of of accumulation, capitalformations,and thus hasthe capacityto integrateand recompose ist and non-capitalist sectors modesof production.Capital,the 'accord or phenomena, can of accords'par excellence, bring togetherheterogeneous and makethem express sameworld, that of capitalistaccumulation. the criteria,which specifywhat is to be Accordsareconstituted selection by Thesecriteria by includedor excluded the termsof the accordin question. also determinewith which other possibleor actual accordsa particular accord will be consonant(or dissonant).The criteria that constitute accordsare usually defined and describedby narratives governed by of and a certainnormativevision of truth, goodness beauty(reminiscent albeit translatedwhere necessary the so-calledmediaevaltranscendentals, into the appropriatecontemporary vernacular).A lessportentous way of making this point would be to say that accordsare inherently axiological, value-laden.What seemsto be happening today, and this is a generalisation that is tendentious, is that these superimposednarratives and the selectioncriteria they sanction,criteria which may or may not be explicitly formulated or entertained, are being weakenedor qualified in ways that deprive them of their force. Such selectioncriteria, policed by the State, tend to function by assigningprivileges of rank and order to the objects they subsume ('Le Pen is more French than Zidane', 'Turks are not Europeans',and so on), asthe lossor attenuationof the customaryforce of such accords makes dissonancesand contradictions difficult or even easierto affirm. and, correlatively,makesdivergences impossibleto resolve, can now be assignedto severaldivergent Events, objects and personages and even incompossibleseries.The functioning of capital in the control requiresthat the Statebecomeinternally pluralised. societies

CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION Ad,rian Parr In developingthe idea of 'creative transformation' Deleuze draws on sources. Initially in his work on Henri Bergson a variety of philosophical conceptof 'creativeevolution'and 'durhe picks up on the philosopher's into of Repetition a discussion the ation', revamping thesein Dffirence and, productiveunderstanding repetition,all the while embracing concept a of of difference that beliesthe negativestructureof a 'differenceto or from' and in in favourof 'difference itself'. Keen to expandupon the generative evolutionhe turns to Baruch creative dynamicimplicationsof Bergsonian in Ethic's, particularthe conceptionof bodiesthat Bergsonand Spinoza's

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Spinozashare:a body is constitutedon an immanent plane. The next philosophical influence Deleuze's of creative in use transformation would haveto be Friedrich Nietzsche's conceptof the 'eternalreturn'. Then, in his collaborationwith Guattari, creative transformation takes a turn through biophilosophy,bypassingboth the human condition and teleological theoriesof evolution characteristic Jean-Baptiste of Lamarck in favourof a transhuman theoryof heredity. The questionof 'life', namelythe force that persists over time and the that ensue,is addressed Deleuzeasan experimental,spontanby changes eous, and open processof transformation. As it was articulated in of Dffirence and Repetitiozl, evolutionis construedasa process repetition it that is inherently creative: is productiveof difference. the handsof In Deleuze(remember,like Michel Foucault,conceptsaretools for Deleuze), creative transformation becomes systemof involutionwheretransversal a movements engage materialforcesand affects. In both his 1956 essayon Bergson and his 1966 book Bergsontsm (D 1988a) Deleuzeutilisesthe idea of 'evolution'proposed Bergsonin by Expandingon this a little more,Deleuzeshiftsthe terms of transmission. focusof inheritance away from determination the continuance a fixed and of Deleuze chooses bring to essence is passed overtime.Like Bergson, that on inherentin evolution. is the force It to our attentionthe creative dimension thus,through change, vitality of life and difference the of life that persists, creativetransformation immais are affirmed.Accordingto this schema nent, taking placeon a planeof consistency that precedes univocalBeing. In Bergson Deleuzefindsthe possibilityfor a philosophy that grasps in life of termsof durationandthe inhuman.The temporality durationis not conceivedof chronologically, wherebythe end of onemomentmarksthe beginning of the next; nor is it a measurable time, that is broken down into minutes, hours,days, months,or years. Put differently, Deleuzian seconds, as as durationneeds be construed the flow of time; it is intensive muchas to it is creativein so far as it is the movementof time that marks the force of life. Hence,durationmaintains in an openstateof indeterminacy. life placedon nonThe theory of creativeinheritanceand the emphasis organiclife is then given a makeover and turned into the conceptof the 'rhizome' in his collaboration with Guattari. Early on in A Thousand, PlateausDeleuze Guattaricharacteriserhizomeasindeterminate and a and interpretexperimental. Steering emphasis the awayfrom representational ative frameworks,they clearly state that a rhizome is a map not a trace. Explaining this distinction they write that what 'distinguishes map the in from thc tracingis that it is entirelyorientedtowardan experimentation (D&G 1987:12).'l'hc rhizomcis conccivccl asan contlrctwith thc rcal' of o;rcnnrultiplicity, rrlllifb is r rlrizonrlticnrrxlco1'clungc withoutfirm rrnd

and fixed boundariesthat proceeds'from the middle, through the middle, comingand goingratherthan startingand finishing'(D&G 1987: 25).It is, however, importantto notethat their useof 'open' hereis not conceived of negatively, which is to sayit is not the antithesis being 'closed';rather, of the machinic character of a rhizome arises out of the virtual and the dynamicboundaries that constituteit. In A Thousand, Plateausthe force of life is describedby Deleuze and Guattari asinherently innovative and social.Inheritance is not articulated within an essentialist frameworkthat placesthe emphasis species, genes on andorganisms, because Deleuzeand Guattarirecognise it is the power that of affect that is creative- to produce affectsand being open to being affected.Here creativity is taken to be a machinic mode of evolution that is productivein and of itself. The whole question of transformationis clearlysituatedby both Deleuzeand Guattari in an experimental milieu and the creativityof this milieu is necessarily social. Connectives Bergson Difference Representation Spinoza

CRYSTAL Felicitjt J. Colm.an producedcrystalform fascinated The multifaceted natureof a geologically Deleuze. Initially he co-joinsexistingscientificand artisticconceptions of the formal properties and concepts of a crystal to work through the Platonic conceptionof a real image and its counterpoint:virtual image. The crystalthen becomes conceptthat Deleuzemethodologically a usesin his considerationof thought, time and differencesin becoming.The conceptof the 'crystal' is engaged Deleuzein his book Cinerna The by 2: Time-Image the'crystallinesign'or'hyalosign',the'crystal-image', as and the 'crystallinestate'.Thesevaryingconcepts enmeshed are with the idea that the figure of the crystal is representative specificstatesof temporaof lity, as discerned through images.The crystal is configured through Deleuze'samalgamation writers, philosophers of and filmmakerswhose workscrcatcdfigurcsof time-spacc. T'hescincludeHenri Bcrgson's vitalism; Mauricc Mcrlclu-Ponty'scxpcrimcnts with thc lrticulirtionof' thc

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perceptionof things; Friedrich Niezsche's suspicionof linguistic phenomenology; Gaston Bachelard'sstudy of reciprocal, affective imagery; and Alain Robbe-Grillet and Alain Resnais'play with socialfolds of time, contextand form. Deleuzedescribes crystallinestructureas a process a and placeof the is between actualand virtual (D 1989: the 69).This 'exchange'that enacted process from Bergson's is conceptof'reflective perception',described in his 1896bookMatter and. Memory (B 1994:105)that Deleuzereworksin his second book on cinema: The Time-Irnage(D 1989: 289). Deleuze describes the exchange that structureof virtual-actual relations means that the crystal-image is an amalgamatedform of virtual and actual in its various stagestoward infinity. In The Time-Image, where examplesof the crystal-image and the conceptof 'crystallinenarration' are discussed at length, Deleuzeequates crystallinestructureof the cinemawith the the nature of its self-reflexivity and the temporal medium. A crystal-image involves a multilayered and infinite register of montaged 'realities'. As Deleuzedescribes cinema's it, techniqueof acknowledgement experand imentationwith the crystal-image's medium achieves divergent modalities of the image. Dependent upon the component layers of time-space montage,the resultant crystal-imagein turn producesan external representation an imageof thought.The crystalis thusa philosophical of mechanism that is illustrative of concept production, and in relation to the image,the crystalconceptis the productionand apprehension time. of In TheTime-Image,Deleuze describes threefoldsystemfor the crystal's a variationsof past-present-future time. This systemis from St Augustine's understanding temporalrelations, of and Deleuzeutilisesit to describe an image'sconfigurationof a memory,or recollection an event.Together of with the Bergsonian conceptof time as a 'thought-image',Augustine's system enablesDeleuze to discuss the crystal-image as a modality of knowing time and its possibleconstitution. Over time, the effectsof time alter the molecularstructureof things (includingcinematicinformation), and the crystal-image employed Deleuzeto encompass shifts in is by vast meaningcausedthrough the exchanges betweenpast, presentand future images, their variousstates virtual and real.Through thesethree variin of ationsof the crystal-image, Deleuzedescribes cognitiveand physical the apprehension time asperceptual of and 'modification'. 'affectation' properties Configuringthe crystalasa temporalconceptwith affective enablesDeleuze to addressthe associated implications for relationships generatedby movement,time, memory, perception and affect - each within a particular circuit of meaning,medium or surround. Deleuze's 'crystal' sccks to dcscribc a cognitivc processwhcrcby the temporal rcgistrltiono1'fhcmovcnrcrrts firrnrsof lffcct lrc cxprcsscd, put irnd and

affectiveexperiences may into effect. Affection may not be instantaneous; perception be delayedin their consciousor corporeal acknowledgement, and utilisation. The crystal'sspecificstatesof formation, mutation and of are of transformation thus effects differentprocesses time. Connectives Actuality Affect Bergson Time-image Virtual/Virtuality

DEATH Bruce Baugh Death is many things: a state of affairs,when a body's parts, through external causes, enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith that body's through an continued existence;an impersonal event of dying, expressed of infinitive verb (mourir,to die); the experience zero 'intensity' that is in of or implicit in a body's feelingor experience an increase decrease its forceof existence; 'model' of immobility and of energythat is not organa destrucisedand put to work; and finally the 'deathinstinct', capitalism's famineand disease. tion of surplusvaluethrough war,unempleyment, a the A body existswhen its parts compose relationthat expresses singular forceof existence 'essence' that body,and ceases be when its to or of parts are determined by outside causesto enter into a relation that is incompatiblewith its own. Death in this sensealwayscomesfrom outside and it and assuchis both fortuitousand inevitable: is the necessary detergoverned by encounters with otherbodies, mined resultof a body'schance with purely mechanical lawsof cause and effect.Sinceeverybody interacts other bodies,it is inevitablethat at somepoint it will encounterbodiesthat the 'decompose' vital relation of its parts,and causethoseparts to enter into new relations, characteristic other bodies. of rclation, forms Dcath, as thc dccompositionof a body's characteristic prcscnt of :rnd clcath thc Sclf or cgo.'lir thisclcath, thc brrsis thc pcrsonal of

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the self and the body,Deleuzecontrasts 'event' asfoundedin the personal in and incorporeal, expressed the infinitive of dying, which is impersonal mortal. Dying is not a process that takes verb 'to die' and in the predicate placein things,nor is 'mortal' a quality that inheresin things or subjects. meanings that extendover the express Rather,the verb and the predicate past and future, but which are never physicallypresentin bodies and or this things,eventhoughthe deathof a body effectuates actualises dying. or dying.The In impersonal dying,'one'dies,but oneneverceases finishes to deathof the Self or 'I' is when it ceases die and is actuallydead:when or is its vital relationsaredecomposed, its essence powerof existence and instant,impersonal dying makes reduced zerointensity. to Yet,at this very of deathloseitself in itself,asthe decomposition one living body is simulthe taneously compositionof a new singularlife, the subsumptionof the deadbody'sparts under a new relation. increases diminutionsof their bodies experience or During its existence, poweror forceof existing. Other bodiescancombinewith a body either in a way that agrees with the body's constitutiverelation,that resultsin an in with increase the body'spowerfelt asjoy,or in a waythat is incompatible in a diminution of power felt as sadness. Poweris that relation,resulting physicalenergy, degreeof intensity,so that everyincrease decrease or in a poweris an increase decrease intensity. in or When the body dies,and the Self or the egowith it, they are returnedto the zero intensityfrom which intensity,or emerges. Every transitionfrom a greaterto a lesser existence from a lesserto a greater,involvesand envelops zero intensity with the Death its or respect which it experiences powerasincreasing decreasing. to is thus felt in everyfeeling,experienced life and for life'. 'in It is in that sensethat the life instincts and appetitesarise from the emptinessor zero intensity of death. The 'model' of zero intensity is into thus the Body without Organs(BwO), the body that is not organised organswith specificfunctions performing specifictasks,the energy of for which is not put to work, but is available investment,what Deleuze form (taking 'speculative'in the senseof calls death in its speculative financialspeculation). Sincethe BwO doesnot perform any labour,it is immobile and catatonic.ln TheLogicof Sense, catatonicBwO arises the from within the depthsof the instincts,asa deathinstinct, an emptiness retainshis definidisguisedby everyappetite.In Anti-Oedipus,Deleuze for energyavailable investment, tion of the deathinstinct asdesexualised of and as the source of the destructiveness drives and instincts, but argues that ratherthan a principle,the deathinstinctis a productof the sociallyclctcrminccl rclationsof procluctionin thc capitalistsystcm. irnd ttnction of thc c:rp| )crrtlr bccomcs instinct,a cliflirscd imnrirncnt rn . ot'llrc surplusvirltrc crr;ritrrlisrrt's itbsorptiorr itrrlist systcrrr spccilicirlly,

it producesthrough anti-production or the production of lack, such as war, unemployment,and the selectionof certain populationsfor starvaThe death instinct is thus historical and political, not tion and disease. natural. Connectives Body Body without Organs

* on'becoming DERRIDA, JACqUES (1930-2004)referto theentries and'virtual/virtuality'. cinema','nonbeing'

on DESCARTES, RENf (1596-1650) referto theentries 'arborescent tplanet,'Spinozat tcogito','Hume',timmanence', and'thought'. schemat,

DESIRE Alison Ross 'Desire' is one of the central terms in Deleuze'sphilosophicallexicon. a In his work with Guattari, Deleuzedevelops definition of desireaspositive and productive that supports the conception of life as material flows.In eachof the featuresusedto definethis conceptionof desire,an alternativeconception of desire as premised on 'lack' or regulated by conceptionof desire as an insa'law' is contested.The psychoanalytic of tiable lack regulatedby Oedipal law is one of the main inaccuracies desire that Deleuze tries to correct. Instead of desire being externally in organised relation to prohibitions that give it a constitutiverelation to of for Deleuzedesireis definedasa process experimentationon a 'lack', plane of immanence.Added to this conceptionof desireas productive, theory is the conceptionof desireaspositive.Whereasin psychoanalytic desireis locatedwithin the individual as an impotent force,the positive and productive dimension Deleuze ascribesto desire makesit a social Thus rcinterpretcd,desireis vicwcdnot iust as an cxperimental, flrrrcc. procluctivcfirrcc, but also as :r f<lrcclblc t<l firrm conncctionsand 'l'lrcsc lwo lcrttttrcs arc irr tlrc cnlrrrrrcc lxrwclol'bodics thcir cor.rrcclion.

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used to distinguish the experimentationof desire from any variant of naturalism; and Deleuze defines desire accordingly in his work with Guattari as assembled machined. This conception of desire works or across a number of themes in Deleuze's writing with Guattari. Productive and positive desire works in their writing as an operative vocabularythrough which they explain fascismin politics as the desire for the repressionof desire,and they advance new ethics of'schizoa analysis' whose task is the differentiation between active and reactive desires, all the while explaining simple activities such as sleeping walking or writing as desires. Desire is alsoa crucial elementin Deleuze'scritique of philosophical dualism.Such dualism,whetherin ImmanuelKant or psychoanalysis, is ableto submit desireto a iuridical systemof regulationprecisely because it first distinguishes the domain of existencefrom those transcendent valuesthat arrangeit in relation to ordering principles.In the caseof psychoanalysis exercise transcendent this of regulationerroneously containsdesireto the field of the subject's sexuality andturns it into a problem of interpretation.Against psychoanalysis, Deleuzetries to de-sexualise and de-individualise desire. Sexualityis one flow that entersinto coniunction with others in an assemblage. is not a privileged infrastructure It within desiringassemblages, an energyableto be transformed, subnor or limatedinto other flows(D 1993b:140). Deleuze particularly is criticalof thealliance between desire-pleasure-lack in which desire misunderstood eitheran insatiable is as internallack,or asa process whosegoalis dissolutionin pleasure. Whetherdesireis relatedto the law of lack or the norm of pleasure is misunderstood regulatedby lack it as or discharge. Againstthis alliance Deleuze describes desire the construcas tion of a planeof immanence which desire continuous. in is Instead a regof ulationof desire pleasure lackin whichdesire extracted by or is from its plane of immanence, desire a process which anything permissible. is in is Desireis accordinglydistinguishedfrom that which 'would come and break up the (D integralprocess desire' 1993b: of 140). This integralprocess described is inA Thousand, Plateaus the construction assemblages. term, which as of The is developed response the subjectivist in to misinterpretation the desiringof machinesof Anti-Oedipus, underlinesthe view that desireis experimental and relatedto an outside. is this relationto an outsidethat underpinsthe It social dimension given to desire in Deleuze'sthought. Understood as an assemblage, desire in Deleuze'svocabularyis irreducible to a distinction between naturalism/artificeor spontaneity/law. For this reason when Deleuze argues against dualismthat prohibitsor intcrruptsdesircfrom the thc cxtcrnd pointsof lackrlr plcirsurc, alsomakcs hc asccsis important an filr conditiorr thc proccsscs c<lnstruct thirt <lf'clcsirc. irsscmhhgcs

Connectives Immanence Kant Lacan Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Schizoanalysis

DESIRE + SOCIAL-PRODUCTION EugeneHolland, Schizoanalysis the pivotalterm 'desiring-production', tandemwith uses in to link SigmundFreud and Karl Marx: the term con'social-production', joinslibido andlabour-power distinctinstances production-in-general. as of politicaleconomy discovered the essence economic that of Justasbourgeois value doesnot inhere in objectsbut is investedin them by subjectiveactivity in the form of labour-power,bourgeoispsychiatry discoveredthat the essence eroticvaluedoesnot inherein objects is invested them by of but in subjective activityin the form of libidinal cathexis. Schizoanalysis the adds discovery that labour-power libido arein essence sidesof the same and two coin,eventhoughthey areseparated capitalism its historically by in unique segregation ofreproductionfrom productionat largevia the privatisation of reproduction in the nuclearfamily. The conceptof desiring-production prevents desirefrom beingunderstoodin terms of 'lack' (asit hasbeenin westernmetaphysics from Plato to Freud): desiring-productionactually produces what we take to be reality (in the sense that a lawyerproducesevidence) through the investment of psychicalenergy (libido), just associal-productionproduceswhat we take to be reality through the investmentof corporeal energy (labourpower).Desireis thus not a fantasyof what we lack:it is first and foremost the psychicaland corporealproduction of what we want - eventhough under certainconditionswhat we want subsequently takenawayfrom gets us by the repressive figure of a castrating fatheror the oppressive figureof an exploitative boss(amongothers).By restoringthe link betweendesiring-production and social-production,schizoanalysis deprives psychoanalysisof its excusefor and justification of repression;that psychic repressionis somehowautonomousfrom social oppression,and exists independent socialconditions. of Schizoanalysis insistson thc contrary thrt 'sucill-productionis purcly nnd simply dcsiring-prrrcluction itsclf

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under determinate conditions'(D&G 1983:29),and that psychicrepression therefore derives from social oppression: transform those social conditions,and you transformthe degreeand form of psychicrepression aswell. There are two basicforms of desiring-production: schizophrenia, the free form of desire promoted half-heartedly by capitalism and wholeheartedlyby schizoanalysis; paranoia,the fixed form of desiresuband jected to socially-authorised belief (in God, the father, the boss, the teacher, leader, soon). There arethreemodes social-production, the and of eachof which oppresses,/represses desiring-production a specificway. in Of the three,capitalism the mostpromising,because at leastis ambivais it lent: it activelyfosters both forms of desiring-production, whereas preits decessors alwaysdid their utmost to crush the one in favourof the other. Capitalism frees desiring-productionfrom capture and repressionby codes and representations, while at the same time it recapturesand represses desiring-production mostly temporarycodesand representain tions,but alsoin the moreenduringforms of State-sponsored nationalism, the Oedipuscomplexand the nuclearfamily. It is because schizoanalysis insiststhat social-production alwaysprovidesthe determinate conditionsunder which desiring-production takes shapethat it can hold the mode of social-production responsible that for shape; that is, schizoanalysis evaluates modeof social-production a according to the form of desiring-production makes possible. it The valueof capitalism as a mode of social-productionis not only the extraordinary materialproductivity so admiredby Marx, but evenmore its propensity for generatingschizophreniaas the radically free form of desiringproduction.And the corresponding challenge schizoanalysis a revoto as lutionarypsychiatry to eliminate countervailing is the forces that recapture free desire and subject it to paranoiaand belief, forcesoperating in institutions ranging from the nuclearfamily and Oedipal psychoanalysis, to the bureaucracy private enterprise,all the way up to and including of the State.

DETERRITORIALISATION Adrian Parr

/ RETERRITORIALISATION

There are a variety of ways in which Deleuze and Guattari describe thc proccss detcrritorialisation. Anti-Oedipus <rf In thcy speakof deterritrrriirlisrfion 'il corning unclonc'(l)&G l9tl3: 322). In A 'l'housuntl rrs l'lttttttts dclcrrit<lriitlisittiort cortstilutcs cultingcdgcol'ln irsscnrltlirgc lhc

(D&G 1987:88).In their book on the novelistFranzKafka, they describe a Kafkaesque literary deterritorialisationthat mutates content, forcing enunciations and expressions 'disarticulate'(D&G 1986:86). In their to -Deleuze and Guattari posit that final collaboration What isPhilosophy? deterritorialisation be physical,mental or spiritual (D&G 1994:68). can Given this seemingly broad spectrum of descriptions two questions First, how doesthe process deterritorialisation emerge. of work?Second, how is deterritorialisationconnected to reterritorialisation?Perhaps deterritorialisationcan best be understood as a movement producing change.In so far as it operatesas a line of flight, deterritorialisation indicatesthe creativepotential of an assemblage. to deterritorialiseis to So, free up the fixed relationsthat contain a body all the while exposingit to new organisations. It is important to rememberthat Deleuze,as well as Guattari, is concerned with overcomingthe dualistic frameworkunderpinning western philosophy(Being/nonbeing, original/copyand soon). In this regard,the relationship must not be condeterritorialisation to reterritorialisation has struednegatively; is not the polar oppositeof territorialisation reterit or ritorialisation(when a territory is established once more). In fact, in the way that Deleuzeand Guattari describe and usethe concept,deterritorivector;hence, is tied it alisationinheresin a territory asits transformative to the very possibilityof change immanentto a giventerritory. there are two different deterritorialising moveQralitatively speaking ments:absolute and relative.Philosophyis an exampleof absolute deterritorialisationand capital is an exampleof relative deterritorialisation. Absolutedeterritorialisation a way of moving and assuchit hasnothing is to do with how fast or slow deterritorialisingmovementsare; such movementsare immanent, differentiatedand ontologicallyprior to the movementsof relative deterritorialisation.Relative deterritorialisation movestowardsfixity and as such it occursnot on a molecularbut molar plane as an actual movement.Put succinctly,absolutedeterritorialising movements virtual, moving through relativedeterritorialising are movementsthat areactual. There are severaldifferent theoretical contexts Deleuze and Guattari in. discuss usedeterritorialisation Theseinclude:art, music,literature, and philosophyand politics.For instance, the westernvisualarts,facesand in landscapes are deterritorialised.Meanwhile in philosophy,thought is deterritorialised all that is outsideof thought.In this regard,it is not the by questionthat is deterritorialisingbut the problem,because question the sccksan answcr, whcreasthe problcm positsall that is unrccognisable or 'l'hcy suggcsttlrlt whirt is dctcrriturialisccl music rrrc unknowrrblc. irr (ritournrllt).A hclplirlcxirrrrplc frtrnrrrrr voiccs hcrc would irnd thc rcli'nirr

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be the composer Olivier Messiaen who, from around 1955on, usedbirdsongin his compositions. theseworkshe did not iust imitate the songs [n of birds; rather he brought birdsong into relation with the piano in a mannerthat transformedthe territory of the musicalinstrument (piano) and the birdsongitself Here the distinctiverone, timbre and tempo of birdsongswere fundamentally changedthe moment theseelements connected with musical organisation.Similarly Messiaen'scompositional style alsochanged when it enteredinto a relationwith birdsong,whereby thesecompositions could be described rermsof a becoming-bird. in Yet asthe bird singsits songis it simply beingrerritorial?Here we may considerthe way in which the bird refrainis a territorial sign.Deleuzeand. Guattari usethe biological understanding 'territoriality' asdiscussed of in the studiesof birds conductedduring the earlyto mid-twentiethcentury; however,they push this work in a different direction. Bernard Altum, Henry Eliot Howard and Konrad Lorenz all suggested malebirds aggressively defenda particular territory as a way of sociallyorganisingthemselves.These studies of bird activiry undersrood territoriality as a biological drive pitched towards the preservationof species.Instead, Deleuzeand Guattari address territoriality from the position of what is produced by the biologicalfunction of mating hunting, earing and so forth, arguing that territoriality actually organises the functions. The problemthey havewith Lorenz, for example, that he makes,aggressiveis nessthe basisof the territory'(D&G 1987:315).They claim functions, suchasmating,areorganised'because areterritorialised'(D&G 1987: they 3 I 6). In this wag they usethe undersranding territory advanced the of by ethologistJakob Uexkiill, to help shift the focusawayfrom a mechanvon istic understanding life onto an expressive of one. Von Uexkiill proposed thar there is no meaning outside of a milieu (Umweh).For him a 'territory' refers to a specificmilieu that cannotbe separated from the living thing occupyingand creatingthe milieu, so that the meaningof a milieu for Von Uexkiill is affective. This is important when we cometo considerthe supposed slippage between deterritorialisation and decodingthat happensin Anti-Oedipusbutnot in A Thousand, Plateaus. decode, the waythat Deleuzeand Guattariintend it, means To in to strike out at the selfsame codesthat producerigid meanings opposed as to translatingmeaning. Rather than understanding deterritorialisation as destabilisingthat which produces meaning, in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuzeand Guattariregardit asa transversal process that defines crethe ativity of an assemblage:nonlinearand nonfiliativesystemof relations. a Apart from biologythc tcrm'tcrrit<lrialisation'can bc foundin psyalso choirnirlysis. crrrlyrrs l9fifi Guattari uscclthc psychoanrrlytic As tcrm isitliritt' : in his lxx>k Piltrfuutlutlltsc 'l'rtnstttrytlit(.llcra. 'f crrilrrrirtf tt

Lacan who influencedGuattari. it wasthe French psychoanalyst Jacques For Lacan, 'territorialisation'refers to the way in which the body of an infant is organisedaround and determined by erogenouszones and the process one is This organisational connections forms with part-objects. it a of of libidinal investment.As the infant undergoes process territorialsense, In isationits orificesand organsareconjugated. the psychoanalytic This freeing is to deterritorialise to free desirefrom libidinal investment. up of desire includes setting desire free from Oedipal investment (desire-as-lack). Accordingly, upshotof Deleuzeand Guattari'sreconthe to figuration of Lacanian'territorialisation'is that the subjectis exposed shatnew organisations; principal insight being: deterritorialisation the ters the subject. antecedents the for and In additionto the bioethological psychoanalytic concepts of deterritorialisationand reterritorialisation,Deleuze and Guattari extend a political use to them. Leaning upon Karl Marx, they the posit that labour-power deterritorialised momentit is freedfrom the is labour-powercan be describedas meansof production. That selfsame to when it is then connected anothermeansof probeingreterritorialised duction. Eugene Holland explains, when the English Enclosure Acts the (1709-1869)enclosedcommon land for purposesof sheep-grazing, (or of peasants banished 'freed') from one means prowereconcomitantly onto other means reterritorialised duction only to havetheir labour-power of production, such as when they becamefactory workers in the textile industry (H 1999: 19-20). During the early phasesof industrialisation when capitalismwas really gaining momentum, a systemof deterritorialising flows prevailed:markets were expanding,social activities were and populationsmoved from rural to urban undergoingradicalchanges, environments.In one sense rural labour-power was deterritorialised (peasantand landowner) but in another senseit was reterritorialised (factory worker and industrial capitalist).Commenting on capitalism, flowsof codearereterriDeleuzeand Guattari insistthat deterritorialised between into the axiomatic capitalism of and it is this connection torialised the the two processes constitutes capitalistsocialmachine. that Connectives Becoming Lacan Lines of flight Nomadicism PirrtirlObjcct Ithizonrc

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Paul Patton The concept of deterritorialisationlies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari'smaturepoliticalphilosophy. Processes deterritorialisation of are the movements which definea givenassemblage sincethey determinethe presence the qualityof 'linesof flight' (D&G 1987: and 508).Lines of flight in turn define the form of creativity specific to that assemblage, the particular waysin which it can effect transformation in other assemblages or in itself (D&G 1987:531).From the point of view of socialor political change, everythinghingeson the kinds of deterritorialisation present. Deleuzeand Guattari define deterritorialisation the movementby as which somethingescapes departsfrom a given territory (D&G 1987: or 508).The processes territory formation, deterritorialisation reterof and ritorialisationare inextricablyentangledin any given social field: 'The merchantbuys in a territory,deterritorialises productsinto commodities, and is reterritorialised on commercial circuits' (D&G 1994: 68). Deterritorialisation always complexprocess is a involvingat leasta deterritorialisingelementand a territory which is being left behind or reconstituted. Karl Marx's account of primitive accumulation in Capital illustratesthe operationof'vectors of deterritorialisation' a socialand in economicterritory: the development commodity marketsdeterritoriof alises socio-economic the territory of feudal agricultureand leadsto the emergence large-scale of commercialproduction. Deterritorialisationis alwaysbound up with correlativeprocesses of reterritorialisation, which doesnot mean returning to the original territory but rather the ways in which deterritorialised elementsrecombine and enter into new relations. Reterritorialisationis itself a complex processwhich takesdifferent forms dependingupon the characterof the processes deterritorialisationwithin which it occurs. Deleuze and of Guattari distinguishbetweenthe 'connection'of deterritorialised flows. which refersto the waysin which distinct deterritorialisations intercan act to accelerate another, one and the 'conjugation'of distinct flowswhich refers to the ways in which one may incorporateor 'overcode'another thereby effectinga relativeblockage its movemenr(D&G 1987:220). of Marx's accountof primitive accumulation showshow the conjugationof the streamof displacedlabour with the flow of deterritorialised money capital provided the conditions under which capitalist industry could dcvelop.In this casc,thc reterritorialisation thc flows of capital and of hbour lclclst<ltlrc cnrcrgcncc ir ncw kinclof lsscmbhgc,nirnrcly of thc itxiontut ol' cirllit ic irlisnr.

that societies definedby their are When Deleuzeand Guattari suggest they meanthat fundamental lines of flight or by their deterritorialisation, itself on happens the time, evenasthe societyreproduces all socialchange other levels.Sometimeschangeoccurs by degrees,as with the steady difference and its role in socialand political erosionof myths aboutsexual institutions. Sometimes, changeoccurs through the eruption of events a which breakwith the pastand inaugurate new field of social,politicalor The rioting of May 1968 was an event of this kind, legal possibilities. breakingthroughinto history' (D 1995:153).Other examples 'a becoming of include the suddencollapse EasternEuropeancommunismor the dismantling of apartheidin South Africa. These are all turning points in history after which somethings will neverbe the sameasbefore.The key question, is however, not whetherchange slowor suddenbut whetheror is deterritorialisation. not it is animated a positiveforceof absolute by along Deleuzeand Guattaridistinguishfour typesof deterritorialisation and relative,positiveand negative(D&G 1987: the twin axesof absolute is only move508-10).Deterritorialisation relativein so far asit concerns is ments within the actual order of things. Relativedeterritorialisation elementis immediatelysubjectedto negatiyewhen the deterritorialised which enclose obstructits line of flight. It is or forms of reterritorialisation reterritorialisations, positivewhenthe line of flight prevails oversecondary elements eventhoughit may still fail to connectwith otherdeterritorialised in Deterritorialisation absolute so far as is or enter into a new assemblage. it concerns virtual orderof things,the stateof 'unformedmatteron the the (D&G 1987:55-6). Absolutedeterritorialisation is planeof consistency' rather but not a further stagethat comesafter relativedeterritorialisation its internal dynamic, since there is 'a perpetualimmanenceof absolute (D&G 1987:56). deterritorialisation within relative deterritorialisation' forms of absolute deterritoThe difference betweenpositiveand negative rialisation correspondsto the differencebetweenthe connection and the is flows.Absolutedeterritorialisation posconjugationof deterritorialised itive when it leadsto the creationof a new earth and new people:'when it vital line or them to the powerof an abstract connects linesof flight, raises (D&G 1987:510).Sincereal transformation drawsa planeof consistency' in of elements mutually suprequiresthe recombination deterritorialised only when portiveways, are social politicalprocesses truly revolutionary or ratherthan conjugation. of they involveassemblages connection

DIAGRAM - rcfcr to thc cntries on 'axiomatic'.'black hole'. 'fold'. * irncl 'scntiotics' 'virtuitl/virturlity'. '[,'ouctrult t'old','plirtciru',

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CliffStagoll

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IJ

Deleuzeis often labelledas a 'philosopherof difference',an assessment that highlightsthe criticalplace 'difference' his work. He is concerned of in to overturn the primacy accorded identity and representation western in rationality by theorising differenceas it is experienced. doing so, In Deleuze challenges two critical presuppositions: privilege accorded the Being and the representational model of thought. He considersboth to haveimportantand undesirable political,aesthetic ethicalimplications and that a disruptionof traditionalphilosophycanhelp to surmount.Deleuze uses notion of empiricaland non-conceptual'difference itself in the his in service sucha disruption. of Differenceis usuallyunderstood either as'difference from the same'or differenceof the sameover time. In either case, refers to a net variation it between two states. Sucha conception assumes states comparable, that are and that thereis at base sameness a against which variationcanbe observed or deduced.As such, differencebecomesmerely a relative measureof sameness and, being the product of a comparison,it concernsexternal relationsbetweenthings. To think about such relationstypically means groupinglike with like, and then drawingdistinctions berween groups. the Furthermore,overand above suchgroupingsmight be positeda uniztersal grouping, such as Being, a conceptionof presence that alonemakesthe groups wholly consistent and meaningful.It is because Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel drew a comprehensive cohesive and world of Being that madehim sucha significant targetfor Deleuze's critique. On such an account, difference is subordinatedto sameness, and becomes objectof representation relationto someidentity.As such, an in it is never conceivedin terms of 'difference-in-itself',the uniqueness implicit in the particularity of things and the momenrsof their conception and perception.Rather,differenceis understoodin terms of resemblance,identity, opposition and analogy,the kinds of relations used to determine groupings of things. Yet this rendencyto think in terms of sameness detracts from the specificity of concreteexperience, instead simplifying phenomenaso that they might 'fit' within the dominant model of unity. Deleuze's from sucha model has 'liberation' of differerrce two parts.First, he develops conceptofdifferencethat doesnot rely on a a relationship with sameness second, challcngcs philosophy and, he the of rcprcscntirti<ln. l)clcuzcilrgucstlrlt wc ought n<ttto prcsunlc prc-cxisting ir unity,but irtstcird scliorrsly.thc lirkc nirlurc ol'thc worldirsit is llcrccivcd, hinr, l,irr

difference,and there is nothing 'behind' every aspctof reality evidences is difference not groundedin anythingelse.Deleuzedoes suchdifference; not mean to refer, however,to differencesof degree,by which he means the identicalor in anysense itemsthat areconsidered amongst distinctions he the Instead, means particularityor'singularity'of eachindividual same. is thing, moment,perceptionor conception.Such difference internalto a or event,implicit in its beingthat particular.Evenif thingsmight be thing as attributesallowingthem to be labelled being conceived havingshared as to of seeks privilegethe conception difference kind, Deleuze's of the same them. between individual differences Such individuality is, for Deleuze,the primary philosophicalfact, so that, rather than theorisinghow individualsmight be grouped,it is more or'becoming'of and uniquedevelopment importantto explorethe specific of eachindividual. The genealogy an individual lies not in generalityor but of commonality, in a process individuationdeterminedby actualand multitudinous influencesand chanceinteractions. specificdifferences, differencefrom domination by releases Deleuze'sdifference-in-itself Indeed, on this account,identity must alwaysbe identity and sameness. being'sweptup'in the inherentin the particulars referredto the difference process constructinga relationshipbetweenthem. To realisethis is to of in of a challenge developing new perspective orderto resist meetDeleuze's Only by destabilisHowever,to do so routinely is not easy. transcendence. from ing our thinking, disrupting our facultiesand freeing our senses evidentin the lived might we uncoverthe difference tendencies established of the world, and realise uniqueness eachmoment and thing. the traditional theory Deleuze'stheory of differencealso challenges by of representation, which we tend to consider each individual as of ('presenting again')somethingas iust anotherinstance a re-presenting that might be is category original.On sucha view,difference something or predicated of a concept, and so logically subordinated to it, whilst the To conceptcan be applied to an infinite number of particular instances. meansto set the conceptasideand think in terms of difference-in-itself of and the unique circumstances its producfocusinsteadon the singular, meansthat the notion of of tion. Awareness such specificcircumstances of some'thing in general'canbe setasidein favourof one'sexperience this thing, hereand now. Connectives Crcativetransformation T'ltcrnirl rcturn llcpctition

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DIFFERENCE + POLITICS
Paul Patton Deleuze's ontological conception a world of free differences of suggests a defence the particularagainst forms of universalisation representaof all or tion. Every time there is representation, argues, he there is an 'unrepresentedsingularity' which does not recogniseitself in the representant (D 1994:52).However,neither this critique of representation rhe onronor logicalpriority of difference establishes politics of difference. a Identities presuppose differences and are inhabited by them, iust as differences presuppose areinhabited identities. politicsof difference inevitably and by A requires specification politicallyrelevant the of kindsof difference. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of minority and their support for minoritarian politics provides a novel understandingof the kind of difference which is relevantfor democraticpolitical change. They define minority in oppositionto majority,but insist that the difference berween them is not quantitative sincesocialminoritiescanbe morenumerous than the so-called majority.Both minority and majorityinvolvethe relationship of a group to the largercollectivityof which it is a part. Suppose rhereare only two groups and supposethat there is a standardor ideal type of member of the larger collectivity: the majority is defined as the group which most closely approximates the standard,while the minority is defined by the gap which separates membersfrom that standard.In a its socialcollectivity, majority cantakemany simultaneous forms: Let ussuppose theconstant standard theaverage that or is adult-white-heterosexualEuropean-male speakingstandard a language . It is obvious 'man'holds .. that the majority, if heisless even numerous mosquitoes, than children, women, peasblacks, ants,homosexuals, That is because appears etc. he twice, oncein the constant and again thevariable in from whichtheconstant extracted. is Majorityassumesstate a of power domination, theother around. and (D&G 1987: cf.291) not way 105, A liberal politics of differencewould simply defend the right of the minoritiesto be includedin the majority.In other words,it would seekto broaden standard that it becomes the so maleor female European nonor European- hetero or homosexual and so on. Social minorities are here conceivedas outcastsbut potentially able to be included among the majority.Deleuzeand Guattari insist upon the importance suchpieceof mcll changcs thc [<lrm to andcontent a givcnmajrtrity. of After rcdescribirrg thc non-coinciclcncc minority and mliority in thc lirnguirgc of of irxiolrrirlic thcory,'thcy sct itsscrr,'this trotlo silythrrltlrcstrugglc thc is on

on levelof the axiomsis without importance; the contrary,it is determinwomen)s strugglefor the vote,for abortion, ing (at the most diverselevels: the for jobs;the struggleof the regionsfor autonomy; struggleof the Third in . . .'(D&G 1987:470-l). At the sametime, however, order to World of in draw attentionto the sense which the reconfiguration the majority is they introducea third of upon a prior process differentiation, dependent term in addition to the pair majority-minority,namely'becoming-minor' of or 'minoritarian',by which they meanthe creativeprocess becomingdifferent or diverging from the maiority. This processof becoming-minor,which subjectsthe standardto a (D&G 1987:106),is variationor deterritorialisation process continuous of the real focus of Deleuze and Guattari's approach to the politics of of of They do not denythe importance the installation newcondifference. but they stress importance the stantsor the attainmentof maiority status, of the minoritarian-becomingof everyone,including the recognised bearersof minority statuswithin a given maiority. They insist that the powerof minorities'is not measured their capacityto enter and make by the nor evento reverse necesfelt themselves within the majority system, criterion of the majority,but to bring to bearthe forceof sarilytautological sets, however small they may be, against the the non-denumerable (D&G 1987:471). this they meanthat the limits By sets denumerable . . .' are of the potentialfor transformation not determinedby the normalising power of the majority but by the transformative potential of becomingThey do not mean to suggestthat minor, or becoming-revolutionary. produceeffects upon the majority. minoritiesdo not enter into and potentialof minoritarianbecomon Their insistence the transformative politics. from the Thoseexcluded not of ingsdoes imply a refusal democratic majority as definedby a given set of axioms,no lessthan thoseincluded of within it, arethepotential bearers thepowerto transformthat set,whether (D&G newaxiomatic or in the directionof a new setof axioms an altogether powerof minority-becoming 1987:471). Everyonemay attain the creative and new peoples. with it the potentialfor new earths that carries

DIFFERENTIATION/DIFFERENCIATION Adrian Parr are The concepts 'differentiation'and 'differenciation' primarily eluciof (D 1988a: 9G8) and Dffirence and datcd by Dcleuzc in Bergsonism the (l) he 20tt-14) rnd the distinction formsbetween two Rcpctition 1994: 'ftr bcgin with hc of'his dill'crcntial ontrtkrgy. is ln imporfiultinFrc(licnt

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appeals the mathematical to conceptof differentiationin order to unlock his understanding the Whole asa unified system, preferring insteadto of think of openwholesthat continuallyproducenew directionsand connections. In effect, what are differentiated are intensitiesand heterogeneous qualities and this is what makesthe virtual real but not actual. In short, differentiationin the way Deleuzeintendsit happens only in the virtual realm. Continually dividing and combining, differentiation can be likened to a zone of divergenceand as such it is fundamentally a creativemovement, or flow,that conditionsa wholein all its provisional consistency. Meanwhile,what is differenciated the heterogeneous is series virtual of pointsout that differenciation an differentiation. BergsonisrnDeleuze ln is actualisation the virtual. Actualisationcan be either conceptualor of material such as an 'eye' which Deleuze describesin Dffirence and Repetition a'differenciated as organ'(D 1994:21l).The problemthis poses, given that Deleuze is not a representational thinker, is how difference differenciates without itself turning into a system representation? of That is to say, differenciation the process actualising virtual how does if is of the this avoidthe representational of similitude and identity?Why isn't trap differenciationsimilar to, or a version o( the virtual it differenciates? For Deleuze,the actualised differences differenciation not enioy of do a privileged point of view over the differences making up the flow of differentiation,nor is differenciationa processthat unifies heterogeneous qualities; rather it simply affirms these qualities and intensities without completelyhalting the flow in its tracks.The actualisation that producesis not'like'differentiation, as this would imply differenciation that the differentiationit is like is in itself a fixed subjectmore than an intensivesystemcontinually undergoingchange.Put simply, what this meansis that the process differenciation a questionof variationmore of is than identity and resemblance because Deleuzeprefersto think of it as a dynamicmovement that bringsdifferences relationwith oneanother. into Overall,Deleuzeconsiders actualisation termsof creativitll whereby in the process doesnot simply mark a changeinto what waspossible the in first instance.To be truly creative,differenciationneedsto be understood assomething new insteadof something that resembles virtuality.Carrying on from here he outlines that the virtual differenciates itself; without this the virtual could not be actualised because there would be no lines of differenciation that could enable actualisation happen(D 1988a: to 97). Connectives Acturrlity Irrdivirlurrt ion

Representation Virtual/Virtuality

DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS Claire Colebrook At its most general, disjunctivesynthesis the production of a series the is of differences. The significance the conceptof disjunctionin Deleuze's of work is threefold.First, whereas structuralismconceives negadifference tively,suchthat an undifferentiated formless or world is then differentiated by a structure.Deleuzeregardsdifferencepositively,so disjunction is a mode of production.There is a potentialin life to produceseries: desire a can attachto this, or this or this; a vibration of light can be perceived as this, or this, or this. Second,the differences ofdisjunction aretransversal. There is not one point or term (suchas consciousness language) or from which differencesare unfolded or connected;consciousness connect can with a language, machine,a colour, a sound, a body, and this meansthat a seriesmay traverseand connect different potentials.Sexual desire,for example, might leavethe series body parts- breast,or mouth, or anus, of or phallus - and invest different territories - the desire for sounds,for colour,for movements. Finally, disjunctionis not binary.Life should not be reducedto the miserable logic of contradictionor excludedmiddle eitheryou wantliberalismor you don't; eitheryou'remaleor female; either you're for the war or for terrorism - for disjunction is open and plural: neitherliberalismnor terrorism,but a further extension the series. of The conceptof synthesis centralto both Dffirence andRepetition is and Anti-Oedipus. ln Dffirence and, Repetition Deleuze rewrites Immanuel (from the Critique of Pure Reason). Kant's three syntheses For Kant, our experiencedworld of time and spaceis possibleonly becausethere is a subject who experiencesand who connects (or synthesises)received impressionsinto a coherentorder. For Deleuze,by contrast,there is not a subject who synthesises. Rather, there are syntheses from which subjects are formed; thesesubjects not personsbut points of relativestability are resultingfrom connection,what Deleuzerefersto as 'larval subjects'. In Anti-Oed,ipu.r Deleuze and Guattari expand the concept of the three syntheses into political terms: association, disjunction and conjunction. Association thc connection, justof data(asin Kant'sphilosophy), is not but also of'bodics tcrmsinto somcmanifillcl cxpcricnccd or rlr thing,an'asscmblitgc'. possibiliry l)isjunclion, sccorrcl llrc syrrtlrcsis,lhc subscr;ucnt is ot'

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relationsbetweenor among such assembled points of relative stability, while conjunctionor the third synthesis the referralof thesetermsto the is ground or planeacross which they range. The disjunctivesynthesis important for two reasons. is First, Deleuze (or waysof thinking aboutthe world) havelegitargues that all syntheses imate and illegitimateuses,or an immanent and transcendent employment. Syntheses are immanent when we recognisethat there are not subjectswho synthesise world; there is not a transcendentor external the point beyond the world from which synthesisemerges. Rather, there are (desires) connections, from which pointsor terms areeffected. syntheses, No point or term canbe setoutsidean eventof synthesis its transcendas ent ground,sotherecanbe no transcendental subjectasthere synthesising wasfor Kant. Second, subjection modernthought liesin the illegitthe of imate use of the disjunctivesynthesis. (pasFrom relationsor syntheses sions,sympathies) among bodiescertain terms are formed, such as the mother,fatherand child of the modern family.We should,then,.see malefemalerelationsor genderasa production,asa way in which bodieshave beensynthesised assembled. canbe maleor female. or One The Oedipuscomplexis the disjunctive synthesis its transcendent in and illegitimateform: eitheryou identify with your fatherand become subject a (thinking'man') 0r yottdesireyour mother and remainother than human. An immanentuseof the synthesis would refusethisexclusioe disjunctionof Instead insistingthat onemust of 'one mustbe this or that, maleor female'. line up beneath signifierof man or womanand submit to the system the of sexual difference, Deleuze and Guattariopenthe disjunctive synthesis: one can be this or this or this, and this and,this and,this: neither mother nor fatherbut a becoming-girl, becoming-animal becoming imperceptible. or Connectives Becoming Desire Kant Oedipalisation

(DURir) DURATTON
CliffStagoll I lcrrrillcrgson intcrcsts l)clcuzc bccrtusc of'hisrrrdicrrl dcparturc fiom philrr )unrtionQlurttt) orrcol'scvclirl llcrgs<ln's iclcirs solrfty's rlrlltockrxy. | is ol' kcy

Typical his of by adopted Deleuzewhen developing philosophy difference. his to usualapproach Bergson, interpretationand use of the of Deleuze's but is concept at oncealmostentirelysympathetic strikinglyidiosyncratic. the Deleuze, one canonly comprehend notion of duration Accordingto by using Bergson'smethod of philosophicalintuition (intuitionphilor or ophique), deliberatereflectiveawareness willed self-consciousness. a (or, mental life) to be essenIntuition reveals consciousness more generally, mental activity that constitutes,in its dynamism tially temporal; ongoing of a and the mutual interpenetration its states, time internal to one'sself. and Mental life is, then,a kind of flowingexperience, durationis the immediateawareness this flow of in Bergsonbelieves that intuition's findingsare bestexpressed images, flow with music.Mental states duration by usinganalogies and soexplains togetheras if parts of a melody,with previousnoteslingering and future onesanticipatedin the unity of a piece,the permeationof eachnote by To of othersrevealing extremecloseness their interconnection. try and the pointless, the musicis because graspthis flow asa completeset of notesis alteredby the addition of a new always the vergeof endingand always on systemis as note. To speakof 'mind' or tconsciousness' a comprehensive attribute of duration: it is alwaysflowing, overtakto ignore an analogous awayin the 'already'. ing what might be calledthe 'not yet' and passing with its quantification duration to be inconsistent of Bergsonconsiders with 'clock time', the time of immediate, lived reality.It can be contrasted elemental time physics practical and life, which eitherspatialises by situating grid or usesthe digitsof a time-piece as instants on end-to-end a referential physical in with image. Whenarranged accordance these a crass imprecise and is'situated' inst4nts, consciousness of models, a timebecomes series separable is and mentalstates, movement conof disparate in time asa series temporally positions. other words,clock In static between ceivedin terms of relations from the notion of duration by distorting its continuity. time abstracts But constitutiveintegrationof momentsof duration must not be overis Bergson'sintuition confirms also that consciousness not emphasised. mentalstates that 'one long thought', asit were,but a flowing togetherof are different from one anotherin important ways.Bergsoncontendsthat allow us to mark one kind of thought or mentalstates differences between one particular thought from another,whilst constituting simultaneously As a singularflow,a mergingof thoughtsasone consciousness. such,durthat of ation is the immediate awareness the flow of changes simultaneously particulars. between and,relationships constitutedifferences In of characteristics durationarecriticalfor Deleuze. his early Scvcral rcnt<xrl, usccl durationasan cxplicatory workson DrrvidHumc, l)clcuzc o1'hrbit, itssociittion tintc.Subscqucntly, lncl dcringlncw I lunrc'sirccounts

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Deleuzeadoptsit asa meansfor exploringdifference and becoming key as elementsof life. If duration 'includes',as it were,all of the qualitative ('differences kind') of one'slived experience, differences of Deleuze argues, then it also emphasises the productive, liberating potenrial of these differences. Even in the continuity of one'sconsciousness, there is a disconnection between events that allowscreativityandrenewal. example, For one is ableto call upon new concepts reinterpretone'smemories perto or ceivesomevistaanewin the light of one'sexposure a work of art. to Deleuze usesduration to make some important philosophicalpoints abouttime and difference. philosophers For suchasImmanuelKant, time is both a form ofreceptiveexperience aboutthe world and a necessary condition for any human experience all. As such, for Kant, time is not an at empiricalconceptbut an a priori necessity underlyingall possible experience. Furthermore,he considers time to comprise homogeneous a series of successive instants, standingin needof synthesis. In contrast, durationis always present the'givenness'ofone's in experience. does transcend It not experience, neithermustit be derivedphiloand sophically. Furthermore,duration, unlike matter,cannotbe divided into elements which, when dividedor reconstituted, remainthe same aggrein gateas their unified form. Duration, as lived experience, brings together both unity and difference a flow of interconnections. Deleuze, in For these contrastsrepresentthe differencebetweena dictatorialphilosophythat creates 'superior'concepts that subsume and order the multiplicitiesand creativityof life and one that creates opportunities change for and variety. Connectives Bergson Intuition Kant

EARTH/LAND John Proteai

(rrRR.E)

As prrrt<rf'whrt l)clcuzcirncl Guirttari comcto calla gcophilosophy llhat in is l'hilovph.y?,in I'hounnl Pluttttus ,.1 with ,ground'(.vrl) 'cilrth'rrkrng rrnd

'territory' (territoire) expressmanners of occupying terrestrial spaceby differentsocialmachines: nomadwar machine, territorial tribe, the the the overcodingState.Earth can also mean the virtual realm or Body without Organs(BwO), while 'a new earth' (unenouaelle terre),called, at points in for A Thousand, Plateaus and madea focal point of What is Philosophy?, entails potentialsof material systemsto new human relationshipsto the creative form consistencies, machines, rhizomes war or from a varietyof means. ln A Thousand, Plateau.s, Brian Massumi usestwo English words to translate French terrerwhich meanboth'earth'in the astronomical the can sense ofour planetand'land' in the geographical sense cultivatedarea. ofa There is no consistency Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the majuscule in in the French text; both Terre and,terre are used in the senseof 'earth' and readershouldkeepin mind the closeproximity of 'land'. The anglophone terre('earth' and 'land') with territoire('territory'). First, 'earth'is equivalent the BwO, otherwise to understood Deleuze by and Guattari as the virtual plane of consistency upon which strata are imposed(D&G 1987: 40). Second,'earth' is part of the earth-territory (terre-territoire) systemof romanticism,the becoming-intensive strata. of Hence 'earth' is the gathering point, outside all territories, of all selforderingforces('forcesof the earth') for intensiveterritorial assemblages (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of territorialisingmachinicassemblages). Third, the 'new earth' (nouaelle terre)is the becoming-virtual of intensive material. Put differently, the 'new earth' is the correlate of (the leavingof all intensiveterritorial assemabsolute deterritorialisation blages attainthe planeof consistency); is the tappingof 'cosmicforces' to it (the virtual seenfrom the point of view of the abstract machines composing it, not the machinicassemblages actualise selection singularthat a of ities). Hence, it marks new potentials for creation (D&G 1987: 423; 509-10).In this sense, is unfortunatethat Brian Massumi translates it zae nouaelle terreas'a new land' (D&G 1987:509). Land,(terre) constituted the overcoding territoriesunderthe sigis by of (D&G 1987:440-l). Land refers nifying regimeand the Stateapparatus exclusively striatedspace, to and is that terrain that canbe owned,held as stock, distributed, rented, made to produce and taxed. Land can be gridded, distributed,classified and categorised without evenbeing physically experienced, and a striking exampleof this is the township-andrangesystemof the US that imparted striatedspaceto a vast part of the North Americancontinentahead actualsettleroccupation. The system of of stockpilingterritories and overcodingthem as land for the Statedoes not stop at thc firrm or evcn thc ranch,but extendsto the forestlands(as irnd to thc unusablc spaces that become nltional parks, 'nrttionrl'fbrcsts) bi<lsphcrc rcscrvcsr so filrth. 'l'hcscspilccs hcld irsrcftgcs firr Statc itncl lrc

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subiectswho seekto escapefrom private property to find some sort of becoming-earth commons. ln What is Philosophy?, new earth' becomesthe rallying cry in the 'a 'geophilosophy'of Deleuze and Guattari, in which 'stratification' is the process wherebythe implantationof codesand territoriesform dominating bodies. This is opposed the construction a 'new earth' that entails to of new human relationshipsto the creativepotentialsof material systemsto form consistencies, machines, rhizomesfrom a varietyof means. war or In the constructionof the new earth, caremust be takennot to confusethe structural differenceof strata and consistencywith an a priori moral categorisation, ratheralways retainthe pragmatic but to and empiricalnature of Deleuzeand Guattari'swork and perform the ethicalevaluation the of life-affirming or life-denying characterof assemblages. Strata,along with codesand territories,are alwaysneeded,if only in providingrestingpointsfor further experiments forming war machines. in Strataare in fact 'beneficial manyregards'(D&G 1987:40),though we in must be carefulnot to laud the stabilityof strataasinstantiating moral the virtue of unchanging self-identityespoused Platonism.The mere fact by that an assemblage body politic is flexibleand resilient,however, or does not guarantee ethical choice-worthiness, what Deleuzeand Guattari its for call 'micro-fascism' not rigid at all but rather a suppleand free-floating is body politic.Eveniffascistsarereterritorialised the'blackhole'oftheir on subjectivity:'thereis fascism when a war machine installedin eachhole, is in everyniche' (D&G 1987 214)and not only thosepractices : that 'intend' to producea life-affirmingassemblage resultin such. will Connectives Body without Organs Blackhole Deterritorialisation Plato Space Virtual/Virtuality

ETERNAL RETURN
Lee Sltinks 'l'hc conccptof''ctcrn:rlrcturn', which l)clcuzcclrirws from lfricdrich Nictzschc, crucirll lo tltc rrrdicrtl is cxlcrtsiot't ol'tlrc llhikrsollhy of'

immanenceand univocity. In Dffirence and RepetitionDeletzearguesthat Duns Scotus, Baruch Spinozaand Nietzsche affirmedunivocalbeing.It is according Deleuze, to that the joyful ideaof univoconly with Nietzsche, ity is thought adequately, Nietzsche imaginesa world and this is because of 'pre-personal singularities'. That is, there is not a 'who' or 'what' that or then has variousproperties;nor is there someone somethingthat ri. Each differenceis a power to differ, with no event of differencebeing the ground or causeof any other. By going through this affirmation of difference,and by abandoningany ground or being before or beyond difference, both Nietzsche and Deleuze arrive at the eternal return. If difference occurredin order to arriveat someproperend - if therewere purposeor properend to life - then the process becomingwould have a of some ideal end point (even if this were only imagined or ideal). But differenceis an event that is joyful in itself; it is not the differenceo/this life life beingor for this end.With eacheventof difference is transformed; becomes other than itself because is difference. life Consequently, only the 'thing' that 'is' is difference,with each repetition of differencebeing Time is what different.Only differencereturns, and it returns eterna,lly. (time is difference); followsfrom difference difference cannotbe locatedin time. Eternalreturn is thereforethe ultimateidea. This difficult and enigmatic idea, developedmost concertedly in Nietzsche'sThus Spake Zarathustra,has proved controversialin philosophicalcircleswhere it has generallybeeninterpreted aseither an existentialor inhumanvision of existence. Accordingto the existential reading, the thought of eternalreturn compelsus to considerhow we ought propin erly to live. This thought can be expressed the following way: were we that ofour lives,both painfulandjoyous, suddenly recognise everyaspect to was fated to return in the guiseof a potentiallyinfinite repetition,how would we needto live to justify the recurrenceof eventhe most terrible and painful events? readingunderConversely, inhuman or cosmological the propositionasthe fundamental Nietzsche's axiomof a philosophy of stands forces in which active force separates itself from and supplants reactive forceand ultimatelylocates itself asthe motor principleof becoming. Deleuze'ssignalcontribution to the post-warphilosophical revisionof Nietzschewas to establishthis secondreadingof eternal return as the return and selection forcesat the heart of modern theoriesof power.He of explicitly repudiates naivereadingof Nietzsche the that envisages eternal return asa doctrineproclaimingthe infinite recurrence everyhistorical of moment in exactlythe sameorder throughouteternity.The perversityof this naivcreading, Deleuzeargues, that it converts is Nietzsche's vision of bcingasthc cndlcss bccoming clifl'crcntial of furccs into a simplcprinciplc ot'idcntity. wc firilto undcrstirnd ctcrnirl rcturnif'wc conccivc ot'it Yct tlrc

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as the ceaseless return of the same; instead, eternal return inscribes differenceand becomingat the very heart of being.For it is not being that recurs in the eternal return; the principle of return constitutes the one thing sharedby diversity and multiplicity. What is at stakeis not rhe repetition of a universalsameness the movementthat produceseverything but that d,ffirs. Eternal return is thereforeproperly understoodasa synthesis of becomingand the being that is affirmed in becoming.It appears rhe funas damental ontological principle of the differenceand repetition of forces that will bear the nameof Will to Power. To think the eternal return is to think the becoming-activeof forces. The return selects forcesaccording to the quantity of Will to Power that they express.Deleuze characterisesthis processas a d,ouble selection by the activity of force and the affirmation of the will. In accordancewith the principle that whateverwe will, we must will it in such a way rhat we also will its eternal recurrence, the eternal return eliminates reactive statesfrom the becoming of being. This first selectioneliminates ali but the most powerfully reactive forces - those which go to rhe active limit of what they can do and form the basisof the nihilistic impulse and the will to nothingness. Thesestrongreactiveforcesaresubsequendy incorporatedinto the eternal return in order to effect the overcoming of negation and the transformation of reactive into active force. Such revaluationtakesplace because the eternal return brings the nihilistic will to completion:the absolutespirit of negationinvolvesa negationof reactive forces themselves.Within this negation of negation reactive forces deny and suppress themselves in the name of a paradoxical affirmation: by destroying the reactive in themselves, the strongest spirits come to embody the becoming-active of reactive force. This movement of affirmation constitutesthe secondor doubled selection undertaken by the eternal return: the transvaluationofreactive forcesby meansof an affirmation of negation itself. This secondselectiontransforms a selectionof thought into a selectionof being: somethingnewis now brought into being which appears the effectof the revaluationof as forces.The eternal return 'is' this movemeRtof transvaluation: according to its double selectiononly action and affirmation return while the negativeis willed out of being.The return eliminates everyreactiveforce that resistsit; iu so doing it affirms both the being of becomingand the becoming-activeof forces. Connectives Active/reactive Ilccoming

Difference Kant Multiplicity Nietzsche

ETHICS John Marhs Throughout his work, Deleuzedraws a clear distinction betweenethics and morality.Morality is a setof constraining rules that judgeactionsand intentionsin relationto transcendent valuesof good and evil. Morality is a way of judging life, whereas ethicsis a way of assessing what we do in terms of waysof existingin the world. Ethics involvesa creativecommitment to maximising connections,and of maximising the powers that will expand the possibilitiesof life. In this way, ethics for Deleuze is inextricably linked with the notion of becoming.Morality implies that we judge ourselvesand others on the basisof what we are and should, be, whereas ethicsimplies that we do not yet know what we might become. For Deleuze,there are no transcendent valuesagainstwhich we should measurelife. It is rather 'Life' itself that constitutes,itsown immanent pragmatic,and it is ethics.An ethicalapproachis, in this way,essentially no surprise that Deleuze admiresthe American pragmatist model that substitutesexperimentation salvation.Deleuzesetsthe ideal of this for pragmatism a world which is 'fn process' againstthe 'European morality' of salvation and charity.It rejectsthe search moral consensus for and the construction of transcendentvalues,and it conceives societyas of experiment rather than contract: a community of inquirers with an experimental spirit. FriedrichNietzsche and BaruchSpinozaarethe two main influences on Deleuze'snotion of ethics.From them, he takesthe idea that ethicsis a form of affirmation and evaluation.Such an ethics applies the acceptancethat the world is, asDeleuzeputs it, neithertrue nor real,but'living'. To affirm is to evaluatelife in order to set free what lives. Rather than weighingdown life with the burden of higher values, seeks makelife it to light and active,and to createnew values. phiBoth thinkers reorientate losophyby callinginto questionthe wayin which morality conceives the of relationshipbetweenmind and body.For the systemof morality,mind as proconsciousness dominates passions the body.Spinoza,however, the of poses ethicalroute that is lator takenup by Nietzsche, rejectingthe an by supcriority mind ovcr body.It i$ not r cirsc giving ficc rcign to thc of of

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passions the body,sincethis would be nothing more than a reversal, of a licenceto act thoughtlessly. Rather in claimingthat there is a parallelism between mind andbody,Spinoza suggests new,morecreative a wayof conceivingof thought. For Deleuze,Spinozais the greatethicalthinker who breakswith the Judeo-Christiantradition, and who is followed by four 'disciples'who developthis ethical approach:Nietzsche,D. H. Lawrence,Franz Kafka and Antonin Artaud. They areall opposed the psychology the priest, to of and Nietzsche particularshows in how judgement subjects manto an infinite debt that he cannotpay.This meansthat the doctrineof judgementis only apparentlymore moderatethan a systemof 'cruelty' accordingto which debt is measured blood and inscribeddirectly on the body,since in it condemns to infinite restitution and servitude. us Deleuzegoesfurther to showhow these four 'disciples' elaborate wholesystem 'cruelty' that a of is opposedto judgement,and which constitutes basicsfor an ethics. the The dominationof the body in favourof consciousness leadsto an impoverishmentof our knowledge the body.We do not fully explorethe capof acitiesof the body, and in the sam way that the body surpasses the knowledgewe haveof it, so thought also surpasses consciousness the we have of it. Once we can begin to explore thesenew dimensions- the unbnown the body and the unconsciousthought- we arein the domain of of of ethics.The transcendent categories Good and Evil canbe abandoned of in favour of 'good' and 'bad'. A 'good' individual seeks makeconnecto tions that increase powerto act, whilst at the sametime not diminishher ing similar powersin others.The 'bad' individual doesnot organiseher encounters this way and either falls backinto guilt and resentment, in or relieson guile and violence. Deleuze'scommitment to ethicsis closelyconnected the conceptof to becoming,and in particular that of becoming-animal. The ethical drive for the 'great health' that allows life to flourish is all too often channelled into serving the petty 'human' ends of self-consolidation and selfaggrandisement. One way of going beyondthis calculationof profit and lossis to'become'animal. The drive for justice,for example, must overcome itself by learning from the lion who, as Nietzschesays,refusesto rage againstthe ticks and flies that seekshelterand nourishmenton its body. In a more generalpolitical sense, is a question of maintaining it our 'belief-in-the-world'. We do this by creatingforms of resistance to what we are becoming (Michel Foucault's 'actual') and not simply to what we are in the present. Rather than judging, we need to makc s<lmcthing cxist.

Connectives Becoming Nietzsche Spinoza

EVENT CliffStasoU Deleuzeintroduced the conceptof the 'event' in The Logic of Sense to productions intrinsic to interactions between describe instantaneous variouskinds of forces.Eventsare changes immanentto a confluence of partsor elements, subsisting pure virtualities(that is, real inherentposas sibilities)and distinguishing themselves only in the courseof their actualisation in somebody or state.Loosely,eventsmight be characterised (as Deleuzedoes) termsconsonant in with the Stoicconceptof lekta:asincorporeal transformationsthat subsistover and abovethe spatio-temporal world, but areexpressible language in nonetheless. As the prod,uct the synthesisof forces,eventssignify the internal of dynamic of their interactions. such, on Deleuze'sinterpretation,an As eventis not a particularstateor happening itselflbut something madeactual in the Stateor happening. other words,an eventis the potentialimmaIn nent within a particularconfluence forces.Take as an examplea tree's of changing colourin the spring.On Deleuze's account, eventis not what the evidentlyoccurs(the tree becomes green)because is merelya passing this surface effector expression actualisation, thus ofa particuofan event's and lar confluence bodiesand other events(such as weatherpatterns,soil of conditions, pigmentation effects and the circumstancesof the original planting).Thereforewe oughtnot to say'thetreebecame green'or'the tree is now green'(both of which imply a changein the tree's 'essence'), but rather'the tree greens'. using the infinitive form'to green',we makea By dynamicattribution of the predicate, incorporeality an distinct from both the tree and green-ness nonetheless dynamismof the which captures the event'sactualisation. The event is not a disruption of some continuous state, ratherthe stateis constituted events'underlying' that, when but by it actualised, mark everymomentof the stateasa transformation. positionpresents alternative traditionalphilosophies Deleuze's an to of substance, challengingthe notion that reality ought to be understoodin

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terms of the determinatestatesof things. This notion was expressed clearlyby Platq who established contrastbetween a fixed and determinate states things definingthe identity of an objecton the one hand and, on of the other,temporalseries causes effectshavingan impact uponthe and of object.Deleuzewould saythat thereis no distinct,particularthing without the eventsthat define it as that particular,constituting its potential for changeand rate of change. Instead,an eyentis unrelatedto any material content,being without fixed structure,position,temporalityor property, and without beginningor end. Deleuze'seventis a sign or indicator of its genesis, the expression and of the productivepotentialof the forcesfrom which it arose. such, it As highlights the momentaryuniqueness the nexusof forces(whetheror of not to someobviouseffect)whilst preservinga placefor discontinuity in terms of someparticular conceptor planeof consistency. Three characteristics highlighted in Deleuze's texts point to this distinctiveness. First, no event is ever constituted by a preliminary or precedentunity betweenthe forcesof its production, being insteadthe primitive effect or changegenerated the moment of their interaction.Second,events at are produced neither in the image of somemodel nor as representative copiesor likenesses a more fundamentalreality,being insteadwholly of immanent, original and creativeproductions.Third, as pure effect, an eventhasno goal. Deleuzeis careful to preservedynamismin his concept.An event is neither a beginningnor an end point, but rather always'in the middle'. Eventsthemselves haveno beginning-or end-point,and their relationship with Deleuze's notion of dynamicchange 'becoming'- is neitherone of momentstogether'nor one in which an eventis the 'end' of one 'joining productiveprocess, be supplanted supplemented the next.Rather, to or by becoming'moves through' an event, with the event representing iust a momentaryproductiveintensity. just in the machinIn his theoryof the event,Deleuzeis not interested potentialinherentin forces ationsof production,but alsoin the productive of all kinds.Eventscarry no determinate outcome, only new possibilbut ities,representing momentat which new forces a might be broughtto bear. Specificallyin terms of his model of thinking, he doesnot meanjust that 'one thinks and thus creates'butthat thinking and creatingareconstituted simultaneously. such,his generaltheoryof the eventprovidesa means As for theorisingthe immanentcreativityof thifking, challenging to think us differcntlyand to considerthingsanew. This is not to saythat he means to chrrf fcngcurito think in terms cvcnts, rathcrt<lmakcthinkingits own of but cvcntby cnrbrrcing rich ch:ros thc of'lifc andthc unitprcncss potcntial tnd
ol' citclt lllo nlc nl.

Connectives Becoming Plato

EXPERIENCE Inna Semetsky Deleuzeconsidered himself an empiricist,yet not in the reductive,tabula rasa-like,passivesense.Experienceis that milieu which provides the capacity to affect and be affected;it is a-subjectiveand impersonal. Experience not an individual property;rathersubjects constituted is are in relationswithin experience itself, that is, by meansof individuation via haecceity. exteriorityof relations The presents vital protestagainst prin'a ciples'(D 1987:55).Experience renderedmeaningfur by grounding is not empirical particulars in abstract universals but by experimentation. somethingin the experiential world forcesus to rhink. This somethingis an object not of recognitionbut a fundamentalencounterthat can be 'grasped a rangeofaffectiverones'(D 1994:139). fact,novelconcepts in In are to be inventedor createdin order to makesense of singular experiout ences and, ultimately,to affirm this sense. Experience qualitative,multidimensional, is and inclusive;it includes 'a draft, a wind, a day,a time of day,a stream,a place,a battle, an illness' (D 1995:l4l): yet, an experiential eventis subjectless. are madeup of we relations, says Deleuze(2000),and experience makes sense us only if we to understandthe relationsin practicebetweenconflicting schemes the of said experience. The difference embedded in real experience makes thought encountera shockor crisis,which is embedded the objective in structureof an eventper se,therebytranscending facultiesof percepthe tion beyondthe 'given' data of sense-impressions. Differenceis an ontological category, 'the noumenonclosestto phenomenon'(D 1994:2zz), which, however, neverbeyondexperience is because everyphenomenon is in fact conditioned by difference.Transcendental empiricism is what Deleuzecalledhis philosophical method:thinking is not a naturalexercise but always second a powerof thought,born under the constraintof experienceasa materialpower,a force.The intensityof difference a function is of desire, latter embedded experience the in because objectis .the entire its surroundingl which it traverses' (D&G 1987: 30). If rclati<lns irrcduciblc thcir tcrms,then the wholedualistic lrc to split llctwcctt thrlught itndworld,thc insidc lnd thc outsiclc, bccontcs invalicl. ancl

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relationallogic is the logic of experimentationnot 'subordinateto the verb to be' (D 1987: 57). This logic is inspired by empiricism because'only empiricism knows how to transcend the experiential dimension of the or to visible'(D 1990:20) without recourse Ideas,moral universals, value judgements. The experiential world is folded,the fold being'the insideo/ the outside'(D 1988a: 96),wherethe outsideis virtual yet realby virtue of manner,and it is impossible to its pragmatics. unfolds in an unpredictable It know aheadof time what the body (both physicaland mental) can do. Becausethe body, acting within experience,is defined by its affective of' it capacity, is equally impossibleto know 'the affectsone is capable (D 1988b:125):life becomes experimental an and experiential affair that by requires,for Deleuze,practicalwisdom in a Spinoziansense meansof or immanent evaluationsof experience, modesof existence.As affective, the experienceis as yet a-conceptual,and Deleuzeemphasises passionate quality of such an experience: the State of passion, is 'perhapspassion, actuallywhat folding the line outside,making it endurable. . . is about' (D 1995: 116). only The Deleuzian objectof experience, beingun-thought,is presented in its tendencyto exist, or rather to subsist,in a virtual, sub-representative state. It actualisesitself through multiple different/ciations. Deleuze's method,compatible intuition, enables readingof the with Henri Bergson's that lay down the dynamical structureof the signs, symbols and symptoms is Experience, contrastto analyticphilosophy, not limited to in experience. perceived: line of flight or becoming realevenif the is what is immediately perceptible things' (D 1995:45). it's of 'we don't seeit, because the least Thinking enriched with desire,is experimentaland experiential:experian encethereforeis future-oriented,lengthenedand enfolded,representing constitutes experiment with what is new,or cominginto being.Experience is, a complexplace, and our experimentation ourselves for Deleuzerthe on philosophy-becoming, a like only reality.By virtue of experimentation, witch's flight, escapes old frame of referencewithin which this flight the like seems an immaterialvanishingthrough someimaginaryevent-horizon, its and creates own terms of actualisationtherebyleadingto the 'intensifiby experience. cationof life' (D&G 1994:74) revaluating Connectives Difference Force Power Spinoza 'llnnsccnclcntnl cmpiricisnr

EXPERIMENTATION
Bruce Baugh In French,the word expirience meansboth 'experience' and 'experiment'. To experimentis to try new actions,methods,techniques and combinations, 'without aim or end' (D&G 1983:371).We experimentwhen we do not know what the result will be and haveno preconceptions concerningwhat it shouldbe. As an open-ended process that explores what'snew and what's cominginto beingrather than something alreadyexperienced known, and experimentation inseparable is from innovation anddiscovery. elements The with which we experimentare desires,forces,powers and their combinations,not only to 'seewhat happens', to determinewhat different entities but (bodies,languages, socialgroupings,environments and soon) arecapable of. Deleuze holdsthat'existence itself is a kind of test',an experiment, that 'like wherebyworkmentestthe quality of somematerial'(D 1992:317). literIn ature, politics, painting, cinema,music and living, Deleuzevalorises an 'experimentation is without interpretation or significance that and restsonly on tests of experience'(D&G 1986:7), the crucial experiencebeing the affectiveone- whether a procedureor combinationproducesan increase in one'spowerof acting(ioy) or a diminution (sadness). Experimentation be an investigative can procedure that seeks explain to how assemblages function by analysingthe elementsthat compose them and the links between thoseelements; an'assemblage'being compound any in which the parts interact with each other to produce a certain effect. However, experimentation is also a practical dismantling of assemblages and the creativeproduction of new combinationsof elements;evenwhen experimentation concernsthoughtsor concepts, is nevermerely theorit etical. Experimentationdoes not interpret what something,such as a text, an idea or a desire,'means',but seeks discoverhow it works or to functions by uncovering an order of causes,namely, the characteristic relations among the parts of an assemblage their structures, flows and connections - and the resulting tendencies.Effects are demystified by being related to their causes that explain the functions and usesof an assemblage, 'what it doesand what is done with it' (D&G 1983:180). Experimentation necessary reveal'what a body or mind can do, in is to a given encounter', arrangementor combination of the affects a body is capableof (D 1988c 125);and alsoto revealthe effectsof combinationsof : different bodiesand elements, whetherthesecombinations and especially or encounters will increase powersof actingof the elements the combined into a grcatcrwhole,or whcthcrthe combination will destroy or'decom'l'hc conrpttibilityor incompntihility posc'onc or nlorc of thc clcmcnts.

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of differentelements and bodies,and the effectof their combination,can only be ascertained through experience; haveno a priori knowledge we of An methodof discovery them through principlesor axioms. experimental through the experience new combinations things encountering of of each other is contrary to any axiomatic-deductive systemor any system of judgement using transcendental criteria. Becauseoutcomescannot be known or predicted in advance, requires patienceand experimentation prudence, certaincombinations may be destructive the experimenter as to and to others.On the other hand, the knowledgegainedthrough experimentationwith differentconjunctions and combinations allowsfor an art (social, of organising'good encounters', of constructingassemblages or political, artistic) in which powers of acting and the active affects that follow from them are increased. Life-experimentation, through a set of practiceseffectingnew combinations and relations and forming powers, is biological and political, and often involvesexperientiallydiscoveringhow to dissolvethe boundariesof the ego or self in order to open flows of intensity, 'continuums and coniunctions of affect' (D&G 1987: 162). Active experimentation involves trying new procedures,combinations and their unpredictable effects to producea 'Body without Organs' (BwO) or a 'field of immanence'or 'plane of consistency',in which desires,intensities,movementsand flows pass unimpeded by the repressivemechanismsof judgement and interpretation. Experimental constructions proceed bit by bit and flow by flow, using different techniquesand materials in different circumstancesand under different conditions, without any pre-establishedor set rules or procedures,as similar effects(for example,intoxication) can be produced by different means(ingesting peyote or 'getting sousedon water'). 'One (D neverknowsin advance' 1987:47), and, one did, it would not be an if experiment.Experimentationby its nature breaksfree of the past and dis(social mantlesold assemblages formations,the Self),and constructs lines of flight or movementsof deterritorialisationby effecting new and previously untried combinations of persons, forces and things, 'the new, remarkable, interesting'(D&G 1994:lll). In literature,politics,and and in life, experiments practices are that discover and dismantleassemblages, and which look for the linesof flight of individualsor groups,the dangers on these lines,andnewcombinations that will thwart predictions andallow the new to emerge. Connectives Body withoutOrgans I)csirc

Immanence Lines of flight

EXPRESSION Claire Colebrook 'Expression' is one of Deleuze's most intense concepts.If we take Deleuze's definition of a concept- that it is a philosophical creationthat produces intensive ofordinates- then expression be understood an set can astruly conceptual. Indeed,the conceptof expression tied to Deleuze's is understanding conceptuality. is not that we havea world of set terms of It and relations, which thought would then have to structure, organiseor name- producing organisedsetsof what exists.Rather, life is an expressive and open whole, nothing more than the possibility for the creation of new relations;and soa concept,or the thought of this life, must try to grasp movementsand potential, rather than collectionsof generalities. strucA ture is a set of coordinates,a fixed set of points that one might then move among to establishrelations, and is extensive,with its points alreadylaid out or set apart from eachother. So a simple mechanismtakesthe form of a structure; if we read a poem as a set of words that might be linked in meaning,with the meaninggoverning the proper relation and order of the words, then we are governed by a structure. If however,we approach a poem asexpressive, seethe words as having unfolded from a potential, we a potentialthat will producefurther relations all the readings thoughts or producedby the poem. Thus, expression tied to a commitmentto the is creationof concepts;for expression the power of life to unfold itself is differently, and one would create a concept in trying to grasp these differentunfoldings. Concepts not structures are because althoughthey establish differences, the differences intensive. extensive are An term - suchas'all the catsin the world that areblack'- is a closedset,whereas intensive an conceptis infinite in its possible movements. the case expression, conceptcovers In of this the potentialfor movements; is not that therearepoints or potentials it in life which thenundergoan expression. Rather,thereare expressions, with the unfolding of life in all its difference beingexceeded expressive by and potential.The conceptof expression excessive therefore refersto intensity, for it allowsus to think a type of relationbut not anyconcludedsetof relations,And it is an ordinatefield,establishing temporalityratherthana set a of terms.Thc conccpt cxpression a styleor possibility thinking. of is of We cannotundcrstrncl this conccptof cxprcssion without bringingin a ncw

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approachto what it is for somethingto be, and what it isto thinb that being. we With expression, no longerimaginea world of substance that which addedto it acciand then haspredicates remainsin itself, remainsthe same, itself in various that then expresses dentally.There is not a substance and variations or expressions, different styles.Rather, there are stylistic With is substance the thought of the open whole of all theseexpressions. we the conceptof expression begin with a relation, rather than a being that then relates,but the relation is also external: nothing determinesin for how potentiality will be expressed, it is the nature of expresadvance to sive substance unfold itself infinitely, in an open seriesof productive relations. In his conclusionto his book on Baruch Spinoza,a book which is Deleuzedistinguishes in avowedly dedicated expressionism philosophy, to the expressionism Spinozafromthat of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz. of by or For Leibniz thereis not a world that is then expressed perceived separate subjects.Rather, the world is made up of monadsor points of perception. A being is just its specificperceptionof the world, and each perceivingmonad is an expression one being. God is the only being of eachfinite beinggrasps the who perceives world perfectlyand completely; infinite being only dimly. For Spinoza, a more radical and immanent is one which allows Deleuze to imagine divergent expression possible, or expressions planesof life. While there is still not a self-presentworld expression, Spinoza'simmanenceprecludesany point of that precedes A perfect expressionthat would ground particular expressions. being iust its is its expression, powerto act. The world is not an objectto be known, so observedor represented, much asa planeof powersto unfold or express of differentpotentials life. Connectives Spinoza

EXTERIORITY/INTERIORITY Jonathan Rofe One of the underlying themesof Deleuze'sphilosophyis a reiection of In the valueof interiority in its varioustheoreticalguises. fact, he goesso far asto connectthe sentimentof 'the hatredof interiority' to his philosophy. On the other hand, tcrms likc 'outside' and 'cxtcriority' play a ccntrnlrolc.

Deleuze'suse of the term 'interiority' refers to the thought, dominant in westernphilosophysince Plato, that things exist independently, and that their actions derive from the unfolding or embodying of this essential unity. The Cartesianegocogitowould be the most familiar exampleof this thought, whereby the human mind - indivisible and immortal forms the interior of the self,and where the body and the physicalworld in general form a contingent exterior. [n other words, 'interiority' is a word indexedto transcendent unities,things that haveno necessary connection to anything else,and which transcendthe external world around them. Deleuze'sphilosophy is rigorously critical of all forms of transcendence. FIe wants to come to grips with the world as a generalised exteriority. In his first book on David Hume (Empiricism and Subjectahy,1953), Deleuzeinsiststhat for Hume, there is no natural interiority (conscious willing, for example)involved in human subjectivity. Rather, the subiect is formed from pre-subjectiveparts which are held together by a network of relations.This is part of the Humean philosophythat strikesDeleuze as particularly important, and he comes back to it a number of times. Deleuzeconsiders Hume to be the first to insistthat relationsareexternal to their terms - and this presages much of Deleuze's mature philosophy. In other words,in order to understandany stateof affairs,we must not look to the internal or intrinsic 'meaning','structure' or 'life' of the terms involved(whetherthey be people,a personand an animal,elementsin a biological system, and so on). This will not provide anything relevant, sinceit is in the relationsbetween(or externalto) things that their nature is decided. Likewise,in his bookson Baruch Spinoza,he demonstrates organthat ised beings are not the embodiment of an essence an idea, but are the or partswhich haveno sigresultof enormous numbersof relationsbetween nificanceon their own. In other words, specificbeingsare produced from within a generalised milieu of exterioritywithout reference any guiding to interiority. So, rather than being a philosophyconcernedwith showing how the interior reasonor structure of things is brought about in the world - the interior conscious intentions of a human speaker, the kernel of social or structure hidden within all of its expressions- Deleuze insists on three points. First, that there is no natural interiority whatsoever: the whole philosophical tradition beginning with Plato that wanted to explain is things in reference their essence mistaken.Second,this meansthat to the interior/exterior division lacksany substantial meaning,and Deleuze somctimes one casts thc distinctionasidc.Third - and this describes of of lahrur - hc insists thc grcatcst nspccts I)clcuzc'sphilosophicrrl thrrtthc

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interior is rather produced from a generalexterior, the immanent world of relations.The nature of this production and its regulationproved to be one of the foci of his philosophy. Hence,human subjectivityasa produced interiority undergoeschangesaccordingto its social milieu, its relations,its specificencounters, and so forth: this is a topic that the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia deal with, and can be summed up in the following Deleuziansentiment:'The interior is only a selected interior.' Finally,on the basis these points,Deleuze's philosophy of alsoembodies an ethicsof exteriority. sofar asinteriority is a 'caved-in' In selection the of externalworld of relations, remainsseparated it from the life and movement of this world. The aim of what Deleuzecallsethicsis to reconnect with the externalworld again,and to be caughtup in its life. Connectives Hume Immanence Plato Spinoza Subjectivity

FACIALITY Tom Conley The concept of faciality, theorised in detail in A Thousand. Plateausand applied to cinema in the chapters of Cinema I: The moztement-image devotedto the close-up, standsat a crossroads subjectivation of and sig(how a nifiance.The former belongsto the language psychogenesis of living beinggrowsinto and negotiates ambientworld) and the latter to the (denoting,contrary to polysemy, semiotics signsthat disseminate infinite meaningin both conscious unconscious and registqrs in directionsnot and under the control of language rules). Subjectivation and signifiance are correlated, respectively, with the 'blackhole' or unknownareaof the face (that can range in which the subjectinvcsts or her affectivc his encrgics from f'car prtssioi) to nnd with thc 'whitc wnll', a surfhcc which signs on

are projectedand from which they rebound or are reflected.Facialityis and holes.The face'is a surface: thus constitutedby a systemof surfaces traits, lines, wrinkles; a long, square,triangular face; the face is a map' (D 1987:170).A seriesof layersor strata,the facebecomes landscape a from the world at large and understoodas a deterwhen it is abstracted It of ritorialisedspace topography. is a displacement what a perceiver or makesof the milieu and the faces that he or shediscerns. Deleuzerelatesfaciality to the close-upin film, the cinematictechnique that generallyusesa lens of long focal length to bring the faceforward and soften the edgesof the frame, or else,to the contrary,deploysa lens of shorterlengthto obtain afacialprojectionor distortionat the centreofthe imagewhile the surroundingmilieu is seenin sharpfocus.In either mode hillocksor mesas; eyes the the rotundity of a person's cheeks resemble can poolsand ponds;the nostrilslairs and caves, earsat might be reflective and Yet the landscape facealsolooksat its specor oncequarriesand cirques. tators, calling their gaze into question or even psychically 'defacing' sequences a gooddeal in them. Suchis the effectof close-ups that establish of classicalcinema (Deleuze's preferred directors being Jean Renoir, Alfred Hitchcock, David Wark Griffith, Georg Wilhelm Pabst, Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein,Luis Buffuel). The face emits signs from its to surfaceat the sametime that the viewer seeks fathom meaningfrom its darkeror hidden regions.If the faceis a 'white wall' it is connotedto be or in what resists understanding semiosis general. to He further elaborates conceptthrough reference literature.For the Marcel Proust,describingin Un amourd,e Swannthe faceof the beloved (but delightfully crassand despicable) Odette de Cr6cy in the eyesof the that he is awestruck Swannis an abstraction that allowshim - aesthete drawn from memories of to wax poeticalby recallinginfinite expressions, in Yet worksof art, musicalnotesand sculptedsurfaces his fantasies. once him the jealouslover discovers that her faceis a fetish or she disillusions even a black hole. Proust meticulously describesSwann's passionfor in Odette's visage,Deleuze observes, order to sanctify faciality in the name of art. To counter Proust's reductiveturn, he showsthat Henry Miller undoes the face by travelling over it with artistic dexterity. The (1939)makes lessa goalor an essence it than authorof Tropicof Capricorn of a surface a white wall or the blank sheet a future map- on which a creof ative itinerary can be drawn. In Miller's descriptionof facesa process deterritorialisation makes work of art not an end in itself but a process the that plots the faceinsteadof diving into it. and an adventure In A Thousand Plateausfaciality is formulated to serve the ends of polcmic.To discerndetailsof the facewithout wishing to idea political rr thtrtcallsinto qucstion nliscits iluril or charm constitutcs micropolitics

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the powerof facialimages. Implied is that Deleuze(with Guattari) seeks, first, ro be finishedwith the facewhereit would be a site of psychological inquiry or of a reassuringhuman essence goodness. and Guattari or He wish to divest the faceof any auratic or seductivepower of the kind that contemporary media- cinema,advertising, television conferupon it. By turning it into an abstraction (but not an idea)and a siteof multiple possibilities of affectivity(and neithera hearthnor a site of warmth) they turn it into a zoneof intensity.The latter finds a powerful visual correlativein Deleuze'streatmentof the paintingsof FrancisBacon.The headsof the artist'sportraitsmeld the faceinto the body and thus confuse facewith the its tradition asa'veil of the soul'with the humananimal.In'the text of The Logic of Sensation that studiesBacon'sportraiture Deleuzeshowsthat the head is not what lacksspirit; rather, it is the spirit in a corporealform, a bodily and vital breathwhoseend is that of und,oing foce.In sum, a the forceful reconsiderationis madeof the facework in philosophy,aesthetics and political theory. Connectives Bacon Black hole Molecular Subjectivity

FASCISM John Protezsi ln Anti-Oed,ipus, pole of paranoiddesireis opposedto schizophrenic the or revolutionary desire.Perhapswe owe the impressionthat a major focus of Anti-Oed,ipzs fascism to Michel Foucault's preface to the English is translation, which he callsthe text'An Introduction to the Non-Fascist in Life' (D&G 1983:xiii). But in fact historicalmanifestations fascism of asFoucaultacknowledges are explicitly addressed Anti-Oed,ipus in relatively infrequently. Despite the lack of attention to historical fascism, Deleuzeand Guattari'scritiqueof analyses fascism termsof ideology of in is important. Ratherthan being the result of fooling peopleby falseconsciousness, fascist desirehasits own properconsistency, spreads and under ccrtain social,economicand politicalconditions. Roughlyspeaking, in ,4nti-Ocdipu.r f'ascist dcsircis thc dcsirc for codesto rcplacethc dccoding thrttf rccsfklwsunttcrcrrpitrrlist lxiomltics; suchcoclcs would fix subjccts

to rigid boundaries thought and actionand fix bodiesto pre-established of patterns of flows, thus attenuating the fascist obsessionwith erotic perversion. Deleuze and Guattari discuss both micro- and macro-fascismin Body without Organs A Thousand Plateaus. Micro-fascismis a cancerous (BwO). The cancerousBwO is the third type of BwO discussedin Plateaus,after the 'full' (positively valued in A Thousand, A Thousand, Plateous,thoughnotin Anti-Oedipzs,where the full BwO is catatonia),and the 'empty'. The cancerousBwO is the strangest and most dangerous on BwO. It is a BwO that belongsto the organismthat resides a stratum, of rather than beingthe limit of a stratum. It is runawayself-duplication not stratification. Sucha cancer occurevenin socialformations, just in can The key to the stratanamedorganism,significance and subjectification. BwQ that forms under tracking down fascismlies here in the cancerous or runawaysedimenconditionsof runawaystratification, more precisely, repeatingthe selection tation, the first 'pincer' of a stratum.By endlessly individuals in a processof 'conformity' the cancerous of homogenised BwO breaksdown the stratum on which it lodges:social cloning and personalities. assembly-line that is, The cancerous BwQ then, occurswith too much sedimentation, too much contentor codingand territorialising,with insufficientovercoding. The result is a cancerof the stratum, a proliferation of points of capture, a proliferation of micro-black holes: thousandsof individuals all completeunto themselves; legislators and subjects in one; judge,jury and executioner- and policeman, private eye, home video operator, the neighbourhoodwatch organiser.Micro-fascism is then the construction of a 'thousand monomanias'in 'little neighborhoodpolicemen' resulting from 'molecularfocuses interaction. . . rural fascism and city or neighin youth fascismand war veteran's fascism, fascismof the borhoodfascism, Left and of the Right, fascismof the couple,family, school,and office' (D&G 1987:214). Such micro-fascismsspreadthroughout a socialfabric prior to the centralising of resonance that creates molar apparatus the the on State.In micro-fascism eachbody is a 'micro-blackhole that stands its own and communicates with the others' (D&G 1987: 228). Although Deleuzeand Guattari do not do so, we can call micro-fascism 'molecular orientedto unity, an indimolarity': eachsubjective unit is self-contained, vidual (molar), but they interact in solely local manner,independently (molecular). In contrast to Anti-Oedipzs'srelative neglect of historical fascism, A Thousand Plateaus devotes leasta few pages an analysis historiat to of (in of crrl manifcstirtions macro-firscism its Nazi ftrrm rathcr than its 'l'hc Nazi rcginrcis charnctcriscd, firlkrwirrg thc Italirrn S;rirnish or firrrns).

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analyses Paul Virilio, as a 'suicidestate'rather than a totalitarianone, of which is 'quintessentially (D&G 1987:230; conservarive' StalinistUSSR is the target here).Here it is not a State army taking power,but a war machine that takesover the institutions of State power.This triggers the last form of the line of flight, the self-immolating, self-destructiveline. This reversionof the line of flight to self-destruction had 'alreadyanimatedthe molecularfocuses fascism, of and madethem interact in a war machineinsteadof resonatingin a State apparatus'(D&G 1987:231). Such a runawaywar machine,onceit reaches consistency a enablingit to takeovera Stateapparatus, forms a 'war machinethat no longerhad anything but war asits objectandwould ratherannihilate own servants its than stop the destruction' (D&G 1987:231).ln A Thousand, Plateaus,then, fascismis too fast, a cancer;what we could call, echoingBataille,a 'solar nihilism', rather than being too slow or the freezing, paranoid, lunar nihilism it is portrayed, in Anti-Oed,ipus. as

Connectives Body without Organs Desire Stratification

FAMILY - refer to the entry on 'psychoanalysis'.

FEMINISM Felicity J. Colman Deleuze did not advocate 'feminism' as the movementhas historically come to be known. Yet in his writings one message that is continually relayed is: Do not ever smugly assumethat you have reached the limit edges, causalorigins of knowledgeof any forn.ror thought. To do so or would be at once to assume and position an organisation recognition of based prior resemblances, on givenstructures, and relationships that have beencodedaccording linguistic and economics_ystems. to These systems operatemost efficientlythrough prescribed genderwork and leisureroles. F'cminism's thcorcticalhistory and legacyhavebeensuchthat its foun<htionll prcmiscs of'pointing thc incclurrlitics rcstrictions out and imposcd by thirrkingiur(l priictisirrg withirr givcn hrundirrics bcclmc principll in

subjectivconcerningsexuality, equality, difference, activities and theories The conceptof a 'limit to be reached' ity, marginalisation, economics. and assumptions that Deleuzeand is in itself one of the key critical systematic Guattari dismantle. With the exception of his cinema books,where core conceptualpoints are made through reference to canonical twentieth-century filmmakers to including MargueriteDuras and ChantalAkerman,references women Plateaas,Deleuze and are few in Deleuze's works. In A Thousand of focuses the processes on of Guattari's discussion 'becoming-woman' formation,through the writing of Virginia Woolf. Indicativeof subjective of the twentiethcentury'sdivisionand demarcation labourrolesaccording to normative patriarchal gender and biological functions, Deleuze'swritings are suffusedwith examplesof published male philosophers,writers, scientists artists. and biases westernmythology of However, Deleuzeis attentiveto the gender and the patriarchallyproduced behaviourof both genders.The ethical constructionof the body asa constituent/contributorof a pre-configured (and hencegendered) is organisation continuallypointed out by Deleuze. ln Anti-Oed.ipusDeleuze Guattari attack and reject the psychoanalytand historical zonesfor its bourgeois ically enframedfamilial unit and gendered hierarchy and assumptions an Oedipally figured desire.Valuablefor of of feminism is Deleuzeand Guattari's discussion a body in terms of its potentialities capabilities, of onceit is conceived not in termsof its past and structure,but in terms of a future modality.Deleuzedrawsupon Baruch Spinozato developthe playwright-poetAntonin Artaud's conceptof the site Body without Organs(BwO). This 'body' is one that affordsa creative for the collection and expressionof the formation of desire. Placing the body on a platfurm of the systemsof exchangeprovides spatial and temporal zonesfor analysis gendered of categorisations. phrase'becoming-woman' a critique of all is Deleuzeand Guattari's aspects anthropocentrism; of that is, whereman is regardedasthe central refersto Becoming-woman and most important dynamicin the universe. and is thus codedby all ecoeverydiscourse that is not anthropocentric, nomic, social,cultural, organic,and political circuits as 'minority'. With womant,Deleuzeand the concept a'minority discourset, tbecoming of and Guattari take the body not to be a cultural medium but a compositionof sociallyand politicallydeterminedforces. develtheoretical Deleuze's of the 'difference'of womenundergoes use in his opment in the 1960s, turn this changeinfluences later theoriesof difference and minority groups,as well as public and capitalistgenerated recognise theories the clcsirc and its cffccton thingsin thc world. Deleuzc's politicrrl publicshaping of'an incliviclual's culturitlrcrlm nnd milicu. rrncl

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This philosophical position on the narrarionof the multiple may appear abstract and antithetical feministmethodologies focuson the analyto that sisand identification the personal. Deleuze's of Yet ideas consistently poinr out how a method that points toward the 'truth' of a particular representation hasa universalising tendencyand doesnot refer to the 'forces'that shape beliefs, thoughtsor structures. Deleuze's work demonstrates how,because its history,subjectivityis of a political constirurion not the result of an individual community. Individual historical figures are utilised by Deleuze to examinethe structuration of bodiesvia historical organisation, culturalaffiliations and social differentiation. The formation and reformationof suchbodiesand things are questioned terms of the waysin which relationships in and qualities provide identity reality and virtuality.The economic, ethical,logicaland aestheticconstitution of these bodies is also consideredby Deleuze in terms of their structuraland systematic constitution.Deleuze's systemof thinking through conceprs identity givenby history,and maintained of in provides valuable capitalism, a revolutionary and unorthodoxapproach for feminism'scritique of the surfaceeffectsof genderroles,as well as its projectof rewriting histories exclusion. of Connectives Body Body without Organs Desire Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Woman

FOLD Simon O'Sulliaan Although appearing throughoutDeleuze's work, the 'fold'is particularly mobilised in the books on Michel Foucault and Gottfried wilhelm von Leibniz. In eachcasethe fold is developed relation to another'swork. in We might even say that thesebooks, like others Deleuze has written, involvea folding- or doubling- of Deleuze's own tliought into the thought of anothcr.We might go further and saythat thought itself,enigmatically, is rrkinclof ftlld,ln instancc whatDclcuze of calls 'firrccs thc outsidc' thc of . thrrtfirkl thc irrsiclc.

Specifically, conceptof the fold allowsDeleuzeto think creatively the aboutthe productionof subjectivityand ultimatelyaboutthe possibilities for,andproduction non-human of, formsof subjectivity. fact,on onelevel In the fold is a critique of typical accounts subjectivity,that presumea simple of interiority and exteriority (appearance essence, surfaceand depth). and or For the fold announces that the insideis nothing more than a fold of the outside. Deleuzegivesus Foucault's vivid illustrationof this relation,that beingthe Renaissance madman,whq in beingput to seain a ship becomes a passenger, prisoner in the interior of the exterior; the fold of the sea.In or Deleuze'saccountof Foucault this picture becomes increasinglycomplex. There is a varietyof modalities folds:from the fold of our materialselves, of our bodies, the folding of time, or simply memory.Indeed,subjectivity to might beunderstood precisely topologyof these as a differentkindsof folds. In this sense. fold can alsobe understoodasthe namefor one's relathe tion to oneself (or, the effect of the self on the self). The Greeks were the first to discover, deploy,this techniqueof folding,or of (selfmastery'. and They inventedsubjectivation takento mean the self-productionof one's subjectivity. Subsequent cultures,suchasChristianity, haveinventedtheir own forms of subjectivation, their own kinds of foldings;and of course or it might be saidthat our own time hasits own folds, or eventhat it requires new ones. This imbuesthe fold with explicitly ethicaland politicaldimensions,for as Deleuzeremarks,the emergence new kinds of struggle of inevitablyalsoinvolves productionof new kinds of subjectivity, new the or kinds of fold (hereDeleuzehasthe uprisingsof 1968in mind). As for Deleuze's use of Foucault and Leibniz, the fold names the relationship- one entailingdomination- of oneselfto (and 'over') one's 'self', Indeed, one's subjectivity for Deleuze is a kind of Nietzschean masteryover the swarm of one'sbeing.This canbe configuredasa question of ownership, of folding. To 'have'is to fold that which is outside or inside. Meanwhile, in the Leibniz book we are offered other diagramsof our subjectivity.One exampleis the two-floored baroquehouse.The lower floor, or the regimeof matter,is in and of the world, receivingthe world's imprint asit were.Here matteris foldedin the mannerof origami,whereby cavernscontainingother caverns,in turn contain further caverns. The world is superabundant, like a lake teeming with fish, with smallerfish betweenthesefish, and so on ad infinitum. There is no boundary between the organicand the inorganichereaseachis foldedinto the other in a continuoustexturology. The upper chamberof the baroquehouseis closedin on itself,without window or opening.It containsinnateideas, the folds of the soul,or if wc wcrc to folkrwGuattarihere,this might bc dcscribcd thc incorporas cal aspccto1'our subjcctivity. And thcn thcrc is tlrc firlclbctwccnthcsc

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two floors. This fold is like one's sryle in the world, or indeed the style of a work of art. It is in this sensethat the upper chamber paradoxically 'contains' the Whole world folded within itself. This world is one amongst many 'possible worlds' each as different as the beings that expressthem. The world of a tick, for example,is different from that of a human, involving asit doesiust the perceptionof light, the smell of its prey and the tactile sensationof where best to burrow. This is not the tick's representation the world but the world's expression, folding of or in, of the tick. As with Deleuze'sbook on Foucault, the later parts of his Leibniz book attendto future foldings.Deleuzecallsattentionro rhe possibilityof a new kind of harmony, fold, between two floorsof our subjectivity. or the This new kind of fold involves openingup of the closed an chamberof the upper floor and the concomitantaffirmation of difference,contact and communication. Echoing his book on Foucault,here we might say that thesenew foldingsare simply the namefor thosenew kinds of subjectivity that emergedin the 1960s, the variousexperiments communal in in living drug useand sexuality, well asin the emergence new prosthetic as of technologies. Connectives Foucault Leibniz Nietzsche Subjectivity

FOLD+ART+TECHNOLOGY Simon O'Sullitsan In his appendix his bookon Michel FoucaultDeleuze to continues naedhis itation on the fold, but looksto the future.If the fold is the operation proper to man, then the 'superfold'is synonymous with the superman- understood as that which 'frees life' from within man. The supermanis in chargeof animals(the capturing of codes),the rocks(the realmof the inorganic),and the very beingof language (the realmof affect'below' signification). This new kind of fold no longerfiguresthe humanbeingasa limiting factoron thc infinite (the classical historicalformation),nor positionspeoplesolely in rclationship thc frrrccs finitudc,suchas lifc, labourand language to of (thc tirrnrrrtion of'thcninctccnth ccntury). llrrthcr, thisncw kind of firld in

a personis involvedin what Deleuzeterms an'unlimited finity' (D 1988b: yields a 131);that being a fold in which a 'finite number of components (D 13l). This is the practically unlimiteddiversityof combinations' 1988b: differenceand repetition of Deleuze, or what we might term his 'fractal ontology'. Put differently, it is the radical discoveryof a person'spotential / or the revolutionary activationof immanence. relationswith an outside.In fact, However,the'superfold' still involves for Deleuze, superfoldwill be the result of three future folds: the fold the code;the fold of silicon of biology, the discovery the genetic or of molecular machines, cybernetics of with carbon,or the emergence third generation or and the folding of language, the uncoverand information technology; an within language', atypicaland a-signifying ing of a 'strangelanguage As that existsat the limits of language. with the other form of expression nontwo this is a fold that openshumansout to that which is specifically to human.That is, forcesthat canbe foldedback'into' themselves produce The first twofoldsinvolvethe utilof newmodalities beingandexpression. productionof new kinds of life and new kinds in isationof technology the politicallyradicalsubjects: They might producedissenting, of subjectivity. Donna Harraway's'cyborgs'orMichael Hardt and Antonio Negri's'New Barbarians'for example.But they might equally produce simply new comIt modified and alienatedsubiectivities,or military assemblages. is in this from, sense third fold is crucial. It is a fold that breaksdown, or deviates the order-wordsor simply foregrounds dominant signification,counteracts and natureof both language and inherentlycreative intensive the affective, be first twofolds must themselves life. This amountsto sayingthat the by stammered the third. In Deleuze and Guattari's book on Franz Kafka this attention to of stuttering or stammeringis seenas characteristic a minor literature. sameterms asa major one,but in a different A minor literatureutilisesthe way (it producesmovement from within the major). Another way of putting this is that a minor literature namesthe becomingrevolutionary of characteristics a minor of all literature (the other two accompanying nature and its alwaysalready literature being its inherently collective political nature).Can we perhapsextendthis notion of a minor literature in to other realms?Might there be a sense which a resistantand radical In politics today must involve a stuttering, or stammering, of language? for example,this might involve turning awayfrom dominthe visual arts, ant regimes of signification, or at least a stammering in and of them to This might be a descripproducenew kinds of 'stuttering' subjectivities. tion of some of the more radical avant-gardegroups of the twentieth ccntury,ftrr example,Dada or the Situationists(from collageto d'6tournemcnt). It might irls<lnamc thttsc 'cxpandcd prrrcticcs'thitt p<lsition

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themselves outsidethe galleryor simply stutter the dominant languages of sculpture and painting. Examples would be art practices, from performanceand installation art to the relational aesthetics today,that of turn away from typical definitions of art, or indeed typical notions of political engagement. might add that many of thesepracices are also We often specifically collectivein nature.In all thesecases doesnot transart port us to an elsewhere utilisesthe stuff of the world (we might say but the stuff of capitalism) albeit in a d,ffirent way. Art here is the discovery of new combinations and new waysof folding the world 'into' the sel{ or put more simply,new kinds of subjectivity. Of course there may still be other foldings, for example,the Oriental fold, that asDeleuzeremarks, perhaps a fold at all, and consequently is not not a process subjectivation. of The relationof art to this non-fold might be one of ritual. Which is not to saythe productionof possible worlds,or eventhe productionof subjectivity;rather it is both of these,in so far as they allow access something, to suchasthe void from which theseworlds and subjects haveemerged. There is an unfoldingthen that always accompaniesthe fold that, in turn, produces new foldswhilst alsoopeningus up to that which is yet to be folded.

FORCE CliffStagoll Deleuze'sconceptionof force is clearest his interpretative in readings of Friedrich Nietzsche, implicit throughouthis corpus.Much of what he but writes on the subject is borrowed directly from Nietzsche,although the way in which he usesthe notion to theorise differenceand becoming is Deleuzets own. For Nietzsche, world comprises chaoticweb of natural and biothe a logicalforceswithout anyparticularorigin or goal,and which nevercomes to rest at a terminal or equilibrium state.Theseforcesinteractceaselessly, constituting a dynamic world-in-flux rather than a collection of stable eptities.The world is always the process becoming in of something thar it is not, so that, for Deleuze, principal(andeternal)characteristic the the of world of forcesis differencefrom whateverhasgone beforeand from that which it will become. Neither Deleuzenor Nietzscheprovidesa clear definition of 'force'. Deleuze states overtlythat he doesnot meanby it'aggression'or'pressure' (rrltlrotrgh Nictzschcis not so clclr). Ir'orl)clcuzc, wc ctn only tr:ulylrerlirrccs intuitilg thcrrr; rrizrc lty thirtis, lly grrrspit'lg thcm withoutrcf'crcncc

To of understanding existence. try and capturein a few to a conceptual words or sentenceswhat is learned through intuition is impossible. Generally, though, 'force' means any capacity to produce a change or 'becoming',whetherthis capacityand its productsare physical,psycholegal social, economic, conceptual, artistic,philosophical, logical,mystical, of and All or whatever. of realityis an expression consequence interactions as betweenforces,with eachinteractionrevealed an 'event' (in Deleuze's of specificsense the term). Every event,body or other phenomenonis, forces, patternofinteractionsbetween then, the netresultofa hierarchical colliding in someparticular and unpredictableway. This enigmatic characterisationof forces is developed in Deleuze's accountof their activity.Every force exertsitself upon others.No force can with other forcesand, sincesuch exist apart from its inter-relationships associations struggle are alwaystemporary,forces are alwaysin the of so out process becomingdifferentor passing of existence, that no parof ticular forcecanbe repeated. Deleuze holds that types of forcesare defined in both quantitativeand in ways.First, the d,ffirence quantity li the qualitative terms,but in special doma quality of the difference forces. in Second, forceis'active'if it seeks inance by self-affirmation, asserting itself over and above another, and 'reactive'ifit startsits struggleby first denyingor negatingthe other force. Whereas'quality' usually refers to a particular complex, or body that forces, Deleuzeusesit to refer insteadto between resultsfrom interactions of tendencies the origin of forces,regardless the complexthat derives at finds the origin of both quantitative Nietzsche his reading, from them. On of and qualitative characteristics forcesin the Will to Power,and a kind of genealogy should be usedto tracequalitativeattributesof forcesto particular culturesand typesofpeople. I forcescan act only upon other forces,eYenthough Having no substance, betweenthem might result in an apparentlysubstantial the interactions and outcome, sooughtnot to be conreality. 'Things'aremerelya temporary Contraryto Immanuel or existence essence. as an sidered having independent and Kant, for example, thereareon this view no 'things-in-themselves', nor are there, contrary to Plato,perfect originalsof which all things are but as a world cannotbe considered an inevitable Furthermore, physical copies. of or permanentconsequence the cognitiveequipmentof a perceiveror of the natureof whateveris beingperceived. of Indeed,for Deleuze,this dichotomousunderstanding the perceiver In and the perceivedis also groundless. his view, the particularity of a pcncil, hereand now,involves not simply one'gazingupon' an object,but l complcx sct of circumstantialinteractionsinvolving a whole 'plane' of principlcsrtnging from thc biologyof sightto the cvcntslncl orgiurising
{l

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circumstances the pencil's being positionedhere, and the physicsof of carbonstructures. such,the theory of forceschallenges traditional As the philosophical dualism between essence and appearance, and also draws attention to the contingent and infinitely complex nature of lived reality. Connectives Active/Reactive Body Event Nietzsche

FOUCAULT, John Marks

MICHEL

(1926-84\

philosophical Michel Foucaultand Deleuzeenjoyedan intense friendship, and much of Deleuze'swriting on Foucaultmight be locatedwithin the tradition of the 'laudatory essay'that characterised certain strand of a intellectual activityin post-warFrance. Suchan essay not a work of critiis cism, but rather a gesture affective of intensity.Talking abouthis writing on Foucault,Deleuzeemphasises it is not necessary demonstrate that to greatfidelity to the work of a thinker, nor is it necessary look for cona to tradictions and blind alleysin a thinker's \Mork:to saythat one part works, but another part does not. Approaching a writer's work in the spirit of as friendship. is aboutbeingwilling to It 'friendship'is the same a personal be carriedalongby the entiretyof the work, accompanying thinker on the it a journey.Sometimes, is aboutfollowingthe work, asonemight a person, to the point that the work becomes little 'crazy',whereit breaks a down or comesup againstapparentlyinsurmountableproblems.Friendship in this doesnot meanthat one necessarily the sameideasor opinionsas has sense somebody else, ratherthat one shares modeof perception but a with them. Deleuzeexplainsthat it is a matter of perceivingsomethingabout somebody and his wayof thinking almostbeforehis thoughtis formulatedat the level of signification.It is for this reasonthat Deleuzetalks of remembering something'metallic', 'strident' and 'dry' in the gestures Foucault. of Deleuzeperceives Foucaultasan individuation,a singularity, rather than a subject.It is almostasif Deleuzeresponds Foucault's to thinking at the levelof his bodily materiality much as a set of philosophical proposas itions.Abovcall, Dclcuzcsccs Foucault a writcr <lfgrcat'passion', as and hc is prrrticulrrrly struck lly thc distiltctionthnt I'irucrrult drawsbctwccn

love and passion.Love is a relationshipbetween individuals, whereas passion a statein which the individualsdissolve is into an impersonal field Deleuzeregardshis own book on Foucault of intensities.For thesereasons, as an act of 'doubling', a way of bringing out and working with minor differences between himselfand Foucault.Both Deleuzeand Foucaulthad a similar conception the art of 'surfaces', making visiblerather than of of interpreting,and this is what Deleuzeseeks do with Foucault's to work. As with his other readings other writers,Deleuzeextractsa dynamic of logic- asopposedto a rational system- from Foucault's work. One of his main aims in Foucault to clear up someof the misunderstandings is surrounding the transitionsin Foucault'swork. For example, Deleuzerejects the notion that Foucault's late work constitutes somesort of return to the subject. Insteadhe sees this later work asaddingthe dimensionof subjectification to the analyses power and knowledgethat Foucault had previof ouslycarriedout. The subjectthat Foucaulttalksaboutin his final work is not a retreator a shelter, ratherone that is producedby a folding of the but outside.Deleuzealsorejectsthe simplisticnotion that Foucault'sformulation of the 'deathof man' might precludepolitical action.The figure of 'man'is simply one historicallydistinct form of the human.Human forces confront various other forcesat different times in history, and it is in this way that a composite human form is constructed. In a doublesense, Deleuzeperceives that which is 'vital' in Foucault's work. That is to say,he concentrates what Foucault thought out of on absolute necessity, well asthe waysin which Foucault'swork expresses as a commitment to life. Foucault may appearto be preoccupiedwith death, imprisonmentand torture, but this is because is concernedwith the he waysin which life might be freed from imprisonment.That is not to say that Deleuzeand Foucaultdid not feel there were points of real tension Foucault,for his part, found Deleuze'suse of betweentheir approaches. the term 'desire' problematic,since for him desire would alwaysentail some notion of 'lack' or repression.He preferred the term 'pleasure', pleasure which wasequallyproblematicfor Deleuze,because seems be to a transcendent category that interrupts the immanence desire. of However, rather than thesedifferences beingthe basisfor a critical interpretationof Foucault's work, they areactuallyconstitutive the 'tranv".rulfdiugorrol of line that Deleuze attempts to trace betweenhimself and Foucault. It is in this way that he hopesto bring out what Foucaultwasstriving to do in his work, and it is in this spirit that Deleuzeoccasionally focuses one of on Foucault's apparently minor concepts, suchasthat of the 'infamousman'. Deleuze finds this concept particularly resonant and respondsto its urgcncgsinccl,irucault uscsit to attcmptto think throughdifficultprobof'powcr. lcmsrclatingto his own undcrstirncling

ll0 Connectives Desire Transversality

FoucAULr

n ' ol n

FoUcAULT

r 'oln

111

FOUCAULT Tom Conley

+ FOLD

The most terseand telling formulation of the fold is found in 'Foldings, or the Inside of Thought (Subfectivation)', last chapterof Deleuze's the Foucauhthat examines Foucault'sthree-volumestudy of the history of sexuality. Michel Foucualt,saysDeleuze,took sexualityto be a mirror of subjectivityand subjectivation. Deleuzebroadens scopeby subsumthe ing sexualityin a matrix of subjectivity.Every human being thinks as a result of an ongoingprocess living in the world and by gainingconof sciousness agencythrough a constantgive-and-take perception, and of affect and cognition. Subjectivity becomesan ongoing negotiarionof things perceived, both consciously unconsciously, and within and outside the body.He builds a diagram, principally from TheHistory of Sexuality: Volume (1984),on the foundation of One (1976) and The Useof Pleasure the earlier writings to sketch a taxonomy and a history of the project. In TheArchaeology Knowledge (1972),Foucault had contendedthat the of 'self', the 'I', is alwaysdefinedby the waysit is doubledby another, a not singleor commanding'other' or Doppelgringer, simply any of a number but of possibleforces.'It is I who live my life as the double of the orher,' and when I find the other in myself the discovery'resemblesexactly the invaginationof a tissuein embryology, the act of doubling in sewing: or twist, fold, stop,and so on' (D 1988b:105).For Foucault,history wasthe (D 'doublingof an emergence' 1988b: 98).By that he meanrthar what was pastor in an archivewasalsopassed asmight a speeding overtaken car or doubled by another on a highway - but alsomirrored or folded into a diagram.History wasshownto be what sumsup the pastbut that can be marshalledfor the shapingof configurationsthat will determine how people live and act in the present and future. Whether forgotten or remembered, history is one of the formativedoubles othersvital to the or process subjectivation. of Therein beginsDeleuze's rhapsody foldsandfoldings.When a doubof ling producesan inner and an outer surface- a doublure French, in meaningat once a lining stitchedinto a pieceof clothing,a stand-inin a procluction, cvena douhleasAntonin Artaud had uscdthc cincmatic and

term in his writings on theatre - a new relation with 'being' is born. An insideand an outsideand a past(memory)and a present(subjectivity) A are two sidesof a singlesurface. person'srelation with his or her body both an archive anda diagram,a collection of subiectivationsand becomes a mental map charted on the basisof the past and drawn from eventsand that four folds, 'like the elementsin the ambientworld. Deleuzeasserts four rivers of Hell' (D 1988b:104),affectthe subject'srelation to itself. The first is the fold of the body,what is surroundedor takenwithin corforces',or social is'the fold ofthe relationbetween porealfolds;the second or conflict;the third is the 'fold of knowledge, the fold of truth in so far as it constitutesa relation of truth to our being' (D 1988b:104),and viceversa;the fourth is the fold of 'the outsideitself, the ultimate' (D 1988b: 104) fold of the limit of life and death. Each of these folds refers to (material, efficient,formal and final) of subjectivityand Aristoteliancauses Deleuzereminds ourselves, hasa variable rhythm of its own. We behoove us, to inquire of the natureof the four foldsbeforewe reflecton how subjectivityin our time is highly internalised, The and isolated. individualised to right to have access struggle for subjectivity is a battle to win the variationand metamorphosis. difference, The human subjectcan only be understoodunder the condition (the formula, it will be shown, is a crucial one) of the fold and through the filters of knowledge,power and affect. The fold, a form said to obsess betweenthings stated or said, Foucault, is shown as somethingcreased The distinction openedbetweenvisible and and things visible or seen. discursive formations is put forward in order to be drawn away from intentionality (as understood in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty) that would ally subjectivity with phenomenology. Things spokendo not refer to an original or individual subjectbut to a and things visiblepoint to a 'being-light'that illumin'being-language', that would be free of any intenates'forms, proportions, perspectives' tional gaze. Anticipating his work on Leibniz, Deleuze notes that intentionality to be collapsedin the gap between 'the Foucault causes Thus, phenomentwo monads' (D 1988b:109)of seeingand speaking. to speakis to know,'but To ology is convertedinto epistemology. seeand of we don't seewhat we are speaking and we don't speakof what we are seeing'. Nothing can precede or antedate knowledge (saaoir), even though knowledgeor knowing is 'irremediablydouble'- hencefolded as and,light,which are independentof as speakingand seeing, language and seers. intending subjectswho would be speakers the the At this juncturethe fold becomes very fabricof ontology, ateaof philosophywith which Deleuze claims staunchaffiliation.The folds of being (as a gcruncl)and of bcing (as a noun) are found in Foucault's

n2

F o U c AU L T

nolo

FR EED OM

ll3

Heideggerand that of an outside is twisted, folded and doubled by an inside in the philosopher'sreading of Merleau-Ponty.Surely, Deleuze observes, Foucault finds theoreticalinspiration in the themesof the fold, the doublethat hauntsthe archaeologist knowledge. a doublingor a of As lining the fold separates speech from sightandkeeps eachregisterin a state of isolationfrom the other. The gap finds an analogue the hermetic in difference the soundand imagetrack of cinema.From such a division of knowledge dividedinto pieces 'tracks'and thus canneverbe recuperis or atedin anyintentional form (D 1988b: 111).The dividednatureof communication has as its common metaphor the creaseor fold between visibility and orality. It is no wonder that in his studiesof differenceand resemblance Foucault begins at the end of the sixteenth century, at the moment when writing evacuates force of visual analogyfrom its printed its form. At that point, when print-culture becomesstandardisedand schematicreasoningreplaces memory in manualsof rhetoric, or when wordsareno longeranalogous the thingsthey seem embodyor resemto to ble, signsbegin to stand, for their referentsand to be autonomousdoubles in with respect what they represent. to To demonstratehow the fold is a figure of subjectivationDeleuzecalls history into the philosophical arena. asksin bold and simplelanguage: He 'What canI do?WhatdoI know? Vl/hat 1? (D 1988b: l5). The events am I of May 1968rehearsed questions inquiring of the limits of visibility, these by of language, of power.They brought forward thoughtsabouturopia, and and henceaboutmodesof beingthat would enable resistance repressive in politicalconditions and fosterthe birth of ideasvital for new subjectivities. In a historicalconfiguration'being' is chartedalongan axis of knowing. by visibleand utterable; the exer'Being' is determined what is deemed by cise of power,itself determined by relation of force and singularitiesat a given moment in time; and by subjectivity,shown to be a processor the places wherethe fold of the self passes through.A grid or a new diagram makesclearthe oppositionby settingforward variations power,knowof (in ledge pouaoir, The lastis conceived andsubjectivity Frenchassauoir, soi). asa fold. Foucault,Deleuzeadvances, doesnot divide a history of institutionsorof subjectivationsbutof conditionsandof their theirprlcesseswithin creases foldingsthat operate both ontological social and in and fields. There is opened dramaticreflection rhe characrer thinking which a on of belongs as much to Deleuze as to Foucault. Historical formations are doubledand thus defineassuchthe epistemictraits of knowledge, powerand subjectivity: termsof knowledge, think is to see in ro and to speak; other in words,thinking takesplacein the inrerstices visibility and discoursc. of Whcn wc think wc causc lightningboltsto flash ancl flickcr'in the midstof words, unlcisht.cry in thc nridstof'visiblcthings'(l) lgtlttb:ll(r). or

Thinking makes seeingand speakingreach their own limits. In what concerns power, thinking is equivalent to 'emitting singularities', to a gambler'sact of tossinga pair of dice onto a table,or to a personengaging relationsof forceor evenconflict in order to preparenew mutationsand singularities. terms of subjectivation In thinking means'to fold to doublethe Outsidewith a coextensive inside'(D 1988b: 118).Created a topologyby is which inner and outerspaces in contactwith eachother. are History is takento be an archioe series stratafrom which thinking, or of a diagramrepletewith strategies, drawsits force and virtue. To makethe (D point clearDeleuzealludesindirectly to'A New Cartographer' 1988b: 2347), an earlier chapter that anticipatesmuch of the spatialdynamicsof The Fold,.When we 'think' we cross all kinds of thresholds and strata. Followinga fissurein order to reach,asthe poet Herman Melville callsit, a 'centralroom' where we fear no one will be and where 'man's soul will reveal nothing but an immense and terrifying void' (D 1988b: l2l). and moving at molecular Ultimately,followinga line of 1,000aberrations speedleadslife into the folds and a centralroom wherethere is no longer any needto fearemptiness because self (a fold) is found inside.These the ideasarch back to how Deleuze once describedthe history of forms or an archiveas 'doubled' (passed folded over) by a becomingof forceswhere or any number of diagrams or folded surfaces thought - plied overeach of other. He calls it the torsion of the 'line of the Outside' that Melville described, oceanic an line without beginningor end, an oceanic line that turns and bumpsaboutdiagrams. The form of the line was 1968,the line aberrations'(D1988b: 44). 'with a thousand

FREEDOM
Paul Patton often in Deleuze's writings,yet there 'Freedom'is not a term that appears is a distinctiveconceptof freedomimplicit throughouthis ethico-political texts written with Guattari. Thesedescribe individual and collective subjectsin terms of differentkinds of assemblage, or modesof occupying line space.For example,they suggestthat we are composedof three kinds of line: firstly, molar lines which correspondto the forms of rigid segmentation found in bureaucratic and hierarchicalinstitutions; secondly, molecular lines which correspond the fluid or overlapping to forms of division characteristic 'primitive' territoriality; and finally,lines of flight which of or into arcthc pathsalongwhichthingschangc bccomc transformcd somcof' systcnrilticillly thing clsc.'l'hc primrrcy lincs of'flight in this ontol(,gy

ll4

FREEDO M

GEN EAL OGY

ll5

privileges processesof creative transformation and metamorphosis through which assemblages may be transformed. Freedom is manifest in the critical points at which somestateor condition of things passes over into a different stateor condition. In contrastto the traditional conceptsof negative and positive freedom, freedom for Deleuze concerns those momentsin a life after which one is no longer the samepersonasbefore. This is an impersonaland non-voluntaristicconceptof freedom which refers to the capacityfor changeor transformationwithin or between assemblages. the texts written with Guattari, this concept of freedom In appears only in the guiseof other concepts suchas 'line of flight', 'deterritorialisation'or'smooth space'. ln A Thousand, Plateaus, authorsuseE ScottFitzgerald's novella,The the Cracb-Up,to showhow this kind of transformation a personmight be in definedin terms of the differentkinds of 'line' which characterise indian (D&G 1987:198-200).Fitzgerald distinguishesthree different vidual life kinds oftransition from one stateor stagein life to another:firstly, the large breakssuch as those betweenyouth and adulthood, betweenpoverty and wealth, betweenillness and good health, betweensuccess failure in a or profession; secondly,the almost imperceptible cracks or subtle chosen shiftsof feelingor attitudewhich involvemolecular in changes the affective constitutionofa person;and finally the abrupt and irreversible transitions through which the individual becomes different personand eventually, a Fitzgeraldwrites, 'the new personfinds new things to care about.' The subjectof the novellaundergoes particularly severe a breakdowninvolving lossof faith in his former values and the dissipation all his convictions. of He seeks effectwhat he calls'a cleanbreak'with his pastself (F 1956: to 69-84).Sucha breakamounts a redistributionof desiresuchthat 'when to somethingoccurs,the Self that awaited is alreadydead,or the one that it would awaitit hasnot yet arrived'(D&G 1987:198-9). This kind of suddenshift towardsanotherquality of life or towardsa life which is livedat another degree intensityis onepossible of outcome what of Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'a line of flight', and it is on this kind of line that freedomis manifest. The type of freedomthat is manifest a breakof this in kind cannotbe captured liberalor humanistconcepts negative posiin of or tive freedom,sincethesedefinefreedomin terms,ofa subject's capacity to act without hindrancein the pursuit of its endsor in terms of its capacity to satisfy its most significant desires.Fitzgerald's characterno longer has the sameinterestsnor the samedesiresand preferences. the relevant In sense the term, he is no longer the samesubject:his goalsare not the of same, arethe values nor which wouldunderpinhis strongevaluations. Whcrclsthc normativc stiltus libcralfrccdom unambiguously of posiis tivc.'ficcdonr'in this | )clcuzirrn scnsc morcitnrbivirlcnt. is Frccdonr this irr

preferences goalsof the subjectin and is sense indifferentto the desires, any that it may threatenasmuch asadvance of these.It is not clearby what standardssuch freedom could be evaluatedas good or bad. There is no of telling in advancewhere such processes mutation and change might Iines may alsobe madeaboutdeterritorialisation, lead.Similar comments with of In of flight or smoothspace. the absence productiveconnections other forces,lines of flight may turn destructiveor simply lead to new of of In forms of capture. the conclusion the discussion smoothasopposed Deleuze and Guattari Plateaus, of A Thousand to striated spaceat the end reaffirm the normative ambiguity of freedom: 'smooth spacesare not in liberatory.But the struggleis changedor displacedin them, themselves inventsnewpaces' confrontsnewobstacles, its and life reconstitutes stakes, Never believethat a smooth spacewill sufficeto save switchesadversaries. hereis that, prima facie,smooth us'(D&G 1987:500).The presupposition spaceis the spaceof freedom. It is the spacein which movements or or processes liberation are possible,evenif thesedo not alwayssucceed of of to the reappearance new forms of capture. evenif they are condemned Connectives Deterritorialisation Lines of flight Molar Molecular Space

FREUD, SIGMUND analysis'.

(1856_1939) refer to the entry on 'psycho-

GENEALOGY Bruce Baugh Deleuze's of use or 'Genealogy'refersto tracing linesof descent ancestry. ol'Morals, Fricdrich Nictzschc's On the Genculog.y thc tcrm dcrivcsfrom

ll6

G ENEALO G Y

cuArrARr,

prERRn-r'f,t-rx ( r g 3o-92)

tL7

which traces the descentof our moral conceptsand practices.one key precept of the genealogical method is that effecrsneed not resembletheir causes, the forcesthat producea phenomenon as may disguise themselves (for example,a religion of love canariseout of resentment);anotheris that

'slaves',for whom 'good' is merely the negationof 'evil'). In Deleuze's hands,Nietzscheangenealogy allied with the philosophiesof immais nence (Henri Bergsonand Baruch spinoza), such that the 'past' from which a phenomenonis descended a set of forces immanent in the is phenomenon that expresses those forces, and thus coexistent with the present.

activeor reactive, nothingbut the difference quantitybetween superis in a ior and an inferior force(D 1983:43), an inferior forcecan defeata superior one by 'decomposing'it and making it reactive,so that the genealogist must evaluatewhether the forcesthat prevailedwere inferior or superior, activeor reactive 1983:59-60).Poweror the will is eitheraffirmative (D or negative,and designates differentialrelation of forceswhich either the dominate(active)or aredominated(reactive)accordingto whether the will affirms its difference from that difference it dominates and enjoys, or whether it negateswhat differs from it and suffers from that difference (often in the form of resentmen$.The affirmativewill, in affirming itsel{, wills that it be obeyed;only a subordinate will can obey by converting 'actions' into reactionsto an external forcg and this becoming-reactive is the expression a negative of will. Genealogythus interprets and evaluates the hierarchicaldifference betweenactiveand reactiveforcesby referring theseto the hierarchical 'geneticelbment' of a 'will to Power' that is either affirmativeor negative. will to Powerdifferentiates forcesasactiveand reactive, through it one as forcedominates commands or anorher that obeys is dominated l9g3: or (D 49-51). However,will to Poweris not externalto the forcesit qualifies or conditions,but is an immancnt principle of forcesand the relationsof forces,their 'internal gcncsis'by conditionsimmanentto the conditioncd(D 1983: 9l). Gcncakrgy thusconnccts conscqucnccs premisses, to fo thc principlc of' thcir llroduction,by scckingthc scnscof ;rroducts

phenomena the forcesthey express(symptomology),interpreting forces in as active or reactiye (typology), and evaluating the origin of forces in a quality of will that is either affirmativeor negative. For example, reason, a rather than beingmerelya givenfaculty of the mind, expresses nihilistic and negative will which negates the sensesand the sensory world to (D produce 91,125,1+5). a'True world'beyondappearances 1983: genealogical Deleuzecontinues methodin laterworks.ln Antiusinghis he Oedipus, traces memory and morality to the debtor-creditor relation and the primitive practice of inflicting physical pain for unpaid debts. the of between creditor's Originally justiceis the assertion an equivalence pleasure paininflictedon the debtorand the injury caused the unpaid by in debt; memoryis the product of marksinscribedon the body for a debt not paid, living reminders that produce the capacity to remember the future individualwho momentat which the promisemust be kept. The sovereign promises himself by powerover himself is and defines can makeand keep thus the product of punishment: how culture trains and selectsits members(D 1983:l34J; D&G 1983:144-5,190-2). Deleuzealsouses genealogyto show that the reactiveforcesand negativewill expressed by priest type are also expressed the figure of the psychoanalyst; both in the debt, whetherthat be to a God createguilt out of an infinite and unpayable who sacrificeshimself for us, or to the analyst as cure for the condition the analystproduces(D&G 1983:108-12,269, 332-3; D&G 1987:154). Even at the basicontologicallevel, aswhen he finds 'the being of the sensible' in 'differencein intensity as the reasonbehind qualitativediversity' (D 1994: 57), Deleuze remains a genealogist, interpreting phenomena through the hidden relations of forcesimmanent in them. Connectives Active/Reactive Immanence Nietzsche

GUATTARI, PIERRE-FELIX Garjt Genosko

( 1930-92)

Pierre-F6lixGuattari was fifteen when he met psychoanalyst JeanOury, brotherFernand, developer founderof Cliniquede la Borde,throughJean's pcdagogy France. the time he reached By twentyyears in of institutional Guttttri to abtndon GurrttrriwastnkcnundcrJcrn'swing.Jcanconvinccd

l 18

cuArrARr,

pTERRE-FfLrx ( r g3o_ gz)

cuArrARI,

pTERRE-r'6ltx (r93o-92)

l19

his study of commercial pharmacyand, in the early 1950s, visitedJean he at clinique saumery, precursor La Borde.saumerywasGuattari'sinia of tiation into the psychiatricmilieu. while a teenagerGuattari had met Fernandoury through the youth hostellingmovement(Fidiration (Jniedes Auberges Jeunesse). d.e Fernandoury wasinstrumentalin gettingGuattari involvedin the summercaravans organised the paris suburb of La he in Garenne-colombes for working-class suburban youth like Guattari himself,who grew up in the same departmenr nearbyVilleneuve. in Guattari assistedin the foundationalwork at La Borde where he helpedwrite its constitution lAn 1 the yearit opened 1953.Guatari,s d,e in next task was to organise intra-hospitalrherapeutic clubs for patients. Guattari'sinvolvement increased after 1955. Guattari's career was also shapedby the friendly tutelage of another master, whom he had met when he wasjust twenty-three, Lacan. Jacques It wasnot until 1962that Guattari graduated a didactictraining ar\alyto siswith Lacan,joiningthe Ecolefreudienne parisasan analyst de in 1969.Guartari'sformativeintellectual milieu wasLacanian. -"-u!, By the mid-1960s Guattari had developeda formidable battery of conceptsorganised around the problem of deliveringtherapyin institutional settings.Psychanalyse tra,nsaersaliti et exposed limits of the psythe choanalytic unconscious arguingthat it wasnot a concernof specialists by treating individualsbut rather perfusedthe socialfield and history.For Guattarithe subject wasa group or collective assemblage heterogeneous of componentswhose formation, delinked from monadic individuals and abstract, universal determinationslike the oedipus myth, structural matheme and part object, could be seenthrough critical analyses the of actual vicissitudes collectivelife in which patientsfound themselves. of A Sartrean-inflected theory of groups emerged distinguishing nonabsolutelybetweensubject-groups (activelyexploring self-defined projects) and subjugated groups (passively receiving directions), each affecting relations their members social the of processes shaping to and the potentialfor subjectformation. The foundation of what Guattari called schizoanalysis was laid in L'inconscient machinique. schizoanalysis requiresa practical,detailed semiotics well asa politicallyprogressive provisional as and transformation of situational powerrelations. The analyst's micropolitical taskis to discern in a particularassemblage mutationalpotentialof a given component the and explorethe effects its passages and between of in assemblages, producing and extracting singularitiesby undoing impasses, arienatingand dcadcning rcdundancies: 'Ratherthan indcfinitcly tracingthe samccomplcxcs thc samc <lr univcrsirl "milthcmcs", schizoirnllytic a cirrt<lgraphy will cxpkrrc cxpcrinrcnt lnd wirhan unc.nsci'us luuality'(G l97t):190). in

will map, in a way specific to each Micropolitical schizoanalysis passage, delinguistifiedand mixed semiotic lines flush with matters of expression, rhizomes released from arborescent structures, molecular faciality traits loosened schizzeson the run from molar bureaucracies, and new machinic connectionsand breaks, from dominant overcodings, regardless their level of formation, elaboratingtheir becomingsand of on across socialfield. This emphasis molecuthe new terms of reference oppositional that privilegescreative, analysis larity entailsa sociopolitical professional neutrality.Guattari introduced so-called flight and eschews the machineasa productiveconnectivityirreducibleboth to technologies of machinesform assemblages componand to foundationalsubstances; ent parts. (1977and 1980) contained The two editionsof La riaolutionmoliculaire advancedsemiotic methods, modified from Hjelmslevian and Peircean for in to roots,adequate the 'semioticpolycentrism'necessary engaging a genuinetransversal analysisof the expandedfields of the unconscious, with a less woodenlydichotomoussenseof super ego on one side and in sociuson the other. Guattari's writings on developments Italy in the potential for new molecular forms of collective 1970sunderlined their revolution'. action,what he called'generalized and elaboratednonrepresenCartographies schizoanolytiques Chaosmose pragprocesses subjectification, of tationalmapsof the self-engendering to the specific ways in which singularitiescome matically attending their together,through four ontological functions of the unconscious, interfaces, and the characterof their components:material fluxes and The machinicphylums; existentialterritoriesand incorporealuniverses. the latter former are actual and discursiveon the plane of expression; on virtual and non-discursive the planeof content.Emergentassemblages in of enunciationare ontologicallycomplex because a given situation a schizoanalyst to bridgethe virtual and actualby discerningthe former tries and attending to how they actually work themselvesout relationally processually expressively subas and and betwixt manifestation possibility, jcctivity everemerges. with Gilles for Guattari is internationallyrecognised his collaborations and What is Plateau.s, l)cleuze on Anti-Oedipus,Kafha, A Thousand' remainvirtually unknown. yet statements l'hilosoph.y?, his key theoretical (lonnectives
l,itcitn

l)sychornirlysis 'l i'ansvcrsrlity

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HAECCEI TY

HUM E,

DAVI o

( r 7r t - 76)

t21

HAECCEITY - refer to the entries on 'experience',,individuation', * 'percept+ literature','phenomenology Husserl'and,post-structuralism * politics'.

HARDY, THOMAS (1840-1928)- refer to the entries on ,art, and 'percept * literature'.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831) - refer to

the entries on tarborescent schema', tBergson', tcapitalism * universal history', tcapture', 'cinema * Werner Herzog', tdifference', ,immanencet, 'phenomenology'and'Spinoza'.

HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1889-1976) refer ro the entries on tontology',tphenomenology,,.socius,,.sub'Foucault+ foldt, tnonbeingt, stance' and 'thought'.

HUME, DAVID (l7tt-76\ CIiffStagoll David Hume was a Scottish philosopher, historian,economistand religious theorist,and perhapsthe best known of the philosopherscommonly designated'empiricisrs'.Although Hume's grouping with such thinkers as John Locke'and George Berkeleyis questionable, mid- to late-twentieth-century historiesof philosophyplacedthem togetherroutinely.In a chapteron Hume, typically one either encounters naturalist a extendingand radicalising work of Locke and/or Berkeley(or Ren6 the Descartes and NicolasMalebranche), a scepticwhosecontributionsto or philosophyare largelyor wholly critical. Perhaps best-knownphilohis sophical theoryis that ideas clearlyoriginatingfrom sense not impressions ought to bc'committcdto flames'. only in thc latc 1960s early 1970s and

did the focusof Anglo-AmericanHume studiesmoveawayfrom such striprinof towardshis analysis the passions, assertions dent epistemological of and ciplesof association, suchfeatures the mind asinstinct,propensity, belief, imagination, feeling and sympathy.Deleuze had adopted this in emphasis 1952and 1953,focusingmainly upon the naturalismevident in Hume's principlesof human nature. extendedfurther. Whereasit is commonly shift in emphasis Deleuze's held that Hume, finding himself unableto counter his scepticalepistemoreligion and economics turned to history,sociology, logical conclusions, Hume's entire corpus to comprise out of frustration,Deleuzeconsiders of of in variousstages the development a 'science human nature'.Just as so dimensions, and human life involvesethical,epistemological aesthetic religiousand historicalones.For Deleuze,one too it involveseconomic, cannotproperly understandHume's philosophywithout referring to his work in other disciplines. In his publishedworks and interviews,Deleuzereturns time and again accountof it is to Hume's empiricism.His most detailedand sustained first full book. Deleuze focuseson three Empiricismand,Subjectitsity,his of aspects Hume's philosophyin particular.The first is Hume's commita ment to a philosophy founded upon direct experience, position that empiricism'. On as reappears a key tenet of Deleuze's'transcendental with Deleuze'sreading, Hume begins his philosophicalinvestigations posit about the world: humansseeobiects, observations straightforward plan work to meet ecoof the existence gods,make ethical judgements, Deleuze in of and nomicimperatives, remainaware themselves somesense. initially to find in thought any element Hume is unable arguesthat, because (constancy per or universality'to which he might refer a psychology se' of a of insteada 'psychology the mind's affections', theoryabout he develops andpassocial to the regular'movement'of the mind according observable than building some philosophicaledifice, Rather sional circumstances. to needed explainsuchdynamicsfrom Hume readsthe concepts however, treating them as contingentexplanatory out of the reality of experience, or be toolsthat canalways replaced supplemented. is emphases upon Hume's 'atomism'.Hume The secondof Deleuze's eachwith a distinct origin of conceives the mind asa set of singularideas, Ratherthan arguingthat the mind precedes or setof originsin experience. is ideasso that experience given ro the mind, Hume holds that the mind just ls theseradicallydisparate ideas. this reading,nothing transcends On them arein no sense between of the ideas the mind, and sothe connections 'pre-programmed'. Sinceideas is third emphasis upon Hume's'associationism'. Deleuze's thereareany number of waysthat they can lrc not inherently structured,

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be brought together to generatenew patterns of understanding,new behavioursand so on. For Deleuze,Hume discountsthe possibility of any universalprinciple or capacityto govern such connections. Ratheq such creativepotentialis realisedunder the influenceof the life of practice (that is, pressures arisingfrom economicand legalstructures, family, languagepatterns, physical requirementsand so on). The tendencies evident in human responses such influencesmight be called 'general to rules', but rather than trulestin the usualsense, theseare contingentand impermanent. The epiphenomenonarising from such complex, contingent and changingrelationships and tendencies the human subject,that we call is 'I'. This Humean subject is understood by Deleuze as a fiction, sufficiently stable to have identity posited of it and ro exist in a social realm, but 'containing' elementsof dynamism with the capacityto transcend hierarchicalthinking of a human being in favour of rhizomatic thinking of non-humanbecoming. Whilst porrionsof the model become targetsfor Deleuze'ssubsequent attackson the ontology of identity and being,othersprovide him with meansof escape a radicalmetaphysics to of becoming. Although Deleuzeis usually faithful ro Hume's writings, his readings are idiosyncraticand go well beyond the original texts. His focus upon generalrules, artifice, habit and stabilisingfictions carry an inordinate weight in Deleuze's early theorisation of the human individual. Nonetheless, whilst his interpretationof Hume is unusual,it is far less radicalthan his versions Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Friedrich of Nietzsche. Connective Transcendental empiricism

HYSTERIA Jonathan Roffe A frequent method to be found in Deleuze'sphilosophyis the use of non-philosophicalterms and perspectives a philosophicalmanner. in Particularly good examplesof this are availablein Anti-Oediltusand A Thousand Plateaus, where Deleuzeand Guattari generalisc and altcr psychoanalytic cortrrin (particularly conccpts schizophrcnia parrrnoia) and in ordcr to r.rsc tlrcnrin srrcial irrrrlysis. is in thisscnsc lt thlt l)clcuzctrkcs

psychiatricthought, the term 'hysteria',derivedfrom nineteenth-century painterFrancisBacon.For Deleuzeand it and applies to the art of the Irish Guattari, hysteriadescribes in this generalphilosophicalsense- the as from one's own body which is experienced a trap. attempt to escape However,it is not that the hystericis trying to liberatehis soul from the notion - but rather body - that would be a very traditional philosophical Hysteria is a namefor that the organisationof the body itself is oppressive. that the the friction between body itself and the organisations it undergoes sociallyand politically. So, in this context,the body is two things at once.On the one hand, it socialand habitualactswhich makeup is the set of politically acceptable, and transient,without any a person.On the other, the body is malleable fixed organisation.It is in a certain sensethe reality of living life otherDrawing on the writings of Antonin Artaud, wise, of being-otherwise. body the Plateaus this malleable call Deleuzeand Guattariin A Thousand, 'Body without Organs' (BwO). In contrast is the social and politically organ-ised body. his Baconcan be seenasa painter of hystericsbecause figuresexpress (the pressureand strucboth the senseof strain that bodies are under ture of organisation),and the attempt of these bodies to escapetheir For example,Deleuzethinks that Bacon'sfamouspainting organisation. Stud,yAfter Wldzquez'sPortrait of PopeInnocentX (1953) - otherwise Pope- showsa body trying to leavethrough referredto asthe Screaming the mouth of the figure. Likewise, the link betweenbodies and meat or fleshshowshow life doesnot take placebeyondthe body,in the mind or soul, but in the body itself. Rather than seeing Bacon as a painter of Deleuze proposes that we see horror and existential meaninglessness, him asa painterof life, depicting the struggleof bodily or fleshlylife with the shapesthat it is forced to assume.This is the hystericalaspectof Baconts art. that the term 'hysteria'can be usedto describe Finally,Deieuzeargues in mustbe understood termsof how paintingitself.While all art, he insists, it expresses imperceptibleforce of life, painting hasa certain privileged the itself to the relation to the body.Pictorial art, Deleuzeclaims,addresses of the disembodied cye.However,rather than placingthe eyeon the side the mind of the spectator, encounterwith the forceof painting- which in thc case Baconis particularlymanifestin his useof colour- returns the of the cyc to the fleshlybody.In other words,the forceof painting dissolves the spectatoran rnind/body hierarchy of the organisedbody, offering freerin concretely opportunity to frcc up the BwQ and therebyto become 'l'his proviclcs link bctwcen ptlliticsand irrt that occathc scnsc. :r gcncrirl in work. siorrally cnrcrgcs l)clcuzc's

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IDENTITY James Williams In Deleuze's work, identity is perhaps most heavilycriticisedconcept the from the philosophicaltradition. That criticism takesmany forms and dependson many different argumentsand aesthetic expressions. However, these can be simplified through the claim that Deleuze's opposition to identity is directed at the falsifying power of identity in representation. Identity works against and covers deeper pure differences.It does so because the dominance the demandto represent the historyof philof of in osophy. Objects,subjects, faculties,feelings,ideasand thoughtsmust be represented them to become legitimatepart of philosophical for a debate. For this representation takeplacethey must be identified. to There is a strong descriptionof this historicaldominance Dffirence in and, Repetition,where Deleuzecharacterises according a series 'posit to of tulates' presupposed a certain 'image of thought'. When thought is by associatedby right with truth and with the good, certain unexamined premissesare at work. Most notably,that truths and goodscan be representedin thought and most properly by thought. So what concernsDeleuze is not only the claim that truths and goods must be represented, alsothe belief that thought is dependent repbut on resentation and on identity for its path to the good and the true. His critiquesof other philosophers.often dependon showinghow this imageof thought is operatingunconsciously and damaginglyin their works. The damage caused is because reality is a process becoming, of which involves pure differences that cannotbe represented. By turning us awayfrom reality,the commitmentto identity in representationfurthers an illusion that leadsus to repress processes becomof ing at work in our own existence. The effects<lfthcseprocesses become all thc morc clillicult to work with, oncc that rcprcssion has takcn placc.

In termsof identity,Deleuze's philosophycanbe seenasa critical attempt to cure us of the self-destructive dependence identity. on But what is identity accordingto Deleuzel ln Dffirence and. Repetition he gives an account of it in terms of concepts (though in lMhat is Philosophy? and Guattari usethe term in a different sense). he Identity is opposedto multiplicity, in that multiplicity is both uncountable and not open to a reductive logical or mathematicalanalysis. Thus, if any concept is definedasa seriesofidentifiable predicates properties,then to saythat or all things must be representedthrough conceptsis to further a falseimage of reality.An identifiablepredicatewould itself be simple,limited and welldetermined, something that could be checkedempirically or through reason with certainty. Accordingto Deleuzenothing canbe checked this way.Concepts in and representations not correspondto anythingin reality.This is because do all things are connectedto multiplicities, that is, to uncountableand processes becoming,rather than existingasfixed beings unidentifiable of with identifiable and limited predicates essences. or But this showsthe extremedifficulty of Deleuze's position,not only in terms of communicability,but alsoin terms of how it can be understood. Do we not needto be ableto representsomethingin order to be ableto talk aboutit in an open and effectivemanner?Do we not needto be ableto identify something order to be ableto understand truthfully? in it His answer that communication expressive well asidentifying.So is is as though we represent what we think and talk about,a seriesof unidentifiableprocesses always work behindthat representation. are at There canbe no identity without pure differences standingin the backgroundasa condition for the illusory appearance a pure, well-determined of identity. Connectives Difference Multiplicity Representation Thoueht

IMMANENCE James Williams 'Ihe distinction drawn between immanenceand transcendence allis phikrsophy. charactcriscs opposition mony importantto I)clcuzc's It his to

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metaphysical positions criticisedasphilosophies transcendence. also of It aligns his philosophy with philosophiesof immanence,most notably Baruch Spinoza. Immanence and transcendence terms about the relationsthat hold are at the heart of different metaphysics. Are the privileged relationsin a philosophyof the form of a relation 'to' something, of a relation 'in' or somethinglIf it is 'to' then it is philosophyof transcendence. it is 'in' If then it is immanence. Deleuzeis radical about immanence, that is, his philosophyis to be thought strictly in terms of relations'in'. In thehistoryof philosophy, relations transcendence be tracedback of can to theologicalroots, where a lower realm is related to a higher one: ('Everything downhereis related andacquires to values throughits relation to God.'). For example, Ren6Descartes, in relations transcendence of hold from bodyto mind andfrom created substance God. Mind is independent to of body and yet body is secondary mind and in its grasp.God is independto ent of his creation,yet the creationmust be referred to God, for example, wherehe actsa guarantorfor the validity of clearand distinct perception. The objectionto relationsof transcendence that they involve founding is (for negations example, that mind is completely separate from body).Such negations the groundsfor negativevaluations, are both in the sense a of 'lower'realm finding its valueor redemptionin a'higher'one, and in the sense the lowerrealmdepending the higherone for its definition. of on For example,if the human realm is seenas transcendedby God, then definitionsof humanessence be turned towards may that higherrealmand awayfrom a purely humanone.The humanbody and mind will be turned awayfrom itself and devalued the light, for instance, a transcendent in of soul.This leadsto an interesting concernin Deleuzewith notionsof eternity that resistdefinitionsin termsof transcendence. arenot immortal We in the way we can rise to a differentrealm (of God or of PlatonicIdeas), but in the way we participate eternalprocesses. in This explains Deleuze's appeals anddeepinterpretation Friedrich to, of, Nietzsche'sdoctrine of eternal return (in Nietzsche and Philosophy and Dffirence and,Repetition)amongothers). Eternal return is an immanent process that brings differentiatingand identifying processes together. In eternalreturn, difference retufns to transformidentities(the same). This is why Deleuzealways insiststhat only difference returnsandnot the sarne. Deleuze's philosophy of immanence emphasises connectionsover forms of separation.But this connectionmust itself be a connectivity betweenrelationsand not between differentidentities.This is because an external principle would be neededto ground those identitics (for cxample, identitydcpcnded the humtn mind - thcrebysettingit up irs on trrnsccnclcnt).

In his Nietzscheand,Philosophy,Deleuze turns on one of the main targetsof his philosophyof immanencethrough a critique of Hegelian dialectics, where a principle of negationitself becomes that which transcends.In contrast, Nietzsche's idea of affirmation emergesout of processes negationbut frees itself from them. A creativerelation of of affirmationdoesnot dependon negatingthings,though it may emerge out pastnegations. of In Dffirence and Repetitioz, philosophyof immanence set out in the is ontologicalterms through a succession argumentsfrom Duns Scotus, of through Spinoza, to Nietzsche.In these arguments,the difficulties in developing philosophyof pure immanence a becomeapparent,as Scotus then Spinozaare shownstill to dependon someforms of transcendence. doctrineof the eternalreturn of pure differences Only Nietzsche's allows for a full immanentontology,because things, whether identifiableor all not, are positedas completeonly through their relation to an immanent (virtual'). (Deleuze's field of pure differences transcendental It is important to note that theseclaims on immanenceand the distinction betweenactual and virtual are a key place for criticisms of Deleuze, notablyby Alain Badiou. His critical claim restson the idea that the virtual itself is a transcendent realm. But this is to missthe necessary inter-relation of virtual and actual through a reciprocal determination. Neither is independentofthe other and cannotthereforebe said to enter into a relation of transcendence. Connectives Nietzsche Spinoza Virtual/Virtuality

TNCORPOREAL
TamsinLorraine In The Logic of Sense,Deleuze characterisesthe distinction made by the Stoicsbetweenmixtures of bodiesor statesof affairsand incorporcal entities that 'frolic' on the surface of occurrences(D 1990: 5). According to Deleuze, this distinction refers to two planes of being, onc of which concernsthe tensions,physicalqualities,actionsand passionsof bodics; and thc othcr of which concerns cntiticsor 'incorporeal' cvcntsthrt do not cxist.lrut rrthcr 'subsist inlrcrc'in stirtcs or of'rrllirirs.

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Although incorporealentitiescan neverbe actuallypresent,they are the effectof mixtures of bodiesand canenter into quasi-causal relationswith other incorporeals. The clearest exampleof the incorporealis an eventof sense. propA osition like 'The sun is shining' expresses sensethat 'inheres' in the a proposition, but is neverreducible to the stateofaffairs ofeither one specific or even an endless series of specific instances of a shining sun (D 1990:cf. l9). Deleuze claims that while srares affairs have rhe remof porality of the living present, the incorporeal eventsof senseare infinitives (to shine, to be the sun) that constitute pure becomingswith the temporality of aion - a form of time independentof matter that always eludesthe present. Thus, no matter how manytimesthe stateof affairsof a shining sun is actualised,the senseof 'The sun is shining' is not exhausted. is this 'frontier of sense'betweenwhat words express It and the attributes of bodies that allows languageto be distinguishedfrom physicalbodies.If the actionsand passions bodiesmake sense, is of it because that sense not itself either an action or a passion, is but is rather an incorporealeffectof a stateof affairs that entersinto relations of quasicausality with other incorporeal eventsof sense. The virtual relations of the events of senseconstitute the condition of any given speech-act. Deleuze refers to the work of Lewis carroll asa revealingexampleof how these quasi-causalrelations can form a 'nonsense' that subsists in tcommonsense' language. rn A Thousand, Plateaus, Deleuzeand Guattari characterise socialfield a in terms of a 'machinicassemblage' a 'collective and assemblage enunof ciation'(D&G 1987: 88).In additionto bodies theactions passions and and affecting thosebodies(the'machinicassemblage', example, body of for the the accused the body of the prison),thereis a set of incorporeal or transformationscurrent in a given societythat are attributed to the bodiesof that society(for example, transformation the accused the of into a convict by the judge'ssentence) (D&G 1987:cf. 8l). We can view the incorporeal effectsof statesof affairs in terms of either the 'order-words' that designate fixed relations between statementsand the incorporeal transformations they express,or the deterritorialisingplay of carroll's Alice in (1865).ln TheLogic of Sense,Deleuze Wond,erland, describes actor or the stoic sage someone as ableto evokean instantwith a taut intensityexpressiveof an unlimited future and past,and therebyembodythe incorporeal effects a stateof affairsratherthan merelyits spatio-temporal of actualisation (D 1990:147).Suchactorsdo more than merelyportray a character's hopesor regrets;they attemptto 'represent'a pure instantat thc point at whichit divides into futurcandpast,thuscmbodying thcir performirncc in an intintittiontlf'virtual rclations bcyondthoscirctunliscd thc situirtion in

one wills portrayed.If one wills to be just in the mannerof a Stoic sage, been not the repetitionof pastactsof justice,but a justicethat hasalways effectof justicethat is nevermadefully and hasyet to be - the incorporeal manifestin any concretesituation.When the incorporealeffectsof sense and terarereducedto order-words,we ignore the pure becomingsof sense ritorialise the infinite variability of meaning into stale repetitions of the past. When we allow the variablesof corporealbodiesand eventsof sense to to be placedinto constantvariation, evenorder-wordsbecomea passage pushes the limit. The movementof new connectionsamongthesevariables (D&G becoming-other to language its limits and bodiesto a metamorphic 1987: 108). Connective Becoming

INDIVIDUATION Constantin V Bound,as Deleuze'sconceptof individuation' is a geneticaccountof individuals. the from a critique of hylomorphismthat exposes The conceptemerges specifierror in thinking of an individual asthe end point of a progressive cationof the species. Substitutingthe imageof 'the mould' for a processthe friendly idea of modulation,this critique alsorepudiates idea that an his individual is mouldedin a specificway.As he develops theory of indimade by Gottfried viduation, Deleuzeborrows and transformsanalyses Wilhelm von Leibniz and Gilbert Simondon. of theory of individuation addresses in the process virtual, Deleuze's continuous(intensive)multiplicities becoming(extended)discrete- the of apparentlycontradictory co-existence the continuum and the discrete. The processof individuation is called 'differentiation' with respectto the continuum, and 'differenciation' with respectto the discrete. Given that Deleuze'sconcept of becoming is basedon the co-imbrication of the of virtual real and the actualreal,the conception the virtual is in terms of Meanwhile,the and intensities. flow of events, singularities a differentiated realm of bodies,their mixtures, actualis understoodasthe differenciated of and states affairs.Actualisationdoesnot meanthe deathof the virtual. a ontologygenerates robusttheoryof individuationthat Hence,Deleuze's aroundnot iust the non-fixityof dcvelopcd sustains crcativccvolution a as spccics tlrrttof inclividuirls wcll. but

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For the elaboration his theory,Deleuzeappeals Leibniz - first, to of to Leibniz'sconcepts, eachof which corresponds an individual;second, to to the Leibnizian method of vice-dictionthat understands individual as an the product of the law of a seriesand the internal differencethat distinguishesone moment of its becoming from another. Ultimately, though, Deleuze movesbeyond Leibniz's theory of individuation because the of latter's relianceon a priori harmony the compossibilityof the series,and the bestpossible world. Finding fresh inspiration in Simondon's theory of individuation Deleuzeconsiders of 'modulation'(instead the mould of the old imageof (virtual/real) systems thought) as the process which metastable by explicatethe potentialenergyimplicatedwithin them. Populated singularby ities and eventsthesesystems bring about new (acual/real) metastable in systems the process their explication.Their metastability due to of is the fact that the virtual does not consist only of elementsand flows differentiatedfrom one another.Rather the differentiatedvirtual is differenceitself - differencedifferenciating itself. The modulatingprocess of (Simondon's individuationis the transduction term) of the virtual continuum of intensitiesto the discreteextendedactual,all the while remembering that the actual is never totally devoid of the dynamism of the pre-individual virtual. Thus, the actual is capableof being reabsorbed by the virtual. Intensity is what makes the passage from the virtual to the actual possible.The modulation is in a stateof permanentvariation- a promiseof becomings disallowingpredictionsof what an individuation is capable of Individuals are not subjects.Deleuze understands'haecceities'as of degrees intensity (a degreeof heat,a certaintime of the day) that, in combinationwith other degrees intensity,bring aboutindividuals.The of individuals they bring about retain the anonymityof the pre-individual realm.First, haecceities consistentirelyof movement and rest (longitude) non-formedmolecules between and particles. Second, they havethe capacity to affect and be affected(latitude). As in Baruch Spinoza'sessences, haecceities co-exist on a plane of consistency, eachone of which is compossiblewith, and responsible the generationof the others.In otder to for, accentuatetheir impersonality,Deleuze arguesthat we need a new languageby which to refer to them, one that consistsof proper names,verbs in the infinitive,and indefinitearticlesand pronouns. l Connectives Actuality y'| I )if}'crcntiatiorr)iff'crcnciltion

Leibniz Virtual/Virtuality

INTENSITY Corustantin V Boundas philosophical project: it manifests 'Intensity' is a key notion in Deleuze's and creative itself asthe intensive virtual of his ontology;asthe affirmative theory;as the desireof his ethicsand politics;asthe affectof his aesthetic empirimotivationfor his methodological decision opt for transcendental to (different/ciation). cism;and asthe guarantor a theoryof difference of Deleuze's ontology of becoming denouncesthe error we commit when we think exclusivelyin terms of things and their qualities,because by privileging extensionand extendedmagnitudeswe bypassthe intenillusion). In an ontology of sive genesis the extended(transcendental of forces like Deleuze's. force refers to the relation between forces. Forces are experiencedonly through the results they render; and the results of forcefields are extensive and qualitative. Transcendental empiricism, being therefore,demandsthat the intensitiesthat constitutean extensive It be sensed the famousDeleuzian'sentiend,um'. needsto be noted that this sensingcannot be achievedthrough the ordinary exerciseof our sensibility.Intensity can be remembered,imagined, thought and said. Intensitiesarenot entities,they are virtual yet real eventswhosemode of in existence to actualise is themselves statesof affairs. The following caveatsthat punctuate Deleuze's writings must be heeded.First, a virtual intensity existsnowhereelsebut in the extended that it constitutes. Despitethe fact that it is not identicalwith the extended, a virtual intensity does not entail ontological separation.Second,the imperativesthat help us grasp intensity no longer circumscribe the of deontology pure reason of alone;they enlarge scope this deontology the so that it encompasses faculties: from sensibility, to memory, and to all thought. Nevertheless, encounterof intensity - being the taskof sensthe - is the first necessary in the interactionof all facultiesstriving ibility link virtual within thought.Third, intensityis not to generate differentiated the or out false anldea/paradigm for particular instantiations for screening pretenders. Intensity is a singularity capable generatingactual cases, of none of which will evercometo resemble it. that is not conDcleuze's ontologyis built arounda notion of difference trincclin thc 'from' of thc 'x is differentfrom y', bnt rather he aimsat l)clcuzc givcs wcight to intcnsity ditl'crcnccin itsclf. (,onscrlucntly,

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because unlike extendedmagnitudeswhose partesextra, pertespermit their division without any correspondingchangein their nature, intensities cannot be subdividedwithout a correspondingchangein their nature. Therefore,intensities incommensurable their (distance' are and from one another makeseachone of them a veritable differencein itself. Intensive magnitudesdo not add up; insteadthey average. Placedin the context of the two sides the Deleuzian of ontology- the virtual and the actual- intensitiescatalyse actualisation the ofthe virtual, generating extension, linear, successive time, extendedbodies and their qualities. The relation of reversibilitythat obtainsbetween virtual and actualguarantees the intensitieswill not suffer the fate of negentropicdeath. The role of intensity in Deleuze'sethics, politics and aesthetics also is pivotal. Deleuze'sethics revolvesaround two axes.The first is the Stoic/ Nietzschean imperativethat we become worthy of the virtual event.The second the Spinozist is admonition live a life of joy andto multiply powerto enhancing'good encounters'. The ethicsofjoy and the preference good for encounters increasing powercouldbelongto a'feel good',self-help our type of psychology it werenot for the intensityof the virtual.Becoming if worthy ofthe event,however, requiresthe ascesis ofthe counter-actualisation ofthe accidents that fill our lives,and asa result, our participationin the intensive, virtual event.Similarly,Deleuze's politicswould be a banalcelebration of multitudes, it werenot for the fact that the multipleis not the same 'the if as many'. In the counter-actualisation the revolutionthat befallsus, the of revolution that never comesand yet never ceases passis graspedas the to untimely, virtual, intensive event; the affirmation of which renders us worthy of our fate. Finally, when in his aesthetics Deleuzesubstitutessensation for form, intensity is what is given priority. What the artist aims towardsis indeedsensation. Sensation intimatelyrelatedto the intensity is of the forcesthat it doesnot represent. Sensation the affect,which is is neithersubjective objective; nor ratherit is both at once:we become senin sationand at the same time something happens because it. of

INTUITION CliffStagoll Deleuzeuses conceptof intuition' in two distinct ways.In someof his the which he co-authoredwith later works (for example,What is Philosophy?, Guattari), it refers to one of the elementsof a plane of immanence. definethe pointsof intensityon a plane,intuition refers Whereas concepts as to movements upon it. As such, intuitions can be considered ideasor even 'lines of thinking' in a general sense,immanent to a particular problemand the circumstances its consideration. of Deleuze usesintuition to refer to a kind of More frequently, though, philosophical method borrowed from Henri Bergson. This is not to suggestthat Deleuzechampionsany particular philosophicaltechnique. of He would oppose consistent adoptionof a methodbecause the tendency for anysingleapproach limit perspectives a problemand soto hinder to on refer to method, he often creativethinking. However,when Deleuzed,oes meansa modified version of Bergson'sphilosophicalintuition (intuition philosophique). According to Bergson, evolution has resulted in the human mind and make consequent becomingable to conduct rational investigations pertainingto the worldsof science practice. and The mind is not decisions inquiriesinto the dynamics of so well adapted conductingmetaphysical to one's life. Indeed, for Bergson,efforts to turn our analyticalintellect to philosophical problemsresult inevitablyin our considering lived reality in terms of somestatic,materialimageupon which we'gazd and which we then theoriseabstractly. For Bergson,our lived reality comprisesa flow of consciousstates. is temporal:ongoingmental activity constitutConsciousness essentially ing the kind of time internal to one'sself.The continuity and persistence and its particularity definesour of this flow makesup our personhood, mind to lived, conscious experiindividuality.Oncewe turn our analytical instantsand ence,however,we tend to think insteadin terms of successive precisionis lost because imagessituatedin space. such, philosophical As reality is no longertheorised its own terms. on methodthat Bergson champions avoidthe to Intuition is the philosophical He analytical mind's tendencyto abstraction. arguesthat one must enter into an experience directly, asto'coincide' and'sympathise'withit. The so rranner in which one achieves this, though, is notoriously difficult to as commentaries. Someclcscribe, with as manycharacterisations scholarly and or timcs llcrgsondigns intuition with artisticsensibility awareness, a it At hc dctlchmcntlrom rcrrlity. othcr tinrcs lssociatcs with purcinstinct.

Connectives Differentiation/Differenciation Nietzsche Spinoza Transcendental empiricism

INTERIORITY : rcf'cr thc cntryon 'cxrcrioritv/intcrioritv'. to

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FRANz ( r 88: - r 924)

r35

On Deleuze's interpretation,intuition is somewhat lessmysterious but no less problematic.He conceives intuition as a deliberatereflective of awareness willed selfconsciousness) or a concentrated direct attention and to the operationsof consciousness contrastwith mediated'observa(in tions of'consciousness consciousness a quest for transparency by in of thoughtto itself).This depictionalignswith Bergson's account the intuof ition of consciousness the attentionthat mind givesitself,continuingits as normal functionsyet somehow discerningsimultaneously natureof its the workings.If our naturaltendencyis to graspthingsin terms of space and quantity,such an effort must be extremelydifficult to achieve. (Deleuze and Bergsonboth suggest varioustimesthat intuition hasno limits, and at can take us beyond the human condition to 'sympathise'and 'coincide' with animals andeveninanimate objects, the means doing soremain but of mysterious.) Deleuzeis particularlyattractedto intuition because desireto move his from experience the contingentconditions of experience order to to in rediscover differencedemandsa meansfor accessing particularityof the consciousness without metaphysical illusions.If he wereto consider reality in termsof concepts supposed makeit (or experience it) possible, to of then he would substituteone kind of abstraction another.Deleuzeinstead for needsto dissociate aspects the whole that is called 'I' accordingto of natural articulations, and to graspconscious and materialaspects life of without recourseto abstract or general concepts.Bergson'sintuition enableshim to achievethis by creating conceptsaccordingto natural articulationsof experience. From the lived reality of a flow of consciousness,Deleuze'sintuition revealssuch articulationsas memory,faculties, dreams,wishes,jokes, perceptionsand calculations. such, Deleuze As maintainsthat there is a resemblance betweenintuition as a method for division and asa meansfor transcendental analysis. Interestingly, Bergson sometimes seems hold morereservations to about the precision and generalapplicability of intuition than Deleuze. He remindshis readers that to express language resultsof an intuitive in the study of consciousness to conceptualise is and symbolise,'andthus to abstract. he means Yet intuition to be freefrom formalconceptual symand bolic constraints. Accordingly, communicate to aboutintuition, he argues that we shouldusemetaphorand suggestiveness point towardswhat is to otherwiseinexpressible. Deleuzeexpresses such reservations few overtly, althoughhis language hints at his havingfollowed use Bergson's suggestion. Connective Ilcrgson

KAFKA, FRANZ (1883-1924) John Marks In KaJba: Towarda Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari seekto overcritical wisdomon Franz Kafka'swork by preturn much of the received in sentinghim asa joyful and comic writer, who is positivelyengaged the world. Kafka was,Deleuzeand Guattari claim, irritated when peoplesaw him asa writer of intimacy'.In Deleuzeand Guattari'shandshe becomes a politicalauthor,and the prophetof a future world. It would, they claim, to life to be grotesque oppose and writing in Kafka. Kafka seeks graspthe from it, and if he is fixated on an world rather than extract impressions notionsof liberty. ratherthan abstract problem,it is that of escape essential is in Kafka'swork, for example, The tendency towardsdeterritorialisation evidentin his useof animalsin his short stories. Ratherthan interpretation sayingthat this meansthat - Deleuzeand Guattaripreferto look at what they call 'Kafka politics','Kafka machines' of Many interpretations Kafka haveconcenand 'Kafka experimentation'. whilst othershave relatingto religionand psychoanalysis, tratedon themes his of seenin Kafka'swork the expression his own acutehuman suffering: cuur.In contrastto this, Deleuzeand Guattari a work becomes tragiccri d,e fear, or three passions intensities: show how the Kafka machinegenerates of it ln flight and dismantling. TheTrial (1925) is lessa question presenting of law, and an imageof a transcendental unknowable andmorea question an of investigation the functioning of a machine.In contrastto the psychoanalyticalapproach,which reducesKafka's particularly intenseattachment with his own father, to the world to a neuroticsymptomof his relationship with writing and obsession they showhow Kafka'sinaptitudefor marriage solitarynature- his Kafka'sapparently havepositivelibidinal motiyations. of existence an unmarriedwriter - shouldnot be viewedas evidence a as of withdrawalinto an ivory tower - but rather one component a 'bachelor with the socialfield, and This machinehasmultiple connections machine'. than that is muchmoreintense to allows bachelor existin a stateof desire the desire.Kafka's or psychoanalytic of incestuous homosexual categories the strategyin 'Letter to his Father'is to inflatethe fatherfigureto absurdand so comicproportions, that he coversthe map of the world. The effectis to a providcr wily out of thc psychoanalytical impasse, linc of flight awayfrom into thc wrlrkl:iI llcw scto1'conncctitlns, thc fhthcrirncl

136

KAFKA,

FRANZ

( r 88: - t g z 4 )

KANr, IMMANUEL (rZz4-r8o4) Connectives Desire Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Intensity Lines of flight Minoritarian Psychoanalysis Rhizome

137

The book on Kafka constitutesDeleuzeand Guattari's most detailed readingof literatureasmachine. They claim that Kafka'swork is a rhizome or a burrow,in which no entranceis more privilegedthan another.They alsoclaim that the Kafka-machine, composed it is of letters,stories as and novels,movesin the direction of the unlimited rather than the fragmentary.Kafka'sceuvre completeyet heterogeneous: is constructed is it from components that do not connectbut are alwaysin communicationwith each other. The Kafka machine is, paradoxically one of continuous contiguity. Such a machinic reading of Kafka is called for by Kafka's own approach, which goes against representation, allegory, symbolism and metaphor. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show how he works with the components reality: objects,characters of and events.The evolution of Kafka's work is towards a sober 'hyper-realism'that dispenseswith impressions imaginings. and Ratherthan metaphor, Kafka'shyper-reality constructsan immanentassemblage metamorphosis, continuum of of a reversible intensities. For Deleuzeand Guattari,Kafka'swork is a'minor'literature par excellence. minor literature'deterritorialises'language provides intimA and an ate and immediateconnectionbetween individual and the political.It the is also a form of literature in which everyrhing is expressed collective in terms and everything takes on a collective value. In short, there is no subjectin a minor literature, only collective assemblages enunciation. of In a 'major' literature there are forms of individuated enunciation' that belongto literary masters, and individual concerns abound.Minor literature can afford no such luxuries, since it is born out of necessityin restricted conditions. Since major literature is essentiallyrepresentational in orientation,it moves from contentto expression, whereas minor a literatureexpresses itself out of absolute necessity only later concepand tualises itself. Expression breaks establishedforms and encourages new directions.This commitment to expression evidentin Kafka's interis est in 'musical' soundsthat escape any form of signification,composition or song. Deleuzeand Guattari repeatedly emphasise fact that Kafka's solithe tude giveshim an acutelypolitical,and evenprophetic,vision. Kafka the perceivesthe 'diabolical powers of the future' bachelor-machine Americancapitalism, Sovietbureaucracy European and Fascism that are knockingon the door of his study.The literary machine enables vision this because functionsnot like a mirror of the world, but rather like a watch it that is running fast. The tendencyof Kafka's work towardsproliferation opensup a field of immanence takes social that his and politicalanalysis out of thc domainof the actual and into the virrual.

KANT, TMMANUEL (1724-1804) Alison Ross Immanuel Kant's critical philosophymarks a turning point in modern the thought. Kant distinguishes 'critical' inquiry he conductsinto reason from the 'fanaticism'that afflicts the 'dogmatic' philosophyof his competiwhat it is posof tors.Againstboth the excesses rationalism- which confuses to sibleto think with what it is possible know- and empiricism,which scuttle the possibility of systematicknowledgealtogether,Kant's self-described followsa language 'moderation'. of revolutionin philosophy Copernican of Kantian philosophy on two Deleuze rejects the self-conception influences the history of in fronts: first, as his own pantheonof selected philosophyindicates, practiceof philosophyunderminesKant's claim his rationalismand empiricismto history; second,he disto haveconsigned putes the style of Kant's philosophyin which thinking is guided by the The centraltaskof Kantian phimoderating influence 'commonsense'. of losophy is the 'critique' of the faculties of the subject. For Deleuze, Kantian 'critique' does not extend to the orientating moral valuesof the Kantian philosophy,and it is Friedrich Nietzsche'spursuit of the critique againstmoral idealsthat makeshim, in Deleuze'seyes,the truly critical philosopher.At the same time that Deleuze rejects the false limits on that Kant places 'critique' he alsoadaptsthe Kantian project of a crifacultiesof the subjectfor his own proiectof 'transcendental tique of the empiricism'. in Kant's importancefor Deleuzecanbe described terms of the way he of altersKant's language the 'faculties'to caterfor the primacy of affect. of revisionof the language the 'faculties'callsinto questionthe Deleuze's to dualiststructureof Kant's thought according which a iuridical concepthc rcgulatcs ficld ofexperience. tion of rcason

138

KA N T , T M M AN U E L

( r7 24-

r 8o4)

KANr ,

I M M ANUEL

( t lz+- r 8o4)

139

In Kantian philosophythe subjectoccupies positionof an interface the between natureand experience. The subiect's categories understanding of constitute organising the structurefor sensation form the conditionof and possibilityfor experience. Accordingto Kant, the coherence form of and experience the work of the mind rather than the 'givens'of sensible are experience. Further,the conditionof possibilityfor thecognition objects of is the mind's own activity.Hence Kant's famousdictum that'the conditions of the possibilityof experience generalare alsothe conditionsof in the possibilityof the objectsof experience.' if Kant viewsexperience But as a compoundof the dataof impressions and what our faculty of knowledgesuppliesitself, he alsoconceives the task of philosophyas a criof tique of the categoriesthat redeem experiencefrom the irreducible particularity of sensible perceptions. The adjunct of this critique is the revivalof the pursuit of knowledge outsideof sensibilityand the field of possible experience, critical philosophyaimsto secure ground of this the extensionby its investigationinto the faculty of reason.In stark contrasr, Deleuzeusesthe language the facultiesto demolishthe positionof the of subjectas the pivot between natureand experience to overturn philand osophy'srole as a court that adjudicates the proper limits of reason. on Instead of a subject with predeterminedfacultiesordering the field of experience, Deleuzeusesthe language the faculties describe regisof to a ter of affect. The Deleuzian force of affect drives the facultiesconstantly to surpass their accepted limits. This is a transcendental projectbecause, like Kant, Deleuzethinks that philosophyshouldcreateconcepts that do not merely trace the 'givens' of sensible experience. Although Deleuze's transcendental empiricism adapts elementsof Kant's thought, specifically conceptionof the faculties,it doesso in his order to critique the implacable dualism of Kantian philosophy. Kant's first two critiques establish division berween a freedomand the sensible world. In the critique of PureReason, taskof critical philosophyis to the restrainreasonfrom the illusory usethat consists confusingwhat it is in possible think with what may be known according the sensible to to conditions of thought (K 1996:8). The risk of sucha confusionof ideasand objectsof possibleexperienceis that a fabrication of reasonmay be confusedfor somethingthat existsin the domainof experience. The critique of PracticalRea'son)onthe other hand,locates dangerin the influenceon a moral action of circumstance. Here the sensible world and the subject's feelingsdo not provide a necessary orientation for ideas of reason,so much asthreatento leadit astray. Accordingly, formalismof the moral the law guardsthe possibility of a moral acrion in the world of sensibility, clcliningsuch irction:rs r strict adhcrcncc thc principlcsof rcas<ln. to

Whether it is reason's tendencyto fanaticism- an error that follows the hubris of limitlessness or the claim circumstances make upon it and constrainit under a falselimitation, critical restraintin either case follows a juridical model. Kant's textsreinforcethe sense renunciation of desires of errant of or speculation in the recurrent references 'the court of reason'which to legislates proper use and safeextensionof reason's the ideas.Hence the by 'revolution' that proceeds pleasfor moderation is fought on two fronts: againstthe illusionsof a reason'independent all experience', well as of as againstthe claim of circumstance action.The final work of the critical on trilogy, the CritiqueofJudgement, tries to mediatethis split betweenexperienceand freedomthrough the faculty of judgement.It is in this work that Kant's positive influence over Deleuze is strongest.In Deleuze and Guattari'sWhatis Philosophy? arguethat Kant's final Critique marks they a significant departure from the termsof the first and second Critiques:the Critique is'. ofJudgement . . an unrestrained work of old agewhich [Kant's] successors havestill not caughtup with: all the mind's facultiesovercome their limits, the very limits that Kant had so carefully laid down in the worksof his prime' (D&G 1994:2). The juridical conceptionof the facultiesand the legislative role it gives philosophy establish limits of reason to the unravels, according Deleuze, to in Kant's conceptionof the sublime.It is important to point out that Deleuze'sreadingof Kant's appendixon the sublimeis an idiosyncratic account. Within Kant's thought the sublime is used to confirm the subject's facultyof reason that which surpasses naturalform, and is as any arguablythe jewelof Kant's metaphysics. Arguing againstKant's attempt to confine the faculties to their proper limits - to their nth power Deleuze's accountof this appendixargues that in the caseof the sublime the facultiesenter into unregulatedrelationsand this is what drives the (see 1983, 1984, faculties D D and D 1994). Aside from these points of direct influence over Deleuze's project, Kant's position within Deleuze'stopography of philosophersis highly unusual. Deleuze describeshis Kant book as an attempt to know his 'enemy'and this book is the only book that Deleuzedevotesto a thinker who is not part of his pantheon of selectedinfluences.Kant's peculiar position needsto be seenas a consequence Deleuze'sdescription of of his own proiect as 'transcendental empiricism'. Deleuze returns to the very rationalist and empiricist thinkers that Kant believedhis critical philosophyhad consignedto the past.Deleuze'sreturn, however, conis cluctcdthrough thc Kantian language 'faculties'and 'transcendental' of thinking.

140 Connectives

KLEE, eAUL (t8lg-rg+o)

LAcAN, JACeuEs (r9or-8t)

l+l

Desire Transcendental empiricism

KLEE, PAUL (1879-1940) refer ro the entrieson .art, and ,utopia'. -

LACAN, JACqUES (1901-81 ) Alison Ross Lacan wasa French psychoanalyst most famousfor his structuralJacques ist interpretationof Freudian psychoanalysis. Despite his ,structuralist' famehis work canbedividedinto manydifferentphases, includingan early fascination with surrealismand the avant-garde, interestin the 1950s an and 1960s with saussurian linguisticsand srructuralism, well ashis late as preoccupation with Borromeanknots and his attemptto mathematise his ideas.It is only in this final 'phase'that Lacanposes the first time the for questionof what the hitherto distinct elementsof the system,reallimaginarylsymbolic (RSI) havein common. Deleuze's relationshipwith Lacan is complex. There are placesin Deleuze's oeuvre, suchashis essay Leopoldvon sacher-Masoch, on which demonstrate experr familiarity with the labyrinthinedetail of Lacanian psychoanalysis. Despite rhis essay's critique of the Freudiancategoryof 'sado-masochism', Deleuzeuseselements Lacanianpsychoanalysis of as an operative framework for his own analysisof 'masochism'.similarly, in the two volumes of capitalisrn and,schizophrenia,Lacan is occasionally a target of the authors' anti-psychiatric polemics,but he can alsobe cited as an influenceon their own attempt to liberatedesirefrom its oedipal ordering in classical, Freudianpsychoanalysis. this respectthe imporIn tant features of Lacan's thought include his uneven verdicts on the differentlayersof the subject(RSI) and his interestin psychoticspeech. on the other hand,Lacanianpsychoanalysis givesa superbillustration of thc gcncralcomplaintirgainst psychoanaly in Anti-oerlipus, sis conccrning rhc crrorsrrf'clcsirc. Lacirn cxcnrplifics 'crror' thrt clcsirc ,lirck'. thc is

For Lacan desireis the product of the split betweendemandand need. Demandis the alienation 'need'in language. is the failureof language of It (demand) an adequately represent to 'need'that produces impotentdesire figuredaround'lack'.Although Deleuzeand Guattaricriticise'lack'as one of the errors of desire they applaud the fact that desire is continuous in Lacan, despitecontestingthe way it earnsthis statusonly on accountof its definitionasa 'lack' regulated the law of the symbolic. by The complexityof Lacan'splacein the thoughtof Deleuzeand Guattari and explanatory can be described relation to the genesis in scopeof their conceptof the Body without Organs (BwO). In psychoanalytic doctrine in the development the individual is described the normativeterms of a of gradual shift awayfrom the polymorphous perversity of the infant's body zonesin an to the hierarchical orderingor codingof the body'serogenous (such as kissing)to endascending scalefrom pathwaysof fore-pleasure (genital). pleasure Accordingto this model,the subjectand its sexual identity arenot given,but theseemerge orderingthe drivesthat arein turn by regulatedby Oedipal relations.In the paper Lacan wrote on the 'mirror stage',this processis describedas the movementfrom organswithout a clearly defined senseof a body, to the (tenuous and fictional) hold of socio-sexual identity. (organs of In contrastto the without a body' that precedes process the acquisition socio-sexual identity in Lacan,the BwQ a trm that Deleuze of the and Guattari take from Antonin Artaud, is deployedto denaturalise process development Against the codingof of definedby psychoanalysis. of the body'spartsaccording 'natural' functionsand the conception the to this organismas a functioning hierarchyof parts on which it depends, conceptaims to explain and to maximisepossibleconnectionsbetweenthe differentparts of the body and its 'outside'.In particular,the authorsuse in this conceptto de-Oedipalise descriptionof such connections clasthe psychoanalysis. in sical Instead of framing breast-feeding terms of a primary anacliticrelationshipbetween mother and infant that will needto identificationwith the authority of the father, be brokenby the secondary this connectionis described an assemblage desirein which 'mouth' as of and 'breast'replace terms'infant' and 'mother'. Despitethe genesis the of a this concept in Anti-Oedipusin a polemic against psychoanalysis, strain tegicalliance with aspects Lacaniantheorycanbe discerned their use of of this concept. (the Accordingto Lacanthe infant'sstateof physiological fragmentation real)is sealed Here into an illusory formation of unity in the mirror stage. thc child foundsits sense integratedidentity through a visual percepof it of fragmentation of unity thrrtdivides from its 'real'state physiological 'l'his pcrccptionof unity, dcsignrrtcd Lacrrnirs thc 'imlginary', by tion.

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J EA N -B Ap rrs rE

(r744-t8zg)

LErBNrz) corrFRIED

wILHELM voN (r7 44-t8zg)

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establishes basisof socio-sexual the identity asa unity. This unity is paradoxicalhowever, giventhat the agencyof its unity is external.For Lacan, unity only becomes functionalwhen the subjectrelinquishes relation its with the (M)Other in order ro occupya placein the symbolicorder as a speaking subject.The primary sense unity developed the subjectin of by the mirror stage, dividedin the subjecr's is secondary identification with the Law of the Father.Deleuzeand Guattari disengage oedipal narrative the that regulates organisation socio-sexual the of unity in psychoanalysis. Yet in many respects Lacanis an ambiguous resourcefor the hold of the organisedBwo is described him asrenuous. is alsointeresring norethar by It to Lacan occasionally sideswith the imaginaryfield of connections prior to symboliclaw and sometimes emphasises unsurpassable the forceof the real in psychiclife. Thus, despitethe limitationsof his framework, work of the Lacan differs from his precursorsin classical psychoanalysis that he proin poses porousrelationbetween body and its 'outside'. a the Connectives Desire Freud

LAMARCK, JEAN-BAPTISTE 'creativetransformationt.

(1744-1829) refer to the enrry on -

LEIBNIZ,

GOTTFRIED

WILHELM

VON (1646_1716\

Brett Nicholls Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is drawn into Deleuze's engagement with the history of philosophy with a book length study,TheFrjld: Leibniz and, the Baroque, and he is presentat strategicmomentsin Deleuze,s wider thinking. ln The Fold Deleuze reinvigorates Leibniz's concept of the monad with the notion that the world is 'a pure emission singularities' of (D 1993a:60).Leibniz insistedin Monad,ology (written 1714,published 1867)that the universeconsists discreteentities:monads. of Monads are simple substances, indivisible and indestructible. with no windows through which anythingcanpass. The world that we inhabitis constituted by monadsthat convcrgcin serics. And, for I_,eibniz, varying scricsconvcrgciu ir hrrrnonious unity thrrtis prccstirblishcd G<td. by

Existencefor Leibniz and Deleuzebursts forth in its variousforms from This plane can be understoodas the inexone plane of singularities. totality of monadsthat provide the substance haustibleand unknowable and objectsin their multifariousmannersemerge'It from which subjects Leibniz to to would not be remiss,however, saythat Deleuzeseeks rescue as substance immaterial.For Leibniz ultimatelyconsidered from idealism. is of Deleuzethe 'pure emission singularities' an organicfield of life forces. 109),in His interestis in what he callsan'animal monadology'(D 1993a: is lessopposedto the alter ego (as in Edmund which the 'animal in me' that monads, of and Husserlt1859-1938]) rather,an aggregate vital forces, or areorganised folded in variousways. upon as The conceptof the fold, expounded it is via Leibniz'sinsistence Deleuzeto think the order of things in waysnot enables one substance, determinedby dualism.The distinction betweenthe mind and the body, is for instance, producedby a kind of matter that hasthe capacityto fold Matter outsidethe mind doesnot perin upon itself in order to perceive. the relationof an inner and outer world into being. Enfoldingbrings ceive. matter, an interior that doesnot Unlike the body, the mind is enclosed as can responddirectlyto the outsideworld. This enclosure be understood a form of theatre,one in which thinking, imaginingand reflectingoccur. Deleuzelinks the form of this theatre to baroquearchitecture,art and 33). as'Fold afterfold'(D 1993a: music,which he admires The subject emergesin Deleuze's work upon Leibniz not as an but an attribute of substance, essence, as a point upon which seriescon(pure is emissionof singularities' thus the universeas verge.At one level, a limited point but in reflected everyindividual asa virtual predicate, with in of view (D 1993a:53). An identity emerges and through the converThis meansthat the subject is detergenceof a seriesof singularities. than determining, and for Leibniz, writing within a mined rather the Christiancosmology, stabilityof the determinedsubiectis guaranteed (1890).He held by God. This position is outlined in Leibniz's Theodicy of that the subjectis determinedin the convergence what he callsa 'comby that is bound by the samelaw,governed the possible world'. Any series world. It is not posprinciple of non-contradiction,belongsto the same sible,in this view, for Adam to be both a sinner and not a sinner in the sameworld. And while we can imagine other realities' say a world in which Adam is not a sinner,the principle of sufficientreasoneffectively world. Leibniz thus guarantees that this and not that is the best possible claimedto havearrived at a solution to the problem of evil; other worlds would simply be incompossible. of of the signals impossibility thc co-existence worlds Incompossibility in I )clcuzc,htlwcvcr, all of thrrtdivcrgcfrom thc hw of'non-contrrdiction.

r4+

L 6 v rN A S,

EMMA N U EL

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LIN E S

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his engagements with Leibniz, goesto work upon this solutionand alters the trajectoryof Leibniz'sthought.He proposes that incompossibility a is conditionof compossibility. Ratherthan governed the metaphysical by law of non-contradiction, world is multiple and the subjectcanbe defined the in relation to foldable, polychronic temporalities, where incompossibles and compossibles co-exist.we might think, therefore,of the divergence of series asnegationor oppositionbut aspossibility. not This emphasisupon divergenceas possibility is sustainedin Dffirence andRepetition 1994:123) (D whereDeleuzereadsagainst Leibniz'sinsistenceupon compossibility with the notion that'basic series divergent' are sincethey are (constanrly displacedwithin . . . chaos'.rn TheLogicofsense (D 1990:109-17),incompossibility becomes ground for the overlapthe ping of senseand non-sense. And in Cinema2: The TimeImage(D 1989: 130-l), Leibniz figuresas a thinker who has unwittingly openedup the problemof time and truth. In eachof theseworks,DeleuzedrawsLeibniz into his rejectionof dualismand his critique of the order of things.He is concernedwith pushing Leibniz beyond the limits of the principle of sufficientreasonto affirm that incompossibles belongto the sameworld. Living involves,after Deleuze'sLeibniz, not the relation of truth and falsity but the affirmarion of possibilities,the work of unfoldins and folding compossible incompossible and series. Connectives Fold Force Substance

LEVINAS, EMMANUEL and 'phenomenology'.

(1906-95) referto rheentrieson ,ontology' -

LINES OF FLIGHT Tamsin Lorraine ThroughoutA Thousand Plateaus,Deleuze Guattaridevelop vocabuand a lary that emphasises how things connectrather than how they ,are',and tendencics that could evolvein creative mutations ratherthan a 'rcality' thlt is an invcrsion.of'thc pllst.IJc lncl(iuattrriprcf'cr to consiclcr thirrgs

or not as substances, asassemblages multiplicities,focusingon things but in terms of unfolding forces- bodiesand their powersto affectand be A affected ratherthan staticessences. 'line of flight' is a path of mutation precipitatedthrough the actualisation connections among bodiesthat of new powersin the werepreviously only implicit (or'virtual') that releases capacities thosebodiesto aq and respond. of Every assemblage territorial in that it sustains is connections that define is of it, but everyassemblage also composed lines of deterritorialisation that run through it and carry it awayfrom its current form (D&G 1987: in assemblages terms of three 503+). Deleuze and Guattari characterise kinds of lines that inform their interactionswith the world. There is the 'molar line' that forms a binary, arborescentsystem of segments,the and 'molecularline'that is morefluid althoughstill segmentary, the line of While the supple flight that rupturesthe other two lines(D&G 1987:205). that of by segmentarity the molecularline operates deterritorialisations may permit reterritorialisations that turn backinto rigid lines,the line of and of flight can evolveinto creativemetamorphoses the assemblage the it In assemblages affects. what they admit is a 'summary' example(since they suggest into oneanother), that the threelinesco-existand canchange the the Roman Empire could be said to exemplify rigid segmentarity; migrant barbarians who come and go acrossfrontiers pillaging, but also into indigenous communities, reterritorialising integratingthemselves by who escape such all supplesegmentarity; and the nomadsof the steppes everywhere they go,a line of territorialisation and sow deterritorialisation flight (D&G 1987 222-3). : (for of On the one hand an assemblage example,an assemblage the book, assemblage' actions, A Thousand, Plateous, and a reader)is a 'machinic of passions bodiesreactingto one another(paper,print, binding, words, and feelingsand the turning of pages).On the other hand it is a 'collective and incorporealtransformations assemblage enunciation',of statements of (the meaningof the book'swords emerges a reading in attributed to bodies extant in the social assemblage terms of the implicit presuppositions in (D&G 1987: in field concerningpragmaticvariables the useof language) producevariouseffectsin 88). Both aspects ofthe book-readerassemblage (for the of their engagement with other assemblages example, assemblage of bookand handripping out pages feeda fire or the assemblage a reader to pluggedinto aesthetic inspired by the notion of 'becomingassemblages imperceptible' createa work of art). Deleuzeand Guattari deliberately to designedA Thousand. Plateausto foster lines of flight in thinking thought-movements that would creativelyevolvein connectionwith the producing new waysof thinklincsof flightof othcr thought-movcmcnts, of into thc rccognisitblc ing rathcr thnn tcrritorirrlising [4r(x)vcs what

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for thought. Interpretations, accordingto Deleuze 'passes' philosophical and Guattari,tracealready patternsof meaning;mapspursue established connections lines of flight not readily perceptibleto the majoritarian or subjectsof dominant reality.Deleuzeand Guattari wrote their book as sucha map,hoping to elicit further maps,rather than interpretations,from their readers. Although Deleuzeand Guattari clearly value lines of flight that can connectwith other linesin creatively productivewaysthat leadto enlivening transformationsof the social field, they also caution againsttheir dangers.A line of flight can becomeineffectual,lead to regressivetransformations, and evenreconstruct (D&G 1987:205). highly rigid segments And evenif it manages crossthe wall and getout of the blackhole,it can to presentthe dangerof becoming more than a line of destruction(D&G no 1987:229).Deleuzeand Guattari advocate extending lines of flight to rhe point where they bring variablesof machinic assemblages continuity into with assemblages enunciation, of transformingsociallife in the process; but they neverminimisethe risks the pursuit of suchlinesentails. Connectives Deterritorialisation /Reterritorialisation Majoritarian Molar

LINES OF FLIGHT Ad,rian Parr

+ ART + POLITICS

understandingthe politicalpotentialof art hasbeena concernthat goes as far backasthe Middle Agesand Renaissance, wherepoliticaland religious influenceoften definedthe content of art commissions inscribingpublic space, this beingthe key concernshapingRichardC. Trexler'sPublicLife (1980).During the early twentieth century,Bertolt in Renaissance Florence Brecht,GeorgLuk6s,and Ernst Bloch examined GermanExpressionism, boldly denouncingthe aestheticisation politics;this was a debatethat of carried enormous influence for both Theodor Adorno and Walter Benjamin'sexamination the industriesof culture and their subsequent of critique of bourgeois culture. In the latter part of the twentieth century Edward Said, and postcolonial theory in general,insistedin Oriantalism (1978)that the representation colonised peoplcby thcir coloniscrs of is inhcrcntly political: rcprcscnting an-<lthcr's culturc on thcirowntcrms not

but on the basisof what the occupyingculture believesis relevantand discusimportant.So what might Deleuzecontributeto this longstanding politicsand art? between the sion concerning connection proTo begin with, art at its most creativemutatesas it experiments, paradigmsof subjectivity.What this meansis that art has the ducing new and combinpotentialto createthe conditionswhereinnew connections economically, linguistically,perceptually, ations can be drawn - socially, Antonin Artaud, a favouriteof For and conceptually historically. example, executed during his drawings animated both Deleuzeand Guattari,whose confinement in a mental institution, captures a senseof physical and psychicexhaustion, exhaustion that is intensifiedby the anarchiclanan of guage develops through the combination colours,words,soundsand he both document and constitute a processof forms. Artaud's drawings In of the sensory overload, linesof which strip awaysystems signification. this way we could useDeleuzeand Guattari'sconceptof a 'line of flight' to considerhow Artaud's work prompts us to think,differently,to sense anew and be exposedto affectsin unpredictableways.Hence, by gdneratsystem' as and affects, could be described an 'affective art ing new percepts of change. When consideringthe political potential of art, we often look to the way are in which certainpractices immanentto the socialfield and the changes theseinvoke.A practice that dismantlesconventionalways of thinking by upheaval looseningup someof the and acting,or one that stimulates rules and ordersthat organiseindividualsand socialbodiesis inherently political. This prompts two key questionsto bubble to the surface.First, how can politics condition art? Second,and more pertinently,how do we gaugethe politicalforceof art? the desiring production that organises Art at its most socialexposes to desirein its most productive sense bring to life the affective space, using out dimensionof art. To this extent,the linesof flight emanating of certain can practices, suchasArtaud's,resultnot so much from what an audience seebut more from what they cannotsee.That is to say,the movementof primary points of subjectivity curator,critic, client, artist, linesbetween - and signification- exotica,erotica, insanity,conmadmanand spectator sumerism,history and value - can locatethe majoritarianlines striating space order to extractthe minoritarianforcesimmanentto a particular in space. The reality of such art work is qualitativelydifferent from art that the 'represents real' or eventhe real of 'reality TV', as this kind of art is This is an nor determinedneitherdialectically purely assymbolicgesture. and rigidity of socialspace art practicethat simply makesthe coherency the lcak.In thc spirit of l)clcuzc and Guattarithc politicsof art cxposcs 'l'housurul of tlight arc put firrwitrtlin tI l)lutcu'tls:'l,incs vcry proposition

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realities;they are very dangerous societies, for althoughthey can get by without them, and sometimes manage keepthem to a minimum'(D&G to 1987:.204). From this viewpoint, art functions asa line of flight, traversing individual and collectivesubjectivities and pushingcentralised organisations to the limit; it combines varietyof affects a in and percepts waysthat conjugate one another. In many respects connective, the expansive deterritorialising and character of lines of flight, when consideredin terms of art, draws our attention to the ethical dimensionof art. Here the questionof ethics in relation to art is primarily takento be a problemof organisation. makesposArt sible,it enables to broadenour horizonsand understanding, us sensitising us to our own affective dimensionin relationto the world asa whole.It is, therefore, no accident that art often becomesthe primary target once repressionsinksin, usually setting off alarm bells,and warning us that the socialsphereis on the vergeof becomingfascistic. As Deleuzeand Guattari insist in A Thousand, Plateaus, when desire in turns repressive finds investment fascistic it socialorganisations; this at point the activelines of flight indicativeof the political undercurrents of art aresusceptible blockage. to This is not to suggestthat art is immune to fascistic investment. too,canbe turned against It, itself;that is whenart is radicalityof art. consumed the blackholethat annihilates innovative by the For example, althoughmanyof the GermanExpressionists wereexemplified asproducers degenerate by the GermanNazisin the 1937 of art exhib(in Reflections Decad,ence DresdenTown Hall), Luk6s insistedthat ition, of the artists in question in fact participated in the selfsame irrational impulsesmotivating Nazism. In other words, when positive lines of flight arewithdrawnor usedto prop up the regulative natureof negative linesof flight, what we are left with is an ethicaldistinctionformed between'the politics of art' or 'the art of politics'. In effect,then, the politics of art politicalsubjectivitysustaining impersonal from how art engages comes an reality that allowspre-individual singularitiesto structure and collectively to orient subjectivity.The politics of art survivesalong the mutative dimensionspositive and creative'lines of flight' expose;it is not fully (yet apparent and still it existsasa to come'.

LINES OF FLIGHT RosiBraid,otti

+ SUICIDE

Thc Dcleuzian subject a singular is onc complexity, that enacts irndrrctu'l'his 'subjcct'simultrncously rrliscs radicrrl a cthics of transf<rrmltion.

In rejectsindividualismand the nihilism of self-destruction. an ecosophione that Deleuzethinks of the subjectin terms of a connection, cal sense, takes place between self and others, pushing the subject beyond selfor centredindividualismalsoto includenon-humans the earth itself. On the issueof suicide,Deleuze is as clear as Baruch Spinoza:the is choice for self-destruction not positive,nor can it be said to be free, because deathis the destructionof the conatus definedas the desireto actualiseone's power of becoming. Self-preservation,in the senseof a cannotfreely the desirefor self-expression, constitutes subject.A conatus if somephysicalor wish its own self-destruction; it does,this is because psychical compulsionnegates subject'sfreedom.As connectivityand the of mutual implicationare the distinguishingfeatures an intensiveunderceasing partakein this vital to dying assuchmeans standing the subject, of flow of life. Hence. the inter-connectedness entities means that selfof preservation a commonlysharedconcern. is one's enjoymentof life is Joining forceswith others so as to enhance the key to Deleuzianethics;it is alsothe definition of a joyouslylived life. The greatest ethical flaw is to succumbto externalforcesthat diminish one's capacityto endure. From this viewpoint, suicide is an unproductive 'blackhole'. from the metaphysics finitude. of Deleuze's view of deathis far removed nor the Death is neithera matter of absolute closure, a borderthat defines the subject is existingor not existing. Instead, Deleuzian difference between producedthrougha multiplicity of connections that unfold in a process of philosophicalnomadicismin becoming. This affirmativeview of life situates economycommonto the logic of positivity,rather than in the redemptive classical metaphysics. What is more is that this vision of death-as-process, out or a Nietzschean vision of the 'eternalreturn', emerges of Deleuze's philosophy time: endurance sustainability. and of Life is the affirmation of radical immanence.What gets affirmed is the characteristic ofdesireor the intensityandacceleration ofexistentialspeed potentia. nomadicsubjects asserts positivthe expression of The ethicsof ity of potentiaitself. That is to say,the singularity of the forces that grid of immanence composes one's compose specificspatio-temporal the life. Life is an assemblage, montage,not a given;it is a set of points in a spaceand time; a quilt of retrievedmaterial. Put simply, for Deleuzewhat essence. makes one'slife unique is the life project,not a deep-seated of Commentingon the suicides Primo Levi andVirginia Woolf,Deleuze - who alsochoseto end his own life - stressed that life can be affirmedby your own life. This he felt wasespecially true in the caseof supprcssing both of social conditions, failinghcalthor whcn lif'cis spcntin dcgrading which scriously cripplc orrc'spowcr to itflirnr lnd cnclurclil'c with ioy.

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somecautionhere,though,because Deleuzeis not We do needto exercise proposinga Christian affirmation of life gearedtoward a transcendent enterprise; rather he is suggestinglife is not marked by any signifier or proper noun: Deleuze's vision is of a radicallyimmanentfleshed existence intensively lived. Deleuze introduces a fundamental distinction between personal and death.Death is the empty form of time, the perpetual impersonal becomin ing that canbe actualised the present flowsbackto the pastandseeps but into the future. The eternalreturn of death is 'virtual' in that it has the generativecapacity to engender the actual. Consequently,death is the ultimate manifestation the activeprinciple that drivesall living matter, of namely the power to express the pre-individualor impersonalpower of potentia,. Death is the becoming-imperceptible the nomadic subjectand of Yet,deathis still interconnected assuchit is part of the cycleof becoming. with the 'outside'and always the frontiersof incorporeality. on

MAJORITARIAN Tamsin Lorraine like 'white-man'or Deleuzeand Guattaridescribe majority asa standard a in comparison to which other quantities can be said to be 'adult-male' Human life in a capitalistsocietyoperates minoritarian(D&G 1987:291). into the on the strataof the organism(various corporeal systems organised functioning wholesof biological organisms),'signifiance'(systemsof signifiers and signifieds that interpreters interpret), and subjectification (systems that distributesubjects enunciation of and subjects the stateof ment - that is, subjects who are speakers, subjects what is spoken and of about). Rather than assumethat the subject is somehowprior to the a societyof which it becomes member,Deleuzeand Guattari take the Foucaultianstance that collectivesystems enunciation(thesecould be of for comparedto Michel Foucault'sdiscursivesystems, examplelegal dis(thesecould be compared Foucault's to course) and machinicassemblages for nondiscursive systems, examplethe bodies,lay-out and behaviours relatedto the court room) are the condition of the subjects they produce. speech dictated by an individual is not What counts mcaningful as subjcct, of but by tlrc svstcms 'signifiancc' thtt clctcrnrinc what nrlkcs scnscin

a givensituation.What countsasa recognisable subject(to oneselfaswell as others) is dictated by systemsof subjectificationthat determine a subject'sposition vis-i-vis others. Deleuzeand Guattari insist it is the 'axioms'of capitalistsocietythat constitute majorities (D&G 1987: 469). The axioms of capitalismare primary statements that arenot derivablefrom other statements and which enterinto assemblages production,circulationand consumption(D&G of 1987:461).The functional elementsand relationsof capitalismare less specified thanin otherforms of society, allowingthem to be simultaneously realised a wide variety of domains(D&G 1987:454).Whether you are in the workeror businessman consumer or depends moreon the function you are performingand the relationsinto which you enter,than who or what you are. This gives capitalism a peculiar fluidity. Deterritorialising flows canbe mastered throughthe multiplicationor withdrawalof axioms(in the latter case, very few axiomsregulate dominantflows,givingotherflows the only a derivativestatus)(D&G 1987:462).The operativestatements of various regionsof the socialfield (statements concerning,for example, schooland the student,the prison and the convict,or the political system and the citizen)constitutethe majoritarian elements a denumerable of set. The majoritarian standardconstituted through thesestatementsspecifies positionson points of the arborescent, recognisable mnemonic, molar, structural systemsof territorialisation and reterritorialisationthrough which subjectsare sorted and significations make sense(cf. D&G 1987: 295). Systems signifiance of and subjectification sort socialmeaningand individual subjects into binary categories that remainrelativelystableand render 'minor' fluctuations invisible or derivative.Minorities are defined by the gaps that separate them from the axiomsconstituting majorities (D&G 1987:469).These gapsfluctuatein keepingwith shifting lines of flight andthe metamorphoses the assemblages of involved. Minorities thus constitute 'fuzzy' sets that are nondenumerable and nonaxiomisable. Deleuzeand Guattaricharacterise suchsetsas'multiplicitiesof escape and flux'(D&G 1987:470). From the polyvocalsemioticsof the body and its corporealcoordinates, a single substance expression produced through the subjectionof is of bodiesto disciplineby the abstract machine faciality(a'blackhole/white of wall system');the fluxesof the organicstrataare superseded the strata by (D&G 1987: 18l). The 'white, male, of signifiance and subjectification adult, ttrational,tt etc.,in short the average Europeant the tcentral'point is by referenceto which binary distributions are organised.All the lines definedby pointsreproducingor resonating with the centralpoint arepart of thc arbrlrcsccnt systcmthat constitutes 'Man' as ir 'giganticmcmory' (l)&G lt)li7: 293). 'l'hc nrnjoritlrirn strndrrcl is thus this 'irvcnrgc'

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European constituted throughout the social field in its myriad forms through the systems signifiance subjectification variousdomains. of and of Connectives Arborescent schema Black hole Deterritorialisation Foucault

MARX, KARL (1818-83) Kenneth Surin Karl Marx doesnot receive dealof explicit attention in the writings ^great of Deleuze and Guattari, though it is clear that the Marxist paradigm is a crucial if tacit framework for many of the conceptionsdevelopedin the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia. Especially significant is Marx's dictum in The Germanld,eology (1932)that 'the nature of individuals dependson the materialconditions determiningtheir production'. Deleuze,of course,interprets this dictum in a distinctive and even 'postMarxist' fashion.The necessityfor this (Deleuzian)reconsrirutionof the Marxist project stemsfrom the crisis of utopia represented the demise by of 'actuallyexistingsocialism', markedin particularby the eventsthat led to the collapse the SovietUnion in 1989(it should,however, noted of be that for Deleuze and Guattari this crisis had its beginningsin 1968). Marxism is depictedby them asa set of axiomsthat governsthe field that is capitalism, and so the crisisof utopia poses, a matter of urgency, as the questionof the compliance this field with the axiomsthat constitute of Marxism. To know that capitalism its current manifestation congruin is ent with the Marxist axiomaticresort has to be made to a higher-order principle that, necessarily, not'Marxist': this metatheoretical is specification tells us in virtue of what conditionsand principlesthisfield (capitalism) is governedby this axioma,tic (Marxism). Deleuze and Guattari provide this metatheoretical elaborationby resorting to a constitutive ontology of power and political practice.This ontology is influencedby Baruch Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche,and Henri Bergson more than Marx, which perhaps accounts the charge for that the authorsof Capitalism and, chizophrenia S are'post-Marxist'. Ccntral for the authors of Caltitalism and Schizophrenia thc dclinis cirti<ln thc moclc procluction, of of which is of'coursc crucialnotion filr r

as of Marx, but the analysis which had fallen somewhatinto abeyance a promoted by the Frankfurt result of the emphasison the commodity But Schooland cultural studiesin recentdecades. Deleuzeand Guattari give this notion a novel twist. First, they eschew dialectics, a matter of as philosophical is of As exigency. they seeit, dialectics a species the logic of identity which collapses'difference' into the rational 'same', and so inevitablyensues a disavowal multiplicity. Secondly,production is in of not simply understoodby them in terms of such items as investment, manufacturing,businessstrategies,and so on. Instead, Deleuze and that is, the modes of Guattari accordprimacy to 'machinic processes', and so on, organisationthat link attractions,repulsions,expressions, which affectthe humanbody.For Deleuzeand Guattari the modesof proof duction are thereforeexpressions desire,so that it is desirewhich is productive;and the modesof production aremerelythe outcomeof truly generativedesire. Desire has this generativeprimacy this ceaselessly because is desire, which is alwayssocial and collective, that makesthe it gun (say)into an instrument of war, or of hunting, or sport, and so forth (asthe case may be). of The mode of production is on the samelevel asany other expressions the modesof desire,and so for Deleuze and Guattari there is neither base nor superstructure in society but only stratifications, that is, accumulations or concatenationsof ordered functions which are expressionsof desire.What enableseach mode of production to be createdis a specific amalgam of desires,forces and powers, and the mode (of production) emergesfrom this amalgam.In the process,traditional Marxist concepproduction to take place tions are reversed:it is not the mode that enables (the gist of these accounts);rather, it is desiring-production itself that is makesthe mode what it is. Capitalism and, Schizophrenia this ontology of desiring-production. for Marx maintainedthat it is necessary societyand the State to exist Deleuze beforesurplus value is realisedand capitalcan be accumulated. and Guattari alsosaythat it is the Statewhich givescapitalits 'modelsof by realisation'. Before anything can be generated capital,politics has to politicsis achieved an apparatus by exist.The linkagebetween capitaland proThis transcoding that transcodes particularspace accumulation. a of of or expenditure labourpowerand it is videsa prior realisation regulated its the function of the Stateto organise membersinto a particularkind of productiveforce.Today capitalhas reacheda stagebeyond the one prevailingat Marx's time. Capitalis now omnipresent, links the mosthetand religion, art, and so forth). Productive crogeneous elements(commerce, But preciselybecause labour is inscrtcclinto cvery componentof society. as hirsa prior socialc<xtpcrrtion its cnrrbling capitrrl ubiquitous, is and

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condition, it hasits unavoidable limits. capital needsthis prior organisation of cooperation order to succeed, in and it followsfrom this that collectivesubjectshavea potential powerthat capitalismitself cannotcapture. The questionof revolutionis thus the questionof finding a politics that will usethis collective subjectivity that the productiveforceof society so is subjected nothing but the desireof its members. to Connectives Capitalism Stratification

MARX + ANTONIO NEGRI Alberto Toscano Deleuze encountered work of Antonio Negri andthe traditionof Italian the workeristMarxism (operaismo) Guattari,who waspersonally via involved with the free radio movemenr and other politicalinitiativesin the Italy of the late 1970s, and who met Negri when rhe latter was invited by Louis Althusser to lecture on Karl Marx's Grundrisse the Ecole Normale at Sup6rieure, a series lectureslater publishedasMarx Beyond, in of Marx. During Negri'simprisonment his politicalactivities Italy in rhe'years for in of lead'(1970s), Deleuze came his defence to with a publicletter.It hasbeen Negri's greatmerit to emphasise persistence Marxist themesin the the of writings of Deleuzeand Guattari,and to appropriate and recast number a of their concepts in his own attempt to transform the vocabulary of Marxism in light of new modesof political subjectivity, new regimesof capitalaccumulation and new strategies commandand control. whilst of Deleuzeand Guattari'sinfluence already felt in Negri's textsof the can be 1980s, is most evidentin Empire(with MichaelHardt), wherenotionsof it virtuality, deterritorialisationand smooth space featureprominently in the attemptto schematise changes the structures sovereignty the the in of and dynamics resistance. influqnce by no means of The is unilateral: already in A Thousond' Plateaus, work of Mario Tronti and Negri's uptakeof it is the identified asan important precursorfor an understanding contemporary of capitalism that acknowledges paradoxical the centralityof 'marginal'forms of subjectivity(students, women,domesticwork, unemployment, and so on). Ratherthan speaking influences, might be preferable consider of it to therelationship Dcleuze (andGuattari) Negri in termsof a significant of to ovcrhpin whrt thc.y rcgard thc kcy problcms rrs fircing contcmprlrrrry phikr-

sophical and politicalthought.Among the questions they sharearethe following:How canwe be faithful to the legacyof Baruch Spinoza? What are the stakes contemporarymaterialism? of How can the thought of Marx be rescuedfrom both structuralismand humanism? what sense In can contemporarycapitalism considered both immanentand transcendentl be as How canwe articulate newmodelsof subjectivation light of the critiques in of Cartesianand Kantian imagesof the subject? Deleuzeand Negri repeatedly situatetheir work in terms of a continuation of Spinoza's ontology.Both locatein Spinozaa singularbreakwith the philosophies transcendence legitimation,driven by the constiof and tution of a thoroughgoing immanentphilosophy. Whereas Deleuze's writingson Spinoza highlight the mannerin which Spinoza's thoughtprovides us with a practical and affirmative extension Duns Scotus'thesisof uniof vocity, Negri's The Sazsage Anomaly (1981), taking into account the Spinoziststudiesof Deleuze,Pierre Machereyand AlexandreMatheron, pointsinstead the tensions to openedup at the heartof Spinoza's ontology by the emergence capitalismin seventeenth-century of Holland and the formulationof a notion of absolute Though their methodolodemocracy. giesdiverge,Deleuzepreferring a far more internalistreadingto Negri's historical materialist approach,both concur on the need to think the flattening of substance onto its modes,understoodas centresof force and composition out on a planeof immanence. is on the basis a directly laid It of politicalunderstanding ontologyasinextricable of from practice(whether as communist revolution or ethology) that Negri and Deleuze wish to extracta materialistlineagein the history of philosophy, one that can be seento combat the attemptsto legislateover the contingencyof being through variousforms of representational thought. In this respect,Negri and Deleuzeconsiderthe critique of transcendence as an eminently political matter, linked to the liberation of forces capableof entering into compositionwithout the aid of supplementary (for dimensions example Their concurrentattemptsto move sovereignty). with andbeyondMarx in an analysis contemporary of capitalism politand graspedas passaBes ical subjectivity can thus be from a transcendental or dialectical mode of thought to an immanentor constructivistone. Their programmes rcsearch converge the notion of contemporary on capitalasa vcry particularadmixtureof immanence transcendence, no longer and one thinkablein terms of a dialectical totality.This is encapsulated Deleuze in by the conceptof the axiomaticand in Negri by that of Empire. In both cirscs dialecticalantagonismis transformedinto a figure of conflict that sccsfirrms of subjcctivityirreducibleto the figuresof peopleor citizenry (thrrtis collcctivc irsscmblagcs cnunciirtion, multitude)confronted of thc with it pitritsiticll ilgcncytlut scckst() cilpturc, controlrrrclcxpklit thcm.

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It should be noted that Negri's abiding preoccupation with the Marxian concept of real subsumption and his refashioningof class struggle differentiate approach his from the definitionof capitalism an axiomatic as (which still demands modelsof realisation) and of resistance terms of in minority (which seems hostileto norionsof class composition).

MATERIALISM John Marks Deleuze's work is undoubtedly materialist orientation, this materialin but ism must be considered the light of the vitalismand empiricismthat also in characterises work. Deleuzedrawsinspirationfor his materialismfrom a this varietyof sources, BaruchSpinoza, but FriedrichNiezsche,Henri Bergson and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz are all extremely important in this respect.Spinozaand Nietzschechallenge devaluation the body in the of favourof consciousness, in this way propose materialist and a readingof thought.They showthatthoughtshouldno longerbeconstrained theconby sciousness have it. Bergson Leibniz- Deleuze alsoinfluenced we of and is by challenge the matter-formmodel pur forwardby Gilbert Simondonto influence Deleuzein the way he develops challenge the hylomorphic a to model: the metaphysical doctrine that distinguishes betweenmatter and form. In contrastto this, Deleuze claimsthat matteris in continuous variation, so that we shouldnot think in termsof formsasmoulds,but ratherin terms of modulationsthat produce singularities.In A Thousand Platenus, Deleuze and Guattari talk of destratified and deterritorialised 'marrermovement' (matter-energy'. and FollowingSpinoza, theychallenge hierthe archyof form andmatterby conceiving animmanent'plane consistency' of of on which eyerything laid out. The elements this planearedistinguishis of ableonly in termsof movement and velocity. Deleuze and Guattarialsotalk of the planebeingpopulated inifinite 'bits' of impalpable anonymous by and matterthat enterinto varyingconnections. Deleuze's later work on Leibniz develops theme, this again emphasising matteris not organised a series that as of solidand discrete forms,but ratherinfinitelyfolded. In order to graspthe originalityof Deleuze's materialism is necessary it to understandwhat he meanswhen he usesthe terms 'machine' and he 'machinic'.In his bookon Michel Foucaulr, speculates rhe possibilon ities for new human forms openedup by the combinationof the forcesof carbonand silicon.However, this statement shouldnot necessarily read be in termsof the humanbody beingsupplemented alteredby means or of 'l'hc rnrrtcrillprosthcscs, sort of nrlchinc thirt I)clcuzcconccivcs is ln <lf

abstractphenomenonthat does not depend entirely upon physicaland mechanical of modifications matter.The machineis insteada function of what might be thought of as the 'vital' principle of this planeof consistand ency,which is that of makingnew connections, in this way constructing what Deleuze calls 'machines'. Nor should Deleuze's machinic materialismbe seen as a form of cybernetics,accordingto which the organic and the mechanical share a common informational language. of The fact that cinemaand painting are capable actingdirectly upon the languages rather nervoussystemmeansthat they function as analogical than digital codes.In common with the sort of materialismfavouredby cyberneticsand theories of artificial intelligence,Deleuze rejects the notion that there is brain behind the brain: an organisingconsciousness of that harnesses and directs the power of the brain. He conceives the humanbrain asmerelyone cerebral crystallisation amongstothers:a cerebral fold in matter. Deleuze's particular formulation of materialism depends upon the counterintuitive Bergsoniannotion that matter is it already'image': beforeit is perceived is 'luminous' in itself; the brain is itself an image.However,he alsoeschews reductivemolecularmaterithe alism upon which artificial intelligenceis based.According to such a and realities can be explainedby reductive materialism,all processes reducing them down to the most basic components - atoms and Again,the fact that he insists molecules from which they areconstructed. that painting and film can act directly upon the nervoussystemto create new neuralpathways indicates that he is not a reductivematerialist. Ultimately,Deleuzeis unwilling to reduceall matter to a singlestratum of syntax. Computer technologymay well transform the world of the future, but it will not be by meansof the development a computational of language that is common to the brain and the computer.It will insteadbe for the resultof computers expandingthe possibilities thought in new and perhapsunpredictable ways.In this manner,the brain and the computer will take part in the constructionof an abstractmachine.In his work on cinema,Deleuzedevelops notion of the brain as a fold of the outside the Michelangelo Antonioni'sfilms to or a'screen'. considers, example, He for be an explorationof the way in which the brain is connected the world, to and the necessity of exploring the potential of these connections. Antonioni drawsa contrastbetween worn-out body,weigheddown by the pastandmodernneuroses, a tcreative'brain, and strivingto create conthe ncctions with the new world around it, and experiencingthe potential thinking takes rrmplification its powersby 'artificial'brains.For Deleuze, of pl:rccwhcn thc brain asa stratum comesinto contactwith other strata.In 'and materialan sunrmary, )clcuzc thinks in tcrms <>f expressiae intensiac | nriltcriillisnr. isnrirsrrlrlroscd rtil.uc'liztr n'/cflsiz,c :tnd l<t',r

158 Connectives Foucault Spinoza

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MATERIALISM Kenneth Surin

+ PHILOSOPHY

For Deleuze and Guattari,traditionalphilosophy always has functionedon the basisof codesthat haveeffectively turned it into a bureaucracy the of consciousness. Traditional philosophyhasneverbeenableto abandonits originsin the codifications the despotic of imperialState.The taskof philosophy now is to controvertthis traditionalphilosophy a waythat canbe in revolutionary only if the new or next philosophyseeks 'transmit someto thing that doesnot and will not allowitself to be codified'.This 'transmission' will eschewthe drama of interiority that traditional philosophy had perforce to invest in as a condition of being what it is, and will instead involve the creation of conceptsthat can registerand delineatethe transmissionof forcesto bodies,that is, it will be a physicsof thought, the thinking of a pure exteriority, the mannerof Deleuze's in two greatprecursors, Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche, and as such will be irreducibly materialist. For Deleuzeand Guattari,philosophy that hasleft behindthe codifications the Statewill be aboutbodiesand forces, of and the concepts designed bring theseto thought.It will therefore to havean essential relation to nonphilosophy well, sinceit will be rootedin percepts affects. as and This materialism that is philosophywill bring somerhing life, it will to extricate from theplaces life whereit hasbeen trapped, it will create and lines of flight from thesestases. The creationof theselinesof flight constitutes events and,asevents, they arequite distantfrom the abstractions conthat stitute the staplediet of traditionalphilosophy. Deleuzeis emphaticthat abstractions explainnothing,but rather are themselves needof explanin ation.So the newphilosophy that will experiment with the real,will eschew suchabStractions universals, as unities,subjects, objects, multiples, and put in their placethe processes culminate the productionof the abstracthat in tionsin question. in place universals have So of processes universalisawe of place of subjects and objects we have subjectificationand tion; in objectification; place unitieswehave in of unification; place themultiplc in of we have multiplication; soon. Theseprocesses place the plancof and take on immanence, sincecxpcrimentation only takeplaceimmancntly. thc can In cnd ir conccpt only rr singulrrrity child', 'a thinkcr','a musiciirn'), ('rr is irnd

that philosophy is the task of arranging theseinto assemblages constitute Plateaus Deleuzeoncesaidthat eachplateauof A Thousand, multiplicities. Philosophyis not so much a form of of wasan example suchan assemblage. institutedon the planeof immanence. reflection a kind of constructionism as insisting At the sametime, philosophyis not just a kind of physicalism, which of on the substantiality Being,that is setentirelyapartfrom noology, insistson the primacyof thought,and in particularthe asan immaterialism image of thought. For Deleuze,the image of thought is a kind of preThe image bound up with philosophy. philosophy, thus is inextricably and and constitutesa preon of thought operates the plane of immanence, The imageof presupposition philosophical that philosophyhasto satisfy. a strict materiis to thought,evenif it is an immaterialism, not antithetical reveals 'unthought' in thought,and its the alism.The planeof immanence aboutwhen philosoonly comes incompatibilitywith materialism absolute phers forget that thought and the constitutionof matter havethe fundaand insteadidentify 'matter' with character events, of mentalontological with an Body,and 'thought' with Mind, in this way saddlingthemselves Mind and Body are saidto possess impasse that cannotbe resolvedbecause ('inert'vs'active','material'vs'spiritual', properties mutuallyincompatible and so forth). The ontology of events,by contrast,allowsthe material and dynamism.Thus, immaterialto be interrelatedand integratedin a ceaseless the eventof 'a housebeingbuilt' requiresmanymaterialthingsto be given functions (windows let in light, doors protect privacy stairs enableaccess, and so on), and these functions in turn involve (immaterial)concepts in (unlessone has the conceptof stairsbeing able to provide access this as rather than that way,a ladder,lift or hoist could servejust effectively to stairsin enablingaccess an upper floor). So conceptsare returned to via materialthings via functions,and things are integratedwith concepts functions,while functions are immaterialbut can only be embodiedin All in thingsevenasthey canonly be expressed concepts. the time a radical For Deleuze the materialismof philosophyis is immanence preserved. to compromised only when the immaterialis harnessed the transcendent: can be immaterialism and materialism without resortto the transcendent, plane- immanence and madeto interactproductively. kept on the same

MEMORY CliffStagoll as for memoryconceived a means summoning l)clcuzchnslittlc time f<rr rrndimplicsthat an Suchir modcl hcks crcltivc p<ttcntill olclpcrccptiorts.

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M ER L EAU - Po N TY,

M AU R IcE

(rgo8-6r)

l6l

object,say,can be re-presented and re-cognised the se,lne as that as one experienced the past.But such a view ignoresthe fact that today'srecin ollectionis quite a differentexperience temporallyand contextuallyfrom either the original experience previousrecollections. theoriseaway or To such differencesis to discount the productive potential that Deleuze considers inherentin the operationof memory in favourof tying oneself to the past. Despite proclaiming his lack of enthusiasm for memory as a topic, Deleuzenonetheless reworkedhis conception it several of times.In early work on David Hume, Deleuzedealt with how the reproductiveand representational effects memoryarecritical to the fiction of personal of identity because their role in establishing of relations of resemblance and causation.In his writings on Henri Bergson,though, and in his own philosophies difference, of Deleuzemoved beyond such 'habit memory' to theorisehow 'blocksof history' might be brought into productiveassociations with the present,such that the past might be lived anew and differently. Deleuze'sBergsoniantheoriesof consciousness outline two kinds of operation.One is the 'line of materiality',upon which he theorises relationshipsbetween mind and the materialworld (including the body). the Such activity always occursin the present,understood a purely theoras eticaldemarcation pastand future. On this line, our relationship between with matteris wholly materialandunmediated: world of consciousness the is reconciled with the world of matterby means differentkindsof moveof ment. Such activity is alwaysorientedrowardsthe practicallife of action rather than pure knowledge. such, the form of memory at work is As 'habit memory', reflex determination of appropriatebodily responses conditionedby whateverhasprovedusefulin the past,but without'pure recollection'. Being distinct from consciousness,the line of materiality cannot account for the temporality of lived experience.Consequently,Deleuze invokesBergson's theory of pure memory on a 'line of pure subjectivity'. Bergsonbelieves that pure memorystores everyconscious eventin its particularity and detail.The perceptions acrualexistence duplicatedin of are a virtual existence imageswith the potentialfor becomingconscious, as actualones.Thus everylived moment is both actualand virtual, with perception on one side and memory on the other; an ever-growingmassof recollections. Taking his lead from Bergson,Deleuze contendsthat the virtual is definedby its potentialfor becoming conscious. Ratherthan merelysimulating the real (as in 'virtual reality' media), the virtual might bc mlclc tctual irnds()hirvcsomcconscqucnt ncw cffcct.How this potcntirrl

of might be realisedwill be determinedby the precisecircumstances its actualisation. memory hasno psychological As a collectionof purely airtual images, existence, being insteada purely ontological'past in general'that is pre(As served neitherin time nor space. such,lossof memoryought not to be conceived a lossof 'contents'from pure memory,but merely a breakas The virtual imagesare arrangedin various down of recall mechanisms.) patternsthat might be conceived 'planes'or'sheets', with everyplane as past distributed relative to some containing the totality of the experienced particularvirtual image,the one from which all otherson the planederive their meaningand history. virtual whenthe relevant to Purememorywill be revealed consciousness a imagesare actualised, matter rarely mentionedin Bergson'stexts but is central to Deleuze.Such actualisation the processof recollectionin which the virtual differentiatesitself by becoming somethingnew - a memoryimagerelevantto someactionor circumstance and thus recalled Deleuze'senigmatic descriptionof assumingpsychological significance. by the process two parts.First, memory is accessed meansof a 'leap has into the past', enabling the most relevant plane to be located. Second, memory is brought to presence and givena new'life'or contextin terms In of current circumstances. this moment, psychology interacts with kind of synthea ontologyin the constitutionof the lived present, special to to sisthat Deleuzeconsiders be essential the flow of lived time. theory of memory are critical to Two aspects Deleuze'sBergsonian of of First, it showsthat one need not conceive a his anti-foundationalism. transcendent subject'owning' memory in order for recollectionto occur. Indeed, Deleuze arguesthe opposite:memory helps to give rise to the it that memory, impression a consistent unifying self.Second, shows of and the ratherthan merelyredrawingthe past,constitutes pastasa new present Thus conceived,memory relative to presentinterestsand circumstances. is a creative power for producing the new rather than a mechanismfor reproducingthe same.

Connectives Bergson Virtual/Virtuality

MERLEAU-PONTY, MAURICE (l90tt-61)- rcficrto the cntricson * rnd'phcnomcnology'. 'crystnl','lioucrult fillcl'

162 MICROPOLITICS
Kenneth Surin

M ICROPOL IT ICS

MIC R OP OLITIC S

163

Deleuze and Guattari opposemicropolitics to rhe politics of molarisation. Where the molar (or'arborescent', to use their equivalentterm) designates structuresand principlesthat arebased rigid stratifications on or codingswhich leaveno room for all that is flexibleand contingent,the molecular which is the basis of micropolitics allows for connections that are local and singular.A molecular logic of production is basically self-organisingor auto-poetic,whereasits molar counterpart finds its generating principle in some feature or entity that is external to what is being produced. The necessityof micropolitics for Deleuze and Guattari stemsfrom the current conjuncture of capitalistproduction and accumulation. In this conjuncture,capitalhasbecomethe ever-present condition that ensures harmonisationof eventhe most disparateforms the (business and finance,the arts,leisure,and so forth). This is the agethat Deleuzetitles 'the societies control' and it contrasts of with the disciplinary societies the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries. this conof [n iuncture, the scopeof labour hasbeen amplified exponentially,ascapital permeatesevery interstice of society:the ubiquity of capital coincides with the expansionof everything capableof creating surplus-value,as human consciousness all that was hitherto considered(private' is and relentlesslyincorporated into the latest structures of accumulation. Capitalism has always had as its 'utopia' the capacity to function without the State and in the current coniuncture this disposition has become more profoundly entrenched. On the other hand, for Deleuze and Guattari this is not becauseState apparatuses have disappeared (clearly they havenot); rather the rigid demarcationbetweenState and society is no longer tenable.Society and State now constitute one allencompassing reality, and all capital has becomesocial capital. Hence, the generation socialcooperation, of undertakenprimarily by the service and informational industries in the advanced economies, has become a crucial one for capitalism. In a situationof this kind, a molar politics with its emphasis standon ardisationand homogeneity becomes increasingly irrelevant,as the traditional dividing line between 'right' and 'left' in politicsbecomes blurred, and such notions as 'the radical centre' gain credencedespite being patentlyoxymoronic;and as traditional classaffiliationsdissolve and the social divisionof labouris radicallyrransformed theemergencc inforby of mation and service industrics. Thc cnablingconditions micrupolitics of 'l'hc clcrivc from this sctilf'dcvclopnlcnts. upslrot thrrtthc orchcstrttion is

muchmoresignificant determining for has of affectanddesire now become politics. linesof affiliationin contemporary The orchestrationof desire in micropolitics will have an oscillating logic,asthe desireconstrained the ordersofcapital is deterritorialised, by so that it becomes desire exterior to capital, and is then reterritorialised a the or foldedbackinto the socialfield. When this happens liberateddesire integratesinto itself the flows and componentsof the Socius or social field to form a 'desiringmachine'.The heart of micropoliticsis the construction of thesenew desiring machinesas well as the creationof new linkagesbetweendesiring machines:without a politics to facilitatethis constructionthere can be no productivedesire,only the endlessrepetition of the non-different, as what is repeated is regulated by logics of identity, equivalence and intersubstitutability(this being the underlying logic of the commodity principle as analysed Karl Marx). In micropby that is only an apparentdifference olitics the fateof repeatinga difference is avoided,and capitalism'snegative,wasteful and ultimately nonproductive repetition, a repetition of nonbeing,is supplantedby the polytopia of a micropolitics that brings together the strata of minorities, becomings, incorporealities, concepts,'peoples',in this way launchinga thought and practice capableof expressingand instantiating a desire to undo the prevailingworld order. Micropolitics, therefore,createsan 'ethos of permanent becomingrevolutionary', ethosnot constrained a politicspredicated the now an by on defunct forms of Soviet bureaucraticsocialismand a liberal or social democracy.In this ethos, our criteria of belonging and affiliation will alwaysbe subject to a kind of chaotic motion, and a new political knowledgeis created lie which dissipates enabling told us by thosewho now the political havepoliticalpower,with their lovefor nation-states, tribes,clans, parties,churches, and perhapseverythingdone up to now in the nameof solidarcommunity.At the sametime, this ethoswill createnew collective ities not based theseold 'loves'. on Connectives Affect Becoming Control society Desire lioucault Molar Molccuhr S<rcius

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MINORITARIAN
VerenaConley

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'Minoritarian' is often used in relation to postcolonial theory and the conceptof minor literature. The term is developed connectionwith lanin guageand the 'order-word',that is, a pass-word that both compelsobedience and opens passages. this senseDeleuze arguesthat language, In because deals it with the art of the possible, fundamentally is political.The scientific undertaking of extracting constantsis alwayscoupled with the politicalenterprise social of control that worksby imposingthem on speakers and transmitting order-words.In order to cope with this condition Deleuzestates that we needto distinguishbetween major and minor lana guage,that is, betweena power (pouaoir)of constants and, power a Qpuissance) variables. the political spherewhere a 'maior' languageis seen of In and heard,there alsoinheresin its form a 'minor' elementthat doesnot exist independently outsideof its expression statements. or and The morea language or acquires characteristics a major form, has the of the more likely it is to be affectedby continuousvariationsthat can transposeit into a minor language. language A alwayshas internal minorities. No homogeneous systemremainsunaffected immanent processes by of variation.constantsdo not existsideby sidewith variables; theyaredrawn from the variables themselves. Major and minor aretwo different usages of the samelanguage.A minor languageopensa passage the order-word in that constitutes any of the operative redundancies the major language. of The problemis not the distinctionbetween major and minor language but one of becoming. person(a subject,but alsoa creativeand activeindiA vidual) has to deterritorialise the major languagerather than reterritorialiseherself within an inherited dialect.Recourse a minor language to puts the maior language into flight. Minoritarian authorsarethosewho areforeignersin their own tongue. A minority is not defined the paucityof its numbers by its capacity by but to becomeor, in its subjectivegeography, draw for itself lines of fluctuto ation that openup a gapand separate from the axiomconstitutinga redunit dantmajority. majorityis linkedto a stateof poweranddomination. A what defines majoritiesandminoritiesarethe relationsinternal to number.For the majority, this relationconstitutes setthat is denumerable. minority is a The nodenumerable, it may havemany elements. but The non-denumerable is characterised the presence connections, is, the additiveconjuncby of that tion 'and' or the mathematical ' * ': a minoritarian sign language ,x t y and is b f traitsa * a and. . .'. It is produced between andbclongs ncithcr. sets to It cludcs thcmrnclcunsritutcslincof flight.In mrthcmatical rr tcrmsl)clcuzc

remarksthat the axiomaticworld of the majority manipulatesonly denu(or merable sets. Minorities,by contrast, constitute non-axiomatic axiomisable)sets,that is, masses multiplicitiesof escape flux. The majority or and assumes standardmeasure, a represented the integral integer,say,an by into armedwhite maleor thoseactinglike one.Domination alwaystranslates hegemony. determination that differs from the constant is considered A minoritarian. Majority is an abstract standard that canbe saidto includeno oneandthusspeak the nameof nobody. minority is a deviation in A from the (toutle monde). majoritarian modelor a becoming everybody of The modeis a constantwhile its minoritariancounterpartis a subsystem. Minoritarian is seenaspotential(puissance), creativeand in becoming. Blacks,Jews, Arabsor makingpossible becoming, neverthrough womencan only createby a but Deleuze ownership. states clearlythat a majorityis nevera becoming. Deleuze observes our ageis becoming ageof minorities. that the Minorities aredefinednot by numberbut by becomingand by their lines of fluctuation. Minorities areobjectively definable states. One canalsothink of them asseeds of becomingwhosevalueis to trigger uncontrollable fluctuationsand deterritorialisations. minor language a major language the process A is in of becoming minoq and a minority a majority in the processof change. Becoming asDeleuzestates time and againin his work on politics,literature and the arts, is creation.It is the becomingof everybody. the process In of giveswayto life (everybody). becoming minor,the figureof death(nobody) Connectives Becoming Deterritorialisation Maioritarian Order-word Power

MINORITARIAN + CINEMA
Constantine Verezsis ln Cinerna Thetirne-image, 2: Deleuzeinvokeshis writing (with Guattari) on Franz Kafka and minor literatures to describea 'minor cinema'firundedin the Third World and its minorities - that connectsimmediirtclyto the qucstionof politics. Sucha (modern)politicalcinemais char(rnd oppuscd clirssicirl to rctcriscd cincma)in thrcc wirys. First, a min<lr cincnu docs not rcplcscnt (or lcldrcss)ln olrprcsscdiurcl subjcctccl

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people,but rather anticipates peopleyet to be created,a consciousness a to be brought into existence. Second,a minor cinemadoesnot maintain a boundary betweenthe private and the public, but rather crosses borders, merging the personalwith the social to make it immediately political. And third, recognisingthat the people exist only in the condition of a minority, political cinemadoesnot identify a new union (a singularity), but rather creates(and recreates) multiplicity of conditions.Deleuze a describes minor cinemaasone that setsout, not to represent conthis the ditions of an oppressed minority, but rather to invent new valuesand facilitatethe creationof a peoplewho havehitherto been missing.Like Kafka's minor literature,a minor cinemais interestedneither in representationor interpretation,but in experimentation: is a creativeact of it becoming. Deleuzerelates account minoritariancinemato the work of Third his of World filmmakers (Lino Brocka, Glauber Rocha, Chahine Nasserism) and in doing so implicitly recallsthe notion of 'Third Cinema',advanced by Latin Americanfilmmakersin the late 1960s. their founding maniIn festo - Towards Third Cinema- Fernando Solanasand Octavio Getino a calledfor a cinemathat wasmilitant in its politicsand experimental its in approach. The manifesto described 'First Cinema'- the so-called imperial cinema of big capital - as an objective and representational cinema. 'SecondCinema' - the authorialcinemaof the petty bourgeoisie was describedas a subjectiveand symbolic cinema. By contrasr, 'Third Cinema'- a politicalor minoritariancinema- wasan attitude,one concerned neither with representation being-whole)nor subjectification (a (a being-one), with life-experimentation the creationand exhibition but of localdifference. later writing, Solanas In explained that Third Cinema, though initially adapted conditionsprevailingin Latin America,could to not be limited to that continent;nor evento the Third World, nor evento a particularcategoryof cultural objects,but rather constituteda kind of virtual geography conditionalobiecthood. Solanas, and For Third Cinema (as opposedto Third World cinema) was broadly concernedwith the expression new culturesand of socialchange: of Third Cinemais ,anopen category, unfinished, and incomplete'. Third Cinema- minor cinema- is a research categoryone that recognisesthe contingencyand multiplicity - the hybridity - of all cultural objects.Paul Willemen, in 'The Third Cinema Q3restion', explainsthat practitionersof rhird cinema refusedro opposeessentialist notions of 'national identity and cultural authenticity' to the values of imperial powers,but rather recognised the multiplicity or 'many-layeredness of their own cultural-historical frrrmarions'.That is, a minor cincma (a nrrtional cincml) is not singulirr, shtpcclby complcxrrncl but nrultiplc

localand internationalforcesand condiestablished between connections tions. A film such as Tran Anh Hung's Cyclo (France-Vietnam,1995) this type of approach.On the one hand, the local (or intraunderstands of national)multi-layeredness Cyclais evidentin its useof variousregional for instance, cyclo-driver of the film's title and his sisterspeak the dialects: of in the vernacular the North and of the South of Vietnam.On the other hand,the hybridisationof global(or international)forcesis evidentin the RollinsBand) and its expresfilm's useof music(Tranh Lam, Radiohead, as vocabulary, that drawsupon influences diverseas TheBicycle one sive 1976), and Thid(Yittorio De Sica, 1948), Taxi Drizser(Martin Scorsese, 1985). Himatsuri(Mitsuo Yanagimatchi, to minoritariancinemaceases be repAs in the minor useof language, resentational and moves instead towards its limits. This is evident in Cyclo,where the beginning of the film, situated in the streetsof neorealism,and in the daily toil and routine of a cyclo driver, soon takesthe viewer- through its wayward and itinerant movements- in unpredictable directions.The focusof this movementis on becomand evendangerous ing, on relations,on what happensbetween:betweenactions,between For Deleuze,a minor cinemais situated affections, betweenperceptions. of in a logic and an aesthetics the 'and'. It is a creativestammering(and . . . and . . . and), a minoritarian use of languagethat the French(Kafta, Tran would sharewith Deleuze'sfavouredexamples Vietnamese as Godard). Cyclocanbeapproached a kind of SamuelBeckett,Jean-Luc betweencolours,between living reality,a type of creativeunderstanding people,betweencinemas- betweenthe red (of the poet) end.the blue (of the cyclo) ond,the yellow (of the fish-boy); betweenthe First, and the Second.and the Third.

MINORITARIAN Ronald,Bogue

+ LITERATURE

Czech and Yiddish In a l9l2 diary entry, Kafta reflectson the advantages in writers enioy as contributorsto minor literatures, which no towering with collectivesocialand figuresdominateand the life of lettersis consumed politicalconcerns. Deleuze and Guattariargue that Kafka'scharacterisation of minor literaturesactuallymapsKafka's own conceptionof literature's properfunctionand guides practice a Prague his as Jew writing in German. 'l'hc csscncc Kafka'sminor literatureDeleuzeand Guattarifind in three of of of thc f'caturcs: clctcrritorillizittion langulgc, conncction thc individ'thc ol'ctttnciation' p<llitical itsscmblitgc inrnrcdilcy, rnd thc collcctivc tull to ir

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(D&G 1986:l8). Kafka discovers PragueGerman the instabilities in of government a deracinated language subtlydeformedthroughCzechusage, and in his writings he further destabilises that alreadydeterritorialised German in an asceticimpoverishmentof diction and syntax.Throughout his storiesand novelsKafta directly links psychological family conflicts and to extendedsocialand political relations.And though he necessarily writes asa solitaryindividual,he treatslanguage a collective as assemblage enunof ciationandthereby attempts articulate voiceof a people come(since to the to a positive, functioningcollectivity precisely is what Kafka findslacking). In the conceptof minor literature Deleuzeand Guattari connectthe political struggles minoritiesto the formal experimentations of typical of the modernist avant-garde. What makespossiblethis rapprochementof politics and formal innovation is Deleuzeand Guattari's view of language asa modeof actionin continuous variation.Everylanguage power imposes relationsthrough its grammatical and syntactic regularities, lexicaland its semanticcodes,yet thoserelationsare inherently unstable, linguistic for constants and invariantsare merely enforcedrestrictionsof speech-acts that in fact are in perpetualvariation.A major usage a language of limits, organises, linguisticmaterials supportof a domcontrolsand regulates in inant social order,whereas minor usage a language a of inducesdisequilibrium in its components, taking advantage the potentialfor diverseand of practices divergentdiscursive alreadypresentwithin the language. A minor literature,then, is not necessarily written in the language one of an oppressed minority,andit is not exclusively literatureof a minorthe ity engaged the deformationof the language a majority.Every lanin of guage,whetherdominant or marginalised, open to a major or a minor is usage,and whateverits linguistic medium, minor literature is defined by a minor treatment of the variablesof language.Nor is minor literature simply literaturewritten by minorities.What constitutes minoritiesis not their statistical number,which may in actualitybe greaterthan that of the power relationships majority,but their positionwithin asymmetrical that are reinforcedby and implementedthrough linguistic codesand binary oppositions.Western white male adult humans may be outnumbered worldwide, but they remain the majority through their position of privilege, and that privilege informs the linguistic oppositionsthat define, situateand help control non-western and non-whitepopulations, women, childrenandnon-humanlife forms.Minorities merelyreinforcedominant powerrelationswhen they accept categories definethem. Only by the that undoing such oppositions as western/non-western,white/non-white, male/female, adult/child, or human/animalcanminoritieschangcpower relations. Only by becoming'other', passing by between polcs binary of thc oppositions anclhlurring clcirrcirtcgorics ncw possibilitics social crrn filr

interaction be created.Such a processof becomingother is central to and of minor literatureand its minor usage language this minor becoming minority into an activeforceof transotheris that which turns a dominated formation. Hence, minor literature is less a product than a processof is becomingminor, through which language deterritorialisedimmediately of and a collectiveassemblage enunare socialand political issues engaged, possible inventionof a peopleto come. the ciationmakes

MINORITARIAN Marcel Spibod.a

+ MUSIC

African-Americanand Afro-Caribbeancultures, under certain circumthere of constituteinstances tminort culture, and in both cases stances, have been a substantialnumber of cultural formations that one could describe being'minoritarian'.Among theseone might number the folas P-funk, free,avant-garde), be-bop,electric, lowing:bhes, jazz(traditional, techno,hiphop, all largely developedaspart of African-American culture; and ska, roots, reggae and dub, all largely developed as part of AfroCaribbeanculture. They constitute instancesof minor culture 'under is their certaincircumstances'because historicaldevelopment complexand one cannot locate every developmentexclusivelywithin minoritarian instances. Sometimesthe creativeand transformativepotential of these of or formationsgivesway to the pressures capitalism of appropriationas which part of the dominant(usuallywhite) cultural formations,pressures conspireto exploit or limit this potential.To the extent often collectively can be said to constitute instances that any of thesecultural developments it is largelyowing to the followingreasons. of the 'minor', the Where it is a questionof language, variousmusicaldevelopments that listed aboveare subjectto linguistic mediationas part of a language reinforcesdominant culture. In each and every case,this languageis minor cultural English.In order to developa minor useof this language, formations, such as those of Black America, the Caribbean or South London, haveall had to find waysof altering or recombiningelementsfrom as in the dominant language order to render them sonorous, a meansto potential.That is to saythat minor cultheir transformative foregrounding This the English language. tural formationshavehad to deterritorialise indeed is the first characteristicof a minor cultural formation. For writer-activistAmiri cxamplc,considerthe work of the African-American His writing distorts and l']araka and his nsc of thc English language. langttitgc opcrltionsot'thc donrinitnt cxpklitirtivc cxposcs nrlrnrntivc, tlrc

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throughthe wayin which he recombines elements, its structuredaccording jazzmusic.Alternatively, to an aesthetic derivedfrom consider work of the the Jamaican-British dub poet, Linton Kwesi Johnson,combining elements from Jamaican Creoleand British English in the productionof an oral poetry performedover dub music.When written, his poetry deploys portmanteau combinations wordsor partsof wordsin order to politicise of the language. both these In instances, majoritarian, the dominantuseof the Englishlanguage rendered is minor in relationto the musics the writers' of respective culturalmilieus,and in eachcase language the becomes musical, or sonorous in its expressions. Consider the title of Linton Kwesi Fren (Linton Kwesi Johirson, Mi Johnson's poem Mi Reztalueshanary Repalueshanary Fren: Selected, Poems), written as it is performed with the word 'revolutionary'phonetically renderedin Creole-English 'revalueas shanary' and therebyconnotingnot only revolution,but alsore-evaluation. The manipulation of the relation between the sound, the word and its of written inscription is purposely developedto challengethe alienation of ethnic groupsasembodiedin a dominant language, and to address spethe cific concerns of these groups in ways that provoke or challenge the oppressionexpressed the language's in dominating operations.This is minor culture'spoliticalfunction. The third and final criterion for assessing how thesemusically-derived or orientedcultural formationsbecome minor is the extent to which they movebeyondthe positionsof individual subjects personstowardscolor lectiveutterance enunciation. order to examine or In this aspect, is necit essary recall that - for Deleuzeand Guattari - enunciationfunctions to collectively relationto a machinicassemblage bodies, in of both humanand non-human,for example geological technological or bodies. What all these differentbodieshavein commonis that they operatethrough the inscription of surfaces: layersof rock beneaththe surfaceof the earth, the the skin and its markings,the striation of the muscles, the groovesof a or record. . . Considerearlyhiphop culture or 'wildstyle',and its characteristics such as 'bombing' (graffiti) or the isolation of a musical passage ('break'or 'breakdown') scratching by vinyl records, eventhe bodiesof or breakdancers whosemovesare only legiblein relation to the surfaces on which they dance. Theseinscriptions and their interactingsurfaces least at partiallyconstitutethe machinicassemblage earlyhiphop.To the extent of that these bodiesproduceutterances enunciations is via the MC whose or it rappin' skillsostensibly mark her out asan individual,and yet their function remainscompletelytied into the hiphop collectiae, comprisingall thc other aspects the hiphop assemblage. of Furthermore, rappin' providcs anotherinstancc r stratcgic minor dcploymcnt<lf thc (Anrcricln) of or l')nglish lirrrguirgc plrrtof an r.rrbirn ils culturirlfirrnrltiorr.

MOLAR Tom Conley The adjective 'molar' belongsto a chemicalidiolect that Deleuzeusesto things molar and inform his work on aesthetics politics.In a strict sense of relateto aggregates matter and not to either their molecularor atomic to properties, their motion. In a geological sense, or 'molar' is understood It ground, continence telluric substance. also pertainsto mass, or be what patternsofbehaviourtakenby an organor anorganpertainsto the general a ism, and thus the term can describe trait of personalityor the character inflectionsin order of the ego.Deleuzetendsto jettisonthe psychological with his differentwaysof describingthe world; this to correlatemolarity is especially casein his treatmentof 'wholes' (Tout and touts)thathe the describes being composedof a compact and firm terrestrial oceanic as mass. molar form caneitherriseup and commanda greatdealof earthly A spaceor be seeneither afloat or drifting in great bodies of water (a point of and Reasons the developed a very early pieceof writing called'Causes in DesertIsland'). Broadeningthe biologicaldefinitions to include philosophy,geologyand aesthetics,Deleuze conceiveslandscapesas massesof greater or lesser molarity. He draws Lucretian and pre-Socratic philosophy through the human sciencesand into an aesthetic domain such that he can detect and metamordeterritorialisation difference,vibration, disaggregation, phosisin terms of molecularactivitiestaking place in and about molar in him in studying Perceqtion its range from masses. The term assists to 'macro' or totalisingprocess 'micro' or keendetectionof infinitesimal differences the physicaland biologicalworld. in In his work on cinema,the dyad of molar/molecularis usedto discern When contrastingthe four great effectsof convectionand atmosphere. schools montage- American,French, German, Soviet- that grew in of of he of the first thirty years cinema, notesthat the signature poeticrealism in directors ranging from Ren6 Clair to Jean Vigo and Jean Renoir is of markedby emphasising 'molar' (and not moral) aspect the physical the world: social contradiction is conveyedthrough imposing and massive monuments Paristhat humblethe lost citizensin TheCrazyRay Q924); of streetson the edgesof the in Vigo's L'Atalante (1934)the cobblestone Scine makeobdurateand unyielding stonethe antithesisof fluidity; the incrt piles of old editions and lithographs cluttering the walls in the Drortning(1932)attestto a b<xrkscllcr's apartmentin BouduSuaed.fiom mist - clcfincs nrolirrityrtgitinst arrcl with whiclr irtrnosphcrc firg,clrizzlc, gcrrcritl of'thc(ircat l)cprcssion. or ot r tttrxxl stiltc thingsirr thc tintc

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ln A Thousand, Plateaus Deleuzeand Guattari apply the 'molar' and 'molecular'to political bodies.Molar entiriesbelong to the State or the civic world. They are well defined,often massive, and are affiliatedwith a governingapparatus. Their molecularcounterparts micro-entities, are politicsthat transpirein areas wherethey arerarelyperceived: the perin ceptionof affectivity, wherebeingsshareineffable sensations; the twists in and turns of conversationhavingnothing to do with the stateof the world atlarge; in the manner,too, that a pedestrianin a city park seeshow the leaves a linden tree might flicker in the afternoon light. The shifting to of and from molar and molecularforms canbe associated only with deternot ritorialisation alsothe very substance effectof eoents beginand but and that end with swarmsand masses micro-perceptions. of Molecules often aggregate swarminto activemasses molar aspect and of and viceversa. TheFoldDeleuze In suggests eaents) very productof that the philosophy and determining features perception, of dependon the prehension of the textures elements termsof their wholesand the partsthat of in swirl and toss within them or on their very surfaces. The processentails graspinga 'chaosmos' becomes that discerniblethrough the categories the of molar andmolecular. Deleuzeis in turn enabled study matterasa function to of mass, hardness, of 'coherence, and (D cohesion' 1993a: He projects 6). the distinction onto the body in sofar asit canbe appreciated its elasticityand in fluidity. Thus, with the 'molar' the philosopher correlates surfaces with structures, masses with territories, and vibrations waves or with landscapes. Connectives Body Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Event Molecular

MOLECULAR Tom Conlejr Deleuzepairsthe adjective'molecular' with'molar'. Informedby atomistic philosophy and biology that runs from Lucretius to Gabriel Tarde, Deleuzestudiesobjectsnot asthey seemto be beforethe nakedeyebut as dynamic masses molecules. of The chemicaldefinition is broadened to include subjectivity.In a psychoanalytical sensemolecularityrclnrcsto (rs indiviclurrl opp<rsccl collcctivc) to rcsponscs phcnomcna typcsof' to or

has Henceanyperceived object,organicor inorganic, a life of its behaviour. own and is felt through the tensionof its moral massand molecularparts and pieces.Deleuze uses molecularity to counter the orthogonal and pensive- seeminglyheavyand unwieldy - systemof Cartesian massive philosophyto arrive, by way of Leibniz, at a sensibilitytouching on the chemical animismof all things,'the actionof fire,thoseof watersand winds (D 9). on the earth,'in varioussystems complexinteractions' 1993a: 'of Molecular action becomesa vital element in what Deleuze uses to moment in describe processes things and of creation.At a decisive the of his presentation Bergson's of theses movementin relation to cinema, on Deleuze uses molecularity to illustrate how wholes (worlds or spatial of aggregates) relatedto duration.When a teaspoon sugaris dissolved are glass waterthe 'whole' is not the containerand its contentsbut the in a of of actionof creationtaking placein the ionisationof the molecules sugar, through states'(D 1986: a sort of 'pure ceaseless becomingwhich passes 10). Molecularity goes with the perception of wholes (such as molar in masses) areopenand disperse themselves a continuumof duration. that not to thesis, menSurelythe most compellingcorrelative the Bergsonian in tioned in either of the books on cinema, is the sequence Jean-Luc Godard's2 or 3 Things Knop AboutHer (1965),a film in which a man in I in the midst of the clatter of porcelainand glasses striking a Parisiancaf6, contemplates cup of coffee. a the zinc surface the bar in the background, of and He dropsa cubeof sugarinto the brown liquid, stirsit with a teaspoon, watches. an extremeclose-upgalaxies In seemto grow from the swirl of in bubblesjust as Godard'sown voice-offspeaks the name of the man's thoughtsabout the end of the world and time. Beforea puff of cigarette momentof pure duration is felt in the smokewaftsoverthe cup,an endless sight of a cosmos becomingmolecular. The molecularsensibilityis found in Deleuze's appreciation microof percepscopicthings,in the tiny perceptions inclinationsthat destabilise or to'pulverize the world' and,in the tion asa whole.They function,he says, perspective 87). same blow,'to spiritualize dust' (D 1993a: The microscopic are hasa politicaldimension well. All societies rent throughby molarand as to that all action molecular segmentarities. They areinterrelated the degree political if politics are understood be of both molar and is conceivably to superstructure, doesnot dismolecular orders. The former,a governmental microperallow the presence the latter, 'a whole world of unconscious of cepts,unconscious affects, rarefieddivisions'that operatedifferentlyfrom Molecularityis tied to a 'micropolitics'of percepcivic and politicalarenas. (D&G 1987:220). tion, affcct,and evenerrantconversation 'l'hc molcculirr of cnrblcsDelcuzeto movc from philosophy relation(or of difl'crcncc rcpctition)to chcnristrics bcing,anclthcn on to dclicittc rnd

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issues perceptionin cinema,music, literatureand painting.As in the of dyad of the 'root' and the 'rhizome', that of molar and molecularforms bears privilegedterm. In Deleuze's no readingof subjectivation prediand cation in Leibniz. both terms arein and of eachother. Each is usedheuristically to test and to determine sensarion beyond and within the limits of perception and cognition. The molecular atteststo a creative processat work in Deleuze's concepts, and it alsoindicates mannerin which he the usesconcepts the contextofphilosophy,science in and aesthetics. Connectives Deterritorialisation/ Reterritorialisation Leibniz Molar Rhizome Sensation

MOVEMENT-IMAGE
Tom Conlejt The mooement-imagethe title of the first panelof a historicaldiptych, is Cinema andCinema I 2,that classifies modesof perception and production of film from its beginnings 1895up to 1985.In this work and irs comin plement,The Timelrnage,Deleuze usescinemato showhow philosophy is not constrainedto a canonor an academic world but to life at large.Cinema is a surface on which viewers reflect their thinking, and in itself it is a mediumor a machine that thinkswith autonomy with respect its viewers to and creators. The movement-image definesand describes quality of the cinematic images that prevailin the mediumoverits first fifty years. From 1895to 1945cinemabecame seventh by embodyingimages the art not in movement but as movement.Motion was at that time the essence of cinema. By way of Henri Bergson Deleuze shows that cinema does not furnish the spectator with 'an image to which it adds movement', but rather, 'it immediatelygivesus a movement-image' 1986:2). A cut (D between two shotsis part of the image,and thus a temporalgapthat allows the eye to perceive effectof movement.The latter is gainedby a sucan cession of staticphotographic not poses of instants any kind whatbut of soever'(D1986: 7-8), thatis,of instants equidistant from oneanother. Thc cvcnt of thc moving imagethus owcsto a 'distributionof thc pointsof' il sl)ilcc 0f'thc nrr)t'ncnts irncvcnt,'il momcntsccnili a 'trtnslitti0nin rlr <lf

of are space'(D 1986:7-8). The two components the movement-image partsor objects, and in what expresses the found in what happens between duration of a wholeor a sum, that which might be indeedthe world in the field of the image. The cinema most characteristicof the movement-imageis based on of action and its intervals.It is seenin the comedies Charlie Chaplin and BusterKeaton,to be sure,but alsoin the molecular agitationof wind, dust tend to attach or smokein the films of Louis Lumidre. Movement-images reflexesof the viewer who is drawn to them. The to the sensori-motor is movement-image made of momentsin a given whole, such as a single it or shotor aplan-siquence,andcanbe felt in the panoramic trackingshots that confer motion upon the field of the image. At a crucial point in his treatment Deleuze delineatesand redefines the three kinds of movement-images renew and energise traditional that generally medium shotor a plan a lexiconof cinema.The 'action-image', amiricain, organises and distributes movement in space and time. Characterised a hold-up or a heist, it abounds in film noir. The by a often a long shot and a long take,conveys 'dramaof 'perception-image', perthe visibleand invisible'within the stagingof action.The spectator ceivesthe origins and limits of visibility in imagesthat are common to the in classical western.The'affection-image'isbest seenin close-ups which Eachof thesetypesof faces tend to occupythe greaterarea the screen. of movement-image constitutes'a point of view on the Whole of the film, a in active way of grasping this whole,which becomes affective the close-up, (D 1986:70). Other in the medium shot, and perceptive the long shot' in the typesof imagesthat he takesup - the memory-image, mental-image, the relation-image- derive from thesethree principal categories. The movement-image reaches end of its tenure at the time of World the Deleuze,for five reasons. no longerrefersto a totalisIt War II, concludes one.Characters beginto multiing or syntheticsituation,but a dispersive ply and becomeinterchangeable. losesits definition as either action, It affectionor perceptionwhen it cannotbe affiliatedwith a genre.An art of the wandering the camera seems moveon its own - replaces storyline, to and plots becomesaturatedwith clich6s.Finally, narrativesare driven by a needto denounce Realityitself becomes'lacunary disperand conspiracy. sive'.At this point, generallyat the end of World War II, the time-image dyads,the one term is beginsto mark cinema.Yet, asin most of Deleuze's tend to always function of the other that is tied to it. Movement-images a be the substance narrative cinema while time-imagesare especially of and styles couldbe based cvidentin cxpcrimental film. A studyof genres that define on thc rchtion of'movcmcnt :rncl timc and thc typesof imagcs thcir trrrits qualitics. ancl

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MULTIPLICITY Jonathan Roffe 'Multiplicity' is arguablyDeleuze'smost important concept.It is found throughouthis work, and is the basisfor other important concepts suchas rhizome,assemblage, 'concept'itself. It is alsoone of Deleuze's and most difficult conceptsto graspbecause the many different waysand contexts of in which he puts it to work. Yet,therearesomeessential traits to be noted. A multiplicity is, in the most basicsense, complexstructurethat does a not reference prior unity. Multiplicities are not parts of a greaterwhole a that have beenfragmented, they cannotbeconsidered and manifoldexpressionsof a singleconceptor transcendent unity.On thesegrounds, Deleuze opposes dyadOne/Many,in all of its forms,with multiplicity.Further, the he insiststhat the crucialpoint is to consider multiplicity in its substantive form - a multiplicity - ratherthan asan adjective asmultipliciry of something. Everythingfor Deleuzeis a multiplicity in this fashion. The two peoplewhom Deleuzeregularlyassociates the development with of the conceptof multiplicity arethe mathematician GeorgRiemann,and the French philosopherHenri Bergson.From Riemann,Deleuzetakesthe idea that any situationis composed different multiplicities that form a kind of of patchworkor ensemble without becominga totality or whole.For example, a houseis a patchworkofconcretestructuresand habits.Eventhoughwe can list thesethings, there is finally no way of determining what the essence of a particular houseis, because cannot point to anything outside of the we house itself to explainor to sumit up - it is simply a patchwork.This canalso be takenasa gooddescriptionof multiplicities themselves. Deleuze'sdebt to Bergsonhere is more profound. It is in Bergson'ism (1966)that Deleuzefirst discusses multiplicity, which receives exrended an philosophy. elaboration Bergson's in Deleuze notesfirst of all that thereare two kinds of multiplicity in Bergson:extensive numericalmultiplicities and continuousintensivemultiplicities.The first of thesecharacterises space Bergson; for and the second, time. The difference between extensive and intensiveis perhapsthe most important point here. In contrast to spacc, whichcanbedividedup into pnrts(thisis why it is called numerical),

intensive multiplicity cannotbe dividedup without changingin nature.In other words,anyalterationto an intensivemultiplicity meansa total change in its nature- a change its intensive in state. This is important for Deleuze it of because means that thereis no essence particularmultiplicitieswhich can remain unaffectedby encounterswith others. Deleuze also makes the important link betweenthe concept of the virtual and that of multiplicity in the context of his readingof Bergson, multiplicity that and it is in connection with the themeof virtual intensive Frequentlywhen discussing Deleuzemost palpablyremainsa Bergsonian. in the virtual, DeleuzequotesMarcel Proust'sadage relation to memory: without being actual,ideal without being abstract'.Virtual multi'Real plicity,then, is realwithout beingnecessarily in embodied the world. And, rather than expressing virtual multiplicabstractalternativepossibilities, ity forms something like the real openness change to that inheresin every particularsituation. doctrineof This is perhaps most difficult point to graspin Deleuze's the virtual multiplicities.While virtual multiplicitiesareembodiedin particular statesof affairs,they must not be consideredto be somehowtranscendent or essentiallyimmutable. As Deleuze shows in his discussionof Repetitioa, virtual and Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz in Dffirence and, the in the actualare interrelated,and effectchanges eachother. So, while the in also virtual is embodied actualsituations, changes actualsituations in the effectchanges the virtual multiplicity. Existence, in then, is a combination of actual multiplicities - states of affairs - and virtual multiplicities particular intensivemovementsof change. While these conceptsseemparticularly abstract,they offer Deleuze groundsupon which to developa very practicalpicture of the world. The realmof the conceptof multiplicity makesno reference a transcendent to world that contains the structures or laws of existence. Since we live among actual multiplicities (and are ourselvesmultiplicities), we are both philosoalwayselements and actorswithin the world. In this sense, practical.The virtual counterphy and human existence eminently are parts of our actualmultiplicities alsomakepossible continuedmovement most and change, even at the points where the world of actualityseems rigid and oppressive. Connectives Bergson Concepts Rhizome Virtual/Virtualitv

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NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH (1844-1900) Lee Spinks ,

The importanceof Deleuze'sreadingof Friedrich Nietzschecannot be over-estimated. Although Deleuzeengages continuallywith the work of Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, David Hume and Henri Bergson (and wrote books on all these philosophersand what they enabled), approach the philosophical his to tradition is markedfundamentally by the Nietzscheangoal of an affirmative philosophy.When Deleuze readsa philosopher, follows Nietzschein examiningwhat their work he enables, what conceptsthey create,the positiveeffectsof the questions they ask and how their philosophies respond to life. While Deleuze is carefulto locatethe ideaof a practical philosophyin the work of Spinoza, he glimpses radicalpotentialof this tradition for modern thought in the Nietzsche's development a numberof Spinozistideas. of One way in which Nietzsche'swork becomes central to Deleuze is through Nietzsche'sreworking of the Spinozist idea of expressivism. Expressivism demands that we no longerconceive an eventasa prediof cateattachedto a prior substance; there is not a matter or uniform substancewhich thenbecomes takeson a form or quality. On the contrary, or expressivism suggests thereis nothingotherthanthe becoming spethat of cific and singularqualities; and thesequalitiesor eventsdo not needto be related back to someneutral ground or substance. Deleuzearguesthat Nietzsche the first philosopher is actuallyto consider world composed a of these'pre-personal singularities'. Nietzscheargues, do not needto As we relateactionsback to a subjector tdoer', nor do we needto seeeventsas effectsor as having a pre-existingcause. These ideasprovided Deleuze with a way of developing philosophyof immanence a and an understanding of beingasunivocity. thereis not a substance If which thenbecomes, or a substance which thentakes qualities, followsthat thereis no dualist on it distinctionbetween beingand becoming, identity and difference. or There is no prior ground, unity or substance which then differentiates itself and becomes; insteadthere is only a univocalfield of differences. Difference conceivedin this way is not d,ffirence someoriginal unity; if there is from only one univocalbeing,then differences primary and themselves become constitutiveforces. There is not a hierarchyin which an original unity or bcingthcnbccomes; thcrcis an original bccoming whichexpresscs itsclfin

the multiplicity of events.The apprehensionof immanent and univocal from existence being demands that we accountfor the eventsof existence condition(suchasGod, the subject itself without positinga transcendental as whosesignificance or being).Deleuze's stress Nietzsche aphilosopher on lies in the tradition of univocity differs from the dominant Angloas Americaninterpretation Nietzsche a moreliterarywriter who avoided of arguments and principles. Alongsidethe development the conceptof immanent and univocal of a being,Nietzschealsopresented vision of life seenas a conflict between forces. Deleuze's of the conceptof 'life' in his use singularand antagonistic readingof Nietzscheis neither biologicalnor humanist. Life is neither matter(asin biologism) the properform or end of matter(asin humannor a ism or vitalism). Life is a power of singularisation; power to create phenomena, societies States and are For organisms, differences. Nietzsche, of of nothing other than the expression particular configurations forces. of One of his mostinfluentialcontributionsto the understanding life, conof sciousness moral thought wasto conceive eachof them asthe effect and of a primary distinction between actioe and reactiaeforces. Nietzsche's diagnosis, particular,of the connectionbetweenreactiveformations in idealon onehand,and and suchasressentiment, conscience the ascetic bad modesof subjectivity and formsof life on the otherhad a profoundimpresidentification politicalthought. Similarly,Nietzsche's sion upon Deleuze's of Will to Power as the basis for a positive vision of life influenced modeof philosoof Deleuze's elaboration an immanentand anti-humanist phy. The postulationof such an immanent principle - a principle that acceptsnothing other than life - enablesthought to focus upon the prodifferentforms of life. Life, duction and legitimationof divisionsbetween striving is constitutedby a commonand inexhaustible in Nietzsche's view, judgements and for power; human life (with its regulativenorms, moral This Nietzschean socialtruths) is merely a form through which life passes. philosophy, a which envisaged plurality of forcesacting upon and being in which the quantityof powerconstitutedthe affected eachother,and by differential element between forces, remained of lasting importance to Deleuze's own philosophyof life. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze sought to move beyond the human beyondlife that deterinvestment transcendence: ascriptionof ideas in the mine the goalandvalueof life. His work is markedby the attemptto engage of with the broadermovements becomingfrom which our idea of life is upon a numberof d,ffirentforms constituted. This led him to concentrate (suchaslanguage, genetic social developments mutations, and of difference firrms,historicalcvcntsand so on) that bring the imageof the human into rcintcrprctationof Nictzschc'sgcncalogicrrl fircus.Dclcuzc alsoclcvclops

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moral ideaswhile taking it in a wholly new direction. Where Nietzsche exposed originsof morality in the manipulationof affectby regimes the of cruelty and force, Deleuze developedthe concept of affect to rethink the meaningand functionof ideologyand politics.Workingagainst visionof a the 'political' that conferred privilege upon the ideologicaldetermination of social codes,Deleuze explored the production of 'politics' and 'ideology' througha series pre-subiective 'inhuman' stylesand intensities. of or Beforethere is a political or ideological decision,Deleuzeclaimed,there is first an unconscious and affectiveinvestment an imageof life and a in style of morality that is subsequently reconceived the moral ground of as life itself. Connectives Active/Reactive Becoming Difference Eternalreturn Plato Will to Power

NOMADICISM Claire Colebrook The concepts 'nomad','nomadology' of and 'nomadicism'arespelledout most explicitly inA Thousand Plateaus,butthe conceptdoeshavea significant philosophical heritage. 1781,in the preface the Critiqueof Pure In to Reason, Immanuel Kant lamented that whereasdogmatistshad maintaineda certaindespotism reason givingreason of fixed but unjustifiable rules - a certainbarbarismhad allowedfor 'a kind of nomadswho abhor all permanent cultivationof the soil'(K 1998: 99).Deleuzeis anythingbut a Kantian philosopher, Kant's aim of limiting the principlesof reason for to a legitimateand harmonious is countered Deleuze's use by nomadicaim of allowingprinciplesto be pushedto their maximumpower(D 1984). Kant's dismissalof the nomadicismthat would be precipitatedby a loss of dogmaticlaw - a law that is fixed and determines space advance is in wardedoffin the Critique PureReasonby appeal the properdomain of an to of anyprinciple;while reason, example, a tendency think beyond for has to (trying to know the unknowable) oughtto bc contnincd its own domain it within its prirtciplC it should only actaccording whatit canckrin rcrms to

Reason a properdomain,just asthe power has of goodand commonsense. to feel has a proper domain (art) which should not be carried over into morality. Deleuze,by contrast, rejectsthe idea that a principle, or a power or tendencyto think, should be limited by somenotion of common sense and sound distribution. Nomadicism allows the maximum extensionof principlesand powers;if somethingcan be thought, then no law outside thinking, no containment thought within the mind of man shouldlimit of (D 1994:37). thinking'spower In Dffirenceand, Repetition,Deleuze beginsa definitionof nomadicdisas insists, tribution from the opposition between nomos logos.If, Deleuze and we cannothavea hierarchyof beings such asthe dominanceof mind over matter, or actualityover potentiality,or the presentover the future - this is the because beingis univocal,which doesnot meanthat it is always same, but that eachof its differenceshasas much being as any other. You do not which is primary and then varying havesomeideal'whiteness'oressence, and are derivative t"gt."r of white; for degrees, differences intensities all there are still individreal, are all differences one being.Nevertheless, of in uationsand hierarchies, thesecanbe regarded two ways. but The first, the point of view of logos, worksby analogy: somebeingsare (the actual,what is present, while others what remains same), the truly real And this subordinationof some are only real in relation, or by analogy. relatedto terdifferences othersis, evenin this earlywork of Deleuze's, to question;a space divided,distributedand hierritoriesand the agrarian is that is outside or abovewhat is archisedby somelaw,logic or voice (logos) distributed. The secondpoint of view of noTnos nomadiclaw hasits principle of or but theseare distribution within itself. That is. there are still hierarchies principle; rather by the power of the prinnot determinedby a separate philosophy. Deleuze ciple itself.This is extremelyimportant for Deleuze's judgingphilosoand wantsto getrid of transcendent externalcriteria- say, phy according whetherit will help us to acquiretransferable skills, life to judging art accordingto whether it will makeus more moral - but he or doesnot want to get rid of distribution and hierarchyaltogether. Nomadic distribution judgesimmanently(D 1994:37). A philosophy would be a great philosophy,not if it could be placedpithin a specificand logic)but if delimitedterritory of reason(suchasa correctand consistent it maximisedwhat philosophycould dq and createda territory: creating and pathsfor concepts and stylesof thought that openednew differences thinking. An artwork would be greatnot if it fulfilled alreadyexistingcritcria for what counts as beautiful, but if it took the power for creating bcauty- thc powcr to prompt us to bathein the sensible and produced ncw nncl rliffcrcntwaysof confiontingscnsibility.

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Even as early as Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze's referenceto the the 'agrarianquestion'marksa politicsof nomadicism: difference between immanentand transcendent criteria. If we subjectdifferenceto a logical just distribution then we havea principle that determines in advance, life asland would be distributedaccording someexternallaw (say, most to its efficienteconomicuse,or its history of ownershipaccordingto a general law of property).This is sedentary space; space the remainswhat it is and is then divided and distributed. Nomadic space,howeveqis produced through its distribution. So we canconsider nomadicspace, asa space not with intrinsic properties that then determinerelations(in the way chess pieces determinehow movements might be enacted), asa space but with extrinsicproperties; the is space producedfrom the movements that then givethat space pecuits liar quality (just asin the gameof Go the pieces not codedaskings or are queens but enter into relations that produce a field of hierarchies). Nomadicspace in this sense, is, smooth- not because is undifferentiated, it but because differences not thoseofa chessboard up in advance, its (cut are with prescribed moves); differences positionsand linesthrough the create movement. tribe dreamsabout,crosses dances A and upon a space and in so doing fills the space from within; the actualspace the materialextension ownedby this tribe that might then be measured and quantifiedby a Statestructure- would be different from (and dependentupon) virtual, nomadic space, if the tribe moved on, dancedand dreamedelsewhere, for then the original spacewould alreadyhave been transformed,given a different depth and extension, now part of a whole new seriesof desires, movements and relations. And if other tribes crossed that first space, the space would be traversed differentmaps. nomadicdistributionthere by On is not one law that stands outsideand determines law space; is producedin the traversal space. of With Guattari, in A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze writes a manifesto for 'nomadology',which is here tied far more explicitly to the 'war machine'. The idea of the war machine does have a clear relation to Deleuze'searlierreiectionof logos.Itis not that there are proper beings, eachwith their identity,that must then be distributedaccordingto their essence and definition, and that.then enter into relation. It is not, for example,that there are masterswho then dominateand govern the slaves or slavish; rather,one becomes masterthrough an exercise force and a of in so doing the master-slave relation is effected,a certain distribution occursin and through the act. Everythingbeginswith forcesor'the war machine;Statesdo not havean existence power outsidetheir warring or power.The distribution of land or territory - its use,seizure, occupation and measurcrnenf produces distinct hierarchies identitics, this and In

by sense, war machineis not somethingexercised the State,for the the State's sovereigntyand law, or the power to distribute space,has to be carved out from a radical exteriority of war, of forces and dominations as which the Statemay or may not harness its own. Connectives Desire Kant Nomos Smoothspace Space

NOMADICISM + CITIZENSHIP
EugeneHolland, refersless The concept 'nomadicism' of that Deleuzeand Guattaridevelop placeless, groups whoseorganisation is to itinerant tribes-people than to immanent to the relations composingthem. Put differently, the organization of a nomadic group is not imposedfrom aboveby a transcendent command.An improvisationaljazzbandforms a n6madicgroup, in conarises trast with a symphonyorchestra:in the former, group coherence in immanentlyfrom the activity of improvisingitself, whereas the symphony orchestra, is imposedfrom aboveby a conductorperforming a it pre-established composer's score. Until recently,citizenshiphas been thought and practisedmostly in on haveof relationto the nation-state. SocialBroupsconsidered this scale groupingsof includeda rich entanglement heterogeneous of coursealways of to varioussizes and kinds,involvingvaryingdegrees allegiance families; professionalorganisations; ethnic, sexual, and other neighbourhoods; and affinity groups;religiousdenominations, so on. But Statecitizenship kind, commands allegiance a qualitativelydifferent and homogenising of it largelybecause candeclare war and therebylegitimatekilling in its name and demandthe sacrifice citizens'lives for its own sake(asformulated of in Carl Schmitt's rna,gnum opus,TheConcept thePolitical). This 'vertical' of master-allegiance the Statetranscends other'horizontal'allegiances to all within the State,making State citizenshipliterally a matter of life and death. Nomad citizenship is a utopian concept createdto re-articulateand suggestsolutionsto the problem posedby the lethal nature of modcrn

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nation-state citizenship. Terrorisedcitizens- citizensterrorisedin large part by their own Stategovernments the hypedspectre someenemy by of or other- areall too easily mobilisedto givetheir livesand takeothers'lives in war; in fact, little elseStatesdo inspire in citizensthe kind of devotion that war does.At the sametime, war wagedin the nameof the Stategives capitalisma longer and longer leaseon life by forestallingits perennial crises ofoverproduction: nothingaddresses over-production keeps and the wheelsof industry turning like a good war - especially today'shigh-tech wars in which eachguided missile strike or smart bomb explosionmeans instantmillionsof dollarsin replacement costs. this context,the concept In of nomadcitizenshipis createdin order to breakthe monopolyexercised by the Stateover conceptions and practices citizenship, of and to add or substitute alternative forms of belongingand allegiance. Of course, kindsof heterogeneous groups all andallegiances already exist, some whichwerelistedabove; the degree these of to groups that self-organise moreor lessspontaneously immanently ratherthanundercommand or from above, they could imply nomadicforms of citizenship. mosr of these Yer groupsinvolveor require somedegreeof face-to-face contactand are hence understoodto take place among space. thereis another, But friendsin a shared properlyplaceless dimensionto nomadcitizenshipwhich is linked to the burgeoning world marketandexemplified the fair trademovement. mighr in We call this the economic market componentof nomad citizenship, it or for depends the capacity marketexchange link far-flunggroupsor indion of to viduals togetherin a socialbond that definesthem neitherasfriendsnor as enemies, simply as temporarypartnersin exchange. this way, the but In marketis ableto capitalise differences on without turning them into enmities.For the virtue ofmarket exchange provided ofcoursethat it is voluntary and fair; that it is apost-capitalist market- is that it enriches livesof the nomad citizens by making regional, ethnic, religious, cultural (and many other) differences available everyone, to regardless who or wherethey are. of

NOMOS Jonathan Roffe 'Nomos' is the namethat Deleuzegivesto the wayof arranging elements whetherthey arepeople, thoughtsor space itself- that doesnot rely upon an organisation permanentstructure. It indicatesa free distribution, or rather than structuredorganisation, certainelements. of Thc Greck w<trdnomos normally translatedas law. Dclcuzc notcs, is howcvcr, onc of' thc fbw instanccs in of'ctymol<lgicrrl considcrttion his in

work, that it is derivedfrom the root word nem,which means'to distribute'. He givesthe exampleof the related word,nem6,which in ancient (pasture livestock' in otherwords,to sendout the animals Greekmeantto to an unboundedpastureaccording no particularpattern or structure. to Deleuzeopposes n0/n0s distribution to anotherGreek work, logos. While as difficult to translate well, it means 'word' or treasont.However, for Deleuze,it canalsobe understood as'law'. This is because picture of the the world indicatedby logos one in which everythinghasits right place: is Logosalso implies, it is a structured and ordered conception of existence. then, a conception of distribution, but one that is founded on a previous structureand is well-organised. this well-organised To legal distribution Deleuzewill oppose anarchic distribution of the nomos. of the logos, the The sense nomos anarchic of in as distribution canbe understood referenceto the nomad.Ratherthan existingwithin a hierarchical structurelike a city, nomadic life takesplace in a non-structuredenvironmentwhere movementis primary.In this context,Deleuzemakesa link between logos polis,wherethe political orderingof states and drawsits main coordinates (this is Plato'sprocedurein the from a prior structuredidea of existence Republic, example).Fixed points like dwellingsare subordinatedto this for fundamental and lawlessmovement. In other words, while there may be points of significancein nomadic life, they do not form fixed references which divide up the movement of life into discreteelements(inside/ outside,the citylthe wilds). As Deleuzegoeson to suggest with Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus,life itself is nomadic. in Repetition. Deleuzefirst employsthe figure of nomos Dffirence and, Here, it is a matter of consideringthe nature of Being itself in terms of non-ordereddistribution rather than the fixed coordinates a logically of and hierarchicallystructured universe,such as we find in Plato and Aristotle. The most elaboratedevelopmentsof nomos, contrast to logos,take in placeinA Thousand, Plateaus-Here, Deleuzeand Guattari usethe distincmathematics and space. In tion to discussopposingmodels of science, elements termsof science, Iogos the structuredand'good'distributionof as leadsto what they call'royal' science, based It one upon universalvalues. is alsoa scientific methodthat naturallyleadsto truth, and is at oncebased on the valuesof the State and supposed be unrelatedto the concrete to practices life. Scienceundertakenin the nameof nomos, the other of on hand,is an ambulantor minor science. doesnot proceed It from universals, but rather keepscloseto the movementof eventsthemselves it 'follows' rirther than 'copies'.Only the practiceof science nomos be said to as can presumes havc nttaincda truc cxpcrimcntal method, sincc thc /ogo.s the plcsuppositions. Anrbuhntscicncc rcsults ldvlncc in thc firrmof'glollrrl in

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is thus profoundly engagedwith life rather than examiningit from a supposed neutraloutside. The two conceptions mathematics closelyrelatedto this. On the of are onehand,thereis the geometric conception that presumes universal structures: straightline, uniform field and parallellines.This mathematics is underwrittenby the ordereddistribution of the logos. the other hand, On nltvtzssupportsmathematics the form of arithmeticsproceedingby local in operations,without presupposinggeneral structures.In this context, Deleuze also privileges differential calculus in so far as it takes the local operationof numericalvalues and determines their movement, one that is unboundedby any one point and cannot be understoodin terms of the absolute fixity presumed geometric by mathematics. In keepingwith the two polesof distribution indicatedby nomos logos, and Deleuze andGuattarialsodistinguish typesof space. two Logos,the ordered conception existence, of offersa pictureof space that is primordiallycut up in various ways, that includes one intrinsicboundaries. This space termed is the contrary, only does not nomos 'striated'.On indicatethat space doesnot haveanyintrinsicorganisation, mustbe considered be open,or what and to Deleuzeand Guattaricall 'smoothspace', this space but itself is something that must be created. The politicalradicalityof nomos, of nomadicdisand tribution, is that it proposes dissolutionof the imposedstructuresof the logos lawful structure, and a creationof smooth spacein which encounas ters outsideof the orderedconception existence become possible. of can Connectives Event Plato Space

NONBEING Claire Colebrook Perhapsthe most profound challengeof Deleuze'swork today is its rejectionof nonbeing.The questionof nonbeinggoesback to the very originsof westernphilosophy in Parmenides andthe twentieth-century critique of westernmetaphysics. Traditionally,and this is the problem openedby Parmenides, we try to speakof nonbeing, say what is not, if or then we havealreadysaidthat nonbeingri. Negativit$ negationand nonbcing havebeensubordinatcd the thought of what is, not only bccausc to

but in speaking attributebeingto nonbeing, also- asMartin Heidegger we and Plato- we passover nonbeing insistedin his readings Parmenides of we begunthinking from the simplebeingsbeforeus, because havealways The challenge which thosethings which arepresentand remainthe same. put to this tradition, and one which is continuedin different Heidegger ways by JacquesDerrida and JacquesLacan, is that before we can have beings- things that are or are not - and beforewe seenonbeingas the simpleabsence being,thereis a nonbeingat the heartof being.First, any of or experience somethingthat rs must come into presence be revealed of through time; being is never fully and finally revealedfor there are always only as we something something by further experiences. Second, experience bringing it into the open, and therebydisclosingit; it was,therefore,not or alwaysfully present,but must come to presence come into being.This is on emphasis the nonbeingin being or presence intensifiedby Derrida, depends a on that presence, the possibilityfor experience, or who argues process tracingwhich is not. And for Lacan,while we live and desirein of oriented we a world of structuredand meaningfulbeings, arenevertheless desired towardsthat which is otherthan or beyondbeing,that inarticulable fullness,Tbelrssa,nce or plenitude that is not a being, not a thing, nothing. Now Deleuzewill havenone of this death,nonbeing,or negativityin life; in effectthis is the main affirmativethrust of his work and the inspirbut are of There may be effects nonbeing, these ation for all his philosophy. productions from the fullness of life. If I experiencemy life as governed by 'lack' - that I am forced to decide among things but never arrive at the of thing - then this is only because a structure of desire (such as the beyond.And Deleuze Oedipalfantasy)which hasproducedthis negative and Guattari spend much time in showing how this nonbeing beyond of thingsis produced;from all the beings life we imaginesomeultidesired we nonbeingor beyond,but this is only because havea far too misermate structure of ableand limited conception being.From the ordersof speech, existthat what cannotbe namedor givenextended andculture,we assume being Againstthis paltry oppositionbetween enceis nothing,or nonbeing. That Repeition, refersto '?being'. Deleuze, Dffirence and, in and nonbeing is, being cannotbe reducedto the world of presentbeingsor things, or what we can sayai,but this doesnot meanwe shouldposit somenegative is beyondbeing or nonbeing.Rather,being (as?being) life understoodas of the potentialfor creation,variationand production in excess what we (or alreadyknow to haveexistence beingin its traditionalsense). the as Deleuzetendsto readthe historyof philosophy thoughit is always productionandaffirmationof life,but he drawsparticularlyupon Friedrich For Nietzsche, Nictzscheand Henri Bergsonin his criticism of nonbeing. ncccls trc undcrstood to as all philosophgcvcn the most morirland flricetic,

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flowing from life. Those philosopherswho attendto nonbeingaresuffering from reactive nihilism; they posit someultimategood or being,and when this cannot be found their piety merely directs itself to nonbeing,the absence, lack or negationof values.For Bergson,similarly,nonbeingis formed from a failure to think life in due order.We may perceive absence an or 'lack'andassume something nonbeing torn a holein life; but like that has we arereallyperceivingmore ratherthanlesslife.If I go into an untidy room I do not seeanabsence order.I seethe room, and thenadd,toitmy expectof ation of how it ought to be.Following Bergson,who insistedon the fullness and positivity of life (and who arguedthat negationwassecondary and illusory),Deleuzerejects negative the ideaof nonbeingwhich hasbeenat the heart of westernmetaphysics. Deleuzewantsto rejectthe strong idea of negativityor nonbeing, he doesnot attributea lacb ofbeing or realityto so error, destruction, assertion the that something not, or evenchange is and development. Deleuzealsowantsto affirm a positivenonbeing, But which he alsowritesas?being. this understanding, On nonbeingis not the lackof presence, suchaswhen we saythat something missingor lackingor not is the case. Nonbeing(as?being) the positivepowerof life to pose is problems, to say 'no' to the commonsensical, self-evident universallyaccepted. or This nonbeingis fully realand positive. Connective Bergson

(ideology) (phenomenology) ideas nor not a studyor science ofappearances If but noology. therearepure noema or 'thinkables' we canalsoimagine but approachinglife, not as grounded in personalconsciousness, as a asthinking. Ideology, of history of variousimages thought,or what counts is for example, the imageof a mind that canthink only throughan imposed is or externalstructure;phenomenology the imageof a mind that forms its are ideas and experiences structuredby a subjectoriented whose world and towardstruth. Insteadofarguing that we, to In general, noologycanbe opposed ideology. as proper subjects,are subiectedto ideasthat are false and that might be that it is the ideaof a proper'we' and assumpDeleuzeargues demystified, our us tion of the good self or 'mind' which precludes from actualising is Plateaus, not only the potential.Noology,as it is definedinA Thousand The of study of images thought,but alsoclaimsa 'historicity' for images. prois of to modern subjectwho is subjected a system signifiers therefore In relations subjection. additionto of in ducedand hasits genesis previous of that assumes if images thoughthave therefore its criticalfunction,noology with the ideal of liberation from beencreatedthey can alwaysbe recreated, some proper image of thought being the ultimate aim. In Dffirence and, because that we havefailedto think truly precisely argues Repetition,Deleuze but an we assume presuppose 'imageof thought'. Not only philosophy, or just what fail and notionsof commonsense goodsense to question everyday of it is to think. In this regard,the concept mind (or,in Greek,nous)hasbeen postulate our thinking.Noologydoes of implicit andrestrictive an unargued, to not only studywhat it might meanfor humansubjects think; it alsostrives beyondthe human. to imaginethoughtcarriedto its infinite power, Connective

NOOLOGY Claire Colebrook The conceptof 'noology' canbe setagainstphenomenology, the groundor ing of thought in what appears consciousness, ideologyor the idea to and that thereare systems structuresof ideasthat areimposedupon thinkor ing. Deleuze's early work The Logic of Sense,while critical of phenomenology nevertheless drew upon Edmund Husserl's 'noeisis/noema' distinction: the noeisisis the act or subjectiveaspect- remembering, imagining, perceiving while the noema the obiective desiring, pole- the is remembered,imagined,desiredand perceived.Even in TheLogic of Sense DeleuzecriticisedHusserlfor restrictingthe noemato being an object of consciousness argued that there were pure noematicpredicates and colouritself,for example, which is still a relation- between light and cyc but a relation libcratcd from anyspccific obscrvcr. Nookrgy would,thcn,bc

Thought

OEDIPALISATION Tamsin Lorraine humirnbcingsasunfolding I)clcuzc nnd Guattrrridcscribc ln Anti-Ocdip,rs, intcrrctionwith thcir surrttltntlings, in proccsscs individurrtion constflnt of

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and they characterise three syntheses the unconscious: of connective syntheses join elements that into series ('desiring-machines', example, for mouth and breast), disjunctive syntheses resonate that series metastable in ('Bodieswithout Organs'(BwO), for example, states mouth and breastor head and arm or milk and stomachresonatingin a state of bliss), and conjunctivesyntheses that gather metastable statesinto the continuous experience conscious of awareness. They propose that Oedipalsubjectivity is but one form that human sentience can take. The syntheses they describe haveanoedipal well asOedipalforms.'Oedipalisation, a conas is temporaryform of socialrepression that reduces forms desiretakesthe and thus the connections desiremakes- to thosethat sustainthe social formationof capitalism. Capitalism'semphasison the abstractquantificationof money and labour(what mattersis how capitaland labourcirculates not the specific form wealth takesor who in particular doeswhat) encourages desireto permute acrossthe social field in unpredictableways. Oedipalisation reduces anarchicproductivity of unconscious the desireto familial forms of desire.Productivedesirethat flows accordingto immanentprinciples becomes organised terms of 'lack', thus reducingthe multiple forms in desirecantaketo thoseforms that canbe referredto the personal identities of the Oedipaltriangle.On the BwQ desireis the only subject.It passes from one body to another,producing partial objects,creating breaksand flows, and making connections that destroythe unity of a 'possessive or proprietary' ego (D&G 1983:72). Oedipalisation makesit appearthat partial objectsare possessed a person and that it is the person who by desires. Productive desire that would fragmentpersonal identity is reduced to the desireof a personwho wants to fill in a lack. Oedipalisation thus ensures that the innovations deterritorialising of capitalareconstrained by the tightly bound parameters personal of identity and familial life (or the triangulatedauthority relationshipsrhar mimic Oedipus in the public realm). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipalisationconstitutesan illegitimate restriction on the productive syntheses the unconscious of because emphasises it global persons(thus excluding all parrial objectsof desire),exclusivedisjunctions(thus relegatingthe subjectro a chronologicalseries momentsthat can be givena coherentnarrativeaccount), of and a segregative and biunivocaluse of the conjunctivesyntheses (thus reducingthe identity of the subjectto a coherentor staticset of one side of a set of oppositions). The subjectionof desireto a phallic paradigm results a subject in who experiences himselfas'having'an idcntitythat is fixedon cithcr onc sidcor the othcr of various oppositional dividcs(mrrlc or fcmitlc, whitc or hlack), rrndwho dcsignltcs virrious thc plcnsurlblc lncl

painful statesthrough which he passes terms of the attributes of a in identity. fundamentally unchanging innovatingflows drive for ever-new sources profit fosters of Capitalism's could so altercapitalistformationsthat of desirethat, if left to themselves, is the latter would evolveinto somethingelse.Oedipalisation a form of socialrepressionthat funnels the productive capacityof the unconscious of back into the constrictingchannels Oedipal desire.Following Oedipal prosubjectivityto its limits and beyond entailsliberating unconscious can new realities. Whereas Oedipaldesire conductionsothat desire create stitutes the subjectas lacking the object desired,the goal of anoedipal it not desireis immanentto its process: seeks what it lacksbut what allows it to continue to flow. In order to flow, anoedipaldesire must mutate and field unfoldingimplicatedwith the social transformin a self-differentiating of forcesof which it is a part. Deleuzeand Guattari rejectthe psychoanalytic contentionthat the only alternativeto Oedipal subjectivityis psyflowsof desireand the schizowho is chosisand insteadexploreanoedipal Their notion of the unconscious suga functioningsubjectof suchdesire. waysof approachingits 'symptoms' that point to possibilitiesfor creBests inevitablylinked with socialchange. ativetransformation Connectives Body without Organs Capitalism Desire Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Psychoanalysis Subjectivity

ONTOLOGY Constantin I1 Bound.as he For Deleuze,philosophyis ontology.In this sense, is one of only two (the otherbeingEmmanuel philosophers L6vinas)of the generation call we not 'poststructuralists' to demur in the faceof ontologyand metaphysics. Deleuze's and ontologyis a rigorousattemptto think of process metamorphosis- becoming- not as a transitionor transformationfrom one substancc anotheror a movement from onepoint to anothcr, ratherasan but to It thcrcforc, initial an attcmptt<lthink of'thcrcirlilsa proccss. prcsupposcs, o1' lnd lincs substitution firrccs substirnccs things,lnd ot'(trrrnsvcrsrl) firr

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for points.The real bifurcates two inextricablyinterlinkedprocesses in the virtual and the actual- neitherone of which canbe without the other. Presentstates affairs, bodieswith their qualitiesand mixtures,make of or up the actualreal.Meanwhile, incorporeal events constitute virtual real. the The natureof the latteris to actualise itself without everbecoming depleted in actualstates affairs. of This bifurcationof the realdoes enshrine not transcendence univocity:becoming saidin oneandthe same and is sense both of the virtual andthe actual. shouldbe notedherethat thereis no separation It or ontological difference between virtual andactual. the Deleuzeclaimsthe virtual is in the actual;it is conserved the pastin itself.Meditating on in temporality,Deleuzeretrievesthe Bergsoniand,urrle, working it into three interrelated syntheses. First, the time of habit;second, time of memory; the and third, the empty time of the future. Substitutingforce for substance, thinking of processes terms of and in series, requiresan ontology of multiplicities.This is because force exists only in the plural - in the differential relation between forces. Series diverge, converge conjoinonly in the deterritorialisation themselves and of and other series.In the Deleuzian ontology multiplicities, unlike the 'many' of traditionalmetaphysics, not opposed the one because are to they (they are not multiplicitiesof discrete are not discrete units or elemenrs), with divisionsand subdivisions leavingtheir naturesunaffected. They are intensivemultiplicitieswith subdivisions affectingrheir nature.As such, multiplicities have no need for a superimposed unity to be what they become. Forces determiningtheir becoming operate from within - they do not needtranscendent forcesin order to function. It is in the virtual that intensivemultiplicities of singularities, seriesand time subsist.It is the virtual that is differentiated terms of its intensive in multiplicities.As the virtual actualises differenciates and itself the series generates it become discrete,without evererasing traces the ofthe virtual insidethe actual. Hence,the ontologyof Deleuzeis firmly anchored difference, by rather than being.This is difference itsel{ not a difference in post established quo between two identities.The ontological primacyDeleuzegivesdifference can no longerbe sublated eliminatedby either resemblance, or analogy or the labour of the negative.In the spaceinscribedby Martin Heidegger with his Being and,Time, Deleuze erects his ontology of Dffirence and, Repetition.Being is the d,ffirent/ ciation at work in the dynamic relationship between virtual and the actual.Actualisation the occursin a presence that can neverbe sufficientunto itself for three reasons. First, the actual carriesthe trace of the virtual differencethat brought it about, Second, actualisation differsfrom the 'originary' difference. Third, actualisation is pregnantwith all the differences the never-before-actualised that virtual is capable precipitatingat any (and all) time(s), of

ORDER-WORD VerenaConley that compelsobediThe 'order-word'is a function immanentto language of ence.The fundamentalform of speechis not the statement(6noncd) judgement the expression(inonciation) afeeling,but the command. of a or giveslife-orders, Language and asa resulthumansonly transmit what has is in been communicated them. All language expressed indirect disto is of of course;thus the transmission order-words not the communication information. to a sign in so far asit is understood contain They arealsothe relation are Order-words not restrictedto commands. that and speech-acts of every statementwith implicit presuppositions The relation between a statement are realisedin statementsthemselves. and speech-actis internal. It is one of redundancy,not of identity. they tell people Newspapers use redundancyto order their statements; what to think. Seenthus,the redundancy the order-wordis its mostperof tinent trait. Information is only the minimal conditionfor the transmission of order-words. An expression always contains collective assemblages; assemblage are that a collective statements individuatedonly to the degree requiresthem to be transmittedasthey are. that transformbodies. is the judge'ssentence transforms It Order-words (the alleged crime into a convict.What takesplacebeforehand the accused (the enactment the of is the accused saidto havecommitted),or afterwards penalty)are actionsand passions affectingbodies(that of victim, convict from the The instantaneous transformation or prison)in the largestsense. attributethat takesthe form suspect into the convict is a pure incorporeal Order-words are thus alwaysdated. of content in a judge's sentence. History recounts actionsand passions bodiesthat developin a social the of field. Yet, history also transmits order-words from one generationto Performative statements nothingoutsideof the circumstances are anothcr, but apply to boclics arc, that qunlifythcm to bc assuch,Transformations

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themselves, incorporeal.In the political spherelanguagemobilisesthe order-word, causingvocabularyand sentences vary and changeas also to do the order-words. Order-words function as explicit commandsor implicit presuppositions. They lead to immanent actsand the incorporealtransformations expressed their form. They alsoleadto assemblages expressions. in of At a certain moment thesevariablescombine into a regime of signs.New order-words ariseand modify the variableswithout being part of a known r6gime. The scientific enterprise that claims to extract constants is coupledwith a politicalenterprise that transmitsorder-words. Constants, however,are alwaysdrawn from variablesso that certain linguistic categories- such as language and speech,competence and performancebecomeinapplicable. Languageconsistsof a major and a minor mode. The former extractsconstantswhile the latter placesthem in continuous variation. The order-word is the variable that defines the usageof language according to one of these two treatments. As the only metalanguage, is capable accountingfor a doubledirection: it is a 'little' (or it of simulated)death,but it is alsoa warning cry or a message takeflight. to Through death the body reachescompletion in time and space.As a warning cry or harbingerof deaththe order-wordproducesflight. All of a suddenvariables find themselves a new stateand in continuousmetain morphosis.Incorporealtransformationsare again attributed to bodies, but now in a passage a limit-degree.The questionis lesshow to elude to the order-word than how to avoid its impact as a death-sentence and, in powerof escape turn, to developa from within the scope(expression and statement) the order-word. of It is thus imperative that life answerthe order-word of death not by fleeing but by making flight, in order to accentuateactive and creative attributes.Beneathorder-words,Deleuze adds,there exist pass-words, what he otherwisedescribes words that passand are componentsof as passage.In strong contrast, order-words mark stoppages,they are arrestive, and in massive shape they organise stratifiedcompositions. Yet, every singlething or word has this twofold nature,a capacityto impose passage. the benefitoflife and flight it is order and to inspirecreative For necessary extract the one from the other, that is, to transform the comto positionsof order into components passage. of Connectives Body Death

ORGANISM tohn Proteoi An 'organism' in the way that Deleuze and Guattari intend it is a self-directed body.It is akin to the'judgementof hierarchised, centralised, it God' (He who providesthe model of such self-sufficiency); is also a molarisedand stratifiedlife form. The organismis an emergenteffectof organsin a particular way,a 'One' addedto the multiplicity of organising : in dimension'(D&G 1987 21,265).Also importorgans a'supplementary that is, an emitter and ant to note is that an organis a 'desiring-machine', breakerof flows, of which part is siphoned off to flow in the economyof the body.Organsare a body'sway of negotiatingwith the exteriormilieu, flow. and regulatinga bit of matter-energy appropriating effectof interlocking homeostatic The organismis the unifying emergent fluctuationsbelow for mechanisms quickly compensate anynon-average that by to certainthresholds return a bodyto its 'normal'condition(asmeasured of norms; henceDeleuzeand Guattari'ssense 'molar'). The species-wide organism as unifying emergent effect is a stratum on the Body without from the virtual (BwO),it is hence construction, certainselection a a Organs multiplicity of what a body canbe,and thereforea constraintimposedon the They've wrongBwO: 'The BwO howls:"They've mademe an organism! my bodyl"' (D&G 1987:159). fully foldedme! They'vestolen While all actualor intensivebodiesare 'ordered'.that is. containsome probabilitystructureto the passage flowsamongtheir organs(only the of virtual BwQ at 'intensity = 0', has removed all patterning among its are that is, its habitualconnections organs),the organismis 'organised', The organsof an organismare patternedby and hierarchical. centralised in actualised of disjunctions',that is, series virtual singularities 'exclusive patterns;in of sucha wayasto precludethe actualisation other,alternative, complexitytheory terms, an organismis lockedinto a basinof attraction, As set or stereotyped of such basins. such a fixed habitualpattern locked the average values, by onto normalfunctioningasdetermined species-wide itself the organism deadens creativityof life;it is'that which life setsagainst however, in order to limit itself' (D&G 1987:503).Like all stratification, - organized, signified, the organismhasa certainvalue:'stayingstratified subjected is not the worst that can happen'(D&G 1987:16l), although this utility is primarily asa restingpoint for further experimentation. or Constructingan organismout of a body (centralising molarisingthe humansfrom the plane body)is oneof the threeprinciplestrataseparating (abng with signifiancc As and subicctivity), a stratum, of consistcncy

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we canusethe terminology of form-substance content-expression and with regard to organisms,though we must remember that on the organic stratum,contentand expression must be specified manydifferentscales: at genes and proteins,cells,tissues, organs, systems, organism,reproductive community,species, biosphere. the levelof genes At and proteinsthe substanceof content consistsof amino acids.Meanwhile, the form of content or codingof theseacidscanbe understood aminoacidsequences proas or teins.Expression, we recall,is the putting of contentto work, sothe form as of expression this scaleis composed nucleotide at of basesequences that specifyamino acids,while the substance expression, emergentfuncof the tional unit, is the gene,which determinesprotein shapeand function. It is importantto notethat in this treatmentwe areoverlooking DNA/RNA the relation,the dependence genes cellularmetabolism, of on and the role of genesin interveningin the self-organising processes morphogenesis. of (cell, tissueand organ)for simplicity's sake, Skipping over several scales we arrive at the levelof organicsystems (for example nervous, the endocrine and digestivesystems), where the substance content is composedof of organsand the form of contentis codingor regulationof flowswithin the body andbetween body and the outside. the The form of expression this at levelis homeostatic regulation(overcoding the regulationof flowsproof vided by organs), while the substance expression the organism, of is conceivedas a process binding the functionsof a body into a whole through coordination multiple systems homeostatic of of regulation. Contemporarytreatmentof Deleuze'sbiophilosophybeginswith Keith Ansell Pearson's Germinal Life. Other treatments include Manuel Delanda, A Thousand, Years NonlinearHistory and, of Intensizse Science and Virtual Philosophy. While Delanda interprets Deleuzeand complexity theorysideby side,Mark Hansensees Deleuzeand Guamari's biophilosophy as incompatible with complexity theory. For Hansen, Deleuze and Guattari's devalorisationof the organism, while resonatingwith the 'molecularrevolution'in twentieth-century biology,is in markedcontrast to the treatmentof the organismasirreduciblein the autopoietic theoryof Humberto Maturana and FranciscoVarela.as well as the valorisation of species 'naturalkinds' found in the complexitytheorybiologyof Stuart as Kauffmanand Brian Goodwin. Connectives Body without Organs Molar Stratification Virtull/Virtuulity'

PARTIAL OBJECTS Kenneth Surin SigmundFreud'smetapsychology in essence theoryof drives,in that was a it invokedthe concepts ofenergy and structureto showthat everyhuman action has its basisin a fundamentaland irreducibleinstinctualground. Two drives were pre-eminent:the sexualdrive and the drive for selfpreservation. Connectedwith the conceptof drive was the notion of an object- the psychiceconomywaspopulated a plethoraof suchobjects, by with the objectsin questionbeingrelatedto the 'discharge' an underlyof ing drive. Interestingly, Freud himself was not alwaysclear or consistent on the relationbetween drive and object,and changed positionin subhis sequentwritings or sometimes said incompatiblethings about objectsin differentparts of the sametext. Yet, the fundamental point remained: the psychic object is a result of the drive, and the relation to an object is the function of a drive'sdischarge. Freud and his followersconstruedsuccessful psychicdevelopment, then, asthe capacity individual psychehasto an form relationswith wholeobjects. Subsequent thinkersin the psychoanalytical tradition criticised this emphasison the individual psyche,and charged Freud with de-emphasising social relations and group ties,despite his attemptsto dealwith suchissues for example,Totem in, anrl Taboo and Moses Monotheism. and, Freud wassaidto havefailedto consider adequately the mechanisms link objectsto drivesand objectsto eachother.These that mechanisms- introjection and proiection - are highly flexible in their operation, and blend objects with each other, as well as decomposing objectsinto 'partial' or'part' objects. Objectcreationcanalsobe enhanced by the particulardealings individual haswith the externalworld. an The positions takenby Deleuze andGuattarion psychoanalysis belongto this deviantor post-Freudiantradition. Perhapsthe most significantfigure in this post-FreudianmovementwasKlein. Klein differedfrom Freud in her insistence that the drivesare not merestreams energy, possess of but from the beginning directionand structure, a that is, they areobject-focused. For Deleuzeand Guattari, though, Klein remainedwithin the psychoanalytic tradition: while Klein acknowledged centrality and power of partial the objccts, with thcir changes intensity, of flows,and havingthe their variable capacity cbb or cxplodc, to shc still locatcdthc tirskof intcrprctingthcsc objccts rt cotrtritctull irr rchtion bctwccnirnirlyst anclgrllicnt.'l'hc rrrrrrlyst

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providedan interpretation these psychic of objects the contextof the conin tract that existed between and the patient.EvenWinnicott,who moved her further from Freudianism than Klein because dispensed he with the contractualrelationbetween analystand patient,wassaidby Deleuzeto have remained paradigm. Deleuze, analyst within the psychoanalytic For the and patienthaveto share something beyondlaw,contractor institution.But the primary disagreement that Deleuze and Guattari had with the psychoanalytic tradition arose from the latter's insistencethat psychic well-being residesultimately in a relationshipwith a wholeobject, therebyconsigning partial objects (the mother'sbreast, penis,a whisper, pain, a pieceof the a cake, and soon) to a necessarily inferior or prolepticpositionin the psychoanalyticscheme things- partialobjectswerealways of something thar one movedon from, a stage that onewentthough,in attainingpsychic maturity. For Deleuzeand Guattari,however, partialobjects (andevendrives)are not mere structural phenomena stages a developmental or on trajectory, but, asthey put itinA Thousand, Plateaus, and exits,impasses 'entryways the child livesout politically, other words,with all the forceof his or her in desire'(D&G 1987:13).Psychoanalysis forces desire the patientinto the of a grid that can then be traced by the analyst,whereasthis desireneedsto be kept awayfrom any pre-tracedidentity or destiny.Only in this way can the patient (and the analyst)experimentwith the real. But to underrake this experimentation is necessary treat psychicobjectsas political it to optionsand just as significantly, refrain from relegatingpartial objects to to a merelysecondary provisionalstatusin relationto wholeobjects. or Partialobjectsare invariablysomething'menacing, explosive, bursting, toxic,or poisonous', and it is this flexibleand plasticquality which makes them inherentlypolitical.For parts follow a specific coursewhen they are detachedfrom a whole or from other parts,or when they are collectedinto other wholes alongwith one or more otherparts,and sothe question the of specific processesthat underlie this detachment or reattachment is absolutelycrucial: is a particular attachment,detachmentor reattachment menacing,reassuring, painful, pleasurable, tranquillising, alluring and so on? What makesit any one (or more) of thesethings?For Deleuzeand processes their meanGuattariit is absolutely essential weseethese that and ingsasinherentlypolitical,asphenomena movepeople or hold them that on, back,in the courses takenby their lives.As they seeit, psychoanalysis, by privilegingthe wholepsychicobject,canneverdo justiceto politics. Connectives Psychoanalysis Rcrrl

PERCEPT + LITERATURE
John Marks Deleuzeis particularlystruck by the way in which the great English and claimingby comparison that authors Americannovelists write in percepts, The'percept' suchasHeinrich von Kleist andFranzKafka write in affects. conceptionof literature,whereby is at the heart of Deleuze'simpersonal conventional literary categorieslike character,milieu and landscapeare read in new ways.In order to explore how the percept works in literature with all that leads it is necessary understand to how Deleuzeis preoccupied to the dissolutionof the ego in art. This might manifestitself in the capto acity of Virginia Woolf's characters merge with the world, in T E. persistent refusal Lawrence's devastation his own ego,or evenBartleby's of of to be 'particular'.The perceptalsohassomething childhoodperception in it, given that small children are unableto distinguishbetweenthemselves and the outsideworld. By meansof the percept,literaturebecomes a wayof exploringnot how we existin the world, but ratherhow webecome with the world. It has the capacity to explore our existenceas haecceities are on the planeof consistency; remind us that we ourselves part of these to The percept makesvisible the invisible forcesof compoundsof sensation. of the world, and it is the literary expression the things that the writer has it seenand heardthat overwhelmher or him. Consequentl$ hasa visionnotions of forms and conventional ary potential.The perceptchallenges in It us subjects. alsohasa political significance, that it enables to explore an impersonaland pre-individualcollectivitythat might be the basisfor a particularsort of ethicalcommunity. The authors that Deleuze initially refers to in order to illustrate the function of the percept in literature are Herman Melville and Virgina Woolf. Moby Dicb is a particularly important referencepoint for Deleuze. into the landscape, Through his perceptions of the whale, Ahab passes form. Ahab that escapes which in turn becomes planeof pure expression a enters into a relationshipof becoming with the whale, and the ocean Another important as emerges a pure percept,a compoundof sensations. point is Virginia Woolf, who talksof 'momentsof the world', in reference into'the town. Similarly, such asMrs Dalloway'passes which a character Deleuze alludesto the way in which the moor functions as a percept for Thomas Hardy, as doesthe steppefor Anton Chekhovand the desert It then, that the perceptimpliesa particufor T, E. Lawrence. canbe seen, Essentially, landthe lar relationshipbetweencharacterand landscape. that cithcr mirrors,mocksor firrmsthc scapc no longcran cnvironmcnt is pcrccivcs lrrndscitpc tlrc by chirrirctcr. is it thc cirsc Nrlr tlut tlrc clritrirctcr

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directing a gazeat it. Rather,Deleuzefeelsthat the perceptin literature showsus how the mind is a sort of membrane that is both in contactwith, and is actuallypart of, the externalworld. The selfis not a thing that is distinct from the externalworld, but something morelike a 'fold' of the external world, a membranethat capturesother things. The intimate contact between the outside and inside means that literature can explore the 'private desert' (T E. Lawrence),or the 'private ocean'(Melville) that results from this contact. As Deleuze puts it, every bomb that T E. Lawrenceexplodesis a bomb that explodesin himself. He cannot stop himself from projecting intenseimagesof himself and others into the desert,with the resultthat theseimagestakeon a life of their own. Given this emphasis impersonalityand the dissolutionof the egq it on is not surprisingthat the literary hero of the perceptis the 'man without qualities'.This sort of character closelyrelatedto what Deleuzecallsthe 'seer' (le aoyeur)in his books on cinema- ultimately has the tendency,at once modest but also crazy, to'become' everyoneand everything.He might be a character who is literally 'on the road',and an obviousexample from popular literature would be the openness experienceof Jack to Kerouac'snarratorin On theRoad.ln 'taking to the road' and beingopen to all contacts, Deleuzetalks about how a particular,pragmaticnotion of democracyis expressed the way the soul in Americanliterature seeks in fulfilment, rather than salvation. The perceptis primarily a literary form of experimentation,but it has somethingto contribute to politics. In simple terms, the percepthasthe effectof drawing us out of ourselvesand into the world, and of challengingthe individualisingand infantilising tendencyof much contemporaryculture. It is not enough,Deleuzeand Guattari argue,to turn our own perceptions and affections into a novel,to embarkupon a journey in search the father who ultimatelyturns out to of be oneself.

PHENOMENOLOGY Tamsin Lorraine Phenomenology a philosophical as movementwas founded by Edmund Husserl.Ren6Descartes, ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegelarbimportantprecursors this movement to that insistsupon returning to 'the things themselves', phenomena they appearto us, in or as order to ground knowledgein the apodictic certainty of self-evidcnt truth. Husscrl institutcda methodof 'bracketing' that suspcnds mctirphysicrrl qucstions.ab<lut whrrt is 'out thcrc', tnd instctd filcuscsolr

phenomenological itself. Husserl took from descriptionsof experience is Franz Brentanothe notion that consciousness intentional- that is, that what liesoutsideof conTo it is always conscious o/something. investigate the Instead, shouldinvestigate structureandconwe is sciousness fruitless. the 'natural attitude' experiences. suspending By tents of our conscious (that is, the assumption is by that our experience caused something'out the'eidetic and we there')with its reifyingprejudices, candiscover describe This, in turn, will revealhow our essences' structureconsciousness. that knowledgeis constitutedand will give us a new method for grounding (that is, experience that has knowledge our'pre-predicative in experience' perspective the naturalattitude). of not yet beenpositedfrom the Sartre,and Maurice EmmanuelL6vinas,Jean-Paul Martin Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty weresomeof thoseinspiredby Husserlto developvarious But Husserlthought of responses versions phenomenology. whereas to of thesephilosophers phenomenology a rigorousscience consciousness, of as by emphasise notion (created Heidegger)of 'being-in-the-world'and the of direct their attentiontoward the lived experience an embodiedsubiect always already immersed in a world from which she cannot separate insistenceon describingphenomenaas they herself. Phenomenology's reflectionthe realm of experience appearthus openedup to philosophical life by asit is experienced ordinaryindividualsin everyday prior to the theby oreticalattitudeof 'objective'thought.It wasembraced manyasa revitphilosophicalthought such as positivism alising alternativeto forms of (anotherimportant philosophical movementprominentin the earlytwentieth century) that took the methodsof natural scienceas their paradigm. teremphasis lived experience on view,phenomenology's On Deleuze's philosophyonto habitualforms of perceptionand conception ritorialises (perception formed from the point of view of the selfor thoughtin keeping and with the form of the 'I'). Deleuzesoughtto determinean 'impersonal pre-individualtranscendental field' that is the conditionof anyactualconscious experience(D 1990: 102). In Foucault,Deleuze lauds Michel There is a gap into Foucaultfor convertingphenomenology epistemology. and between what we perceive what we say'asthoughintentionalitydenied itself' (D 1988b:109).There is no suchthing asa pure or'savage'experiwhat we sayand The gap between enceprior to or underlyingknowledge. (as gap Deleuzecharacwhat we feel and perceive well asthe Bergsonian terisesin his Cinemabooks that can open up betweenperceptionand or action)indicates implicit tendencies forcesthat insistin what we sayand effects of of do. The conscious experiences an individual are the emergent virtual, as well asactuallyunfolding, forcesof which the individual is, for Thc singularitics cvcntsdcfiningtheseforccs or thc most part, unawarc. ficld thrrtmayncvcrbc rctuitlisccl constitutc trirnsccndcntrrl of'thc virturrl a

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in individualbodies. (for example, concepts philosEventsof sense rhe of ophy), as well aseventsof physicalprocesses example,the capacityto (for fall, to run, to sweat) and their virtual relations'insist' in concrete states of affairs,whether or not they actually unfold in specificspeech-acts physor ical states. Philosophyas 'genuine thinking' does not attempt to representor describe, ratherto makethingshappen creating but by concepts response in to the problems life that actualise virrual relations rhe transcendof the of ental field in novel ways.Phenomenology's invocationof the 'primordial lived'renders immanence termsof whatis immanent a subject's in to experiencerather than processes unfolding at levelsbelow as well as abovethe threshold consciousness, groundingits investigations whatare,in of thus in Deleuzeand Guattari'sview, opinions that are alreadyclich6sextracted (D&G 1994:150).The notion of a world 'teaming'with from experience anonymous, nomadic, impersonal pre-individual and singularities opens up the field of the transcendental allowsthinkingof individuals termsof and in the singularities that are their condition,rather than in terms of the synthetic and analyticunitiesofconscious (D experience 1990:103). Connectives Bergson Experience Foucault Singularity

PHENOMENOLOGY Alberto Toscano

+ HUSSERL, EDMUND (1859-1938)

Deleuze's relationship to the philosophy of Edmund Husserl is split between a critical hostility toward the methodologicalprinciples and overall aims of his phenomenologyand the isolation, extraction and transformationof certain moments in Husserl'soeuvreto sustainconceptual developments his own. The most significant among these of Husserlianinsertionsoccur with regardto the elucidationof (the genesis of) sensein The Logic of Sensa and in the discussionof the machinic phylum in A Thousand Plateaus inspiredby Gilbert Simondon.Deleuze finds support for his discussion sensein Husserl'sdelineationof thc of nocm:rta his scparation a logicof cxprcssion and of (scnsc) from thc logics of'dcnotirtion, manif'cstirtion clcmonstrati<ln. this rcspcct[-Iusscrl irncl ln

is linked to the key Stoic insight, prolonged by mediaevalnominalism and with regardboth to physby Meinong, regardingthe autonomyof sense However,while Husserl is ical causalityand to the logic of propositions. its characterof sense, commendedfor having identified the paradoxical statusas both impassiveand genetic,he is criticised for having shirked and falling from drawing the ultimate conclusionsof his (re)discovery, back, via his notion of Urdoxa, on the requirementsof generalityand of recognitionthat define the image of thought as a convergence good and common sense. Deleuzeargues that to be faithful to the inaugsense ural Stoic insight one must conceivethe nucleusof the noemaas verbas like, asan eventand not an attribute or predicate, well asmaintain the paradox sense, neutralisingit in a Kantian rather than transcendentally of recourseto an object = x. Otherwise sensebecomesa mere shadowor to doubleof the proposition and is subordinated the genericdemandof unificationprovidedby the concept,on the one hand,and the form ofthe person,on the other. Following the arguments put forward by Jean-Paul Sartre in the Transcendence the Ego (1937), Deleuze demands a more radical of reduction, moreimpersonal treatmentof the phenomenological because pre-individual singularities the at to such that it would allow access the heartof genesis sense. This canstill be regardedasthe contextfor his and work Plateaus,where phenomenologist's the useof HusserlinA Thousand in and morphologicalessences, is mined for the notions of anexactitude (without, incidentally, resortfrom bodies order to distinguishorganisms ing to Husserl'sown Leib/ Korperdistinction),nomad from royal science processes (via Husserl'sintimation of a protogeometry), and to delineate on of transformation, distortion, ablationand augmentation the machinic phylum. Onceagain,Husserlis criticisedfor a certainKantian inspiration a that doesnot allowhim to determineindependently dimensionof events Husserl's and becomings that would be neither objectivenor subjective. commitment to transcendental philosophy forces him instead to becomings matterto an of the of and subordinate events sense the anexact royal science). The situationis much instance legislation(in this case, of the samefor the notion of passivesynthesis,borrowed from Husserl and translated into empiricist, biophilosophical terms in Dffirence and Repetition. all from his Deleuzedevelops ontologyof multiplicity against dialectics, the work of Henri Bergson.Husserl,like Bergson,tried to draw the philof osophicaland methodologicalconsequences the work of Bernhard vitalist thesetwo standpoints, Ricmannon topology. What distinguishes Whilc llcrgsonandDclcuzc towitrdmultiplicitics? lncl phcnomcnologicirl, proposcthnl rr distinctionltctwccntwo typcsof'nrultiplicitics clln ()pcn

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onto an understanding becoming of that would not be subjected extrinto sic measurement, Husserl adopts the notion of multiplicity to formulate a universalisticand homogeneous theoreticalscienceof theory (or metascience), which the mathematical for conceptof multiplicity could serveas the commonformal term. Husserlexplicitly usesmultiplicitiesto distinguish object-fields theoriesand to ground the unity of explanationin of eachfield. In this regardhis interestonceagainis with thosequestions of foundationand legitimationthat Deleuze'sformulation of an immanent and intensive logic of multiplicitiesis designed undermineor evade. to Theseencounters with Husserl,aroundthe ideas sense, machinic of the phylum and multiplicities,permir us to identify rhreealternative notions punctuatingDeleuze'sphilosophical of phenomenology itinerary: a phenomenologyof events(or rigorous science surfaceeffects),a phenomenof ology of material fluxes, breaks and assemblages phenomenologyof (or production),and a phenomenology the concept. of Respectively, thesecan be linked to the autonomyof sense, autonomyof a nomad science the of (or haecceities of the practiceof the artisan)and the autonomyof philosophy.Thesearelike the threemomentsof an-otherphenomenology, no one longertied to the teleological programme makingimmanence of immanent to consciousness subjectivity. or

PLANE CliffStagoll Deleuzeusesthe imageof the 'plane'in numerous contexts. Typically,it is employed explaina type of thinking that mediates to berween chaos the of (and the complexityof their ever-shifting chancehappenings origins and outcomes) the one hand,and structured,orderlythinking on the other. on Deleuzereveals former in his theoriesof multiplicity, becomingand the difference. proposes He that the lasttypifieshow we dealwith suchchaos: by imposingstructures, creatinghierarchies, conceiving things as (the of same'from one moment to the next, using definitionsto limit meanings, and ignoring new and potentiallycreative inquiries.The imageof a'plane of consistency' 'plane of immanence'both explainsthe relationship or between these two ways of thinking and revealsmore fully the creative potentialevidentin thinking aboutthe world. A plane of immanence can be conceived a surfaceupon which all as eventsoccur, where eventsare understoodas chance,productive interactions betweenforcesof all kinds. As such, it represents thc field of bccoming, 'spircc' a containing of rhc possibilitics all inhcrcntin firrccs.

On this plane,all possible eventsare brought together,and new connecTo tionsbetween them madeandcontinuously dissolved. think of this field of possibilities means arrangingit according someconcept(in Deleuze's to specificsenseof the word), thereby constructing a temporary and virtual arrangementaccordingto causal,logical and temporal relations.Such thinking is alwaysa response some particular set of circumstances, to which might be as complex as a philosophicalinquiry or as seemingly simple as feeling hungry. In the former instance, one might constructa complexmodel to which one returns time and again over the courseof one's life whereas, the latter, it might involve no more than acting to in satisfy hunger. In either case,though, one's world is organisedanew suchthat a new planeof aroundsomerelevantconceptor setof concepts, providingthe temporaryconsistency thinkimmanence constructed, of is ing upon which meaningdepends. philosophyis all aboutthe creationof new concepts. Each For Deleuze, new conceptcreates new plane;that is, a new imageof thought provida and For ing theoretical consistency how life is experienced understood. for preconditionupon example, cogitoof Ren6Descartes the essential the was and which the Cartesian understanding the world could be developed of its concepts usedas explanatory tools.Deleuzeholds that, by thinking in its new waysand proposingnew concepts, everygreatphilosophycreates own planeof immanence. The planecan only be definedin terms of the concepts operatingupon it, and the concept canonly havemeaningrelative to the,forces work on the plane.The concepts like 'coordinates' act at for thinking,providingpointsof focusfor realisingthe potentialof chance eventsoccurring upon the plane. In Deleuzeusesthe imageof the planequite variously. his Bergsonian Deleuzerefersto 'planes'and 'sheets' model of recollection, instance, for of memories.His explorationsof art refer to a 'plane of percepts',and A Thousand. Plateausis structured around a range of planesthat seemto ground life and thinking. However,the key characteristics ascribedto a planeare alwaysconsistent. First, a planeis always virtual construction a ratherthan an actualone,unextended space in and imperceptible. Second, production upon a plane (that is, interconnection events)occursat a of involved.Third, a 'speed'specificto the particular terms of the changes plane is not the theoreticalfield of some pre-existing subject or self. Nothing is superior to the plane'smovement.Fourth, a plane doesnot precede connections and syntheses brought aboutbetween events a by the preciselyas they are created. Taken together, concept,but is constructed a thcsccharactcristics comprise plane's 'immanence'. when he Delcuzcraiscda rangcof new issues Vcry latc in his carccr, 'l'hc implicrrtions of'thisconrplcx wrotcitbout"l'l lli plrtnc immirncncc', of

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variantof the model are debatable. Deleuzeclearlydoesnot meansome superiorplaneupon which particular planes(of conceptual consistency, art or memory,for example)are inscribed.Rather,he seems be pointing to out that there is a planeof immanence immanentto all thinkableplanes, such that eachplaneis merelyone centreof activity or perspective. THE planeis the field of all events. such,the unity of rhe cosmos As ought not to be thought assometranscendent containingthe immanent, but only the immanentitself conceived the transcendentally as necessary conditionfor all life: everythingis unified in so far aseverythingis becomingand flux. whilst this notion is certainlynor new in itself,the modelof the planedoes provide a new imagefor thinking about the universalityof immanent production and becoming. Connectives Art Becoming Concept Event Immanence Memory

PLATEAU Tamsin Lorraine Rather than plotting points or fixing an order,Deleuzeand Guattari wrote their book, A Thousand Plateaus, a rhizome composedof (plateaus'. as They claim that the circular form they gave it was ,only for laughs' (D&G 1987:22).The plateaus meantto be readin any order and each are plateau can be related to any other plateau. Deleuze and Guattari cite Gregory Bateson'suse of the word 'plateau' to designatea ,continuous, self-vibratingregion of intensities'that doesnot developin terms of a point of culminationor an externalgoal.Plateaus constituted are whenthe elements a region(for example, microsensations a sexual of the of practice or the micreperceptions a mannerof attending)arenot subjected an of to externalplan of organisation. externalplan imposesthe selection An of someconnections rather than othersfrom the virtual relationsamongthe elementsthat could be actualised, actualising varying capacities affcct to and be affected thc process. plateau in A emergcs when the singularitics of an indiviclurrl a phnc thrt prcvior,lsly 'insistcd' ir concrctc <lr only in stirtc of

affairsareput into play through the actualisation connections of that defy (for practices the impositionof externalconstraints example, tantric sexual in which orgasmis not the goal or meditativestatesthat deliberatelyavoid goal-oriented thinking). Deleuzeand Guattari deliberately avoidedwriting I Thousand, Plateaus in a stylethat moves readerfrom oneargumentto the next, until all the arguthe mentscanbe gathered togetherinto the culminatingargumentof the bookas a whole.Insteadthey presentfifteen plateaus that aremeantto instigateproThroughout ductive connections with a world they refuseto represent. Deleuze's work and his work with Guattari,he and Guattari createphilosophicalconceptsthat they do not want to pin down to any one meaning. Insteadthey let their concepts reverberate, someofthe variations expressing in their sense throughthe shiftingcontexts which they areput to use.In in A Thousand, Plateaus, they characterise as suchconcepts fragmentarywholes that canresonate a powerful,openWholethat includes the concepts in all on plane.This planethey call a 'planeof consistency' 'the one and the same or (D&G 1987: planeof immanence concepts, planomenon' of the 35). Deleuze and Guattari advocate constructinga Body without Organs (BwO) and 'abstractmachines'(with a 'diagrammatic'function D&G 1987:cf. 189-90)that put into play forcesthat are not constrained the by habitual forms of a personalself or other 'molar' forms of existence. A BwO is a plateauconstructed terms of intensities in in that reverberate keepingwith a logic immanentto their own unfoldingrather than conventional boundariesof self and other. An abstractmachine 'placesvariables of contentand expression continuity'(D&G 1987:5l l). It (for example, in the Galileoabstract machine)emerges when variables actionsand pasof sions (the telescope, movementof a pendulum, the desireto underthe stand) are put into continuous variation with incorporeal eventsof sense (Aristotelianmechanics cosmology, and Copernican heliocentrism), creating effects that reverberate throughoutthe social field (D&G 1987: 5l l). cf. There are variouswaysin which an assemblage's capacityto increase its number of connectionsinto a plane of consistencycan be impeded; creative connectionscan be replacedwith blockages, strata, 'black holes', or approaches the that 'lines of death'.An assemblage multipliesconnections machine'(D&G 1987: 513). 'living abstract Connectives Actuality lllack hole Rhizomc Wholc

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PLATO (c. 428-c.348 nc) Alison Ross Plato's philosophy exerts a profound influenceover modern thought. ImmanuelKant's 'Copernicanrevolution'in philosophywas styledas an invertedPlatonismin which the dependence a finite consciousness of on sensible forms to think ideasreversed Platonichierarchybetween the the intelligible and the sensible. Friedrich Nietzsche,who found Kanr's critical philosophy inadequatefor such a reversalon account of the primacy in Kant of the moral idea,definedthe task of the philosophyof the furure as the'reversal Platonism'inwhich the distinctionbetween realandthe of the apparent worldswouldbe abolished. DeleuzefollowsNietzsche this task in of a reversalof Platonism,but also refines the 'abstract' Nietzschean formula of this task by askingabout the motivationof Platonism.In his (exteranalysis this motivationDeleuze of findsin Plato,unlikeNietzsche's nal' critique,the conditionsfor the reversal Platonism. of For this reason, Deleuze'sreversalof Platonismis also better equippedto critique the dualistontologyof Platonismthat continues operate Kant. to in The motive of Plato'stheory of the Ideasneedsto 'be soughtin a will to selectand to choose'lineages and 'to distinguishpretenders'(D 1990: 2534).In Plato,the hierarchythat distinguishes Ideasfrom modelsand copies describes degradation a ofuse andknowledge. According Plato, to the sensible world is derivedfrom and modelled a 'copy' on the realmof the as Ideas.'Copies',that comprisethe sensible world, mark a gradeddescent away from therealmof theIdeas themerely'apparent' to world of the senses. The copyingof these copies art marksa further declinein ontology(use) in and epistemology (knowledge). the Republic, mimetic mechanism In the of art leadsto Plato'shostility to art as a 'copy of a copy' and to the dramatic arts in particularwhich dissimulate their statusasa copyof a copy.The Idea of 'a bed' is a modeluntrammelledby sensibilityand containsonly thosefeaturesthat are the necessary conditionsfor any bed (that it is a structureable to supportthe weightof a person). sensible A 'copy'of this ldeanecessarily placescertainlimitationson this form by makingit a certainheight and colour.However,the painterwho paintsa copy of this bed copiesall the things about the bed that are inessential its use (that it is a particular to colour,a particularheight,in a particularsetting), is unableto copyany but of thosefeatures the bed that relateto its function(that it hasa structure of ableto supportthe weightof a person).The restrictionof paintingto the copyingof the mereappearance the objectshows, Plato,that thc artist of for producesthings whose internal mechanisms they arc ignorant of. This dcgradltion ltsclncl knowlcdgc thc fabricrrtccl ofi in objcctnrlkcsrrt I futilc,

is because proit but harmless activity.Dramatic poetry,however, dangerous poetry The spectators dramatic of duces spectacle to suspend a able disbelief. wherean actor playingthe areinductedinto the world of the performance roleof a statesman a philosopher this role.For Platothis dissimulation or 'is' to of its statusasa copyrendersdramaticpoetry dangerous the proper order for a it of of the Statebecause trainsin the souls its citizens disregard the disThis distinctionin Platobetween a tinctionbetween true and falsecopy. the a harmlesscopy and the malevolentcopy,that itself becomes model, is the key to Deleuze'sproject of a 'reversalof Platonism'. According to Deleuze the pertinent distinction for the reversal of The are but copy-simulacra. simulacra those Platonismis not model-copy the of falsecopies that place'in question verynotations copyandmodel'and philosophy transcribed Deleuze therepresas is by the'motivation'ofPlato's (D are in sionof the simulacra favourof the copies 1990:256-7).Simulacra thedualism images to withoutresemblance theIdea.As suchtheyundermine and grades betweenIdea and imagein Platonicthought, which regulates It to relationof resemblance the Ideas. is termsaccording a presupposed to because simulacraare not modelled on the Idea that their pretension, the to their merely externalresemblance the Idea, is without foundation.But it suggest that is alsobecause this merelyexternalresemblance the simulacra of a conceptionof the world in which identity follows 'deep disparity', and contestthe conceptionof the world in which differenceis regulatedaccording to a prior similitude (D 1990: 261). Thus, Deleuze's'reversalof for overthe copy.He argues a Platonism' asserts rightsof the simulacra the pop art ableto 'be pushed the point whereit changes nature'asa copy its to (anti-Platonism) into the simulacrum' to of a copy(Platonism) be 'reversed (D 1990:265).In this way,the essence-appearance distincor model-copy to tions usedby modern philosophers tacklePlatoare shownby Deleuze's genealogy Plato to be ineffectivein reversingPlatonism. of Connectives Kant Nietzsche Thought

POLITICS + ECOLOGY RosiBraidotti of Adlpting llaruch Spinoza'smonism to an ccosophy transccndcnttl of''inrnrlncncc': incorpornting thc cmpiricism, l)clcuzcconstructs conccpt

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strainsof vitalismand yet still bypassing essentialism. Choosingto move beyond the dualism of human/non-human,Deleuze'secosophy rejects liberal individualismas much as it does the holism of 'deep ecology'. Primarily,the ecosophy Deleuzeaspires express rhizomaticstrucof to the ture of subjectivity. The subject's mind is 'part of nature'- embedded and embodied that is to sayimmanentand dynamic.As the structureof the Deleuziansubjectis interactive, is inherently ethical.In this manner, it when Deleuzeimbues ethical agencywith an anti-essenrialist vision of displaces anthropocentric 'commitment'he accordingly the bias of communitarianism. The ecosophical ethicsof Deleuzeincorporares physics the and biology of bodiesthat together produceethological forces. Insteadof the essentialist question-'What is a body?'- Deleuzeprefersto inflect his questions slightlydifferently. asks: He 'What cana body candol'and'How much can a body can take?'. We are thereforeinvited ro think about the problemof ecosophy terms of affectivity:How is affectivityenhanced impoverin or joy ished? this way,ethicalvirtue,empowerment, andunderstanding In are implied. However,an act of understandingdoes not merely entail the mental acquisitionof certain ideas, but it also coincideswith bodily processes. is thus an activity that actualises It what is goodfor the subject, potentia. for example Mind and body act in unisonand are synchronised by what Spinozacallsconatus, that is to saythe desireto becomeand to increase intensityof one'sbecoming. the The selection composite positivepassions, of that constituteprocesses of becoming, worksasa matterof affective corporeal and affinity.An ethical relation is conduciveto joyful and empoweringencounters that express one'spotentiaand increase subject'scapacityto enter into further relathe tions.This expansion boundboth spatially is (environmental) remporand ally (endurance). entering into ethical relations,nomadicbecomings By engenderpossible futures in that, as they produceconnections, they in turn producethe affective possibilityof the world asa whole. Vitalist ecosophy also functionsto critique advanced capitalism; more specifically capitalist consumerism the over-indulgent and consumption of resources. a temporalsequence, As capitalism engenders schizophrenic the simultaneity opposite of effects and therefore short-circuitsthe present. it Thus, it immobilises it saturates social as the space with commodities. The temporal disjunction induced by the speedyrurnover of available commodities is not different from the jet-lag one suffers after flying from London to Sydney. Capitalism inducesa perverse logic of desirebased on the deferral of pleasurefulfilment, deferring the gratificationonto thc of 'next generation' tcchnological commoditics gadgcts: picccmcal and thc instalmcnts popillarculturcin thc filrm of''infirtirinmcnt'thirtbccomc of

obsolete at the speed of light. These legal addictions titillate without release, inducing dependencywithout any senseof responsibility. This mixture of dependencyand dissatisfactionconstitutespower as a nucleus passions, of negative suchasresentment, frustration,envyand bitterness. Deleuze'secosophy radical immanenceand intensivesubjectsresof ponds to the unsustainable logic and internal contradictions advanced of capitalism. This Deleuzianbody is in fact an ecological unit. Through a structureof mutual flowsand data-transfer, that probablyis bestunderone stoodin reference viral contamination intensive to or interconnection, this body is environmentallyinterdependent.This environmentally-bound intensive subject a collective is entity; it is an embodied, affective inteland ligent entity that captures,processes and transforms energiesand forces. Being environmentally-bound it and territorially-based is immersed in fieldsthat constantly flow and transform. All in all, Deleuzeexpands notion of universalism be more incluthe to sive.He doesthis in two ways.First, by affirming biocentredand transspecies egalitarianism an ethicalprinciple,he opensup the possibilityof as conceptualising post-humanity. a Second, new sense globalintercona of nectionis established the ethicsfor non-unitarysubjects, as emphasising a commitmentto others(includingthe non-human,non-organic and 'earth' others).By removingthe obstacle self-centred of individualism,the politics of Deleuzianecosophy implies a new way of combininginterests with an enlargedsenseof community.Deleuze insists that it is the task of philosophyto create that respondto forms of ethicaland politicalactivities the complex and multilayered nature of 'belonging'. In other words, philosophyin the handsof Deleuzebecomes nomadicecosophy mula of tiple beings.

POSTCOLONIAL THEORY
VerenaConlejt Postcolonial theory is derived from terms such as 'minoritarian', 'nomadism', 'becoming' and their variants. A worldwide becomingminoritarian bearsa potential Qpuissancevirtuality) that can affectbodies or politics,of underminingthe power and words.The contextis oneof sexual (pouaoir givenforce)of the white malewho hasorder-words his disat or posal.Minorities havenothing to do with numbersbut with internalrelations. Of importancc are the connectionsbetween bodies and words, valuc cspccially conjunctivc frrrms(suchils'and' and 'plus')that irugmcnt whichtlrcylrc firund. l')vcry nujor hnguirgc ridcllcd is to thc tcrmsbctwccn

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with minor languages that transform order-wordsand deterritorialise or dispersetheir mortifying effects.The more a language the characterishas tics of a major language, more,toq it is affected continuousvariations the by that transform it into a 'minor' language. Insteadof criticising the worldwide imperialism of English in our time by denouncingthe corruption it introducesinto other languages, one can say that the idiom is necessarily workedupon by all the minorities of the world that imposediverseprocedures of variation:in the handsof minoritarians English becomes-pidgin, a form that mocksits lawsandstrictures reterritorialises for newends. and it It is clearthat two languages neverexistadjacent eachother,and that as to a resulttwo idiomsarereallyonly two treatments the same of language. Ratherthanoperating between something and something seen said,languagegoesfrom sayingto saying,utteranceto utterance,and from aphorism to aphorism.Postcolonial theory does not deal with the 'look' of phenomenology with the transmission language. dealsespecially but of It with the order-word,or password, that it replaces with passages. When, in passage the limit, language a to losesits fixed meaning,bodiesenter into a process metamorphosis. of They losetheir identities and becomecommon and totalised,the idioms of everybody(tout le monde). The becoming-minoritarianof bodiesand language linked to creativis ity. Literature is a privileged field for a becoming-minoritarian.A minor literature works the maior languagefrom the inside. In a postcolonial context,minor literaturedeals with the undoingof the majorlanguage, not by reterritorialisingby mere usage of a dialect but by transforming imposedor inheritedorder-words that giveit meaningand direction. The processof becoming-minoritarian can be accelerated what by Deleuzecallsthe'war machine'. That is, the axiomatic the white,monoof lingual,English-speaking maleand the worldwideinstitutionof capitalism needsto be challenged. is only by leaving, It and by neverceasing leave, to the plan(e) capitalthat masses of from the Third World and the ex-colonies shift the forcesin the dominantequilibrium. If minoritiesdo not constitute viableStates a cultural,political,or economic in sense, is because it the State-form,the axiomaticrule of capitaland their corresponding culture may not be appropriatefor them. Capitalismmaintainsand organises nonviable States for the precise purpose of crushing minorities. Devolving upon minorities is the task of countering the worldwide war machine by meansothor than thoseits juggernaughtimposesupon them. To becoming-minoritarianis tantamountto undoing closuresand transforming striatedspaces into smoothand unimpededspaces where words and bodiesmoveat top speed an ongoingprocss deterritorialisation. in of Becoming-minoritarian linked to physicaland mental nomrdism. I'br is nomtds,contrirryto migrirntswho g<lfr<tmonc point to irnothcr; cvcry

point they reach is a relay. Nomads and migrants can mix, yet their conditions are not the same.The nomads' trajectory distributes people. Sedentaryor dominant spaceis striated with walls and roads. Nomadic space markedonly by'traits'that areeffaced displaced the moveis and by ment of trajectories.The nomad doesnot want to leavethe smooth space left by the receding forest where the desert advances. Nomadism is inventedasa response this challenge. to Nomadshaveabsolute movement, that is, speedwhich is intensive. The migrants' movements extensive. are Vorticalor swirlingmovement an essential is featureof the war machineof the nomad. Contrary to the migrants who reterritorialisethemselves, nomadsfind themselves ongoingdeterritorialisation. in In an era of global capitalismorder-wordsare the sameeverywhere. Minoritarian masses at the sametime engaged a worldwideprocess are in of becomingand in a creative transformation the order-words of imposed in the nameof democratic capitalism. Postcolonial theory,argues Deleuze, is built from these processes. practice assumes Its different forms and shapes according the natureofgeography, to historyand the inheritedconditions of conflict. Connectives Creativetransformation Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Minoritarian

POST.STRUCTURALISM Alberto Toscano

+ POLITICS

The post-structuralist, evenanti-structuralist, or character Deleuzeand of Guattari can be said to rest on four elements: theory of subjectivation, a a critique of the notion of ideology, ontologyof control and an analythe post-structuralism bestgauged, only by sisof capitalism. Deleuze's is not his attack on structuralismin the 1970s, but by consideringhis earlier appropriation of structuralist themes, especiallyhis formulation of the fundamental criteria for structuralism in 'How do we Recognize (1967,seeStivale1998). Structuralism?' This essay stands for its attenout tion to how structuralismarticulatesthe empty placeat the heart of the symbolic,the accidents structure (or spatio-temporal of dynamisms) and pcrhaps kcy issuc irn instirncc subjcctivity. Dclcuzc,it inclicatcs of Rlr thc of thc politiurl,undcrstood thc problcmof novclty(or bccoming), rrs

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By portraying the structuralist subject (or hero) as comprising affectedby impersonalindividuations and pre-individual singularities, immanentto the structure,Deleuze,in 1967 formulatedone of the events , few,if not the only, consistentdefinition of post-structuralism.By emphasising the importanceof praxis in the mutation of structures,Deleuzelays structuralismbehind. the ground for a conceptionof politics that leaves with Guattari, as a factory driven by flows of Treating the unconscious, Deleuzebreakswith the desire, rather than asa theatreof representation, whole thematic of ideology (and its critique) that defined the Freudo(and thus continuedhis earlierempiricistconcern Marxism of the 1960s jurisprudence). The emphasis a sub-representaon with institutionsand heralded a tional, libidinal dimensionto socialand psychic(re)production or to movefrom a focuson structures what might be calleda constructivist at ethologicalapproach,aimed at discerningthe modalitiesof synthesis work in the collectiveproduction of subjectivity.Accompanyingthis shift and of wasone from an earlierconcernwith problems organisation genesis to (seethe discussion the ideaof revolutionin DffirenceandRepetition) of populatinga planeof immafocuson formsof individuation(haecceities) a and differences. nencethat cannotbe capturedby any structureof places By shifting the focusof an analysisof capitalismfrom value and labour to codificationand desire,whilst retaining many elementsof the Marxian correlationof polita problematic, Deleuzeand Guattarievade dialectical prefer an inventoryof Insteadthey change. ical subjectivityand systemic (or is wherebydesiringsubjectivity prothe typesof operations syntheses) duced and an outline of how capitalismand its Statesare able to axiomatise and capture subjectivity,in order to bend it to the imperativesof surplusvalue. (or of Now it is the materialeffects the axiomatic of capitalistsubjectivin and ity) on subjects, not their placement a structurethrough ideological interpellation that areat stake.It is not only from the sideof commandthat Deleuzeand the systemiccorrelation(whetherstructural or dialectical) poweror dominationand subjectivation undermined.In their are between formulations of the conceptsof 'minority' and of the 'war machine', autonomyor exterthe Deleuzeand Guattari alsodelineate constructive mechanisms control and of nality of certain forms of subiectivationto the exploitation.Rather than identifying the subject with an instancethat the it accompanies structureand appropriates heroically, minoritarian the subject(or the subjectof the war machine)is definedby a line of flight, creativityand ontological which signals both its capacityfor independent seeks capture to the the mannerin which it affects societythat perpetually <tf undcrstandings or idcntify it. This attackon symbolicand dialectical is both ir milttcrof principlctnd of conittnctttrc. llolitics

On the one hand, Deleuzeand Guattari'sphilosophyis determinedby an anti-dialectical impetus:to think the independence becoming,and of the possibilityof an ethicsoutsideany frameworkof legitimationor regulation. Consider their separationof becoming and history, such that becoming-revolutionaryis a trans-temporal event that can detach itself from the fateof an actualrevolution.In conjuncturalterms,Deleuze's definition of the society of control, following William S. Burroughs and Michel Foucault, argues that we areno longerin a situationwhere,evenat the formal level,we could speakof a correlation or transitivity betweenthe system and its individual subjects. mechanisms disciplinecometo be As of superseded technologies control, politicsis more and more a matter by of of 'dividuality', such that the impersonaland the pre-individualbecome the very materialof control,but alsoof minoritariansubjectivation the and constructionof effectivealternatives. Whence Deleuze'spreferencefor notionsof combator guerrillawarfareover thoseof antagonism (class) or struggle: for Delduze, the combat betweenand within individuals, as becoming, the preconditionof the combatagainstor resistance. is This is what differentiates combat from war, which takesthe confrontationof subjects primary. as

POWER Claire Colebrook Although the conceptof powerin Frenchphilosophyis usuallyassociated with Michel Foucault,and althoughDeleuzeand Guattari in A Thousand, Plateaus explicitlycriticalof Foucault's of the word 'power' (rather are use than their own 'desire' which they seeas creatingrelations through which powermight operate),it makes greatdealof sense locateDeleuzewithin a to a tradition of the philosophyof power.This is not power in the political sense a powerexercised one body overanotherbody - but is closerto by the positiveidea of plver t0. Deleuze'santecedents this tradition are in BaruchSpinoza and FriedrichNietzsche. Spinoza beingis defined For a by its power,its striving or its potential to maintain itself. Rather than seeing human life ashavinga proper form which it then ought to realise, that so potential wouldbe properlyorientedtowards actualisation, Spinoza regards potentialityas creativeand expressive; all life is the striving ro express if substance all its differentpotentials in then the fulfilment or jo.yof human life is the cxpansion power. of of Joy,as the realisation power,is therefore diffcrcntfrom thc moral opposition grxrdirncl of cvil, an oppositirlrr that powcrby constririningwithinsomc im;rcdcs it rlrcirdy givcnnrlrnr.

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Nietzsche, whose 'Will to Power' for Deleuze is also an affirmation of life (and not the assertion or imposition of power), extended Spinoza's expressivephilosophy. Instead of there being bodies or enrities that have a certain power or potential, Nietzsche begins with powers or forces, from which beings are effected. A master does not have power because he is a master; rather, it is the exercise of a certain power which produces masters and slaves.Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche is concerned primarily with Nietzsche as a philosopher of power and forces, where force has a strict metaphysical function. There are powers (or quanta of force) that in their encounter or connection with other powers produce relations, but nothing in the power itself determines how it will be actualised, and any power has the potential to be actualised differently. Deleuze's repeated insistence that relations are external to terms has a twofold significance. First, in line with a philosophy of power, Deleuze does not begin from beings that then enter into relations; rather, there are powers to be, powers that are actualised only in their relation to other powers. So what a power ej is secondaryto its potential; the virtual precedes the actual. Second, if powers are, in this world, actualisedin a certain way, through the particular relations that have been effected, it is also possible for different relations to produce different worlds; powers might be actualised through other relations. For Deleuze, power is positive; there are not beings who then have the power to act, or who then suffer from power (where power would be the corruption of, or fall from, some passivestate). Rather, a being is its power or what it can do. For Deleuze, then, power posesa problem: How is it that beings can be separated from their power? Why does power appear to be something from which we suffer; why does power seem to be repressive? For Deleuze, this is becausewe rest too easily with the effects of power its manifestations, what we already are - without intuiting power's force how points of power emerge, what we might be, and what we can do. More importantly, and following Nietzsche, Deleuze makesan ethical distinction between active and reactive powers. An active power maximises its potential, pushes itself to its limit and affirms the life of which it is but one expression.A reactive power, by contrast, turns back upon itself. The usual concept of political power is reactive.We imagine - from the image of individuals who exist together in a possible community - that we then need to form some form of political relation or system (so power in this senseis power between or among beings). But there can only be a polity or individual beings ifthere has already been an active power that has crcirtcclsnch a community or assemblagc pcrsons;oncc wc rcaliscthis thcn wc nright of think of politics ts thc rccrcafion<lrrc:tctiv:rti<ln p<lwcr, of' n<ltirst hc rcclisI lillr r t ion r lr nrrrn rrg trrrc o l ' l )o w c t' . rrl

Connectives Active/Reactive Force

on PROUST, MARCEL (1871-1922) referto theentries 'art', 'faciality', and'thought'. 'multiplicity','semiotics'

PSYCHOANALYSIS _ FAMILY, FREUD, AND UNCONSCIOUS Alison Ross Farnily role within psychoanalytic theory;its The 'family' hasa pivotalconceptual primacy in psychoanalysis neither limited to the bourgeoisnuclear is that dealswith it. Rather, family nor the therapeuticpracticeof analysis given by Sigmund Freud to the Oedipus through the organisingrole model for the organisation of complex,the 'family' actsasan explanatory practice- but extends desirein the individual- asseenin his therapeutic aswell to the historicalforcesinvolvedin the shapingof instinct described writings on civilisation. in his meta-psychological The Oedipuscomplexintroducesthe sense an externalprohibition of The significance this of under which infantilelibido is definitivelyshaped. complex is that unlike the other forcesshapingthe libido, which Freud describes standingin a relationof psychical as oppositionto unrestrained the Oedipus expenditureand which appearto be internally generated, the complextakes form of an externalprohibition and presupposes trithe The universality this of the angularrelationbetween child and its parents. agencyagainstincestthat setsup complexis usedby Freud to explainthe wishesand the law Its unithe necessary division for civilisationbetween versalityis alsoindicativeof the primacyof the family unit asan explanain tory category psychoanalysis. The libidinal relationswithin the family havea crucialrole to play asthe prototypcfor adult relations, which an externalprohibitionorganises in however, s:rtisflaction.is importirnt remember, It to rttcmptsirt instinctual nuclcurf'anrily upon arrirctuirl tlut lhcsclillidinrrltics rrrcnot clcpcnclcnt ()ctlillrrs li;ltrrcot' corrrlllcx bc lirrrttctl t'rrrr wilh it llitlct'ttitl rrrrd llrrrsrrrr

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structureof authority,or, in the work of Jacques Lacan, an institutional force such as language, rather than an actualfather.Here, as in Freud's writings on phylogenesis, important themein the negotiation libidthe of inousrelations of within the family is the credence the threatof the prohibition placed on incestuous relations. The writings on the topic of phylogenesisexamine a similar theme in the prohibitive force of the 'primal father' over the'primal horde'. In Deleuze's writing on psychoanalysis, attacks the use of the he model of the Oedipal family because sees as justifying a particular he it for conceptionof desire.In the Anti-Oed,ipu.s, instance,he and Guattari complainnot only aboutthe unhistoricalprojectionof the familial structure acrosscultures and history, so that some psychoanalysts locate the figure of the 'primal father' in Neo- and Paleolithic times, but alsq that the psychoanalytic use of a familial structure containsdesire to sexual relations within the family. These relations do not simply constitute desirein relation to the shapingforce of an externalprohibition but also mark out intellectual,political and cultural formationsassubstitutes that compensatefor the prohibition placed on desire by the incest taboo. Against the 'daddy-mummy-me' formation of desire described in Freud's case study of little Flans, or the explanation of Leonardo da Vinci's curiosity in terms of his infantile memories, they propose a those writers, such as D. H. defamilialisationof desire and consecrate Lawrence, who write against the trap of familialism. In particular, Deleuze and Guattari are critical of the interpretativelicencegiven to psychoanalysis its postulate of the familial organisationof desire: by through this postulate, psychoanalysisneither explains desire nor renders cultural formations legible but, on their view, justifies the misinterpretation of desireas a libidinal force capturedwithin and shaped by familial dynamics. This critique of the psychoanalytic accountof the family derivesits force from Deleuzeand Guattari'sanalysis the reterritorialising of function of capitalism in the two volumes of Capitalismand,Schizophrenia. Capital operatesaccording to a logic of deterritorialisation in which the flowsofcapital areno longerextractedfrom agricultural labour,but, rather than being tied to the produceof the land, are transnational global. or Although capitaltendstowarda deterritorialisation geographical, familof ial and sogial it defersthis limit by reiteratingartificialterritorialities. ties, In this contextpsychoanalysis, particularlyits useof the family asan but explanatory unit for desire,is criticisedasone of the paradigmatic movementsby which the family is reiteratedand the logic of deterritorialising flowsis capturedby a function of reterritorialisation.

Freud, Sigmund ( I 856-1939) medicalcasehistories;studiesin the Sigmund Freud wrote conventional narcisresearch: unconscious, the particularcategories psychoanalytic of of sism, dreamsand infantile sexuality;aswell asanalyses cultural institutions and practicessuch as art and religion. His postulate of a repressed of infantile sexualityat the core of the pathologies civilisedlife led to his This postulate,which formed isolationfrom the medicalestablishment. towardculposturetakenby psychoanalysis the basis the interpretative for material, also underpinned its counter-cultural tural and therapeutic a status.Freud's approachto art and religion was,for instance, radically demystifying one, which held that religious belief was an infantile desire for an irreproachablefather figure and that the products of high culture were financed by, and legible as, displacedlibidinal drives. Deleuze, however,is scepticalof the radical statusclaimed by Freudian psychoHis analysis. criticismsof Freud relateto the way he insistson the Oedipal raisedagainstit by clinical orderingof desire,evendespitethe questions of evidence and the researches other psychoanalysts. ideas important pointsof departurefor someof Deleuze's Nonetheless, can be found in Freud's thought. In the two volumes of Capitalismand and Schizophrenia,Deleuze Guattari try to marry Freud's conceptionof of libidinal flowswith Karl Marx's conception capital.This project,which refuses dualismbetweenpsychicand materialreality,involvesa recuthe perationof someof the elements Freudianthought. Hence they reject in the way desire'sproductivity is confinedto a psychicalreality,but in so doing they developand radicalisethe Freudian insight that wrests desire from pre-ordainedfunctions such asreproduction. of the confinement desire, Asidefrom rejectingthe impotent,psychical his constant complaintof the authorsin this studyagainstFreud concerns accountof schizophrenics EugeneBleuler'snegative to willingness accept Freud asautisticfigureswho are cut off from reality.Even here,however, of alsoprovidesan important point of departurefor their defence schizoas the'clinical'schizophrenia.They argueagainst confusing, Freud does, phrenic who is rendered ill and autistic with the connective practice of assemand produces states segregated desire,which fusesconventionally In are that they believe modelledin schizophrenia. this project,they blages follow the practicein someof Freud's writing in which literary and culsource ableto correctand develop become diagnostic the tural productions of 'clinical' terms.Hence,the evidence the schizopole of desireis found in Antonin Artaud and Henry Miller, ratherthan the clinicalcontextthat dcsircs. pathokrgiscs rcnders impotcntconnectivc rncl

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unfinished'critique This strategy, which formed the basisfor Deleuze's questionsomeof the central diagnosticcatand clinical' project, callsinto Freud's conception of 'sadoegories of Freudian psychoanalysis. is examination masochism' a couplet,for instance, refutedby Deleuze's as in of the writing of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch which he showssadism and masochismto be completelydistinct, rather than inverseand complementarydisorders. in Finally,Deleuze's criticalrelationto Freud canbe summarised terms In and therapeutic of the Freudian drive to teleology. his meta-psychology practice,what was of interest to Freud was an accountof the 'origins' For underpinningcurrent circumstances. the psychoanalyst 'origins' play as a role in two distinct senses: an explanatorymodel that the analyst, finding the origin had blockedfrom direct access, to fathom - in this sense for the symptomsof neurosisalso has a curativefunction. But Freud's frame he usedto locate mode of access theseorigins,the interpretative to the eventsthat had becomepathogensin an individuals' life, ought not to obscurethe fact that the interpretative force he gaveto theseoriginating and events cameto be usedasa predictorfor development a theory,therefor fore,of the differentcourses waspossible psychiclife to follow.It is it this teleological orientation and its installation of a dualism between 'nature' and 'civilisation'that Deleuzerejectsand that underpinshis critical reworkingof key Freudianideas. IJnconscious The'unconscious'inpsychoanalytic terminologyrefersto the accretion of instinctual drives that are repressedby the individual in the processof adaptationto social demands.Nonetheless, these drives remain active forces the psyche andbehaviour individuals. of Dreams,parapraxis and on instincts in casesof hysteria provide Freud somatic displacements of with the proof of the unconscious not as a sealedoff locality, but as processes lawsbelongingto a system.In Freud'sfirst topographyof and the psychical apparatus(unconscious,pre-conscious, conscious),the repression from the unconscious designates thosecontentsbanishedby pre-conscious--conscious system. In his second,dynamic conception of is the psyche(id, ego, superego) unconscious replacedby the id or the Here instinctshavethe statusof agencies in instinctualpoleof the psyche. psychicalapparatus. both cases, dynamicrole of the unconscious In the the or instincts takes psychoanalysis away from a descriptive,phenomenologicalapproach the 'facts'of psychiclife, and designates activerole the to of the analyst in the interpretation of the work of systematisation pcrftrrmcd thc unconscious. by

of account the of In Deleuze's thought,heuses aspects this psychoanalytic to unconscious argueagainstboth the conceptionof desireasconfiguredin principleof'lack', andthe interpsychoanalysis relationto a transcendent in pretative In relationto psychiclife that this relationlicenses. Anti-Oedipus the 'desiringmachine'is modelledon a conceptionof the unconscious, it functionof a limit that contains to an indiwhich is without the regulating The processes ascribed Freud to the unconscious that it by vidualsubject. to of acceptability dovetail operates withoutconceding the demands social with the features that Deleuze and Guattari ascribe to the desiring that form, for instance, conjunctivesyntheses machines thesemachines instead an of However, of operate according an expansive to sense possibility. impotent manifestationof unrealisablewishes, interpretable by psychoanalysisin the form of their distorted manifestationin consciouslife, the to are desiringmachines definedin termsof their capacity forgelinks to an the outsideand thereforein terms of their capacityto surpass regulating principle (such as the superego)or natural limit. force of a higher Reinterpreted theseterms,the unconscious not an interior localeonly in is ableto be interpretedin its impotent and distortedformations,but is the or logicaccording which anarchic to connections assembled made. are givea positiveaccountof the psychoanalytic Although desiringmachines the is category the unconscious, term 'unconscious' not directly transof posable that of the 'desiringmachine',or the term 'assemblage' usedin to the designates what gets A Thousand Plateaus. This is because unconscious or left overin the process the construction shift from onemachine/assemof however, unconscious not reconcilable is In the blageto another. suchuses, affects, refersto but of to the Freudianconception a registerof submerged prior, fractal,materialcomponentsof desiringmachines/assemblages.

Connectives Desire Lacan PartialObjects Schizoanalysis

REA(;'tIVli - rcf'crto thc cntrv on 'itctivc/rcilctivc'.

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James Williams

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Deleuzesubyerts concept'real' throughhis distinctiondrawnbetween the the 'actual'andthe'virtual'. For him, the actualis morelike what we would ordinarilyunderstand the real,that is, a realmof thingsthat existindeas pendently of our ways of thinking about them and perceivingthem. Whereas virtual is the realmof transcendental the conditions the actual, for that is, thingsthat we haveto presuppose thereto be actualthingsat all. for More seriously, with respectto any discussion his work in terms of of realism,Deleuzedeniesany priority accorded human subjects, their to to minds, ideas,perceptualapparatuses linguistic capacities. we trador If itionally frame the oppositionbetweenreal and unreal through the distinction drawn between thing that is dependent us (the chair I dream a on of, or imagine)and an independenr existenr(the real chair),then we shall havestartedwith a conceptualframework that doesnot fit Deleuze'sphilosophywell at all. Rather, Deleuze provides us with critical angles against traditional realismand a new metaphysical framework for developinga conceptof the real. Accordingto this conceprthe real is the virtual and the actual.It is hence betterto think of realthingsin termsmoreof complete thingsrather than independentones.Note that this commits Deleuze to degreesof realityand unrealityor illusion.We shouldnot sayrealor unreal,bur more or lessreal,meaninga more or lesscompleteexpression the thing. of It is questionable whetherwe can saythat a thing is completelyreal,in Deleuze'swork, other than the metaphysical statement that the real is all of the actualand of the virtual. Wheneverwe givean expression a thing of it will be under an individual form of expression that allowsfor further completion.More importantly,that completionwill involve a synthetic alterationof the components any earlierreality,to the point whereno of componentcanbe claimedto be finally realor complete. For example, Deleuze, mountainexists realwith all the waysit has for a as beenpainted,sensed, written aboutand walkedover.It alsoexistswith all the virtual conditionsfor them, such asideasand different intensitiesof sensations. The real mountain changes completelywhen it is paintedand sensed anew:whenits namechanges, whenit is mined,or movedthroughdifferently. This means that traditionalformsof realismarecomplerely oddswith at philosophy, Deleuze's sincethe notion that the realstands oppositionto in somethingunrealor imaginaryalreadysetsthe real as somethingincomplete.So to speak thc realchairasif it couldbe identified of inclcpcndcntly of onr idcrslbout'it is rr mistarkc conccrning significirncc thc of'things,

Reality goeshand in hand with ideal and emotional effects,rather than being free of them. Does this mean that Deleuze is an idealist, denying the existenceof an independentexternal reality and bringing all things into the mind? philosophyis beyondthe idealistand realistdistinction.There Deleuze's are actualthings and we should pay attention to them. Without them it But, reciprodoesnot makesense speakof virtual ideasor intensities. to cally,it makesno sense speakof real or actualthings asif they could be to from the idealand emotionalfieldsthat makethem live for us. abstracted

Connectives Actuality Virtual/Virtuality

REICH, WILHELM

(1897-1957) referto the entry on 'schizoanalysis'. -

REPETITION Ad,rian Parr The conceptof 'repetition',asit appears the Deleuziancorpus,encomin passes variety of other conceptssuch as 'difference','differentiation', a and 'becoming'.To begin with, it should be noted 'deterritorialisation', repetitionis not a matterof the same that for Deleuze, thing occurringover and over again. That is to say,repetition is connectedto the power of variationin and difference terms of a productiveprocess in that produces through every repetition. In this way, repetition is best understoodin terms of discovery and experimentation; allowsnew experiences, it affects and expressions emerge.To repeatis to begin again;to affirm the power to of the new and the unforeseeable. so far as life itself is described a In as dynamic and active force of repetition producing difference,the force of which Deleuze encourages to think of in terms of 'becoming', forces us incorporate differenceas they repeatgiving rise to mutation. The first question that arises is: How is repetition produced?For Deleuze, repetition is produced via difference, not mimesis. It is a process ungrounding that resists of turning into an inert systemof replication.In fact,thc wholePlatonistideaof rcpcatingin ordcr to producc copicsis complctcly unclcrminccl l)clcuzc. lior l)clcuzc maintirins by

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this approachis deeplyflawedbecause subsumes creativenature of it the differenceunder an immobile systemof resemblance. Deleuze refusesto seekan originary point out of which repetition can cyclically reproduce itself. He insists that the processdoes not depend upon a subject or object that repeats, rather it is self-sustainable.Whilst repetition is potentially infinite, consistingof new beginnings,it is crucial we do not mistake this to be a linear sequence: end of one cycle marking the the beginningof the next. In his innovativediscussions Friedrich Nietzsche's of conceptof the eternalreturn, Deleuzeturns his backon a teleological understanding of repetition condemning such interpretations to be flawed. Instead, he insiststhat the process Nietzscheoutlines is considerably more complicated than that: the return is an activeaffirmation that intensifiesas it returns. Put differently, heterogeneityarisesout of intensity. In addition, the return pointsto a wholethat emerges throughdifference variation: and one and the multiple in combination. his readingof Nietzsche, In Deleuze explains his 1968work Dffirenceand, in Repetitionthat is the'power of this beginningand beginningagain'(D 1994:136). question: This now leads on to the second us What is repeated? First, it is important to notethat repetitionis not unidirectional, thereis no object of repetition,no final goaltowardwhich everything that repeats be said can to direct itself. What repeats, then, is not models,stylesor identitiesbut the full force of difference and of itself, thosepre-individualsingularin ities that radicallymaximisedifferenceon a plane of immanence. an In earlyessay from 1956 Henri Bergson, on Deleuze insistsrepetitionis more a matterof coexistence succession, than repetitionis virtual which is to say, more than it is actual.It is this innovativeunderstanding the process of of difference and differentiation that mutates the context through which repetitionoccurs. Thus, in a very real sense, repetitionis a creative activityof transformation. When Deleuzespeaks the 'new' that repetition invokes,he is likeof wise pointing to creativity, whereby habit and convention are both destabilised. The'new', for Deleuze, filled with innovationand actually is preventsthe trap of routines and clich6s; the latter characterise habitual waysof living. As a power of the new,repetition callsforth a terr&incognita filled with a sense noveltyandunfamiliarity. instance, is a far cry of For this from Sigrqund Freud who posited that we compulsivelyrepeat the past, pushes to reiterate whereall the materialof our repressed unconscious us the pastin all its discomfortand pain.Actually,psychoanalysis limits repetition to representation, what therapyaims to do is stop the process and entirelyalongwith the disorders givesriseto. Deleuze, the othcr hirnd, it on cncourirgcs to rcpcirt us hccausc sccs it thc possibility rcinvcntion, hc in of

repetitiondissolves identitiesasit changes them, giving rise that is to say, and productive. It is for this reasonthat he to somethingunrecognisable repetitionis a positivepower(puissance) transformation. of maintains

Connectives Active/Reactive Becoming Difference Eternalreturn Psychoanalysis

REPETITION + CINEMA Constantine Vereois and Deleuze'sbookson cinema- CinemaI: Themooement-image Cinema 2: Thetime-imoge are about the possibility of 'repeating' a film (or films) As within the institution of cinemastudies. in RolandBarthes'accountof re-reading, this repetition would not be the re-presentation of identity (a re-discovery the same), but the re-production- the creationand the of exhibition- of the differencethat lies at the heart of repetition (B 1974). bookscanbe seenasan attempt to negoFor film studies,Deleuze'sCinema (film) theory and history via a non-totalising tiate the tension between one which canattendto the heterogeneity the local conceptofdifference, repetitions- of historicalmaterial. and specific In Dffirence and,Repetition, Delettze puts forward two alternative theoriesof repetition. The first, a 'Platonic' theory of repetition, posits a world of difference based upon some pre-established similitude or The second,a identity; it definesa world of copies (representations). that similitude and identity theory of repetition suggests 'Nietzschean' is the product of some fundamental disparity or difference; it defines Taking theseformulations as distinct a world of simulacra(phantasms). interpretationsof the world, Deleuze describessimulacraas intensive systems constituted by the placing together of disparate elements. Within these differential series,a third virtual object (dark precursor, eternal return, abstract machine) plays the role of differenciator,the in-itself of difference which relates different to different, and allows divergcntscricsto rcturn asdivcrsityand its rc-production.As systcms point of vicw,sinrultcrit this diff'crcntial thrrtincluclcwithin thcnrsclvcs

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(the model of recognition)to effectthe evadethe limit of representation intensity of an encounter with difference and its repetition, a pure becoming-in-the-world. The idea of the intensivesystem,and its frustration of any attempt to a establish order of succession, hierarchyof identity and resemblance an moreevidentthan in the serialrepebetween originaland copy is nowhere the tition of new Hollywood cinema,especially film remake.The majority remaking understand it as a one-way of critical accountsof cinematic process: movement from authenticity imitation,from the superiorselfto a resemblance the remake.For of identity of the original to the debased release Gus Van Sant's of instance, much of the discussion aroundthe 1998 (1960)wasan expresremake('replica') of Alfred Hitchcock'sPsycho close sion of outrage and confusion at the defilementof a revered classic. that Reviewers 'Hitchcockians'agreed VanSantmadetwo fundamental and mistakes:the first, to haveundertakento remakea landmark of cinematic history; and the second,to have followed the Hitchcock original (almost) differed shotby shot,line by line.Evenfor thosewho notedthat the rpmake addednothing to what in its detail from the Hitchcockfilm, the revisions fixity (identity) against a remainedan intact and undeniable classic, semantic as which the new versionwasevaluated and dismissed a degradedcopy. Deleuze'saccountof Rather than follow theseessentialist trajectories, application that remakingin its most general repetitionsuggests cinematic aspect a broader of as might - more productively- be regarded a specific has been and more open-endedintertextuality. A modern classic,Psycho moviesinitiretrospectively codedas the forerunnerto a cycleof slasher (1978)andcelebrated the sequels series that folin and atedby Hallopeen movie sub-genre interestin the slasher lowed.More particularly,the 1970s sequels sawthe characterof Norman Batesrevivedfor a number of Psycho quoted in a host of homages, notably QI-I\, and the Hitchcock original the films of Brian De Palma.Eachof theserepetitionscan be understood as a limited form of remaking,suggestingthat the precursor text is never singular, and that Van Sant's Psychoremake differs textually from these not but other examples in bind,, only in degree. a While the aboveapproachestablishes largecircuit betweenPsycho-60 is there is anotherposition: namely,that Van Sant'sPsycho andPsycho-98, not close enough to the Hitchcock version.This suggestion that an playssimultaneously between mostmechanical the of irreduciblg difference Douglas by of repetitions is bestdemonstrated an earlierremake Psycho, (1993).So namedbecause takestwenty-four it Gordon's24 Hour Psycho that re-runs hoursto run its course, Gordon'sversionis a videoinstallation just per second, fastenoughfor cach Ps.ycho-60 ntapproximately frames two strltcgy clcmonstratcs imagcto bc pullcclforwardinto thc ncxt. Gordon's

that eachand every film is remade- dispersed and transformed- in its every new context or configuration.Gordon doesnot set out to imitate Psycho to repeatit - to changenothing, but at the sametime allow an but absolutedifferenceto emerge.Understood in this way,Psycho-98 not a is perversion an original identity,but the productionof a new event,one of that addsto (ratherthan corrupts)the serialityof the former version.

REPRESENTATION lohn Marks for moral view of the 'Representation', Deleuze, entails an essentially world, explicitly or implicitly drawingon what'everybodyknows',and he conceives ofphilosophy asan antidoteto this view.Representation cannot help us to encounter world asit appears the flow of time andbecomthe in ing. It constitutesa particularly restrictedform of thinking and acting, working accordingto fixed norms, and which is unableto acknowledge difference 'in itself'. ln Dffirence and RepetitionDeleuze challengesthe representational conception philosophy. of Here, he contrasts 'poet' to the the 'politician'.The poet speaks the nameof a creative power,and seeks in to affirm difference a stateof permanentrevolution:he is willing to be as destructive in the searchfor the 'new'. The new, in this sense,remains forever new, since it has the power of beginning anew every time. It enables forcesin thought which are not the forcesof recognition,but the powersof an unrecognisable terra incognita. The politician, on the other hand, seeksto deny that which differs in order to establishor maintain a particularhistoricalorder.In philosophical terms, Deleuzeproposes to between original- the thing the 'overturn'Platonism,which distinguishes that most resembles itself, characterised exemplaryself-identity- and by the copy,which is alwaysdeficient in relation to the original. Platonism is incapable thinking difference itself,preferringto conceive it in relaof in of tion to'the thing itself'. In order to go beyondrepresentation, is necesit sary,therefore, underminethe primacyof the originaloverthe copyand to to promote the simulacrum, the copy for which there is no original. A key influenceon Deleuzeas far as the anti-representational orientation of his thought is concerned,is Friedrich Nietzsche.Nietzsche's speculations metaphorshowthat thereis no 'truth' behindthe maskof on appearances, rather only more masks,more metaphors. but Deleuzeelevatesthis insight into something like a general principle.For metaphysical him, thc world is composecl simulircra: is a 'swarm'<lfirppcirranccs. of it l)clcuzc'slicrgsonism, which cnrphirsiscsrirclical ir of'linrc, is iur irnrrlysis

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In important elementof his challengeto representation. his books on very particular draws on Henri Bergson's cinem" in particular,Deleuze of images.Rather than materialismin order to claim that life is composed illuminating the world like a searchlight,it is the case human consciousness that the world is 'luminous' in itself. Bergson'scritique of the problematics of perceptionand action, and matter and thought, springsfrom the rather than time. This tenclaim that we tend to think in terms of space of dency immobilisesintuition, and to counter this Bergson conceives This hasimportthat transmitmovement. materialityin terms of images perception, which can no longer be conceivedof as for ant consequences and All that is rootedin consciousness. life perceives is necesknowledge and volautomatism sarilyopen to the 'outside'and distinctionsbetween in rather than differences kind. of urrr"ry u"t, ,r. only differences degree, accordingto which the metaphysics, This alternative,non-psychological world is 'luminous in itself', rather than being illuminatedby a beamof proiect, is consciousness. at the heart of Deleuze's non-representational and is exploredat length in his books on cinema.Following Bergson's materialisi ontology,accordingto which our body is merely an image among images,Deleuze opens the self to the outside, the pure form of time. The self comes into contact with a virtual, non-psychological memory,a domain of diversity,dffirence, and with potentiallyanarchic selfhood' the that associations, ieopardise sense thought arethreateningand potenSuch forms of anti-representational on tially disorientaring.As Bergsonargues,human beingschoose the basis the of what is the most useful. As such they tend to spa'tialise fluidity of public form. we separate a staticand impersonal duration, reducingit to elementsand reconfiguretheseelementsin a duration into dissociated spatial form organisedaround the conventionsof 'public' homogeneous language that conveys widely recognised notions' We like 'simple thoughts" Bergsonremarks,and we prefer to rely on customand habit, the diversitywith simplicity,foregoing noveltyof new situations. replacing This of In-short, we prefer the comfortsand conventions representation. such an helps to explain why art - literature, painting and cinema- plays important patt itt Deleuze'swork. For Deleuze,art is not a way of repreand memoriesthat we might 'recognise':it doesnot ser,ting experiences world. Similarly, a showus what the world ri, but rather imagines possible art is concernedwith 'sensation',with creating 'sensibleaggregates', In rather than making the world intelligible and recognisable. order to chalart, Deleuze talks of 'affects'and 'perviews of lenge representational cepts'.These are artistic forcesthat havebeenfreed from the organising thcy givcus Instcad' individuals. of framcwgrk pcrceiving rcprcscntational In ..."*, to I prc-indiiidualworlclof singularitics' this way,I)clcuzcsccs

art asa wayof challenging interpretative the tendencyof representation to tracebecomings backto origins. Connectives Affect Art Becoming Difference Sensation

REPRESSION Claire Colebrooh On the one hand,Deleuzemight appear be a philosopher against to set the dominantimageof repression, that being repression its everyday in sense and in its technicalpsychoanalytic sense. its most generalthe concept At of 'repression'would seemto imply a natural self or subjectwho precedes the operationof power of socialisation that all we would haveto do is (so lift the strictures repression arriveat who we reallyare).The concept of to of repressionseems, then, to be associated with the ideaof a pre-socialself who must then undergosocialisation structuration.Deleuzewants to or avoid this naivety, and so to a certain extent he acceptsthe productive nature of repression it was put forward by Sigmund Freud and then as Lacan.It is only because our existence of within a symbolicorder, Jacques or perceived system, that we imaginethat theremust havebeena real .me' prior to the net of repression. For psychoanalysis, then, it is not the self who is repressed, the self - the fantasyof that which exists before for speech,relationsand sociality- is an effect of the idea of repression. Repression primary and produces own' before'.Deleuzeaccepts is its this Lacanirn/Freudian picture up ro a point. with Guattari he arguesthat thereareOedipalstructuresof repression. Living in a modern age,we are indeedsubmittedto a systemof signification. then imaginethat there we must have been a moment of plenitude and, jouissanceprior to Oedipal repression, and that we must thereforehavedesiredthe maternalincest prohibited by the structures of the family. But Deleuze and Guattari regardrepression or the internalisation subjection asa modernpheof nomenon that nevcrtheless drawsupon archaic structures imagcs. and Dclcuzc ancl Gurttirri's mnin rttack on whirt Michcl I,bucault (in T'hc Ilistor.,yol' ,\t.t'uulit.y: l4tlumt Olr,) rcf'crrcd to rrs .tlrc rcPrcssivc

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hypothesis'occurs in Anti-Oedipzs. WhereasFreud's Oedipus complex seeks explainwhy and how we arerepressed how it is that we submit to to law and renounceour enjoyment- Deleuze and Guattari arguethat we sufferfrom the ideaof repression itself, the ideathat thereis someultimate object that we haveabandoned. Psychoanalysis supposedlyexplains our repressionby arguing that we all desired our mothers but had to abandonincestfor the sakeof socialand cultural development. Deleuze and Guattari arguethat this repressive idea of renunciationand submission is a historical and political development. Desire, they insist, is not the desirefor someforbidden object, a desirethat we must necessarily repress.Rather,all life is positive desire- expansion,connection,creation. It is not that we must repress our desirefor incest.Rather,the idea of incest- that we are inevitablyfamilial and desireonly the impossible maternalobject- is itself repressive. is What it represses not a personal desire,but the impersonality of desire or the intense germinal influx. To imagine ourselvesas rational individuals, engagedin negotiation and the management our drives- this idea of ourselves bourgeois, of as selfgoverning, commonsensicalagents - represses the desire for non-familial, impersonal,chaoticand singularconfigurations life. We of arerepressed, then, not by a socialorder that prohibits the natural desire for incest,but by the imagethat our desires'naturally' take the form of Oedipal and familial images. The latemodernunderstanding the selfor subjectasnecessarily of subjectedto law is the outcomeof a history of politicaldevelopment that has coveredover the originally expansive,excessive and constructive movements of desire.A number of philosophical movements, including psychoanalysis, have explainedlife from the point of view of the already repressed subject,the bourgeois individual who hassubmittedhis desires polity and the market. Against this, Deleuze and to the systemof the Guattari aim to revealthe positivedesirebehindrepression. the case In of, Oedipal repression, is the desire of the father - the desireof white, it modern, bourgeois man - that lies at the heartof the ideaof all selves as necessarily power. subjected repressive to Connectives Desire Foucault Freud Oedipalisation Psychoanalysis Woman

RETERRITORIALISATION tion./reterritorialisation'.

- referto the entry on'deterritorialsa-

RHIZOME Felicity J. Colman the that the 'Rhizome'describes connections occurbetween mostdisparate placesand people;the strangechainsof and the most similar of objects, the of events that link people:the feelingof'six degrees separation', sense of of 'having been here before' and assemblages bodies.Deleuze and meaning, Guattari'sconceptof the 'rhizome' drawsfrom its etymological where 'rhizo'means combining form and the biologicalterm 'rhizome' describes form of plant that can extenditself through its underground a horizontaltuber-likeroot systemand developnew plants.In Deleuzeand Guattari'suseof the term, the rhizomeis a conceptthat 'maps' a process of networked,relational and transversalthought, and a way of being without'tracing' the constructionof that map asa fixed entity (D&G 1987: 12). Ordered lineages bodiesand ideasthat trace their originary and of as thought', and this individual bases considered forms of 'aborescent are and metaphorof a tree-likestructurethat ordersepistemologies forms hisis schemata, invoked by Deleuze and torical frames and homogeneous Guattari to describe everythingthat rhizomaticthought is not. the In addition,Deleuzeand Guattari describe rhizomeasan actionof including music, mathematics, ecomany abstractentities in the world, The rhizome nomics,politics, science, art, the ecologyand the cosmos. ofconcrete,abstract conceives everything andeverybody- all aspects how and virtual entities and activities - can be seenas multiple in their interrelationalmovementswith other things and bodies.The nature of the rhizomeis that of a moving matrix, composed organicand non-organic of partsforming symbioticand aparallel according transitory to connections, and as yet undeterminedroutes(D & G 1987:10).Such a reconceptualof isationconstitutes revolutionaryphilosophyfor the reassessment any a form of hierarchical thought, history or activity. In a world that builds structuresfrom economiccircuits of difference and desire, Deleuze responds by reconsideringhow bodies are constructed.He and Guattari arguethat such structuresconstraincreativity and position things and people into regulatory orders. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuzeand Guattari stagedthe entire book as a seriesof networkcd rhizomatic'plateaus'that operateto counter historicaland philpositions pitchccl that towardthc systcm rcprcscntntion Iix thc of osophicol

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flow of thought. Instead,through a virtuoso demonstrationof the relational energiesable to be configured through often disparate forms and systemsof knowledge,they offer the reader an open systemof thought. Rhizomaticformations can serveto overcome, overturn and transform structuresof rigid, fixed or binary thought and judgement- the rhizome (D&G 1987:ll). A rhizomecontribures rhe formais 'anti-genealogy' ro tion of a plateau throughits linesof becoming, which form aggregate connections.There are no singular positions on the networkedlines of a rhizome,only connected points which form connections betweenthings. A rhizomaticplateauof thought, Deleuzeand Guattari suggest, may be reachedthrough the consideration the potentialof multiple and relaof tional ideas andbodies. The rhizomeis anynetworkof thingsbroughtinto contact with one another,functioning as an assemblage machine for new affects, new concepts, new bodies,new thoughts;the rhizomaticnetwork is a mapping of the forcesthat move and,/ immobilise bodies. or Deleuzeand Guattari insist bodiesand things ceaselessly on new take dimensions through their contact with different and divergent entities over time; in this way the conceptof the 'rhizome' marksa divergentway of conceptualising world that is indicativeof Deleuzianphilosophyas the a whole. Rather than reality being thought of and wrimen as an ordered series structuralwholes, of wheresemioticconnections taxonomies or can be compiled from complete root to tree-like structure, the story of the world and its components, Deleuzeand Guattari propose,can be communicated through the rhizomatic operations of things - mevements, intensitiesand polymorphousformations.In opposition to descendent evolutionary modelsof classification, rhizomeshaveno hierarchicalorder to their compoundingnetworks.Instead,Deleuzianrhizomaticthinking functions as an open-ended productive configuration, where random associations and connectionspropel, sidetrack and abstract relations between components.Any part within a rhizome may be connected to anotherpart, forming a milieu that is decentred, with no distinctiveend or entry point. Deleuze'sapparatusfor describingaffectivechangeis the 'rhizome'. Deleuze viewed every operation in the world asthe affectiveexchangeof rhizomatically-produced intensities that create bodies: systems, economies, machinesand thoughts. Each and every body is propelled and perpetuated by innumerable levels of the affective forces of desire and its resonatingmaterialisations. Variationsto any given systemcan occur because interventionswithin cyclical,systematic of repetition. As the rhizome may be constitutedwith an existingbody - including existing thoughts one might bring to bear upon anotherbody - the rhizome is nccessarilysubject to thc principlcs of divcrsity and cliffercncc

through repetition, which Deleuzediscussed his booksNietzsche in and. Philosophyand Dffirence and,Repetition. Deleuze acknowledges Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the eternal return as the constitutionof things through repeatedelements(existing bodies, modesof thought)that form a'synthesis'ofdifference through the repetition of elements(D 1983: 46). 'Synthesis' is also describedby Deleuzeand Guattari as an assemblage variablerelationsproducedby of the movement,surfaces, elusionsand relations of rhizomes that form bodies (desiring machines) through composite chains of previously unattached links (D&G 1983:39, 327).As a non-homogeneous sequence, then, the rhizome describesa seriesthat may be composedof causal, chance, and/or randomlinks.Rhizomaticconnections between bodiesand forcesproducean affective energyor entropy.As Deleuzedescribes his in work on David Hume, the interaction of a socially,politically, or culturally determinedforceand any givenbody both produces and usesassociations of ideas(D l99l: ix, 103).The discontinuous chain is the medium for the rhizome'sexpanding network,just asit is alsothe contextualcircumstance for the chain'sproduction. Rhizomaticwriting, being,andlor becoming not simply a process is that assimilates things, rather it is a milieu of perpetualtransformation.The relationalmilieu that the rhizome createsgivesform to evolutionaryenvironmentswhererelations alter the courseof how flowsand collective desire develop.There is no stabilising function produced by the rhizomatic parts. medium;thereis no creationof a wholeout of virtual and dispersed Rather,through the rhizome,points form assemblages, multiple journey systems associate possiblydisconnected brokentopologies; turn, into or in suchassemblages typologies and change, divide,and multiply throughdisparateand complexencounters and gestures. The rhizome is a powerful way of thinking without recourseto analogyor binary constructions. To think in termsof the rhizomeis to reveal multiple waysthat you might the approach any thought, activity,or a concept- what you always bring with you are the many and various ways of entering any body, of assembling thought and actionthrough the world. Connectives Affect Becoming Desire Hume Intensity Lincs of Flight

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RHIZOME + TECHNOLOGY VerenaConley The'rhizome' replaces arborescent an structurethat hasbeendominating the west and the world for centuries. The rhizome carriesimagesof the natural world, of pliable grasses, weightlessness, of landscapes of and of the east. It is horizontal and flat, bearing what the mathematician in Deleuzecalls'n-l dimensions'. is always multiplicity; it hasno genealIt a ogy; it could be takenfrom different contexts(including Freudian psychoanalysis); and is neither genesis nor childhood.The rhizome doesaway hierarchies. augments valences with It its throughhybrid connections that consistby virtue of addition, of one thing 'and' another.The rhizome operates a spacewithout boundaries in and defiesestablished categories suchasbinaries pointsthat would mark-offand be usedto fix positions or in extensive It space. ceaselessly connects and reconnects overfissures and gaps,deterritorialising reterritorialising and itself at once.It workstoward abstract machines and produces linesof flight. The rhizome doesnot imitate or represent, rather it connectsthrough middle and inventshybrids with virusesthat becomepart of the cells the that scramblethe dominant lines of genealogical trees. The'rhizome createsa web or a network; through capture of code, it increases its valences and is alwaysin a stateof becoming.It creates and recreates the world through connections.A rhizome has no structure or centre, no graph or regulation.Models are both in constructionand collapse. a In rhizome, movement is more intensive than extensive. Unlike graphic arts, the rhizome makes a map and not a tracing of lines (that would belongto a representation an obiect).It is a war machine:rhizomatic of or nomadic writing operates a mobile war machinethat movesat top as speed to form lines, making alliancesthat form a temporary plateau. The rhizome is in a constantprocessof making active,but alwaystemporary,selections. The selections be goodor bad. Good or bad ideas, can stat'es Deleuzein consortwith Gregory Bateson, can leadto good or bad connections. The proximity of the rhizometo digital technology and the computeris evident.The connectionwith Donna Haraway'scyborg has often been made. DeleuzeandGuattarido not write muchaboutcomputers. Yet They derive someof their ideason rhizomesfrom Bateson's S/epsto an Ecolog.y of Mind,. They connect with the anthropologist's pronouncements in which biology and information theory are conjoined. Bateson argues that a person is not limited to her or his visible body.Of importanceis the pcrson's brainthattransmits infurmation discrcte as diffcrcnces. brain The

fires electronsthat move along circuits. Through the transmissionof differences, the person connects and reconnectswith other humans, animalsand the world. Deleuze and Guattari see the potential in Bateson'swork for rhizomatic thinking. The nervous system is said to be a rhizome, web or network. The terminology is the sameas for computersthough it does not pertain to them exclusively.Clearly, computers do offer possibilities. Not only the brain, but humans and the world consist of circuits in which differencesare transmitted along pathways. Through computerassisted Deleuze and subjectivity,humans can increasetheir valences. Guattari write about a 'becoming-radio' or 'becoming-television' that yield good or bad connections;productive or nefariousbecomings. can Computers and the internet have great potential as rhizomatic war machines. The way they are being capturedby capitalism,that deploys order-words, consumer codes, and their multifarious redundancies makesthem too often becomeendsin and for themselves, a sphereof in what Deleuze calls a generalised'techno-narcissism'. The scienceof technologytakesover with its order-words.Yet, in Deleuze'spractical utopia, iust as every major languageis worked through by minor languages,so the capitalist war machine is always being threatenedby mobile nomadic war machinesthat use technolosiesto form new rhizomesand open up to becoming.

SACHER-MASOCH, LEOPOLD VON (1835-95) refer to the tart', tpsychoanalysis'. entrieson 'Lacantand

SARTRE, JEAN PAUL (1905-80)- refer to the entrieson 'Guattari', * and'phenomenology Husserl'. 'phenomenology'

- referto theentries on SAUSSURE, FERDINAND DE (18.57-1913) rrncl'significr, significcl'. 'scmiotics'

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SCHIZOANALYSIS
EugeneHolland, Schizoanalysis the revolutionary 'materialist psychiatry' derived priis As marily from the critiqueof psychoanalysis. the concept'schizoanalysis' indicates, SigmundFreud'stheoryof the Oedipuscomplexis the principle drawing substantially Karl Marx, on object of critique: schizoanalysis, transformspsychoanalysis asto includethe full scope socialand hisso of Yet torical factorsin its explanations cognitionand behaviour. psychoof analysis not rejectedwholesale: is also schizoanalysis drawssubstantially on Freud and especiallyon JacquesLacan to transform historical materialism so as to include the full scopeof libidinal and semiotic factors in its explanationsof social structure and development.Ultimately, though perhapsleast obviously,both structuralistpsychoanalysis historical and materialism transformed Friedrich Nietzsche's are by critique of nihilism and asceticism his transvaluation difference, and of which inform both the libidinal and the socialeconomies mappedby schizoanalysis. Ultimately, universalhistory for schizoanalysis offers the hope and the chancethat the developmentof productive forcesbeyond capitalismand the expansionof Will to Powerbeyond nihilism will lead to greaterfreedomrather than enduringservitude. The basic question posed by schizoanalysis(following Baruch Spinozaand Wilhelm Reich)is: Why do peoplefight for their own serviThe answeris that people tude asstubbornly asif it weretheir salvation? have been trained since birth in asceticismby the Oedipus complex, which relayssocialoppressioninto the heart of the nuclear family. Social two oppression and psychicrepression, thus, arefor schizoanalysis sides reversesthe direction of of the same coin, except that schizoanalysis It causality, making psychic repressiondepend on socialoppression. is goes, father to the man, asthe psychoanalytic not the child who is saying rather it is the bosswho is father to the man, who is in turn father to the child: the nuclearfamily imprints capitalistsocialrelationson the infant psyche. Just as capital denies (through primitive accumulation) direct accessto the means of production and the means of life, and mediates betweenthe worker, work, consumergoodsand eventualretirement,so the father denies(through the threat of castrationenforcing the incest taboo) direct access the mother (the means of life), and mediates to betweenthe child, other family members and eventualmarriage with By a mother-substitute. denyin"g child all the peopleclosestto her, the the nuclcar family programmespeople from birth for asceticismancl sclf'-clcnirrl.

The critique of Oedipusis mounted on two fronts. Internally, schizoanalysis models the psyche on schizophreniarather than neurosis, thereby revealingthe immanent operationsof the unconscious work at beneaththe levelof representation. The Oedipuscomplexis shownto be a systematic betrayal of unconscious processes,an illegitimate metaphysicsof the psyche.But it is a metaphysics that derivesdirectly from the realityof capitalistsociety. in the externalcritique of the Oedipus, For through a comparison the capitalistmodeof production with two other of libidinal modesof production, schizoanalysis showscapitalismto be the quantitativerather than qualitative only social formation organisedby relations. Capitalism organisesthe socialby the cashnexus of the market rather than by codes and representation. Furthermore, this is the only social formation where socialreproduction is isolated from socialproduction at large,through the privatisationof reproductionin the nuclear family: the nuclearfamily,but alsoOedipalpsychoanalysis itself,are thus revealed be strictly capitalistinstitutions.Yet at the sametime that the to nuclear family is capturing and programming desire in the Oedipus complex,the market is subvertingcodesand freeingdesirefrom capture in representationthroughout society at large, thereby producing schizophrenia as the radically free form of semiosisand the potential hope of universal history. Connectives Desire Freud Marx Oedipalisation

SCHIZOPHRENIA RosiBraidotti The touchstoneof Deleuze and, Guattari's conceptualcritique of psychoanalysisis their emphasison the positivity of schizophreniclanguage. Refusingto interpret desireassymptomaticof 'lack' or to usea linguistic paradigm that interprets desire through the system of metaphor and as they insistwe understand desirein termsof affectivity, a rhimetonymy, zomicmodcof interconnection. AlthoughSigmundFrcud rccogniscs structurc affcctivity of and thc thc pcrvcrsity',hc of' hctcrogcncorrs conrplcxplcrstrrcs 'polyrnor'phous urcl

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endsup policing desirewhen he captures in a normativetheory of the it drives. The Freudian theory of drives codesand concentrates desiring affectsinto erotogeneous zones.Thus, psychoanalysis implementsa functional vision of the body that simply turns schizoidlanguage and expression into a disorder.This is in stark contrastto the schizoanalytic vision both Deleuzeand Guattarioffer us. Building on GeorgesCanguilhemand Michel Foucault,Deleuzeand Guattari blur the distinctiondrawn between normal/pathological and all the negativeconnotations that this model of desireimplies. Castingaffectivity, the passions sexuality and alongthe axes eithernormative pathological of or behaviour, they say,is complicit with thoseselfsame political forcesof biopowerthat disciplineand control the expressive potentialities a body.The of doubleburden that comesfrom medicalisingemotionsand affects,in conjunction with reducingsexual expression genitalia, to leaves bodily affects and intensities animpoverished in state. Their theoryof the Bodywithout Organs (BwO) not only critiquespsychoanalysis' complicityin repression the but functionalist approach human affectivityas well. Instead,Deleuzeand to Guattariassert positive the natureof unruly desire termsof schizoid in flows. For Deleuze, distinctionbetween properand abjectobjects desire the of is implementedasa normative index to police and civilise behaviour.The more unmanageable aspects affectivityhaveeither to come under the of disciplinary mechanism of representationor be swiftly discarded. Deviance, insanityand transgression commonlyregarded unacceptare as ablefor they point to an uncontrollable forceof wild intensity. Thesetend to be negatively represented: impersonal, uncaringand dangerous forces. Concomitantly such forces are both criminalisedand renderedpathological.The schizophrenic body is emblematic this violent'outside',one of that is beyondproprietyand normality. Deleuze's effortsto depathologise mentaland somatic deviancy, unconventional sexualbehaviourand clinical conditions - like anorexia,depression, suicide,and so forth - is not a celebrationof transgression its own for Instead, is integralto his intensive sake. it readingofthe subjectasa structure of affectivity. That is, Deleuzemapsout alternative modesof experimentationon the levelof sensation, perceptionand affects. The intensity of thesestatesand their criminalisedand pathological socialstatusoften makesthem implode into the black hole of ego-indexednegative forces. Deleuzeis interested experimenting in with the positivepotentialof these practices. What is at stake this reappraisal schizophrenia how other in of is modesof assemblage variationsof intensityfor non-unitary subjects and are gestured to. A subject a gcnealogical is entity,possessing a minoritaritn,or countcrmcnrory, which in turn is irn cxprcssion<lf clcgrccsof' rrll'ccrivity.

Genealogical createa discontinuous ties sense time, closerto Friedrich of Nietzsche's Dionysiacmode.Hence, spatially,a subjectmay seemfragmented and disunited; temporally, however,a subject developsa certain amountof consistency that comesfrom the continuingpowerof recollection. Here Deleuzeborrows the distinction betweenthe molar senseof linear,recordedtime (chronos) the molecularsense cyclical,disconand of tinuoustime (aion)that the Greeksoncedescribed. Simply put, the former is relatedto being/the molar/the masculine; the latter to becoming/the molecular/thefeminine.The co-occurrence past and future in a conof tinuouspresentmay appearschizophrenic thosewho uphold a vision of to the subjectasrationaland self-contained, however, needto havesome we caution here as Deleuze'sphilosophyof immanence restson the idea of a transformative dynamicsubjectwho inhabitsthe activepresent and tense of continuous conceptof 'duration' to 'becoming'.Using Henri Bergson's guide him, Deleuze proposes subjectas an enduring entity, one that a changes much as it is changedthrough the connections forms with as it a collectivity. Also important to note is that Deleuze disengages the notion of it 'endurance'from the metaphysicaltradition that associates with an essence permanence. or Hence, the potency of the Deleuzian subject comesfrom how it displaces phallogocentric the vision of consciousness, one that hingeson the sovereignty the 'I'. It can no longer be safely of assumedthat consciousness coincideswith subjectivity,or that either consciousness subjectivity chargesthe course of events.Thus, the or image of thought implied by liberal individualism and classicalhumanism is disrupted in favour of a multi-layered dynamic subject.On this level, schizophrenia actsas an alternativeto how the art of thinking can be practised. Together with paranoia,schizoid loops and double-bindsmark the political economy of affectivity in advancedcapitalism. These enact the doubleimperativeof consumerconsumptionand its inherent deferralof pleasure. With capitalismthe deferral of pleasure concomitantlyturned into a commodity.The saturationof socialspace, fast-changing by commodities,short-circuitsthe presentinducing a disjunctionin time. Like the insatiable appetiteof the vampire,the capitalisttheft of 'the present' expresses system that not only immobilises in the processof a commodity over-accumulation,but also suspends active desiringproduction in favour of an addictive pursuit of commodity goods.In response, Deleuzeposits'becoming'as an antidote:flows of empowering dcsircthat introduce mobility and thus destabilise sedentary gravitathe 'l'his involvcs pull of molar formations. tionrrl cxpcrimcnting with nonunititryor sclrizoid nrodcs ot'bcconring.

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Connectives Becoming Bergson Black hole Body Body without Organs Duration Molar Nietzsche Representation

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SEGMENTARITY
Kjtlie Message 'Segmentation' is a fundamental structuring principle that contributes to organisingthe individual and sociallife of all humans.While Deleuze and Guattari explore the superficially dichotomous relationship of the dominant segments primitive, suppleor molecular,that aredifferentiated againstthe rigid or molar statesegment they do so in order to contend that each of these dominant segments can themselves be subcompartmentalised binary,circularand linearforms.More important into than the distinctionsexistingwithin eachof the terms of the dichotomy, however, is the idea that yet another - far less discernible and easily defined- spaceexistsin betweenthesetwo segments. This liminal third spaceis producedby one or severallines of flight that binds the binary terms into dialogue with eachother at the same time asit worksto enforce procedurefor eachof the segmented a kind of decoding forms. In other words,it both binds and separates terms,but ensures the that a continual mutability carrieson existingbetween two. the Although Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that binary couplings appearat the basisof their approachto the conceptof segmentation,this mode of differentiation is consciouslyand cautiouslyinvoked in order to show that even the most formalised of dichotomous stateshave a relationship that is in fact more pliable or porous than would first appear. In this senseeverything is political: every politics is alwaysboth macropolitics and micropolitics.Illustrating the inter-relationship the binary of term that is alwaystied into dialoguewith its contrastingfigure (via the third, liminal space that tendsto be occupiedby deterritorialising lincs of flight) whilc rrt tho sirmctimc bcing dift'crcntiatcd agrrinst indiviclurrls it,

and societies are understood as being organised according to two dominant and interwoven modes of segmentation:one molar, the other molecular. These terms are alwaysclosely related becausethey co-exist and crossover into eachother. Exploring the dominant forms of segmentation, Deleuzeand Guattari contrastthe ideaof a primitive or supplekind of segmentarity againstthe notion of modern statehood, exist without dediwhereprimitive societies catedpolitical institutions.Considerable manoeuvrability and communicability aremaintained between differentiated, heterogeneous fieldsof the primarily because the segmented thesesocieties, relationshipthat each of of thesefieldsor units shares with the other.Operatingaccording disto crete,localised forms of management, Deleuzeand Guattari characterise this primitive segmentarity functioning through polyvocalcodesthat as emerge a resultof variousrelationships lineages, asan itinerant as and and territoriality that is basedon local divisionsthat overlaprather than exist in any discretestate.Communication,codificationand territorialisation occur in thesesocieties a process shifting relationships via of and interpower. sections,rather than any centrally organising While these systems of organisation are perhaps more molecular (focusedon small-scale trajectoriesand local environments)than thoseof modern societies, would not be true to claim that they are more organic it or lesssystematic, in accordwith their contentionthat the molar exists and within the molecularand vice versa,Deleuze and Guattari explainthat it is a mistakesimply to contrastthis primitive, suppleor molecularsegmentarity againstthe more rigid global organisations that characterise the modern Statesociety. Acknowledgingthat the modern political systemis a unified and unifying globalapparatus, they maintainthat it is organised in a formationof clearlyorderedsubsystems. However,despitethe reaching agendathat motivatesthis inclusive process,it cannot be entirely differentiatedfrom the primitive system out of which it has evolved. Accordingly, overarching the system neverfreefrom gaps, is displacements and partial processes that interconnectwith eachother and yet it never attainsproper signifi cation. To ignore thesespaces slippagethat exist in betweenthe privileged of or State-sanctifiedunits is a mistake, Deleuze and Guattari counsel, because theseoften indiscernible spaces may contain either - or perhaps both in somecases the rumblings of popular massdissatisfaction with the dominantand determining Statebody (asin the socialupheavals May of 1968),or the quotidian embodiment of extreme State power whereby cvcryday citizens adopta self-regulating attitudeor beliefthat is based on thcir inclividual intcrnalisation a particularpoliticirlcodcor idcalproof motcdby thc Statc(irsin Nnzi (icrmany).In hothcilscs, rupturcsilrc tlrcsc

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micro-fascismsthat threaten to disorganiseor destabilisethe dominant within which they exist. segments can as neither molecularnor molar segments resistbeing entirely Just differentiated from the other, Deleuze and Guattari explain that rather is fascism of than beinga distinctcharacteristic the rigid or Statesegment, of because its molecularor micropoliticalpower; as a mass dangerous As it than a totalitarianorganisation. such, movement is more threatening of not attainsmolar (State)significance because the public profile fascism posters), it but because is by of its leader(evidenced the larger-than-life imbricated and interiorised throughout the molecular level of everyday experience. Connectives Lines of flight Molar Molecular

SEMIOTICS Inna Semetsky 'semiotics' is, in general, the study of signs and their signification. presenta conceptual mix of CharlesS. Deleuzeand Guattari'ssemiotics Peirce'slogic of relativesand Louis Hielmslev'slinguistics;both framePlateaus, ln semiology. A Thousand works are taken to opposeSaussurean Deleuze and Guattari assertthat content is not a signified, neither is in a expression signifier:insteadboth are variables common assemblage. An a-signifying rupture ensurestransfer from the form of expressionto the form of content.Dyadic, or binary significationgivesway to triadic, a-signifying semiotics,and the authors employ the Peirceannotion of part of sign-dynamics. diagramis a bridge, A a'diagram'as a constructive a diagonalconnectionthat, by meansof double articulations,connects of planesof expression and contentleadingto the emergence new forms. in give way to the productionof new meanings Fixed and rigid signifieds (D accordwith the logic of sense 1990).Conceptsthat exist in a triadic relationshipwith both perceptsand affectsexpresseventsrather than and should be understood not in the traditional representaessences which would submit a line to a point, tional mannerof analyticphilosophy, but as a pluralistic, a-signifying distribution of lincs and phncs. 'l'hc (l) Ontokrgically,''bciirg-its-firkl' l9tltla; l9t)3t) dclicssigniticittion.

pragmatics or transformational consists destratification, openingup to of function. Accordingto the logic of mula neq diagrammatic and creative symbol,'a third'(D tiplicities,a diagramserves a mediatoryin-between as 1987: 131)that disturbs the fatal binarity of the signifier/signifieddisapproach, which is Deleuzeand tinction. It forms part of the cartographic par logicalcopulaswith the that replaces Guattari'ssemiotics excellence, radicalconjunction'and'. without the relation For Deleuze,the theory of signs is meaningless in signsand the corresponding apprenticeship practice.Reading between Deleuze notices the MarcelProustfrom the perspective triadicsemiotics, of intimate' dynamiccharacter signs,that is, their havingan 'increasingly of (D 2000:88) relation with their enfoldedand involutedmeanings that so interpretation. Meaningsare truth becomes contingentand subordinate to which organization not givenbut dependon signsentering'intothe surface (D on ensures resonance two series' 1990:104),the latterconverging the of a paradoxical differentiator, which becomes 'both word and objectat once' (D 1990: There to cannotbe reduced just linguisticsigns. 51).Yet,semiotics imagesor are extra-linguistic semioticcategories too, such as memories, which areapprehended termsof neitherobjectin immaterial artisticsigns, probin in ivenor subjective criteriabut learned practice termsof immanent a lematic instances and their practicaleffects.Analogously, formal abstract philosophyof language; machineexceeds applicationto (Chomskian) its insteadsemioticsis applied to psychological, biological,social,technological, aesthetic and incorporeal codings. Semiotically, discursive and formationsareconnected virtue of transversal by communinon-discursive psychic, and social cation,'transversality' beinga conceptthat encompasses transversality exceeds evenontologicaldimensions.As a semioticcategory, regimes signs;by the same of verbalcommunication appliesto diverse and and cartographies the of token, Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis presuppose different semiotictheory from the one appropriunconscious a process, psychoanalysis. semiotic The based the logicof on atedin Lacanian The line of includedmiddle,is the basisfor the productionof subjectivity. flight or becoming a third between is subjectand objectand is to be understood 'not so much . . . in their oppositionas in their complementarity' (D 1987:13l). The relationship between subjectand objectis of the nature presupposition. of reciprocal Brian Massumipoints out that Deleuzereinventsthe conceptof semiotics in his various books: in Proustand Signs,Deleuze refers to four differently organised semioticworlds (M 1992).In Cinema-1he presents sixtecn diffcrent types of cinematic signs. Rlr Deleuze, philosophers, scmioticilns rrndsymptomirt<tlwritcrs and artistsarc first and forcmost ot' ogists: thcy rcitd,intcrprct itnd crcittcsigns,wltich itrc 'lhc synrplonrs

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life . . . There is a profound link betweensigns,events,life and vitalism' and a (D 1995:143).The task of philosophyis the creationof concepts, in accord with a-signifying semiotics,has no reference;it is concept, positingitself togetherwith its obiectat the momentof its autoreferential, the own creation.A map,or a diagram,engenders territory to which it is giving of to supposed refer;a staticrepresentation the order of references of dynamics the order of meanings. way to a relational Connectives Lacan Schizoanalysis Signifier/Signified

SENSATION Tom Conlejt in philosophyespecially the domainof Biology infusesmuch of Deleuze's It sensation. remainsat the basisof perception,perceptionin turn being the what bringsaboutthe creationof events, very mattercommonto philat opensat the thresholdofsense, those Sensation art, osophy, and science. the momentsprior to when a subjectdiscovers meaningof somethingor takesplacebefore cognition.Sensation of entersinto a process reasoned in In to cognitionand thus pertains signifiance. film it is grasped what takes grasped, in Jean-LucGodard'stitle, are as placebeforewordsand images Prinorn: Carmen,in which the field of sensationinheres in what comes the prior to the name,before naming of 'Carmen', in what is felt and experiencedbefore the name is understoodin a common way (D 1989:154). which Deleuzetakesup through his study of FrancisBacon In aesthetics, is sensation what strikesa viewer of a painting or in TheLogic of Sensation, the readerof a poem beforemeaningis discernedin figuration or a thematic design.It has the productivelydeformativepower of defacingthe at it representations cause to be felt. It is alsowhat vibrates the threshthat of the old of a given form; in other words, what causes 'appleness' the painter Paul C6zanne's applesto be felt as the geometricand painterly in that they become the field of his still lifes. abstractions figures, Body without Organs(BwO), the mostfamous One of Deleuze's of of of as is conceived a surface sensations, a textureand elasticity cqual passcs tlvcrand Scnsati<tn ovcr thc cntircty<tfits mass, filrccand intcnsity

through the body in waves and rhythms that meld its perceptible sitesor organisation partsinto vibrationsand spasms. of Borrowingfrom Wilhelm Wiirringer'swritings on the generativity 'gothic' linearity,Deleuzeand of Guattari'sconceptof BwO is in continuousand autonomous movement, endlessly emanating sensation in its designthan in its process. less The line is continually becoming itself,exudingforce;whatDeleuze of callsthe 'condition of sensation'. animaland vegetal Of character, hasthe capacity it of turning inward and outward, into the body and along different trajectories, makingpalpable what otherwisecould be sensed sensation in itself. Deleuze explainsthe point through C6zanne, whom he championsfor having made visiblethe folding character the Mont-Saint-Victoire,the germinating of forceswithin seeds, the convection or and heat transpiringin a landscape. Theseelements within sensation are prior to becoming or visualised. felt Deleuzeuses Bacon's distinctionbetween two typesof violence refine to his 'logic' of sensation. violence public spectacle, A of seenin athleticand political arenas and in traditional 'theatresof torture' must be refusedin orderto reacha kind of sensation the British paintercallsa'declaration that of faith in life'. Many of the paintingsplacedeformedbodiesin arenas so that their abstractioncan embody invisible forces;forcesthat accordingly condition the uncannysensation spectatorfeelsin view of both familiar the and monstroushuman forms. When seenin series(many are diptychs and triptychs),the paintingsexuderhythms thar are tied to what Baconcalls 'figures',which areneitherfigurativenor beyondfigurationbut accumulations and coagulations sensation. anothercontexthe links composite of In units of percepts and affectsto blocksof sensation, themselves in beings that existautonomously, much in paintingsasin the spectators as who look at them. The artist finds in the areabetween perceiver the and the work a field of sensation, that is 'sculpting,composing, one writing sensations. As percepts, sensations not perceptions are referringto an object'(D&G 1994: 166)but somethingthat inheresin its beingand its duration. The taskof the artist,ashe showswith Baconand C6zanne, to extractfrom a'block is of sensations,pure beingof sensation' (D&G 1994:167). a In this respect, his unique galleryof naturalhistory two of Deleuze's in totemsof sensation the tick and the dog.The tick is a creature are that feels rhythmic sensations that inspire it to fall onro the skin of the animal it covets. melodyor 'block' of sensation A causes to leap.The dog that is it eatingat its food bowl senses arrivalof the masterthat will flog it, prior the to the flogging, with thousands sensations anticipate eventitself: of that the a hostileodour,the sound of footsteps, the sight of a raisedstick, that or the of into pain'.Sensations mixed with 'subtend conversion pleasure arc that are'thc passagc 'tiny pcrccptions' from onc perccption an<lthcr', to rrncl thcyconstitutc'thc prrr lninrll condition cxccllcncc'(l) l993rr: 87),

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in increasing resonance acquires Readers Deleuzenotethat sensation of on It a workswritten after 1980. becomes commonterm of speculation the the time asit retrieves vitalat aesthetics, biologyand philosophy the same ism and intuition of Henri Bergson'sformative work written from the early becomes decisiveelementin the style and texture of a 1950s. Sensation Deleuze's writing, for in its rhythms,its 'blocks'of reflectionand its own in figures,conceived a manner akin to thoseof his favourite conceptual painters,the writing exudesthe forcesthat it describes. Connectives Art Bacon Bergson Body without Organs Faciality

SENSATION + CINEMA Constantine Vereois Deleuzestatesthat the modern work of art ln Dffirence and Repetition, in leaves domain of representation order to becomepure experience: the empiricism or scienceof the sensible'(D 1994: 56). transcendental 'a sugDeleuze developsthis idea in FrancisBacon: TheLogic of Sensation, of the gestingthat modern paintingtranscends representation both illustrative and narrativefiguration by moving either toward a pure form of (as Piet Mondrian or WassilyKandinsky) by, abstraction exemplified say, (followingJean-Frangois Lyotard) the purely or toward what Deleuzecalls figural. For Deleuze (as for Bacon, who refusesboth straight abstraction and figurative illustration), the preferred option is the latter, for the painting,like the figurativeartwork,is ultimatelydirectedtoward abstract ordinary thought or to the brain, whereasthe figure is the sensibleform systern to 'vital movement'.Citing or to relatedto sensation, the neraous that is neither a Deleuze describes 'logic of the senses' Paul C6zanne, rational, nor cerebral,but a bodily sensation an unequal difference all betweenforces- that overflowsand traverses domains. (figure)shifts attentionfrom the form of the artwork, be it Sensation representational abstract,to the nature of its encounterwith othcr or bccoming-unlimitcd, btdics, lncl thc'-bccomings hccoming<lther, -

becoming-intense that they bring about. Deleuze says: ,I become in sensation, something and happens throughsensation, throughthe other one and one in the other' (D 1993b:187).In rhe caseof cinema,narrariverepresentational canbe understood a machine film as assemblagea potentiality of intensitiesor sensations that, on the one hand, is organised (represented) an activityof figuration,and on the other,is reproduced by multiplied and intensified- as a creativefigure of sensation. The first describes habitualrecognitionwherethe film is familiar and banalbecause a it is represented termsof its identity and sameness. latter describes in The a moment of attentiverecognition(of dis-figuration) which the object in does remainon the oneandthe same not plane, passes but throughdifferent planes. This is the momentof the crystal,wherepastand future collide;the momentwhererepetitionis the eternalreturn: difference repeating. Sensationcan be related to the concept of'cinephilia,, an obsessive passion cinema- in particularthe Hollywood films of 1940s for and 1950s - that developed the front rows of the Pariscinimathiques the 1950s in in and 1960s. Paul Willemen suggests that the phenomenonof cinephilia, influenced still activeresidues surrealism post-warFrenchculture, by of in involvesa sublime moment of defamiliarisation. encounterwith the an unpresentable sublime.willemen links cinephiliatoJeanEpstein'snotion of photoginie, fleeting moment of experience emotionalintensity a or a sensation that the viewercannotdescribe verballyor rationalise cognitively (W 1994).As in the caseof Deleuze'stime-image,photlginie is a direct representation time, a 'crystal-image', direct sensation a of or of presentpresence. Focusingupon that aspectof cinephiliawhich escapes existingnetworksof critical discourse, willemen describes encounter an a 'dangerous moment' that points to a'beyond of cinema'(241).Ina brief example,one can find this potential dislocationin the films of David Lynch: the anamorphicdeformity of the dream in The ElephantMan (1980), Ben'slip-syncingof 'In Dreams'in Blue ltelaet (1986),the lighting of a cigarettein Wild, Heart (1990). at Contemporarycinephilia - which embraces not only the Hollywood films of classical cinephilia and the work of the nouoelle ,)ague, but also Hollywood's delayednouaelle aague(Francis Ford Coppola, Brian De Palma,Martin Scorsese), newFrench new waye([ean-Jacques the Beineix, Luc Besson, Leos Carax),and internationalart cinema(PedroAlmodovar, Takeshi Kitano, Abbas Kiarostami) - can be seenas one of the many diverse readingstrategies encouraged recentcultural technologies. by The developments include not only new storageand information technologies(television, video, internet)and agencies pr<lmotion commodiof and fication(rcvicws,advcrtiscmcnts, mcrchandisc) irn irssociirtccl but incrcasc in film and nrcdialitcrrrcyrnd ir moclc<lf'vicwing imbricrrtcd with nn

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Understoodin this way, intertextualnetworkof masscultural discourses. the reproduction of the cinephile is a type of infinite representation,an serialproduct designedto be confunction of a standardised, extensive niche markets.But equally, sumed within globalisedand/or specialised of cinephilia, the resonancecreated within the the intensive experience as can series, be described a momentof sensation, proliferating, differential Contemporary a glimpse over the edge of cinematic representation. both a generaleconomyof viewing' one which cinephiliathus becomes of circulation (sameness) the cinematicinstitution, guarantees endless the to and also a point of resistance these forms of re-presentation the moment at which the founding principle (Idea)breaksdown to become a positive event, a universal un-founding. The serial repetition of the (global Hollywood) film product, and the reproduction of the new both the confirmationof identity and the affirmationof become cinephile, different. the multiple sensation, return of the absolutely

SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED Claire Colebrook a Accordingto the structuralistlinguist,Ferdinandde Saussure, language is madeup of signifiersor differential marks,which then organiseor strucof but also the very conceptualisation our ture, not only our language, on The revolutionof structuralistlinguisticslay in the insistence world. and on the highly contingentproboth the arbitrarynatureof the signifier duction of the systemof signification.Whereaslinguistics prior to strucby turalism might havestudieda word diachronically looking at the way to wordratio comes form a commonroot (andmeaningfulcause) the Latin trational','rationalise', treason', 'irrational' and so for the modern words, One shouldnot study the emeron, structuralistlinguisticsis synchronic. of genceor genesis signs,for this is vague,but only signsas they form a system. So it would be significantthat one languagemight mark a differencebetweengrey and blue, or like and love,while anotherlanguage of The consequences this supposed would not mark out sucha difference. If well beyondlinguistics. it is the case primacy of the signifierextended then thought depends that we think only within a systemof differences, upon a prior structureand that structurecanonly be studiedor criticised asa whole.There canbe no intuition of anyterm or thing in itself,for we without positivetcrms' of only know and think within a system differences Not only doesDeleuzefavour the linguisticsof Louis Hiclmslcv ovcr thilt or Sirussurc that ihcrc irrc irlrcndyf<rrms clift'crcntirrtions ilrc not so

the effect of a languageor conceptualscheme,he also (with Guattari) conducted an intensepolitical assaulton the ideology or despotismofthe signifier.How is it that we come to think of thought as reducible to a systemof linguisticsigns? Not only do Deleuzeand Guattari insist, positively, that there are r6gimes of signs beyond language,ranging from musicand the visualartsto the signsof the inhuman world - smokebeing a sign of fire, light being a sign for a heliotropeor a bird's refrain being the sign of its territory, they also conduct a critique of the modern concept of signification, the idea that we are submitted to a system of signsbeyondwhich we cannotthink. On the structuralistunderstanding of the signifier, all thought takes place in a system of signs and all differences mediatedthrough this systemsuch that nothing can be are consideredin itself. Structuralism is often, therefore, consideredto be a for that there 'break' in this history of westernmetaphysics, it concedes can be no knowledgeof pure presence, only knowledgeof the world as mediated through signs. According to Deleuze and Guattari, however, the signifier is yet one more way in which we fail to think differencepositively; one more way in which we mistakealreadystructuredexperience for the positivestructuring powerof life to differ. Signifiers,Deleuzeand Guattari argue,are just examplesof the waysin which life is expressed or differentiated. Deleuze's argumentfor positivedifference in direct conis trast with the ideathat there is a systemof relationsthat determineslife in advance.On the contrary, Deleuze saysthat while languagecan overcode other systemsof difference,for we can speakabout other systemsof signs,it is also possiblefor language be deterritorialisedthrough the to positivepower of difference. for example, If, our r6gimeof visualsignsis overturned by an event in cinema, then we might be forced to think In differently and createnew concepts. sucha case thinking would not be governedby a precedingsystem,but would be violated by the shockor encounterwith life, a life that emits signswell beyondthoseof the system of signification.

Connectives Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Difference

SIMONDON, GILBERT (1926-87) referto the entries on'cinema* * itnd'phcnomcn<ll<lgy Wcrncr Hcrzog','individuati<ln','m:ltcrialism' I Iusscrl'.

250 SIMULACRUM
Jonathan Roffe

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that In his 1990'Preface'to Clet-Martin'sbookon his work, Deleuzestates part of his philosophy. the conceptof 'simulacrum'wasneveran essential However,it doesoffer one of the strongestforms of his critique of identity, and the affirmation of a world populated by differences-in-themselves of which arenot copies any prior model. discussion of Simply put, 'simulacrum'means'copy'. It is in Deleuze's Plato that simulacraare most closelydiscussed. Plato in TheLogic of Sense hierarchyof the model,the copy,andthe copyof the copy offersa three-level which is the simulacrum.The real concern for Plato is that, being a step removed from the model, the simulacrum is inaccurateand betrays the it in and model.He usesthis hierarchy a numberof places, in eachcase is a For example, matterof distinguishing 'falsepretender'or simulacrum. the in the Sophisf,Socrates discusses meanswith which we might distinthe (the of guishbetween philosopher goodcopy),who is in search the Good the (the model), and the sophist(the simulacrumof the philosopher- the bad in of skillsasthe philosopher search profit or fame. copy),who uses same the the Deleuzenotesthat while the distinctionbetween modelandthe copy seems mostimportantone for Plato,it is ratherthe distinctionbetween the the true and the falsecopieswhich is at the heartof Platonism.The copy to of the copy,cut offfrom reference a model,puts into questionthe modelcopy systemasa whole,and confronts it with a world of pure simulacrum. This reveals, Deleuze,the moral natureof Plato'ssystem,which funfor damentallyvaluesidentity, order, and the stablereferenceto a model over This doesnot meanthat Deleuze movements simulacra. of the groundless considers world to be madeup of appearances, the 'simulations'of a real itself It of world that hasnow vanished. is the sense the word 'appearances' that is in question.Simulacrado not refer to anythingbehind or beyond the world - they make up the world. So what is being underminedby and the understanding existence, of Deleuze here is a representational of that alongwith it. Furthermore,this moralinterpretation existence goes For a understanding embodies certainnegativitythat is alsoproblematic. a copy to be a copy of any kind it must havereferenceto somethingit is not It - a copy standsin for something that is not present. requiresthis other and thing (whatlinguistics would call the'referent')to giveit sense importance. with this picture,doesnot The simulacrum, the otherhand,breaking on beyondit for its force,but is itself forceor power;able rely upon something It to do thingsandnot merelyrepresent. is asa resultof this positivepower

that simulacra can produceidentitiesfrom within the world, and without reference a model,by enteringinto concreterelations in this case, the to philosopher not the one searching the Good, but the one who is able for is to createnew conceptsfrom the material availablein the world; concepts of which will do something. can seehere a hint of the understanding We productive-machinethat will emergein Anti-Oedipusand the world as a A Thousand, Plateaus. Deleuze also connectsthe thought of the simulacrum to that of the eternal return. As Deleuze frequently argues,we must understandthe eternal return in terms of the return and affirmation of the different, and goodand bad copies, not of the Same. Ratherthan distinguishing between the eternal return rejects the whole model/copy picture - which is groundedon the valueof the Sameand infusesnegativityinto the world in favourof the productivepowerof the simulacra themselves. Connectives Difference Eternal return Plato Representation

SINGULARITY Tom Conley In the historiesof cartographyand of the cognition of terrestrialspace, that of the mirror. It is first seenin the 'singularity'is a term that replaces earlymodern period. In the Middle Agesthe 'mirror of human salvation' (speculum humane salaationis) charteda typology of eventsin human and in divine time that madeclearthe order of the world on the basisof events The the Old Testamentthat alsohaveanalogues the New Testament. in mirror wasthat which assured reflectionof a totality and the presence a of God, a reflectivesurface,resemblingperhapsthe pupil of an eyeon which were gatheredand assembled variety and wealth of divine creation, the When, in the later fifteenth century,oceanictravellersventured south and eastfrom Europe to the Indies by way of Africa or west to the Caribbean of of o!easterncoast SouthAmerica,mostrepresentations the world could Discovery and no long conform to the figure of the speculum mund,i. encounterpromptedcosmographers,to registernew,often conflicting,and sometimes unthinkablethings into works of opcn form. As singularitics

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theseworks were subjectto changeand revision- indeedwhat Deleuze often calls'open totalities'.For a brief time, the world itself wastakento be a mass islands of and continents, insularshapes of that contained posa sibly infinite measureof singularities.Thus are born works such as Les (by singularitisde la Franceantarctique Andr6 Thevet) or isolarii ('islandbooks', by BenedettoBordone, TomassoPorcacchiand others). They are conceived accountfor, recordand copewith new shapes to ofalterity and difference comingfrom distantspaces. WhereverDeleuzeinvokes singularityit can be understood against this historicalbackground. a philosopher embraces idea of virtual As he the travel, along infinite trajectoriesor lines of flight that lead the thinker anywhere about the world, but first and foremostamongand betweenconceptual islandsor points of singularity.As islands,they are alsopoints that can be seenin series, inflexionsor emissions events. singularity,alsoinsuas of A point anda place larity,is a decisive whereperception felt in movement. is In Leibniz'sconceptof the monad,Deleuzenoteshow a 'singularity'is frequentlyassociated condensed with events. Singularities the'zoneof clear are expression' the monad.Lessabstractly, termsof civic geography sinof in a gularity would be a county,a regionaldepartment,or evena topography. The singularitiesof the monad are what assure presence a body in the of or through which they vibrate.They arethe eventsthat makeit both unique and common,both an entity of its own perceptual dataand a groundfor the relationthat the monadholdswith its environs. They arethe places where the 'singularities belonging each. . . areextended to the singularities to up of others'(D 1993a: 86).The world asa wholeis perceived infinitesimally in microperceptions and gigantically,in macroperceptions. Singularity allows the subject to perceivethe world in both ways,infinitesimally and infinitely, in hearing the whir of a familiar watermill, in being awareof wavesof water striking the hull of a boat, or even in sensingmusic that accompanies a'danceof dust'(D 1993a: Theseformulations 86). aboutsingularityinflectDeleuze's work on styleand the creative imagination. With vocabulary notesthat greatwriterspossess'singular the same he conditions of perception'(D 1997b:116).Indeed singularities allow greatwriters to percepts turn aesthetic into veritable visions;in other words,to movefrom a unique site of consciousness an oceanicone. Such is what makesthe to writer changethe world at large through microperceptionsthat become translatedinto a style,a seriesof singularitiesand differences that estrange common usages language of and make the world of both the writer and thosein which the readerlivesvibratein unforeseen compellingways. and Weresingularityassociated with the 'Causes Reasons the Desert and of Island',(oneof Deleuze's first pieces philosophical of writing)it wouldbc conncctcd with differcncc and rcpctition,onc of thc bascs of'his wurk on

Repetition. singularityis A duration,identity and ideationin Dffirence and, and a unique point but it is alsoa point of perpetualrecommencement of keywords his personal in dictionary, singularityshifts variation.Like other and bearsdifferent inflections in different contextsbut is alwaysrelated to perception,subjectivity,affectivity and creation. Connectives Event Leibniz Lines of flight

SMOOTH SPACE Tarnsin Lorraine ln A Thousand, Plateaus,Deleuze and Guattari characteriseliving orBanisms in terms of interior milieus' (cellularformation, organicfunctions) and 'exterior milieus' (food to eat, water to drink, ground to walk on). Milieus are vibratory blocks of space-timeconstituted by the periodic repetition of the configurations forcesthat makesthem what they are of (D&G 1987:313).All the milieusof the organismhavetheir own patterns and thesepatternsinteract with the patternsof other milieus with which The rhythm of the interactions between thesedifferent they communicate. blocksrather than one homomilieus operates terms of heterogeneous in geneous Thus, an organismemerges from chaos('the milieu of space-time. all milieus') as vibratory milieus or blocks of space-time that create rhythms within the organismas well as with the milieus exterior to the organism. Territorial animals(includinghumanbeings)arenaturalartists who establishrelations to imperceptibleas well as perceptibleforces through the refrainsof song (birds)or movements and markings(wolves, regularities from cosmic rabbits)that create rhythms of life-sustaining the The variousrhythms of the human subject's components and their chaos. relations to interior and exterior blocks of space-timebecome territoriof alised into the sentient awareness one organism living in the 'striated' life, cancelling anomalous interactions amongmilieusin space social of out whole the process. The conventionalnotion of spaceas a homogeneous within which movement unfolds is thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, a blocksof totalisedconstruct of spacethat emergesfrom heterogeneous 'I'hcy contrastthcir conccptof 'smrxlthspacc'to thc morc sprcc-timc. notion of spilcc; spircc' hrunts itnd citn disru;rtthc convcntionirl 'snlrxrth

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striations conventional of space, it unfoldsthrough 'an infinite succesand sion of linkages and changes direction' that creates in shifting mosaics of space-times of the heterogeneous out (D&G blocksof different milieus 1987: 494).Deleuzeand Guattari are interestednot in substitutingone conception ofspacewith another, ratherin how forces but striatespace and how at the same time it developsother forces that emit smooth spaces (D&G 1987: 500). In a discussion the conceptof the (movement-image' of inspired by Henri Bergson, Deleuze distinguishesmovement from space: 'space coveredis past, movementis present,the act of covering' (D 1986: l). Spaces covered movement divisibleand belongto a single,homogeby are neous space while movement changesqualitatively when it is divided. Movements, of what Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateauscall are con'deterritorialization', actsofcoveringthat arenot referredto space ceivedasa uniform area measurable of units within which changes occur. A subjectwho orients himself with respectto movements, rather than a retrospectively created constructof space, experiences space in terms not (I of a totality to which it is connected walk across snowfive milesfrom the the centreof town), but rather in terms of pure relationsof speedand slowness(snowunder moving feet aswind lifts hair) that evokepowersto affect and be affected, both actualand potential (pushingfeet againstground, could alsojump or run). A personon a trip to anothercity might orient himself by followingthe roadmappedout through socialconvention from one point to another. nomadof the desertin search food might orient A of himselfdifferently, travellingnot from onepoint to a predesignated destination, but rather travelling from one indication of food to the next as the need arises.In the former case,local movementsare charted with respect points(thusimposinga planeof organisation to already specified upon the movements that unfold). In the latter case, spaceshifts with eachmovement in keepingwith shifts in meetingthe needfor food. Theseshifts do not occur in space; rather they establishdifferent configurationsof nomad and vegetation landscape unfold asthe smoothspace the search and that of for food. The smooth spacesharedwith othersemerges with reference not to an 'immobile outside observer',but rather through the tactile relations of any number of observers(D&G 1987 493).It is thus a space like that : polar landscapes occupiedby intensities, of the steppes, desertor the forces and tactilequalities, with no fixed reference point (D&G 1987:479). Connectives Deterritorialisation Rcterritorialisation / Nomadicism

Space Subjectivity

SOCIUS Kenneth Surin Traditional philosophyrelied overwhelminglyon the operationof tranas principleswhich wererequiredto makeclaimspossible, well scendental judgements. principles, also transcendental There are as moral aesthetic perhapslesswidely acknowledged than the onesthat underlie traditional philosophy, which subtendthe constitutionof the socialorder.Theseprinciplesare embodiedin what Deleuzeand Guattari call the 'socius'.The well-known philosophical counter-tradition inaugurated by Friedrich undertooka dismantling Nietzsche, and continuedby Martin Heidegger, basis of traditional philosophy,and the work of of the transcendental an Deleuzeis to be locatedin this tradition. For Deleuze,asfor Nietzsche, Kant. in which it is declaredthat the entire tradition extendsfrom Plato to yardstick of knowledgeis verisimilitude.In Plato's caseverisimilitude whereasfor derivesfrom an ideal 'world of Forms' (the transcendent), to was ImmanuelKant this world of the transcendent banished the realm Kant, though,insistedthat the counterpartto of the 'noumenalabsolute'. was the the noumenal world, for example world of phenomena, constituted (or by the activity of the transcendental non-empiricallygiven)subjectof possibleexperience. their reflection on the socius,conducted throughIn two volumes of Copitalism and, Schizophrenia,Deleuze and, out the undoing of the transcenGuattari seekwhat amountsto a comprehensive order.In sodoing,they adhere dentalbasis ofthe constitutionofthe social (transcendental empiricism',in which the basisfor the constitution to the (asopposed possible) is to experience sought.This proiectis 'tranof real require a nonscendental' so far as the conditionsfor real experience in empirical organisationof the objectsof experience,though the sourceof subjecti la Kant, but rather the is this organisation not a transcendental as very form in which real objectsareexperienced activeand dynamic. desiringbecause the ln Anti-Oed,ipus, sociusis said to be necessary productionandreproduction, for and productionis coterminous with social so the latter to takeplacedesirehasto be codedand recoded, that subiects is The socius the terrain for rolesand functions. canbe prepared their social for stemsfrom the Anotherrationale the socius of this codingand recoding. ordcr.l)csirc is simultancously part it playsin consolidating capitalist thc its cntboclinrcnts by whiclrtrccsit fi'onr prcvious rrnd cnablcd lirrritccl crrpitrrl,

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or codingssothat it canbe placedat the disposal ofcapitalisr expansion; and desire,after this decodingby capital, is reined in or recodedso that it can subserve novel requirementsof capitalistproduction. the Coding or 'inscription' are thus central to the constitution of the socius, and Deleuzeand Guattarirespond the crucialquestion the surface to of on which inscriptiontakes place invokingthe notion of the earth.The earth by precedes the constitution of the socius,and is the primordial unity or ground of desireand production.As suchthe earthis the preconditionof productionwhile alsobeingthe objectof desire. The first form of the socius has thereforeto involve a territorialisation,undertakenby a 'territorial machine',which parcels the earthinto segments socialmeaning. out of Once territorialisationhas occurred, it becomespossiblefor social (the coreof the socius) operate. machines to Socialmachines havehumans as their parts and are essential the generation cultural forms, these to of forms being neededto link humansto their (technical) machines. Social machines organise flowsof powerand desireby codingthem. There areall kinds of flows:differentkindsof humans, vegetation, non-humananimals, agricultural implements, flows that involve bodily functions and organs, and soon. Nothing escapes coding,and sonothing canescape purview the of the socius. If the socius a megamachine, fuel that drivesthis machine desire, is the is though desireis shapedand orchestrated its insertioninto this megaby machine. modernsocieties, natureof this insertionof desireinto the In the socialmegamachine been significantlyrransformed. facilitatethe has To functioning of capitalism, flows havehad to becomemore abstract, since capital requires intersubstitutibility,homogeneity, relentlessquantification, and exchange mechanisms work. Hand in hand with this abstracto tion goes a privatisationof the social, since an over-valuationof the individual is requiredto compensate the massive for collectivedisinvestment that takesplacein the socialas a result of the inexorable growth of the processes abstraction. of The vehicles this privatisation ruled by of are the Oedipusprinciple,which functionsasa kind of transcendental r6gime for the investment socialdesire.Other principles,primarily concerned of with morality and punishment, but alsowith death and cruelty, are effective in this domain too. Dispensingwith psychoanalysis the ontology for how a sociusis conas stituted, Deleuze and Guattari find it necessary replace Freudianism to with a different ontology. The alternative- called 'schizoanalysis' or 'nomadology'- beginsby refusingany kind of transcendental principle purporting to serveas the ground of the socius.In placeof the logic of necessityand continuity that characterised previous social ontologies, I)clcuzc and Guttttri opt firr onc that is markcclby rupturcs,limits,

singularities,ironies and contingencies. Traditional logic displacesdesire asthe motor driving the socialmegamachine. Schizoanalysis nomadolor ogy provide a new conception of experienceand desiring-production, emphasisingforms of experimentation not constrained by the ego or Oedipal structures,aswell asthe needto createnew forms of collective(as opposed merelyindividual) liberation.Importantly,this kind of liberato tion cannotbe sponsored either by the Stateor capital. Connectives Capitalism Desire Earth/Land, Guattari Psychoanalysis Schizoanalysis

SPACE
Tom Conlejt In a view of a port seenat night at the beginningof Jean-Luc Godard's Pierrotlefou (1965),one of Deleuze's modelfilms in his work on the timeimage, a voice quotes a passage from Elie Faure on Velasquez: 'Space reigns'. The remark could apply to all of Deleuze'swritings. For the philosopher, is space what is at oncecreatedand exhausted annihilated or in the creationof an event.Whereverphilosophycreates events, recoups it literatureandthe artsin general. an importantessay Samuel In on Beckett, Deleuzenotesthat spaceis rich in potentialitybecause makespossible it the realisationof events.A given image or concept,when it is seenor engaged, creates and dissipates space the time of its perception.Space in is somethingthat is at the edges language. Deleuzecallsthe apprehenof sion of space 'exhaustion' meaning. an of The artist dissipates meaningin order to makespacepalpableat the moment it is both createdand annihilated.For both Godard and Beckettit could be saidthat the stakes those are of 'exhausting space'(D 1997b:163).Only then can it be seenand felt in an event, in a sudden disjunction, that scatterswhat we take to be the reality in which we live. The almost mystical tenor of Deleuze'swork on spaceand the event (cspecially "I'hc Exhaustcd'in .Es.ra.y.s in Criticaland Clinical)is cxplained by whatthc historirrn rcligionMichcl clc(lcrtciruwritcsin a l9ll4 study of

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of the inventionof everyday life: Spaceis a discursive practiceof a place. A placeis a givenarea, namedand mapped,that canbe measured terms in of surface volume.It becomes or space only whenit becomes siteof exista entialengagemenr amongliving agents who mark it with their activities or affiliate with dialogueand acriveperception. Placein this senseis equivalent to Deleuze'sconceptof an espace quelconque, 'any-space-whatsoever', that is determined and given to be what it is without being inflected by a useror a traveller.The taskof the philosopherand artist is to takethe most innocuous or ineffectual of all placesand to fragment (even atomise or molecularise) strip them of their potenrial. or The taskof the filmmakeris to make visible these non-placesbefore fracturing and dispersing them through creative manipulation. Roberto Rossellini, in Paisan (1947) or Germany,YearZero (1948)extendsbeforethe eyesof the spectatorproliferationsof any-spaces-whatsoever,'an urban cancer, indifferent surface, an a wasteland'(D 1986:212) that haveas rheir counterparts clich6sof the everydaylife, that his cameramakesuntenableand inhuman. Accordingly, the taskof the philosopher to turn'commonplaces' is into matterfor more exhaustivespeculation.Therein are engendered other spaces that can be hypotheticaland utopian or evenvirtual. is Space elsewhere measured Deleuze's in politicalwritingsaccording to degrees smoothness striation.A 'smoothspace' onethat is boundof and is lessand possibly oceanic, space a that is without borderor distinctionthat would privilegeonesiteor place overanother. does belongto a prelapIt not sarianworld from which humanshavefallen (asRousseau might argue),nor is it utopian unlessit can be thought of in coniunctionwith irs 'srriated' counterpart, space a drawn and riddled with lines of divide and demarcation that name,measure, appropriateand distribute spaceaccordingto inheritedpolitical designs, history or economicconflict.Without boundariesor measure, smoothspace frequently affiliatedwith the unconscious. is It is 'occupiedby eventsor haecceities more than by formed and perceived things', and thus it is more a space affects sensations of or than properties (D&G 1987:479).It is definedby a flow of forcesand henceis perceived haptically instead optically. is 'intensive' of It wherestriated space 'extenis sive'.A Body without Organs(BwO) bearsa surface smoothspace of that lackszones organs or that haveaffective privilegeoverothers. Striatedspace is one wherelinesand pointsdesignate itineraries and trajectories. Smoothspace be perceived andthroughstriated can in space, indeedwhat is seen experienced the world at large, orderto deterritorialise and in in given places. Deleuze's In lexiconthat pertains space place, to and deterritorialisation andreterritorialisation at thebasis mosrbiological philosophare of and icalactivity. this respect nomadis the person thinkerwhoconstantly In the or creates spacc movingfrom placcto placc.Thc nomacl, phiklsophcr; by thc

and the scientist and artist alikeare capable creatingspaces of through the trajectories their passages movefrom one territory to anotherand of that from givenstriationson the surface the world to smoothand intensive of areas, areas that aretantamountto the folds and creases eventsthat vibrate of in the body,itself a placethat canbe affectively spatialised infinite ways. in Connectives Body without Organs Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Nomadicism Smoothspace Utopia Virtual/Virtuality

SPACE + DIGITAL VerenaConlelt

ART

Open spaces, smoothspaces, absence boundaries, of speed, firing of electhe trons, blurrings of sexualor species boundaries,rhizomatic connectivities and the creation of hybrids: all of thesedescriptivesabound in Deleuze's writings and asa result they makehim a favouriteof digital artists.Deleuze puts in question traditionalconcepts ofspacethat, asreselctens&,served asa passivebackground against which humans stagedtheir dramatic actions. giveswayto rhizomaticthinking, space no longerbe When arborescence can separated from human actors.Spaceendowedwith virtual qualitiesexists betweenrhizomatic lines and is more intensivethan extensive. Rhizomaticthinking makesits way into the virtual spaces computers of and digital art. It setsout to undo limits and collapsebinaries- nature versusculture, human versusmachine,human versusanimal,or human versus cyborg - and creates new spaces.On their computers, network digital artists experimentwith connections betweendifferent species to create hybrids and becomings.Like philosophers,many digital artists questionlimits in order to destabilise selfthat is definedby the position the it occupiesor owns in the world. Working with Spinozist questions'What cana bodydo?'and'Wheredo the senses end?'- digitalartists undo thc barriersusedto fix and definethe 'Self'. Digital artistsquestion the mrrrkcd and finitc body by disembodying by producing lloclywithout it, rr Organs([]wO) :rnda machinic boclyof dcsirc.A wcb of'coltncctivity thrrt 'l'his wcb is pcrccivccl hc inlinitc opcnsonlo ncw lrrrdothcr spilccs. to

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replaces stable, a finite self and increases possibilities becomingfor the of human beings.Digital art emphasises permanentflux, magneticstreams and fluid desires.In virtual spaces, where experience mediatedthrough is the medium rather than narure,digital art creates hybrids and opensto becomings.simulation replacesrepresentation. Emphasisis placed on constructionand not on finality. Networks are in incessant circulation, makingpossible creationof virtual spaces. the Digital art seems times to be an extension concepts at of that Deleuze developed with Guattariin the conrextof informationtheoryand biology. The philosophers drawfrom GregoryBateson's notionof the world asa circulation of differencesalong circuits that function as forebearers comof

philosophy much ascybernetics computerscreens. they seepossias and If bilitiesof becoming throughconnections between humans and machines or the creationof new spaces) they also flatly condemnthe political abuses through the world of the digital mediaand the internet.Technology, they argue,can be liberating.It can help createand recreate world that no a longerexiststo be represented. canbreakdown barriersbetween It human and machine.It canopento new virtual spaces infinite becomings. and They warn us that humansshouldnot deludethemselves: information science, like everyother science, alsoconstructed is aroundorder-words. exracts It constantsand discourages true becomings. Computersand the internet are presently under the spellof finance capitalism, latter deploysits orderthe words to build barriersand arrestmovements that it would otherwise be unableto channelfor its own ends.It extracts constants helpsconsoliand datea society ofcontrol. Spaces their virtual qualities. lose Art, however, has the potential of escaping the capitalist economic sphere capitalism as consolidates throughcontrol,whilst digitalart experimentsin and with virtual spaces and, while unravelling boundaries verat tiginous speed,it continuously createsand recreatesrrew virtual spaces through hybrid connections.

SPINOZA, BARUCH (1632_7 7\ Kenneth Surin In the last few dccadcs writingsof Louis Arthusscr, thc Eticnncllalibar, Picrrc Mrrchcrcy, Antonio Ncgri, I)clcuzc rncl rthcrs. hrvc nrrrrkcd ir

resurgenceof interest in the thought of Baruch Spinoza, in which Spinoza'smaterialistontology has been used as a framework for constructing a matrix of thought and practice not regimented by the axioms of Platonicmetaphysics, epistemology Ren6Descartes, the tranthe of and scendental rationalismof ImmanuelKant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.Also important for thesethinkershasbeenthe useof spinoza asa resourceto reconceptualise some of Karl Marx's more important categoriesand principles.coupled with this resurgence been a parallel has development the areaof more technicalcommentary Spinoza,assoin on ciated primarily with the massive works of Martial Gueroult and Alexandre Matheron.Deleuzehimselfdealtwith Spinozain two texts:his 1968doctoralthesisSpinozaet leproblime l'expression 1992)and the (D d,e 1970 shorter text Spinoza: Philosophie pratique (D 1988c),though the thoughtof spinozapermeates his works,including the textsco-written all with Guattari. Deleuzeviews Spinozaas the first thinker to make judgementsabout truth and virtue inescapably social.Hence,for spinoza, notionsof moral culpability,responsibility, good and evil haveno reality exceprin so far as they stemfrom the dispositionto obeyor disobeythosein authority.The Statecannotcompel the individual as long as she is seento obey,and so DeleuzecreditsSpinozawith beingthe first philosopherto placethought outsidethe purview of the Stateand its functions:Spinoza,saysDeleuze in Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,'solicitsforces in thought that elude obedience well asblame,and fashionsthe imageof a life beyond good as and evil, a rigorousinnocencewithout merir or culpability' (D 1988c: 4). Life for Spinoza,since it cannot be constrainedby the state or milieu from which it emerges, irreducibly positive:life cannotbe enhanced is if it is trammelled by the interdictions of priesrs, judges, and generals whoseown livesare markedby an internal sado-masochism. Needless to say,Deleuze's use of Spinoza is inevitably selective.There are many Spinozas,iust as there are many Platos and Hegels, and Deleuze's Spinozais a Spinozaread through the eyesof Friedrich Nietzsche,and especiallyNietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return. For Nietzsche. accordingto Deleuze,the eternal return meansthat one will be willing to experience over and over againin exactlythe sameway.Similarly, life where Spinozais concerned,the person who will not be a victim of the sad passions, aspirant for beatitude,will be someonewhoseactions the cannot be an occasion regret. In both cases, for therefore,the individual concerned will not want the terms undcr which shc lives life to be any diffcrcnt. lror spinozir,tlrcrc ilrc two primirry kirrdsof'firrccs wlriclr dinrinish lifb - hrrtrcd, whichis tttrttcdtowirlds olhrrr; llrc irrrd birdcorrscicncc. llrc

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which is turned inwards.Only a new kind of life, capableof sustaining experimentation and a new appetitefor living, can overcome thesenegative and reactive passions.Spinoza's works, primarily the Ethics, delineatean intellectualframework(going under the name of an 'ethics') for leadingthis new life. In this new ontology,a body is definedby its speeds and slownesses, its forms and functions, as it was in the age-old not Aristotelianmetaphysics that dominatedphilosophyuntil the Enlightenment. Also important in this ontology are the linkagesbetweendifferent bodies,culminating in the forming of a nexusof connections, eachconnection or set of connectionsproceedingwith its own speedand slowness. Knowledge understood in this way is essentiallymaterial and contingent, since no individual knows aheadof time what their bodily affectsare and what they are likely to involve in relation ro other individuals and forces. Deleuzeand Guattari'skinship with Spinozastemsfrom their perception that philosophy todayhasto cometo termswith the emergence new of knowledgesthat havebeen accompanied the explosiverise of a whole by rangeof new sciences, basedon the creationof'nonstandard' logicsand topologies change of and relation,and typically devised dealwith situto ations that have the characterof the irregular or the arbitrary (what Deleuzeand Guattaricall'nomad thought','rhizomatics','schizoanalysis'). These new logicsand topologies concernthemselves only with not principlesofchangeand process, alsowith surfaces, the structural but textures, rhythms, connections and so on, all of which can be analysed in terms of suchnotionsasthoseof strings,knots,flows,labyrinths,intensitiesand becomings. Spinozais viewedby Deleuzeasthe pre-eminentprecursorof this'nomadthought',thoughclearlyfor them Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergsonarealsoexemplary predecessors. The appropriationof Spinoza'sthought by Deleuze(and Guattari) is undeniably selective. There is a rationalismin Spinozathatisdownplayed in Deleuze's interpretationof him, and while Spinozawascriticalof State power,he cannoteasilybe madeto sharethe same premisses theoretical as the anarcho-Marxism Deleuzeand Guattari.All this notwithstanding, of Spinoza'srigorous immanentismand materialism, mediatedin complex waysby the thought of several other thinkers,are very much in evidence in Deleuze's oeuvre. Connectives Eternal return Immanence Materialism

sPrNozA + ETHTCS JOY OF

Constantin Il Bound,as Deleuzehasoften beenpraisedfor his (Stoic)commitmentto the ethicsof the event - our becomingworthy of the event through the processof counter-actualisation that which is happeningto us. But Deleuzehas of alsolaid claim to an ethic of joy, the articulationof which is the result of his many encounters with Baruch Spinoza.The nodal point that representsthe linkageof this commitmentis the Nietzschean affirmationof the 'eternalreturn' - the lynchpin of Deleuze'sontology and the indispensableimperativeof his ethics. Deleuze thinks of desire as an affirmative,non-intentionalintensity, producingconnections real in their function and revolutionaryin their multiplicity. Deleuze'sdesire is modelled after Spinoza'sconatus; is it neithera 'want' nor 'lack' but the effort of an individualentity to persevere in its own existence, thinks of conatus beingdetermined as Spinozaalways by its capacityto affect and to be affected;it is not, therefore, difficult to think of czna,tus desire.Providedthat we do not separate as from essence action,a czna,tus be understood the essence can as ofan entity or its degree of power.Actions themselves constitutea person'saffirmationof life and his will to exist. Spinozaspeaks an order of essences, is, of an order of intensities, of that within which all singularessences cohereand aremutually responsible for eachother'sproduction.In Deleuze's work, this order helpshim articulate the virtual/real.But in Spinoza, thereis alsoan orderof organisation, with its own lawseternallydeterminingthe conditionsfor the cominginto being and the enduranceof singularentities.On this plane,arrangements are made ad infinitum, but not every arrangementis compatiblewith the others. Spinoza recognises order of fortuitous encounters:bodies an encounter otherbodiesand in somecases singulararrangements one the of body are suchthat they 'fit' the singulararrangements the bodiesthey of encounter; together they increase each other's power of affectivity. however, Sometimes somebodiesare incompatiblewith others' arrangements,thus when they meet they decrease powerof one another. the In an effort to think aboutdesireasjoy,Deleuzeborrowsfrom Spinoza's schema intensities. the extentthat desireis not phantasmatic, To of desire is the power that one has, which allows one to go as far as this power pgrmits: the powerto annexbeing.Here the distinctionbetween progressive and regressive annexationbecomesthe urgent task of the ethicist. Deleuze's allegiancc Spinozapermits him to arguethat the questionof to the effort of thc individualto maintainand prokrnghis cxistcncc tlso is

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a questionof how to enable maximumexperience activeaffects. the of The order of fortuitousencounters doesnot giveus an edgebecause leadsto it the formation of inadequate ideas- an inadequare idea being the idea whosecause not in our own powerto understand. is Nevertheless, evenan inadequate ideacauses affect,and an affect,whoseadequate an cause are we not, is a passion.Conversely, adequate an idea finds its formal causein our power to think and to understand,and also generates affectin us, an an affectwhoseadequate cause our own powerto think and is, therefore, is an action.In this case, no longercount on accidental we encounters multito ply joyful passions. An entire geneticphenomenology the becoming-active human of of beingscanbe found in Spinoza's Ethics, and this is what inspiresDeleuze's ethicsof joy. We begin with passive desires/joysthat increase power ro our act despite the fact that they are at the mercy of inadequateideas.But, then, thanks to thesedesiresand passions, begin to form common we notions, or adequate ideas.Active desire/joy accompanies common the notionsasour powerto act increases. Finally,activeioy replaces passions, filling us with new capacities be affected; to this combinationconsrirutes the activelife of the individual.In turn our capacity understand ro sadness and contrariety is enhanced,and as we developa better understandingof theseaffections activejoy increases. our At this time, the influenceof Friedrich Nietzsche Deleuze's in ethicsof joy is revealed:the pedagogyfor the formulation of adequateideas becomes process the counter-actualisation that which happens the of of to us. It is no longerthe generality the commonnotion that standsfor the of cogitandum practicalreason; is the eventthat must be grasped of it through the process counter-actualisation. of The sadness the stateof affairspasin sively affecting us is transformed into a ioyful affirmation of the event. Passive affectionsare turned into activeonesthat are capable transvaluof ing and transformingstates affairs. of

STATE Kenneth Surin Deleuzeand Guattarihavea conception the Statethat is indebtedto the of work of the anthropologistand anarchistPierre Clastres.Clastreshad arguedagainstthe conventional evolutionistaccountof the emergence of the Stateas a form of political and socialorganisation. Accordingto this traditional account,the Statecan developonly when a socictyrcnchcs ir ccrtaindcgrccof complcxity, primrrrily its capacity crciltc cvidcnccd by to

and sustaina more sophisticated division of labour. Against this view, Clastres arguedthe Stateis the condition for undertakingsignificanteconomic and political projectsand the division of labour that ensues from theseprojects,and so logically and empirically the division of labour does not condition economicand political projects.Deleuzeand Guattari follow Clastres repudiatingthis evolutionisttheory. in In Capitalism andSchizophrenia,Deleuze Guattari view the Stateas and powerthat bringstogetherlabourpowerand the prior conan overarching ditions for the constitution of labour power, enabling the creation of surplus-value. a result, there is a constitutive antagonisticrelation As between the State and labour, especiallysince the State supplies capital with its models realisation, sothereis alsonecessarily antagonism of and an itselfby organbetween capitaland labour.Capitalexistsand perpetuates ising itself to orchestrate and contain this proletarianantagonism. The necessary concomitant the State's of apparatuses'capacity engage this to in task of organisationis the production of surplus-valueand facilitating accumulation. a result,capitaland the Stateareunder unceasing As internal pressure neutraliseand containthe antagonism to that, paradoxically, is the very thing that enables to exist. The assemblages it createdand maintained by the Stateand capital createa collectivesubiectivity which establishes the material aspects of the productive forces that generate possible. surplus-value by sodoingmakeproductionandaccumulation and goes (State's) power Along with the formationof collective subjectivity the of subjection. The State's capacity engage the formationof a collective to in subjectivity, neededto constitute labour as a productive force, doesnot remain the samethroughout history. The despoticState in early historical times used slaveryand serfdomwith their accompanying forms of subjectivity for this task;industrialcapitalism usedthe figureof the mass workerand disciplinary socialformations;and today, in the age of a globalised and worldintegrated capitalism,the State is still neededto regulate the flows of productionand to reproduce forms of accumulation. this powerof the But dominationis no longermediatory, wasthe case as with the previouseconomic dispensations, as much asthe State is no longer neededto create in and maintain classes other socialand economicsubgroupings. and Instead, the function of the State/capitalin the current phase capitalist of accumulation is to engagein the work of disaggregation, segment,through to procedures the useof mediaand informationalsystems, administrative and powerthat the proletariathasdeveloped. the countervailing Capital/State hasa negative relationship the forcesand forms that opposcit. to In thc prcscntcapitalistc<tnjuncturc, authorsof Cupitulism thc untt Sthizophrcnia thitt crrpitnlisnr an indcpcndcnt, sry is worklwidcirxiolrrirtic

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that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 'megamachine' of which the States are parts, or neighbourhoods. Towards this end, capitalism will cven create States that are not viable, like Somalia and Rwanda, for its own purposes: subjugating minorities through forced integration and extermination. In the present conjuncture, that is, the age of the societies of control (as opposed to thc disciplinary societies of the previous epoch), capital has become the ubiquitous milieu that secures the isomorphism of even the most disparate forms (commercial, religious, artistic, and so forth). In this milieu, productive labour is inserted into every section of society: the universality of capital is simultaneous with the omnipresence of everything that createssurplus-value, as human subiectivity' leisure and play, and so on, are incorporated into the latest regimes of accumulation. Capitalism has always striven to create an economic order that is able to function without the State, and in its current phasethis propensity has become more marked than ever. However, for Deleuze and Guattari this is not because the State itself has been abolished, but rather because the separation between State and society can now no longer be maintained. Society and State now constitute a single and unified nexus, and all capital has become social capital. Hence the production of social cooperation, undertaken primarily by the service and informational industries in developed countries' has become crucial for capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the deterritorialising effect of State/Capital merely produces an even more powerful reterritorialisation, that is, State/Capital only breacheslimits in order to impose its own limits.

Connective Capitalism

STRATIFICATION K1lie Message Deleuze and Guattari explain 'stratification' is an ongoing, rhizomatic or processthat contributes to the line of emergence becoming.This reiectionof a unifying subiectivity process may (or may not) lead to our Body without Organs(BwO). and embraceinsteadthe forever-formative to also 'stratification' refers whatis cssentially the However, process/term writersin thcir rrttcmpt it whercby assists of sorts, principle an organising l)ltrlcttrts (.1 'l'httusttntl to irctivcly ilpply- or put iuto prircticc thcir iclcas
r rirls t1 p rrt tillt h ir s c lic s of ' ' 1' r r : t gt t t r t lit ' s 't r t l l t c t 'l l t r t t t r t b s t t 'i t c t t h c o l i e s ) .

As such, the term provides both an organising form for discussion, as well as the subject matter or content contained by that form. The processes(rather than just the effects) of everyday experience are invoked by Deleuze and Guattari in order to show interweaving journeys between statesofconsciousnessand unconsciousness that we both take and make routinely and repetitively. These often forgotten journeys and the non-cognitive decisions that accompany our movements are precisely where a potential line of flight or becoming may be located, and in evoking largely taken-for-granted State systems,all processesof becoming occur at lcast initially - within these systems. In what is perhaps the most useful and accessible paradox of Plateau 3 of A Thousand. Plateaus,a primary point of discussionemergesas the relationship betweenthe production and reception of language(via theoriesof semiotics). As paradoxicalmeta-narrativeforms, the chaotic principles motivaring maintenanceof the conccptsof the carth and God function to destabilisethe claims for truth or universality that are often associated with somehowmore seamless semiotic theorics that attempt to provide a generalisingexplanation for all aspectsof reality. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari show that language, like all systemsand all aspectsof life, is constituted by a seriesof strata that have been traditionally contained by physiochemical,organic or anthropomorphic catcgories.Straddling these fields, languageaffects every aspectof the universe by contextualisingthem within a singlc sphere of interaction. For Deleuze and Guattari, every articulation (or stratum) consists of abstract and discrete components. In accord with this, language(and semiotics as the scienceof language)can clearly be seenas an organising principle that presumes to make senseof our experienceof these components that, when combined, produce realit,v.However, while acknowledging that they need to invoke the system they aim to critique (languagemust be used for generalcommunication to occur between writers and readers),Deleuze and Guattari also show that linguistic terms or signifiers rend ro be used in such generalisingand structural ways that they ceaseto function linguistically in relation to a specific idea or field of content. As such, the signifier comes ro adopt instead a kind of physical or distinct independenceand objecthood, whereby the relationship betweensignifier and signified is further obliterated. Deleuze and Guattari contend that all articulations are always already a double articulation becausethey are consrituted by the dual components of content and expression. We can understand this to mean that strata come in pairs and are themselves made up of a double articulation that can then be recognisedas molar and molecular (and bound by the third evcn more varirblc tcrm/linc <lf nomaclic),<lr which wc miry lltcrnativcly consiclcr throttgh tl rc lcr r r r s of ''cxlt r cssior r 'r r ncl 'cr ) nlcnl'( t lr csc r clllr r r . cllr c .S i tttssttri rttt ( 'cl) ls 'sigr r ilict '' r nt l'sigr r iliet l')I.low't 'r cr ', : rir r t lit 'ir t cr l r ol cor) r s lr

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the more generally acceptedbreakdown in referential relations between the signifier and signified, it is important to note that the layers, planes or discrete strata of content or expression are arbitrary. There is no referential, signifier-signified, or cause-and-effect relationship regulating their production or existence, despite the fact that the layers may cooperate with each other or bleed into one another in order to produce new strata or lines of deterritorialisation. The concept of 'stratification' is an attempt to promote a new kind of thinking about the way language produces an image of reality (and is itself reframed as a product of this same activity). Language is an important point of focus becauseit is both a grand and minor narrative, and an organising as well as organised principle through which our subiectivity is only ever provisionally contained.

Connectives Becoming Body without Organs Lines of flight Rhizome Semiotics Signifier/signified Subjectivity

SUBJECTIVITY Constantin V Boundas or as the Deleuzeabandons old imageof the subiect a fixedsubstance foundation stone, in favour of a subject that is the provisionaloutcomeof of subiectis an assemblage hetThe Deleuzian of a process subjectivation. interiority of the traditional whosesourceis not the elements erogeneous is imageof thought.Deleuzeinsiststhat subiectivity not given;it is always underconstruction. to seem defy aboutsubiectivity shiftingattitudes Deleuze's At first glance, (a that subject he outlines and, First, in Empiricism Subjectialry reconciliation. (D throughwhichit is developed' l99l: 85' 86). by is defined themovement but that thereare 'no more subiccts, he Second,in the Dialogues explains ilsscmcollcctivc whichconstitr,rte withoutsubjects, individuations dynamic rtccording f:tkc but subjcctivc haccccitics shapc bccomcs . blirgcs . . N<lthing ().1).,rrst ) l ()fl7: l s' rtttd ivc tll'rtott-strbicct powcrs cll'cct (l , posit iotts I rl t ltc c:rlrt

in Foucault he writes that 'the struggle for [modern] subjectivity presents itself, therefore,as the right to difference,variation and metamorphosis' (D 1988b: 106).The reconciliationof thesepositions hinges on our ability to read each one of them as a separateanswer to a distinct question. ln Empiricismand Subjectioity, Deleuze outlines that the inrensive, inregrative act of our practical interesr (extension of an initially intensive - yet narrow - moral sympathy over those who are not our kin), together with the associativerules of our speculative interest, make the organisation of subjectivity possible.Far from establishingthe seamless identity of the subiect, this organisation shows us that the subiect's constitution is a fiction, for the subject is an entity out of joint (cracked).There would be no belief in the subject without the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in God and the World - illegitimate, becauseneither God nor World can evcr be objects of knowledge. Yet, these fictions act as the horizons of all possiblebeliefs, including the (illegitimate and fictitious) belief in the subject and its unity. For Deleuze in Dffirence and Reltetition, the subject is the tensive arrangement of many larval subjects. A self exists as long as a contracting machine, capableof drawing a difference from repetition, functions somewhere. There is a self lurking in the eye; another in the liver; a third in the stomach.A subject is the inclusive disjunction borne from the contracrion of all these selves. In Cultitalism and,Schizophrenia, the subject's recognition of itself as subject is described by Deleuze and Guattari as 'retrospective'. It emerges not as the agent of selection but as an after-effect of desiring-production. Capitalism and the isolation of the nuclear family from society that capitalism facilitates provide a perfect rraining ground for the ascetic subjectivity that capitalism requires. It also reproduces patriarchy by producing hicrarchically gendered subiects in accordance with specific values and imperatives that thrive within the nuclear family. Meanwhile, in The Fold a subject is that which comes ro a poinr of view, or rather that which remains at the point of view, provided that the point of view is one of variation. It is not the point of view that varies within the subject; on the contrary it is the condition through which an eventual subject apprehendsvariation. A subject is a monad that includes in itself and also conveys - the entire World obscurely, by expressing clearly only a small region of the world. Deleuze and Guattari propose in Foucault that the inside is an operation ol the outside or a doubling up of the outside. Here, rhe subject is the result of a processof subjectivationin accordance with four foldings. These are as foll<lws: first, thc mrrtcriirlpirrt of <lursclvcs; sccond,thc f<llcling firrcc; of thi rcl , thc ti rlcling o1'knowlcdgc; nd f ir ur t lr , t hc f ir lclir r g 't hc or r t sidc.A it of g l )ct' sol docs tt ol lir lt l t hc lilr ccscor r r posir rlht 'r r r ,wit lr or r tt hc or r t sit lt . it sr . ll' t

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also being folded, henceforming a self within a person.Folding is the memoryof the outside. Further, the 'other' asit is discussed TheLogicof Sense in makespossible the categories 'subject'and 'object'. The other is the structureof all posof sible worlds: it inhabits the transitionsfrom one object to another;it relativisesdistances differences; forms the backgroundfrom which forms and it riseup; and the otherspatialises temporalises. intensive and The bracketing of 'the other', therefore, tantamountto the intensive is bracketing 'the of Self'. The familiarworld and the subjects that inhabitit, in the presence of others, release molecularise elements singularities werepreand the and that viously sedimented and stratified inside them. The ideology of 'lack' and negationthat kept the subject'sdesirecaptiveis now shownto be the result of socio-historical processes subjectivation,rather than the irreducible of datum of subjectivity. What emerges after the bracketingof the other as structure all possible of worldsis the 'otherwise other'- l'autrement qu'autre. Connectives Capitalism Desire Fold Memory

SUBJECTIVITY Simon O'Sullizsan

+ ART

Deleuzehasbeenportrayedasa philosopher dissolution, a thinker of of as flowsand intensities somehow'outside'ofi or'beyond', the human.Indeed a cursoryreadingof A Thousand, Plateaus might leadone to suppose that Deleuzeand Guattari are interesred 'escaping' in lived life. Certainlythis trajectory is there, perhapsmost infamouslyin the notion of the Body without Organs (BwO), understood as a srrategythat helps free us from the strata that constitutesus aJ human (that is to say,in a particular configuration). However Deleuze's philosophy is also very much one of caution,for it is nevera questionof wildly destratifying of dosages, but of finding creatioe linesof flight that leadsomewhere from which one can and 'return'. Deterritorialisation always endsin a reterritorialisation in fact and needsa territory from which to operate. It is in this sense that Deleuzemight alsobe understood a construcas (lcrtainlyhc is involvcd thc prodigions tivephilosophcr. in consrruction of

However,we might alsoseehim, concepts, evidenced this dictionary. as by specifically his collaborations, beinginvolvedin the parallelprojectof in as This is evenmore the case the construction,or production, subjectivity. of with Guattari's own work, which wasalwaysinvolved in thinking through what Guattaricalled'resingularisation': potentialityfor, and practicalthe ities o( reconfiguring our subjectivities. Guattari, asfor Deleuze,this For is a pragmaticand specifically materialistproject. Through involvement with certain materialsof expression, with groups and individuals,and alwayswith an toutside'we can open up new universes reference: of new waysof seeing and beingin the world. For Guattari La Borde clinic operatedasjust sucha siteof transformation. encouraged It new relationships At and new experiences. stakehere wasnot the reintegrationof a 'cured' individual into society,but an encouragement becomeinvolved, to parto ticipate,in one'sown processual self-creation. Whateverthe successes or failuresof the clinic, we havehere an interestingframeworkfor thinking thosecollaborative collective practices todaythat might be seen and of art as producingcommunitiesand subjectivities preciselythis sense. in This practice, 'relationalaesthetics' it hasbecome field of expanded or as known doesnot requirespectators such,but participants as who are'transformed' through their interactionwith the practice. We might recognise Deleuze's Spinozism here. Indeed Baruch Spinoza's ethicsinvolvesa similar mappingto the above: organisation the of one'sworld so as to produce productive- that is joltful - encounters. Involving the coming togetherof two 'bodies'that essentially agreewith oneanother, havethe concomitant resultof increasing our suchencounters capacityto act in the world. We might call this a 'rhizomaticsof friendship', the latter understood in its broadest sense.For Spinoza, ethics involvesexploring what a body,in both the individual and collectivesense, is capable that beginswith ethical principlesor guidelines, of but ultimproduces understanding one'sself and world - and in fact a ately it an of certainovercoming one'sseparation from the world. of Perhaps key factor preventingthesetransformations habit. Here is the 'habit' is takento meannot just our daily routinesbut alsoour dominant refrainsand typical reactionsto the world. In this sense aesthetics becomes important.For namingasit doesa'disinterested'response the world, aesto thetics can operateas a rupture in otherwisedominant r6gimesof signifi(the cationand expression clich6sof our beingand indeedof our consumer culture).Aesthetics hereneednot be a transcendent category, ratherwe can think of it simplyasthe generation unexpected affects andon thebody. in of This rupture canand doesproducepossibilities resingularisation. for Anothcrwayof thinkingthis 'immancnt acsthctic' asinvolving kind is a or gilp bctwccnstimulusrnd rcsponsc. his uscof'llcnri In of'hcsitation

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Bergson, Deleuze attends to this: the pause between action and reaction is what constitutes the human as a particularly complex brain-body assemblage. This pause allows a certain amount of freedom and the possibility for a more creative responseto the world. Put differently, in today's world it is important to change speed, to slow down sometimes and even at times to remain still. Art, in fact the contemplation art, might have a role to play of here (this is also the sensein which meditation can be understood as a creative technology of self production). In some sensessuch an 'aesthetic' is 'beyond' subjectivity. Throughout his work, Deleuze attends to those experiences that are atypical and 'non-ordinary'. For example, what happens to an individual in a 'world without others'? Here the interaction with the world takes on an idiosyncratic and perverted character. The individual harnesses cosmic forces and 'becomesworld'as it were. Again this might be a name for certain art practices from prehistory to today, those that allow accessto a kind of immanent beyond to the everyday, and to everyday consciousness.We might say, then, that this is the aesthetic - and,ritualistic - function of art that always accompaniesthe latter's ethical or indeed political character.

S UB S T A NC E Claire Colebrook Deleuze might appear to be a purely inventive philosopher, avowedly creating concepts and vocabularieswhile rejecting the constraints of already formed metaphysical systcms.Certainly, he would seemto be a far cry from the project of Martin Heidegger that approached Being through its philosophical history. Central to Heidegger's destruction of the history of philosophy was the way in which the concept and grammar of 'substance' had dominated thinking. In Dffirence and Repetition,Deleuze repeatedly refers to Heidegger's project of re-activating thinking, and part of this reactivation depends upon avoiding the logic of a certain understanding of substance.However, it is not only in his early works on the history of philosophy but also in his later work with Guattari that Deleuze cngageswith the concept of 'substance'. There are two reasons for the importance of this concept. Philosophically, the concept of susbstancegoes back to the Greek term, hypoheimenon, that which underlies, and to the concept of or ousia, or that which remains present through a series of changcs. We can qualitics or ;rlcclicittcs. think of a substanccthat thenhas variousaccidental 'l'lrc lrist<lry<lf mctlphysics has thcrcfilrc clcbltccl just whrrt cor,u'lts ils ( rr it s t t bs liur c c , th i tl ttl l o tt w l ti c h rrl lo th c r p ropcrti cstl cpcrrtl .l )cl crrzcti rkcs

part in, at the same time as he overturns this debate. For Deleuze, part of this overturning is to think of substance,not as a noun - something that is - but as an infinitive: not, 'The tree li green,' but a power 'to green'. So, Deleuze acceptsthe function of substance- that from which differentiated beings are expressed- but he does not seesubstanceas some ultimate bcing or entity, but as a power of creation and expression. If we think of substance(as it is traditionally defined) as what exisrs in itself before all relations, requiring no other being in order to be, then this has two resonances in Deleuze's philosophy. First, following Baruch Spinoza, Dcleuze argues that substance cannot be numerically several. This is because Spinoza adoptsthe traditional definition of somethingthat exists iz itself,, but also saysthat substanceis conceived through itself,We do not need more than one substance- say,the substanceof mind that will represent or know the substanceof matter. Substance- or what is - unfolds in two modes: the mode of extension (or spatial matter) and the mode of thought or mind. So there is iust one substancethat is then expressedboth in thought and in body. If there were more than one substance- say mind and body (which is the Cartesian answer) - then we would have to explain a relation between the two. But it is the very nature of substanceto be independent of its relation to anything else. Substancemust then be one, but it must also expressitself differently. Indeed, real difference is only possible on such an account. We should not, for example, think of different minds as different substances.What is numerically several - all the different minds in the world - is substantially univocal; each mind is an expression of the one power of life to express itself in the arrribute of mind; each is a different mode of the one attribute. Becausethere is only one substance we cannot say that mind is the origin or author of matter, or vice versa; all dualisms arc invalid and arise from mistaking the expressionsof substance - the relations unfolded from substance- for relations between substance. No substanceis the causeor ground of any other; there is just one univocal substance that expressesitself infinitely, and cannot be reduced to any of its expressions,effects or accidents. This allows Deleuze to think of substance in terms of powers or potentials. We cannot reduce life to already effected relations, for there is alsoa power or potential to produce relations. In this sense,then, the metaphysical function of substance,as that which exists in itself before relations, and through itself, forms a vital role in Deleuze's work. In traditional metaphysics,a substanceis whatever can exist without requiring :rny other being in order to be. For instance,there cannot be whitcncss without somc thing that is whitc; substirnccis thc bcarcr of prccl i ci ttcs r pr opcr t ics. l) clcuzc's phikr sophy is conccr r r cd wit h t hc o ol ' st t bslit t t cc, lir t 't hc t t st r t l cor r r r r r it nr cr rlo sr r llslir r r cc llows t lr fnthl utt

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philosophers establish ultimate reality or ground - what really is to an before its different expressionsor perceptions.Even more importantly, as while all other beingswere God wasestablished the only true substance, Againstontologyand the notion of substance saidto 'be' only by analogy. ground,Deleuzeargues full that all beingspossess realityasa preceding whiteness,a memory,a smile, a potentiality - and are equally real and are formally distinct while numericallyone (that is, are truly different only and beingin relathereis only one substance sonothing is a lesser because tion to anyother). Connectives Memory Real Spinoza

TERRITORY Kylie Message Plateaus, Deleuzeand Guattari privilege ideasof spatiality ln A Thousand, (evidenced the privilegedterm of'plateau') and the geographies and by cartographies movement,presentingtheseas an informal antidoteto of from Michel Foucault).Even in history (here they can be distinguished historyis presented beingsubsirmed as within discussions, their geological it the constitutionof space; is significantfor the role that time plays in movement acrossfields (in, for example,its relations of speedand slowmodeof categorical dating. ness), nobfor its institutionalised but Rather than denying the affectivityof history Deleuzeand Guattari grand narrativestrategies that are reject the universalising chronological frequently associated with it. In their preferencefor lines of flight and becoming, they critique history for beinga tool of the unitary Stateapparimpulse, atus.These,linesare understoodnot only as a deterritorialising materialandpsychological compon-' but they alsocontributeto the spatial, group, or individual (those a ents that constituteor deconstitute society, of that comprisehistory as a lived, experientialassemblage apparatuses All components hclp producethe concept events circumstances). these and

accompanies concepts 'deterritothe of of a 'territory' that concomitantly rialisation'and'reterritorialisation'. ratherthan The concept easy categorisation because of'territory' evades placemaintainingfirm bordersagainstoutsidethreat, being a sedentary As it the territory itself is a malleable of passage. an assemblage, exists site into somethingelse. in a stateof processwhereby it continually passes A However,it alsomaintainsan internal organisation. territory is alsoan componentof deterritorialisation, accomassemblage that, asa necessary paniesthe conceptof 'nomadology'.A territory refers to a mobile and shifting centre that is localisableas a specific point in spaceand time. It doesnot privilegeor maintain the nostalgicor xenophobicprotectionof any particularhomeland;instead,this centre(that may be more correctly calleda 'vector' because can resideoutsideof the assemblage/territory) it expresses experiential an conceptthat hasno fixed subjector object.It is neither symbolicnor representational, doesnot signify.As an assemand blage,a territory manifests series constantlychangingheterogeneous of a at elements and circumstances cometogetherfor variousreasons parthat from the areas connections ticular times.Although a territory establishes subject,conceptand being, it is distinct from a fixed of representation, image, signification or subjectivity.Through this, we can seethat a territory is primarily marked by the ways movementoccurs over the earth, rather than by Stateborders.A territory is necessarily lived and produced by asa vagueentity because this desireto avoidcategorisation language of or other Stateapparatuses. Hence,it is closelyconnectedto molecularcognitiveand non-cognitive modesof movement. A territory doesnot simply hold backthe process deterritorialisation, of nor doesit provideit with an opposingor dichotomous term (Deleuzeand Guattari contendthat there is no needto leavethe territory to follow a line Neither doesa territory providea baseor originary of deterritorialisation). (home)from which deterritorialisation may occur.Instead,it is a conterm stantaccompaniment (andevenproponentfacilitating)the linesof flight to proposes. deterritorialisation o many In addressing idea of territory, Deleuzeand Guattari discuss the (which they describe a mode as examples, from the refrain of the birdcall of expressionthat both draws a territory and envelopsinto territorial motifs and landscapes) the role played by the artist's signature,that to equates with placing a flag on a pieceof land. However,they frequently return to the relationshipbetween territory and the earth in order to show from maintainingits own organising that the territory does not escape principleand structure.This example usedto illustratethat sucha relais tionship is not dichotomoussimply,in the sensethat one term can be differentiated a straightforwardmanncr from the othcr. lnstead,takcn in

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together, these terms show the magnetic pull that often works toward accumulating a synthesisof apparently disjunctive terms. As such, territories cannot contain or encompass the earth, but neither can the earth be fixed to a single territory. On the other hand, even though the earth embraces all territories (as a seriesof molecular or nomadic moments collected bytheconjoining'. . . and. . . and. . . and' logic that motivatesit), it is also the force of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation since its continuous movements of development and variation unfold new relations of materials and forces (predicated on a relationship of speed and slowness).So, in contrast to the specific or localisabletime and place offered by territories, the earth offers up an alternative complex assemblage(and various productive lines of becoming or fligh$ - the Body without Organs.

Connectives Body without Organs Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation Earth/Land Lines of flight Nomadicism

THEORY Bruce Baugh Deleuze's most interestingthoughtson theory comein a discussion with Michel Foucault,where he puts forward the following idea: 'A theory is exactlylike a box of tools . . . It must be useful.It must function' (D&F 1977:208). theory is something to A that we must constructasa response to then 'we haveno choicebut to cona problem,and if it ceases be usefr,rl, struct others'. This approachto theory is inherently practical,although Deleuzedistinguishes betweentheoreticaland practicalactivity while at that the same time arguingthat theoryis neithera foundationfor practices to nor would merelyapply universal theories particularcases) the resultof norms from para reflectionon particularpractices that extractuniversal ticular cases. Rather than being universal,a 'theory is alwayslocal and relatedto a limited field'. Extendingtheory to practiceis not merely the rules or theorems particularcases, a 'rclay' to but applicationof universal walls to a 'more or lessdistant field of practice'in response 'obstrcles, to lly ancl bkrckrrgcs' within thc thcory's own immirncnt cl<lmirin. 'rclirying' to irs'ruroll.rtr ol'discotrlsc'withdill'crcrrl lyllc rr rl<lrrrairr, lhcrlr'.y rrsc:s l)rrlcticc

practice as a way of overcoming its internal difficulties, making practice serye as 'a set of relays between one theoretical point and another' (D&F 1977: 206). Conversely, theory can serve as a relay from one practice to another, connecting one practical field to a different one in order to overcome a practical impasse. In the latter case,theory does not represent or 'speak for' practice, any more than practice 'applies' theory: 'there's only action - theoretical and practical action' connected in networks and relays. As an example, Deleuze refers to his and Foucault's work with prisoners as a way of connecting 'official discoursesof confinement' to the discourse of the confined themselves,a move that is simultaneously theoretical and practical. As Foucault puts it in the same dialogue, 'Theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice' (D&F 1977:208). Nowhere else does Deleuze offer such a positivc appreciation of theory, which he usually downgrades in contrast with thought: 'Thinking's never just a theoreticalmatter. It has to do with vital problems' (D 1995:105).Yet many characteristics thought shares with what he said about'theory'in the dialogue with Foucault. Thought is a practical activity, work; philosophy, specifically,is thought-experimentation through the creation of concepts, each concept being a responseto a problem whose conditions and scopethe concept helps define, and each concept being created in the midst ofalready existing concepts which encounter impassesor blockagesthat require new conceptsas'bridgesor crossroads'enabling them to join up with other conproblems subject to the same conditions (D&G 1994: cepts responding to 27).'A concept lacks meaning to the extent that it is not connected to other concepts and is not linked to a problem that it resolves or helps resolve' (D&G 1994:79). Problems necessarilychangealong with the changing conditions of thought and action. Thought, then, is a strategy in the face of problems, and seekssolutions through creating concepts, ways of thinking, and a system of coordinatesthat dynamically relatesthoughts and problems to one another. On this conception, the 'practice' that serves as a relay between one theoretical point and another is thought itself, and the singular theoretical points are concepts in the caseof philosophy, affectsand percepts in the caseof art, and functions in the caseof science. Deleuze's pragmatic conception of theory also extends to his explanation of Foucault'sdistinction betweenthe'classic'intellectual,who'could Iay claim to universality' in virtue of the writer's social position being on a par with jurists and lawyers who represent the universality of law, and the 'specific intellectual' who 'tends to move from one specific place or point to anothcr', 'producing effectsnot of universalitybut of transversality, and f r,rnctioning:rs cxchangcr'betwccn cliffcrcntthcorcticirlficlcls, :rn br.rt thc in l corl tcxt of' ;rr r t ct icr t r ur t l polit ic: r l st lugglcs ( l) l9f ilib: 9l) . 'l'hc syr ccif ic i nl cl l ccl rrrtl ' cxpcr t isc or llt cot 'yis ir lwr r ys : ir l, 'xllr cssir r g li'ir gr r r cnlur y s lot t ir

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totality that is necessarily limited and necessarily runs up against impasses or 'walls' that can be breachedby a strategicrelay or detour through other theoretical fields.No intellectual, no theory cantotalisethe entirefield and of knowledgeand action. A theory multiplies and eruprs in a totally different areaby finding 'lateral affiliationsand entire systemof networks', or else it loses its efficacy(D&F 1977: 212). Transversalconnections betweentheory and practiceon the part of specificintellectualswould include nuclearphysicists using their expertiseto speakagainstnuclear weapons; transversal a relayfrom one theoretical domainto anotherwould be Deleuzeand Guattari'sstrategic shift of FriedrichNietzsche from philosophyto ethnologyin their own theoretical-politicalAnti-oed,ipus (D&G 1983: 190-l). Connectives Concepts Foucault

THOUGHT John Marks In his earlier work, and in particular Dffirence and,Repethion,Deleuze talksof a dominant'Imageof thought'that he sets to challenge, out exploring the possibilityof a 'thought without image'.The imagethat Deleuze challenges essentially is dogmaticand moral. In this sense, is represenit tational in nature, in that it presupposes that 'everyoneknows, what it meansto think, and that the only prerequisite for'thought'is an individual in possession goodwill and a 'natural capacity'for thought. Ren6 of Descartes, example, for presumes that everybody knowswhat is meantby self, thinking and being. For Deleuze, this image of thought as cognito natura is extraordinarilycomplacent.Instead,he claims that we think rarelyand more often under the impulseof a shockthan in the excitement of a tastefor thinking. Genuinethinking is necessarily antagonistictowards the combinationof good sense and common sense that form the d,oxa of received wisdom,and it frequentlyrequiressomething more than the formulationsof commonlanguage. general In terms,Deleuzechallenges the assumption that thought hasa natural affinity with the (true'. rnstead,he claimsthat thoughtis an actof problematisation. Thought may,in this way, hnvca prophctic rolc in anticipatingthc forcesof thc futurc. It is, morcovcr'itblcto bring out thc 'ncw', ilsopposcd cstablishccl to valucs,

Deleuze also arguesthat there is something that he calls an 'image of thought' that changesthrough history. Works such as The Logic of Plateausall contribute to the Sense,Proust and Signsand A Thousand, study of imagesof thought, or 'noology' as Deleuzecalls it. Noology is different from a history of thought, in that it does not subscribe to the notion that there is a narrative developmentin thought. It is not the casethat there is a sort of long-term debatein the courseof which either some ideas and concepts win the day, or disagreements are eventuallyturned into consensus. This would be a history of thought as the uncovering or construction of universals.Deleuze talks instead in terms of 'geophilosophy';the superimposition of layers of thought. Drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the 'untimely', Deleuze suggests that what is new in a philosopher'swork remainsneq and the reactivationof theseuntimely elementsis an important component of Deleuze'swork. As far asnoologyis concerned, imageof thoughtis a system coordan of inates or dynamics:a sort of map that showshow we orientate ourselves within thought. One of Deleuze'sinfluenceshere is Martin Heidegger, who claimsthat to think is to be under way,to be on a path that one must clearfor oneself,althoughone canhaveno certain destinationin mind. For Deleuze, must initially makea decisionasto our orientationin relation we to the verticaland horizontalaxes.Should we stretchout, and follow the In 'line of flight' on the horizontalaxis,or should we erect vertical axes? immanence and transcendother words,this constitutes choicebetween a ence.If we choose transcendence, entailsa further choiceto be made this betweenthree types of 'universal': contemplation,reflection and communication. Immanuel Kant seemedequipped to overturn the Image of thought, but ultimately he was committed to an orientation in which thought would havean upright nature. personae' Deleuzeclaimsthat philosophers tend to invent 'conceptual who will help the philosopher questionto negotiate in and establish new a image of thought that springs from a seriesof intuitions. The conceptual persona functionssomethinglike the detective crime fiction. He is the in everyman who must orientatehimself within the imageof thought. So,for example,Deleuze shows how the 'rational' man of scholasticthought is replacedby the Cartesian'idiot', who is later replacedby the Russian 'idiot'. This 'undergroundman' haswhat Deleuzecallsin a characteristically wry statement,the 'necessary modesty' not to manageto know what everybody knows.He is like a character a Russian in novel,paralysed and stupefied the coordinates by ofproblems that do not correspond repreto prcsuppositions. scntationfll Thought may not havcrr history,but it drrcs hirvcir drrnrttis pcrsonnc.

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This approachto thought leads Deleuze to value and promote the to 'private thinker', asopposed the'public professor'. The model for this sort of thinker is Baruch Spinoza,who pursuesa frugal and itinerant lifestyle, and is in this way ableto avoidthe pitfall of confusinghis purpose with that of the Stateor religion.Ratherthan a modelof opinion and consensus, Deleuzepreferswhat he callsa 'nomadic'or 'clandestine' form of thinking. The only form of 'communication' that is suitable ro the contemporaryworld is the Nietzschean arrow or Adorno's 'message in a bottle'. Thought is fired like an arroq in the hope thar another thinker a 'friend'- may pick up the arrow and fire it in turn. Connectives Lines of flight Nomadicism Noology Spinoza

TIME-IMAGE Tom Conley The time-imageis what tends to govern cinemafrom the end of World War II until the present. It is the title of the secondor dexter panel of Deleuze's historical taxonomy of film. It designatesimages that Henri Bergsonqualifiedas imbued with duration: a componentof time that is neither successive chronological. nor Seenlessasmatter than felt aspure duration time-images relatea changein the configurationof the world. They draw attention to the qualitiesof their own oprical and aural properties asmuch asthe signsor matter they represent.They tend not to favour narrativeor beg the spectator identify with their content.For Deleuze to the time imageis apt to be read- itis a legible image- asmuch asit is seen or given to visibility.It prompts the spectator rhink through the signs to with which it articulates narrativemarter. In the r6gime of the movement-image, intervals are vital to the perception of motion, sensation, affectionand change;in the time-image,perceptionbecomes 'perceptionof perception',offeringa shift of emphasis a that is witnessedin the image itself rather than the linkages(or cuts) between images. What this means that whenmontage, foundationof is the classical cinema, losesits hold time beginsto bc increasingly spntirrliscd. li<rrinst:rncc, in.lilmrutirthc pastor nirrrativcs that tcll il pcrson'slif'c-strlry

through his or her point of view is shown in flashbacks. This classical devicegivesway,in the era of the time-image, a perpetualduration that to cannotbe locatedin one moment or another.Memory elidestemporal distinction in wayssuch that only 'is it in the presentthat we makememory, in order to make use of it in the future when the presentwill be past' (D 1989:52).The time-imagefrequentlybecomes siteof amnesia a where waves actionturn the world at largeinto a matrix in which personages of seemto float indiscriminately. Certainfilms, suchasJean Renoir'sLa rigle duj eu (1939)or Orson Welles'TheL ad,y om Shang ai (1946),su h ggestthat fr subjectivitycan only be felt through the perceptionof time: humans,be they spectators characters film aredetermined the environs time or in by of in which they are held. Deleuzecallsthe effectthat of a 'time-crystal',a way of being that is discovered a time insideof the eventthat allowsit in to be perceived.ln La rigle d.ujeuthe time-crystal might be the illuminated greenhouse the chateau which the characters held. In Welles'film or in are it would be the hall of mirrors in which the characters shatterthe narrative to pieces. The time-image(and its crystals) often discerned deepfocusphois in tography, the model par excellence for Renoir and Welles, for whom montage is folded into the spatial dynamics given in a single take. Yet it acquires legibility in Godard's cinema, such as Pierrot le fou (1965) in which a 'depth of surface'is createdby patterns of writing or abstract forms paintedon wallsagainst which humanplayers seem flattened. Timeimagesare seenin nappes 'sheets'in what Deleuzecalls 'mental caror tographies'of cinema (D 1989: l2l). In Alain Resnais'Hiroshirna, rnon &mour(1959) the past is a matte surfaceon which traumatic memoryimagesare reflectedand meld into one another.Time is bereft of dates, thus inheringin the body and soulof the two loversestranged the places in wherethey happento meet. In this continuum,cinemabecomes site wherethought itself acquires a a force of becoming unknown to historical time. It is a power of the irrational or unthought that is essential all thinking: somethingincomto municable,somethingthat cannot be uttered, somethingundecidedor undecidable. represented, the time-image Where the movement-image time, is'no longerempirical,nor metaphysical; is "transcendental" the sense it in that Kant givesthe word: time is out of joint and presents itself in the pure state' (D 1989: 271). Through the concept of the time-image Deleuze (with Guattari) notes that the questionat the basisof all film theory turns into the question 'What is cinema?'-that Andr6Bazinposed 'What is philosophy?'. Thc time-image dernonstrates cinemais a new practhat ticeof imagcs rrndsignsfirr which phikrsophy summoncd construct is to ir prrcticc.'l'hus,with thc crlrrcsponcling thcoryitndlt concc;)fr,rill ol' corrccpt

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the movement-image enduringinquiry into the natureof cinemais set an in place. Connectives Becoming Cinema Duration Event Memory Movement-image

TRANSCENDENTAL CIiffStagoll

EMPIRICISM

Empiricism refers to the view that the intelligible derivesalwaysfrom must rest the sensible, whilst transcendentalism assumes that experience upon somelogically necessary foundation. The former position is typified by the work of David Hume, who argued that ideasof consciousness are just from sensory derived impressions, that any test of soundreasonand ing shouldrefer to the natureof the connection between two. On this the view,ideas concepts neverfound or logicallyprecede and philosophical can perceptions. sense perhapsthe In theorisingthe human subject,ImmanuelKant developed bestknown form of transcendentalism. soughtto identify all of the conHe ditions of the possibilityof attaining distinctively human knowledge.It is particularcognitivecapabilities, argues, humanspossess he only because that we experience world aswe do andareableto makeclaimsaboutthe the world as it appears priori. This set of capabilities the 'forms' of sensa for ibility, understanding reason is universal and and logicallynecessary human knowledge.On Kant's account,without time and space, rangeof a (suchasmodality,quantity and quality), and 'Ideas' basicconcepts reason of founding a kind of rational faith, there would be no knowledgeof the kind of and evidentin the humanexperience the world. As such,the categories by conditionsuncovered Kant areclaimedto be true of all selves. Accordingto Deleuze,this argumentfails on two counts.First, it does not accountfor differences between whatever oneknowsofa phenomenon in advance and what one learnsabout it a posteriori. Second,Kant conin ceives experience of only in terms of re-presentation consistencies and functioningfrom timc to timc irnclpcrsonto pcrson.As such, mcntll

Deleuze argues,transcendental deduction reproducesthe empirical in form and then shields from further critique.The Kantian it transcendental subject,for instance,is constructedas an explanationfor how diverse experiences synthesised unified, and then employedas the essenare and precondition for any human experiencewhatsoever. tial Deleuze'sdescription of his philosophy as a transcendental empiricism In is a challenge thesepositionsrather than a unified counter-theory. to contrastto transcendentalism, Deleuzeseeks after the conditionsof actaal rather than all possibleexperience. These conditions are not logically necessar$ but contingent upon the nature of experienceas it is lived. Therefore, for Deleuze as for Hume, philosophy must begin with the immediategiven- real conscious awareness without presupposing any categories, conceptsor axioms.Only then should it begin to developconperceptions and their ceptsthat might refer to objectsand their relations, causes, anyofa rangeofpsychological physiological or relations evident or in consciousness. is preciselythe actualityof the empiricaland the priIt ority accorded experience real that, for Deleuze, waysof avoidingtranare imprecisionand universalising abstractions. scendentalism's Deleuze's approach is a transcend,ental empiricism becauseit is an attempt to deducethe conditions of the possibility of consciousexperience (such as the apparentconsciousimmediacy to which one refers when saying'I'). Realityasit is experienced doesnot revealthe preconditions of experience such elements inaccessible consciousness, are to and, because they necessitate transcendental, deductivestudy of their implicit condiKant, Deleuzedoesnot conceive theseunthought conditions.Unlike of tions as abstract or necessaryphilosophical entities, but as contingent tendencies As beyond the reach of empirical consciousness. such, he preDeleuzefinds that the'I' only sumesno beingor subjectrohoexperiences. responses, everrefersto contingenteffects interactions of between events, memory functions,socialforces,chancehappenings, belief systems, economic conditions,and so on that togethermake up a life. By taking a philosophers movingbeyond differentapproach the transcendental to and a view of empiricism based upon just the epistemologicalrelationship between ideas and senseimpressions,Deleuze shifts the philosophical focus from determining a foundation of likenessamongst humans to revealing celebrating contingency, and the dissimilarityand varietyof each individual life. Connectives Actuality FIunrc

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Kant Real Virtual/Virtuality

TRANSCENDENTAL Bruce Baugh

EMPIRICISM + POLITICS

dictum that the abstract Deleuzeoften quotedAlfred North Whitehead's doesnot explain,but needsto be explained.This thought standsat the for empiricism that searches the real basisof both Deleuze'stranscendental conditions of actual experiencerather than for the abstractconditions of and any possible experience, of his politics.Empiricismwantsto hold onto by and to resistabstractuniversals the concreterichnessof experience, insistingon the situatedand historicalnatureof the conditionsof experience.Deleuzianpolitics likewiseinsistson the singularityof experiences and practices,rather than merely seeingtheseas either instancesof some universalrule or exceptionsto the rule. Yet, in contrast with classical empiricism holds that the empiricism and liberalism, transcendental empirical is not composedof discrete givens,but of concreteparticulars (individuals,groups)definedby the history of their contingentand actual relationswith other beings.Againstidealismand Marxism, transcendennecessary universals and structuresas all tal empiricismsees supposedly and on or beingeithercausally logicallydependent contingentparticulars, contingent. thus asthemselves Classical empiricism (fohn Locke, George Berkeley, David Hume) and relations('dog', 'black', holds that universalclassterms, predicates 'next to') are derived through abstractionfrom particular experiences, (constant basedon the and linked together through habits of association conjunction' of those experiences;pnlike in Plato, universals have no independent standing, and particulars do not depend on universals. liberalism(ThomasHobbes, Classical John Stuart Mill andJohn Locke) such as 'society' and 'the State' are similarly holds that aggregates nothing over and abovethe individuals which composethem, and so are The'independence'of dependent individuals,rather than the reverse. on liberal theory is the basisof its demandfor indiindividuals in classical vidual rights and liberty, understoodas freedom from the coercionof societyor the State. on that the universaldepends the particular, Although Deleuzeagrees individuals. For Deleuze, and he rejcctsthc 'atomism'of experiences of involving by but itrc scnsntions not 'givcns', musthc cxplaincd crtnditittns

a complexand mostly unconscious of relationsamongdifferentbodies' set powersof acting and reacting.Similarly,individualsare conditionednor just by other individualswith whom they interact,but by factorscommon to all ofthem (language, relations, social biological structures, technology). Liberalism's'individual' is superseded what Deleuzecalls an 'assemby blage'(agencement): a conjunctionof a numberof persons, forcesand circumstances, capable its own collectiveexperiences actions.Rather of and than the rights and libertiesof individuals,power or agencyis the prime concernof Deleuzianpolitics.Ratherthan universalprinciplesbeing the criteriaby which practices evaluated, pracrices judgedentirelywith are are respectto whether their effectsincrease decrease or someone's someor thing's power of acting. Principlesemergeas a reflectionon how much certain practicesincreaseor decrease agency,as an a,posteriorigeneralisation, rather than an a priori necessary condition. Like Deleuze, Marxismalsoargues that social relations particularly economic relations condition individual experience agency. and Yet, unlike classical Marxism,Deleuzedoesnot believe that'classes' basicunits of are analysis, that the economicbaseis more fundamentalthan the ideological or superstructure. Socialand economicstructures,forms of thought, norms of action, are all producedthrough particular and contingentconjunctionsof desires, actionsand affects,and are all part of an assemblage which each in elementis conditionedby all the others.'Classes' abstractin relation to are assemblages are not just subdivisions that within classes, can cut across but differentsocio-economic classes. someextent,classical To Marxism retains the precedence abstractuniversalsover singular assemblages of that whethertheuniversal a class, be aparty, Stateor history- suppresses the creativity and blocksthe emergence the new.Subjectionto higher universals of cuts offassemblages from their powerand is alwaysreactive. Transcendental empiricismwould be the basisof a politics of positive individuality and difference,valorisingagencyand creativepower, but mindful of the oppressive conditioning of individualsand our voluntary servitudeto universalnorms.

TRANSVERSALITY Ad,am Bryx and,Gary Genosho A. critical conceptfor literary criticism, 'transversality'is introducedby Deleuzein the secondedition of Proustand Signs. Thc conccptconcerns the kind of communicationpropcr to thc trnnsvcrsirl dimcnsion of' machinic litcrlry ;rrrxluction.'l'rlnsvcrsalitydcfincsir nrodcrn wiry of'

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and dialecticpresuppositions writing that departsfrom the transcendent an and of the Platonicmodelof reminiscence. envisions immanentandsingularisingversion instead. heterogeneous assembles style', transversality Also termed an' anti-logos is far from totalising. Unlike undera unifyingviewpoint,which components to that strives imitatethe Ideaand thus reproduce the Platoniccounterpart departsfrom Proust'sreminiscence what is both stableand transcendent, and associations culminatesin an originatingviewpoint. The crisubjective where before, tique of Platocentreson the issueof intelligencealwayscoming the disjunctive useof facultiesmerely servesas a prelude for the unifying in use disiunctive of faculties Proustis found in a singlelogos.The dialectic and dialecticmodel, and works on an unhinged from this transcendent after. immanentprinciple where intelligencealwayscomes The transversaldimension of fiction fundamentallycountersthe principles of the world of attributes, logos,analytic expression,and rational pathos, of thought with the characteristics the world of signsand symptoms, in phoneticwriting.Whereorderhascollapsed ideograms and hieroglyphs, of states the world, the viewpointprovidesa formulaby which fiction can constitute and reconstitutea beginning to the world. Such a beginning is necessarily singularising;the transversaldimension or the never-viewed pieces viewpoint drawsa line of communicationthrough the heterogeneous and fragmentsthat refuseto belongto a whole,that are parts of different images, memno or wholes, that have wholeotherthanstyle.The ephemeral ories and signsof the odours,flavoursand drafts of particular settingsare swept along at various rhythms and velocitiesin the creation of the nondimensionof fiction that is not reproductive,imitative totalisingtransversal solelyon its functioning. but or representative, depends aberrantlybetween Deleuzefinds third partiesthat will communicate partial objects of hermaphroditic bodies and plants. The partitioned famous apiarianbestiaryof Deleuze showsitself here.But the pollinating insectis not simply natural or organic,for that is a trope of the transversal Rather, it is a line ofpassage,azig-zaggingflight, or eventhe narra/agas. Transversality tion of involuntarymemory,that productivelytransverses. partialobjectsand resonances is machinic.The literary machineproduces as viewpoint,understood an essential them. The fore-mentioned between singularity,is superior to the partitioned obiects,yet not beyond them, for literary machineworks in and upon itself. the self-engendering Connectives Guattari Psvchoanalvsis

TRANSVERSALITY Gary Genosko

+ GUATTARI, FELIX

'Transversality', a corecriticalconceptintroducedby Guattari in a conis ferencepaper 'Transversality'in 1964and published, psychanalyse in et transaersaliti. The conceptof 'transversality' usedas a therapeuticand is political tool by Guattari in his analyticalcritique of experimentationwith institutional formarions of subjectivity at clinique de la Borde in courChevernyFrance,wherehe workedfrom 1955to his deathin 1992. Guattari reintroducedsocialdemands, problemsand realitiesinto the analyticencounter. Guided by sigmund Freud's remarkson the fundamentally socialbeing of individualsin the survivalof sources anxiety of beyond the stagesof psychogenesis, Guattari consideredthe object of institutional analysisto be outside both family, linguistic structure and oedipal myth. The problemof socialreproductions superegos of (political leaders, example, for despitetheir actualinfluence)as constantsources of anxiety in advancedindustrial societies(capitalist and socialist) led Guattari provisionally to 'arrive at a modification of the superego's "accommodation" of databy transmuting this data in a kind of new,,initiatic" reception,clearingfrom its path the blind socialdemandof a certain castrative procedurero the exclusionof all else'(G 1972:75).The goalis to bring aboutacceptance new data,rather than interminablecastration of anxietyprecipitated everysuperego by figurehead, primarily by establishing new demands and setting up innovative points of reference within existing attachmentsto institutions. Guattari's therapeutic focus shifted awayfrom the dual analysis psychotherapy onto'real patientswhere of and they actuallyfind themselves' clinicalsetrings. in This directly challenged innumerable inheritedanalyticmethods. Guattari foregrounds institutional attachmentsby analysing groups. The desireof a de-individuatedsubject,understoodasa group or collective assemblage heterogeneous of componentsfreed from abstract determinationssuchasthe archaicinheritances Freudiananalysis, the official of or objectsthat supportthe symbolicorder (definedby Jacques Lacan,D. W. winnicott, and Melanie Klein) is undersrood through critical analyses of the organisational texturesof actualgroups. Guattari distinguishednon-absolutelybetweensubject(activelyexploring self-definedprojects) and subjugatedgroups (passivelyreceiving directions), each affecting the relations of their members to social processes, shaping their potentialfor subjectformation,the amountof risk they can tolerate, and how they can usesuch groups.'l'hc moclilication of alicnatingfirntnsics would pcrmit crcativit$ rcnr(,vcirrhibitions,rrnd

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encourage the self-engendering of group-subjects, whereas a subjectgroup could decay into a subjugated group through bureaucratic automutilation by reversing its transversal potentiality. Guattari set about experimenting with ways to heighten and maximise an institution's 'therapeutic coefficient' by unfixing rigid roles, thawing frozen hierarchies, and opening hitherto closed blinkers. He accomplished this through an institutional technique called 'the grid', a complex, rotaring system of tasks and responsibilities that he developed with colleague Jean Oury ('La grille'[1987] 1998). This role redefinirion scrambled existing relations of power between doctors and nurses, interns and nurses, nurses and patients, medical and non-medical staff, bureaucrats and unions, hospital bureaucraciesand State funding bodies. tansversality replaced the psychoanalytic concept of transference (movement of positive and negative affect back and forth from patient and doctor). Guattari placed rapport in a collective clinical context beyond the dual analytical situation. If rransference is the artificial relation in which the unconscious becomes conscious, transversality is the measure of an institution's influence on all its denizens. It is the group's unconscious, which entails that a descriptive analytics of overt power relations and objective laws inscribed in either verrical (pyramid) or horizonral (field of distribution) terms is insufficient. This is an unconscious that perfuses the social field and history. Transversality: 'tends to be realised when communication maximised is betweendifferentlevels and aboveall in differentdirections. is the objecttowardwhich a subject-group It moves. our hypothesis this: it is possible modify the differentcoefficients is to of unconscious transversality differentlevelsofan institution. (G 1972:80) at Among a group of interns there may exist great potential for transversal relations. As a group, interns normally have little real power, work long hours, are dangerously tired, and so on. Their high level of transversality would remain latent to the extent that its the group's institutional effects would be extremely limited. It is not an easy task to find the group rhat actually holds the key to 'regulating the latent transversality of the entire institution'; objectively weak interns may engage in intimate and authentic relations among themselves or with nurses which have therapeutic effects for patients. tansversality in an institution is thus uneven. But this is the task of institutional analysis:to locate the group's unconscious desirc in relation to every member's attempt to negotiateit. 'The grid' madc it possiblcto :rnalysc actualrclationsof firrcc by proviclirrg:lcorltcxt irr whiclr t hc t lir r r s v cl s ad i n rc rrs i o n f' fh c i n s ti tu l i o n coukl l l c l crrctrcd. l o

TRUTH James Williams Deleuze's work is opposed to the coherence theory of truth and to the correspondencetheory of truth. The first claims that the truth of a proposition depends on its coherence with some other propositions. The second claims that the truth of a proposition depends on its correspondence to some objective facts. So a proposition is either true due to certain logical relations or due to a relation to things in the world. For Deleuze, both theories are wrong-headed from their very premisses. That is, propositions are false simplifications of reality and cannot be bearers of truth in any significant sense.Objective facts do not exist and cannot be identified or shown, becausereal things are limitless and always ofbecoming. To abstract from these processes caught in endlessprocesses is to give a false irnage of reality. So, in contrast to the two traditional and dominant theories of truth, Deleuze defines truth in terms of creativity and construction. We create truth in complex constructions of propositions and sensationsthat express the conditions for the genesis and development of events. Truth then would not be a property of single propositions in a book or in a paper. It would be a property of a seriesof them through a work as it captured and changed our relation to the events expressedin the'work. Deleuze is apt to mock philosophical theories based on simple propositions that say little of the world. According to him, it is a mistake to begin an enquiry about truth with abstracted propositions such as 'The cat is on the mat'. Instead, truth only appears in more complex works such as a series of paintings or literary and philosophical works. It is a mistake to think that the truth of such works depends on the truth of their components becausethe significanceof the components only appears when they are in context. It is not so much that simple propositions have no relation to truth at all. It is rather that truth is a matter of degrees.The more a work, or a propabout reality and the inter-relation of all things, osition in a work, expresses and the more a work creates with that inter-relation in order to be able to expressit, the more truth it will carry. This carrying is itself a matter of the transference of significance and intensity in the event, rather than a representation of it. Thus, to say something is true is not to say somethingverifiablcin somc way,but to sirysomcthing that vivifics irnd nltcrs it situation. A pocrr itbout l it W l rl cl W u' I t hlr tr r r ukcs scr 'r sc ir r r dlivc t hlough r r r r rwit lt it ir r it dillcr cr r t us is t t ol r t ct r r t r r pr r t r itlt y 't l w i ry i s trrrtlr lir l. A slr t t ist iclt llor t l llt c wiu'lllill

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sensations transformations not truthful. The lessstatistics and is transform and giveus signsof the deeperideasand intensesensations work in the at war, the lesstruthful they are. This meansthat Deleuzeis caught in a difficult position of opposing concepts truth, but without beingableto saythat we cansomehow of move beyondtruth or stop usingthe conceptat all. In Nietzsche Philosophy, and he noteshow truth and the searchfor truth fixes worlds, in the sense of settingdown truths that become immutableand settledrepresentations of statesof things.Instead,truth should be a destructive and transforming process. Similarly, traditional conceptsof truth turn us away from the world, in the sense searching truths that are not here or missing; of for whereas, Deleuze,truths are always for latentand it is a matter of dramatising them, of bringing them out and allowing them to transform us, rather than a matter of projectingourselves into an identifiabletruthful future. Again followingFriedrich Nietzsche, Deleuzesees truth asnecessarily involvedin moral presuppositions. Truth is associated with the morally goodand it is assumed that throughtruth we arriveat the moral good.For Deleuzethis cannotbe the case because both the moral goodand truth are part of a strugglebetween differentvalueswith no externalway of dividing them into true and false,goodand evil. Instead,the goodand the true arerelativeto differentattitudesto life - whereDeleuze and Nietzsche seek thosethat affirm becoming (or overbeing,transformation transvaluation) over identity and sameness. In Cinema 2,Dele:uze extends this view of truth asbecoming and part of the complex struggle for life, by pointing out rhar there are no simple oppositionsof the true and of the false.This is alreadyan idea from his Dffirence and,Repetition,where the false can have an affirmative power and where the deep opponentof both the rrue and the false(and life) is stupidity - definedasthe desirefor simpleoppositions, commonsense for and for transcendent life-denying values.Thus, in Cinema2, Deleuze emphasises variationof truth over time and hencethe powerof falsethe hoodsto vary thosetruths (anygivensettledseries truths must be chalof lengedby falsehoods from their angle,but truths from a different one). Falsehoods, examplein cinematicnarration,havethe power to reveal for differentand more affirmativeviewsof life. It could be objectedthat when Deleuzemovesawayfrom truth as an arbiter of propositions, is as if he doesnot careabout factsand logical it necessity. That is not the case. believes He that factsand logicalnecessity haverolesto play,but theseare secondary a much highcr voclltionfor to truth; which is to rcvcaldccpconnections hctwccn thingsanclto:rlklw all us to livc rrp to thc cvcntsthirtnukc:rnd trirnsfilrrrr In llris rcsllcct, us.

a temperaturereading has some importance but a film capturing the is of significance the crackingice-caps more truthful. Connectives Difference Nietzsche

UEXKULL, JACOB VON (1864-1944) refer to the entrieson 'becoming* music' and'deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation'.

UNCONSCIOUS - referto the entry on'psychoanalysis'.

UNIVOCAL Claire Colebrooh most important critics,Alain Badiou,'uniAccordingto one of Deleuze's is the central concept of Deleuze's proiect. ln Dffirence and, vocity' Deleuzedescribes alternativehistory of philosophycoman Repetition, prising thosephilosophers daring enoughto think of being as univocal: John Duns Scotus,Baruch Spinozaand Friedrich Nietzsche.If philosophy has been dominated by Platonism, this is because being has been deemedto be equivocal:only one being truly is, while other beingsare or either not truly substances different types of dependent,secondary, abovecopy; Mind is elevated abovematter; original is elevated substance. the actualis the privilegedand properlocusofthe potential;only the actual is realor proper being,while the potentialcannotbe saidto be in the same sense. Against this equivocity,Deleuzearguesfor univocity: no eventor phenomenon morerealthananyother.There is only onc bcing:perccpis mcmorics and fictionsarcasrcll ts iltoms,univcrsitls, tions,anticipirtions, phikrsophcrs, l)clcuzc of'univocrrl l"rom his lristury or conccpts bodics. idcits. thrccrcvrlluIirlttitt'y cnrphlsiscs

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From Duns Scotus,Deleuzeinsiststhat only with univocity can there be real difference. If there is only one being then we cannot relate differences- say,differencesof colour - asdifferencesa/some grounding neutral being,a beingwhich is, and which then hassecondary lessreal or qualities.Rather,eachdifferenceis fully real: eachshadeofa colour, each fleck of light, each sound or affect is fully real and therefore different in itself, not merely a different way in which someother subtendingbeing is grasped. From Spinoza'sunivocity,Deleuzearticulates conceptof the immanence.If there is only one substancethen there cannot be a creating God outside creation;the divine is nothing outside irs expression. Mind and matter are,accordingly, two distinct substances; does not nor one depend on or derive from the other. Mind and matter are attributes of the one divine substance and eachbody - such as a human body - is just one expression mode of the attribute of mind and the attribute of or matter. There is not some transcendentbeing which then createsor grounds different beings,beingsthat can be said to be only by analogy.Each being is fully real and is so because just is the expression the divine subit of stance, which is nothing outsideits expressions. Immanence followsfrom univocity preciselybecause commitment to one substance the precludes any point outside being; everything that is rs equally, possessing full reality. From Nietzsche, Deleuze's favoured philosopher of univocity, (eternal Deleuzeaffirms the conceptof return'. There is only one being but this does not mean that there cannot be radically new events and futures.On the contrary,eternalreturn and univocity precludethe idea that a stateof completion or rest will ever comeabout. We should neither wait nor hope for a better world, nor should we imagine an apocalyptic break with this world in order to achievea radical future. If there is only one being then all life, all futures,all events, will be actualisations this of immanent life, which in all its virtual power can continually create and differentiatenew experiences. Eternal return describes future that is a positive becauseit repeats and affirms this life. There are two ways in which this one immanent life can be affirmed univocally.The first would be a biologistor vitalist account,wherebylife could be identifiedwith the actual, material being that already exists - nature as it is commonly understood; if this were so then futures, events and becomings would already exist in potential and would then unfold. So we could say, for example, that the potential that createdWilliam Shakespeare would, produceanotherShakespeare. eventually, After all, there is only one life, and all potential would eventually be repeated. But this is where Deleuze's conception of life differs from a grounding on actual life.

Imagine that we were to find someof Shakespeare's DNA and were to we would not have a Renaissance bard who would clone Shakespeare; then write Hamlet. Why? Becausethis would only be possiblein an equivocal life, one where life in all its becoming and difference was submitted to pre-given forms, 'a Shakespeare' would have had to life is univocal, because there is no form, idea or emerge.But because principle that governsor grounds life, all we have is the potential for difference and variation.Cloning would not producelife's effects; indeed really to repeatlife is to repeatcreation,difference. life Deleuzerefers By not to what actuallyis, but the virtual power from which life is unfolded. The potential that produced Shakespeare would, if it were repeated, produce as much differenceand variation as the 'original'. And this is because the original life was not an actuality - something that simply was,and then had to go through time and alteration- but a 'pre-personal singularity', a power of variation that is singularbecause is radically it different from the stable, definable and general forms it effects.Only if we seerepetition as a pale copy or resemblance we need to think of do the radically new as other than this already full life. If, however, we graspeachrepetition of the world's virtual power asthoroughly new we will recognisethat univocity - one life, one being yielding infinite difference - is also difference and futuritv. Connectives Eternal return Immanence Nietzsche Spinoza

UTOPIA Jonathan Roffe The term 'utopia' designates Deleuzethe political vocationof philfor osophy:the attempt to bring about different ways of existihg and new contextsfor our existencethrough the creation of concepts.The word has with manydifferent conceptions of 'utopia', however, beenassociated political thought and actionin ways that would seemantitheticalto the philosophyof Deleuze.On the one hand, there is the real naivety with which doctrines of utopia are often propounded,On thc othcr, as the (u-topia,no-place), iclcn utopia$ccms rcfcr word itself indicntcs thc of trl

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to a world totally disconnected from the real social engagementsthat characterise hereand now,asif we could leapoutsideof our concrete life existenceinto a fundamentally different kind of society,free of any kind of strife. Despite these concerns, Deleuze makes pivotal use of the concept (while noting thesepotential problems),even if theseusesare few in number. The primary locationof the useof utopia in his philosophyis in l[/hat is Philosophy.z, written with Guattari. Utopia namesthe point of contact between the present state of affairs and the activiry of philosophy. No ideal future is involved, but rather the view that the present can always be negotiated with philosophically order to bring aboutmore freedom. in Philosophy therefore has two temporal loci: the present and the future. While engaging with the concrete present situation as it in fact is, philosophy'saim ought to be the breakingwith or resistingof the presentfor the future. We can think here of Friedrich Nietzsche's statement in his UntimefuMed,itations, that philosophy actson the present, and therefore against it, for the benefit of a time to come. This task is undertaken by philosophybecause is, accordingto Deleuze and. it Guattari, the creation of concepts. Unlike many other ideasof philosophy,conceptsare not to be thought of as representationsof reality or tools for uncovering the truth. Rather,concepts true creations, are and philosophyasthe creation of conceptsmakespossible new waysof existingthrough them. Art and science also undertake the same creative task, but through their own waysof thinking that do not include the concept.In the context of discussionsabout the creation of concepts,Deleuze often brings up the artist Paul Klee's claim that the audiencefor a work of art doesnot preexist the artwork itself - the peopleare lacking,ashe says- but is called into being by it. For Deleuze,all creativethought calls for a new people and a new earth. So utopia is what links philosophywith its own time, but is alsothat which givesit the forum for its criticalpoliticalactivitythat hasits focusin the future (D&G 1994:99). This conception of politics clearly doesnot concernstatements (unlikemany aboutthe idealnatureof social existence utopianphilosophies), sees politicsasthoseactsthat offer resistance but to the norms and valuesof the present.Finally, for Deleuze,we cannotclaim in advancethat certain conceptswill necessarilylead to a better future. While reSistingthe present and opening up the f,uturefor us, there is no guaranteethat the world thus opened will be freer. These decisionscan only be made on the difficult path of practical,empiric4l learning and'" carefulattention.

Connectives Art Concepts Freedom

VAN GOGH, VINCENT (1853-90) referto the entry on 'art'.

VARIATION Jonathan Roffe Deleuzemobilisesthe conceptof variation in order to insist on what is perhapshis most fundamental theme, that existenceis not characterised primarily by unities, but rather by a continual senseof movementand That is, to recall the philosopherHeraclitusas Deleuzedoeson change. occasion, In that we find beingis becoming. turn, the unitiesand structures in life are thereforethe result of organisingthis fundamentalmovement, and not the other way around. Deleuzeoffersa numberof examples the conceptof 'variation'in his for on work, oneof which is music.Music is traditionallyunderstood the basis of scales that are fixed moments of pitch extracted from the whole range of frequencies. westernmusic,there is alsothe conceptof the octavethat In dividessoundup into repeatable scalarunits. For Deleuze,we must considerthesestructures be secondary relationto the movement sound to in of There is, fundamentally, only itself,which hasno intrinsic notesor scales. the continuous variationof pitch - a pure movement difference of without identity. Likewise, for Deleuze,if we examinelanguage use,we do not find the fixed categoriesof a logicaFgpmmar or innate structure. Rather, the its shifting around,depending the context.of use. on useof wordsis always In A Thousand, Plateaus, Deleuzeand Guattari describe this as the inherent variability of language. The fact that language use does not remain itself.We can alsoconsider fixed but is fluid is the very natureof language the importantexample space. of Deleuzeand Guattariofferthe opposition

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betweensmooth and striated space.Smooth spaceis the type of spacein which thereare no fixed points or boundaries, in which movementis and uninhibited.In smoothspace, movement therefore is continuous variation. In contrast, striated spaceis structured and organised,creating fixed pointsand limits between what movements be undertaken. a result, can As thereis a sense a resultthat the natureandconstruction certainspaces as of formsoneof the primary concerns politics,sincesmoothspace by defof is inition the space freedom. a morefundamental of on level,natureitself for Deleuzeis continuous variation.Even animalspecies must be understood in termsof a movement life which hasbeenstructuredinto localised of patterns of stability. Perhapsthe fundamentalpoint with regard to variation in Deleuze's work comesin connectionto the theme of difference-in-itself, pursued most systematicallyin Dffirence and Repetition.Rather than seeing difference a difference as betweentwo things,difference must be thought of asthe continualmovement self-differing, the continualvariation of like of a soundrising and loweringin pitch without stoppingat notesin a scale. In other words,difference continuous is variation.This is in contrastto the bulk of the westerntradition of philosophysinceParmenid,es from the that outsetpostulates primary identity.The wholeof Deleuze's a thought is in this sense basedupon the primary valuehe givesto continuousvariation. As a result,Deleuze's booksand concepts must alsobe considered according to the principleof continuous variation.No one on its own canbe consideredto be definitive,but each works best when placedalongside his other texts and concepts, that vary from eachother,outlining the movement of his thought rather than the doctrinesthat he espouses along the way. Connectives Difference Freedom Space

VIRTUAL/VIRTUALITY Constantin 11 Boundas In Deleuze's ontology,the virtual and the actualare two mutually exclusive,yet jointly sufficient, characrerisations the real.The actuirl,/rcirl of irrc 'l'hc strttcs itfthirs, of brrlics,bodilymixturcsand incliviclr.rals. virtrrirl/rcirl

belongare incorporealeventsand singularitieson a plane of consistency, ing to the pure past - the past that can never be fully present.Without has the beingor resembling actual,the virtual nonetheless the capacityto and or bring aboutactualisation yet the virtual nevercoincides canbe idenDeleuze leansupon Duns Scotus when he tified with its actualisation. influences for insiststhat the virtual is not a potential.Other philosophical his conceptof the virtual include Henri Bergsonand his critique of the possible, in Baruch Spinoza'sidea of one substance that is differentiated its infinite attributesand alwaysin the processof being further differenciatedin its modes,and finally Friedrich Nietzsche'sconcept of the teternalreturn'. One way of characterising becoming is with the following schema: virtual/real<+actual/real<+virtual/real. What sucha diagrampointsto is from one actualto another;rather it that becomingis not a linear process is the movement from an actualised stateof affairs, through a dynamicfield of virtual,/real tendencies, the actualisation this field in a new stateof to of safeguards reversible the natureof virtual and actual affairs.This schema relations. Deleuzehascharacterised virtual as Meanwhilein differentcontexts the the d,urieand ilan oital in his studiesof Bergson;as Ideas/structures and the realm of problems in Dffirence and Repetitiozwhereby the diverse of actualisations the virtual are understood as solutions; and finally throughout many of his texts he referredto the virtual as an event.The given the virtual by Deleuzeraisesthe quesvariety of characterisations tion of how the virtual ought to be understood and the extentto which each is characterisation complicit in the next. That the virtual is the Bergsonian and d,urde 6lan oital stemsfrom the basicagreementbetweenDeleuzeand Bergsonregardingthe structureof temporality. Any actualpresentpasses all presents constitutedboth aspresentand aspast.In all are only because pastpresents entirepastis conserved itself,and this includesthe past in the that hasneverbeenpresent(the virtual). The idea of a past that has never been present(the immemorialpast) DerridaandEmmanuel L6vinas. canalso foundin the writingsofJacques be but The reasons its postulationvary from one thinker to another, there for is onething that they havein common:anyphilosophy that puts a premium of on the de-actualisation the present,in order to tap the resources the of pastor the future, runs the risk of reifying the past(asin Plato'srecolleceschatologies). preventthis To tion) and the future (asin someapocalyptic future reification,the notions of the immemorialpast and the messianic (Deleuzcprcfersto talk of the purc pastirndof thc ctcrnalrcpctitionof the thirl prcsupposcs diffcrcnt)succcccl safcgr.rarding idcirof ir proccss in thc 'l'hcpitst citllcd non-tlctcrrttittirtg tcndcncics. is 'pttrc'itt ordcrlo cntphitsisc

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that it is the site of problems and the source of actualisations;that the realm of solutions is limited in numbers and, unlike the virtual past, it is rich in extention and poor in intensity; and that, occasionally,a great artist may assist something past to reveal its real being as if in a time that has been nobody's present. To the extent that both Deleuze and Bergson agreed,urtie is not empty; rather it is an immanently differentiated dynamic processof the real whose nature is always to actualiseitself in novel differenciations. Hence, the appropriate name 'dlan aital . Boldly transforming Kantianism in Dffirence and,Repetition,Deleuze begins to identify the virtual with Ideas. An ldea, for Immanuel Kanr, has no instantiations in the empirical world, yet at the same time it must be thought. Deleuze retains this imperative when he thinks of the virtual (for example, the cogitandum)but he moves beyond pure Kantianism when he multiplies Ideas by making them the gerundives of all faculties (the memlrandum, the loquend,urn, so on). The claim that Ideas are structures in and large part comes from the prevailing structuralist vocabulary Deleuze uses throughout Dffirence and Repetition. ln later work, Deleuze elaborates upon this claim that Ideas are structures when he describes the nature of the virtual in terms of a plane of consistency.Most important for Deleuze is that the virtual is not to be understood as duplicating or resembling the actual, nor should it be taken to mean transcendence.Simply put, problems do not resemble or represent their solutions. Were we to understand the relationship between virtual singularities and actual individuals in terms of resemblanceor analogy,we would reduce the notion of repetition that Deleuze advancessimply to a repetition of the same.To understand how the virtual may be characterisedas an event we need to recall Deleuze's theory of sense, which is given in the infinitive of verbs (a verb, unlike a noun or an adjective, is better suited for an ontology of becoming). In their infinitival modes, verbs best introduce the untimely nature of the virtual, and the absenceof subjects or objects; yet they also introduce the strange combination: the impassive and dynamic aspectsof multiplicities in the processof actualisation.

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W H OLE jonattan Roffe As early as his first book, Empiricism and Subjectiuity, Deleuze rejects the idea of total unities, and works to analysehow things which are practically speaking unified - like human beings, societies and ideas of God and the world - come to be so. Deleuze's procedure for coming to grips with the thought of unity throughout his philosophy is threefold. First of all, he maintains that there are no pre-existent wholes. Not only does nature itself not make a whole, but things themselves exist only one by one. They do not fit into an overarching structure and cannot be 'added up' to make a total picture of existence becauseeverything is unique. We simply do not have any grounds for taking the unique things which make up existenceas members of a species which could ground a unifying perspective.This point is closely connected to Deleuze's concept of 'multiplicity' that describesunique things in terms of their own complex constitutive relations. The most substantial treatment of the concept of the 'whole' in this senseis given in the discussion of Stoic philosophy in The Logic of Sense. Second, it is important to note we seem, in fact, to be surrounded by unities of many kinds: human subjectivity, a unified and coherent basis for thinking, the unity of natural languages, and so on. For Deleuze, these kinds of transcendent totalities are fundamentally illusory. They are the product of certain habitual ways of thinking common to western culture and the metaphysical tradition Deleuze calls 'dogmatic image of thought'. The most significant discussion of the illusory nature of such totalities is undertaken in Dffirence and Repetition. Finally, Deleuze goes on to argue that there are, in fact, unities but that these are produced by and in very particular social contexts. The unity of human experience, for example, or the idea of the world as a whole, is the very real and concrete result of the kinds of social experience that we have. As such, produced wholes are subject to the variations in the social context that is theirs. Their wholeness cannot be guaranteed, since it has no tranof scendentalprinciple of unity but only the support of thc sociirlfrrrccs its 'l'irkcn togcfhcr,tlrcscthrcc gcncsisand thc nririntcnirncc its c<lnsistcncy. of ol'l) clcr r zt 'r 'or t ccr t t it t r t ill lcl lhc consllr r ct ivistnr ct hodologv 1' l oi nts cs clilr c r is r r t on( 'c non cxist cr r t( r r r t he lr iuls( : ( 'll( l( 'nl,t lt solt t lt ' rrrri ti es. t ot r r lit v A

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sense), illusory (with regard to thinking), and concretely produced in a certain way by our social context. At certain points, Deleuze himself seems to be advocating a kind of primary oneness to existence, particularly concerning his thesis of ontological univocity, or the univocity of being. In shorr, this is the position that claims all existing things are within a single world - everything rhat exists is 'said' in the same way ('uni-vocalised'). Univocity disqualifies in advance any thought of a transcendent ordering realm that is higher or more pure than the world of events.Ontological univocity is closely related to the thesis of monism that claims there is a single substancefrom which individual things are formed. Whilst this emphasis in Deleuze's work involves a certain thought of unity, we cannot consider him to be a 'holist' in any direct sense.Univocity must be understood rather as the emphasis on the common world of relations for everything that exists - a certain thought of general interconnectednessand proximity that would allow us to consider Deleuze's ontology as a kind of ecology of being. As he states in Empiricism and,Subjectiaity, nature is unique - but this does not mean that it is unified.

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Lee Spinks Friedrich Nietzsche's famous formulation of the 'Will to Power' represents the culmination of his attempt to develop an immanent and inhuman vision of life. Its image of existenceas a ceaseless struggle for power and dominion is 'inhuman' becauseit claims that alllife, not just human life, is united by a common striving for power. The conception of the Will to Power also afforded Nietzsche the opportunity to overcomethe 'metaphysical' distinction between being and becoming or appearanceand reality by conceiving of a principle of life immanent and interior to life rather than elevatedabove and beyond it in the form of transcendentalreason.According to this principle, the whole of life is a single field of forces expressingan inhuman Will to Power that produces forms such as consciousncss, languagc :rncl nrorirl 'l-hc cntirc gcncsislncl clcvcklpnrcnl iclcits scctlnclary its irnclrcuctivccft'ccts. of ' lilc is t lc t c rn ti n c tlb y th c c o n l l i c l b c tw c c nthc w i l l to l hc rrccrrrrrrrl rrti on ol '

force and everything that resists subordination to stronger will. Life at a primordial level 'is' this struggle between appropriation and resistance;the issue at stake in every event of life is the quantity of superior power it expresses and the quantity of resistancethat opposesit. The Will to Power is the genealogical element of force: it is both an expression of the constitutive conflict between forces and the differential element internal to force itself. Will to Power is internal to force becauseit interpretsrelative levels of force by establishing the extent to which one has successfully incorporated another into its domain. 'Force' in this senseis defined by the quantitative difference that obtains between different forces; we know this quantitative difference as a force's quality. The Will to Power, Deleuze emphasises,should be understood as the principle of the synthesis of forces: it names the element that establishes the quantitative difference between forccs and the element of quality that this difference expresses. Within this synthesis, forces contend continually over the differential relation that defines them; the eternal return is therefore the mode of synthesis that expressesthe genetic and differential element of the Will to Power. The vision of life as Will to Power revealsthat there is no other form of causality than the movement of domination between one will and another. 'Will' must therefore be rigorously detached from anthropomorphic psychologicalcategories like'desiring'and 'demanding'which posit an ideaor subjectivity behind and before the expression of forces. The Will to Power is not a secondary effect of force nor is it separablefrom a determined configuration of forces. Yet if Will to Power cannot 6e separatedfrom force neither should itbe confused, with force. The concept of 'force' names what is triumphant in the struggle between forces; but the outcome of this struggle remains perpetually indeterminate unless another element is introduced to gauge the quantitative difference between forces that determines their relative difference in quality. It is this element that Nietzsche and Deleuze describe as the Will to Power. The Will to Power is therefore both the genetic and differential element of force: the element that produces the quality accorded to each force within a particular relation. Because the Will to Power determines the relation between forces, it divides force into its active and reactive components. The difference between a dominant and dominated force is determined by a quantitative difference; the distinction between active and reactive forces manifests a difference in quality. The quantitative difference between forces is exprcsscd by their relative difference in quality. The clistinction bctwccn qu:rliticsof firrcc is dcfincd by thc tcrms':rctivc'irncl'rcrctivc'; but thc corrsti ftrti vcqur r lit yot 't lr c Will t <ll) owcr llr ir t dct cr r r r ir r csir r ccis cxpr csscrbv f l iot ivc l hc tl i sti rtct t llclwccn ir llir r r r lr t ir r r t lr r t 'gr r t ' t ; t r r r lit Allir r r r ir t ion: r r r r l ivt v.

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negationgo beyond action and reactionbecause they are interior to the movementof becomingitself. Affirmation is the power to becomeother; negationis the process becoming-reactive. of These powersare interior to actionand reactionand bring thesequalitiesinto being.What is at stakein the distinctionbetween affirmationand negationand actionand reaction is nothing lessthan the distinctionbetween interpretationand evaluation. Interpretation, Deleuze points out, determinesthe relation of forces; evaluationdeterminesthe Will to Power that confers value upon a thing. It is the elementof Will to Powerthat determinesthe nature of values:the value of a value is established the quality of Will ro Power that it by expresses. The valueof value inheresin this differentialelement;consequently genealogical immanentcritique seeks establish quality and ro the of Will to Powerat the origin of everyevaluativegesture. Connectives Active/Reactive Nietzsche

WOMAN RosiBraidotti Like all formationsof identity in Deleuze's thought, 'woman' is a molar entity that pertainsto and sustainsthe political economyof a majority. However,in a much broaderphallogocentric historicalsystem'woman'is alsopositionedas'other'. Deleuzeshowsgreatsensitivity his treatment in of 'woman'neithercasting asthe mistress alterity,nor fetishising her of her as the privileged object of masculinedesire.Rather Deleuzeavoidsthe tropescommon to philosophical discourse the feminine,choosingto on remain polymorphouson the topic of sexuality, the while performing all a doubledisplacement the levelof both Platonicrheories representaat of tion and psychoanalytic theoriesof desire. Deleuzerejectsthe speculative self/other relationship dialectics of and arguesinstead that these terms are not linked by negation, but are two positively different systemseach with its specificmode of activity. Thus 'woman'is not the sexualised sex'of the phallicsystem, a posi'second but tive term: as the other, she is a matrix of becoming.Deleuze also rejects psychoanalytic the emphasis negativity(lack)andthe equation on of bodily matcriality with the originarysite of rhe maternal. Instead thc of r6gimcof'thc phrrllus <lfits spccuhrothcr- womiln |)clcuzcprcfcrs irncl -

heterogeneous multiplicitiesand internal differentiation. this sense In he positivefigurationssuch as the non-Oedipal empowers 'woman' through little girl of Alice in Wonderland,who hasnot yet beendispossessed her of position body by the phallic law of the father; or in the equally empowered fianc6e who expresses femininefaceof phithe of Ariadne, philosopher's the losophyand is alsothe source ethicaltransmutation, of turning negative or reactivevaluesinto affirmativeones.Transcending negativepassions the that the Oedipalising economy the phallusinduces in effecta Deleuzian of is engineof the transformation, what Deleuzeotherwise calls'becoming'. The role of 'woman' in Deleuze'stheory of becomingis noteworthy. of forces 'Becoming'is the actualisation the immanentencounterbetween partsof eachother in a crewhich areapt mutually to affectand exchange ativeand empathicmanner.The notion of 'forces'accomplishes double a aim, which is centralto Deleuze's emphasis radicalimmanence: the on on one hand it givespriority to affectivity in his theory of the subject;and on the other,it emphasises embodiedstructureof the subjectand the spethe cific temporalityof the embodiedhuman.A forceis a degreeof affectivity or of intensity, that it is openand receptive encountering in to otheraffects. The transformationthat occurs in the processof becomingasserts the affirmative,joyful affectsover and abovethe negativeones. Womannot only can enactprocesses becoming-minoritarian also, but of especiallyfor Guattari, constitutesthe main bloc of becoming for all processes deterritorialisation. is of 'Becoming-woman' both integralto the concept of and andprocess becoming alsouncomfortably written into it asa nomadicsubjectivity. constitutiveparadoxof Deleuze's The womanin question hereis not an empiricalreferent,but rather a topologicalposition,which marksdegrees levels intensityandaffective imperand of states. expresses It sonaland ungendered forces; and, asis to be expected, hasgenerated this a lively andoftencriticaldebate philosophers. with feministpoststructuralist Moreover,tbecoming-woman' a moment, a passaBe, line of flight is a which bypasses empirical women per se. Processes becoming are not of predicated upon a stable, centralised their unfolding. 'self' who supervises Rather, they rest on a non-unitary, multilayered, dynamic subject. Becomingwoman,/animal/insect an affectthat flows;like writing it is a is composition,or a location that needsto be constructedin the encounter with others.All becomings minoritarian,that is to saythey inevitably are and necessarily moveinto the directionof the 'others' of classical dualism (suchassexualised, racialised Yet becomings and/or naturalised 'others'). do not stop there; they becomedisplacedand are reterritorialised the in process. Thus, 'becoming-woman' marks thc thresholdof pattcrnsof thirt 'bccoming-minoritariirn' crossthrough thc lnimrrl irnclgo into tlrc ltnd lincitror 'bccoming-irrtpcrccpriblc' llcyottd.'l'hcrc ru'cn(, syslcrnirtic,

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teleologicalstages becoming;eachplateaumarks a framed and sustainof ableblock or moment of transformation that is actualisedimmanently. Alternatively, patterns of becoming can be visualisedas an affirmative deconstruction dominant subject-positions of (masculine/ white/heterosexual/speaking standard a language/property-owning/urbanised so and on). Or else, becomings be understood steppingstones a complex can as to and open-ended processof depersonalisation the subject.Internally of self-contradictory, becoming bestbe expressed figurations: wasp can by the and the orchid;the womanand the turning of the waves; soundand the the fury, signifyingnothing.In this way,the process becomingis not about of signification, but aboutactualising new modesof affectiveinteraction:it assertsthe potency of expression. Expressionis the non-linguistically coded affirmation of an affectivity whose degree, speed, extension and intensitycanonly be measured materiallyand pragmatically, case case. by And it is therefore interestingto note that womenarenot a priori molecular; they too haveto becomewoman. Connectives Becoming Expression Force Lines of flight Molar Psychoanalysis

wooLR vrRGrNrA (1882-1941)

Claire Colebrook One of the challenges Deleuzepresentsto late twentieth-century philosophyand theory is his critique of linguisticism,or the idea that we can only think within a language and that language structures our perception. His ideathat true thinking must plungebackinto the life from which languageemerges, rather than remain within a language, profoundly modis ernist and continuesan early twentieth-century concernwith the genesis of systems signs.Although Deleuzewrites positivelyabout a seriesof of modernist writers and artists,including James Joyce,his and Guattari's celebration virginia woolf inA Thousand, of Plateaus significant two is for reasons. First, Woolf's own work is contemporaneous Henri Bergson with who wasso importantfor Deleuze. is possible It that woolf 's concernwith

pre-linguistic perception may well have emerged from the same Woolf's Bloomsburycircle intellectualmilieu to which Deleuzeappeals. wasconcernedwith the autonomy of the aestheticand its differencefrom appeal the undividedflow of creto the fixed categories logic.Bergson's of ativelife from which fixed terms emergewaspart of a broadermodernist rationalisaand technological reactionagainstreification,intellectualism the the expression. Second, tion of which Woolf 's styleis perhaps greatest is in the most explicit appealmade by Deleuze and Guattari to Woolf Plateaus. 'becoming-woman'sectionof A Thousand If modernism in generalsharesthe Bergsoniandistastefor a world experience, reducedto clock time, mathematical spaceand impoverished positive and affirmative. Unlike Virginia Woolf 's response. uniquely is of such as the fragmentation lanother modernistswho used techniques * guage, quotation,allusion,punning and parataxis linguistictechniques beyondhumanintent, Woolf usedlitto showsignsoperatingasmachines This is perhaps why, when eratureto think and express extra-literary. the Deleuze and Guattari want to think about becoming, they turn to becoming-womanand Virginia Woolf. universalsubjectof the systemof Whereas'man' is the presupposed all becomingis represented, womanis the speech and the being to whom key to all becomings. Womanis not the Other of man, not that which lies If negativeand undifferentiated. we outsidelanguage unrepresentable, as from which the subject want to think the life, becomingor perceptions emergesthen we need to move beyond 'man' as subject or ground to and creation.Woolf is crucial here not woman as becoming,expression in women'sexperience language because is a womanwriter, expressing she (for sheargues A Roomof One'sOwn(1929)that it is fatal,when writing, in to think of one'ssex).Rather,Woolf's style is becoming-woman. in On the one hand,Woolf's writing is aboutperception;her sentences (1931)createcharacters and whose who are their perceptions, The Watses so of world is not a setof staticobjects much asa perception others'worlds. Charactersreceiveimpressionsnot as extendedobjects in time but as intensities becoming, or 'blocksof becoming'.On the other hand,Woolf's she also work is not just about perceptionand a world of impressions; enacts becomingand intensity at the levelof style,with many of her senstructure of tences complicating and subverting the subject-predicate speech and logic. standard Connectives Becoming Bergson

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WRITING RosiBraidotti philosophical Deleuze's monism makesno categorical difference between thinking and creating,painting and writing, conceptand percept.These areall variations experimentation, of morespecifically, experimentation an with intensities that foster patterns of becoming. Experimentation expresses differenttopological modes;they enacta creative process that is not configured by unfolding a fixed essence telos.Creativity is underor stoodasa multiple and complexprocess transformation, of otherwisethe flux of becoming.Put simply, creativity affirms the positive structure of difference. Writing then, is not the self-assertion a rationallyordainedimaginaof tive subject,rather its eviction. It has to do with emptying out the self, openingit up to possible encounters with a number of affective outsides. The writer's eye capturesthe outside world by becomingreceptiveto minute and seeminglyirrelevant perceptions. During such momentsof floatingawareness, when rationalcontrol releases hold, 'reality' vigorits ously rushesthrough the sensorial/perceptive appararus. This onslaught of data,information and affectivitysimultaneously propelsthe self out of the blackhole of its atomised isolation,dispersing into a myriad of datait imprints. Ambushed,the self not only receives affects,it concomitantly recomposes itself aroundthem. A rhizomic bond is thus established that, through the singulargeometryof the affectsinvolvedand their specific planeof composition, confirmsthe singularityof the subjectproducedon a particularplaneof immanence. One needs be ableto sustainthe impactof affectivity:to'hold'it. But to holding or capturing affectivity does not happen dialecticallywithin a dominantmodeof consciousness. Instead,it takes form of an affective, the depersonalised, highly receptive subjectwhich quite simply is not unified. The singularityof this rhizomic subjectivityrestson the spario-temporal coordinates that make it coincidewith nothing more than the degrees, levels,expansions and extensions the 'outside' as it rusheshead-on. of moving inwardsand outwards. What are mobilisedare one'scapacitics to process sustain impactin c<lnjunction thc complcx feel,sense, and the with mrrtcriality thcoutsiclc; sort of fluid but sclflsustrrining ofl ir scnsibility, rlr

that stream-of-consciousness is porous to the outside.Our culture has mode of tendedto codethis as 'feminine'. Pure creativity is an aesthetic immersionalongwith the unfolding and enfoldingof one'ssensabsolute temibility in the field of forcesone inhabits- music,colour,light, speed, peratureand intensity. Because the historicalbond that ties writing to r6gimesof power,the of pragmaticrole;it is a tool that canbe used activityof writing playsa special to decodethe despoticpower of the linguistic signifier.In this way,the intensivewriting style particularto Deleuzespellsthe end of the linguisthinkthe tic turn, ashe releases subjectfrom the cageofrepresentational to ing. Writing is therefore,not explainedwith reference psychoanalytic theories symbolic'lack', or reducedto an economyof guilt, nor is it the of linguistic power of the mastersignifier.Writing is an intensiveapproach Put differently, that stresses productive,more than the regressive. the Deleuzeinsists writing is the structure of affectivity that animatesthe rhizomaticsis a positivereadingof the subject.At the heart of Deleuze's pleasure-prone machinecapableof all kinds of human as affirmative,a the empowering forces. is just a questionof establishing most positiveor It and resonances. evenjoyful connections For Deleuzewhat is at stakein writing is not the manipulationof a set of nor of linguisticor narrativeconventions; is it the cognitivepenetration an object;nor eventhe appropriationof a theme.Writing is an orientation; of it is the skill that consistsin developinga compass the cognitive,afftictin ive and ethicalkind. It is quite simply an apprenticeship the art of conperceptualcolouring. ceptual and A new image,or philosophical concept,is an affectthat breaksthrough framesand representations. illuminatesa territory through It established it visible/thirikable/sayable/hearthe orientationof its coordinates; makes passions Thus, and affectsthat were previouslyunperceived. ableforces, it the questionof creationis ultimately technological: is one of 'how?'.It is alsogeological: is about'where?'and'in which territory?'.Ultimately, it it is ethical:it is concerned with wherelimits canbe setand how to sustain processes or ofchange. alteredstates Connectives Black hole Creativetransformation Difference Immancncc Powcr Rcprcscltlitl iott

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D 1992 D 1993a DELEUZE D 19 5 6

Deleuze,Gilles (1956),'La conception la diff6rence de chez Bergson', Les Etudes Bergsoniennes, 4, Paris: Presses vol. Universitaires France,pp.77-1I3. de Deleuze, Gilles(1965)Nietzsche,Paris: Presses Universitaires , de France. Deleuze, Gilles (1977), 'Nomad Thought', in David B. Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche:Contemporary Styles of Interpretatioz,New York: Delta Books, pp. 142-9. Deleuze, Gilles (1983), Nietzscheand Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson,London: Athlone Press. Deleuze, Gilles (1984), Kant's Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone Press. Deleuze, Gilles(1986), Cinema Thernoaement-image)trans. I: Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress. pith Clare Pa,rnet,trans. Deleuze, Gilles (1987), Dialogues Hugh Tomlinsonand Barbara Habberjam, London: Athlone Press. Deleuze,Gilles (1988),Bergsonism, trans.Hugh Tomlinson and BarbaraHabberjam,New York: Zone Books. Deleuze, Gilles (1988), Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Deleuze,Gilles ( 1988),Spinoza: PracticalPhilosop trans. hy, RobertHurley, SanFrancisco: City Light Books. Deleuze, Gilles(1989), 2: Cinema Thetime-image,trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta,Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Deleuze, Gilles(1990),TheLogicof Sense, trans.Mark Lester with CharlesStivale, Constantin Boundas, ed. V. New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress.

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D 1983 D 1984

D r997b

D 1997c D 2000

D 1986

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D 2003

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Deleuze,Gilles (1991) Empiricism Subjectiohy: Essay An and, , on Hume's Theory of Human Nature, trans. Constantin V. Boundas, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press. Deleuze,Gilles (1992),Expressionism Philosophy: in Spinoza, trans.MartinJoughin, New York: Zone Books. Deleuze,Gilles (1993),The Fold,:Leibniz and the Baroque, trans.Tom Conley,Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press. (ed.),TheDeleuze Reader, Constantin Boundas V. New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press. Deleuze,Gilles (1994),Dffirence andRepetitioz, trans.Paul Patton, London: Athlone Press;and New York: Columbia University Press. Deleuze,Gilles (1995),Negotiations, trans.Martin Joughin, New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press. 'Desire and Pleasure',trans. Daniel W. Smith, in A. I. Davidson (ed,.), Foucault and his Interlocutors, Chicago: pp. University of ChicagoPress, 183-95. Deleuze, Gilles (1997), EssaysCritical and,Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, Minnesota: University of MinnesotaPress. 'Immanence:A Life . . .', trans. N. Millet, Theory,Culture, and, Society14:2, pp.3-9. Deleuze,Gilles (2000),Proustand Signs: TheComplete Text, trans.R. Howard, Theoryout of Bound,s, 17,Minnesota: vol. University of MinneapolisPress. Deleuze, Gilles (2003), Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans.Daniel W Smith, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress.

DELEUZE AND GUATTARI D&G 1983 Deleuze, Gilles and F6lix Guattari (1983),Anti-Oedipus:
Capitalismand,Schizophrenia, vol. l, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seemand Helen R. Lane, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. D&G 1986 Deleuze,Gilles and F6lix Guattari (1986),KaJha: Topard, a Minor Literature trans.DanaPolan,Minneapolis: University 1 of MinnesotaPress.

D 1990

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DELEUZE AND FOUCAULT D &F 1977 Deleuze,Gilles and Michel Foucault(1977),'Intellectuals and Power'in Michel Foucault,Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. trans. Donald tr Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell Universitv Press. M 1959

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Kant, Immanuel (1996), Critique of Pure Reason,trans. Hackett. Werner S, Pluhar,Indianapolis: trans.Paul Kant, Immanuel(1998),Critiqueof PureReason, Cambridge University andAllen W. Wood,Cambridge: Guyer Press. (1977),Ecrits,trans. A. Sheridan,New York Lacan,Jacques and London:W W. Norton and Co. Lacan Sexuality:Jacques Lacan, Jacques(1982),Ferninine trans.J. Rose,ed. J. Rose and J. and the Ecole Freud'ienne) Mitchell, London: MacMillan Press. Paailion, of Mishima, Yukio (1959),The Temple the Gold'en trans. Ivan Morris. introd. Nancv Wilson Ross. Tokvo: CharlesE. Tuttle. Mishima, Yukio (1970),Sun and Steel,trans.John Bester, Tokyo:Kodansha. Massumi, Brian (1992), A User's Guide to Capitalismand Schizophrenia: Deaiations from Deleuze and' Guattari, The MIT Press. Cambridge: Willemen, Paul (199+), 'Through the Glass Darkly: in Cinephilia Reconsidered',in Looks and,Frictions: Essays Film Cuhural Studies and' Film Theorv. London: British Institute, pp.223-57.

USING DELEUZE (AND GUATTARI) Ansell Pearson, Keith (ed.) (1997), The Deleuze and' Philosophy: The London: Routledge. Dffirence Engineer, Life: TheDffirence andRepetition Keith (1999),Germinal Ansell Pearson, London: Routledge. of Deleuze, Badiou, Alain (2000), Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. and, Guattari,London: Routlege. Bogue,Ronald(1989),Deleuze Bogue, Ronald (2003), Deleuzeon Music, Painting and the Arts, London: Routledge. Bogue, Ronald (2004), Deleuze'sWahe: Tributesand,Tributaries,Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press. Boundas, Constantin V. and Dorothea Olkowski (eds) (1994), Gilles New York: Routledge. Deleuze and the Theaterof Philosoph.y, Diffbrence Embod'iment Sexual and Nomatlic Subjects: Braidotti,Rosi(1994), (krlumbiaUnivcrsity Prcss. Feminist T'hcor,y,, York: Ncw in Cznleml)nrll1

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Buchanan,Ian (ed.) (1997),A DeleuzianCentury?, specialissueof The SouthAtlantic Q,tarterly96: 3 (Summer). Buchanan, Ian (2000), Deleuzism:A Meta-Commentar)l, Edinburgh: EdinburghUniversityPress. Buchanan,Ian and Claire Colebrook(eds)(2000),Deleuze and Feminist Theory, Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press. Buchanan,Ian and Marcel Swiboda (eds) (2004), Deleuzeand Music, Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press. Clet-Martin, Jean (1993), Variations:La philosophie Gilles Deleuze, d,e Paris:Payotet Rivages. Colebrook, Claire (2002),GillesDeleuze, London: Routlege. Critical Horizons:Journal of Socialand Critical Theory,(2002)4:2. De Certeau,Michel (1984),ThePractice EaerydayLrfe, trans.Sreven of rendall,Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. Del-anda,Manuel (1997), Thousand A Years oJ'Non-Linear History,New York: Zone Books. Delanda, Manuel(2002), ntensipSciencand VirtuaI Philoso hy, London: I p e e Continuum. Goodchild, Philip (1996a), Deleuze and Guattari: An Introtluction the to Politics Desire, of London: Sage. Goodchild,Philip (1996b),GillesDeleuze and theQtestionof Philosophy, London: Associated University Press. Grosz, Elizabeth(ed.) (1999),Becomings: Explorations Tirue, in Memory, and, Futures, Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Grosz, Elizabeth (2001),Architecture from the Outside,Massachusets: MIT Press. Guattari, F6lix (1977), La riaolution moliculaire, Fontenay-sous-Bois: Recherches. Guattari, F6lix (1980),La riaolution moliculaire,Paris: Union g6,n6raIe d'6ditions. Guattari,F6lix ( 1989),Cartograp sc hies hizoanalytiques, Paris:Galil6e. Guattari,F6lix (1992), Chaosmose, Galil6e. Paris; Hansen,Mark (2000),'Becoming Creative as Involution?: Contextualizing Deleuze and Guattari's Biophilosophy', Postmod,ern Culture ll.l jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture http:,//muse. Hardt, Michael (1993a),GillesDeleuze: Apprenticeshilt Philosolth.y, An in Minneapolis:University of MinnesotaPress. Hardt, Michael (1993b),GillesDeleuze, London: UCL Press. Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000),Empire,Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. Kaufmrn, IifcirnorandKcvinJonIlcllcr(ctls) (l99tt), Dcltuxt:unlOrtrtuttri :

New Mappings in Politics, Philosophy, and Culture, Minneapolis: Press. Universityof Minnesota in Lorraine, Tamsin (1999),Irigaray and Deleuze:Experiments Visceral Philosoph.y, Ithaca:Cornell University Press. Massumi, Brian (1992),A User'sGuide to Capitalismand Schizophrenia: MIT Press. and Deaiations from Deleuze Gualtari, Cambridge: and theRuin of Representation, Olkowski,Dorothea(1999),GillesDeleuze Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress. da Parr, Adrian (2003),Exploringthe Workof Leonardo Vinci in the Context New York: Edwin Mellen Press. and Philosolth.y Art, of Contemporar.y London: Basil Patton, Paul (ed.) (1996), Deleuze:A Critical Read'er, Blackwell. und Patton,Paul (2000),Deleuze thePolitical,London: Routledge. Derrida, and, Deleuze Patton,Paul andJohn Protevi (eds)(2003),Betpeen London: Continuum. the Pisters,Patricia(ed.) (2001),Miuopolitics of Media Culture:Reading Rhizomes Deleuze untl Guattari,Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversity of Press. Massachusetts: MIT Press. Raichman, , John (1998) Constructions, Duke TimeA4achine,Durham: Rodowick,D. N. (1997),GillesDeleuze's University Press. and Guattari: of Stivate,CharlesJ.(1998),The Tpo-Fold Thought Deleuze New York: Guilford Press. Interseclions Anirnatiozs. and

OTHER REFERENCES IN ENGLISH London: Routledge. Foucault,Michel (1966),TheOrderof Things, Practice,Oxford: Counter-Memor.y, Foucault, Michel (1977), Language, Blackwell. l: Foucault,Michel (1979),TheHistory of Sexuality: Volume TheWill, the Knowled,ge, London: Allen Lane. Brighton: Harvester. er Foucault,Michel ( I 980),Pow / Knowledge, II: Foucault,Michel (1986),TheHistory of Sexuality: Volume The UseoJ' Pleasure, London: Penguin. III: TheCare Foucault,Michel (1988),TheHistory of Sexuality: Volume of theSelf,London: Penguin. New York: trans.K. Jones, Moses Monotheism, and Freud,Sigmund(1939), VintageBooks. (1 : Lonclon Routlcclgc. tc Frcud,Sigrrrunrcl 9.50),'l'ou unl.' l'uhoo. 'l'ht (irrr_y (icrr<rskrr, (ctl.)(199(r), (luttttri IIcultr,Orfirrcl: Ilrrsil lllirckwcll.

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Genosko,Gary (2002),Filix Guattari: An AberrantIntroduction,London: Continuum. Guattari, F6lix (1984), Molecular Reztolution, trans. RosemarySheed, London:Penguin. Guattari, F6lix (1995),Chaosmosis: Ethico-Aesthetic An Paradigm,trans. Paul BainsandJulianBefanis,Sydney:PowerPublications. Guattari, F6lix and Antonio Negri (1990), Communists Lihe {./s,trans. Michael Ryan,New York: Semiotext(e). Harraway, Donna (1991), Simians, Cyborgs Women: Reinaention and The of N ature,London: Routledge. Hume, David (1985),A Treatiseof Human Nalure, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Hume, David (1993), An Enquir.y Concerning Human Understand,ing, Indianapolis: Hackett. Fren: Selected Poems, Johnson,Linton Kwesi (2002),Mi Reaalueshanary New York and London: PenguinBooks. Kafka, Franz (1954), DearestFalher, trans. Eranst Kaiser and Ethne Wilkins, New York: Schocken Books. Leibniz, Gottfried (1973), Philosophical Writings, ed. G. Parkinson, London:Dent. Leibniz, Gottfried (1988),G. W Leibniz: Philosophical Texts, trans.R. S. Woolhouse RichardFranks,Oxford; Oxford UniversityPress. and Nietzfche, Friedrich (1969), Thus Spahe Zarathusra, trans. R. S. Hollingdate,Harmondsworth:Penguin. Reich,Wilhelm (1961),Selected l4/ritings, New York: Farrar, Straussand Cudahy. Reich,Wilhelm (1969),TheSexualReoolution, London: Vision. Fernando Solanas, and Octavio Getino(1983),'Towards Third Cinema: a Notesand Experiences the Development a Cinemaof Liberation for of in the Third World', in Michael Chanan(ed.), Twent.y-Fioe Years the of N ewLatin American Cinema,London: British Film Institute, pp. l7 -27 . Spinoza, Baruch(1989), Ethics, ed., with rev.trans.G. H. R. Parkinson, London:J. M. Dent. Uexkiill, Jakobvon (1957),'A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men', in Claire H. Schillcr (ed.), InstinctiaeBehaaior,New York: International Universities. Weismann,August (1893), The Theory of Heredit.y, trans. W. Newton Parkerand H. Ronnfeldt,London: WalterScott. Willemen,Paul(1994), in 'The Third Cinema Question', PaulWillemen, Looks undFriclions: Essu.ys CulturulStudics Itilrn'l-hutry,London: in untl, llritishFilm Institutc, 175-20.5. pp.

N otes on C ontr i butor s

Bruce Baugh is AssociateProfessorof Philosophyat the University Collegeof the Cariboo.He is the author of FrenchHegel: From Surrealism (2003),aswell asseveral articleson Deleuze. to Postmod,ernism Literature at the University Ronald Bogue is Professor Comparative of and and Guattart(1989),Deleuze of Georgia.He is the author of Deleuze (2003),andDeleuze's (2004). theArts Wabe Constantin V. Boundas is ProfessorEmeritus in the Department of Reader Philosophyat Trent University. He is the editor of The Deleuze (1993),and (with Dorothea Olkowski) of GillesDeleuze:The Theater of (1994). Philosophy Rosi Braidotti is Professorof Gender Studies in the Humanities at (2002);Nomadic Utrecht University.She is the author of Metamorphoses (1991),aswell asof several (199+)andPatternsof Dissonance edited Subjects volumeson Continentalphilosophyand feminism. Adarn Bryx is a graduatestudentin Englishat Lakehead University.He with Gary Genosko,interviews and articles by Jean has co-translated, Baudrillardand Paul Virilio. of Claire Colebrook is Professor Literary Theory at the University of (1997),Ethicsand Edinburgh. She is the author of New Literary Histories (2003), (1999),GillesDeleuze (2002), [Inderstand,ing Deleuze Representation Ironlt: The New Critical ld,iom (2003), Irony in the Work of Philosophy (2003).She is also the editor (with Ian Buchanan)of (2003) and Gender Deleuze and FeministTheory(1999). Felicity J. Colrnan teaches contemporarytheoriesof commodity cultures) avant-garde, experimental,and feminist practicesof visual and screen culture in the CinemaProgramat the University of Melbourne. of in Torn Conlcy is l)rotcssor ltomitnccLitnguagcs thc Dcpartmcntof of llirrvirrdLJnivclsity. is tlrc atttlrot' 'l'ht: llc It<rnrancc l,irrrgrr:rgcs, ^Stll( l()()l);:ttttltrr cditol ol' llrutitl, (l()()(r) ltiltu llirn44lyphs Mult Mup uxl

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Papers(1996).He has translateda number of books,including Gilles Deleuze's Foldandwritten on Deleuzein Le Cinimachez The Deleuze. Iris, Discourse, SouthAtlantic Qrarterly and other journals. The Verena Anderrnatt Conley teaches in Literature and Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard University. She has written on Marxism in post-warFrance,theoriesof feminism,technologies the and environment. Sheis currently interested space, in subjectivityand globalisationin Frenchthought. Gary Genosko is Canada Research Chair in Technoculture Lakehead at University. He has publishedextensively the life and work of F6lix on Guattari. Eugene W. Holland haspublishedextensively Deleuzeand Guattari, on including a book on Baud,elaire and. Schizoanalyvs(1993) and an Introd,uction Schizoanalysis(1999). to Tarnsin Lorraine is an associate professor Swarthmore at College. Sheis the author of lrigara.y and Deleuze: Experiments VisceralPhilosophy in (1999)and is currently at work on a book tentativelytitled Feminism and. DeleuzianSubjectiaitlt. in John Marks is Reader FrenchStudiesat NottinghamTrent University. He is the author of GillesDeleuze: Vitalismand Multiplicity (1998) and is the editor of a forthcomingissueof Paragraph Deleuzeand Science. on Kylie Message is ResearchFellow in the Centre for Cross-Cultural Research the AustralianNationalUniversity.Prior to this shewasPostat doctoral Research Fellow in the Department of English with Cultural Studiesat the University of Melbourne.Publishedwidely,her work uses the interdisciplinary methodology cultural studiesto engage of critically with the new museummodelasit is emersinE across world. the Brett Nicholls lecturesin Film and Media Studies at the University of Otago,and is the author of variousarticleson art, politics and digital technologies. Sirnon O'Sullivan is a lecturerin Art History/VisualCultureat GolclsmithsCollege, University London.Hc is thc authorof thc forthconring of (lo Art Encountars Dclauzc urul()ualturi: 7'hought llc.yond llcfrascnkt,tioz bc irs Mircnrilliur's llcurtt,irt,ti l'hilosophl, scrics). lrrrlrfislrcrf plrrlof'l)algrirvc

Adrian Parr is Professorof Contemporary Art and Design at the Savannah Collegeof Art and Design.Shehaswritten a book that explores the notebooksof f,eonardo through the philosophicallens of Deleuze (2003), and is the editor, with Ian Buchanan, of Deleuze and the Contemporar.y l4orldalsoforthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press. Paul Patton is Professor Philosophyat the University of New South of Wales.He translatedDifibrence Deleuze:A Critical and,Repetition,edited, Rearler is the authorof Deleuze thePolitical(2000). and and Professor French Studiesat LouisianaState of John Protevi is Associate University.He is the authorof Tirue Exterionty(1994), PoliticalPh.ysics and (2001)andco-authorof Deleuze Geophilosoph.y (2004). is alsoeditor He and of the forthcoming EdinhurghDictionar.yof Continental Philosophy. Jonathan Roffe is convcnor of the Melbourne School of Continental (2004)with Jack Philosophy. is thc co-editorof Untlerstanding He Derrid,a Reynolds,and Derrida'sHeidegger (forthcoming) with Simon Critchley. He is currently working on the relationbetween work of Alain Badiou the and Deleuze, and on a Deleuzianunderstanding cities. of Alison Ross teachesCritical Theory in the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studiesat Monash University.She specialises in modern philosophy,aesthetics and contemporaryFrench thought. Her book, TheAesthetic Anomaly: Aesthetic Presentation Kant, Heid,egger in and, Nancy, is forthcomingin 2006. Inna Sernetsky is an honorary researchassociate the School of in Philosophyand Bioethics,Monash University.In 2002shedefendedher Ph.D. dissertation'Continuities, Discontinuities, Interactions:Gilles Deleuzeand the DeweyanLegacy'at ColumbiaUniversity.She won the KevelsonMemorial Award from the SemioticSocietyof America(1999). Lee Spinks is a senior lecturer in English Literature at Edinburgh University. He is the author of Fried,rich (2003) andJames Nietzsche Joyce (2005) and is currently completing a study of Michael Ondaatje for Manchester University Press. Cliff Stagoll complctccl Ph.D. in Philosophy thc Univcrsity of his at Warwick, with :rtlisscrlatiotr l)clcuzc's on of'tlrchrrnr:rn lhcorisatiorr irrclividtrrrl. is rrt'cscitt'clt Ilc ol'thc |)cprrrtrrrcrrl itssocirtlc ol'l)lrilosolllry tht: rrt [.Jnivclsity Ncw Sorrtlr ol' Wrk's.

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Kenneth Surin is based the Literature Program,Duke University. in his Marcel Swiboda received Ph.D. from the Universityof Leedsin 2003 wherehe currently worksasan associate lecturerin the Schoolof Fine Art, History of Art and Culrural Studies.He is the co-editor,with Ian Buchanan, of Deleuze Music,publishedby Edinburgh University Press(2004). and, Alberto Toscano teaches the SociologyDepartment at Goldsmiths in He College. haspublishedarticleson Italian Marxism, Alain Badiou and Nietzsche.He is the editor of Alain Bad,iou:Theoretical Writingswith Ray with Brassier (forthcoming) and Antonio Negri: The Political Descartes Matteo Mandarini (forthcoming). Constantine Verevis lectures in the School of Literary, Visual and is Performance Studies at Monash University. His book Film Remakes forthcomingfrom EdinburghUniversity Press. Jarnes Williams is Readerin Philosophy at the University of Dundee. His books include Gilles Deleuze'sDifferenceand Repetition:A Critical Introduction and, Guid,e(2003) and The TransaersalThought of Gilhs Deleuze(2005).Jamesis grateful for the support of the AHRB Research Trust for the UniversitiesScotland. LeaveScheme and the Carnegie