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Art. III, Sec. 2 Who can invoke? 1. People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 43 Facts: Accused-appellant (Chua Ho San) prayed for his acquittal and the reversal of the judgment finding him guilty of transporting, without legal authority, the regulated substance methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659. The trial court sentenced him to die by lethal injection. In view thereof, the judgment was brought to the Supreme Court for automatic review. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride before the RTC. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union, the charge was amended for illegal transport of a regulated drug, to which he was convicted. The RTC found the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving the charge. It characterized the search as incidentals to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, hence, it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futility of informing Chua of his constitutional right under custodial investigation considering the language barrier, and such irregularity was rectified when the accused was duly arraigned and actually participated in the trial of the case. Issue: Can aliens invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure? Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the search made was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. From all indications, the search was nothing like a fishing expedition. Indeed, the likelihood of Chua having actually transported the items cannot be quickly dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded. The decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside and the accused-appellant was acquitted of the crime charged. NOTES TO PONDER AND HEADBANG ON: POLITICAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRIVACY; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THE CONSTITUTION BARS STATE INTRUSIONS TO A PERSONS BODY, PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE EXCEPT IF CONDUCTED BY VIRTUE OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT; EXCEPTIONS. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly ordains that

people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizure does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State intrusions to a persons body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid search warrant issued in compliance with the procedure outlined in the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court; otherwise such search and seizure become unreasonable within the meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 2. FCC vs. AT&T, 562 US____ March 1, 2011 Facts: The Freedom of Information Act requires federal agencies to make records and documents publicly available upon request, subject to several statutory exemptions. One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. One of those exemptions, Exemption 7(C), covers law enforcement records the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.. CompTel, a trade association, submitted a FOIA request for documents AT&T had provided to the Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau during an investigation of that company. The Bureau found that Exemption 7(C) applied to individuals identified in AT&Ts submissions but not to the company itself, concluding that corporations do not have personal privacy interests as required by the exemption. The FCC agreed with the Bureau, but the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not. It held that Exemption 7(C) extends to the personal

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privacy of corporations, reasoning that personal is the adjective form of the term person, which Congress has defined, as applicable here, to include corporations. Issue: Do corporations have personal privacy? Ruling: No, the US Supreme Court rejected the argument that because person is defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrasepersonal privacy in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations. DNA Testing & Suspicionless Drug Tests

picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

4. Lucas vs Lucas, GR 190710, 6 June 2011 Facts: Petitioner filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. Issue: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a search which must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid? Ruling: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere

3. Pimentel vs Comelec, GR 157870, 3 Nov. 2008, 570 SCRA 410 Facts: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: Students of secondary and tertiary schools, Officers and employees of public and private offices, All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test, all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. Issue: Are the drugs tests required under RA 9165 suspicionless and valid? Ruling: No. A mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly

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harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

Anticipatory Warrants/Service of Warrant/Media Ride-along

fugitive will be on the described premises (3) when the warrant is executed. It should be noted, however, that where the anticipatory warrant places a condition (other than the mere passage of time) upon its execution, the first of these determinations goes not merely to what will probably be found if the condition is met. Rather, the probability determination for a conditioned anticipatory warrant looks also to the likelihood that the condition will occur, and thus that a proper object of seizure will be on the described premises. Two pre-requisites of probability must be satisfied (1) It must be true that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place (2) there is probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur.

5. United States vs Grubbs, 547 US 90 (2007) Facts: A magistrate judge issued an anticipatory search warrant for respondent Grubbs house based on a federal officers affidavit. The affidavit explained that the warrant would not be executed until a parcel containing a videotape of child pornography which Grubbs had ordered from an undercover postal inspector was received at, and physically taken into, the residence. The affidavit also referred to two attachments describing the residence and the items to be seized. After the package was delivered and the search commenced, Grubbs was given a copy of the warrant, which included the attachments but not the supporting affidavit. When he admitted ordering the videotape, he was arrested, and the videotape and other items were seized. Following his indictment for receiving child pornography, Grubbs moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing, inter alia, that the warrant was invalid because it failed to list the triggering condition. The District Court denied the motion, and Grubbs pleaded guilty. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the warrant ran afoul of the Fourth Amendments particularity requirement, which, under Circuit precedent, applied to the conditions precedent to an anticipatory warrant. Issue: What are anticipatory warrants? What are the requirements/conditions to make anticipatory warrants valid and constitutional? Ruling: The court defined an anticipatory search warrant as a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a specified place. The court further held that the probable-cause requirement looks to whether evidence will be found when the search is conducted, all warrants are in a sense, anticipatory. Anticipatory warrants are, therefore, no different in principal from ordinary warrants. They require a magistrate to determine (1) that it is now probable that (2) contraband, evidence of a crime, or a

6. Wilson vs Layne, 526 US 603 Facts: While executing a warrant to arrest petitioners son in their home, Respondents invited a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention of such a media ride-along. The officers early morning entry into the home prompted a confrontation with petitioners, and a protective sweep revealed that the son was not in the house. The reporters observed and photographed the incident but were not involved in the execution of the warrant. Their newspaper never published the photographs they took of the incident. Petitioners sued the officers in their personal capacities for money damages contending that the officers actions in bringing the media to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court denied respondents motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. In reversing, the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the officers actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but concluded that because no court had held at the time of the search that media presence during a police entry into a residence constituted such a violation, the right allegedly violated was not clearly established and thus respondents were entitled to qualified immunity. Issue: Is the service of warrant through media ride along, valid? Ruling: NO, the service of warrant through media ride along, is not valid. A media ride-along in a home violates the Fourth Amendment. However, because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time the entry in the case took place; Respondent officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Media ride alongs violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into their home

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during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the warrants execution. The Amendment embodies centuries-old principles of respect for the privacy of the home, which apply where, as here, police enter a home under the authority of an arrest warrant in order to take into custody the suspect named in the warrant. It does not necessarily follow from the fact that the officers were entitled to enter petitioners home that they were entitled to bring a reporter and a photographer with them. The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. It is certain that the presence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of the warrant or assist the police in their task, was not related to the objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension of petitioners son. Taken in the entirety, the reasons advanced by respondents to support the reporters presence publicizing the governments efforts to combat crime, facilitating accurate reporting on law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses, and protecting suspects and the officers fall short of justifying media ride-alongs. Although the presence of third parties during the execution of a warrant may in some circumstances be constitutionally permissible, the presence of these third parties was not. 7. LA County vs Retelle, 550 US 609 (2007) Facts: Respondents led a 42 U. S. C. 1983 suit, alleging that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department deputies, who were executing a valid warrant to search a house but were unaware that the potentially armed suspects being sought had sold the house to respondents and moved out, ordered the unclothed respondents out of bed and required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit found that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment and were not entitled to qualied immunity because a reasonable deputy would have stopped the search upon discovering that respondents were of a different race than the suspects and would not have ordered respondents from their bed. Issue: Did the deputies violate the Fourth Amendment? In executing a search warrant, what action may an officer take? Ruling: The deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Ofcers executing a search warrant may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety and the efcacy of the search. Upon encountering respondents, the deputies acted reasonably to secure the premises. The presence of one race did not eliminate the possibility that

suspects of a different race were in the residence as well. In ordering respondents out of bed, the deputies acted reasonably to ensure their own safety, since blankets and bedding can conceal a weapon and since one of the suspects was known to own a rearm. There is no allegation that the detention was prolonged or that respondents were prevented from dressing any longer than necessary to protect the deputies safety. Personal Determination and Probable Cause 8. Republic vs Eugenio, GR 174629, 14 Feb. 2008 Facts: Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC). The CIS conducted an intelligence database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved in the award, including respondent Pantaleon Alvarez (Alvarez) who had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee, NAIA-IPT3 Project.5 By this time, Alvarez had already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.6 The search revealed that Alvarez maintained eight (8) bank accounts with six (6) different banks.7 Lilia Cheng, wife of the accused, argues that the AMLA, being substantive penal statute has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 9164. Thus, she concludes, her subject bank accounts which she and her husband Pantaleon Alvarez jointly owns, could not be the subject of the bank inquiry order lest there be a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. Issues: 1. Are AMLA bank inquiry orders valid and constitutional? 2. Must a bank inquiry order under Sec. 11 of the AMLA comply with the constitutional requirements on search warrant? Ruling: 1. Valid and constitutional, given that the statutory right to privacy will not prevent the courts from authorizing the inquiry anyway upon the fulfillment of the requirements set forth under Section 11 of the AMLA or Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act; at the same time, the owner of the accounts have the right to challenge whether the requirements were indeed complied with. 2. No. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.

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A bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holders record of deposits and transactions. 9. Safford United School District vs Redding, 557 US__ (2009) Facts: Due to a declaration from another student that Savana Redding, an eighth grader at Safford Middle School, might have ibuprofen with her, which was a violation of the schools policy, a strip-search was conducted by school officials on Savana. They searched Savana's backpack but found no evidence of drug use, drug possession, or any other illegal or improper conduct. They then took the girl to the nurse's office and ordered her to undress. Not finding any pills in Savana's pants or shirt, the officials ordered the girl to pull out her bra and panties and move them to the side. The observation of Savana's genital area and breasts also failed to reveal any contraband. Savanas mother then filed suit against the school district and the school officials responsible for the search alleging that her daughters Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. However, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. On the initial appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. However, on rehearing before the entire court, the court of appeals held that Ms. Redding's Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It reasoned that the strip search was not justified nor was the scope of intrusion reasonably related to the circumstances. Now the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, hence this petition. Issue: Can school officials strip-search a 13 year old girl student based on a declaration of a student claiming to have received drugs from the 13 year old girl? Ruling: This depends on the facts. But in this case, the Supreme Court held that Savanna's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when school officials searched her underwear for non-prescription painkillers. The Court reiterated that, based on a reasonable suspicion, search measures used by school officials to root out contraband must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Here, school officials did not have

sufficient suspicion to warrant extending the search of Savanna to her underwear. On the liability of the of the school administrators, the Court, however, held that they were not personally liable because "clearly established law [did] not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment." It reasoned that lower court decisions were disparate enough to have warranted doubt about the scope of a student's Fourth Amendment right. Searching Questions 10. Tabujara vs People, GR 175162, 29 Oct. 2008 Facts: The petitioner assails the February 24, 2004 decision of the CA in CA GR 63280 denying its petition for review and directing the MTC of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Br. II to proceed with the trial of criminal cases nos. 99-29031 and 99-29038 as well as the October 23, 2006 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner insist that the orders of the court should be annulled for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion because the finding of probable cause was based solely on the unseen statement of Mauro de Lara who never appeared during the preliminary investigation. Issue: Can the judge base his findings of probable cause on a statement of a witness whom he did not personally examine under oath? Ruling: No. It is constitutionally mandated that a warrant of arrest shall be issued only upon finding of probable cause personally determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he/she may produce and particularly describing the person to be seized. In the case at bar, Judge Adriatico gravely abused his discretion in issuing the assailed May 2, 2000 and July 4, 2000 orders finding probable cause to hold petitioner liable for trial and to issue warrant of arrest because it was based solely in the statement of witness de Lara whom Judge Adriatico did not personally examine and under oath; neither did he asked propound questions. He merely stated that in the assailed May 2, 2000 Order, he overlooked that said statements of de Lara, nevertheless, without conducting a personal examination on said witness, Judge Adriatico still found de Laras allegations sufficient to establish probable cause. Plainly, this falls short of the requirement imposed by the Constitution. Particularity of Description 11. Yao et al vs People, GR 168306, 29 Oct. 2008

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Facts: Petitioners are incorporators and officers of Masagana Gas Corporation which is engaged in the refilling, sale, and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines: GASUL and SHELLANE, respectively. Petron is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products, and its trademarks while Pilipinas Shell is the only corporation authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and products. On April 3, 2003, the NBI filed two applications for search warrant against petitioners and other occupants of Masagana compound for violation of sec. 155, in relation to sec. 170 of RA 8293 (The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) for alleged production, selling, and distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell without authority and in violation of the rights of the said entities. On April 22, 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash the two search warrants and on April 30, 2003, Masagana, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine. Both were denied, including their MRs. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue: Did the search warrant satisfy the particularity of description requirement? Ruling: Yes. The two search warrants satisfied the particularity of description requirement. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The law, however, does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for applicants to obtain a search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice. The items to be seized under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were

restricted to a certain enumeration and the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to the offense (violation of sec. 155 of RA 8293). Hence, the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied. The indication of the accurate sizes of the Gasul and Shellane LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary. Chain of Custody Rule 12. Lopez vs People, GR 184037, 19 June 2007 Facts: On April 23, 2003, PO2 Atienza, a member of Task Force of the Mandaluyong City Police Station, while conducting a routinary foot patrol saw petitioner at a distance of seven meters walking in his direction. He saw petitioner, walking with head bowed, looking at his hand, which held a plastic sachet containing a crystalline substance. Thereafter, PO2 Atienza introduced himself to petitioner as a member of the Mandaluyong police, arrested him, and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. He then brought petitioner to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for a check-up. He also confiscated the plastic sachet and brought it to the police station. He prepared a request and then placed the markings APAhis initialson the plastic sachet. Issues: 1) What is the chain of custody rule on search and seizure? 2) Does the presumption of regularity rule apply to chain of custody rule? Ruling: 1) As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. 3) No. The presumption of regularity does not apply to the chain custody rule. In case at bar, the courts heavily relied on the testimony of PO2 Atienza and, in the same way, banked on the presumption of regularity. It bears stressing that this presumption only arises in the absence of contradicting details that

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would raise doubts on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in this case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedure prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption of regularity. 13. People vs Alejandro, GR 176350, 10 Aug. 2011 Facts: The RTC the appellant John-John Alejandro for violating RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. It was alleged that he sold shabu to an undercover police on September 1, 2002. The appellant appealed the case in the Court of Appeals but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court stating that the defense already admitted the admissibility of certain evidences against the appellant and further stated that, in the absence of any motive to do otherwise, the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. Thus, the appellant raised the matter to the Supreme Court claiming that the RTC erred in convicting him because the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity of the seized item, with police having failed to mark and photograph the seized item, therefore, his guilt was not proven to be beyond reasonable doubt. Issue: Is the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers applicable in the prosecution of RA 9165? Ruling: No. In convicting the appellant, the RTC and CA relied on the evidentiary presumption that the police officers have performed their duties in a regular manner. However, this presumption is not conclusive and cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The presumption of regularity is assumed only when there is no deviation from the regular performance of duty. If there is any official act that is questioned, the presumption of regularity is no longer applied. In the case at bar, it was clear that the officers failed to follow the proper procedures stipulated in paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. Simply put, the Court said that since they were not able to properly mark the evidence, the integrity of the evidence has been compromised, therefore we can never be fully certain that it was still the same item seized on the day of the arrest. The failure to follow the procedure is the reason why the accused was acquitted by the Court because his guilt was not established to be beyond reasonable doubt. Warrantless Searches and Seizures 14. Valeroso vs People, GR 164815, 3 Sept. 2009 Facts: On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched

and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a locked cabinet where they discovered the subject firearm. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Valeroso now appeals before the Supreme Court for acquittal alleging that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure have been violated by the arresting police officers; and if granted would render the confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence against him. Issue: Should the search be considered incident to a valid arrest? How should within the area of his immediate control be construed? Ruling: Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. The purpose of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. However there is an exception which is that the search should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. Furthermore, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. In the present case, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, from where the officers found the weapon, could no longer be considered as

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an area within his immediate control because there was no way for Valeroso to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Hence, the warrantless search in this case could not be justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. 15. Arizona vs Gant, 556 US 2009 Facts: The case involved Rodney J. Gant, who was arrested by Tucson, Arizona, police and charged with driving on a suspended drivers license. Police arrested Gant in a friend's yard after he had parked his vehicle and was walking away. Gant and all other suspects on the scene were then secured in police patrol cars. The officers then searched Gant's vehicle. After finding a weapon and a bag of cocaine, they also charged him with possession of a narcotic for sale and possession of drug paraphernalia. Issue: Up to what extent may a warrantless search on cars be allowed? Ruling: Police may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions. The exception for a search incident to a lawful arrest applies only to the area from within which (an arrestee) might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Warrantless Arrests 16. People vs Gadiana, GR 184761, 8 Sept. 2010 Facts: Julius Gadiana was convicted by the lower court of possessing 0.09 grams of shabu in 2 heat-sealed transparent plastic packets. The prosecutions version of events says that about 3:40pm on 7 Feb., 2004, PO1 Busico, PO3 Dinauanao, and PO2 Ferrer and three others were conducting a saturation drive when they chanced upon Gadiana holding the two plastic bags. Thereafter, they approached Gadiana , identified themselves as policemen, and confiscated the sachets. According to Busicos testimony, it was Ferrer who prepared and brought the request-letter for lab examination. Gadianas version: He denied ever holding two plastic bags. According to him, what happened was that three of the policemen only passed by him, after which, PO1 Busico uttered, "This is the one, this is the one. This is very obvious," held appellants arms and dipped into his pocket.

The forensic report admitted that only the existence but not the sources of the two sachets was admitted. Issues: 1) Was the warrantless arrest of the accused valid? 2) Was the prosecution able to establish the chain of custody? Ruling: 1) No. PO1 Busico only saw that Gadiana was placing two plastic sachets into his pocket. This, in itself, does not meet any of the requirements under the rules for warrantless arrests as provided in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. 2) The Court said, Except for the charge sheet prepared against appellant which stated that evidence consisted of "two (2) heat-sealed clear plastic sachets containing shabu with markings JGR-1 and JGR-2," nowhere in the record is a showing that the marking was done in the presence of appellant or his representatives or that a physical inventory and photograph of the seized items were taken as required under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 reading:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the

drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The polices failure to comply with this requirement essentially makes it so that they failed in establishing the chain of custody. There are exceptions to

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this requirement, but prosecution failed to establish justifiable grounds for such exceptions. Art. III, Sec. 3 17. People vs Racho, GR 186529, 3 Aug. 2010 Facts: On May 20, 2003, appellant was caught possessing a suspected drug during a police operation. He was charged for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and, of Section 11 for possessing dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, he denied liability and pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC convicted him on the first charge but acquitted him of the second. Hence, he appealed and averred that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. He assailed the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questioned the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree. Issue: Should the confiscated items be considered fruits of the poisonous tree and, thus, admissible in evidence? Ruling: The case is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely: (a)Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (b) Search of evidence in "plain view;" (c) Search of a moving vehicle; (d) Consented warrantless search; (e) Customs search; (f) Stop and Frisk; and, (g) Exigent and emergency circumstances. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.

Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. He was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. 18. People vs De la Cruz, GR 185717, 8 June 2011 Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial and alleged a frameup by the arresting officers which was supported by some witnesses. Issue: Is the non-compliance with said Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, fatal and renders and accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible? Was the prosecution able to establish the chain of custody? Ruling: Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust operation against appellant ever took place. The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the

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performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court stated; In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of custody, We cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt. In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit 19. Meralco vs Lim, GR 184769, 5 Oct. 2010 Facts: On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police. By Memorandum1[3]dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security. Issue: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted thereinimputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to informs her of the details thereof? Ruling: Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.2[16] Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.3[17] It is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment - are what prompted her to adopt the

extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters. 20. Pollo vs David, GR 181881, 18 Oct. 2011 Facts: On January 3, 2007, an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson David was marked Confidential and sent through a courier service from a certain Alan San Pascual. The lettercomplaint indicated that a certain attorney of CSC is lawyering people with pending cases in the Commission. Furthermore, the letter-complaint said that the lawyer is from the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division. Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna division. Text messages were also sent informing the employees of the ongoing copying of computer files. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found out that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by Briccio Ricky A. Pollo were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. Pollo, filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer. He asserted that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. The CSC issued a Resolution finding prima facie case against Pollo and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). He then filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals but it was denied. Issue: Was the search conducted on Pollos office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent violate his constitutional right to privacy?

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Ruling: No. The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures. First, if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, he can be protected of search and seizure. Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a twofold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective). In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. He described his office as full of people, his friends, unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, and drafting cases on appeals. The CSC also had a policy regulating the use of office computers. Second, a search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases before the Commission, then such scenario would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. The fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. The ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action.