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ARTICLE IV & V CASE DIGESTS AND BAR QUESTIONS Article IV Go vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 167569, September 4, 2009 Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. He submitted as proof, Jimmys birth certificate indicating that the latters citizenship is Chinese. The birth certificates of Jimmys siblings also indicate that they are Chinese. Jimmy, as a defense, explained that he is Filipino since his father is also a Filipino, having elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625, while his mother is Filipina. Issue: Does the principle of res judicata apply to decisions on citizenship? Ruling: Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: 1. A persons citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controvers y where said person is a party; 2. The Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and 3. The finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court. In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party in this case. Borough of Duryea vs. Guarnieri, 564 US (2011) Facts: Charles Guarnieri filed a union grievance challenging his termination as chief of police for the borough of Duryea. The arbitrator found that the council committed errors in connection with the termination. The arbitrator ordered Guarnieri reinstated. Upon Guarnieris retu rn, the council issued 11 directives. Guarnieri filed a second union grievance challenging the directives. Guarnieri claimed that his first union grievance was a petition protected by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, and he alleged that the directives issued upon his reinstatement were retaliation for that protected activity. Defendants appealed on the ground that Guarnieris grievances and lawsuit did not address matters of public concern. Issue: Is the right to petition the government a right available to citizens and non-citizens? Ruling: The right to petition the government is a right available only to citizens. The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives, whereas the right to speak fosters the public exchange of ideas that is integral to deliberative democracy as well as to the whole realm of ideas and human affairs. Beyond the political sphere, both speech and petition advance personal expression, although the right to petition is generally concerned with expression directed to the government seeking redress of a grievance. Kilosbayan vs. Janolo, G.R. No. 180543, July 27, 2010 Facts: On July 9, 2007, private respondent Gregory Ong, following the promulgation of the Courts decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, filed a petition under Rule 108, Rules of Court for the amendment/correction/supplementation or annotation of the entry on citizenship in his Certificate of Birth over which public respondent Leoncio Janolo, Jr. presided. Via the present recourse of certiorari and prohibition, petitioners Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation assail four orders and the decision emanating from the proceedings in the RTC case. The RTC granted Ongs petition and recognized him as a natural -born citizen of the Philippines. Issue: Can substantial corrections to the citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry be effected through an ex parte application? Ruling: No. The Court, in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, stated that substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry are effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Jurisprudence has settled that such proceedings are adversarial in nature or [o]ne having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this case, impleaded as defendants were the Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila and any other person having or claiming an interest under the entry sought to be corrected, the interest of the State was amply represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, while petitioners interest was deemed waived when they failed to appear and file a responsive pleading. Ma vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010 Facts: Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother. Upon reaching the age of majority, they executed their affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance before proper authorities. However, they failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625. It was only 30 years after, in 2005 that petitioners complied with the said requirement after a complaint was filed against them before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). The BI ruled that they violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 respectively. Upon motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the BIs ruling. Hence, this present petition for review. Issue: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals? Ruling: No. The Supreme Court laid down the statutory formalities in electing Philippine citizenship: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. In the case at bar, the Court ruled that the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and petitioners should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election, subject to any administrative penalties, if any. This is because the petitioners have complied with the first two requirements, and even though they are late in registering their documents, they should be allowed to still do so because of their positive acts of citizenship. These positive acts were equivalent to formal registration. In justifying their ruling, the Court said that registration is made for the purpose of notification, and does not add value to the validity of an instrument nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one. In the case at bar, registration is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. DOJ vs. Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010

Facts: Filipino-Australian Michael Alfio Mike Pennisi, erstwhile player for the Red Bull Team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA), is questioned with regard to his citizenship as a Filipino. In 1999, Pennisi filed petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI), which the BI granted in 2000. He was then drafted and played for the Red Bull. In 2003, the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports and on Constitutional Amendments jointly submitted committee report recommending, among others, the BI to conduct summary deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBD players, including Pennisi. Pennisi, nevertheless, presented as evidence the certified true copy of his mothers birth certificate indicating the birthplace of his mother, Anita Tomeda Quintos, as Philippines. In 2004, the BI issued summary deportation order against several Filipino-foreign PBA players including Pennisi. Pennisi, subsequently, elevated the matter to the appellate court and won. Hence, this petition by former DOJ Raul M. Gonzales. Issue: Did the departure of Pennisi render moot the proceedings challenging DOJs revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary deportation? Is Pennisi a Filipino? Ruling: NO. Pennisis departure did not render the present case as moot. Prior to his deportation, Pennisi was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the country because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the petition before the CA and before the SC showed his intention to prove his Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his deportation from the country. He was precisely questioning the DOJs revocation of his certificate of recognition and his summary deportation by the BI. Filipino-Australian Michael Alfio Mike Pennisi is a Filipino citizen. The Supreme Court has denied the petition of former DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, et al. and affirmed the September 30, 2005 decision of the CA that had found Mike Pennisi a Filipino citizen. Tabasa vs. CA, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006 Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. By derivative naturalization(citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of naturalization ), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner then arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a balikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and was brought to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation(BID) in Manila. It was alleged that his passport had been revoked by the US Department of State and thus making him an undesirable alien, therefore ordered to be deported to his country of origin, United States of America. Issue: Is Joevanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? Ruling: No. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law, under his fathers name and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his, considering that he was still a minor when his father decided t o acquire American citizenship. What is enshrined in RA 8171 is that only Filipino women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens can exercise repatriation, as well as the natural born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In the case of Joevanie, he is already 35 years old, not a minor anymore, when he filed his petition under RA 8171, therefore making his re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship invalid. He could have re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under his fathers name, when he was still a minor, which is so impossible in the case at hand. It is therefore conclusive that he cannot be protected under RA 8171 and this will not save him from the deportation order issued to him. Vilando vs. HRET, G.R. No 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011 Facts: On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Vilando; and Jacinto Paras, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before the HRET. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter. Also, they contend that Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother given that at the time of her birth, her mother is not already a Filipino citizen as a result of her marriage to her father. Issue: By obtaining an ACR did Limkaichongs mother repudiate her Filipino citizenship? Did it result in an acquisition of an alien citizenship? Is Limkaichong a natural-born Filipino citizen? Ruling: An application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture of Philippine citizenship. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship, nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein. On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration. Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. AASJS vs. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007 Facts: Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship.1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner avers that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. It cheapens Philippine citizenship by allowing dual allegiance among Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Issue: Is Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution a self-executing provision? Ruling: Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a selfexecuting provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. Neither can the Court subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not

needed since the case of Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. 2001 Bar Question From the mainland China where he was born of Chinese parents, Mr. Nya Tsa Chan migrated to the Philippines in 1894. As of April 11, 1899 he was already a permanent resident of the Philippine Islands and continued to reside in this country until his death. During his lifetime and when he was already in the Philippiens, Mr. Ny Tsa Chan married Charing, a Filipina, with whom he begot one son. Hap Chan, who was born on October 18, 1897. Hap Chan got married also to Nimfa, a Filipina, and one of their children was Lacqui Chan who was born on September 27, 1936. Lacqui Chan finished the course of Bachelor of Science in Commerce and eventually engaged in business. In the May 1989 election, Lacqui Chan ran for and was elected Representative (Congressman). His rival candidate, Ramon Deloria, filed a quo warranto or disqualification case against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. It was pointed out in particular, that Lacqui Chan did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of 21. Decide whether Mr. Lacqui Chan suffers from a disqualification or not. Suggested Answer: Lacqui Chan is a Filipino citizen and need not elect Philippine citizenship. His father, Hap Chan, was a Spanish subject, was residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and continued to reside in the Philippines. In accordance with Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902, he was a Filipino citizen. Hence, in accordance with Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, Lacqui Chan is a natural born Filipino citizen, since his father was a Filipino citizen. 2003 Bar Question Miguel Sin was born a year ago in China to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His parents met in Shanghai where they were lawfully married just two years ago. Is Miguel Sin a Filipino citizen? Suggested Answer: Miguel Sin is a Filipino citizen because he is the legitimate child of a Filipino mother. Under Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, his mother retained her Philippine citizenship despite her marriage to an alien husband, and according to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1987 Constitution, children born of a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens. 2004 Bar Question TCA, a Filipina medical technologist, left in 1975 to work in ZOZ State. In 1988, she married ODH, a citizen of ZOZ. Pursuant to ZOZs law, by taking an oath of allegiance, she acquired her husbands citizenship. ODH died in 2001, leaving her financially secure. She returned home in 2002, and sought elective office in 2004 by running for Mayor of APP, her hometown. Her opponent sought to have her disqualified because of her ZOZ citizenship. She replied that although she acquired her ZOZs citizen ship because of marriage, she did not lose her Filipino citizenship. Both her parents, she said, are Filipino citizens. Suggested Answer: On the assumption that TCA took an oath of allegiance to ZOZ to acquire the citizenship of her husband, she is not qualified to run for mayor. She did not become a citizen of ZOZ merely by virtue of her marriage, she also took an oath of allegiance to ZOZ. By this act, she lost her Philippine citizenship (Section 1(3), Commonwealth Act No. 63) 2006 Bar Question Atty. Emily Go, a legitimate daughter of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was born in 1945. At 21, she elected Philippine citizenship and studied law. She passed the bar examinations and engaged in private practice for many years. The Judicial and Bar Council nominated her as a candidate for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. But her nomination is being contested by Atty. Juris Castillo, also an aspirant to the position. She claims that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen, hence, not qualified to be appointed to the Supreme Court. Is this contention correct? Explain. Suggested Answer: The contention that Atty. Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen is not correct. She was born before January 17, 1973 of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She elected Philippine citizenship when she reached twenty-one years of age. Those who elect Philippine citizenship under Section 1(3), Article IV of the Constitution are natural-born citizens. 2006 Bar Question Atty. Richard Chua was born in 1964. He is a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. His father became a naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty. Chua was still a minor. Eventually, he studied law and was allowed by the Supreme Court to take the bar examinations, subject to his submission to the Supreme Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Although he never complied with such requirement, Atty. Chua practiced law for many years until one Noel Eugenio filed with the Supreme Court a complaint for disbarment against him on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen. He then filed with the Bureau of Immigration an affidavit electing Philippine citizenship. Noel contested it claiming it was filed many years after Atty. Chua reached the age of majority. Will Atty. Chua be disbarred? Explain. Suggested Answer: Atty. William Chua should not be disbarred. In accordance with Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act, he became a naturalized Philippine citizen when his father became a Filipino citizen during his minority. Hence, there was no need for him to elect Philippine citizenship (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, [1991]). 2009 Bar Question Warlito, a natural-born Filipino, took up permanent residence in the United States, and eventually acquired American citizenship. He then married Shirley, an American, and sired three children. In August 2009, Warlito decided to visit the Philippines with his wife and children: Johnny, 23 years of age; Warlito, Jr., 20; and Luisa, 17. While in the Philippines, a friend informed him that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship without necessarily losing U.S. nationality. Thus, he took the oath of allegiance required under R.A. 9225. a. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, is Warlito a natural-born or a naturalized Filipino citizen today? Explain your answer. Warlito is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Repatriation of Filipinos results in the recovery of the original nationality. Since Warlito was a natural-born Filipino citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he was restored to his former status as a natural-born

Filipino citizen (Bengson vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 [2001]; RA 2630). b. With Warlito having regained Philippine citizenship, will Shirley also become a Filipino citizen? If so, why? If not, what would be the most speedy procedure for Shirley to acquire Philippine citizenship? Explain. Shirley will not become a Filipino citizen, because u nder RA 9225, Warlitos reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not extend its benefits to Shirley. She should instead file with the Bureau of Immigration a petition for the cancellation ofher alien certificate of registration on the ground that in accordance with Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, because of her marriage to Warlito, she should be deemed to have become a Filipino citizen. She must allege and prove that she possesses none of the disqualifications to become a naturalized Filipino citizen. c. Do the children --- Johnny, Warlito Jr., and Luisa --- become Filipino citizens with their father's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship? Explain your answer. Under Section 18 of RA 9225, only the unmarried children who are below eighteen years of age of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship shall be deemed Filipino citizens. Thus, only Luisa, who is seventeen years old, became a Filipino citizen. 2011 Bar Question Filipino citizenship may be acquired through judicial naturalization only by an alien a. Born, raised, and educated in the Philippines who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen b. Who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen c. Born and raised in the Philippines who has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen d. Whose mother or father is a naturalized Filipino and who himself is qualified to be naturalized 2011 Bar Question A child born in the United States to a Filipino mother and an American father is a. A Filipino citizen by election b. A repatriated Filipino citizen c. A dual citizen d. A natural born Filipino citizen 2011 Bar Question The Special Committee on Naturalization is headed by a. The Secretary of Justice b. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs c. The National Security Adviser d. The Solicitor General 2012 Bar Question Basic Philippine law, in respect of the modes of acquiring citizenship, follows the rule(s) of: a. Jus soli and jus sanguinis; b. Naturalization and provides for jus soli; c. d. Jus sanguinis and provides for naturalization; None of the above.

2012 Bar Question Dual allegiance by citizen is: a. Inimical to the national interest and is therefore proscribed by law b. Inimical to national interest and is therefore prescribed by law c. Inimical to the national interest and therefore shall be dealt with by law d. Inimical to the national interest and is therefore outside of coverage of law 2012 Bar Question Margarita was born in 1986 to a Filipino mother and a Swedish father. She has been living and continues to live in the US for the last 20 years and has also been naturalized as a US citizen. She recently reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Can Margarita vote in the next national elections? a. Yes. Dual citizens who are not residents may register under the Overseas Absentee Voting Law. b. Yes. Margarita is a Filipino citizen and thus may enjoy the right to I Political Law Page 5 of23 suffrage like everyone else without registering as an overseas absentee voter. c. No. Margarita fails the residency requirement under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution for Filipinos. d. No. Dual citizens upon renunciation of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition 1of foreign citizenship, have practically and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to their homeland as a consequence. Article V Pundaodaya vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 179313, September 17, 2009 Facts: Petitioner ran against Noble for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections. Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. In a resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled and disqualified Noble from running as mayor. Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate. Pundaodaya then filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation. The COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position. Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari. Issue: Can one have more than one residence for purposes of suffrage? Did Noble effectively change his domicile? Ruling: No. The Court ruled in Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. No. The Court found that Noble failed to convince that he successfully effected a change of domicile. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it ones fixed and permanent place of abode.

De Guzman vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180048 June 19, 2009 Facts: Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. On April 3, 2007, private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification docketed as SPA No. 07-211, alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003.[5] Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6, 2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. During the May 14, 2007 elections, private respondent won as vicemayor. Petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. The case was filed before Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija and was docketed as Election Protest No. 07-01. Issue: Does the filing of a certificate of candidacy ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 Ruling: Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship. By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. In the instant case, petitioners Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections Jacot vs. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, November 26, 2008 Facts: Petitioner assails the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc disqualifying him from running for Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the May 2007 Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his US citizenship under Section 5(2) of RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act). He was a natural born citizen and later naturalized as a US citizen. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship and took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California. He was issued an Identification Certificate recognizing him as a citizen by the Bureau of Immigration. He then filed his Certificate of Candidacy but respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification against him. Issue: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship? Ruling: No. Petitioners oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 5(2) of RA 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under RA 9225. Petitioners presentation for the first time, in the present Court, an affidavit of renunciation of allegiance to other citizenship, which he supposedly executed before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy, constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the COMELECthat he complied with the requirement of renunciation and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation. Likewise, the Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Cordova vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 176947, February 12, 2009 Facts: In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Petitioner Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in his Certificate of Candidacy. Petitioner further stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because he lacked the citizenship and residency requirements. To disprove Tambuntings claim of being a natural born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii. On the other hand, Tambunting maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy by presenting documents on the contrary. The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordoras complaint which the COMELEC En Banc affirmed. Hence, this instant petition. Issue: Did Tambunting fulfill the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law? Ruling: Yes. Tambunting possesses dual citizenship because of the circumstances of his birth; it was no longer necessary for him to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which he acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office. Moreover, Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambuntings naturalization as an American. Cordoras reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship. Thus, Tambunting is eligible for the office which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law. Mitra vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010

Facts: Before the end of Mitras second term as Representative of the Second District of Palawan, Puerto Princesa City was reclassified as a highly urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials. On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan. COMELEC canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner for allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.[6] Issue: Did Mitra satisfy the residence requirement to exercise his right of suffrage? Issue: Does the PCOS infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot? Ruling: Yes. Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC. The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill residence. The purpose of the residency requirement is best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. Residency adds meaning and substance to the voters freedom of choice in the electoral exercise that characterizes every democracy. Crawford vs. Marion County, 2008, 550 US (2008) Facts: After Indiana enacted an election law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification, petitioners filed separate suits challenging the laws constitutionality. Following discovery, the District Court granted respondents summary judgment, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support a facial attack on the statutes validity. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit declined to judge the law by the strict standard set for poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , finding the burden on voters offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud. Issue: *What is the Harpers Standard? Is the Indiana Election Law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote? Ruling: a. Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However, even handed restrictions protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself satisfy Harpers standard. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 , n. 9. A state laws burden on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation. Norman b. The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483. Because Indianas cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of personse.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificateis mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerks office. Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to es tablish petitioners right to the relief they seek. Pp. 1316. Roque vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009 Ruling: NO. The court rules that the petitioner's contention is not well taken. Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be confronted with a three feet long ballot, does not commend itself for concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his vote known. Cagas vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012 Facts: The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division. Petitioner, in his answer submitted averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of. The COMELEC however find Bautista to be in compliance with the Law. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was once more denied. Petitioner not being satisfied commenced this special civil action directly to the Court thus the reason for the case at bar. Issue: Did the Supreme Court guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections in Roque vs. Comelec? Ruling: No. The Court only ruled there that the system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating the PCOS machines and CCS computers met the minimum system requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436. The Court did not guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated system of elections, as can be gleaned from the following pronouncement thereat: The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seeking to nullify respondent Comelecs award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic). The Comelec, private respondents, the National Computer Center and other computer wizards are confident that nationwide automated elections can be successfully implemented. But petitioners and some skeptics in the information technology (IT) industry have, however, think that the automated election system and the untested technology Comelec has chosen and set in motion have risks and could lead to a disastrous failure of elections.

tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly. CENPEG vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010 Facts: In this case, the Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of identified canvass machines despite repeated requests and demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections, claiming that the source code remained important and relevant "not only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud. Issue: What is the source code? Who can access and review the source code? Ruling: Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the "human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do." The source code in voting machines is in some ways analogous to the procedures provided to election workers. Procedures are instructions that are provided to people; for instance, the procedures provided to poll workers list a sequence of steps that poll workers should follow to open the polls on election morning. Source code contains instructions, not for people, but for the computers running the election. Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. Chato vs. HRET, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013 Facts: Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10,2010 elections as representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the seven (7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and San Lorenzo, with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes. On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. In its Resolution No. 11-208, the HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. Issues: * What are the two types of automated election system (AES)? * What system was adopted in the May 2010 Elections? * Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as official ballots? Ruling: * There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system, which uses paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count. ; and (2) direct recording electronic election system, which uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically. * The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast. * Yes. The SC agreed with the HRET that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. 2001 Bar Question Let us suppose that Congress enacted a law which amended the Omnibus Election Code (particularly Sections 138, 139, 142, 143, by vesting in the Commission on Elections the jurisdiction over inclusion and exclusion cases filed by voters, instead of the courts (MTC, then RTC).). Is the law valid or not, and why? 2011 Bar Question The decision of the Regional Trial Court on appeals pertaining to inclusions or exclusions from the list of voters a. Is inappealable b. Is subject to an action for annulment c. May be brought straight to the Supreme Court d. Is appealable to the Commission on Elections