Arevalo p1

Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., 670 SCRA 310, April 23, 2012

p20

8) Du vs. Jayoma, 670 SCRA 333, April 23, 2012 p33 9) Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company, 670 SCRA 343, April 23, 2012 p42

SPOUSES DAISY and SOCRATES M. AREVALO, petitioners, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE CITY, respondents.

April 18, 2012.

G.R. No. 193415.*

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case, thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case. Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case, any appeal therefrom notwithstanding, as this Court emphasized in Buyco v. Baraquia, 107 SCRA 187 (2009). Constitutional Law; Judicial Power; As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. Furthermore, courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.
_______________ * SECOND DIVISION.

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2 53

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another.Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. Same; Same; Same; Every litigant is required to notify the court of the filing or pendency of any other action or such other proceeding involving the same or similar action or claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact. Every litigant is required to notify the court of the filing or pendency of any other action or such other proceeding involving the same or similar action or claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact. Petitioners claim that it was merely due to inadvertence that they failed to disclose the said filing within five (5) days, contrary to their undertaking.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Socrates M. Arevalo for petitioners. Alexander M. Paulino for respondent.
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Bank SERENO,J.: This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review, which seeks to reverse the Decision dated 24 March 20101 and Resolution dated 05 August 20102 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110806. The CA affirmed the trial courts Decision not to grant petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction. As stated, this case involves the trial courts refusal to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of petitioner Spouses Daisy and Socrates M. Arevalo (Spouses Arevalo) based on their failure to comply with Section 2 of the Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages (Procedure on Foreclosure)3 issued by this Court. This procedure required them to pay twelve percent (12%) per annuminterest on the amount of the principal obligation, as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, before an injunctive writ may issue against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.4 We deny the instant Petition for the following reasons: (1) the Petition is moot, because the trial court has already dismissed the Complaint dated 07 April 2009 (the First Complaint),5upon which petitioners application for the provi_______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 51-62. 2 Rollo, p. 64. 3 SC Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 dated 20 February 2007. (Hereinafter, Procedure on Foreclosure). 4 No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending. (Sec. 2 of the Procedure on Foreclosure.) 5 The Complaint for Nullification of Interests, Penalties and Other Charges, Specific Performance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, TRO and Damages dated 07 April 2009, docketed as Civil

255

VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 255 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank sional remedy of preliminary injunction was based; and (2) petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping.

The conflict between the parties arose from a Loan Agreement6 petitioners executed with respondent Planters Development Bank (Bank). Petitioners obtained from respondent Bank a P2,100,000 loan secured by a mortgage on their property situated in Muntinlupa. Due to their failure to pay the loaned amount, the Bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. The Clerk of Court issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale and set the auction sale on 21 and 28 April 2009.7 Petitioners thereafter filed the First Complaint wherein they asked for the nullification of interests, penalties and other charges, as well as for specific performance with an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the then impending auction sale of their Muntinlupa property. They alleged that it was respondent Bank who breached its obligations under the loan agreement; and that the auction sale was premature, arbitrary and confiscatory, as their inability to pay the loan was caused and aggravated by the Banks illegal schemes.8 During the hearing of petitioners application for preliminary injunction, the trial court ruled that, as a precondition for the issuance of the writ and pursuant to the Procedure on Foreclosure, petitioners were directed to pay 12% per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale. Otherwise, the writ shall not issue.9 The trial court further ruled that the evidence in support of
_______________ Case No. 09-0126, entitled Daisy M. Arevalo and Socrates M. Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, Inc., then pending before Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 258, was dismissed by virtue of an Order dated 27 October 2009; Rollo, pp. 105-137, 231-236. 6 Rollo, pp. 118-121. 7 Rollo, p. 52. 8 Rollo, p. 54. 9 Order dated 24 April 2009;Rollo, p. 139.

256

256

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank their application was evidentiary in nature and should thus be presented during trial.10

Petitioner Spouses Arevalo sought to clarify the trial courts Order,11inquiring whether they should be required to pay 12% per annum interest. They argue that the rule requiring the payment of 12% interest as a condition for the issuance of an injunctive writ against an impending foreclosure sale was applicable only when applicant alleges that the interest rate is unconscionable.12 According to petitioners, nowhere in the Complaint did they allege that the interest charges were unconscionable.13Instead, what they raised in the First Complaint as their principal cause of action was the Banks deliberate withholding of loan releases on various pretexts and the propriety of the acts of the Bank charging them with interests and penalties due to the delay caused by the Bank itself.14 The trial court, however, affirmed its earlier ruling.15 Petitioners moved for reconsideration,16 but their motion was denied.17Consequently, they did not pay the required interest; thus, no writ of preliminary injunction was issued in their favor. Aggrieved, petitioner Spouses Arevalo filed a Rule 65 Petition18 with the CA to assail the Orders of the trial court involving the non-issuance of the injunctive writ.19
_______________ 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Rollo, pp. 140-159. 13 Rollo, p. 145. 14 Id. 15 Order dated 10 July 2009;Rollo, pp. 98-100. 16 Rollo, pp. 160-166. 17 Order dated 24 August 2009;Rollo, pp. 102-103. 18 Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 110806, entitled Sps. Daisy Arevalo and Socrates Arevalo v. The Presiding Judge Branch 258, Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City ; Rollo, pp. 65-97. 19 Rollo, p. 79.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 257 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank Meanwhile, proceedings for the First Complaint ensued at the trial court. Acting on the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Bank, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the First Complaint for lack of

cause of action.20 Petitioner Spouses Arevalo then proceeded again to the CA to appeal21 the dismissal of the main case. The record does not reveal the status of the case.With regard to the Rule 65 Petition to the CA questioning the non-issuance of the writ, respondent Bank filed its Comment22 thereon. Subsequently, the CA rendered the present assailed Decision dated 24 March 2010, affirming the applicability of Section 2 of the Procedure on Foreclosure. It ruled that the trial court was correct in refusing to issue the writ due to petitioners inexplicable failure and even stubborn refusal to pay the accrued interest at 12% per annum.23The CA held that the words used by petitioners in their First Complaint, such as manifestly unjust, purely potestative condition, voidab initio, clearly contravenes morals, good customs and public policy, whimsical, capricious violation of the legal and inherent principles of mutuality of contracts, illegal, invalid, unilateral impositionsall of which pertained to interest imposed by the Bank undeniably meant that petitioners were challenging the interest for being unconscionable, while opting to use other words of similar import.24 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.25
_______________ 20 Order dated 27 October 2009;Rollo, pp. 231-236. 21 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 94925, entitled Sps. Daisy & Socrates Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, Notice of Appeal dated 08 March 2010; Rollo, pp. 237-238 and Notice dated 28 September 2010; Rollo, p. 239. 22 Rollo, pp. 178-186. 23 Rollo, pp. 60-61. 24 Rollo, p. 60. 25 Rollo, p. 64.

258

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank Aggrieved, they filed the instant Rule 45 Petition to assail the Decision of the CA affirming the non-issuance of the injunctive writ. There are thus two (2) cases arising from similar facts and circumstances; more particularly, the instant Rule 45 Petition and the appeal of the dismissal of the main case with the CA. 26It appears on record also that on 12 November 2010, petitioners filed yet another Complaint

dated 11 November 201027 (Second Complaint) with the trial court. This time, they prayed for the nullification of the real estate mortgage, the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and the subsequent proceedings, with a prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. With regard to the instant Rule 45 Petition, petitioners assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA based on the following grounds:28(1) they were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence on their application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and (2) the CA erred when it required them to pay 12% interest per annum based on Section 2 of the Procedure on Foreclosure, when the core of their First Complaint was not excessiveness of the interest but the Banks supposed breach of their obligations in the loan agreement.29 Respondent Bank, on the other hand, countered as follows: 30 (1) petitioner Spouses Arevalo were not denied due process, since they were accorded several opportunities to be heard on their application for the issuance of an injunctive writ; (2) the CA correctly required petitioners to pay the interest; and (3) petitioner Spouses Arevalo were guilty of forumshopping when they filed their Second Complaint. For forum-shopping, respondent Bank likewise moved to hold
_______________ 26 Supra note 21. 27 Rollo, pp. 290-299. 28 Rollo, p. 8. 29 Rollo, p. 27. 30 Rollo, pp. 279-301.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 259 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank them in contempt,31 arguing that they had sought similar reliefs in their Second Complaint with the trial court as in the present Petition. Petitioners filed their Reply32 and Comment33 to the charges on contempt. Based on the parties submissions, the following issues are presented for the resolution of this Court: Whether the requirement to pay 12% interest 1. per annumbefore the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending foreclosure sale is applicable to the instant case; and

Whether petitioner Spouses Arevalo are guilty of forum-shopping and should consequently be punished for contempt. 2. Ruling of the Court I. The issue of the applicability to this case of the requirement to pay 12% interest per annum before the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin an impending foreclosure sale is moot. The Court rules that upon dismissal of the First Complaint by the trial court on 27 October 2009,34 the issue of whether the writ of injunction should issue has become moot. Although both parties failed to raise this particular argument in their submissions, we deny the instant Petition on this ground.
_______________ 31 Id. 32 Rollo, pp. 307-320. 33 Rollo, pp. 334-347. 34 Supra note 20.

260

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or useful purpose that can be served in passing upon the merits.35 There remains no actual controversy in the instant Petition because the First Complaint has already been dismissed by the trial court. Upon its dismissal, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction necessarily died with it. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy. It is auxiliary to, an adjunct of, and subject to the outcome of the main case. 36Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted upon dismissal of the main case,

any appeal therefrom notwithstanding,37 as this Court emphasized in Buyco v. Baraquia38 from which we quote:

The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. xxx xxx xxx
_______________ 35 Tantoy, Sr. v. Hon. Judge Abrogar, 497 Phil. 615; 458 SCRA 301 (2005). 36 Bustamante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126371, 17 April 2002, 381 SCRA 171. 37 Golez v. Hon. Judge Leonidas, 194 Phil. 179; 107 SCRA 187 (1981). 38 G.R. No. 177486, 21 December 2009, 608 SCRA 699. 262

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank

The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Unionbank v. Court of Appeals enlightens: xxx a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction , regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal of the action. (Emphases supplied.)39

There will be no practical value in resolving the question of the nonissuance of an injunctive writ in this case. Setting aside the assailed Orders is manifestly pointless, considering that the First Complaint itself has already been dismissed, and there is nothing left to enjoin. The reversal of the assailed Orders would have a practical effect only if the dismissal were set aside and the First Complaint reinstated. 40 In this case, however, petitioner Spouses Arevalo admitted to the impossibility of the reinstatement of the First Complaint when they filed their Second Complaint.41
_______________ 39 Id., at pp. 703-705. 40 Ley Construction & Development Corporation v. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation , 393 Phil. 633; 339 SCRA 223 (2000). 41 Civil Case no. 10-0519 is anchored on an entirely distinct causes of action, one of which, is that despite the total approved loan was already annotated on petitioners TCT No. 13168 pursuant to the real estate mortgage, the respondent bank failed to release the full amount of loan to the petitioners on various pretexts, thus, a substantial portion of the consideration of the real estate mortgage was not released to petitioners resulting to their substantial prejudice. Thus, in Civil Case No. CV-09-0126 before Branch 258, peti-

262

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank Even petitioners plea that this Court give due course to the Petition for a ruling on the proper application of the Procedure on Foreclosure42cannot compel us to resolve this issue. The Constitution provides that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.43 The exercise of judicial power requires an actual case calling for it. The courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions, or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests.44Furthermore, courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.45As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.46 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an

assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution, as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
_______________ tioners prayed for Specific Performance for the release to the latter of the P602,013.93 which the respondent bank unjustifiably withheld from them, but instead proceeded with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property. Since fulfillment is rendered legally impossible by the extrajudicial foreclosure already conducted by the respondent bank, as in fact it may have already consolidated its title over petitioners property, petitioners availed themselves of the remedy provided, for under paragraph 2 of Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which states: x x x He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment if the latter should become impossible. (Emphases supplied.) (Rollo, pp. 335-336.) 42 Rollo, p. 319. 43 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 3. 44 Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 426; 292 SCRA 402, 413 (1998). 45 Id. 46 Id.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 263 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank difference or dispute.47 There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.48 This Court cannot issue a mere advisory opinion in relation to the applicability of the provisions of the Procedure on Foreclosure. II.Petitioners are guilty of forumshopping. Petitioners have committed two distinct acts of forumshopping,49 namely: (1) petitioners willfully and deliberately went to different courts to avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies founded on similar facts and raising substantially similar reliefs, and (2) they did not comply with their undertaking to report the filing of the Second Complaint within five days from its filing. A.Petitioners filed multiple suits based on similar facts while seeking similar reliefs

acts proscribed by the rules on forum-shopping. We rule that petitioners were guilty of willful and deliberate forumshopping when they filed their Second Complaint with the trial court insofar as they undertook to obtain similar reliefs as those sought in the instant Petition. Respondent Bank argues that the rights asserted by petitioners, as well as the reliefs petitioners seek in the instant
_______________ 47 Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893 & 183591, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402. 48 Id. 49 Sadang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140138, 11 October 2006, 504 SCRA 137.

264

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank Petition, are identical to those raised in their Second Complaint.50 Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that the disparity between the two cases lies in the issue to be resolved. More particularly, they allege that the issue in this Petition is the summary application of the payment of 12% interest per annum as a precondition for the issuance of a writ, as opposed to the issue in the Second Complaint involving the validity of the real estate mortgage and compliance with the rules on the holding of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.51 Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in differentfora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision, if not in one court, then in another. 52The rationale against forumshopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.53

In Yu v. Lim,54 this Court enumerated the requisites of forum-shopping, as follows:

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentiaare present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
_______________ 50 Rollo, pp. 285-288. 51 Rollo, pp. 318, 340. 52 Pilipino Telephone Corp. v. Radiomarine Network, Inc. , G.R. No. 152092, 04 August 2010, 626 SCRA 702. 53 Id. 54 G.R. No. 182291, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 172. 265

VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 265 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.55

What is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same issues.56 A comparison of the reliefs sought by petitioners in the instant Petition and in their Second Complaint confirms that they are substantially similar on two points: (1) revocation and cancellation of the Certificate of Sale and (2) permanent injunction on any transfer and/or consolidation of title in favor of respondent Bank. These similarities undoubtedly create the possibility of conflicting decisions from different courts:
Instant Petition Second Complaint WHEREFORE, it is most WHEREFORE, it is respectfully respectfully prayed that prayed of the Honorable Court that immediately upon filing of this pending consideration and hearing on petition, the same be given due the principal reliefs herein prayed for,

Instant Petition course, and an order issue, ex parte:

Second Complaint a Temporary Restraining order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction be

_______________ 55 Id. 56 Lim v. Vianzon, 529 Phil. 472; 497 SCRA 482 (2006). 57 Rollo, pp. 41-42. 266

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank

A Resolution be issued (1)directing the Ex-Officio Sheriff and his Assisting Sheriff to undo, cancel, revoke the Certificate of Sale they issued; Enjoining the Register of Deeds of Paraaque (or any of her subordinates, agents, representatives and persons acting in their behalf (2) to cease and desist from allowing any transfer and/or consolidation of respondents banks title to the property in questionand an order be issueddirecting the Register of Deeds to undo, cancel and revoke the registration of the Certificate of Sale on November 13, 2009 and other proceedings had thereafter, the petition be given due

issued immediatelyrestraining and/or stopping the defendants Ex-Officio Sheriff Atty. Jerry R. Toledo and Deputy Sheriff Paulo Jose N. Cusi from executing and issuing a final deed of sale in favor of the defendant bank and further ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds of Paraaque City to hold in abeyance the registration of the final deed of sale and other documents of consolidation pending resolution of this Honorable Court. Plaintiffs pray for the following additional reliefs: After hearing on the merits, the Real Estate Mortgage be declared and rescinded and/or null and void; 1. 2.The Certificate of Sale [dated November 4, 2009] issued by the defendant Sheriffs and its subsequent registration on November 13, 2009 with the Registry of Deeds be declared null and void; 3.After due hearing, the preliminary injunction be declared permanent.x x x58

_______________ 58 Rollo, pp. 298-299. 267

VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 267 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank
Sale and/or (Emphases defer any supplied.) consolidation of title in favor of respondent bank pending final resolution of this petition. Reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 24, 2010 and Resolution dated August 5, 2010. 3.57(Emphasis supplied.)

As illustrated above, there is a clear violation of the rules on forumshopping, as the Court is being asked to grant substantially similar reliefs as those that may also be granted by the trial court, in the process creating a possibility of conflicting decisions. We emphasize that the grave evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum-shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.59 To avoid any confusion, this Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case.60 The acts committed and described herein can possibly constitute direct contempt.61
_______________ 59 Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation, G.R. No. 159786, 15 August 2006, 498 SCRA 613. 60 Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171842, 22 July 2009, 593 SCRA 440.

61

5. SEC.Certification against forum shopping.The plaintiff or principal party shall certify

under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or

268

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank B. Petitioners did not report the filing of their Second Complaint within five (5) days, in violation of their undertaking to do so. Aside from the fact that petitioners sought substantially similar reliefs from different courts, they likewise failed to disclose to this Court the filing of their Second Complaint within five (5) days from its filing, in violation of their previous undertaking to do so.62 Every litigant is required to notify the court of the filing or pendency of any other action or such other proceeding involving the same or similar action or claim within five (5) days of learning of that fact.63Petitioners claim that it was merely due to inadvertence that they failed to disclose the said filing within five (5) days, contrary to their undertaking.64
_______________ claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission, of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphases supplied.) (Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 5.) 62 Rollo, pp. 43, 317-319 and 341-343.

63 Rules of Court, Rule 45, Sec. 4, in relation to Rule 42, Sec. 2; Rule 7, Sec. 5. 64 Rollo, pp. 319 and 343.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 18, 2012 269 Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank This Court is not inclined to accept this self-serving explanation. We cannot disregard the glaring fact that respondents had to call the attention of petitioners to the said requirement before the latter admitted that they had indeed filed their Second Complaint. As previously established, petitioners have violated two (2) components of forum-shopping, more particularly: (1) petitioners willfully and deliberately went to different courts to avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies founded on similar facts and raising substantially similar reliefs, an act which may be punishable as direct contempt; 65 and (2) they did not comply with their undertaking to report the filing of the Second Complaint within five days from its filing. The latter action may also possibly be construed as a separate count for indirect contempt. While in a limited sense, petitioners have already been given the chance to rebut the prayer to hold them in contempt, We hereby provide sufficient avenue for them to explain themselves by requiring them to show cause, within fifteen (15) days, why they should not be held in direct and indirect contempt of court. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review filed by Spouses Daisy Arevalo and Socrates M. Arevalo is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 24 March 2010 and Resolution dated 05 August 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110806 are AFFIRMED. Accordingly, petitioners are required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Decision, why they should not be held in contempt; more specifically: (a) for direct contempt of courtfor availing of multiple judicial remedies founded on similar facts and raising substantially similar reliefs from different courts; and (b) for indirect contempt of
_______________ 65 Rules of Court, Rule 7, Sec. 5;Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 165835, 22 June 2005, 460 SCRA 600.

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REPORTS ANNOTATED Arevalo vs. Planters Development Bank courtfor not complying with their undertaking to report the filing of the Second Complaint within five days from its filing. SO ORDERED. Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. Notes.The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. (G.G. Sportswear Manufacturing Corp. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc., 612 SCRA 47 [2010]) The Supreme Court, by constitutional design is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law; This constitutional scheme cannot be thwarted or subverted through a criminal complaint that under the guise of imputing a misdeed on the Court and its members seeks to revive and re-litigate matters that have long been laid to rest by the Court. (Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 11, 2010 of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman, 614 SCRA 1 [2010]) o0o

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A. SORIANO, petitioners, vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),** LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. Same; Same; Same; Amendments are generally favored. Amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial courts denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same.
_______________ * THIRD DIVISION. ** Per Manifestation dated January 26, 2012, filed by said respondent. 311

April 23, 2012.

G.R. No. 143264.*

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 3 2012 11 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
Corporation Law; Derivative Suits; Requisites for Filing a Derivative Suit.In Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 590 SCRA 548 (2009), the Court enumerated the requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows: a) the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; b) he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or

refused to heed his plea; and c) the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit. A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; Due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense.Respondent PCIB should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the original complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been well aware that due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolution and order of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Br. 4. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Perfecto Nixon C. Taborafor petitioner. Emmanuel P.J. Tamasefor BDO Unibank, Inc. (PCIB). Nicolas A. Ocampo for respondent Soriano.
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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 311 2012 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. PERALTA,J.: This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Resolution1 of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (RTC), dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners complaint, and its Order2dated May 15, 2000, denying herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, be reversed and set aside. The records reveal the following antecedent facts. On August 13, 1999, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for Annulment of Mortgage with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction with Damages with the RTC of Legaspi City. Petitioner Lolita A. Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of petitioner Lisam Enterprises, Inc. (LEI) and a member of its Board of Directors,

designated as its Corporate Secretary. The Complaint also alleged the following:
Sometime in 1993, plaintiff LEI, in the course of its business operation, acquired by purchase a parcel of residential land with improvement situated at Legaspi City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37866, copy attached as Annex A, which property is more particularly described as follows: xxxx On or about 28 March 1996, defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., as husband and wife (hereafter Spouses Soriano), in their personal capacity and for their own use and benefit, obtained a loan from defendant PCIB (Legaspi Branch) (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) in the total amount of P20 Million; 5. That as security for the payment of the aforesaid credit accommodation, the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. and defendant Lilian S. Soriano, as president and treasurer, respectively of plaintiff LEI, but
_______________ 1 Penned by Judge Gregorio A. Consulta. 2 Id. 313

4.

6.

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without authority and consent of the board of said plaintiff and with the use of a falsified board resolution, executed a real estate mortgage on 28 March 1996, over the abovedescribed property of plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, and had the same registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Legaspi City, copy of the Real Estate Mortgage is hereto attached and marked as Annex B, and made part hereof, to the prejudice of plaintiffs; That specifically, the Spouses Soriano, with intent to defraud and prejudice plaintiff LEI and its stockholders, falsified the signatures of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary and director of plaintiff LEI, in a document denominated as board resolution purportedly issued by the board of plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995, making it appear that plaintiff LEIs Board met and passed a board resolution on said date authorizing the Spouses Soriano to mortgage or encumber all or substantially all of the properties of plaintiff LEI, when in fact and in truth, no resolution of that nature was ever issued by the board of plaintiff LEI, nor a meeting was called to that effect, copy of the resolution in question is hereto attached and marked as Annex C, and made part hereof; 7.

That plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as Corporate Secretary of plaintiff LEI, had never signed a board resolution nor issued a Secretarys Certificate to the effect that on 6 November 1995 a resolution was passed and approved by plaintiff LEI authorizing the Spouses Soriano as president and treasurer, respectively, to mortgage the above-described property of plaintiff LEI, neither did she appear personally before a notary public on 28 March 1996 to acknowledge or attest to the issuance of a supposed board resolution issued by plaintiff LEI on 6 November 1995; 8. That defendant PCIB, knowing fully well that the property being mortgaged by the Spouses Soriano belongs to plaintiff LEI, a corporation, negligently and miserably failed to exercise due care and prudence required of a banking institution. Specifically, defendant PCIB failed to investigate and to delve into the propriety of the issuance of or due execution of subject board resolution, which is the very foundation of the validity of subject real estate mortgage. Further, it failed to verify the genuineness of the signatures appearing in said board resolution nor to confirm the fact of its issuance with plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano, as the corporate secretary of plaintiff LEI. Furthermore, the height of its negligence was displayed when it disregarded or failed to notice that the questioned board resolution
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.

with a Secretarys Certificate was notarized only on 28 March 1996 or after the lapse of more than four (4) months from its purported date of issue on 6 November 1995. That these circumstances should have put defendant PCIB on notice of the flaws and infirmities of the questioned board resolution. Unfortunately, it negligently failed to exercise due care and prudence expected of a banking institution; That having been executed without authority of the board of plaintiff LEI said real estate mortgage dated 28 March 1996 executed by the Spouses Soriano, as officers of plaintiff LEI in favor of defendant PCIB, is the null and void and has no legal effect upon said plaintiff. Consequently, said mortgage deed cannot be used nor resorted to by defendant PCIB against subject property of plaintiff LEI as no right or rights whatsoever were created nor granted thereunder by reason of its nullity; 10. Worst, sometime in August 1998, in order to remedy the defects in the mortgage transaction entered by the Spouses Soriano and defendant PCIB, the former, with the unlawful instigation of the latter, signed a document denominated as Deed of Assumption of Loans and Mortgage Obligations and Amendment of Mortgage; wherein in said document, plaintiff LEI was made to assume the P20 Million personal indebtedness of the Spouses Soriano with defendant PCIB, when in fact and in truth it never so assumed the

same as no board resolution duly certified to by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary was ever issued to that effect, copy of said Deed is hereto attached and marked as Annex D, and made part hereof; 11. Moreover, to make it appear that plaintiff LEI had consented to the execution of said deed of assumption of mortgage, the Spouses Soriano again, through the unlawful instigation and connivance of defendant PCIB, falsified the signature of plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano as corporate secretary of plaintiff LEI in a document denominated as Corporate Resolution to Borrow, to make it appear that plaintiff LEI so authorized the Spouses Soriano to perform said acts for the corporation, when in fact and in truth no such authority or resolution was ever issued nor granted by plaintiff LEI, nor a meeting called and held for said purpose in accordance with its By-laws; copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex E and made part hereof; 12. 13. That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defen315

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 315 2012 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million. However, said defendants, for reason only known to them, continued and still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs; dant PCIB, on the other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April 1999. That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendants Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Hence, on 25 June 1999, plaintiffs commenced a derivative suit against defendants Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., before the Securities and Exchange Commission, docketed as SEC Case No. 06-99-6339 for Fraudulent Scheme and Unlawful Machination with Damages in order to protect and preserve the rights of plaintiffs, copy of said complaint is hereto attached as AnnexF; 14. That plaintiffs, in order to seek complete relief from the unauthorized mortgage transaction between the Spouses Soriano and defendant PCIB, were further compelled to institute this instant case to seek the nullification of the real estate mortgage dated 28 March 1999. Consequently, plaintiffs were forced 15. to retain the services of a lawyer with whom they contracted to pay P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fee; That unfortunately, the plaintiffs learned that on 30 July 1999, defendant Sarte, in his capacity as Notary Public of Daraga, Albay and upon application of defendant PCIB, issued

a notice of Auction/Foreclosure Sale of the property subject of the mortgage in question and has set the auction sale on 7 September 1999 x x x; 16. That by reason of the fraudulent and surreptitious schemes perpetrated by defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband, the late Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., in unlawful connivance and through the gross negligence of defendant PCIB, plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano, as stockholder, suffered sleepless nights, moral shock, wounded feeling, hurt pride and similar injuries, hence, should be awarded moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00. 17.

After service of summons on all defendants, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order on August 25, 1990 and, after
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. hearing, went on to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent PCIB (now known as Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.) from proceeding with the auction sale of the subject property. Respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. filed an Answer dated September 25, 1999, stating that the Spouses Lilian and Leandro Soriano, Jr. were duly authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject property; that proceeds of the loan from respondent PCIB were for the use and benefit of LEI; that all notarized documents submitted to PCIB by the Spouses Soriano bore the genuine signature of Lolita Soriano; and that although the Spouses Soriano indeed received demands from petitioner Lolita Soriano for them to pay the loan, they gave satisfactory explanations to the latter why her demands could not be honored. It was, likewise, alleged in said Answer that it was respondent Lilian Soriano who should be entitled to moral damages and attorneys fees. On September 28, 1999, respondent PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state cause of action, and litis pendencia. Petitioners filed an Opposition thereto, while PCIBs co-defendants filed a Motion to Suspend Action. On November 11, 1999, the RTC issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing petitioners Complaint. Petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution. While awaiting resolution of the motion for reconsideration, petitioners also filed, on January 4, 2000, a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, amending paragraph 13 of the original complaint to read as follows:

That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her husband Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defendant PCIB, on the other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April 1999. That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendant Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of plaintiff LEI
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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 317 2012 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million. However, said defendants, for reason only known to them, continued and still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiffs; that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of the corporation;

On May 15, 2000, the trial court issued the questioned Order denying both the Motion for Reconsideration and the Motion to Admit Amended Complaint. The trial court held that no new argument had been raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration to address the fact of plaintiffs failure to allege in the complaint that petitioner Lolita A. Soriano made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc. to take steps to protect the interest of the corporation against the fraudulent acts of the Spouses Soriano and PCIB. The trial court further ruled that the Amended Complaint can no longer be admitted, because the same absolutely changed petitioners cause of action. Petitioners filed the present petition with this Court, alleging that what are involved are pure questions of law, to wit:
FIRST, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT PETITIONER LOLITA A. SORIANO HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE AS SHE IS NOT A REAL PARTY-ININTEREST; SECOND, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS ANOTHER ACTION PENDING BETWEEN THE SAME PARTIES FOR THE SAME CAUSE;

THIRD, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED THE ACTION ON THE
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GROUND THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION; FOURTH, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE ADMISSION OF PETITIONERS AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT, AFTER THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS ISSUED BUT BEFORE ITS FINALITY. FIFTH, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE ACTION, INSTEAD OF MERELY SUSPENDING THE SAME FOLLOWING THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN UNION GLASS.3

The petition is impressed with merit. The Court shall first delve into the matter of the propriety of the denial of the motion to admit amended complaint. Pertinent provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provide as follows:
2. Sec.Amendments as a matter of right.A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served x x x. 3 Sec.Amendments by leave of court.Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x x

It should be noted that respondents Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr. already filed their Answer, to petitioners complaint, and the claims being asserted were made against said parties. A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore, be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. However, in Tiu v. Philippine Bank of Communications,4 the Court discussed this rule at length, to wit:
_______________ 3 Rollo, p. 5. 4 G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 432.

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Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.

x x x [A]fter petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states: 3. SECTIONAmendments by leave of court.Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard. This Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals, thus: Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense. This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated inValenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that
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the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial. Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.5

Since, as explained above, amendments are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards petitioners by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint became final and executory. It is quite apparent that since trial proper had not yet even begun, allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay. Moreover, doing so would have served the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined. Hence, the Court overrules the trial courts denial of the motion to admit the amended complaint, and orders the admission of the same. With the amendment stating that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of the corporation, does the amended complaint now
_______________ 5 Id., at pp. 444-445. (Emphasis supplied.)

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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 321 2012 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. sufficiently state a cause of action? In Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court enumerated the requisites for filing a derivative suit, as follows:

the party bringing the suit should be a shareholder as of the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of his shares not being material; he has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, plea; and the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation, the wrongdoing or harm having been, or being caused to the corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit. c) 7 a) b) i.e., has made a demand on the

board of directors for the appropriate relief but the latter has failed or refused to heed his

A reading of the amended complaint will reveal that all the foregoing requisites had been alleged therein. Hence, the amended complaint remedied the defect in the original complaint and now sufficiently states a cause of action. Respondent PCIB should not complain that admitting the amended complaint after they pointed out a defect in the original complaint would be unfair to them. They should have been well aware that due to the changes made by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amendments may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. It should not have been a surprise to them that petitioners would redress the defect in the original complaint by substantially amending the same, which course of action is now allowed under the new rules. The next question then is, upon admission of the amended complaint, would it still be proper for the trial court to dismiss the complaint? The Court answers in the negative. Saura v. Saura, Jr.8 is closely analogous to the present case. In Saura,9 the petitioners therein, stockholders of a
_______________ 6 G.R. No. 168863, June 23, 2009, 590 SCRA 548. 7 Id., at p. 556. 8 G.R. No. 136159, September 1, 1999, 313 SCRA 465. 9 Supra.

322

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. corporation, sold a disputed real property owned by the corporation, despite the existence of a case in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between stockholders for annulment of subscription, recovery of

corporate assets and funds,etc. The sale was done without the knowledge of the other stockholders, thus, said stockholders filed a separate case for annulment of sale, declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, recovery of possession, etc., against the stockholders who took part in the sale, and the buyer of the property, filing said case with the regular court (RTC). Petitioners therein also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for annulment of sale filed with the RTC, on the ground of forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and litis pendentia among others. The Court held that the complaint for annulment of sale was properly filed with the regular court, because the buyer of the property had no intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders, hence, the buyer could not be joined as party-defendant in the SEC case. To include said buyer as a party-defendant in the case pending with the SEC would violate the then existing rule on jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The Court also struck down the argument that there was forum shopping, ruling that the issue of recovery of corporate assets and funds pending with the SEC is a totally different issue from the issue of the validity of the sale, so a decision in the SEC case would not amount to res judicata in the case before the regular court. Thus, the Court merely ordered the suspension of the proceedings before the RTC until the final outcome of the SEC case. The foregoing pronouncements of the Court are exactly in point with the issues in the present case. Here, the complaint is for annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as one of the defendants, thus, as held in Saura,10 jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged with the regular courts because the
_______________ 10 Supra.

323

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 323 2012 Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. mortgagee bank has no intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders. There can also be no forum shopping, because there is no identity of issues. The issue being threshed out in the SEC case is the due execution, authenticity or validity of board resolutions and other documents used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while the issue in the case filed by

petitioners with the RTC is the validity of the mortgage itself executed between the bank and the corporation, purportedly represented by the spouses Leandro and Lilian Soriano, the President and Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively. Thus, there is no reason to dismiss the complaint in this case. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 9729, and its Order dated May 15, 2000, denying herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, is hereby DIRECTED to ADMIT the Amended Complaint. Considering further, that this case has been pending for some time and, under R.A. No. 8799, it is now the regular courts which have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes, the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4 is hereby DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in trying Civil Case No. 9729. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. Resolution and order reversed and set aside. Notes.The rule on amendment of pleadings need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. (Bormaheco, Incorporated vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Incorporated, 625 SCRA 309 [2010])324 324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Lisam Enterprises, Inc. vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. An amended complaint that changes the plaintiffs cause of action is technically a new complaint; The action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version; An amendment supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. (Dionisio vs. Linsangan, 644 SCRA 424 [2011])

DANILO A. DU, petitioner,vs. VENANCIO R. JAYOMA, then Municipal Mayor of Mabini, Bohol, VICENTE GULLE, JR., JOVENIANO MIANO, WILFREDO MENDEZ, AGAPITO VALLESPIN, RENE BUCIO, JESUS TUTOR, CRESCENCIO BERNALES, EDGARDO YBANEZ, and REY PAGALAN, then members of theSangguniang Bayan (SB) of Mabini, Bohol, respondents.
Remedial Law; Cause of Action; Elements of a Cause of Action; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. Administrative Law; Local Government Code; Cockpits and Cockfighting; It is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks.Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayanwhich is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioners cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respon_______________ * FIRST DIVISION. 334

April 23, 2012.

G.R. No. 175042.*

3 34

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Du vs. Jayoma

dent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioners cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution.

Same; Same; Same; It is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require.It is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require. Having said that, petitioners allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on. Same; Same; Same; Damages; Without any legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality, petitioner is not entitled to damagesinjury alone does not give petitioner the right to recover damages; he must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by the respondents.Without any legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality, petitioner is not entitled to damages. Injury alone does not give petitioner the right to recover damages; he must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by the respondents. We need not belabor that in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must bedamnum et injuriathat act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Lord M. Marapao for petitioner. Oscar B. Glovasa for respondents. DEL CASTILLO,J.: In the absence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff, there can be no cause of action.335 VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 335 Du vs. Jayoma This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 and the Resolution3dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00492. Factual Antecedents On July 7, 1988, theSangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, 4 requiring the conduct of a public bidding for the operation of a cockpit in the said municipality every four years. For the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992, the winning bidder was Engr. Edgardo Carabuena.5However, due to his failure to

comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, the Sangguniang Bayan on December 1, 1988 adopted Resolution No. 127, series of 1988,6 authorizing petitioner Danilo Du to continue his cockpit operation until the winning bidder complies with the legal requirements.7 On July 9, 1997, upon discovering that petitioner has been operating his cockpit in violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 1, series of 1988, theSangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997,8suspending petitioners cockpit operation effective upon approval.9
_______________ 1 Rollo, pp. 3-107 with Annexes A to J-1 inclusive. 2 Id., at pp. 85-93; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente L. Yap and Romeo F. Barza. 3 Id., at pp. 104-105; penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Antonio L. Villamor. 4 Id., at p. 40. 5 Id., at p. 86. 6 Id., at p. 41. 7 Id., at p. 86. 8 Records, p. 8. 9 Rollo, pp. 86-87.

336

336

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Du vs. Jayoma On July 11, 1997, pursuant to Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, respondent Venancio R. Jayoma, then Mayor of Mabini, in a letter,10 ordered petitioner to desist from holding any cockfighting activity effective immediately.11 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, a Petition for Prohibition, 12docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4, against respondent mayor and nine members of theSangguniang Bayan of Mabini, namely: Vicente Gulle, Jr., Joveniano Miano, Wilfredo Mendez, Agapito Vallespin, Rene Bucio, Jesus Tutor, Crescencio Bernales, Edgardo Ybanez and Rey Pagalan. Petitioner prayed that a preliminary injunction and/or a temporary restraining order be issued to prevent respondents from suspending his cockpit operation.13 Petitioner claimed that he has a business permit to operate

until December 31, 1997;14and that the Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, was unlawfully issued as it deprived him of due process.15 In their Answer,16respondents interposed that under the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cockpit is lodged in theSangguniang Bayan;17 that respondent mayor, in ordering the suspension of petitioners cockpit operation, was merely exercising his executive power to regulate the establishment of cockpits in the municipality, pursuant to the ordinances and resolutions enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan;18and that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, does not need to be approved by the Sang_______________ 10 Records, p. 7. 11 Rollo, pp. 87-88. 12 Id., at pp. 29-33. 13 Id., at p. 32. 14 Id., at p. 29. 15 Id., at pp. 31-32. 16 Id., at pp. 34-39. 17 Id., at p. 35. 18 Id.

337

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 337 Du vs. Jayoma guniang Panlalawiganbecause it is not an ordinance but an expression of sentiments of theSangguniang Bayan of Mabini.19 On October 22, 1997, a Temporary Restraining Order20 was issued by the RTC enjoining respondents from suspending the cockpit operation of petitioner until further orders from the court.21 The Petition for Prohibition was later amended22 to include damages, which the RTC admitted in an Order23 dated January 21, 1998. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court On October 5, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision24 in favor of petitioner, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and on the ground that petitioner was able to prove his case with preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and

against the respondents, ordering the respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: The amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) in the concept of moral damages; 1. The amount of Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) in the concept of unearned income considering the unrebutted testimony of the petitioner [that] he lost Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for each of the fifteen (15) Sundays that his cockpit was closed as its operation was ordered suspended by the respondent. By mathematical computation P4,000.00 x 15 amounts to P60,000.00; 2.
_______________ 19 Id. 20 Records, p. 54. 21 Rollo, p. 88. 22 Id., at pp. 44-50. 23 Id., at p. 51. 24 Id., at pp. 52-61; penned by Executive Presiding Judge Patsita Sarmiento-Gamutan. 338

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Du vs. Jayoma

3.

The amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as exemplary damages to deter other public officials from committing similar acts; cost. 4. The amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees, and to pay the SO ORDERED.25

Ruling of the Court of Appeals On appeal, the CA reversed the Decision of the RTC. According to the CA, petitioner did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality as he was only granted a temporary privilege by theSangguniang Bayan.26Hence, there being no right in esse, petitioner is not entitled to damages.27 Thus, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision granting petitioner the award of damages is SET ASIDE and the petition filed by petitioner against respondents is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.28

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied by the CA in a Resolution29 dated October 4, 2006. Issue

Hence, the instant petition raising the core issue of whether the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to damages.30
_______________ 25 Id., at p. 61. 26 Id., at pp. 91-92. 27 Id. 28 Id., at pp. 92-93. 29 Id., at pp. 104-105. 30 Id., at pp. 146-147 and 169.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 339 Du vs. Jayoma Petitioners Arguments Petitioner contends that Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997, is ultra vires as it was maliciously, hastily, and unlawfully enforced by respondent mayor two days after its passage without the review or approval of theSangguniang Panlalawiganof Bohol.31 He alleges that respondents suspended the operation of his cockpit without due process and that the suspension was politically motivated.32 In addition, he claims that as a result of the incident, he is entitled to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.33 Respondents Arguments Echoing the ruling of the CA, respondents insist that petitioner is not entitled to damages because he did not acquire a vested right to operate a cockpit in the municipality.34 They also maintain that the suspension of petitioners cockpit operation was pursuant to law and prevailing ordinance.35

Our Ruling The petition lacks merit. A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.36Corollarily, the essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the plain_______________ 31 Id., at p. 148.

32 Id. 33 Id., at pp. 148-149. 34 Id., at pp. 169-172. 35 Id. 36 RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Section 2.

340

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Du vs. Jayoma tiffs right with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may file an action for the recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 37 Petitioner has no legal right to operate a cockpit. In this case, we find that petitioner has no cause of action against the respondents as he has no legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Under Resolution No. 127, series of 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan allowed him to continue to operate his cockpit only because the winning bidder for the period January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1992 failed to comply with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit. Clearly, under the said resolution, petitioners authority to operate the cockpit would end on December 31, 1992 or upon compliance by the winning bidder with the legal requirements for operating a cockpit, whichever comes first. As we see it, the only reason he was able to continue operating until July 1997 was because theSangguniang Bayan of Mabini failed to monitor the status of the cockpit in their municipality. And even if he was able to get a business permit from respondent mayor for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997, this did not give him a license to operate a cockpit. Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks. Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January 1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of theSangguniang Bayan, therefore,
_______________

37 Soloil, Inc. v. Philippine Coconut Authority , G.R. No. 174806, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 185, 190.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 2012 341 Du vs. Jayoma had every reason to suspend the operation of petitioners cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioners cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution. It bears stressing that no evidence was presented to show that upon review by theSangguniang Panlalawiganof Bohol, the resolution was declared invalid or that the resolution was issued beyond the powers of theSangguniang Bayan or mayor. Jurisprudence consistently holds that an ordinance, or in this case a resolution, is presumed valid in the absence of evidence showing that it is not in accordance with the law.38 Hence, we find no reason to invalidate Municipal Resolution No. 065, series of 1997. License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege. In addition, it is well enshrined in our jurisprudence that a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require.39Having said that, petitioners allegation that he was deprived of due process has no leg to stand on. Petitioner not entitled to damages Without any legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality, petitioner is not entitled to damages. Injury alone does not give petitioner the right to recover damages; he must also have a right of action for the legal wrong inflicted by the re_______________ 38 Judge Leynes v. Commission on Audit, 463 Phil. 557, 580; 418 SCRA 180, 203 (2003). 39 Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123, 132 (1931).

342

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Du vs. Jayoma

spondents.40 We need not belabor that in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful.41 All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in dismissing petitioners case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 11, 2006 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00492 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur. Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed. Notes.Cockfighting, orsabong in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even during the Spanish occupationwhile it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. ( Teves vs. Commission on Elections, 587 SCRA 1 [2009]) In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of action or not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. (Macaslang vs. Zamora, 649 SCRA 92 [2011]) o0o
_______________ 40 Tan v. Perea, 492 Phil. 200, 210; 452 SCRA 53, 64-65 (2005). 41 Id

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INSURANCE COMPANY, respondent.

April 23, 2012.

G.R. No. 179488.*

INC.,

petitioner,

vs. KEMPER

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum Shopping; The certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. Corporation Law; Actions; Board of Directors; The power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of nonforum shopping on behalf of
_______________ * THIRD DIVISION. 344

SUPREME COURT 44 REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company
a corporation.In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), 479 SCRA 605 (2006), we ruled that only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of

non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority. Same; Same; Same; The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice.In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. Same; Same; Same; If a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.InTamondong v. Court of Appeals, 444 SCRA 509 (2004), we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff. Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction. Same; Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.Jurisdiction is the power with which
345

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 3 2012 45 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company
courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the courts jurisdiction. Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed

with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell for petitioner. Rodolfo A. Lat Law Officefor respondent. PERALTA,J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895, entitled Kemper Insurance Company v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the Order dated March 22, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila, which granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc., and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The antecedents are as follows:
_______________ 1 Penned by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III, concurring; Rollo, pp. 31-38. 2 Id., at pp. 40-41.

346

346

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company Respondent Kemper Insurance Company is a foreign insurance company based in Illinois, United States of America (USA) with no license to engage in business in the Philippines, as it is not doing business in the Philippines, except in isolated transactions; while petitioner is a domestic shipping company organized in accordance with Philippine laws. In 1998, respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned by Genosi, Inc.), which was loaded at a port in Brisbane, Australia, for shipment to Genosi, Inc. (the importer-consignee) in the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the shipment was rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged temperature fluctuations of petitioners reefer containers.

Thus, Genosi, Inc. filed a claim against both petitioner shipping company and respondent Kemper Insurance Company. The claim was referred to McLarens Chartered for investigation, evaluation, and adjustment of the claim. After processing the claim documents, McLarens Chartered recommended a settlement of the claim in the amount of $64,492.58, which Genosi, Inc. (the consignee-insured) accepted. Thereafter, respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc. (the insured) in the amount of $64,492.58. Consequently, Genosi, Inc., through its General Manager, Avelino S. Mangahas, Jr., executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt3 dated September 22, 1999, stating that Genosi, Inc. received from respondent the amount of $64,492.58 as the full and final satisfaction compromise, and discharges respondent of all claims for losses and expenses sustained by the property insured, under various policy numbers, due to spoilage brought about by machinery breakdown which occurred on October 25, November 7 and 10, and December 5, 14, and 18, 1998; and, in consideration thereof, subrogates respondent to the claims of
_______________ 3 Records, p. 10.

347

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 347 2012 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company Genosi, Inc. to the extent of the said amount. Respondent then made demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused to pay the said amount. Hence, on October 28, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages4 against petitioner before the trial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95561, entitledKemper Insurance Company v. Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. Respondent alleged that despite repeated demands to pay and settle the total amount of US$64,492.58, representing the value of the loss, petitioner failed and refused to pay the same, thereby causing damage and prejudice to respondent in the amount of US$64,492.58; that the loss and damage it sustained was due to the fault and negligence of petitioner, specifically, the fluctuations in the temperature of the reefer container beyond the required setting which was caused by the breakdown in the electronics controller assembly; that due to the unjustified failure and refusal to pay its just and valid claims,

petitioner should be held liable to pay interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of demand; and that due to the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to pay the said amount, it was compelled to engage the services of a counsel whom it agreed to pay 25% of the whole amount due as attorneys fees. Respondent prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered in its favor and that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of US$64,492.58, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the prevailing foreign exchange rate, or a total of P2,594,513.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of demand, 25% of the whole amount due as attorneys fees, and costs. In its Answer5 dated November 29, 1999, petitioner insisted, among others, that respondent had no capacity to sue since it was doing business in the Philippines without the required license; that the complaint has prescribed and/or is
_______________ 4 Id., at pp. 1-4. 5 Id., at pp. 13-19.

348

348

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company barred by laches; that no timely claim was filed; that the loss or damage sustained by the shipments, if any, was due to causes beyond the carriers control and was due to the inherent nature or insufficient packing of the shipments and/or fault of the consignee or the hired stevedores or arrastre operator or the fault of persons whose acts or omissions cannot be the basis of liability of the carrier; and that the subject shipment was discharged under required temperature and was complete, sealed, and in good order condition. During the pre-trial proceedings, respondents counsel proffered and marked its exhibits, while petitioners counsel manifested that he would mark his clients exhibits on the next scheduled pre-trial. However, on November 8, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,6contending that the same was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lats act of signing the certification against

forum shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court. In its Order7 dated March 22, 2002, the trial court granted petitioners Motion to Dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice, ruling that it is mandatory that the certification must be executed by the petitioner himself, and not by counsel. Since respondents counsel did not have a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to act on its behalf, hence, the certification against forum shopping executed by said counsel was fatally defective and constituted a valid cause for dismissal of the complaint. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration8 was denied by the trial court in an Order9 dated July 9, 2002.
_______________ 6 Id., at pp. 119-122. 7 Id., at pp. 141-142. 8 Id., at pp. 145-147. 9 Id., at pp. 171-172.

349

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 349 2012 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company On appeal by respondent, the CA, in its Decision 10dated March 23, 2007, reversed and set aside the trial courts order. The CA ruled that the required certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the same must be signed by the plaintiff or principal party concerned and not by counsel; and in case of corporations, the physical act of signing may be performed in behalf of the corporate entity by specifically authorized individuals. However, the CA pointed out that the factual circumstances of the case warranted the liberal application of the rules and, as such, ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration11 was later denied by the CA in the Resolution12 dated September 3, 2007. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court viaPetition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT ATTY. RODOLFO LAT WAS PROPERLY AUTHORIZED BY THE RESPONDENT TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT:

THE PERSON WHO EXECUTED THE SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY (SPA) APPOINTING ATTY. LAT AS RESPONDENTS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT WAS MERELY AN UNDERWRITER OF THE RESPONDENT WHO HAS NOT SHOWN PROOF THAT HE WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF RESPONDENT TO DO SO. A) THE POWERS GRANTED TO ATTY. LAT REFER TO [THE AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT DURING THE] PRE-TRIAL [STAGE] AND DO NOT COVER THE SPECIFIC POWER TO SIGN THE CERTIFICATE.
_______________ 10 CA Rollo, pp. 74-81. 11 Id., at pp. 86-95. 12 Id., at pp. 105-106. 13 Rollo, p. 15.

B)13

350

350

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company Petitioner alleged that respondent failed to submit any board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing Atty. Lat to institute the complaint and sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on its behalf. Petitioner submits that since respondent is a juridical entity, the signatory in the complaint must show proof of his or her authority to sign on behalf of the corporation. Further, the SPA14 dated May 11, 2000, submitted by Atty. Lat, which was notarized before the Consulate General of Chicago, Illinois, USA, allegedly authorizing him to represent respondent in the pre-trial and other stages of the proceedings was signed by one Brent Healy (respondents underwriter), who lacks authorization from its board of directors. In its Comment, respondent admitted that it failed to attach in the complaint a concrete proof of Atty. Lats authority to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping on its behalf. However, there was subsequent compliance as respondent submitted an authenticated SPA empowering Atty. Lat to represent it in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings. Further, it averred that petitioner is barred by laches from questioning the purported defect in respondents certificate of non-forum shopping.

The main issue in this case is whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the certification against forum shopping on its behalf. The petition is meritorious. We have consistently held that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties.15 If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the
_______________ 14 Records, pp. 148-149. 15 Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 156905, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 343, 351;Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 147217, October 7, 2004, 440 SCRA 200, 205.

351

VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 351 2012 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. 16 With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. 17 A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.18 In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP),19 we ruled that only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. We also required proof of such authority to be presented. The petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatorys authority.

In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the complaint will
_______________ 16 Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010, 616 SCRA 116, 132. 17 Athena Computers, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 156905, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 343, 351. 18 Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 491, 498. 19 G.R. No. 143088, January 24, 2006, 479 SCRA 605, 608.

352

352

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company have to be dismissed.20 The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. 21 The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.22
_______________ 20 Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158397, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 509, 520-521. 21 Section 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute

indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis supplied.) 22 Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc. ,supra note 18, at p. 499.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 353 2012 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondents complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages (Civil Case No. 99-95561) against petitioner. In Republic v. Coalbrine International Philippines, Inc.,23 the Court cited instances wherein the lack of authority of the person making the certification of non-forum shopping was remedied through subsequent compliance by the parties therein. Thus,
[w]hile there were instances where we have allowed the filing of a certification against non-forum shopping by someone on behalf of a corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time of its filing, we did so on the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a subsequent compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the person who signed the certification was duly authorized. In China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc. , the CA dismissed the petition filed by China Bank, since the latter failed to show that its bank manager who signed the certification against non-forum shopping was authorized to do so. We reversed the CA and said that the case be decided on the merits despite the failure to attach the required proof of authority, since the board resolution which was subsequently attached recognized the pre-existing status of the bank manager as an authorized signatory. In Abaya Investments Corporation v. Merit Philippines, where the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila was instituted by petitioners Chairman and President, Ofelia Abaya, who signed the verification and certification against non-forum shopping without proof of authority to sign for the corporation, we also relaxed the rule. We did so

taking into consideration the merits of the case and to avoid a re-litigation of the issues and further delay the administration of justice, since the case had already been de_______________ 23 Supra note 18. 354

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company

cided by the lower courts on the merits. Moreover, Abayas authority to sign the certification was ratified by the Board. 24

Contrary to the CAs finding, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case do not necessitate the relaxation of the rules. There was no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly, to show subsequent compliance with the requirement of the law. Neither was there a copy of the board resolution or secretarys certificate subsequently submitted to the trial court that would attest to the fact that Atty. Lat was indeed authorized to file said complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, nor did respondent satisfactorily explain why it failed to comply with the rules. Thus, there exists no cogent reason for the relaxation of the rule on this matter. Obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.25 Moreover, the SPA dated May 11, 2000, submitted by respondent allegedly authorizing Atty. Lat to appear on behalf of the corporation, in the pre-trial and all stages of the proceedings, signed by Brent Healy, was fatally defective and had no evidentiary value. It failed to establish Healys authority to act in behalf of respondent, in view of the absence of a resolution from respondents board of directors or secretarys certificate proving the same. Like any other corporate act, the power of Healy to name, constitute, and appoint Atty. Lat as respondents attorney-in-fact, with full powers to represent respondent in the proceedings, should have been evidenced by a board resolution or secretarys certificate. Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped by laches from raising the defect in respondents certificate of non-forum shopping does not hold water.
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24 Id., at pp. 500-501. (Citations omitted.) 25 Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623, 631.

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VOL. 670, APRIL 23, 355 2012 Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,26 we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.27Accordingly, since Atty. Lat was not duly authorized by respondent to file the complaint and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping, the complaint is considered not filed and ineffectual, and, as a necessary consequence, is dismissable due to lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice; that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the courts jurisdiction.28Clearly, since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC, Branch 8, Manila, the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of respondent. Since the court has no jurisdiction over the complaint and respondent, petitioner is not estopped from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or byestoppel.29
_______________ 26 Supra note 20, cited inNegros Merchant's Enterprises, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation , G.R. No. 150918, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 478, 487. 27 Id., at p. 519. 28 Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte. Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation , G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 170, 186. 29 Figueroa v. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 63, 81.

356

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company In Regalado v. Go,30 the Court held that laches should be clearly present for theSibonghanoy31 doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated inTijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case . In such controversies,laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quoas well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.32

The factual setting attendant in Sibonghanoy is not similar to that of the present case so as to make it fall under the doctrine ofestoppel by laches. Here, the trial courts jurisdiction
_______________ 30 G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616. 31 In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968), the Court held that a party may be barred by laches from invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea of lack of jurisdiction. 32 Id., at pp. 635-636.

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Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc. vs. Kemper Insurance Company was questioned by the petitioner during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated March 23, 2007 and September 3, 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75895 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, dated March 22, 2002 and July 9, 2002, respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-95561, are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Notes.The power to institute actions necessarily includes the power to execute the verification and certification against forum shopping required in initiatory pleadings. (Cunanan vs. Jumping Jap Trading Corporation, 586 SCRA 620 [2009]) As to the certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof. ( Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Heirs of Estanislao Mioza , 641 SCRA 520 [2011]) o0o