Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
-Laissez Faire!,
Leo T. Magnificent
Preface to the Essays
These are the premises or doctrines of Post-
Objectivism. You must observe them or else you will
be assimilated. Resistance is optional.
1. RAND IS ALPHA, NOT OMEGA.
Ayn Rand was a genius, but she is a starting point, a platform, not the final word.
5. TO KNOW IS TO CONNECT.
The most important work to be done today, is to compare Rand with other thinkers: to connect her with
the history of thought, and to broaden and deepen not her, but our philosophy.
History of ideas should be considered mandatory reading by all Randian and Objectivist thinkers, and
should be approached with a "gold-digger" attitude, not a horror file-attitude.
-Thomas Gramstad
POP culture
Premises Of Post-Objectivism
INDEX TO POST-OBJECTIVISM
1. ABORTION
2. ANARCHISM/MINIMUM STATE
RELIGION
4. FEMINISM
CONDITIONS
6. OBJECTIVISM AS A MOVEMENT AND
LIVING PHILOSOPHY
7. TECHNOSOPHY & TECHNOCULTURE
UTOPIA
9. MISCELLANEOUS
Chapter 1
ABORTION
ANOTHER LOOK AT ABORTION
A response to Tibor Machan
Copyright Thomas Gramstad
Full Context Vol. 11, No. 7 (October 1999)
Tibor Machan in his Another Look at Abortion in Full Context Vol. 11, No. 6 (July/August 1999) writes
that "The main issue involved in the abortion debate is the time at which a human being come into
existence." Not so. The main issue is the sovereignty of self, the most intimate and fundamental of
all individual rights: the right to control one's own body. Noone has the right to access, use or
dispose one's body against one's will. Therefore it makes no difference what a fetus is - body part,
potential human, individual person, god or goddess - none of these have any right to invade a
human's body against its owner's will, because there is no such right. The nature of the fetus is
irrelevant to the woman's right to abortion. She has the right to evict it at any time during
pregnancy, for the same reason and in the same way that she has the right to end an intercourse
at any point of its execution.
The morality of abortion may indeed be affected by conclusions about the nature and moral status of
the fetus. But Machan was adressing the issue of abortion rights, not abortion morals.
Also, Machan refers repeatedly to the need for "a stable approach" in the face of "cultural diversity".
But a stable approach in such cases is to allow the full range and bloom of individual choices - and not
enforcing one group's views on everyone, as any legally enforced time limit on abortion does. Those
who are against abortion should abstain from having any. They do not have the right to force other
people to give birth. They do not even have the right to force anyone to hear their case, even that
requires the recipient's consent.
A fetus becomes a human when it is born, when it becomes an individual. It would be
meaningless and self-contradictory to talk about a human or a person who is not an individual.
Some would say that a newborn is not a human because it lacks a conceptual consciousness and/or a
self-concept. But these things develop gradually and there is no specific point in time where they
suddenly appear and establish themselves. Therefore prudence requires that individual rights are
acknowledged at the earliest point in time they could possibly be of relevance or come into being,
which is at birth or very shortly thereafter. Since a fetus is not an individual it cannot and does not
have individual rights.
If the fetus were an individual, it would, as I noted, still not have the right to exploit anyone's body
against their will, because noone has such a right. An individual's right to her- or himself cannot be
superseded or suspended by any other concern. Indeed, when a fetus is allowed to do this on the
pretext that it is an individual, the fetus becomes the moral equivalent of a rapist, and those who allow
the fetus to acquire this status are accomplices to rape - a long, continuous rape of nine months.
Since the fetus is a body part, and not an individual, and has no will (nor anything else) of its own, it
can of course not really be a rapist. But this illustrates the absurd premises and logic of the socalled
"pro-life" position.
I will close with a recommendation of the Rand-and-abortion mailing list, a forum for discussing
ethical, social, political and other aspects of abortion, from a basis of Ayn Rand's philosophy. See http://
www.egroups.com/subscribe/rand-and-abortion for further information.
See also:
A guide to individualist abortion resources
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/abortion-links.html
1. PRIVACY CONCERNS
The woman might want to be certain that noone comes knocking at her door some day in the future,
disrupting her personal life with claims about being her biological son/daughter, wanting to know about
her and her life, why she had an abortion etc.
In order to address this need, the anti-abortionist might support laws that protect privacy, and point out
to the pregnant woman how their anti-abortionist group have supported such rights. Still, private
investigators have a lot of techniques for finding people; usually someone will succeed in finding their
biological parents if they really want to. The anti-abortionist could then explain about how the anti-
abortionist group will (1) offer the offspring to join their free-of-charge "abortion surviver" support
group, (2) assist the offspring finding professional psychological help if necessary, and (3) if worst
comes to worst, provide free legal counsel and other help if the abort-seeking woman were ever stalked
or harassed by the offspring. Surely anti-abortionists would work together in order to be able to offer
all these things, if they are serious about protecting the "little people" from death. This certainly must
be a more constructive and satisfying activity than today's political struggle, and demonstrations and
badgering in front of abortion clinics.
Still, destruction would preempt a lot of potential problems for the abortion-seeker, wouldn't it?
So then the anti-abortionists may pull the ace from their sleeve: "If you agree to a cryo-preservation,
free-of-charge, we guarantee you, and you will have this in a legally binding contract, that the embryo
or fetus will not be reawakened in your lifetime. For you, that is indistinguishable from destruction. For
us, it is a life saved."
2. RESOURCES
Abortion Is Pro-life
(A web site with articles and resources presenting the moral case for abortion along Objectivist lines
first developed by Ayn Rand)
http://www.abortionisprolife.com/
Alstad, Diana & Kramer, Joel: Abortion as a Moral Act
http://www.rit.org/editorials/abortion/morality.html
Alstad, Diana: Abortion and the Morality Wars: Taking the Moral Offensive
http://www.rit.org/editorials/abortion/moralwar.html
Alstad, Diana: Teen Abortion: Requiring Parental Consent Makes No Sense
http://www.rit.org/editorials/abortion/teen.html
Anarchism and the Fight For Abortion Rights
(An anarchosocialist compilation of articles about women's right to choose)
http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/abortion_wsm.html
Ayn Rand Institute: What was Ayn Rand's view on abortion?
http://www.aynrand.org/faq/faq_objectivism.shtml#5
Bissell, Roger: Thoughts on Abortion and Child-Support
(Self-described as a "craven middle-of-the-road" position avoiding the extreme ends of the
spectrum! :-)
http://hometown.aol.com/REBissell/mmAbortion81.html
Dykes, Nicholas: Context, Responsibility and Law
A response to Will Thomas' Navigator article
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/abortion-context.html
Gramstad, Thomas: Another Look at Abortion
A response to Tibor Machan's Full Context article
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/abortion-machanreply.html
Gramstad, Thomas: Can Cryopreservation Solve "The Abortion Problem"?
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/cryobortion.html
King, David: Abortion From chapter 6 of his webpublished book, A Guide to the Philosophy of
Objectivism
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Olympus/7695/CHAPTR06.HTM#86
Lawrence University Students of Objectivism: Does a Woman Have a Right to an Abortion?
(Compares the conservative approach vs. the liberal approach vs. the Objectivist approach)
http://www.lawrence.edu/sorg/objectivism/abortion.html
McElroy, Wendy: Abortion
Self-ownership vs. mandatory motherhood
http://www.zetetics.com/mac/abort.htm
McElroy, Wendy: The Abortion Debate that Wasn't
Pro-choicers must not be afraid to make the moral case for abortion
http://www.ifeminists.com/introduction/editorials/2001/0424.html
The officers of The Association for Objective Law:
Abortion: An Absolute Right
http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/absolute.html
O'Neill, Bill: Barricade: the Only Moral Common Ground for Abortion Rights
(Conception is neither the beginning of an individual nor of life, and there can be no common ground
with those who seek authoritarianism and blind obedience.)
http://www.freeworldtrading.com/Reason/pages/fundamentalsarticles/barricade.htm
O'Neill, Bill: Modern Demons
(An impassioned delivery about the pro-life movement as promoting slavery, why offering adoption is
evil, and about the Religious Right, the Catholic Church, and the UN as propagators of irrational ideas)
http://www.freeworldtrading.com/Reason/pages/fundamentalsarticles/moderndemons.htm
Peikoff, Leonard: Abortion Rights Are Pro-Life
http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/prolife.html
The Rand & abortion mailing list:
http://www.egroups.com/subscribe/rand-and-abortion
Ray, Carolyn: Potentiality Arguments
(The first part of a series of caro thinks journal entries on abortion)
http://www.supersaturated.com/journal/caro/2001_08_10:17:34Potentiality+Arguments.html
Stubblefield, Robert J.: Infants, Fetuses, and the Right to Life
http://www.intellectualactivist.com/tia/articles_new/iammo_abortion.html
Thomas, Will: Debate Topic: Abortion
http://ios.org/debates/DebAbor1.htm
Watkins III, Don: Abortion Is A Moral Right
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Oracle/9035/abort.html
Woiceshyn, Glenn: The "Partial-Birth" Smokescreen:
Anti-Abortionists Are Anti-Life and Want to Stop All Abortions
http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/reprint_sample.txt
ANARCHISM/MINIMUM STATE
INTRODUCTION
In November, 1997, the Internet discussion group "Objectivism L", co-ordinated by Kirez Korgan at
Cornell, began a "Great Anarcho-Capitalist Debate" with the intention of thoroughly airing, if not
necessarily deciding, the issue of whether a government is necessary to protect individual rights.
Participants in the debate included well-known Libertarian or Objectivist personalities such as George
H. Smith, David Friedman, David Ross and Chris Sciabarra.(1)
Naturally enough, the ideas of Ayn Rand featured extensively in the discussions, and since it could be
claimed that Rand started the debate back in the Sixties, I thought it might be timely to take a close
look at her thinking about government. Another reason for doing so is the current upsurge of interest in
Rand's work, highlighted recently by an Oscar nomination for the documentary Ayn Rand: A Sense of
Life. This last, by all accounts - I have not seen it - presents Rand's thought as totally consistent.
Because I dispute that view, and because I now hold that government is not necessary to protect rights,
my 'close look' amounts to a fairly detailed critique.
Several of the topics I cover will be familiar to most Libertarians, and/or Objectivists, they may even
be 'old hat.' However, I have not seen them discussed alongside my other material and, as my essay
would be incomplete without them, I thought they should be included. Other issues covered here I have
either not seen elsewhere, or have not seen directed at Rand, so I hope there will be enough original
observations in these pages to compensate for the familiar ones.
In concentrating my fire on Rand, I am very conscious that other thinkers, some of whom she inspired,
have put the case for limited government - or have advanced arguments against anarchism - far more
extensively, persuasively or learnedly than Rand herself. I think particularly of John Hospers, Robert
Nozick and Tibor Machan. However, it is not my intention to be exhaustive. Rand remains the prime
source for one side of the anarchy/minarchy debate and much of what I say in criticism of her may be
applied equally to any proposal for monopoly government, whoever advances it. Besides, the authors
just mentioned deserve far more attention than I could give them in an essay of this length.(2)
A note on semantics: I use 'force' to mean initiated violence or the threat of it. By 'state' I mean a
permanent institution, by 'government' its current personnel; but I tend to use the terms interchangeably
to refer to any group of people claiming exclusive authority to make and enforce rules of conduct in a
given geographical area. 'Monopoly' refers to activities made exclusive by state-initiated force.
Finally, my criticism of Ayn Rand implies no disrespect. Despite some reservations, I still think her
novels and philosophy are magnificent achievements.
B. Gang Warfare?
Rand maintained, with Hobbes,(31) that the absence of a government monopoly on force would
precipitate gang warfare: "a society without an organised government would be at the mercy of the first
criminal who came along and who would precipitate it into the chaos of gang warfare" [VOS 112]. Yet
the historical and ethnographic record, much of it published before or during Rand's intellectual
lifetime, belies this assumption emphatically.
While a single negative instance suffices to invalidate a universal affirmative proposition, there are
literally thousands of examples of societies the world over - from primitive forest dwellers to miners in
the Old West - all of whom recognised individual rights and worked out methods for protecting them,
and for resolving disputes, without recourse either to gang warfare or to monopoly government.
What these societies had in common was customary law: voluntary, usually unwritten codes which
evolved over time through trial and error, yet which were willingly and near universally obeyed, often
for centuries on end, because they were practical, and because it was in every individual's self-interest
to do so. Let us look briefly at some examples.
Herbert Spencer told us, for instance, about the "utterly uncivilized Wood Veddahs" on the island of
Ceylon, who were "without any social organisation at all," yet who thought it "perfectly inconceivable
that any person should ever take what doesn't belong to him, or strike his fellow, or say anything that is
untrue."(32)
In the Americas, French ethnographer Pierre Clastres has pointed to the great personal freedom and
contentment of the stateless aborigines who, when one peels away the European prejudice that saw
them as primitive, were actually healthier, wealthier and in many ways wiser than those who conquered
or annihilated them. For example, according to Clastres, the mutilation that marked entry into manhood
in many tribes was deliberately devised to prevent the development of tyranny: "Archaic societies,
societies of the mark, are societies without a State, societies against the State. The mark on the body
[mutilation scars], on all bodies alike, declares: You will not have the desire for power; you will not
have the desire for submission..."(33)
In Europe and the Middle East, Rose Wilder Lane has reminded us (even if she does exaggerate a bit)
that while Europeans were enduring the 'Dark Ages,' a great Moorish civilization stretched in a shining
crescent around the Mediterranean; largely anarchical - there was no state provision of justice or
policing - yet educated, scientific, clean, healthy, free and prosperous for nearly a millennium.(34) It
was the Moors, or Saracens, who introduced modern Europe to Aristotle, and also to astronomy,
modern medicine, geography and other sciences.
David Friedman has shown us the freedom-loving and - the sagas notwithstanding - usually peaceful
Icelanders, who lived on their isolated island in complete anarchy for centuries until overwhelmed by
the Norwegian state.(35)
Murray Rothbard drew our attention to medieval Ireland, "a highly complex society... the most
advanced, most scholarly, and most civilized in all of Western Europe" where there was "no trace of
State-administered justice" and where customary law held sway for 1000 years, until destroyed by the
English state.(36)
Coming closer to our own times, Bruce Benson has reported on recent studies of the American 'Wild
West' which show that its supposed 'lawlessness' before the arrival of government was in fact the
opposite: "some long-cherished notions about violence, lawlessness and justice in the Old West ... are
nothing more than myth."(37) Most Westerners were far too busy trying to survive or get rich to be
fighting each other.
What the 'Wild West' more often provided were examples of the spontaneous generation of customary
law: universally accepted, efficient, cheap, and usually a lot more just than the state law which
eventually superseded it. Far from lawless, Western settlers, ranchers and miners were as law-abiding
as any people in history: "Doors were not locked."(38) Here again, the heart of the matter was simple
self-interest. In the trenchant words of Eric Hoffer: "Those who have something worth fighting for, do
not want to fight."(39)
Dr Benson also pointed to marked likenesses between the customary law of primitive societies and that
of early medieval Europe. He refers, for example to the Kapauku of New Guinea, who were described
by an anthropologist in the 1950s. Like all 'primitive' societies the Kapauku had no government, yet
enjoyed a thriving culture based on individual rights. Protection was provided by kinship groups, and
arbitration by competing judges called tonowi.(40) The similarity between the customary, state-less law
of the Kapauku and that of Anglo-Saxon England is striking.(41)
Much may also be learned from the northern Iroquoian peoples, some of whose descendants lived on
Rand's doorstep in New York State. The Seneca, Mohawk and their confederates, and the Hurons in
Ontario, had existed as cohesive societies without government for centuries prior to the arrival of
Europeans. Their secret was a true freedom involving genuine equality and consent. Among the Huron,
"No man could be expected to be bound by a decision to which he had not willingly given his
consent."(42) Among Iroquoians generally, "The implementation of the decisions of ... councils
required securing the consent of all those involved, since no Iroquoian had the right to commit another
to a course of action against his will." Far from a war of all against all, Iroquoian society was
characterised by "a respect for individual dignity and a sense of self-reliance, which resulted in
individuals rarely quarrelling openly with one another." It was also marked by "politeness and
hospitality to fellow villagers and to strangers" and by "the kindness and respect they showed towards
children."(43)
Even Jesuit missionaries, who were appalled by various aspects of Huron life, such as their sexual
'licence,' freely acknowledged the cooperativeness and tranquillity of Huron communities - in which
thousands of people lived closely together in conditions of considerable discomfort. Jean Brébeuf SJ,
for example, writing in the 1640s, commented at length on the "love and unity" that existed among the
Hurons and "their kindness towards each other" even in times of great stress.(44) A hundred years later,
Pierre Charlevoix SJ confirmed the "harmony" which characterised the domestic and community life of
the many interior tribes he visited.(45)
It is true that the Iroquoians engaged in constant inter-tribal warfare, but this was waged for vengeance,
prestige and to obtain victims for sacrifice, not for conquest. Their wars were thus quite unlike
European wars, which were launched for territorial gain and for the exploitation of subject peoples. The
origins of most Iroquoian conflicts were ancient blood feuds, but the futility of these had become well
recognised. The main purposes of Huron confederacy councils were to "prevent disputes between
members of different [Huron] tribes from disrupting ... unity" and to "maintain friendly relations with
tribes with whom the Huron traded." The Huron were well aware that "no tribal organisation and no
confederacy could survive if internal blood feuds went unchecked. One of the basic functions of the
confederacy was to eliminate such feuds ... indeed, between Huron, they were regarded as a more
reprehensible crime than murder itself."(46)
The above evidence shows that it is simply not true to assert that in the absence of a state, internecine
conflict immediately breaks out. What the historical and anthropological records actually reveal -
anticipating the computer studies of Robert Axelrod - is that when people are left to their own devices
what emerges is not a Hobbesian war of all against all, but cooperation.(47)
C. Objective Law
The most crucial aspect of the case for monopoly government as advanced by Ayn Rand, is the
assertion or implication that objective law is not possible without it. Since anybody ruled by law must
desire their master to be non-arbitrary, just, and impartial - i.e. objective - plainly the assertion that
objective law can only be created by a monopoly government is going to carry great weight.
Yet the assertion is false. We have just seen compelling evidence that objective law can and does arise
without government. Just as 'spontaneous order' arises in economic life, so spontaneous or 'customary'
law arises in social life. But there is nothing subjective about customary law. It is every bit as objective
as the products of legislatures.
Another compelling example cited by Bruce Benson is the Law Merchant of medieval commerce. This
arose spontaneously to facilitate trade when Europe was emerging from the 'Dark Ages' and still forms
the bedrock of modern commercial law. The Lex mercatoria was private, created by the merchants
themselves, yet was universal, being recognised all over Europe and beyond. It was extremely efficient
and cheap to run, and had its own courts with their own rapid and informal procedures. Rulings were
followed without question because the judges were merchants themselves - who knew intimately what
plaintiff and defendant were arguing about. Besides, it was in the interest of the courts and everybody
else that judgments be reasonable and just.
A defendant was of course free to ignore an unfavorable ruling, the court had no power to enforce. But
to outlaw oneself in this manner was to put oneself out of business, for nobody traded with merchants
who disrespected the merchants' own law. Compliance was thus achieved without coercion, perhaps the
most vital lesson the Law Merchant has to teach.
The Law Merchant's success was due to its objectivity. It was simple, clear, confined to essentials and,
its raison d'être, was a practical requirement of trade. It arose because merchants needed independent
arbitration, and continued because it performed that service efficiently. Yet it was created and sustained
voluntarily - without any involvement from government - and functioned effectively for centuries
without costing a penny in tax. Although later submerged in most countries by the growing power of
the state, the Law Merchant lives on today in the underlying principles of the (non-state) law which
guides international trade.
The history of the Law Merchant demolishes the notion that state-created law is a prerequisite for the
free market. Prior to 1600 or so, commercial and contract law was entirely private - and vastly cheaper
and more efficient for being so. In Bruce Benson's words, the spontaneous generation of the Law
Merchant "shatters the myth that government must define and enforce 'the rules of the game'."(48)
Equally, the well-documented existence of customary law societies all over the world - in which law-
generation, policing and justice were carried out effectively without government - shatters the myth
that only state monopolies can create objective law.
It might be objected that I am relying on work published after Rand's death and hence am being
completely unfair. That would only be true if Bruce Benson's book were the sole source for such
material, which is not the case. Spencer, Spooner, Oppenheimer, Nock, Lane and other critics of the
state all wrote long before Rand composed her essay on government. (Spencer's The Man versus the
State was actually 'recommended reading' at the Nathaniel Branden Institute, which promoted Rand's
ideas, with her approval, until 1968.) Similarly, students of customary law such as Friedman, Rothbard
and the Tannehills, and anthropologists such as Clastres and Trigger, all published their work well prior
to Rand's retirement from active intellectual life. She could have been, and should have been, better
informed.
Furthermore, Rand studied history in St Petersburg, and must surely have known of the medieval
Hanseatic League, which dominated trade in the Baltic, and whose trading was governed by private
mercantile law. She must also have studied the transition in Europe from customary to authoritarian law
which occurred from the 10th Century onwards. The medieval era has always been important in the
history syllabus and would have been particularly so in Russia under the Soviets, the rise and fall of
feudalism being integral to the Marxist thesis.
To conclude this section, it must also be averred that the historical record hardly supports the
contention that monopoly government does produce objective law. Whether one thinks of John Locke's
strictures on 17th Century lawyers; or the spurious 18th Century doctrine of the Sovereignty of
Parliament; or the despairing 19th Century cry "The law is an ass" immortalised by Dickens in Bleak
House; or the labyrinthine 6000 pages of the 20th Century 'IRS Code', the US tax law; or one of Rand's
own favourite targets - the manifestly unjust and self-contradictory US Anti-Trust Laws: history seems
rather to show that much, if not most, state-made law is and always has been the opposite of objective.
Nor is state-provided justice any better. One could cite a thousand examples of judicial perversity. But
just one will have to suffice here. In the 1997 Woodward v. Massachusetts case, Judge Hiller Zobel
approvingly quoted John Adams to the effect that the law is "inflexible, inexorable and deaf," then
informed the world: "evidence is evidence if the jurors believe it; what they choose not to believe is not
evidence."(49) I have not come across a better illustration of outright subjectivity entrenched in a state-
made legal system.
We can see from the above brief review that the basic problem with customary law is not any want of
objectivity, but rather the lack of objectivity of those who disparage or ignore it. Brought up in the
tradition that 'law is made by government', and swaddled from cradle to grave in state-made, fiat law,
supporters of monopoly government assume that objective law can only be made by government. As
Nock put it: "There appears to be a curious difficulty about exercising reflective thought upon the
actual nature of an institution into which one was born and one's ancestors were born."(50)
But in point of historical fact, government is a newcomer. Most laws of any true benefit in use today
are merely formalisations or logical extensions of customs or customary laws which existed long before
the legislatures which enacted the modern fiat versions.
Law was invented prior to government. The state has merely expropriated the law, and has only
gradually succeeded in creating the monopoly on law-making and law enforcement which it now
claims as its discovery and birthright.
POSTSCRIPT
Loyalty to Rand made reaching the above conclusion a long and hesitant process. My interest in
politics, my intellectual life itself, began with Rand, in 1963. But doubts about limited government
surfaced early. The first occurred when reading Thomas Jefferson at university. His emphasis on self
government seemed almost to preclude external forms of control. Rand's 'monopoly on the use of force'
also clashed with all those checks and balances I was learning about. Surely they were intended to
prevent monopoly?
Some years later, about 1970, while reading the journals of Samuel Champlain and other explorers of
North America, I was struck, as they were, by the great contentment of the aborigines, in most of whose
societies respect for individual rights thrived despite a complete absence of government. Anarchism
suddenly lost some of its anarchic connotations.
Later still, during the 1980s, in the course of devising a programme for limiting government in the UK,
I began to see more clearly the weaknesses of the minimal state position, particularly vis-à-vis its
monopoly status. However I wasn't yet ready to abandon 'minarchy,' so I sidestepped, or perhaps
evaded, my own acknowledgement of the logical strength of the anarchist case: "... if one is setting out
to control government, it must be admitted that the most effective method is to dispense with
government entirely."(64)
Then, in 1993, a friend, Kevin McFarlane, to whom I shall always be indebted, urged me to read
Morris and Linda Tannehill's The Market for Liberty. This, while highly abstract and at first sight not
fully convincing, did at least present a consistent argument for anarcho-capitalism which revived my
earlier doubts about limited government.
Kevin next lent me Bruce Benson's The Enterprise of Law. That remarkable book had something of the
effect that Rand had had on me thirty years before. Like Cortez in Keats's poem, I found myself staring
at a vast, new, apolitical horizon, my mind filled with the "wild surmise" that a stateless society might
indeed be possible - even in our complex modern world.
The last piece of the puzzle fell into place in 1995, when I heard about Murray Franck's essay on
taxation.(65) Startled to find an Objectivist in favour of taxes, I reread Ayn Rand's essay on
government. I was even more startled, and considerably dismayed, when I noticed for the first time the
flaws and empty spaces in her arguments.
Yet, so what? Rand's mentor Aristotle said, "one swallow does not make a summer,"(66) and even a
whole flight of errors in one branch of knowledge says nothing about a philosopher's work in others.
Aristotle made some pretty fair blunders himself; eg, over women, slavery, evolution and astronomy.
We might have been on Andromeda by now if he hadn't. But he was still the greatest of the great
philosophers. Rand's errors in politics do nothing to invalidate the rest of Objectivism, which in my
judgment remains solid: it works; both as a guide for living and - though far from complete -
technically as a philosophy, especially in its logical integrity.
Nonetheless, everything I have read since 1993 - when the Tannehills and Bruce Benson jolted me out
of my dogmatic slumbers- and all the facts and arguments presented in this paper, have convinced me
that for its logical structure to be sustained from start to finish, the political destination of Objectivism
must be sought not among the archives and marble monuments of the District of Columbia, but in the
ideal, yet-to-be-realised world of Galt 's Gulch.
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Nicholas Dykes is a British-Canadian writer currently living in England. He is the author of Fed up
with Government?, the manifesto for a putative British 'Libertarian Party,' and of A Tangled Web of
Guesses, a critical assessment of the philosophy of Karl Popper. Anybody wishing to discuss aspects of
this paper privately can reach Nicholas at: oldnick@wbsnet.co.uk
***************************************************************************
NOTES
1. I am grateful to Roger Donway of The Objectivist Centre (formerly The Institute for Objectivist
Studies) who kept me informed of the debate despite disagreement with my views. Since I refer only
briefly to Objectivism L, I should point out that the arguments in this essay were developed before their
debate began. Also, I followed only the first month, during which postings focussed on topics I do not
address.
2. John Hospers, Libertarianism (Santa Barbara: Reason Press, 1971), p. 417ff, and Anarchy or Limited
Government? (San Francisco: Gutenberg, 1976); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1990), "the minimal state is inspiring as well as right," p. ix; Tibor Machan, Human Rights
and Human Liberties (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975) and Individuals and Their Rights (Lasalle, Ill:
Open Court, 1989). For unpersuasive discussions of anarchy v. minarchy see Leonard Peikoff,
Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York: Dutton, 1991), Ch. 10, and Robert James
Bidinotto "The Contradiction in Anarchism," Full Context (Objectivist Club of Michigan, Troy,
Michigan), May & June 1994.
3. See Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness [VOS] (New York: New American Library, 1968). Numbers
in brackets refer to the current paperback edition.
4. A view shared by many 'right-wing' contemporaries. Cf Rose Wilder Lane, The Discovery of
Freedom (San Francisco: Laissez-Faire Books, 1984), pp. 201 & 204; and Leonard E. Read,
Government: An Ideal Concept (1954), passim.
5. Ayn Rand, "Textbook of Americanism" in Harry Binswanger, The Ayn Rand Lexicon (New York:
Meridian, 1986), p. 211.
6. "Objectivism and the State: An Open Letter to Ayn Rand"; Liberty against Power: Essays by Roy A.
Childs, Jr (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1994), p. 146; original in italics. Childs' essay was followed
in 1970 by two brilliant treatises on anarchism, Morris and Linda Tannehill's The Market for Liberty
and Murray Rothbard's Power and Market.
7. I have not been able to find Rand's reaction to Childs' letter, but I have a distinct recollection of
reading it, I think in The Objectivist, c.1968.
8. 23 October 1997; quoted with permission. Ronald Merrill's early death saddened me greatly. He was
a sharp thinker and an entertaining writer whose book The Ideas of Ayn Rand (Lasalle, Ill: Open Court,
1991) helped me to develop a more critical approach to Rand.
9. Chris Tame, Director of the UK Libertarian Alliance, informs me that no advocate of anarcho-
capitalism has referred to 'competing governments'. Since the phrase is confusing and self-
contradictory, Rand may have employed it to disparage.
10. Rand's rejection of anarchism may stem from experiences during the collapse of Czarist Russia.
She often went in fear of her life, and at age 13 was robbed in the dark at gunpoint by a bandit gang.
See Barbara Branden, The Passion of Ayn Rand (New York: Doubleday, 1986), p. 30.
11. Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism, op cit, p. 371ff.
12. Rand's 1960s nickname in New York Objectivist circles.
13. In his great work Social Statics (1850), ch. XIX.
14. Lysander Spooner, No Treason, James J. Martin Ed. (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1973), p. 14.
15. Ibid, p. 14, note 2.
16. Cf Hospers, Libertarianism, op cit, p. 14.
17. I owe this point to George H. Smith. See his excellent "Introduction" to Oppenheimer's The State,
loc cit, p. xix.
18. "Gentlemen, Leave Your Guns Outside," Full Context, April, 1997. Saint-André also noted,
correctly: "A fully consistent Objectivist theory of government remains to be developed."
19. Second Treatise, Ch 3, 18-19.
20. The Journals of Ayn Rand, David Hariman, Ed. (New York: Dutton, 1997), p. 73.
21. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 1, Ch 4, 1095b 6.
22. Herbert Spencer, The Man Versus The State (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1969), p. 112.
23. Franz Oppenheimer, The State (San Francisco: Fox & Wilkes, 1997), p.9.
24. Albert Jay Nock, Our Enemy the State (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1950), p. 44.
25. Cf Rand: "A government is an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of
social conduct in a given geographical area" [VOS 107]. Note that the italics are Rand's.
26. Tom Paine, Common Sense (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1976), p. 78.
27. I owe this point to George H. Smith, "Introduction," Oppenheimer, op cit, p. xvii.
28. Ibid.
29. Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1971), passim.
30. George H. Smith, "Introduction," Oppenheimer, op cit,, pp. xx-xxi.
31. "Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in
awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man, against every
man .... In such condition there is no place for industry ... no culture of the earth ... no arts; no letters;
no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man,
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited by Michael Oakeshott
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1946), p. 82.
32. The Man versus the State, op cit, p. 173.
33. Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, Robert Hurley trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), p. 157,
italics in original.
34. The Discovery of Freedom, op cit, p. 82ff; she noted Hebrew anarchy too.
35. David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom (New Rochelle NY: Arlington House, 1973),
Appendix to 3rd Edn. R. J. Bidinotto, op cit, scorns Icelandic anarchism for being unable to resist
Norwegian invasion, a criticism which implies might is right. Bill Stoddard (objectivisml@cornell.edu,
18 Dec 1997) argues that medieval Iceland's court system was in fact a monopoly and thus the island
did have a state, albeit minimal. This may overlook the fact that sole suppliers arise naturally under
freedom, the most able supplier winning the competition for the consumers' favour. (Eg, as has
happened with many other standards, the simplicity of the metric system is gradually eliminating
British Imperial measure.) There is every reason to believe that in a completely free society, there
would eventually be one code of justice, worldwide. The Law Merchant has already shown the way.
36. Murray Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New York: Libertarian Review Foundation, 1978), p. 231.
37. Bruce Benson, quoting Dr Roger McGrath; The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State (San
Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1990), p. 312.
38. Ibid, p. 313.
39. In The True Believer (1951).
40. The Enterprise of Law, op cit, p. 15ff.
41. Ibid, p. 21.
42. Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aatensic: A History of the Huron people to 1660 (Kingston,
Ontario, and Montréal, Québec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1976, 1987), p. 54.
43. Ibid, pp. 102-4.
44. Bruce G. Trigger, The Huron: Farmers of the North, 2nd Edn (Montreal: Harcourt, 1990), p. 72.
45. Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's Heroic Age Reconsidered (Kingston and
Montreal: McGill-Queens, 1985), p. 24.
46. The Children of Aatensic, op cit, p. 59-60.
47. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (London: Penguin, 1990): "Finally, no central
authority is needed: co-operation based on reciprocity can be self-policing" p. 174. It is, in fact, the
history of government which is replete with gang warfare; a reality ignored by writers like R. J.
Bidinotto, op cit, who attempt to link anarchism to state-created evils such as the Mafia, civil war in
Bosnia, Ulster terrorism, or inner city street gangs. The forecast of chaos sans state is a clear case of
psychological 'projection.'
48. The Enterprise of Law, op cit, p. 30. One influential paper which argued this case-although written
when the author was still a student-is "The Necessity of Government" by David Kelley; The Freeman,
April 1974, p. 243-8.
49. Quoted in The Daily Telegraph (London, UK) 11 November 1997, p. 2.
50. Our Enemy the State, op cit, p. 30.
51. Thomas Sowell, Is Reality Optional? (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1993), p. 72.
52. The Discovery of Freedom, op cit, p. 42.
53. In The Man versus the State; quoted in Nock, op cit, pp. 53-4.
54. The Man Versus the State, op cit, p. 118.
55. I am indebted to Kevin McFarlane for the correction of an ambiguity at this point in an earlier draft.
US libertarian Sy Leon has made the point eloquently: "Some of the things done by government are
essential, but it is not essential that they be done by government." Quoted in a Laissez-Faire Books
catalogue. Reference lost.
56. The growth of human knowledge results in a tendency towards peace and cooperation. The
resurgence of the state since the Renaissance-in essence a rerun of the Roman Empire-has, and is,
stifling this trend.
57. An embellishment added by Leonard Peikoff; see Objectivism, op cit, p. 373.
58. I am indebted to George H. Smith for clarifying this point. See "Objectivism as a Religion," in
Atheism, Ayn Rand, and Other Heresies (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1991), p. 213ff. Dr Merrill
contradicted this, but his untimely death prevented me from discussing it with him. See his "Objectivist
Ethics: A Biological Critique," Objectivity, (Chicago, Illinois), Vol 2, #5, p. 70.
59. Social Statics, op cit, p. 162.
60. Ayn Rand, "The Objectivist Ethics", quoted in David Kelley, Unrugged Individualism
(Poughkeepsie, NY: Institute for Objectivist Studies, 1996), p. 25.
61. Quoted by John Stossel, "Interview with John Stossel," Full Context, January 1998, p. 4.
62. Exactly the same can be said of Canada, most of Central and South America, Africa, and other large
areas of the globe. In the words of Russian historian Vasilii Klyuchevski, "The State swells up; the
people diminish." Quoted by James J. Martin, "Introduction," No Treason, op cit, p. 2.
63. Brilliantly summarised in Benson, op cit, p. 43ff. The forts built by the US Army in native
American lands are exactly analogous to the castles built by William the Conqueror and his 'armed
banditti.'
64. Nicholas Dykes, Fed Up With Government? The Manifesto of the Reform Party (Hereford, UK:
Four Nations, 1991), p. 16.
65. Murray I. Franck, "Taxation is Moral", Full Context, June 1994, p. 9, and in subsequent issues.
66. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 1, Ch 7, 1098a18.
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT RIGHTS
Copyright Nicholas Dykes
Previously published as Do rights only come into existence with the state? A Randian response to
an allegedly Randian position. Philosophical Notes No. 49, London: Libertarian Alliance (1998)
I was recently informed by a prominent American Objectivist that, "Correctly or not, Objectivists
apparently hold that rights come into existence simultaneously with the state .... they would not exist in
a 'state of nature.'" (1)
My instant reaction was, 'Hey, I'm an Objectivist, but that's not my position.' After few moments'
thought, I added, 'It's not Ayn Rand's position either. It's not even logical, and it sure ain't historically
accurate!'
Rand stated that "the source of rights is man's nature"(2) and publicly upheld the political philosophy of
the US Declaration of Independence: to wit, that men are endowed with inalienable rights, To secure
which governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Rand's
essay The Nature of Government endorses this view explicitly.(3)
Now, regardless of the validity of this time-honoured position, governments could hardly be instituted
to protect rights if rights did not already exist. Therefore, on Rand's own view, the notion that rights
come into existence simultaneously with the state is illogical - to say the least.
I would agree that it is not clear from her essay just how much of Jefferson's wording Rand actually
accepted, but she did quote him directly in affirming that government derived its authority from "the
consent of the governed."(4) Such a grant of authority can only imply one thing: that 'the governed' had
the authority first. What authority? Rights. Indeed, Rand specifically stated that "the government as
such has no rights except the rights delegated to it by the citizens ..."(5) All these points imply the pre-
existence of rights and contradict the notion that rights come into being simultaneously with the state.
Leaving aside Rand's Jeffersonian perspective, this new 'Objectivist' view makes even less sense when
considered historically or anthropologically. There are numerous customary law societies on record,
such as that of medieval Ireland;(6) and plenty still extant, such as the Kapauku of New Guinea;(7) in
which individual rights, while perhaps not named as such, were or are clearly recognised and protected
despite the absence of anything which could be called a state. Thus the view that rights come into
existence with the state is not only illogical in Randian terms, it ignores a mass of evidence which
directly contradicts it.
All that said, when I raised the issue with an anarchist friend, let us call him 'M', I was startled to find
that he held a similar view; only in his opinion it was society rather than state which caused rights to
come into existence. He actually quoted Leonard Peikoff to the effect that Robinson Crusoe alone on a
desert island would have no rights.(8)
A second friend then informed me that there had been considerable and sometimes heated debate on the
Internet about this issue, some postings going so far as to assert that if you came across a solitary
Eskimo at the North Pole you could kill or rob him with impunity. Unprotected by a state, the postings
apparently held, the poor fellow would have no rights. (Although, if this were the case, with his local
knowledge and skill, I imagine the Eskimo would be more likely to put paid to you first. Deservedly so
too, I reckon, if you thought statelessness allowed you to commit murder).
I confess to being amazed by all this. I have a view of rights - derived, so I thought, from Ayn Rand -
which differs in some respects from the various accounts I have read over the years, but the differences
do not seem great and the whole matter has always appeared to me so uncontroversial that I looked
upon my own contributions as obvious or commonplace. Herewith a quick sketch of my thinking.
There is no life apart from living beings. Life is integral. Indeed, life is the integrity of each living
thing, its conatus and cohesive force. When life ends, that integrity ends with it.
Life is thus purely individual; it is individually procreated and individually sustained. That is the nature
of life, the way things are.
In other words, life is about selves, about self generation and self preservation. Which means, that the
point of each life is that life. Which in turn means that life is an end in itself. And without the
primordial driving force of self-sustenance and self-replication, evolution would not, could not, have
taken place - and there would be no life.
Man shares these basic characteristics of living entities to the full. His life is a fully integrated aspect of
his being; it is individual from beginning to end; and it is an end in itself: each human being is, in
himself or herself, the sole purpose for which he or she exists.
From the facts that life is individual and an end in itself, two things follow. First, life is lived for its
own sake, for the sake of its possessor. From that we derive ethical egoism. Second, if life is an end in
itself, it cannot be the end of anything else. And that is the source of individual rights.
Although clear enough, these points perhaps require a slightly more elaborate restatement: if life is an
end in itself, the only correct course for each human being is to live his or her life for his or her own
sake, what we call ethical egoism, or the pursuit of happiness. Similarly, if life is an end in itself, all
human beings are entitled by that fact alone to live their lives unimpeded: i.e. entitled to pursue values
(liberty); to acquire life's means (property); and to retaliate in kind should force be initiated against
them (self-defense).(9)
While rights are more often than not referred to abstractly - for example as compossible spheres, or as
metanormative principles to use Den Uyl and Rasmussen's phrase (10) - they are in fact deeply rooted
in individual human beings, without whom they would not exist. It is not state or society which cause
rights to exist, it is the individual.
Let us consider the matter more thoroughly. Just as life itself is totally integrated in man or woman, so
are the various elements that combine to make up their nature: human beings are living organisms.
Mind and body, for example, are distinguishable for purposes of analysis or discussion, as are emotion
and thought, pleasure and pain, etc, but all of these are aspects of individual humans and have no
separate existence.
The functions of consciousness can similarly be separated out by abstraction - sensation, perception,
concept formation, volition, desire, the subconscious, memory, etc - but none exist apart from
conscious human beings.
The most important single aspect of human consciousness is volition, for without the capacity to will
there could be no action and hence no human life. Similarly, the most important aspect of volition is
freedom, for without freedom to focus, analyse, choose, act, etc, volition is not possible. Without
freedom, there is no free will.
But freedom is not something separate or external to volition, it is integral: it is a moving, working part,
as essential to volition as the heart is to the body or as oxygen is to brain functioning. Freedom is built
into volition, it is not bolted on. (11)
Freedom is thus an integral aspect of man's faculty of reason, i.e., an essential element of what makes
him man. It is as deeply rooted in man's being as life itself.
I see no significant difference between freedom viewed in this light - as an integral, essential and
fundamental aspect of man's distinguishing characteristic, reason - and freedom viewed as a social or
political right.
It might be objected that I am resorting to what Ronald Merrill called "the classic meaning switch
cheapo" (12); that I am referring to the essence of reason as freedom, then quietly substituting the more
usual meaning of freedom, political liberty.
I intend no such subterfuge. I maintain, rather, that the essence of reason - free will - and its socio-
political counterpart - the right to freedom - are really the same thing, but seen from internal or external
points of view. The two are separable for the sake of analysis, but the separation is a shift of perspective
only: man observing or being observed, as subject or object, as individual or as social being. Freedom
of will is freedom of action, and because each human being is an end in him-or-herself, each has a right
to that freedom.
Because property is external to man, not integral, it might seem difficult to treat the right to property in
similar vein. I do not think so. Man is engaged in a continuous exchange with his environment. Every
second of his life he must draw from it the means of his survival. He cannot be cut off from it even for
a minute. In Galt's Speech, Rand stated that rights are "conditions of existence required by man's nature
for his proper survival." (13) She also said that "without property rights, no other rights are possible."
(14) And, since oxygen is the first condition of his existence, it is man's first form of property. Food,
clothing and shelter follow, varying according to individual circumstances. I therefore maintain that,
here too, the natural needs of man's survival, and his right to pursue them, are really the same thing,
differing only in the perspective from which one views them.
True, Rand said elsewhere that a right is "a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom
of action in a social context." (15) This might appear to lend credence to the view that rights only come
into existence in a social setting, since a principle is general, not particular. But rights are only one of
several principles in a code of ethics. Others are virtues such as rationality and productiveness, honesty
and justice, all of which may or may not have a social dimension: it depends on context. E.g., I can
cultivate my garden rationally and productively alone, yet honestly admit - being just to myself - that at
my age I need some help.
A code of morality is abstract. But the principles of morality are derived from the facts of man's life
and are useless if they do not relate directly to the concrete nature of the physical being, man. The fact
that a right can be abstracted to serve as a social principle should not be allowed to obscure or diminish
the equally important fact that, like other moral principles, rights are rooted in, and drawn from, the
actual physical nature of individual men and women, and from the essential physical conditions which
make their lives possible. Only particulars exist.
Noone can seriously dispute that man is a social animal, but he is first and foremost an individual,
"entire unto himself." Pursuing life for himself, he is primarily unique, an entity complete in itself.
When Frenchman Georges Brassens sang, Non, je ne suis jamais seul, avec ma solitude ("I'm never
alone, when I have my solitude") there was more to his words than pretty paradox. The existence of
others is as essential for happiness as it is for procreation. It also creates a myriad of opportunities
denied to a solitary person. Yet the social dimension of human life must not be allowed to detract from
its starting point, the primacy of the individual.
In sum, just as there can be no such thing as consciousness without a conscious being, neither can there
be any such thing as a right without a being who possesses it. A right is an integral aspect of a human
being in the same sense that motion is an integral aspect of a moving entity.
Plainly, as already noted, rights can be considered abstractly, apart from the human beings who give
rise to them, but they cannot be divorced from those beings. To borrow a phrase from Aristotle, a right
is "distinct by definition but by nature inseparable." (16)
Thus it seems meaningless to me to say that rights only come into existence in the presence of other
people, whether state or society. To borrow once more from Aristotle, he spoke of the possession of
virtue as "compatible with being asleep" (17); and said of our senses, "we had them before we used
them, and did not come to have them by using them." (18)
In other words, a talented pianist does not lose his or her talent in the absence of a piano; nor would an
honest man lose his honesty if he chose to live in a hermit's cell; and a space explorer would still have
rights even if he got lost and never saw another human being.
My life doesn't come into being when someone else enters the room. My consciousness doesn't cease
functioning when there's nobody else around. My reason, my volition, my power to choose, my ability
to act, all are mine throughout my life, regardless of the presence of anybody or nobody.
It is true that rights, in their socio-political sense, are only activated in a social context, because only
then are they honoured or potentially under threat. But to claim that they do not exist otherwise is to cut
them off from their source and make them floating abstractions.
The notion reminds me of Berkeleyan subjectivism, esse est percipe, to be is to be perceived. Rights
are alleged to be created only when two or more people meet. Facing each other, these folk then
generate intangible buffers to keep themselves apart, like so many invisible garden fences. If they
decide to about-face and head off alone into the blue, their rights simply vanish. On this theory, then,
rights are as ephemeral as rainbows, mere tricks of light, insubstantial pageants that leave not a wrack
behind. (Yes, that's Old Bill's Tempest.)
It also seems to me that this approach collectivises rights, making them dependent upon other people,
particularly upon other people's wrongdoing. Further, in thus depriving rights of individuality, the
approach deprives them of their essential nature, for all rights are individual rights.
Moreover, this conception of rights makes them appear as mere social conventions. As such, they
would be very difficult to protect. If my rights are not inherent, not mine, I do not see how they can be
righteously defended against superior might. As a cynical and laconic Canadian friend once riposted to
a disquisition of mine on natural rights: "Garbage! Your rights are what you can defend."
The view that rights only materialise under government seems to me to be bordering on statism. It is
certainly headed in that direction. For if rights only come into existence simultaneously with the state,
in other words if rights partly depend upon government, then quite clearly one is half-way to conceding
the statist's position - the primacy of the state.
It seems plain enough to me that this new 'Objectivist' view has arisen through espousal of 'limited
government.' Unable to overcome the contradiction between an inalienable (19) individual right to
liberty and coercive monopoly government, the proponents of the latter are attempting to outflank their
anarchist opponents by claiming that since rights only emerge with the state, there is no contradiction.
It seems equally plain that advocates of limited government would be comfortable enough living with a
quasi-statist position because they believe the state can be legitimate. But it does seem odd for
'Objectivists' to abandon so openly Rand's view that rights precede the state.
Just as Jeremy Bentham was led to reject rights as "nonsense on stilts" when he realized what an
obstacle they were to his rationalist/statist designs, so I believe one can predict an eventual rejection of
natural rights by those Objectivists who tie rights to the state. All states, no matter what their origins,
have eventually assumed themselves to be both essential, and superior to the individual. Logic has thus
led them - inevitably and invariably - to over-ride or ignore rights. The principle of force by which
states operate dictates the outcome. There is no reason to suppose that an Objectivist state would be any
different. In fact, the demise of rights in Objectivism has already been presaged in the essays of
Objectivist Murray Franck, whose rationalisation of taxation eviscerates the concept of property rights.
(20)
Somewhat paradoxically, there is a sense in which rights were created by the state, but it is entirely
negative: the full formulation of natural rights was due to the growth of state oppression. Indeed, the
concept of rights might never have been formulated if customary law had not been crushed by state
power and forcibly replaced by legislated, fiat law. What philosophers such as Locke were looking for
was a moral principle by which men could oppose the encroachment of the state (which had begun in
England in the late Anglo-Saxon period and accelerated rapidly after the Norman conquest.) (21)
Lockean rights did hold back the statist onslaught somewhat, but the sword is always mightier than the
pen when wielded first, and the threat to their existence which the concept of rights presented caused
states to redouble their self-justifying efforts during the 18th and 19th centuries. Locke's bold defence
eventually came to nought.
Sooner or later, no doubt, someone will introduce the Objectivist shibboleth, intrinsicism, and say that
my view of rights as integral is intrinsicist. Indeed, the correspondent who informed me of this new
'Objectivist' position, also advised me that, "Objectivists see Lockeanism as 'nice try' intrinsicism."
Well, perhaps it is. (22) But, if rights cannot be integral without being intrinsicist, concepts such as
'life,' 'consciousness,' 'volition,' 'reason,' etc, must also be intrinsicist. They, too, refer to faculties and
characteristics which are rooted in, integral to, and solely dependent upon actual living beings.
Intrinsicism concerns conceptual realism; i.e., attempts by philosophers such as Plato, Hegel or
Bergson, to establish existents where there are only human abstractions. E.g., the concept
'consciousness' is abstracted from observation of conscious beings but doesn't exist apart from those
beings. Is consciousness intrinsicist?
I think rather that it is those who maintain that rights come into existence with the state who may be
intrinsicist. First, they appear to see state and/or society as entities, whereas both terms are merely
collective nouns - like bureaucracy or herd - which refer to groups of individuals and have no actual
existence apart from those individuals.
Second, they see rights as distinct from individuals. On their premise, rights are principles and
principles alone, which operate only where there is 'a state,' the latter, as already seen, being evidently a
real entity. In sharp contrast, I assert that rights pertain only to individuals and that discussion of them
apart from individuals is meaningless.
Objectivists pride themselves on the extent to which their philosophy overcomes traditional
dichotomies. I fear that if they adopt the position that rights only come into existence with the state (or
with society), Objectivists risk creating a new dichotomy of their own - between the individual and his
rights.
I would like to conclude this discussion by quoting the famous 19th century British legal commentator
A. V. Dicey, who said "the state is one's neighbours," thus putting things in their proper perspective.
For my own rights are the last things I would go looking for amongst the gallimaufry with whom I
share this overcrowded island.
Finally, I should point out that my friend M has bluntly dismissed my view of rights as "incoherent".
Obviously, I disagree. I therefore thought I might seek the judgement of a wider group of peers. If my
views are indeed erroneous I hope someone will explain to me why. I don't mind being proved wrong, I
just want to know what's right. Rand's precept, "Judge, and be prepared to be judged" has long been my
personal motto.
***************************************************************************
Nicholas Dykes is a British-Canadian writer currently living in England. He is the author of Fed up
with Government? (1991), the manifesto for a putative British 'Libertarian Party;' A Tangled Web of
Guesses (1996), a critical assessment of the philosophy of Karl Popper; Mrs Logic and the Law
(1998), a critique of Ayn Rand's view of government; and Debunking Popper (1999), a critique of Karl
Popper's Critical Rationalism, published in issue no. 24 of the US journal Reason Papers.
***************************************************************************
NOTES
1. Private letter, 12 November 1997. The author does not wish to be named owing to plans to write
about the issue.
2. The Virtue of Selfishness [VOS], paperback edition, p. 94.
3. VOS, p. 110.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, the italics are Rand's.
6. Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty (New York: Libertarian Review Foundation, 1978), p. 231.
7. Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law (San Francisco: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy,
1990), p. 15.
8. This is not accurate as far as I could see from a quick look at Peikoff's book. He wrote: "If a man
lived on a desert island, there would be no question of defining his proper relationship to others .... the
issue of rights would be premature." But 'premature' is a far cry from asserting that rights come into
existence with the state. See Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand (New York:
Dutton, 1991), p. 351, and Ch. 10 passim.
9. Although these points were not made in quite this way by Ayn Rand, they seem clearly implied in
"The Objectivist Ethics": "... every human being is an end in himself, not the means to the end or the
welfare of others ... therefore ... man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others
nor sacrificing others to himself" (VOS, p. 27).
10. Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen Liberty and Nature (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991).
See also their "`Rights' as MetaNormative Principles" in Liberty for a 21st Century, Tibor Machan and
Douglas Rasmussen eds., (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), p. 59ff.
11. Apologies to Zenith Corp, whose 1980s advertisement I am paraphrasing.
12. Ronald E. Merrill, The Ideas of Ayn Rand (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1991), p. 117.
13. For the New Intellectual, paperback edition, p. 182. Thanks to Harry Binswanger's Lexicon, loc cit,
for the reference.
14. VOS, p. 94.
15. Ibid, p. 93.
16. Nicomachean Ethics, Bk 1, Ch 13, 1102a 31.
17. Ibid, Bk 1, Ch 5, 1095b 32.
18. Ibid, Bk 2 Ch 1, 1103a 31. When Rand said "the source of rights is man's nature" (VOS, p.94) it
seems evident to me that she was not talking solely about the social context of rights.
19. Contrary to what some may think, the word 'inalienable' does not imply intrinsicism. It merely
means "that which we may not take away, suspend, infringe, restrict or violate - not ever, not at any
time, not for any purpose whatsoever." Ayn Rand, Textbook of Americanism, in Harry Binswanger, The
Ayn Rand Lexicon (New York: Meridian, 1986), p. 211.
20. Taxation is Moral by Murray I. Franck; in Full Context (Troy, Michigan, USA: The Objectivist
Club of Michigan) Vol. 6, #10; June, 1994, and in subsequent issues.
21. Benson, op cit, Ch. 3.
22. I question the accuracy of this. I haven't studied him recently, but Locke certainly did not strike me
as a Platonist when I read the Second Treatise.
BOOK REVIEW:
The longest running debate in Libertarian/Objectivist circles, and at times the most heated, has been
between proponents of limited government and those of anarcho-capitalism - more succinctly, between
minarchists and anarchists. In 1997/98, for instance, a "Great Anarcho-Capitalist Debate" raged
inconclusively for months on the Internet discussion group (mailing list) Objectivism-L, now renamed
Objectivism@WeTheLiving.com.
One reason for this inconclusiveness is the hypothetical nature of much of the debate: discussions of
the likely or unlikely behaviour of imaginary 'defence agencies' in societies which have never existed
are hardly persuasive. It is therefore surprising that the debaters have not had more recourse to The
Enterprise of Law by Bruce Benson<1>, a treatise packed with evidence about societies which have
existed and defence agencies which currently do exist. Dr Benson mentions neither minarchists nor
anarchists, yet his book bears directly on their debates.
Dr Benson's Introduction begins: "Anyone who would even question the 'fact' that law and order are
necessary functions of government is likely to be considered a ridiculous, uninformed radical ... But
even though most academics do not question the logic of government domination of law and the
maintenance of order, large segments of the population do. Surveys and polls indicate growing
dissatisfaction with all aspects of government law enforcement." and, in consequence, "privately
produced crime detection, arbitration and mediation are growth industries in the United States." (1) It is
thus time, asserts Dr Benson, "to question the presumption that law and order must be governmentally
provided."(5)
Part I of The Enterprise of Law is devoted to showing that, in fact, "our modern reliance on government
to make law and establish order is not the historical norm"(2). The historical norm was customary law
which, spontaneously created and voluntarily obeyed, provided law and order in all early societies.
Since customary law had precisely the same status and served the same purpose as the state-created law
we take for granted today, the commonly-held belief that law and government develop together is
mistaken.
As an illustration of a stateless, customary law society, Dr Benson refers us to the Kapauku of New
Guinea, who were studied in depth by the anthropologist Leopold Popisil in the 1950s (15ff). The
Kapauku had no government, yet enjoyed a prosperous and largely tranquil existence based on
horticulture. All property was private, even strips of forest, and individual rights were clearly
recognised. Personal protection was provided by kinship groups, and disputes were settled by
prominent and wealthy men called tonowi. The tonowi had no authority. They maintainedtheir judicial
role solely through respect garnered from wise decisions, effectively competing with one another.
However, competition did not make the administration of justice haphazard or arbitrary. All legal
proceedings followed well-established rituals and had to accord with memorised precedents.
The non-governmental legal system of the Kapauku was remarkably similar in its guiding principles to
that of Anglo-Saxon England (21ff). Among the Anglo-Saxons, protection was provided by kindred or
neighbourhood groups called "tithings" whose members had reciprocal agreements to help each other
in times of trouble and to join the hue and cry in pursuit of thieves, murderers, etc. Groups of tithings
formed a "hundred" in each of which was a "hundredsman,' a respected individual who was informed
of wrongdoing and who organised the hue and cry; and a court presided over by a judicial committee
drawn from the men of the tithings. There were separate shire courts for disputes between members of
different hundreds.
Anglo-Saxon customary law was primarily concerned with protection of individuals and their property,
and with restitution to victims, and/or their families, in the event laws were broken. Offences were
treated as torts - wrongs to be righted by compensation - and there was an elaborate system of fines
covering the appropriate payments for homicide, wounding, rape, indecent assault, theft, etc. Persons
who refused to accept the judgement of the court were declared outlaws and could be killed and their
property taken with impunity. This powerful sanction was sufficient to inspire acceptance of court
rulings in most cases.
The Anglo-Saxon system was voluntary: no one was forced to join it nor taxed to pay for it. However,
everyone was involved, and the system was respected and sustained, because customary law
successfully provided both protection and arbitration at minimum cost. It evolved spontaneously,
without state involvement, for the simple reason that there was no state.
Another commonplace of modern thought is that government is necessary to create a level playing field
for trade and commerce. In point of fact, government involvement in commercial law is quite recent.
The collapse of the Roman Empire after 400 AD virtually extinguished European commerce. When
trade began to revive, a separate system of customary law arose spontaneously to facilitate local and
international commerce (30ff). Merchants set up their own courts to resolve their disputes; effective
procedures were copied; and gradually a common, entirely private and entirely objective Law
Merchant spread, and was recognised, throughout Europe and beyond. All the basic principles of
modern commercial law, national and international, are derived from the medieval Law Merchant.
The Law Merchant was also universally obeyed. Firstly, the judges were merchants themselves who
were intimately familiar with the kind of cases they ruled upon: their judgements were sound.
Secondly, no one would deal with a trader who refused to abide by the decision of a merchant court.
The judges had no means to enforce their decisions, but the boycott sanction was so effective it
removed any need for coercion. The Law Merchant thus "shatters the myth that government must
define and enforce the 'rules of the game.'" (30)
Why, given the effectiveness of customary legal systems, asks Dr Benson, have nation-states taken on
such a substantial role in the creation and enforcement of law? (36) To answer this, Dr Benson takes us
back to the origins of kingship in Anglo-Saxon England. Kings were originally temporary war leaders.
But because Anglo-Saxon England was in a virtually constant state of war, kingship gradually became
a permanent institution. To support it, and to pay for war, kings needed money. Customary law fines
were a very visible source, and Dr Benson shows how the British monarchy, particularly after the
Norman conquest, and using a carrot and stick approach involving both inducement and force (coupled
with the heavyweight backing of the Church) - though not without considerable resistance - gradually
pushed its way into the fields of law-making and justice and slowly replaced Anglo-Saxon torts with
'crimes against the state' so that fines went to the crown, not to the victim.
The monetary objective of state involvement in law is shown most clearly by the royal legal invention
of 'theftbote,' which made it a crime to settle an offence privately - and thus deprive the crown of its
profits (62) - a concept still with us. In later centuries the crown also forced its way into commercial
law (c. 1600 AD) and, finally, but not until the 19th century, took over policing as well.
For those who might dismiss customary law as ancient history, irrelevant to the modern world, Dr
Benson draws attention to white settlement of the American West, in which customary law preceded
state law, and which modern scholarship has shown to be much more peaceful than is usually thought:
"some long-cherished notions about lawlessness, violence, and justice in the Old West are nothing more
than myth." (312)
What emerges most clearly from Dr Benson's account is that the evolution of state involvement in law
had nothing to do with lofty goals of promoting justice for all, preserving freedom, or protecting
citizens: it was entirely concerned with raising money to pay the upkeep of the state, which in turn
rested upon a royal imperative to wage war. War isn't just the health of the state, as Randolph Bourne
observed; it is the state's raison d'être<2>.
Dr Benson's survey of the transition from customary to authoritarian law takes up less than a quarter of
the book. In Part II, he examines the actual functioning of state provision of law and justice in the USA
today. Using public choice analysis, he describes this as a 'political market.' In Part III, he examines
resurgence of private policing and arbitration in the face of widespread failure by the state to provide
either. Part IV looks at topics such as logical deficiencies in arguments for the state monopoly on law;
and the corruption of state law enforcement officials, including judges: "organised crime cannot
function without organised justice." (161) The study concludes (Part V) with speculation about an
entirely private system of law in which Dr Benson echoes David Friedman's observation that "the most
effective way to demonstrate that these things can be done privately is to do them." (344)
It is not possible in a short review to comment on all the challenging ideas and observations in The
Enterprise of Law. Every section of the book is enlightening, supported by solid evidence, and closely
reasoned.
Part II does seem especially important however, for here Dr Benson shows that state lawmaking
invariably turns into a political process; one dominated by pressure groups and self-serving
bureaucracies whose prime motivations diverge sharply from their ostensible purpose of protecting the
public. The oft-lamented inefficiency, tardiness and callousness of state legal proceedings are shown to
be, not accidental, but systemic.
The selfsame political process also creates powerful incentives and disincentives for law enforcement
officials which either have little to do with justice, or work actively against it. For example, police
success is measured by arrest rate. (131) This gives officers a strong incentive to focus on 'soft' targets
such as vice and drugs - where arrests are numerous and easy (136) - and to avoid the vastly more
important field of crime prevention, which yields no arrests at all.
Similarly, state attorneys are rewarded on the basis of successful prosecutions. This has led them to rely
more and more on plea bargaining which, while often allowing villains to get off more lightly than their
offences warrant, takes much less time and effort and hence produces the politically desirable or career-
enhancing statistics more rapidly. (137ff)
Virtually all the incentives and disincentives driving the state legal system work against the original
subject of law, the wronged victim, who has to "fend for himself every step of the way." (147)
Chapter 12 is a good illustration of the logical power of the book. It begins: "Two conflicting monopoly
arguments are presented to justify state provision of police, courts, and law. First, a single law-and-
order firm will naturally emerge to monopolize the entire industry, which means that this firm will be
able to dictate citizens' behaviour. A benevolent government monopoly, therefore, is presumably
necessary to preserve freedom. Second, there must be a single centralized authority of last resort (e.g., a
supreme court) to prevent the development of the conflicting (competing) systems of law and the
inefficient duplication of services that privatization would generate. If one argument is correct, then the
other cannot be - privatized law and order either leads to a monopoly or to a competitive arrangement."
(291) Dr Benson then proceeds to demonstrate that "neither argument is valid" but this review will not
spoil the reader's pleasure by revealing how.
Problems with the book are few and minor. There is no bibliography, which makes chasing up
references difficult. Rather, citations are given anew after each chapter. Since many sources are quoted
frequently, this results in much needless repetition. At least 30 pages could have been cut from the book
by a single set of notes and/or a bibliography.
Dr Benson also adopts the academic practice of referring to his peers as if they were household names:
"Peltzman observed ... Hirshleifer pointed out." (91). Such references would be more persuasive with
some personal information: e.g., 'Harvard sociologist Peltzman,' 'noted legal scholar Hirshleifer' (or
whatever they may be); for when one does come across a reference such as "Lawrence Sherman,
director of the Police Foundation" (134) the gentleman's position, and his achievement in reaching it,
immediately lend weight to his quoted remarks.
The only other problems with the book are occasional lapses into jargon. When he is describing facts,
or reasoning from facts, Dr Benson's writing is concise, and his meaning crisp and clear. However, as
soon as he starts to explain fact by means of economic theory, clarity fades. Even after three readings
this reviewer still has difficulty understanding "multivariate analysis reinforced the zero-order
correlation results" (108) and a scattering of similar statements. As already noted, though, such minor
inconveniences do not diminish the overall power and importance of the work<3>.
The implications of The Enterprise of Law are at least as intriguing as its content<4>. For example, the
origins of the USA appear in quite a different light. The country did not spring fully formed from the
brows of the Founding Fathers, but is rather the result of a gradual process of state creation which
began with the Norman Conquest of England. Most of the governmental institutions and legal
principles hallowed by the various US constitutions were devised long before 1776 or 1787: not by
Jefferson or Madison, but by British monarchs, Parliaments and state-appointed judges; and not to
secure liberty, but to preserve or extend state power. Unsurprisingly therefore, the growth of state
power has continued as relentlessly in the New World as it did, and does, in the Old.
Other reinterpretations spring to mind. One is Ayn Rand's insistence on the importance of philosophical
ideas in human history. For instance, she asserted that in the Middle Ages, "Wealth was not earned on
an open market ... wealth was acquired by conquest" (For the New Intellectual [FNI] p. 13), and that
"The prelude to the Renaissance was the return of Aristotle via Thomas Aquinas." (FNI, p. 23) But
when one examines the medieval era more closely, it becomes plain that it was the recovery of trade
and the spontaneous creation of the Law Merchant which was the prelude to the Renaissance. Private
trade, protected by private law, created the wealth which generated the 'great rebirth.' It was rulers who
acquired their wealth by conquest, not merchants. The merchants' wealth, and the Renaissance it led to,
had much more to do with private law than with Aristotle.
Similarly, Rand maintained that the Industrial Revolution (IR) was the result of Aristotle's influence.
(FNI, p. 23) In so far as it can be shown that science and conscious devotion to reason played a part in
18th century industry, her assertion may be partly true; although very indirectly, and although many
historians and philosophers of science would dispute it.
In point of fact, however, the IR came about due to a happy accident. The Norman invaders of England
had grabbed all the land, because at that time land was the prime source of wealth. Later, as trade grew
more important, the Norman state moved to control and profit from this new form of wealth with
regulation, tariffs and monopolies. Thus the IR did not begin in London, because trade in the capital
was governed, and innovation stifled, by state regulation and state-sanctioned guilds (as it was all over
Europe). The IR began rather in English villages like Birmingham, and in small towns like Manchester
and Glasgow, because the tentacles of the growing British state had not yet reached them. Their
factories created another new form of wealth, one unknown to the state, and hence not yet exploited by
it. The cotton millers and metal bashers, and the nail makers made famous by Adam Smith, were not
following Aristotle, they were simply free!
It is self-evident that philosophical and other ideas do influence history, but not always in the manner
Rand thought. Human needs are constant, regardless what intellectuals may think or say, and the need
for freedom is born again with each generation regardless what tyranny men may suffer under. What Dr
Benson's book leads one to realise is that freedom under customary law is man's true natural condition.
Here one can indeed quote Aristotle: "For men of pre-eminent virtue there is no law - they are
themselves a law." (Politics 1284a13) Any study of stateless societies reveals the truth of that, for only
in a genuinely stateless society is each individual truly sovereign. It is not until states and organised
religions arise to curtail freedom<5> that the kind of intellectual influence Rand had in mind comes to
the fore.
Locke's Treatises, for example, were written to defend individuals and their property against the
growing power of the British state. But Locke's efforts would have been thought most curious by 10th
century Anglo-Saxons, Medieval Irishmen and Icelanders, 16th century Iroquoians, or the 20th century
Kapauku, for all of whom individual rights and private property were as natural and necessary as
breathing, and for all of whom domination by a state lay in the future. Rand's evocative analysis of
history using the symbols Attila and the Witch Doctor is fascinating and important, but its prime
concern is with political and religious power. There are wide and equally vital areas of social, economic
and legal history, and of anthropology, for which her analysis is not germane.
Rand also spoke of "the rise of Statism in the Roman Empire" (FNI, p. 23, her italics). In point of fact,
the whole history of Rome is about the growth of a state, Rome was always statist. And it thrived, as
states always have, on wealth taken by force from its citizens and neighbours. When that wealth ran
out, the Roman state collapsed. But Roman concepts of state-imposed law and empire - whether copied
from Ancient Greeks or homegrown - were preserved by the Roman Church, reinforced with the notion
of Divine Right, then re-introduced when powerful warriors such as Charlemagne and William the
Conqueror began to emulate their Roman predecessors.
What reflection on Dr Benson's book makes clear, is that modern Western political history consists of a
series of re-runs of the history of Rome, on larger or smaller scales. The Roman state was reborn in
various guises in the Middle Ages and later, and each modern clone has grown through exploitation of
its citizens and neighbours in exactly the same manner as its ancient progenitor.
The genius of modern wealth creation has thus far outstripped state growth, so the fate of Rome is
unlikely to be repeated soon (although it has been in the British and communist Russian empires). But
if state power continues its present (domestic) acceleration, one can reasonably predict the collapse of
the USA and other countries in the not-too-distant future. Like causes produce like events.
The Enterprise of Law is challenging reading for proponents of limited government. For when one has
digested the historical facts that stateless societies were once the norm; that law and order, including
commercial law, arose spontaneously without state involvement; that this customary law was clearly
objective; and that the origin of states was war: it becomes difficult to maintain that the state's purpose
is to protect rights; that only a state can create objective law; or that a state is essential.
***************************************************************************
Nicholas Dykes is a British-Canadian writer currently living in England. He has been an Objectivist
since 1963 and is married with two teenaged children. He is the author of Fed up with Government?
(1991), the manifesto for a putative British 'Libertarian Party;' A Tangled Web of Guesses (1996), a
critical assessment of the philosophy of Karl Popper; Mrs Logic and the Law (1998), a critique of Ayn
Rand's view of government; and Debunking Popper (1999), a critique of Karl Popper's Critical
Rationalism, published in issue no. 24 of the US journal Reason Papers. He is currently working on a
screenplay about the first political execution in Canada.
***************************************************************************
NOTES
<1>. From Laissez-Faire Books, San Francisco, paperback, $14.95. Numbers in brackets in this review
refer to pages in the 1991 hardback edition.
<2>. Cf Franz Oppenheimer, The State: "The State ... is a social institution forced by a victorious group
of men on a defeated group ... [for] no other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished
by the victors. No primitive State known to history originated in any other manner." (San Francisco:
Fox and Wilkes, 1997), p.9.
<3>. All these problems have been eradicated in Dr Benson's later book, To Serve and Protect:
Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice (New York: NYU Press, 1998) which amplifies Part
III and other aspects of The Enterprise of Law. The later book also contains a fascinating account of the
spontaneous emergence of customary law in Old West mining camps, pp. 102-7.
<4>. A more detailed examination of the ramifications of Dr Benson's ideas, and of other topics
touched upon in this review, will be found in Nicholas Dykes, Mrs Logic and the Law: A Critique of
Ayn Rand's View of Government, Philosophical Notes # 50 (London: Libertarian Alliance, 1998),
available at http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/misslogic.html.
<5>. "There is nothing to take a man's freedom away from him, save other men." Ayn Rand, Anthem.
AYN RAND AND THE PERVERSION OF
LIBERTARIANISM
By Lance Klafta
Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed no. 34 (1993)
The political controversy of the late 19th century was:
• whether socialists (all those who believed in the individual's right to possess what he or she
produced) should engage in the political process, seize control of the state, and use the state
apparatus to achieve liberation;
• or, whether a worker's state was inherently contradictory, counter revolutionary, and would only
lead to the creation of a new ruling class whose interests would still clash with those of the ruled
- that the state should be abolished allowing for no transitional stage of any kind during which
power may have the chance to reconsolidate itself.
The situation has recreated itself with amazing similarity almost exactly a century later. Non-libertarian
parties the world over (those who see authoritarian centralization as the bulwark of civilization) are
bankrupt, economically and intellectually. The only viable intellectual current today falls under that
ambiguous term - "libertarian."
Today there exist beneath this umbrella as many splinter groups as there were a hundred years ago
under the umbrella of socialism. Two distinct trends, a right and a left if you will, are clearly
discernible. One group, clearly the largest with a hierarchical organization modeled on the other
political parties, believes, like most Marxists, in constitutional parliamentary republican democracy.
They believe that the state is a necessary guarantor of individual safety and the product of the
individual's labor, and in gradual progress toward a free society through participation in the political
process. The other group, much smaller and far more splintered, rejects the state as necessarily a tool of
class domination and exploitation. This group believes that what Bakunin said a hundred years ago is
as true today, "If you took the most ardent revolutionary, vested him in absolute power, within a year he
would be worse than the Czar himself."
The first group is in all fairness a direct inheritor of the ideals of the American Revolution. In modern
times, however, it has only two roots: (1) the Austrian school of economics represented by Ludwig Von
Mises; (2) the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Von Mises never considered the libertarians. He answered the
Marxists and the Keynesians and defended laissez-faire capitalism at a time when no one else would.
His justification for capitalism was empirical - the greatest good for the greatest number. Ayn Rand,
however, attempted to offer a moral justification of capitalism by substituting the word `capitalism' for
the libertarian meaning of the word "socialism." She then attributed all of the ills of capitalism to
government interference with the market and all of the world's wealth to the minds of the men whom
the world considered the robber barons.
The contrast between Ayn Rand's "Objectivism" and libertarianism is deeper than mere substitution of
terminology, however. Several of her propositions or axioms place her clearly outside of the libertarian
tradition. Her justification of the state is derived from a Hobbesian state of nature theory:
... a society without an organized government would be at the mercy of the first criminal
who came along and who would precipitate it into chaos and gang warfare.... [The Virtue of
Selfishness, 152; pb 112]
If a society provided no organized protection against force, it would compel every citizen to
go about armed, to turn his home into a fortress, to shoot any strangers approaching his
door - or to join a protective gang of citizens who would fight other gangs, formed for the
same purpose, and thus bring about the degeneration of society into the chaos of gang rule,
i.e., rule by brute force, into perpetual warfare of prehistoric savages. [Ibid., 146; pb 108]
Ayn Rand's belief in the inherent depravity of human nature which renders us forever incapable of
living without rulers and not descending to the level of `savages', clearly places her outside of the
libertarian tradition which views human nature as essentially good, capable of indefinite improvement
through the experience of freedom and the exercise of reason. Her knowledge of anthropology is as
embarrassing as her understanding of history. For example, in regards to her conception of who are the
savages, she describes America as, "...a superlative material achievement in the midst of an untouched
wilderness, against the resistance of savage tribes." [For The New Intellectual, 58; pb 50]
To Rand, the essential characteristic of the state is that it possesses a monopoly on the use of retaliatory
force. How does she justify this monopoly or national sovereignty? She accepts it as a given, something
not requiring a justification, and demands that an-archy, the negation of the proposition, justify itself.
Her concept of national sovereignty is then something transcendental, existing separate and apart from
individuals, and beyond the right of the individual to accept or reject according to his or her own
reason. These propositions clearly place Ayn Rand's philosophy closer to Hobbes, Hegel, and Marx,
than to libertarianism.
The state, according to Miss Rand, must hold a monopoly on the enforcement of contracts and the
settling of disputes between individuals, at least whenever this arbitration is not accepted by both sides
voluntarily. She fails to consider that the enforcement of contracts by the state fundamentally alters the
nature of free agreements. Agreements are made on terms which otherwise might not be, because they
are justiciable.
The terms of "free agreements" under law are titled in favor of lenders over debtors, landlords over
tenants, employers over employees, in a way which would not exist in a "free market." This leveraging
of power is not `objective' at all. Depending purely on legal convention, creditors may have debtors
imprisoned, tenants may be evicted without notice and their effects confiscated, one human being may
own another or the land on which another lives and works, all to varying degrees.
To understand Ayn Rand's psychology it is helpful to know her background. She was born to a wealthy
St. Petersburg family in 1905. The position of her family in Czarist society must have been
considerable. At a time when the lives of most Russians had changed little since feudalism, her family
was wealthy enough to afford a French Governess and take regular vacations to the Crimea.
It should be noted that wealth in Czarist society was almost wholly a measure of one's favor with the
government. There were few if any Horatio Alger stories about individuals who lifted themselves out of
serfdom without the patronage of the Czar.
At the age of twelve, she must have been very upset when those nasty workers took over her father's
business. Her family fled St. Petersburg for the Crimea and the protection of the White Army. This
experience rendered her forever incapable of seeing land reform or any struggle of oppressed and
exploited people as anything more than hatred for the good and lust for the unearned.
She shared with Marx the bourgeois ideology that only a few people were capable of running things.
The masses ought to be happy to have a job working for bosses. Any suggestion that an enterprise
could be run by the employees without having someone in charge was to her absurd.
She shared with Godwin and Kropotkin the belief that the individual is born tabula rasa - a blank slate,
and all human knowledge is derived from sense experience. She then proceeded, however, to
completely dismiss environment and socialization as the determining factor in the development of
character.
People were to her good or evil, brilliant or indolent, depending solely on their volition. People should
be judged by their actions with equal severity regardless of their condition. Though she insisted that the
United States was not and never had been a completely free country, she granted no such thing as
extenuating circumstances when judging an individual and had no qualms upholding the power of the
state to inflict capital punishment.
A far more sinister legacy of Ayn Rand to libertarianism is that of a moralizing autocrat who gathered
about her an inner circle which she ironically called, "The collective." Outwardly, this collective
professed egoism and individuality. They were to be the vanguard of an intellectual renaissance. The
price of admission to this group, however, was slavish conformity of one's life and professed
philosophy to Ayn Rand's whims and eccentricities. For example, she did not like men who wore facial
hair or listened to Mozart, and if you didn't give them up you were unfit for Rand's inner circle. This is
particularly sinister if one considers that Karl Marx, believed by millions to be the very symbol of
liberation, was also an autocrat who, though professed to be the ultimate champion of democracy,
resorted to extraordinary means to maintain control of the International Workingmen's Association. He
even moved its headquarters to New York to exclude the libertarian influence.
Today Ayn Rand is gone, but like Marx a century ago, hers is the primary influence on the largest
libertarian organization existing. Even the pledge which all Libertarian Party members must sign is
taken directly from her admonition, "I hereby certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation
of force as a means of achieving political or social goals." In spite of their pledge to non-violence,
many libertarians are frustrated with election laws and media censorship. An argument which circulates
among libertarians of the right is that, if they were more threatening, the government may take steps to
accommodate them as it did the black civil rights movement.
Ayn Rand's writings are not entirely consistent on the point of non-violence either. In The
Fountainhead, Howard Roark resorts to the use of dynamite. In Atlas Shrugged, Ragnar Danneskjold
engages in piracy on the high seas and even shells a factory which has been nationalized. In a
clandestine rescue mission, Dagny Taggart shoots a guard who stood in the way of her desired end.
In the event of economic upheaval, ruined by unemployment and inflation, tenants and home owners
may refuse to make rent and mortgage payments. The unemployed may seize vacant land and begin to
farm, and factory workers may realize they can run things without stock holders. It would not be at all
surprising if there were to emerge within the libertarian right, groups committed to direct action and
counter revolutionary violence, even a coup d'etat.
Imagine a charismatic and autocratic personality at the center of such a group and you have the
Objectivist Lenin. Like the Marxists and right libertarians, Lenin and the Objectivists are professed
republican democrats. Lenin and the Bolsheviks promised that if given power, they would immediately
convoke a constituent assembly. When they realized, however, they would not hold a majority in such
an assembly they turned against the idea of such an assembly.
Can anyone doubt that the cultist mentality which characterizes most of Miss Rand's followers could
lead to the creation of a group of self-appointed avengers of the capitalist class? That they would
suppress strikes, demonstrations, and factory take overs? That they would not execute people for
crimes against the libertarian state?
Ayn Rand believed in a republican form of government with a cleverly constructed constitution which
would deny the majority of the power to infringe on the rights of a minority as she conceived them. If
the majority supported a general strike against rents and mortgages and supported the factory
takeovers, would not the clandestinely organized Objectivist libertarian party be tempted to dispense
with democracy in order to enforce what they conceived of as the rights of the dispossessed
bourgeoisie?
In all fairness it must be admitted that Ayn Rand herself would never sanction such actions, but the
same argument is made everyday by western Marxists that Marx would probably not have sanctioned
many of Lenin's actions and would certainly not take credit for the Soviet Union.
Lenin and the Bolsheviks won power by promising, "Land to the peasants!" "Factories to the workers!"
When they took power, however, they immediately set about liquidating the factory committees and
nationalizing the land. They crushed work place democracy by installing armed guards in the factories,
and even returned former owners to their positions as employees of the worker's state. Leon Trotsky
stopped the practice of soldiers electing their officers from their ranks and even restored former Czarist
officers to their ranks in the Red Army.
When the Russian Revolution began few people clearly understood the gulf which separated the state
socialists from the libertarians. Many dedicated libertarians like Alexander Berkman, rallied to the
Bolshevik cause, willing to give them the benefit of the doubt in hopes that seizing state power would
only be a transitional stage toward the development of the stateless/classless society.
Many sincere lovers of liberty now flock to the standard of the Libertarian Party, as they did the
Bolsheviks, completely ignorant of the history of the last century. As Santayana said: "Those who
forget the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them."
What should be done? It should be obvious that government enforcement of private contracts is not
libertarian any more than is taking state power to set people free. Libertarianism is and always will
mean socialism - the self-emancipation of working people.
Libertarians must stop courting the Republican right and return to their intellectual roots. By standing
outside of the political process we deny the state legitimacy, and like the state torturers in Atlas
Shrugged, they will come and beg for libertarians to take over.
Remembering the experience of the Spanish libertarians, and heeding the advice of John Galt,
libertarians must refuse state power even when begged. The state can never be a tool of liberation. Only
its complete and utter collapse will allow for the emergence of non-statist institutions, libertarian co-
ops, communes, and free markets, to flourish and displace the political state once and for all.
Chapter 3
- The Buddha
The Dhammapada 28
This is an unusual suggestion to Objectivist and Randian communities, but I ask you to consider it and
to please try to be objective. I am here offering to you the shocking consideration that Objectivists and
Randians should reach out to the Buddhist portion of humanity. Some Buddhists are closer to you than
you might imagine, regardless of highly touted tenets of Buddhist 'doctrine' that would make you think
otherwise.
I am a Buddhist - a Theravada Buddhist. I do not believe in the supernatural, nor in a god or gods of
any kind. I first read Ayn Rand's fiction because a Buddhist friend told me that her heroes were sages of
advanced Buddha-like characteristics. For instance, one of her greatest heroes exhibited a face that was
without the trace of "pain, fear, or guilt". That is the face of the Buddha as we in Buddhist cultures have
always imagined him and have portrayed him in art. You name him "John Galt". Howard Roark is also
in possession of great self-command, detachment from pain, and serenity. Andrej Taganov reminds one
of a samurai warrior, does he not? And what of Ragnar Danneskjold, that ideal champion of justice?
When considering the Western Tradition, Buddhism reminds me a lot of Stoicism, i.e., accepting one's
Fate while controlling one's attitude toward that Fate. Didn't the Stoics also come up with Natural Law,
an incredible philosophy of tolerance (also very Buddhist-like)? Ayn Rand starts her essay, The
Metaphysical versus the Man-Made, with a quasi-Stoic quote: "God grant me the serenity to accept the
things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference".
This is vintage Greek and solidly Objectivist, but it is also classically Buddhist. Balance, perspective,
wisdom, and that Greek-like poise of a confident mind.... A Buddhist might see Aristotle as a friend.
His eudaimonia is quite interesting, his megalopsychia quite familiar.
I really do not expect, or even desire, that any of you Objectivists will become Buddhists. If I were a
Mahayana Buddhist, I might try to proselytize, but I am essentially in the Theravada school and
recognize the beauty of the individualist path. Rather, I believe that we in the East need the influences
of a modern, rational, freedom oriented philosophy such as Objectivism. You can teach my culture
much and are more similar to us than you can conceive. Buddhists will not often completely throw
away their entire tradition and they will nearly always identify themselves primarily as Buddhists, but
they often can modernize, learn, adjust, and synthesize. A dialectical conversation is necessary to orient
the East toward the future - and the stars.
We Buddhists love the moon. Ayn Rand's Apollo 11 is still my favorite of her writings, for it celebrates
the event of representatives of the human race actually setting foot on the moon - and making it safely
back to earth. What a triumph of mind!
If you want complete 100% conversion to "dogmatic" Objectivism, you will forever be an unnoticed
minority on this planet (and beyond, some day). But Objectivist ideas are fecund, vital, uplifting, and
hopeful. In the technological future, Objectivism's grounding of human rights is humankind's great
hope of freedom. You are secular and universal. You can enrich, ennoble, and inform many segments of
humanity.
Few of you probably realize what a natural ally you have in Buddhism. It is ethical but is not interested
in theological dogma. It is radically individualistic (especially in its Theravada form). Its trappings,
stories, and doctrines are old. They echo antiquity, but there is a kernel of noble wisdom there. Also,
many in the West are turning to Buddhism because of disillusionment with Christianity and with much
of modern Western philosophy.
Some among the practitioners of Buddhism are natural advocates for freedom and dignity. The plight of
Buddhists in Tibet and elsewhere in the empire of the Peoples Republic of China are examples of high
profile tyranny against peaceful peoples, and many are united by their revulsion when freedom is
denied. But, you must never ask them to accept Objectivism as a dogmatic religion/philosophy. They
abhor such simplemindedness.
In sum, you can befriend Buddhists, if you parley like honest seekers of the truth. The East needs to
update itself with reason, science, business ethics, the politics of individual rights, and completely free
enterprise. And maybe you could benefit from a jolt of wisdom from aspects of the dharma. After all,
do you folks know everything? (Please take this last remark in good humour.) Seriously, Buddhists can
be powerful allies to Objectivism. After all, we are both on an ethical crusade for - among other things -
nobility, serenity, and integrity, are we not?
With the utmost metta ("loving kindness"),
Savaka Sukhothaia
June 2001
SPIRITUAL TITANISM
Another related topic of interest is Buddhism's and Objectivism's relationships to what has been called
spiritual titanism. According to Gier: "Titanism is an extreme form of humanism in which human
beings take on divine attributes and prerogatives."<7> An example of Objectivist titanism is ascribing
too much "concrete reality" to Rand's fictional heroes and heroines, and being too literal and too eager
to emulate them in real life. Titanism, as the concept is explored in Gier's book, suggests an atomist and
anti-social form of individualism, unlike the zoon politicon of Aristotle, and unlike the social virtues
frequently practiced by Rand's heroes. Yet social virtues are underrepresented and underemphasized in
Rand's explicit philosophy<8>, and a danger of titanism seems to be present. Buddhism seems to have
better inbuilt ways of defeating titanism, and maybe Objectivists have something to learn here. The
same goes for atomism, since Buddhists do not have an atomist self concept. While some Objectivists
seem to fall prey easily to atomist tendencies, perhaps being influenced by a Christian culture in
general and Christian soul metaphysics in particular.
In this quote, Suzuki uses neither/nor dialectic to reject a false alternative ("not two, not one"). Then he
integrates the mind and the body, they are a unity. But they can also be experienced as two (or more)
separate parts of that unity. So the neither/nor dialectic is a method for rejecting false alternatives and
then integrate the true aspects of each alternative. One of Buddhism's strongpoints is relational thinking
and real or apparent paradoxes associated with it.
Note how this methodology leads Buddhism to the same view of the mind-body relationship as
Objectivism - and this is a rare position indeed. This view of the mind-body relationship also naturally
leads to an inclination towards perceiving questions about "life after death" or "reincarnation" as
pointless or meaningless, a position held by many Buddhist traditions. Also, while Objectivism is
virtually alone<13> to reject the is-ought dichotomy in the Western tradition, Buddhism rejects it too.
How much common ground do these two important and rare agreements lend to Objectivism and
Buddhism?
NOTES
<1> I'm indebted to Savaka Sukhothaia's open letter to Objectivists and Randians calling for an
outreach to and dialogue with Buddhists for the inspiration to engage in this investigation. See Savaka
Sukhothaia: A Call to Objectivists and Randians For Dialogue With Buddhists. Open letter, June 2001.
http://folk.uio.no/thomas/po/buddhists-and-objectivists.html
<2a> Objectivism: Theory and Practice. IOS 1997 summer seminar program, available at http://ios.org/
events/seminars-sem97.asp, and
<2b> Summer Seminar Brings "Academical Village" to Life, http://ios.org/center/news/news_sumsem-
academic-village.asp.
<3> Nick Gier: Buddhist Ethics as Virtue Ethics, http://www.its.uidaho.edu/ngier/307/buddve.htm.
<4> There exist some strains of Buddhism advocating duty ethics rather than virtue ethics, such as
Christian-Buddhist hybrids that interpret buddhist dharma in accordance with Christian duty and slave
morality. See for example the Church of the East, http://church-of-the-east.org/welcome.shtml.
<5> Karen Minto: Can Sacrifice Be Rational?, in Full Context Vol. 9 No. 10, 1997.
<6> Breaking out of destructive, repetitive or locked patterns is also a frequent theme in Nathaniel
Branden's works.
<7> Nick Gier: Spiritual Titanism: Indian, Chinese, and Western Perspectives. State University Of
New York Press, 2000. http://www.its.uidaho.edu/ngier/steab.htm
<8> See: David Kelley: Unrugged Individualism. The Objectivist Center, 1996.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1577240006/qid%3D994212989/102-6811221-6858530
Nathaniel Branden: The Benefits and Hazards of the Philosophy of Ayn Rand (1984),
http://www.nathanielbranden.net/ayn/ayn03.html.
<9> The Art of Living Consciously: The Power of Awareness to Transform Everyday Life is the title of
one of Nathaniel Branden's books, reviewed by Carolyn Ray in Navigator Vol. 1 No. 10 under the
heading Sleepers, Awake!, see
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/carolynray/sleepersawake.html.
<10> http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/
<11> See Nick Gier: Dialectics: East and West (1983),
http://www.its.uidaho.edu/ngier/307/dialectic.htm.
<12> Shunryu Suzuki: Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind. Weatherhouse, 1988.
http://www.sfzc.com/Pages/Library/zmbm.html
<13> Apparently Epicurus rejected the is-ought dichotomy too. See Ray Shelton's two articles (1995),
Epicurus and Rand, in Objectivity Vol. 2 No. 3, http://folk.uio.no/thomas/po/epicurus-and-rand.html
(web version forthcoming), and Parallel Metaethics, in Objectivity Vol. 2 No. 4,
http://folk.uio.no/thomas/po/parallel-metaethics.html.
Chapter 4
FEMINISM
NOTES
1. For this assessment, see Brownmiller.
2. Loiret-Prunet supports this interpretation in Gladstein and Sciabarra, pp. 83-115. Glennon herself
mentions Rand as an example of instrumentalist thinking in Glennon, p. 46.
3. Glennon discusses synthesism in Glennon, pp. 97-119, but drawing on pp. 46-96.
4. The dialectical interpretation of Rand is defended in Sciabarra, which is easily the best discussion of
Rand's philosophy yet written.
5. For Rand's view see Rand 1964 esp. p. 27. for discussions of Aristotle, see Nussbaum chapter 3 and
Register 1999 chapter 3.
6. Glennon p. 46.
7. Glennon pp. 48-49.
8. Rand 1992 pp. 54-55.
9. Rand 1992 p. 817.
10. Rand 1992 p. 155.
11. Glennon p. 120.
12. Branden, Barbara p. 18.
13. For a discussion of Aristotle's view of the sexes, see Allen ch. 2.
14. Rand 1990 p. 268.
15. Branden, Nathaniel p. 386.
16. Rand 1975 p. 175.
17. Gramstad makes a similar point in Gladstein and Sciabarra, pp. 349-350.
18. An alternative interpretation of these passages appears in Michalson.
19. Rand 1992 p. 569.
20. Rand 1992 p. 707.
21. Rand 1992 pp. 720-721.
22. I have in mind here the biography by Barbara Branden, Nathaniel Branden's memoir, and such
critical accounts as Walker and Rothbard. See also the sad tale of Lissa Roche, discussed in Vincent
2000.
23. I've moderated Objectivist discussion lists which discussed feminism and other topics and have
attended several Objectivist events. These experiences have led to a number of personal dealings with
members of the movement; it's private discussions about individuals' relationships, as well as public
discussions about issues of sexuality, which have generated the anecdotal evidence I'm relying on. But
my claims should not be confused with anything which a social scientist would find acceptable as
evidence.
WORKS CITED
Allen, Prudence. 1985. The Concept of Woman. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Branden, Barbara. 1986. The Passion of Ayn Rand. Garden City: Doubleday.
Branden, Nathaniel. 1968. "Self-Esteem and Romantic Love, Part II" The Objectivist, January.
Brownmiller, Susan. 1999 [1975]. "Ayn Rand: A Traitor to Her Own Sex". In Gladstein and Sciabarra,
pp. 63-66.
Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice. Cambridge: Harvard UP.
Gladstein, Mimi, and Sciabarra, Chris, eds. 1999. Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand. University
Park: Penn State Press. http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/femstart.htm
Glennon, Lynda. 1979. Women and Dualism: A Sociology of Knowledge Analysis. New York:
Longman.
Gramstad, Thomas. 1999. "The Female Hero: A Randian-Feminist Synthesis". In Gladstein and
Sciabarra, pp. 333-362.
Loiret-Prunet, Valérie. "Ayn Rand and Feminist Synthesis: Rereading We the Living". In Gladstein and
Sciabarra, pp. 83-114.
Michalson, Karen. "Who is Dagny Taggart? The Epic Hero/ine in Disguise". In Gladstein and
Sciabarra, pp. 199-219.
Nussbaum, Martha. 1994. The Therapy of Desire. Princeton: Princeton UP.
Rand, Ayn. 1992 [1957]. Atlas Shrugged. New York: Signet.
-. 1975. The New Left. New York: Signet.
-. 1990. The Voice of Reason. New York: Meridian.
Register, Bryan 1999. The Logic and Validity of Emotional Appeal in Classical Greek Rhetorical
Theory. Thesis composed to meet the honors requirements for the degree of bachelor of science in
speech communication, Spring 1999. http://www.olist.com/essays/text/register/thesis/index.html
-. 2000. "Should Ayn Rand Have Been a Feminist?" Navigator, April.
Rothbard, Murray. 1987. "The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult". (Pamphlet) Port Townsend: Liberty
Publishing.
Sciabarra, Chris. 1995. Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. University Park: Penn State Press.
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/randstar.htm
Vincent, Norah. 2000. "The Polecat Makes a Comeback." Village Voice, March 15-21.
http://villagevoice.com/issues/0011/vincent.shtml
Walker, Jeff. 1999. The Ayn Rand Cult. Chicago: Open Court.
being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life,
Ayn Rand formulated and presented a new vision of human being. She achieved a wide-ranging
integration of mind and body, a unified conception of love, sex, self and relationships. She viewed love
as a response to values, and romantic love as a unity of reason and emotion, virtue and desire,
admiration and passion, human pride and animal lust. Sex, for Rand, is an expression of self-esteem - a
celebration of oneself and of existence. A relationship provides a trade of spiritual values, offering
psychological visibility (and thereby spiritual growth) through the perception of oneself as an external
reflection in another self.
And yet, despite this achievement, Rand made a mistake - a mistake that limits the range of her
achievement, and undercuts the scope of her integration, a mistake that preserved elements of
Platonism and collectivism in her integration of love and sex. Rand maintained a Platonic view of
gender, which translates into gender-role collectivism. The goal of this article is to identify these
elements and their effects, to establish how and at what levels they contradict more fundamental ideas
in Rand's philosophy, and finally to suggest an extended Randian<1> position that incorporates gender
individualism and Feminist insights, thus providing the foundation for a Randian-Feminist synthesis. I
hope to unleash a hidden potential in Rand's thought - a potential from which a conceptual foundation
for The Female Hero can be established.
For Rand, a person's physical appearance expresses his or her gender, and Rand operates with distinct
and separate bipolar gender roles (masculinity and femininity) linked to the person's biological sex
(maleness and femaleness respectively). Hence, the look of being chained is associated with femininity,
and femininity is seen by Rand as the psychological expression of biological femaleness.
There is also this description of Dominique Francon, the heroine of The Fountainhead (
[1943] 1986 , 262):
One finds that all of Rand's heroines are of very slender - or fragile - build. This also includes Kira in
We The Living, Karen Andre in Night of January 16th, and the various heroines in The Early Ayn Rand.
The sex in Rand's novels is always described as a combat of wills, and sometimes as a physical combat,
such as the notorious "rape" scene in The Fountainhead<2>, and Bjorn Faulkner's "rape" of Karen
Andre in Night of January 16th (Rand 1968, 82-83). To a lesser degree this also applies to Dagny
Taggart's sex scenes in Atlas Shrugged, especially the one with John Galt (956-957). This combat is not
a combat of equals, and the woman is never the aggressor. The man is always superior in both mental
and physical strength.<3>
Here is another description of Dagny Taggart that illustrates this ideal (154):
She stood as she always did, straight and taut, her head lifted
impatiently. It was the unfeminine pose of an executive. But
her naked shoulder betrayed the fragility of the body under the
black dress, and the pose made her most truly a woman. The proud
strength became a challenge to someone's superior strength, and
the fragility a reminder that the challenge could be broken.
Several other examples of male dominance may be found in the pieces of fiction compiled in The Early
Ayn Rand, e.g., "Kira's viking", and "Vesta Dunning".<4> Interestingly, the editor of this collection,
Leonard Peikoff, identifies a development in Rand's writing whereby the early fiction, with dominating
heroines, rather quickly turns into the male domination typical of Rand's mature fiction (in Rand, 1984,
4). Peikoff, in further describing the Randian heroine's feelings for her hero, calls her "the opposite of a
feminist" (34), and in yet another instance he offers this description: "The hero, who now has primacy
over the heroine, is a completely recognizable Ayn Rand type" (259).<5>
A discussion of the nature of sex in Atlas Shrugged, aimed at explaining the integration of mind and
body, love and sex, evaluation and desire, and often repeated in Rand's non-fiction (Rand
[1961] 1968 ; Binswanger 1986), also carries with it strong gender-role implications:
Just as Rand's heroines are slender/fragile and feminine, her female villains are often athletic or large,
and unfeminine or masculine, such as Eve Layton in The Fountainhead<6>, or Comrade Sonia in We
the Living.<7> There seems to be a pattern in which heroes are masculine, heroines are feminine,
female villains are unfeminine or masculine, and male villains are unmasculine or feminine. Rand
seems to engage in the "gendering" of evil, in that characters whose gender identities and/or gender
expressions are considered inappropriate to their biological sex, are portrayed as evil. This tendency is
apparent in Rand's fiction and non-fiction.
Here Branden describes man as the romantic initiator and aggressor, and woman as the challenger and
responder to the man.<9> Throughout the Randian canon, this formulation is not merely a preference,
but a natural law. It is fair to say that this is a part of Rand's philosophy, even though "sexual
psychology" is not strictly a part of any of the five major philosophical disciplines.<10> But the errors
that Rand make concerning gender are philosophical in that they contradict or entail philosophical
principles and positions. Moreover, Rand's gender credo is a part of Objectivist culture. But the credo
itself is unsupported by scientific knowledge and logically incompatible with the larger context of
Objectivism as a philosophical system. Furthermore, it is both anti-individualist and antifeminist.
Since the substance of Rand's claims are addressed throughout this article, it is worth quoting at length
from her important essay "About a Woman President":
Rand mentions Joan of Arc as the most heroic woman - and the most tragic symbol - in history, not
primarily because she was burned at the stake, but because she had to assume the role of leader in order
to revive the fighting spirit of the soldiers.<12> It is interesting to compare Rand's view of Joan of Arc
with her penchant for gendering characters. Rand's view seems to be that the heroism of Joan of Arc is
not due to military actions and achievements, or to opposition and resistance to torture. Rather, it
resides in Joan's alleged rejection of femininity. This is a forceful illustration of the natural law-like
status that Rand ascribes to her own conceptions of the masculine and the feminine in sexual
psychology.
RANDIAN ALTERNATIVES TO RAND'S VIEWS OF GENDER
An obvious alternative interpretation of the sexual act, namely that who conquers and who surrenders
need not be predetermined either in fact or by gender, that the sexual power transactions may shift,
change and reconfigure themselves over time (and that this shifting and uncertainty of outcome itself
may be a part of the sexual tension and build-up), is not addressed neither by Rand nor by other
Objectivists. The Randian version of erotic combat seems monotonous compared to the rich natural
variation of expression in human sexuality - even when limiting oneself to consider rough and
passionate sex only.
The lack of awareness of alternatives may be rightly interpreted by feminists as an example of what
Riane Eisler ( [19... ) calls "the dominator model" at work, whereby human
interaction is always interpreted as instances of corresponding domination and submission. This is
distinct from what Eisler calls "the partnership model", whereby human interaction is interpreted as a
voluntary exchange between equals (xvii). Replacing power hierarchies (especially gendered power
hierarchies) with equality and choice has always been a major (perhaps, and ideally, the major) concern
of feminism, and a discussion of this aspect of feminism is essential for understanding the tensions
between Rand and feminism.
Interpreting Rand with Eisler's terminology, one may argue that Rand's general philosophy as well as
her heroic characters upholds "the partnership model", which is the only moral basis for human
interaction and transactions, what Rand calls "the trader principle". Yet, the literary images of human
sexuality projected by Rand, as well as several of her explicit non-fiction statements are written in the
language of "the dominator model". This is an inherent contradiction in Rand's writing, and a feminist
rereading of Rand must address, and if possible, resolve it.
There are three interaction style alternatives to male conquest and the domination of women: "women
conquering men", "switching between submission and conquest", and "equality without power
difference fetishism". Are these alternatives compatible with Rand's philosophy? Or does her
philosophy contradict her own position on gender, which entails a restrictive and limited view of
human psychology and sexuality?
The alternatives above are underemphasized in Rand's work, because of her gender restrictions. Indeed,
if Rand's gender style preferences are viewed as universal gender-role prescriptions, the alternatives
would be rejected in toto by any ardent Objectivist. This would indeed be a strange and tragic outcome
for a philosophy that started out as a highly integrated vision of love, sex, self and relationships.
While Rand was not a biological essentialist (even though several of her positions on gender would
seem to require a basis in biological essentialism), she favored androcentrism and gender polarization,
both incompatible with her Objectivist philosophy. In my view, Rand's Objectivism logically entails
"metaphysical equality" of women and men (not androcentrism) and gender nonessentialism (not
gender polarization).
Nonessentialism, in the context of gender and social science, does not mean a denial of identity of
consciousness, as Rand's supporters might fear. It means a rejection of biological determinism -
specifically, it means a rejection of the idea that biological sex alone determines or delimits human
behavior. It means that environmental and cultural factors, as well as individual choice, will always be
a part of the picture, and that they may override, direct or redefine the expression of genetical or
biological tendencies at any time. So the term 'essentialism' means one thing in philosophy (a universal
and immutable Platonic essence), and something else in the social sciences (where 'essence' is
translated into an assumption of a transcultural, transindividual biological determinism).
According to Rand and Objectivism, on the other hand, consciousness has a particular identity.<13>
However, this identity is the same for men and women. In fact, this is the only gender position
compatible with Objectivism.<13b> The idea of a gendered identity of consciousness is not only
unsupported; there are many indications against it, including the empirical fact of human variety with
overlap between men and women, the fact that no characteristic isolated to one sex only has been
found, and the fact that the variety of characteristics within each sex is actually larger than it is
betweenthe sexes.<14>
The idea that the identity of consciousness is gendered is incompatible with a key idea of Objectivism,
namely that people are born tabula rasa, that is, without inborn ideas, i.e., their mind is a "clean
slate".<15> This means that all of an individual's ideas and actions are open to rational evaluation and
may be changed volitionally. The idea of a universal "gender essence", upon which the idea of a
gendered identity of consciousness rests, is a Platonic construct. Both this construct itself and its
implementation in the form of biological determinism are totally at odds with Objectivism.
BEYOND ANDROGYNY
The concept of androgyny has been criticized for reproducing the same flaws inherent in "masculinity"
and "femininity" - namely, the idea of metaphysically given gender essences (even if coexisting in the
same body). If our goal is to liberate virtues, and vices from arbitrary gender categories, why not
abandon androgyny, along with femininity and masculinity?
There are two reasons to reject this line of reasoning: First, androgyny has served to undermine and
expose several flaws in traditional gender views, such as the notion that masculinity and femininity are
opposites and cannot coexist in the same person, and the notion that sex determines gender, or that
gender expression (as well as sexual orientation) must follow and adhere to sex stereotypes. Second,
since it is unlikely that "femininity" and "masculinity" will drop out of popular usage, a strategy is
needed to counteract their most damaging collectivist implications. Androgyny is that strategy; it is a
concept of a process, the process of transcending the masculine-feminine duality.<20>
One may question whether "masculine" and "feminine" are valid concepts at all. Will anything at all
remain when all cultural artifacts and restrictions of gender have been overcome? If so, what would be
left? If what is left is essentially the same, only habitually referred to as "feminine" when found in a
woman and "masculine" when found in a man, then there is no reason to have two concepts for it. One
concept will do.<20b> Moreover, since whatever it is that is left is something that will vary in degree
and composition between individuals, using the two categories "femininity" and "masculinity" to refer
to it will be misleading because such a use would suggest that the degree and composition varies with
gender, rather than varying with individuals, and that leads back towards gender stereotypes and away
from individual variation and authenticity.
So we are faced with two alternatives: Either the terms "masculine" and "feminine" may be used to
describe any individual, independent of one's sex, and without any moral component (so that there is no
implication of moral degradation in describing someone as a "masculine woman" or a "feminine man").
This alternative translates into the descriptive use of instrumental and expressive characteristics, as
described above. The benefit of this approach is that it actually starts with what most people associate
with and mean by "masculine" and "feminine", and then there is some hope of making it clear that
these words do not refer to unalterable natural or biological characteristics, nor mutually exclusive
ones, but to a diverse reality which is changeable, voluntary, volatile and to a large degree cultural and
social.
Alternatively, "masculine" and "feminine" may not refer to phenomena that constitute two opposite or
separate realms (if they point to anything at all), but to some common aspect of the human condition
(for example characteristics related to an authentic expression of sexual orientation, style preferences,
and values on a fundamental level common to all humans). But if so, the existence of two opposite
categories for the same, one, fundamental reality is misleading - especially so because the categories
are construed as opposites. Hence, both terms ought to be abandoned. Besides, a lot of other already
existing terms would seem to capture this reality better: authenticity, identity, vitality, life force and
soforth. However, I think it unlikely for this to happen (that is, people will not abandon the use of the
words "masculine" and "feminine"), so we probably have to live with the first approach for a long time.
A problem in the historical and etymological connection between femininity and women and
masculinity and men, is that, in a Randian context, it may encourage the unwarranted and harmful
conclusion that only men are worthy of hero-worship, and only women are to be granted the privilege
of hero-worshiping. Ideally, in the long run, we should abandon the terms "masculinity" and
"femininity" altogether, as remnants of a collectivist past. Gender liberation or gender individualism
encourages individuals to take pride in and develop their own unique gender identities. Perhaps most or
all concepts of androgyny will make themselves superfluous through the creation of a
"postandrogynous", or individualist, society.
[1968... , 268). Rand's claim is too narrow in three ways: First, it posits masculinity
as the only object worthy of hero-worship, and second, it only permits women the privilege of hero
worship, not men. But Rand's claim is wrong in a third way as well: in its tacit assumption that if one
admires or worships some other aspect than masculinity/gender in the other, this can only happen if one
does not possess (at least not to the same degree) the trait or virtue in question. And if it is a basic
character virtue that one lacks and therefore seeks to find in another person, the relationship must
degenerate into Platonic (incomplete in itself) love (examined below).<22>
But one can possess a virtue in the same degree as one's lover, and still worship an expression of that
virtue in a realm or through skills that one does not possess. For example, I may be as courageous as
my lover, but lacking her physical skills and training, I can worship her courage as expressed through
her abilities as a skydiver or kickboxer. Possessing a virtue is one thing, skills and arenas for its
expression is something else, and it is the latter, the unique embodiment of virtues, skills,
characteristics, preferences, experiences, gestures, ideas and beliefs and so forth, that constitute the
flavor and style of a unique personality. It is this flavor and style that are the building blocks of a
person's sense of life, which, according to Rand, is the main component of a person with whom one
falls in love. Being in love implies that two persons' senses of life resonate.
So Rand posited an asymmetry between femininity and masculinity, and hence between men and
women, and that was a mistake. However, there is an asymmetry here, one not properly addressed or
explored by Rand. Hero-worship and heroism/being a hero are asymmetrical a way other than Rand
assumed. Being a hero (which, for Rand means having a productive purpose, developing and using
one's abilities and creativity to the fullest, and earning pride in the process)<23> is something that one
can achieve for oneself, and recognize and acknowledge in oneself through one's self-esteem and pride.
But hero-worship requires another, one who is the object and recipient of worship.
This constitutes a fundamental asymmetry. On the one hand, developing a fully self-sufficient ego with
an independent first-hand 'creator' approach to life is a demanding task. Indeed, it is this task which is
the very theme of The Fountainhead. Still, it involves primarily oneself and thus one self. It rests on
factors that are in principle available to the individual in the first place, factors within the individual.
Finding another self, however - that special other self with whom one has a great deal in common - and
developing and maintaining a relationship with this other resonating self, depends on many external
factors that may be outside an individual's control. In other words, "finding oneself" is a self-contained
task, so to speak, while finding another is not. And this is the asymmetry.
The need for hero worship is also outwardly directed. It is the need for connection, the crucial
foundation for a love relationship. And since this connection emerges through a process of mutual
psychological visibility, the need for a hero to worship in a romantic-sexual context, speaks to the very
essence of the relationship. One might say, in this context, that it is even more crucial than the need to
be a hero.<24> What each hero needs from a relationship, then, is not primarily the recognition of his
or her own heroism, but an outlet for the act of worshiping the other's heroism. Both need to be heroes
in the first place, and both need an external source for hero worship.
A romantic relationship with only one hero and one hero-worshiper is dysfunctional; it would reduce
the hero-worshiper to a kind of metaphysical parasitism. Rand can easily be read to support and uphold
such a position. This is why Rand has never been popular with feminists; and it is certainly a strange
position for her to hold, as an individualist.<25>
There must be an equality of worth and an equality of "soul trading" in a relationship, and the
asymmetry between being a hero and worshiping a hero (between pride and admiration) destroys that
equality, unless both lovers do both. However, since Rand equates masculinity with being a hero, and
femininity with hero-worship, she obscures our perception of the heroic in women.
I have argued for the mutuality, equality and symmetry of these needs in all humans, regardless of
gender. The paradox is that my case is based on inferences drawn from a rereading of Rand's own
philosophy. This suggests that Rand's personal views of gender are at variance with that philosophy.
to say the "I" (Rand [19... , 377). Exploring this topic, Allan Gotthelf (1989), an
Aristotelian scholar and an Objectivist, introduces the opposing concepts of "Aristotelian love", and
"Platonic love":
Gotthelf identifies six key aspects of the Aristotelian alternative to Platonic love. First, that there is
nothing higher or more real than the individual. Second, that completeness of character (moral
perfection) is possible. Third, that humans can achieve full virtues. Fourth, that humans take pride in
this, and that this is profoundly good. Fifth, that love of others is an expression of love for self. And
sixth, that love is an end in itself.
Gotthelf also identifies romantic love as a species of Aristotelian love. Rand was an Aristotelian in her
conceptions of love and sex, building upon and enhancing foundations laid by Aristotle. Since all of
Rand's heroes and heroines are (or come to be) morally complete, they practice Aristotelian love.
However, if one considers their larger context, a gender role pattern emerges. A rereading of the
Randian canon reveals a pattern that reflects Rand's personal preferences, rather than a universal
prescription to be inferred or derived from her philosophy.
GENDER AS HUMAN-MADE
My point then, is that the ideas of contemporary feminism concerning the relationship between gender
and sex are compatible with Objectivism and individualism, unlike Rand's own personal views of
gender. Moreover, these ideas are best supported by empirical findings, unlike research purporting to
support biological essentialism, "research" that is usually biased, methodologically flawed, and
conceptually ambiguous.<28>
So, gender is man-made, not metaphysical;<29> there are no universal gender forms of masculinity or
femininity. Gender is Aristotelian; it is personal and unique to the individual. Gender and sex are two
different things.<30> Hence, those who uphold Platonic gender, including Rand,<31> commit the
epistemological fallacy that Rand called "package-dealing", treating two different things as if they were
one and the same thing.
Platonic gender is in conflict with the idea of tabula rasa, that humans have no inborn ideas. Platonic
gender is sex as destiny and sex as duty: a rationale for cultural and social enforcement of collectivist
gender roles, and for other arbitrary rules regulating the expression of gender and sexuality.
The idea of gender roles (and rules) is a form of collectivism, and is incompatible with individualism.
The feminist claim that there is no connection, or a weak and breakable connection, between sex and
gender<32> is thus not merely an empirical claim, but also a moral imperative. By removing the
collectivist restrictions on gender, it becomes possible to treat people as individual humans first, thus
liberating them to choose their own path. Ironically, many feminists hold a view on gender roles that is
much closer to individualism than are the views of many Randians. When it comes to issues of gender,
contemporary feminism is more "Randian" than Rand.
According to Rand, "Man is a being of self-made soul" - and so, of course, is Woman. So why should
Man (or Woman) let tradition or other group thinking decide their gender expression or sexual
preferences? People of course have a right to be anything they want to be, including a right to limit
themselves with collectivist stereotypes. Rand developed and advocated a philosophy of enlightened
self-interest, with an imperative to "be all you can be". But this striving for one's best self, this "moral
ambitiousness", is irreconcilable with the idea of reducing oneself to a stereotype, to an interchangeable
unit in a collectivist binary gender machine.
Rand ( [1968... ) tells us "that a properly feminine woman does not treat men as if
she were their pal, sister, mother - or leader." But she is inconsistent with her own philosophy.
Relationships go through dynamic shifts. They are not always about sex or love-making. Sometimes a
relationship is about emotional support. For example, through a difficult moment, during stress or a
crisis, one or the other may temporarily assume a role like that of a sister, brother, mother or father, a
situation where a sexual emphasis might be inappropriate.
And pal? Certainly friendship is a vital and necessary ingredient in any long-lasting romantic
relationship. Often a long-lasting relationship begins as a solid friendship. A lover can be a good
pal.<33> There are also such things as sexual friendships - friendships that take on a sexual component,
without the assumption of a lasting romantic relationship, and without love in the strict sense.
Furthermore, sex and love-making are much richer and more complex realms than Rand seems to
allow. Let us identify four different main categories of interaction in human sexuality:
1. male domination with active penile penetration
2. female domination with active vaginal engulfment
3. switching roles, sometimes one dominates, sometimes the other
4. equality with neither partner more active or dominating
Since this is a conceptual categorization, the four roles may be combined in different ways, or used
alternatively in the same sexual experience.<34>
Sciabarra (1995, 200) describes an interpretation of the sexual act as portrayed by Dmitri Sergeyevich
Merezhkovsky, a Russian Symbolist poet in the Silver Age era of Rand's youth:
Merezhkovsky had viewed the sexual act as the highest form of
unity, since each body is interpenetrated by the other. For
Merezhkovsky, true human being involves a synthesis of the
womanly aspect in man, and the manly aspect in woman.
Sciabarra further points out that this ideal of an indivisible androgyne goes beyond what Objectivists -
so far - have accepted, even though some Objectivists reject many culturally-induced gender
stereotypes (at least in the intellectual and emotional realms).
There are two points that require comment here: First, the ideal of "interpenetration" is an unfortunate
term because it is androcentric, evoking the image of penile penetration to the exclusion of vaginal
engulfment. A better term might be, for example, permeation. Second, while the idea of a mutual
interpenetration (or permeation) certainly is an improvement over androcentric, one-sided active male
penetration and passive female reception, it is still problematic. The concept seems to hide a great
variety in the reality it attempts to describe, ranging from complete female domination and active
engulfment to complete male domination and active penetration. Just as the male penetration-concept
excludes the three other main interaction categories, the mutual interpenetration concept seems to over-
emphasize the "equal roles"-category (and perhaps male penetration as well, due to choice of words).
All four sexual-interaction categories are compatible with the feminist "partnership model", as defined
by Riane Eisler, only when identified as equally valid personal preferences. None of them would be
acceptable or compatible if enforced as a universal prescription.
female heroism. These images and myths of a "new ancient feminism" (Stone [1979]
1990 ) can be used as vehicles for assessing and interpreting the feminist potential in Rand's
philosophy.
There is an archetype of female power and heroism that is known in all cultures and all times, even
among the most androcentric and misogynistic ones: The Amazon.<36> Heroic Amazon traditions,
ancient Greek mythology and philosophy (including androcentrism), and Rand's ancient Greece-
influenced philosophy have a number of intriguing conceptual and historical interconnections.
Rand compared one of her heroines to a Valkyrie, a powerful Amazon feminist symbol (see note <5>).
Is there a basis for an amazon feminist interpretation of Rand,<37> and how would such an
interpretation relate to the author's explicit androcentrism?
The virgin, because purity was a kind of freedom from the sexual
claims of any man, was theoretically more free than the wife.
This conceptual freedom was translated into the power of virgins
in myth. Virgins were associated with the wild and untamed;
hunters were often required to maintain chastity. The verb
damazo, "tame", referred to the taking of a wife.<38>
This is a powerful illustration of the cultural sundering of female sexuality and female power. In order
to be a sexual being, a woman must be accessible to a man, available for conquest and penetration. If
she is not, she cannot have a sex life, and a sexuality, because these are given to her by the man. She
cannot take them on her own; she cannot herself win or conquer a man, and take him into her,
engulfing him - or so this mythology will have us believe.
Hence, as a result of this monotonous over-emphasis on the first sexual-interaction category, male
domination and conquest, the powerful woman is widely imagined as virginal, and perhaps even
sexless. Rereading Rand's "Woman President" essay in this context is illuminating. Rand describes the
woman in power as "totally depersonalized", "utterly selfless", "incommunicably lonely",
"unfeminine", "metaphysically inappropriate", and "rationally revolting". Rand's supporters often cite
her defense of women as the intellectual, emotional, moral, and political equals of men. While this
claim about equality is largely true if one emphasizes Rand's meta-ethics and ethics rather than her
views on gender and sexuality,<38b> Rand's view of gender is part of an old, ignoble canonical
tradition stretching back to the androcentric society of ancient Greece. Walker (1983, 1051) notes,
about virtue:
Rand speaks of the "excruciating psychological torture" of women who are allegedly defeminized,
masculinized and made sexless by being powerful and rise to a leadership position over men. What
about the girls who stumble and languish in their search for a worthy role model, a vision of female
heroism? How can young girls know what they should be looking for? What about the boys who are
longing for the vision of a female hero, perhaps without even knowing what they are longing for? Some
girls find both inspiration and role models through identification with male heroic characters, and that's
fine, but we should not have to rely on literary or artistic crossdressing. Then again, how could it be
different in a culture whose very concept of moral virtue is equated with maleness?
bring. A master-slave relationship among men and women entails mutual dependency. As Rand (
[1943] 1986 , 691) observed, "[A] leash is only a rope with a noose at both ends". A
master may be as rigidly confined to his role as a slave. Both the master and the slave could benefit
greatly from breaking out of a gender role prison. They would lose their separate role perks, but they
would collaborate in the process of dismantling the polarization that has crippled them.
This is the potential in Rand's vision - and in its synthesis with feminism. Rand limited herself to the
task of projecting Man the Hero, the ideal man. The time is ripe for Woman the Hero, the ideal woman
- woman as equal and woman as conqueror. Those who wish to carry forth Rand's legacy should take it
upon themselves to uphold "Randian androgynes" - a fully realized heroism that extends to female and
male heroes equally.
It is a synthesis that clears Rand's philosophy of androcentric and Platonic gender ideals, while clearing
feminism of any vestige of collectivism and victimology. This is what a synthesis of Rand and
feminism can achieve: heroism for everyone, human virtues for everyone (no "feminine" or
"masculine" virtues, only human virtues), and the possibility of morally neutral personality options for
everyone. The future belongs to the androgynes and postandrogynes.
NOTES
<1>I use the terms "Randian" and "Randianism" as broad terms describing the philosophy and
philosophers influenced by and building upon Rand (on a par with Aristotelian, Kantian etc.). Hence
"Randian" is a broader term than "Objectivist" (but narrower than "Aristotelian", if one agrees that
Randianism is a tradition within Aristotelianism).
<2> See Rand ( [1943] 1986 ), 219-221. I do not mean to suggest that these scenes
imply or advocate rape. There is a distinction between rape and physical force, and the two must not be
confused. The essential characteristic of rape is non-consensuality (Amsden 1983b).
The use of physical force need not be part of rape, because it can be consensual. Erotic combat is a
valid and moral preference. If one of the lovers has a distinct physical prowess and "superiority", this
can be a resource for sexual playfulness and a basis for hero worship in action.
Just as there can be physical force without rape, there can be rape without physical force. Having sex
with an unconscious person is rape. Sex coerced with threats is rape, even if no actual physical force is
exerted.
<3> One might argue that Dagny Taggart was mentally superior to Hank Rearden and that, in spite of
this, they had a love affair. But this love relationship was a temporary one - it was over the very
moment that Dagny set eyes on John Galt. At that point, Galt became the center of Dagny Taggart's
romantic-sexual life. Both Rearden and later Francisco D'Anconia immediately accept Galt as the
winner of Dagny's love. Hence, the Rearden-Dagny Taggart relationship is not an exception to Rand's
general ideal of male superiority, but a particular way to illustrate how this ideal is supposed to work.
<4> Consider also Rand's reply to Peikoff concerning Think Twice: "Do you think that I would ever
give the central action in a story of mine to anyone but the hero?" (1984, 333).
<5> While Dagny Taggart is usually perceived to be the mature and most fully realized Rand heroine, a
case may be made that in the context of feminism, gender and sexuality, Kira Argounova of We the
Living may in fact be a better candidate. See Valérie Loiret-Prunet's essay in this volume. Since We the
Living is an early work of Rand, the male hero has not yet gained primacy over the heroine. Kira is in
fact stronger than both Andrej and Leo, and profoundly determines the course of their lives, even
though she chooses the pose of submitting to them. The descriptions of Kira underscore her strength
and power, her heroism (3, 4 and 26-37). She is contrasted both to her stereotypically feminine sister
Lydia and to the masculine Communist Comrade Sonia, and she may in many ways be perceived as
androgynous. She is also compared to a Valkyrie (27) - a symbol of female power and the conqueror of
heroes.
Dagny Taggart, on the other hand, is subject to the mature Rand's increased literary efficacy with male
primacy.
<6> Rand [1943] 1986 , 581: "She had the special faculty of making satin and
perfume appear as modern as an aluminum table top. She was Venus rising out of a submarine hatch.
Eve Layton believed that her mission in life was to be the vanguard - it did not matter of what. Her
method had always been to take a careless leap and land triumphantly far ahead of all others. Her
philosophy consisted of one sentence - "I can get away with anything". In conversation she paraphrased
it to her favorite line: "I? I'm the day after tomorrow." She was an expert horsewoman, a racing driver,
a stunt pilot, a swimming champion."
<7> Rand [1936] 1959 , 51: "The young woman had broad shoulders and a
masculine leather jacket; short husky legs and flat masculine oxfords; a red kerchief tied carelessly
over short straight hair; eyes wide apart in a round freckled face; thin lips drawn together with so
obvious and fierce a determination that they seemed weak; dandruff on the black leather of her
shoulders."
<8> Rand generously condemns the irrationality of Freudianism; yet one of the most bizarre
consequences of Rand's views on gender is that she actually provides some rationalization for Freud's
concept of "penis envy". After all, if a penis is required in order to be a powerful subject, a seducer, a
sexual initiator and aggressor, and a hero, then surely it must be rational to want one?
<9> One wonders whether a romantic liaison between a man and a physically stronger, bigger or more
energetic woman (or even a woman equal in these respects) would be considered abnormal or immoral;
the formulations would seem to favor such a conclusion.
<10> Rand divides philosophy into the five disciplines metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics and
esthetics.
<11> Actually, one need only consider Rand's Playboy interview to see a contradiction with her general
philosophy:
This is Rand's general philosophy, and it directly contradicts what Rand says in her "Woman President"
essay.
<12> For a much more plausible and better-investigated interpretation of Joan of Arc, see Leslie
Feinberg (1996), chapter 4 and Walker (1983), s.v. "Joan of Arc".
<13> See Rand 1990, 75-82, 154-58 and 193-96, and Peikoff 1991, 48-52.
<13b> The idea of two universal and separate gendered identities (a "male" and a "female"
consciousness) leads inevitably to polylogism - an idea that Rand was strongly opposed to, and that
Objectivist epistemology rejects.
<14> See for example Fausto-Sterling 1992; Tavris 1992; Caplan and Caplan 1994; Lenskyj 1987;
Rothblatt 1995; Vetterling-Braggin 1982.
gender/sex dualism, depart from the duality. See Mead [1949] 1975 and Feinberg
1996, especially chapter 3.
<22> In a Randian or Aristotelian context, Platonic love is unhealthy and undesirable for several
reasons. First, Platonic love assumes that sex, as opposed to "pure love" (an example of the mind-body
dichotomy), is impure and base. Second, it assumes that love has a "higher purpose" than itself, i.e.,
that love is a means to some other goal, such as moral or religious improvement. Thus, love is not a
goal in itself, but is demoted to a lower status. Third, the idea of Platonic love, based upon Plato's
metaphysics, rejects the importance of the individual, and the possibility for completeness of character
for which an Aristotelian ethics provides.
<23> Interestingly, and unfortunately, neither "hero", "heroism", or "masculinity" is explicitly defined
in the Randian corpus, and none of these terms are to be found in the index of any of Rand's books, nor
in The Ayn Rand Lexicon. Masculinity is, however, implicitly equated with being a hero, since
femininity is defined as hero-worship. But notice how this concept of masculinity contradicts Rand's
general philosophy - where heroism is understood as a human character trait, as a sum and effect of
human life-affirming and necessary virtues. Recently Andrew Bernstein (1998) has addressed the issue
of heroism in an online article, discussed by Gramstad (1998).
<24> It must be stressed, however, that these two needs are not to be conceived as dualistic opposites,
but as relational and as mutually reinforcing, thus constituting an organic unity. Consider Gail
Wynand's worship of Dominique in The Fountainhead: "It was a strange glance; she had noticed it
before; a glance of simple worship. And it made her realize that there is a stage of worship which
makes the worshiper himself an object of reverence." (Rand [1943] 1986 , 509). In
other words, the ability to worship is both an expression of a person's heroism and a causal factor in
creating and establishing that heroism. In order to become heroic, one must first desire heroic being,
and in order to desire this, one must value (or worship) the perceived heroism in another. So hero-
worship is more fundamental, but the fundamental and the derivative constitute a reciprocal bicausal
organic whole. For a discussion of the role and importance of organic unity in Rand's thought, see
Sciabarra 1995, especially 17, 117, 128, 138, 145, 256, 269 and 403 n. 5.
A relationship with one hero and one hero-worshiper would sunder the organic unity of the
relationship, and create dualistic opposition (conflict). This is why we talk about "opposite" sexes and a
"war between the sexes". This feminist rereading of Rand stresses organic unity in its rejection of
"opposite" sexes and the gender-role collectivist ideology associated with them.
<25> The famous Russian film creator Andrej Tarkovskij has said that when the masculine world and
the feminine world meet in a relationship, the feminine must give way and reorient itself according to
the masculine. This attitude seems to be very common in Russia, taken for granted even by the
Communists. Rand may have inherited this attitude from her environment (see Sciabarra 1995). It was
a part of the Russian air she breathed, an aspect of the Russian culture of her youth, and may have been
reinforced by Rand's childhood admiration of Hollywood.
<26> See Rand [1968] 1988 . See also notes 15 and 34.
<27> See note 11.
<28> See for example Fausto-Sterling 1992; Tavris 1992; Caplan and Caplan 1994; Lenskyj 1987;
Rothblatt 1995; Vetterling-Braggin 1982.
<29> Normally I would say "human-made", not "man-made". However, I use the term man-made at
this juncture, because "the metaphysical versus the man-made" is a central motif and a well-known
phrase in Rand's philosophy (see her essay by that title in Rand 1982b). Furthermore, the
androcentrism, misogyny, gender polarization and biological essentialism in our culture, are to a large
degree man-made.
<30> For a discussion of the different meanings of sex and gender, see the introduction to Vetterling-
Braggin 1982. See also Burke 1996 and Bem 1993. See also this popular online source: What is
Gender? An Anthropologist From Mars, http://www.chaparraltree.com/raq/whatis.shtml.
<31> It is a curious parallel between Rand and Aristotle that neither was able to overcome so many of
the poor gender stereotypes of their respective ages, in spite of rethinking and innovating so many other
areas of their contemporary thought. Even more curious is the fact that Plato was a gender egalitarian;
he did not accept the low and restricted view of women of his day. Aristotle was the one who, in
advocating male and female essences, applied Platonic forms to gender.
<32> See Vetterling-Braggin 1982, part 4. See also Tavris 1992; Caplan and Caplan 1994; Lenskyj
1987.
<33> Rand's novels have many instances of this. For example, Dagny was a pal to Frisco before their
love affair ended; after they became "enemies", their relations retained elements of friendship. Hank
and Dagny were friendly business associates.
<34> There are other dimensions as well, concerning, for example, degrees of tenderness, and of
playfulness (Branden 1983). Yet another dimension is the type of activity, such as polymorphous
(nongenital) sex. The idea of genital sex as the only worthy form of sex, while anything else is just
"foreplay", is another result of the androcentric and gender-polarized view of human sexuality. In order
to fully realize its sexual potential, each sexual activity needs to be recognized and perceived as an end
in itself, not as a means to some other or "higher" end.
Moreover, since the gender of the lovers does not make any difference (there is no such thing as a
gender role or a gender duty), the lovers need not be of different sexes. They may both be of the one
sex, or the other sex, or one of each sex. Being heterosexual, I frame this whole essay in heterosexual
terms, but I do not see any reason to assume that the arguments I make are not equally valid for a gay
or lesbian couple. Quite the contrary, unlike many Objectivists, who exhibit antigay sentiment, I say
that we don't need to know the developmental origins of homosexuality in order to evaluate its
morality. The validity of homosexuality as a neutral moral option (neither a virtue nor a vice) - like
heterosexuality - follows directly from these two premises: (1) the "metaphysical egalitarianism" of
women and men, and (2) the mutuality of pride and admiration in relationships as I have described.
This is in stark contrast to Rand, who perceived homosexuality as "immoral" and "disgusting", a result
of "psychological flaws and corruptions" (Rand 1971). One might assume that she would be most
opposed to lesbianism, since that, by her own definition, supposedly cannot involve a hero. This
assumption seems to be confirmed in Rand's expressed disgust with the Women's Lib movement: "[T]o
proclaim spiritual sisterhood with lesbians, and to swear eternal hostility to men - is so repulsive a set
of premises from so loathsome a sense of life that an accurate commentary would require the kind of
language I do not like to see in print." See Rand (1975a, 175). Rand's antigay sentiment has been
softened somewhat by Peikoff (1994). Peikoff's statement is worth quoting at length:
Peikoff admits that "philosophy as such has [nothing] to say about sexual orientation", but he suggests
that Roark and Wynand do not have a sexual relationship, because "essential" to sexuality is "conquest
and surrender, or dominance and submission". Rand, he says, saw these roles not as arbitrary, but as
having an "anatomical basis. There has to be a reason in the nature of the two bodies why one conquers
and one surrenders. Otherwise, she thought it was arbitrary, demeaning and irrational. ... for that reason
she believed that homosexuality was improper. Not immoral. ... You could be completely moral and
just trapped in an upbringing and conclusions that you didn't understand, but objectively wrong, in that,
knowingly or not, it is a defiance of one of the conditions of a mature and healthy sexual relationship.
But that is not the same thing ... as this irreplaceable male love relationship", symbolized in the Roark-
Wynand connection.
Given Rand's expressed disgust with homosexuality, and her view of romantic love as an "integrated
response of mind and body, of love and sexual desire", as a "profound, exalted, lifelong passion that
unites ... mind and body in the sexual act" (1988, 54-56), it is clear that Peikoff has deviated from
Rand's position - even while maintaining her Platonic view of gender.
<35> It may be noted that Ancient Greece had its share of strong women, exemplified in pantheons,
myths, literature, theater plays and so forth. But the range of choice, expression and societal
participation for women was severely limited. According to Larson (1995, 8): "As a general rule, only
heroines who lack significant familial ties (i.e., husband or son) can stand alone" - and thus be
independent female heroes.
<36> The Amazons comprised different peoples living in Asia Minor and North Africa, among whom
women were political and military leaders, and soldiers (Bell 1991; Stone 1976,
[1979... ; Walker 1983). They are known from Greek legends; the Greeks feared them and they were
long believed to be invincible. The term has survived in the vernacular, usually referring to any tall and
strong woman - or, more generally, referring to any woman who is vigorous, unafraid, outspoken.
Women like this are known in all cultures. But androcentric societies disparage and debase them, and
institutionalize social and cultural patterns that suppress and oppress such qualities in girls and women.
<37> The soc.feminism terminology FAQ file defines Amazon feminism thus:
(http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/hypertext/faq/usenet/feminism/terms/faq.html)
<38> Modern texts about reclaiming "Wild Woman" archetypes address the same situation. See for
example Estes 1995.
<38b> But one may ask, if a woman, qua woman, is incapable of being a sexual conqueror and thus of
experiencing sexual conquest, can she then be said to be the emotional equal of man? And if the rapture
and power of a sexual conquest, caused by the conqueror, is a measure of character strength or virtue,
as Rand often seems to suggest, can one then truly say that woman are morally equal to man when it is
assumed that she is incapable of (or must be discouraged from) being a conqueror?
<38c> Borrowing a phrase from Rand: today we are witnessing "[T]he first of their return".
<39> For example Elizabeth Moon, Jessica Amanda Salmonson, Joanna Russ, Marion Zimmer
Bradley, Mercedes Lackey, Tanith Lee, Anne McCaffrey, David Weber, James Schmitz, Ingar
Knudtsen.
REFERENCES
Amsden, Diana Avery. 1983a. An Index to Ayn Rand's "Atlas Shrugged". Santa Fe: Diana Avery
Amsden.
Amsden, Diana Avery. 1983b. Some Observations on Ayn Rand and Her Work. North Hollywood,
Calif. Pamphlet.
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Bem, Sandra Lipsitz. 1971. The theory and measurement of androgyny. Journal of Personality and
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Bem, Sandra Lipsitz. 1993. The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Bernstein, Andrew. 1998. The Philosophical Foundations of Heroism.
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Burke, Phyllis. 1996 Gender Shock: Exploding the Myths of Male and Female. New York: Anchor
Books.
Caplan, Paula J., and Jerry Caplan. 1994. Thinking Critically About Research on Sex and Gender. New
York: HarperCollins.
Chesler, Phyllis. 1994. Patriarchy: Notes of an Expert Witness. Monroe, Maine: Common Courage
Press.
Eisler, Riane. [1987] 1995 . The Chalice and the Blade: Our History, Our Future.
San Francisco: Harper.
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Archetype. New York: Ballantine.
Farrell, Warren. 1990. Why Men Are the Way They Are. London: Bantam.
Farrell, Warren. 1994. The Myth of Male Power. London: Fourth Estate.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. 1992 Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Women and Men. New York:
Basic Books.
Feinberg, Leslie. 1993. Stone Butch Blues. Ithaca, New York: Firebrand.
Feinberg, Leslie 1996. Transgender Warriors: Making History From Joan of Arc to RuPaul. Boston:
Beacon Press.
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Museum Books. New York: Rizzoli International Publications.
Gladstein, Mimi Reisel. 1986. The Ayn Rand Companion. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Gotthelf, Allan. 1989. Love and Philosophy: Aristotelian vs. Platonic. Handout from lecture delivered
at the EuroCon Objectivist Conference in Amsterdam, 27 May.
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published in Amazons International no. 19, 1992, http://www.etext.org/Politics/Amazons.Intl/ai.19 )
Gramstad, Thomas. 1992. Red Sonja - a review. Amazons International no. 17.
http://www.etext.org/Politics/Amazons.Intl/ai.17
Gramstad, Thomas. 1998. Heroism: Rand's and Bernstein's. Full Context 10, no. 7:4-6.
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/heroism.html
Mead, Margaret. [1949] 1975 . Male and Female: The Classic Study of the Sexes.
New York: William Morrow.
Monaghan, Patricia. 1990 The Book of Goddesses and Heroines. St. Paul, Minn.: Llewellyn
Publications.
Naisbitt, John and Patricia Aburdene. 1994. Megatrends for Women. London: Arrow Books.
Nelson, Mariah Burton. 1991. Are We Winning Yet? How Women Are Changing Sports and Sports Are
Changing Women. New York: Random House.
Nelson, Mariah Burton. 1994. The Stronger Women Get, the More Men Love Football: Sexism and the
American Culture of Sports. New York: Avon Books.
Peikoff, Leonard. 1991. Objectivism: The philosophy of Ayn Rand. New York: Penguin Dutton.
Peikoff, Leonard. 1994. Eight Great Plays. 9 lectures (18 audio tapes), tape 4, 2B. New Milford, Conn.:
Second Renaissance Books.
Rand, Ayn. [1936] 1959 . We the Living. New York: Random House.
Rand, Ayn. [1961] 1968 . For the New Intellectual. New York: New American
Library.
Rand, Ayn. 1964. Playboy interview with Ayn Rand: A Candid Conversation with the Fountainhead of
"Objectivism". By Alvin Toffler. Playboy, March, 35-43.
Rand, Ayn. [1964] 1970 . The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism.
New York: New American Library.
Rand, Ayn. 1968. Night of January 16th. New York: New American Library.
Rand, Ayn. [19... . About a Woman President. In The Voice of Reason: Essays in
Objectivist Thought, edited by Leonard Peikoff. New York: New American Library. Originally
published in The Objectivist, December 1968.
Rand, Ayn. 1971. The Moratorium on Brains. Oceanside, Calif.: Second Renaissance Books.
Audiotape.
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York: New American Library.
Rand, Ayn. 1975b. The comprachicos. In The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, 2d rev. ed.
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Leonard Peikoff. New York: New American Library.
Rothblatt, Martine. 1995. The Apartheid of Sex: A Manifesto on the Freedom of Gender. New York:
Crown Publications.
Sciabarra, Chris Matthew. 1995. Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical. University Park: Pennsylvania State
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WEB REFERENCES
Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand web site
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/femstart.htm
Randian Feminism mailing list
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/lists/randian-feminism.html
REAL BIOLOGY IS INDIVIDUALIST, NOT
COLLECTIVIST
A response to Cathy Young's review of Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand
Copyright Thomas Gramstad (september 1999)
In her fruitful and engaging review of Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand in the August/September
1999 issue of Reason magazine, available at http://www.reason.com/9908/bk.cy.hear.html, Cathy
Young writes that
Gramstad offers a rousing "Randian-feminist synthesis" in
which the heroic individualist potential of Rand's philosophy
is fully extended to women. Like Brown and some other
contributors, however, he is much too uncritical of the
feminist dogma that all psychological differences between the
sexes are social in origin, and much too inclined to dismiss
biological theories of difference by citing ideologically
driven critiques.
Not so; I do not deny the importance of biology. Young fails to consider that biological difference does
not mean, and cannot be reduced to, sex difference. People are indeed so different, even
biologically, that relying on biological averages or statistical tendencies is often misleading and
unhelpful and may even be life threatening. A New Scientist article, 14 Nov 1998 pp. 32-36, titled
Tailor Made Personal Drugs to Suit Your Genes, illustrates this point. What is good and healthy for one
person may be unhealthy or even poison for another. Preferences in food and drinking no doubt have a
significant biological component. Other preferences and values may as well.
But sociobiologists and social conservatives seem to have misunderstood what conclusions may be
drawn from this. The conclusion is not one about averages, uniformity and biology as destiny. On the
contrary, the conclusion is one about customization, individuality, and one's unique identity as destiny.
One is reminded of Barry Vacker's vital essay (in Feminist Interpretations) and his fundamentally
important identification of second wave esthetical paradigms vs. third wave ditto.
Now, observe two things.
1. The bulk of human biological difference is not related to sex. Most biological differences
between people are not related to reproduction.
2. Emphasizing "group differences" (real or imaginary) always implies deemphasizing,
reducing, marginalizing and denying individual differences. I always find it strange and
self-contradictory when libertarians and other alleged individualists are eager to run
gender collectivist hammerheads into the heads of individuals whose only crime is the
expression of non-majority gender or sexual preferences.
Anyone may make an argument that biology is important, or that environmental influences are small
compared to biological factors in some area or even many areas. Fine, but such a case, even when it
succeeds, is not per se an argument for biological or inherent sex roles because of observation no. 1
above. So far this would be just a lack of a connection, a missing link in the chain of reasoning. But
now consider observation no. 2: one sees that biology is in fact opposed to sex role stereotypes,
because the former implies individualism and variety while the latter implies collectivism and
conformity.
"Biological individualism" implies that people are all different, as individuals, and since these
differences are inherent, they are hard to change - and why would an individualist feel compelled to
change or erase individual differences and promote conformity, anyway? Sex role stereotypes, on
the other hand, are based on group identity and enforcement of group rules designed to promote
conformity, and on a belief that all men are fundamentally the same and all women are fundamentally
the same, and that they are, not different, but "opposites".
Of course, all these individual differences would be just as real and inherent/incorporated in the
individual if they were the result of early choices or early environmental influences. Neither biology,
nor the social sciences and environmentalist theories about humans, support gender collectivist ideas
about sex roles. These ideas are ideological, not scientific. The sex role comprachicos don't have a
scientific leg to stand on.
Space constraints did not allow me to discuss biological individualism in an already densely packed
article. I did, however, address the ideological nature and agendas involved in gender and sex research.
Young refers to "feminist dogma" and "ideologically driven critiques", but she got it backwards.
Sociobiology, for example, is more ideology than science, dogmatic and riddled with bias and hidden
agendas. It would be more aptly called sociobiologism.
Pointing out patriarchally inconvenient facts like the above inevitably inspire some alleged champions
of liberty and individualism to label me Politically Correct... well, I can live with that. In my
experience, the PC epithet is commonly used as substitute for argument by those who prefer the
secondhander collectivist lifestyle of Patriarchal Correctness and sex role stereotypes. At her best,
Rand championed sex as celebration of life, the most intense and ecstatic expression of joy, pride and
happiness. In order to realize that ideal, Patriarchally Correct sexuality ("wham bam, thank you
ma'am") must be rejected, so that the full scale and potential of human sexuality in all its wonderfully
polymorphous, individually unique and artistically diverse glory may be explored and embraced.
I have no wish to rob Young of what she describes as "perversely refreshing" ideas of male dominance
- as one "natural way of things" among many others. I would like to remind her that each and every
natural way is never a universal way. Nature thrives on variety and diversity, which are both
preconditions and results of evolutionary change. Natural selection cannot work in the absence of
biological variety, and a one-way one-universal-form monoculture is not only evolutionary
vulnerable and unstable, it is headed for extinction.
How is that for a "biological theory of difference".
VIVE LES DIFFERENCES!
Copyright Thomas Gramstad
ALF Newsletter # 66, Spring 1998
The phrase Vive la Difference is regularly invoked by social conservatives, on the pretext that it serves
to promote individual variation and liberty, in the form of distinct men and women - as opposed to an
alleged undistinct soup of ungendered, neuter "human beings".
But is it really the case that this phrase serves to promote individualism and diversity? Or is it instead a
tool of conformism and oppression?
Human beings are not ungendered or neuter beings, and the incorporation of both masculine and
feminine psychological characteristics does not produce an undistinct neuter average mix. Just who are
these people who allegedly advocate neuter, identical, interchangeable beings? Where are those who
allegedly advocate this as an ideal that humanity ought to aspire to? "Unisex" fashion trend setters,
psychological androgynists, social constructionists, transgender activists, sex researchers and gender
radicals - all these advocate choice, liberty and diversity, not a neutered conformism.
Why then, do the advocates of Vive la Difference construct such an enemy image? What purpose does
the invention of an enemy image of neutered conformism serve? Is it an innocuous, if misguided,
attempt to stress and defend liberty - or is it a sinister blueprint for oppression and intimidating
collectivism?
Notes
<1> The term "polyandrogyny", rather than androgyny, has been suggested in order to stress the great
variety and diversity that androgyny leads to. That is, contrary to the claims of gender dualists,
androgyny does not advocate one uniform model for all people, as opposed to the two uniform models
of gender dualists. Instead, androgyny rejects the idea of uniformism and celebrates human variety and
diversity.
See Vetterling-Braggin 1982 for essays and articles discussing different concepts and terminologies of
androgyny.
Literature
Bem, Sandra Lipsitz (1971): The theory and measurement of androgyny, in: Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 37, pp. 1047-1054.
Bem, Sandra Lipsitz (1993): The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality.
Yale University Press.
Burke, Phyllis (1996): Gender Shock: Exploding the Myths of Male and Female. Anchor Books, New
York.
Caplan, Paula J. & Caplan, Jerry (1994): Thinking Critically About Research on Sex and Gender.
HarperCollins, New York.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne (1992): Myths of Gender: Biological Theories About Women and Men. Basic
Books, New York.
Feinberg, Leslie (1993): Stone Butch Blues. Firebrand, Ithaca, New York.
Gramstad, Thomas (1998): The Androgyny and Gender Dialectics Web Page: an online guide to gender
diversity.
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/gnd/androgyny.html
ISNA: The Intersex Society of North America
http://www.isna.org/
Rothblatt, Martine (1995): The Apartheid of Sex: A Manifesto on the Freedom of Gender. Crown
Publications, New York.
Stoltenberg, John (1980): Future Genders. Omni Magazine, May issue.
Tavris, Carol (1992): The Mismeasure of Woman: Why Women are not the Better Sex, the Inferior Sex,
or the Opposite Sex. Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, New York.
Vetterling-Braggin, Mary (ed.) (1982): "Femininity," "Masculinity," and "Androgyny": A Modern
Philosophical Discussion. Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, Towota, NJ.
THE CULTURAL PHENOMENON OF WARRIOR
HEROINES
IFEMINISTS.COM CHAT SESSION WITH THOMAS GRAMSTAD
those 15-20 minutes as well (see Part 2). This includes some
replies
DEFINING FEMINISM
The following tripartite definition is from the soc.feminism FAQ file
(http://www.cs.uu.nl/wais/html/na-dir/feminism/info.html):
1. The belief that women and men are, and have been, treated
differently by our society, and that women have frequently
and systematically been unable to participate fully in all
social arenas and institutions.
2. A desire to change that situation.
3. That this gives a "new" point-of-view on society, when
eliminating old assumptions about why things are the way
they are, and looking at it from the perspective that women
are not inferior and men are not "the norm."
It does not follow the classical Aristotelian genus-species structure of definitions, yet clearly refers to
and identifies an aspect of reality.
ADJECTIVAL FEMINISM
You may agree with the core theory of feminism without fitting into any branch of feminism you know
about. You can believe that women and men should be politically, economically and socially equal for
your own reasons and hold your own ideas pertaining to how to make it happen. This freedom leads to
the diversity of ''adjectival feminisms''. But at the core, feminism remains a theory that men and women
should be politically, socially, and economically equal.
This quotation - Rebecca West in The Clarion, 1913 - shows that Lamont is wrong when he claims that
the term ''feminism'' was not commonly used in earlier times and that the term was retrofitted by
feminists in the 1960s and 70s. The early use of ''feminism'' is well documented.
The soc.feminism Terminologies file lists 16 different types of feminism. They cover a large spectrum
and convey the diversity of feminism. Of these, 7 can easily be embraced by Objectivists and Randians,
while 5 are clearly incompatible.
A Randian feminism must be individualist. You could use individualist as an adjective (''individualist
feminist''). Or - probably better - you can use both as nouns, saying that you are an individualist and a
feminist. There is no reason to fear the word feminist.
ENDNOTES
1. Harry Binswanger's Ayn Rand Lexicon is comprised almost entirely of direct quotations of
statements taken from Rand's more technical philosophic writings. The excerpts range from single
sentence definitions to extended passages. The Lexicon is, in effect, an annotated index of the body of
Rand's non-fiction writings, also including excerpts from her fiction that she had herself referenced or
quoted in her commentaries and theoretical essays.
2. Feminist historians attribute this subordination of the goddess to a cultural transition toward political
hierarchy (presaging monotheism and the Roman legal system) and, more ominously, a move away
from secular naturalism. Traditional art history texts as well as those authored by contemporary
feminist historians have traced the naturalism of classical Ancient Greek imagery to an earlier Archaic
period emerging in (Minoan) Crete and Mycenae circa 2,500 to 1400 B.C.E., or earlier. (Eisler, 1987,
Chap. 3; Platon, 1966) Archaeologists have in recent decades uncovered sculptures and wall paintings
depicting athletic figures, male and female, engaged in dance, sport, and games. This imagery is seen to
be a distinct departure from Ancient Egyptian figures which tended to be geometrically stylized,
frontal, and static. In contrast, the Archaic Greek forms are remarkably agile and graceful, moving
more freely, often standing with their weight and balance shifted off center. (Much of this same sort of
analysis applies to depictions of land and sea animals as well.)
The term naturalistic, in this context, refers to imagery based upon careful observation of the natural
world, to be contrasted with geometric, iconic, stylized representations. Naturalistic representations in
early (Archaic) Ancient Greek visual art indicate careful study of anatomy and biology, revealed
particularly in the representation of movement and proportions of figures. This sense of the terms
"naturalistic" or "naturalism" is distinct from its use as a reference to a style of visual and literary art
depicting renderings of ordinary, everyday (genre) subject matter.
3. In her discussion of the historical origins of myth-making, Powers (1991) offers a (non-technical)
definition of the function of art that bears a striking resemblance to Rand's. Human beings are said to
be "the only species which has cerebral encounters with abstract issues,... which asks metaphysical
questions... [which] are potentially overwhelming.... [From a] drive for life, the species [evolved]...
religious rituals and mythmaking. Thus imaginative defenses were created... envision[ing] spirits which
they might placate,... and subsequently evolved a conception of divinity... conceptualiz[ing] themselves
as heroic, as chosen." (pp. 201-202) And for an excellent summary of Rand's ideas on how art serves a
basic human psychological requirement, see M.F. Enright's "Why man needs approval," in Objectivity
(1:2), pp. 68-71).
REFERENCES
Binswanger, Harry (ed., 1986). The Ayn Rand Lexicon, NY: New American Lib.
Branden, Barbara (1986). The Passion of Ayn Rand, NY: Doubleday.
Branden, Nathaniel (1962). Who is Ayn Rand?, NY: Paperback Lib.
__________ (1983). Honoring the Self, Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher.
__________ (1989). Judgment Day: My Years with Ayn Rand, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Broudy, Harry (1964). "The structure of knowledge in the arts," in Education and the Structure of
Knowledge (S. Elam, ed.), Chicago: Rand McNally.
Downing, Christine (1981). The Goddess, NY: Continuum.
Eisler, Riane (1988). The Chalice and the Blade, NY: Harper & Row.
Enright, Marsha Familaro (1992). "Why man needs approval," in Objectivity (1:2).
Gibran, Kahlil (1970). The Prophet, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Gladstein, Mimi Reisel (1984). The Ayn Rand Companion, London:Greenwood Press.
_________(1978). "Ayn Rand and feminism: an unlikely alliance," in College English (39:6).
Grizzuti Harrison, Barbara (1978). "Psyching out Ayn Rand," in Ms. Magazine (Sept.)
10S Journal (Inst. for Objectivist Studies newsletter). N. Branden reference in Feb.1997 issue, p. 12;
Bidinotto quotation appearing in a summary of his lecture entitled "The case for cultural optimism,"
June, 1996, p.2.
Kelley, David (1998). "The autobiography of an idea," in Navigator, NY: Inst. for Objectivist Studies,
Feb.
McElroy, Wendy, ed. (1991). Freedom, Feminism, and the State (2nd ed.), NY: Holmes & Meier.
Orenstein, Gloria Fenman (1990). The Reflowering of the Goddess, NY: Pergamon Press.
Platon, Nicolas (1966). Crete, Geneva: Nagel.
Powers, Meredith A. (1991). The Heroine in Western Literature, NC: McFarland.
Rand, Ayn (1994). The Fountainhead, NY: Plume/Penguin.
__________ (1957). Atlas Shrugged, NY: Random House.
__________ (Nathaniel Branden, co-author, 1964). The Virtue of Selfishness, NY: New American Lib.
__________ (1968). Night of January 16th, NY: World.
__________ (1968). "An answer to readers: about a woman president," in The Objectivist (Dec.) (or
Peikoff, ed. op cit., 1989).
__________ (1969). The Romantic Manifesto, Cleveland, OH:World.
__________ (1971). "Apollo and Dionysus" (Chapt. 2), in The New Left: The Anti-industrial
Revolution, NY:New American Lib.
__________ (1989). The Voice of Reason (L. Peikoff, ed.), NY: New American Lib.
_________ (1962-1965, with Nathaniel Branden, ed.). The Objectivist Newsletter (vols. 1-4), NY: The
Objectivist.
Sciabarra, Chris Matthew (1995). Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, PA: The Penn State U. Press.
Chapter 5
1972, 218)
The economic relations that divide classes, then, have something to do with the combination of capital
(in the sense of means of production). The situation and interests of the mass, or the class against
capital (in the sense of the owners of the means of production), is determined by their relation to the
means of production. Likewise, one expects, for the situation and interests of the capitalist class.
How does one class exploit another by way of economic relations? Here is a brief list, by Engels, of the
essential features of capitalist relations of production:
Here is how it seems to work. Under feudalism, production and exchange were both individual: the
individual tenant farmer worked the land, and likewise individual farmers, merchants, or lords
exchanged goods (sometimes by way of appropriation). Under capitalism, due to technological
developments, production has become social while exchange remains individual. Because workers
exchange their labor for pay, a fundamental distortion is introduced into the distribution of wealth:
workers socially produce all of the value in the economy, but they individually exchange some of it
away. Thus capitalist relations of production give rise to two classes: the socially producing class, and
the class to which this class exchanges some of the value which they produce. The former class is the
proletariat, and the latter the bourgeoisie or capitalist class.
For Marx, then, capitalist relations of production constitute the owners and workers of capital as
opposed groups playing a zero-sum game: any value gained by the owners is of necessity taken from
the workers, because the owners do not participate in the social process of production and hence make
no productive contribution to the social product (the aggregate wealth of the community). This
oppositional relation constitutes workers and owners of capital as different in interests, as well as mode
of life and culture. The relations of production become one of Marx's essential analytic tools in coming
to understand the nature of capitalist political economy and hence the exploitative social relations to
which it gives rise.
The libertarian approach to the theory of class which I will present here is modeled on Marx's but seeks
to avoid certain key errors which he makes. A core error of Marx's account is his failure to place the
individual business concern within its economic context. It is because of this failure that Engels's
explanation would continue, moving on to list essential features of the late stages of capitalism like
this:
Engels does not understand the relationship of the owner of capital to the market within which she
operates, and hence has failed to correctly grasp the relationship between worker and owner of capital.
Ironically, this is because he has failed to grasp the social character of the productive forces.<1> Here
is a very simplified version of what he has failed to recognize.
The individual business concern produces goods of some kind which are sold on a market. The owner
of that concern must design the concern to maximize her profit. She does this by arranging to produce
goods for which there is a relatively high demand relative to supply, and for which cost is low relative
to expected income. However, she cannot arrange things in this way without knowing the social
relations of supply and demand, and the expected costs and income to be expended and derived from a
given arrangement of the productive forces. This information exists in the form of prices: current prices
of the good to be produced, as well as the capital and labor required to produce those goods. Without
prices, the owner of an individual business concern could make no decisions at all; no investment
decision could be any more rational than any other.
If we were to, through some form of social action, eliminate the distinction between Marx's classes,
such that the owners of the business concern are identical with those who work at it, the problem to be
solved would not disappear (nor need it be exacerbated). The owners of a worker-owned business
concern would have as their goal (ceteris paribus, of course - homo economicus is a myth) the
maximization of their wealth, which would be derived in the form of a portion of the profits gained by
their business concern. They would thus benefit from the social information carried by prices, just as
the bourgeois owner of the business would have benefited.
However, prices can exist only under social conditions of exchange. Only when agents are willing to
exchange goods or services with one another is there a price that they are willing to pay for those goods
or services which they desire. But if there is no price without exchange, and no exchange without a
market, then there can no rational economic decision-making without a market. Engels is wrong to say
that the function of the bourgeoisie could be taken over by salaried state employees. It could be taken
over by workers who retained the social difference between firms, so that prices could be established
on an open market, but it could not be taken over by a single agent (construed as a single person or
organization, such as the state) and continue to function.
So the existence of a market is crucial to rational economic decision-making, because economic
decision-making is typically decision-making in a social context, and crucial information about this
social context is carried in the form of prices. But this implies that there must be persons who attend to
the market and are empowered to direct capital in those ways most likely to produce a profit. It is quite
possible for this agent to be the workers of a firm, organized for mutual advantage in the marketplace.
But there are reasons why this arrangement may not be most efficient. Different persons have different
levels of skill at understanding market signals,<2> and it is often most efficient that those who have the
necessary skill and inclination focus their efforts in this area, even as others focus their efforts
elsewhere, often as workers in a business concern owned by one who has the necessary training to
direct capital to achieve a profit. Owners and workers each benefit from this arrangement: owners of
capital have workers to produce the goods for which the owners have realized there is substantial social
demand, while workers' efforts are rendered more efficient and more remunerative by their
participation in a profitable concern. The owners are performing a valuable social service and their
salaries are not stolen from the workers. Indeed, the crucial labor performed by the owners of capital
make possible the rational direction of the business concern and hence create the opportunity of the
worker to engage in social production just as the crucial labor performed by the workers make possible
the business concern and hence create the opportunity of the owner to engage in rational direction
according to signals of social supply and demand. The division of labor here achieved is no more
sinister than any other and does not give rise to a division between classes.
Obviously, there can be conflicts of interest between owners and workers of capital; for this reason,
libertarian social theory recognizes that workers must be empowered to form unions and strike and that
there must be some third party capable of mediating between the two. (These conditions are not met if
the 'third party' is the state acting on behalf of the owners, and the form which mediation takes is
violence directed against workers.) But it is not plain that such conflicts are necessary or will occur
systematically in an unregulated marketplace.<3>
Despite the failure of Marxism to grasp the social nature of production (and hence to grasp the relation
between the owner and worker of capital), there are important insights to be gained into the nature of
classes from Marx's approach. For Marx, a class is a relational group which acquires its identity as a
class by its oppositional relations with other classes. These oppositional relations are essentially
economic in nature. These relations, furthermore, are key to explaining social and economic
phenomena.
Libertarian social theory seeks to understand contemporary social relations in terms of class. But
Marx's theory of class makes sense only if we have already accepted his mistaken theory of the worker-
capitalist relation. Libertarian analysts, however, have discovered that there is a cleavage within
contemporary society which has much the same effects which Marx thought that the cleavage between
worker and capitalist had. Often the very same economic events (such as, crucially, the business cycle)
which Marx would have explained with reference to the divide between workers and capitalists can be
explained with reference to the divide between the majority of the populace and the owners of banks
when they are organized either as a cartel or under the administration of a central reserve bank.
(Grinder and Hagel 1977, 64) Grinder and Hagel argue that, as capitalism advances and acquires
greater internal complexity,
The argument is this. Some individual depositors wish to defer consumption in return for greater
consumption at a later time. They wish to gain the maximum future consumption, that is, the maximum
rate of interest. But in general higher-interest investments are also higher-risk investments. The
depositor is willing to forego the maximum possible interest in return for a preferable ratio of risk to
interest; that is, she is willing to lower her expected return if she can get a higher return with less risk
than she would have done otherwise. The bank is the institution which she employs to gain a relatively
high return on her investment, and she pays the bank for taking on the risk of her investment by
lowering the return which she requires. Moreover, the depositor typically is not an expert on financial
matters and thus has greater confidence in the investment decisions made by a bank than she would
make herself; alternately, she may simply not wish to spend time acquiring the knowledge of the
market which is necessary for wise investment. Thus, the bank becomes the agency which is primary
economic decision-maker, in lieu of the individual depositor/investor.<4>
Because banks make their money by way of lending money, it will be to their benefit to loan more
money rather than less. Thus banks will be tempted to maintain ever-smaller fractions of their
depositors' deposits on hand for repayment should those depositors wish to withdraw their funds; that
is, they will be tempted to pursue inflationary policies. However, those banks with a lesser fractional
reserve will have more difficulty should many of their investments fail and/or should many of their
depositors seek to withdraw their money simultaneously. At worst, the less fractional reserve a bank
has on hand the more likely it is to fail and thus potentially destroy its depositors' savings. Since
depositors wish to avoid such risks, they will tend to gravitate toward banks with relatively high
fractional reserves (or even full reserves). Thus there is a market pressure toward higher reserves.
However, it is possible to eliminate this pressure. This can occur if all banks systematically maintain
lower reserves. But this cannot be arranged for on the unfettered market, because cartelization on the
market creates a prisoner's dilemma: each bank will benefit from defecting from the cartel; knowing
that each other bank faces the same temptation to defect, each bank is likely to defect. But that an
inflationary banking cartel cannot be created in the unfettered market does not imply that an
inflationary banking cartel cannot be created. All that is necessary is fetters:
Banks can be cartelized only by way of state intervention. If the state creates a bank that backs all
individual banks, then each bank may pursue inflationary policies and reduce fractional reserves
without fear of failure. Individual banks are aware that the central bank will pay its depositors should
its investments fail, and thus are unmotivated to preserve depositor confidence. To put the point another
way, depositor confidence has been placed, not in the bank, but in the state.<5>
For libertarian social theorists like Grinder and Hagel, the basic division between classes comes about
because of the structurally distortive effects of state action on the economy. State intervention in the
banking sector is both spectacularly destructive to the economy<6> and tends to move a certain group
of well-placed bankers from a position of responsibility to depositors and adherence to market
discipline into a position of economic class dominance.
Grinder and Hagel categorize different groups within the dominant class. They aren't quite clear on the
nature of the actual ruling class that they distinguish from other groups, but it flows from the logic of
their argument to this point that it would stem from the original group of bankers who lobbied for
cartelization. I'll call this the state-banking nexus. Additional constituents of the class of beneficiaries
of state action include the state bureaucracy by which the ruling class rules, upper echelons of the
military and their commercial suppliers (which two groups together constitute the military-industrial
complex), the political party elite who are funded largely by the ruling class (and who deliver up the
faE7ade of functioning democracy), court intellectuals who take grants from the ruling class and
provide them with scholarly justification, and owners of quasi-private corporations which rely on the
state for a large proportion of their funding and profit.
Grinder and Hagel suggest that organized labor and recipients of welfare are also members of the
dominant class, but these suggestions are harder to accept. With respect to organized labor, it might be
more to the point to differentiate between labor organizers, who might be able to deliver union support
to key members of the ruling class in return for timely political action to support the organizers' bids for
power within labor, and workers themselves. The latter might not show any benefits. With respect to
recipients of welfare, such persons are often victims not only of structural dislocations in the economy
caused by the economic machinations of the ruling class, but of barriers to market entry maintained by
those who wish not to face competition. Welfare is the means by which resentment against these effects
is kept under control; welfare recipients ought not be looked at as members of a dominant class, but as
enemies of the dominant class whose silence is purchased with state handouts.<7>
But even if we count out workers and the unemployed, Grinder and Hagel show the relations of power
between most of society and a group composed of powerful figures within the state-banking nexus, the
military, the political parties, the academy, the managers of quasi-private corporations, and perhaps
certain elements of the labor movement.
WHAT IS HEGEMONY?
These groups are not homogeneous, and one group - the state-banking nexus - appears dominant within
the system. Thus we should introduce the notion of hegemony. Gramsci explains:
For Gramsci, class society is not characterized by a dualistic opposition between two classes engaged
in a zero-sum game. Rather, there are many 'subaltern' groups who sustain the hegemony of the ruling
class but are not strictly members of it. Thus Grinder and Hagel's model becomes clearer if looked at
through the lens of Gramsci's notion of hegemony. The true ruling class is the state-banking nexus. But
this class must maintain its rule by way of groups other than itself. To do this, it must attract the aid of
these other groups; it must invite them within hegemony in order to make them serve hegemony.
Politicians, academics, and others are eager to prop up relations of power in return for a cut of the
ruling class's profits and other benefits. Thus they constitute hegemony in two ways: first, they are most
of its members (outside the state-banking nexus, the true hegemonic class), and second, they sustain it
and help determine its nature.
Gramsci's final sentence ("The intellectuals are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern
functions of social hegemony and political government.") might seem a little odd or be liable to
misinterpretation. Gramsci is not using the word 'intellectual' the way it is ordinarily used.<8> For
Gramsci, the mark of an intellectual is not having a certain kind of, paradigmatically academic, job, but
rather performing tasks which involve a relatively high ratio of mental effort to physical effort:
Libertarian social theory wishes to suggest that certain groups, including especially the military-
industrial complex, the political parties, the academy, the managers of quasi-private corporations, and
perhaps certain members of the labor movement, are the subaltern hegemonic classes, while the true
dominant class is the state-banking nexus. By Gramsci's criterion of intellectuality, all of these groups
are clearly intellectuals. So there is a neat fit here.
Gramsci's subaltern hegemonic classes sustain domination in two contexts: in the state, by way of
coercion, and in civil society by way of hegemony. It is important to grasp the relationships between
these two contexts of activity. For libertarian social theory, the ruling class is constituted as the ruling
class specifically by its relations to the means of coercion, the state. No group of people that does not
employ - typically state - coercion to advance its economic interests can qualify as a dominant
class.<9> Thus there is a means-ends asymmetry between hegemonic and coercive ways of maintaining
relations of domination. For libertarianism, coercion, typically by way of the state, is the relation of
domination which is the target of critique. Hegemony, which is the way those intellectuals who serve
the dominant class work in civil society to preserve relations of power, is only hegemony in relation to
the coercive acts of the state which it serves to sustain and/or legitimate.
However, at least in ostensively democratic societies, members of the state itself are often not the
primary beneficiaries of statism. Rather, the ruling class exists within civil society and employs the
state as a means to distort the workings of civil society, especially the market. In the present case, the
state-banking nexus employs the state as a means to its distortive end. But the maintenance of state
power requires that the populace acquiesce in state actions. This requires the development of hegemony
in civil society. A libertarian analysis of the state-banking nexus, then, must recognize three moments
of the relations of power: a hegemonic moment in which statism is preserved by way of various
machinations, a statist moment in which certain illegitimate economic behavior within civil society is
coercively enforced, and what I'll call the 'terminal moment' in which the illegitimate economic
behavior is actually performed and wealth unfairly accrued by unproductive elites. For libertarians, the
second moment is what makes the terminal moment possible, and it's the fact that statism is a moment
in the wealth-gathering activities of the state-banking nexus that constitute it as a ruling class. The first
moment, hegemony in civil society, is a mere means and is objectionable only insofar as it sustains
relations of statist dominance. But because the economic manipulations are performed within civil
society, this means that civil society can become a location of struggle against the state-banking nexus
in two ways: first, in a practical way, in which economic competitors to the state-banking nexus attempt
to redirect wealth in ways more appropriate to the actual conditions obtaining in the market (it's to
prevent this that the state-banking nexus co-opted the state in the first place), and second, in a
persuasive way, in which intellectuals attempt to delegitimate the statist regime.
A similar quasi-symmetry shows up in Gramsci:
civil society (in the sense that one might say that State 3D
In the former passage, the state is central and civil society a protective periphery; this is the earlier
liberal perspective in which the dominant class is constituted of members of the state and the workings
of civil society are a mere instrument by which it secures its state power. But in the latter passage,
hegemony is central and coercion a protective periphery; since hegemony is the means by which
dominance is secured in civil society, and coercion the means by which dominance is secured in the
state, this implies that civil society is central and the state a protective periphery. I take it that this is
more like the classical Marxist perspective, in which the dominant class is constituted by its relation to
the means of production and the state is a mere instrument by which it secures its economic power. The
binocular perspective derived from the synthesis of these two views, however, is eminently libertarian.
The libertarian analysis of contemporary society will be similar to Marx's in that it regards state action
as caused by the desires of certain actors within civil society, but it will be like the classical liberal
approach in that it regards classes within civil society as essentially constituted by differential relations
to state power. Thus neither the class divisions between the state-banking nexus and others within civil
society, nor the distortive actions of the state, are mere epiphenoma of one another: they relate,
dialectically, in a mutually supporting manner.
How, then, do the subaltern classes sustain, through hegemony in civil society, the dominance of the
state-banking nexus? Different subaltern groups do so in different ways at different times, but one key
way is by way of ideology. In general, the state-banking nexus has taken partial control over a state
apparatus which was not designed to serve it and which is legitimated, in the eyes of the populace, not
with respect to how well it serves the state-banking nexus but rather with respect to how well it serves
the populace. Thus, if the state-banking nexus wishes to sustain its relations of domination to the rest of
the populace, it must resort to mystification and distortion: it must make the illegitimate appear
legitimate. At this point, libertarian social theory should introduce the concept of ideology.
WHAT IS IDEOLOGY?
I want to look at ideology from two points of view. The first involves the neutral conception of
ideology as introduced by Higgs:
Higgs argues that ideology in this neutral sense is important for historical explanations. History is at
least partly driven by forms of mass or group action, in which many people coordinate action to
achieve some goal. But whenever there is group action, there is a prisoner's dilemma: no one
participant in the action will have a significant effect on the success of the action, but the success of the
action requires that there be many participants. Each participant will thus be tempted to defect and
become a free rider. But since this does not occur, something other than an individual's own expected
effect on the outcome of the group action must be at least partially motivating each member of the
group (unless all group action relies on mass irrationality, which is obviously not the case). Higgs
suggests that an additional motivation for participants in group action is a sense of identification with
the cause which satisfies a basic desire for solidarity with appropriate others. Which others are
appropriate for a person is decided by her on the basis of her ideology. Thus ideology in Higgs's non-
pejorative sense helps explains group action.
Ideology in this sense is surely necessary for the imposition of relations of domination or for their
removal or replacement with other relations of domination. Persons will participate in the imposition of
such relations because they experience some kind of solidarity - including, I imagine, class
consciousness - with the class which they wish to see made dominant. Persons will participate in the
removal of such relations because they experience some kind of solidarity with similarly inclined anti-
establishmentarians.
However, Higgs downplays an essential feature of ideologies (even ideologies construed non-
pejoratively). He notes that
An example may clarify. Consider the Gulf War. As explained in the popular press of our semi-fascist
semi-liberal welfare-warfare state, the Gulf War was in fact a response by western democracies to
violent aggression by a dictator. Since the United States and its allies have a moral obligation to
preserve democratic institutions, such as those of Kuwait, whenever possible, the Gulf War was clearly
appropriate and moral. This is especially so in light of the negligible loss of civilian life caused by US
surgical strikes.
A socialist or libertarian capitalist critic of the Gulf War probably would not disagree that it is good to
fight tyrants and defend democracy, and that there are times when this might be an appropriate action
for a democratic state to take. Such a critic would, however, pay attention to other relevant facts of the
matter and hence derive a very different evaluation. It's not that stopping tyrants is bad, it's that
Hussein's tyranny was really US tyranny; it's not that democratic institutions are bad, it's that Kuwait
doesn't have any; it's not that minimal loss of civilian life is bad, it's that US action has caused the
deaths of millions of civilians.
Because the two ideologies - that of the statist mass media<11>, and those of the libertarian or socialist
critic - seek different kinds of factual, explanatory accounts, they might end up giving different
evaluations because of their different explanations of how the social world works. But with respect to
explanations of social events, there is a matter of fact about how things are. An ideology which lays
bare the actual explanations of events is different in kind from an ideology which mystifies or obscures
the real world. This is the difference which the pejorative conception of ideology seeks to mark.
Thompson introduces such a conception of ideology:
1990, 53-54)
This has important implications for libertarian social theory. So far, I have tried to introduce the
outlines of a libertarian theory of (contemporary US) class relations and a libertarian approach to the
issue of hegemony. This should ground a libertarian approach to ideology.
For libertarianism, classes are constituted by differential relations to the state. A class, such as the
state-banking nexus, which is the primary user of state power to advance its own economic interests,
must interest other classes in sustaining its dominance. Thus a hegemonic group of classes emerges
around the central hegemonizing class. These classes sustain relations of dominance directly, by way of
state action, and indirectly, by way of their hegemony in civil society. One of their primary goals in
civil society is to mask, distort, and hide our understanding of the relations of domination which they
wish to preserve. To do this, they must inculcate in the people incorrect beliefs as to matters of fact,
including facts about the explanations of events in the social world. The dominance of the state-
banking nexus leads to a wide variety of economic dislocations, crises, and gross inequities, which
occur because of the differences between how the state-banking nexus relates to the state and how
other, oppressed, classes relate to the state. Since the state is supposed to protect the people from
oppression and is legitimated with reference to responsivity to democratic demands, the hegemonic
classes must prevent the people from discovering that their state is oppressive and radically
undemocratic. They do this by way of ideology: by way of preventing the people from understanding
how the social world works. Specifically, they inculcate in the people a sense that state action solves
problems and does not typically create and/or exacerbate them.
Since libertarian social theory holds the opposite view - state action almost always worsens the
problems it is designed to solve, and state action almost always sacrifices the interests of some to
others - it views any communication, especially rhetoric, which veils the actual effects of state action
as ideological. Libertarian ideology criticism, then, will focus on how communicative acts tend to
mystify social relations in ways that make state action appear appropriate to the very people who will
be harmed by it.
Two related tropes, I think, will be among the most common in statist rhetoric. The first is introduced
by Barthes as the privation of history:
prepares all things, brings them, lays them out, the master
151)
Statist ideology - mythology - removes from history and makes natural the causes of negative social
phenomena. The ideologist wishes to sustain and/or enhance state power. To do this, she must
rhetorically construct the state as solver of problems presented by some non-state factor. But typically
the problem occurs in the context of state action. Thus two solutions present themselves: either remove
the state action which contributes to the problem, or employ the state as a means of removing whatever
else it is that causes the problem. The libertarian chooses the first option because the second option
simply leads to more economic distortions and vicious inequalities, while the ideologist is committed to
choosing the second because this is the only means preserve her favored relations of power. In order to
avoid allowing the libertarian alternative to occur to people, the ideologist must mask the fact that the
state could change its mode of action. Ideology, then, takes actions of the state as natural and
unalterable. It dehistoricizes them by making them the background against which social phenomena
occur, rather than as part of the etiology of those social phenomena.
The other master-trope of statist rhetoric is the mystification or even rhetorical obliteration of non-
state action. The ideologist seeks to expand state power at the expense of non-coercive means of action.
To do this, she must prevent people from grasping the actual nature of those non-coercive means of
action. State regulation of the economy is justified to the degree that the economy has no means of self-
regulation. State education is necessary to the degree that there is no agent other than the state which
can educate. State welfare is necessary if we are unaware that agents other than the state can aid the
poor. And so forth. Statism relies on our systematic ignorance about agents of action other than the
state, and means of action other than coercion.
The two tropes work together. The degree to which we take the state for granted is the degree to which
we cannot imagine social problems being caused by the state. The degree to which we do not believe in
non-state agency is the degree to which we will invite the state to solve our problems. But this solution
then becomes, rhetorically speaking, part of the background against which the next crisis occurs,
rather than, as it is in fact, the partial cause of the next crisis.
Milken, then, aimed to lead investors to place their capital in lines of production which establishment
investors wouldn't touch. But this aim was based on the theory that the establishment was mis-
evaluating the investment potential of bonds. He made hundreds of millions of dollars for himself and
Drexel by arranging for massive investments in high-yield bonds, but the benefits were not limited to a
small coterie:
became the first black CEO in the Fortune 500 after Milken
That is, Milken redirected investment on a massive scale, and not in directions that the state-banking
nexus was taking. For precisely this reason, his epistemic labor paid off rather better than that of the
establishment banks.<12>
Cut out of the profits, the dominant class called on the state to eliminate this threat to their economic
power. A first step, though, to defending themselves was to demonize the junk bond market.
Establishment rhetors stepped into place, advocating regulation. Regulation of the junk bond market
represents a barrier to market entry and is hence anti-competitive - but then, competition is what the
state-banking nexus organized itself to eliminate.
In an April 18, 1985 Wall Street Journal editorial entitled "Junk Bonds and Other Securities Swill",
Felix Rohatyn argues for 'intelligent regulation ' of the junk bond market. He opens by claiming that
"Hundreds of millions of dollars have been lost by banks, cities, and state agencies under the
impression that they were making perfectly safe investments backed by government agencies." He
doesn't provide any cases or make any explanations. But moreover, he is foregrounding bad
investments at the rhetorical expense of the overwhelming majority of junk investments. Fischel
explains that, "In 1989 $8.11 billion of the bonds defaulted, or about 4.3 percent of the total market. In
1990 defaults increased to $18.35 billion, or 10.1 percent of the market. But still, even in 1990, its
worst year, 90 percent of the market did not default." (Fischel 1995, 153) Since Rohatyn is writing in
1985, his allegation is a bit ridiculous. Had he actually said that hundreds of millions of dollars were
lost out of a market of hundreds of billions, then we would have known to ignore him. By taking the
losses out of their context, he creates the impression that junk bonds have been by and large a disaster
when they have in fact been by and large a success.
He continues to explain that,
For Rohatyn, decisions by financial ratings services are the standard of value of financial offerings. He
naturalizes their decisions by treating any disagreement with them as nothing but confusion or
ignorance. Someone who, like Milken, actually pursues a different epistemic policy than the ratings
services cannot possibly have a reason for doing so. Moreover, his essential conservatism comes
through in the final sentence. Credit stems from a company's past behavior and current assets. Growth
- what Rohatyn thinks is too risky - is future-oriented. This sort of conservatism naturalizes the status
quo by stressing the past and present at the expense of future possibilities.
For Rohatyn, the greatest danger of junk bonds and the hostile takeovers they finance is that "Under
the banner of deregulation and total faith in the marketplace, we're impairing our greatest of assets:
the credibility of our capital markets and the faith in our financial institutions." But two inches to the
right, in the next column, he writes that
stories...
Now, our faith in our financial institutions consists in our willingness to make investments in them. If
people are eager to invest or hold on to their investments - which is the case if stock prices rise - then
our faith in our financial institutions must be high, not low. So Rohatyn has directly contradicted
himself. How is he able to do this? Note that the remarks on CBS do not give anyone's motivations for
selling or buying stock at the higher price. In fact, no one seems to be involved at all: CBS stock 'was
driven up'. The passivization of stockholders removes agency from the picture. But additionally,
Rohatyn wants to prevent us from realizing that the quantitative claim about rising stock prices
contradicts his qualitative claim about our confidence in our financial institutions. To generate the
incommensurability, he converts the qualitative fact about our rising confidence in our financial
institutions into a quantitative claim about CBS's stock prices, which we can no longer contrast with
the qualitative claim. Barthes notes that, "By reducing any quality to quantity, myth economizes
intelligence: it understands reality more cheaply." (Barthes 1970, 153) But Rohatyn runs against
Barthes's expectation that the dominant ideology will involve "a weighing operation, the essences...
placed in scales of which bourgeois man will remain the motionless beam." (ibid., 155) Rohatyn is, as
Barthes suggests, making the financial world all too easy to understand, but the misunderstanding
which he seeks to produce requires that the quantitative data be unintegrable with his qualitative
claims. Rohatyn seeks to make it impossible to weigh the claims against the data.
Rohatyn's next move is to again obscure motives: "The interest rates [junk bonds] carry are mostly
higher than the rates of return the underlying businesses are likely to earn in periods of economic
downturn. These securities are therefore based on the ability of new management to sell assets in order
to service debt." But such restructuring was often the point of the takeovers, not an accidental side-
effect of their failures. Fischel explains that
Domenici notes that Metromedia sold seven of its TV stations to help make debt payments which it
accrued during the $1.3 billion sale of junk bonds. Like Rohatyn, Domenici has backgrounded the
epistemic agency of investors. He seems to be suggesting that Metromedia made a mistake in its bond
issue and that purchasers made a mistake in their bond purchases. But he drops the context in which
such bond offers and purchases make sense. Purchasers would buy bonds only if they had some reason
to expect that they would make a return on their investment; Metromedia surely had some financial
incentive to offer the bonds. By dropping this context, Domenici treats the sale and purchase of junk
bonds in a vacuum. By abstracting the junk bond market from the reasons for its existence and the
motivations of those who engage in the sale or purchase of junk bonds, Domenici rhetorically
constructs the market as a machine in which human intention plays no part. Indeed, he concludes this
section by quoting the chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, who said, "The more
leveraged takeovers and buyouts today, the more bankruptcies tomorrow." This quote constructs the
market as a machine which takes takeovers and buyouts as inputs and gives depressions as outputs.
Junk bond advocates have also argued that leveraged takeovers improve the economic efficiency of the
firms which are taken over. But Domenici says that "Talk of improving management is a smoke screen
for the raiders' scorched-earth tactics..." But the substance of Domenici's argument seems to come
here: "[Corporate raiders] are looking for targets with two characteristics: strong cash flow and little
debt. The quality of management is irrelevant. ...court documents also undercut any contention that the
raiders are concerned with the long-range health of the target company." Here, Domenici rhetorically
constructs corporate raiders as short-term profiteers, who destroy companies and make a lot of money
in the process. But again, Domenici has abstracted market processes from the context of human
intentions within which they make sense. The junk bond market, as with all financial markets, can only
exist in a context in which purchasers of financial offerings expect to benefit from their purchases.
Since junk bonds, as used in takeovers, amount to a means of taking out loans, junk bond buyers -
those who are loaning the money to allow the seller to perform a takeover - expect the sellers to repay
the purchase cost of the bond with interest. But money is not made from destroying capital; it comes
from making capital produce goods which sell on the market at a profit. Corporate raiders are able to
make their profits from their restructuring of their takeover targets such that greater economic
efficiency is the result. Buyers of junk bonds expect sellers to perform this task. Domenici, however,
rhetorically constructs corporate raiders as acting in a vacuum, in which the intentions of junk bond
purchasers do not exist.
Domenici concludes by obscuring the nature of markets and hinting that the real intelligence at work
in markets is always state action:
Market theorists love to rhapsodize about the wisdom of markets, because such theorists realize that
markets are (essentially?) a means of communicating information about economic phenomena and are
the product of many distinct decisions made by persons with divergent interests and knowledge. Thus
they propose that regulation of markets typically blocks the flow of economic information and prohibit
decisions which persons would have made. But Domenici has systematically suppressed this context,
by treating corporate raiders as the only agent of action in the junk bond market and hinting that junk
bond purchasers behave mechanically, without attention to their own financial interests. Thus the
source of market wisdom has been suppressed. No wonder, then, that Domenici provides an alternative
source of wisdom: the harsh dealings of the regulators.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have sought to, by way of engaging with the closely related Marxist tradition, sketch out
a libertarian approach to the theory of class. Grinder and Hagel have proposed that the dominant
class in contemporary society is what I've called the state-banking nexus, a cartel of banks which
employ their command over the state regulatory apparatus to limit competition within their own field.
Other groups perform and legitimate the coercion of the state-banking nexus. Thus this class is not
simply a dominant class, but the center of a complex hegemony. Introducing the pejorative notion of
ideology, I then made some basic empirical predictions about what the dominant ideology of
contemporary society should be if the libertarian theory about the state-banking nexus is correct. If
libertarianism is correct, then certain tropes ought to show up in the rhetoric of defenders of the state-
banking nexus. Finally, I briefly examined two such rhetorical artifacts, one written by an investment
banker and one by a Republican senator, both in the allegedly pro-market Wall Street Journal. Both
behaved as expected. They both obscured the epistemic action of investors and others in the market,
and both dehistoricized the status quo of bloated corporations and state intervention in financial
markets.
Of course, two pieces of confirming data will hardly prove a theory. But hopefully this paper has
presented a sample of what mature libertarian rhetorical analysis will look like, and has suggested a
plausible line of research.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks to Dana Cloud and Chris Matthew Sciabarra for their comments on a draft of this paper.
WORKS CITED
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Domenici, Pete. May 14, 1985. "Fools and Their Takeover Bonds." Wall Street Journal. p. 28.
Fischel, Daniel. 1995. Payback. New York: HarperBusiness.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell
Smith, eds. and trans. New York: International Publishers.
Grinder, Walter E. and John Hagel III. 1977. " Toward a Theory of State Capitalism: Ultimate
Decision-Making and Class Structure". Journal of Libertarian Studies 1:1, 59-79.
Higgs, Robert. 1987. Crisis and Leviathan. Oxford: Oxford UP.
Long, Roderick. 1998. "Toward a Libertarian Theory of Class". in Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred D. Miller,
Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds. 1998. Problems of Market Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Marx, Karl. 1986 [1849]. Wage-Labor and Capital. with an introduction by Frederick Engels.
Chicago: Charles H. Kerr.
Rohatyn, Felix. April 18, 1985. "Junk Bonds and Other Securities Swill." Wall Street Journal. p. 30.
Thompson, John. 1990. Ideology and Modern Culture. Stanford: Stanford UP.
Tucker, Robert. ed. 1978. The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd Ed. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
NOTES
<1> Why does Marx fail to grasp the social nature of production? I suspect that it has something to do
with his commitment to the labor theory of value. For Marx,
This claim is not true. Marx is correct to say that prices are determined by supply and demand, that
profit level of a business concern is determined by the ratio between the supply and demand of the
goods produced by that concern, and that investment is determined by profitability. Thus capital is
invested in those lines of production the demand for the products of which currently most outstrip
supply of them. However, a line of production need not overproduce to lose investment. It can simply be
less profitable than other lines of production. The average price of goods is not equal to their cost of
production but is higher. This is the case because the quantity of wealth in the economy is not fixed but
continually rises; hence, all lines of production can be profitable at the same time, though perhaps not
to the same degree.
Marx moves from the claim that the value of a good is determined by its costs of production to list the
two factors the costs of which compose the costs of production:
(1) raw materials and wear and tear of implements, that is,
So the costs of production are costs of plant and equipment, which is ultimately determined by labor,
and costs of labor. For Marx, the owner of capital adds nothing to the value of the goods produced by
her business concern. But this, too, is false. There is a third factor in value, which is that it meets a
demand.
A little example might help. Assume that two persons make snow machines - machines that
manufacture artificial snow - and that they perform identical labor in so making. One of the two takes
her machine to Alaska, where there is snow aplenty. The other takes her machine to Texas, where snow
(let us say) sells as a novelty item. They then place an equal amount of water into their machines and
perform an equal amount of labor to create equal amounts of snow. Why does one of them make a
profit, while the other does not? Because there is a demand for snow in Texas, but not in Alaska.
The Marxist theory would predict that the two piles of snow have equal value, because an equal
amount of labor went into the production of each pile. But the two piles have different values. There
must, then, be a third factor in the creation of value. We create value not just by creating physical
objects which can in principle be objects of consumption by others, but by seeing to it that the creation
of such objects meets some demand. This task is not mechanical, but epistemic. It consists (essentially)
of monitoring the market to note ratios between supply and demand of goods and directing investment
into lines of production in which demand substantially outstrips supply.
Marx is aware that capital moves from less profitable to more profitable lines of production: "...what is
the result of a rise in the price of a commodity? A mass of capital is thrown into that flourishing branch
of business..." (ibid., 28) Note the phrasing: capital 'is thrown'. Marx is employing the rhetorical trope
Thompson calls 'passivization', which "occurs when verbs are rendered in the passive form, ...[which
tends to] focus the attention of the hearer or reader on certain themes at the expense of others. They
delete actors and agency and tend to represent processes as things or events which take place in the
absence of a subject who produces them." (Thompson 1990, 66) By backgrounding the process by
which capital is thrown into more profitable lines of production, Marx rhetorically annihilates the
agents who do the throwing, owners of capital.
The employment of this trope at this place in Marx is not accidental. Were Marx to own up to the fact
that owners of capital move capital around, then we might ask why they do this and what the effects
are. But then the importance of the owner of capital would become apparent. When owners of capital
change lines of investment, they do so to enhance the profitability of those investments. But this
happens only when they invest in lines of production with relatively high profits. And high profits are
achieved when demand had previously outstripped supply. That is, when owners of capital make
investments of capital, they are striving to cause supply to meet social demand. Without someone
performing this function, demands could be met only in a happenstance way. But if value is created not
in the creation of possible objects of consumption, but of actually desired objects of consumption, and
owners of capital decide which goods are to be produced, then the investment decisions of the owners
of capital are crucial to the creation of value. If we accept that labor alone creates value, then we must
include the epistemic labor of the owner of capital in the equation. If this is not something which we
regard as labor, then the labor theory of value is mistaken.
The argument here has not been the familiar one about different persons having different levels of
ability or different kinds of labor having different values. Rather, the point is that for anyone's ability or
labor to be socially valuable, it must be directed toward meeting social needs. Such needs constitute
demands for goods, and such demands determine prices of goods. Those who redirect capital to fulfill
such needs are not parasites; to the contrary, without their labor, most other labor would be
dramatically less valuable.
<2> I don't attempt to explain this fact here. But it is a fact about persons' economic skills, not about
their levels of wealth. Wealthy people can lack the essential skills necessary to make successful
investments - that is why they turn to the state. And those of modest background can certainly attain
these skills (hence the persecution by the state-banking nexus of its competitors).
<3> Historical argumentation to the contrary would need to take into account the political situations
in which rational labor unrest has occurred. Much historical evidence ostensively linking conflicts
between labor and management to free-market capitalism in fact links conflicts between labor and
management to statism ('state capitalism').
<4> This is not to deny that the depositor is an economic agent. Depositors are consumers of financial
offerings by banks and are hence essential members of the market to which banks must be responsive.
They choose between banks and they choose between different financial offerings at various banks;
indeed, they choose whether or not to invest at all, and if so how much. Nevertheless, the depositor
hires the bank to make particular decisions and take certain risks for her , and her investment would
not have been a good one if she were not relieved of a substantial burden of decision-making.
<5> Moreover, cartelization constitutes a barrier to market entry. Those banks which originally
pushed for the cartel will have substantial power over the new regulatory apparatus which governs the
cartel, and will thus find it possible to set up a regulatory regime hostile to market entry. But moreover,
the very fact that no bank is required to hold a high fractional reserve constitutes a barrier to market
entry because entrants to the market cannot compete with established banks on the issue of level of
reserve; the issue no longer exists.
<6> The cartel's power is not an academic point. The banks' greater capacity to lend brings with it a
greater capacity to lend poorly. Systematic overinvestment by the banking cartel can lead to periods of
intense capital development. However, during the inflation, prices do not reflect social demand.
Because the quantity of money available for investment and consumption is not what it would be on the
unfettered market, but the quantity of capital and consumption goods remains unchanged, the apparent
wisdom of given investments is not what it would be on the unfettered market: it becomes difficult to
tell a good investment from a bad. Thus banks will tend to systematically malinvest in lines of
production for which the social demand, as communicated by prices, is not as high as it would appear
given the distorted prices. Eventually, stockholders cannot help but discover the malinvestments and
seek to reinvest in other lines of production which will be actually, and not merely apparently,
profitable. The sudden attempt to liquidate and reinvest within the inflated market triggers a massive
drop in the value of stock. Stockholders (including, indirectly, depositors) lose money on a vast scale as
the actual social value of their investments makes itself known.
Incidentally, when Engels provides a list of features characterizing a middle stage of capitalist
development that looks like this: "...unheard-of development of productive forces, excess of supply over
demand, over-production, glutting of the markets every ten years..." (Engels in Tucker 1972, 716), he is
discussing a business cycle brought about by state intervention in the banking sector as I've discussed -
not a cycle innate to the unfettered market.
During such crises, it is typical for the state to attempt to soften the blow. But because the bankers'
cartel has such power within the apparatus designed to regulate it, the true cause of the downturn, the
banks' inflationary policy, is never dealt with. Rather, the state typically seeks to increase regulation
and control over economic activity. Because of the banks' substantial power over economic decisions,
the state may find it difficult to control economy activity in ways not approved of by the cartel and its
allies - worse, it can just follow the orders of the cartel. Thus the decision-making power of the cartel's
members is even further enhanced.
<7> With respect to alleged impoverished oppressors, Grinder and Hagel seem to have slipped into an
error Long thinks of as typically conservative:
the government for harming the poor, they are all too likely
to
<8> "This way of posing the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of
intellectual, but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete approximation of reality."
(Gramsci 1971, 12)
<9> An issue worth considering in this context is the relation between the libertarian and the Marxist
theories of the state. For Marxism,
For libertarian theory, the state can never be a new means of oppression; rather, it is the only means
specific to oppression. Everything else done by the dominant class by way of maintaining its power is
either an offshoot of statist coercion or something which, were it not somehow tied to statism, would
not count as oppressive in the political sense.
For non-anarchist libertarians (such as myself), the government is not intrinsically an agent of
coercion or class warfare. Rather, the government has the legitimate function of protecting the rights of
its citizens from violation by force or fraud, foreign or domestic. Libertarians typically distinguish
between a government - which does nothing but protect the rights of its citizens - and the state, which is
a government once it has become a tool of class warfare. So libertarians would expect class warfare to
arise within a society when a certain group seizes control of the government and converts it into a state
(and themselves into a class), whereas Marxists would expect class warfare to arise without the
presence of a state.
However, it's not clear just what the difference is, because Marxists and libertarians seem to use the
term 'state' the same way. Engels says of formation of the Roman state: "The victory of the plebs burst
the old gentile constitution asunder and erected on its ruins the state..." (ibid., 751). He cannot
possibly mean that at a certain point in Roman history, after the 'old gentile constitution' had been
'burst asunder', that a first Roman government came into being. Likewise, when he says that the
formation of a society's state "...is the admission that this society has become entangled into
irreconcilable antagonisms..." (ibid., 752), he cannot possibly mean that societies form governments
only after they have found themselves enmeshed in some kind of fundamental class conflict. Rather, he
has to mean that within a society which has some form of public administration which we can call
'government', classes arise and then take control of the (or form a new) government, at which point in
time they constitute that government as a state, since it is now a means of economic class exploitation.
Now it looks as though the difference between the libertarian and Marxist theories of the state turn on
the concept of a class. For Marxists, classes are defined by reference to their relations to the means of
production, while for libertarians, they are defined by reference to their relations to the means of
coercion - the state. But the dispute looks almost semantic. Marxists agree that the state is important to
class warfare. If this 'important' can be given a strong reading - as 'essential' or 'necessary' in the
strong modal sense - then the Marxist would agree that without the state there can be no classes.
Libertarians will surely agree that there is something distinctive about the group which is about to
seize state power even before it has done so; they simply don't wish to call this group a 'class'. But it is
clearly a proto-class or potential class even on a libertarian account. If Marxists were to agree that
something important has happened to the nature of the dominant class at the moment that it assumed
state power, and libertarians were to agree that a proto-class is importantly related to a class, then the
dispute might well shrink to one about whether to call a group of people who haven't yet but are on
their way to take state power a 'class'. But this analysis turns on the question of whether the Marxist
would in fact agree that the state is essential for class warfare; if I'm wrong on that point, then the
dispute is substantive after all.
<10> Unlike Higgs's, my own libertarianism at least hopes to be ethically cognitivist. So from my
point of view, his political economist's value-neutrality itself sounds ideological.
<11> Why 'statist'? Because (if the present libertarian theory is correct) the corporate mass media is
directed, ultimately, by the interests of the state-banking nexus; those interests are, largely, in the
preservation of statism.
<12> Establishment ideology would have it that junk bonds are intrinsically bad, and that that's why
the state-banking nexus wouldn't deal with them. But in fact traditional banks did deal with them, just
not as well as Drexel:
the end of 1988 was 43.6 percent, slightly less than its
market
percent) was 2.3 times its market share (8.1 percent), and
Lehman
<13> This is a bit like the 'two-party system', which maintains the minimum number of nominal parties
necessary to sustain the illusion of democracy.
<14> Incidentally, the real joke of the Rohatyn editorial comes in the by-line: "Mr. Rohatyn is a senior
partner of Lazard Freres & Co." He's a member of the state-banking nexus which he seeks to defend.
Chapter 6
Dear Harry,
I regret to tell you that I have written a letter to Dr. Buechner in which I inform him that I've taken a
stand siding with David Kelley in his dispute with Dr. Peikoff. Since, however, I fail to see that
Kelley's paper represents ''a repudiation of the fundamental principles of Objectivism'', as Peikoff
states, and since I know that my stand will jeopardize my standing with the Objectivist movement, I
ask you to consider my reasons.
First of all, I wish to make it clear that, ideologically, I have no sympathy with the Libertarian
movement. As I've had no affiliation with the movement, however, I feel that I lack sufficient
knowledge to pass judgment on the intellectual honesty of its individual members, or to decide whether
or not it's appropriate to speak for libertarian groups. Consequently, I want to bypass this question and
restrict my discussion to the philosophical issues.
First, the relationship between fact and value. In principle, I subscribe to Peikoff's view that a proper
understanding of Objectivism lies in grasping the concept of objectivity, both in its application to
cognition and evaluation. But I'm not convinced that his own interpretation of the proper application of
this principle is the right one. Nor am I convinced that he's fully right in his analysis of the schisms that
have plagued the Objectivist movement. His contention that Objectivists who become champions of
tolerance are people who have failed to grasp the concept of objectivity, causing them to swing from
intrinsicism to subjectivism, may apply to some (I have, in fact, made a similar reflection regarding the
Brandens), but I fail to see that it's true of Kelley. Judging him from his paper, my conclusion is that
Kelley too seeks objectivity, both with respect to cognition and evaluation, but that he find its
application a much more complex issue than does Peikoff. In my judgment, then, the dispute between
them boils down to differences regarding interpretation of the concept of objectivity - differences that
lead them to irreconcilable positions, with Peikoff accusing Kelley of subjectivism and Kelley accusing
Peikoff of dogmatism. Instead of giving my opinion of who is or is not right in this kind of labeling, I
find it more fruitful to offer my standpoint on some of their philosophical arguments.
One important point of argument concerns the question of moral evaluation of ideas. On this point I
agree with Peikoff that an idea can be evaluated morally on the basis of its implicit causes and effects,
but I do not share his view that one can infer from the truth or falsehood of an idea to the virtue or vice
of its advocates. In this respect, my position is closer to Kelley's.
My reason is that knowledge is contextual and that consequently the causes and consequences logically
implicit in an idea exist merely as a potential; the actual causes and consequences will vary with
different individuals - depending on their particular intellectual context. Accordingly, if we are to judge
a person morally for his ideas, we must consider his context and the specific causes and consequences
they give rise to in his individual case. To judge him for his convictions in the abstract, ignoring his
context, may, in my opinion, easily result in gross injustices. Part of this context, for instance, will be a
person's sense of life - in consideration of which Ayn Rand could say of Victor Hugo that she shared his
sense of life although she disagreed with most of his conscious ideas. Obviously, sense of life affinity
was, in this case, more important to her than philosophic agreement. My position, then, is that objective
evaluation implies contextual evaluation and that consequently we cannot judge a person morally
merely on the basis of his ideas - not even in the cause of clearly irrational ideas. There is always the
possibility of extenuating circumstances.
In consequence of this view, I agree with Kelley that we must consider differences of degree in our
moral evaluations. In his discussion of the moral evaluation of ideas, Peikoff largely brushes such
differences aside, trivializing some important distinctions - both with respect to the causes and the
consequences of ideas.
In regard to causes, he trivializes the distinction between error and evasion. Arguing that honest errors
are self-correcting and short-lived, he restricts their relevancy to the very young, making it safe, in an
adult context, to infer from the irrationality of a movement to the evasion of its adherents. This, in my
opinion, is a gross simplification, and not very consistent with Ayn Rand's fictional use of this
distinction in her novels, where a number of characters, Gail Wynand and Hank Rearden most notably,
struggle with serious errors well into their mature years. Although clear enough in principle, the error-
evasion distinction is not always that easy in application. Take, for example, the case of Thomas Mann
who, shortly before his death, acknowledged his own role, as a leading Weimar nihilist, in paving the
way for the Nazis. Would his be a clear-cut case of evasion?
Similarly, in regard to consequences, Peikoff trivializes the question of whether or not a person acts on
his own ideas. Although I do concede his point that the advocacy of an irrational philosophy is ''a form
of action'', I do not see that we can evaluate a person morally on this basis alone - for the same reason
that we cannot judge a person morally on the basis of his actions alone. Again, we have to consider
certain contextual factors; in particular, we have to consider a person's motivation and interpretation.
In considering motivation, or intention, we have to ask whether a person advocates irrational ideas with
the deliberate purpose of destroying other people (like Toohey), or whether he does so out of misguided
idealism, in ignorance of the harm he may cause (like Andrei) - to take two extreme examples. Just as
we cannot assumethat advocacy of the irrational necessarily implies evasion, we cannot assume that it
necessarily implies evil intent. I am, for example, not convinced that Kant was deliberately evil the way
Toohey is, although I believe him guilty of evasion; nor am I sure that Toohey's evil is rooted in
evasion the way it is in James Taggart. There is a distinction here between deliberate evil and evasion
that never was made explicit by Ayn Rand, and that needs further exploration.
In considering interpretation, we must bear in mind that a philosophy, however inherently irrational,
will be interpreted in different ways by different people, and that consequently the effects of the
philosophy will vary - both regarding the enactment of its ideas and the nature of its influence on other
people. Consider the case of Friedrich Schiller, for example, who was an avowed Kantian. Yet, in his
case, the result was not nihilism but the passionate moral idealism we find in his plays. It would be
bloody unfair to condemn him on a par with a modern non-objective artist; and it would be equally
unfair to hold him responsible for the later atrocities caused by Kant's philosophy - particularly since he
tried to uproot some of the worse aspects of this philosophy.
It's on the basis of such reflections that I sympathize with Kelley's view on the question of moral
evaluation of ideas, and, by implication, with his appeal to tolerance, or benevolence, in the cognitive
realm.
In his article, Peikoff rejects the concept of tolerance, as used by Kelley, on the ground that it's rooted
in subjectivism and scepticism and hence incompatible with Objectivism. Instead, he upholds the virtue
of justice. But Kelley's argument is not based on subjectivism; it's based on contextualism. He does not
say that we can never know whether a man is irrational (this is Peikoff's inference); what he says is that
''we should assume that people are rational until we have evidence to the contrary''. I think this is a
sound principle and fully compatible with justice, even integral to it. In fact, I believe that Peikoff here
is creating a false dichotomy between justice and tolerance (as well as compassion and kindness). One
of the things that attracts me to Ayn Rand's heroes is that they combine qualities that are normally held
to be contradictory - such as selfishness and kindness, ruthlessness and compassion, justice and
benevolence. The benevolence we find in Hank Rearden, for example, is expressive of his passionate
sense of justice, his fear of judging people without having sufficient evidence. Judging from his paper, I
believe that Kelley's appeal to tolerance arises from a similar fear of injustice. In my view, then, his
tolerance is not the result of a dichotomy between cognition and evaluation, but of a wish to integrate
the two, to base evaluation on cognition. It's a recognition of the principle that evaluation must be
suspended, though not evaded, until we have established certainty in the cognitive realm. Such demand
for cognitive certainty does not spring from scepticism, but from conscientious willingness to consider
all relevant facts before passing moral judgment.
Another point on which I sympathize with Kelley is in his appeal to independent thought. As I see it,
independent thought is the mark of the creative thinker and hence of the true Objectivist. In his article,
Peikoff states that the authentic Objectivist is a ''valuer'' - a statement I readily support. But, again, I
take exception to his interpretation. In Peikoff's view, the valuer is primarily a moralist; in my view, he
is primarily a creator. This view is derived from my interpretation of Ayn Rand's heroes. Invariably, the
passionate dedication to values we find in the Randian hero is expressed through his single-minded
pursuit of a productive or creative goal, not through constant preoccupation with moral judgment; his
overriding concern is with his work, his own self-fulfillment, not to fight a moral crusade to change
other people or the world. To the extent he spends time and effort judging, fighting or persuading
people, it's of secondary importance, a part of his struggle to attain his creative goals.
I have often wondered why it's so rare to find such dedication among Objectivists, why, indeed,
Objectivism seems to inspire so little true independence and creativity, which to my mind is what
Objectivism is all about. One reason, no doubt, is the stifling effect of rationalism and dogmatism on all
creative impulse. However loyal to Ayn Rand's ideas the dogmatic Objectivist might be, he will, in a
deeper sense, betray the spirit of her philosophy by closing his mind shut to any first-hand knowledge
of reality; he will become a second-hander, living through and for Objectivism, making it an end rather
than a guide and inspiration to become a thinker, producer, creator in his own right.
I don't know whether similar reflections underlie Kelley's statement that Ayn Rand's philosophy is ''not
a closed system''. Since he does not specify what exactly he means by this statement, I'm a bit uncertain
about how to interpret it. I agree with Peikoff that the essence of the philosophy, its basic principles, is
immutable and cannot be changed. The problem is that this essence tends to branch out so that every
statement ever uttered by Ayn Rand is held up as indisputable truth, stifling any urge to question,
develop or correct the philosophy in its wider implications and applications. If it's this kind of closed
system Kelley wishes to oppose, I sympathize with him on this point as well.
For this reason, I'm a little dubious about the implications of Peikoff's statement that ''a proper
philosophy is an integrated whole, any change in any element of which would destroy the entire
system''. If what he means is that a philosophy, as defined by its author, is not changed by its
interpreters, I agree. If, however, the implication is that a philosophy has to be accepted or rejected in
toto, I disagree. It's perfectly legitimate to take a selective approach to a philosophy, to extract from it
what's good and to use that as a basis for new integrations - as Aristotle did with Plato and Ayn Rand
did with Aristotle. It's true that in the process one may change the philosophy, even develop a new one,
but if these changes are for the better, this is the approach to take. In the long run, any philosopher,
however great his achievement, is best served by such discrimination. This goes for Ayn Rand, too.
Revolutionary as her philosophy is in its scope of truth, it is neither exhaustive nor infallible; it needs
systematization and expansion, as well as correction - although not in its basic principles, where it
stands firm and should be left intact. But it is meaningless, even dangerous, to demand complete
adherence to the whole system, to not only its fundamental base but to all aspects touched upon by Ayn
Rand concerning its wider implications and consequences, the way Peikoff seems to be doing. This is
to invite a dogmatic approach to Objectivism - an approach that will freeze the philosophy into rigid
dogma and stifle creative independence.
It's this fear of dogmatism and its consequences which is my primary reason for siding with Kelley in
this dispute. Not only does he have my sympathy, but I regard him as an authentic Objectivist. His
benevolence, his will to consider the context of other people before judging them, his independent and
questioning mind are, in my opinion, qualities that are desperately needed in the Objectivist movement,
qualities that serve as a valuable antidote to the dogmatism that has plagued the movement. The fact
that he now is being ostracized for these very qualities is very saddening. What Objectivism needs is
more of his kind.
I hope that in writing this letter I have not excluded myself from the Objectivist movement. As
Objectivists and advocates of reason we should try to solve the issues raised in this dispute, not let
them split us into irreconcilable factions. Let us leave that kind of thing to our enemies, to those who
advocate irrational philosophies. Let us show that reason works in solving conflicts and disputes. If we
cannot show it, how can we preach it?
Cordially,
Kirsti Minsaas
Kelley in San
Francisco:
Objectivism as a philosophy and a movement
by
Raymie Stata
February 1, 1990
1. Metaphysics.
2. Epistemology.
- Reason: the senses as its base, logic as its method, and
conceptualization and abstraction as its form of function. Kelley
stressed Miss Rand's distinctive emphasis on universals.
3. Ethics.
4. Politics.
Kelley said that these points and connections, when properly under-
stood and integrated, are the essence of Objectivism, and anyone in
agreement with them is an Objectivist. Other issues he said, such as
the theory of measurement omission and the rest of the virtues, are
technical issues raised in elaboration or defense of the essentials, and
a person who disputes them can be in the Objectivist school.
Kelley said that while he feels that he can prove why exactly those
points he listed define Objectivism, this itself is open to argument.
He returned to his point that "Objectivism" should be treated as any
other concept by saying that its definition needs to be proven, allows
for borderline cases, and can change with growing knowledge.
Kelley rejected the view that one can dismiss a person who disputes
a point of Objectivism on the grounds that "if you reject this, every-
thing else falls." This begs the question: the person is disputing the
point because he denies that everything else will fall and, to the
contrary, that the point in question actually contradicts the rest of
Objectivism. While Objectivism is an integrated whole, Kelley said, its
connections are not intrinsically revealed but must be discovered. Thus
the proper approach is for Objectivists to argue over disputed connec-
tions, not legislate them out of existence.
OBJECTIVISM AS A MOVEMENT
---------
AN ASS OR A LION?
A REVIEW OF LEONARD PEIKOFF'S OBJECTIVISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND
Copyright Nicholas Dykes
by Leonard Peikoff
ISBN 0-525-93380-8
Previously published in Free Life, the journal of the UK Libertarian Alliance, no. 21 (November
1994).
AD 1993 saw some notable anniversaries, from Queen Elizabeth's 40th as a powerless monarch to
"Whitewater Bill" Clinton's first as the world's most powerful elected official.
In the less grandiose but nonetheless powerful world of publishing, another milestone was reached: the
50th anniversary of The Fountainhead, the novel which established Ayn Rand as a major literary figure
and which contained the first statement - albeit in embryo - of her challenging philosophy, Objectivism.
(A fuller statement arrived in 1957, with her novel Atlas Shrugged.)
As a novelist, Rand achieved enduring success. The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged not only remain
in print but sell upwards of 100,000 copies a year, nearly 20 years after their author's death. For Rand
the philosopher, however, reception was distinctly mixed. Among students, she quickly acquired a wide
following; among their professors, she was usually either ignored or scornfully dismissed.
Since over a quarter of a century has elapsed since the heyday of the "Objectivist Movement" it is
worth noting some of the reasons for the latter reaction. In the first place, from the beginning of her
career, Rand made no secret at all of her scorn for "modern philosophers" (and with few exceptions,
she was not renowned for tact). Little wonder "modern philosophers" responded in kind.
Secondly, Rand was an atheist who rejected out-of-hand all religions and virtually every other
philosophy from Platonism to Existentialism; specifically any brand of scepticism, subjectivism,
determinism, pragmatism, or positivism; and all forms of altruism. She also maintained that most
"problems" in philosophy - such as the analytic-synthetic dichotomy and the is-ought problem - were
either false or easily resolved. Since the above just about covers the syllabus for a philosophy degree,
Rand's acerbic veto was unlikely to win friends in, or influence, the professoriat.
Nor did Rand broadcast her ideas in the forms or outlets used by other philosophers. Eschewing
academic journals, she expressed herself at first in novels; later in essays, articles, pamphlets and
speeches most of which she initially edited and published herself. Media of this kind do not normally
excite much interest in philosophy departments.
Lastly, though an avowed system-builder, Rand's approach to philosophy was anything but systematic.
Her views are scattered among her novels and essays, and the closest she came to a philosophic treatise
- her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology (1971) - is, while eminently worthy of study, barely 70
pages long and covers only one philosophical topic, the theory of concepts. Rand often spoke of a
"future book on Objectivism" but never wrote it.
For anyone interested in Ayn Rand's philosophical ideas, therefore, Leonard Peikoff's Objectivism
should be a welcome arrival. It is the first full treatise on Rand, the first time her philosophy has been
presented in its entirety in a single volume.
Dr. Peikoff's book has several virtues. It is clearly written and easy to follow. In effect, the book
continues the exceptionally high standard of clarity set by Rand herself, who invariably said exactly
what she meant, and meant exactly what she said. The work is also well organised and moves easily
and logically from Rand's first premises in metaphysics and epistemology to her final conclusions in
ethics, politics, and aesthetics.
Dr. Peikoff begins where Rand begins, firmly and positively in reality, in this world. He expounds her
founding axiom "existence exists", and its corollaries: that one exists possessing consciousness - the
faculty for perceiving existents - and that to exist, to be, is to be some thing, hence the law of identity,
and its corollary, the law of causality. He then elaborates Rand's insistence on the primacy of existence
over consciousness; the crucial role of reason in man's life; her view of man as a being of volitional
consciousness; and her stress on objectivity, hierarchy and context in determining what constitutes
knowledge. These and other topics take up most of the first half of the book.
An objection at this point is that Dr. Peikoff spends less time than one might have wished on Rand's
innovative theory of concepts. Rand described the core of the theory herself in a highly condensed
summary in the aforementioned Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology:
The process of concept formation consists of mentally isolating two or more existents by means of their
distinguishing characteristic, and retaining this characteristic while omitting their particular
measurements - on the principle that these measurements must exist in some quantity, but may exist in
any quantity. A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing
characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted.
Other lacunae in the book are the absence of any discussion of the "problem" of induction, and of the
"is/ought" controversy. Since Rand offered resolutions for both, this is surprising. (Dr. Peikoff's
disclaimers, on p. 74 and p. 186, do not suffice.)
Having dealt with Rand's metaphysics and epistemology, Dr. Peikoff proceeds to her most controversial
contribution to thought: her egoistic ethics, with its adamant rejection of altruism. Rand maintained
that, far from being bound in duty to others, each human life is an end in itself, not a means to any
other end, and that therefore each human being has a right to live for his or her own sake, neither
sacrificing themselves to others nor others to themselves.
For Rand, the ultimate goal for humanity on this earth is each person's own life; the ultimate
beneficiary of action, each person's own self.
Dr. Peikoff concludes his presentation of the Objectivist ethics with a chapter on happiness, which Ayn
Rand held to be the "only moral purpose" of one's life (p.325). The chapter closes with Rand's
movingly exalted view of sex:
...the moment when, in answer to the highest of one's values, in an admiration not to be expressed by
any other form of tribute, one's spirit makes one's body become the tribute, recasting it - as proof, as
sanction, as reward - into a single sensation of such intensity of joy that no other sanction of one's
existence is necessary. (p. 348).
From the sublime, Dr. Peikoff brings us sharply back to earth with Rand's politics; explaining her
dedication to individual rights; her identification of the initiation of force as the one real political or
social vice (pp. 310-23); and her view of government as a purely retaliatory institution existing solely
to protect the individual against internal or external aggression. This leads naturally to Rand's ringing
endorsement of capitalism as mankind's only proper form of social organisation. But not the "mixed"
economy which poses as capitalism today, rather:
a full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated laissez-faire capitalism - with a separation of state and
economics, in the same way and for the same reasons as the separation of state and church.
Dr. Peikoff ends his study with Rand's aesthetics, this, the last, actually being one of the better chapters
in the book. However, virtually all sections cover their material comprehensively and Rand's ideas are
presented cogently throughout, with ample quotations and careful annotation. Thus, in many ways, Dr.
Peikoff's work is both excellent and useful and will no doubt take its place as required reading
wherever Objectivism is studied.
The reader may be wondering by now about my title. In brief, despite the credit I have tried to give to
Dr. Peikoff, I was not at all happy with his book. From Preface to Epilogue I was troubled by errors,
gaps and flaws, many of which I found so annoying that I had to put the book aside, often for long
periods. Seventeen months elapsed between purchase and completion of an initial reading.
The first egregious error comes at the end of the short Preface, where Peikoff describes himself as
Rand's "best student and chosen heir" (p. xv). Leaving aside the questionable taste of such a
pronouncement, Peikoff's assertion is fanciful to say the least. Anyone who knows anything at all about
the short history of Objectivism knows that for nearly twenty years Nathaniel Branden was quite
obviously Rand's "best student", just as he was for ten years her publicly proclaimed heir. After her
break with Branden, Rand changed her Will more than once, it appears, and it is more than likely that
the main reason Peikoff was eventually "chosen" was that he was Hobson's Choice, as the English say,
or no choice at all. He was the only early member of Rand's erstwhile "Inner Circle" to stick with her to
the end.
In my day, students, even the best of them, were taught: a) be accurate; b) avoid self-congratulation.
My second problem is that I found Peikoff's tone far too polemical for a philosophical work; too
reminiscent, one has to say, of Rand at her worst. There are the same sudden switches from exposition
to harangue; the same sweeping generalisations, caustic dismissals, and frosty denunciations. Even
Rand's over-use of pejorative jargon terms is emulated - although her favourite, "whim", is leavened by
the addition of "caprice", and her fiendish "whim-worshipper" is partially displaced by a new
jabberwock, the dreaded "intrinsicist".
These stylistic irritants grate because Rand's lapses were usually forgivable: most of the time she
rewarded the reader with new, forcefully expressed and compelling insights. Dr. Peikoff by contrast,
however worthy, has little of Rand's discernment, brilliance at condensing, or relentless pursuit of the
essential. Although admittedly Rand would be a hard act for anyone to follow, we are nevertheless left
with the impression of the journeyman who apes his master; producing, after immense labour,
something much better in the original.
My third problem is that from beginning to end I did not notice a single word of criticism of Ayn Rand.
Peikoff writes as if everything she uttered was beyond reproach. But this is not the case. As even
friendly critics have pointed out - e.g., Ronald Merrill, David Kelley, and others - there is both
imperfection and incompleteness in Rand's thought. There are also many areas of concern to
philosophy about which she had little or nothing to say; and even where she was most thorough, few
philosophers, friendly or otherwise, would accept her ideas as fully worked up in a philosophical sense.
Peikoff's uncritical acceptance of Rand, warts and all, makes one doubly aware of another serious flaw
in the book, that Peikoff writes as if he were alone in the world. Many contemporary toilers in the
vineyard have addressed the issues Rand addressed yet, with the exception of Peikoff's colleague Dr.
Harry Binswanger, who is cited once (p. 191), the only practising philosophers referred to in the text -
both disparagingly - are John Rawls (p. 122) and W. Gerber (p. 140).
This rather glaring deficiency may of course be due to Peikoff's unfortunate decision to perpetuate
Rand's anti-academic stance, which he advertises with a gratuitous insult in his Preface (p. xiv).
Disregarding the self-defeating consequences of such a posture, the obvious snag with it is that a
significant number of professional philosophers, including other Randians, have raised issues,
objections and problems which bear directly on Peikoff's subject matter. Their studies, several
important and interesting, cannot simply be ignored, nor should they be. As the noted Aristotelian
scholar Henry B. Veatch observed, when reviewing Peikoff's book for Liberty magazine:
Had he taken cognizance of what various of these contemporary critics have said ... it would have
rendered his own presentation ... far more sophisticated and illuminating.
But the greater difficulty with Dr. Peikoff's myopic one-sidedness is that it makes the work
unconvincing - even to an Objectivist of thirty years such as myself. The book would have been much
stronger, for example, if Dr. Peikoff had devoted some space, even just a few pages, to rebutting some
of the better-known criticisms of Rand. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how he managed to resist a
swipe at the knock-kneed straw man set up by Robert Nozick in his Personalist article On the Randian
Argument. Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen had a field day blowing it to bits, why not Dr.
Peikoff?
These considerations lead naturally to my major criticisms of Dr. Peikoff's book: his seriously
inadequate, sometimes non-existent presentation of opposing points of view; and his corresponding
failure to fit Objectivism into the context of Western philosophy.
Dr. Peikoff is certainly aware of such requirements. His pages are peppered with the names of dozens
of other philosophers, from Socrates to Wittgenstein (although only six are deemed worthy of inclusion
in his Index), and every once in a while he lifts his approving gaze from the Randian corpus for a brief,
and usually withering, survey of other ideas. (For examples, see: re metaphysics, pp. 30-35;
epistemology, 142-49; reason, 182-85; ethics, 243-49; and politics, 369-77.)
The crux of my criticism, and a grave charge in my view, is that those whom Dr. Peikoff (or
Peikoff/Rand) disagrees with so vociferously are not allowed anything like a proper say. His surveys
are mostly composed of generalisations about "mystics", "sceptics", "subjectivists" "determinists", and
our friend the "intrinsicist"; or are based on equally vague allusions such as: "We hear on all sides..."
(p. 22); "The monist insistence that..." (p. 35); "Kant-inspired attacks..." or "according to Kantians" (p.
49); "The followers of these schools, who are legion..." (p. 80); "For centuries, rationalist philosophers
have..." (p. 90), etc, etc.
When particular philosophers are treated at all, their views are presented either in briefest summary or
in paraphrase - there is an extraordinary paucity of non-Randian quotations. Most irritating of all, on
those rare occasions when another philosopher is actually quoted, there is no reference. Of 400
footnotes, only seven refer to non-Objectivist works. As to the bibliography, it is one of the shortest I
have ever seen, confined entirely to Rand's own main works and one or two posthumous collections of
her essays.
The three philosophers who are presented in some detail, Plato, Aristotle and Kant - villain, hero,
villain - fare no better. Quotation is scant or absent. Platonic dialogues are mentioned twice by name,
and two of Kant's critiques, but there are no edition or page references for either. Aristotle does receive
mostly favourable treatment throughout the book, but only two references to his work are provided,
both in the last chapter, and both from De Poetica, which is hardly the sum and substance of peripatetic
philosophy.
I have already referred to Peikoff's polemical tone. This is most noticeable when he deigns to consider
opposing viewpoints, his manner quickly becoming terse, flippant, sarcastic, or dismissive. The
following off-handed, parenthetical aside about Hume is typical:
the worst offenders philosophically are not the primitives who implicitly count on causality yet never
discover it, but the modern sophisticates, such as David Hume, who count on it while explicitly
rejecting it. (p. 15)
Another typical passage is this treatment of "materialists" (p. 33), which is, if I recall correctly, all the
attention they receive in the book:
men such as Democritus, Hobbes, Marx, Skinner - champion nature but deny the reality or efficacy of
consciousness.... [which is] either a myth or a useless byproduct of brain or other motions....Ayn Rand
describes materialists as "mystics of muscle"....[According to materialists, man] is essentially a body
without a mind. His conclusions, accordingly, reflect not the objective methodology of reason and
logic, but the blind operation of physical factors, such as atomic dances in the cerebellum, glandular
squirtings, S-R conditioning, or the tools of production moving in that weird, waltzlike contortion
known as the dialectic process.
There are two issues to consider here. The first is convincing the reader. Labelling Hume a "paralyzed
skeptic" (p. 54), or Kant "the world's greatest subverter of the conceptual faculty" (p. 109), may be
entirely just; but if one's case is not demonstrated it is mere opinion or, worse, abuse. Nowhere in the
book is there any documentation or clear evidence to justify Peikoff/Rand's revulsion for Kant. All is
assertion or paraphrase. It is simply not enough to instruct the reader, "For evidence...consult The
Critique of Pure Reason" (p. 109), particularly when one has just implied that the Critique is so badly
written as to be unintelligible (pp. 108-9).
Nor does it suffice, on such serious matters, to refer readers to one's own earlier work, as Peikoff
eventually does (p. 451). His first book, The Ominous Parallels, does indeed document a (partial) case
against Kant, but couldn't we have had a few of the juicy bits reiterated here?
To be convincing, a writer must make a case there and then, not pack the poor reader off to the library
to do the job himself.
The second issue here is that when Ayn Rand is treated for hundreds of pages with solemn respect,
while all other philosophers are skimped over in hasty or dismissive pastiches (even Aristotle takes his
share of knocks), the reader fairly soon comes to question the objectivity of the writer.
Thus when we read of Rand's "unprecedented and pregnant identification" (p. 91); or her "landmark
discoveries" (p. 151), even an Objectivist sympathiser is reaching for the salt. The most peculiar thing
about this book on Objectivism is, alas, how subjective it is.
Throughout his book Dr. Peikoff treats Objectivism as if it had sprung, fully formed, pristine, and
almost entirely original, from the forehead of Ayn Rand. This is partly true, Rand was neither a scholar
nor a reader, she worked out her ideas herself. Nonetheless, Objectivism inevitably had roots and
origins and influences. The reader would like to know what these were. For example, Rand frequently
acknowledged her debt to Aristotle, but Dr. Peikoff does not attempt the all-important task of showing
exactly how Objectivism dovetails with Aristotelianism.
A further deficiency concerns Locke. The great man does get his name dropped a couple of times, but
since he anticipated a substantial part of Rand's politics he surely deserves more than that.
Another "missing person" is Nietzsche. Ronald Merrill demonstrated a Nietzschian influence on the
younger Rand in his book The Ideas of Ayn Rand, yet the enigmatic German gets no more attention
from Dr. Peikoff than Locke does, even though Rand herself reported her youthful attraction without
too much reticence.
In fact no biographical information about Rand is provided whatsoever. Her education during and after
the Bolshevik revolution in Russia; her carefully contrived escape; her arrival in the United States as a
penniless immigrant with barely a word of English; her bitterness at the lack of respect accorded her by
the American intellectual establishment after her dramatic success: all these experiences coloured her
thought, style and behaviour, and should therefore feature in a discussion of her ideas.
Similarly, the evolution of Objectivism into its final form surely merits attention in a treatise on Ayn
Rand's philosophy. Nobody, no matter how brilliant, reaches Rand's level of insight and abstraction
without decades of trial and error, false leads, blind alleys, formulation and reformulation, and long
years of refinement. Dr. Peikoff has had better access than anybody to Rand's Philosophic Journals.
Even if he intends to publish them later, a summary and a few extracts would not have been amiss in
this book.
In a philosophy which lays such emphasis on context, gaps of the kind I have been discussing are not
merely mystifying, they are serious sins of omission.
I have been very critical of Dr. Peikoff's treatment of opposing points of view. I would like to conclude
this article with a look at his discussion of anarchism (pp. 371-73), which I found so unacceptable that
it made me wonder whether my judgement elsewhere had been too lenient.
The discussion occupies a bare one-and-a-half pages in Dr. Peikoff's chapter on Rand's concept of
government. Now, it is true that Ayn Rand dismissed anarchism in her own brief look at the nature of
government, and certainly she had no sympathy or patience with modern "anarcho-capitalists". But I do
not believe that the following accurately represents her thinking:
"Anarchism...amounts to the view that every man should defend himself by using force against others
whenever he feels like it, with no objective standards of justice, crime, or proof". (pp. 371-2)
"'What if an individual does not want to delegate his right of self-defense?' .... The question implies
that a "free man" is one with the right to enact his desire, any desire, simply because it is his desire,
including the desire to use force."
"Anarchists in America pretend to be individualists.... however... as its main modern popularizer, Karl
Marx, makes clear, anarchism is an expression of Utopian collectivism."
"...anarchism does not recognise that honest disagreement and deliberate evil will always be possible
to men; it does not grasp the need of any mechanism to enable real human beings to live together in
harmony.... the theory has no place for real human beings..." (p. 372).
"The immediate result of anarchy...has to be gang rule/or the rule of a strongman."
"Anarchism is merely an unusually senseless form of statism..." (p. 373).
I do not think it is necessary for me to spell out - in a review which is already long enough - the
inaccuracy, contradictions, misrepresentation, smear by association, argument by intimidation,
disregard for history, and twisted reasoning evident in the above passages. It is hard to believe an
Objectivist author wrote them. Where are context, hierarchy, and objectivity? Gang rule? Strongmen?
What happened to Objectivist man: to reason, purpose, self-esteem; to rationality, productiveness,
pride; to honesty, independence, integrity, and justice? Where is the "benevolent universe" Rand so
often upheld? Who said "There are no conflicts of interest among men of goodwill"? Who invented
Galt's Gulch - the haven with neither government nor dispute?
Was it all just a dream, then? Men can not, after all, be entrusted with liberty? Must we ignore all
history, all experience, all the overwhelming evidence that power corrupts and, when all is said and
done, bow to the inevitable statist claim that freedom and happiness really do depend upon
government?
One last problem with this problematic book is that in it Dr. Peikoff tells us nothing new. Every
important point he makes was made previously by Ayn Rand. Contrast Nathaniel Branden in
psychology, say, or David Kelley in epistemology, who have taken an Objectivist foundation and built
upon it substantially. Dr. Peikoff merely repeats what Rand said. He is always looking over his
shoulder, never at the road ahead.
I take no issue with his intention to present Rand's system systematically, but there are enough open
spaces in her philosophy, or areas she did not touch, that one would have thought that any philosopher
worth his salt would have seized the Randian ball and run off joyously into parks and pastures new.
Instead, Dr. Peikoff seems so overwhelmed by the marvellous inheritance which fell into his hands that
he remains welded to the spot he was occupying when probate was granted in 1982.
Regretfully then, for I was really looking forward to this book, my conclusion is that Objectivism: The
Philosophy of Ayn Rand, while from an Objectivist point of view it is worth reading, from the
perspective of philosophy in general it is far from "the definitive statement" that Dr. Peikoff imagines it
to be (p. xv).
Tom Paine said that a king could just as well be born an ass as a lion. Something similar can be said of
chosen heirs, who often fail to live up to their inheritance. No doubt Objectivist "true believers" will
continue to uphold Leonard Peikoff as a lion, but with this narrow-focused and intemperate book I am
afraid he has made himself appear a bit of an ass.
Chapter 7
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTELIAN
COMPUTER SCIENCE
Copyright Thomas Gramstad
Nordic Artificial Intelligence Magazine No. 2 1991
This article introduces some of the basic ideas behind a deductive database based on Aristotelian logic.
The database was created by Eyal Mozes and is the basis for his doctoral thesis, completed at the
Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, Israel.
Aristotelian logic is the area of logic which is concerned which is concerned
with rules for reasoning from general premises to specific conclusions, i.e.,
deductive logic - an area that was founded and almost singlehandedly developed
by Aristotle. Today it is common among philosophers and mathematicians to
regard it as a special case of predicate calculus. This view, however, is severely
mutilated, if not killed, by the latest gadget from the Aristotelian Philosophy
Defense Department.
Why use Aristotelian logic in a database? Aristotelian logic is concerned with
actual human thought. This gives the database some unique features: It can give
natural-language explanations for its deductions; it can volunteer information, in
answer to yes/no questions, if a stronger or weaker version of the "yes" answer
can be proven; it can point out likely (but unprovable) possibilities; it can
suggest "missing rules" (i.e., new rules that would allow a "yes" answer); and it
can even suggest instances in which nondeductive forms of reasoning (e.g.,
analogy, induction) may be useful.
There is, however, a deeper motivation for the use of Aristotelian logic. In agreement with H.B. Veatch,
the author of Intentional Logic (Yale University Press 1952), Eyal Mozes criticizes modern
mathematical logic for confusing real relations - the relations among different objects and between
objects and their properties - with logical ones. Thus, general facts used in deduction are referred to as
"deductive rules" when they are contained in a deductive database. However, stresses Eyal Mozes, they
are not rules guiding the deduction - they are premises of the deduction.
Aristotelian logic, created for the purpose of understanding and practically guiding actual human
thought, studies the relations of identity on which human knowledge and thought are based, their
possible forms, and their use in inference; this study is the theory of the syllogism. ... Previous work on
deductive databases was based on mathematical logic, and therefore did not recognize the role of the
logical relation of identity as the base of knowledge and of inference; instead, database relations -
which represent real relations - were treated as if they are logical relations. That is why general facts
about these relations were treated as if they are deduction rules, and the four possible types of general
facts were not recognized. One result of this is that the various distinctions and classifications made in
Aristotelian logic - such as the classification of syllogisms into figures, and the classification of the
fallacies - which are relevant to human thinking and allow implicit reasoning about knowledge, and the
resulting capabilities of the user interaction, were not possible. (Mozes, p. 21)
The thesis consists of 9 chapters. The introductory chapter describes the goals of the thesis, the basic
features of the database, and projects the historical influence of traditional philosophical logic vs.
modern, mathematical logic. The second chapter provides an overview of the structure of the database
as seen by the user, and the third chapter describes the deductive procedures; this chapter may serve as
a brief introduction to Aristotelian logic. Chapter 4 compares the thesis to other works on deductive
databases, and other works on Aristotelian logic. Chapter 5 provides examples of how the database
works. Chapter 6 discusses the philosophical motivation behind the database. Chapter 7 considers the
use of Aristotelian logic as an extension of the usual procedures of deductive databases, and provides a
system of rules for valid inference and a partial formal semantics. Chapter 8 describes the
implementation of the prototype system, including its general architecture and the major algorithms.
Chapter 9 contains conclusions and suggestions for future research. Finally, an appendix lists the valid
moods and figures of the syllogism, and another gives examples of runs with the deductive algorithm.
The database demonstrates the advantages of Aristotelian logic and suggests two broad areas to which
it can be applied:
1. Applications in which interactions with human users are important.
2. Simulations of human thought, especially AI applications dealing with induction and the
suggestion of possibilities.
Eyal Mozes may be contacted at eyal@cloud9.net. His thesis is available for free from:
A CHOICE OF METHODOLOGIES
I want to stress the methodology here. The conclusion that a computer can't think isn't very exciting in
itself. It would be more exciting if I could have demonstrated that computers can think. But in order to
advance knowledge, in order to achieve new discoveries and inventions, we have to use the correct
methodology. An incorrect one may provide lots of exciting promises, but will not provide many
results.
The operational method of thinking, with its stress on models, encourages thinking by analogy.
Operationally, if two things act alike, they are alike. For some purposes, analogies are very useful;
seeing a similarity between a new situation and a previously understood one can lead to a valuable
insight. However, it is also necessary to understand when to break away from analogies, when to form
a new conceptual framework. Being unable to do this leads to stagnation.
Regarding computers as thinking machines is, in fact, such a path to stagnation. It can distract one from
identifying the role which computers can and do in fact play, as adjuncts to human thought rather than
as thinkers. And in fact, virtually all the advances in the use of computers have come from people who
have not clung to the idea that a computer is a low-grade human mind. This includes many of the
advances in artificial intelligence itself, which have resulted from backing away from models of
thought and instead approaching specific problems.
The real key to computers is contained in the term information processing. The basic action of a
computer is to accept information of some kind, and produce information of another kind. A word
processor creates formatted text from keystrokes. A data base manager creates responses from queries
and from its data base. A game creates visual or verbal effects from its internal data and the player's
input.
Thinking in these terms, and not in terms imitative of humans, is the key to creativity. For example,
Apple Computer's HyperCard deals with units of textual or graphic information called cards, organizes
these in stacks, and allows user input to affect the progression from one card to another. The
spreadsheet - VisiCalc and its thousand imitators - is another example; its creators thought about what
people needed and how that need could be met in terms of the computer's information-processing
capability. People don't think like spreadsheets; they don't think like stacks of cards; but they use both
of these as tools. An analogy from the tools people use, transferred to the new context of information
processing, was the key to both of these creations. But in addition, elements were introduced which
were not possible without the computer; a "sheet of paper" in the middle of which new rows and
columns can be created, and which calculates formulas automatically; cards that have areas on them
which reach out directly on request to other cards.
The idea of information processing can be extended in many directions. I have been very interested in
the idea of interactive fiction, of a story whose progress changes according to the "reader's" choices.
Whoever thinks of and devises the next widely useful application of information processing will be in a
position to make a lot of money. The possibilities are limitless, if we don't restrict our concept of the
computer to less than it can be.
And this, ironically, is what is wrong with regarding computers as thinking machines: not that it is too
much to expect of a computer, but that it is the wrong thing to expect, and therefore ultimately limiting.
Discarding false concepts keeps the future open for new discoveries, and perhaps for computers doing
things much more amazing than any robot science-fiction has ever suggested.
Gary McGath is a software-consultant in Penacook, New Hampshire.
"AWAKENING" AS EMERGENCE
McGath claims that having a computer "wake up", like Mike in Heinleins's The Moon is a Harsh
Mistress, is no more plausible than a beautiful statue waking up, and that there is no objectively valid
reason to consider the former more plausible than the latter. I disagree. There is such a reason.
Anyone can observe a proportional relationship between, on the one hand, the increasing complexity of
the nervous system in the animal kingdom, and on the other hand, a corresponding incremental increase
in their mental or cognitive capacities. From observing this correspondence in many independent and
diverse instances (i.e., species) one is justified in concluding that there is a necessary link, a causal
connection, between the degree of complexity of the physical support structure and the possibility for,
origin of, and degree, scope and intensity of consciousness. This is further supported by the observation
that damaging specific parts of a brain damages specific or corresponding parts of the organism's
mental or cognitive capacities.
Given that consciousness is not some mystical Cartesian substance, it must exist as an integrated part of
the system that constitute the organism as a whole, and co-develop synergistically and bi-causally with
the physical support structure. This is what we observe, phylogenetically and ontogenetically. It follows
that given the right kind of physical support structure, awareness will emerge. Consciousness is an
emergent property. "Awakening", that is, reaching a conceptual identification of the self, constitutes the
final stage of the emergence of consciousness, namely self-awareness.
STRUCTURE AND CONNECTIONS VS. SUBSTANCE AND MATERIALS
McGath correctly identifies the Turing test as an instance of the Black Box Fallacy; the implicit
assumption that a model of a process is the full equivalent of the process which it represents; the view
that the map is the territory. However, it seems that he would be inclined to classify all ideas in favor of
artificial intelligence as instances of the Black Box Fallacy.
Yet the Black Box Fallacy does not apply to those situations where the copy or simulation is better than
the original. A perhaps trivial example of this would be old books or paintings which are copied with
modern computer-graphics technology, producing copies that are better than the originals ever were;
clearer, brighter, more detailed and so on. Computer simulation technology is moving at an accelerating
pace along the path of creating virtual or "hyperreal" environments. Maybe it is wrong to classify such
copies or simulations as models - maybe they should be regarded as originals in their own right, as new
territory rather than maps.
Since the possibility of creating an artificial physical structure that may support consciousness has not
been ruled out in principle, we must be prepared to recognize such an entity as a new original, not a
model, even if models of human cognition went into the effort of its creation, and the Black Box
Fallacy would not apply to it.
The assumptions of the Turing test should not be confused with the perfectly plausible idea that
consciousness need not necessarily have a carbon-based support structure; that what matters is not the
building materials of the support structure per se, but their organization and architecture, the nature of
the structure; its complexity, the type and number of connections and so forth.
This is not to say that consciousness is independent of a physical basis, since the structural demands
restrict what building materials may be used. However, it is inappropriate to conclude from one
observed instance (human beings) that only one support structure for self-awareness or a conceptual
consciousness is possible. This is the inductive fallacy of premature generalization, or "jumping to
conclusions". There is simply no basis for such a generalization. Similarly, there is no evidence for the
belief that only one type of physical structure may support and give rise to perceptual consciousness,
and it seems hopelessly parochial to hold such a belief.
SILICONSCIOUSNESS
How did consciousness originate in humans? At some point there must have been some sort of
"awakening". So awakening is a real phenomenon, and we're back at the unsettled question about the
necessary properties of the physical support structure of consciousness and their interaction with the
emerging consciousness. This question is a scientific one, not a philosophical one.
McGath has neither shown that noncarbon-based conscious life is impossible, nor that creating such a
being artificially is impossible. Hence he has not demonstrated that the pursuit of a noncarbon-based
artifial mind or intelligence is a "holy grail" (i.e., an impossibility). What he has shown is that The
approach of the Turing test (and so a lot of today's AI research) is going in a misguided and unfruitful
direction. This does not prove that there are no other approaches that may lead to the creation of
artificial life or minds. One methodology that comes to mind, and that to my knowledge does not
depend on The assumptions of the Turing test, is neural nets or connectionism. Others are organic
computers, and nanotechnology.
Incidentally, Heinlein's Mike seems to be based upon something resembling connectionism. The
counterargument to Heinlein would be to prove that the parts that his "machine" were made of could
not possibly give rise to consciousness by any kind of reshuffling, or rearrangement, of them in their
current form. That is an easy task with any of today's computers, which is one important reason, I
assume, that Heinlein invented some new terms, like neuristors, to describe the building blocks of his
machine.
In one sense, the question "Can a computer think?" is as easy to answer with a resounding "No!" as the
question "Can an amoeba think?". And if they could think, they would no longer be computer and
amoeba respectively. The historical fact remains that something that started out in as primitive a form
as an amoeba evolved and eventually ended up giving rise to complex physical forms able to support
consciousness, namely, the higher animals. Today's computers are silicon amoebas. Neural nets may
give rise to the first silicon animals.
While the Turing test skips the question of necessary physical preconditions for consciousness, refuting
it and its assumptions do not preclude the possibility of an evolution from simple physical structures
into complex physical structures capable of supporting consciousness, and even a conceptual, self-
aware consciousness. After all, this has already happened at least once (when human consciousness
originated), and the main guide of that develoment was The Blind Watchmaker of random mutations
and natural selection. One may expect that systematic changes and rational selection by purposeful and
goal-directed human minds will enable a much faster completion of an artificial version of this process.
In terms of fruitfulness it would be a terrible waste not to pursue the creation of an artificial mind if the
creation of such be possible.
In July 2000 a writer asked to write a profile of me, for publication as an e-book. The publisher hoped
to issue this e-book early in order to boost the acceptance of e-books. I agreed to cooperate, provided it
would be published in a way that would respect the readers' freedom; the writer expected to be able to
achieve this and made it a commitment.
But when it came time to work out the details, no agreement could be reached. The publisher was
determined to publish an encrypted, watermarked, trackable e-book, and offered only the concession of
publishing the text in another less-fancy form which would not be restricted. I concluded that only
making the actual e-book visibly and markedly less restrictive than what is generally planned could
make my participation a positive act; so I declined.
Strange to say, the publisher's representatives, despite knowing full well what my views are, were
surprised that I planned to base a real decision on them. Apparently they expect criticism of business
practices to be a purely theoretical matter--not to be reflected in personal decisions, and not to be
applied to their activities.
Chapter 8
at the moment.
down there.
In his science fiction novels, British author Iain M. Banks projects a future human society that seems to
embody all the essential virtues of Objectivist social theory, while at the same time suggesting how two
widespread and major shortcomings of current Objectivist thought may be corrected.
The Culture is a machine-symbiotic human society. There are artificial intelligences and other
mechanical persons enjoying individual rights. Biological persons (humans) are enhanced genetically
and biotechnologically, they have a lot of extra glands and add-ons that expand volitional control of
body functions and mind states. This includes the ability to change sex back and forth by will, or to
have both sexes (intersexuality) or no sex. The Culture is an abundant society, with no scarcity
economy. One Culture adage is, Money is a sign of poverty, meaning that money only has a function
in a scarcity economy, and therefore its existence betrays a pre-abundant (poor) society. The Culture is
a stateless society, continually expanding its size and accumulated knowledge. Erik Vasaasen has
described 'The Culture' as Star Trek without the Prime Directive. When the Contact branch of the
Culture encounters dictatorships or religious-militaristic civilizations, or other societies that violate the
Cultures code and sense of human dignity, liberty and individual rights, it neutralizes, subverts,
educates and transforms them.
My purpose in this article is not to perform a detailed discussion of the probabilities or the specifics of
the evolutionary path towards a society like the Culture. Rather, I seek to achieve three goals:
(1) to present the big picture, and incite people to read Banks' books and others like them,
(2) to impart that a society like the Culture is the goal and ideal we should have in mind and strive for,
and that this must influence our priorities and strategies today, and
(3) to indicate a few areas of cultural difference from our present society and their consequences.
EPICUREAN ANARCHY AND AUTARCHY
Living in an abundant society without scarcity means that people are free to spend all their time
anyway they want to. People with creative urges or passions have a maximum degree of freedom to
pursue these wherever they may lead them. Or, one can pursue other interests, like play or having fun.
This may sound more Epicurean than Objectivist, and it probably is. But then again, Epicurus had a
more developed conceptual apparatus for understanding joy and pleasure than Rand ever did<1>.
Which leads to the first shortcoming of Objectivist social theory of today.
Everything Rand wrote about economics, politics and social theory assumes an economy of scarcity.
She assumes a second-wave<2>, industrial civilization. Her followers seem to take this premise for
granted as well. Given this premise, all subsequent social reasoning and conclusions focus on exclusive
property rights, how to achieve and apply just principles for establishing them, money, and the
industrial social organization. But we are already in the process of transcending that kind of society,
heading into a third-wave, post-industrial era. In the not too distant future, we can already see a
glimmer of an abundant society. A few key technologies are necessary for establishing abundance. In
particular: nanotechnology, biotechnology, genetic engineering, further advances in electronics and
computer technology, and further expansion into space including the establishment of microgravity
industrial production facilities. All these are well underway, and they could have advanced far enough
to completely penetrate society within the next 50 years. Artificial Intelligence would be nice too, and
would establish mechanical persons. But perhaps cybernetic extensions and add-ons to the human body
would come first; cyborgs may arise earlier than artificial intelligences. This would be slightly different
from Banks' the Culture, where cyborgs are not emphasized.
NOTES
<1> For a comparison of similarities of and differences between Epicurus and Rand, see Shelton, Ray:
Epicurus and Rand, in Objectivity, Vol. 2 No. 3 and subsequent debate in Vol. 2 No. 4.
http://bomis.snap.com/objectivity/abstracts.html#EPICURUS
<2> By «second-wave», I refer of course to Alvin Toffler's concepts of the first, second and third waves
of civilization, known from Toffler's numerous books, in particular The Third Wave (1980). Recently,
Toffler has begun using the term «supercivilization» rather than «wave». See for example the Tofflers'
Encyclopedia Britannica article, entitled Supercivilization and its Discontents, at
http://www.britannica.com/bcom/original/article/0,5744,5364,00.html.
<3> See Barry Vacker's forthcoming book, Chaos at the Edge of Utopia,
http://www.ifi.uio.no/~thomas/po/chaos-edge-utopia.html
Also, various books by Drexler and Rothschild, respectively. Web searches on transhumanism,
nanotechnology and extropianism will yield interesting results as well.
<4> For a discussion and comparison of these social groups, see Eric S. Raymond's essay, entitled The
Magic Cauldron, at http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/magic-cauldron/
<5> Gladstein, Mimi & Sciabarra, Chris: Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand, Pennsylvania State
University Press 1999. See also http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/femstart.htm
<6> See for example Natasha Vita More's essay, The Future of Sexuality, at
http://www.natasha.cc/sex.htm
<7> Banks also writes mainstream novels, and occasional science fiction not about the Culture. Books
about The Culture include the following titles: Consider Phlebas; The Player of Games; The State of
the Art; Inversions; Use of Weapons; Excession. The State of the Art describes The Culture's
discovery of and meeting with Earth 2000 culture.
POSTSCRIPT
After writing and publishing this article, I have been made aware of several web sites dedicated to Iain
Banks in general, and to the Culture in particular, including Culture Shock at http://www.phlebas.com/.
The site contains a lot of information, including a bibliography, a FAQ, a link collection of relevant
articles and interviews, a news service, a lot of trivia, a mailing list, an article by Banks himself about
the Culture (A Few Notes About The Culture, http://www.phlebas.com/text/cultnote.html), and much
more.
LINKS
Culture Shock
http://www.phlebas.com/
Iain Banks bibliography
http://www.phlebas.com/text/bib.html
A Few Notes on the Culture, by Iain M Banks
http://www.phlebas.com/text/cultnote.html
Link page to interviews, articles and FAQ
http://www.phlebas.com/text/banks.html
The Culture mailing list
http://www.core.no/culture/
Iain Banks' Culture novels
http://www.gen-mars.freeserve.co.uk/books/banks/index.htm
War and Culture
http://www.strangewords.com/archive/use.html
Hamish Sinclair: Iain M. Banks' "Culture" references in Bungie's Halo
http://www.marathon.org/story/halo_culture.html
SFbook.com's Iain M. Banks page
http://sfbook.com/?authorid=6
Iain (M.) Banks Resource Page
http://www.purge.freeserve.co.uk/banks.htm
Slipstream
http://www.rossyb.dabsol.co.uk/slipstream/frameset.html
The web pages for the alt.books.iain-banks newsgroup
http://members.tripod.com/a.b.i-b/
Iain Banks web ring
http://www.rossyb.dabsol.co.uk/banksie/
'The Wasp Factory' web site
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/1027/index.html
IMMORTALITY WOULD BE WORTH IT
A RESPONSE TO STEPHEN HICKS
Copyright Svein Olav G. Nyberg
Objectivity Vol. 1 no. 6 (1993)
In Objectivity Vol. 1 no. 4 (1992), Stephen Hicks wrote an article, Would Immortality be worth it? I
disagree with his conclusion, which I think rests on two false premises. The first is the philosophical
impossibility of infinities, and the second is the assumption that boredom will necessarily come - and
come as a good reason to end life - after one has lived for sufficiently many years.
INFINITY
Concerning infinity, I recognize that from present science there is much corroborative evidence that the
amount of matter is finite. It is not true, however, that philosophy by itself can support the claim that
everything is finite.
The argument for the position that existence must be finite, is in essence that what is infinite is thereby
indefinite. But this argument always consists in an equivocation on infinite in one respect, versus
infinite in all respects. While it is true that what is unbounded in all respects is indefinite, that which is
unbounded in just one respect is not. There would be nothing indefinite about a rod that just went on
and on in one direction. The argument conflating the infinite and the indefinite is fallacious.
There is one other, more clever, argument that is raised to "prove" the impossibility of the infinite: by
reference to concept formation. The argument goes that what exists must exist in some quantity, but
may exist in any quantity. The concept existence is formed by omitting measurements of entities, which
again must exist in some but may exist in any quantity. Finite quantity is a redundancy. Infinite
quantity is a contradiction in terms.
This is clearly a confusion of epistemology and metaphysics; what Harry Binswanger has called the
Positivistic fallacy. Though we might only be able to grasp and measure what is finite, that we be able
to grasp and measure X should never be taken as a criterion for X existing. To demand that nature
should conform to such a degree to human powers of cognition errs also by the fallacy of the primacy
of consciousness.
It remains for me to answer the rightfully asked question "What do you mean by infinite then, if you
cannot grasp it?" The concept infinite cannot be made as a concept of an actuality. But it can be one of
potentiality. Now, to say that there might be an infinite number of entities in the Universe would then
be to say that if we started a process of counting the entities in the universe, it would never stop. To
claim that the universe is finite, would then be the same as the claim that a process of counting the
entities of the universe would by philosophical necessity have to stop somewhere. This, philosophy
cannot establish.
IMMORTALITY
The other defective premise was the inevitability of boredom. Why should this be inevitable? Ayn Rand
states that emotions are the product of thoughts. To phrase in Rand's terms: Which thoughts give rise to
this boredom? As far as I can see, Hicks has not provided such linkage to reality. Rand says life is self-
sustained, self-generated action. In contrast, Hicks claims that life is essentially growth. While within a
limited context the two are equal, in that flourishing consists in actualizing one's potential, they differ
in the estimation of what will happen once the potential is fully realized. While I would rejoice and
enjoy my total self-actualization, Hicks seems to find this perfection an unattainable goal which, if
reached, should be abandoned in favor of death.
So, since perfection is both desirable and attainable, Hicks' analysis is wrong.
Chapter 9
MISCELLANEOUS
ACCIDENTAL ELEMENTS
The first problem is that here and there, the article reflects the personal attitudes and style of certain
Objectivists (like ARI), rather than Objectivist philosophy. For example, Hillary Clinton is compared to
Hitler (and Ellsworth Toohey and Iago) early in the article, without any justification, and without any
motivation or relevance to the article. It might have been acceptable to compare the Clintons' statist
policies with those of Nazists in a rhetorical piece about politics. But this is not such a piece; the aim
and language of the article is scholarly, not polemical, and it is about heroism, not about politics. And
no comparison is being made, it's just a juxtaposition of H. Clinton and Hitler in the same sentence. It
serves no function, except alienating parts of the readership. More than a few women consider Hillary
Clinton to be a successful and powerful female role model - a hero, as it were. That doesn't make her
one, but the issue here is - not for the first time - certain Objectivists' ability to alienate readers without
good reason.
Another example of odd, unexplained juxtaposition occurs later in the article, when Bill Clinton, the
Pope, Mother Theresa, and Madonna are put in the same group, a sub-hero or anti-hero group, without
explanation. Objectivists will understand that Clinton, the Pope and Mother Theresa are put together
because of their altruism and collectivism. But this point would require explanation for any non-
Objectivist reader. Why Madonna is included in the group is anyone's guess - maybe Bernstein felt a
need to say something about his musical (dis)tastes. Another unmotivated element.
Bernstein's perfunctory dismissal of Hamlet as a "pathetic figure" who is a perfect literary expression
of the mind-body dichotomy, a "brilliant philosopher-intellectual who excels in the theoretical realm
but is helpless to deal with the practical", may reflect Rand's personal tastes or perhaps ARI's official
policy. For most other people, Hamlet represents a moral hero of great stature, struggling to incorporate
his principles and knowledge with a complex and difficult reality.
DEFINITION BY ESSENTIALS
Bernstein quotes and harshly criticizes a dictionary definition of a hero:
Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary defines "hero as: a)
"a mythological or legendary figure often of divine descent
endowed with great strength or ability, b) an illustrious
warrior, c) a man admired for his achievements and noble
qualities, d) one that shows great courage."
According to Bernstein, this "attempt at" definition is "woefully inadequate". However, his "woefully
inadequate"-comment is overstated. While he does indeed add clarity and philosophical depth to this
definition, his own definition nevertheless leans heavily on the dictionary definition:
A hero is ... an individual of elevated moral stature and
superior ability who pursues his goals indefatigably in the face
of powerful antagonist(s). Because of his unbreached devotion to
the good, no matter the opposition, a hero attains spiritual
grandeur, even in he fails to achieve practical victory. Notice
then the four components of heroism: moral greatness, ability or
prowess, action in the face of opposition, and triumph in at
least a spiritual, if not a physical, form.
Both definitions identify the same four key components, but Bernstein's is the more philosophical, his
definition is "essentialized" and therefore superior. Webster's definition can be seen as a pop version of
a philosophical definition, so they are really closely related. Therefore the dictionary definition cannot
be "woefully inadequate"; even though Bernstein's definition is a substantial improvement of it, the
dictionary definition too is true and identify the four key elements.
I disagree. First, there are issues of symbolical action and symbolical-esthetical representations of the
body to consider. To be a hero is to do something specific (action). And a highly functional body, a
body with athletic strenght, agility and dexterity, is a universal, transcultural symbol of heroism. This
leads to the second point, which is that Bernstein's claim is historically inaccurate or uninformed. The
first heroes in history were warrior-heroes who protected their clan, community or city against
invaders. This is the historical origin of the coupling of heroism with action<2>.
In other words, the coupling of heroism with action existed long before Plato and Christianity, and it
also exists in cultures without Plato and Christianity. It is still possible, of course, that the mind-body
dichotomy (MBD) can influence the coupling in an unhealthy way, e.g., by causing an overemphasis on
it. But the point is, contrary to Bernstein's claim, the MBD didn't cause or originate the coupling; the
requirements of human survival in pre-industrial societies did. Therefore, the MBD cannot be used to
discredit a strong connection between heroism and action. The connection was a historical existential
necessity - and even today the connection is essential, because human survival requires the integration
of thought and action. And the esthetical-symbolical issues related to heroism, inspiration and hero-
worship have not changed. But how to express and present images of thought-action integration and
heroic grandeur?
Heroism involves a moral character, and a moral character is integrated with its expression in action. A
"theoretically good character", which is not expressed in action, is not heroic - and would not even be
considered to be a good character. While the intellect, or "intellectual heroism", certainly is important,
and certainly is underemphasized in the culture, it doesn't lend itself so easily to symbolical expression,
by itself. First, because it is possible to have a great intellect without having a moral character.
Secondly, because it is difficult to portray a thought process itself as heroic and exciting: someone
sitting and concentrating on a chair, someone sitting and looking into the air in an office - these are not
powerful images. But the end result of the thought process - the action that it leads to - lends itself
easily to symbolic expression of heroism. Just as creation is an integration of intellect and action, so
must heroism be. Bernstein knows this, he makes it one of his key points. But the actual degrees of
intellect and action, mind and body, in the mix, and their style of expression, can vary greatly. While
the culture underemphasizes the intellectual aspects of heroism, Bernstein errs in the opposite direction,
he demotes the physical aspects of the symbolic expression of heroism too much. Such a demotion will
also cause an attenuation of the esthetical aspects of heroism.
Bernstein presents "hero" as a concept interchangeable with "moral genius". I do not question the
existence of moral geniuses, or the value of recognizing and praising them. But I cannot accept this
bereavement of heroism from humanity at large. Neither rational selfishness nor morality nor courage
(the building blocks of heroism) are elitist concepts. Everyone can be an egoist, a moral person, or a
courageous person. The degree can and will vary, as is the case with all forms of competence and
achievement. I do not accept that the upper end of the scale shall be cut off and placed in a superhuman
realm, inaccessible to and separate from humanity at large. Instead, I propose an unbreached,
continuous scale of heroism.
Heroism, as it is depicted in art and literature, as well as in life, comes in a large continuous range of
degrees and dimensions. Here I will focus on the two extreme ends of the scale. I call these the
Everyday Hero and the Epic Hero.
The Everyday Hero is the more or less ordinary person who gets into trouble, probably not by his or her
own choosing, and who rise to the occasion, actualizing the best of their slumbering and unknown
potentials in the process. The Everyday Hero seems familiar and realistic in that s/he could have been
one of the neighbors, and because we are told about her or his confusion, conflicts and development.
An example of this would be Harrison Ford in one of his I'm-an-ordinary-and-decent-person-but-don't-
push-me-movies.
The Everyday Hero is positive and inspiring through his familiarity and through the description of a
gradual personal development that may provide one with clear ideas about steps to take in order to
become heroic, to realize one's possibilities. The Everyday Hero is the role model.
The Epic Hero, by contrast, is out of this world, larger than life. An extraordinary person in
extraordinary situations and difficulties, but handling it all apparently without any serious problems.
The Epic Hero goes or rather flies through life with panache, grandeur and in big-time style.
The Epic Hero is positive and inspiring through the images and emotions being evoked, the
impossible dream that suddenly becomes real and concrete. S/he is not really a role model, but
rather a fertilizer that will prepare the ground so that role models may find a place to take root - an
image that evokes the desire for heroic being.
The issue is a balance between, or rather an integration of, realism and symbolism. Realism is the
vehicle you make that will carry you in the direction you want to go. Symbolism is the stars in the sky
that can tell you the direction.
We need both; the symbolism and the realism, the Epic Hero and the Everyday Hero. We don't need
both in each text or each work of art, but we need a diet that contains both, and we need to identify
their fundamental connection, as constituents of the same structure, points on the same scale. Without
the latter we will become escapists; and without the former we will become buried in the nitty-gritty of
everyday life and lose the perspective and the emotional fuel that help us keep going.
The problems of Bernstein's article are more or less small in comparison to its virtues, but nevertheless
annoying. Luckily they are easy to remove in one's mind, and they do not damage the case for the
philosophical doctrines of Randian heroism. Bernstein identifies and explains the Objectivist theory on
the nature of heroism. But heroism is a part of human nature, not the exclusive property of an
elite<3>. Rand's legacy has the potential to aid everyone of us to reclaim and develop this part of our
humanity - a part which is both common (species identity) and unique (individual identity) to all human
individuals.
NOTES
<2> I owe this point to Kirsti Minsaas, and to the discussion by Stephen Cox and David
Kelley of different concepts of heroism in their The Fountainhead: A Fiftieth
Anniversary Celebration pamphlet (1993), published by and available from The
Objectivist Center.
<3> See also Will Thomas' analysis of and contrast of Richard Taylor's elitist
conception of pride with the Randian conception of pride in Navigator Vol. 2
No. 13 (October 1999) for a similar discussion.
Y2K: A RADICAL SOLUTION
This is a release from the Tiddlywink Graduate Center.
Source of inspiration: http://www.dailyobjectivist.com/Spir/SpirFeat/Dialectical/dialectical.htm
Copyright Thomas Gramstad (november 1999)
All rights reserved
The specter of doom and destruction is hovering over civilization as we know it, in the form of the
horrible y2k total breakdown threat. But fear not. Rationality will prevail: the solution is as simple as it
is elegant. Due to pervasive irrationality, our calendar is based on the birth of some irrational religious
collectivist cult leader. But in realizing this, the solution to our dilemma presents itself with thundering
clarity: replace Jesus calendars with Rand calendars! By founding our calendars on the birth of
Rand rather than the birth of Jesus, we will buy ourselves another 2000 (1902 to be exact) years
to prepare for and solve the y2k problem. And by that time it won't matter, because there won't be any
computers anymore anyway, we will all be using various forms of self-directed quantum-cognitive
thought materialization and matter transmission processes.
But, you say, current society will not accept replacing Jesus with Rand? My point exactly. While the
rest of the world collapses under the weight of irrationality and religion, we, the Keepers of Reason,
shall retreat to a remote resort or gulch or something, where we create a new society based on the new
calendar. I mean, can you say Apollo Shrugged? (or whomever)
Now, this plan, simple and elegant as it is (ahem) may appear drastical and highly radical - indeed,
utterly Randical. Therefore we need to ground it properly in our present reality, which we may
accomplish only by considering the total context in all its dynamic, cohesive, and spatio-temporal
intermingling ramifications. As Zen Triadbarra established in his seminal work, Ayn Rand: The
Etruscan Rascal (Zensylvania State of Mind Press, 1995), the essential aspect of Rand's methodology
was a fundamental adherence to contextual totality achieved by sophisticated technologies involving
dialectical engineering, triadic recombination, and small microscopical entities. A domain to be
further explored in his forthcoming work: Total Combustion: Triad By Fire (an extensive study of
spontaneous syllogistic self-combustion, the ultimate form and expression of materialistic
reductionism).
While it remains highly doubtful that this genuinely randical work will be accepted, appreciated or
even abbreviated by The Clergy, in particular its esteemed leader, His Rational Highness, Pope of
Reason, Peon Leakoff I, one must keep gently but firmly in mind that each and every important truth
started out in the form of eccentric speculation, radical ruckus and bio-organic waste products
generated by and excreted from the gastrointestinal tracts of very large mammalian animals. Therefore,
the fertility quotient and truth value of any new idea is and must be determined by the idea itself and by
an intransigent, no-holds-barred application of TCA (Total Context Adherence, aka grokking) as
indicated above, and cannot be settled by acts of obedience or submission to The Clergy. Only thus
may The Fiery Triad (Reality, Truth, and Dialectics) prevail.
So, as you can now clearly see for yourself, the y2k problem can and must be solved by the R2k.
However, I urge you to consider that time is short. The R2k solution must be implemented
immediately, or else Jesus and the computers will cook us all. In order to help establishing the R2k
solution, you must copy and forward this article to all your friends immediately, and ask them to do the
same. Do your du.., eh, serve your self-interest today! This iron chain of Reason and Progress must not
be broken! Pump the iron chain NOW! HURRY UP!! Go! Go! One more!
Thomas Gramstad is the World Authority on synthetic and applied randicalism.
Post-Notes
This may be updated in the near future, but that will be
dependent if any more essays are added to the website.
-Laissez Faire!,
Leo T. Magnificent