Reproduced frbmthe of the National Archives'

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At .: OG 5TH INF DIV
2lj. October 1944
INITIALS:
46th Inie'ld Battalion
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AFT;iER AOTION TaE ENEMY REPORT
Period 1) Oc 1944 to 21 Oc t 1941+
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I'ERSONNEL ;'
a,.. ,Totaleffectlve strength..
V
(1) Begining of period 32 Officers 2 Warrant Officers 460 EM
(2) End of period ;3 Officers 2 Warrant Officers 470 EM
b. Killed in action ... None ..
Wounded in aotion -:- None.
d. Missing in action.
1st Lt Frederick D.Morrison, Cpl James E. McGuire, Tee 5 And
Zobel, pvt Paul W. Thompson,
13",
Repla.cements .
1st Lt Spirldion E. Ma.hlstadt, 20. Lts H.obert/C.'Ga.rland and Harry C.
DalesQfrSI'homaSMolver, Harold paige, mOM :!Bradley.
f. Returned to duty.

r,.
Tee 48 Elmer Matlock, William Reynolds, Nevel Atkins, Cpls Emory tc,
Caudill, Louis Vance, PfcsJoe Petty, Samuel Sims, William Jaebne, '<1 .
Bova, Ola.rence lLa.wson, Thelbert :;:Iage, Pa.ul Winters.
:2". Enemy:. "
af> The enemy 1s s1tuated on terrain covered with fortifications ,of ,
various types from concrete shelters to elaborate forts, some of World War!:)
construction modernized; and others evidently of recent construction" OannQn,
of light and medium calibers are skillfully located in these fortifications
in addition to lighter automatic weapons in well prepared posl tions out.side,
in conformi ty wi.th the current enemy practice. Where the enemy is not located
in flxed'permanenttype .fortlfacatlons he i6 well dug in with adaquate over
head cover to afford protection from all but direct hit,s ..
The enemyts aactivities have been confined principally to patrols
or ra,ida on infantry elements of our force, and spasmodic artillery fire,
which unobserved harassing and interdictory fIre on roads
and areas of concentration of troops such as villages. :E-:nemy artIllery has
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",. BEADQJ1ARTERS
fired with weapon's of caliber from 7S"'mm to reported 280"'mm, the majority
being 105 and ISO-rom. On some ocoasions, concentrations have fallen in.
friendly territory with a'high percentage' of duds, while in other instances
all rounds explod.ed. One mission evidently of an harassj.ng nature fell in
Bois deY Brule (U8044), and out of forty-one (41) roundS, twentywnine (29)
failed to detonate. As in the past period the enemy ha.8 appeared to have
ammunition to expend on targets, but has not wa.sted rounds by
commencing fire with poor data. No enemy batteries have been located by ou
at ranges less than five thousand yards from our forward elements
the enemy useEi SP guns much Gloser, moving them at .night, and
carefullY concee.ling them -in the daytime. These SPs are usually difficul t
to locate, beoause on the rare instanoes in which they have been notE'Jd to
fire in the daytime, they have fired from ruined buildings or other conceal ...
ment and oover, usually clown very narrow avenues of fire, and observers who
cbuld see the weapon were sometimes the target. The practice of firing one
rpund of HE shell with time fl..!ze, bursting about two'""hundred yards in the
ail!', and following a. 'few minutes later With, a heavy concentration on the area
pfJlow that burst has not been reported durtng.thia 'period, as in the last.
In short, the enemy has not shown such a htghty polIshed technique, although
his fire is still effective. Ibnemy batteries' and battalj"ons have been
methodically and surely nuetra11zed by both Corps and Division Artillery.
Nuetralization has lasted from a few minutes to apparent permanent ceasing of
fire.. Our observers located on Hill 396 have hadsuoh commanding ,:
observation as to enable them to fires on any daylight activiw
o,f the, enemy_ For thiS reason, he has become ver:y oautious about moving
vehioles or personnel except under cover of darkl"leSS, and his artillery has,
been virtually unable to fire without being loca.t.ed almost
'p;roofof, the enemy's feat' of' our artillery lies in the fact that during the!
'r,eoent period of reduoed, ammuni tion allowances, he showed him.self a.s if 111.0
'\',t":,au,,nJ., t,he, :",observers who could report but C"Dyld nO"t fir,S. t\C(', 'I 18
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," . 'L 4-, ':,- _ ............ -""'""", __"., ___ __-,____ ........... __ ...,-,><,i,. , ___ _____ ___ -' __;,;".___._,_ .-' ,- _ .,N
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Known enemy elements in contact: Guns of Forts Verdun, Drlant,
Marival Aiane and Yser. 11th SlZi Arty Regt, 719th Arty Regtand 3d Arty
Regt.
b. Prisoners oaptured - None.
30 Our Opera . . . .
The lj6th FA En oontinued its normal mission of dlrect support of the lOth
Infantry Regiment in their st,abilized posl tiona approximately Smiles south
of Metz, France. During the early days of the month ammunition expenditure
was not severely restricted as later, observers took advantage of the
excellent observation and clear weathrer, and many observed missions were
fired. Mueh use was made of massed fires of several battallons, including
the 50th FA Bn, 274th Arnn FA Bn, 695th FA Bn, and this battalion. In many
areaswhlch enemy troops were known to be concentrated in received
TOTS from several battalions with excellent effect reported. In addition to..
these, fires by this battalion to disrupt enemy counterattacks were used with
great success, the enemy always retiring, sometimes leaving his dea4 and . ,
wounded behind. Prisoners disolosed in interrogationa, that almost a company
of enemy were made casualties by a TOT fired on the woods in which they were
assembling for an attack. .
One of the most important operations in which members of the battalion
participated during this period was the attack on Fort Driant near Metz, by
Task Force Warnock. \1hile the guns of the battalion were not wi thin range
of'the fort itself, the battalion supported the attack by continuing to fire
harassing and nuetralization missions on enemy guns .and vehicles activity SE
of Metz. Effect of fires on enemy artillery 'in Augny (U8253) and viclnlt.y
could not be d.finitely determined, but these enemy batteries definitely
fired at the task force attacking Fort Driant. Two (2) Forward Ovservers
parties from this 'battalion accompanied the infantry assault companies, and
during the action, Lt. .. Morrison and his party from Battery flAil were reported
miSSing, presumably captured with .the company headquarters of Co. "Btl lOth
at Fort Driant.
On 8 october Lt. Col. Robert L. Brunzell assumed command of the battalion,
while Lt. Col. James R. Johnson, past commanding officer assumed his new
duties as Division Artillery 8-3. . . I .
8/Sgt Young adjusted one 8" Howi t ger on a raihray bridge Southeast of
Netz, and. succeeded in damaging the bridge to the extent. that a train W8.S
later reported to have halted and backed away from the bridge, as it attempt
ed to leave .ivletz. Thereafter, the enemy confined most of his raill"'oad
activi ty to lines running to the aast, but fur'ther north.
Begining on Ilth,October, Division ordered that the battalions
fireonlywhen enemy guns were observed and inflicting casualties or when a
serious connterattack was to be checked. Co. "Btl 8l8th TD Bn (MIO) was
fired by our observers through their own fire direction center with good re
sults, considering weight of projectile and the small number of guns. To
augment these reenforCing fires, units without such ammunition restrictions
were used. Co. "Blf 735th Tank Bn placed four ta.nks mounting 7S-mm guns in
position on 14th october and these were fired througrl our FDC with great
success o It is interesting to note that previous to this time, this unit
fired no massed fires or fires sincetl16 beginning of the ca.mpaign
in France..Lt. Gremaud, .RO, Battery "All; aided this reef'orcing organizatlon
by acting as executive and liaison officer until tJhe untt COUld. perform
efficiently without outstd:e help. In addition to the t.anks on 18th October
one platoon of Co. "BII 8lst Chemical Battalion's 4,.2
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Chemioal l-rortars were
emplaced; and were fired through .G1:w.r fire direction center.
.. By the end of the second week of October howitzer&batteries' had completed
elaborate gun pits and personnel dugouts affording complete protection to
personnel and much protection for howitzers and vehicles, all such equipment
being dug into the ground at least t.hree feet. ' .
Preparations were made to completely orient the 358th .FA Bn, which wa.s
to relieve the ,46th FA Bn, and take over all installations. This wa.s
carried out .several days the actual relief took place, and the 46th
FA Bn was relieved by this unit of the 95th Infantry Division Artillery
without receiving inoreased fire, in spite of the fact that the move involved
. moving the battalion paralled to the front lines for several miles at night,
on a road which is under enemy observation in daylight and at a distance of
about :two miles from enemy installations. To acoomplish thiS, activi ty. was
curtailed, and every means possible used to prevent the enemy trom suspecting"
ahy unusual activity at time. During most of the period in this' a'rea, .
the battallonI s fires were l"einforced by the 27 Al"'md FA Bn.
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ReproiltKiedft'Om the UnotaSsifiedl Declassified Holdings oftheNational Archives';
4. Supply and Evacuation
.. Supply normal with normal ration by captured stocks of
beef,. and QM baked white bread.
b. Evacuation normal.
Recommendations.
n ,the past period, the use of two types of weapons other than the
organiC .weapons of this battalion have brought to light a. few principles
which were not readily evident at the outset. In emplacing any fla.t trajec'"
toried weapon such as the 75-mm GUn 113, mounted in the M4A2 medium tank, great
care must be exeroised in choosing the gun position. Normal issues of,
:ammunltion to units armed with these guna, include only Supercharge ammunition
wi th B. muzzfhe velocity of about two-thousa.nd feet per second. If the guns are
masked,as those of Co. "B'I 735th Tank Bn were, by trees," and the guns in
some places only 1500 yards from the OPLR, an area of deadspace exists which
preoludes'a.ny fires from these guns in close support. Sinoe emp1aoement of
these guns further baokreduoes theireffeotive range, some substitute fires
must be fired with other weapons of more curved trajectory. The 4.2 inch
Oml Mort is an eBoellent weapon for this purpose, as indicated oy the success'
whioh they were fired through our fire direction center.' ThiS weapon haa the
,!?haracteristic of being difficult to traverse more than three hundred mils
or left of the center line because the tube and bipod. baseplates bury
ae 1 in soft earth.
, In retrospect then, the u-se of tanks and mortars to reenforce the fires
of normal'artillery ina stable situation when artillery ammunition must be
cpnserved,. or secttecy concerning the presence of artillery must be
should be emplaced in very carefully recconoitered posi tlons,. not
too far from forward infantry elements. If the terra:"n causes these weapons
to have deadspace, the deadlspace should be covered,by the fires of heavy
mortars, 4" 2 inch' Om1 Morts if pOBsi ble. 'Ehe tanks and mortars may both be
fired conveniently from any well trained artillery fire di.rection canter.
using artillery OPs and artillery forward observation methods. The reenforc
ing units should beconnected to the artillery FDO by direot wire linea if
possi ble, and theile, must be established a.nd maintained by artillery personnel
because tank and mortar units a.re not well to supply such
communication. Some difficulty experienced with slowness due to base plates
of the mortars burying in the ground could proba.bly be eliminated by the use
of ma ts on tltte gl"a:ye.i beneath. "
The relief of an artillery battalion, by a similar uni't in combat in a
situation stablized sufficiently 'to accomplish B,uch relief, and where avail'"
able gun pOSitions areas are very few in number, or occupied, the fo110wing
things must be born in mind. .
When the enemy artillery is act1ve, and when observation by the enemy
1s such that any movement on roads can ,be observed, the movement must take
place under cover of darkness, with routes coordinated to
prevent road traffiC from becoming too de,ns9. Thorough orientation of key
of the relieving unit should be accomplished prior to the relief,
.espeoially wherein the CO, 8-3,8-2, Comm 0, Ln os, BCs a.nd Obser-vers a.re
ooncerned... If possible key NCOs'should be brought to the position before
to 'reconnoiter and become familiar with the positions. When only one
gun position is available, and is, ovvupied by the unit to be relievec,
another unit,in should assume the mission of the battalion to be
rel1.eved until' the relievipg battalion can assume it,s proper mission. The
unit assuming this mission in the interim, shOUld if possible fire at the
usual rate in the sector of the battalion being relieved, to reduce suspiciQn
caused by artillery silence. Artillery silence in our recant situation
usually was marked by a reduction in the volume of enemy' fire,
although t.he enemy fire did not appear to be reduced by B. complete cessation
of counterbattery fires when our units did not firee
Liaison and observer personnel should remain in pOSition with
corresponding personnel from the relieving unit for several hours, or a day
if possib1:e, to enable the parties to exchange information and become
thoroughly familiar with the terrain and situation.
In summing up then, it can be said that there should be a very thorough
orientation of the relieving unit by the unit relieved, and coordination chf
traffic must be thorough.
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Daily O;peratlop.! -See Annex 1.
;1 For the Battalion Commt;a,nder;
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