Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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\
4- 5 _..!.,O j'"
Sc.l6'
Henderson Field Area.
.f.:,L. -----',,6: (USN)
The Japanese airiield at Lunga just prior to the invasion. The taxiway to the
main runway and the circular revetments are clearly evident as is the "Pa-
goda" in the center left of the photo. (USMC)
Henderson looking southwest from Lengo Channel across the lIu (Tenaru)
River and coconut plantations with Mt. Austen to the south. (USN)
26
livid, also to this day. The reasons given for the withdrawal were
questionable. The carriers were refueled before leaving Fiji, and
aircraft losses had been in the acceptable range. After the with-
drawal, Ghormley decided that he would not risk his carrier task
force until there were protecting aircraft and gasoline supplies based
on Guadalcanal. He stationed the carriers far to the south in posi-
tion to attack only priority Japanese targets and protect his lines of
communication to New Caledonia. The situation made the cautious
Ghormley into the indecisive Ghormley, who did not leave his ship-
board at Noumea for a month. Ghormley considered the in-
vasion a lost cause and continued to do so until Halsey relieved
him in October. General of the Air Force H.H. Arnold also declined
to send more contemporary aircraft to Guadalcanal because he felt
they would be lost if the Japanese recaptured the island. Maj.Gen.
Harmon was concerned that the establishment of an airbase, that
was the priority of the landings, would now not be met, and pressed
for a concerted air and sea offensive to achieve this end. Mean-
After its capture the "Pagoda" was used as the airiield's operations center
housing the ground-to-air radio network. (USMC)
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
Acaptured Japanese roller that was very useful in rebuilding Henderson,
especially after Fletcher withdrew his transports with most of the Seabee
construction equipment on board. (US Army)
while, the only air forces covering the invasion were R.Adm.
McCain's land-based bombers and scouting units that continued as
areconnaissance force.
Despite the loss of the majority of their protecting warships
the night before, Turner's transports continued to unload into the
afternoon ofthe 9'\ when they lifted anchor and headed for Noumea
before the Japanese could return that night. The 10,900 Marines on
Guadalcanal and the 7,500 on Tulagi, already without air or naval
cover, and now with less than half of their 60 days of supplies, felt
they had been deserted. Undaunted, the Marines consolidated their
five-mile beachhead, drove two miles inland, and set up a defen-
sive perimeter. A critical loss was that there was no barbed wire
available. Anti-aircraft protection was inadequate, as many AAguns,
including the five-inch coastal AAguns and radar, were still aboard
the fleeing transports. The 3
rd
Defense Battalion placed searchlights,
a90mmAAbattery, and 58 small caliber automatic AAguns around
the airfield. Vandegrift's first priority, the primary objective of the
invasion, was to repair the nearly completed Japanese airfield on
the grassy Lunga Plain. The Japanese had built hangars, machine
shops, a control tower, and an operations center nicknamed "The
Pagoda." Vandegrift ordered the airfield to be operational in two
days. The llBG had heavily bombed the field, but the pt Marine
Engineer Battalion easily repaired the 2,600-foot Japanese runway
by filling in the bomb craters. The lighter Japanese aircraft could
have used this grass runway, as they did not need a hard surface or
long runway. Heavier American aircraft would require the field to
be extended 1,200 to 3,800 feet with crushed coral rock that was
rolled and later covered with Marston Steel Matting. The Marine
engineer's equipment was still on Turner's transports, and even
shovels were in short supply. Fortunately there was a surprising
amount of captured supplies and serviceable Japanese equipment
left intact on the airfield. There were 34 trucks, four tractors, three
gasoline cement mixers, six gasoline rollers, and 150,000 gallons
of65 octane automotive gasoline to fuel them. Also there was 600
The improvement of Henderson continued into mid-I 944. It was converted
into a bomber field with lengthened and widened runways and additional
taxiways and hardstands. (USMC)
tons of cement, 80 tons of reinforcing bars, assorted steel building
materials, dynamite, shovels, wheel barrows, and grass mat bags.
To extend the runway a large 200-foot shallow gully at the 2,600-
foot Japanese field's end point had to be filled with about 10,000
cubic yards of dirt and coral. The Japanese engineers did not pay
much attention to drainage, and a crown had to be laid over the
existing runway without interfering with operations. The first SBDs
on the island were equipped with hard rubber tires intended for
carrier landings that cut long furrows in the soft runways. A mix-
ture of clay, gravel, and coral was used to fill in the ruts and bomb
and shell craters, but left large soft areas. On take offs and landings
these soft spots had to be avoided, as mud would be forcefully
splashed over the aircraft and into wheel wells, jeopardizing plane
and pilot. The west end of the runway had a stand of tall coconut
and banyan trees growing at a point where the Plain dropped off
toward the Lunga River. Since this was usually the approach end of
the field the trees were dynamited, and the new opening allowed a
longer and lower approach to the runway. The east end of the field
then had a good takeoff view to the west. The Marine engineers
built taxiways and revetments, and tried to establish the all-impor-
tant drainage for the field. Later the 6
th
Naval Seabee Battalion
landed to augment the Marine engineers. The field was called Lunga
Airstrip until the 17
t
\ when it was renamed Henderson Field in
honor of Maj. Lofton Henderson, who was killed leading a Marine
dive-bomber unit over Midway. Once completed, there were two
runway conditions on Henderson, dry dust that contaminated en-
gines and made visibility nil, or a quagmire that made take offs and
landings harrowing. After five weeks Henderson remained unus-
able by medium and heavy bombers, and except for the small de-
tachment of 67FS fighters no AAF unit would be based on Cactus
until December. Steel matting was not scheduled to be laid until 25
September and would make the field more operational, but once
down it would become shrapnel when hit by Japanese bombs and
shells. When repairs were made to fill the bomb and shell holes in
27
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Above: Maj. John Smith was the CO of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-223
and was credited with 19 victories and awarded the Medal of Honor during
his tour there. (USMC)
Right: Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum was the CO ofVMSB-232, the first Marine
dive-bomber squadron on Guadalcanal. (USMC)
damaged matting the filling material could never be packed as sol-
idly as before and would become soft and muddy under the new
patching matting.
Even though the field would not be completed until the 18
th
, on
the 12
th
Vandegrift declared the field ready for fighters and dive-
bombers. That day a PBY-SA flown by R.Adm. McCain's aide, Lt.
William Sampson, was the first American aircraft to land on
Henderson, but it soon left, and for the next week the only aircraft
over Guadalcanal were the almost daily Japanese formations of
Bettys escorted by Zeros. Supply was a problem for the Americans
until air superiority could be achieved. On the 12
th
Ghormley had
approved the movement of Turner's destroyer-transports from
Espiritu Santo back to Guadalcanalloaded with bombs, ammuni-
tion, gasoline, lubricants, and ground crews. The destroyer-trans-
The Ichiki Regiment suffered heavy casualties that decimated its ranks along
the banks of the Ilu (Tenaru) River (USMC)
28
ports moved like fast blockade-runners, arriving off Lunga Point in
the late afternoon to offload at night and departing in the morning
before regular mid-day Tojo Time air attacks. The Japanese were
unable to capitalize on their victory at Savo, as there were no Ameri-
can ships to attack off Lunga. Japanese air raids were minimal, as
they lost h ~ l f of their Rabaul-based aircraft and only sent down a
few minor raids and recurrent small late night nuisance raids by
one or two aircraft nicknamed "Washing Machine Charlie" or "Louie
the Louse." The Japanese continued to attack the field in small air
formations and delayed finishing the field by destroying all but one
of the six important captured rollers. On the 18
th
, the day the entire
3,800 feet of runway was completed, Japanese bombers hit the area
with 17 bombs, and three heavy bombs cratered the runway; it took
another day of hard labor to fill and roll the craters.
Finally, on the afternoon of the 20
th
, the escort carrier Long
Island, laying 200-miles out, launched 12 Marine SBD Dauntless
dive-bombers of Richard Mangrum's VMSB-232 "Red Devils" and
19 F4F-4 fighters of John Smith's VMF-223 of the advanced squad-
rons of Marine Air Group (MAG) 23. Smith had exchanged eight
of his inexperienced pilots for eight of VMF-212's more experi-
enced pilots, and the squadron was assigned air defense immedi-
ately after its arrival. The new air force was nicknamed the "Cactus
Air Force" after the code name for Guadalcanal, "Cactus."
To supply Guadalcanal the Japanese formed what was to be
known as the "Tokyo Express." R.Adm. Raizo Tanaka was the in-
telligent and courageous leader of the Express, which consisted of
Destroyer Squadron 2 and destroyer/transports that were old de-
stroyers converted to fast transports. Tanaka's flagship, the light
cruiser Jintsu, led the Express and was occasionally strengthened
for specific missions with cruisers and additional destroyers.
Tanaka's Squadron had trained together, and was particularly pro-
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
ficient in night torpedo attacks. The Japanese would load destroyer/
transports with troops and supplies at Rabaul and lay off the central
Solomons until late afternoon, when they would sail down the Slot
to arrive after dark to disembark and then return safely to the cen-
tral Solomons to be out of aircraft range by daylight. The Express
was difficult to detect even though the Navy had radar. Early naval
radar was of the primitive SC type, and the Japanese hid in radar
shadows formed by some nearby island. The frequent tropical thun-
derstorms and rain showers added to the electronic jumble. The
dark, cloudy, tropical nights and poor weather hampered visual aerial
reconnaissance. The Tokyo Express slipped 1,000 troops ashore
under Col. Kiyono Ichiki, who organized an attack on the Marines
on the east bank of the Ilu River (mistakenly thought to be the
Tenaru). On the 21SI the Marines became aware of the massing Japa-
nese and withdrew to the west bank and prepared to defend their
position. The Japanese mounted a fierce frontal attack and lost 800
men. The sand spit at the mouth of the river was covered with Japa-
nese bodies, and Col. Ichiki was so distraught over the defeat that
he committed suicide. The first major battle since the Marines landed
was a decisive, morale-building victory, but the Marines lost 35
killed in action (KIA) and 75 wounded (WIA). The newly arrived
Marine aviators in single SBDs flew several reconnaissance flights
and strafed the shoreline and mouth of the Ilu, but were of little use
because the thick jungle prevented effecti ve attacks. After the battle
Capt. Dale Brannon, CO of the 67FS, the first AAF unit to arrive on
Guadalcanal. (Brannon)
the SBDs flew ground support sorties to disrupt enemy troops from
concentrating for further attacks. Capt. John Smith of VMF-223
led four Wildcats to intercept a small air raid, and lLt. Eugene
Trowbridge scored the first Marine victories on Guadalcanal, get-
ting two Zeros, while Smith added one. But two Wildcats were
badly damaged and one precious Grumman was written off after a
dead stick landing.
While on New Caledonia 27 P-400s were fitted with belly tanks
for the long flight to Guadalcanal. After several long-legged plan-
ning flights around New Caledonia Capt. Dale Brannon was able to
estimate flying time, fuel consumption, and engine cruise control
settings for a flight to Guadalcanal. Gen. Harmon had planned to
transfer three flights of five P-400s each, navigated by a B-17, to
Cactus. However, that would leave New Caledonia defense with
only 12 P-400s, two P-39s, and two P-43s, so Harmon modified his
plans. Two flights were to be sent, the first with five aircraft and the
second with nine later. At 1000 on 21 August, five P-400s piloted
by Brannon, and Lts. Davis, Erwin, Brzuska, and Fincher, took off
from Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, joined their B-17 escort,
and flew 325 miles to Efate in two hours 20 minutes. Then, after a
brief stop there flew 180 miles to Espiritu Santo. The next morning
their fuel tanks had to be topped off after warm up, as every ounce
of fuel would be critical for the final leg to Cactus. They left Espiritu
equipped with belly tanks and flew 640 miles to Henderson at 200
feet led by a B-17 navigating above, and followed by another B-17
equipped with rubber rafts to be dropped to any ditching pilots. The
flight was flown through intermittent low stratus clouds and mist,
and the pilots were happy to have the B-17 mother hen. All five
fighters landed safely at Henderson at 1030, 3:45 later, to come
under the command of MAG-23 of the 1
st
Marine Air Wing. The
next day Lt. Robert Chilson, with 30 enlisted men of the ground
echelon, arrived at Lunga on the transport Fomalhaute that left
Noumea on the 17
th
The 67
th
was ready for operations, but the conditions at
Henderson were abysmal at best. It was a frontline base in every
sense of the word. Once the two flights of 15 pilots, 30 ground
crew, and 15 P-400s arrived they were assigned to the Marines and
relied on the Leathernecks for food, supplies, quarters, and medical
care. The ground crew was quartered in an abandoned Japanese
hangar at the west end of the field that was close to their aircraft
and bomb shelters. Brannon and his pilots were billeted in mud-
floored, unscreened tents located between the ocean and airfield in
the Lever Brothers Company coconut plantation, which was often
flooded and referred to as the "Mosquito Grove." It was said that
the mosquitoes on Cactus were so large that one landed at Henderson
and was refueled and rearmed by a ground crew before being iden-
tified! Even mosquito netting did not help, since if the netting lay
too close to the body the "little bastards would work their stingers
through the little holes." (Doug Canning) The plentiful mosquitoes
were much more than a nuisance and caused malaria, a protozoan
disease transmitted by the female anopheles mosquito. "There were
so damn many mosquitoes that you couldn't help but to get ma-
laria." (Doug Canning) Once stung, the parasites course the blood-
stream to the liver, where they reproduce asexually. The parasite
can continue to live in the liver and bloodstream for long periods
29
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Above: Officers' "lounge." Note the handmade wooden "easy" chairs to the
left and right of officer. (Canning)
LeftThe pyramidal tents at FighterTwo on Guadalcanal.This is an early photo,
as the cots sit on bare ground and wooden floors have not been added.
(USAF)
and are able to recur several times, and some Guadalcanal veterans
suffered reoccurrences years after the war. Soon the personnel on
Guadalcanal were taking a yellow pill every day and twice on Sun-
day called Atabrine. There was no cure for malaria, and Atabrine
did not prevent or cure the disease, but only suppressed its symp-
toms, just as aspirin suppresses the symptoms of a cold but does
not prevent it. Afew men were hesitant about taking the drug, as it
was rumored to make one sterile, and despite dispensing Atabrine
there was a substantial incidence of malaria.
A song "Atabrine," sung to the tune of "Tangerine," a popular
song of the day, made the rounds on the island:
"Atabrine for malaria,
That's the pill that keeps the chill away.
Try to grin; don't let it scare you,
It you start to change color that's OK. You can see what
it's done for me,
Look! My face is gray; my hands are turning green,
But we have to get the Japs on the run
And when it's all said and done,
We owe it all to Atabrine, we don't mean quinine,
We owe it all to Atabrine."
Later, Army tests demonstrated the suppressive effectiveness
of Atabrine. When the Americal Infantry Division was withdrawn
from the fighting on Guadalcanal and returned to Fiji it was taken
off the anti -malarial. The incidence of the disease rose from 1,000
cases per 1,000 men per annum to 14,000 cases per 1,000 men per
annum within three weeks after discontinuing the drug. Bill Harris
(339FS) described having malaria:
"I had malaria, and you get a fever and your whole body shakes.
You feel like you're freezing and then you're roasting. Then sud-
30
denly it just goes away and you then have to wait for it to recur,
weeks and even years later."
Before the war a pilot who came down with malaria was hos-
pitalized and not allowed to fly for two years without a reoccur-
rence. Initially, on Guadalcanal treatment was rest and the continu-
ation of A t a b r ~ n e for a month in the dispensary, and only cases ex-
hibiting a very high fever and reoccun'ing attacks were referred to a
hospital administered by the Australians or New Zealanders back
in their countries. On Guadalcanal this therapy was immediately
forgotten, as the shortage of pilots in the early stages of the war
forced flight surgeons to allow many sick and fatigued men to fly
combat. Directives were issued for personnel to wear long-sleeved
shirts and long pants stuffed inside their socks, especially after sun-
set, but these were commonly ignored. It was not until mid-1943
that there were sufficient American hospitals, hospital ships, and
air ambulances in the theater to treat malaria. Insect repellent and
large scale insect control would not come into effect until 1944.
Dengue fever, scrub typhus, dysentery, and jungle rot were
among the tropical diseases that also plagued the invaders. Dengue
was another mosquito-borne disease spread by the Aedes mosquito,
which flew in the daytime; malaria was spread by the nocturnal
Anopheles. Dengue was rarely fatal and not recurrent, but was much
more painful, with every part of the body hurting. Scrub typhus
was a mite-borne disease carried by animals that could be fatal and
could cause epidemics. Pets and mascots could carry it, and the
Army banned them, but to no avail, as the order was ignored. For-
tunately there was a shortage of lovable native pets in the South
Pacific. Of all the illnesses that plagued personnel in the Pacific the
most insidious and costly were the various types of dysentery. Dys-
entery is a microbial disease that had plagued armies for centuries
and was caused by unsanitary conditions. The most common type
was amoebic dysentery, which caused constant, watery, and often
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
bloody diarrhea that debilitated, made life miserable, and work
impossible. Latrines that were primitive open trenches, a bath that
was the Lunga River, unsanitary messes and cooking facilities of-
ten manned by an asymptomatic carrier, such as a food-handler,
could case the rapid spread of the disease. Doug Canning (67FS):
"We got dysentery so bad that we couldn't fly anymore and we
were sent back to New Caledonia to recover. There was a French-
man on the other side of the island who had what in later times I
would describe as a motel with six or seven cabins. We were sent
there to rest and recuperate. It was the most beautiful place I had
ever seen, with a big pond surrounded by palm trees. The French-
man had a daughter who was befriended by our Captain. One morn-
ing she walked by wearing his wings and we knew something had
transpired the night before! It took us about ten days to become
well enough to check out on our new P-38s, and a few weeks later
I was back at Guadalcanal."
The most prevalent of the jungle maladies was called "jungle
rot," and was caused by the chronic Pacific rains and humidity.
Doug Canning described it:
"We were always wet. Water ran through our tents in the rain
and our feet were always wet. The smallest cut could become in-
fected, and the areas between our fingers, toes, armI;lits, and even
crotch would become raw. They put some purple tincture (Gentian
Violet-author) on it and sent us out to fly. There was really no get-
ting rid of it until we were sent somewhere dry."
Amisunderstood affliction throughout the war was combat fa-
tigue. Statistics throughout the war show that 20 to 30% of the non-
battle casualties in the 13
th
and 5
th
Air Forces were lumped under
that heading and caused by stress, fatigue, and "psychiatric prob-
lems" that were exacerbated by night air raids, ground and naval
shelling, living conditions, food and supply shortages, boredom,
and the immediacy of possible death. The pilots who came to the
Pacific were young men who thought that nothing was going to
Besides the physical hardships endured by the men on the Canal, there was
always the specter of death.The price was heavy, as a Marine crew honors a
fallen comrade in the cemetery at Henderson. (USMC)
happen to them; that it would be the other guy. When they saw the
other guy go down they were secretly happy it was not them. The
Flight Surgeon had to deal with ambiguous psychological circum-
stances for which he was often untrained to identify and treat. Yet,
he was responsible not only for the physical, but also the psycho-
logical welfare of his squadron. Flight Surgeons found the symp-
toms of combat fatigue usually did not occur until the airman spent
six to eight months in combat. During World War II, especially the
early war, it was not common for a man to ask to be taken off com-
bat duty. Often combat fatigue was looked upon as a form of cow-
ardice or personal weakness. Men overcame fear, as they felt the
need to prove themselves to their squadron as a dependable and
responsible member. The Flight Surgeon was theoretically respon-
sible for the diagnosis and rotation of fatigued aircrew, but in prac-
tice the shortage of pilots in the early war portions of squadrons,
not individuals, were sent on leave. Everyone wanted to have the
Flight Surgeon as a tent mate, as he controlled the medical alcohol
that was the only alcohol available to the Air Force on the island.
Sam Howie (339FS):
'Three of us-Rex Barber, Joe Moore, and me-shared a tent
with the flight surgeon. Because of him we always had plenty of
alcohol. We mixed it with canned fruit juice. There was no other
alcohol on the island."
The Marine cooks provided the meals for the 67
th
Breakfast
would usually be served about 0900 depending on the mission sched-
ule, but dawn mission pilots had only coffee for breakfast. Coffee
was brewed in a split fuel drum, and the powdered eggs and pan-
cakes were cooked on a griddle made from a piece of armor plate.
Lunch and dinner consisted of dehydrated potatoes, the ubiquitous
Spam, and a mystery meat-either a form of hash or Australian
bully beef-and captured Japanese rice and canned food. John Th-
ompson (67FS):
"Japanese canned food was always an adventure, as the labels
had come off, but that didn't make much difference, as they were in
The 'Tojo Ice Company" was a Japanese ice-making facility that was captured
in tact. (Lansdale)
31
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Capt. Bill Harris (left) and ground crew. Harris considered his Crew Chief an
important part of his success and kept in touch with after the war. (Harris via
Lansdale)
67FS ground crews pose in front of a well worn P-39 or P-400 # I00.
(Lansdale)
32
Japanese anyway. But sometimes there were pictures of the food
inside.
The daily ration of a package of Japanese cigarettes was the
saving grace for many men. They were also issued a box of 'pogey
bait' (Japanese caramels) once a day. One day, a bombing just be-
fore breakfast totally destroyed the kitchen and supply tent, and all
the cook's homemade utensils. The 'Tojo Ice Company' was a Japa-
nese ice-making facility that was captured intact, and was a bless-
ing in the tropical heat."
Rank and discipline were difficult to maintain in the confused
situation andjungle environment of Guadalcanal. Bill Harris (339FS
CO):
"To the credit of the ranking air officers and other air officers
there was no need for spit and polish type discipline. Everyone knew
his place and what was right and wrong. There was no need to sa-
lute. There was no formality. No one wore rank. No one pulled
rank. Don't forget there were 22-year old Captains giving orders to
Lieutenants who were only a year younger. It was mostly the flying
skill of a CO or pilot that gained him the respect of everyone around
him. It was in our (pilots) best interest to be on good terms with our
ground crews. I had six crew chiefs during my tours in the Pacific.
I kept in contact with all of them after the war until they passed
away."
Aircraft servicing facilities were non-existent, and ground crews
had to work 14 to 16 hour days with rudimentary equipment and
insufficienr tools to maintain the aircraft, leaving them little time to
improve their living conditions. Operations on Guadalcanal were
dependent on naval transport to bring in fuel and heavy equipment
to improve the field. Fueling was a backbreaking task, as fuel had
to be hand-pumped out of 55-gallon drums, strained through cham-
ois into 12-quart buckets, and then poured into the aircraft fuel tanks.
The bomb supply was adequate, but there were no bomb hoists to
move and load them. There were too few ground crews, armorers,
Ground crews on Guadalcanallacked equipment and spare partsThis photo
shows them using an improvised wooden log as a hoist while servicing a P-
39. One of the few things in favor of the P-39 was that it was designed for
maintenance under primitive conditions. (USAF)
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
Bore-sighting and test firing the cannon of a P-39 at FighterTwo in Decem-
ber 1942.The Marston Matting can be seen in the foreground. By this time
there was enough of the steel mat to cover the taxiways. (Palmer)
and mechanics, and there were few tools, spare parts, and block
and tackle equipment. Only seven armorers were sent to service the
first 14 fighters.
Guadalcanal weather was typically tropical, with high altitude
clouds building up by mid-afternoon and thunder storms occurring
by late afternoon and early evening. The storms usually occurred
closer to land than out to sea and were locally heavy, but aircraft
could generally fly around them. Often the missions sent aircraft to
the limits of their fuel, and an unexpected weather front or storm
could be deadly, as could navigational errors. The reaction to being
caught in bad weather was for the pilot to drop below the clouds
and to try to get some visual fix. But flying blind at low altitude
could lead to hitting the highlands of a mountain, or even the ocean
itself. The advantage of navigation up or down the Slot was that the
two chains of islands that made up the Solomons generally ran along
the north and south of it toward Guadalcanal, and a pilot could
navigate between them. The South Pacific skies were extremely
Ground crewman fueling PAOO "Impotient Virgin" of Patsy Flight, which was
flown by Lts. Barcley Dillon and Vernon Head. Earlier fuel had to be hand-
pumped from 55-gallon drums and strained through chamois. (Haedtler via
Lansdale)
The "BoneYard" ofthe 68FS Engineering section, located at the end of Fighter
Two. Here damaged fighters were repaired or cannibalized for spare parts.
(Palmer)
clear and often made up for poor navigation. Against regulations
Cactus air controllers would often turn on radio beacons, radio si-
lence was neglected, and for late arriving flights in darkness the
searchlights were turned on. There were usually clouds nearby, and
this allowed outclassed fighter and vulnerable dive-bombers a place
to run and hide. American aircraft were exceptionally sturdy, and
pilots regularly flew through bad weather without the fear of struc-
tural damage. Probably as many American losses were due to op-
erational causes as to the Japanese. The sudden torrential equato-
rial rains were dried to dust by the first three hours of scorching sun
the next day. The extent and location of mud and dust depended on
drainage. Dust and mud caused a maintenance crisis, as aircraft
engines and instruments were complex and unable to cope with the
elements sucked into them via aircraft cooling systems on taxiing,
takeoff, and landing. It was the nature of the Pacific air war that the
air forces would fly from the worst fields, as they were recently
captured and closest to the battle. By the time the Seabees and en-
Doug Canning (67FS) in flight garb. Because the PAOO could not climb to
over 14,000 feet pilots never became cold in the tropical skies. (Canning)
33
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Typical ground attire at Fighter Two control tower The man on the left is
wearing a jumpsuit, while the man on the right is shirtless. Men often cut off
the legs of their khaki trousers to make shorts. (USAF)
gineers improved the fields the battles had moved on, to be fought
from other primitive forward bases that in turn would be improved.
The AAF pilots came to Cactus in low top shoes, and the mud
was often so deep that before they got into the cockpit they re-
moved them and gave them to the crew chief so as not to make a
mess. Pilot officers were supposed to buy their own shoes and cov-
eted the Marines their GI-issue high top boots, and solicited extra
pairs from them. Doug Canning (67FS):
"When we arrived at Guadalcanal we got the Marines to issue
us their boots, as our ankle high shoes were too low for the mud
and just didn't hold up. The boots were very comfortable, and we
wore them throughout our tour until we got back to the States."
Coast watcher Capt. Martin Clemens and his native scouts. The Australian
coast watchers located on islands along the Slot were vital to Henderson, as
they radioed early warnings of both approaching Japanese aircraft and war-
shipsThey were also responsible for rescuing and returning numerous downed
pilots. (USMC)
34
As the situation became less hectic at Cactus the men had time to relax.
Note the two sophisticated lawn chairs and the Japanese mats that were
captured by the hundreds. (Canning)
Pilots were issued .45 caliber pistols to carry into combat, but
the P-38 pilots made it a point to be armed with .38 caliber pistols!
Doug Canning stated:
"You flew in your flight suit, and if you were lucky you would
have two. I guess you would call themjumpsuits today. It was good
to climb to altitude, as you could finally get cool and you didn't
want to come back down. Even though we flew at 20 to 30,000 feet
I don't ever remember being cold in my flight suit. When we ar-
rived in Fiji, we had been issued long sleeved shirts and long pants,
so we went down to the tailor shop and had the locals make us
short-sleeved shirts and short pants. We didn't wear rank because
that gave the snipers a chance to identify the officers as targets."
The air defense of Henderson was under the control of VMF-
223 and a single battery of 90mmAA guns and 58 automatic weap-
ons located around the field. Air warning was essential, and a sys-
tem was established about the time Henderson was available for
aircraft. Australian coast watchers and their native scouts were or-
ganized into an early warning network extending from Buka,
Bougainville, New Georgia, Malaita, Santa Isabel, and on
GuadalcanaI. The coast watchers were New Zealand, Australian, or
British prewar island residents who had served as civil servants,
missionaries, planters, and traders. They were either stranded on or
voluntarily returned to these islands to report on the Japanese. Ra-
dio reports from these outposts on passing ships and aircraft were
their most important contribution, but they also reported on the Japa-
nese air and ground strength, as well as building, geographic, and
oceanographic information. The coast watcher on ew Georgia,
Donald Kennedy, provided reports on Japanese aircraft flying from
Rabaul, and his reports allowed fighter aircraft on Henderson to
take off and get to altitude before the bombers reached their target.
Coast watchers on Bougainville sent warnings on aircraft taking
off from there and those stopping over from RabauI. Henderson's
long-range SCR-270 radar would not become operational until Sep-
tember. The coordinated intelligence of reports from the coast watch-
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
ers and their scouts, along with daily aircraft patrols, warned of
approaching attacks and played an important role in the success of
Marine, Navy, and Air Force pilots over the Solomons. After a while
the Japanese formations would try to fly a course around islands
along the Slot to avoid the coast watchers. A black flag raised over
the Pagoda (Allied air ops HQ) indicated an imminent air raid, and
Cactus personnel headed for their slit trenches and the coconut log-
reinforced bomb shelters. Wildcats and PAOOs scrambled to take
off two by two through either blinding dust or slogging mud, de-
pending on the weather and time of day, on a runway that was cov-
ered with hastily filled bomb and shell craters and rutted by the
solid rubber tires of carrier aircraft.
Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 24/25 August 1942
Henderson Field posed a dangerous threat, and the Japanese sent
reinforcements to retake the air base. On 23 August Australian coast
watchers reported a large Japanese naval force massing at Rabaul
and moving toward Guadalcanal. The Japanese sent four transports,
a light cruiser, and four destroyers to land 1,500 troops on the is-
ILt. Deltis Fincher (left) scored the first AAF victory in the South Pacific on
18 November 1942 when he shot down the first of two Zeros while escort-
ing B-17s over Tonolei Harbor on the southern tip of Bougainville. (AAF)
land. Three carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, a light
cruiser, and 17 destroyers protected the landing force. The 25
th
Japa-
nese Air Flotilla was transferred to Rabaul to provide air cover for
the operation. To oppose the landings two naval task forces com-
prised of a battleship (North Carolina), four cruisers, and ten de-
stroyers, along with the carriers Enterprise and Saratoga, were in
position 100 miles southeast of the Solomons. U.S. Navy search
planes discovered the enemy fleet, and the stage was set for the air-
naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons. The third carrier battle of the
war (after the Coral Sea and Midway) began at 1300 on 24 August
as the Japanese carrier Ryujo sent up six Kate bombers and 15 Ze-
ros to hit Henderson at Tojo Time. The 67FS crews were working
on their PAOOs when they heard aircraft overhead. Capt. Brannon
and Lt. Deltis Fincher managed to take off, just evading strafing
Zeros, but bombs from the Kate bombers fell almost immediately,
preventing other P-400s from taking off. The Marines sent up 14
Wildcats and downed 13 Kates and seven Zeros-probably from
the Ryujo-for four fighters lost. Capt. Marion Carl shot down three
bombers and a Zero to become an ace (he had a previous victory on
4 June with VMF-221 over Wake Island). Brannon and Fincher
came across a lone Zero climbing out of a strafing attack and shared
a victory for the first AAF victory in the South Pacific.
Meanwhile, at 1620 aircraft from the Saratoga found the car-
rier Ryujo and sank it with four direct bomb hits and a torpedo hit.
At the same time 70 aircraft from the Shokaku and Zuikaku attacked
the Enterprise and heavily damaged the carrier with three bomb
hits and several near misses. The Enterprise was able to deck land
its patrolling aircraft after they had failed to find the Japanese force.
But Lt. Turner Caldwell's 11 fuel-starved SBDs had to head to
Henderson and land in darkness, where they remained to become
part of the "Cactus Air Force" as Flight 300 until 27 September.
The Enterprise was forced to retreat for major repairs. B-17s from
the llBG out of Espiritu Santo claimed four hits on the crippled
Ryujo at 1705, and a hour later four other B-17s led by Maj. Allan
Sewart attacked another carrier. The B-17 formation claimed hits
on the carrier that were later confirmed as misses, while gunners
claimed five Zeros downed. All eight B-17s returned safely to base
through heavy rainstorms. IIBG B-17s flying from "Buttons"
(Espiritu Santo) were to continue to playa large role against the
Japanese in the South Pacific.
Unaccountably, that night the major Japanese warships with-
drew, but Adm. Raizo Tanaka in his flagship, the cruiser Jintsu, and
eight destroyers and destroyer transports of the landing force con-
tinued on toward Guadalcanal. At 08-35 on the 25
th
12 Henderson
SBDs of Lt.Col. Mangrum's VSB-232, escorted by F4Fs, attacked
the transports, sinking one, the 14,000 ton transport (Kinryu Maru),
heavily damaging an 8,000 ton transport, and damaging the Jintsu,
causing Tanaka to move his flag to a destroyer and withdraw. The
Marine aviators landed, and despite being slowly refueled by hand
were able to take off just before Tojo Time and avoid becoming
sitting ducks on the ground for Japanese bombs. At 1015 eight B-
17s came upon the veteran Japanese destroyer Mitzuki that was pick-
ing up survivors and sank it with three direct hits to close the Battle
of the Eastern Solomons.
35
13
th
Fighter Command in World War 11
That day, the PAOOs were assigned daily sunrise to sunset pa-
trols at 14,000 feet over Henderson. This was the highest altitude at
which the fighter was effective. The P-400s were intended for ex-
port to the RAF and were equipped with the English high-pressure
oxygen system, and no high-pressure oxygen bottles were avail-
able in the South Pacific. 67
th
pilots could not fly sustained patrols
at that altitude without oxygen, and after two hours on patrol the
pilots got headaches and became woozy. Even with oxygen the P-
400 had trouble operating above 16,000 feet, as it was equipped
with a two-stage blower and the engine could not get enough air
above that altitude and would slog along.
"With a belly tank it could climb to 18,000 feet but took 30
minutes to get there, and once it did the only maneuver it could pull
off was a dive!" (Doug Canning)
After the Japanese had been repelled in their effort to land troops
to recapture the island they sent down 16 Bettys and 12 Zeros the
next day. The Marines belatedly sent up 12 Wildcats but were un-
able to intercept them before the Bettys dropped their bombs. The
attack set 2,000 gallons of valuable gasoline on fire, and the fire
spread to an ammunition dump and exploded two 1,000lb. bombs,
causing heavy damage. Once VMF-212 climbed to intercept the
Japanese after their bomb run they shot down seven bombers and
five escorts for the loss of one Wildcat. For their part in the battle
two P-400s had to settle for a reconnaissance mission around the
circumference of the island.
On the 27
th
at 1110 Capt. John "Tommy" Thompson flew in
eight more P-400s of "Patsy Flight" from Espiritu Santo navigated
by a B-17.' Accompanying him were Lts. Bryan Brown, Peter
Childress, Barclay Dillon, Linwood Glazier, Vernon Head, and Keith
Wythes. John Thompson:
Adm. Raizo Tanaka was to lead a succession of "Tokyo Expresses" down the
Slot over the next several months. (USN)
PAOO ofthe 67FS at Guadalcanal.The PAOO can
easily be distinguished by the 12 exhaust stacks
located just behind the cockpit door versus the
six stacks on the P-39. (USAF)
Airacobra I, later to be returned to the Me as
the PAOO.The British version was fitted with an
incompatible British high-pressure oxygen system
and instruments calibrated in the Metric system.
(USAF)
36
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
Awell-worn P-400 being cannibalized at Guadalcanal in january 1943. Note
the British marking on its tail and the Solomons native (not a cannibal!)
standing by the wing. (USAF)
"As we approached Henderson I looked down and saw the
narrow 4,000-foot strip cut in the middle of a large grassy area near
the ocean. Bomb and shell craters pockmarked the entire area. There
was a grove of coconut trees extending probably 4,000 feet on the
oceanside, then there was the grassy area running from the river
(Tenaru/Ulu-author) to the east. Thick jungle sprung up immedi-
ately on the opposite side of the field."
As they landed the pilots were surprised that there was no one
around to greet them. Tojo Time was imminent, and the ground
crews reluctantly crawled out of their slit trenches and hurriedly
refueled the new reinforcements. The tired pilots took off to orbit
the eastern end of the island and waited out the raid that never ap-
peared. Lt. Zed Fountain left Espiritu late due to a minor repair,
managed to navigate to Cactus, and arrived later that day to put 13
total P-400s on the island.
On 27 August, "Patsy Flight" led by Capt. john "Tommy"Thompson and con-
sisting of Lts. Brown, Childress, Dillon, Glazier, Head, and Wythes landed at
Cactus during an air raid alert. Lt. Zed Fountain made it a baker's dozen of P-
400s on Cactus when he came that afternoon, as he left New Caledonia late
due to a mechanical problem. In this photo, Fountain's P-400 No.6 has the
original RAF camouflage and clearly shows the RAF serial number, BW 167,
located just below the tailplane. (Lansdale/USMC)
P-400 of the 67FS "Hawk Eye 1/" being pulled out of the Guadalcanal mud.
(USAF)
By this time the Japanese South Pacific strategy was formu-
lated. Their bases on Bougainville, Vella Lavella on Kula Gulf, and
Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel were readily supplied from Rabaul and
Truk. Men and supplies were loaded onto destroyer/transports and
sometimes cruisers from these bases, and made up the "Tokyo Ex-
press." The ships hid in the central Solomons in the daytime from
searching Allied aircraft from Cactus, and then passed quickly down
the Slot at night, landing troops and supplies near Henderson, and
concluded their mission by lobbing a few shells on the field. By
daylight the Tokyo Express had returned safely to the central
Solomons. The Japanese hoped to reinforce the island and drive the
Americans back to Australia in a final offensive. But the Japanese
were unable to fully control the air and seas around the lower
Solomons, and the Tokyo Express became a tenuous supply line. In
the meantime, the Japanese sent down almost daily Tojo Time air
attacks launched mainly from Kahili airfield on southern
67FS pilots (left to right): Linwood Glazier, Barclay Dillon, Zed Fountain, and
RB johnston at Tontouta, New Caledonia. (Lansdale/HeadI347FGA)
37
13
th
Fighter Command in World War 1I
Bougainville. In'egular nightly naval forces made up of warships
were sent down the Slot to bombard the field and created a psycho-
logical threat when they didn't arrive. Occasionally "Oscar," a sub-
marine, surfaced off Lunga and lobbed a few shells on Henderson
or Tulagi. But the main nightly annoyance was the twin-engine
bombers named "Washing Machine Charlie" or "Maytag Mike"
(the names were interchangeable), or a seaplane named "Louie the
Louse." They would fly back and forth and finally drop a few bombs
that usually did no physical damage, but interrupted the sleep of
the personnel below. The washing machine reference was derived
from the sound of their unsynchronized engines. A song became
popular to immortalize Charlie:
"Douglas, Vaught, Sikorsky, Bell-
All make planes that sound so swell.
But the Japanese, strange as it seems,
Make planes that sound like washing machines.
There's an isle in the Coral Sea
That we took from the Japanese.
From it came the story of a guy called 'Maytag Charlie.'
Every night at about 10: IS
The air raid warning used to scream,
Up would go the search light beam
And in flew 'Maytag Charlie.'
Now this Charlie guy, he flew so high
We couldn't score a hit
Until one night they set a trap-
And 'Magtag Charlie' bit.
He saw a light and he flew down low-
The anti-aircraft guns let go.
They heard the blast in Tokyo-
And down came 'Maytag CharUe.'"
On the 28
th
Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, commander of the
17
th
Army on Rabaul, dispatched 3,500 infantry under Maj.Gen.
Kiyotake Kawaguchi on four destroyer transports down the Slot in
the late afternoon. Two SBDs on recon spotted the force and bombed
it without getting any hits, but 11 of Mangrum's SBDs took off
from Henderson and hit three of the destroyers only 70 miles off
Guadalcanal. They exploded the Asagiri and set the Yugiri on fire.
The Shirakumo was brought to a stop, and it had to be towed back
to the Shortlands by the undamaged destroyer. The Marines lost
one dive-bomber and had averted Japanese reinforcement of the
island.
On the 29
th
at 1000 coast watchers on Bougainville reported 18
Bettys and a Zero escort headed southeast. At 1105 a coast watcher
on New Georgia corroborated the sighting. The newly established
Henderson radar set up on the northwest corner of the field then
picked up the Japanese formation. Ten VMF-223 Marine F4Fs and
three flights of four P-400s were scrambled at noon to intercept,
while other aircraft on the field took off and flew away to the east
to safety until after the attack. The F4Fs and the P-400s climbed to
14,000 feet, where the P-400s stayed and watched helplessly as the
38
Marine Wildcats continued to climb. The enemy bombers dropped
their bombs accurately on the field, but the Marine F4Fs reached
them and attacked. The Leathernecks were credited with II victo-
ries, six Zeros, and five bombers, with Capt. John Smith getting
two bombers to become an ace. All the disheartened AAF pilots
could do is watch helplessly as the bombers flew out of range above
them, juicy targets for Smith's Marine pilots. The Japanese bombs
had found their target, and Henderson was in chaos. The pilots landed
on the field, weaving around bomb craters marked by bushes set
out by ground crews and through the smoke from the burning grass
fields around the runway. Men were on the sides of the runways
beating out the grass fires with their blankets, and trucks were haul-
ing dirt to fill up the bomb craters on the runway. Crews unloaded
new steel mat from trucks to patch large sections of damaged mat-
ting. As the pilots taxied they passed two demolished former Japa-
nese hangars with two wrecked Wildcats burning in Hangar 2 and a
SBD burning in Hangar 3. Despite ammunition cooking off and
exploding from the burning aircraft, ground crews tried to save the
flaming Wildcats by beating them with blankets and pitching dirt
on them with shovels, and even their bare hands. Ground crews
rolled barrels of gasoline and oil out of the burning storage dump to
refuel the arriving aircraft with hand pumps so they would be ready
in case there was another attack approaching. That night four Japa-
nese destroyers from the Shortlands landed 450 troops on Taivu
Point just after dark.
Japanese snipers were an intermittent problem, hiding in trees
around the edge of the field and shooting at personnel and aircraft,
but they were quickly eliminated by Marine patrols. Officers were
urged to remove their insignias, as they were prime sniper targets.
John Thompson (67FS):
"Snipers were a problem, as they would take pot shots at our
aircraft taking off and landing from Henderson. One time we were
having lunch when a sniper off in a tree across the field hit our table
with a bullet. We all quickly took cover. It wasn't long before we
heard gunshots from a Marine patrol shooting the Jap out of his
tree."
Crew chiefs would take their straw ground mats, blankets, and
rifles down to their aircraft to guard against any Japanese infiltra-
tors trying to sabotage the aircraft at night.
On 30 August, SBDs reported a Japanese destroyer moving
southward toward Guadalcanal. That evening, after four days of
combat, of the original 14 P-400s only three remained immediately
operational, but mechanics worked feverishly all night to get oth-
ers into the air. Three Air Force pilots were on standby alert from
midnight, sitting in the cool hangars waiting for something to hap-
pen, but just before dawn the destroyer slipped in undetected, landed
its troops, and was gone. At 0930 Bougainville coast watchers re-
ported 20 single-engine aircraft coming down from Buka Passage,
flying to the southeast. At 1130 all Marine and Army CAP aircraft
were recalled for refueling to meet the daily Tojo Time. Since the
reported aircraft were single-engine it was assumed that a dive-
bombing attack on the shipping in Tulagi Harbor was imminent. At
1105 eight F4Fs and 11 (eight repaired that night) PAOOs took off
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
to meet the dive-bombers. One flight, led by Capt. Thomas Chris-
tian and made up of Lts. Chilson, Dutton, and Wythes, was sent on
CAP over the shipping at Tulagi, particularly the USS Burroughs,
which ran aground trying to anchor for the night after unloading
troops and supplies off Cactus. Flights led by Captains Brannon
and Thompson and followed by Lts. Childress, Dillon, Fincher,
Fountain, and Johnston climbed to their customary 14,000 feet, or-
biting in clouds, while the Wildcats climbed to 28,000 feet. The
dive-bombers turned out to be Zeros from the carriers Shokaku and
Zuikaku that were based at Buka airfield in the far western Solomons
for refueling. The seven P-400 pilots orbited at 14,000 feet and had
been on patrol for about a half hour; they were beginning to feel the
effects from the lack of oxygen when they were bounced from be-
hind and below by Zeros that came out of a cloud. The outnum-
bered Airacobra pilots went into a Lufbery defensive formation.
However the Lufbery, while workable against the Luftwaffe Me-
109s over Europe, was ineffective against the nimble Zero. The
Japanese fighter had a short turning radius that permitted it to get
inside the defensive circle, flying in the opposite direction. A P-39
or P-40 could not turn tight enough to hit the Zeros, and soon there
were more Zeros in the circle than PAOOs. But Marine Wildcats
dove to the rescue, and the air battle turned into a disorganized
dogfight. The P-400s were no match for the agile Zeros piloted by
veteran Imperial Navy pilots, and their only alternative was to dive
and duck into a cloud. Once inside the cloud the Army pilots at-
tempted to make an instrument turn and hoped to c ~ m e out on top
set to make an attack on a passing Zero. The weather had reduced
visibility to 1,000 feet, and Christian's four patrolling Airacobras
over TuJagi Harbor decided to return to base. As they headed out of
arainsquall they were attacked by six Zeros. Two pilots, Lts. Rob-
ert Chilson and Keith Wythes, were lost and listed MIA. Capt. John
Thompson landed with 15 bullet holes in his fighter and one in his
shoulder. About an hour later Lt. Peter Childress limped back into
camp. He had bailed out of his crippled fighter and:
"...as I floated down in my parachute I was worried that I was
going to land in Japanese territory. On my way down I was able to
get my bearings and landed about two miles from Henderson. I
made my way back through a no-man's land encountering a Jap
body along the way. As I approached the Marine lines I had to creep
past their booby traps and barbed wire, hoping not to be shot by
friendly fire. I was able to identify myself and return to the squad-
ron." (Childress)
During the CAPover Tulagi, Lt. Dutton's engine malfunctioned
and he bailed out. He landed in a grove of tall trees and fell through
the branches, and was knocked unconscious. When he came to he
was hanging upside down .15 feet above the ground in his para-
chute harness and covered head to toe by large biting black ants.
He cut himself down, stripped off his clothing, and brushed away
the vicious ants. Covered by painful bites, he made his way to
American lines and was returned by boat across Skylark Channel
the next day; he was given two ounces of medical brandy and sent
back to combat. Altogether, four P-400s were lost during combat,
and six of the seven returning fighters were riddled with bullet holes
and had to be written off for parts. The details of the combat are
muddled in the disastrous losses the squadron suffered that day.
Original 67
th
combat reports claimed four victories and three
probables, whileAAF records show two victories (Brannon's). But
diligent researcher Frank Olynyk in his USAAF (Pacific Theater)
Credits for the Destruction ofEnemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Combat
World War 2 lists five victories and two probables. Capt. Dale
Brannon was credited with two of the victories, 2Lt. Barclay Dillon
a victory and a probable, 1Lts. Albert Dutton and Richard Johnson
a Zero each, and Capt. John Thompson a probable. VMF-223 Ma-
rines had another big day, bagging 14 Japanese Zeros, with Capt.
John Smith adding four and Capt. Marion Carl adding three to make
him a double ace with 11 victories.
At 1500 Col. William Wallace, MAG-23 commander, arrived
at Henderson with 19 Wildcats of Maj. Robert Galer's VMF-224
and 12 Dauntlesses of Maj. Leo Smith's VMSB-231, navigated by
two B-17 escort bombers. Ahalf hour later, with the airfield packed
with aircraft, 18 Japanese dive-bombers flying in two large Vs by-
passed the vulnerable airfield and attacked the shipping in Tulagi
Harbor instead. They sunk the destroyer Calhoun and hit the trans-
port William Ward Burrows that had run aground offTulagi. To add
to the day's confusion, two strong earthquakes rocked the island at
1645, but Mother Nature's damage was minor compared to that
caused by the Japanese. At 2100 Marine SBDs took off in the dark-
ness to search for three cruisers and two destroyers that shelled the
island and landed troops to the east. Rainstorms prevented a suc-
cessful attack on the ships but caused them to withdraw. At the end
of the day Cactus air strength numbered 86 pilots and 64 aircraft:
51 Marine; 10 Navy; and only 3 Air Force.
On 2 September the 6
th
Seabees arrived with five officers, 387
men, and two bulldozers to improve Henderson, and to clear a grass
fighter strip one mile to the east. The Seabees used the large quan-
tity of captured Japanese equipment to clear and roll the 4,600 x
300-foot grass strip. They leveled the hummocks and filled in the
trenches and foxholes, then rolled the field and cut down the sur-
rounding tall bush to a foot and a half. It was completed on the 9
th
and was originally called the Fighter Strip, then Fighter One, but
would be dubbed the "Cow Pasture" by those who were based on
it. At one time in October it served all Cactus aircraft-including
Early view of Fighter One, a grass emergency strip built by the 6
th
Seabees in
case Henderson was shut downThere was a barbed wire fence around the
field. (USN)
39
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Fighter One with Bloody Ridge in the center
background in January 1943. On the left are
Marine SBDs, with a PV in the centerforeground
and a P-38 on the right. In the background are
P-39s (right center), F4Fs (right) and a two C-
47s (in the distance center). In the foreground is
a barbed wire fence (AAF)
B-17s-when Pistol Pete put too many holes in Henderson's run-
ways. By mid-September only a small quantity of Marston steel
matting had arrived, and the daily average gasoline reserve on the
island could only support air operations for four days. The increased
enemy presence on Bougainville, the Bismarcks, and Guadalcanal
furnished choice targets for AAF heavy bombers, but the B-17s
were forced to remain at Espiritu Santo-some 640 miles away-
as they could not stage through Henderson. Once Henderson was
ready to handle the bombers they were only able to calTY out infre-
quent strikes against Japanese shipping in the Buin-Tonalei area,
and these were limited by the chronic lack of fuel at Henderson.
An important and unheralded segment of the Cactus Air Force
were Navy and Marine SBD units on Guadalcanal. SBD dive-bomb-
ing missions from Henderson were often without fighter escort,
which could not be spared, and consequently they suffered heavy
losses. Four Marine SBD COs were KIA during the campaign.
Fighter pilots never really enjoyed escorting SBDs, as they flew at
a slow 125 mph and climbed to altitude very slowly, wasting a lot
of the waiting escort's fuel. The fighters had to throttle back and
weave over a wide area, keeping a look out for each other, the SBDs,
and the Japanese. The escorts usually flew above the dive-bombers
and close enough to get in between them and any attackers.
40
The 6
th
Seabee Battalion on Guadalcanal was
instrumental in the air victory; as they kept the
field constantly open for operations after heavy
Japanese air and naval attacks. (USN)
Part Two, Chapter 2 - August 1942
6
th
Seabees laying Marston Mat on Henderson. (USN)
Navy SBn Units:
Flight 300 was a mixture of eight VS-5 and three VB-6 SBDs off
the Enterprise under Lt. Turner Caldwell that landed at Henderson
on 24 August.
YS-3 was detached from the Saratoga to Espiritu Santo after she
was damaged in late August. Lt.Cdr. Louis Kim's SBDs were sent
to Henderson from 6 September to 17 October.
YS-71 under able CO, Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge. Served on Cactus
from 28 September to 7 November after the Wasp was sunk on 15
September.
YB-lO off the Enterprise, under Lt.Cdr. James Thomas, served from
13-16 November.
YS-lO off the
Enterprise, under Lt.Cdr. James Lee, served from 13-16 November
Marine SBn Units:
VMSB-232 had 12 SBDs under Lt.Col. Richard Mangrum from 20
August to 13 October.
VMSB-231 had 16 SBDs under Maj. Leo Smith (succeeded by Capt.
Ruben Iden MIA and then Capt. Elmer Glidden); landed on 30
August and was relieved on 16 October.
VMBS-141 had an advance element arrive on 23 September, after
which CO Maj. Gordon Bell landed with the largest squadron to
operate from Cactus on 5-6 October. The squadron left the island
by 19 November. Bell's successor, Lt. W.S. Ashcraft, was KIAon 8
November.
VMBS-132, under Maj. Joseph Sailer, arrived on 1 November and
left on 9 December without its able leader, who was killed in action
on 7 December.
VMBS-142 had ten SBDs under Maj. Robert Richard that arrived
on 12 November and remained at Henderson into late April 1943.
VMBS-141 had the highest pilot casualty rate, as of the origi-
nal 43 pilots, 27 were KIA and nine were evacuated WIA in five
weeks. Three quarters of their pilots contracted malaria (two evacu-
ated). In addition 19 rear gunners were KIA or MIA.
41
3
September 1942
At the start of September General Vandegrift commanded less
than 20,000 troops that held a perimeter measuring five and half
miles along the north coast, and less than two miles in depth. For
the Japanese, the American invasion and its continued presence rep-
resented the first stumbling block since they started the war, as far
back as the late 1930s in China. The stinging defeat at the Ilu
(Tenaru) River on 20121 August and failure of their Navy and Air
Forces to dislodge the Marines caused the Japanese to try to save
face and increase the tempo of their offensive. The American car-
rier-based and land-based aircraft and 3
rd
Defense Battalion and
naval AA had taken a large toll, as the Japanese had lost most of
their original complement of aircraft on Rabaul and still were un-
able to gain air supremacy. Distance was in the Americans' favor,
as they operated over and near Henderson, and their pilots were
able to land many damaged aircraft on the airfield. Also, the Navy
and friendly natives were able to rescue and return pilots who ditched
or bailed out. The Japanese had to fly 560 miles from Rabaul and
300 miles from southern Bougainville, and could not loiter long
over Cactus. The heavy fuel loads needed for the long return trip
handicapped air combat for the Zero fighters. Many American com-
bat reports described Japanese aircraft that flamed or exploded be-
cause of their large fuel load and unprotected gasoline tanks (a du-
bious weight savings that gave them extended range). Henderson
had received 31 new aircraft by I September, but the Japanese re-
ceived 36 fighters and 27 bombers that day. Both Harmon and
Ghormley had repeatedly requested that Gen. Arnold send the
Lockheed P-38 Lightning to the South Pacific, but the success of
the impending North African invasion in early November depended
on the P-38. The Lightning was the only fighter that was able to
cross the Atlantic Ocean to Great Britain and then fly to North Af-
rica, so none could be spared. Adm. Ghormley had also asked
MacArthur for P-38s, but MacArthur was under pressure from a
threatened Japanese invasion at Port Moresby, New Guinea. He
had only 18 P-38s himself and, in turn, asked Ghormley to lend
him some of his four aircraft carriers! Neither gave in. One bright
spot was the landing of the first transport plane at Guadalcanal on 3
September, carrying 1
st
MAW commander Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger,
who announced that MAG-14, with two combat squadrons and a
42
Maj',Gen. Roy Geiger was a veteran Marine Corps air commander and was
the CO of the Ist Marine Air Wing (I MAW) on Guadalcanal on 3 Septem-
ber His command included the Army Air Force and the Navy, and was dubbed
the "Cactus Air Force." (USMC)
Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942
67FS Patsy Flight P-400 'Whistlin' Bntches" starboard landing gear is being
serviced. There is a hydraulic jack supporting the wing and the mechanic is
holding the wheel and strut. (Lansdale/347FGA)
service squadron with III officers and 1,116 enlisted men, was to
be shipped to the South Pacific. On the 5
th
, MAG-25 began opera-
tions at Henderson when its first R4D transport landed with 3,000
Ibs of welcome cigarettes and candy and returned carrying wounded.
The Japanese would organize air and naval attacks 11 times in
September, 16 times in October, and eight times in ,ovember. The
Tokyo Express was operating nearly nightly. Beginning in August
and increasing in September and. 'early October the Japanese rein-
forced Guadalcanal by sendingJast destroyer/transports and cruis-
ers down the Slot from the Shortland Islands in the afternoon. By
nightfall they would be about 200 miles from Guadalcanal, and
then would speed in at night to land as many as 1,000 troops at
Cape Esperance. Over the months these fast destroyers, along with
larger vessels and barges, were able to land 20,000 troops and sup-
plies. The Marines and AAF had limited night-equipped aircraft to
counter the Tokyo Express and the nighttime air raids over the is-
A Patsy Flight P-400 (No. 22) carrying a 2501b. bomb. The Marines at
Guadalcanal experienced a chronic shortage of artillery ammunition, and
the emergence of the P-400 and its heavy firepower and bombs became a
welcome sight.The 67
th
pilots began to refer to themselves as the' 'JagstaffeI: '
a corruption of the Luftwaffe term "Jagdstaffel," which translates in German
as "fighter squadron," not fighter-bomber. (Lansdale/Ferguson)
67FS P-400 "Impatient Virgin" shows off the distinguishing features of the P-
400: its tricycle landing gear. 12 exhaust stacks, auto-type door and 20mm
cannon that fired through the propeller hub. (Lansdale/347FGA)
land. Japanese reinforcements were slowly increasing and organiz-
ing in the jungle, and it was a matter of time before they were a
force in strength ready to drive the lSI Marine Division from their
beachhead. The Japanese could pursue this objective as long as their
Navy controlled the Southern Solomons. The reluctant U.S. Navy
needed to become more aggressive and bring to bear greater force
to cause more casualties on the Japanese avy. If this could be
accomplished the Japanese, completely reliant on the Tokyo Ex-
press to bring in reinforcements, equipment, and supplies, could
not organize and deploy a large invasion force to retake the island.
Meanwhile, Japanese fighters and bombers from Rabaul and
Bougainville took part in Tojo Time at noon and several other times
a day, often taking costly losses from the Cactus Air Force. How-
ever, it was the almost nightly naval attacks, big guns firing salvo
after salvo, that exacted the greatest damage, both materiel and psy-
chological, on the defenders of the island.
The rough field conditions at Cactus are seen hereThe fragile tricycle land-
ing gear could collapse with disastrous results. (Lansdale/347FGA)
43
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
After their poor showing, the PAOOs were assigned recon
flights, and embalTassingly sent to orbit the safe east end of the
island during Tojo Time to wait for the attack to end. The word
around the island was "the P-400 was a PAO with a Zero in its tail!"
67FS morale hit low ebb. The Game Cock pilots reluctantly recog-
nized their fighter did not have the performance to be an intercep-
tor, and the air battle of the 30
th
made it painfully obvious that the
P-400 was unable to intercept high-flying Bettys and Zeros. With-
out oxygen the AAF pilots were unable to climb to the altitudes of
the attacking Zeros and Bettys, and even if they were able to reach
the Japanese the fighter did not have the perfoITnance there to counter
the Betty bomber, much less the Zero. Besides the lack of high
altitude performance, the fighter had a low rate of climb, excessive
wing loading, and an engine that was very vulnerable to hits to the
glycol cooling system. Generals Harmon and Vandegrift found the
P-400 unsuitable for operations on Guadalcanal and urged that P-
38 and P-47 squadrons be sent.
Maj. John Smith, commander ofVMF-223, assessed the 67FS
in an intelligence report dated 10 November 1942:
"The first Army Squadron that came down there with P-400s
had some of the finest pilots that I've ever seen, even though they
didn't have the best plane in the world. And they were certainly
willing to do anything they were asked to do and cooperated well
with the Marine officer who was running the show there. The fact
that the P-400 didn't get up high enough didn't bother them a great
deal; they always wanted to go up every time they had a chance."
It did bother the 67
th
pilots that their aircraft was not an inter-
ceptor and that they were taken out of combat, but they were eager
to fly and fight, and a new assignment would be coming their way.
The P-400, known as the Model 14 or Airacobra I, was the P-
39D-l and D-2 model built for export to the French, who ordered
170 on 30 March 1940. When France fell the British assumed their
order and planned on naming the fighter the Caribou, but left the
name at Airacobra. The French contract was followed by two Brit-
ish orders of 205 and 300, and Bell built 675. The British flew the
A smoking Japanese bomber plunges to its destruction off Guadalcanal. The
bomber was undoubtedly shot down by Marine F4F Wildcats, as the Army
P-400s could not reach the altitude the Japanese flew to intercept. (USMC)
44
Airacobra for a limited time in combat and trials and couldn't wait
to foist 212 off on the desperate Russians. The USAAC "reclaimed"
179 RAP Airacobras that were renamed the P-400 and sent them to
the South Pacific. Most of the P-400s in the Pacific maintained
their RAF serial numbers and three-color camouflage, and had the
U.S. national insignia painted over the RAF roundels. It can-ied the
British high-pressure oxygen system and was armed with the Brit-
ish ordered 20mm Hispano-Suiza Mk 404 (M-l) cannon, while the
P-39 had an inferior American 37mm T9 cannon. The six .30 cali-
ber machine guns were replaced by six Browning .303 caliber ma-
chine guns. The identifying features of the P-400 vs. P-39C/D were
the line of twelve exhaust stacks located below and behind the cock-
pit door on each side of the P-400, versus the six on the P-39C/D.
Also, the 20mm cannon muzzle was longer than the 37mm cannon.
The P-400 had the centerline hardpoint that was found on the D
models and could carry a 500lb. bomb or jettisonable fuel tank.
The Model 14 was equipped with the Allison V-171O-E4 engine
that was rated at 60 more horsepower than the P-39C/D Allison.
The mixture and the prop control on the PAOO throttle quadrant
were reversed from the P-39 (the throttle was the same).
In early 1941 a Senate committee headed by Harry S. Truman
investigated the nation's preparedness problems and included a re-
port on why the obsolete P-39 was put into mass production and
continued in production when more contemporary fighters could
be pressed into production. The committee found that Senators pork
barreled the continued production of obsolete aircraft built in their
districts. Manufacturers justified large orders of Brewster F2As,
Curtiss P-40s, and Bell P-39s, as they were available, could be pro-
duced in large ,numbers, and could be improved upon. But the fact
was this assertion was cOlTect, as the newer and better aircraft-the
Lockheed P-38, the Republic P-47, and North American P-51-
were either in the developmental or prototype stage and not ready
for mass production. The P-39 and P-40 truly were all that was
readily available in the American fighter arsenal.
The AAF had known of the shortcomings of the P-39/P-400
several months before Guadalcanal. In May 1942 Lt.Col. Boyd
"Buzz" Wagner, who had scored three victories flying a P-39D for
the 5
th
Fighter Command over ew Guinea, had forwarded a report
to Gen. MacArthur on the P-39 and P-40. Wagner's report criti-
cized the fighter's low rate of climb and excessive wing loading,
which precluded aerial combat with the Zero, and the vulnerability
of its liquid-cooled engine. He also was angered by the P-39's con-
stant gun jamming problems. The .30 caliber wing guns and the
37mmpropeller-mounted cannon chronically jammed, and only the
two cowl-mounted .50 caliber machine guns could be trusted in
combat. He did feel that the P-39 was "10% better than the P-40 in
every respect except maneuverability below 18,000 feet." (Fighter
Aircraft Report to USAFTA, 21 May 1942). Col. Gordon Seville,
the Director of Air Defense, stated emphatically that neither the P-
39 nor P-40 could performeffectively against the Zero in the SWPA,
and the only American fighter that could was the P-38, and asked
that they be sent to the Pacific. (Memo, 27 May 1942 to the Chief
of Staff)
The reason for the P-400/P-39's perfoITnance shortcomings was
the absence of a turbocharger. The turbocharger is a mechanism
Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942
Crew Chief checks the maintenance log of a P-39 at Cactus. The ground
crews did yeoman's work, keeping the aircraft maintained and repaired dur-
ing the battle for the island. (USAF)
that helps an aircraft engine increase and maintain power output at
high altitudes. At the time the P-39 was designed American turbo-
chargers were not dependable, and wind tunnel tests of the design
had shown numerous lift and drag problems that were eliminated
by deleting the turbocharger. During the 1930s bomber aviation
was the vanguard of tactical air combat thinking, and fighter per-
formance expectations did not anticipate that the fighter would regu-
larly fly at high altitude or have to escort bombers. Although Allison
could have manufactured the V-I7l 0 engine with a turbocharger,
the Army revised Airacobra specifications and eliminated the tur-
bocharger. The move cut costs for Bell, reduced drag, and removed
the possibility of technical problems that the installation of a turbo-
charger may have caused. What remained was a sleek-looking lack-
luster fighter with virtually no high altitude capabilities, but with
good, but unexplored, low altitude qualities that 67FS pilots were
about to exploit.
The P-400s and P-39s were available in the South Pacific, and
62 more were on their way to the Pacific. The P-39D-2 was armed
with one nose-mounted 37mm cannon, two cowl-mounted .50 cali-
ber machine guns (300 rounds per gun), and four wing-mounted
.30 caliber machine guns (1,000 rpg). The soon to arrive P-39K-l
was stripped of 650 pounds of original equipment, and this im-
proved the Bell fighter's performance, as well as its service ceiling,
which theoretically reached 27,000 feet. The 37mm cannon (30
rounds) was to be replaced by a .50 caliber machine gun with 280
rounds of ammunition, but the resulting weight saving and increase
in the rate of firewas not worth the time and effort, and the project
was dropped. The other armament was the same. The K model was
also equipped to carry a 500lb. or auxiliary fuel tank. One third of
the P-39s were not stripped and were intended for fighter-bomber
use. Meanwhile, the AAC had the P-400 fighter that could not be
used as a fighter. Of the 13 Cactus P-400s, four had been shot down,
and in a single combat eight had been damaged, and of those six
would be eventually written off. Harmon felt that stripping the air-
craft of the recommended 1,500 pounds of weight still would not
make it a successful high altitude interceptor. The aircraft had good
low-altitude performance, good protective armor plate, and a heavy
armament of a 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber and four .30 caliber
machine guns, and could carry two bombs. The P-400 would be-
come the superlative attack aircraft over Guadalcanal, and the P-
400/39 would prove itself again in this role as a Lend-Lease air-
craft to the Soviets on the Eastern Front against the Germans.
On 3 September Maj.Gen. Archibald Vandegrift, Commander
of the 1sf Marine Division, advised Lt.Gen. Delos Emmons, Com-
mander of Army Aircraft in the Pacific, that:
"P-400s will not be employed further except in extreme emer-
gencies; they are entirely unsuitable for Cactus operations."
Harmon asked the Gen. George Marshall for aircraft (e.g. the
P-38) that could operate above 20,000 feet:
"If we are to maintain the morale and the elan of our fighter
pilots, obtain the desired effectiveness of our Army fighter effort,
and to avoid losses out of proportion to results obtain, a reasonable
proportion of Army fighter units in this area must be equipped with
the P-38 or P-47 types." (Harmon to Marshall, 8 September 1942)
But the P-400 did have a role in the Cactus Air Force, and soon
it flew its first mission in that new role. During the night of 1 Sep-
tember, two Japanese transports and two destroyers stood off
Tasimboko, a village about 20 miles east of Henderson. The Japa-
nese had disembarked a strong garrison of 300 troops and supplies
in bad weather that prevented SBDs from flying that night to inter-
"Fancy Nancy" (No.12) was a PAOa of Patsy
Flight flown by Lt. Richard Johnston that flew with
Brannon's original group on 22August. Not long
after this photo was taken she was caught on
the runway and destroyed by strafing Zeros.
(Lansdale/USMC)
45
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
dict the landings. At 0500 the next morning, Japanese destroyers
shelled Henderson and woke every American in the perimeter. At
0600 five P-400s, led by now Major Brannon, and followed by Us.
Childress, Davis, Fincher, and Fountain, took off to attack the land-
ings. They found no troops, and only five beached landing craft
were spotted. At 0800 four more P-400s, led by Capt. Thompson
and followed by Us. Brzuska, Head, and Johnston, took off and
dropped their 500lb. bombs on the village and strafed both the land-
ing craft and village. At noon, with Tojo Time forthcoming, the 67
th
decided to fly another mission on Tasimboko, rather than to suffer
another Japanese bombing attack. They attacked the village, and
during their attack the Japanese sent down 18 Bettys escorted by 21
Zeros and attacked Henderson on schedule. The defending Marine
fighters of Maj. Robert Galer's VMF-224 shot down five bombers
and a Zero, while Smith's VMF-223 got three Zeros. But the Japa-
nese hit the airfield hard, and the returning Americans landed on
cratered runways, taxied past a burning hangar, three smoldering
SBDs, and burning fuel and ammo dumps. Throughout the next
several hours delayed action bombs detonated over the area
On 4 September the 67
th
had three P-400s operational and 13
pilots to fly them. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that the Japa-
nese were using Santa Isabel as a staging area for barges and land-
ing craft that carried reinforcements to Guadalcanal, 75 miles to
the SSE. At 1440 on the 4
t
h, Maj. Robert Galer ofVMF-224 led the
three P-400s flown by Capt. Thomas Christian and Lts. Brown and
Glazier to small coves on Santa Isabel that concealed 34 loaded
landing craft ranging from 40 to 70 feet long. The P-400s dove on a
group of six boats loaded with men and supplies moving back to
safety toward shore. Two were destroyed by two direct hits from
500lb. bombs, and after the bombs were dropped the other boats
and landing troops were strafed. At debriefing Galer claimed that
25 landing craft in the area's coves had been destroyed and two
machine guns put out of action. The fighters returned safely, some
with several bullet holes from small anns fire. To make the day a
complete success, bad weather cancelled Tojo Time.
- During the late night of 5 September the Express, consisting of
a light cruiser and two destroyers, came down the Slot and sunk the
transports Gregory and Little off Savo Island, and then shelled the
Lt.Vernon Head's P-400 crashed on 8 September attempting to take off on
a muddy field carrying a SOOlb. bomb. 67FS Adjutant Charles Allard surveys
the damage. (Lansdale/Head/347FGA)
46
island, killing three men. Maj. Brannon and Lt. Fountain left on a
dawn patrol, and at 0700 came upon 15 Japanese landing barges
bringing troops ashore in daylight. Ten of the barges were about a
third of a mile offshore of Levers Pass and Visale on the northwest
coast. Brannon radioed the sighting back to Henderson, and the P-
400s dove low and repeatedly strafed the flotilla until they ran out
of ammunition, sinking one barge, damaging several others, and
killing many of the troops by gun fire or drowning before they could
reach shore. Six Wildcats from VMF-224 joined the P-400s and
continued the carnage. One Marine pilot was hit by the heavy small
arms fire and crashed into the ocean off the landing b e ~ c h e s . All
fighters taking part in the mission had holes from small arms fire.
Two hours later two P-400s, flown by Capt. Thompson and Lt.
Fincher, returned to strafe the barges that were unloading supplies
onshore, and to destroy the supplies that had been abandoned in the
landing craft that had been grounded on the reefs close inshore.
Despite the apparent success of these attacks, Japanese records in-
dicate that 5,200 troops had nonetheless landed by 7 September.
Despite their new success as fighter-bomber pilots, the 67
th
considered themselves fighter pilots, trained for air combat. But
during every Tojo Time they were sent out on ground support sor-
ties or to interdict suspected supply and troop concentrations, or to
go after targets of opportunity. These missions would put them out
of danger from falling bombs and marauding Zeros. Before long
the firepower and low-altitude attack capability of the P-400 and
the competence of the pilots led to outstanding results that were
directly appreciated by the Marine infantry below. Soon 67
th
pilots
thought maybe the P-400 wasn't so bad after all, and it had a place
in the Pacific War. COMAIRSOPAC Chief of Staff Capt. Matt
Gardner noted that the P-400 was "tremendously effective in its
strafing work." Time and again Gen. Vandegrift sent the once ma-
ligned fighter against Japanese strongpoints and asked for more of
them. The 67
th
morale began to swell. But if the pilots felt better,
Harmon was irritated that his Army fighters were put into a second-
ary role, and he again appealed to Gen. Emmons in Hawaii for P-
38s and P-47s.
The rains in early September made operations from Henderson
and reconnaissance patrols difficult. The Japanese took advantage
of the poor weather to continue their troop and supply build up near
Tasimboko. To interdict the Japanese the Marines planned a raid
from Tulagi, landing to the east of the village, attacking their rear,
and withdrawing the same day. At 0700, 8 September, Lt.Col. Merritt
Edson's 1Sl Marine Raider Battalion landed near Taivu Point to at-
tack Japanese positions at Tasimboko. Maj. Brannon and Us.
Childress, Fincher, and Head flew four P-400s in diving, strafing,
and bombing attacks to drive the Japanese under cover during the
Raider beach landing, and then attacked in front of the advancing
Raiders. The Raiders met heavy resistance from a strong rear guard
action as they neared their objective. The large main Japanese force
of 4,000 troops under Gen. Kiytake Kawaguchi had left the area
and was headed for the Marines' defensive perimeter near
Henderson. Edson moved toward the village, which was defended
by seasoned, well-equipped enemy troops ordered to protect their
newly arrived store of arms, ammunition, and supplies that were
vital to their offensive. As his force took up positions around
Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942
Tasimboko Edson called for a close air strike on huts that he knew
were occupied by the enemy. At 0900 the P-400s of Capt. Thomp-
son and Lts. Davis, Glazier, and Johnston attacked to aid the ad-
vance, but Edson continued to meet heavy opposition. Edson's
Raiders finally routed the Japanese and destroyed their arms and
supplies. He called for more air attacks at 1530 to support his
Raider's withdrawal. The previous heavy rains and the day's con-
tinuous operations had taken their toll on the condition of the air-
field, which had become a quagmire. To avoid most of the mud a
short take off run had to be made. Maj. Brannon and Lts. Fincher
and Head taxied their P-400s out onto the runway loaded with a
500lb. bomb and a full load of fuel and ammunition. Brannon tax-
ied to the end ofthe runway, followed by Head and Fincher. Brannon,
with half flaps, stood on the brakes and put the engine in full throttle.
He released the brakes and the plane moved slowly forward, sway-
ing and picking up speed, and finally lifted out of the sucking mud
into the air. Next Lt. Head tried the same procedure, but his plane,
in trying to pick up speed, skidded and soaked the plane with mud
as it sloshed through pools of water. His aircraft was running out of
runway and Head tried to lift it off, but the plane stalled from the
weight of the mud on the wings, hit the ground, fractured the land-
ing gear, broke the fuselage in half, and caught on fire. Head man-
aged to unbuckle his seat beat and scrambled out of the burning
wreckage. Fincher managed to take off over Head's burning wreck-
age. The two pilots covered the Marine withdrawal for two hours,
intimidating the Japanese by flying lazy eights over the beach until
the Marines were safely in the their landing craft calTying booty
such as tinned crab meat and bottles of beer and sake. The pilots
landed safely on reserve fuel at 1730 in a muddy spray. The Ma-
rines at Tasimboko commended the 67
th
for its support of their op-
eration there. They lost only two men and six wounded out of 600
men, and destroyed a large store of vital Japanese supplies that would
be needed for Kawakuchi's offensive. Head was burned and bruised
and was evacuated to New Caledonia the next day.
At nightfall F4Fs were returning late from a long mission.
Torches made from sake bottles with wicks were set along the run-
way, and truck lights lit the touchdown area. The lighting was inad-
equate, and the first F4F down ground looped and crashed off the
side of the deeply rutted runway. During the landings four more
Wildcats had to be written off, along with a bulldozer that was hit
by a careening Wildcat. At the end of the day there were only 11
F4Fs and two P-400s operational on Henderson. On the 9
th
, a F4F
crashed on take off and four more were shot down while destroying
seven bombers and three Zeros. After the arrival of four F4Fs from
Espititu Santo, air strength on the 10
th
was 11 F4Fs, 22 SBDs, and
three P-400s.
The Army pilots developed dive-bombing techniques for their
P-400s in these initial sorties. The pilots had to learn how to use the
aircraft as a dive-bomber, as it had no dive brakes and its terminal
velocity was high. They also had to use care when flying the air-
craft close to the ground because of its tendency to stall. There was
a warning notice on the fighter's instrument panel:
"Do not release bomb when the nose angle is 30 degrees up or
down or when the air speed exceeds 280mph."
This made the dive-bombing too horizontal and slow, expos-
ing the aircraft to enemy ground fire for too long. Pilots found that
they were able to release the bomb at 70 degrees and still have it
clear the propeller arc if immediate pressure were put on the stick
to yank the aircraft away from the falling bomb. Unlike the Navy
SBDs that began their dives at 15,000 feet or more, the P-400s
began their dives at 5,000 feet and released their bomb just above
the jungle at speeds of 300-350mph, then pulled up, weaving over
the trees to avoid ground fire. They would then turn to strafe the
area they had just bombed. The thickjungle made visual target iden-
tification difficult, and Marine units reported enemy targets on map
locations and indicated their own positions by setting out panels.
Nonetheless, most P-400 bombing and strafing attacks were blind,
never actually seeing the enemy. However, when the Marines moved
on the enemy position they often found it damaged or destroyed
and sUlTounded by dead enemy troops. The Marines at Guadalcanal
experienced a chronic shortage of artillery ammunition, and the
emergence of the P-400 and its heavy firepower became a welcome
sight. The 67
th
pilots began to refer to themselves as the "Jagstaffel,"
a corruption of the Luftwaffe term "Jagdstaffel" which translates in
German as "fighter squadron," not fighter-bomber. Maj.Gen. Archie
Vandegrift, USMC commander, commended the P-400s:
"... their armament and the zeal and training of their pilots en-
abled them to undertake ground support missions which were to
contribute as materially, if not spectacularly, to the defense of
Guadalcanal. "
A67FS P-400 had a fiat tire while taxiing; it suc-
cumbed to strafing Japanese fighters in Septem-
ber 1942 and had to be written off. Even as a
wreck the Airacobra soldiered on as a source of
spare parts, and then as a decoy for other straf-
ing Japs. (USAF)
47
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Standing outside a sandbag shelter in the pilot's bivouac at Henderson: Capts.
John Thompson (I) and Dale Brannon (2) and Lts. Obermiller (3), Childress
(4), and Ryan (5). (Lansdale/Head/347FGA)
Capt. Matt Gardner, R.Adm. McCain's Chief of Staff, stated
the P-400 "... was tremendously effective in strafing troops and land-
ing barges." But lessons were learned from these early operations.
The P-400 had poor air to ground communications and could not
be adequately directed to ground support targets. The squadron ar-
rived with insufficient ground personnel, as only seven armorers
had accompanied the original 14 P-400s. In the future each aircraft
would have its own crew chief and armorer. Fueling was a prob-
lem, as gasoline pumper trucks were unavailable, and each plane
did not have its own hand pump to transfer fuel from 55-gallon
drums. Spare parts were not shipped with the aircraft and had to be
cannibalized from wrecked aircraft.
The 67
th
continued its ground support missions in mid-Sep-
tember. On the 10
th
, Lt. Deltis Fincher scored a direct bomb hit on a
Japanese radio station on the island. On the return flight Lt. Zed
Fountain landed and taxied in, and as he shut down his engine his
20mm cannon fired two rounds into the roof of a hangar. The shells
exploded, slightly injuring 67
th
pilot Lt. Robert Ferguson. On the
11
th
at 0930, Maj. Brannon and Lts. Peter Childress, Zed Fountain,
and Vernon Head were assigned to search for a Japanese force that
was reported to be five miles east of Henderson. They sighted noth-
ing and moved west to Cape Esperance, but saw nothing but the
landing barges they had attacked previously. Capt. Thompson and
Lts. Brown, Davis, Fountain, and Johnston went out on patrol be-
fore Tojo Time searching for the reported Japanese force. While
they were gone 26 Betty bombers and eight Zeros attacked
Henderson at 1205. The bombers hit the east side of the field, where
Edson's Raiders were digging in, and eleven Marines were killed
and 17 injured. A P-400 was destroyed, but a bomb hit next to a
dugout sheltering 67
th
personnel. Lt. Peter Childress related his par-
ticipation in the raid:
"It was high noon on September 11th_Tojo Time-the black
flag was up at the Pagoda. Due to a shortage of planes, some of the
pilots had to take this bombing raid on the ground, and to deter-
mine who would fly; they cut for low cards in a very frayed and
incomplete deck. Those not winning: Capt. Brannon, and Lts.
48
Fincher, Glazier, and I retired to our favorite bomb-proof dugout, a
little beauty of 12 x 12 feet, with beam frame work that supported
three-eighths inch metal plates and hundreds of pounds of sand-
bags. We felt fairly safe in there.
About two minutes before the bombers came over our com-
pany in the shelter was increased by a Marine colonel, major, and
their driver, who were caught short and had to find shelter. We were
crouching in the dugout, puffing on our customary 'Tojo Time' ciga-
rette. Capt. Brannon was standing just outside, watching the bomb-
ers overhead. Suddenly he shouted, 'Here they come!' and dived
headlong into the dugout. He was in mid-air as the bOlJ1b hit us. I
remember a strange sensation of lazily floating in space, no pain,
no fright, just a momentary mental attitude of wondering what was
happening here. Thinking maybe I was dead. Then suddenly what
had happened dawned on me, as I was thrown into the air and plum-
meted down to earth with tons of dirt, armor plate, and 12 x 12
beams. I beat them all back to the ground and they landed on top of
me in the middle of a fresh crater.
Lucky Day. Maj. Dale Brannon stands in a bomb crater from a bomb explo-
sion that threw Brannon and several others into the air without serious
injury. 12 September /942. (347
th
FGA)
Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942
The Japanese 1000 pound bomb had hit only five feet away
from the entrance of our dugout. It then penetrated the earth and
blasted a huge cone of earth at least 25 feet in diameter sky high.
Our dugout was part of this crater.
The dirt piled up quickly around me and began to engulf me. I
had bitter thoughts about being buried alive, ironically, after sur-
viving the blast of the bomb that was almost close enough for me to
touch. I felt helpless despair. I was pinned by Mother Earth, immo-
bile, in a slumped standing position. My arms and legs were held
fast. Desperately shaking my head, then extending my nose into
fresh air, through the dust and smoke I could see other explosions.
Then came a deadly silence in which joyously I was aware that I
was alive, quickly followed by anxiety and concern about the oth-
ers. The visions I had in my semi-stupor made me nauseated.
Then I heard Fincher, 'Where's Pete? For Christ's sake where's
Pete? Here he is.' He started digging like a dog, and after uncover-
ing my left arm he called for help. Some medical corpsmen came.
One was pulling on my tin hat and was about to pull my head off,
but the chinstrap as well as my neck held on. Another was jabbing
my free arm with a morphine shot. I think I got more needle than
morphine.
Aview of Bloody Ridge, with Henderson Field located as the long open
patch just beyondThe ridgelines are denuded and scarred.AAF P-400s were
instrumental in the battle, as they flew close support missions, ravaging the
attacking Japs. (USMC)
Col. Merritt Edson lead his men in the valiant defense ofthe Ridge that saved
Henderson and was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor. (USMC)
About this time a gang gathered to dig me out. As they crowded
around me they packed the dirt down. I felt my chest slowly col-
lapsing and I tried to get them away, but to my amazement I could
not speak. One fellow trying to get me free had his knee wedged
between my back and the dirt. Finally they interpreted my frantic
moans and some of them moved off. During the excavation I was
worried about my hands. Once they were free I was told that they
were not badly bunged up. With my relief about being alive and all
right and the increasing effect of the morphine I felt rather happy as
they hauled us off to the hospital in a bumpy truck. I must have
been on a morphine jag, as I was humming a ditty when I was ad-
mitted. No one was killed or seriously injured." (The Japanese lost
six bombers and a Zero during the attack - author)
Later that day 30 Marine SBDs patrolling under Lt. T. Caldwell
spotted a Japanese heavy cruiser and two destroyers, but only four
of the dive-bombers made the attack due to bad weather, and no
damage was done. Late that afternoon 24 Wildcats of VF-5 off the
Saratoga under Lt. Leroy Simpler landed at Henderson for tempo-
rary duty in expectation of the upcoming Japanese offensive. The
Saratoga had been torpedoed and withdrew for repairs, leaving VF-
49
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
5 at Espiritu Santo. The F4F contingent on Cactus increased two
fold, but after five weeks of grinding combat only five of the VF-5
fighters would remain in combat. Previously, Ghormley had stead-
fastly refused to use carrier-based aircraft from Cactus, but intelli-
gence had detected the presence of a large Japanese naval and mili-
tary force in the Truk-Palau region, indicating a coordinated attack
on Guadalcanal with Rabaul-based aircraft and the newly landed
Tokyo Express troops. Later that night these warships bombarded
the island.
At 0500 on 12 September Maj. Brannon, with a large patch on
his chin from his encounter with the Jap bomb the day before, led a
scramble that was a false alert, and all P-400s returned by 0830.
Tojo Time came at 1100 when 26 Betty bombers escorted by 16
Zeros attacked. Simpler's Navy squadron was thrown into its first
combat, along with five of Smith's VMF-223 and six of Galer's
VMF-224 Wildcats. The Japanese lost 15 aircraft: four bombers
and a Zero to VF-5; six bombers and a Zero to VMF-223; and three
bombers to VMF-224. Marine AA fire claimed several bombers
that may actually have been air combat victims on their way down.
Henderson's radio facility sustained minor damage, and three SBDs
Capt. john Thompson, with Lts. Bryan Brown and Eugene Davis, attacked
"Bloody Ridge" and left over 600 japanese dead, allowing Edson's men to
retake the Ridge. (Thompson)
50
In the Aftermath of the savage battle for Bloody Ridge on 13/14 September,
a Marine infantryman overlooks the foxholes and debris ofthe battle where
Col. Edson's raiders repelled the japanese Kawaguchi Force to save Henderson
from being over run. (USMC)
were destroyed on the ground. In the afternoon a Japanese naval
force was reported on their way to Guadalcanal, and American in-
telligence had detected Gen. Kawaguchi's main Japanese force,
which had moved inland from Tasimboko. Vandegrift decided to
meet Kawaguchi's attack by concentrating his Marines on a ridge
connecting open hills about a mile south of the Henderson Field
runway. Lt.Col. Merritt Edson's lSI Raider Battalion, reinforced by
a parachute battalion, took up forward positions on the ridge and
waited for the attack. At midnight on 12/13 September the Japa-
nese made ~ concerted effort to recapture Henderson. A heavy na-
val bombardment alternated between the beachhead, airfield, and
ridge, and was followed by a three-pronged attack on Marine posi-
tions. Two of the attacks were repulsed, but the most brutal fighting
was on Lunga Ridge, defended by Edson's Raiders, who were driven
slowly from the ridge, and by the next morning only the inner pe-
rimeter defense kept the Japanese from overrunning Henderson.
Throughout the night the field was under mortar and artillery fire,
and snipers were firing on personnel on the field.
At 0730 on the 14
th
three P-400s led by Capt. John Thompson,
with Lts. Bryan Brown and Eugene Davis, attacked "Bloody Ridge,"
as it would come to be known. They did not have to fly far to the
ridge. After takeoff they only had to circle the field in a wide left
turn, climb to a 1,000 feet, and then dive on the ridge from the west
at tree top level. From the briefing at the Pagoda, Thompson only
knew the relative positions of the 2,000 Japanese troops and Edson's
800 Marines on a rough hand-drawn map. The air action was so
close to the airfield that the ground crews watched and heard the
battle. The surprised Japanese on and below the sOllthern ridge were
marshaling for another attack when the P-400s bombed and strafed
them at 25 to 30 feet. The fire from the 20mm cannon and two .50
caliber nose guns and the four .30 caliber machine guns in the wings
was devastating. On their second run the Japanese were prepared
and the P-400s faced heavy small arms and machine gun fire. Lt.
Brown's fighter received a hit in the radiator, and he used his straf-
ing dive speed t9 gain enough altitude to reach the runway before
Part Two, Chapter 3 - September 1942
his engine seized, and he dead sticked in safely. On the next run
Thompson's radiator was also hit, and he too used his diving speed
to gain altitude to reach the runway and also landed without power.
Lt. Davis continued to strafe the ridge until he ran out of ammuni-
tion. The attack devastated the Japanese, who suffered over 600
dead on the ridge and allowed a Marine counter attack to retake the
ridge from the demoralized enemy, who retreated into the jungle.
For their action, Capt. Thompson was awarded the Navy Cross and
LIs. Brown and Davis the Silver Star by Generals Vandegrift and
Geiger. Geiger told Thompson:
"You'll never read it in the papers, but that three PAOO mis-
sion of yours (at Bloody Ridge) saved Guadalcanal." When no one
was watching Geiger reached under the seat of his jeep and took
out a bottle of whiskey and handed it to Thompson, telling him to
hide it under his shirt, as he didn't have enough for everyone. (Th-
ompson)
The last entry in a dead Japanese infantry officer's diary re-
flected the outcome of the P-400 attack:
"Intensive bombing and strafing followed our unsuccessful
attack at dawn, and our efforts to take the field are doomed to fail-
ure."
At 0700 the American high command b e c a m ~ desperate and
flew 18 more Wildcats-replacement aircraft for VMF-223 and
YMF-224-from the carriers Hornet and Wasp. They headed for
Henderson to meet the day's Tojo Time, but unfortunately four were
lost on landing or in accidents. During the afternoon additional
Saratoga aircraft arrived: Lt.Cdr. Louis Kirn flew in 12 SBDs of
YS-3, and Lt. Harold Larson flew in six TBFs ofVT-8. For the day
Cactus shot down 11 Japanese (The Marines claimed four bombers
and three Zeros and the Navy claimed two bombers and two Zeros)
but lost six aircraft. Between 11-13 September Henderson had gained
60 additional aircraft, but on the 12
th
Rabaul received 140 aircraft
(60 fighters, 72 bombers, and eight reconnaissance planes) of
VAdm. Masasato Yamagata's new 26
th
Air Flotilla.
The grim defeat at Bloody Ridge caused the Japanese to re-
think their Guadalcanal counter attack strategy. They had just ex-
pended much of the strength they had built up in costly Tokyo Ex-
press runs. The Ichiki and Kawaguchi forces squandered on the Ilu
River and Bloody Ridge were only a portion of the Japanese forces
that Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, Commander of the Japanese 17
th
Army, commanded on Rabaul. The Japanese pulled back and at-
tempted to consolidate their three forces west of Henderson, and
the Marines sent out patrols to harass them. From the onset of the
Guadalcanal invasion the Japanese had underestimated the strength
and will of their American enemy. Their planning was inadequate
and unsupported by patrols and reconnaissance, and their attacks
were uncoordinated and mrogantly carried out. What they needed
were decisive naval battles and heavy reinforcements to retake
Guadalcanal-Tulagi. In the meantime they continued frequent air
raids, along with the nightly Washing Machine Charlie air raids
and small but ferocious hit and run infantry attacks in the jungle
around Henderson. By mid-September, the Tokyo Express arrived
on an almost nightly basis and replaced the Bloody Ridge losses
and added two infantry regiments. A powerful enemy force was
gathering far to the west under the cover of the jungle. Gen. Maseo
Murayama was in command ofthe Guadalcanal forces, and by mid-
October he mustered 20,000 well-equipped troops supplemented
with heavy weapons and artillery. The drawback to the small de-
stroyer/transports of the Tokyo Express was that trucks and tanks
could only be shipped in lm'ge transports.
In the early morning on 14 September Maj. Brannon and Lts.
Childress and Glazier left in a C-47 for Tontouta, and in the late
afternoon were replaced by Lts. Albert Farquharson, Robert
Ferguson, E. Fernam, and Delton Goerke, who arrived in the first
of several recurrent exchanges to relieve pilots from combat. For
their heroic actions from 14 August to 14 September, Capt. Dale
Brannon and 2Lt. Dellis Fincher were awarded the Silver Star. On
16 September Lts. Brown, Fincher, Fountain, and Johnston returned
to Tontouta, and Lts. D. Miller, 1. Morton, and 1. Sawyer arrived
from Espiritu Santo in P-400s. A P-400 piloted by Lt. Walsh was
lost in a landing accident on Espiritu, and another P-400 piloted by
Lt. R. Kaiser had engine problems and remained behind. The
Airacobra pilots on Guadalcanal nicknamed each other after the
characters in Damon Runyon stories: "Dancing Dan"; "Guinea
Mike"; "Harry the Horse"; "Handaxe John"; "Spanish John" (Saw-
yer); and "Little Isadore" (Patterson). The next day Capt. Thomp-
son checked out his new pilots by bombing and strafing the Japa-
nese front lines and flying interdiction against Japanese supplies
and Tokyo Express landing craft. On 19 September they attacked
landing craft near Morovovo village on the western end of the is-
land and destroyed two by bombs and two by strafing, and inca-
pacitated the rest by strafing. Astrafing run on the village exploded
a building containing ammunition in a huge explosion. On the 22
nd
five P-400s and Marine SBDs hit newly built huts in the Visale
area. A P-400, flown by 2Lt. E. Fernam, was shot down, and S&R
was hindered by bad weather. Fernam returned to base in poor health
12 days later and evacuated after being rescued by a coast watcher.
On 17 September air strength on Guadalcanal was 63 opera-
tional aircraft, of which 36 were recent arrivals from the Navy car-
riers: 29 F4Fs; 26 SBDs; 5TBFs; and 3 P-400s. Maj.Gen. Ross
Rowell, CG of Marine Air Wings Pacific (MAWPac), commented:
"What saved Guadalcanal was the loss of so many carriers." Six
more Navy TBFs arrived on the 18
th
, and two more SBDs and TBFs
on the 28
th
During the last half of September Cactus lost two or
three planes per day, mostly through weather and accidents, as Japa-
nese attacks were diminished during that fortnight. The loss rate
for Marine VMFs for the first 25 days of the Guadalcanal cam-
paign was 57%, which could not be sustained. On 17 September
Navy COMINCHAdm. Ernest King sent a memo to Army Chief of
Staff, Gen. George Marshall. The memo stated that the grave situ-
ation at Guadalcanal:
"... made it imperative that the future continuous flow of army
fighters be planned at once, irrespective of, and in higher priority
than the commitments to any other theater" (e.g. "Europe first" -
author)
51
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Marshall answered King, saying that Nimitz had the authority
to move aircraft in the Pacific and "higher authorities" had assigned
TORCH (the invasion of North Africa) the highest priority. The rift
between the Army and Navy was widening, and Arnold made a
brief visit to the Pacific in late September. He met with Harmon,
who gave him a very gloomy report on the meager supplies reach-
ing Guadalcanal and the steady stream of Japanese troops and air-
craft moving into the upper Solomons in preparation for a large
offensive on Guadalcanal. Arnold maintained that the base facili-
ties in the South Pacific were insufficient to handle anything but
what had been allocated to them, and the main problem was one of
distribution of aircraft and personnel from Hawaii, which he con-
sidered a vast base of supply. As the debate escalated Marshall re-
alized that the entire outcome in the South Pacific depended on the
Guadalcanal result. Marshall authorized 27 medium bombers and
133 fighters for the Pacific, with 23 heavy bombers to fly in and 53
additional fighters to be shipped in by water. At the time there were
1,014 air personnel at Cactus: 917 Marine; 64 Navy; and 33 Air
Force. Cactus ground forces were also reinforced, as on 18 Sep-
tember a large U.S. Navy convoy debarked in the early morning
and embarked before 1800, when the Japanese Navy usually came
down the Slot. The Marine garrison was reinforced with 4,262 troops
of the fresh 7
th
Marine Division, along with food and gasoline. The
reinforcements allowed Vandegrift to consolidate his defensive pe-
rimeter and consider a minor expansion.
During 23-26 September Vandegrift decided to expand his pe-
rimeter on the east to the Tenaru River and the west to the Matanikau
River, while the southern line was to remain constant, as it was
bounded by impenetrable jungle. The 1Sl Battalion of the 7
th
Ma-
rines made a landing on the coast west of Point Cruz, beyond the
Matanikau towards Kokumbona, while at the same time Edson's
Raiders attacked to the east bank of the Matanikau, hoping to link
up with the 1st Battalion. Both forces met unexpected heavy resis-
tance, with the 1st becoming surrounded on a ridge with heavy ca-
sualties, and the Raiders were pinned down at Matanikau's east
bank. Both forces requested close air support. The 1st Battalion got
support from 67
th
P-400s and Marine and Navy SBDs, as well as
naval gunfire from the destroyer Ballard. Lts. Farquharson,
Ferguson, Goerke, Miller, and Morton made numerous strafing at-
52
tacks, clearing a path to the beach. The 1st was then able to fight
their way back to the beach and evacuate into their landing craft.
The Raiders retreated back to the Henderson perimeter.
Between the 15
th
and 26
th
no Japanese aircraft were shot down
near Guadalcanal, as bad weather curtailed operations. During this
period the Japanese were reinforcing their depleted Betty units at
Rabaul and Kavieng, and withdrew the battered 4
th
Kokutai, which
had lost 40 crew and 50 aircraft over Guadalcanal and New Guinea.
On the 22
nd
Gen. Roy Geiger answered pilot's complaints about
having to take off from the rough and cratered runway at Henderson
by taking off from the same runway himself in a SBD and dropping
a 1,000lb. bomb on reported troops in the Visale area. On 27 Sep-
tember air combat intensified, as a coast watcher on New Georgia
sighted 17 Japanese bombers and 14 escorts, but there were also 12
undetected Zeros patrolling in advance of the main formation to
ambush scrambling American fighters. Cactus sent up 34 F4Fs, but
the dozen patrolling Zeros did not see them and left the area. Ten
VMF-223 and VMF-224 pilots shot down six bombers and two
Zeros, and six VF-5 pilots shot down four Zeros, with two of the
pilots becoming aces (Ensigns John Wesolowski and Francis Reg-
ister). All six Wildcats returned with holes, and two pilots were
slightly wounded.
On the 28
th
27 Bettys and 42 Zeros attacked Henderson, and
the bombers were decimated, with 24 of the 27 attacking bombers
(and one Zero) shot down; however, as usual, Japanese figures were
much less, reporting eight bombers lost and 17 sustaining light to
heavy damage. VMF-223 claimed six bombers and the Zero, VMF-
224 claimed eight bombers (Galer became a double ace with three
bombers), a n ~ VF-5 claimed ten bombers. The large Zero escort
was largely ineffective, as many arrived late, were out of position,
or did not intercept the American Grummans. Their air losses and
battle damage for the past two days caused the Japanese to again
rethink their tactics, as the large number of escorts did not prevent
the disproportionate destruction of bombers by a smaller force of
Wildcats. On the 29
th
the Japanese sent nine Bettys down to act as
decoys for a 27-plane fighter sweep. The Bettys turned around be-
fore reaching Cactus after guiding the fighters to the island, and the
Zeros swept in, causing minimal damage, and there was no inter-
ceptions or claims. For the next ten days the Japanese cut back their
attacks, hoping for a change of fortune once they completed their
forward fighter base at Buin and the improved facilities at Buka.
4
October 1942
During the last days of September and first week in October
rains soaked Henderson and Fighter One, making the runways a
quagmire. On I October there was a hiatus in the rain, and Lts.
Farquharson, Jarman, Miller, Morton, and Sawyer took off armed
with 100lb. bombs to attack Japanese targets of opportunity to the
west. They found a new building at Visale and strafed through heavy
ground fire, causing it to blaze from fuel stored inside. On return-
ing to Henderson Lt. Faquharson found that his electrical system
was damaged, and he had to crank down his landing gear by hand,
347
th
Fighter Group insignia was fashioned aftertheAmericallnfantry Division's
insignia, with the lightning flash and Southern Cross. (USAF)
but his flaps could not be lowered. Faquharson tried to hit the very
end of the runway to give himself as much runway to slow down on
the no-flaps landing. He hit a few feet short of the steel matting into
the mud and tore off his landing gear. The fighter skidded along the
matting and safely stopped facing the direction of the landing. The
three other fighters in the landing pattern were forced to land at
Fighter One.
During the night of 3/4 October the destroyers of the Tokyo
Express were reinforced by the seaplane tender
Nisshin, whose size allowed it to land a large number of troops
and artillery pieces. The P-400s and SBDs had only limited success
against the Express, as it would not come into range until the late
afternoon, and poor weather and darkness interfered with missions
sent against it. Once landed these troops and equipment, and new
storage buildings became targets for the P-400s. The PAOOs and
SBDs were not the only aircraft to attack the Japanese in the area.
In August and September B-17s of the IIBG flew 299 search mis-
sions and 151 bombing missions against Japanese air bases, supply
centers, and shipping. By October there were 50 B-17s available in
the South Pacific.
Activation of the 347
th
Fighter Group
The 67
th
was a fighter squadron, but had been operating in a larger
capacity despite a chronic shortage of aircraft and equipment. It
was operating a combat base at Guadalcanal and a home base at
Tontouta. From Tontouta the 67
th
supplied pilots, ground crew, air-
craft and parts, ran a combat school for newly arrived pilots from
the States, provided periodic relief of crew and pilots back from
combat, and was responsible for the air defense of New Caledonia.
To make matters more difficult for the 67
t
\ on 29 September it was
divided in two by the Adjunctant General's Office, and from one
half the 339FS and the 347FG Headquarters was formed. Capt. John
Thompson took command of the stripped 67FS. On 3 October the
347
th
Fighter Group was activated with headquarters at Tontouta
and had the 6T\ 68
th
, 70
th
, and the planned 339FS assigned to it.
Recently arrived Maj. George McNeese commanded the new group,
rather than the more experienced Maj. Dale Brannon, who was to
command the 339th. The veteran Cactus pilots thought this to be an
53
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Meeting in the 67FS Operations hut at Guadalcanal. (L-R) Lt. Leland Ramp,
Lt. james jarman, and Capt. john Thompson. (USAF)
affront to Brannon, who pilot Doug Canning considered the "God-
father of the 13'h Fighter Command." The 347 HQ staff was made
up of eight officers and nine enlisted men of the 67FS. McNeese's
new Operations Officer was Philippines veteran Maj. Thomas Chris-
tian, and Maj. Thomas Hubbard, who in early 1942 escaped from
the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, was to be the group
Executive Officer. The formation of the 347'h was inauspicious. The
floors and sides of the Headquarter buildings were constructed from
empty aircraft crates, and the ceilings were made from stretched
54
tents. The eight officers were housed in a leased private home of a
wealthy farmer. The farm had a caretaker and two servants, along
with a small swimming pool. The 347FG and 67FS messed together,
as both camps were adjoining and the 347'h did not have adequate
personnel for a separate mess. "B" and "c" rations (Spam, Vienna
sausages, and corned beef) were all that was available for break-
fast, lunch, and dinner. Fortunately, the caretaker actually liked Spam
and traded the Americans for a few fresh eggs.
The disappointed Brannon was assigned as CO to the 339'h
Fighter Squadron, the "Sunsetters," which was to be a P-38 squad-
ron. The 339'h had 33 pilots and 102 enlisted men assig!1ed to it,
and of these, seven pilots (Canning, Dewey, Holmes, Miller,
Faquharson, Goerke, and Morton) and 16 enlisted men had been
sent to Guadalcanal. During their first weeks on Cactus, although
separation had taken place on paper, distinct squadron 67(h/339'h
operations were uncommon because of the shortage of aircraft and
pilots. Pilots from different squadrons lived and flew together un-
der one squadron name. 0 P-38s had aITived for the 339'h to fly,
and its seven pilots lived with their old friends from the 67FS and
flew their P-39s and P-400s. The Japanese had come to fear the
"long-nosed fighters," as the Japanese described the Aircobras in
their diaries, as the maligned fighter constantly and effectively dive-
bombed and strafed enemy troop concentrations, gun emplacements,
and supply lines.
At Tontouta the two squadrons lived and flew together, but by
22 October the 339FS was physically separated and operating on
its own, with a separate kitchen, mess tent, and squadron supply.
julius "jake" Jacobson was a very good pilot, and for that reason Mitchell
chose him as his wing man-to protect his back. (Lansdale)
Canning (left) and Mitchell at Fiji Island, September 1942. Canning credits
Mitchell for his training program that enabled the (Canning)
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
The 339
tl1
began flying the P-39, but would transition to the new P-
38 when it arrived. The 347
tl1
was assigned four squadrons: the 67
t
\
the 68
th
(stationed on Tonga); the 70
th
(stationed on Fiji); and the
339
th
All would soon be based at Tontouta and rotate their men and
aircraft to the AAF "Cactus Flight" fighter pool. The "new" fight-
ers arriving at Tontouta were P-39s and D-ls, Ls, and Ks. They
were assembled, tested, and assigned to individual pilots, who
trained in it and took it into combat. At Guadalcanal the P-39s joined
the remaining P-400s, which continued in their close support role.
The P-39, with better performance, flew close support, but also flew
escort missions for Navy and Marine dive-bombers and torpedo-
bombers and joined the F4Fs in scrambles. Doug Canning:
"I really enjoyed the P-39. John Mitchell ran the program and
trained us, and we got to be pretty good fighter pilots. Mitchell
picked the best pilot to be his wingman and Jake Jacobson was
picked, which was too bad for Jake. He never got to lead any mis-
sions, and he was never able to do much on his own, as he was
always watching that Mitchell wouldn't get shot down."
Maintenance and Repair
Maintenance and repair in the Air Force was divided into four ech-
elons that depended on the type and amount of time necessary to
complete it. The first echelon of maintenance was the completion
of daily checks to be certain that an aircraft was operational, but
did not include any repair work. The second echelon involved easy
field repairs and general care of aircraft so that it could participate
in daily operations. First and second echelon duties were the re-
sponsibility of squadron ground crews, and involved repairs that
could be completed within 12 to 36 hours (the time between mis-
sions). When the second echelon was unable to repair an aircraft it
was sent to a service group to make third echelon repairs. At this
time the engineering officer elected to write off or repair the air-
craft. Early in the Guadalcanal Campaign, when aircraft replace-
ments were in short supply, aircraft that would have otherwise been
written off were repaired. The third echelon involved major repairs,
The third echelon of repair involved major repairs, such as replacement of
major parts (e,g, wing and tail assemblies), substantial sheet metal repairs,
engine changes, repairs to the electrical and hydraulic systems, propeller re-
pairs, and landing gear repair and replacement. (Canning)
such as replacement of major parts (e.g. wing and tail assemblies),
substantial sheet metal repairs, engine changes, repairs to the elec-
trical and hydraulic systems, propeller repairs, and landing gear
repair and replacement. To perform third echelon maintenance, a
service group was assigned two service squadrons that consisted of
a number of highly skilled personnel: mechanics, electricians, in-
strument technicians, propeller technicians, sheet metal workers,
machinists, and dope and fabric men, etc. After the damage was
evaluated the aircraft was assigned to these specialists, who worked
as crews for repair. Each service squadron was allocated four trail-
ers to perform the various precision repairs: one was a machine
shop; one was an instrument shop; and the other two were supply
units. The machine shop planed, shaped, turned, and milled aircraft
parts for repair or modification. The instrument shop repaired, cali-
brated, maintained, or modified the delicate and accurate aircraft
instruments. The supply trailers contained and managed spare parts.
The four trailers functioned as an efficient and compact unit in the
field. Fourth echelon repair was the function of the Air Depot Group
that provided supplies of all kinds, not only to the service squad-
rons, but also for itself, as it set up the procedure and equipment to
perform large-scale maintenance functions, assembling, modify-
ing, and repairing aircraft at Tontouta. Tontouta was never a base
for tactical units, but was the Air Force's air supply depot adminis-
tered by the Air Depot Group, which arrived at New Caledonia in
late November 1942 and remained there until June 1944 when the
Far East Air Service Command undertook the duty. They built a
large machine shop capable of performing complete aircraft over-
hauls and producing parts that were not readily available. Every
maintenance function was set up: paint shops; dope and fabric shops;
sheet metal shops; and prop shops. Other necessary repair and main-
tenance facilities were established in a very central large facility.
In October, Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake proceeded with his
plans to recapture Guadalcanal, and after its capture would con-
tinue on to attack Port Moresby, New Guinea. Despite the massa-
cres of the Ichiki Detachment of 900 men at the Ilu River and then
of3,600 men of the Kawaguchi Force at Bloody Ridge, Hyakutake's
plan was to attack Guadalcanal by 12 October with the 2
nd
Sendai
Division and the veteran 38
th
Division. Rabaul was reinforced with
more than 180 naval aircraft, more than three times the number
available to the Americans on Guadalcanal. The air base at Buka in
the northern Solomons was improved to receive bombers, which
would shorten their route to Guadalcanal by 160 miles. The fighter
strip at Buin was completed, and 30 Zeros were sent there on 20
October. Naval forces were also increased, as the battleships Haruna,
Hiei, Kirishima, and Kongo were sent down t; the Solomons for
the first appearance of the Dreadnoughts in the theater. In his mes-
sage to the 17
th
Army Hyakutake stated:
"The operation to surround and recapture Guadalcanal will truly
decide the fate of the control of the entire Pacific."
As the situation in early October worsened Harmon made three
suggestions to COMSOPAC: (I) immediate reinforcement by not
less than one infantry combat team; (2) strengthen naval forces in
the area; and (3) bring in all available airdrome construction per-
55
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
sonnel and their equipment. Harmon requested the completion of
two all-weather runways and dispersal areas, improved camouflage,
and airfield fueling systems and supply so that there would be a
constant minimum reserve of a quarter million gallons available.
Harmon had implored Ghormley to improve Henderson so that B-
17s could be based there so they would not have to fly 700 miles
from Espiritu Santo, as once based at Cactus the Flying Fortresses
could begin operations against the Buin-Tonolei-Buka area to at-
tack and disrupt enemy air operations.
By the beginning of October the Tokyo Express had used dark-
ness and consummate proficiency to land over 20,000 troops by
destroyer and barge. Again, destroyers carrying up to 1,000 troops
each would leave the Shortlands-Faisi area during the afternoon,
and by 1800, just before sunset, it would be just out of the 200 mile
range of Guadalcanal dive-bombers. Cactus sent out some very
unsuccessful SBD night attacks, losing several planes in the dark-
ness. The destroyers would then race down the Slot and arrive off
Guadalcanal at about midnight to unload troops across the Matanikau
River, about ten miles west of Henderson. The unloading of troops
was usually coordinated with Washing Machine Charlie or the na-
val shelling of the field. The unloading took two or three hours, and
then the Express raced out of the range of Henderson dive-bombers
and Army fighter-bombers before sunrise. Dive-bombers were suc-
cessful against the Express on only one day. On 5 October Lt.Cdr.
Louis Kim led a mixed group of nine VS-3 and VMSB-141 SBDs
against six destroyers. They claimed to have sunk one and possibly
sunk another, but the actuality was major damage to two destroyers
from near misses. On the 9
th
Gen. Hyakutake arrived at Guadalcanal
via the Express to take personal command of the recapture of the
island.
Feating a Japanese invasion of Ndeni Island in the Santa Cruz
Islands, 335 miles to the southeast of Henderson, Adm. Ghormley,
supported by Adm. Turner, was pressing for their occupation. How-
ever, Generals Harmon and Vandegrift were openly against the di-
version of any forces from the precarious situation at Guadalcanal.
Ghormley held a conference with Turner and Harmon on 6 October
announcing his intention to proceed with the Ndeni oper:ation, but
agreed with Harmon to send reinforcements to Cactus at once. On
the 13
th
the 164
th
Infantry regiment of the Americal Division based
in New Caledonia was transferred to the island, and Edson's Raid-
ers were evacuated for a well-deserved rest.
With the 164
th
on hand, Vandegrift decided again to move his
western perimeter to the east bank of the Matanikau River to keep
Japanese artillery out of range of Henderson. On 7-9 October, ele-
ments of the 2
nd
, 5
th
, and 7
th
Marines attacked and, unlike the unsuc-
cessful September attack, succeeded, as the main Japanese forces
were located far to the west, near Kokumbona and Tassafaronga.
Only about 150 Japanese resisted at the mouth ofthe river and were
surrounded and wiped out by the 5
th
Marines. Further upriver, the
7
th
Marines and the 3
rd
Battalion of the 2
nd
Marines forced a cross-
ing in heavy rains and then attacked toward the coast at Point Cruz.
They fought their way through thick jungle, sporadically trapping
RUSSELL I s . ~ r
IS.
NAG-r/CAL HILEs
...........-.e-l
o 30 GO
."01 "THE SLOT"
<3 755 MILES
IINIJR50N 1"/1) 1i PT: HOI?SBY I
270 T!?UE
The Slot. (USAF)
56
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
Maj.Gen. Roy Geiger (left) meets with his ace, Maj. Joe Foss, who tied World
War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker's record of 26 victories and was awarded the
Medal of Honor (USMC)
large enemy units in ravines, calling in artillery and SBD and P-
400 close air support directed from the ground to decimate the
trapped enemy. The threat of the new Japanese offensive supported
by naval units gathering at Rabaul caused the Marines to again with-
draw back to the defensive perimeter. The Japanese offensive in-
tended to move east of the Matanikau River in order to bring
Henderson back under artillery fire. Meanwhile, the 67
th
continu-
ously patrolled the area west of the river and bombed and strafed
anything that looked suspicious with their remaining P-400s and
newly arrived P-39s.
By early October air operations at Cactus were at a low point.
On 1 October Cactus aircraft numbered 58 aircraft (34 F4Fs, 16
SBDs, 5TBFs, and 3 P-400s), and two days later the figure dropped
to 49. The Marine squadrons had been on the island since 20 Au-
gust and were war-weary and depleted. Six pilots of John Smith's
VMF-223 had been killed or wounded, and Galer's VMF-224 was
only slightly better off. Both Smith and Galer had been forced to
bailout of damaged fighters on 2 October but both were rescued.
Each of the great air leaders would be awarded the Medal of Honor
for his exploits on Cactus. The 67FS had received sporadic replace-
ments and managed to keep their P-400s flying on bombing and
strafing missions. On 8 October the squadron received 11 new P-
The first of the great Marine aviators at Cactus (L-R): Maj. John Smith, Lt.Col.
Richard Mangrum, and Capt. Marion Carl. (USMC)
39s, and on the 9
th
VMF-121 under Maj. Leonard "Duke" Davis
arrived with 24 F4Fs. Davis' XO was Capt. Joe Foss, who would
later tie Eddie Rickenbacker for America's Ace of Aces with 26
victories and be awarded the Medal of Honor. On the 16
th
, VMF-
223 under Capt. John Smith was relieved after it had scored 111 1/
2 victories, 19 by Smith, who was the highest-scoring American
fighter pilot in the war to date. Capt. Marion Carl followed Smith
with 16.5 victories, and seven other Marine pilots became aces. Of
the VMSB-232 SBD pilots, only commander Lt.Col. Richard
Mangrum was miraculously as out of the rest of his pi-
lots seven were killed, four wounded, and the remainder were hos-
pitalized for disease and fatigue. Four rear seat gunners were killed
and one wounded. After the low point of 49 aircraft on the 3
rd
, the
number increased to 61 on the 7
t
\ and 96 with the arrival of 11 P-
39s on the 8
th
and the 24 F4Fs ofVMF-121 on the 9'h.
On the 8'h 11 pilots flew new P-39s into Guadalcanal. Eight of
the pilots had been transferred from the 70FS that was part of the
new 347FG. The plan was for the new P-39s to fly off Fighter One
with the Wildcats, while the P-400s were to continue flying ground
support from Henderson. But Vandegrift was so pleased with the P-
400s in their close air support role that he diverted the P-39s to that
role, particularly after it was found that they also could not reach
70FS (August I 942).Top (L-R): Hendrix, Cosart,
Gorham, Robinson, W. Williams (CO), Stevens,
Harris, Schindler, and Houseworth. Middle (L-R):
Johnson, Petit, Lanphier, Debernardie, McKulla,
Barnes, Rivers, Buck, Barber, and Williams. Front
(L-R): Daggitt, Fiedler, Dunbar, Hendrix, Topoll,
Vargas, Holloway, Frame, Kuntz, and Koenig.
(Lansdale/347
th
FGA)
57
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
67
th
Fighter Squadron "Fighting Cocks" pose on P-400 "Hell's Bells." Sitting on
Wing (L-R) Albert Faquharson (no shirt), james Jarman (cap), Jerome Saw-
yer (t-shirt), and james Campbell. Near cockpit: F.Williams (Pith helmet) and
A. Fitzgerald (cap/shirtless)-both were armorers. Front: (L-R) F. Fjelstad,
George Dewey, Leland Ramp (leaning on wing behind Dewey), Besby Holmes
(darkJacket holding door),james Morton (cap holding door), Delton Goerke
(cap behind Morton), Douglas Canning (holding door/hand on hip), Robert
Kerstetter Oust behind Goerke shoulder), G. Headtler; and D. Miller. (Lansdale/
Canning)
V.Adm. Jinichi Kusaka was the C-in-C japanese Southeast Area Fleet and the
I Ith Air Fleet when he arrived at Rabaul on 8 October 1942. (USMC)
58
Betty bomber of the 705th Naval Air Group
being prepared for a missionThe Betty medium
bomber was the mainstay of the japanese
bomber force and took heavy losses. (Lansdale)
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
the altitude of the Japanese bombers and fighters. The new fighters
arrived with the standard red circle painted out of the white star of
the national insignia, as the red ball could be confused for a Japa-
nese "meatball' insignia.
VAdm. Jinichi Kusaka had arrived on Rabaul on 8 October as
the C-in-C of the Southeastern Fleet, and found 156 operational
aircraft (77 Zeros, 62 Bettys, and 17 assorted aircraft). These air-
craft were operating with the 25
1h
Air Flotilla under R.Adm. Yamada
Sadayoshi, the 6
1h
Air Flotilla under VAdm. Yamagata Seigo, and
the 1
st
Air Flotilla under R.Adm. Ichimaru Rinosuke. The 25
1h
Air
Flotilla consisted of the Tinain Air Group (36 Zeros and six recon
aircraft), 2
nd
Air group (16 Zeros and five Vals), Toko Air Group
(six flying boats), and an advanced detachment of the 6th Air Group
(25 Zeros). The 26
1h
Wing consisted of the Kisarazu Air Group (15
Bettys), the MisawaAir Group (12 Bettys), and the TakaoAir Group
Detachment (19 Bettys). The 21SI Air Group consisted of the Kanoya
Air Group (16 Bettys).
On the 9
1
\ after heavy rains during the night, six P-400s flown
by Lts. Holmes, Kerstetter, Kaiser, Morton, Patterson, and Sawyer
were scheduled for a mission to bomb and strafe the Kokumbona
area from 0545 to 0700. However, Lt. Holmes' fighter got two flat
tires while taxiing, Lt. Sawyer's aircraft hit a muddy hole and broke
Lee Ramp of the 67FS was an effective journeyman ground support and
strafing pilot. (Canning)
off the nose wheel, and Lt. Kaiser's engine ran rough and he aborted.
The remaining three P-400s dropped their bombs and strafed the
area in front of the Marine perimeter. At 0845 three P-400s were
scheduled for another mission, and Maj. Thomas Hubbard with Lts.
Kaiser and Stern taxied for take off. Lt. Kaiser's aircraft built up a
heavy accumulation of mud under its wheels and ground to a stop.
Fearing he would damage the gear Kaiser shut down, while the
other two aircraft managed to take off and attack the Japanese. At
1100, with the field drying under the hot sun, a flight of rearmed
and refueled P-400s took off, flown by Lts. Holmes, Kaiser, Miller,
and Sawyer. All were able to lift off and dropped bombs and strafed
the area between Matanikau and Kokumbona. The targets could
not be seen from the air, and ground-to-air radio and signal panels
directed the attack. The flight returned at 1200 just as the black
attack alert flag was flying and aircraft were being dispersed around
the field, but the Japanese bombers did not attack the field. The P-
400s were rearmed and refueled, and between 1410 and 1500 Maj.
Hubbard and Lts. Canning and Ramp bombed and blindly strafed
Japanese troop concentrations west of Point Cruz. The Marines
below directed the attacks and reported that they had been very
effective. Canning described their technique:
"The landscape on Guadalcanal was a series of parallel ridges,
their tops covered by brown grass and separated by deep ravines
covered in heavy jungle, where the Japs would hide. The Marines
would mark the ridge top where they were sitting with three panels,
and anything beyond that point was fair game. We didn't learn until
later that our bombs would hit the tree canopy and explode there,
causing little damage. The Marines reported that the .30 and .50
caliber fire could be effective if concentrated on a target we actu-
ally saw or were accurately directed to, but most of the time we just
dropped bombs and fired into the jungle. One effective method of
finding the Japs was to takeoff at sunrise and catch them when they
were cooking breakfast. At that time of the day there was no wind,
and the smoke from their fires rose directly up, giving away their
position so we could accurately hit their camps. It didn't take long
for the Japs to figure out what we were doing and start phony fires
to throw us off."
On the night of 8/9 October the Nisshin again joined the Tokyo
Express to land heavy equipment on Guadalcanal. Before sunrise
the next morning nine Marine SBDs of VS-71 under John Eldridge
took off to attack the withdrawing Japanese shipping at first light.
They were followed at 0545 by threeP-39s and four P-400s from
Henderson led by Capts. John Mitchell and William Sharpsteen,
and followed by Lts. Farron, Gillon, Jacobson, Purnell, and Shaw
to escort the SBDs. Lt. Jacobson returned after three-quarters of an
hour with a defective belly tank. Five destroyers and a cruiser were
spotted withdrawing 150 miles from Guadalcanal in the New Geor-
gia Channel. The naval force had been attacked the night before
and the cruiser was smoking, and the destroyers were screening as
the SBDs attacked. They made several hits on the ships but were
interrupted by five Zeros and fi ve float planes. The Airacobras were
flying at 12,000 feet when they spotted the enemy float planes be-
low them and peeled off to attack. Capt. Mitchell, flying a P-39,
59
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Mitchell and Gillon.
On 9 October Capt. John Mitchell scored the first of his eight I 3AF victories
and the first ofthe 339FS' 163 victories ofWWlI when he downed afloatplane.
(Mitchell)
dove on a biplane from behind and 3,000 feet above and hit the
agile but fragile float Zero with his cannon, blowing it to pieces.
Mitchell's 37mm cannon jammed, as did his .50 caliber machine
guns, and he was unable to take advantage of downing other good
targets. Lt. William Shaw dove into a head on attack from 8,000
feet. The Jap never wavered, and Shaw had to veer off after hitting
the Zero with both his cannon and machine guns, causing it to fall
into a spin. Shaw's aircraft was hit in the prop by small caliber
7.7mm bullets but kept flying. Lt. Farran was flying under Shaw's
spinning victim and finished it off when all his guns jammed and
he left the battle. Capt. Sharpsteen dove from 5,000 feet and missed
a .50 caliber full-deflection shot. He came around for a head on
attack and all his guns jammed. As the Japanese plane approached
the American plane was hit several times. A shell penetrated the
windscreen and cut Sharpsteen's face and hands. Lt. Purnell in a P-
400 hit a Japanese plane with his .50 caliber guns, as his 20mm
jammed. The bullets blew pieces off of the enemy, but Purnell had
to break off his attack before he could see the fate of his quarry, but
was credited with a victory. Lt. Oscar Gillon made three head-on
passes and undershot his target each time, and all his guns jammed
60
on the third pass and he left the battle. The Japanese shipping es-
caped with slight damage. The 339FS had scored its first aerial
victories of the 163 it would score during the war. The pilots cursed
the chronic gun jamming that deprived them of more victories that
day.
Late that afternoon, the P-39s took part in two more missions
carrying 100lb. incendiaries and GP bombs. Capt. Mitchell and Lts.
Banfield, Dews, Dinn, Farron, Gillon, Jacobson, Purnell, Shaw, and
Stem hit the Marovovo area beyond Cape Esperance directed by
Marine forward observers. For his action that day Shaw was awarded
the Distinguished Service Cross (DSC). The next day the P-39s
flew two missions up to New Georgia as an escort for SBDs on
shipping attacks.
By 11 October both sides wished to bring the battle for
Guada1canal to a conclusion. The Japanese sent down 101 aircraft
in two attack waves. The first wave consisted of 18 Zeros and nine
Bettys, and the second wave consisted of 29 Zeros and 45 Betty
bombers to knock out Henderson. The first wave turned back at the
Russell Islands. At 1220 Henderson radar picked up the second
formation at 140 miles out. The three P-400s flew their customary
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
On II October, I Lt. Howard Stern became the first 339
th
KIA when he
bailed out at low altitude and his chute did not open. (Canning)
ground support missions, while nine P-39s of the 339FS were
scrambled with 39 F4Fs (8 fromVF-5, 15 from VMF-121, and 16
from a mixed VMF-223 and 224 formation). The P-39s climbed to
19,000 feet when oxygen failure relegated them to watching the
Japanese formations that were engaged by VMF-224 Wildcats,
which shot down four Zeros and seven bombers. Heavy cloud pre-
vented VF-5 and VMF-121 from contacting the enemy, but also
prevented the Japanese from completing their mission. Several
bombers trying to escape from the fight descended and Capt. Will-
iam Sharpsteen and Lt. Robert Rist of the 339FS each shot one
down. 1Lt. Howard Stern became the first 339
th
KIA when he bailed
out at low altitude and his chute did not open.
Battle of Cape Esperance, 11/12 October 1942
The naval task force under R.Adm. Norman Scott had protected
the convoy that brought in the 164th Infantry, and afterward were
assigned to disrupt Japanese supply and reinforcements coming
down from Rabaul and the northern Solomons (e.g. Tokyo Express).
Scott commanded the light cruisers Boise and Helena and heavy
cruisers Salt Lake City and San Francisco, as well as the destroyers
Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, and McCalla, which were
loitering off the coast of Rennell Island, out of range of Japanese
air reconnaissance but within five hours of Savo. There were two
other task forces in the lower Solomons: one was a carrier group
led by the Hornet, and another group led by the battleship Wash-
ington. The Express was ready to come down the Slot with six de-
stroyers and the seaplane tenders Nisshin and Chitose, supported
by R.Adm. Aritomo Goto's three heavy cruisers and two destroy-
ers that were to make a run off Henderson and bombard the area. At
1345 Henderson SBD search planes and B-17s from Espiritu Santo
reported two cruisers (actually the seaplane tenders) and six de-
stroyers steaming down the Slot. The afternoon air attacks on
Henderson prevented further air recon on the Japanese force, and
the Nisshen-Chitose Force was undetected and unloaded its troops,
heavy artillery, and supplies and escaped safely back up the Slot.
Scott steamed toward Cape Esperence, off the western end of
Guadalcanal, and at 2200 was converging on Goto's force in Sealark
Channel, moving along the north coast. Scott launched his search
float planes, but one from the Salt Lake City crashed and burned in
the water some distance from the cruiser. The Japanese thought
that the fire was a signal fire from the shore and answered with
searchlights. The USN search planes spotted the Japanese ships,
and radar contact was made at the same time at ten miles. Scott's
force held the classic naval advantage when it crossed the "T" of
the oncoming line of Japanese warships. At 2346 the Americans
opened fire, and 35 minutes later the Japanese lost their commander,
Goto, who was killed on the bridge of his flagship, the Aoba, the
heavy cruiser Furutaka, and the destroyer Fabuki. The Aoba was
heavily damaged but made it back to Japan for repairs. However,
the official U.S. Navy summary at the time reported one Japanese
cruiser sunk, one heavily damaged, and four destroyers and a trans-
port sunk. Scott lost the destroyer Duncan, and the Salt Lake City
and Farenholt were lightly damaged. The Navy Department had
not announced their defeat at Savo and decided now that with this
victory at Esperance, the results of the two battles could be an-
nounced to the public to soften the Savo debacle.
On the 12
th
the Cactus Air Force had a full schedule to mop up
after the naval battle of the night before. The rains of early October
and the maximum effort flying schedule made the fields a hazard-
ous morass for operations. The P-400s of the 67FS flew ground
support missions, attacking gathering Japanese troops west of the
perimeter and newly arrived landing barges between Kokumbona
and Tassafaronga. At 0515 eight 339
th
P-39s under Capt. John
Mitchell and 16 VMF-121 F4Fs under Maj. Duke Davis flew top
cover for two divisions of SBDs, five dive-bombers under Lt.Cdr.
John Eldridge (VS-71) and 11 under Lt.Col. Albert Cooley, CO of
MAG-14. They attacked three destroyers detached from the
Nissen-Chotise force to rescue the Goto Force survivors that
were retreating up the Slot, north of the Russell Islands. The SBDs
were not successful in their first attacks, but later Lt.Cdr. Louis
Kirn ofVS-3 with seven SBDs and six TBFs found two destroyers,
the Shirayuki and Murakumo, off the coast of New Georgia, and
soon the Murakumo was dead in the water due to a TBF torpedo
61
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
On 12 October 1943, the 339'h'S Lt. Oscar Gillon was taking off on his sec-
ond mission of the day when his wheels became clogged with mud forced
up through the Marston matting and covered the wings of his aircraft. As he
attempted to lift off, his mud-laden fighter stalled and rolled over, off the left
side of the runway. Gillon was pulled from the burning inverted plane by
nearby Marines and, though burned, later returned to duty. (Canning)
hole in her side. Later in the afternoon a third mission led by
Eldridge's 11 SBDs and a lone TBF escorted by four 339FS P-39s
and eight VF-5 F4Fs searched for crippled Japanese shipping. South-
east of New Georgia they found a "heavy cruiser surrounded by a
light cruiser and two destroyers," that in fact were the disabled de-
stroyer Murakumo surrounded by the destroyers Shirayuki,
Natsugumo, and Asagumo, which had also been detached from the
Nissen-Chitose Force. The SBDs attacked the Natsugamo, and near
misses by seven 1,000lb. bombs tore open her hull, and she sank
quickly after the attack. The P-39s and F4Fs continued the attack
on the "cruiser" Mukagamo, strafing in the face of heavy AA fire,
but did not sink her. The Shirayuki later torpedoed the Muragamo
hull to end the battle and to secure the waters around Guadalcanal
for the time being. R.Adm. Richmond Turner's reinforcement con-
voy was able to reach Lunga safely the next morning. The 339,h'S
Lt. Oscar Gillon had been taking off on his second mission of the
day when his wheels became clogged with mud forced up through
the Marston matting and covered the wings of his aircraft. As he
attempted to lift off the mud-laden fighter stalled and rolled over,
off the left side of the runway. Gillon was pulled from the burning
inverted plane by nearby Marines and, though burned, later returned
to duty.
In the early morning (0530) of the 13'h the 67'h, led by Maj.
Hubbard with Lts. Holmes, Patterson, and Sawyer, attacked Japa-
nese landing barges that had been beached during the night at the
western end of Guadalcanal. The daily Japanese air strategy again
consisted of a double raid of 27 bombers (three aborted) escorted
by 18 Zeros in the lead group, and two hours behind, 14 bombers
and 18 Zeros. The Japanese hoped that the American fighters would
oppose the first group and then the second group would catch them
on the ground while rearming and refueling. The coast watcher on
New Georgia reported the first Japanese wave at 1115, and
Henderson radar picked them up at 1130. Despite the warning the
Japanese closed more quickly than expected and were over Lunga
62
... ~ . --.-;
During the naval shelling of Henderson on 13 October 1942, several
overnighting B-17s of the 11BG were so damaged that they were unable to
return to Espiritu SantoThis B-17 had a shell explode under its wing, sending
shrapnel through wing and fuselage and throwing dirt on its wing. (USAF)
at 1200. Col. Wallace scrambled 42 F4Fs (22 VMF-121, II VMF-
224, and nine VF-5), six PAOOs, and seven P-39s. The six P-400s
struggled to 14,000, and the seven P-39s climbed higher, but their
pilots only could watch the exiting Bettys flying away at 24,000
feet. The 42 F4Fs scrambled too late and did not attack in force,
and only one bomber was shot down by VF-5 and two Zeros and a
bomber by VMF-121. The bombers effectively bombed both air-
fields, scoring thirteen hits on the runways, destroying a laid-over
B-17, damaging 12 planes and blowing up 5,000 gallons of avia-
tion gasoline. The newly arriving 164'11 Infantry Division suffered
casualties as it disembarked at Lunga Point. The Seabees rushed
out to fill the holes with all available shovels, and even helmets.
Radar picked up the second Japanese wave at 1335, and they came
at 1400, when the American fighters were being refueled and re-
armed. Only 12 F4Fs of VMF-121 scrambled, but were bounced
from above by the Zeros as they were climbing. On this mission
Capt. Joe Foss shot down a Zero that overran him, but then had his
I OSmm and ISOmm artillery of the 4
th
Japanese Heavy Artillery Field Regi-
ment opened up on Henderson and the shipping off Lunga.The gun(s) were
dubbed "Pistol Pete" (and sometimes "Millimeter Mike") by the American
troops on the island.The guns fired at irregular periods, usually three or four
shells per hour, so that the men thought it was only one gun. (USMC)
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
oil cooler shot out and had to make a harrowing crashlanding, heavily
bouncing through the dirt and stopping just short of the trees at the
end of the runway.
Later that afternoon a patrolling SBD, two hundred miles from
Guadalcanal, found three transports and three destroyers approach-
ing Guadalcanal at high speed. The transports carried seven infan-
try battalions, heavy weapons, and tanks of the 17
th
Army. These
ships, called the High Speed Convoy, were part ofR.Adm. Takama's
4
th
Destroyer Squadron of six transports and eight destroyers.
In the early evening (1800), the newly landed 105mm and
ISOmm artillery pieces of the 4
th
Japanese Heavy Artillery Field
Regiment opened fire. Soon the guns found the range and shelled
the infantry positions at Kukum Beach, cratered the west end of the
Henderson runway, and the shipping off Lunga, including Adm.
Turner's flagship McCawley. The guns fired at irregular periods,
usually three or four shells per hour, so that the men thought it was
only one gun. The gun(s) was dubbed "Pistol Pete" (and sometimes
"Millimeter Mike") by the American troops on the island. The Japa-
nese decided that they would use a battleship bombardment of
Lunga/Henderson to facilitate the approach of the High Speed Con-
voy. Adm. Kurita Takeo's 3
rd
Battleship Division (the Kongo and
Haruna), accompanied by R.Adm. Tanaka's 2
nd
Destroyer Squad-
ron (the light cruiser Isuzu and nine destroyers), sped toward
Guadalcanal. At 0130 Kurita's float plane dropped three colored
flares, red over the western end of the runway, white over the Pa-
goda, and green over the eastern end of the runway. The men rushed
for their trenches just as shells began to fall. The Kongo fired spe-
cial14-inch incendiary shells that disgorged hundreds of fiery cin-
ders. The Haruna was loaded with HE shells, and both battlewagons
fired standard AP rounds. For two hours the two battleships lobbed
over 973 large caliber shells at the airfield. The thorough bombard-
ment pattern hit the runway and dispersal area, moved on to the
personnel bivouac area in the palm grove, and finally to the fuel
and ammunition dumps. A67
th
Squadron History described the bom-
bardment:
"After midnight it started. First there was the noise of a small
plane, a lone one lung Charlie overhead. He dropped three flares; a
red one at the west end of the runway, a green one at the east end,
and a white one in the middle. We had hardly hit the foxholes be-
fore the air was filled with a bedlam of sound: the screaming of
shells, the dull roar of cannonading off shore, the whine of shrap-
nel, the thud of palm trees as they were severed and hit the ground,
and the lulls from the big noises, the ceaseless sifting of dirt into
the foxholes. We knew we were in for a shelling but we didn't know
how bad.
The first salvo hit the west side of the field and moved right
across it. It was pattern shelling, and the Japs did a thorough job of
it. First they plastered the runway and dispersal area, then they started
dropping shells in the palm grove where the campsites were. Planes
overhead dropped flares intermittently. Sometimes the whole area
was bright as day. The shells following trails, like comets, as they
whined over the palm trees. A gasoline dump and an ammunition
dump were hit and went up in flames. Airplanes were burning all
over the field.
And in hundreds of little foxholes in the palm groves and the
jungle men were cringing and praying. Once some of the 67
th
pilots
looked up to see a star shell burst directly above. They knew the
next salvo would knock the hell out of them. It did, killing five
dive-bomber pilots in a nearby foxhole.
The Japanese let up only to cool their guns (14-inch shells,
mostly). There was no relief from agonizing fear during these lulls.
The men knew there would be more shells, and the next ones would
probably be closer.
Two of the 67
th
pilots with an eye for comfort and style had
dug themselves a foxhole big enough to hold two cots. 'We will be
below ground level even on the cots,' they explained, 'so nothing
can hurt us except a direct hit, and if you get a direct hit nothing
matters anyway. So we will just lay there and watch the fireworks
go by.' When the first shell came over they rolled off their cots and
hugged the ground. Then when the sound stopped they got up and
dusted themselves off and reasoned with each other, 'Now, we
looked silly this time acting on mechanical impulse. Next time we
will just lie still.' Then there was the whine of another shell and
both of them hit the ground again.... This ritual was repeated three
more times, then they both threw their cots out of the foxhole and
hugged the good earth.
Past midnight and on and on into the morning the shells came.
In the foxholes there were cases of men screaming at God and sob-
bing for their mothers and gibbering like idiots. It seemed as if the
horror would never cease. And there were other cases of unsung
heroes who kept up a steady banter of quips and jibes.
At 3 AM, October 14
th
the shelling finally stopped. The battle-
ships pulled away from Lunga Point, as they believed that after
pouring such a tonnage of steel and explosive, nothing living could
remain."
The warships withdrew at 0300 and were followed by a series
of formations of two bombers each that dropped bombs until dawn.
In a day the Japanese shells and shrapnel had reduced the opera-
tional air strength at Henderson by 52 aircraft: from 39 to seven
SBDs; 41 to 29 F4Fs; six to two P-39s; and the four P-400s es-
caped. Fighter One fared somewhat better, as of the 30 Marine
Wildcats 18 were flyable. Nearly all the aviation gasoline was on
Marine SBD dive-bomber destroyed during the bombardment by the Japa-
nese battleships Kongo and Hurono during the night of 13 November 1942.
The naval bombardment almost put Henderson out of commission. (USMC)
63
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
.-
,-_.-- ........--".... _",. --="
The repair crews at Henderson were organized to quickly repair the Marston.
There are two B-17s and two P-39s parked at the upper far right of the
photo. (USAF)
fire, and there were 13 large craters in the Marston Matting on the
runway. The AP shells that hit the field burrowed deep, but made
very narrow, easily filled holes. The bombardment killed 41 Ameri-
cans; VMBS-14l suffered particularly heavy losses during the bom-
bardment, as it lost its CO, Maj. Gordon Bell, and four pilots. Seven
B-17s of the llBG were lying over at Henderson after a long bomb-
ing mission over Buka and Tonolei, and two were rendered unflyable
by shrapnel. Five Fortresses loaded their ground crews and seven
VF-5 pilots and took off for Espiritu Santo in mid-morning, and
were followed by a sixth that was quickly repaired and took off on
three engines. The bivouac area in the palm trees was littered with
fallen trees, fronds, coconuts, and debris from tents and buildings,
as the shells burst in the treetops. Shrapnel from the shells shred-
ded the tents and pilots' personal belongings, and the returning pi-
lots had to watch for falling trees and coconuts.
At 0500 the Japanese Combined Fleet announced that the
American air force on Guadalcanal had been decimated, but at 0540
SBDs took off from Henderson for their morning search and two
Marine F4Fs took off from Fighter One for their dawn patrol. Pistol
Pete began shelling the field, but the 6
th
Seabees filled shell craters
as quickly as the Japs could make them. Four P-400s were loaded
with 100lb. bombs while their pilots waited in nearby foxholes with
their parachutes strapped on. Between shell bursts a pilot would
make a run for his fighter, and finally the four P-400s (Maj. Hubbard
and Lts. Dewey, Morton, and Sawyer) took off to find and destroy
"Pete". As the P-400s approached the guns stopped firing, and the
Americans were unable to locate them, but strafed newly landed
barges and troops. Later, five P-400s (Lts. Dewey, Goerke, Holmes,
Kaiser, and Kerstetter) again took off to find "Pete," and again were
unsuccessful. The "Pete" search had to be called off to conserve
gasoline.
The shortage of gasoline restricted more air operations that
day, but on the bright side eight new SBDs arrived. The Japanese
artillery kept the 6
th
Seabees busy repairing craters on the runway.
Pre-cut sections of Marston Matting and loaded dump trucks were
ready to move on any new craters. The Seabees learned from expe-
64
rience how big the typical bomb and shell crater would be and filled
their dump trucks accordingly with sand and gravel, then stationed
them near the field. Once the air raid was finished or a shell had hit
the field the trucks would drive out and fill the crater. These were
followed by pneumatic tampers, a section of steel mat was placed,
and the crater would vanish in a half hour. Gen. Geiger finally de-
cided that the Pagoda gave the Japanese artillery spotters and bomber
crews a too convenient reference point and ordered that it be bull-
dozed. The radio equipment was transferred to a tunnel, and avia-
tion HQ moved into the trees south of Fighter One. The coast watcher
on New Georgia reported enemy aircraft at 0945. f4Fs were
scrambled-five from VF-5, 16 from VMF-12l, and four from
VMF-224-but the Japanese never arrived, and one F4F of VF-5
ground looped on landing, reducing the Navy fighter strength to
four. At ll57 the first wave of another two-prong Japanese attack
appeared without warning due to malfunctioning radar. The first
wave of 26 bombers, escorted by 18 Zeros, made the attack. Cactus
scrambled 25 F4Fs (12 from Foss' VMF-121, nine from Galer's
VMF-224, and four from Jensen's VF-5). To clear the field of tar-
gets most of the operational SBDs and P-39/400s followed them.
Before the Wildcats could gain altitude the Japanese bombers were
over Cactus and dropped their bombs on the two airfields, only
causing further damage to the wrecked aircraft below and making a
few more craters. Neither the Japanese nor Americas suffered any
losses in this attack. At 1303 the second wave of 12 bombers, es-
corted by IS Zeros, arrived, but this time the Wildcats were wait-
ing. Galer's VMF-224 shot down four bombers and three Zeros
(Galer got his 14
th
and final victory), and VF-5 got five bombers
(Lt. H a y d ~ n Jensen claimed two for his sixth and seventh victo-
ries).
After the air raid Pistol Pete continued to shell the airfields.
The Seabees filled crater after crater, but Pistol Pete was firing eight
to ten shells per hour, and by afternoon the field was inoperable.
Pete hit two F4Fs from VF-5, reducing its operable strength to two.
Marine HQ issued the following bleak communique:
"We don't know if we can hold the field or not. There's Japa-
nese task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports headed
our way. We have enough gasoline left for one mission against them.
Over weeks the Pagoda was much improved from the open-sided Japanese
building, but later Maj.Gen.vandegrift had the building demolished, as he felt
it was an aiming point for Japanese naval shelling and aerial bombing. (USMC)
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
Load your airplanes with bombs and go out with the dive-bombers
and hit them. After the gas is gone we'll have to let the ground
troops take over. Then your officers and men will attach themselves
to some infantry outfit. God luck and good bye."
At 1600 SBDs spotted the Tokyo Express 180 miles from
Guadalcanal. Four P-39s armed with a 300lb. bomb and two P-
400s with 100 lb. bombs (piloted by Capt. Sharpsteen and Us. Dinn,
Farran, Haedtler, Miller, and Sawyer) took off with four SBDs to
find the oncoming Tokyo Express. The formation spotted the Japa-
nese task force off the coast of Santa Isabel. There were six trans-
ports in line covered by eight destroyers and cruisers, four on each
side. The formation dove safely through heavy AAfire, and Marine
SBD 2Lt. J. Waterman of VMSB-141 scored a direct hit on a trans-
port, but no other damage was done to the frantically maneuvering
ships. There was no gasoline available for another mission, but some-
one remembered the two abandoned llBG B-17s and their gaso-
line was siphoned off. At 1715 Capt. Mitchell and Lts. Farron and
Shaw in P-39s, and Us. Barr, Headtler, Holmes, Miller, and Saw-
yer in PAOOs, all armed with 500lb. bombs, flew with the SBDs to
attack the Japanese force, nowjust off the end of Santa Isabel. Saw-
yer and Haedtler returned early to base with mechanical problems.
Haedtler made a landing after dark, hit a pile of steel matting off
the edge of the field, and tore off a wing that killed a Marine field
maintenance man, but Haedtler was uninjured. The, SBDs scored
two near misses, and all aircraft strafed the ships before returning
to base as their ammunition ran out. Lt. Barr was the last pilot to
make a firing pass and was thought to have been hit by AA fire and
did not return to base. The returning aircraft had to land on Fighter
One, as Haedtler's wrecked aircraft was blocking the runway. Barr
managed to make it to Russell and returned to Cactus on the 21st.
Geiger desperately needed to reinforce Cactus air strength as
soon as possible. During the day, pilots from Lt.Col. Joe Bauer's
VMF-212 ferried SBDs from Efate to Espiritu Santo, then rode a
transport aircraft back to get their fighters. Just before sunset Lt.Cdr.
Raymond Davis of VB-6 flew in eight SBDs. But the situation at
Cactus was grave, as the regular Tokyo Express and Takama's High
Speed Convoy were about to deliver their troops that night, and
there was the threat of another bombardment by battleships sup-
ported by light cruisers and destroyers. That night everyone on
Guadalcanal hunkered down and waited.
At midnight Takama's High Speed Convoy was landing its
troops, weapons, and supplies 15 miles away between Tassafaronga
and Kokumbona, while the Express, two light cruisers and four
transports, landed troops at Cape Esperance. Shortly afterward two
heavy Japanese cruisers, the
Chokai and Kinugasa, and two destroyers under VAdm.
Gunichi Mikawa cruised off Lunga (now called "Sleepless Lagoon"
by the Marines) and lobbed 752 eight-inch shells at the airfield.
By dawn on the 15'h, the six Japanese transports did not sneak
away before light, but blatantly lay offshore west of Kokumbona,
hurriedly unloading the last of 10,000 infantry and supplies. The
Convoy was protected by destroyers cruising offshore and an um-
brella of fighters. Takama had gambled that the naval bombard-
ment had nullified American air power and that the continuing ar-
tillery barrage from Pistol Pete would prevent any surviving air-
craft from leaving the field. Actually, there wasn't enough fuel avail-
able for the remaining undamaged aircraft at Henderson to do much
of anything about this full-fledged invasion. At 0800 two F4Fs of
VF-5 took off, climbed to 7,000 feet, and dove into AA fire as they
strafed the transports anchored in a line. The Wildcats turned and
made a second run, then returned to base chased by a Jap seaplane
that they turned on and damaged. The gasoline shortage was re-
duced when someone remembered a hidden reserve of over 400
drums of fuel. Then by mid-morning, C-47s of the Marine trans-
port squadron VMJ-253 and the AAF 13
th
Troop Carrier Squadron
began to bring in drums of gasoline from Espiritu Santo. The R4Ds
(Marine C-47s) landed and braked to a stop and unloaded quickly,
with their engines running, hoping to take off before Pistol Pete
found the range. They continued their gasoline nms for a week,
while YP boats from Tulagi brought in another 200 drums. Each
drum could keep a fighter in the air for an hour. Ground crews
worked feverishly to repair damaged aircraft to get them into the
air. Everyone pitched in; pilots, ground crew, and any available
personnel to help in belting ammunition and rolling the newly de-
livered gasoline drums for delivery to the dispersal, then transfer-
ring the fuel from the drums to the aircraft. It took ten men to load
a 500lb. bomb onto a truck that then transported the bombs as close
as possible to the aircraft, where they were pushed off and then
rolled through the mud and under the belly of the fighter. As many
men as could get under each plane lifted the slippery bombs onto
the bomb shackles.
The three serviceable SBDs were scrambled from Fighter One,
but two were destroyed when they hit shell craters in the runway.
The P-39s and P-400s took off individually at 0700 and flew for
only a few minutes to bomb and strafe the transports that were cov-
ered by Zeros and heavy AA fire from the destroyers. When the
Airacobras reached the target they tried to ignore the Zeros and
flak, dove, and attempted to line up the ship below in the center of
their gunsight, then drop the bomb and get out at mast top level to
return to Henderson to rearm. The attacks only interrupted the un-
loading and caused no damage. At 1015 twelve SBDs of VMSB-
141 and Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen in P-39s carrying 500lb.
bombs, accompanied by P-400s flown by Us. Campbell, Dewey,
and Holmes armed with 100lb. bombs, attacked the Convoy. Five
VMF-121 F4Fs flew cover. Sharpsteen claimed a probable hit or
near miss on a transport and then shot down a Zero that flew in
front of his aircraft for his second victory. Sawyer and Holmes also
claimed hits on a transport each, burtheir claims were probably
wishful thinking. The SBDs lost three pilots. At 1125 Capt.
Sharpsteen and Us. Dinn, Farron, Jacobson, and Purnell in P-39s
and Us. Dews, Kaiser, Kerstetter, and Sawyer in P-400s attacked
the Convoy again. At the same time eleven B-17s of the IlBG from
Espiritu Santo joined the attack and scored three hits on a transport.
Dinn claimed a possible direct hit on a transport that sunk, but his
claim may have been a transport hit by a B-17. Lt. Farron was hit
either by AA fire or by a marauding Zero and failed to return to
base. In the attack three transports were so extensively damaged
that they had to be beached, while the other two beat a hasty retreat.
Despite the air attacks the Japanese managed to land 4,500 troops
65
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
and their equipment, as well as much of their gasoline and ammu-
nition. That day six more SBDs arrived, and Marine R4Ds flew in
enough gasoline so some operations could be carried out the next
day. At the end of the day the Marines had lost three F4Fs and three
SBDs, and the AAF lost one P-39 (Farron).
In a 67
th
Fighter Squadron Summary of 13 October 1942, en-
titled "Comments on Combat on Guadalcanal," the pilots of the
squadron gave their views on ground support and anti-shipping at-
tacks. Their observations were based first on advice given to them
by Marine SBD pilots and then by their combat experience. They
found that anti-shipping attacks should start in a shallow dive from
12,000 to 14,000 feet to about 8,000 to 10,000 feet, where they
would trim the aircraft for control and begin their bombing run.
The most effective anti-shipping attack was from stern to bow, with
the bomb release occurring just as the bow was about to disappear
under the nose. Strafing runs were to be made after the dive-bomb-
ing attack.
That night, just after midnight, the cruisers Myoko and Maya
and their destroyer escort came down the Slot and fired over 1,500
eight-inch shells on Henderson for an hour and destroyed several
more aircraft. The shelling was short but intense, and the men around
Henderson hunkered down in their shelters as the shells exploded
around them. Many felt that the Navy had abandoned them and left
them unprotected. Morale was at a low point, and scuttlebutt had it
that the Japanese were reinforcing the island nightly and that they
were in serious danger of being over run.
Most of the Japanese troops, equipment, and supplies had
reached shore, but the Japanese had placed these newly landed troops
and supplies in temporary dumps hidden in the trees near the beaches
until they could be moved inland. Over the next several days the
mission of the 67
th
was to attack these vulnerable troops and sup-
plies. They attacked the Japanese in short hops; taking off, climb-
ing quickly, dive-bombing, pulling up in a turn to come around and
strafe the area, and then flying back to base to rearm. Fortunately,
with the critical fuel situation, the targets were only a few miles
away. These repeated missions took their toll on the pilots and
ground crews, who had little sleep and subsisted on short rations of
hardtack and cold canned food. Men and aircraft wore out. On one
mission the remaining four PAOOs were readied for takeoff. One
was armed with a bomb but had only one .30 caliber machine gun
working, another carried a bomb and had no guns functioning, and
numbers three and four carried no bombs but had most of their
guns in service. Records show that combat fatigue forced the evacu-
ation of a number of men back to New Caledonia on the 18
th
of the
month.
After the loss of 13 SBDs destroyed (plus 13 damaged and
repaired and ten damaged and requiring major overhaul), five TBDS
destroyed (plus three damaged and needing major overhaul), six
F4Fs destroyed (plus three damaged and repaired), and four PAOO
and P-39s destroyed, the operational strength on Cactus on the 16
th
was down to 19 SBDs, nine F4Fs, two P-39s, and four P-400s.
During the day the six remaining Air Force fighters joined the SBDs
and F4Fs in seven bombing and strafing attacks on the Tassafaronga
landing sites. That afternoon nine Vals attacked and critically dam-
aged the fuel tanker, McFarland, as it layoff Lunga Point, but not
66
before the tanker had pumped 40,000 gallons of fuel to barges, but
unfortunately also had taken 160 wounded aboard for evacuation.
As the Japanese Vals were diving on the tanker seven SBDs and 19
F4Fs of VMF-212 under Lt.Coi. Harold Bauer just arrived from
Espiritu Santo. With his fuel tanks almost empty Bauer got into
action, downing four Vals, and then turned to land and report in to
his CO, Gen. Geiger. After losing 27 killed and 28 wounded the
McFarland sailed back to Noumea.
With the arrival of new pilots the veterans could be sent out for
long overdue R&R. The last pilots of Smith's VMF-223, Mangrum's
VMSB-232, and Simpler's VF-s left by the 12
t
\ and VMF-
224, now under Maj. John Dobbin, left with the last 12 pilots. MAG-
23 CO WilliamWallace turned over tactical air command to MAG-
14. From 20 August to 16 October MAG-23 and its attached units
claimed 244 Japanese aircraft destroyed (III.s by VMF-223, 60.5
by VMF-224, 38 by VF-s, and eight by the 67FS; the remainder
were by the newly arrived VMF-121 and VMF-212 and by gun-
ners on SBDs and TBFs). Anti-shipping claims were for 28 ships
hit, six "seen to sink," and four "believed to have sunk." Japanese
records credit six sunk: three transports, two destroyers, and an
auxiliary cruiser-transport. MAG-23 lost 22 of its own pilots (three
to naval bombardment) and 33 attached Marine, Navy, and Air Force
pilots (five to naval gunfire). The KIAIMIA rate would have been
much higher if it had not been for the pilot and crew rescues by
coast watchers and friendly natives.
On the 17th P-39s, PAOOs, and six B-17s attacked the Japa-
nese supply base at Kokumbona. That night the Tokyo Express made
its last major foray for a time when four destroyers shelled the two
airfields. 18 October the Pistol Pete artillery pieces closed
Henderson for five days, and only Fighter One remained opera-
tional. To make matters worse, the Marine infantry waiting on the
Lunga perimeter were near their physical and mental breaking
points. The P-400s were one step from the scrap heap and could no
longer undertake long overwater missions, but with heroic mainte-
nance, could accompany P-39s and SBDs on short hop sorties to
bomb and strafe Japanese ships, landing boats, troops, and supplies
from Matanikau to Cape Esperance. The Japanese AA positions
near Kokumbona were proving to be particularly troublesome. On
the 21st Lt. Haedtler knocked out two positions with bombs, and Lt.
Dewey destroyed one position. The last 67FS hangar remaining
was destroyed by artillery fire, and Capt. Mitchell moved everyone
to Fighter One. Lt. Edgar Barr, who was shot down the previous
week, managed to swim to the Russell Islands and made contact
with a coast watcher, who notified the Navy. He was returned by a
PT boat from the Russell Islands with a wrenched back and knee,
and was evacuated by a CA7.
The new Marine fighter squadrons (VMF-121 and VMF-212)
quickly got blooded. On the 17
th
, Duke Davis ied eight F4Fs of
VMF-121 to intercept Japanese bombers over Kukem Beach, and
they shot down eight dive-bombers and two Zero escorts. The next
day five F4Fs from VMF-121 and six from VMF-212 shot down
six bombers and 15 Zeros over Cactus. Capt. Joe Foss shot down
two Zeros and a bomber to become an ace. VMF-121 got two more
on the 19
t
\ and on the 20
th
VMF-121 claimed four Zeros and a
dive-bomber, while VMF-212 claimed five Zeros and two dive-
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
bombers, and pilots from each squadron shared a dive-bomber. The
four-day total was 45 Japanese aircraft destroyed, and the Grummans
blunted the Japanese air attacks in preparation for their next big
offensive and maintained local air superiority.
Among the many problems faced by Nimitz in the South Pa-
cific, the most important was that of leadership. The deteriorating
situation on land and sea had made the typically cautious Ghormley
into the indecisive Ghormley, who did not leave his shipboard of-
fice at Noumea for a month. As the American naval defeats off
Guadalcanal continued Ghormley succumbed to debilitating worry
and depression. Finally, on the 18
th
Ghormley was relieved by
VAdm. William "Bull" Halsey as Nimitz, backed by Arnold, fi-
nally decided that the precarious situation at Guadalcanal needed a
more aggressive and decisive commander whose personality would
be able to inspire the beleaguered troops on the island. As early as
the mid-I920s Halsey was an advocate of naval aviation, but was
unable to qualify as a pilot due to poor vision. He persisted, and
finally in 1934 became a qualified pilot at the age of 52. Halsey had
carried out Nimitz' directive to carry out carrier attacks on Japa-
On 20 October Adm. William "Bull" Halsey (right) relieved VAdm. Robert
Ghormley (left) as commander of the South Pacific area (COMSOPAC).
(USN)
nese bases in the Pacific with raids against Kwajalein in February
1942, and followed by raids on the Marshall, Gilbert, Wake, and
Marcus Islands. Halsey's appointment was widely hailed by both
the Naval command and the men on the ships. Halsey immediately
deep-sixed Ghormley's deni plan and committed to a zealous de-
fense of Cactus by air and ground reinforcements. He also sorted
out logistics problems and soon increased supply. Halsey's vigor
and decisiveness galvanized the beleaguered Marines on Cactus
and the sailors in the Slot. For his accomplishments on Guadalcanal
Halsey would be promoted to full Admiral on 26 November 1942.
Halsey and his Chief of Staff, Capt. Miles Browning, and 15
Staff Officers set up shop on Noumea and took charge of the entire
South Pacific (COMSOPAC)-on the ground, the sea, and in the
air. Also at this time the continuing Army-Navy aircraft deploy-
ment controversy was close to being settled. During the Guadalcanal
campaign Harmon had the problem of procuring regular crew and
aircraft replacement. His requests were met with the South Pacific
low priority "Europe first" rebuttal. Finally the situation at
Guadalcanal became so critical that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to
Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon. Commander of the U.s. Army Air Forces in the
South Pacific Area. (USAFISPA)
67
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
The aftermath of the Japanese air attack. Here a
hangar is burning in the background (center); a
F4F is damaged and knocked off its wheels on
the far left, but a P-400139 remains standing on
its tricycle gear on the far right. (USAF)
relent, and on 27 October the JCS accepted a complete schedule of
Army-Navy aircraft deployment. The plan called for a minimumof
70 heavy bombers, 52 medium bombers, and 150 fighters to be
under the command of Nimitz, but that he assign them to
COMSOPAC, as the units were not to be divided. Immediately,
Halsey's appointment brought new optimism to theAAF in the South
Pacific. Harmon had established his command at Noumea, New
Caledonia, even though New Zealand was the authorized HQ for
the South Pacific. The move put Harmon's HQjust across the har-
bor from COMSOPAC HQ stationed on the Argonne.
The Japanese senior commander, Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake,
was planning a coordinated three-pronged ground offensive on the
American beachhead set tentatively for the 18
th
Lt.Gen. Masao
Maruyama would lead the offensive, with his nine infantry battal-
ions assigned to attack the southeast perimeter of Henderson.
Maj.Gen. Kiyotake Kawaguchi, leader of the Bloody Ridge attack,
was to attack the east perimeter, and Maj.Gen. Yumio Nasu was to
attack the west perimeter. Maj.Gen. Tadashi Sumiyoshi was to bring
two infantry battalions and a tank company against the Matanikau
River line. Sumiyoshi also commanded the majority of Japanese
artillery, including the "Petes," and was to shell the perimeter and
lead a diversionary attack across the river. Before the attack could
begin Maruyama had to cut trails through the jungle to move his
force to their jump off points near the airfield. The complacent Japa-
nese did no previous reconnaissance of the forbidding jungle, and
this oversight would cost Maruyama. Heavy rains then slowed
progress further, damaged communications equipment, and forced
the abandonment of heavy weapons that would be needed for sup-
pOlting fire during the attack. The slow-moving Japanese battal-
ions were forced to postpone their assault to the 22
nd
, and finally to
the 24
1h
, when maximum but separate, uncoordinated attacks, lack-
ing communications and supporting fire, were made. However, air
reconnaissance and ground patrols failed to discover the Japanese
trail building. On the 23
rd
the Japanese sent down a large air fleet to
68
attack the American perimeter in preparation for Hyakutake's of-
fensive. The two Marine squadrons sent up 24 F4Fs to intercept
and shot down 21 Zeros (ten each by VMF-12l and VMF-212)
and one bomber (by VMF-121). Capt. Joe Foss shot down four
Zeros to become a double ace with 11 victories. Sumiyoshi contin-
ued to be uninformed of the change of plans as to the delay in the
start of the offensive to the 24
th
On the 23
rd
he began a heavy con-
centration of artillery fire on the Matanikau perimeter and sent a
tank column, followed by infantry, across the sandbar at the mouth
of the river towards the Marines in heavy, intermittent rains. The
Il
lh
Marine artillery fired behind the Japanese tanks, decimating
the waiting infantry. 75mm guns mounted on U.S. half-tracks
knocked out the enemy tanks as they tried to cross the Matanikau,
and then the lSI and 2
nd
Battalions of the 5
th
Marines held back four
furious Japanese attacks, mowing down over 2,000 Japanese troops.
The rainy weather prevented close air support from Henderson.
Sumiyoshi regrouped that evening and launched a dawn attack on
-
~ - ,-;,- -'
,... '."
A Marine SBD Dauntless is totaled by a direct hit during "Tojo Time," the
almost daily early afternoon air raids on Cactus. (USMC)
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
the Matanikau. At sunrise the P-39s, P-400s, and SBDs began close
air support on the Japanese positions just west of the Marine line.
At 0645 Lts. Haedtler and Holmes dropped 100lb bombs on enemy
troop positions, and then returned to strafe until they were out of
ammunition. The numerous air attacks caused the aviation gasoline
supply at Henderson to be reduced to nearly empty, while the heavy
Marine artillery barrage depleted its stock. C-47s heroically landed
in heavy rains on a soggy field to bring in critical gasoline drums
and artillery shells. The heavy rains continued and grounded fur-
ther air support missions late that afternoon, but the Japanese main
thrust on the Matanikau had spent itself. The Japanese communica-
tions were broken, and the flexible Vandegrift was then able to di-
rect his Marine infantry to deal with each of the other divided, un-
coordinated Japanese attacks.
October 25
111
was named "Dugout Sunday," as Japanese threw
infantry and artillery, air raids, and naval guns of the light cruiser
Yura and five destroyers at the troops on the island. Due to the
heavy rains of the previous day Henderson was of no help, as it was
closed again; Fighter One became a morass, and operations had to
wait for the field to dry sufficiently by mid-morning. There were so
many Japanese air raids that day that Geiger's war diary states:
"Enemy fighter planes were over Cactus at irregular intervals
throughout the daylight hours. Our Grummans were almost con-
tinuously in the air, landing, refueling, reloading, and taking off
again, time after time." ,
Julius "Jake" Jacobson scored a direct hit on the Yum that caused flooding, and
she was so badly damaged that she had to be later sunk by her destroyer
escort. (Canning)
At 0800 five Zeros continued to circle Henderson without at-
tacking. Soon nine more Zeros and a medium bomber arrived and
circled, apparently waiting to land, thinking the field had been cap-
tured by Sumiyoshi. By 0930 the sun had dried the field enough for
eight F4Fs of VMF-121 to finally be scrambled, followed by four
more from VMF-212. The first F4Fs shot down three Zeros, two
more by Foss, and then the VMF-212 Wildcats got three more Ze-
ros and VMF-121 four Zeros. During a later attack at 1430,16 Japa-
nese bombers bombed a line of parked aircraft on Henderson, de-
stroying many of them. These aircraft were boneyard wrecks that
had been placed in the open to draw enemy attacks while opera-
tional aircraft were dispersed in the trees at the edge of the runway.
Again, the two Marine squadrons scrambled and shot down 12 Japa-
nese, seven Zeros, and five bombers. Foss got three Zeros on this
mission to become an ace-in-a-day and a triple ace with 16 victo-
ries. The Japanese air attacks further damaged the airfields, but the
Japanese Navy Air Force lost 22 aircraft-five Bettys and 17 Ze-
ros-losses that spent their ajr reserves. The Cactus Air Force lost
three fighters but no pilots, and its operational inventory totaled 11
SBDs, 12 F4Fs, three P-39s, and three P-400s.
At 0700 the next day, air reconnaissance and coast watchers
reported three enemy destroyers only 35 miles off the Guadalcanal
coast, and soon they were shelling the beach and sunk two small
vessels. Two fighters of the 67'h and two VS-71 SBDs managed to
slog through the mud and take off, but their strafing attacks on the
ships were ineffective. At 1300 an enemy naval force comprised of
the heavy cruiser Yum, three light cruisers (destroyers?), and two
destroyers were located 105 mjJes out, and were attacked by five
SBDs led by Lt.Cdr. John Eldridge of VS-71. The Yum took a di-
rect hit from Eldridge and was stopped dead in the water. At the
same time the P-39s attacked Japanese shipping off Lunga, sinkjng
a barge, tug, and patrol craft. At 1420 Lts. Dinn, Purnell, and
Jacobson attacked the ships off Florida Island, narrowly missing
them with 500lb. bombs. At 1630 the same three lieutenants and
Capt. John Mjtchell attacked the ships again, and Jacobson scored
a direct hit on the Yum that caused flooding, and she was so badly
damaged that she had to be sunk later by her destroyer escort. Near
misses bracketed a light cruiser as the warships withdrew. That day
the submarine Amberjack moved submerged toward the island and
surfaced offshore, bringing thousands of gallons of avjation gaso-
line in her spare tanks, 100lb. bombs, and 15 badly needed aircraft
mechanics and armorers from New Caledonia.
On the land, Surniyoshi's premature attack on the 23'd came
before Maruyama's forces could cut their way through the jungle
to be in position on the south of the perimeter. The Marine troops
that had been moved from the south perimeter to reinforce the
Matanikau and stop Sumiyoshi were now shifted back by Vandegrift
to the south to meet Maruyama. The southern Japanese attack did
not have any supporting artillery, as it had been abandoned on the
muddy jungle trails, and the attack had to rely on machine guns as
its heaviest weapons. At dawn, on the 25
1h
, the furious, almost sui-
cidal Japanese attack was launched against the 7
1h
Marines and 164
1h
Infantry. The Japanese managed to penetrate American lines at sev-
eral points, but were repulsed and suffered gruesome losses to heavy
small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. By 0700 Maruyama was forced
69
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
to withdraw to regroup his battered troops. After the "Dugout
Sunday's" constant heavy land, air, and sea attacks, both the Japa-
nese and Americans were regrouping to attack and defend their
positions, respectively. After sunset Maruyama ordered a last des-
perate frontal attack by wave after wave of fanatical infantry on
south Lunga Ridge. The Army 164
th
Infantry and 5
th
and 7
th
Ma-
rines slaughtered the Japanese, who kept COIning, only to be stopped
by American artillery, mortar, small arms fire, and finally by hand-
to-hand combat. A night attack by Col. Oka almost broke through
to the airfield, but in the morning of the 26
th
the 7
th
Marines made a
furious counter attack that.drove the Japanese back into the jungle.
The 67FS' three old P-400s and two P-39s aided the Marine attack
by bombing and strafing the Japanese just south of Fighter One.
The Japanese ground attack had finally stopped, as they lost 3,568
troops. The third major Japanese offensive to retake Guadalcanal
was concluded, and their plans to capture Henderson and gain air
superiority to insure the unimpeded invasion of the island were
Capt. John Mitchell became the 339FS Co. Ranking with his contemporal-ies
in the Pacific-the Navy'sThach, Flatley, and O'Hare, and the Marine's Smith
and Foss-Mitchell was the ideal Commanding Officer of a fighter squadron
in a war zone. He was both a consummate fighter pilot and tactician. He led
by example, and trained his men hard to fight and to stay alive. (Mitchell)
70
ended. With each attack the Japanese had underestimated their en-
emy with disastrous results, first with Ichiki's Battalion, then
Kawaguchi's Brigade, and now Maruyama's Division. The Japa-
nese had been beaten off on the land, but the total fighter aircraft
available to counter them in the air was a precarious 18 aircraft:
three out of six P-400s; three of six P-39s; and 12 of 35 F4Fs.
There were command changes in the Army Air Forces during
the period. On the 24
th
Maj. Kermit Tyler, four first Lieutenants,
and 19 Second Lieutenants were transferred from the 44FS to duty
with the 339FS at Tontouta, with Tyler becoming squadron CO. On
the 25
th
Maj. Brannon transferred from CO ofthe 339
th
to tpe 347FG,
and Capt. John Mitchell became the 339FS CO. Mitchell's exper-
tise and leadership ranked him with his contemporaries in the Pa-
cific: the Navy's Thach, Flatley, and O'Hare; and the Marine's Smith
and Foss. He was the ideal Commanding Officer of a fighter squad-
ron in a war zone, as he was a consummate fighter pilot, tactician,
and leader of men. He led by example and trained his men hard to
fight and to stay alive. Veteran personnel from the 67FS were
mingled new arrivals from training in the States. The training and
administrative portion of the new squadron was to be located at
Oua Tom, then under construction on the central west coast of ew
Caledonia, while the operational portion was at Guadalcanal. Pi-
lots and ground crew were to be rotated in and out of Guadalcanal
back to Oua Tom at 25 mission intervals for the pilots, and about
every three months for the ground crew.
Battle of Santa Cruz. 26 October 1942
With the new Guadalcanal offensive the Japanese Navy was finally
committed to a major action as it gathered its forces from the Man-
dates. An e ~ o n e o u s communication stating that Guadalcanal was
in Japanese hands sputTed Lt.Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake at Rabaul
to send a powerful naval force to strike Guadalcanal. His forces
consisted of a Carrier Striking Force under VAdm. Chuichi Nagumo
of two carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku), one light carrier (Zuiho),
one heavy cruiser, and seven destroyers; a second force of two battle-
ships (Hiei and Kirishima), three heavy cruisers, a light cruiser,
seven destroyers, and 12 submarines; and a Battleship Striking Force
under VAdm. Nobutake Kondo of two battleships (Kongo and
Haruna), a catTier (Junyo), three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser,
and eight destroyers. Adm. Halsey had to reach deep into his Pa-
cific reserves to meet this large Japanese force. He sent Task Force
16, consisting of the carrier Enterprise, newly repaired from the
damage of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the new battle-
ship South Dakota from Hawaii to join a heavy and light cruiser
and five destroyers under R.Adm. Thomas Kinkaid. This force was
to join Task Force 17 under R.Adm. George Murray consisting of
the Hornet, two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and six destroy-
ers. The USN force, under the overall control of Kinkaid, was off
the Santa Cruz Islands on the 26
th
when a B-17 of the 5BG discov-
ered part of the Japanese force east of Malaita. The B-17, flown by
Lt. Mario Sesso, shadowed the enemy for 30 minutes before seven
Zeros off a carrier attacked it and caused heavy damage. The For-
tress beat off the attack and returned to Espiritu Santo to give its
report. The Battle of Santa Cruz took place on the 26
th
The results
were the sinking of the Hornet and the destroyer Porter. The Enter-
Part Two, Chapter 4 - October 1942
prise and battleship South Dakota, the cruiser San Juan, and de-
stroyer Smith were damaged. Twenty American planes were lost in
combat, and an additional 54 to other causes. The Japanese lost the
carrier Shokaku, the light carrier Zuiho, and the cruiser Chikuma,
and two destroyers were heavily damaged. They lost over 100 planes,
and more importantly, the experienced pilots flying them. After the
battle the remaining Japanese carriers and warships steamed slowly
off to the north. Japanese commander Nagamo had victory within
reach but withdrew, as he felt he had lost too many aircraft to chance
a meeting with the American fleet and its carrier aircraft, or to take
on land-based aircraft based at the still undefeated beachhead at
Guadalcanal. An attack by PBY Black Cats from Espiritu Santo
that night may also have influenced his decision, as one damaged a
destroyer and nearly missed getting a torpedo hit on the Zuikaku.
Following the Battle of Santa Cruz there were no raids on Cac-
tus, and American forces put pressure on the flagging Japanese air
bases and ground forces on Guadalcanal. Marine and Air Force air-
craft attacked Rakata, the home of "Louie the Louse" seaplanes,
Lt.Wallace Dinn, flying a P-39 carrying IOOlb. bombs, accompanied four SBDs
and six F4Fs to fly c o v e ~ then described a dive bombing and strafing attack
on the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island. (Can-
ning)
four times in the next six days, while Air Force and other Marine
planes lent ground support on Japanese positions on the island and
flew continuous CAP. On the 28
th
Capt. John Mitchell and Lts.
Wallace Dinn and Jack Jacobson, flying P-39s carrying 100lb.
bombs, accompanied four SBDs and six F4Fs to fly cover and then
dive bomb and strafe the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on
Santa Isabel Island. The surprise morning attack on enemy installa-
tions was made through a 2,500 foot overcast with the SBDs diving
first, followed by the P-39s and then the Wildcats. The flights made
several runs without opposition. Dinn describes the action:
"After dropping our bombs we proceeded to strafe the enemy
float planes on the water and blast a few ground installations. Eight
enemy planes were reported destroyed, but I saw only six of them
get it. We experienced no enemy fire during several runs.
When we were pulling up off the target for home I spotted an
enemy gasoline dump of about 1,500 gallons well-camouflaged on
the beach. I called Capt. Mitchell's attention to my discovery, and
he told me to return and strafe the dump if I had any ammunition
left. My right .30 caliber wing guns were still firing so I went down.
The first burst set a small blaze at one end of the dump. I pulled
up and started down on the other end. As I dived I strafed the beach
and got in an extra burst at the already damaged float planes.
I had to fly along sideways to keep the two live guns on the
gasoline dump, and as I pulled up this time I heard a close explo-
sion and my right side went numb. This happened when I was thirty
feet off the water and a hundred feet or so from the coconut trees
along the shore. Smoke began filling my cockpit, and I saw Prestone
running in from the right side. Since I could move my arm without
difficulty I figured I wasn't hit badly, if at all.
Immediately I chandelled left, away from the enemy. Smoke
was boiling into the cockpit, and my breathing was becoming in-
creasingly difficult. The Prestone gauge was against the stop and
the oil was heating up like the devil. I tried to call Capt. Mitchell on
the radio to give him my position because I knew I would have to
bailout soon. I couldn't see any of our planes. When I receives no
answer, I knew my radio set had been disabled.
My burning ship struggled up to about 2,000 feet, and I spot-
ted two Marine fighters in front of me. I fired tracers in front of
them to attract their attention and immediately they turned. One
chap, named Watkins, seeing me smoking, pulled up along side.
My engine was pounding like hell and giving little power. Since
it was low tide there was a wide expanse of white sand below; I
started to crash-land but thought better of it when I realized how
near I was to the Jap seaplane base. So I figured I would have a
better chance of getting away if I bailed out.
I pulled the emergency door release, waved to Watkins, and
went over the side and seemed to fall in sort of a forward position
without tumbling. There was no sensation of falling. Probably I
was too excited to notice.
Suddenly I realized there was something else I should do-I
pulled the ripcord. The ground was coming up at an alarming rate,
and I began to wonder how I could land. It was all over in a mo-
ment. I came down with a bit of a thud in a little clearing at the foot
of a tree in which my chute had tangled. I cut my jungle pack free
71
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
from my chute, cocked my .45, and started down the hillside." (Air.
Force Magazine March 1943)
On 30 October Gen. Vandegrift's Marines began their move to
the west supported by the light cruiser
Atlanta and four destroyers offshore. By 3 November they had
advanced to Point Cruz. That night the Tokyo Express disembarked
1,500 troops to the east of Lunga at Koli Point and stopped the
Marine offensive. On 4 November the
San Francisco, Helena, and Sterett shelled the newly landed
Japanese, and Marine and Army troops moved to the east the next
day to meet the current Japanese threat, and by the 8
th
had surrounded
and neutralized them.
At the end of October there were only 29 aircraft on opera-
tional status in the Cactus Air Force serviced and flown by 1,557
Marine and 197 Air Force aviation personnel. After a shamefullack
of support President Roosevelt ordered Gen. George Marshall and
Adm. Ernest King to immediately send additional troops, ships,
and aircraft to the Pacific, even if it meant cutting into the "Europe
first" mentality of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By mid-November the
air situation had improved. The 347FG, activated in October with
the 339FS, had incorporated the 70
t
h, 69
th
, and 67
th
fighter squad-
72
rons. The 70
th
became part of Cactus Flight on 8 October when 11
new P-39s flew into Henderson. Four pilots of the 68
th
arrived on 7
November as the squadron moved from Tonga to New Caledonia.
Cactus Flight was under the 67FS until 2 December, when it began
to be referred to as the 347
th
Fighter Group. Elements of the 67
th
,
69
th
, 70
th
, and 339
th
rotated and operated through Cactus Flight as
early as mid-November. These fighter squadrons would not become
part of the 13
th
Fighter Command until January 1943 when the 13FC
was formed. Four squadrons of Lt.Col. William Brice's MAG-II
arrived at New Caledonia on 30 October and began to send aircraft
to Guadalcanal. On 1 November Maj. Joseph Sailer's, SBDs of
VMSB-132 began operations from Henderson, and nine pilots of
Maj. Paul Fontana's VMF-112 flew in by transport plane the next
day; the squadron completed its move nine days later. The new
units operated from the new strip at Turtle Bay that had been com-
pleted in three days by cutting through brush, filling in trenches,
foxholes, and bomb craters, and then grading and rolling the ground.
On 12 November Maj. Robert Richard's VMSB-142 and three pi-
lots from VMF-122 and VMSB-131-the Marine's first TBF tor-
pedo squadron at Cactus-began operations from Turtle Bay. AAF
bomber strength in the South Pacific increased to 50 B-17 and 20
B-26s, with 23 more heavy bombers on the way from Hawaii.
5
November 1942
In early November, at a time when there was a critical shortage
of personnel and materiel on the island, Adm. Turner decided to
push forward on one of his personal projects, the construction of a
secondary airfield at Aola Bay. Despite surveys that precluded the
area as an airfield site, Turner nonetheless diverted newly arrived
infantry, defense battalions, artillery units, and construction troops
that were vitally needed to strengthen perimeter defenses and to
improve Henderson and Fighter One. Turner wasted a month be-
fore abandoning the project. '
Despite the failure of their 23-25 October offensive the Japa-
nese began to plan for another offensive. Gen. Hyakutake, com-
mander of the 17
th
Army on Rabaul, decided to send Lt.Gen.
Tadayoshi Sano's division and its heavy equipment to Gaudalcanal
in larger troop transports instead of the Tokyo Express. Hyakutake
formed the Japanese 8
th
Area Army, and would personally take it to
Guadalcanal and recapture the island from a command post near
Kokumbona. Four naval task forces were organized to take the is-
land: two bombardment task forces to shell the American airfields
into oblivion; a third for general support; and the fourth to transport
troops and equipment. Despite their previous success the Japanese
did not wish to commit their carriers and would depend on land-
based aircraft and those that could be catapulted from cruisers. Japa-
nese troops remaining on the island after the third defeat were be-
ing reorganized west of the perimeter, one force west of Kokumbona
and a smaller force east at Koli. Vandegrift decided to strike first
while the Japanese were regrouping. He ordered an attack across
the Matanikau River to move the perimeter about five miles west
and capture the Kokumbona area. He would then move another 15
miles further west to the Poha River to finally put enemy artillery
out of range.
On I November the American attack began with an artillery
barrage across the river by the 11th Marines and 3
rd
Defense Battal-
ion, and by naval cruisers shelling the Point Cruz area and west-
ward. P-39s and SBDs attacked Japanese infantry and artillery po-
sitions in front of the advance across the Matanikau, while 19 llBG
B-J7s from Espiritu Santo bombed Kokumbona. At 0615 Lts.
Dewey, Haedtler, Holmes, Jacobson, and Shaw strafed near Point
Cruz, and after the B-17s bombed Kokumbona they raked that area
with their guns. Dewey and Jacobson returned early due to me-
chanical problems with their over-worked aircraft. A second mis-
sion flown by Lts. Kerstetter and Patterson attacked artillery posi-
tions. A third mission flown by Capt. Mitchell and Lt. Jacobson
bombed the Kokumbona area but found that their bombs were duds
when they returned to strafe the area. A fourth mission flown by
Lts. Dewey, Haedtler, Holmes, and Patterson strafed ahead of the
advancing Army and Marine infantry, which was making good head-
way despite stubborn resistance. The fighters were guided by sig-
nal panels at the front indicating where they should bomb and strafe.
Lt.Arnold Patterson takes five
in front ofthe P-400 "Whistlin
Britches" he shared with Lt.
Zed Fountain. (Lansdale/
Haedtler via 347FGA)
73
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Haedtler left the battle early with jammed guns, and Patterson left
with propeller trouble. Lts. Dewey and Holmes bombed and strafed
Japanese road movement between Point Cruz and Lukumbona. On
the fifth mission Lts. Shaw and Purnell bombed and strafed
Kokumbona and reported starting several fires, a few of which ex-
ploded, indicating ammunition dumps. Once the initial bombard-
ment was lifted there were several crossings of the Matanikau by
the 5
th
Malines and 164
th
Infantry, gaining almost two miles in the
first day. The main Japanese resistance at the base of Point Cruz
was eliminated by several savage bayonet attacks by the 5
th
Ma-
rines that killed 350 Japanese.
On the 2
nd
the P-39s and P-400 continued day long close air
support, hitting Japanese troop movements, vehicles, artillery, AA
positions, bivouac areas, gasoline and ammunition dumps, and land-
ing boats. That day VS-71 lost its resolute leader, Lt.Cdr. John
Eldridge, and two Marine lieutenants of VMSB-132 on a volunteer
night SBD mission against suspected Japanese warships approach-
ing Guadalcanal.
On the 3
rd
, 164
th
Infantry and 5
th
Marines moved another mile
beyond Point Cruz and were within two and half miles of
Kokumbona. The 67
th
joined in the attack, with P-400s and P-39s
flying in pairs carrying 100 and 500lb. bombs. Two bombed the
Japanese AA positions at Kokumbona that had made the area dan-
gerous for air attack. Soon aerial reconnaissance discovered that
the Japanese had landed troops to the east at Koli Point, near the
village of Tetere. To deal with the situation 15 SBDs, one TBF, five
P-39s (Capt. Mitchell, Lts. Dews, Jacobson, Purnell, and Shaw),
two P-400s (Lts. Dewey and Patterson), and seven F4Fs immedi-
ately bombed the reinforcements. They dropped 20 500lb. bombs,
76 100lb. bombs, and a 3251b. depth charge through heavy small
arms and small caliber AA fire. To reduce this new threat at Koli
Point the 5
th
Marines and l64
th
Infantry closed in on the Japanese
attempting to surround them. Four or five two-plane missions a day
were flown over the next few days and reached a high of 12 mis-
sions. Poor communications and the thick jungle made it difficult
to identify the front lines, and there were several friendly fire casu-
alties from strafing aircraft. By 10 November 450 Japanese had
been killed by ground troops and air attack at Koli Point. The re-
mainder of their force managed to escape into the jungle, but less
than half made the arduous journey to join the defense of
Kokumbona. The elimination of the Koli threat permitted the re-
newal of the American Kokumbona offensive.
On 4 November a local boat, "Horton's Schoone/;" arrived at
Lunga Point and dropped off five MIApilots who had been rescued
by friendly natives and coast watchers. One of the pilots was Lt.
Wallace Dinn, who was hit by AAfire and parachuted into the jungle
on the south coast of Santa Isabel Island on 28 October. Dinn came
upon a village of friendly natives, one of whom spoke mission school
pidgin English. Dinn talked two natives into taking him in a small
dugout canoe down the Santa Isabel coast toward Tulagi, 160 miles
away. After the first day they transferred to a 20-foot war canoe
with four paddlers following the coast. Dinn and his rescuers met
perils along the way. Since it was the rainy season they were soaked
most of the time. Occasionally, Japanese recon aircraft would fly
over and Dinn had to hide in the wet bottom of the canoe. Croco-
74
diles swam up to the canoe and Dinn fired his .45 to scare them
away. Adowned Japanese pilot was reported to be on a nearby small
island inhabited by nine adult natives and several children. Dinn
sent three of his paddlers over to the island in the early morning to
surprise and capture the lap while he was eating breakfast. The Jap
was captured and bound, and the group continued their voyage with
their prisoner. During a driving rainstorm in rough seas the next
evening the Jap overturned the canoe and escaped to a nearby is-
land by swimming ashore in the darkness. After a search the Jap
was recaptured the next afternoon, and he was carefully bound.
The group was faced with crossing 60 miles of open \Y,ater from
Santa Isabel to Florida Island, and then on to Tulagi. A large 30-
foot war canoe with a high pointed bow and stern was procured for
the 30-hour trip. The group paddled to the end of Santa Isabel when
they were informed that there was a British boat on the other side
of the island that could get them to Guadalcanal in an hour and a
half. The only problem was they had to cross the 2,000-foot spine
of the island. By this time everyone was becoming weak, and the
Japanese prisoner refused to walk, but a few jabs with a bayonet
persuaded him otherwise. The group struggled across the ridge only
Lt. Frederick Purnell. (Canning)
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
Nakajima A6M2 Rufe floatplane taking off from Rekata Bay. (Lansdale/Na-
tional Archives)
to find tht:<y had to paddle another canoe fi ve miles to meet the boat.
When they reached the 30-foot boat called "Horton s Schooner"
they found it had a top speed of only six knots. They left at 2200
that night heading for the Russell Islands to land supplies for a
coast watcher there, and to pick up a downed SBD pilot and his
gunner. They arrived at noon the next day and were told of three
stranded Japs on the island. The Japs eluded the search, but the
group destroyed their camp and supplies. They left the Russells at
0200 the next day and moved up the backside of Guadalcanal to
pick up a Marine fighter pilot and dive-bomber pilot who had been
lost for 28 days. The bedraggled group finally made it back to Cac-
tus late in the afternoon. Dinn had been traveling for six days in
canoes and two days in the "Schooner" and was back in the air
after a day's rest.
At this time the Cactus Air Force consisted of the following
aircraft (57 operational of73 total): P-400s (2 of 4); P-39s (5 of 5);
SBDs (12 of22); TBFs (1 of 2); and F4Fs (37 of 40). On the 7
t
h, ten
pilots in new P-39s joined the 67FS. Two of the pilots were on their
second tour (Ferguson and Jarman), and five pilots were from the
68FS. Capt. Mitchell and most of the pilots were scheduled to be
relieved and returned to Tontouta to be assigned to the 339FS and
transition to the newly arrived P-38s. But before they could leave
they had to meet the Tokyo Express.
The afternoon of the 7
th
the Tokyo Express, made up of 11
Japanese warships, one light cruiser, and ten destroyers, were spot-
ted moving northeast of Santa Isabel Island. A composite air attack
force was marshaled from Henderson consisting of seven SBDs of
Sailor's VMSB-132 with 1,000lb. bombs, three torpedo-carrying
TBFs of VT-8, eight P-39s (led by Capt. Mitchell with Lts. Dinn,
Ferguson, Geyer, Jacobson, Jarman, Purnell, and Shaw) with 500lb.
bombs, and all escorted by 23 F4Fs of VMF-121. The Express had
landed 1,300 troops under the cover of Rufe float planes and float
biplanes. The AAF pilots were instructed to attack the warships
first and then climb to fly CAP with the Wildcats as the SBDs and
TBFs attacked. However, the P-39s were delayed on takeoff and
were trying to catch up when they came upon three float Zeros and
two float biplanes about to bounce two F4Fs. The Airacobras jetti-
soned their bombs and went into aerial combat with a chance to
have some Rising Sun victory symbols painted on their cowlings.
The P-39 pilots shot down three Rufes and two biplane float planes.
Lt. Robert Ferguson of the 67FS, Capt. WilliamShaw, and the briefly
rested Lt. Walter Dinn of 339FS claimed the Rufes, while Capt.
John Mitchell and Lt. Fred Purnell claimed the biplanes. The victo-
. ries were the second for Mitchell and Shaw. The Navy TBFs hit a
cruiser with two torpedoes and put one into a destroyer, while the
SBDs hit another cruiser with a 1,000lb. bomb. VMF-121 shot down
11 float planes (three by Capt. Joe Foss to give him 19 total victo-
ries to tie John Smith's USMC record) and lost three of their own,
including Foss, who was rescued and returned to base. For the next
several days Capt. Mitchell and several of the veteran pilots who
were scheduled to be relieved remained to indoctrinate the new
pilots. The cadre included: returnees Lts. Ferguson and Jarman;
and new Lts. Bauer, Hull, Inciardi, Kellum, McLanahan, Norris,
Novak, Ryan, Shambrook, Waldmire, and Williams. To fix a rou-
tine, Mitchell had them fly close support missions in the
Tassafaronga area.
On the 7
th
Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger was relieved by Brig.Gen.
Louis Woods, who had been his chief of staff. The next day Adm.
Halsey flew into Guadalcanal from Noumea to get a first hand look
at the situation, and was accommodated by a Japanese destroyer
that lobbed in a few shells on Cactus during the night. When he
returned to headquarters he was given the intelligence estimates of
the strength ofthe next Japanese naval offensive. The Japanese naval
commitment would be similar to the Battle of Santa Cruz, while
Halsey's forces would be minus the sunken Hornet and the Enter-
prise and South Dakota, which were at Noumea for repairs. The
Japanese Army had failed to take Henderson, and the Japanese na-
val high command felt that too much effort had been expended;
naval bombardment alone could knock out the airfield, and then -
Gen. Hyakutake's reinforcements could land without interference.
The Japanese attack on Port Moresby, New Guinea, was postponed
so that the 38
th
Infantry scheduled to fight there could be landed,
along with 3,500 special naval landing force troops, on GuadalcanaI.
The landing was to be at Koli Point, east of the American perim-
eter, causing the Americans to divide their forces.
To mount the new offensi ve the undaunted Japanese marshaled
a convoy of 12 heavy transports off Buin-Faisi to carry 13,500
troops, supplies, and heavy artillery for a major effort to drive the
Americans off GuadalcanaI. The attack was to be supported by a
strong Ilaval force of four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and a
large destroyer escort, assembled at Truk and RabauI. All Halsey
had to defend were two task forces. Adm. Thomas Kincaid's car-
rier task force had the tough carrier
Enterprise as its nucleus, and was supported by the battleships
Washington and South Dakota, two cruisers, and eight destroyers
cruising off New Caledonia. Adm. Richard Kelly Turner's task force
consisted of three groups. The first group included three transports,
one cruiser, and four destroyers under Adm. Norman Scott that were
carrying Marines, supplies, and ammunition from Espiritu Santo to
Cactus. The second group was a force of five cruisers and ten de-
stroyers operating from Espiritu Santo, commanded by Adm. Daniel
75
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
At the end of October. a few partially assembled P-38s had been shipped to the port of Dumbea, New Caledonia, near NoumeaThey were driven through
the streets to be quickly completed at the small strip at Magenta Field, then flown 40 miles up to Tontouta to avoid the arduous 30-mile truck drive. There
they were flight tested and readied, either for training or combat on Guadalcanal. (Lansdale)
Callaghan. He was charged with protecting the third force of four
transports carrying the 182
nd
Infantry to the island that was com-
manded by Turner, who left Noumea on the 8
1h
and was joined by
Scott and Callaghan.
To complicate the situation, COMSOPAC first needed to land
reinforcements and supplies on Guadalcanal and then turn to meet
the Japanese force. Adm. Turner was in command of the supply
situation and accurately predicted the Japanese timetable. The Japa-
nese would send down a land-based air attack on Henderson on the
10
th
; a naval bombardment on the night of the llth; a day carrier
attack on Henderson on the 12
th
; a naval bombardment and land-
ings that night; and an invasion in force on the 13
th
. All transports
and cargo vessels had to clear of Guadalcanal by the night of the
12
th
. On the morning of the lllh cargo ships at Guadalcanal were
unloaded at Lunga Point to make room for transports from Noumea
that would arrive on the morning of the 12
lh
. The escorts of the
transports, commanded by R.Adm. Callaghan, were to defend
against any Japanese naval forces that might come down the Slot.
The main Japanese naval force had not yet been comrrUtted,
and on the 11
th
the Enterprise, South Dakota, and Washington sailed
from Noumea, COMSOPAC flew land-based aircraft into
Henderson, and SBD, TBF, and F4F reinforcements were also flown
in. At the end of October a few partially assembled P-38s had been
shipped to the port of Dumbea, New Caledonia, near Noumea, and
were hauled to a small nearby airstrip called Magenta Field and
quickly assembled to avoid the arduous 30 mile truck drive to their
base at Tontouta. At Tontouta they were flight tested and readied
either for training or combat on Guadalcanal. On 12 November, at
1530, a new aircraft appeared over Cactus for the first time, as
Lockheed P-38 Lightnings of the 339FS of the new 347FG landed
at Fighter Two. Maj. Dale Brannon led the eight P-38s that included
four other pilots who had also been on the inaugural P-400 flight to
Cactus on 7 August. Brannon, now recovered from his wounds, left
Tontouta at 0700 and routed through Espiritu 3.5 hours later to re-
fuel, then continued to Cactus. As the flight approached Cactus the
76
navigation B-17 carrying ground crew for the P-38s had to turn
back to San Cristobal, as they received an erroneous radio report
that Henderson was under air attack. Once the P-38s based at Cac-
tus Marine personnel serviced them until the AAF ground crews
arrived. From this point on, all 347FG squadrons were integrated
with Army Cactus Flight operations, flying Airacobras and Light-
nings with little squadron identity. However, 347
1h
combat logs con-
tinued to be designated "The 67
th
Fighter Squadron" for some time
afterward. For the AAF keeping accurate records was a low prior-
ity on Cactus in fall 1942. It was impossible to determine who was
flying with which squadron, who was on TDY (temporary duty) to
which squadron, and which personnel were at Guadalcanal and
which were at New Caledonia.
The 339
th
P-38s had been diverted in September from Gen.
Kenney's 5
th
Air Force and transferred to Gen. Harmon's
The 339
th
's P-38s had been diverted in September from Gen. Kenney's 5
th
Air Force and transferred to Gen. Harmon COMAIRSOPAC at New
CaledoniaThe first Lightnings were flown in by ferry pilots, who immediately
boarded a transport and flew out. Soon eight more P-38s arrived, flying non-
stop from the 5AF at Milne Bay, New Guinea. (Canning)
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
COMAIRSOPAC at New Caledonia. Ferry pilots flying non-stop
from the 5AF at Milne Bay, New Guinea, brought in two groups of
eight Lightnings and immediately boarded transport planes and flew
back out. Lockheed sent out a factory representative who stayed
briefly, but neither he nor the ferry pilots did much to indoctrinate
the ex-Airacobra pilots on their new fighter. The fighters were held
at Tontouta, as the Japanese air attacks and naval bombardments on
Henderson made it too hazardous to base them there. During Octo-
ber 339
th
pilots became more or less self-trained at Tontouta in the
new fighter. They were given the pilot's handbook to read, then
checked out the cockpit instruments and controls and took off for
their first flight. Rex Barber stated that the only training he had in
the Lightning were several check out flights at Noumea before he
left for combat at Guadalcanal. He reported that it took him ten or
so combat missions from Cactus before he became familiar with all
the buttons, switches, and toggles.
\
On 12 November 1943 the 67FS carried on with its usual daily close sup-
port missions, At 0740, Us, Donald Hansen (pictured) and Kenneth Kellum
dropped I OOlb, bombs, then strafed Japanese positions along theTambelego
River. During a low strafing pass, Hansen's wing caught a treetop and his
plane cartwheeled into a flaming explosion, (Canning)
On the 11th at 0530 the transports Betelgeuse, Libra, and Zeilin
anchored at Lunga Point and unloaded on schedule, covered by
destroyers and cruisers. At 0935 they were attacked by ten Vals
with a 12 Zero escort. Several vessels received slight damage, and
VMF-121 shot down six Zeros and five dive-bombers, but lost five
F4Fs. At 1127 Bettys came over in a high altitude attack. Airacobras
of the 67FS and VMF-1l2 F4Fs were sent up to intercept. The P-
39s struggled and climbed and climbed, and finally ran out of alti-
tude at 24,000 feet and had to watch as the Marine fighters contin-
ued to climb and shot down seven Bettys. The Marine victories
were bittersweet, as they lost two more F4Fs for a total of seven
lost that day. The Japanese air raid disrupted unloading, as the cargo
ships had to get under way to evade the attack and the Zeilin was
slightly damaged. In other missions that day the P-39s and P-400s
strafed enemy landing boats in Doma Cove and near Tassafaronga,
and supported Marine artillery fire on Kokumbona. At 1800 the
transports were almost unloaded, but had to retire to safety to the
east for the night. Adm. Callaghan protected Adm. Turner's trans-
ports before midnight, and after midnight Adm. Scott's warships
joined Callaghan in the Sealark Channel.
On the 12
th
the status report for aircraft available at Cactus was
26 F4Fs, 23 SBDs, 18 P-39s, no P-400s, and approximately seven
P-38s. At 0530 the transports and cargo ships returned and contin-
ued unloading two battalions of the 182
nd
Infantry off Kukum Point.
The 67FS carried on with its usual daily close support missions. At
0740 Us. Donald Hansen and Kenneth Kellum dropped 100lb.
bombs, then strafed Japanese positions along the Tambelego River.
During a low strafing pass Hansen's wing caught a treetop and his
plane cartwheeled into a flaming explosion.
At 1340 an air raid alert was sounded and the transports stopped
unloading and formed into a defensive AA formation. Capt. Joe
Foss' Wildcats scrambled into the high clouds, and eight P-39s
circled at mid-altitude. At 1405 25 Japanese torpedo-bombers flew
in line abreast at low altitude from behind Florida Island covered
by eight Zeros to attack shipping off Lunga Point. The Airacobras
were notified by radio of the impending attack, and for once the P-
39s could climb to altitude in time to dive into combat. However,
the temperatures at high altitude had cooled their canopies, and as
they dove into the warmer, humid lower altitudes their canopies
became covered by condensation. Lt. Frank Clark was blinded and
plunged to his death in the sea. The P-39 attack surprised the Japa-
nese torpedo bombers, prompting many of them to drop their tor-
pedoes too high, causing them to tumble and sink. Adm. Callaghans'
flagship, the cruiser San Francisco, and the destroyer Buchanan
were damaged in the attack. The San Francisco was crashed by a
Japanese aircraft in the after control station and suffered 30 killed,
including the cruiser's XO. Lt. James McLanahan of the 67FS
bagged a Zero that was reported to have an elongated cockpit to
accommodate a rear seat observer (a misidentified Val). McLanahan
hit the plane with a long burst to start it smoking, and then it burst
into flames and half-rolled into the ocean. lLt. William Norris of
the 70FS got a Val, and lLt. Martin Ryan claimed a Zero. VMF-
112 shot down six Bettys and four Zeros, while VMF-121 accounted
for eight bombers and three escorts, including two Bettys and a
Zero by Foss to give him 22 total victories. The Army Air Force's
77
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
timely arri val had chased Zeros off the tails of several Marine Wild-
cats, and Joe Foss and his pilots were waiting on the ground after
the battle to thank the P-39 pilots for their help. The air battle cost
three more Wildcats and a P-39, further depleting the Cactus Air
Force.
During the day reconnaissance aircraft had reported a Japa-
nese task force that included two battleships steaming down the
Slot. Further to the north another recon plane spotted a convoy of
11 Japanese transports carrying an infantry landing force escorted
by 12 destroyers. After unloading almost 6,000 men Turner's trans-
ports weighed anchor at 1815 and were escorted by Callaghan and
Scott northeast to the safety ofIndispensable Strait, located between
eastern Guadalcanal and Malaita Island. The U.S. warships then
returned toward Guadalcanal to meet the Japanese task force.
First Battle of Guadalcanal 12/13 November 1942
The Japanese began their massive offensive on the night of 12/13
November as their 12 transports paused offshore, waiting VAdm.
Hiroaki Abe's force of two battleships (Hiei and Kirishima), a
cruiser, and 15 destroyers to bombard Henderson shortly after mid-
night. This was the first time the Japanese committed battleships in
the Solomons, albeit their oldest battlewagons, both launched in
1912. In the darkness R.Adm. Daniel Callaghan's force offive cruis-
ers and eight destroyers passed between the two columns of Japa-
nese warships, and in 36 confused, ferocious minutes the First Battle
of Guadalcanal was over. The Japanese battleship Hiei was severely
damaged by 85 shells and lost her steering, and two Japanese de-
stroyers were sunk. The U.S. avy lost the cruiser Atlanta, killing
R.Adm. Norman Scott. The San Francisco was heavily hit;
Callaghan and most of his staff were killed, and the cruiser had to
return to the American West Coast for repairs. The cruiser Portland
was also heavily damaged and towed first to Sydney, then to Cali-
fornia for repairs. The damage to the cruiser Helena was repaired at
Noumea. Half of the eight USN destroyers were sunk and three
damaged. The cruiser Juneau was heavily hit and limped away,
only to be hit by a torpedo from the Japanese submarine 1-26 the
next morning and blew up, killing all but ten of her 700 men, in-
cluding the famous five Sullivan brothers. It was a very costly battle
for the U.S. Navy, but losses caused both navies to withdraw. One
of the newly arrived P-38s was destroyed in the shelling.
At dawn on 13 November, while patrolling off Savo Island, six
SBDs found the severely damaged Hiei unable to maneuver and
escorted by three destroyers. At 0615 a Navy SBD hit the Hiei with
a bomb and was followed by a torpedo hit by a VMSB-13J TBF. At
1100 nine detached Enterprise TBFs escorted by six F4Fs of VF-
10 put three more torpedoes into the tough old battleship, which
refused to sink. Later 17 11BG B-17s that left Espiritu at 0500 ar-
rived and flew through heavy AA fire and got a hit and several near
misses. Five more Marine and Navy bomber attacks covered by the
67FS followed but could not hit the floundering battleship. Marine
Wildcats shot down ten of the Zeros the Japanese sent down from
Buin to protect the crippled battleship. As night approached the
Hiei had taken five bombs and ten torpedoes, and the crew was
finally ordered to scuttle the wreck a few hours later.
On the night of 13/14, for 45 minutes after midnight, three
cruisers and four destroyers under VAdm. Gunichi Mikawa lobbed
over 1,000 HE shells into Henderson and Fighter One and Two,
guided by flares dropped by Washing Machine Charlie. Two F4Fs
were destroyed and 15 F4Fs and one SBD were damaged, but could
be quickly repaired. However, the 67FS bore the brunt of the at-
tack, as of its 16 fighters in commission the day before only the
oldest and m ~ s t patched up fighter, the venerable "Resurrection,"
remained undamaged. During the fighter's stay at Cactus a IS-inch
naval shell had landed under its wing but didn't explode, and in a
later attack an aerial bomb landed nearby but also was a dud. "Res-
urrection" was truly charmed, as later, when the fighter's Allison
Of the 67FS P-400s. only the oldest and most patched up fighter, the vener-
able "Resurrection," remained undamaged. A IS-inch naval shell had landed
under its wing but did not explode, and in a later attack an aerial bomb
landed nearby but was a dud. "Resurrection" was truly charmed, as later, when
the fighter's Allison engine died, mechanics were able to squeeze the bigger
and more powerful engine from a P-39 into it. (Lansdale/Canning)
78
339FS P-38 at Fighter Two, parked off the Coconut plantation.There is an-
other P-38 in the background and a reveted Marine SBD. (Lansdale/Coley/
347FGA)
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
339FS P-38 at FighterTwoThe Marston matting in the foreground is chewed
up and studded with small rocks. There is a B-17 parked in the right back-
ground. (Lansdale/Coley/347FGA)
engine died, mechanics were able to squeeze the bigger and more
powerful engine from a P-39 into it. That morning after the Japa-
nese attacked ground crews, using parts from those aircraft written
off in the attack, quickly put the Airacobras with minor damage
back into operational status. None of the eight P-38s that arrived
the day before from New Guinea were damaged, nor were the eight
that flew in from Espiritu Santo on the 12
th
Over tue past several
days the total air strength on Cactus had risen to 41 F4Fs, 30 SBDs,
19 TBFs, two P-400s, and 16 P-38s. The 68FS sustained three
wounded enlisted men during the shelling for the only casualties it
would record during the war.
The next morning the Japanese did not send air reconnaissance
down to Henderson to check on the results of their attack and disre-
garded the fact that it had not been neutralized. They ordered their
transports that had been waiting in the northern Solomons toward
Cactus. At sunrise scout planes from Cactus and long-range patrol
Salvage crew hoists "Tojo's Fate" onto a flatbed truck for further cannibaliza-
tion. (USAF via Lansdale)
ILt Besby Holmes P-38 # 100 was the oldest Lightning in the 339FS. It is
pictured being towed through Noumea, New Caledonia, on their way to
Tontouta. (Lansdale/Holmes)
bombers from Button were searching the seas north and west of
Guadalcanal. These reconnaissance aircraft discovered Tanaka's
transports about 150 miles to the northwest in the Slot and Mikawa's
retreating bombardment force about 140 miles south of New Geor-
gia. Since the Japanese task force had no aircraft carriers their land-
based aircraft were furnishing air cover by flying in relays. Ground
crews at Cactus were busy from before dawn repairing and then
refueling and rearming aircraft. They had to roll bombs and gaso-
line from dumps through mud and around craters. SBDs escorted
by F4Fs and P-39s flew mission after mission that day. At 0800
seven SBDs and six TBFs escorted by seven F4Fs took off from
Henderson, and the SBDs scored direct hits on the heavy cruiser
Maya with 500lb. bombs, while the TBFs hit the heavy cruiser
Kinugasa with two torpedoes. At 0915 the SBDs from Henderson
hit the Kinugasa with a 500lb. bomb through the #2 turret, and
immediately the cruiser took another 500lb. bomb hit and was in
Ground crew prepare Capt Robert Petit's P-38 Lightning "Miss Virginia,"
No. 147. Petit named the fighter after his fiance, MissVirginia Woodard. Note
the I65-gallon auxiliary steel fuel tank in the background (behind the nose
wheel). (National Archives via Lansdale)
79
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Neatness doesn't count
l
Capt. Thomas Lanphier's "Phoebe," with its nose
wheel removed and strut resting on a box, and the tire lies under the fighter.
The port prop spinner and blade lay on the ground, right foregroundVarious
boxes, cans, and drums lay scattered around the plane. The U.S. Navy PBY
pilot is posing at FighterTwo. (Canning, 347FGA via Lansdale)
serious difficulty. At 101527 planes off the Enterprise arrived from
250 miles south and hit Mikawa's flagship, the heavy cruiser Chokai,
the light cruiser Isuz, and the destroyer Michishio. They scored a
near miss on the crippled Kinugasa that ruptured her side plate,
causing her to be abandoned before she sunk 15 miles south of
Rendova Island. Since the Enterprise had a damaged NO.1 elevator
these SBDs landed on Henderson, where they operated for the re-
mainder of the day. AB-17 discovered Tanaka's convoy of 11 trans-
ports and 13 destroyers heading toward Guadalcanal and called in
Marine and Navy aircraft from Guadalcanal and B-17s from Espiritu
Santo. Six of the transports were carrying 11,000 troops of the 38
th
Division, while five other cargo ships were transporting 10,000 tons
Capt. Robert Petit's "Miss Virginia" displays the "destroyer" sunk on the 29
March 1943 Shortland Mission. It was not discoyered until after the war that
the destroyer did not sink and was, in fact, a subchaser that was badly dam-
aged with great loss of life. The aircraft kill markings were Rufes that Petit
shot down on 27 February 1943 (He later was credited with one Rufe kill
and a probable). (Lansdale)
80
ILt. Doug Canning (70FS) holds the I Ifoot six inch, constant speed, selec-
tive pitch Curtiss Electric propeller that used electrical power to adjust the
pitch of the blades. The plate at Canning's hip says "Remove brushes before
removing propeller." (Canning via Lansdale)
of supplies and 2,500 elite naval troops. Forty-one planes from the
supposedly destroyed Henderson airfield surprised Tanaka, and B-
17s would be on their way from Espiritu Santo. Just before noon 18
Marine and Navy SBDs and seven TBF bombers, escorted by four
Airacobras of the 67FS (AAF mechanics were able to repair three
more fighters) and 12 F4Fs, attacked Tanaka's frantically maneu-
vering four-column convoy. Tanaka had anticipated that Mikawa's
cruisers and destroyers would arrive in time to add to his AA de-
fense, but'Mikawa was withdrawing his three damaged cruisers to
the Shortlands. Tanaka's destroyers laid a smoke screen and put up
a heavy AAbarrage. Two Maru transports (Niagara and Canberra)
were sunk by torpedoes, and the Sado Maru was crippled by a bomb
and headed back to the Shortlands escorted by two destroyers. The
Sado Maru had 38
th
Division officers aboard, leaving any troops
getting ashore without command. SBDs and TBFs made repeated
attacks and damaged the Marus throughout the day. At 1245 17
SBDs escorted by fighters sunk the Brisbane Maru, and at 1345 20
more SBDs sunk the Shinanogawa and Arizona Maru. The escort-
ing Japanese destroyers tried to put up an effective AAdefense while
attempting to rescue thousands of troops at the same time, but were
only able to shoot down three bombers. At 1430 15 B-17s from
Espiritu dropped 60 bombs on the convoy in two attacks: the first
flight hit a transport from 17,000 feet, and the second straddled a
seaplane tender from 20,000 feet. At 1530 the Enterprise sent eight
SBDs out and found the determined Tanaka heading toward
Guadalcanal, and set the Nako Maru on fire. An unescorted group
of seven SBDs dropped down to attack and were intercepted by
Zeros that shot down three and damaged two others. Tanaka radi-
oed a request to Adm. Kondo for permission to run his remaining
four cargo ships aground at Tassafaronga, as there would not be
enough time to unload during darkness and then withdraw. The air
score for the day was six Zeros shot down for six SBDs and two
F4Fs lost for the day. One of the F4Fs that did return was piloted by
legendary Marine ace Lt.Col. Joe Bauer, who shot down a Zero
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
The northwest coast of Guadalcanal was the area of the final battles for the
island, and the area of the landings of theTokyo Express.The even rows of a
large coconut plantation are seen in the foreground, and the landmark Cape
Esperance is seen in the far background. (USAF)
The 14 November attempt of the "Tokyo Express" was costly.Three trans-
ports are seen on this photo, two burning in the foreground offTassafaronga
Point, and one sunk along the upper right shore, which is also pictured in the
photo below with a destroyed landing barge in the foreground. (USMC)
that day to become a double ace with ten victories and would later
be awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. Tanaka had lost six
transports and had one damaged and turn back. There are no accu-
rate totals for the number of Japanese troops lost, but over 3,000
had drowned, and of the many rescued by the destroyers the major-
ity were burned or injured.
Second Battle of Guadalcanal14/lS November 1942
Later, V.Adm Kondo aboard the Atago moved down the Slot with
14 warships, including the battleship Kirishima, heavy cruisers
Atago and Takao, the light cruisers Nagara and Sendai, and nine
destroyers. His orders were to wipe out Henderson after R.Adm.
Abe failed to do it on the 13
th
and V.Adm. Mikawa the night before
that. Kondo split his 14 ships into three groups, a bombardment
group and two screening groups. Facing him was Task Force 64
under R.Adm. Willis "Ching" Lee in the battleship Washington and
accompanied by the battleship South Dakota and four escorting
destroyers. The Enterprise had withdrawn after its busy day. Early
in the battle the Japanese put the four American destroyers out of
./
I
- .
..c: ,""-:....
81
13
1h
Fighter Command in World War II
action, sinking three and leaving the battleships virtually unescorted.
The South Dakota was heavily damaged by 27 hits but was able to
fire back, damaging the Takao and Atago. The Washington's radar
picked up the Kirishima, which was shelling the South Dakota. Lee's
guns crashed shell after shell into the Japanese battleship, and seven
minutes later she left the battle a flaming hulk. The Kirishima and
the destroyer Ayanami were sunk in the battle. The South Dakota
sustained heavy damage, but refused to sink and sailed to New York
for repairs, and would return to the Pacific the next spring. The
USN also lost three destroyers, the Preston, Walke, and Benham.
Tanaka's destroyers valiantly continued to pick up survivors through-
out the night, and then he led his remaining four transports to
Tassafaronga to be beached before daylight. As soon as they were
beached Tanaka withdrew his crowded destroyers back up the Slot.
The Americans had won a costly strategic victory. This was to be
the last major Japanese effort to destroy the Cactus airfields and to
transport and land a large infantry force and its equipment as rein-
forcements to mount an offensive on the island. The Japanese Navy
no longer had control of the Slot, and Japanese troops on the island
were near starvation; and not only battling the Americans, but dis-
ease and the jungle. Over the past four days the Japanese had not
only lost a battle, but she had lost the Guadalcanal campaign, and
eventually the war.
The aircraft status summary for the 15t
h
reported the availabil-
ity of20 of29 F4Fs, II of22 SBDs, all eight TBFs, 13 of 16 P-38s,
six of ten P-39s, and no P-400s. An early patrol was scheduled for
the morning to search for Tanaka's surviving transports. From their
dispersal points on the nearly completed Fighter Two strip, Lt. James
Jarman taxied in the darkness followed by Lts. Ferguson, Norris,
and Ryan. Jarman proceeded down the runway, leading the flight
with his wing lights, and noticed bright flashes. As he turned at the
end of the runway he saw the flashes were from Japanese artillery
taking aim at the wing lights, and he ordered the other fighters to
disperse, shut down, and the pilots were to take cover. Jarman took
off a l o n ~ and climbed, and as he turned he saw the silhouette of a
large aircraft in the predawn darkness. As he closed in he was met
with machine gun fire that passed over his cockpit. He pulled away
to the side and could make out the roundels of the Royal New
Zealand Air Force on the fuselage of an approaching Lockheed
Hudson. Jarman flew off toward Savo Island searching for the sur-
viving transports from the previous night's battle. Looking toward
Tassafaronga and Kokumbona he discovered four transports; one
was beached and the others were heading toward the beach. Not
sure of their identity, he flew in a high-speed turn and descended to
500 feet for an inspection pass through heavy AA and small arms
fire that immediately revealed the transports as the enemy. Jarman
quickly returned to Henderson to gather his flight and took off to
get at the transports first. As they approached Point Cruz they now
saw three beached transports, with the last one heading toward shore.
Ferguson and Ryan dove and got direct bomb hits on a transport
each. Norris got a near miss, and Jarman's bomb did no damage.
Ferguson and Ryan turned and strafed with devastating results, and
the flight returned to base. After quickly rearming they returned to
Cruz Point, and Ryan and Ferguson shared the credit for another
transport damaged, hitting the last one to be finally beached. Both
82
Ryan and Ferguson would be awarded the DFC for this action. In
the next hour, 13 Navy and Marine SBDs and one TBF got seven
hits on the three beached transports. At 0900 seven P-39s now in
commission flown by Lts. Conrad, Geyer, Kellum, McLanahan,
Novak, Waldmire, and Williams hit the fourth transport with two
bombs. Three B-26s ofthe newly arrived 70BS hit a transport with
a 1,00Olb. bomb and put two 1,000 pounders on small vessels un-
loading supplies nearby. At 1045, with another P-39 repaired and
in service, four pilots (Lts. Jarman, Inciardi, Patterson, and Ryan)
attacked the least damaged transport and got a direct hit. Since the
skies over the transports were swarming with attacking friendly
aircraft, Jarman's flight flew out into Skylark Channeilooking for
other targets. The P-39s spotted the bow of a sinking ship and sur-
vivors bobbing among the debris in the water. Jarman radioed
Henderson for permission to attack and was told to go ahead, as
there were no American shipping losses in the area. As the Airacobras
turned to make their strafing runs, Henderson fighter control in-
structed them to hold their fire, as they had just learned of the loss
of the four American destroyers the night before. The P-39s flew
back to the destroyer Meade that had been shelling the beached
transports and flew low over the destroyer, waggling their wings
one after another and hoping to lead it out toward the survivors.
Finally, after three passes they convinced the Meade to follow and
pick up the American survivors floating about 12 miles away. When
the Meade arrived it picked up 264 survivors of the
Walke and Preston and took them to Tulagi.
American air attacks continued during the afternoon despite
Pistol Pete shelling the airfield as the aircraft took off and landed.
SBDs and TBFs attacked the transports that had been damaged the
previous day and were left burning and dead in the water 95 miles
from Guadalcanal. One transport was sunk, one was left a burning
hulk, and another was sinking as the attacks ended. With the Japa-
nese transports reduced to blazing hulks the air attacks concentrated
on the enemy troops and stores that were hurriedly brought ashore
from the beached transports, which were poorly camouflaged and
were vulnerable targets. The Pistol Petes had continued their ha-
rassment of Henderson. Doug Canning (67FS):
"During the last week of my tour Pistol Pete got so bad that the
guys dug a cave in a hillside, and I slept there on the comfortable
sandy floor with my blanket thrown over me. It was a lot better
than crouching in a foxhole all night waiting for an artillery shell to
hit you."
Finally a patrolling SBD located an artillery position and spot-
ted it with a smoke bomb. Lts. Geyer and McLanahan took off and
strafed the area around the gun to scatter its crew, and then
McLanahan was able to drop a 500lb. bomb within a few feet of the
gun. The two then came around and strafed again, with Geyer's
bullets blowing up its ammunition stores. At 1530 the Japanese
sent 12 Vals and eight Zeros to Henderson, but only two Zeros es-
caped the Marine fighter scramble. Late in the day two 339FS P-
38s were sent out to escort the withdrawing battleships
South Dakota and Washington back to Noumea, but were turned
back by bad weather.
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
In the battle both sides had the same objective; to reinforce
and supply their position on the island and deny it to the enemy by
air and sea. By nightfall the Japanese had been able to land only
2,000 troops, and most were lucky to have their rifles and minimal
supplies. Once landed they were tormented by American air power.
On the American-held beaches Turner had managed to land most
of his troops and supplies before withdrawing. The Japanese Navy
lost two battleships, a heavy cruiser, three destroyers, II transports,
and 16 Bettys and 25 Zeros that were going to be difficult to re-
place. The battle for Guada!canal was not over, and the Japanese
Army would not withdraw from the island for another two and a
half months.
On 16 November Maj. John Thompson, 67FS CO, led eight
new P-38s to Cactus from Tontouta, with seven of the pilots return-
ing for second tour. On his first tour Thompson's P-400 had been
shot up and he was wounded in the shoulder. Lt. Vernon Head had
been burned in a take off accident on a muddy field. Lt. Peter
Childress had bailed out of his damaged fighter and walked back
through the jungle, and had also been buried in a bomb blast and
was dug out. Lt. Deltis Fincher also returned after recovering from
his wounds. The pilot's they relieved were disappointed to find that
their R&R would be spent back at primitive, hot, and humid New
Caledonia, rather than Australia and New Zealand.
The air reinforcements put the number of aircraft in the Cactus
Air Force at 96: 25 F4Fs; 25 SBDs; eight TBFs; and 38 AAF P-39/
400s and P-38s. The Army aircraft continued their ground attack
duties, but the P-39s also supplied escort for SBDs, and the P-38s
flew escort missions with B-17s. Even though the squadron had
been conceived as a twin-engine unit the 339
Lh
had been flying P-
400s and P-39s, along with their P-38s. But By mid-November the
Sunsetters were finally able to realize this intention, as more P-38s
had arrived from the States, and pilots checked out and trained in
them at New Caledonia. The 339
1h
had the distinction of being the
Col. La verne Saunders took control of the severely damaged B-17 whose
pilot and co-pilot were killed, made a successful ditching, and was rescued
with the rest of the crew. Pictured are South Pacific air leaders (L-R): R.Adm.
John "Slew" McCain; Col. LaVerne "Blondie" Saunders, CO of the I I BG; and
Maj.Gen. Millard "Miff" Harmon, commander of the AAF in the South Pacific.
(USAF)
first unit to fly the P-38 in the Pacific, but it would not be until mid-
March 1943 that the squadron was officially designated as a twin-
engine unit.
On 18 November the Air Force was able to begin offensive
operations against Japanese targets in the Central Solomons. The
first target was cargo shipping at Tonolei Harbor on the south end
of Bougainville Island, as II B-17Fs staging through Guadalcanal
were joined by four B-26s in the attack. This was to be the first
mission in which fighters would escort bombers all the way to their
target. Problems arose from the start, as the Flying Fortresses were
based at Henderson and the P-38s at Fighter Two, and the two groups
had problems assembling after takeoff. The fighter pilots were as-
signed to cover the bombers and prevent the usual Japanese frontal
attack on the B-17s by picking them off from above as they turned
into their attack. The bombers were flying at 12,000 feet, which
meant the P-38s had to fly escort at 16,000 feet, an altitude that was
too low for the Lightning to be effective. Eight P-38s were flown
by Maj. Brannon, 339FS CO, and Capt. Sharpsteen and Lts. Brzuska,
Farquharson, Fincher, Goerke, Miller, and Reagh, but soon after
take off Miller aborted with engine problems. The P-38s were the
only fighters capable of escorting the bombers to their full range to
Kahili-Buin, while the P-40s had to wait well short of these targets
to cover the bombers on their withdrawal. The lead B-17 was flown
by Maj. Allan Sewart, with Col. Laverne Saunders (strike force
commander) aboard. The P-38s flew in formation at 16,000 feet
over the bomber formation. Although the weather was good enroute,
it was cloudy and rainy over the target. As Sewart's B-17 made its
bombing run the bombs hung up, and he had to bring his flight of
five Fortresses over the target again. The Japanese sent up about 30
fighters; a few were land-based square-wing tip Zeros, but the ma-
jority were float biplanes. The Japanese made no attempt to attack
the bombers and the P-38s intercepted them. Lt. Grant Reagh, who
flew the mission with his right supercharger malfunctioning,
Lt.Albert Farquharson's Lightning was hit eight times; six machine gun bullets
damaged the tail, a 20mm shell drilled through the flap, and another ex-
ploded a large hole in his wing. Farquharson had also taken hits while flying
the P-39 on I October I 942.This P-38 is # 115 "Hod 'V' Unlimited." The "V"
inside the round white circle was red and had three dots and a dash under-
neath.The three dots and dash is "V" in Morse Code and the first four notes
of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. (Lansdale)
83
13/
h
Fighter Command in World War II
"pressed a determined attack" and fired on a float plane and claimed
a hit the on the top of its cockpit, but left the battle to return to
Cactus. For this action Reagh was awarded the Silver Star. Lt. Deltis
Fincher shot down two Zeros to become the top AAF fighter pilot
in the South Pacific with three victories. Lt. James Obermiller also
claimed a Zero. Lt. Farquharson's Lightning was hit eight times:
six machine gun bullets damaged the tail; a 20mm shell drilled
through the flap; and another exploded a large hole in his wing. The
P-38 flight then headed back to Guadalcanal, as they had not been
informed of the B-17s having to return for a second run on the
target. The B-17s' second run put two direct hits on two cargo ships,
but 18 enemy fighters attacked the bomber formation for the next
half hour on their return to base. Maj. Sewart and his co-pilot were
hit and killed, and Col. Saunders took control of the B-17, which
had two engines down and the port wing on fire. Saunders skill-
fully flew the bomber and ditched it near Vella Lavella. All survi-
vors reached shore in rubber life rafts and were rescued by a PBY
the next afternoon. The B-17s claimed a heavy, but probably exag-
gerated, toll on the attacking enemy fighters with 12 being claimed-
eight by Sewart's crew. The B-26s also claimed two more Japs.
Capt. John Mitchell and 339
th
mascot. "Blackie:' (Canning)
84
In a combat report to the G-2 ofUSAFISPA, Group G-2, Capt.
George Phillips, stated:
"The conclusions drawn are the same as submitted in all previ-
ous reports-the P-38 is not an escort fighter, as the plane is too
unmaneuverable and blind. The P-38 has not yet been sent out at its
proper altitude, and the B-17s are always at poor altitude for the P-
38. If our pilots had some P-40s or P-S 1s, they could have had a
field day over Tonolei and given the Japs a real shellacking." (Re-
port on P-38 Escort Mission to Bougainville, 18 November 1942
dated 20 December 1942)
These first P-38 escort missions reiterated the lessons learned
in Europe; that the Lockheed fighter could not maneuver with the
more agile Luftwaffe Me-109s and FW-190s, nor now with the Japa-
nese Zeros. It had blind spots and was unable to turn with the en-
emy fighters. To compensate for their deficiencies, a mutually pro-
tective formation was devised with flights of four P-38s dispersed
in echelon right or left, with a distance of several plane lengths for
maneuvering. Each flight leader had a wingman on his port, and
the other two P-38s an element leader and his wingman to his right
in echelon to the starboard. This wingman was dubbed "tail-end
Charlie," as he was the last aircraft in the formation and needed to
be (but often was not -author) an experienced pilot, as he was to
protect the formation from attack from the rear. There were usually
four flights (16 aircraft) in an escort or fighter mission formation.
On an escort mission the P-38s were urged to continue their protec-
tive formation and only open fire on enemy aircraft entering the
formation a ~ e a d . During a fighter mission it was emphasized that
once the P-38s were engaged in combat the element (a leader and
his protecting wingman) was the smallest fighting unit. The P-38
needed to take advantage of its strengths, either to dive away to
safety or turn into the attacker utilizing the fighter's firepower and
speed.
On the 2S'h, Cactus veteran Capt. John Mitchell, who had three
victories in the P-39, replaced Maj. Brannon as 339FS CO. Brannon
transferred to 347FG HQ at Tontouta as Group XO. Soon after he
arrived Brannon attended a USAFISPA (US. Army Forces in the
South Pacific Area) meeting in Noumea, where he was able to brief
visiting Gen. H.H. "Hap" Arnold on the very poor performance of
the P-39/400 and the problems the P-38 was having with the Zero.
Arnold did not believe that the Zero could be effecti ve above 20,000
feet, or that the P-39 and the new P-38 could have the problems that
Brannon described. Brannon told Arnold that the B-17s needed to
fly their missions above at least 20,000 feet for the P-38s to be an
effective escort. The P-38s were at a distinct disadvantage when
escorting medium bombers, as they had to drop from high cover-
above 20,000 feet-to the Mitchell's or Marauder's much lower
operational altitude, where they were inferior to the Zero.
In mid-November two 7AF fighter squadrons arrived in the
South Pacific. The P-39 equipped 12FS left Christmas Island and
arrived at Efate in the ew Hebrides on 19 November, and the P-40
equipped 44FS arrived there from Hawaii on the 22
nd
By the end
of the year detachments from both of these squadrons were operat-
ing from Guadalcanal with three other squadrons. At the end of
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
Panorama overlooking FighterTwo from pilot tents located on a low hill. (Canning)
The pilots' quarters were in tents dug in along the top of the hill on the right
from which the above photos were taken. A P-39 is parked at the far right of
the runway, and three Marine F4Fs on the adjacent runway. (Canning)
A 68FS PAO parked for maintenance at FighterTwo while a Marine F4F (dot
in sky above PAO) flies over the field. A damaged P-38 is being cannibalized
in the background (behind fuel truck). (Canning)
85
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
November the 68FS sent a PAO detachment to Guadalcanal, and
by 8 December the entire unit was at Fighter Two. A detachment of
the 70FS entered operations on 21 December, and the next day the
67FS, which had done yeoman's work during the past months on
Guadalcanal, was transferred back to New Caledonia for R&R. At
the end of 1942 the 339FS (P-38s), 12FS and 70FS (P-39s), 44FS
(PAOs), and the 68FS (P-39s and PAOs) were operating from
Guadalcanal.
After the Japanese lost their II transports and were only able
to land 2,000 troops the American Marine and Army troops on
Guadalcanal went on the offensive toward Kokumbona and the Poha
River. Brig.Gen. Roy Geiger planned to attack across the Matanikau
River, which recon patrols had determined to be undefended. How-
ever, Lt.Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake, now with about 25,000 troops,
was also planning an offensive to advance east from Kokumbona.
He planned to take the high ground east of the river as a line of
departure and set up artillery positions there. His troops would then
take the three American airfields and capture Mt. Austen, which
dominated the entire area around Henderson. On the 18
th
Geiger
sent his 184
th
Infantry, backed by the 8
th
Marines, across the
Matanikau, and the next day the 8
th
Marines followed and moved to
the base of Point Cruz, where they dug in at noon, as they met stiff
resistance and artillery fire. The stalled Americans called in air sup-
port to help them hold their newly gained territory. Ground support
missions by the 67FS and Marine SBDs broke the Japanese Point
Cruz positions, but it was not until the 164
th
joined in that the attack
moved forward. The Army and Marines had to fight across one
ravine at a time, and were stopped by heavy fire from Japanese dug
in the sides and tops of the ravines. The two armies stopped, facing
each other on the high ground between the ravines that made up the
Point Cruz Line. Since an attempt to advance would cause heavy
casualties the Americans called in air and artillery interdiction to
keep the Japanese at bay. Although the American attack stalled un-
til the end of December, it had pre-empted the Japanese attack across
the Matanikau.
From the 18
th
and into mid-December, the Army Cactus Flight
flew almost constant close air support, interdiction, and search and
destroy missions, first to support Geiger's attack, and then to hold
off Hyutake's attack. The term "search and destroy" was credited
to Lt. Danforth Miller of the 67FS by Robert Ferguson in his book,
Gaudalcanal, The Island of Fire: Reflections of the 347'" Fighter
Group (Aero, PA, 1987). The pilots rarely caught sight of the Japa-
nese they were attacking, relying on ground radio directions or
ground signal panels. On the 21 st, Lts. Patterson and Tullis on a
search and destroy mission spotted about a dozen enemy soldiers
camped near a road on the mouth of a small river near the sea. The
attack surprised the Japs, who were bombed and strafed, but a 100lb.
bomb failed to explode when it hit the middle of the camp. The
67FS flew daily missions, coordinating its support with attacking
infantry, and flew continuous air interdiction attacks, hitting any-
thing that moved on the Japanese side of the line. On 23 November
Lt. McLanahan bombed and strafed a herd of cattle! The air arma-
ments of choice were the standard machine guns and cannons, as
well as demolition, fragmentation, and incendiary bombs. The in-
novati ve armorers rigged depth charges that flattened grassy areas
86
and served as very effective concussion bombs. Lt. Jim McLanahan
devised a bomb called the "Rube Goldberg," which was a belly
tank or Navy practice bomb filled with a mixture of gasoline and
oil fitted with an incendiary detonator. McLanahan had his doubt-
ers until he incinerated thick vegetation, exposing and also scorch-
ing a Japanese position.
The 67
th
Fighter Squadron War Diary (20 November 1942)
quotes a pilot's impression of everyday flying:
"The 67
th
fighters continued to sit and wait for a scramble. Their
only work lately has been dawn, dusk, and noonday patrols. Any
one of the three patrol assignments is disagreeable. On the dawn
shift you arise in the middle of the night, cold and damp from the
tropical damp, take off when you still cannot see the far end of the
runway, and fly for two hours without breakfast. Cigarettes that
you smoke to keep awake fill your stomach full of fuss. On the
noonday shift you sweat. The cockpit is oven hot, even if you suc-
ceed in stuffing the hot air opening with a towel. The glare from the
Lt. Jim McLanahan devised a bomb called the "Rube Goldberg" that was a
belly tank or Navy practice bomb filled with a mixture of gasoline and oil
fitted with an incendiary detonator. McLanahan had his doubters until he
incinerated thick vegetation, exposing and also scorching aJapanese position.
Part Two, Chapter 5 - November 1942
sun and altitude makes your eyes sting and gives you a headache.
Besides, you have to eat a second chow. On the dusk shift over the
harbor, you fly for two hours after everyone is off for the day. You
land after dark, and if the field is dusty the landing lights make a
false runway 20 feet in the air on top of the dust. You wonder if
there has been any beer, and if there has, if any would be left when
you get down. Two hours is a long time to sit hunched over in one
position. Your empennage gets so sore it aches."
On 23 November 1942, as part of a report to 7AF CG, Brig.Gen.
Willis Hale, Capt. Robert Hedges, 44FS Intelligence Officer, (Re-
port to Gen.) discussed air tactics:
'Talks with Air Corps, Marine, and Navy Pilots all indicate
that individual initiative must be used in fighting the Japs. The most
favorable positions must be assumed and followed through. Some
prefer the four-ship element, but at times should fly in pairs, and
under no circumstance attempt to dogfight with the Japs. One trick
was brought out clearly, namely that the Japs themselves will simu-
late dogfighting among themselves in an effort to get one of our
planes to approach when both have attacked, usually out of the sun.
It is suicidal to be enticed away from the formation by such Jap
methods, and many of our boys have learned that lesson. Our pilots
must think at all times and must stay together, or at least with an-
other ship, particularly in the climb. The tighter the formation the
more effective the operation. Weaving tactics have been used most
effectively by our men, but they are indoctrinated to get into the
spot where they can do the most damage. The scissors has not al-
ways proved effective over Cactus due to the Jap close formations.
Most ofthe Marine and Navy fliers, when attacking a bomber-fighter
formation, come down on them, making but one pass and then run-
ning away. They converge their sights at 250 yards, aiming at the
engine or engines or the gas tanks, and have experienced exceed-
ingly good fortune in bringing down many 97s by concentrating on
their engines, which are apparently vulnerable."
The important contribution the 67
th
Fighter Squadron's close
air support operations were overshadowed by the Marine Wildcats,
first under Maj. John Smith with 19 victories and Capt. Marion
Carl with 16.5 victories, and then by Capt. Joe Foss, who tied Capt.
Eddie Rickenbacker's World War I record of 26 victories to be-
come America's Ace of Aces. The Navy dispatches made little men-
tion of the Army's Cactus Flight and the successful and dangerous
work they did, especially in its ground attack role. To this day their
contribution to the victory on Guadalcanal is virtually unknown
and certainly unappreciated, except by the Marine and Army infan-
try who were there. This snub so irritated MacArthur that during
the Philippines Campaign at Leyte in December 1944 his
communiquEs did not include the Navy and Marine air operations
there.
Establishment of the 13
th
Air Force and 13
th
Fighter Command
In late November it was apparent to Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon,
COMGENSOPAC (Commanding General in the South Pacific), that
something needed to done to increase AAF efficiency without af-
fecting the unity of command embodied in COMAIRSOPAC. To
accomplish this, Harmon urged the formation of a new South Pa-
cific air force and submitted his proposals to Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 19 November for the authorization of the new air force. Harmon
argued for directAAF operational control of its aircraft, personnel,
and operations within established AAF doctrine. Brig.Gen. Nathan
Twining was to be the new air force's proposed commander, and it
was to incorporate a bomber and fighter command to be staffed by
experienced personnel already in the South Pacific. Harmon pro-
posed a closer coordination with COMAIRSOPAC, as previously
it directed all air operations, so that Harmon had no control over
AAF units and no AAF air organization existed. AAF combat and
service units, training, and supply were under the control of com-
manders of the various island bases: Canton; Christmas; the Fijis;
New Caledonia; and Tongatabu. By mid-December the headquar-
ters and headquarters squadrons were established for the 13
1h
Air
Force, XIII Bomber Command, and XIII Fighter Command. Harmon
realized that the responsibilities of these two Commands would be
abridged because of the wide distribution of their units and com-
mands on the various island bases. But under the new air force
Harmon would have greater control, and as opportunities arose he
could gain even more control. Most of the 13AF personnel needed
would have to come from units in the field, as the Joint Chiefs were
not going to increase their previously agreed on commitments. The
physical administration and housing facilities were being quickly
constructed on Espiritu Santo. The Joint Chiefs had committed 70
heavy bombers (47 arrived in the theater by 30 December), 52 me-
dium bombers (26 were in the theater by 30 December), and 150
fighters (158 arrived by 30 December).
On Thanksgiving Day the American air forces went on the of-
fensive and attacked the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay on
the north end of Santa Isabel Island, 165 miles northwest of
Henderson. Rekata Bay was garrisoned by several thousand troops
and was the largest seaplane facility in the Solomons. The 67
1h
Fighter Squadron War Diary for 26 November 1942 describes this
combat:
"We were expecting and waiting for an enemy air annada for
the simple reason that Tojo seems to delight in cooking up some
sort of observance of our holidays. Thanksgiving is no holiday here,
of course, and there was no Tojo either. (Charlie came over at 4:30
this morning and shook our foxholes with four bombs, but that's
routine now.) Since the Nips didn't see fit to celebrate our Thanks-
giving, we did. We gave them bombs and bullets. The recipients of
our fireworks were the 3000-odd Nips who maintain a seaplane
base, gasoline, and ammunition dumps at Rekata Bay, on the north-
eastern shore of Santa Isabel Island, 165 miles from here. In the
flight were nine SBDs, each carrying a 500-pound bomb and two
100-pound bombs, and 15 of our P-39s carried 100 pounders.
The lumbering Navy dive-bombers took off in the late after-
noon, and sometime later our faster Army fighters started (piloted
by Lts. Bauer, Brewster, McLanahan, Norris, Patton, Ryan, Tullis,
Waldmire, Williams, and a few ofthe newly arrived pilots -author).
The SBDs headed across to make their bombing runs while we
sped back and forth overhead looking for float Zeros. There were
87
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
none. The sun was just setting with a brilliant red when the first
bombs hit. The high mountain ridges in the middle of the island
cast a shadow over the harbor, but it was still light enough to see
that there were no flying boats on the water. We had been informed
that the Nips were ferrying in supplies that very afternoon. With no
flying boats to hit, we just bombed and strafed the shore area.
After the SBDs finished their business we started down. It was
a pretty, although a rather deadl y sight, and was more like the Fourth
of July than Thanksgiving. All the way down in a dive from 9,000
feet to where we pulled out at about 2,500 feet we fired our guns in
salvo. We figured the sight of all that lead coming from our wings
would cause a little consternation among the ground gunners and
maybe mess up their aim. The tracers from our two .50 calibers and
our cannon streaked down in front of us into the palm grove below.
It was dark enough to make the tracers show up well.
What also showed up were their tracers passing ours and com-
ing right at us-they were shots from the 20mm ground guns. This
wasn't so pretty. At the bottom of our dives we released our bombs,
then streaked across the water, zigzagging to make it harder for the
Nip anti-aircraft. one of us were hit on this mission. We rejoined
the formation neatly right above the SBDs and escorted them home-
ward for several miles, or out of danger, anyway. We couldn't fool
around with them too long, because we barely had enough gas to
get back as it was.
Naturally, in the excitement of getting away we did not line up
just right and Bauer, a new arrival from the class of 42-F, was a
little surprised and disturbed to find himself in the position of ele-
ment leader with not one, but two wingmen. 'How about taking the
lead, one of you, somebody,' he said over the radio. 'There's a
yardbird in this ship.'
It was well in the night when we got home. We managed to get
all 15 planes down on the fighter strip in the dust and darkness
without a single casualty. It was missions such as this that the squad-
ron began taking the war to the enemy. Meanwhile, the Jap fleet
was still determined to blast Henderson off the map."
Battle of Tassafaronga 30 November-l December 1942
The Japanese planned to reinforce and supply their troops on
Guadalcanal, but vigilant American air reconnaissance discovered
that the Tokyo Express was readying another sizable run. To counter
the Express, U.S. Navy Task Force 67 commanded by R.Adm.
Carlton Wright sailed from Espiritu Santo just before midnight on
29 November. Four heavy cruisers-the
New Orleans, Minneapolis (Wright's flagship), Northampton,
and Pensacola-the light cruiser Honolulu, and four destroyers ar-
rived off Tulagi-Guadalcanal the next night. The reason for the avail-
ability of USN cruisers and destroyers in the South Pacific was that
each time a carrier was sunk (the Enterprise, Yorktown, Wasp, and
Hornet) or left for repairs (the Saratoga) its escorting warships were
released. Adm. Yamamoto held the Japanese Combined Fleet back
at Truk, waiting to commit it for a decisive battle. Unknown to
Yamamoto was that the USN had only one operational carrier (the
Enterprise) that was not completely repaired from her damage at
the Battle of Santa Cruz. imitz was withholding his precious car-
rier back at Noumea. Adm. Raizo Tanaka was ordered to take eight
88
destroyers from the Buin anchorage and head north, away from
Guadalcanal, to mislead any patrol aircraft. On the 30
th
a coast
watcher at Buin reported that the Japanese destroyers had left the
anchorage, and the stage was set for the Battle of Tassafaronga.
The alerted Americans sent out an increased number of patrol air-
craft from Henderson and eight B-17s from Espiritu. The well-
trained Tanaka destroyer force evaded detection during the day-
time of the 30
th
as it turned back east toward Guadalcanal through
the uninhabited islands and reefs east of the Solomons. As Tanaka
approached Guadalcanal he was unaware of Task Force 67, and
concentrated on getting into position to off-load 24Q floating oil
drums that were lashed to the decks of six of his eight ships. The
drums contained food, medicine, and ammunition, and were chained
together to prevent their dispersal. To carry this cargo the destroy-
ers had to leave their replacement torpedoes and half of their am-
munition back at Rabaul. USN radar picked up the Japanese, but
their illumination seaplanes were unable to take off from Tulagi
because of calm water. The glassy calm water created a kind of
surface tension between it and the aircraft's pontoons and prevented
separation. The condition had been known for years, and the fix
was to have a fast boat create small waves in front of the aircraft so
it could take off. This was not done, despite the presence of over a
dozen PT-boats in the area. After vacillating for nearly a quarter
hour and losing much of the advantage of surprise, R.Adm. Wright
ordered his cruisers to open fire and launch their torpedoes. Tanaka,
seeing the gun flashes, ordered an immediate course reversal, and
all 20 American torpedoes missed, and their shells fell into the va-
cated ocean. The Japanese picket closest to the Americans opened
fire with9ut Tanaka's orders and was smothered by heavy return
fire. Tanaka's DDs executed a simultaneous fast night torpedo run
that they had practiced for over 18 months. Two long lance torpe-
does hit the Minneapolis, and the New Orleans was hit by another
torpedo. Both cruisers had their bows blown off and retired from
the battle. Soon the Pensacola was hit, losing her aft engine room
and three turrets. The Pensacola turned and limped back to Tulagi,
leaving only the Honolulu and Northampton to CatTy on the fight.
The Northampton was hit by two torpedoes that ruptured her fuel
tanks, causing her to catch fire and sink. It was a brilliant victory
for Tanaka's inferior destroyer force, but not knowing he no longer
had opposition he withdrew before he could off load his supply
drums. The Pensacola, Minneapolis, and New Orleans were saved
by heroic efforts of their crews, but were damaged so badly that
they all were out of action for over a year while undergoing repairs.
The Battle of Tassafaronga was another defeat for the U.S. Navy,
but as bad as it was, the Navy would soon be reinforced by the
return of the carriers Enterprise and Saratoga, the addition of three
new 16-inch and two old 14-inch battleships, several new cruisers,
and many new destroyers and submarines. The battle was to be the
last naval action off Guadalcanal in which major American war-
ships were involved. From this point on the Tokyo Express was
engaged by PT boats and the Cactus Air Force. During this time
Army Maj. Gen. Alexander Patch's Americal Division relieved
Vandegrift's 1
st
and 5
th
Marines. Patch, under Halsey's command,
was to direct tactical operations, taking over from Adm. Turner,
who continued to be responsible for transport of troops and sup-
plies. On 1 December the Americal assumed supply responsibili-
ties, and a week later Americal staff officers were in complete con-
trol. Cactus was no longer in danger of being lost from the sea.
The biggest changes on the island were in its air component
and facilities. Adm. Halsey had been commander of the South Pa-
cific (COMSOPAC) since 20 October 1942, and had named R.Adm.
Aubrey Fitchas his air commander (COMAIRSOPAC) on 15 Sep-
tember 1942. Fitch commanded all the air components in the South
Pacific, Army, Navy, Marine, and New Zealand. On 15 November,
Fitch designated Henderson as a Marine air base with Col. William
Fox as its commander. Fox initiated the rebuilding of the entire
runway system of Henderson and Fighter Two (Kukum) to improve
their drainage. Fighter One would be abandoned because it was
totally unusable during any wet weather. The lSI Marine Aviation
Engineers relieved the 6[h Seabees on 1 December and were fol-
lowed by the 2
nd
Engineers on 30 January 1943 to improve the air
facilities. The coral of Lunga could not be used ,as it was too brittle
and turned to sludge in the rain, and more distant coral had to be
hauled in and rolled by Japanese equipment captured three months
before. Bundles of Marston matting (named after the location of its
first use, Marston, North Carolina) had to be separated and hauled
in pieces, as there were no cranes to unload it. Brig.Gen. Louis
Woods continued as COMAIR Cactus until 26 December, when
Brig.Gen. Francis McCauley, CG of the 2
nd
MAW, relieved him.
MAG-14 was responsible for the administration of food and hous-
ing for Marine, Air Force, and the occasional transient naval units
on the island. COMAIR Cactus executed tactical employment of
the air units there. On 20 November there were 101 aircraft on the
island: 35 F4Fs; 24 SBDs; 8 TBFs; 17 P-38s; 16 P-39s; and 1 P-
400. By the end of the month there were 188, including 71 F4Fs.
EightB-17s of the merged 5[h and 11[h BGs were sent to Guadalcanal
to carry out long-range reconnaissance. The AAF sent the 12[h and
70[h Fighter Squadrons in December, and the 339[h FS was receiv-
ing more P-38s daily.
89
6
December 1942
Torrential tropical rains during the first week of December
deluged the Fighter One quarters of Cactus Flight and caused them
to evacuate to the Fighter Two strip (also called Kukum Field). The
Seabees had constructed the field in a coconut plantation on a nar-
row coastal plain parallel to the beach and several miles north of
Lunga Beach. Fighter Two was located on higher ground and better
drained, and its runway was constructed of crushed and rolled coral
and covered with steel matting. The pilots continued to be billeted
in the pyramidal tents, but cement floors had now been laid and the
tents were pitched over them. There was an abundance of wood
available for lumber from the surrounding trees, and portable saw
mills were shipped to the island to manufacture building materials
and tent floors. Unfortunately, most of the surrounding trees were
filled with shrapnel from the shellings and bombings and broke
many of the saw blades. The pilots were heartened by the promise
of Quonset Huts. More service and repair equipment and men had
arrived, and increased the aircraft serviceability rate. As in the past,
the majority of pilots and enlisted men were based back at New
Caledonia, and squadrons conducted training programs there for
both the veterans and newly arrived pilots from the States. In mid-
December the 339FS had nearly 100 pilots, along with 70 to 80
P-39 being run up by a mechanic at FighterTwo on Guadalcanal. (Palmer)
90
aircraft at its new facility at Oua Tom. There were often as many
pilots from other squadrons also based there. At the same time
Henderson was being refurbished with a new runway surface cov-
ered with fresh matting and restored taxiways to accommodate B-
l7s. Things were looking up at Guadalcanal, but it still wasn't the
proverbial bowl of cherries. Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker visited
Henderson and wrote in the February 1943 issue of Life magazine:
"I spent only one night and a day on the island, but it was
enough to make me mad at myself and my people back home for
ever thinking what war is. If New Guinea is a hellhole Guadalcanal
is ten times more so."
The failure of Tanaka to deliver supplies to the beleaguered
Japanese 17
th
Army necessitated the immediate formation of an-
other naval supply column. On 3 December a new Tokyo Express
made up of ten destroyers, seven destroyer/transports, and three
escorts was scheduled to come down the Slot and arrive after dark-
ness and under poor weather. The destroyer/transports were again
to use the chained drum technique and jettison them offshore. How-
ever, a coast watcher and a patrol plane warned of their approach.
Operations tent at FighterTwo.lt appears that the pilots are playing cards or
dice. (Palmer)
Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942
Waiting for a scramble under an Improvised tarp sunscreen at Fighter Two.
(Palmer)
Eight SBDs ofVMSB-142 and seven TBFs ofVMSB-131 escorted
by four F4Fs and six P-39s of the 67FS took off at 1730 in clouds
and mist with the visibility at one mile to intercept the Express at
160 miles out. The attackers flew west for over an hou;; they reached
the limit of their search radius and were ready to return to base
when they spotted the wakes of ships through the clouds. The SBDs
dove first, and the Japanese ships broke their formation, increased
their speed, and frantically dispersed. The haze and mist below the
clouds afforded the pilots no visual reference to the location of the
ocean's surface, but following the ship's zigzag wakes gave the
pilots that reference. After the SBDs attacked through a barrage of
AA fire, the P-39s dove and dropped their bombs and rejoined the
F4Fs for top cover. The Japanese sent up 12 Rufe float planes from
the Shortlands, and the F4Fs turned into their attack. The P-39s
were at 8,000 feet and climbing from their bombing attack when
they spotted the Rufes. The P-39 pilots knew they were unable to
dogfight with the agile float planes and executed a chandelle in
formation to climb to 11,000 feet to make a diving attack on them.
The float planes turned to meet the Airacobra attack and fired their
light caliber machine guns in a determined head-on attack, almost
ramming the P-39s, which had to pull sharply away. On passing
through the American formation the Japanese then pulled up verti-
cally to give their rear gunners a shot at the American fighters. The
P-39s went into another steep chandelle to reach altitude and dived
to the attack again. The old jammed gun bugaboo plagued the P-39
pilots again, but four of the ten Rufes shot down that day were shot
down by 67FS pilots: two by Lt. Lynwood Glazier and one each by
Us. Peter Childress and Zed Fountain. Childress and Glazier were
also credited with a probable each. Maj. Nathan Post ofVMF-121
and ILl. Michael Yunck ofVMO-251 were credited with three vic-
tories each. One Dauntless was lost in the action. The bombers
claimed two "cruisers" sunk and two damaged, but Japanese records
The compasses in the P-39s were notoriously undependable, and due to the
weather the pilots had no horizon to fly by. If one strayed off course there
was the danger of hitting the mountains on the neighboring island. As they
approached Henderson searchlights were switched on, and shafts of light
poked through the clouds to guide the planes. Pictured is Lt. Vernon Head
inbound over the Russell Islands from a mission to Lambetti Plantation Air-
drome, New Georgia, probably in December 1942. (Lansdale/347FGA)
show only the destroyer (Manama) to have sustained slight dam-
aged. Exhaustion, heavy drizzle, then darkness, and finally the con-
cern that they would run out fuel made the return flight harrowing.
The compasses in the P-39s were notoriously undependable, and
due to the weather the pilots had no horizon to fly by. If a pilot
strayed off course there was the danger of hitting the mountains on
the neighboring island. The pilots turned on their running lights in
an attempt to rendezvous, but everyone was on his own. As they
approached Henderson searchlights were switched on, and shafts
of light poked through the clouds to guide the planes. All 67FS P-
39s made it back, but an Avenger and Wildcat were lost on landing.
Several days later the 67
th
pilots received a shot of whiskey and
commendations from Adm. Halsey and Gen. Woods for this action.
On the 4
th
, Lts. McLanahan and Tullis were on patrol when
they detected what appeared to be strings of gasoline drums tied
together floating offshore between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona.
These were part of the 1,500 chain-linked drums the Japanese had
dropped the day before. The lack of Japanese shore personnel and
their physical incapacity from near starvation rations prevented the
pickup of many drums floating close to shore. The 67
th
spent the
day shuttling to strafe the drums and then returning to base to re-
arm. Aided by PT boats, all but 310 drums were sunk before they
reached shore. The next day Cactus flight bombed and strafed Japa-
nese dugouts and strong points, slowing the infantry advance along
the Point Cruz Line. Interdiction missions were flown against en-
emy movements and fuel and supply dumps behind enemy lines.
On 5 December all Army Air Force units in the South Pacific
were informed that on 13 January 1943 they would become part of
the 13
th
Air Force under Gen. Nathan Twining, headquartered at
New Caledonia. During December Cactus Flight, set up by the 67FS,
began to be referred to in daily operations as a "detachment of the
347th Fighter Group," and continued to include pilots of all the
squadrons of the group.
91
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Above and following: 68 Fighter Squadron P-40s at FighterTwo. (Canning)
The increased heavy American air attacks on Rabaul and the
Shortlands caused the Japanese High Command to decide to build
larger forward airfields to the east. These bases would put Japanese
aircraft within easy bombing distance of the bombers now based at
Henderson, and would base their fighters in better position to inter-
cept the American bombers flying west. The fighter strip at Buin, at
the southern end of Bougainville, was too small, and the various
scattered seaplane bases were inadequate. Aforward base was cho-
sen to be built at an abandoned coconut plantation on the southeast-
ern end of New Georgia at Munda Point, about 180 miles from
Henderson. A Japanese construction convoy was sent out on 24
November and quickly unloaded, and work was begun under strict
camouflage. During early December American patrols flew to Santa
Isabel and New Georgia Islands searching for destroyer/transports,
barges, and landing boats for the Tokyo Express and the troops and
supplies to be loaded on them. Despite these air searches and re-
connaissance of this area it was not until 5 December that the first
aerial reconnaissance photos by VMD-154 discovered the construc-
tion. On the 6
th
, Lts. Brewster, Kellum, McLanahan, and Patterson
flew a patrol to Munda Point to investigate reports that an airfield
was being constructed. As they dropped down on the area they found
two camouflaged strips under construction and bombed and strafed
the construction workers and their equipment. It was not until the
12
th
that nine SBDs of VMSB-142 attacked Munda's AApositions,
runways, and fuel supplies, and from that point Munda airfield came
under almost daily attacks. During December, B-17s of the II th and
5'h Bomb Groups attacked the site 21 times. Despite these constant
attacks the Japanese persevered and completed the fields; by Christ-
mas Zeros were operating there, and bombers flew in by the end of
the year.
On the 7
th
Marine dive and torpedo bombers led by Maj. Jo-
seph Sailer and escorted by fighters foiled a ten destroyer Express
commanded by Capt. Torajiro Sato. The bombers attacked at 1635,
just after sunset, and holed the Nowake, which had to be towed to
safety by two other destroyers. The remaining seven destroyers were
attacked by torpedoes and automatic gunfire from a resolute PI
boat attack, and Sato withdrew without releasing his supply drums.
The Marines lost "the best dive-bomber pilot in the Pacific," as Joe
Sailer's SBD was hit by AA fire from a destroyer he was bombing,
and then was picked off by a Zero. Sailer had flown 25 missions
and was credited with six hits and three near misses on enemy ship-
ping. Also on the 7
th
, the remaining detachments of the 68FS ar-
rived by ship from Noumea and became the first complete fighter
squadron to based at Guadalcanal. The squadron was based at Fighter
92
Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942
Two and flew P-39s and PAOs on escort missions to the Northern
Solomons, as well as tactical missions in support of infantry on
Guadalcanal, which was now Army, as the Marines had been with-
drawn.
On 10 December, 11 B-17s escorted by eight P-38s ofthe 339FS
attacked shipping in Tonolei Harbor, Bougainville. The Japanese
sent up Zeros late to intercept, and the P-38s, having an altitude
advantage, intercepted them on their way up. Five were shot down,
one each by: Lts. Edgar Barr, Edwin Brzuska, Douglas Canning,
Delton Goerke, and Danford Miller, with an additional Zero claimed
by a B-17 gunner and Lt. Grant Reagh claiming a probable. The
Flying Fortresses scored three hits on harbor shipping, and all air-
craft returned safely to base, but one Lightning returned to base on
one engine. On the 16
th
Capt. John Thompson of the 67FS shot
down a Zero on an escort mission to Munda. That night it started to
rain, which was not unusual, but instead of stopping after a few
minutes the rain continued throughout the night. A bolt oflightning
hit the camp and knocked two enlisted men unconscious for sev-
eral minutes. At dawn there was water everywhere, the tent floors
had three inches of water flowing over them, and bedding and cloth-
ing were damp. Bill Harris (339FS):
Although the pyramidal tents were fairly waterproof, flooding from torren-
tial rains such as shown soaked everything. (USMC)
The searing tropical sun on a metal wing quickly dried laundry. (USAF)
"The pyramidal tents were pretty waterproof and usually did
not leak. But like most canvas during a constant rain, if anything
touched the sides that area would begin to leak. One night I got up
during a rain and accidentally ,touched the side of the tent; it started
to leak on to my cot. Luckily there was room in the tent to move it."
Clothing placed in parachute bags under their cots was sop-
ping wet, and shoes floated away. The next morning the men had to
slog through ankle deep mud to get anywhere. It took longer than
usual for the tropical sun to dry things out, but then the men knew it
would soon rain again.
In the late afternoon of the 11
th
Tanaka led 11 destroyers to-
ward the Slot. Before dusk the Express was attacked off New Geor-
gia by 14 SBDs led by Sailer's successor, Maj. Ben Robertshaw.
The Marine dive-bombers claimed four destroyers left burning, but
Japanese accounts record no hits. However, the Japanese were sur-
prised by an unexpected PT boat attack, as the quick little boats
raced onto the scene at 0100 and quickly hit Tanaka's new flagship
(Teruzuki) with a torpedo. Tanaka was taken off the stricken vessel,
and the Express again retreated without accomplishing its supply
mission. This was to be the last Tokyo Express excursion down the
93
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Above: Rutted wet road leading from FighterTwo Camp to the Airstrip. On the right side of
the road is the shaving and wash station, with the water tank trailer behind it. Left: Shower
time at FighterTwo.The water was brought up to the pilots' bivouac on the ridge by a water
trailer pulled by a Jeep. A wobble pump was used to get water into the overhead can.
(Palmer)
Slot for a while, as on the 12
th
, the Japanese naval command or-
dered a temporary stop because of the coming of the full moon.
During this hiatus the Japanese High Command evaluated the situ-
ation, and at the end of December decided to evacuate Guadalcanal,
which Tanaka had long advocated.
On 19 December the 339FS moved its Tontouta base on New
Caledonia to Oua Tom, where it was to remain throughout 1943.
Oua Tom camp was in a better location than Tontouta, as it was
built at the base of a mountain range about 600 feet from the air-
field. The base had better drainage, providing better living and op-
erating conditions and fewer mosquitoes. While on R&R from Cac-
tus the pilots and enlisted men worked hard on improving their new
base. The pyramidal tents had wooden frames and floors, and the
mess hall had a cement floor and rain-proof thatched roof. Supplies
from America were more frequent and meals improved. Aday room
was built with a PX that stocked beer and candy. Of the creature
comforts available the latrines had sit down seats and flushing toi-
lets, as well as a central wash stand area for shaving. The wash
areas were covered with canvas, corrugated iron, wood, or tarpaper.
The washstand was a SO-gallon drum split lengthways, sometimes
supplied with pumped cold running water. The showers had hot
water supplied from three barrels of water heated by oil and piped
to the shower room plumbing. Since water and pumping equip-
ment were in short supply the wasting of water was not tolerated.
Posters were hung in washrooms giving a tutorial on the con-ect
method of taking a shower, shaving, and brushing teeth. Meanwhile,
back at Fighter Two conditions also improved, as tents had wooden
floors and mess tents became elaborate affairs, with tables, benches,
high pitched roofs, and cement floors. Showers, wash stations, and
latrines were improved. Water was brought up to the pilot's
bivouac on the ridge by a water trailer pulled by a jeep. A wobble
94
pump was used to get water into the overhead can with holes
punched in the bottom to provide a showerhead.
On 21 December 11 pilots of the 70FS arrived from Fiji. Capt.
Robert Hubbell led seven new P-40F Rolls Royce engined P-40s
into lLt. Martin Ryan had to ditch between Espiritu Santo
and Guadalcanal when his engine overheated, but was rescued. The
68
th
now had more pilots than aircraft. Squadron CO Henry Viccellio
asked if anyone wanted to fly the P-38, and three pilots volunteered.
This was to prove an ill-fated decision for ILts. Ronald Hilken,
Raymond Hine, and Emmett Norris, as all three would be MIA!
KIA in the future flying the P-38.
70FS (20 December 1942) First Contingent Fiji. Front (L-R): Daggitt; Dunbar;
Cosart; Lanphier; and Hendrix. Rear (L-R): Moore;Topoll;Vicellio; Buck; Bar-
ber; Rivers; and Petit. (Lansdale)
Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942
25,000 starving and malarial Japanese, who had received mini-
mal supplies from the Tokyo Express and were incapable of mount-
ing a sustained offensive, faced Gen. Patch's Army infantry forces.
However, they were determined to fight and die for the Emperor,
and were entrenched along a line extending from Point Cruz to
Mount Austin in a number of strongpoints. The Japanese had made
Mount Austen, which was a series of rocky ridges running west
and surrounded by heavy jungle, into a stronghold. It was also a
valuable observation point of everything happening inside the
Henderson perimeter: the arrival of shipping; the movement of
troops; and the transit of aircraft flying toward Japanese bases to
the west. To the west of Mount Austen was a series of hills or open
crests. The Army gave these hills numbers for reference (e.g. Hill
53), but the most prominent ones were named the Gifu, the Seahorse,
and the Galloping Horse. This defense line blocked an American
advance to the south and west and posed a continual threat to
Henderson. Just as things seemed to settle down a five man Japa-
nese patrol infiltrated Fighter Two on the 12
th
and set a P-39 and
fuel truck on fire, then returned to their lines safely in the confu-
sion.
The Land Offensive
In preparation for the new American offensive against Mt. Austen,
P-39s and SBDs regularly flew sorties against Japanese bivouac
and supply dumps in the Kokumbona area. During the infantry at-
tack on Hill 53 American aircraft stepped up their activity. Previ-
ous to the attack AAF fighters had been able to isolate the battle-
field by cutting off supplies landing on the coast. Army artillery
began a half hour bombardment beginning at 0550 that was fol-
lowed by 12 P-39s and 12 SBDs attacking the hill and its surround-
ing area for 20 minutes. The P-39s were armed with a 500lb. bomb,
and the SBDs carried three depth charges. The initial Army ad-
vance after the attack took Hill 53 without heavy resistance. The P-
39s then attacked Japanese reinforcements moving through the
jungle and blew up several ammunition dumps. As often as targets
were sighted and called in the P-39s were sent out to attack them.
Early in the morning of the 13
t
\ two P-39s strafed Japanese troops
landed on Kokumbona beach, and five Airacobras hit Vasale later
in the day. On the 14
th
the P-39s were out all day on sorties, some
using improvised gasoline bombs. On the 15'h the P-39s supple-
mented B-26s that dropped 82 100lb. bombs on Tassafaronga, and
five P-39s dropped depth charges in the Mt. Austen area. The Ameri-
can offensive to take Mount Austen began on the 17
t
h, but the ad-
vance was slow and costly, as the Japanese strongpoints were well
dug-in, well camouflaged, and mutually supporting. Numerous close
air support missions were called in against the ravines forward of
the advancing troops but had little effect. The Japanese defenses
had to be dislodged one by one using machine guns and mortars to
support infantry using demolition charges, hand grenades, and then
hand-to-hand fighting. On the 17
th
the Japanese OKA unit was put-
ting up strong resistance in a small pocket in a ravine between Hills
31-27 and 43-44. The area was small and too narrow to safely call
in artillery fire before the advancing American battalions. A P-39
squadron was armed with 500lb. depth charges that they dropped
in the ravines. The large detonations of the depth charges in the
confined area caused heavy enemy casualties, and the infantry was
able to overrun the Japanese positions after two days of battle. Mount
Austen was not taken until 10 January, and the area was not cleared
until the 23'd. The XIV Corps' general offensive to secure the Ameri-
can flank began on 8 January against the Galloping Horse and ended
on the llth, and against the Sea Horse on the 10
t
\ and it was cap-
tured on the 14
th
. The Japanese resistance was fanatical, American
casualties were heavy in the savage fighting, and American infan-
try morale was at its lowest ebb since Bloody Ridge. Finally the
flank was secured, and the coastal offensive to the west from Point
Cruz could begin on the 13
th
. Kokumbona was captured on the 23
rd
,
and the offensive reached the Poha River on the 25
th
. The loss of
Kokumbona meant that the Japanese lost their closest good landing
beach west of the American airfields, their artillery positions that
had constantly shelled the American perimeter, and their main sup-
ply routes to the east and south, along with their primary ammuni-
tion and materiel dumps.
Pilots of the 12FS arrived on Guadalcanal from Efate, New
Hebrides, on 20 December, and were to see their first combat after
flying an uneventful B-17 escort mission on the 23
rd
. The Squadron
was led by Maj. Paul Bechtel, who was considered a veteran, hav-
ingjoined the Air Force in 1939 after graduating from the Univer-
sity of Wyoming with an engineering degree and earning his wings
Paul Bechtel (3'd right on wing) poses with his
pilots and crew, (Bechtel)
95
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
12FS P-39Ds "Innocent Imogene" with 12FS insignia (a fist clutching a lightning bolt) on the door. Note the belly auxiliary fuel tank shackles. (Bechtel)
in late March 1940. On 24 December nine SBDs escorted by eight
P-39s led by Maj. Bechtel and four F4Fs ofVMF-121 led by their
CO, Maj. Donald Yost, attacked Munda airfield. The formation
approached Munda at 0800 in clear weather, with the F4Fs provid-
ing high cover at 16,000 feet and the AAF flight flying intermedi-
ate cover at 12,000 feet for nine Marine SBDs. The dive-bombers
were difficult to escort because of their low speed, and the fighters
had to weave continually to stay with them. Unknown to American
intelligence was that the Japanese had moved 24 Zeros to Munda,
and as the Americans arrived they spotted the dust from Zeros taxi-
ing for take off. The SBDs dove to attack the field from 10,000
feet, with the Wildcats abandoning their high cover assignment and
following them. The SBD attack caused chaos and destroyed ten
Zeros waiting at the end of the runway, while the F4Fs shot up
taxiing Zeros and a few in their take off and climbing patterns.
Bechtel remained at his assigned intermediate cover position, and
once the attack was finished he split his two flights. He sent a flight
down to intercept the Zeros that had managed to take off and were
now pursuing the Wildcats, while Bechtel remained with his flight
at 12,000 feet as top cover. While orbiting, Bechtel spotted about a
half dozen Zeros in echelon formation to the west. These Zeros had
probably taken offjust before the Americans arrived and were wait-
ing to bounce the SBDs when they climbed back to altitude after
their attack. Bechtel's fight was up sun and he turned into them.
The Zeros, thinking that Bechtel's flight was another group of Ze-
ros, casually turned, allowing the P-39s to join the formation from
the rear. ever trusting his 37mm cannon, Bechtel fired his four
wing .30 caliber and two cowl .50 caliber machine guns at a Zero,
but did not get any hits. He doubled his deflection and still didn't
see any hits, but the Zero quickly began to smoke and lost power.
96
Later Bechtel's wingman reported that he had seen the stricken plane
break into flames. Bechtel climbed and fired at the next Zero in the
formation, getting good hits, but then the Jap formation broke up
and the maneuverable Zeros pulled tight turns inside the P-39s.
During a filing pass Bechtel heard a frantic call from his wingman,
2Lt. Everett Anglin, informing him to go into immediate evasive
maneuvers, as he had a Zero on his tail. The Zeros' tracers followed
Bechtel as he tried a tight right tum to escape. His Airacobra went
into a stall and spun to the right. The Japanese pilot thought he had
hit Bechtel and turned on Anglin, who shot him down. Bechtel re-
covered from his spin and was alone over Rendova Island. He
searched for another plane to follow back to Cactus and saw one
about four or five miles off to his left and about 300 to 400 yards
higher. As he approached he saw that the plane was another Zero.
Again the Zero turned gently and allowed Bechtel to pull up behind
him. Bechtel closed to 300 yards and fired a burst, setting the Zero
on fire (later confirmed by a ground observer). P-39 pilots of the
12FS had good day, making their first combat claims of the war
(four Zeros and two probables). Maj. Bechtel claimed two Zeros
and a probable, 2Lt. Anglin shot down one Zero, and Capt. James
Baird and lLt. James Lamburth shared a Zero. Another probable
was shared by 2Lts. Roger Ames and Joseph Young. ASBD appar-
ently shot down the last Zero. But it was the Marines that took the
day again by scoring ten aerial victories after their strafing run,
with Maj. Donald Yost getting four and lLt. Kenneth Kirk ofVMO-
251 three. Earlier in the day Capt. Thomas Lanphier, flying a P-39,
got a Zero for the 70FS over Cactus. However this victory could be
in error, as there is no mention of it in 70FS records, but the simi-
larly named lLt. James Lamburth shared a victory that day, and
Lanphier may have gotten a victory credit. Lanphier, in his unpub-
Part Two, Chapter 6 - December 1942
ILt Joseph Moore. (Canning)
lished self-aggrandizing biography, seems confused, and com-
mingles his missions of 23,24, and 26 December- he credits him-
self with two Zeros on the 24
th
! That afternoon nine SBDs escorted
by four Wildcats and four Airacobras attacked 13 Japanese barges
carrying troops and sunk nine, taking a heavy toll on their passen-
gers.
A Christmas present for the exhausted pilots of the 67FS and
339FS was R&R. They were flown to Sydney, Australia, in C-47s
and spent the next two weeks there (the next leaves would be spent
in Auckland, New Zealand). Sections relieved one another every
eight weeks, spending nine to 14 days on R&R, and then returned
to New Caledonia for further training before returning to combat.
During their time on the Canal entertainment and relaxation was
provided mainly by motion pictures. At new bases one of the first
duties of the Special Service Officers was to set up a movie or pic-
ture show, as they were called back then. The first theaters were a
simple projection booth, a few logs or bomb fin packing cases to sit
on, and an improvised screen from a white sheet or tent side. After
a while these theaters evolved into elaborate stages with curtains
and wooden seats, and were given names such as the "Tropicana,"
"Coralcobana," or "Jungle Bijou." Every night was movie night, as
one unit showed its movies on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday,
while a nearby unit would show its movies on Sunday, Tuesday,
and Saturday, so there was always a movie to see. Unfortunately,
movies were scarce and units often traded, so the same movies were
often seen many times by the men.
On the 26
th
the 70FS sent 14 fighters to accompany four SBDs
on a surprise attack on Lambeti Airfield, New Georgia. Most of the
enemy aircraft were caught on the ground by the strafing attack and
13 were destroyed, along with gasoline and supplies. Several Zeros
took off through the pandemonium, and lLt. Joseph Moore shot
one down.
On the 28
th
lLt. Rex Barber and his wingman, lLt. William
Daggitt (70FS) were flying a two-plane P-39 reconnaissance patrol
over Munda Point at 9,000 feet when nine Japanese fighters were
spotted orbiting at 13,000 feet directly over the airfield. At the same
time a Betty ( ell?) bomber was flying below at 1,000 feet making
a landing approach on the field. Barber and Daggitt dove on the
bomber, with Daggitt feinting toward the fighters while Barber, in
"Diablo," attacked the Betty. As he dove his aircraft seemed slug-
gish and would not come up to speed. He realized that he had not
dropped his belly tank, jettisoned the tank, and continued his dive
on the bomber and set its right engine on fire. It continued to fly on
until it crashed into the ocean for Barber's first victory. As Barber
climbed he saw some aircraft off to his left that he thought were
Marine Corsairs. As he closed he discovered that they were Zeros,
but the two Jap pilots saw him and high-tailed it back to base. When
he returned to Cactus Barber's crew chief told him that it had been
reported that he had "bombed" a Japanese bomber. An Australian
coast watcher had seen him drop his belly tank before he fired on
the enemy aircraft and thought it was a bomb!
The Japanese Washing Machine Charlie attacks continued on
Guadalcanal with one or more attacks sent each night. Materiel
damage was modest and occasionally casualties happened, but the
major casualty was the morale of the personnel, whose sleep was
interrupted as they spent hours in a foxhole or slit trench waiting
out the attacks. On 21 December Maj .Gen. Alexander Patch rec-
ommended to Halsey that six night fighters be sent to Cactus.
Harmon was given permission to request the night fighters and their
GCI (Ground Control Intercept) equipment. The Cactus Director
of Air Defense asked for one fixed SCR-588 unit to be sent, but the
Navy felt that a mobile unit would be better suited and could sup-
ply one within three months from a British unit at New Zealand. So
it would not be until March 1943 that night fighters and associated
radar would arrive at Guadalcanal.
At the end of 1942 Harmon assessed the condition of his air
units at Cactus. The P-38s were performing well in their various
roles with minimal maintenance problems. They were good bomber
escorts when properly utilized (e.g. high cover -author), "excel-
lent" recon aircraft (F-5s), and had "splendid potential" as a "sec-
ond bomber" (fighter-bomber), but there were only 41 operational
in the theater. B-25s were scheduled to operate out of Henderson
permanently at the start of 1943, but only the P-38 could provide
escort to the range limit of the Mitchell. Harmon reported that the
P-38 was at a "terrific disadvantage" in performance when it es-
corted this medium bomber at its effective combat ceiling or lower.
The P-38 did not have sufficient range to escort the B-17s to Rabaul,
and advanced bases would have to be captured or built for this to
happen. The P-39 continued to do stellar work as a fighter-bomber,
but often had to be withheld from that duty over Guadalcanal to
keep them in reserve for SBD/TBF escort missions. Harmon's last
nine P-40s were doing yeoman duty -but were beginning to wear
out. He reported that for the period 1 February 1942 to the end of
the year the Japanese lost 388 aircraft (46 bombers, 304 fighters,
and 38 others), while his air forces lost 160 (20 bombers of all
types, 67 fighters, and 73 others, including those MIA). His report
stated that Henderson (Bomber One) was in "fair condition," Fighter
One was being regraded for the installation of Marston mat, Fighter
Two was almost completely matted, and Bomber Two on Koli Point
was still under construction. Despite the improving conditions, the
uncontrollable weather kept operations below optimal levels. At-
tacks were conducted under low ceilings and through rainstorms
that limited visibility. Long missions necessitated take offs before
97
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
sunrise and landings after sunset. Bomber escort often required five
to six hours flying time with the possibility of meeting Japanese
interception. Nightly Washing Machine Charlie/Louie the Louse
attacks interrupted sleep and caused morale and physical exhaus-
tion to decline. Harmon also needed replacement crews for Gen.
Saunder's 11
th
and 5
th
Bombardment Groups, whose crews were
flying 12 hours daily for days at a time. In response to Harmon's
recommendations Arnold established a replacement schedule for
all personnel who had been in combat for four continuous months.
Harmon wanted the replacement of entire units, but the plan called
for the replacement of- eight crews per month. Fighter squadron
personnel were replaced in partial detachments back to the rear bases
on New Caledonia and usually/hopefully to New Zealand. The shuf-
fling of these detached units to and from areas resulted in the mix-
ing of pilots of different fighter squadrons, so that it was almost
impossible to determine the composition of a fighter squadron in
combat at any time.
98
A columnist from Collier's Magazine asked Maj.Gen.
Vandegrift what had caused the most Japanese infantry casualties:
"This columnist recently asked Major General A.A. ("Archie")
Vandegrift, who had led the Marines into the Solomons last August
and commanded our forces there during the heavy fighting last fall,
what caused the most casualties among Japanese infantry? Machine
gun and rifle fire, artillery fire, or dive-bombing?
'We haven't any official statistics,' Vandegrift said, and then
turned to his chief of staff, Colonel Gerald Thomas, and asked,
'But how about it, Gerry?'
'I'd say, definitely, Chief, that ground strafing by airplanes
killed the most Japs' Thomas replied. 'American airplanes, firing
both .50 caliber machine guns and 37 millimeter cannon, accounted
for many of the Nipponese killed at Guadalcanal by aircraft fire
while attacking landing barges.'" (Colliers Magazine, March 13,
1943)
7
January 1943
Gen. Hitoshi Imamura diverted the 50,000 troops of his 8
th
Area
Army on Java from a planned attack on New Guinea in December
to reinforce Hyakutake's 17
th
Army at Rabaul in preparation to re-
capture Guadalcanal on 1 February 1943. However, on 4 January
the Imperial War Council issued an order to evacuate the troops on
Guadalcanal ("Operation Ke") and use them to establish a new de-
fensive perimeter in the Munda-Kolombangara region, and to rein-
force New Guinea to prevent a defeat there. The evacuation would
have to be conducted under increased air support a ~ d by a reverse
Tokyo Express. The Japanese Navy air arm had suffered heavy
losses, and the Army would be directed to throw their aircraft into
the inferno to aid in the evacuation of their troops. In December
about 100 Imperial Japanese Army Air Force aircraft were trans-
ferred from Malaya to Rabaul, and the first an'ivals were sent up to
intercept B-17s bombing Rabaul.
On 5 January B-17s with a mixed P-38 escort from the 339FS
and 68FS attacked a cruiser in Tonolei Harbor, off Buin, and were
intercepted by 25 Zeros and float planes. Capt. Robert Hubbell, CO
of the 68FS, shot down a Zero, and lLt. Emmett Norris claimed a
Lt. Besby Holmes claimed a floatplane and two probables over Tonolei Har-
bOe (Holmes)
probable. The 339
th
's Capt. John Mitchell and lLt. Besby Holmes
each shot down a float plane. Holmes also claimed two probables.
Two P-38s were lost, with lLt. Ronald Hilken crashing north of
Vella Lavella and listed MIA/KIA. Hilken was the first ofViccellio's
P-38 volunteers to die. lLt. Walter Dinn was shot down for the
third time and was last seen descending in flames; he was never
found.
The 67FS was assigned to conduct searches over three areas:
Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Santa Isabel. The aircraft were to
fly low over the coast looking for barges and landing craft, war-
ships, observation and gun positions, enemy bivouacs, and dumps.
Two planes on the New Georgia patrol were to fly over the Munda
area, and two on the Santa Isabel patrol were to fly over Rekata.
Their assignments were to draw anti-aircraft fire from these air-
fields and determine if it was light or heavy! Along with their search
missions the 67
th
flew their usual escort missions. On the 6
th
B-17s
escorted by P-38s and P-40s attacked transports near Shortland,
and the next day P-39s escorted B-26s in an attack of Rakata Bay.
Two B-26s were lost.
Mitsubishi FI MI Pete floatplane ofAir Group 958 was easy prey. (Passingham
via Lansdale)
99
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
On the 12
th
the Japanese sent a small force to Henderson and
destroyed a P-39 and a fuel truck on Fighter Two. This was a rare
occurrence, as at this time the Japanese were usually intercepted
before they could close in on Cactus. Only Washing Machine Charlie
continued to fly virtually unmolested at night, causing more an-
noyance than damage.
On the 14
th
, lLt. George Topoll of the 70FS led a morning two-
plane patrol over the Rekata Bay area at 10,000 feet. He spotted
three Mitsubishi FIMI Pete float planes at 3,000 feet and dove on
them through AA fire. Topoll shot down a Pete float plane, and his
wingman, 2Lt. Harvey Dunbar, damaged another.
Activation of the 13AF and COMAIRSOLS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had authorized Lt.Gen. Millard Harmon,
COMGENSOPAC, to form the 13AF, and on 13 January 1943 it
was activated at Noumea, New Caledonia, under Maj.Gen. Nathan
Twining, who had been Harmon's Chief of Staff. Also activated
were the XIII Bomber Command under Col. Harlan McCormick
and the XIII Fighter Command under Col. Dean Strother (who would
soon become a Brig. General). The new Chief of Staff was Col.
Glen Jamison. The staffs of these three commands were very small.
On the 21st Twining moved 13
th
HQ to Espiritu Santo, where it re-
mained for a year. AAF units assigned to the 13AF were the 5
th
and
11
th
Bomb Groups (H), the 69
th
and 70
th
Bomb Squadrons (M), the
347
th
Fighter Group, the 12
th
and 44
th
Fighter Squadrons, and the
13
th
Troop Carrier Squadron. The 13AF was activated without an
air service command, and the administrative and supply of the 13AF
would remain under USAFISP. AAF air service units were directly
under the control of island commanders, and this system continued
until mid-1943, when they were transferred to the XIII Air Service
Command. The establishment of the 13AF did not change air op-
erations in the South Pacific, which remained under the control of
COMAIRSOPAC. All Harmon could do was emphasize that the
100
13
th
Air Force was definitely under his command, and that he was
to have direct control of administration, supply, movement, and
training, along with a firm input on the attention to AAF principles,
doctrine, and techniques in the employment of 13AF units. None-
theless, neither Harmon nor Twining had operational control over
their air units, and were only advisors dependent on a good rela-
tionship with VAdm. Aubrey Fitch, head of COMAIRSOPAC.
Purpose of the 13
th
Air Force
in relation to proposed objectives:
13 January 1943 to mid-year, 1943:
I) Gain air supremacy over the Central Solomons
2) Aid in the achieving ground and sea objectives in the Central
Solomons
3) Destroy Japanese supply lines in the Northern Solomons and
to the Central Solomons
From mid-year 1943 to December 1943:
1) Gain air superiority over the Northern Solomons
2) Neutralize Japanese airfields and installations on New
Georgia and Bougainville
3) Support and protect amphibious landings in the Northern
Solomons
4) Destroy Japanese supply lines to the BougainvillelNorthern
Solomons area
December 1943
I) Maintain air superiority over the Northern Solomons
2) Destroy Japanese airfields and installations on New Britain
3) Support amphibious landings in the invasion of New Britain
or in out-flanking New Britain
The amphibious nature of the war in the Pacific demanded
coordination of sea, land, and air components. Well equipped and
defended bases had to be established on a series of Pacific islands
from which air, land, and naval offensives could be dispatched
against enemy's air, land, and naval forces. The primary prerequi-
site for any offensive was air and naval superiority in the area. The
13AF was to supply land-based air power, in cooperation with
Marine, Navy, and later the 5AF air units. Early in the Pacific war
the AAF units were under the operational control of the Commander
of the South Pacific (COMSOPAC), Adm. Robert Ghormley, a Navy
admiral, and R.Adm. Fitch (COMAIRSOPAC), another Navy ad-
miral, who had control of all air units operating in the South Pa-
cific. After Ghormley was relieved operational control ofAAF units
was passed to the control of the Marine general, A.A. Vandegrift,
commander of Guadalcanal operations. When Brig.Gen. Francis
Mulcahy become the Senior Aviator on Guadalcanal on 26 Decem-
ber 1943 he commanded not only his 2MAW, but also all AAF,
USN, USMC, and RNZAF units on the island. Fitch continued as
COMAIRSOPAC, so there was a need for a centralized, coordi-
nated command. On 16 February 1943 Air Command, Solomons
(COMAIRSOLS) was formed under the command of R.Adm.
Charles Mason and four staff officers, who took over control of all
aircraft on Guadalcanal, with Mulcahy continuing on as its Chief
Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943
of Staff using the 2MAW as a framework. The new staff was beset
with administrative, supply, and operational problems of its dispar-
ate force. On 1 February Lt.Col. Luther Moore, the CO of MAG-
12, was named Fighter Commander of all fighter aircraft on
Guadalcanal, and later on the Russell Islands, and would maintain
his control until 25 July. Halsey's rule of "unity of command" gave
tactical control of the area to the major air force there (the USMC),
but left management of administration, training, and discipline to
individual air forces. In each smaller geographic area in the South
Pacific the principle of unity applied through the establishment of
island air commanders. The most important air commander and,
the one most closely connected to the control of the 13AF was
R.Adm. Mason, COMAIRSOLS (Commander of the Solomons),
who was directly responsible to COMAIRSOPAC. Mason was fol-
lowed by: R.Adm. Marc Mitscher USN (4 April 1943), Maj.Gen.
Nathan Twining AAF (25 July 1943), Maj.Gen. Ralph Mitchell
USMC (20 November 1943), and Maj.Gen. Hubert Harmon AAF
(IS March 1944). It would not be until 1944 that the 13AF would
gain operational control of its fighter and bomber units. Then, in
April 1944, its forward units were placed under the Thirteenth Air
Task Force under the 5
th
Air Force Advanced Echelon. On IS June
1944, the 13AF was assigned to the Far East Air Forces, which
included the S'h Air Force and was under the command of Lt.Gen.
George Kenney, the former Commanding General of the SAP.
COMAIRSOLS was divided into four subcommands:
13
'
/' Fighter Command: 347FG composed of the 67FS (P-39s),
68FS (P-39s and P-40s), 70FS (P-39s),
339FS (P-38s) plus theMFS (P-40s) and
12FS (P-39s), which were on temporary
duty. Fighter Command was responsible
for air defense, ground support, and es-
cort for air, naval, and some Strike
Command operations.
13'
h
Bomber Command: 5
th
and II th Bomb Groups Heavy (B-17s)
and 69
th
and 70
th
Bomb Squadrons Me-
dium (B-26s) carried out attacks on en-
emy air, naval, and ground forces and
installations.
13
'h
Strike Command: Mainly USMC (F4Fs) flying low-level
missions against Japanese surface units
and airfields.
13
'
/' Search Command: Reconnaissance
Even though the 13AF had administrative control, the conse-
quence of COMAIRSOLS was to deny 13AF HQ of operational
control of its tactical units as long as it was in the South Pacific.
Throughout the campaign the successive COMAIRSOLS staffs
experienced administration, supply, equipment, and doctrinal prob-
lems because of its diversity. To its credit COMAIRSOLS coped
amazingly well, and overcame these problems thanks to Halsey's
"unity of command" principle. A large number of 13AF missions
were flown with other COMAIRSOLS units, particularly in the in-
stance of 13AF fighters. 13AF fighters could fly escort for Marine
SBD and TBF bombers or AAF heavy and medium bombers, or
both at once, as Marine bombers often flew bombing missions in
coordination with AAF bombers. Almost every Japanese raid on
Guadalcanal was met by a mixed group ofArmy, Marine, and some-
times Navy fighters.
The tactical units of the 13AF were not utilizing the optimal
aircraft for operations in the South Pacific. The 5BG and llBG
were using B-17s that were not as suited to flying over the great
distances of the theater as were the B-24s. The medium B-26 bomb-
ers of the 69BS and 70BS were only beginning to be replaced by
the better B-25. Three fighter squadrons were flying obsolete P-
39s (67
t
h, 70
th
, and 12
th
), two were flying nearly obsolete P-40s (68
th
and 44
th
), and only the 339
th
was equipped with the P-38, which
was considered the superlative AAF fighter in the Pacific. Conse-
quently, 13AFbombers were obliged to depend on Marine and Navy
fighters for escort and cover or fly without escort. The P-38 was the
answer to AAF bomber escort problems, but during two months of
combat ending in mid-January just over half had been lost in com-
bat or operationally. Seven more were being transported on a ship
that left Hawaii on 6 January. Emmons promised Harmon that be-
ginning in March five P-38s per month would be allocated from
production lines to the South Pacific. At a 20% loss rate the 339FS
could be maintained at its full 25 aircraft strength.
The first combat for the 13
th
Air Force came in the -:arly morn-
ing of 15 January when 12FS P-39s escorted SBDs to search for
Lt. Darrrell Cosart posing with the P-39 "Short Stroke."There are three rising
Sun victory markings, but Cosart had two victory credits. Probably the other
victory credit was by another pilot flying "Short Stroke." (Lansdale)
101
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Left Capt. Richard Riv-
ers shot down two
Petes for his only vic-
tories of the war
(Canning)
Right: Lt. Phillip Hendrix
shot down one iloat-
plane, his only aerial
victory (Canning)
the Tokyo Express off New Georgia and claimed two Zero probabIes
(one each by Capt. Cyril Nichols and Lt. Roger Ames). Later that
day, during an afternoon bombing mission, a mixed group of P-38,
P-39, and P-40 fighters of the 68
th
and 70
th
Fighter Squadrons es-
corted a formation of SBDs up the Slot to attack five enemy de-
stroyers of the Tokyo Express about 37 miles southeast of Faisi. As
the Americans neared the destroyers the Japanese sent up a large
formation ofl2 float planes, mostly Petes, from Rekata Bay to in-
tercept. A flight of four 68FS P-40s took on nine of the attackers
and decimated them. Lts. Robert Kennedy, Martin Smith, and Allen
Webb each downed two, while Lt. Lloyd Huff became the first AAF
pilot in the South Pacific to down three Japanese aircraft in a day. It
was to be the squadron's second best day of the war. Two four-
plane sections of70FS P-39s led by Capt. Richard Rivers had flown
almost to their maximum range to find the destroyers and encoun-
tered the float planes. Capt. Rivers got two, and ILts. Darrell Cosart
and Phillip Hendrix one each. The B-17s did no damage to the de-
stroyers, but all aircraft returned safely to base. That same day SBDs
Capt. Stan Palmer's P-40 was shot down by a nervous B-1? waist gunner
(Palmer)
102
with F4F and P-39 escort attacked a cargo ship off Munda and were
intercepted by a dozen Zeros, and seven were shot down by the
Wildcats. Elsewhere, VMF-1211ed by Joe Foss and VMO-251 un-
der Lt.Col. John Hart had a good day in two missions, shooting
down 20 Japanese aircraft. The American losses for the day were
one SBD and five Marine F4F escorts.
On the 16
th
the men of the 17
th
Photo Reconnaissance Squad-
ron disembarked from the troopship USS McCawley and came on
shore at Lunga Point by barge to set up camp in the coconut grove
on the west end of Fighter Two. The photo lab was set up on the
Lunga River near Henderson Field using old aircraft crates and other
material begged, borrowed, or stolen. The squadron would have to
wait until 2 February for their aircraft to arrive.
On the 18
th
11 B-17s escorted by two flights of 68FS PAOs on
close cover and P-38s on high cover at 30,000 feet were to bomb a
cargo ship near Shortland, 285 miles away. Capt. Robert Hubbell
led the first 68FS flight and Capt. Stanley Palmer led the other.
Because a P-40 had to maintain airspeed at 185mph the seven P-
40s had to "s" above the B-17s that were flying at 165mph. As they
approached the target the P-40s encountered two oblivious Japa-
nese Rufes, with one towing a gunnery target and the other weav-
ing in and out to practice firing runs. ILts. Joseph Lynch and Allen
Webb broke out of escort and each shot down a Rufe. The P-40s
had been instructed to keep close to the B-17s to provide them for-
ward firepower, as these early B-17s did not have a chin turret. The
bombers had just finished their bombing run and were making their
customary diving right hand turns to "get the hell out of there" and
to elude any lurking Japanese interceptors. The escorts lagged be-
hind after the bombers' quick turn and were to move back to escort
position. Capt. Palmer, thinking his flight was right behind him,
moved back up to his escort position, and a B-17 nervous waist
gunner began to fire on the lone P-40. Palmer's aircraft was hit, his
coolant and hydraulics were shot out, and he was forced to bailout
Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943
would establish itself with the 339FS as the premier l3'h Fighter
Command fighter squadron.
On the 20
th
the 339FS and 68FS escorted dive-bombers that
attacked shipping near the Shortlands. Zeros and float planes at-
tacked the formation between Fauro and Shortland Island at 0815.
Capt. Robert Hubbell and Lts. Frederick Ploetz and Martin Smith
each shot down float planes. lLt. Kennedy claimed two probables
and Hubbell one. Capt. William Shaw became the first 339FS
Sunsetter pilot to claim a double victory. lLts. Besby Holmes and
Fred Purnell claimed a probable each. Lt. Ploetz of the 68
th
was hit
in the shoulder by shrapnel from a shell that hit his fighter, but was
able to return safely to base. lLt. Emmett Norris became the sec-
ond 68FS pilot who had volunteered to fly the P-38 to be MIA/
KIA, and only Raymond Hine remained alive.
On the nnd, the 44FS flew its first B-17 escort mission when it
accompanied nine bombers to Munda. The P-40s of the 44
th
flew
low cover, while the 339
th
P-38s flew high cover during the un-
eventfu13.5-hour round trip mission. After landing the P-40s were
immediately refueled, and the 44
th
took off for a low cover escort
for SBDs on a bombing mission on transports. During the mission
one of the SBD pilots called out bogies and the P-40s rushed over
to find "enemy" P-38s escorting B-26s to Munda. On 23 January
six 12FS pilots arrived from Fiji.
The American air and naval buildup on Guadalcanal threat-
ened the entire Japanese status in the central and northern Solomons.
To prevent the buildup on Guadalcanal the Japanese increased their
air attacks on the island. On the 25
th
30 JAAF bombers and fighters
approached Guadalcanal and were met by Marine and Air Force
fighters. Two Oscars were downed by Marine pilots and two more
by 339FS pilots, ILts. Ray Bezner and Besby Holmes. The Japa-
nese formation was turned back, but four defending Marine fight-
ers were lost.
very close to Japanese positions onshore, where he floated in his
raft during that late afternoon and night. The next day a PBY
"Dumbo" piloted by Lt. G.E. Hoffman was sent out on a S&R mis-
sion with P-38 and P-40 escorts to ward off enemy fighters and to
suppress Japanese shore fire. Palmer threw out a dye marker that
was very fortunately spotted by an alert Capt. William Shaw flying
aP-38 for the 339FS. As the PBY was about to set down Hoffman
spotted the wakes of two Japanese destroyers about six miles away
heading toward Palmer. As Hoffman landed the amphibian the de-
stroyers were five miles away and closing at a mile every two min-
utes, which Hoffman figured would give him enough time to pick
up Palmer. But during the rescue Lt. Joseph Lynch's PAO had en-
gine failure, and he ditched between Palmer and the closing de-
stroyers. Hoffman had to make a quick decision; if he went to pick
up the nearby Palmer he could not reach Lynch before the destroy-
ers came into firing range, and if he went for Lynch first he might
not have had time to return to pick up Palmer. Hoffman raced the
engines and put the PBY into step, pounding along the tops of the
waves toward Lynch, who was dragged through the side blister as
the destroyers closed to four miles. Hoffman turned the PBY and
lumbered across the waves towards Palmer as shells from the de-
stroyers splashed to within a 100 yards of the Dumbo. Palmer was
hauled through the blister, and the Dumbo turned and took off with
the destroyers less than three miles away; Hoffman's gamble saved
the lives of both pilots. Palmer suffered from exposure, and Lynch
a black eye and 32 stitches when he hit his gunsight during the
ditching. (Palmer narrative) During their Solomon rescue duties
the Navy Dumbo squadrons were credited with saving 161 pilots
and crews.
On 19 January the 44FS left New Caledonia for Cactus with
an overnight stop at Espiritu Santo. Maj. Tyler, Capts. Forsythe and
Taylor, and Lts. Tarbet, Wheadon, and Westbrook flew their PAOs,
while Lts. Byrnes, Matson, and Morrissey flew on one of the navi-
gation B-25s. The next morning at 0630 the six Warhawks and
Mitchell bombers left
Buttons. Maj. Tyler's PAO's gas cap came off and one of the
B-25s developed engine trouble, and both had to return. The other
five P-40s and the B-25 landed safely at 1030 at Cactus, where it
Capt.William Shaw became the first 339FS Sun Setter pilot to claim a double
victory. (Canning)
Lt. Fred Ploetz of the 68FS
shot down a floatplane be-
tween Fauro and Shortland
Island; he was wounded in
the shoulder during the
mission, but returned safely
to base. (Palmer) (Lansdale/
347FG Assoc.)
103
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
12
th
Fighter Squadron P-39 "Beth" has a 12
th
FS insignia on the door. The
insignia has the lightning bolt held in the clawed fist extending beyond the
circle. (LansdaleI347FGA)
On the 26
th
the 70FS was on a search and rescue mission for a
life raft reported in the vicinity of Choiseul when ILt. Lawrence
McKulla's P-39 was shot down just off the coast of Wagina Island.
McCulla swam to the small island and was stranded there for 16
days before being picked up by a submarine. McKulla remained
aboard the sub until it completed its patrol, and he returned to base
several weeks later.
On the 27
th
the JAAF returned to Cactus with nine Bettys es-
corted by 30 Zeros. The bombers circled the Russell Islands while
the Zeros came in to take on the defending fighters. Eight F4Fs had
been scrambled at 0950, followed immediately by six 339FS P-38s
led by Capt. John Mitchell. The Wildcats climbed to 20,000 and
Lightnings to 30,000 feet to wait to pounce on the incoming Zeros.
The P-38s were the first to see the enemy, flying in undisciplined
formation, and dove, followed by the Wildcats; soon a wild dog-
fight began. A Zero came at Capt. Mitchell from the right, and he
turned into it and fired, hitting the cockpit. The stricken Zero dove,
briefly leveled out, and then crashed into the jungle near Cape
Esperance. 2Lt. Ray Bezner also shot a Zero, and 1Lt. Frank Holmes
claimed a probable. The 44FS had arrived on 20 January, but was to
see its first Jap in combat today. Ten of the squadron's PAOs took
off at 1015 and divided into two flights and an element and began
to climb, but at 6,000 feet a few of the Zeros broke off from the
dogfight above and bounced the first flight. Two PAOs were shot
down, but their pilots parachuted safely, landing near the airfield
below. Another P-40 was badly damaged, and the pilot crash-landed
on Henderson. The P-38s came down after the Zeros and, supported
by the second P-40 flight, broke up their attack. The 44
th
's 2Lt.
Dale Tarbet hit a Zero that crashed into the Aruligo jungle, and
Capt. Kenneth Taylor and ILt. Elmer Wheadon of the 44FS both
got a Zero. Wheadon was bounced and hit by numerous bullets (69
holes were counted later), but was able to land safely despite hav-
ing the fighter written off. Lt. Robert Westbrook's P-40, "Princess
Pat, " was hit in the tail, but he escaped by diving, and as he climbed
he spotted three Zeros and turned into one. He fired from 10 0' clock,
104
12
th
Fighter Squadron P-39 "Lilly." (LansdaleI347FGA)
hitting it in the belly, and it fell off on a wing and began to flame.
This would be the first of 20 victories for the top-scoring ace of the
13AF. The last P-40 element, led by Capt. Robert Hubbell from the
68FS, had been held back and had only climbed to 3,000 feet when
they were attacked. Hubbell called for his formation to break and
turn into the attackers. ILt. Fred Purnell shot down a lagging Zero
over Kokumbona, and he and his wingman then followed the home-
ward-bound Zeros. Purnell got a second Zero near Cape Esperance,
causing its pilot to bailout. In the dogfight Capt. Hubbell and Lt.
Ralph Moseley were shot down and listed MIA. ILt. Paul Hansen
had his Warhawk shot up, losing his hydraulics, and could not lower
his landing gear and chose the longer Henderson bomber field to
belly-land. As he was coming into Cactus a C-47 was also in its
landing approach. Henderson gave Hansen a "no go," but he came
-J ()lJ1d,
~ . WELGE
CaQtain, Air Corps.
Capt. Kenneth Taylor had served with the 47PS/ 15FG at Pearl Harbor as a
2
nd
Lieutenant flying P-40s. He and 2Lt. George Welch were the first Ameri-
cans to intercept the Japanese, and scored America's first aerial victories of
the Second World War. (Taylor)
Part Two, Chapter 7 - January 1943
in anyway and skidded safely off the runway before the C-47 touched
down. The 339
lh
P-38s also chased the Zeros home. The Zeros were
flying low over the water and would turn into the Lightning at-
tacks. Lt. Ray Bezner hit a Zero whose pilot bailed for his second
victory in three days. Capt. William Shaw, the leader of the second
section, despite being unable to release one of his belly tanks, made
a pass at a Zero when another Jap turned into him. The first Zero
also turned and fired, exploding Shaw's belly tank and fighter in a
ball of flame. Flight leader Capt. John Mitchell exacted revenge for
Shaw, as he got on the tail of this Zero and shot it down for his
second Zero of the day. Lt. N. McDaniel was also lost. The Marine
Wildcats scored two victories in the early fighting, but one ran out
offuel and had to ditch. The day's totals were ten Zeros for two P-
40s, two P-38s, a F4F, and two P-4Ds written off after landing. Dur-
ing the dogfight the waiting Japanese bombers flew under Cactus
radar and made one ineffective bombing and strafing pass on Ameri-
can troop positions. Capt. Mitchell's first victory of the day gave
him five and made him the first of 21 aces of the 13AF. Capt. Ken-
neth Taylor had served with the 47PS/lSFG at Pearl Harbor as a 2
nd
Lieutenant flying P-4Ds. He and 2Lt. George Welch were the first
Capt. Robert Hubbell of the 68FS (kneeling) was shot down leading a PAO
element for the 44FS. (Palmer)
Americans to intercept the Japanese and scored America's first aerial
victories of the Second World War. Taylor was credited with two
Kate victories and a probable in his first sortie, and after refueling
and rearming he claimed a Val probable after being wounded in the
left arm and receiving fragments in his leg. After the war the In-
spector General credited Taylor with victories for the two Pearl
Harbor probabIes, but the official USAF Historical Study 85 does
not credit him with these victories that would have made him an
ace. Doug Canning (67FS):
"Early belly tanks were crudely made, and the mounts didn't
always fit. The mechanics would take cold steel chisels and chisel
the mounts to fit. The word we got was if we got into the air and
they started to vibrate we should drop them right away, or they
would shake your wing off. On a B-24 escort mission my tanks
started to vibrate and I pulled away from my formation. First I hit
the electrical release and nothing happened. Then I hit the manual
and they didn't go. I went into a big dive and pulled back real hard
and hit both releases. The tanks released, but one tank hit my right
rudder, and now I had a full jam to the right. I was able to maintain
A released belly tank hit Doug Canning's P-38 rudder and forced him to
ditch. (Canning)
]05
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Capt. Willie Hull,
68FS. (Lansdale)
Capt. Ray Williams and his Crew Chief, S/Sgt. Williams. (68FS) Canning)
straight and level by using differential power. But the question now
was if I had enough fuel to make it back. Sure enough, when I was
about ten miles from the field it was evident that I wasn't going to
get back. Then the question was; do I bailout or ditch into the
water? I decided to ditch, but I was using differential power and
had quite a bit of speed. Three of the guys had stayed with me and
said that I had made quite a big rooster tail as I skidded across the
water. Finally, the aircraft slowed down and I got the canopy up,
but almost immediately the plane dove toward the bottom. I tried to
get out but something was holding me in. I found it was my headset
cord and ripped it out of the socket. I guess that I must have been
down 80 feet or so because the plane was going down pretty fast. I
popped up to the surface, climbed into my life raft, and thought I
could paddle the ten miles to shore. The paddles were only about
15 inches long, and it didn't take long for me to decide to wait to be
rescued. The boys had radioed my position, and it wasn't too long
before a lOa-foot ship came out to pick me up. The whole crew was
without shirts, and when I got on board the only guy with a uniform
asked me how I was. I said I was a little nervous. He asked if I
would like to have a shot. I thought he was a doctor. He took me
below and gave me dry Navy dungarees and I got my shot; medici-
nal whiskey, and then a steak, a Hershey bar, and a Coca Cola. I got
back to Fighter Two and flew a mission the next day."
106
On the 28
th
Lt. Henry Matson of the 44FS shot down a Zero
while on an escort over the Slot. On the 29
th
the 67FS and 339FS
pilots who had been on R&R were rotated back to Guadalcanal,
along with two 12FS pilots. All squadrons (67
t
h, 68
th
, 70
th
, and 339
th
)
were now represented in Cactus Flight.
During the last days of January and into early April the 68FS
had numerous command shuffles. On 27 January ILt. Fred Purnell
assumed command but was relieved by Capt. Karl Conradi on 5
February, then eight days later he was relieved by Capt. Ray Will-
iams, who was transferred from the 347FG HQ Squadron. Then,
two weeks later Williams left for New Caledonia and was replaced
by ILt. Paul Hancock. During this period there were no 68
th
pilots
in combat. Then, on 14 March Capt. William Hull replaced Hancock,
and Capt. Stanley Palmer replaced him, in tum, on 3 April.
Nearly every night Washing Machine Charlie continued his
nightly forays over Henderson, and since there were no night fight
fighters available several day fighter pilots volunteered to attempt
a night intercept but were denied permission. Finally, on the 29th,
Capt. John Mitchell of the 339'h was granted permission to try to
intercept Charlie. He took off to patrol shortly before sunrise and
waited for the final incoming Charlie of the night. The Betty gave
away its position when it dropped its bombs, and Mitchell dove on
it and hit it with a long burst. He continued on its tail, and a short
burst sent it flaming into the Slot. The Americans on Cactus awak-
ened by Charlie cheered Mitchell's seventh victory.
8
February 1943
On 1 February four P-40s of the 44FS and four P-38s of the
339FS escorted B-17s. All bombers made their bomb runs, but four
bombardiers did not jettison and turned to make a second run. Three
Fortresses were shot down, as the escorts were unaware of the sec-
ond run and did not accompany them. At 1630 the Cactus Fighter
Director was alerted of a Japanese air and naval attack approaching
the area and scrambled SBDs, TBFs, and a flight of 44FS PAOs to
escort them. The Japanese vessels were contacted to the north, near
Savo Island, and were protected by Zeros. The 44FS flight, led by
Maj. Kermit Tyler, consisted of Capt. Kenneth Taylor and Lts. Elmer
Wheadon and Robert Westbrook. The PAOs managed to keep the
Zeros at bay, but Wheadon's fighter had its stabilizer shot away,
and he was hit in the calf by shrapnel from a Japanese 20mm can-
non. Wheadon managed to crash-land the fighter at Cactus, total-
ing it. He was hospitalized, but spent the night in a bomb shelter
while the Japanese shelled the base. He was evacuated to New
Caledonia to recuperate, but would return to become an ace in July.
Capt. Jerome Sawyer of the 67FS shot down a Zero for the only
13FC victory for the day.
On 2 February 44FS Lts. Raymond Morrissey, Dale Tarbet,
and John Wood were escorting B-17s over Buin on southern
Bougainville when they were bounced by 20 Zeros as the bombers
were beginning their bombing run. Wood shot down a Zero but was
hit in the arm, side, and leg during the fray; he returned to the bomber
formation and continued flying escort. Tarbet and Morrissey also
shot down a Zero each, and all bombers returned safely to base. All
three pilots were awarded the Silver Star for their action that day.
The 339FS provided four P-38s for high cover for B-17s bombing
shipping in Shortland Harbor. Lt. Besby Holmes got his fourth vic-
tory (a Zero), John Mitchell claimed his eighth and last South Pa-
cific victory (a float plane), and Lt. Murray Shubin claimed a Zero
for his first of 11 victories. Shubin, called Jim by his squadronmates,
named his P-38 Oriole after his fiancE, and gave the name on the
cowling a loving ritual tap before each take off and after landing.
Wood commented on these escort missions:
"It must be remembered that our job was not to shoot down
Zeros. It was to protect the bombers, or whatever it was we were
escorting. On such missions it is a hard rule that we must hold our
formation and not let the enemy suck you out for a fight. Ours was
a defensive job, and what we got we got in holding these tactics-
to get the mission through." Tarbet added: "And it's hell to have to
sit there, holding that formation when surrounded by Zeros peck-
ing away at you. You get scared, scared as hell. Your mouth gets
dry and you suck up your oxygen as if it's the only thing to hold
onto. You want to dive out and get away but you know you can't.
Even after you get safely back home you are still scared from the
reaction. I couldn't sleep well for two nights. Every time I closed
my eyes I saw Zeros flocking around me." (44FS Combat Narra-
tives)
On the 2
nd
the 17
th
Photo Recon Squadron had its F-5 P-38
photo ships fly into Fighter Two and were greeted by their ground
personnel, who had arrived two weeks earlier via transport aircraft.
When they landed the infantry on Henderson hoped these new fight-
ers were the P-38 night fighter versions sent to knock off "Washing
Machine Charlie," but were disappointed when they saw that the
fighters were not even armed. Three days later, the l7PRS flew its
first sortie when CO Capt. John Murray scouted the southern end
of New Georgia. On the 14
th
the squadron lost its first pilot in com-
bat when 2Lt. Ardell Nord failed to return from a recon sortie. The
unit would lose five more pilots during their tour in 1943: 1Lt. John
Mancini (22 April); 2Lt. Charles Roberts (9 May); 2Lt. Frederick
Baird (2 July); 2Lt. Raymond Petterson (17 August); and 2Lt. James
Reed (6 December). Lt. Allan Wekel was forced down off San Isabel,
but was rescued by coast watchers and returned to base. The squad-
ron would leave Guadalcanal on 5 October 1944 after 21 months
with detachments operating out of Munda (13 October 1943 to 31
January 1944) and Bougainville (11 December 1943 to February
1945).
The 17
th
PRS History contains a narrative of a Photo Recon
pilot's mission from Guadalcanal in 1943:
"It's only 0700, but it seems like hours since I took off. Better
be getting on that oxygen mask and the last minute check of gauges
before I get too high. Down ahead I can see two or three small
107
13
th
Fighter Command in World War 11
The 17PRS flew the unarmed F-5 photo recon version of the P-38.These photos show the two camera ports located in the nose below and behind the
number 676. Also note the top-hatted bee holding a camera insignia. (Canning)
islands, all exactly alike in their tangled mass of tropical jungle.
The furthest island ahead is the one to worry about.
It's 0745, I wonder if! will get there! Gosh, I'm getting cold!.
It's getting below zero, and I've still got to go up and up. Better
check the gauges again-can't be caught asleep if anything goes
wrong. Better start looking around more often, as these Japs don't
play for fun. Well I'm getting pretty close, better develop the old
rubber neck, because I can expect company out of the sun anytime
now.
Doesn't seem to be many new ships in the harbor,just a couple
of transports riding at anchor and one under steam. The airstrip
seems to have been pretty well repaired since last night's working
over. If it weren't so darn cold maybe I could write some of this
dope down so I could read it when I got back. Oh, Oh! There's five,
no, six Zekes at about five thousand feet below me; keep an eye on
them. One last look around, then over the target for those ever lov-
ing pictures. About time for Ack-Ack to kick up. Oh! Oh! I talked
too soon again, here it comes, but a little off to the beam. So far, so
good, its all braking upstairs. On with the cameras, because brother
I don't want to have to do this job over again. Everything's rolling
OK, so just keep her straight down the alley, and we can soon head
for home. Those guys with the Ack-Ack are too darn close for com-
fort now. Cut the cameras and let's be heading for the tall timbers.
Wonder where those Zekes are by now? Gotta keep looking around
because I'm not home yet, and it could be a very long swim before
I'm through.
Ten hundred and halfway home going like the breeze. Gee, it's
great to be alive."
By the end of January U.S. Army troops had captured
Kokumbona and neared Tassafaronga, forcing the Japanese into a
narrow area around Cape Esperance. On the first day of February
20 destroyers of the Tokyo Express covered by 20 to 30 Zeros from
Buin passed down the Slot at 1600; not to bring in reinforcements,
but to evacuate Japanese troops from the island. Five enemy dive-
108
bombers came along and tried to sneak into the American anchor-
age at Guadalcanal. They sunk the destroyer DeHaven, but the pi-
lots of VMF-1l2 saved the day. All five dive-bombers were shot
down (three by Capt. Robert Fraser) and 17 of the Zeros were shot
down (four by ILl. James Percy). P-40s of the 68FS were scrambled
but did not make contact. SBDs and TBFs attacked the Japanese
convoy at dusk, but were only able to cause heavy damage to one
destroyer that was towed back to Shortland. That night another 19
destroyers came in and took off troops; one destroyer was lost to a
mine, and t,he rest escaped by sunrise after evacuating several thou-
sand troops. The Americans continued to believe that the Express
was on its typical reinforcement and supply mission. The Japanese
had moved a large number of troops and the 4
th
Air Army to Rabaul,
and reinforced the Munda airstrip to lead the Americans to the con-
70FS flight leader, Capt. James Robinson (center), downed two Zeros. (Can-
ning)
Part Two, Chapter 8 - February 1943
ILt.William Fiedler (70FS) shot down a Zero for his second victory toward
his five total. (Canning)
elusion that a new offensive was being prepared for Guadalcanal.
The U.S. Navy Action Report of 17 April 1943 stated:
"Until almost the last moment, it appeared that the Japanese
were attempting a major reinforcement effort. Only skill in keep-
ing their plans disguised and bold celebrity in carrying them out
enabled the Japanese to withdraw the remnants of the Guadalcanal
garrison. Not until organized forces had been evacuated on 8 Feb-
ruary did we realize the purpose of their air and naval dispositions;
otherwise with the strong forces available to us ashore on
Guadalcanal and our powerful fleet in the South Pacific, we might
have converted the withdrawal into a disastrous defeat."
On 4 February the Tokyo Express-22 destroyers covered by
25 Zeros-came down the Slot to attempt a second evacuation. At
two hundred miles out 12 SBDs and 13 TBFs escorted by eight P-
39s, four P-38s, and 16 F4Fs attacked and disabled one destroyer
Lt. Jack "Spyder" Bade (44FS) scored his first victory toward becoming a five
victory ace. (Canning)
and damaged another. Flight leader Capt. James Robinson downed
two Zeros, and Lt. William Fiedler was credited with another fly-
ing their 70FS P-39s. The F4Fs claimed six Zeros, the TBF gun-
ners two, and the SBD gunners one. One F4F, one SBD, and four
TBFs were lost in the action. An hour later 12 SBDS, escorted by
ten F4Fs and four 44FS P-40s, attacked the Express and slightly
damaged two destroyers. Three Warhawk pilots shot down a Zero
each: Lts. Jack "Spyder" Bade (his first victory toward becoming a
five victory ace); Henry Matson; and John Wood. Lt. Michael Carter
was hit and bailed out, and landed near the Japanese ships; he was
listed as the first 44
th
MIA. The 67FS flew escort for SBDs and got
two probables north of Kolombangara, one each by lLts. ilo
Inciardi and Robert Tullis. ILt. Robert Bauer was MIA. The F4Fs
downed four Zeros and lost two fighters, while the SBDs claimed
two Zeros and had one of their own shot down and another crash
land. That night the Japanese made another successful evacuation
from Guadalcanal.
109
13
th
Fighter Command in World War 1I
On 7 February the Tokyo Express made the third and last evacu-
ation when it came down the Slot covered by a rain storm and em-
barked most of the troops remaining on Guadalcanal. The three
February Express trips evacuated 11,706 troops, and at 1625 on 9
February all organized Japanese resistance on the island ended and
the island was declared secure. Late that afternoon the B-26s of the
69BS became based on the island and were escorted by P-38s and
P-39s to bomb the Japanese on Kolombangara Island. On 5 Febru-
ary the 70FS, under Capt. Waldon Williams and lLts. Koenig and
Kuntz and 2Lts. Burgess, Clark, Decker, and Gorham, flew their P-
39s from Fiji to Guadalcanal on what was the longest hop to date
for the Airacobra. Guadalcanal became the major base for Ameri-
can airpower in the South Pacific.
Lt. Richard Koenig was part of a group that flew their P-39s from Fiji to
Guadalcanal on what was the longest hop to date for the Airacobra. Note
the Hell's Angel. a Devil with a halo. on its tail. (Lansdale)
110
Summary and Assessment
of the Battle for Guadalcanal
With the successful Japanese evacuation, organized resistance
on Guadalcanal came to an end on 9 February 1943. Of 60,000
American personnel committed, the Marines had lost 1,207 killed,
2,894 wounded, and the Army 562 KIA and 1,289 WIA, and both
forces suffered thousands incapacitated by disease, particularly
malaria. U.S. Navy losses were about 4,770 (plus 130 aviator and
49 shipboard Marines). In comparison, the bloody battle for
Okinawa, often considered as the U.S. Navy's most costly cam-
paign, caused only slightly more casualties at 4,907 killed or miss-
ing. New Zealand and Australia lost 92 naval personnel. The Japa-
nese force of nearly 36,000 men lost 14,800 killed or missing, 9,000
more dead from disease, and 1,000 taken prisoner (almost 12,000
were evacuated). The Imperial Navy lost approximately 3,500 KIA/
MIA. The Allied navies lost two fleet carriers, six heavy and two
light cruisers, and 15 destroyers totaling 126,400 tons. The Japa-
nese Navy lost two battleships, a light carrier, three heavy cruisers,
one light cruiser, 11 destroyers, and six submarines totaling 138,000
tons. The Japanese lost 13 transports and one destroyer conversion,
while the Allies lost one transport and three destroyer conversions.
It was the air war over Guadalcanal that produced the greatest long-
term effect on the Pacific war. The shortage of airfields in the cen-
tral and northern Solomons and the distance to Guadalcanal from
Rabaul and Kavieng restricted Japanese air operations. Japanese
fighter and bomber crews were only able to mount one six to seven-
hour mission per day, and were unable to sustain a daily air offen-
sive in force. Missions were often interrupted or turned back by the
unpredictable tropical weather, but more importantly, the Japanese
air forces were overextended and were unable to conduct opera-
tions in both the Solomons and ew Guinea. When the Japanese
. concentrated their air activities in one theater, it gave respite to the
Allies in the other. The American build up in Australia and the emer-
gence of the 5AF soon placed more aircraft in the air over New
Guinea, further stretching Japanese air capabilities. The IJNAF had
lost many aircraft in the attritional air battles around Guadalcanal,
and while the Japanese aircraft industry was able to replace these
aircraft multiple times during the course of the war, skilled pilots
lost could not be replaced. The United States lost 264 aircraft and
420 aircrew casualties: 150 AAF; 140 USMC; and 130 USN. The
Japanese lost about 620 aircraft; aircrew loss figures are difficult to
quantify, but their losses were between 900 and 1,600. The 620
Japanese aircraft losses included a large number of Zeros (246 from
carriers and the 11th Air Fleet), and also bombers with multiple crew-
men: Vals (91 from carriers and the 11 th Air Fleet); Kates (47 car-
rier); and Bettys (125 11
th
Air Fleet). An additional 77 float planes
and 19 flying boats were lost, along with 15 Oscars of the IJAAF
(Adiscussion of Japanese and Allied air losses will be further elabo-
rated in the next chapter.). These losses were from Japan's best-
trained and veteran personnel, and so the impact of their loss was
more than what mere numbers indicate. At the beginning of the war
the IJNAF had 600 experienced carrier pilots, and 175 to 200 of
these were lost during the Guadalcanal campaign. The II th Air Fleet
lost 125 Betty bombers, along with most of their experienced crews.
During the period from the initial American invasion to the end of
the Naval Battle for Guadalcanal the Japanese had superiority in
total land and sea-based aircraft. The 565-mile distance from Rabaul
to Cactus was the major disadvantage for the Japanese air units. It
effectively halved the Zero escort force, as the Model 32 did not
have sufficient range, and the under-escorted bombers suffered
losses. The long distances and the excellent coast watcher organi-
zation, complemented by radar, gave the slow climbing Wildcats
time to reach an altitude to intercept the Japanese bomber forma-
tions and confront the Zero escorts. Japanese operations over this
long distance necessarily were predictable and routine, as fuel con-
sumption was a consideration in calculating time over the target
and returning back to base, and was the reason for mid-day Tojo
Time attacks. Once over Guadalcanal the unarmored Japanese
bombers and fighter escorts (without self-sealing fuel tanks) had
half of their fuel remaining for the return home, and would end up
as fiery explosions or flame into the sea when hit. The long dis-
tance caused inordinate wear on the aircraft and eroded the crew's
combat effectiveness, and ordinary battle damage could often be-
come fatal, as slightly damaged aircraft were unable to make the
long return home. Japanese overconfidence in the impending suc-
cess of each month's ground attacks on the island caused them to
postpone building airfields closer to Guadalcanal. But the Japanese
also lacked adequate airfield construction capability. The Marine
111
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
pilots were at a disadvantage to the Zeros in their inferior Wildcats,
but Maj. John Smith, learning from Gen. Claire Chennault's expe-
rience with the American Volunteer Group earlier in China, devel-
oped the high overhead pass, dive, and climb tactic to maximize
the sturdy little Grumman's qualities. The Air Force learned that
their P-400s and later P-39s were incapable of intercepting the high-
flying Japanese formations, but went on to do yeoman's work as
superlative ground support fighter-bombers that turned the battle at
Bloody Ridge and constantly harassed the beleaguered Japanese
troops on the island. The Marine Wildcats and then Corsairs would
often escort their Marine SBDs and TBFs, but AAF fighters or a
mixed group of AAF, USMC, and RNZAF fighters would also of-
ten escort these bombers. The B-26 and later B-25 low-level mis-
sions were almost always escorted by P-39s, and often later with P-
38 high cover. The aggressive Marine VMFs were frequently criti-
cized for often leaving their escort position in the bomber forma-
tion to run off and shoot down Zeros. The AAF and Navy had few
problems or criticism in their maintenance of bomber escort air
112
discipline. The RNZAF were always beyond reproach and consis-
tently flew well-coordinated and disciplined missions. While the
Japanese naval and air bases at Rabaul were well-developed and
equipped and relatively untouched to date by bombing, the Ameri-
can ground crews and support personnel on Guadalcanal worked
tirelessly under air and naval bombardment, without adequate tools
and equipment, and under the most primitive conditions. The con-
tribution of the ground crews and construction engineers to the vic-
tory was important but unheralded. The SBD Dauntless dive-bomb-
ers interdicted the Japanese naval movements within 200 miles of
the island, restricting Japanese troop reinforcement a ~ d supply of
the island. 67FS Airacobras and Marine SBDs continually harassed
the starving and dejected Japanese troops, and restricted their day-
light operations on the island. The Battle of Midway was America's
first great victory of the Pacific war, beginning the reversal of Japan's
naval power; but Guadalcanal forever changed the strategic course
of the Pacific war on the land, sea, and in the air, and allowed Al-
lied global strategy to continue as planned at Casablanca.
10
Statistics:
Assessing the Guadalcanal Air Campaign
*Includes aircraft lost in rear areas (14), observation-type aircraft
(30), and 1 B-26
Credit: Figures compiled by Richard Frank (Guadalcanal: A De-
finitive Account ofthe Landmark Battle) from Japanese Unit Histo-
ries and the research of John Lundstrom (The First Team and the
Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to
November 1942) and James Sawruk.
Flying Boats
12
7
o
19
TBF
7
10
23
40
Bettys
95
o
5
100
Marine infantry inspect the wreckage of a
Japanese Emily flying boat beached at
Guadalcanal. (USMC)
SBD
11
30
22
63
45*
Aircraft Losses During the Guadalcanal Campaign
1 August to 15 November 1942
506
240
Zeros Vals
72 11
7 0
27 4
106 15
Carrier Air Groups 197
Aircraft Type Lost Zeros Vals Kates
Air Combat 43 58 35
Shipboard 5 0 3
Operational 33 11 9
Total 81 69 47
Rear Area Air Force 66
Float planes 66 .. ....-
Other 3
American 480
USMC/USAAF 251
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......--- ,
12 FS/ 18 FG P-38 L-S, #210 RICKY BOY, s.n. and pilot unknown From
December'42 until VJ-day,the 18th Group pilots and crews, in theirAiracobras
and Lightnings alike, ranged from the Solomon Islands, to the Indo-china
coast and the great island of Borneo, to hunt down 40 aerial victories and
countless tactical targets. RICKY BOY is typical of the blue checkerboard
adorned 'fist of lightning' P-38s fiown on the 12 FS Philippine-Celebes mis-
sions at war's end. As with the many 'irregularities' of the resilient 12th Sqn
crews, the checker patterns and 1.0. numbers of the P-38s varied significantly
on each of their Lightnings.
IN
......
v,
I' ---
i J
i
.1-
0
'_"_\_; of
" .-
0-;. ..
--- -
HQ Flight/347 FG P-38 L-IS, # 100 PRISCILLA, s,n, 44-24978, This Lightning
from the Philippine campaign era is possibly the HQ fiight bird assign to LtC.
Leo Drusard, the journeyman commander of the 347 FG. Self proclaimed as
the 'Green Lightning' outfit, their tail markings displayed a green lightning bolt
cutting through a blue stripe underscoring the serial number, or on other
ships, two such stripes bracketing the serial. Some artistic license is taken in
translating Priscilla's grainy resource photo which suggests the 'English script'
letters plus her yellow spinners and wing tips, Despite years of accumulated
photos, proof of 347 FG squadron designator colors is inconclusive.
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VMF-224, MAG-n, Grumman F3F-3Wildcat #MF-I, s.n. unknown, pilot e.o.
Maj. Bob Galer. This garishly marked Wildcat carried Galer through the ma-
jority of his September-November'42 tour over embattled Gaudalcanal where
he accrued 14 aerial victories to become the fourth highest scoring Wildcat
aviator of the war. Leading his outfit 'from the cockpit' inevitably placed him
in the elite ranks of the seven other USMC aviators who received the Con-
gressional Medal of Honor in the extended Solomon's campaign.
..........
V,,)
So
~
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;:s-<
~
~
~
~
~
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~
~
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~
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:::::=
'"'"
'-
'-I
VMF-213, MAG-23,Vought F4U-1 Corsair. # 10, GUS'S GOPHER, s.n. unknown, pi-
lot Lt. W 'Gus'Thomas. VMF-213 CO Major Britt brought his well trained outfit to
Gaudalcanal in March '43 for the summer offensive surging northward up the
Solomon Islands. In the ensuing six months, his Corsairs drivers contributed to the
slaughtered of Imperial air groups at an appalling victory-to-Ioss ratio of I I to I.
Thomas led a half dozen other VMF-213 aces with his sixteen confirmed aerial
victories. As of mid-August, his 'bird cage' Corsair # 10, aka. the winged rodent
GUS's GOPHER, displayed eight victory flags plus an update of white bars added to
the upper wing and fuselage cocarde insignias. Gus Thomas scored his last two
victories from the deck of the USS Essex in February '45.
"'0
~
~
~
~
~
;S
~
"\:5
~
;::i
~
.......
C'")
~
~
g
C3"'
""'l
"'0
2l
~
~
~
Uv
'"'-
00
Mitsubishi FI M Type 0 - PETE, coded L-2-6, Observation Seaplane to the
Kunikawa Maru, pilot and crew unknown. The obsolete F1M floatplane, armed
with two 7mm forward firing machine guns and a single observer's 7mm
defensive gun, was one of several PETE's desperately commited to the criti-
cal reccon sorties flown from many remote lagoons throughout the Solomon's
campaign. Inexorably, opposing Allied fighters obliterated these bi-wingers
whenever they were encountered.
"-
IN
S-
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00'
~
~
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~
~
~
~
~
~
S
~
~
~
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~
'-N
........
\0
Mitsubishi A6M3 Model 32 (Zero-Sen) HAMP, 204 Kokutai, codedT2/ 169,
pilot WO Kenji Yanagiya. After a year of devastating setbacks in the South
Pacific campaigns,jAAF and jNAF units alike rested briefiy before being sent
back to Rabaul, New Britain, to renew the Solomons offensive. The jNAF
fighter kokutais were refit with model 22 and 32 Zero-Sen types which had
received varying degrees of abruptly applied dark green camoufiage over
their original. battle worn grey-green base colors. Yellow 1.0. stripes on the
inner leading edge of the wings quickly followed service wide. Such is the
case ofYanagiya's HAMPT2/ 169 fiown in escort to AdmiralYamamoto's fatal
venture of 18 April '43.
'"tJ
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~
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~
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~
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~
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~
c..,
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'-5,
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~
c..,
'-'"
N
a
Mitsubishi G4M I Type 0 #323, BETTY, 705 Kokutai, s.n. 2653.Yet another
interpretive illustration ofYamamoto's transport/bomber gleaned from sev-
eral archival sources. Records indicate the fated BETTY was a relative late
comer to the Rabaul operations and probably displayed a minimum of unit
markings. Mitsubishi craftsmanship would typically yield a hard, smooth fIn-
ished aluminum proving a poor substrate for camouflage paint. Hence, the
objective of the 339 FS that 18 April day is offered here in a rather simple,
weather worn display.
"-'
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~
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:::::
Abbreviations
A6M-Mitsubishi Zero/Zeke/Hap/Hamp fighter (IJNAF/IJAAF)
A-20-Douglas Havoc/Boston light bomber (AAF)
AA-Anti-aircraft
AAC-Army Air Corps
AAF-Army Air Force
AM-Air Medal
BSN-Nakajima Kate bomber (IJNAF)
B-17-Boeing Flying Fortress heavy bomber (AAF)
B-24-Consoildated Liberator heavy bomber (AAF)
B-2S-North American Mitchell medium bomber (AAF)
B-26-Martin Marauder medium bomber (AAF)
BB-Battleship
BG-Bomb Group
BS-Bomb Squadron
BS-Bronze Star
C-47-Douglas Dakota transport (AAF)
CA-Heavy Cruiser
CAP-Combat Air Patrol
CB-Naval Construction Battalions ("Seabees")
CG-Commanding General
C-in-C- Commander-in-Chief
CINCPAC-Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CL-Light Cruiser
CMH-Congressional Medal of Honor
CO-Commanding Officer
COMAIRNORSOLS-Comrnander Air North Solomons
COMAIRSOLS-Commander Air Solomons
COMAIRSOPAC-Commander Aircraft South Pacific
COMGENSOPAC-Commanding General, US Army Forces, South
Pacific
COMSOPAC-Commander South Pacific
CV- Aircraft Carrier
CVL-Light Aircraft Carrier
D3A-Aichi Val dive-bomber
DD-Destroyer
DFC-Distinguished Flying Cross
DSC-Distinguished Service Cross
DUC-Distinguished Unit Citation
F4F-Grumman Wildcat fighter (USMCIUSN)
F4U-Chance-Voight Corsair fighter (USMC/USN)
F-S-Lockheed Lightning photo recon a i r c l ~ a f t (P-38)
F6F-Grumrnan Hellcat fighter (USNIUSMC)
FEP-Float bi-plane
FC-Fighter Command
FG-Fighter Group
FP-Float plane
FBP- Float bi-plane
FS-Fighter Squadron
G4M-Mitsubishi Betty medium bomber (IJNAF/IJAAF)
GCI-Ground Control Intercept
IJAAF-Imperial Japanese Army Air Force
IJNAF-Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force
JCS-Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAW-Marine Air Wing
NFS-Night Fighter Squadron
P-38-Lockheed Lightning fighter (AAF)
P-39-Bell Airacobra fighter (AAF)
P-400-Bell Airacobra fighter (export version) (AAF)
P-40-Curtiss Warhawk, fighter (AAF) (Tomahawk, Kittyhawk-RAF
export)
P-70-Douglas Nighthawk night-fighter A-20) (AAF)
PBY-Consolidated Catalina amphibian (Dumbo, Black Cat) (USN)
PB4Y-Consolidated Privateer patrol bomber (US B-24)
PH-Purple Heart
PRG-Photo reconnaissance group
PRS-Photo reconnaissance squadron
PSP-Pierced Steel Plank (Marston Mat)
R4D-Douglas transport (USN/USMC)
PRS-Photo Recon Squadron
RAAF-Royal Australian Air Force
RNZAF-Royal New Zealand Air Force
R/O-Radar Operator
SBD-Douglas Dauntless dive-bomber (USMCIUS
SOPAC-South Pacific
SOWESPAC-Southwest Pacific Command (MacArthur)
SS-Silver Star
321
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
TBF-Grumman Avenger torpedo-bomber (USMC/USN)
USAAF-United States Army Air Force
USMC-United States Marine Corps
USN-United States Navy
YF- Navy Fighter Squadron
YMF-Marine Fighter Squadron
Code ames
Blissful-Marine raid on Choiseul
Buttons-Espiritu Santo
Cactus-Guadalcanal/Henderson Airfields
Cartwheel-Seizure of Rabaul (New Britain)
Cherry Blossom-Torokina (Bougainville) landings
Cleanslate-Russell Island landings
322
Elkton-Joint SOPAC and SOWESPAC for the reduction of Rabaul
Goodtime-New Zealand invasion of the Treasury Islands
Iron Bottom Sound-Water between Tulagi and Guadalcanal
Mainyard-Guadalcanal after Cactus
Poppy-New Caledonia
Ringbolt-Tulagi
Roses-Elfate
Shoestring-Invasion of Tulagi and later included Guadalcanal
Slot-Soloman's sheltered inside passage
Toenails-Invasion of New Georgia and surrounding areas
Watchtower-Invasion of the Tulagi area
"X"-Guadalcanal
"Y"- Tulagi
Fighter Director Codes
In late November 1942, Lt. Lewis Mattison (USN), the Senior Fighter Director Officer
at Guadalcanal issued the following Fighter Director Code:
Bogey-Unidentified aircraft
Small Bogey-One to five planes
Large Bogey-More than ten planes
Bandit-Enemy aircraft
Bombers-Enemy level bombers (large)
Hawks-Enemy dive-bombers
Rats-Enemy fighters
Chickens-Friendly fighters
Mattress-Base of clouds or ceiling
Quilt-Top of clouds
Popeye-In clouds
Angels Mattress Etc.-Fly at base of clouds etc.
What is Mattress Etc.-Give altitude at base of clouds etc.
Angels-Altitude-e.g. 10,000 feet-Angels Ten, 7,500 feet-Angels Seven and a half etc.
Lights-Turn on or check your IFF
Negat Lights-Tum off your IFF
Vector-Fly magnetic course of-
Orbit-Circle lazy, turning as short as practicable
Orbit Figure 8-Describe figure 8 at right angles to present vector with position at time
of order as center
Gate-Maximum speed, pour it on
Position-What is your position? (Either geographic or bearing and distance from base)
Guns-Ammunition. How much ammunition do you have?
Guns Plus (or Minus)-I have more (or less) than half my ammo
Juice-Gas, How much gas do you have?
Juice Plus (or Minus)-I have more (or less) than half my gas
No Dope-There is any information; continue last order
323
Bibliography and Sources
Author's Note: Over the past 35 years I have collected over
14,000 books and magazines, 1,000s of photos, and literally miles
of microfilm on WWII. The major sources of material for the frame-
work of this book were the thousands of pages of microfilmed
records of the l3AF, 13FC, l8FG, and 347FG, the individual squad-
rons of the 13FC, and the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. The mi-
crofilm included official and unofficial combat reports, documents,
unit histories, personal narrations, and interrogations. Most of the
documents on this microfilm were irrelevant, and the wheat had to
be separated from the chaff over long hours of peering at the bright
screen of the microfilm reader.
Microfilm
Army Air Force, "AAF in the South Pacific to October 1942"
(AAFRH-1), Asst. Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence (December
1944)
USSBS, "The Allied Air Campaign Against Rabaul, " USSBS
(Pacific) Naval Analysis Division. (1 September 1946)
13
th
Air Force, Roll A7717, A7633 & A7634, Albert Simpson
Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
l3
1h
Air Force Official History, Guadalcanal, Rolls A7673 & A7674,
Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
13
th
Air Force Official History, Solomons, Rolls A7675 & A7676,
Albert Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
347FG, Rolls B0301 & B0302, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
l8FG, Rolls B0083 & B0084, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
l2FS, Roll A0722, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center,
Maxwell AFB, AL
44FS, Roll A0740, Albert Simpson Historical Research Center,
Maxwell AFB, AL
67FS, Rolls A0749 & A0750, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
68FS, Rolls A0750 & A075l, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
70FS, Roll A0752 & A0753, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
324
339FS, Roll A0776 & A0777, Albert Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, AL
Correspondence/Interviews for book: *Special thanks
Correspondence and telephone interview: Truman Barnes, April
2003
*Correspondence and telephone interview: Doug Canning, Feb.-
May 2003
*Correspondence and telephone interview: George Chandler, May
2003
Correspondence and telephone interview: Peter Childress, March
2003.
*Correspondence and telephone interview: Bill Harris, April 1991
and May 2003
Correspondence and telephone interview: Sam Howie April 2003
*Correspondence and telephone interview: Stan Palmer, March-May
2003
Correspondence and telephone interview: Rollin Snelling, April
2003
*Correspondence and telephone interview: John Thompson, May
2003
(The following were contacted in the early 1990s as part of doing
biographies of WWII U.S. fighter aces for the American Fighter
Aces Association Album:)
*Correspondence and telephone interview: Rex Barber
Correspondence: Truman Barnes
*Correspondence: Paul Bechtel
Correspondence: Robert Byrnes
*Correspondence: George Chandler
Correspondence: Frank Gaunt
Correspondence: Cy Gladen
Correspondence: Besby Holmes
Correspondence: Joe Lesicka
Correspondence: Henry Meigs
*Correspondence: John Mitchell
*Correspondence: Lucien and Barbara Shuler
*Correspondence: Grant Smith
Correspondence: Elmer Wheadon
Part Seven, Appendices - Bibliography and Sources
Books and Pamphlets
Agawa, Hiro, Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial
Japanese Navy, Kodasha, Tokyo, 1979
Altobello, Brian, Into the Shadows Furious: The Brutal Battle for
New Georgia, Presidio, CA, 2000
Bergerud, Eric, Touched With Fire: Land War in the South Pacific,
Viking, NY, 1996
Bergerud, Eric, Touched With Fire: Air War in the South Pacific,
Westview, CO, 2000
Bodie, Wan'en, Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Widewing, GA, 1994
Bureau of Yards and Docks, Building the Navy's Bases in World
War 2,2 Vo1s., GPO, Wash. DC, 1947
Cleveland, William, Grey Geese Calling, llBG Assoc., MN, 1981
Coggins, Jack, Campaign for Guadalcanal, Battle That Changed
History, Doubleday, NJ, 1972
Coomb, Jack, Derailing the Tokyo Express, Stackpole, PA, 1991
Craven, Wesley & Cate, James, Army Air Forces in World War 2,
The Pacific-Guadalcanal to Saipan, VolA, University of
Chicago, Chicago, 1955
Craven, Wesley & Cate, James, Army Air Forces in World War 2,
Men & Planes, Vo1.6, University of Chicago, Chicago, 1955
Dorr, Robert & Scutts, Jerry, Bell P-39 Airacobra, Crowood, UK,
2000
Ferguson, Robert, Guadalcanal, Island of Fire, Aero, PA, 1987
Frank, Richard, Guadalcanal: Definitive Account of the Landmark
Battle, Random House, NY, 1990
Griffith, Samuel, The Battlefor Guadalcanal, Lippencott, PA, 1963
Halsey, William & Bryan, J, Admiral Halsey's Story, McGraw Hill,
NY, 1947
Hammel, Eric, Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea, The Naval Battle of
Guadalcanal, Pacifica, CA, 1998
Hammel, Eric, Guadalcanal: Starvation Island, Crown, NY, 1987
Hansen, Paul M., Amazing Facts in the Life of Paul M. Hansen:
Unique Average American, Heritage Press, WA, 2000
Hata, Ikuhiko and Izawa, Yasuko, Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter
Units in World War 2, Naval Institute Press, MD, 1989
Hess, William, Pacific Sweep, The Fifth and Thirteenth Fighter
Commands in World War 2, Doubleday, NY, 1974.
Horton, D.C., New Georgia: Pattern for Victory, Ballantine, NY,
1971
Hough, Frank, Ludwig, Verle & Shaw, Henry, History of Marine
Corps Operations in World War 2: Vol.1, Pearl Harbor and
Guadalcanal, USMC Historical Division, Wash. DC, 1966
Hough, Frank & Crown, John, Campaign in New Britain, USMC
Historical Branch, Wash. DC, 1952
Hoyt, Edwin, Guadalcanal, Stein & Day, NY, 1981
Hoyt, Edwin, Glory of the Solomons, Stein & Day, NY, 1983
Johnsen, Frederick, Bell P-39/P-63 Airacobra/Kingcobra, Specialty,
MN,1998
Johnson, Edwin, A Brief History of the 68
th
Fighter-Interceptor
Squadron, 1940-1962, Private printing, 68FS, IN, 1962
Kilpatrick, C.W., Naval Night Battles in the Solomons, Exposition,
FL,1981
Kinzey, Bert, P-38 Lightning in Scale and Detail, Parts I&ll,
Squadron/Signal, TX, 1996
Kinzey, Bert, P-39 Airacobra in Scale and Detail, Squadron!
Signal, TX, 1999
Kinzey, Bert, P-40 Warhawk in Scale and Detail Vol.1, Squadron!
Signal, TX, 1999
Koberger, Charles, Pacific Turning Point: The Solomons Campaign,
1942-43, Praeger, CT, 1995
Lanphier, Thomas, Unpublished Biography c. 1980-85
Leakie, Robert, Challenge for the Pacific, Doubleday, NY, 1965
Lippincott, Benjamin, From Fiji Through the Philippines,
MacMillan, NY, 1946
Lofgren, Stephen, Northern Solomons, US Army Center of
Military History, Wash. DC, 1995
Lundstrom, John, The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign,
NIP, MD, 1994
Matthews, Birch, Cobra: Bell Aircraft Corporation, Schiffer, PA,
1996
Maurer, Maurer, Air Force Combat Units of World War 2, USGPO,
Wash, DC, 1961
Maurer, Maurer, Air Force Combat Squadrons of World War 2,
USAF Historical Division, Wash. DC, 1969
McGee, William, Solomon's Campaign, 1942-1943, From Guadal-
canal to Bougainville, Vol. 2, BMC, Santa Barbara, CA, 2002
Mellinger, George & Stanaway, John, P-39 AiracobraAces ofWorld
War 2, Osprey, UK, 2001
Mersky, Peter, Time of the Aces: Marine Pilots in the Solomons,
1942-1944, WW-2 Commemorative Series, USMC Historical
Center, Wash, DC, 1993
Miller, John, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, U.S. Army
Center for Military History, Wash. DC, 1949
Miller, John, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, WW-2, U.S. Army
Center for Military History, Wash. DC, 1959
Miller, Thomas, Cactus Air Force, Harper & Row, NY, 1969
Mitchell, Rock, Airacobra Advantage: Flying Cannon, Pictorial
Histories, MT, 1992
Mueller, Joseph, Guadalcanal1942,Osprey, UK, 1992
Moore, Col. Thomas, Story of the 339
th
Fighter Squadron, 339FS,
March, 1944.
Morison, Samuel, History of us Naval Operations in WW-2, Little
Brown, MA, 1947
Vol. V: Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 to February 1943
Vol. VI: Breaking the Bismarck Barrier, 22 July to 1 May 1944
Okumirya, Matsutake and Horikoshi, Jiro with Caidin, Martin,
Zero!, Dutton, NY, 1956
O'Leary, Michael, USAAF Fighters, Blandford, UK, 1986
Olynyk, Frank, Stars and Bars, Grub Street, UK, 1995
Olynyk, Frank, USN Credits For the Destruction ofEnemy Aircraft
in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt. Printing, OH, 1982
Olynyk, Frank, USMC Credits For the Destruction of Enemy
Aircraft in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt. Printing, OH,
1981
Olynyk, Frank, USAAF (Pacific Theater) Credits For the Destruc-
tion ofEnemy Aircraft in Air-to Air Combat World War 2, Pvt.
Printing, OH, 1985
Rentz, John, Bougainville and the Northern Solomons, USMC
Historical Section, Wash. DC, 1948
325
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
Rentz, John, Marines in the Central Solomons, USMC Historical
Section, Wash. DC, 1952
Rust, Ken & Bell, Dana, Thirteenth Air Force Story, Historical
Aviation, CA, Sakaida, Henry, Imperial Navy Aces ofWW-2,
1937-1945, Osprey, UK, 1999
Sakaida, Henry, Siege ofRabaul, Phalanx, M , 1996
Sakaida, Henry, Winged Samara, Champlain, AZ, 1985
17
th
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron, 1T" Photo Reconnaissance
Squadron History, Pvt. Printing, Palawan, P.I., 1945
Shaw, Henry & Kane, Douglas, 1solation ofRabaul, Vol.2, USMC
G-3 Division, Wash. DC, 1963
Sherrod, Robert, History ofMarine Corps Aviation in World War 2,
Nautical & Aviation, MD, 1987
Stanaway, John, Peter Three Eight, Pictorial Histories, MT, 1986
Stanaway, John, P-38 Lightning Aces ofthe Pacific and CB1, Osprey,
UK, 1997
Starke, William, Vampire Squadron, Robinson, CA, 1985
Tagaya, Osamu, Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko 'Betty' Units of World
War 2, Osprey, UK, 2001
Taylor, Theodore, Magnificent Mitscher, Norton, NY, 1954
13
lh
Air Force, "Tribute to Lt. Col. Robert Westbrook", Dec. 1944.
Tillman, Barrett, US Navy Fighter Squadrons in World War 2,
Specialty, MN, 1997
U.S. Army Air Forces, Pacific Counterblow, AAF HQ, Wash. DC.,
1952 (reprint)
U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating Instructions for the P-38,
AAF, Wash. DC. 1944
U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating 1nstructions for the P-39,
AAF, Wash. DC. 1944
U.S. Army Air Forces, Pilot's Operating Instructions for the P-40,
AAF, Wash. DC. 1943
U.S. Army Air Forces, 'Transcript of Proceedings" by the Air Force
Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR Docket:
91-02347, October 17-18,1991)
U.S. Navy, Action Report of 17April 1943
U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Military Analysis Division, Wash.
DC
Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan, 1946
Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, 1947
Campaigns of the Pacific, 1946
Wagner, Ray, Curtiss P-40 Tomahawk #35, Profile, UK, 1971
Westbrook, Robert, "How to Stay Alive Flying Combat," 347
1h
Fighter Group, 1944
Wolf, William, Victory Roll, American Fighter Pilot andAircraft in
World War 2, Schiffer, PA, 2002
Zimmerman, John, Guadalcanal Campaign, Lancaster, IL, 1949
Magazines/Articles
Bachman, Lawrence, "Blocking Rabaul by Air," Air Force, May
1944 (microfilm)
Colliers Magazine, March 13, 1943
Burroughs, Hulbert, "Air Force in Action in the Solomons," Air
Force, January 1943 (microfilm)
Crane, James, "Time Out for Rest," Air Force. April 1944
(microfilm)
326
Dinn, Wallace, "My Solomons Canoe Trip," Air Force, March 1943
(microfilm)
Flight Journal, P-38 Lightning in Action, Summer 2003
Flight Journal, Pacific Fighters: Air Combat Stories, Winter 2001
Frazer, Charles, "Be Ready for Anything," Air Force September
1943 (microfilm)
Furler, E.H., "Klunker," Air Classics, October 1883
Hollway, Don, "Cactus Air Force: Thorn in Japan's Side, "
Aviation History, March 1995
Johansen, Herbert, "The Fighting 13
1h
," Air Force, May 1945
Kent, Richard, "Flying the P-39 Airacobra," What Were They Like
to Fly? VoU, Sun Flower, KS, 1975
Larsen, George, "Henderson Field: History's Slim Difference, Part
1," Air Classics, October 1994
Larsen, George, "Henderson Field: History's Slim Difference, Part
2," Air Classics, November 1994
Marolda, Edward, "Deadly Battle: The Fightfor Guadalcanal,"
Air Classics, August 1993
Mizahi, Joseph, "50 Bombers Headed Your Way, " Wings, August
1986
O'Leary, Michael, "Gamecocks Go to War, " Air Classics:
Victorious Eagles: Vol.l1N0.2
Rust, Kenn, "The 1T" P.R. Sqdn., " American Aviation Historical
Society Journal, Fall 1961
Time Magazine, "Bull's Eye in the South Pacific," 7 February 1944
Videos
Cromwell Productions, "Battle.field: Guadalcanal, " UK, 200 J
Traditions Military History, "Guadalcanal: Official Marine Films,"
Avion Park, "This is Guadalcanal, " KY, 1999
US News, "Masters of War: Turning Point at Guadalcanal, " NY,
1995
Daystar, "Guadalcanal: The Island of Death," OR, 1999
Yamamoto Bibliography
Magazine, Newspaper Articles, Videos, and Websites
Chandler, George, "Fighter Pilot's Odyssey of 44 Years to Deter-
mine Who Shot Down Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, " SYMA,
November 10, 1987
Darby, Dr. Charles, "Transcript of Proceedings" by the Air Force
Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR Docket:
91-02347, October 17-18, 1991)
Darby, Dr. Charles, Interview
Guttman, Jon, " Controversy Surrounding the Life and Death of
Admiral Isoroko Yamamoto," World War 2, September 1990
History Channel (Video), "Deadmen's Secrets: Yamamoto Mission, "
Nugus-Martin Productions, 2002
Kohn, Richard, "A Note on the Yamamoto Aerial Victory Credit
Controversy," Air Power History, Spring 1992
Lanphier, Thomas, Three part article, New Times, September 12-
14, 1945
Lanphier, Thomas, "I Shot Down Yamamoto," Reader's Digest,
December 1966
New York Times, "Yamamoto's Killer Identified by Army,"
September 12, 1945
Part Seven, Appendices - Bibliography and Sources
Stanaway, John, "Historian's Comer: Yamamoto Mission Report-
ing, " P-38 National Association, March 2003
Second Yamamoto Mission Association website
Taylor, Blaine, "Ambush in Hostile Skies," Military History,
August 1988
Taylor, Blaine, "The Plot to Kill Admiral Yamamoto, Part 1, " Air
Classics, April 1989
Taylor, Blaine, "The Plot to Kill Admiral Yamamoto, Part 2, " Air
Classics, May 1989
Wible, John, "The Yamamoto Mission," Journal of the American
Aviation Historical Society, Fall 1967
Books
Agawa, Hiroyuki, Reluctant Admiral, Kodasha, Tokyo, 1979
Closterman, Pierre, Flames in the Sky, Penguin, UK, 1952
Davis, Burke, Get Yamamoto!, Random House, NY, 1969
Glines, Carroll, Attack on Yamamoto, Orion, NY, 1990
Hall, R. Cargill, Lightning Over Bougainville: Yamamoto Mission
Reconsidered, Smithsonian, Wash. DC, 199 I
Hoyt, Edwin, Last Kamikaze: Story o.fAdm. Matome Ugaki, Praeger,
CT, 1993
Potter, John Deane, Yamamoto, Paperback Library, NY, 1965
Ugaki, MatomeAdm., Fading Victory, Pittsburgh Press, PA, 1991
Wible, John, Yamamoto Mission, imitz Foundation, TX, 1988
327
(':, indicates 13FC pilot)
A
Abe, V.Adm.: 81
*Adams, Joseph: 262
*Adams, Milton: 167,260,261
Ainsworth, Walden: 186,189
Akiyama, Teruo: 186
*Ames, Roger: 96, 102, 139, 139,155
*Anderson, Donald: 243
Anderson, John: 243
*Anderson, Wayne: 224
*Andrews, Harry: 185,250
*Anglin, Everett: 96,
139, 139, 150
*Anthony, Louis: 244
Arnold, Henry "Hap": 10,26,41,52,67,84, 150
Ashcraft, W.S.: 41
*Ashton, William: 18
328
Index
B
*Bade, Jack: 109, 109, 117,117,170,170,171,175,182,
287
*Baird, Frederick: 107
*Baird, James: 96
*Baker, Emmerson: 199
*Baker, Richard: 185
Bandy, J.I.: 182
*Banfield, Lt.: 60
124,125,133,134,139
(2), 139, 142, 143-7, 149,150,150-5,155, 157-60, 167,
272,287,287
Barnes, Earl: 224, 255, 255
Barker, John: 222
*Barnes, Samuel: 171, 174
* Barnes, Truman: 177,247,248,251,254,254,288,288
*Barr, Edgar: 65,66,93
Bauer, Joseph: 24,65,80
*Bauer, Robert: 75, 87, 88,109
*Bechtel, Paul: 95, 94, 95, 131, 133, 192,203,273,292,
292
Part Seven, Appendices - Index
*Benum, Lt.: 247
*Bennett, Earl: 165
*Bentley, Ellis: 267
*Berkow, Joseph: 200
*Bezner, Raymond: 103,104,105,172,185
*Bell, Gordon: 41, 64
*Bergquist, K.P.: 11
*Bishop, Samuel: 11
Blackburn, Tom: 197,222,247,255
"Boeye, John: 267
Bong, Richard: 8
*Borders, Andrew: 203
*Bowman, Barney: 262
*Bowman, Byron: 235
Boyington, Gregory "Pappy": 217,228,234,235,241,
*Brannon, Dale: 14, 15, 16,23,29,29,35,39,46,47,48
(2),50,51,53,54,70,76,84,194,275
Breene, Robert: 22
':'Brewster,Gordon: 87,92,213,214
Brice, William: 72, 210
*Brown, Byron: 36,46,48,50,51
*Brown, Lt.: 218
':'Brown, Frederick: 119
Browning, Miles: 67
*Bruce, James: 14,
*Buck, A.J.: 94, 123, 124,124
*Bunderson, Mack: 174, 175,203
*Burgess, Lt.: 110
*Butler, Robert: 188
*Butler, William: 253
*Brzuska, Edwin: 29,46,83,93,213
':'Byers, Rex: 202, 235
*Byrnes, Robert: 103,169,170,171,174,202,202,203,
288
C
Caidin, Martin: 130,249
Caldwell, Henry: 222
Caldwell, Turner: 35,41,49
Callaghan, Daniel: 76, 77, 78
*Campbell, James: 58, 65
*Canning, Douglas: 6,29,31,33,34,36,54,54,55,58,59,
80,93,105,105,122,139,139,143-4,147,151,155,
167,225
*Capa, Andrew: 202, 203
*Cargill, William: 171, 175,
Carl, Marion: 35,39,57,57,87,278
*Carnes, Russell: 260
*Carter, Michael: 109
*Cartwright, Richard: 262
*Chandler, George: 6, 154, 155, 185, 185, 187,194, 194,
211,223,229,246,247,248,249,250,250,253,289,
289
*Cheney, Francis: 203, 256, 258
*Childress, Peter: 15, 15,36,39,45,48,48,51,83,91
*Chilson, Robert: 29, 39
*Christian, Thomas: 14, 39,46,54
*Christiansen, Hans: 11
':'Christiansen, Russell: 251, 254
*Clark, Frank: 77, 121, 176,177
*Clark, Thomas: 110,176
Clemons, Martin: 34, 34
*Cleveland, Howard: 192,235,245,262
*Coe, Donald: 254,266
':'Collins, Capt.: 180
*Condon, John: 142, 153
*Condor, George: 235
*Connolly, Robert: 245,267
*Conrad, Earl: 185, 185, 187
*Conradi, Karl: 106, 132
*Cooley, Albert: 61
*Corbett, Robert: 214, 219, 243, 244:
*Cosart, Darrell: 94, 101,101,102, 132,132
*Cosgrove, John: 199,219
*Councill, William: 213, 215, 238, 238
*Cox, Charles: 192, 200
*Crain, Franklin: 224
Crane, James: 224
*Cramer, Darrell: 117, 219, 222, 293, 293
*Crandall, Thomas: 167,260
Crouch, Tim: 142
*Curry, Douglas: 171,175, 182, 183, 185, 186,234,235,
243
Curtis, John: 192
329
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
D
Daggitt, William: 94,97, 121
Dale, Eben: 124, 125,
Darby, Dr. Charles: 6, 152, ] 60-62
*Daugherty, Francis: 256, 258, 265
Davis, Burke: 142, 154
Davis, Raymond, "Duke": 61, 65, 66
*Decker, Lt.: 110
*Deforrest, Glen: 265
*Dews, Lt.: 60, 65, 74
*DilIon, Barclay: 36, 37, 39
Dillon, Katherine: 144
*Dinn,Wallace: 60,65,71,71,75,99
*Dollen, John: 224
*Dreckman, Harold: 175, 185,189,190, 193,241,242
DuBose, Laurence: 223, 224
*Dunbar, Harvey: 94, 100
*Duhon, Joseph: 266
*Dusard, Henry: 241, 242, 243, 244, 251
*Dutton, Albert: 39
E
Edson, Merritt: 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52
*Ehrman, Lt.: 185,
*Ehrenmann, William: 188
Eldridge, John: 41, 59, 61, 69,74
Emmons, Delos: 45,46, 101,164
*Endriss, John: 255,266
Englade, Larry: 256
*Erwin, Lt.: 29
*Eubanks, George: 2] 7
*Evans, John: 167, 191, 194
*Everest, Frank: 22, 117
F
*Farkas, Raymond: 213
*Farquharson, Albert: 51,52, 53,54,58,83, 83, 84
*Farron, Lt.: 59, 60, 65
*Ferguson, Robert: 48, 51, 52, 75
*Fernam, K: 51
*Fetch, Robert: 171, 176,
330
*Fincher, Deltis: 29, 35, 35, 46, 47, 48, 51, 83
*Fincher, William: 224,229,251
*Fiedler, William: 109,109,171,176,177,275,289,290
Fitch, Aubrey: 89, 100, 128, 167, 179
*Fitzgerald, A.: 58
Fitzpatrick, J.T.: 182
*Fjelsted, F.: 58,
*Fleming, Bernard: 192
*Folts, John: 18
Fontana, Paul: 72
*Forsythe, Maj.: 103
Foss,Joseph: 57(2),62,64,68,75,77,87,102,278
*Foss, Theodore: 217
*Fowler, Roy: 202
Fletcher, Frank: 22, 23, 25,
*Fountain, Zeb: 37,37,46,48,51,91
*Fouquet, Raymond: 235
*Fox, Robert: 229
*Fox, William: 89,202
*Frame, Leonard: 132, 132, 168, 176,
':'Francis, Magnus: 169, 170, 182, ] 83,242,243
*Frick, William: 214, 219, 251
*Frinkenstein, Joseph: 118
*Fritsch, James: 262
Funk, Harold: 222
G
Galer, Robert: 24,39,46,50,52,57,64,66
Gardner, "Lefty": 156
Gardner, Matt: 46, 48
*Gaunt, Frank: 175, 188,190, 190,200,200,234,243,
243,244,246,283,283
Geiger, Roy: 41,41,51,52,57,65,75,86
*Geyer, James: 75, 118
Ghormley, Robert: 21,22,22,23,25,42,50,56,67, 100
*Gibbs, George: 219
*Gilchrist, William: 219
*GilIon, Oscar: 59, 60, 60, 62, 62
Gise, William: 117
*Gladen,Cy: 174,174,202,202,246,290,290
*Glazier, Linwood: 36, 37, 46, 47, 48, 51, 91 .
*Glidden, Elmer: 41
Glines, Carroll: 6, 142, 148
Part Seven, Appendices - Index
*Glommen, Martell: 194
*Goerke, Delton: 51,52,54,58,64,83,93,139,139,
143-4, 151,155, 167
Goldstein, Donald: 144
Golman, Norman: 270
*Goode, James: 261
Gorham, Calvin: 110, 121
Gotto, Aritomo: 61
*Grabner, Lawrence: 139, 139
Green, Donald: 275
':'Green, William: 219
*Griffith, William: lt8, 172, 174, 177,212
Grinnell, Roy: 143
Griswold, Oscar: 187
*Gunder, Joseph: 224, 267, 272
H
*Haggard, Lt.: 218
Hall, R. Cargill: 142, 155, 156,
Halsey, William, "Bull": 67,67,70,75,89,91,97,125,
127,128,138,149,150,151,167,179,205,209,223,
228,246,248
*Hancock, Paul: 106
*Hanks, William: 261
*Hansen, Donald: 77, 77
Hansen, George: 210
*Hansen, Paul: 104, 131
Hanson, Robert: 222, 244
*Hardaway, Braydon: 215
Harmon, Hubert: 101
Harmon, Millard: 22,26,29,42,44,45,52,56,67,67,68,
76,83,87,97,128,164,167,187,188,196,214
*Harper, Wade: 182
*Harrell, James: 199
*Harris, Bill: 6,8,8,30,32,32,93,121,122,149,167, ,
170,171,172,174,177,194,199,211,213,214,215,
215,217,219,225,247,248,250,251,251,253,253,
267,267,268,270,270,281,281
*Harris, Charles: 171, 176,
':'Hart, Glen: 191, 222, 245
*Hart, John: 24, 102,247
*Harter, V.: 222
*Hartman, Kermit: 250
*Hay, Carl: 182,190,243
*Haynes, William: 228
*Head, Cotesworth: 8, 12,175, 175, 182, 185, 186, 195,
199,204,213,216,241,242,243,244,245,246,281,
282
*Head, Vernon: 36,46,46,47,48, 83,
*Headtler, G.: 58, 65, 69, 73
*Heckert, G.: 131
*Heckler, Earl: 244
':'Hecht, Maj.: 180
Hedges, Robert: 87
Henderson, Lofton: 27
*Hendrickson, Russell: 267
*Hendrix, Phillip: 94, 102,102, 124
*Henke, Albert: 168
*Henkey, Wilfred: 266, 268
*Hearnden, John: 266
*Herman, Donald: 267
Hester, John: 119, 179, 187, 196
Hibbard, H.L.: 270
':'Hilken, Ronald: 94, 99
Hill, David "Tex": 153
*Hine, Raymond: 94, 103, 139, 143, 146,147, 150
*Hoffman, G.E.: 103
*Holly, Gerald: 267
*Holman, Robert: 171,175,182
':'Holmes, Besby: 54, 58, 59, 62, 64, 65, 69, 73, 79, 99, 99,
103, 104, 107, 134, 139(2), 139, 143, 147, 149, 150-4,
155,167,291,291
*Holman, Robert: 235
*Holmes, K.: 214
*Holtner, J.L.: 11
*Honaker, William: 171, 194
*Hopkins, George: 214, 247, 251
':'Horne, Fred: 168
*Howie, Sam: 31, 195,205,218,219,219,225
*Hoyle, James: 172, 185
*Hubbard, Thomas: 14,54,59,62,64,
*Hubbell, Robert: 16,99, 103, 104, 105, 105
*Huey, Wellman: 118
*Huff, Lloyd: 102,131, 135
*Hulbert, H.: 131,
*Hull, William: 75, 106, 106
*Hultin, Carman: 267
Hyakutake, Hyakichi: 38,51,55,70, 73, 75,86,228,256
331
13
1h
Fighter Command in World War II
I
"'Imberg, Ralph: 193,193
Ichiki, Kiyono: 29
Ichimaru, Rinosake: 130,223,223
Iden, Ruben: 41
Injuin, Matsuji: 201, 214
Imamura, Hitoshi: 99,252
';'Inciardi, Nilo: 75, 109
Izaki, Shunji: 189
J
"'Jacobson, Julius "Jake": 54,59,60,69,69,73,74, 139,
139,155,167
"'James, Lt.: 191
':'Jamison, Glen: 22, 22,
"'Jarman, James: 53,54,58,75
"'Jenkins, Max: 266
';'Jennings, Theo: 185,186,219
"'Jennings, Wallace: 175,185,186,243
Jensen, Hayden: 64
"'Johnson, Albert: 117
*Johnson, Richard: 37, 46,47,48,51,
*Johnson, Thomas: 117
*Jordon, Darrell: 203
*Jordon, Harry: 191,211,222,251
"'Jurgenson, Elmer: 248,251
K
*Kaiser, R.: 51. 59, 64, 65
Kakuji, Kakuta: 130
Kauslick, AI: 156
Kawaguchi, Kiyotake: 38,46,47,50,55,68,
':'Kellum, Kenneth: 75,77,92
Kenney, George: 7, 76,101,103,129,211,216,222,
Kennedy, Donald: 34
"'Kennedy, James: 224,244,251
Kennedy, John F.: 186
*Kennedy, Robert: 102
"'Kent, Richard: 176, 189
Kepford, Ira: 248, 254
"'Kerstetter, Robert: 58, 59, 64, 65, 121, 213
"'Kester, William: 200, 219
"'Kincaid, Skinner: 226
"'Kincaid, Webster: 191
332
Kincaid, Thomas: 70, 75
*King, Benjamin: 191
King, Ernest: 21, 51, 72, 150
Kim, Louis: 41,51,55,61
*Kingham, A.R.: 11
"'Kirk, Kenneth: 96
"'Kittel, Louis: 139,139,166, 168,168,171,214,228,228
*Klauda, Charles: 251
*Kobbemann, Edward: 192
*Koenig, Richard: 110, 110
Koga, Mineichi: 166, 167,221,226
Kohn, Richard: 142,156-7,
Kondo, Nobutake: 70, 80, 81
Kosaka, Kanae: 130,137,138,148,148
*Koval, Leslie: 266
"'Krohn, Robert: 182, 185, 235, 241
*Kuntz, Lt.: 110
Kurita, Takeo: 222
Kusaka, Jinichi: 58, 59, 211, 222, 226, 229
L
*Labarge, Arlington: 215
*Lalonde, Isaac: 121
*Lamburth, James: 99
*Lanphier, Thomas: 80,94,96,123, 125,132,133, 134,
139(2),139,143-7,149, 150,150-4, 151, 152,157-60,
167,291,291
Lansdale, James: 6,8,125,130,142,160
*Latham, Lt.: 247
*Larson, Harold: 51
*Lawrence, Henry: 172, 194,223,246,247,248,250,251,
253,255
*Laurie, Jack: 262
Lee, James: 41
Lee, Willis: 81
*Lehrbiel, Burman: 262
*Lesicka, Joseph: 175, 176, 182, 188, 189, 190, 197, 198,
246,283,283
*Lessing, John: 214
*Lewis, Jackson: 119
*Lilliedoll, Jarrold: 217,244,248
Lindbergh, Charles: 272
*Little, John: 119,175,205,206
"'Livesey, Donald: 213,214,214,251,253
Part Seven, Appendices - Index
*Lockridge, Lt.: 117
Lodge, J. Norman: 150
*Long, Albert: 139,139
*Long,James:242,245
*Lucas, Alphonse: 265
*Lynch, Joseph: 102
Lynch, Thomas: 275
M
MacArthur, Douglas: 7,41, 127,127,128,209,252
"'MacFarland, Winfield: 243, 267
*Macklin, Bruce: 182, 192, 197
*Mancini, John: 107
Mangrum, Richard: 24, 28, 35, 41, 57, 66
Marsh, Charles: 148
Marshall, George: 21, 45, 51, 52, 72
*Mason, Charles: 100,101,
*Matson, Henry: 103,106,109,171
"'Mathis, Peyton: 262
Maurer, Maurer: 154
"'McBride, Clyde: 266
*McBride, J.S.: 11,12
McCain, John: 22,23,24,83
McCauley, Francis: 89
*McClanahan, James: 75,77,86,86,87,92,124,133,133,
139,143-4,
*McClendon, Wallace: 121
*McCloud, Kenneth: 213, 247, 247, 248
*McCormick, Harlan: 100
*McDaniel, N.: 105
*McDonald, Donald: 132
*McGinn, John: 172,174,191,221,293,293
':'McGown, Robert: 200, 224
McGuigan, Joseph: 140, 149, 154
*McKulla, Lawrence: 104
*McNeese, George: 53, 54, 134, 242
*Meigs, Henry: 199, 204, 244, 251, 253, 286, 286
*Mein, Robert: 203
"'Mekus, Frank: 219
Merrill, Aaron: 179
Metheny, William: 192, 210
Metke, Henry: 147,148
*Michaels, Harold: 268
Mikawa, Gunichi: 25,65,81
*Miller, Danforth: 52,53,54,58,59,65,83,86,93
Mills, James: 148
*Mitchell, John: 54,59,60(2),60,61,65,69, 70, 70, 71,
73,74,75,84,84,97,99,104,105,106,107,134,139,
139, 140,140,142-4,147,149, 150,150-5, 151, 152,
155,164,167,194,284,284
Mitchell, Ralph: 101,210,210,233
Mitscher, Marc: 101,125,138,149,176,179,192
':'Moore, Cecil: 201, 201, 202
*Moore, Joseph: 31,97, 124,125,132,143-4,
Moore, Luther: 101
"'Moore, Marvin: 267
*Moore, Lt.: 94
Morrell, Benjamin: 23
Morrison, William: 140, 149, 154
*Morrissey, Raymond: 103,107,117
*Morton, James: 52,53,54,58,59,64,117
*Moseley, Ralph: 104, 131
Mulcahy, Francis: 100, 179, 196
*Mulvey, John: 118, 205, 213, 215, 218
*Munson, John: 244
Murayama, Maseo: 51,68,69,70
*Murray, Andrew: 188
*Murray, George: 70
':'Murray, John: 18, 107
*Mushlit, Richard: 235
N
Nagumo, Chuichi: 70, 131
*Nash, R.: 131
Nasu, Yumio: 68
*Newlander, Carl: 171,182, '83,
*Newton, A.C.: 11
*Nichols, Cyril: 102,171,200
*Njus, Kaspar: 193
Nimitz, Chester: 24,67,88, 127, 127, 128, 138, 150,226,
252
*Nord, Ardell: 107
*Norris, Emmett: 94,99,103
':'Norris, William: 75,77,87, 131,175
*Novak, Emil: 75, 214
Noyes, Leigh: 23
333
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
o
*Obermiller, James: 48, 84
Oka, Col.: 70
*Olson, Walter: 268
Olynyk,Frank: 153
O'Neill, David: 192,210
Ostrum Charles: 182
Owens, Raymond: 192
P-Q
*Pace, Morris: 190
*Pafford,Eugene:206,211,251,252,252
*Palmer, Stan: 6, 16, 102,103,106,132,135, 166,276
*Parker, James: 171,182,184
Patch, Alexander: 10, 88, 97
*Patton, Lt.: 87
:;'Patterson, Arnold: 59, 62, 73, 73, 74,86,92, 121
*Payne, Buell: 203
*Pederson, Myron: 213, 214, 218, 250, 251
*Pedro, Henry: 171,172,177,213
*Peek, Robert: 260
*Petit, Robert: 6,94,119, 120, 121, 123,123, 124, 125,
132, 143
';'Petterson, Raymond: 107
*Phillips, George: 84
*Pickel, Creel: 267
*Ploetz, Frederick: 103,103, 131, 166
*Pollock, John: 262,266
*Pollard, William: 214
Post, Nathan: 91, 227
*Price, John: 193, 194
*Purnell, Frederick: 59,60, 74, 74, 103, 104, 106
R
*Radzuikinas, Frank: 197
*Rake, Erwin: 172, 177, 213
:;'Ramp, Leland: 58,58,59
*Rankin, William: 182
*Rapson, George: 268
*Reddington, James: 245, 245
':'Reed, James: 107
*Rees, Roland: 267
Rembert, John: 217
*Restifo, Joseph: 222, 250
334
Richard, Robert: 41,72
Rickenbacker, Eddie: 17,57,87,90
Rinosuke, Ichimaru: 59,
*Rist, Robert: 61, 117,
*Rivers, Richard: 14, 94, 102, 102, 121
*Robb, Robert: 190, 195, 200
*Robinson, James: 108, 108
*Roberts, John: 107
*Roehm, John: 224,245
Rowell, Ross: 51
Rupertus, William: 24
Russell, Hawley: 241
*Russell, Robert: 266
*Ryan, Martin: 48,75,77,87,94, 131
*Ryzek, George: 268
S
*SackeU, Charles: 171, 182, 183, 186, 203
Sadayoshi, Yamada: 25, 59
Sakai, Saburo: 25
Sailer, Joseph: 41,72,75,
Sampson, William: 28
Sano,Tadayoshi:73
Saunders, Lavern: 23,83,83
*Sawyer, Jerome: 53,58,59,62,64,65,107, 121
*Sawyers, Andrew: 214,258
*Schottel, Theo: 235, 244
*Shrock, Lt.: 247
*Scott, Edgar: 266
Scott, Norman: 61,76,78
*Seaman, Glen: 222
Segal, Harold: 227
Seigo, Yamagata: 59
*Serwat, Lt.: 247
Seville, Gordon: 44
*Sewart, Allan: 35, 83
*Shafer, Herbert: 198
*Shaffer, Russell: 268
*Shambrook, Lt.: 75, 131
*Shank,John:244,251
*Shapiro, Leonard: 266
*Sharpsteen, William: 13,59,60,61,65,83,
*Shaw, William: 59,60,73,74, 103,103,105
*Shell, George: 244
[
Part Seven, Appendices - Index
Sherman, Frederick: 241
*Sherman, Lawrence: 23
*Shimp, Robert: 212, 218
Shipp, VVayne: 143
*Shubin, Murray: 8, 107, 170, 171, 172, 173(2),173,177,
190,211,214,218,219,219,282,282
*Shuler, Lucien: 175,182,192, 194,195, 198,285,285
*Shrock, Lt.: 226
Simpler, Leroy: 49, 50, 66
*Skogland, Carl: 266
*Silvers, Howard: 185
*Slupe, Harold: 243
*Smith, Benjamin: 266
*Smith, Grant: 6, 186, 186, 195, 198,199,234,243
Smith, John: 24,28,29,44,46,50,57,57,278
Smith, Leo: 39, 41
*Smith, Maurice: 267
Smith, Martin: 102, 103, 131
*Smith, Richard: 267
*Smith, Robert: 224, 251
*Smith, VVilliam: 133, 139,139,166
*Snelling, Roland: 166
*Snider, Simon: 266
*Sofaly, Raymond: 268
*Sooter, Ralph: 170
*Southwell, Richard: 261
*Spofford, James: 267
*Squire, Christopher: 266
*Squires, Carl: 224
*Starke, VVilliam: 268
*Stern,Howard: 59,60,61,61
*Stewart, Donald: 174,213,219,248,253
*Stewart, E.VV.: 12
*Stewart, Richard: 267
Stimpson, Charles: 171,176
*Stoll, Robert: 242, 243
*Storino, Henry: 262
*Stratton, Eldon: 139,139,150,202
*Strate, John: 267
Streett, St.Clair: 265, 268
Strother, Dean: 22, 100, 134,150,192
*Studley, Edwin: 247
*Stuff, VVilliam: 267
Sumiyoshi, Tadashi: 68, 69
*Summerich, Eugene: 267
Swett, James: 134
*Sylvester, Robert: 172,174,185
*Szela, John: 267
T
Tabuchi, Jisaburo: 145
Tanaka, Raizo: 28, 35, 36, 63, 80, 81, 88, 90, 93, 189
Takama, R.Adm.: 63,65
Takeo, Kurita: 63
*Tarbet, Dale: 103,104,107,174, 175,175
*Taylor, Cecil: 103,203,260
*Taylor, Kenneth: 104, 104, 105, 107
*Tedder, John: 175,176,
*Thomas, James: 41
Thomas, VVilbur: 182, 216
*Thomas, VVilliam: 248, 261
*Thompson, John "Tommy": 14,31,36,37,38,46,47,
48,50,50,51,54,83,93,274
*Tinsley, VV.F.: 126
*Tomlinson, Edwin: 165
*Topoll, George: 94, 100, 124, 125, 132,132
Torkelson, Ross: 182
211,253,253
*Tucker, Robert: 170
*Tullis, Robert: 86,87,109
*Turner, Lt.: 218
Turner, Richmond, "Kelly": 23,24,25,56,76,88,179
*Tuttle, Ralph: 191
Twining, Nathan: 22,22,87,91, 100,101,136, 150,187,
192,204,216,217,233
*Tyler, Kermit: 12,70,103,107,
*Tyler, Aaron: 139,150,174,238
U-Y
Ugaki, Matome: 138,138, 139,143,145,149,155
Unruh, Marion: 199
*Yahey, James: 266
*Yan Bibber, Charles: 172,205
Yandegrift, Alexander: 22,23,24,25,44,45,46,50,52,
56,98,100
*Yiccellio, Henry: 13,94,94, 123, 125,135,139
*Voss, John: 175,192,223
335
13
th
Fighter Command in World War II
W
*Waddell, Lt.: 261
Wagner, Boyd: 44
*Wagoner, Earl: 194
*Walden, Stanley: 248
*Waldmire, Lt.: 75,87
'"Walker, Thomas: 185,224,229,247,251,253,286,286
Wallace, William: 24,39,62
Walley, James: 256
*Walsh, Lt.: 51
Walsh, Kenneth: 123, 131, 199, 201
*Walters, Harry: 182,191,217
*Warner, Donald: 211,266,267
*Wasson, John: 260
Waterman, J.: 65
*Weart, George: 211,266,267
*Webb, Allen: 102
*Webber, Donald: 171, 172, 177, 215
*Wekel, Allan: 107
*Welch, George: 104,105
*Wells, Perry: 204, 204
*Wells, Travis: 243
*Wells, William: 176, 177
*Westbrook, Robert: 8,12,103,107, 117,117,170,170,
171,182,183,205,214,215,224,235,236,241,241,
242,246,253,265,265,266,267,280,280
*Wharton Sidney: 164,
*Wheadon, Elmer: 103,104,107, 182,182,183,190,203,
285,285
*Wheeler, Richard: 190, 242, 242
*Whistler, Victor: 206
White, Charles: 171
*White, Donald: 118
336
*Whiteman, George: 11
';'Whitman, Edward: 188
*Whittaker, Gordon: 139,139,148
Wible, John: 142
*Wiesenger, Robert: 267
Wilkinson, Theodore: 201,214,214
*Williams, F.: 58,
*Williams, Raymond: 75,87,106,106,132,
*Williams, Waldon: 110, 133
*Windes, Alvin: 266
*Wilson, John: 180
*Wilson, Morris: 206,251
*Wittbrott, Glenn: 261
*Woldering, Daniel: 190,
*Wood,John: 107,109,175,185,186
Woods, Louis: 75, 89, 91
*Workman, John: 203
*Works, David: 203
*Worley, Chandler: 266
Worthham, Coleman: 195
Wurtsmith, Paul: 267
Wright, Carlton: 88
*Wythes, Keith: 36, 39
X-Y-Z
Yamagada, Masasato: 51
Yamamoto, Adm. Ishoroku: 6,88,130,130,131,135,135,
137 (2), 137, 138, 138, 139, 142-5, 148, 149, 150-4
Yanagiya, Kenji: 154-5, 155, 156,156
*Yeilding, Lt.: 247
Yost, Donald: 96, 203
*Young, Joseph: 96, 133
Yunck, Michael: 91
*Zink, John: 251,253,266
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