Police On Ppoliceolice Shootings

NewYorkStateTaskForceon PoliceonPoliceShootings
ReducingInherentDanger:
ReportoftheTaskForceon PoliceonPoliceShootings
ChristopherStone,Chair ZacharyCarter,ViceChair ThomasBelfiore EllaM.BullyCummings Rev.Dr.HerbertDaughtry MichaelJ.Farrell GeorgeGascn ArvaRice LewRice DamonT.Hewitt,ExecutiveDirector
ExecutiveSummary
Since1981,some26policeofficersacrosstheUnitedStateshavebeenshotandkilledby fellowpoliceofficerswhohavemistakenthemfordangerouscriminals.Thesefatal shootingsaredoublytragic,firstbecauseboththeshootersandvictimsinsuchsituations areriskingtheirlivestoenforcethelawandprotectthepublic,andsecondbecausemany ofthesedeathsarepreventable.Thedangersthatgiverisetothesedeathsareinherentin policing,butthosedangerscanbereducedandmoredeathsprevented. Overthelastfifteenyears,tenofthefourteenofficerskilledinthesemistakenidentity, policeonpoliceshootingshavebeenpeopleofcolor.Thetwomostrecentofthesefatal, policeonpoliceshootingstookplaceinNewYorkState,andinbothcasesthevictimswere offduty,AfricanAmericanpoliceofficers:OfficerChristopherRidley,killedinWestchester CountyinJanuary2008;andOfficerOmarEdwards,killedinHarleminMay2009. Thesetwomostrecenttragediesreverberatedpowerfully,notonlywithintheranksoflaw enforcementbutwiththebroaderpublic.Inpressaccounts,publicdebate,andinformal conversationsamongpoliceofficers,weheardwidespreadspeculationabouttherolethat racemayhaveplayedintheseshootings,notbasedonanyspecificevidenceofbiasinthese twocases,butemanatinginsteadfromthewidelysharedsuspicionthatraceplaysarolein manypoliceconfrontations,asitdoesinAmericansocietygenerally. Inresponse,GovernorDavidA.PatersonempanelledthisTaskForce,directingusto examinetheissuesandimplicationsarisingfrompoliceonpoliceshootingsand confrontations,especiallybetweenondutyandoffdutyofficers,betweenuniformedand undercoverofficers,andbetweenofficersofdifferentraces,nationalitiesandethnicities, seekingtopreventsuchincidentsinthefuture.Ourworkoffersmanylessons,from methodstoimprovetrainingandtacticstodefusepoliceonpoliceconfrontationsbefore theybecomefatalandimprovetheinvestigationofpoliceonpoliceshootings,to proceduresthatcanimprovethetreatmentoftheofficersandfamiliesinvolved.Equally important,ourworkoffersachancetobetterunderstandtheroleofraceinpolicing decisionsgenerallyandtoidentifyspecificactionsthatpoliceagenciesandgovernmentat everylevelcantaketoreducetheeffectofracialbias,evenunconsciousracialbias,in policedecisionstoshootinfastmoving,dangeroussituations. InthesixmonthssinceourTaskForceconvened,wehaveundertakenanationwide, systematicinvestigationofmistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsthefirsttimeto ourknowledgethatanindependentpanelhasconductedsuchaninquiry.Weidentifiedand examined26fatalshootingsofthiskindintheperiodbetween1981and2009,looking particularlycloselyatthetwomostrecentcasesinNewYorkState.Weinvitedcurrentand retiredlawenforcementofficersfromacrossthecountrytoshareexamplesofmistaken identityconfrontationsfromtheirownexperience,resultinginourcollectingandanalyzing over300storiesofsuchconfrontations.Atthreepublichearingsandthroughwritten submissions,weheardfrompoliceofficersofallranks,includingseveralwhosurvived nearfatalmistakenidentityconfrontations,friendsandrelativesofofficerskilled,
ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings
P a g e |ii
concernedcitizens,andsocialscientists.Wealsocommissionedindepthinterviewswith tenleadingscholarswhohavestudiedpolicingformorethanadecadeeachandwe solicitedadvicefromascoreofexpertsandpoliceveterans. Wefoundthatfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsaremerelythetipofanicebergof confrontationsbetweenondutypoliceofficers(usuallyinuniform)andtheiroffduty, plainclothes,orundercovercounterparts.Theseconfrontationsoccureveryday,andwhile mostaredefusedwithoutinjury,eachcontainstheseedofatragedy.Wheretraininghas beenpoorornonexistent,whereprotocolsareunclear,andespeciallywheretheofficers arefromdifferentlawenforcementagencies,theseconfrontationscanandoftendo escalatequickly.Protectingthelivesoflawenforcementofficerswhentheyareoutof uniformrequiresthattraining,protocols,anddatacollectionallbeimproved. Issuesofracemustalsobeaddresseddirectly:bothperceptionsandreality.Theperception thatracemattersintheseconfrontationsisstrong,includingamongmanyofficersofcolor. Justasmanypeopleofcolorareawarethattheyaremorelikelythantheirwhite counterpartstobestoppedandquestionedbypolice,so,too,manyofficersofcolorbelieve thattheyaremorelikelythantheirwhitecounterpartstobemistakenforacriminalwhen outofuniform,andthatthedangerismanytimesgreaterwhentheyaretakingpolice actionwiththeirgundisplayed. Asforthereality,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingshavetragicallykilled undercoverandplainclothesofficerswhite,black,andHispanicwithoutanyobvious racialorethnicpattern;buttherealityisstrikinglydifferentforoffdutyofficers.Asfaras wecandetermine,1982wasthelastyearinwhichanoffduty,whitepoliceofficerwas killedinamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootinganywhereintheUnitedStates.Since then,nineoffdutyofficersofcolorhavebeenkilledinsuchshootings,includingboth OfficerRidleyandOfficerEdwardsinNewYorkState.Distinguishingtheoffdutyshootings fromthemistakenidentityshootingsofundercoverorplainclothesofficersisimportant becausepolicedepartments,atleastuntilnow,havehadmoretoolsandtrainingtokeep plainclothesandundercoverofficerssafethantheytypicallyhavehadforoffdutyofficers. Thereisbroadconsensusamongpoliceleadersacrossthecountrythatdepartmentsmust alwaysbeworking,asoneseniorNewYorkStatePoliceexecutiveputittous,toweedout themostvirulentracists,instillculturalsensitivityandfairness,andfinallystrictlypursuea policyofzerotolerancewhenitcomestodiscriminatorybiasofitsofficers.Weagree. Butthecasesthatledtothecreationofthistaskforceraiseadifferentissue:theneedfor policedepartmentstogobeyondtheissueofovertbiastodealwiththeunconsciousbiases thatinfluenceallpeople,includingpoliceofficers. Wefindthescientificevidencepersuasivethatpoliceofficerssharethesameunconscious racialbiasesfoundamongthegeneralpublicintheUnitedStates.Specifically,weare persuadedbyevidencethatbothpoliceofficersandmembersofthegeneralpublicdisplay unconsciousbiasesthatleadthemtobequickertoshootimagesofarmedblackpeople thanofarmedwhitepeopleincomputerbasedsimulationstestingshoot/dontshoot decisionmaking.Moreover,weareencouragedthatpreliminaryevidencesuggeststhat
P a g e |iii
policetrainingmayreducethisunconsciousbias,andwecommendthosepolice departmentsincludingtheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentthathavebegun systematicresearch,testingtheirnewrecruitsforthisbiasbeforeandaftertheirtraining, aswellasintheearlystagesoftheirpolicecareers.Reducinganykindofracialbiasin shoot/dontshootdecisionshasthegreatestpotentialtosavethelivesofpoliceofficersof colorandofciviliansalike. Finally,wehavefoundthatthesefatalpoliceonpoliceshootingscaneasilytraumatizeand sometimespolarizeentirepolicedepartments.Notonlyaretheindividualofficerspresent atthesceneaffecteddeeply,buttheorganizationalroutinesthatnormallystructurean agencysresponsetoashootingcanbethrownintoconfusionaswordofanofficerkilled spreadsunevenlythroughadepartment,asotherofficersreactwithunderstandable emotion,andasthedeepestofregretsgripeveryoneinvolved.Departmentsthathadnever imaginedthatsuchatragedywouldoccurwithintheirranksfindthemselvesunprepared tohandletheinevitableemotionandtrauma,sometimesleadingtoalossofcredibilityand respect,notonlywiththepublic,butalsoamongswornmembersoftheirownlaw enforcementagencies.Yet,ifrecentpatternshold,itislikelythatanotherpolice departmentsomewhereintheUnitedStateswillfinditselffacingjustsuchatragedythis year,anotherwillfaceonein2011,andsoonintothefuture. Preventionandpreparationarestraightforwardandessential.NewYorkState,withtwo suchtragicrecentexperiences,hasaspecialobligationtostrengthenitsprevention, preparation,andresponsestatewide.Wemakeninespecificrecommendations,eachwith implicationsforpolicedepartments,municipalities,andstateandfederalgovernment. 1. Toreducethefrequencyanddangerinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,we recommendthatcommonprotocolsbedevelopedbothstatewideandnationwide regardingwhenandhowtotakepoliceactionwhileoffdutyoroutofuniform,and howchallengingandconfrontedofficersshouldconductthemselves. 2. Tomakethoseprotocolseffectiveandtopreparedepartmentstorespond appropriatelywhentragedystrikes,werecommendthatinteractive,scenario basedtrainingontheprotocolsbecomemandatoryinNewYorkStateand routinethroughoutthenation,bothfornewrecruitsandforveteranofficers,and thattrainingbedevelopedforpoliceleadersinhowtorespondeffectivelyto policeonpoliceshootings. 3. Toreducetherolethatracialstereotypesplayinpoliceconfrontations,we recommendthatbothfederalandstategovernmentsacceleratethedevelopment oftestingandtrainingtomeasurablyreduceunconsciousracialbiasin shoot/dontshootdecisions. 4. Toreducetherolethatracialstereotypesplaywithinpolicedepartments,we recommendthatpolicetrainingonissuesofraceanddiversitybeexpandedto includeafocusondiversitywithinpoliceagencies,drawingontheexperiencesof officersofcolorwhohavebeenmistakenforoffenders. 5. Toimprovethequalityandcredibilityofpoliceresponsesintherareinstances ofpoliceonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkState,werecommendthe
ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings P a g e |iv
developmentofaspecializedsupportteamthatwouldbequicklydeployedtoany locationinthestatewhereapoliceonpoliceshootingoccurs,andthatcouldbe availabletoassistdepartmentsinotherstatesuponrequest. 6. Toimproveunderstandingastohowpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsoccur,and howtheycanberesolvedwithoutinjury,werecommendtheestablishmentofa mandatorystatewidereportingsystemforallfirearmsdischarges,the distributionofavoluntaryannualsurveytoindividualofficers,andenhanced recordkeepingmeasuresbytheNewYorkDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices andtheFederalBureauofInvestigation. 7. Toimprovethetransparencyandunderstandingofprosecutorialdecisionsin policeonpoliceshootings,werecommendthatprosecutorsoverseeingthese investigationspubliclydiscloseasmanydetailsaspossibleasearlyaspossible, andthatGovernorsgivegreatweighttotheneedtoencouragepublicdisclosure ofthecircumstancesoftheseshootingswhenweighingwhetherornottoappoint aspecialprosecutorinanindividualcase. 8. Tosharethebenefitsofthelessonsdrawnfrompoliceonpoliceshootings,we recommendthattheprotocolsdevelopedtoprotectofficersbeadaptedforuse bythosecommunityorganizationsprovidingtrainingtociviliansonhowto handlethemselvesduringencounterswithpolice,andthatthistrainingbemade availabletociviliansofallracesandethnicities. 9. Toattendtotheconcernsofthegrowingnumbersofofficersofcolorinour increasinglydiversesociety,werecommendthatthefederalgovernment, togetherwithlocallawenforcementagencies,launchaprogramofdialogueand researchontheexperiencesofofficersofcolor,especiallywhenoffduty, deepeningthefieldsabilitytosupporttheseofficersastheystrivetobring safetyandjusticetocommunitiesthatneedthemsodearly. WhilenothingcanundothetragediesthathavetakenthelivesofOfficersOmarEdwards, ChristopherRidley,anddozensofothersbeforethem,wemustactonthelessonstheir deathshavetaughtus.Ourrecommendationsurgepreciselytheseactions,promisingto reducethechancesthatthesetragedieswillberepeatedandincreasingthesafetyofpolice officersandciviliansacrossNewYorkStateandacrossthenation.
P a g e |v
TaskForceMembers
ChristopherStone,Chair DanielandFlorenceGuggenheimProfessorofthePracticeofCriminalJustice, JohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,HarvardUniversity ZacharyCarter,ViceChair Partner,Dorsey&WhitneyLLP andformerUnitedStatesAttorneyfortheEasternDistrictofNewYork ThomasBelfiore Chair,NewYorkMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil FormerCommissioner,WestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety EllaM.BullyCummings FormerChiefofPolice,DetroitPoliceDepartment Rev.Dr.HerbertDaughtry NationalPresidingMinister,HouseoftheLordChurches MichaelJ.Farrell DeputyCommissionerforStrategicInitiatives,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment GeorgeGascn ChiefofPolice,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment ArvaRice PresidentandCEO,NewYorkUrbanLeague LewRice FormerSpecialAgentinCharge,U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration,NewYorkOffice
P a g e |vi
TaskForceStaff
DamonT.Hewitt,Esq. ExecutiveDirector JamesA.Gilmer DirectorofResearch Chief,CrimeResearchandAnalysisUnit,OfficeofJusticeResearchandPerformance, NewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices DeleneBromirski ResearchAssistant DoctoralStudent,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice KirstenChristiansen ResearchAssistant DoctoralCandidate,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice AmberHorning ResearchAssistant DoctoralStudent,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice ZacharyShemtob ResearchAssistant DoctoralCandidate,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice JenniferTsai ResearchAssistant Master'sCandidate,WagnerSchoolofPublicPolicy,NYU
P a g e |vii
TaskForceAdvisorsandContributors
GeoffreyP.Alpert,Ph.D. Professor,DepartmentofCriminologyandCriminalJusticeUniversityofSouthCarolina DavidBayley,Ph.D. DistinguishedProfessor,CollegeofCriminalJusticeUniversityatAlbany,StateUniversity ofNewYork AnthonyBraga,Ph.D. SeniorResearchAssociateHarvardUniversityJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment MerrickBobb President,PoliceAssessmentResourceCenter HenryDeGeneste FormerSuperintendent,PortAuthorityPoliceDepartment JohnJackDovidio,Ph.D. Professor,DepartmentofPsychologyYaleUniversity DirectorofTraining,ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity(CPLE) JohnEck,Ph.D. Professor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeUniversityofCincinnati WilliamA.Geller Principal,Geller&Associates ErnestE.GreenIII President,NationalOrganizationofBlackLawEnforcementExecutives(NOBLE) PhillipAtibaGoff,Ph.D. AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofPsychologyUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles ExecutiveDirectorofResearch,ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity(CPLE) RonaldE.Hampton ExecutiveDirector,NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA) DeloresJonesBrown,Ph.D. AssociateProfessorandDirectoroftheCenteronRace,CrimeandJustice JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice GeorgeL.Kelling,Ph.D. Professor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeRutgersUniversityNewark
ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings P a g e |viii
DavidA.Klinger,Ph.D. AssociateProfessor,DepartmentofCriminologyandCriminalJusticeUniversityof Missouri,StLouis JamesH.Lawrence FormerCommissioner,NassauCountyPoliceDepartment,FormerChiefofPersonneland FormerDeputyCommissionerforTraining,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment WilliamJ.Lewinski,Ph.D. ExecutiveDirector,ForceScienceInstitute,Ltd. Professor,DepartmentofPoliticalScienceandLawEnforcement, MinnesotaStateUniversity,Mankato StephenMastrofski,Ph.D. UniversityProfessor,ChairoftheDepartmentofAdministrationofJustice,andDirectorof theCenterforJusticeLeadershipandManagement,GeorgeMasonUniversity HamiltonRobinson FormerChiefofPatrol,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandFormerChiefofNewYork CityHousingAuthorityPolice JonM.Shane,Ph.D. AssistantProfessor,DepartmentofLawJohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice WesleyG.Skogan,Ph.D. ProfessorofPoliticalScienceandFacultyFellow,InstituteforPolicyResearch NorthwesternUniversity WilliamTerrill,Ph.D. AssociateProfessor,SchoolofCriminalJusticeMichiganStateUniversity JeremyTravis President,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice Lt.CharlesP.Wilson NationalChairman,NationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers(NABLEO)
P a g e |ix
Contents
ExecutiveSummary.................................................................................................................ii TaskForceMembers ..............................................................................................................vi TaskForceStaff...................................................................................................................... vii TaskForceAdvisorsandContributors.................................................................................... viii 1. RareEventsthatReverberateWidely...............................................................................1
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsastheApexofPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.......................................4 PoliceonPoliceShootingsastheExemplarsofaWiderArrayofMistakenShootings...............................9 PoliceonPoliceShootingsasaSpecialBurdenforPoliceOfficersofColor..............................................10
2. WhatWeKnowAboutPatternsandTrendsinPoliceonPoliceShootingsand Confrontations...............................................................................................................13
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootings................................................................................................................. 13 TheRidleyCase...........................................................................................................................................13 TheEdwardsCase.......................................................................................................................................16 FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsSince1981.............................................................................................. 18 TheActionsofVictimOfficersandConfrontingOfficersinFatalEncounters............................................22 ACloserLookatMistakenShootingsofOffDutyOfficers......................................................................... 24 AftermathofFatalShootings...................................................................................................................... 27 NonFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings......................................................................................................... 31 OtherPoliceonPoliceConfrontations....................................................................................................... 32 TheRoleofStereotypesinPoliceConfrontationswithPeopleofColor....................................................37 InformationGapsonPoliceonPoliceShootingsandConfrontations.......................................................41
3. TheRoleofTraining........................................................................................................43
TraininginNewYorkStateonPoliceonPoliceConfrontations................................................................44 TheContentandMethodofConfrontationTraining .................................................................................. 48 TrainingforOutofUniformOfficersandConfrontedOfficers..................................................................48 TrainingforChallengingOfficers................................................................................................................ 50 TrainingforCiviliansonConfrontationswithPolice................................................................................... 52
4. Recommendations ..........................................................................................................54
1.DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations.........................................54 2.RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations.................................................................55 3.DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasin Shoot/DontShootDecisions.............................................................................................................. 58 4.ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPoliceAgencies...................................58
P a g e |x
5.DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthatExperienceaPoliceonPolice Shooting..............................................................................................................................................59 6.EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearmsDischargesandaVoluntary, AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceonPoliceConfrontations..................................................61 7.PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceonPoliceShootings...................63 8.ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPoliceCivilianShootings.........64 9.ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor......................................................65
Acknowledgements...............................................................................................................68 AppendixA:ListofFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings19812009...........................................71 AppendixB:NewYorkCityFatalIncidents,19302009.........................................................77 AppendixC:NewYorkCityNonFatalConfrontations,19952009........................................81 AppendixD:LetterfromNYPDCommissionerRaymondW.Kellyto GovernorDavidA.Paterson...........................................................................................83 AppendixE:ListofRecommendationsbyGovernmentalUnit..............................................90 AppendixF:ReportsfromSelectedTaskForceAdvisors.......................................................92 AppendixG:ListofWitnessesandWrittenSubmissionsMadetotheTaskForce...............119 AppendixH:ExecutiveOrderCreatingPoliceonPoliceShootingsTaskForce....................120 AppendixI:GlossaryofTermsUsedinReport....................................................................124

P a g e |xi
1.
RareEventsthatReverberateWidely
AspecialfearhauntspoliceofficersofcoloracrosstheUnitedStates.Beyondallthe dangersthateverylawenforcementofficerfaces,theseofficersfeeluniquelythreatenedby another.Itisthedangerthatadaywillcomewhentheyareoutofuniformoffduty, undercover,orinplainclothesandthecoloroftheirskinandagunintheirhandwill promptfellowofficerstomistakethemforanarmedcriminal,andshoot.Whenanofficer ofcolorisnotinuniformandseesacrimeinprogressoralifethreatened,andconsiders takingpoliceaction,heorshemustoftenthinktwiceabouthowthenextpoliceofficerson thescenewillreacttoanunfamiliarblackorLatinowithagun. OnJanuary25,2008,OfficerChristopherRidleyoftheMountVernonPoliceDepartment wasshotandkilledbyofficersoftheWestchesterCountyPoliceDepartmentinWhite Plains,NewYork.OfficerRidleyhadbeenoffduty,hadseenaphysicalaltercation betweentwociviliansandhadtakenpoliceactiontoapprehendthesuspectwhoinitiated theassault.Whenotheruniformedofficersarrived,theysawRidley,anAfricanAmerican, withaguninhishand. OnMay28,2009,OfficerOmarEdwardsoftheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmenthadjust goneoffdutywhenhesawsomeonebreakingintohiscar.Hetookpoliceaction,chasing thethiefdown125thStreetinHarlem,withhisguninhishand.Otherplainclothesofficers inanunmarkedcarsawOfficerEdwards,anAfricanAmerican,withaweaponchasingthe otherman.TheplainclothesofficersgotoutoftheircarandoneofthemorderedOfficer Edwardstodrophisweapon.Reportedly,OfficerEdwardsinsteadturnedtowardthe plainclothesofficers,andoneofthemfiredsixrounds,killinghim. Thesetwoincidents,describedmorefullybelow,promptedGovernorDavidA.Patersonto createthisTaskForce.Thesewerenotaccidentalshootings.Thesewerecasesofmistaken identity,inwhichpoliceofficersintentionallyshototherpoliceofficerswhomthey mistakenlybelievedtobecriminaloffenders.1 Fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsarerareevents.Eachincidentisunique;butinthetwo casesdescribedabove,bothvictimswereoffdutyAfricanAmericanofficerswhotook policeactionwiththeirgunsdrawn,onlytobeshotandkilledbyotherofficerswhodidnot knowthattheywerepoliceofficers.Tragicdeathssuchasthesereverberatepowerfully amongpoliceofficersofallcolors,races,andethnicities,aswellasamongmembersofthe generalpublic. Thesetragediesresonateinatleastthreeseparateanddistinctways,eachofwhichwe addressdirectlyinthisreport. First,thesedeathsstandattheapexofamountainofnonfatal,policeonpolice confrontationsinwhichsomeofficersdonotrecognizeothersaspolice.Minor confrontationsofthiskindoccureverydayinpolicing,andareusuallydefusedregardless
1Werefertotheseincidentsaspoliceonpoliceshootings,thoughsomeinvolvelawenforcementofficers
fromagenciesotherthantraditionalpolicedepartments.
P a g e |1
oftheraceorethnicityoftheofficersinvolvedwithoutphysicalinjury.Officerstrainfor theseconfrontations,andlawenforcementagenciespromulgatepoliciesdesignedto minimizetheirfrequencyandendthemsafely.Still,theseconfrontationscontinuetooccur andcancauseinsultandharmtotheofficersinvolved,evenwhentheystopshortoffatality orphysicalinjury.Themostseriousincidentscantraumatizeentirepolicedepartments andshakethecommunitiesthosedepartmentsserve.Ourrecommendationsshouldmake policeonpoliceconfrontationslessfrequentandlessdangerousforallpoliceofficers. Second,thesedeathsareespeciallyvividexamplesofawiderrangeofinstancesinwhich policeofficersshootandsometimeskillpeoplewhomtheymistakeforoffenders.Whether thevictimisacivilianoranofficeroutofuniform,officersassessingdangerwithlimited informationintenseandrapidlymovingconfrontationscanmakemistakes.Such shootingsinvitecontroversy,especiallywhenthereisapossibilitythatconsciousor unconsciousracialbiasmayhaveplayedevenasmallroleinthedecisiontoshoot.The inevitabledebatesoverindividualculpabilityoftencompetewithbroadereffortsto preventrecurrence.Theambiguitiesandthedebatestheyprovokemaybesomewhat reducedwhenthevictimisapoliceofficer,especiallyifallagreethatthevictimofficerwas actingwiththebestofintentions.Thesemistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings, therefore,provideanopportunitytoassembleabroaderconsensusforthepreventionof futuretragedies.Ourrecommendationsshouldnotonlyreducemistakenidentityshootingsof policeofficers,butshouldalsohelptoprotectciviliansfromsuchfatalencounters. Third,thesedeaths,eveninadistantcityorstate,reverberatewithinthefamiliesof officersofcolor,wheretheysurfacequestionsaboutwhethertheseofficersshouldhave joinedlawenforcementinthefirstplace.Arounddinnertablesandingatheringsof friends,manyofficersofcolorhavefacedskepticismabouttheirdecisionstojointhepolice, especiallyfromfriendsandrelativeswhohavehadbadexperienceswithanypartofthe criminaljusticesystem.Eachpoliceonpoliceshootinginwhichthevictimofficerisa personofcolorrevivesthosequestionsincountlessconversations,strainingfamilytiesand careercommitments.Insomecases,thesereverberationsarealsofeltbypolicerecruiters seekingtohirenewofficersofcolor.Ourrecommendationsshouldreinforcetheconfidence andresolveoftodaysofficersofcolorandtomorrowsaswellbystrengtheningtheabilityand commitmentoflawenforcementagencieseverywheretoprotectandrespectalloftheir members,aswellasthecommunitiesfromwhichtheyaredrawn. Intheremainingsectionsofthischapter,weexamineeachofthesethreeissuesinturn;but firstweconsidertheissueofraceintheseshootings. Althoughpublicattentionisparticularlyattunedtoincidentswhereofficersofcolorare mistakenforcriminals,whiteofficershavealsobeenvictimsofbothfatalandnonfatal mistakenidentityshootings.Inourpublichearingsandthroughouronlinequestionnaire, manywhiteofficersdescribedforussituationswheretheyaimedtheirweaponsatoffduty whiteofficerswhomtheymistookforcriminals,andmanywhiteofficersdescribedhow theywerechallengedbyothers.BlackandHispanicofficershavealsobeenamongthe
P a g e |2
confrontingofficersinfatalandnonfatalmistakenidentityshootings.2Inshort,thereare manyissuesbesidesracepresentintheseshootingsandtherolethatraceplaysisnot simpleorstraightforward. Whileourreportreachesmanyissuesotherthanracethatcontributetothesetragedies, werecognizethatissuesofracearecentraltothebroadpublicconcernovertheNewYork Statepoliceonpoliceshootings.Wewerenotaskedtodeterminethepreciserolethatrace playedinanyparticularincident,andwehavenottriedtodetermineifanyoftheofficers involvedinthespecificincidentsthattriggeredourreviewconsciouslyheldanyparticular biasesoractedonstereotypes.Instead,wewereaskedtolookatpatternsacrossmany incidentsandtoexaminethescientificresearchbearingonthesetragedies. Ourconclusionfromthatreviewisclear:inherentorunconsciousracialbiasplaysarolein shoot/dontshootdecisionsmadebyofficersofallracesandethnicities.Therolemaybe smallandsubtle,measuredduringsimulationsonlyinmillisecondsofactionorhesitation, butthepatterns(describedmorefullybelow)areclearandconsistent.Equallyimportant, training,supervision,andprofessionaldisciplinemayreducetherolethatracialbiasplays andcanhelpofficersrespondtochallengesinwaysthatdefusetheconfrontationsbefore theyturndeadly.Thatmakesitallthemoreimportantthatpoliceagenciesaswellasstate andfederalgovernmentsdealdirectlywithinherentorunconsciousbiasinshoot/dont shootdecisions. Racialbiascan,insomeinstances,beovertratherthanunconscious,andweagreewiththe manypoliceofficersandcommunityleaderswhoemphasizedduringourreviewthe importanceofpressingaheadwitheffortstoeliminateovertbiasfromeverypoliceagency. Policedepartmentsmustcontinuetodevelopmechanismstoidentifyandweedout recruitsandveteranofficerswhoclearlyexhibitconsciousracialanimus.Asthesecondin commandoftheNewYorkStatePolicebluntlyputtheissueinourfirstpublichearing: Weunfortunatelystillliveinasocietythatstillhasaconsiderableamountof racism. Many in our society will perceive a minority police officer in plain clothes with a gun as a criminal in the very first instances, and a non minority officer as a police officer. Thus, given that thepolice are recruited from society at large, it stands to reason that these recruits will bring with them their own prejudices and opinions. The question is: What can police agenciesdotoweedoutthemostvirulentracists,instillculturalsensitivity and fairness, and finally strictly pursue a police of zero tolerance when it
mistookeachotherforrobbersandfiredateachother.Oneofficer,DavidTurman,died.Theotherofficer washospitalized.In2006,anoffdutyHispanicofficerintheNewYorkPoliceDepartment(EricHernandez) wasshotandkilledbyanotherHispanicuniformedofficeroutsideofafastfoodrestaurant.Andin1999,ina nonfatalshooting,GavinReece,ablackNYPDuniformedpoliceofficer,shotatanowretired35yearold whiteNYPDofficerwhowastakingpoliceaction.Thewhiteretiredofficerhadfiredhisweaponattwo suspectswhohadjustrobbedhimatgunpoint.WhenoneofhisshotsstruckthewindshieldofOfficerReeces vehicle,OfficerReecereturnedfire.Fortunately,noneofhisthreeshotshitatargetandthetwoofficerswere abletoidentifyeachotheranddefusethesituation.

2In1968,twoblackoffdutyNewYorkCitypoliceofficers(oneamemberoftheHousingPolice)tragically
P a g e |3
comestodiscriminatorybiasofitsofficersandtheagencyasawhole?How doesitregainthetrustofthecommunities,officers,andfamiliesmostkeenly impactedbythetragedyoffriendlyfiredeaths?3 Quitesimply,issuesofracepervadepoliceworkintheUnitedStates.Theyarefeltin relationsamongofficersaswellasbetweenofficersandcivilians.Manyofourfindings drawoutspecificissuesofraceandmanyofourrecommendationsaddressthemdirectly; butourindividualrecommendationswillnotbeadequatewithoutleadershipfromwithin policeorganizationsandfromcommunityorganizationsonthesematters.Policeexecutives inparticularmustbeabletoidentifytheseissuesanddiscussthemcomfortably,both withintheiragenciesandwiththepublic.Amongourrecommendations,weurgethatpolice leadersreceivetrainingtohelpwiththiscrucialtask.
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsastheApexofPoliceonPolice Confrontations
Theshootingdeathofapoliceofficermistakenbyotherofficersforadangerouscriminalis extremelyrare,havingoccurredsomewhereintheUnitedStatesaboutonceayearoverthe lastthreedecades.4Yet,thesedeathsarethetipofaproverbialicebergofthousandsof confrontationseachyearthatendwithoutfatalities.Preventingevenonedeatheachyear wouldbeworththeeffortrequired;butthebenefitswouldbefeltmuchmorewidelyifthey helpedtoavertormoresafelydefusethesethousandsofnonfatalconfrontations,aswell. Almosteverylawenforcementveteranwithwhomwespokeinthisinquiryhadpersonal storiestoshareaboutpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.Indeed,theseconfrontationsare widelyunderstoodasinevitable,leadinglawenforcementagenciesacrosstheUnitedStates todevelopawidearrayofcreativetacticstodefusethem.Wediscusssomeofthesetactics laterinthisreportwhenweturntotraining;buteventhebesttacticscanleadtoproblems whentheyvaryfromagencytoagency.Onefundamentalproblemisthatthereisnosingle protocolinplacetodefusepoliceonpoliceconfrontations,notsimplynationally,buteven acrossasinglestate,county,orcity. BecausetheUnitedStatesuniquelyintheworldhasliterallythousandsofseparate policedepartmentswithnogovernmentagencyabletosetstandardsforthemall,the varietyofpoliciesandprotocolsisvirtuallyendless,withenormousvariationinhow thoroughlydepartmentstrainforsuchencounters,iftheytrainatall.Themultiplicityof
oftheNationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers,madeasuggestioninalmostidenticallanguage whenheurgedpolicedepartmentstodomoretoweedoutthosewithdivisiveattitudesandbeliefsduring initialhiring.ViewpointsofCharlesP.WilsononbehalfoftheWestchesterCountyGuardiansAssociation, December4,2009. 4Bycomparison,policeofficersacrosstheUnitedStateskilledapproximately365personsincustodyor duringthearrestprocesseachyearfrom2003to2005,theonlythreeyearsforwhichthesedataareavailable nationally.SeeChristopherJ.Mumola,ArrestRelatedDeathsintheUnitedStates,20032005,U.S.Department ofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,October2007,NCJ219534, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ardus05.pdf

3TestimonyofPedroPerez,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).CharlesWilson,nationalchairman
P a g e |4
agenciesisasourceofmanyproblemsinpolicing,butitraisesparticularproblemswhen officersfromoneagencyconfrontanofficeroutofuniformfromanotheragency,mistaking theconfrontedofficerforacriminal.Ifeachagencyusesadifferentmethodforidentifying suchofficersandthetrainingisinconsistent,evengoodprotocolsandtrainingarelikelyto failandtheconfrontationcouldmoreeasilygowrong. Figure1.1FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsAretheTipoftheIceberg

Thehandfuloffatalpoliceonpolice shootingswehaveseenovertheyears areonlythevisibletipofanicebergof policeonpoliceconfrontations. Virtuallyinvisiblearethescoresofnon fatalconfrontationsoccurringevery year,inmostofwhichnoweaponis fired.Theseconfrontationsarisewhen officersdonotrecognizeoutofuniform officersaspolice.Theyarerarely reported,evenwithintheofficersown departments.
Thedangerisperhapsmostobviouswithpoliceofficersworkingundercover,whooften deliberatelyposeascriminals.OneveteranLatinoofficerwiththeNewYorkStatePolice recountedastoryofwhen,asanundercovernarcoticsinvestigator,hewasassignedto arrestasmalltowndrugdealer.Becausethesuspecthadrelativesonthelocalpoliceforce, theStatePolicehadnotnotifiedlocallawenforcementoftheoperation.Whenhestopped thesuspectscar,heapproachedthedriverwithhisweapondrawn,identifyinghimselfasa policeofficer,but,ashetellsit,Iwasdressedinplainclothesandmyfacialdescription wasthatofalocaldrugdealer,becausethatswhatIhadbeendoing,conducting undercoverbuys.Civiliansobservingfromtheroadsidemistookthisarrestoperationfor arobberyinprogressandcalledthelocalpolice.Theclosestlocalofficerhappenedtobe performingcommunityserviceinagradeschool,dressedasSantaClaus.Withoutchanging backintouniform,thelocalofficerdrovethefewblockstothesceneandpulledupasthe undercoverStatePoliceofficerwasplacinghissuspectontheground.Theofficerdressed asSantagotoutofhiscarwithhisgundrawn,shoutingtotheundercoverofficertodrop hisweapon.Theundercovershoutedbackthathewasapoliceofficer,butthenrealized thathemustdrophisweapon,evenwhileotherofficersonhisundercoverteamwere shoutingthathewasindeedacop.Astheformerundercoverofficertoldus,Theofficer camewithinafewfeetofmewithhisgunpointedatmyhead.Luckily,hedidnot
P a g e |5
intentionallyoraccidentallyfirehisweapon.These[incidents]happenallthetime,and theremustbesomethingdoneaboutit.5 Officersworkinginplainclothesassignmentsfacesimilardangers.Forexample,wewere toldofanincidentinwhichaplainclothesofficerwasinsideabuildingwithhisweapon drawnwhilesearchingforanarmedsuspect.Uniformedofficersweremobilizinginfrontof thebuildingwhenoneofficersawthroughawindowanindividualwithagun.The uniformedofficerfiredandstrucktheplainclothesofficerinthehand,mistakinghimfor thearmedsuspect.6Severalofthepolicingscholarsinterviewedforthisreportalso reportedthatthesetwocategoriesofofficersthoseworkingundercoverorin plainclotheswerethemostlikelytohaveweaponsdrawnonthemorotherwisetobe involvedinnearmissconfrontations. Preciselybecausethedangersforundercoverandplainclothesofficersaresoobvious,law enforcementagenciestakemanyprecautionstoavoidanddefusethelikelyconfrontations. Anundercoverteamwilloftennotifyalawenforcementagencyintheareathatitis operatinginitsjurisdictionandmightdescribetheofficersinvolved.7Undercoveror plainclothesofficersmaybeaccompaniedbyuniformedofficersnearby,monitoringlocal policeradiosandreadytointerveneifneeded.Theundercoverorplainclothesofficers themselvesmaybewearingthecoloroftheday,anarmbandorotherarticleofclothing inadesignatedcolor,orraidjacketswithPOLICEorthenameoftheagency emblazonedontheback,allowinglawenforcementofficerstoeasilyidentifytheseofficers onsight.Andbecausesomeofficersworktheseoutofuniformassignmentsregularly,they canbetrainedtobeconfronted,tocomplywiththeinstructionsofanyofficerswho confrontthem,andtoidentifythemselvesverballywithoutmakinganyinadvertentmoves. Foroffdutyofficerswhodrawtheirweaponstotakepoliceaction,theseconfrontations maybemoredangerous.Thisisespeciallythecaseiftheyareoffdutyinplaceswherethey donotnormallyworkandarethereforeunlikelytoberecognizedbylocalofficers.Inmany agencies,officersareunlikelytohavereceivedtraining,exceptperhapsbrieflywhenthey firstjointhepoliceoratthefiringrange,onhowtotakeactionoffdutyandthenhowto respondwhentheyareconfrontedbyauniformedofficer.Offdutyofficersareunlikelyto beinradiocommunicationwithadispatcher,andtheyareusuallyunabletoalertother unitsthattheyaretakingpoliceactionoutofuniform.Thereisnocolorofthedayforoff dutyofficers.Moreover,theymaybemorelikelytodrawtheirgunearlyinaconfrontation, sincetheyarenotequippedwiththeothertoolsthatplainclothesofficersusuallycarry, suchashandcuffs,pepperspray,andotherlesslethalalternativestotheirfirearms. Foralloftheseofficerstakingpoliceactionoutofuniform,somebasicprotocolswould seemnecessary.Indeed,thegeneraltacticsurgedonofficersconfrontingapersonwitha gunarewidelyagreedupon,althoughthemultiplicityofpolicedepartmentsacrossthe
5TestimonyofPedroPerez,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing). 6TestimonyofRichardBellucci,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing). 7Theremaybetimeswhenlawenforcementagenciesdonotshareinformationabouttheiroperations.For
example,outsideofjointtaskforceoperations,federallawenforcementagenciesmaynotasamatterof courseshareinformationabouttheirplannedoperationswithlocalauthorities.
P a g e |6
UnitedStatesandevenwithinNewYorkStatemeansthatspecificinstructionsvaryfrom onepolicedepartmenttoanother.Whenconfrontingapersonwithagun,officersare typicallytrainedtoissueastrong,simplecommand,Police!Dontmove!(notmore colloquialphrasessuchasFreeze,DropthegunorGetdown,thoughthesekindsof commandsmayfollowshortlyaftertheoriginalDontmove!).Thisclear,initialverbal instructionnottomovehasnowbecomecommonplaceamonglawenforcementagencies. Confrontingofficersareexpectedsimultaneouslytotakecover(behindthedoorofapolice car,atree,oranythingelseavailable).Coverissoimportantbecauseitprovidesafew extrasecondsforconfrontingofficerstoassesstheactualthreattheyfacefromtheperson withthegun. Atagenerallevel,thereiswideagreementaboutwhatshouldhappennextwhenanarmed, outofuniformofficerhearsthecommand,Police!Dontmove!Theconfrontedofficer shouldobeythecommandsoftheuniformedorondutyofficer.Theconfrontedofficer shouldnotmoveintheslightest,eventoreachforidentificationortofacetheconfronting officer,asthatsimplemotion(whichsomecallreflexivespin)islikelytobringhisorher weaponaroundaswell.Theconfrontedofficershouldremainmotionlessandverbally identifyhimselforherselfasanofficer.Buthow?Incontrasttotheconsensusonthe appropriateinitialcommandfromtheconfrontingofficer,Police.Dontmove!thereis surprisinglylittleconsensusontheprecisewordstheconfrontedofficershoulduse.8 Inpractice,ofcourse,thingsgetmorecomplicated.Manypoliceofficers,outofuniform, dontfullycomprehendthattheorder,Police!Dontmove!isdirectedatthem.They knowtheyrepoliceofficers,andtheyassumeothersdoaswell.Insteadoffreezing,they sometimesinstinctivelyturnorgetupofftheground,whichonlylookstotheconfronting officerlikedisobedience,escalatingtheconfrontation.AsformerMountVernonPolice Commissioner(andcurrentWhitePlainsDepartmentofPublicSafetyCommissioner) DavidChongdescribedhisownexperienceataTaskForcehearing: WhenIarriveonthesceneandobserveanindividualwithadrawngun,not inuniform,withnoidentifyingfeaturesasafellowlawenforcementofficer,I wouldtypicallyfeelthreatenedfirst.AsIclearlyscreamoutcommandsand seekatacticaladvantage,Iconsidermyselfondutyandincharge.Iexpectto seecompliancewithmyorders:Policedontmove,dropthegun,getdown ontheground,etc.Noncomplianceonlyexacerbatesthesituation,andmy perception,atthatinstantmoment,isthatIaminrealandimminentdanger. Ihave,whileinuniform,personallydrawnmyweaponandpointeditanoff dutyofficerarmedwithagun.Luckilytheofficercompliedwithmy directions.Aftertheofficerwasproperlyidentified,IcantellyouthatIwas
8OneformerNYPDundercoverofficerexplainedtous,IdidntresemblethetypicalpoliceofficerasIhad
longhair,earrings,andIwasAsian.Iquicklydevelopedahabitthatwastaughttousinundercover school[to]quicklyidentifyoneselfwithknownpolicejargonandphrasessuchasImonthejob,Ivegota collar,orassomeoftheveteranshadtaughtme,yelloutthecodefordinner,1063,orthecodeforhelp, 1013.TestimonyofDavidChong,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).Wereceivedsimilar testimonyfromseveralotherveteranofficers,suggestingthatthereisnostandardresponse.Wereturnto thispointinourrecommendations.
P a g e |7
stillnothappybecauseIknewhowdangerouslycloseIhadcometoa tragedy.9 Otherwitnessestoldusofoffdutyofficerswithgunswho,whencommandedto freeze,insteadreachedfortheirbadgesintheirpocketstoidentifythemselves.The confrontingofficersthinktheyrereachingforagun.Itisnothardtoseehowthese confrontationscanturndeadly,asthefollowingstoryillustrates: Ononeoccasion,IwasflaggeddownbyateenagerinBushwickwhotoldmy partnerandmethathesawsomeonewhohedescribedasawhitemale, chasinganotherpersonwithagun.Hegotinthecarwithusandbeforewe couldradioinadescriptionhepointedouttheindividualonthestreet,a shortdistanceaway.Thewitnessthendovetothefloorofthepolicevehicle. MypartnerandIconfrontedthesuspect,fromapositionofcoverutilizing ourcardoorsandrepeatedlyissuedtheverbalcommand,Police!Dont Move!Heignoredmycommandsandinfact,reachedintohispocket.Atthat timeIhadeveryreasontobelievethatIwasdealingwithanarmedcriminal whowasignoringmycommandsandwasreachingforafirearm.He proceededtopulloutofhispocketapoliceofficersshield.Thankfully,the lightingwasgoodandIsawtheshieldbeforeitwastoolate.Butifithad beendarkorifallIsawwasthesunreflectingoffofsomethingmetal,inthis contextitcouldhavebeenadifferentstory.10 Forthesereasons,somelawenforcementagenciesdiscourageofficersnotinuniformfrom takingpoliceactionthatmightrequirethemtousetheirweaponexceptinthemost extremecircumstances,instructingthemtodefertouniformedofficerswheneverpossible. Themostrecenttrainingprogramsencourageoffdutyofficerstohelpbybeinggood witnesses,whileuniformedofficerstakeaction,unlessalifeisatstake.Similarly, plainclothesofficersareencouragedtodefertouniformedofficers,pullingoutofanactive operationonceuniformedofficersarriveonacrimescene. Despitethegeneraltrenddiscouragingoffdutyofficersfromtakingpoliceaction,atleast onerecentlyenactedfederallawriskspushingofficersintheoppositedirection.In2004, CongressadoptedandPresidentBushsignedtheLawEnforcementOfficersSafetyAct (LEOSA)authorizingoffdutyofficersandretiredofficersfromanypoliceagencyinthe nationtocarryconcealedweaponswhentravelingoutoftheirhomestates.11Itssponsors hopedthattravelingoffdutyofficers,ifmorefrequentlyarmed,wouldaddtothelaw enforcementcapacityoftheplacestheyvisited.LEOSAhasnotyetraisedinpracticethe problemsthatmanypoliceofficialsoriginallyexpectedbecausecountyandcityofficials, perhapsworriedabouttheliabilitythattheymightincuriftheirofficerstravelthenation armed,haveonlyslowlyputinplacethetrainingandidentificationprocedures contemplatedintheAct.Still,LEOSAraisesthepossibilityofincreasingnumbersofarmed offdutyandretiredofficerstakingpoliceactionwithoutknowinglocalprotocolsfor
9TestimonyofDavidChong,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing). 10TestimonyofJohnBilich,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing). 11Thebill,alsoknownasHR218,iscodifiedat18U.S.C.926B,926C.
P a g e |8
identifyingthemselvesaspolice.Bythesametoken,LEOSAgivesthefederalgovernment anopportunity,andperhapsaresponsibility,totakeamoreactiverolehere,assuringthat standardprotocolsandtrainingareestablishednationwidetopreventmistakenidentity, policeonpoliceconfrontations.
PoliceonPoliceShootingsastheExemplarsofaWiderArrayofMistaken Shootings
Fromtheperspectiveofthechallengingofficer,mistakingafellowpoliceofficerfora dangerouscriminalisanextremeexampleofthewiderdangerofmisperceivingaperson whoposesnothreatassomeonewhodoes.Suchmisperceptionsareinevitableinsome numberofsituationsasofficersoftenhaveonlyafewsecondsinwhichtochoosewhether toshootornot.Failingtoshootwhenthethreatisrealcouldleadtotheofficersowndeath orthedeathsofinnocentpeople.Yetifthethreatismisperceived,theofficermaytakea lifeunnecessarily.Becausethestakesonbothsidesaresohigh,thetimeavailablefor decisionsoshort,andthejudgmentsinevitablyimperfect,policeorganizations, prosecutors,andcourtsarereluctanttosecondguessquestionabledecisionsthatmight havebeenreasonableinthemoment,atleastwhentheissueiswhethertoblameand punishtheconfrontingofficer. Atthesametime,thebestpolicedepartmentsstrivetolearnfromincidentswhere,in hindsight,itisclearthatconfrontingofficersmisperceivedathreat.Thatprocessof learningrequiressomereexaminationofshoot/dontshootdecisionsinparticular incidents.Departmentalreviewswalkadifficultpath,tryingtoavoidcastingblameby secondguessingreasonabledecisionstoshoot,yetencouragingcarefulanalysisofeach stepinashootingincidenttoidentifyspecificthingsthatmighthavebeendonedifferently. Tomanagethatdifficulty,themostsophisticateddepartmentshavecreatedspecialized shootingteamstoinvestigateofficerinvolvedshootings,withmembersdrawnfroma varietyofspecialties,includingtrainingdivisions.Thesespecializedteamsmakeatleast twoseparatedeterminations:first,whetherashootingwasinpolicy(meaningitwas justifiedinthemoment),andsecond,eveniftheshootingisjustifiedinlawandpolicy, whetherthetacticsusedwereflawed(meaningthatvariousstepstakeninthehours, minutes,orsecondsbeforetheshootingshouldhavebeendifferent).Publiccontroversy understandablyoftensurroundsthedecisiontoruleanymistakenidentitypoliceshooting asbeinginpolicy,especiallyifthevictimwasunarmed.Weaddresstheimportanceof objectiveinvestigationofanypoliceonpoliceshootinglaterinthisreport,andour recommendationsthereshouldhelptoimprovethepublicconfidenceinjudgmentsthat individualshootingswereorwerenotinpolicy.However,beyondthequestionof whethersuchshootingsareinpolicy,thereareseparatequestionsaboutthetacticsthat shouldbeemployedtopreventthem. Itisnotunusualtodayforpoliceshootingsofinnocentcivilianstobejudgedinpolicyeven thoughtheofficersinvolvedarelaterreferredforatacticaldebriefingiftheyfailedto makeuseofavailablecoveroriftheymadeothertacticalerrors.Suchanapparentlymild responsetoanavoidabledeathisoftenfrustratingtocommunitymembersandthefamilies andfriendsofthevictims,andtheoutrageinsomecircumstancescanreachpolitically
P a g e |9
volatileheights.Still,thesetacticaldebriefsarepartoftheefforttomanagethedifficulty ofnotsecondguessingwhatmayhavebeenareasonablethoughmistakendecisionto shootwhilestilllearningfromandpreventingfuturetragedies. Policeonpoliceshootingsprovidesomeofthemostvividexamplesofofficer misperceptions.Andbecausepolicedepartmentsfeelkeenlytheneedtopreventthe repetitionsofthesetragedies,theimpetusforlearningisparticularlystrong,andthe potentialtoavoidfuturemistakenshootingsofpoliceofficersandofciviliansis especiallygreat.Therefore,creatingclearprotocolsandtacticalguidanceforchallenging officersasaresultoftheinvestigationsofpoliceonpoliceshootingsisonewaytoprevent mistakenshootingsingeneral.Inthisway,carefulstudy,critiqueandanalysisofpoliceon policeshootingscanhelptoincreaseofficersafetyandoverallpublicsafety. Itisalsoimportanttoengagedirectlytheissueofraceinthesemistakenshootings.There isgrowingevidencethatpoliceofficerslikemembersofthegeneralpubliccarrywhat psychologistscallimplicitracialbiaswhichrevealsitselfinsomeshoot/dontshoot decisions.Wetakeuptheseissueswhenweaddressracialstereotypesintheseshootings.
PoliceonPoliceShootingsasaSpecialBurdenforPoliceOfficersofColor
Whenanofficerofcolorisshotandkilledinaconfrontationafterbeingmistakenforan offender,thedeathstrikeshomewithparticularforceforotherofficersofcoloreven thoselivingandworkinghundredsofmilesfromthepolicedepartmentsinvolved.To understandthefullimpactofthesedeaths,oneneedstoappreciatethechoicesthatpeople ofcolormakewhentheyjoinapoliceorganizationandtheconsequencesofthosechoices forthemintheirfamiliesandcommunities.Peopleofcolorwhochoosetomakeacareerin lawenforcementriskthedisapprovalandeventhescornoftheirfriendsandfamilyinways thatmostwhitepeoplewhojointhepolicedonot. Thedisapprovalthatmanyofficersofcolorfacefromfamilyandfriends,andindeedthe questionstheyposetothemselves,reflectthespecialexperienceofpeopleofcolorinthe UnitedStateswiththecriminaljusticesystem.HispanicandAfricanAmericanmen,in particular,arefarmorelikelythanotherstobestoppedbythepolice,questioned,and frisked.AsPresidentBarackObamahasstraightforwardlyobserved,thereisalong historyinthiscountryofAfricanAmericansandLatinosbeingstoppedbylawenforcement disproportionately.Andthat'sjustafact.12Beyondthestops,whichaffectmillionsof peopleeachyearnationally,13therearethearrestsandincarcerations,leavingtheUnited StateswithaboutoneintenAfricanAmericanmenbetween20and40yearsold incarceratedonanygivenday,andoneinthreeAfricanAmericanmenlikelytospendtime
12HeleneCooper,ObamaCriticizesArrestofHarvardProfessor,inNewYorkTimes,July23,2009,pA20. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/23/us/politics/23gates.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=obama+news+conference +gates+arrest&st=nyt. 13ForNewYorkCitydata,seeNewYorkCityPoliceDepartment,Stop,QuestionandFriskDatabase, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_report.shtmland DeloresJonesBrown,JaspreetGill&JenniferTrone,Stop,Question&FriskPolicingPracticesinNewYorkCity: APrimer,JohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice,CenteronRace,CrimeandJustice,March2010, http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf.
P a g e |10
incarceratedatsometimeintheirlives.14Withconcentrationslikethese,mostAfrican Americanshavecloserelativeswhohavehadbadexperienceswiththecriminaljustice system,andsurveysrepeatedlyshowthatpeopleofcolor,especiallyblackAmericans,hold thepoliceandthecriminaljusticesysteminlowerregardthandowhiteAmericans.15 Atthesametime,victimsofviolentcrimeintheUnitedStatesaredisproportionately peopleofcolor,asarethesuspectsinthosecrimes.Accordingtothemostrecentdata availablefromtheNationalCrimeVictimizationSurvey,blacksintheUnitedStatesare victimsofviolentcrimeatanannualrateof24.3perthousand,whilewhites,including thoseofHispanicancestry,arevictimsofviolentcrimeatarateof19.9perthousand.16In citieswithlargepercentagesofpeopleofcolor,thefiguresareoftenevenmore disproportionate.InNewYorkCityin2009,forexample,72.8percentofshootingvictims wereblack,23.0percentwereHispanic,3.1percentwerewhite,and0.9percentwere Asian.Thedistributionofsuspectswhoseraceorethnicityisknownintheseshooting incidentswasbroadlysimilar,with79.8percentblack,18.3percentHispanic,1.4percent white,and0.4percentAsian.17 Forthesereasons,manypeopleofcolorbelievestronglythattheircommunitiesare especiallyinneedofeffectivepoliceprotectionandthattheythemselvescanbest contributetotheircommunitiesandsimultaneouslyimprovepoliceinstitutionsby workingfromtheinside.Still,thechoicesetsofficersofcolorapartandoftenputsthemon
comesfromacensusconductedinthesummerof2007.WilliamJ.SabolandHeatherCouture,PrisonInmates atMidyear2007,U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,June2008,NCJ221944,table10, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim07.pdf.Morerecentdataareavailableonlyforthesentenced, prisonpopulation.In2008,aboutoneintwelveAfricanAmericanmenfromages2540wereincarceratedin stateorfederalprison,servingsentencesofayearormore.SeeWilliamJ.Sabol,HeatherC.West,and MatthewCooper,Prisonersin2008,U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,December2009, NCJ228417,appendixtable14,http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf.Fortheimpactofarrest andincarcerationinthelifeofAfricanAmericans,seegenerally,BeckyPettitandBruceWestern,Mass ImprisonmentandtheLifeCourse:RaceandClassInequalityinU.S.Incarceration,AmericanSociological Review,2004,Vol.69(April:151169). 15InaJune2009GallupsurveyreportedinthemostrecentU.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJustice Statistics,SourcebookofCriminalJusticeStatistics,31percentofblackAmericanshaveverylittleorno confidenceinthepolice,comparedwith7percentofwhites.Thecorrespondingnumberforallnonwhites, includingblacks,is23percent.http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2122009.pdf. 16SeeU.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,CriminalVictimizationintheUnitedStates,2007, Table5,availableathttp://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1743. 17DataarefromNYPDandcoverthecalendaryear2009.Thetotalnumberofvictimswas1,729,withthe race/ethnicityknownin1,719.Therewereatotalof1,511suspects,withrace/ethnicityknownof988. EquivalentdataforallviolentcrimesuspectsarereportedquarterlytotheNewYorkCityCouncil.National dataontherace/ethnicityofsuspectsinviolentcrimesdonotexist,butotherdatapermitestimatesofthe rateofviolentoffendingbyrace/ethnicity,showingdisparitiessimilartodisparitiesinvictimization.See SarahBecker,RaceandViolentOffenderPropensityinJusticeResearchandPolicy,9:2,5386(Fall2007); YouthViolence:AReportoftheSurgeonGeneral(2000),Chapter2andTable2.2, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/chapter2/sec12.html;andDarnellF.Hawkins,John H.Laub,JanetL.Lauritsen,andLynnCothern,Race,Ethnicity,andSeriousandViolentJuvenileOffending,U.S. DepartmentofJustice,OfficeofJuvenileJusticeandDelinquencyPrevention,June2000,NCJ181202, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/181202.pdf.
14Themostrecentdataonincarcerationnationallycombiningdatafromfederalandstateprisonsandjails
P a g e |11
thedefensiveinconversationsintheverycommunitiestheyseektoserve,sometimesin theirownfamilies. Mostdays,theexperienceofpeopleofcolorwiththejusticesystemsitsunderthesurface ofthoughtandconversationforblackandLatinoofficers;buttheshootingofanofficerof colormistakenforanoffenderbringsthoseissuesbacktothesurface.Acrossthenation,in thewakeofashootinglikethatofOfficersEdwardsorRidley,officersofcolorface skepticalquestionsfromtheirfamiliesandfriendsatholidayparties,socialgatherings,and justacrossthedinnertable.Why,theyareasked,areyouputtingyourlifeonthelineina jobwheretherisksthateveryofficerfacesarecompoundedbytheriskyoullbekilledby yourowncolleagues?Toignorethisaspectofpoliceonpoliceshootingsistomissan essentialpartoftheproblem.Theseshootingscallintoquestionforcountlessofficersof colortheirveryidentitiesaslawenforcementofficers. OneAfricanAmericanpolicechieffromoutsideNewYorkStateputtheissueofidentityin clearandhelpfulterms: WhenIfirstjoinedthepolice,Iwantedtothinkthatmyracedidntmatteron thejob.Iwasapoliceofficerwhohappenedalsotobeablackman.But thatsnotright,becauseIwasablackmanbeforeIwasapoliceofficer,and ImgoingtobeablackmanafterImapoliceofficer.Actually,Imablack manwhohappenstobeapoliceofficer.Andwehavetorecognizethatmore andmoreofourofficersofcoloraregoingtobethinkingthatway.18
18StatementofChiefRonaldL.Davis,EastPaloAltoPoliceDepartment,atExecutiveSessiononPolicingand
PublicSafety,HarvardKennedySchool,October2931,2009(quotedwithpermissionofChiefDavis).
P a g e |12
2.
WhatWeKnowAboutPatternsandTrendsinPoliceonPolice ShootingsandConfrontations
Wemustdistinguishamongthreelevelsofseriousnessofmistakenidentity,policeon policeencounters.Themostserious,andleastfrequent,arethefatalpoliceonpolice shootings.Nextarenonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings:thoseinwhichatleastoneshotis firedbutnooneiskilled.Indeed,oftenthebulletsstrikenoone.Thirdandmostnumerous arepoliceonpoliceconfrontationsthatstopshortofanyshooting.Theincidentsinthis lastcategoryaregenerallytheleastseriousintermsofinjury,thoughthereareoccasional mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceconfrontationsthatescalatetoseverebeatingsorother usesofforce.Weconsidereachofthesecategoriesinturn.
FatalPoliceonPoliceShootings
WestartwiththetwofatalshootingsthatledtothecreationofourTaskForcethe shootingdeathsofOfficerChristopherRidleyandOfficerOmarEdwards.TheTaskForce didnotconductitsowninvestigationofthesecases,butwehavesoughttounderstand whathappenedinbothinstancesinsufficientdetailtoguideourrecommendationsabout preventingsuchincidentsinthefuture.Thesetwocasesalonecannotrevealpatterns,but theycansuggestquestionsthatanexaminationofadditionalcasesmightbegintoanswer.
TheRidleyCase
Atapproximately4:43p.m.onJanuary25,2008,ChristopherRidley,anoffdutyMount Vernonpoliceofficerwhowaswithinonemonthofcompletinghisprobationaryterm, arrivedattheintersectionofCourtStreetandMartineAvenueinthecityofWhitePlains, NewYork,inhispersonalvehicle.PoliceOfficerRidleyparkedonthesouthwestcorner facingsouthtowardtheintersectionandwaitedforhiscousin,whomhehadarrangedto meetatthatlocation.Aswasthecasewithmanyofthecriticaleventsthatunfoldedthat afternoon,OfficerRidleysarrivalatthescenewascapturedonvideotaperecordedbyone ofthenumeroussecuritycamerasthatwereaffixedtoseveralgovernmentofficebuildings clusteredalongCourtStreet.OfficerRidleywasdressedinawhitesweatshirtanddark pants. ApproximatelytenminutesafterOfficerRidleyparked,anindividualnamedRobert GadsdenwalkedwestalongMartineAvenuetowardstheintersection,havingjustlefta nearbyPostOffice.GadsdenwasapproachedbyanindividualnamedAnthonyJacobs,a homelessmanwithahistoryofmentalillness,whowasastrangertoGadsden.Jacobsfirst exchangedwordswithGadsdenandthenwalkedaway.Gadsdencontinuedtoproceed throughtheintersection.However,withinseconds,andfornoapparentreason,Jacobs knockeddownGadsdeninthemiddleoftheintersection.Hethenproceededtobeat Gadsdenwithhisfistswithabriefvolleyofblowsthatlastedonlyseconds,butleft Gadsdensfacebloodyandbothhiswristsfracturedfromhiseffortstoshieldhimself.A civilianwhoobservedtheassaultintervenedindefenseofGadsden,kickingJacobsaway. Jacobsimmediatelybrokeofftheassault.Hecanbeseenonvideowalkingawayfromthe intersectionwithoutparticularhasteandmakinghiswaysouthalongCourtStreet,then
P a g e |13
diagonallyacrossthestreetinthedirectionoftheDepartmentofSocialServicesbuilding, approximatelyahalfblockawayfromtheintersection,whereavanoperatedbyVolunteers ofAmericawasscheduledtopickupclientsat5:00p.m. Ataboutthetimetheassaultintheintersectioncommenced,OfficerRidleycanbeobserved onvideogettingoutofhiscar,facinginthedirectionoftheconfrontationbetweenGadsden andJacobs.OfficerRidleycanthenbeseenturningtoopenthebackdoorofhisvehicle, leaningintothebackseatandreemerging,closingthereardoorbehindhim.Concealed beneathhissweatshirt,OfficerRidleycarriedaGlock9mmautomatichandguninanoff duty,lowprofileholster,whichwastuckedintohiswaistband.OfficerRidleythenraninto theintersection,butbythistime,thebriefassaultwasoverandJacobswaswalkingsouth alongCourtStreettowardthemiddleoftheblock.Crossingtheintersection,OfficerRidley ranpastthevictim,Gadsden,withoutpausing,inapparentpursuitofJacobs.Asrecorded onvideo,OfficerRidleybrieflybrokeoffhispursuittoduckintotheentranceofthe WestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingonthecornerofCourtStreetandMartineAvenue.As canbeseenfromavideocamerainsidethelobbyandfromthereportofauniformed civiliansecurityguardthere,OfficerRidleyranintothelobby,statedthatheneededpolice assistance,andranbackoutofthebuilding,remaininginthebuildingforonlyaboutfour seconds.Accordingtothesecurityguard,OfficerRidleydidnotidentifyhimselfasapolice officer. AnothersecuritycamerashowsOfficerRidleyrunningfromthelobbyinthedirectionof theDepartmentofSocialServicesBuilding,diagonallyacrossthestreetandhalfwaydown theblock.AcombinationofvideofootageandwitnessaccountsestablishthatOfficerRidley caughtupwithJacobsinfrontoftheSocialServicesBuildingasJacobsapproachedthe VolunteersofAmericavaninfrontofthebuilding.OfficerRidleywasheardtosaytoJacobs, Yourenotgoinganywhere.Ataboutthesametime,atleastaccordingtoonecivilian witnessinadditiontoJacobs,OfficerRidleyraisedhissweatshirtanddisplayedhis handgun. Byvirtuallyallaccounts,afightbetweenOfficerRidleyandJacobsimmediatelyensued afterOfficerRidleysapproach,withbothmenultimatelywrestlingontheground.Atsome point,OfficerRidleyendedupontopofJacobsontheground.AccordingtoJacobsand severaleyewitnesses,JacobsgrabbedthehandgunfromOfficerRidleyswaistband.Jacobs acknowledgesfiringoneshotandpossiblytwofromOfficerRidleysweapon.Mostcivilian accountsandavailableforensicevidenceindicatethatitismostlikelythatoneshotwas firedfromOfficerRidleysweapon.Videorecordedfromseveraldifferentvantagepoints showspedestriansrunningawayfromthesceneoftheconfrontationsimultaneously,asif respondingtothisfirstshot.Noonewasstruckbythebullet. Afterthoseoneortwoshots,thetwomencontinuedtostruggleforcontroloftheweapon. Inthemeantime,uniformedWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficersFrankOliveriandChristian Gutierrez,whohadbeensummonedbythesecurityguardattheWestchesterCountyOffice Building,arrivedatthefrontoftheSocialServicesbuildingonfoot.Videorecordedfroma securitycamerainthecountyofficebuildinglobbyshowstheofficersbeginningtoemerge lessthanthirtysecondsafterOfficerRidleyexitedthebuildinglobby.Andvideorecorded
P a g e |14
fromanexteriorcamerashowsthetwoofficerscrossingthestreetonadiagonalpathfrom theWestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingtowardtheSocialServicesBuilding.Atapointin timethatseemstocoincidewiththeinstantashotdischargedfromOfficerRidleys weapon,theapproachingofficersbrieflyhesitated,andthensplitup,withOfficerGutierrez approachingalongthesidewalkandOfficerOliveriapproachingfromthestreet,ultimately takingcoverbehindapickuptruckneartheentrancetothebuilding.Bothappearedto havetheirgunsdrawn.Ataboutthesametime,uniformedWestchesterCountyPolice OfficerJoseCaleroanduniformedDetectiveRobertMartinemergedfromtheSocial ServicesBuilding,apparentlyhavingbeenalertedtothedisturbancebyanemployeethere. Atthatpoint,thetwopairsofofficerswereinpositionsflankingOfficerRidleyandJacobs atarightangle.Alloftheofficershadtheirweaponsdrawn. Civilianwitnesses,includingpassengersontheVolunteersofAmericavan,thoseaboutto boardthevan,andemployeesleavingtheSocialServicesBuilding,consistentlyreported thatthefourWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficersrepeatedlyshoutedtobothOfficerRidley andJacobsvariously,dontmove,putupyourhands,getdown,orfreeze.Atleast fourwitnessesreportedhearingtheofficerssay,dropthegun.Andanumberofwitnesses reportedthatOfficerRidleythenstoodupwiththeguninhishand,leavingJacobslyingon theground.Somereportedthat,afterOfficerRidleyinitiallystoodup,hebentoverand stoodupagain.WitnessaccountsvaryastowhetherOfficerRidleyheldthegunathisside orhadhisarmoutstretched.AndthosewitnesseswhoreportedthatOfficerRidleysarm wasoutstretchedvaryastowhetherOfficerRidleyhadhisweaponpointedatanyofthe respondingofficersoratJacobslyingontheground.Onlyoneofthenumerouscivilian witnessestotheinitialencounterbetweenOfficerRidleyandJacobsreportedhearing OfficerRidleyidentifyhimselfasapoliceofficer.19Onecivilianwitnessreportedthat OfficerRidleybehavedasifhewereinadazeanddidnotrespondtoorobeytheuniformed policeofficersdemandsthathedroptheweapon. WhenOfficerRidleyreportedlydidnotcomplywiththecommandsoftheresponding officerstodrophisweapon,atleastthreeofthefourofficersfiredonhim,strikinghim onceintheheadandfivetimesinthetorso.AtleasttwowitnessesreportedthatOfficer Ridleywasshotbyoneormultipleofficersandstartedtogodown,andwasthenshotin theheadbyanotherofficer.However,theexactsequenceoftheshotscouldnotbe determined.OfficerRidleywaspronounceddeadatthescene. Asbestascanbereconstructedfromthevariousvideocamerasinthevicinityofthe incident,approximatelytwominuteselapsedfromthetimeoftheinitialassaultbyJacobs
19TheonlywitnesswhoclaimedthatOfficerRidleyidentifiedhimselfasapoliceofficerwasthecousinwhom
OfficerRidleywasscheduledtomeetattheintersectionofMartineAvenueandCourtStreet.Inhisinitial handwrittenstatementtopoliceontheeveningoftheincident,thecousinreportedthatOfficerRidley screamedImacoptotheapproachingWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficers.However,inasubsequent typewrittenstatement,hesoftenedthisassertiontostate,Imnot100%surebutIthinkIheardmycousin sayImacop,Imacop.Moreover,videofromasecuritycameraclearlyestablishesthatatthetimeofthe shootingthecousinwasstandingattheentranceoftheWestchesterCountyOfficeBuildingnearthecornerof MartineAvenueandCourtStreet,diagonallyacrossthestreetandonehalfblockawayfromtheconfrontation betweenOfficerRidleyandJacobs.
P a g e |15
onGadsdenattheintersectionofMartineAvenueandCourtStreetandthefiringofthe fatalshotsthatkilledOfficerRidleyinfrontoftheSocialServicesBuilding. OfthefourWestchesterCountyPoliceOfficerswhorespondedtotheincidentinfrontof theSocialServicesBuilding,OfficerOliveriisWhite,OfficersGutierrezandCaleroare Hispanic,andDetectiveMartinisAfricanAmerican.Eachofthefourofficerswasarmed witha9mmSmithandWessonautomatichandgun.Shellcasingsandbulletsforensically linkedtotheweaponsbelongingtothreeofthesefourofficerswererecoveredfromthe sceneoratautopsy.Itappearsthateachofthesethreeofficersfiredatleasttwoshots,but notmorethanfour.Therewerenocasingsorbulletsforensicallymatchedtotheweapon ofDetectiveMartin.However,oneeyewitnessreportedthataWestchesterCountyPolice Officersheknewas"Rob"shoutedatRidleytodrophisgun,andwhenRidleyfailedto respond,firedhisweaponatRidley.AswasthecasewitheachofthefourWestchester Countyofficers,thereweremagazinescollectedfromDetectiveMartinfollowingthe shootingthatwerenotloadedtofullcapacity.However,nostepsweretakenwithanyof thefourofficersaftertheshootingtoidentifywhichmagazineclipswereloadedintotheir weaponsatthetimeoftheincident.Inthecaseofeachofthefourofficers,itcouldnotbe determinedforensicallywhether"missing"roundsrepresentedshotsfiredorbulletsnot loadedintothemagazineinthefirstplace.WhetherornotDetectiveMartinfiredhis weaponduringthecourseofthisincidentcannotbeforensicallyverified.Theonly statementsmadebythefourWestchesterCountyOfficersconcerningthisincidentwere madeduringtheirappearancesbeforetheWestchesterCountygrandjuryinthecourseof itsinvestigation.ThosestatementsareunavailabletotheTaskForceortothepublicby virtueofgrandjurysecrecylaws.
TheEdwardsCase
OnMay28,2009,atapproximately10:00p.m.,OfficerOmarEdwards,aoneyearten monthmemberoftheNYPDassignedtotheHousingBureausImpactResponseTeam, endedhisshiftearlywiththepermissionofhissupervisor.Shortlyafterchangingfromhis uniformintobluejeansandanoffwhitesweater,heleftPoliceServiceArea5command locatedat221East123rdStreetinEastHarlem.Hecarriedhisserviceweaponwithhim, butitwasnotholstered.Accordingtoeyewitnessaccounts,asOfficerEdwardsapproached hisvehicleparkedonSecondAvenue,betweenEast124thandEast125thStreets,he observedanindividualleaningintohiscarthroughthebrokendriverssidewindow.A civilianeyewitnessreportedseeingthebreakinandthenseeingOfficerEdwards,withhis firearminhand,attempttoapprehendandphysicallyrestrainthesubject,lateridentified asMiguelGortia.Afterashortstruggle,GortiamanagedtobreakfreeofOfficerEdwardss graspbywrigglingoutofajerseyhewaswearing,andfledonfoot.OfficerEdwardsgave chase,stillholdinghisfirearminhishand. GortiainitiallyrantowardtheentranceramptotheRobertF.KennedyBridge(formerly theTriboroughBridge),butthenchangeddirection,runningoutontoEast125thStreet towardsFirstAvenue.OfficerEdwardswasinclosepursuit.Acivilianwitnesswhowas standingonthecornerofEast125thStreetand2ndAvenuereportedseeingGortiabeing chasedbyadarkskinnedmaleblackinawhiteshirtwithagunwhowasyellingPolice
P a g e |16
dontmove,getthef__kdown.AsGortiaandthepursuingOfficerEdwardsraneaston 125thStreetonadiagonalfromthenorthtothesouthsideofthestreet,ananticrimeteam consistingofthreeplainclothesofficersinanunmarkedvehiclehappenedtoturnonto 125thStreet,travelingwestboundfromFirstAvenue.Atthepointthattheanticrimeteam arrived,theywerefacingtheonrushingGortia,withOfficerEdwardsgivingchasebehind himwithhisguninhand.Uponseeingthetwoindividualsrunningtowardthem,Officer AndrewDunton,sittinginthefrontpassengerseat,toldtheotherofficersthatoneofthe meninvolvedinthepursuithadagun.Thedriveroftheanticrimevehicle,PoliceOfficer JohnMusante,stoppedthevehicle.Accordingtohisaccount,OfficerMusantebegantoget outofthevehicle,butimmediatelyreenteredwhenherealizedthatthecarhadnotbeen placedinparkandwasstillrolling.SergeantJohnAnzelino,whowassittingintherearof theunmarkedpolicecaronthepassengerside,reportedthathestartedtogetoutofthe car,butfellbecauseitwasstillmoving.PoliceOfficerAndrewDunton,whohadbeensitting inthefrontpassengerseat,reportedthathegotoutofthecar,andmanagedtotakecover behindtheopenedfrontpassengersidedoorofthestillmovingvehicle. AllthreeofficersreportthatOfficerDuntonyelledPolice!Stop!Dropthegun.Dropthe gunasGortiaandOfficerEdwardsranby.DuntonreportedthathenoticedthatOfficer Edwardssloweddownuponhearingthiscommand,butthenturnedaroundwithagunin hishand,withhiselbowlocked.Neitheroftheothertwoplainclothesanticrimeofficers reportedseeingtheshooting,apparentlyduetotheirbeingmomentarilyoutofposition, andneitheroftheseofficersfiredweaponsthemselves.Butatleastoneofficerdidreport seeingOfficerEdwardsfalltothegroundseveralfeetaway. Accordingtoacivilianwitness,asGortiaandOfficerEdwardsranpasttheanticrime vehicle,oneoftheanticrimeofficersshoutedhaltandsomeothercommandthatwasnot clearlydiscernible.Thiswitnessstatedthatthreetosixshotswerefiredastheblackmale withthefirearm(OfficerEdwards)turnedtowardtheanticrimevehicle.Anothercivilian witnessbelievedthatsheheardthemalewearingwhatshethoughtwasagreysweatshirt (OfficerEdwards)sayImPoliceastheofficersfired.Thissamewitnessmisidentified theunmarkedanticrimevehicleasamarkedpolicecar,andwasapproximately200feet awayfromthesceneoftheshooting.Anumberofothercivilianwitnessesheardgunshots, butdidnotseetheshooting. Atapproximately10:30p.m.,anEmergencyServicesUnitarrivedatthescene.Duringthe courseofrenderingaidtoOfficerEdwards,theESUofficerdiscoveredthatOfficerEdwards waswearinganNYPDPoliceAcademygymshirt(inscribedwithhiscompanynumberand lastname)underhisoutergarment.OfficerEdwardssshieldwasdiscoveredclippedtothe insideofhispantspocket.Theclipwasexposed,butthefaceofthebadgewasinsideofthe pocketsuchthatitwasnotvisible. AnautopsyrevealedthatOfficerEdwardshadthreegunshotwounds.Onebulletentered hisleftfrontforearmareaandexitedhisleftelbowarea.Onebulletenteredhisleftlower flank,traveledthroughhisabdomen,strikingnomajororgansandlodginginthebodywall oftherightflank.Andanotherbulletenteredtheleftmidback,enteredthechestcavity throughtherearchestwallandtraveledthroughthelowerlobeoftheleftlungand
P a g e |17
perforatedtheheart.Ultimately,thisbulletlodgedintheleftpectoralarea.Althoughthe precisesequenceofshotsfiredwasnotclear,theMedicalExaminerfoundthewounds consistentwithshotsfiredinrapidsuccessionatasubjectwhowasspunaroundbyafirst shotthatenteredtheleftforearmandexitedtheleftelbow.Thisconclusionisalso supportedbythecivilianeyewitnessaccountthatdescribedOfficerEdwardsturningasthe shotswerefired.

FatalPoliceonPoliceShootingsSince1981
ToplacetheRidleyandEdwardsdeathsinnationalcontext,theTaskForceobtaineddata fromtheFederalBureauofInvestigation(FBI)onallpoliceofficerskilledinthelineofduty nationwidegoingbackto1981,theearliestyearforwhichcaseleveldatawerereadily available.TheFBIdatabaseandcorrespondingreport,LawEnforcementOfficersKilledand Assaulted(LEOKA),wasfirstpublishedin1982using1981dataandhasbeenpublished annuallysincethattime.Fromwithinthesedata,ourstaffidentifiedthosefewcasesin whichanofficersdeathresultedfromamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshooting.The staffthenverifiedandsupplementedthedetailsofthoseshootingsthroughsearchesofon linenewsstoriesandotheropensources,aswellasthroughreportsobtainedfromseveral ofthepolicedepartments.Thesesearchesalsorevealedadditionalcasesthatwerenot includedintheFBIsdata.Weidentifiedatotalof26lawenforcementofficerswhodiedin mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsduringthe29yearperiodspanning1981to 2009,orapproximatelyoneperyear.20 Whileitisdifficulttodistinguishmeaningfulpatternsfromrandomvariationinthe circumstancesofsuchasmallnumberoffatalshootings,the26casesdorevealfivespecific trendsoverthisperiod,andtheseinturnsuggestsomeofthefactorsthatmayturna simplecaseofmistakenidentificationintoafatalshooting.21 TrendOne:Fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingshaveoccurredataslow butsteadypaceoverthepast30years.Whiletheseareinfrequentincidentsbyany measure,withsomeyearspassingwithoutasingleinstanceandnevermorethanthreein oneyear,thepaceissteadyacrossdecades.Therewereninefatalshootingsbetween2000 and2009,sevenbetween1990and1999,andtenbetween1981and1989.(SeeFigure 2.1).Nocomprehensivedataareavailableforearlierdecades. TrendTwo:ForthecurrentgenerationofpoliceofficersandresidentsofNewYorkState, fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsareanewphenomenoninthelastfew years.NofatalshootingsofthiskindoccurredinNewYorkStatefrom1981through2005, buttherehavebeenthreesince2006.22Thispatternexplainswhysomeresidentsand
20AfulllisttheseincidentsappearsasAppendixAtothisreportinchronologicalorderwiththevictim
officersrank,race,anddutyassignment,alsoshowingthelawenforcementagenciesinvolved.
entireuniverseofknowncasesduringtherelevanttimeperiod,notasamplefromwhichwearetryingto makeinferencesaboutalargeruniverse. 22Thestoryisdifferentifwegobackfurtherintime.AccordingtodataprovidedbytheNYPDDeputy CommissionerWilburChapmanatourHarlempublichearing,therehavebeentenfatal,mistakenidentity policeonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkCityoverthepast80years,withsevenofthoseoccurringbefore
21Wenotethatstatisticaltestsrelatedtosamplingareinapplicabletothiscollectionofcases,asthisisthe
P a g e |18
policeofficersinthegreaterNewYorkCitymetropolitanareasensethatfatalpoliceon policeshootingsareoccurringwithgreaterfrequency,thoughtheyremainextremelyrare. TheonlyothersuchfatalshootingsintheNortheastsince1981occurredinRhodeIslandin 2000andinPennsylvaniain1997and2004.
TrendThree:Theseshootingsoccurinallpartsofthecountryandinpolicedepartments ofallsizes.Ofthe20fatalincidentssince1981outsidetheNortheast,thirteenoccurredin theSouth,includingTexas(four),Florida(two),DistrictofColumbia(two),andoneeachin Maryland,Alabama,SouthCarolina,TennesseeandVirginia.Fiveofthefatalshootings occurredintheWest:California(three),Arizona(one)andUtah(one).Andonefatal shootingoccurredintheMidwest(Michigan)andinaU.S.Territory(VirginIslands).The tableinFigure2.2showsthenumberoffatalshootingsbystateandregion,andFigure2.3 showstheregionaltrendsovertworoughlyequalhalvesofourstudyperiod:19811994 and19952009.

1981.OnefatalincidentinvolvedamaleblackHousingPoliceDepartmentofficerkillingandbeingshotby, anothermaleblackpatrolman;oneincidentinvolvedamaleHispanicofficerkillinganothermaleHispanic officer;fourincidentsinvolvedmalewhiteofficerskillingmaleblackofficers;fourincidentsinvolvedmale whiteofficerskillingmalewhiteofficers.Wedonothavethiskindofhistoricaldatafrombefore1981 outsideofNewYorkCity.
P a g e |19
Figure2.2Fatal,MistakenIdentityPoliceonPolice ShootingsbyRegionandState,1981200923
Region South(13) Northeast(6) West(5) Midwest(1) U.S.Territory(1) Total State Texas Florida Washington,DC Alabama Maryland SouthCarolina Tennessee Virginia NewYork RhodeIsland Pennsylvania California Arizona Utah Michigan VirginIslands 16 Fatalities 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 26

Figure2.3FatalMistakenIdentityPoliceonPolice ShootingsbyRegionandTimePeriod,19812009 Region South Northeast West Midwest USTerritory Total 19811994 8 1 2 1 0 12 19952009 5 5 3 0 1 14 Total 13 6 5 1 1 26
DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,initsSourceboookofCriminalJusticeStatistics,availableat http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/app3.html.
23TheidentificationofregionsadoptedherecomportswiththecategorizationschemeusedbytheU.S.
P a g e |20
TrendFour:Officersofcolorweremorefrequentlythevictimsinfatal,mistakenidentity, policeonpoliceshootingsinthesecondhalfofour30yearstudyperiodthantheywerein thefirst.Ofthe26victimofficersinfatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootings from1981to2009,12wereblackorHispanicand14werewhite.Inthefirsthalfofthis period,10ofthe12victimofficerswerewhite,andonlytwowereblack.Butinthesecond halfoftheperiod,10ofthe14victimswereofficersofcolor(8blackand2Hispanic)and only4victimofficerswerewhite.(SeeFigure2.4)Thegradualincreaseinthediversityof manyU.S.lawenforcementagenciescannotaloneexplainaswingofthismagnitude.

Figure2.4Fatal,MistakenIdentity,PoliceonPolice ShootingsbyRace&EthnicityofVictimOfficers,19812009 Period 19811994 19952009 Total White 10 4 14 Black 2 8 10 Hispanic 0 2 2 Total 12 14 26
TrendFive:Almostalloftheofficersofcolorkilledintheseincidentsweretakingpolice actionwhileoffdutyatthetimetheywerekilled(9outof12),whereasalmostnoneofthe whiteofficerswereoffdutyatthetime(1of13withknowndutyassignments),asFigure 2.5showsingreaterdetail.

Figure2.5VictimOfficerDutyAssignmentin Fatal,MistakenIdentityShootings19812009 Dutyassignment OffDuty Undercover Plainclothes Uniform Unknown Total WhiteOfficers 198194 199509 1 0 3 2 5 1 0 1 1 0 10 4 OfficersofColor 198194 199509 2 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 10
Todescribethistrendanotherway:Asfaraswecandetermine,onlyoneoffduty,white policeofficerhasbeenkilledinamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingintheUnited Statesoverthepast29years,whereasnineoffdutyofficersofcolor(8black,1Hispanic) havebeenkilledbyotherofficersinthoseyears,includingbothOfficersRidleyand Edwards.Forwhitepoliceofficers,thedangerssuchastheyarevirtuallyallliein undercoverandplainclothesassignments.Forofficersofcolor,thedangersaregreatest whentheydrawtheirweaponswhileoffduty.Thesestarkracialdifferencesinduty assignmentatthetimetheofficerswerekilledareimportant,bothforunderstanding differencesinhowtheproblemofpoliceonpoliceshootingsareviewedacrossraceand
P a g e |21
ethnicity,andforthepreventivestepsthatpolicedepartmentshavetakenandshouldtake toreducetheiroccurrence. Thisdifferencemayexplainwhytherehasbeensolittlescholarlyattentiontotheproblems ofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings,forthescholarshiponpolicinghaslargely beenconfinedtothestudyofpoliceofficerswhileonduty.Ofthetenpolicescholarswe interviewedforthisreport,allconceivedtheissueasprincipallyaboutplainclothesand undercoverofficersactingonduty.Amongthem,thescholarsknewofonlythreeincidents involvingoffdutyofficersbeingbrieflymistakenforcriminals:twoofficerstryingtobreak upbarfights,andathirdwhohaddrawnhisguntoapprehendsomeonehecaught breakingintohiscar.Noneofthesethreeincidentsresultedinanyinjury.Incontrast,the nearmisscasesandtheinstanceswhereconfrontedofficerswereroughedupby challengingofficersbeforebeingcorrectlyidentifiedalloccurredinplainclothesand undercoveroperations. Theblindspotinscholarlyresearchmaynotbeabouttheseshootings,whichareveryrare byanymeasure,butmaybetheexperiencesofoffdutyofficersmoregenerally.Thisoff dutyexperiencemaybequitedifferentacrossracialandethniclines.Aspolice departmentsbecomemorediverse,withseverallargedepartmentsnowadmittingnew classesofrecruitsinwhichthemajorityarepeopleofcolor,thisblindspotinour understandingoftheexperienceofpoliceofficersshouldbeaddressed. TheActionsofVictimOfficersandConfrontingOfficersinFatalEncounters Asweexploretheactionsofofficersintheseencounters,wearemindfulthattheofficers wererespondingtorapidlyshiftingevents,oftenundergreatstress.Officerstypicallyfeel thattheywillfacedireconsequencesiftheydonotactquicklyinthefaceofathreat,and theiractionsneedtobeunderstoodinthatcontext. Regardlessofdutyassignment,nearlyallofthevictimofficersinthe26fatalincidentswere inpossessionoffirearmsandhadthosefirearmsdisplayedatthetimetheywereshot.The twoexceptionswereOfficerRobertPatterson(whowasinpossessionofknivesthathehad confiscatedfromasuspect,CaseA1)andLieutenantGerryLaneIvie(whowasdrivinghis caratthetime,AppendixA,CaseD1).Inaddition,manyofthevictimofficerswithguns displayedreportedlyfailedtocomplywiththecommandsofchallengingofficerswho orderedthemtofreezeortodroptheirweapons.Thisfailuretocomplyisoftensimplythe rapidturningoftheheadandbodytodeterminethesourceofaverbalcommanda phenomenonknowntosomepoliceofficersandresearcherswhostudythesecasesas reflexivespin.Thisisreportedtohavehappenedinatleastsevenofthefatalmistaken identityshootings,andthreeotherincidentsapparentlyinvolvedvictimofficerswhowere approachingthechallengingofficers,perhapsoblivioustothedangertheyfaced. Theapparentfailuretocomplywithachallengingofficersdemandscanresultfroma numberoffactors.First,withtherushofadrenalineinvolvedinapursuitoreffortto apprehendasuspect,eventhebesttrainedofficersmaynotrespondastheirtraining
P a g e |22
woulddictate.TaskForceAdvisorDr.WilliamJ.LewinskioftheForceScienceInstitute explainsthephenomenonasfollows: Intheseincidents,theoffdutyofficerallowshisorherfocustofunnelinon theindividual(s)andscenariothatmayhaveservedasacatalystfortheir armedengagementwhilefailingtotakeintoconsiderationtheobservations andperceptionsoftherespondinguniformedofficers.Typically,thestressof theencountercausestheoffdutyofficertolosefocusonorcompletely ignorethefactthathe/sheisnotinuniform,isnotimmediately recognizableasalawenforcementofficer,andisarmed.24 Exacerbatingthisinitialphenomenon,anyfirearmdischargepriortotheconfrontation withthechallengingofficer(e.g.,whilethevictimofficerisstrugglingwiththesuspect), maycauseauditoryblock.Thehighdecibellevelofthegunshotcaneffectivelyblock theabilityofapersonnearbytorecognizeorprocessanapparentlyloudandclearverbal command.Forexample,thevictimofficermighthearavoicebutnotclearlymakeoutthe words,andmightthenturntowardthesoundofthevoiceinanefforttomakesenseofit. Evenintheabsenceofagunshot,thesameconditioncanarisefromstress.Dr.Lewinski notesthatitiscommonforofficersinvolvedinhighstressencounterstoexperiencea phenomenonknownasauditoryexclusion,whichisafailuretohearcertainthingsranging fromverbalcommentstogunshots.Thisisanormalprocessofhumanattention.Ourbrain assistsusinfocusingbyignoringorsuppressinginformationthatcoulddistractusfrom ourfocus.25 Whilewedeclinetospeculateonhowthesephenomenamightapplyinindividualcases,we doknowthattherewerepriorgunshotsinsixoftheinstancesinwhichvictimofficers reportedlydidnotcomplywithverbalcommands. Justasweseektounderstandwhytheconfrontedofficersinsomeofthesecases apparentlydidnotcomplywithcommands,wehavealsosoughttounderstandwhysome challengingofficersdidnottakecoveratthestartoftheconfrontationorshoutthe command,Police!DontMove.Wehavenoscientificanswertooffer,merelytheadviceof virtuallyeverylawenforcementexpertwhotestifiedorwrotetous:trainingneedstobe improvedtoingraintheseresponses,andthattrainingneedstobeinteractiveand scenariobased. Insomeofthesefatalcases,thevictimofficersarelaterdiscoveredtohavehadpolice identificationdisplayedontheirperson.Whydidthechallengingofficersnotseethepolice badgeorshieldaroundthevictimofficersneckorclippedonhisorherpocketor waistband?Theanswerappearstobethatchallengingofficersunderstressalsoexclude muchfromtheirfieldofvisionandfromtheirperceptiongenerally.Evenunderoptimal conditions,somechallengingofficersaresimplyunabletoseeanythingotherthanthat whichleadstotheperceptionofathreattheweaponinthehandofthevictimofficer.
24Lewinskireportpg.4(AppendixF). 25Lewinskireportpg.4(AppendixF).
P a g e |23
Policeofficersaregenerallytrainedtoscanasceneforcommonthreatvalues,including gunsandedgedweaponssuchasknives.Whenofficersseesuchathreat(orevenfaintly perceiveit),theycanexperiencetunnelvision,focusingonlyonthethreateningobject. Dr.Lewinskiwrites, Researchshowsthatinhighstress,lifethreateningencountershumans,inan instinctivesurvivalresponse,typicallyrefinetheirfocusspecificallytoan elementofthreatwhilefilteringoutseeminglysuperfluouselements.Ina lawenforcementcontext,thisphenomenon,knownasselectiveattentionor morecommonlyastunnelvision,wouldbeclearlyillustratedbyanofficer zoominginonthebarrelofagunorthebladeofaknifepointedintheir directionorzeroinginonasuspectshands,whichtheyhavebeentrainedto watchcloselywhilesimultaneouslyfilteringoutextraneousvisualelements, suchasclothingcolor,facialfeaturesandevensubjectraceorgender.This tunnelorfunnelvision,althougheffectiveinallowinganofficertovery closelymonitorthelocationand/ormovementofaweapon,canalsopose difficulties.26 ThedifficultieshereincludewhatDr.Lewinskitermsinattentionalblindness,orthe failuretoseeorhearimportantcontextualfactsbesidesthegunorotherobjectof attention.Asaresult,Dr.Lewinskiquestionswhethervisualsignsthatanarmedpersonin plainclothesisanofficer,suchasabadgeoracolorofthedayarmbandusedby undercoverandplainclothesofficers,wouldbesufficienttopreventatragicmistake. Otherfactors,suchasdimlighting,smoke,fogorrainalsoimpairachallengingofficers visualcapacity.The1996fatalshootingofuniformedPoliceOfficerJamesRexJensenofthe Oxnard,California,PoliceDepartmentbyamemberofhisownteamfollowedthe detonationofasmokegrenade(seeAppendixA,CaseC9).Andin1987,plainclothes DetectiveLynnRussellSutteroftheBethelPark,Pennsylvania,PoliceDepartmentwasshot byamemberofhisownteamwhowasonadimlylitstairwaylandingandfiredafterseeing ashadowofaman(DetectiveSutter)holdingaweapon(seeAppendixA,CaseC6).
ACloserLookatMistakenShootingsofOffDutyOfficers
Intheuniverseofthe26fatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingssince1981,ten involvedthedeathofanoffdutyofficer.Infiveofthese,includingthedeathofOfficer Ridley,theoffdutyofficercameacrossacrimeinprogressandcametotheassistanceof otherofficersoranapparentcivilianvictim.Infiveothers,includingthedeathofOfficer Edwards,theoffdutyofficerwashimselfthevictimofacrimeduringwhichhetookaction toapprehendtheperpetrator.WehavealreadydescribedtheRidleyandEdwardscases,so wenowturnourattentionbrieflytodescriptionsoftheeightotheroffdutycases.Allof thesesummariesarebaseduponFBIreports,reportsfromthelawenforcementagencies involved,publicstatements,andotheropensources.Theremaining16casesof plainclothesandundercoverofficerskilledaredescribedinAppendixA.Thoseother
26Lewinskireportpg.5(AppendixF).
P a g e |24
incidentsinvolvedplannedoperationsoflawenforcementteamsandondutyresponsesto crimesinprogress. GroupA:OffDutyOfficersComingtotheAidofOthers CaseA1:RobertPatterson(1982,WhiteMaleOfficerwiththeBirmingham,Alabama, PoliceDepartment).Theoffdutyvictimofficerwasvisitinganightclubwherehe sometimesworkedasasecurityguardduringhisoffhours.Afightbrokeoutandthe victimofficerresponded,takingtwowomenintocustody,oneofwhomwasarmedwith twoknives.Asheescortedthewomenoutoftheclub,hewasobservedbyoneoftwo uniformedofficerswhorespondedtoapleaforassistancebyoneoftheclubpatronswho ranoutside.Thatuniformedofficerthentoldthevictimofficertoholdit,andgrabbedthe victimofficersarminanattempttotaketheknives,whichthevictimofficerhad confiscated.Theuniformedofficerthendrewhisweapon;astruggleensuedandthevictim officerwasshot.Thereareconflictingaccountsastowhetherthevictimofficerever identifiedhimselftothechallengingofficer. CaseA2:JamesMcGee,Jr.(1995,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC, MetropolitanPoliceDepartment):Theoffdutyvictimofficerintervenedinacabrobbery thathewitnessed.Pursuingoneofthetwosuspects,hedrewhisweaponandwas mistakenforasuspectbytwouniformedofficersrespondingtoacall.Witnessingthe victimofficerholdingoneoftheactualsuspectsatgunpoint,theconfrontingofficers orderedhimtodrophisweapon.Whenthevictimofficerreportedlydidnotidentify himself,andreportedlystartedtoturnwithoutloweringhisgun,hewasfiredupon. CaseA3:CornelYoung,Jr.(2000,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeProvidence,RhodeIsland, PoliceDepartment).Theoffdutyvictimofficerwasatalatenightdinerwhenanargument betweentwopatronsescalated.Oneofthepatronsleftthediner,apparentlytoretrievea gunfromhisvehicle,andthemanagercalledthepolice.Twouniformedofficersresponded toaradiocall.Aftertheofficersarrived,thevictimofficerlefttherestaurantwithhis weapondrawntoprovideassistancetotheuniformedofficersoutside.Theuniformed officersmistookthevictimofficerforanadditionalsuspectandorderedhimtodrophis weapon.Whenhereportedlydidnotdoso,theyfiredtheirweapons,killinghim. CaseA4:NehemiahPickens(2005,BlackMaleReserveDeputyConstablewiththeHarris County,Texas,ConstablesOffice).Whileworkingasecondjobasasecurityguardatan apartmentcomplex,theoffdutyvictimofficersawasuspectcrashacarintothecomplex andbegintofleeonfootwhilebeingchasedbyofficersfromanotheragency.Thevictim officerdrewhisweaponanddecidedtopursuethesuspect,aswell.Whenoneoftheon dutypursuingofficerssawthevictimofficer,hebrokeofffromtheactualsuspectand begantochasethevictimofficer,whomheapparentlymistookforanadditionalsuspect. Thatofficerfiredhisweaponwhenthevictimofficerreportedlyfailedtostopanddrophis weaponandinsteadturnedtowardthechallengingofficerwithhisgundrawn.
P a g e |25
GroupB:OffDutyOfficerswhowereVictimsofCrimesorEngagedinDisputes CaseB1:JamesL.Gordon(1987,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC, MetropolitanPoliceDepartment).Onawinterevening,aneighborofthevictimofficer called911toreportaburglaryinprogressatthevictimofficershome.Ataboutthesame time,thevictimofficerarrivedathishomeandnoticedthatsomeoneappearedtohave tamperedwithawindow.Hethenenteredhishomewithhisweapondrawn.Auniformed officerwhorespondedminuteslatercircledthehousewithhisweaponandflashlight drawnandsawanarmedman(thevictimofficer)throughthewindowofalightedroom. Theuniformedofficerfiredonceafterthevictimofficerreportedlyfailedtodrophis weaponinresponsetoacommandtodosoandinsteadturnedtowardthechallenging officer. CaseB2:RufusGates(1994,BlackMaleMajorintheMemphis,Tennessee,Police Department).Theoffdutyvictimofficerbecameengagedinadisputewithanother motoristafteraminorcaraccident.Whenthevictimofficernoticedthattheothermotorist hadagun,heinstructedhissonandanotherboy(stillinhiscar)tocall911;healso retrievedhisowngun.Whenauniformedofficerrespondedtothe911call,themotorist toldtheuniformedofficerthatthevictimofficerhadagunandthendroveoff.Whenthe uniformedofficersawthevictimofficerwalkingtowardshimwithaweaponinhand,he firedfourshots,killingthevictimofficer. CaseB3:ThomasHamlette,Jr.(1998,BlackMaleOfficerwiththeWashington,DC, MetropolitanPoliceDepartment).Outsideanightclubcoownedbyhisfather,theoffduty victimofficerbecameengagedinadisputewithapatronoveraparkingspace.Thedispute escalatedandtheofficerdrewhisserviceweapon.Thetwobecameinvolvedinastruggle fortheweaponanditdischarged.Anotheroffdutyofficerwhowasstandingnearthe clubsentranceapproachedwithhisownweapondrawn,identifiedhimselfasapolice officer,andorderedthevictimofficertodrophisweapon.Asthevictimofficerandtheclub patroncontinuedtostruggle,thevictimofficersweapondischargedasecondtime.The patronthenfled.Thevictimofficerthenreportedlyturnedtowardsthesecondoffduty officerwithoutloweringhisweaponoridentifyinghimselfasanofficer.Thesecondoff dutyofficerreportedlyorderedthevictimofficertodrophisweaponand,whenthevictim officerfailedtodoso,firedthefatalshot. CaseB4:EricHernandez(2006,HispanicMaleOfficerwiththeNewYorkCityPolice Department).Thevictimofficerbecameengagedinanearlymorningargumentatafast foodrestaurantandwasseverelyassaultedbyseveraloftherestaurantpatrons. Immediatelythereafter,thevictimofficermistookaninnocentbystanderforoneofhis assailants,andheldhimatgunpoint.Ataboutthesametime,twouniformedofficers respondedtoa911callregardingtheincident.Whentheyarrivedatthescene,the respondingofficerssawthevictimofficerandorderedhimtodrophisweapon.Whenthe victimofficerreportedlyfailedtocomply,oneoftherespondingofficersfiredhisweapon.
P a g e |26
Eachofthesetragediesevolvedfromauniquecombinationofevents,misjudgments,and reactions,yetthefactthatnineofthetenoffdutyvictimswereofficersofcolorbegs furtherexamination.Whenofficersofcolorreturntotheircommunitiesoffduty,dothey findthemselvesinlocationsorinsituationsthatplacetheminanygreaterriskof misidentificationbyotherpoliceofficers?Withonlytencasesofoffdutyofficersshotand killedbyotherofficersoverthelast29years,itisimpossibletoknow,butour recommendationsaddresstheneedformoreresearchonquestionslikethese. Regardlessoflocation,however,offdutyofficersofcolorseemtofacegreaterdangersthan theirwhitecounterpartswhentheydisplaytheirweapons.Simplyput,itismorelikely thattheywillbemistakenforacriminal.AsoneretiredAfricanAmericanpolicechieftold us,henevercarriedaweaponwhenhewasoffdutyinhisownneighborhoodbecausein thatpredominantlywhitecommunityheroutinelyarousedthesuspicionofpoliceofficers whodidnotrecognizehimasapoliceexecutivefromanotherjurisdiction.27Herecounted severaloccasionsonwhichhewasstoppedandquestionedsimplywhenoutforamorning jog.Hetoldusthathenevercarriedhisweaponbecauseitwouldnotbesafeforhimtodo so.Asheexplained,hebelievedthat,asablackman,hispossessionofaweaponcould easilyescalateanotherwiseannoyingencounterintoapotentiallylethalone. Alloftheoffdutyofficersinthefatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsweredisplayingagun whentheywerekilled.Ourreviewoftheiragencyproceduresrevealedthatsomeofthese lawenforcementagenciesrequiredtheirofficerstocarryweaponswiththemwhileoff duty.Whilethisrequirementisnottoblameforanyofthesetragedies,wenotethatmany agencieshavereconsideredsuchoffdutycarryrequirements.Thetrendtodayisto permit,butnotrequire,officerstocarrytheirserviceweaponswhileoffduty.Police departmentsinthecitiesofProvidence,Washington,D.C.,andDetroithaveeither eliminatedorrelaxedtheiroffdutycarryrequirements.Neitheroftheagenciesthat employedthevictimofficersinthethreeNewYorkfatalities(NYPDandMountVernonPD) hadoffdutycarryrequirementswhentheirfatalshootingstookplace.Still,of30mid sizedtolargedepartmentsrecentlysurveyedinNewYorkState,twostillrequiretheir officerstocarrytheirfirearmswhileoffduty,andthreehavenospecificpolicyatall.
AftermathofFatalShootings
Theresponsebylawenforcementagenciestoapoliceonpoliceshootingcanhelphealor exacerbatethetragedythatfellowofficers,relatives,andfriendsofthevictimofficers experience.Becausethesearesuchrareevents,policeorganizationsareoftenunprepared tohandlethecomplexcurrentsofemotionatthesametimethattheymustinitiatea complexinvestigationintothecircumstancesoftheshooting. Theimmediateresponseofalawenforcementagencytothemistakenshootingdeathof oneofitsownofficersstartswithmattersasbasicaspropernotificationoffamilyand fellowofficersandtherespectfulhandlingofthebodyofthedeceasedofficer.Chief BarbaraDuncanoftheMountVernonPoliceDepartmentdescribedforushowheragencys
27StatementofHenryDeGeneste,January29,2010.
P a g e |27
lackofaformalprotocolforhandlingthenotificationoffamilyintheeventofthedeathof anofficerinthelineofdutyexacerbatedthealreadygrievouslossofOfficerChristopher Ridley.ChiefDuncan,whoheldtherankofcaptainatthetime,acknowledgedthatword spreadsoquicklyinthedepartmentthatmanylineofficerswereawareofRidleysdeath beforethecommandstaff.28OtherofficerscomplainedthatOfficerRidleysbodyremained atthescenelongerthannecessary.StanleyRidley,OfficerChristopherRidleysfather,told usthathefirstlearnedofhissonsdeathnotfromaseniorofficialbutfromoneofhissons colleagueswhocalledtoexpresshiscondolences.Someofficersinthatdepartmentquickly formedanimpressionthatthedepartmentwasnotrespondingwithsufficientsensitivityto OfficerRidleysdeath.Thistensesituationunderminedmoraleandcreateddivisions,some alongraciallines,whichhavecausedfurtherdamagetoanalreadydevastatedpolice department. Theemotionalscarsleftbytheseshootingscanlastforyears.Policechiefsinother departmentsthathaveexperiencedthesefatalitieshavetoldusstoriesofofficersstill sufferingemotionaltraumayearsaftertheincident,especiallywhenitisnotaddressedin thefirstdaysandweeks.UnderChiefDuncansleadership,theMountVernonPolice Departmenthascreatednewlineofdutydeathpoliciesincludingaskingeachofficerto provideuptodatepreferencesastowhomtheywishtobecontactediftheyshouldbe injuredorkilled.Thedepartmenthasalsobeguntoprovidepeercounselingandforums forofficerswhocontinuetosuffergriefandresentmentaboutthelossoftheirfriendand colleague. Asecondsetofchallengesintheimmediateaftermathoftheseshootingsistoavoid releasinginformationthatprematurelysuggestswhereblamemayormaynotlie.Our reviewoftheseincidentssuggeststhattheyareoftentheresultofanaccumulationof mistakesandmisjudgments.Intheimmediateaftermathofashooting,however, suggestionsthatthevictimofficermayhavecontributedtohisorherowndeathcanseem unnecessarilyinsulting,insensitive,anddefensive. Similarly,whereanofficerofcoloriskilled,suggestionsabouthowtheofficersraceor ethnicitymayormaynothavebeenafactor,ordrawingconclusionsbasedontheraceor ethnicityofthechallengingofficers,canalsoexacerbateratherthancalmconcerns.Intime, theseincidentsmustbestudiedandwidelyunderstood,butitisparticularlyimportantthat anyreleaseofinformationbeascomplete,accurate,andrespectfulaspossible. Thefullinvestigationofamistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingisacomplicated task,servingfourdistinctpurposessimultaneously.Asinanyofficerinvolvedshooting,the investigationmust: examinewhetherornotanytheconductofanypersoninvolvedwascriminaland shouldbechargedassuch; examinewhetheranyofficersshouldbesubjecttodepartmentaldisciplinefor inappropriateuseofdeadlyforceorviolationofotherdepartmentpoliciesand,
28TestimonyofBarbaraDuncan,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |28
regardlessofanydiscipline,whetheranyoftheofficersshouldreceiveadditional instructiononappropriatetacticswhenconfrontingarmedindividuals; revealgapsorweaknessesindepartmentpolicies,procedures,ortrainingthatcan berepaired;and provideacompletepublicaccountoftheshootingthatassuresthepublic,thefamily andfriendsofthevictimofficers,formercolleaguesandconcernedlawenforcement officerseverywherethattheinvestigationitselfhasbeenthoroughandobjective.
Iftheinvestigationisnotplannedandexecutedwithcare,thesefourpurposescanconflict withoneanother.Andevenwiththeguidanceofexpertinvestigators,pursuingthesegoals inconcertoftenprovesdifficult.Avarietyoflegalrulescanmakeevidencegatheredforone purposeunavailableforothers.Forexample,whilemanylawenforcementagencies routinelyinterviewanyofficerwhohasfiredaweaponshortlyaftertheshooting, statementsmadeinarequiredinterviewcannotbeusedlaterinacriminalprosecution againsttheofficer.Inpractice,prosecutorsexaminingwhethertobringcriminalcharges againstanofficeroftenrequestthattheseinterviewsbedelayedforweeksormonths becausetheymaycompromisetheofficersrightsatanysubsequenttrial.29Similarly,in NewYorkandsomeotherstates,evidencegatheredinaninvestigationandthenpresented toagrandjurycanbecomesubjecttolegalrestrictionsonitspublicrelease.These restrictionsaredesignedtoprotectthesecrecyofbothactiveandcompletedgrandjury proceedings. Untilrecentyears,itwascommonforinvestigationsintoofficerinvolvedshootingsto resolvethetensionsbetweenandamongthesedifferentpurposesbysimplygivingpriority tothequestionofcriminalliability.Byresolvingalltacticalconflictsinwaysthatmost benefittheinquiryintopossiblecriminalcharges,investigationsliketheseoftensacrificed thecollectionoravailabilityofevidencethatcouldotherwisehavestrengthened departmentaldiscipline,improvedpoliciesandtraining,andprovidedacompletepublic accountofacontroversialshooting.Yet,becausemostoftheseinvestigationsendwiththe decisionnottochargeanyofficerscriminally,theresultofprioritizingtheissueofcriminal culpabilityhasoftenmeantthattheinvestigationsleadtolittleofconsequence:nocriminal case,nodepartmentaldiscipline,fewchangesinpolicy,andanincompletepublicaccount. Morerecently,somepolicedepartmentsandprosecutorshavecreatedspecialized investigativeshootingteamscomposednotonlyofdetectives,butalsooftrainers,tactical specialists,integrityinvestigators,forensicexperts,andmore.Vigorouslypursuingallfour ofthepurposesmentionedaboveremainschallenging,evenforsuchexpertteams;butin severalcasesthesespecializedinvestigativeteamshavemadetacticalreviewsmore substantiveandpublicaccountsmorecredibleintheabsenceofcriminalorformal disciplinaryproceedings.
29InGarrityv.NewJersey,385US493(1967),theU.S.SupremeCourtheldthatwhileanemployersuchasa
policedepartmentmaycompelanofficertomakestatementsinadministrativeproceedingsunderthreatof beingfiredorfacingotherdisciplinaryaction,thesestatementsmaynotbeusedinsubsequentcriminal prosecutionsbecausedoingsowouldviolatetheofficersFifthAmendmentrightagainstselfincrimination.
P a g e |29
OfthetwomostrecentpoliceonpoliceshootingsinNewYorkState,onewasinvestigated bytheWhitePlainsPoliceDepartmentandtheWestchesterCountyDistrictAttorneys Office,whiletheotherwasinvestigatedbytheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandthe ManhattanDistrictAttorneysOffice.Neitherinvestigationhasresultedincriminalcharges orformaldiscipline,butadministrativeandcivilproceedingswerestillinprogressatthe timethisreportwasfinalized.Inresearchingbothoftheseinvestigations,ourabilityto reviewrelevantmaterialwaslimitedbygrandjurysecrecylaws.Nevertheless,the investigatingdetectivesfromtherelevantbureauswithinbothpolicedepartmentsspent considerabletimebriefingusontheirwork.30 InNewYorkCity,wewereimpressedbytheNYPDspolicyofinvestigatingeverypolice involvedshootingnotonlymistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootingsusinga shootingteamcomprisedofrankingofficersfrommultipleunits.Eachofficerinvolved shootingisinvestigatedbyanNYPDshootingteamledbyacaptain,underthedirectionofa BoroughCommanderwhoisanAssistantChief.Theshootingteamhasatitsdisposalallof theNYPDsinvestigativeresources:precinctdetectives,crimesceneanalysts,forensic specialists,andofficerstrainedinpolicetacticsanduseoffirearms.Andastheshooting teamcolletsevidenceandinterviewswitnessesandtheofficersinvolved,aspecifically taskedgroupfromtheNYPDsInternalAffairsBureau(IAB)conductsaparallelbut independentinvestigation. Theshootingteamsprocessislargelydevotedtomemorializingtheeventfor incorporationintotheNYPDslargerknowledgemanagementsystemsandforassessing thetacticsemployedbyeachparticipant.Meanwhile,theIABsparallelinvestigationis designedtosupporttheNYPDsdisciplinaryintegrity,assessingtheproceduralproprietyof theofficersactions.BoththeshootingteamandtheIABgatherandpreserveevidencein supportoftheDistrictAttorneysofficialinquiry,tobeusedintheeventofanycriminal proceedingthatmayensue.31 InthecaseofOfficeRidleyinWestchesterCounty,localandcountyauthoritiesappointed theWhitePlainsPoliceDepartmentastheleadinvestigativeagency.Where,asinthiscase, thevictimofficerandchallengingofficersarefromdifferentpolicedepartments,callingina
member. 31Criminalproceedings,whentheyoccur,aredirectedbythedistrictattorneyofthecountyinwhichthe incidenttookplace.Inmostcasesincludingnearlyeveryinstanceinwhichapolicedischargeresultsin injuryordeaththedistrictattorneywillinitiateitsownindependentinvestigation,separatefromthepolice investigation,andwillpresentitsevidencetoagrandjury.Ifthegrandjurydeclinestohanddownan indictment,thedistrictattorneysinvolvementgenerallyends.Ifanindictmentresults,thedistrictattorney willassumecontrolofthecasewhileconductingacriminalprosecution.Policedepartmentsgenerally provideassistanceasrequestedandgenerallysuspendtheirinvestigationsuntiltheprosecutionconcludes. Somecasesarealsoreviewedbyfederalauthorities,particularlywhenthereispotentialforfindingacivil rightsviolation.Onceallstateandfederalcriminalprocesseshaveended,theNYPDcontinueswithboththe shootingteamsinvestigationandtheIABinvestigationandconvenesadisciplinarybodyknownasthe FirearmsDischargeReviewBoard.Thisentitycollectsinformationfromalloftheprecedinginvestigations andconsiderswhethertheshootingwasinpolicyaccordingtoNYPDguidelines.Theboardthenrefersthe mattertotheNYPDCommissionerforanultimatedeterminationandanyadministrationofdiscipline.
30TheseparticularbriefingswereattendedbytheTaskForcevicechair,executivedirector,andastaff
P a g e |30
thirdpartyagencytoconducttheinvestigationcanhelptomitigateconcernsoffavoritism andmayimprovepublicconfidenceinthethoroughnessandaccuracyoftheinvestigation. InNewYorkCity,themultifacetedinvestigationhassupportedamultitrackresponsefrom thepolicedepartment,evenasthedistrictattorneyandagrandjurywereconsidering whetherornottobringcriminalcharges.Beforethegrandjuryfinisheditsconsideration, theNYPDhadalreadyrevisedatrainingvideoonpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsand shownitatallrollcalls.Thedepartmentalsoincreasedtheappearanceofplainclothes officersfromvariousdivisionsatprecinctrollcallsofuniformedofficersworkinginthe sameneighborhoods,tomakeuniformedofficersmorefamiliarwithoutofuniform officerstheymightencounter.And,attherecommendationofitspolicefraternal organizations,thedepartmenthasbeguntodevelopanewhighvisibilitybadgeholderthat willallowoffdutyofficerstakingpoliceactiontodisplaytheirbadgesmoreeasily.32 WhiletheinvestigationofOfficerRidleysdeathinWhitePlainswasmoretraditional, withoutthebenefitofthekindofmultiskilledshootingteamdeployedbytheNYPD,a separatepanelofexpertswasassembledtorecommendimprovementstotraining.Inits report,thePaneltoReviewUseofForceTrainingattheWestchesterCountyPolice AcademydidnotprovideanypublicaccountoftheshootingofOfficerRidley,butitdid makeseveralrecommendationsthatwereimplementedattheacademylevel,andalsoat thestatelevel.AsdiscussedinmoredetailinChapter3,theWestchesterDepartmentof PublicSafety,whichoperatesthesametrainingacademythatprovidedbasictrainingfor bothOfficerRidleyandthechallengingofficersinvolvedintheincident,requiredformal changestoitsownpoliciesattheacademyandalsoplayedakeyroleincraftingthe requirementtoaddconfrontationtrainingtothemandatedbasictrainingofnewpolice officersstatewide. Unfortunately,therobustresponseofthesepolicedepartmentsismoretheexceptionthan therule.Wewereabletofindevidenceofsignificantchangesinpolicy,proceduresand trainingbyjustahandfuloftheagenciesinvolvedinthe26fatalincidents.
NonFatalPoliceonPoliceShootings
Informationonnonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsprovednearlyimpossibletocollect systematically.Asaresult,ourunderstandingofnonfatalshootingsreliesonsixindividual accountswereceivedfromtheNYPD,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment,andindividual officers.Whileanecdotalaccountsratherthanarepresentativesample,theynonetheless raiseintriguingquestions. Threeofthenonfatalmistakenidentityshootingswereviewedinvolvedofficerswhowere confrontedwhileinuniform.In1997,CorvetCurley,anAfricanAmericanofficerinthe policedepartmentofthePortAuthorityofNewYorkandNewJersey,wasinuniformwhen heheardaradiocallaboutNewJerseyStatetrooperschasingadangeroussuspecttowards hislocationattheGeorgeWashingtonBridge.AsOfficerCurleypreparedforthesuspectto
32TheNYPDhasalsoengagedinanumberofothermeanstopreventfuturetragedies.SeeAppendixD,Letter
fromNYPDCommissionerRaymondKellytoNewYorkGovernorDavidA.Paterson.
P a g e |31
drivetowardhim,hedrewhisserviceweapon.Shortlythereafter,thesuspectcrashedhis vehiclenearthebridgetollplazaandOfficerCurleyrepositionedhimselftoimprovehis tacticaladvantage.Meanwhile,awhiteNewJerseyStatetrooperwhohadbeenengagedin thecarchasegotoutofhisvehiclewithashotgun,sawOfficerCurleywithhisgundrawn, andshothim,causingasevere,permanentlydisablinginjury.Thetrooperlaterdescribed OfficerCurleyasfittingthesuspectsdescriptionbecauseCurleywasatall,thin,black male. TheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentshareddetailswiththeTaskForceofasecond mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootinginvolvingauniformedofficer.InJuneof1991, OfficerTerryGregoryandthreeotheruniformedofficersweresearchingahotelforan assailant.Theofficerssplitintotwoteams,onetakingalongcivilianhotelemployeestoaid inthesearch.Atsomepoint,oneofthecivilianstriedtoopenastairwelldoor.Feeling resistance,helookedandnoticedthroughthepartiallyopendoorthehandofaman holdingagun.ThatpersonwasOfficerGregory,butthecivilianmistookhimtobethe actualsuspectandinformedtheotherofficers.Thoseofficerstookupdefensivepositions andoneofthemshotOfficerGregoryashewalkedthroughthedoorwithhisguninhis leadinghand. Fournonfatal,mistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootingsoccurredwithintheNYPD between1995and2009,includingtheshootingofoneofficerinuniform.Thevictim officersinallfourofthesenonfatalshootingswerewhite,aswereallbutoneofthe challengingofficers.Allofthevictimofficershadtheirweaponsvisibletothechallenging officers.Ofthethreenotinuniform,onewasaretiredofficerinstreetclotheswhohimself hadbeenthevictimofacrimeandwaspursuingtheperpetrators,andtheothertwowere workingplainclothesassignments. Wehadhoped,whenourtaskforcewasformed,tobeabletocollectdataonnonfatal, policeonpoliceshootingsfromallpoliceagenciesacrossNewYorkStateandfroma selectionofmajordepartmentsincitiesnationally.Unfortunately,suchdataarenot routinelycollectedinsidelawenforcementagencies.ThedataavailablefortheNewYork CityPoliceDepartmentwerecollectedbythatagencyinapainstakingprocessfollowing thedeathofOfficerEdwards.Wereturntotheneedformoresystematicdataonthese nonfatalshootingsinourrecommendations.
OtherPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
Thankfully,thegreatmajorityofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceconfrontationsdonot involveshotsbeingfired.Butitispreciselyhere,inthevastnumberofconfrontations neverformallyreportedevenwithinthelawenforcementagenciesinvolved,thatwefind someofthemostinterestingpatterns.Thistypeofconfrontationismostsimilartothe spectrumofinteractionsthatciviliansmayexperiencewithpoliceonadailybasis:stop andfrisks,temporarydetention,physicalaltercations,andsometimesweaponsdrawn. Becausetheseincidentsarerarelyreportedwhentheyoccur,whatweknowaboutnon fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsismostlyanecdotal,buttherearelotsofanecdotes.The
P a g e |32
informationconsideredbytheTaskForcecameprimarilyfromthreesources:apairof NYPDsurveysofitsundercoverofficersandplainclothesanticrimeofficers,theTask Forcesownonlinequestionnaireforcurrentandformerlawenforcementofficers,anda pairofsurveysoflawenforcementagenciesthroughoutNewYorkStateadministeredon ourbehalfbyDCJS(theDCJSsurveyofdepartmentsparticipatingintheStatesIMPACT program)andtheNewYorkAssociationofChiefsofPolice(theNYSACOPsurvey).33 Thesevarioussourcessuggestthatnonfatalpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsarecommon occurrences. Mostoftheincidentsweknowaboutweredescribedforusinanonlinequestionnairethat theTaskForcedesignedtoelicitaccountsofpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsfromcurrent andretiredlawenforcementofficersnationwide.Morethanfourhundredthirtycurrent andformerlawenforcementofficerscompletedthequestionnaire;392ofthemwere submittedintimeforinclusionintheanalysishere.And250ofthosequestionnaire respondentsindicatedthattheyhadbeeninvolvedinamistakenidentity,policeonpolice confrontationatsomepointintheircareers.34Aboutathirdoftheofficerswhoreported suchincidentsinourquestionnaireestimatedthattheyhadbeeninvolvedinthreeormore intheircareersforsomeasmanyasten. SeveralNewYorkStatelawenforcementagencieswecontactedwereawareofnonfatal policeonpoliceconfrontationsamongtheirofficers.Sixteenofthe30agenciespolledin theDCJSsurveyindicatedhavingexperiencedsomesortofmistakenidentitypoliceon policeconfrontationsinthepastfifteenyears,andfifteenofthe54municipalpolice departmentsthatcompletedtheNYSACOPsurveyindicatedtheirofficershadexperienced confrontations.AmoresystematicNYPDsurveyof200undercoverofficersfoundthat nearly1in6(18percent)ofthemhadexperiencedagunpointconfrontationwithanother officerandasimilarsurveyof228NYPDplainclothesanticrimeofficersindicatedthat31 percenthadexperiencedgunpointconfrontationswithfellowofficers. Inordertolearnmoreaboutwhathappensintheseconfrontations,weaskedthe questionnairerespondentstoprovidewrittennarrativesofuptothreeoftheirmost seriousmistakenidentityconfrontations.Thisyieldeddetailedinformationabout344
OfficeofPublicSafetyattheNYDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices.Theeightquestionsurveywas distributedtothe30municipalpolicedepartmentsparticipatinginNewYorkStatesOperationIMPACT,a crimereductionprogramthatencompassesthosepolicejurisdictionsfromthe17countiesoutsideofNew YorkCitythatexperiencethehighestvolumeofseriouscrimeinthestate.(TheStatesOperationIMPACTis unrelatedtothelongerestablishedNYPDprogramofthesamename.)Thesecondsurveywasconductedat theTaskForcesrequestbytheNewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice(NYSACOP),whosemembers includepoliceexecutivesfromvariousagenciesthroughouttheState.The54respondentswereaskedto identifywhethertheyhadencounteredanypoliceonpoliceshootingsorconfrontationsinrecentyearsand tospecifythedutyassignment(undercover,plainclothesoroffduty)ofofficerswhohadbeeninvolvedinany encounters,andwhetherlethalornonlethalforcehadbeenusedinanyoftheseconfrontations.Afinal questionaskedwhetherandatwhatpointofficersreceivetraininginhowtohandleplainclothesandoffduty encounters. 34Wereceived149questionnaires(38percentoftotal)describingexperiencesasconfrontedofficers,and 168(43percentoftotal)describingexperiencesaschallengingofficers.Sixtysevenquestionnaires(17 percent)containedaccountsofofficerswhoexperiencedbothtypesofincidents.
33ThefirstsurveyreviewedwasdesignedandadministeredbytheTaskForcestaffwithassistancefromthe
P a g e |33
individualmistakenidentityincidents.Ofthe344confrontationsdescribed,welearnedthe raceorethnicityofboththechallengingandtheconfrontedofficersin277.Mostofthe storiesinvolvedwhiteofficersaschallengingandconfrontedofficers,thoughtherewere manystoriesinvolvingofficersofcolorinoneroleortheother.Whiletheseaccountsdo notconstitutearepresentativesampleoftheuniverseofpoliceonpoliceconfrontations, theindividualstoriesreinforcewhatthescholarswhomweinterviewedalsosurmised:the lowlevelconfrontationsthatoccurfrequentlyandthatendwithoutshotsbeingfiredbegin forwidelyvaryingreasons,withracialorethnicstereotypesandunconsciousbiasbeing onlyoneamongmanypossiblefactorsintheirinceptionanddevelopment.35 Perhapsthemosthopefulfindingfromthesequestionnairesisthatevenwhenthe confrontedofficershavetheirweaponsdrawn,theconfrontationcannonethelessbe defusedwithoutashotbeingfired.Infortytwoconfrontationincidentsdescribedinthe responsestoourquestionnaire,theconfrontedofficerhaddrawnhisweaponbutthe confrontationwasneverthelessendedwithoutinjury.Thisrequirescare,awareness,and disciplineonbothsidesoftheconfrontation.Challengingofficersneedtobelookingand listeningforcluesthatdeepentheirunderstandingoftheirsituation,whileconfronted officersneedtocomplywiththechallengingofficerscommands,remainmotionless,and identifythemselvesaspoliceofficers. Inpractice,however,asthesestoriesillustrate,defusingtheseconfrontationscanrequire strictdisciplineandnervesofsteel.OneplainclothesAfricanAmericanofficersharedthe followingconfrontationstorythatoccurredasheandhisWhitepartnerwerepursuinga suspect: AsIapproachedthestepstothetrainstationrunningfullspeedwithmy partnersomewherebehindmeIcouldseeapoliceofficerfromtheother townpullingup.AsIwasrunningtothestairstheofficerinuniformwas runningtowardsme.Thestairsweretohisleftbuthewasrunningtowards me.Icouldseethatheislookingatmewithfearanduncertaintyinhiseyes. IknewrighttherethathethoughtIwasthesuspect.Hedidnotseemyshield onmychestormyradioinmyhand.Hesawamaleblackinhis20sandan olderwhitemanwholookslikeaplainclothesofficer(mypartner)chasing themaleblack.AshepulledouthisgunandbegantoraiseitatmeI immediatelystoppedrunning.BythetimehepointedhisfirearmatmeIwas
35Thecurrentandformerofficerswhocompletedouronlinequestionnairewerenotarepresentative
sampleofofficersorofofficerswhohaveexperiencedpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.TheTaskForce promotedthequestionnairethroughorganizationsofpoliceofficers,includingseveralorganizationsof officersofcolor,encouragingthemtoincludelinksontheirwebsites,noticesintheirnewsletters,and announcementsattheirconventions.Evenamongthosewholearnedofthesurvey,somemighthavebeen morelikelythanotherstocompleteit,ormighthaveincludedsomeincidentsandnotothers.Respondents mayhavebeenmorelikelytodescribeconfrontationsthatleftthemangryorshaken,confrontationswith officersoutsidetheirownunitordepartment,confrontationsinwhichtheydidnotreceiveanapology,andso on.Forthisreason,anypatternsacrossthestoriesarenotindicativeoftrendsinthewideruniverseof policeonpoliceconfrontations;buttheaccountsthemselvescontainvaluableinsightsintothewaysinwhich confrontationsoccur,thewaysthatofficersrespondtoeachotherinconfrontations,andthefeelingsthat theseconfrontationscanevokeinofficers.
P a g e |34
screaming,Police,Iamapoliceofficer.Iputmybadgeupnearmyeyesso thathecouldseeit.Heimmediatelyholsteredhisweapon.Hesaidnothing priortomeshouting"Police,Iamapoliceofficer."Noshotswerefired.Itold himthesuspectwasrunningonthetracksandwejoinedthefootpursuit.36 Inthiscase,theconfrontedofficerrealizedearlythatthechallengingofficerfromanother jurisdictionhadmistakenhimforthesuspect,eventhoughthechallengingofficerhadnot yetissuedanycommands.Inhindsightitiseasytoappreciatehowhisdeftresponse turnedwhatcouldhavebeenatragedyintojustanotherdayonthejob.Asheexplained: ItooktheinitiativetousemyvoiceandtellhimthatIamapoliceofficer.I saiditloudandIsaiditclear.Iusedmyhandwhichwasemptytoshowhim mybadgebyplacingitupnearmyfacebecauseIcouldseethatiswherethe officerwasstaring.Iknewmypartnerwhoisolderandwhitewasbehind meandIfiguredthechallengingofficerfeltIwasbeingpursuedbymy partner.Iknewthatwewerechasingamaleblackinhis20sandIwasinmy 20satthetime.Iknewtherewasamistakeinsuspectidentitymadebythe challengingofficerandIdidnotwantittoturnbad.Ididn'tyellattheofficer todrophisweapon,orbaithimintoanargumentorchallengehim.Ijust shoutedthatIwasapoliceofficerandIshowedhimmybadge.37 Someofthestoriesillustratehowlittlechoiceanoffdutyofficerhasabouttakingpolice actionwhenoffenders,sometimesliterally,justrunrightintothem.Asoneoffdutyofficer describessuchanencounter: [I]waswalkingintoaconveniencestore"offduty"whenarobberran throughthedoorrightintome.Hewasknockedtothegroundbyoursudden impact.[The]clerkyelledhejustrobbedherandIdrewdownonthesuspect andheldhimatgunpointuntilarrivalofofficers.[The]clerkhadalready calledforpolice.WhenofficersarrivedIimmediatelybeganyellingthat"IAM ACOP."Iwasinstructedtodropmygun.Isteppedbackawayfromthe suspectandplacedmygunontheground.[I]advised[that]mybadgeandID [were]inmybackpocketandwasinstructedtoremoveanddisplayit.After doingthat,IwastoldthatIcouldpickupmygun.Allwentwell.38 Trainingtoobeycommands,andavoidturningtowardtheofficersissuingthose commands,canbeverydifficulttofollowinthefield,especiallywhenstressorother situationalorenvironmentalfactorspreventconfrontedofficersfromhearingthose commandsclearly.Asoneplainclothesofficerdescribeshisownstory: Uniformedofficerscamerunningoutofthebuildingfromapositionbehind measIapproachedthepronedoutsuspecttoplacehandcuffsonhim.Iwas focusedonhimwhenIheardyellingcomingfrombehindme.Istoppedand
36Questionnaireresponse#54746033. 37Id.
38Questionnaireresponse#59082179(emphasisadded.).
P a g e |35
turnedmyheadtoseeseveraluniformedofficerscomingatmewithguns drawnyelling,"Dropthegun!"AsIstartedputtingthegundown,[one]ofthe officersrecognizedmeandorderedtheotherofficersawayfrommeandto takethepronedoutsuspectintocustody.Ibelieveifthatofficerhadnot recognizedme,Iwouldhavebeenshot.39 Sometimesdetailsassimpleashowandwhenconfrontedofficersidentifythemselvesand announcethattheyarearmedmaymakeadifferenceinhowthesituationplaysout.We seethisinaconfrontationdescribedtousbyanundercoverofficerworkingacontrolled drugbuyinTexas.Wearingabeardandlookingdisheveled,hewaswithhispartnerinan unmarkedvehicleturningdownadeadendstreetwhentheywereconfrontedbyateamof uniformedofficers: [Two]markedunitsinitiatedvehiclestopofmyU/C[undercover]vehicle, [the]officer(rookie)fromcityagency(IworkforState)verynervousduring approach,maintainedhandonweaponduringentireinitialcontact.I maintainedbothhandsonsteeringwheel,respondedtoidentificationof reasonforstopandstatedthatIhadaguninthesmallofmyback.AsIthen begantostatethatIwasapoliceofficer,theofficerscreamed,"GUN"and drewhisweapon.TheotherU/Cofficerinmypassengerseatandthesenior [uniformed]officerthathadarrivedonthepassengersideofthecarhadboth recognizedeachotherfromtheiragencyandwerealreadytalkingcasually. TheotherU/Cputhishandsontothefrontdashboardareaandshoutedfor theseniorofficertostoptheactionsoftherookieofficer.Iwritethisoffto rookienervousness,butimmediatelyrecognizedandchangedthewayIwould respondtotheidentificationofmyselffirstbeforetheidentificationthatIwas armed.40 Morethanhalfofthestoriesthatofficersdescribedinresponsetoourquestionnaire concernedchallengingofficersfromdifferentagenciesthantheofficerstheyconfronted. Thereisnoquestionthatsuchconfrontationsdohappenfrequentlyandposespecial dangersagainstwhichprotocolsandtrainingwithinasingleagencycannotfullyprotect. Still,theymayappearinthesestoriesbecausetheyarealsoeasierforpoliceofficerstotell, andthishasimplicationsforanysystemofreportingthatpoliceagenciesorgovernments putinplace.Thepolicingscholarsinterviewedforthisreportpredictedthatthe confrontationsthatweremostlikelytobereportedinanymannerwouldbethosebetween officersindifferentdepartments.Nextmostlikelywouldbeconfrontationsbetween officersindifferentunits.Theleastlikelytobereported,eveninformallywithinthe departmentitself,wouldbethosebetweenofficersinthesameunit. Moreover,thereisareluctancetoreportthroughthechainofcommandeventhestories wereceived.Oftheconfrontationsdescribedinourquestionnairesinwhichofficers indicatedwhetherornottheyhadreportedthem,onlyaboutthreepercentwereformally
39Questionnaireresponse#59585405. 40Questionnaireresponse#59753835(emphasisadded.).
P a g e |36
reported,andonlyathirdwereinformallyreported,mostlyinconversationswithdirect supervisors. TheTaskForcestaffinterviewedofficialsattwelvepoliceagencieswithinNewYorkState thatreportedpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsthroughtheDCJSorNYSACOPsurveys.Most ofthelawenforcementexecutivesweinterviewedindicatedthattheincidentsthey recountedtoushadneverbeenofficiallyrecordedorreported.Asaresult,theyhadno reliabledataonconfrontations.Onepolicechiefrecalledhearingfromanolderofficer whoadmittedhehadoncepulledagunonanundercoverofficer;yet,thechiefcouldfind nowrittenrecordoftheincident,whichhappenedpriortohistenure.Asasergeantat anotherdepartmentexplained,thevastmajorityoftheseincidentsaresimplyresolvedon thestreet. Mostpolicedepartmentsdonotrequiretheirofficerstoreportconfrontationexperiences. While25ofthe30departmentssurveyedbyDCJSindicatedthatareportwouldbe requiredforapoliceonpoliceshootingoraconfrontationinvolvingaphysicalaltercation, only18ofthedepartmentsrequireofficerstoreportconfrontationsinwhichweaponsare pointedandonly11requirereportsforconfrontationsinvolvingpurelyverbal confrontationswithnoweaponspointed.Wereturntothedifficultyofconstructingany plausiblereportingsysteminourrecommendations. Despitetheverylowrateofformalreportingofpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,thestories wereceivedincludednineincidentsthatresultedindisciplinaryactionagainstoneormore oftheofficersinvolved.Themostcommonformsofdisciplineintheseincidentswere officialreprimandsintheofficersfiles,followedbydisciplinerelatedtransferstoother units.Itisnotclearwhetheranyofthesedisciplinaryactionsalsoresultedinadditional trainingforthereprimandedortransferredofficers.Insevenoftheseninereports,the disciplinaryactionwastakenagainsttheconfrontedofficers,mostcommonlyfortheir failuretoobeythecommandsofthechallengingofficersorfortakingpoliceactioninthe firstplace,suchasexecutingwarrantsorrespondingtocallswithoutnotifyingcommandor dispatch.Thetwochallengingofficerswhofacedreprimandsweredisciplinedforracial harassmentandunsatisfactoryjobperformance.
TheRoleofStereotypesinPoliceConfrontationswithPeopleofColor
Thereisnoquestionthatmanyofficersofcolorfeelthattheyareatheightenedriskof beingmistakenforcriminalswhentheyareoutofuniformandtakingpoliceaction.A tellinganecdotealongtheselinescomesfromoneofthescholarsinterviewedforthis report.Thatscholardescribedhowagangunitcommanderinoneurbanpolice departmentpurchasedspecialjacketswithGangUnitemblazonedonthebackso plainclothesofficerscouldquicklyputthejacketsonwhenchasingasuspect.The commanderpurchasedthejacketsafterblackofficersconfidedinthecommanderthatthey sloweddowntheirpursuitwhileinalleystoavoidbeingmistakenforthecriminalbeing pursued.
P a g e |37
Similarly,oneretiredAfricanAmericanlawenforcementexecutivetoldusthathehadhad difficultyrecruitingblackofficersforundercoverassignments,widelyconsideredapath towardcareeradvancement,becausetheyfearedbeingmistakenforcriminalsbyfellow officers. Manycurrentandformerofficersofcolorsharedthisperspectivethroughouronline questionnaireandinourpublichearings.Someimpliedthattheyfeelaheighteneddanger fromwhitepoliceofficers,asinthissubmission: Iwasanactivestreetcopmyentirecareer,ascendedthroughtheranksto therankofLieutenantandendedmycareerasaDetectiveSquad commander,andthereisonefearIcarriedmyentirecareerthefearof beingshotbyawhitepoliceofficer.41 Forothers,thehigherrisksofundercoverworkforofficersofcolorweregenerally understoodandwidelyaccepted.Asoneofficerdescribedtheunderstanding: IwasanNYPDundercoverinthelate80's/early90'sandwasfortunate enoughtoworkwithandlearnfromtheabsolutebestthattheNYPDhadto offeratthetime.Aneachone,teachoneattitudewasadaptedandwe(as undercovers)tookafewhourseachweektogettogethertoteacheachother necessarysurvivaltactics.BeinginNewYorkandpartoftheNYPD,itwas understoodthatANYAfricanAmericanorHispanicundercoverwasatrisk wheneverwesteppedontheset.42 Whilesomepoliceofficersandexecutivesdescribedthesedangersasinevitableinlightof crimepatternsandtheuncertaintiesofpolicework,wealsoheardfromtheleadersof somepolicefraternalorganizationswhoinsistthattheserisksaregroundedinaculture theywanttoseechanged.AsLt.CharlesWilson,NationalChairmanoftheNational AssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficers,explainedinhissubmissiontotheTask Force: Theoverallmindsetthatablackmanoutofuniformcanonlybeasuspected criminalhasbecomeembeddedinthecultureoflawenforcement....[T]he cultureofourprofessionmustbeindisputablychanged.Nolongercanitbe acceptableformenandwomenofcolortobeconsideredfirstasapossible criminal,andonlyasanafterthoughtavaluedmemberofthecommunity.43 WhiteofficersaswellasBlackofficersdescribedforushowthesestereotypescontributeto policeonpoliceconfrontations.Thefollowingstory,forexample,wasprovidedbyaWhite plainclothesofficerwhosepartneratthetimewasAfricanAmerican.Theywereworking anautotheftdetail,securinganautomobilechopshopthathadbeenraidedduringthe
41SubmissionfromLieutenantWillieShaw,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(ret.) 42QuestionnaireResponse#5123056. 43TestimonyofLt.CharlesP.Wilson,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
P a g e |38
day.Thatevening,thetwoplainclothesofficersweresittingintheirunmarkedcarwhen confrontedbyofficersfromthelocalpoliceprecinct: [Thechallenging]officerssnuckupon[the]carweweresittinginatnight. [They]pointedweaponsatusand[we]weretolddon'tmove.Iputmyhands outandstatedIwasacop,[and]Iwasinstructedtogetoutofthecar.[The] challengingofficerhad[his]guncockedandpointedatme.Itoldhimwhere myIDwasandhetookitfrommypocketandconfirmedmyidentitystating "thisone'sonthejob."[My]partner(AfricanAmerican)wasstillbeingheld atgunpointwithguncockedinhisfaceandtheyrefusedtobelievehewas mypartneruntilhecouldproduceID.44 Thesestories,togetherwithcommonsense,suggestthatraceislikelyonefactorslowinga confrontingofficersrecognitionofanoutofuniformofficerasacop.AsJohnBilich, DeputyCommissionerfortheOfficeofPublicSafetyattheNewYorkStateDivisionof CriminalJusticeServices,toldus:Itwouldbenavetothinkthatraceneverplaysarole.... Thedifficulty,howeveris:Whotrulyknowstowhatextentitplaysaroleinthecritical adrenalindrivenandemotionallychargedfewmomentsthatprecedesuchanincident?45 Somepoliceexecutivesandscholarstoldusthat,intheirexperienceandopinion,racedoes notplayasignificantroleinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations.Atfirstthisseemsatodds bothwiththetestimonyweheardfrommanyofficersofcolorandwiththeresearchwe havealreadydiscussed.Withintheseopinions,however,wecantracetwoseparate propositions. First,weunderstandthescholarstobesayingthattheconfrontationsthemselvesoften beginforreasonsotherthanracialbias.Noscholarshavestudiedtherareinstancesof policeonpoliceshootings.Insteadthesescholars,atourrequest,plumbedtheirown experiencetoreflectontheconfrontationstheyhadobservedorhearddescribedinwhich noshotswerefired.Indeed,thereisampleevidencethatmistakenidentityconfrontations doindeedbeginformultiplereasons,usuallygroundedinbehavior.Itisadifferent questionandonethescholarscouldnotaddressastowhysomeconfrontations escalatewhileothersaredefused,andwhatroleraceplaysinthatcomplexprocess. Second,afewoftheresearchersandpoliceofficersweconsultedwerestressingapoint aboutthefocusofchallengingofficers,especiallywhentheconfrontedofficerisdisplaying aweapon.Weunderstandthispointtobethatchallengingofficersmayfocusalmost exclusivelyonthethreatthegunitselfignoringnotonlythesignsthattheperson holdingthegunmaybeapoliceofficerbutperhapsalsothepersonsraceandethnicity. Weacceptbothofthesepoints,yetnotethattheyareconsistentwithourbeliefthatrace can,andoftendoes,playasignificantroleintheseconfrontationsatleastinthe escalationoftheseconfrontationsintofataltragedies.
44Questionnaireresponse#58259430(emphasisadded.). 45TestimonyofJohnBilich,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |39
Themostpersuasiveevidencewehavefoundonthispointcomesfromnewresearchin socialpsychology.TaskForceadvisorsDr.PhilipAtibaGoffandDr.JohnDovidioexplain thatblatantexpressionsofracialbiashaveconsistentlydeclined[yet]becauseofarange ofnormalpsychologicalprocesses,suchashistoricalculturalassociations,ingroup affinities,andselfandgroupinterest,themajorityofWhiteAmericansstillharbor negativefeelingsandbeliefsaboutBlacks,whichareimplicitfrequentlyunconsciousand typicallyautomaticallyactivated.46Moreover,psychologicalresearchersfindthesesame implicitorunconsciousbiasespresentinpeopleofallracesandethnicitieswithin Americanculture.Asanotherscholardescribesina2002article,thetendencytoseean AfricanAmericansbehaviorasmoremeanandthreateningthanawhitepersonsdidnot dependontheobserversethnicity.47 Thereisgrowingevidencethatpoliceofficerslikemembersofthegeneralpublic displaywhatthesepsychologistscallimplicitracialbias,whichrevealsitselfinsimulated shoot/dontshootdecisions.OnestudybyDr.JenniferEberhardt,Dr.Goffandothers foundthatmerelythinkingaboutBlackscanleadpeopletoevaluateambiguousbehavior asaggressive,tomiscategorizeharmlessobjectsasweapons,ortoshootquickly,andat times,inappropriately.48Otherresearchshowswhenciviliansandpoliceofficersare forcedtomakedecisionsundertimepressure,theyshowarangeofweaponsbiases againstblacks,makingthemmorelikelytofalselyperceiveagunafterbeingprimedwitha photographofablackthanawhiteman.49 JoshuaCorrell,apsychologistattheUniversityofChicagoandconsultanttotheNYPD,has demonstratedthroughvideogamesimulationsthatciviliansandpoliceofficersoften evidencesimilarformsofbiasinthespeedwithwhichtheyshootblackarmedsuspects comparedwithwhitearmedsuspects.50Inonesuchsimulation,researchsubjectswere shownavarietyofimagesofblackandwhiteindividuals:someholdingagunofsomekind, othersholdinginnocuousobjectssuchasacellphone,wallet,orasodacan.51Askedto makeadecisionwhethertoshootornotshoot,bothpoliceofficersandciviliansinthese gamestooklongertoactontheimagesofblackpeoplewithinnocuousobjectsandofwhite peoplewithguns,andtheywerefastertorespondtoblackpeoplewithgunsandtowhite peopleholdinginnocuousobjects.Inotherwords,theyshotanarmedtargetmore
46Goff&Dovidioreportpg.1(AppendixF)(emphasisinoriginal).
ThreateningIndividualsJournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2002,Vol.83,No.6,13141329,1315. 48See:JenniferEberhardt,etal.,SeeingBlack:Race,CrimeandVisualProcessing,inJournalofPersonality andSocialPsychology,2004,Vol.87,No.6,876893,876. 49Goff&Dovidioreportpg.3(AppendixF). 50See:JoshuaCorrell,etal.,AcrosstheThinBlueLine:PoliceOfficersandRacialBiasintheDecisionto ShootinJournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology,2007,Vol.92,No.6,10061023. 51Drs.GoffandDovidioexplainthat[r]esearchinthisfieldtendstohaveparticipantsplayacomputer simulationgamewhereintheyhavetodecidewhetherornottoshootarmedorunarmedtargetstheyare supposedtoshootthearmedtargets,butnottheunarmedtargets.Participantsareplacedunderstrenuous timeconstraintstomaketheirdecisionsinanefforttomimicrealworldcriticalincidents.Researchersthen varytheraceofthearmedandunarmedtargetssothateachindividualmakesdecisionsaboutwhetherornot toshootarmedandunarmedBlackandWhitetargets.Goff&Dovidioreportpg.1(AppendixF).
47SeeJoshuaCorrell,etal.,ThePoliceOfficersDilemma:UsingEthnicitytoDisambiguatePotentially
P a g e |40
quicklyifhewasAfricanAmericanthanifhewaswhite;andtheydeclinedtoshootan unarmedtargetmorequicklyifhewaswhitethanifhewasAfricanAmerican. Ontheimportantissueofaccuracyofdistinguishinglethalfrominnocentobjects,police officersdobetterthanciviliansinthesetests.Veteranpoliceofficerstestedinthisresearch donotshowthetypicalbiasofshootingunarmedBlacksuspectsmoreoftenthanunarmed Whitesuspects.Despiteshowingbiasinreactiontimes,thepoliceofficersmadetheir decisionsmoreaccuratelythancivilians.Theseresultssuggestthatpolicetrainingand experiencemightreducetheeffectsofracialstereotypesandthatpoliceofficerscouldbe trainedtofurthercounteractracialstereotypes. InpartialresponsetothetragicdeathofOfficerOmarEdwards,theNewYorkCityPolice DepartmenthasretainedDr.Correlltotakethisresearchfurther.Dr.Correllisnow overseeinganexperimentalprogramusingcomputersimulationstotestallNYPDrecruits whoenteredthepoliceacademyinJuly2009forimplicitracialbiasinshoot/dontshoot decisions,particularlyunderhighstressconditions.Therecruitsaretestedatadmission, againattheendoftheirtraining,andagainoncetheyareinthefield.Dr.Correllandthe NYPDhopetodeterminewhetherandtowhatextentbasicpolicetraininghasaffectedthe recruitsdecisionmakingprocessesinshoot/dontshootsituations.Iftheresearchcan determinewhatamountandintensityoftrainingreducesracialbiasinofficers,the Departmentshouldbeabletousetheresultstoimproveinstructionforallofficers. Untilnow,researchonimplicitbiashasbeenconfinedtolaboratorysettings,butwehope thefieldtestingnowunderwayinNewYorkCityencouragesotherdepartmentsto experimentwithsimilarprogramsoftestingandtraining.
InformationGapsonPoliceonPoliceShootingsandConfrontations
Weknowlittleaboutsomanyoftheseshootingsandconfrontationsbecausesolittle informationisreleasedlocallyorcollectednationally.Mostsmallandmidsizedpolice departmentshaveneverexperiencedafatalshootingofthiskindanddonotregardthe nonfatalconfrontationsasahighpriorityforattention.Yetthecollectionofevenbasic informationonthemostseriousincidentscouldcontributesignificantlytoofficersafety andpublicsafetymoregenerally,aswellastohelpingpoliceorganizationsdealwiththe growingdiversityintheirranks. TheFBIsdatabaseofLawEnforcementOfficersKilledandAssaulted(LEOKA)istheclosest thingtoanationalrepository,butitsinformationisincompleteanditdoesnotfocuson mistakenidentityshootings.PartoftheFBIsUniformCrimeReporting(UCR)Program, LEOKAcollectsdetailedinformationoninthelineofdutydeathsoflawenforcement officers,bothfeloniousandaccidental,aswellasgunandknifeassaultsthatcauseinjuryto lawenforcementofficers. YetLEOKAhasseverallimitationsasasourceofinformationaboutmistakenidentity, policeonpoliceshootings.First,LEOKAdoesnotspecificallyidentifymistakenidentity policeonpoliceshootingdeathswithinthebroadercategoryofaccidentaldeaths
P a g e |41
resultingfromcrossfires,mistakenforoffenderincidents,[and]mishaps.52Second,as withparticipationintheUCRprogramingeneral,submissionofLEOKAreportsispurely voluntary.53Ourownsearchofmediareportsandconversationswithpolicepractitioners surfacedatleastthreefatalincidentsbetween1981and2007thatwerenotcapturedin LEOKAreports,eitherbecauseinformationwasnotsubmittedorbecausetheincidentsdid notmeetLEOKAscriteriaforinclusioninthedatabase.54Theremaybeothers.Third,the LEOKAdatabasedoesnotincludenonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsbecausethese incidentsbydefinitioninvolveneitherdeathsnorfeloniousassaultsonpoliceofficers.And nonfatalshootingsgenerallydrawlessmediaattention,makingthemmoredifficulttofind ingeneralsearchesofonlinenews. EvenwithinNewYorkState,noagencyorofficecollectsstatewideinformationonfatal(or nonfatal)policeonpoliceshootings.TheNewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJustice Services(DCJS)doescollectUCRdata;buttheUCRprogram(includingLEOKA),doesnot requirealevelofreportingthatallowsonetoidentifypoliceonpoliceshootings.Whenwe beganourinquiry,DCJSsimplydidnotknowhowmanyshootingsofthiskind,fatalornon fatal,hadoccurredinNewYorkStateoverthelastdecade. WedonotmeantocriticizeDCJSortheFBIsUCRorLEOKAprograms.Theseagenciesand theprogramsthattheyoperatearesimplydoingwhattheyhavetheauthorityandmandate todo.Withtheproperauthorityandresourcestocollectexpandedtypesofinformation, theycouldprovideveryusefulanalysisandunderstandingofbothfatalandnonfatal policeonpoliceshootingsandconfrontations.
describesthefatality,including:shooting,automobile,motorcycle,struckbyvehicle,aircraft,andother(fall, fire,drowning,etc).Accidentalshootingdeathsarecapturedinthreedistinctcategories:(1)training mishaps;(2)selfinflicted,weaponcleaningmishapornotapparentorconfirmedsuicide;and(3) crossfires,mistakenforoffender,mishap.Thethirdcategoryissomewhatofacatchallcategory;it combinesincidentsinwhichdeathsresultedfromacrossfiresituationandthoseinwhichthevictimofficer wasmistakenforasuspectbyanotherpoliceofficer.Withinthiscategory,themistakenidentityshooting deathscanonlybeidentifiedbyreviewingtheindividualnarrativesaccompanyingeachindividualreport filedbylocalpolicedepartments,andinsomecasesthereislittleinformationinthosenarratives. 53ThereportingprocessusedbytheUCRProgramtogatherLEOKAinformationinvolvestwosteps.First, participatinglawenforcementagenciessubmitamonthlytallytotheStateUCRprogramlistingthenumber andtypeofofficerdeathsand/ornonfatalassaultswithinjury,ifany.Inturn,theStateUCRprogramnotifies theFBIsLEOKAprogram,whichissuesaneightpagequestionnaire(FBIform1701)tothevictimofficers agencyforcompletion.Inpractice,however,itismorecommonthatanFBIFieldOfficepromptstheissuance oftheLEOKAquestionnairebydirectlynotifyingtheFBIUCRprogramofanofficerdeathorassaultinany stateorlocalagencywithinitsgeographicarea.Wewereunabletoobtaininformationabouttheresponse ratetothesequestionnaires,butLEOKAdidreportthatatleastonequestionnaireregardingafairlyrecent incidentthatmayhavebeenafatal,mistakenidentity,possiblepoliceonpoliceshootinghasnotbeen returnedbythepolicedepartmentinvolved. 54ThestrictcriteriaforinclusionofcasesintheLEOKAdatabasesometimesexcludecasesthatwould normallybeconsideredmistakenidentity,policeonpoliceshootings.Forexample,theshootingsofOfficers JamesL.GordonandEricHernandezwereexcludedbecauseitwasnotclearatthetimewhethertheofficers haddiedinthelineofduty.AndNehemiahPickensstatusasareservedeputyconstablewithoutarrest powersautomaticallyexcludedhimfrominclusionintheLEOKAdatabase.
52LEOKAclassifiesallreportedaccidentaldeathsofpoliceofficersaccordingtothecircumstancethat
P a g e |42
3.
TheRoleofTraining
Consideringthemyriadfederal,state,county,andlocallawenforcementofficersworking incivilianclothesorcarryingafirearmoffduty,thepotentialformistakenidentity confrontationsisenormous.InNewYorkStatealone,thereare571individualpolice departments,ranginginsizefromfewerthanfiveswornofficerstoover35,000inthe NYPD.Collectively,theselawenforcementagenciesemployover69,000sworn personnel.55
Figure3.1LawEnforcementAgenciesandPoliceOfficers,byTypeofAgency TypeofAgency Municipal NYPD CountySheriffs'Offices NYStatePolice OtherStateLawEnforcement OtherLawEnforcement TotalAgenciesandOfficers Agencies
#
PoliceOfficers
# %
450 1 57 1 4 58 571
19,674 35,844 4093 4851 1448 3449 69,359
28.4% 51.7% 5.9% 7.0% 2.1% 5.0% 100%
Ifevenasmallfractionoftheconfrontationsamongtheseofficerscouldbecapturedand understood,theknowledgecouldproveatreasuretroveoflessonsabouthowtoprevent moreoftheseconfrontationsinthefirstplaceandhowtodeescalatethosethatdooccur. Moreover,someofthesameinformationmighthelppolicedepartmentsdeveloptrainingto deescalatepoliceencounterswithciviliansaswell. Trainingholdsparticularpromiseinreducingpoliceonpoliceshootingspreciselybecause itispossibletotrainbothpartiesintheconfrontation.Policerecruitsandveteranpolice officersalikecanbetrainedtoanticipatesuchconfrontationsandlearntheappropriate responsesforboththechallengingandtheconfrontedofficers.Unfortunately,suchtraining hasonlybeeninstitutedstatewideinNewYorkStateinrecentyears,andisonlyrequired forofficersatthestartoftheircareers. Inanefforttoidentifyexistingtrainingprogramsthataddressconfrontationsituations,and tocollectotherrelevantdataandinformation,theTaskForce: reviewedtrainingmandatescurrentlyinplaceinNewYorkStatethroughthe MunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncilandtheStateAccreditationProgram; examinedcurrenttrainingofferedbytheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandthe NewYorkStatePolice;
55TotalsbasedonswornpoliceofficerslistedontheNYStatePoliceOfficerRegistryasofMarch17,2010.
P a g e |43
collectedtrainingofferedinselectedjurisdictionsnationally;and elicitedopinionsonthebestpracticesandrecommendationsfrompoliceofficers expertsinpolicetraining.
TraininginNewYorkStateonPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
ThroughtheMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil(MPTC),NewYorkStateregulateslaw enforcementagenciesandensuresminimumpropertrainingoftheirofficers.Createdbya 1959statelaw,theMPTCsauthorityislimitedtomostmunicipallawenforcement agencies.TheNYPD,NewYorkStatePolice,DistrictAttorneyOfficeinvestigators,and officersfromtherailroadpoliceandotherstateagenciesarenotgovernedbyMPTC regulations,althoughsomecomplyvoluntarilyaspartofthestateslawenforcement agencyaccreditationprogram.Thus,theMPTCsguidelinesdonotreachthemajorityof swornlawenforcementofficersintheState. TheMPTCisobligatedtorecommendtotheGovernorminimumrequirementsforbasic andsupervisorytraining.Itisalsoresponsibleformakingrecommendationsregarding policetrainingschools,instructorqualifications,andcategoriesofinservicetraining.56 Onceimplemented,theserulesandregulationscarrytheforceoflaw. TheMPTCmandatestwocoursesforpoliceofficersinNewYorkState:theBasicCoursefor PoliceOfficersandtheCourseinPoliceSupervision.Thesecoursesaredesignedforpolice recruitsandfirsttimePoliceSupervisorsandeachisgenerallytakenonlyonce.TheBasic CourseforPoliceOfficerscurrentlyconsistsof639hoursofinstruction,whichincludes bothclassroomandfieldtrainingcomponents.TheCourseinPoliceSupervisionconsistsof atleast105hoursofinstructionincludingtheroleofasupervisor,legalissues,incident management,communityrelations,andmore. NewYorkwasthefirststateinthecountrytoestablishbasictrainingfornewlyappointed policeofficers.57Thepoliceacademiesandtheirdirectorsarerequiredbyregulationto meetorexceedtheminimumstandardsestablishedbytheMPTC.However,theMPTC encouragesschoolstoexceedtheminimumstandardsbyaddingtimeandobjectivesfor existingunitsandaddingnewtopics.Manypolicedepartmentsrequiremorethanthe
56SeeNewYorkExecutiveLaw83940.TheMPTChaseightmembers:threeareappointedbythe
Governor;twoarenominatedbytheNewYorkStateSheriffsAssociationandmusthavespecialized experienceinpolicetraining;twoarenominatedbytheNewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPoliceand mustalsohavespecializedexperienceinpolicetraining;andoneistheCommissioneroftheNYPD,orhis delegate.Currently,theCounciliscomprisedof:thePublicSafetyCommissionerofWestchesterCounty;the SuperintendentoftheNewYorkStatePolice;theNYPDDeputyCommissionerforTraining;theFBIAssistant DirectorinChargeoftheNewYorkOffice;theMonroeandYatesCountySheriffsandthePoliceChiefsofthe CityofMechanicvilleandtheVillageofBath.TheNewYorkStateDivisionofCriminalJustice(DCJS),Officeof PublicSafety,servesasthestaffingarmoftheMPTC,coordinatingitsresearchanddevelopmentof curriculum,andassemblingworkinggroupsofsubjectmatterexpertstoconstructandrevisecourses.DCJSis alsoresponsibleforassistingtheMPTCintheplanningandevaluationofbasicandinservicetrainingcourses andtoensurethatpractitionersmeettheminimumstandards. 57SeeDCJS,BasicPoliceTraining,History,http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ops/training/bcpo/index.htm.
P a g e |44
minimumand,onaverage,departmentsinNewYorkStaterequire800hourstograduate fromapoliceacademy.TheMPTCregularlyexaminesthecoursestodeterminewhether additionaltopicsshouldbeaddedorwhetherexistingcoursesshouldberevised.Sincethe early1980s,theBasicCourseforPoliceOfficershasgrownbyover200hours. IntheaftermathofthedeathofOfficerChristopherRidley,theWestchesterCounty DepartmentofPublicSafetyconvenedadiversepaneloflawenforcementpractitioners, academicians,andcommunityleaderstoconductacomprehensivereviewofalluseof forcetrainingconductedattheWestchesterpoliceacademy.Amongits64 recommendations,thepanelurgedthatNewYorkState,throughtheMPTC,developand distributeasingleprotocoltobeusedbyallpolicedepartmentsinthestatefortheproper handlingofoffdutyconfrontations,andthatthisprotocolbeincorporatedintothebasic entrylevelrecruittrainingcurriculum.InSeptember2008,MPTCmembersrevieweda twohourcoursetitledOffDutyandPlainClothesPoliceEncounterspreparedforthem bytheDivisionofCriminalJusticeServices.TheMPTCapprovedthistrainingasaminimum standardoftrainingforallrecruits,andapproveditforuseduringoptionalinservice training.OnNovember5th,2008,GovernorPatersonacceptedtheMPTCs recommendationandatwohourtrainingblockonoffdutyandplainclothesconfrontations wasaddedtotheentryleveltrainingcurriculumstatewide. NotalloftheWestchesterpanelsrecommendationshavebeensopromptlyimplemented. Forexample,thepanelrecommendedthatconfrontationtrainingshouldbeinteractive, handson,andentailtheuseofliveactors,roleplaying,wellscriptedscenariosand simulationsorsomeothertechnologytoplacethestudentofficerinasrealisticasettingas possible,andfurtherthat[a]llofficerswhoundergothistrainingmustbecompelledto participateasboththeconfrontingandtheconfrontedofficer.Althoughsometraining academiesarestrivingforthislivescenariobasedtraining,therecommendationhasnot beenadoptedstatewide.58 Severalofficerswhocontactedusindicatedthattheyfeltthattheirinitialacademytraining wassufficient,butfeltthat,onceinthefield,officersdidnotalwaysactastheywere trained.Inthewordsofoneofficer,thetrainingdidnotalwaysstick.Onewaytoaddress thisproblemwouldbeunderscoreimportanttacticalconsiderationsperiodicallythrough inserviceorrefreshertraining.However,theMPTCdoesnothavestatutoryauthorityto requireinservicetraining.Itsmandateiscurrentlylimitedtorecommending requirementsforbasictraining,initialsupervisortrainingandvoluntarystandardsfor accreditation.59 Evenwithoutastatewiderequirement,mostofthestateslargerpolicedepartmentsdo ensurethattheirofficersattendsomeformofinservicetraining,andforthosethat
58Currently,separatepanelsaredevelopingcurriculumforthebasiccourseintheareasofDomesticViolence, HateCrimesandCulturalDiversity.Atarecentmeeting,theMPTCdirectedtheformationofapanelto evaluateandupdatetheCourseforPoliceSupervision.Additionally,acurriculumwasdevelopedin2009for aninservicetrainingonStreetEncounters,ConductiveEnergyDevices(commonlyreferredtoastasers), PropertyEvidenceRoomManagementandaCrimeAnalystCertificationprogram. 59SeeNewYorkExecutiveLaw840.
P a g e |45
participateinthestateaccreditationprogram,aminimumof21hoursofinservicetraining isrequiredforeachofficerannually,includinguseoffirearms,legalupdates,areviewof thelawregardinguseofforceandtheuseofdeadlyforce.60Still,thetopicsofinstruction andamountoftimededicatedtoinservicetrainingvarywidelyinbothaccreditedand nonaccreditedagencies.LargerpolicedepartmentssuchastheNYPDtypicallyrelyonan inhousetrainingunit,whilesmallerdepartmentsemployadesignatedtrainingofficeror relyonaregionalacademy.Asaresult,thetraininglackscentralizedthemesandthereis nomechanismtoidentifyprioritiesforstatewideattention. Thevariationintrainingwasillustratedamongtheofficerswhocompletedour questionnaire.Approximatelyfortypercentofthemreportedthattheyhadreceivedsome typeoftrainingonpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsduringbasicpolicetraining,anda similarpercentagesaidtheyhadreceivedadvancedorinservicetraining.Themost commonformsofinstructionwerelectures,classroomdiscussion,androleplaying exercises.Theleastcommonwerescenariobasedinstructionanduseofcasestudies.In termsofactualcontent,theadmonitionstheyrecalledbestwereforofficerstocomplywith thechallengingofficerscommandsandtheimportanceofidentifyingoneselfasanofficer. Theleastcommonlyreportedinstructionswere(a)tobeagoodwitnessratherthan intervening,(b)contactdispatchbeforeenteringacrimescene,(c)usespecialized languagethatotherlawenforcementofficerswouldrecognize,(d)keephandsvisible,and (e)neverturntowardsthechallengingofficers.TheanswersfromtheNewYorkState officerswhofilledoutthequestionnairewerenotnoticeablydifferentfromtheothersin theserespects. ManypoliceexecutivesfromNewYorkStatebelieveitistimetostrengtheninservice trainingwithgreaterrigorandstandardization.DemosthenesLong,theformerFirst DeputyPoliceCommissionerandUndersheriffoftheWestchesterDepartmentofPublic SafetyandtheformerCommandingOfficeroftheNewYorkCityPoliceAcademy,explained persuasivelyatourfinalpublichearing: Ibelievetheareaofinservicetrainingisripeforstatereview.Ibelievethere arecoretrainingareasthatlendthemselvestoacentralizedtrainingmodel. Centralizedtrainingensuresuniformityandconsistencyinthematerial delivered.IwouldasktheMPTC,withtheassistanceoftheTraining DirectorsAssociationandotherstakeholders,toidentifycoresubjectareas, suchasfirearmsandtacticaltraining,legalupdates,domesticviolence protocols,CPRandfirstaidrefreshercourses,todeveloplessonplansand associatedteachingaidsandprovidethemtoregionaltrainingandother academies,andrequirethatthesecoursesbecompletedattheregional
60TherecentlycreatedStateAccreditationCounciloverseestheaccreditationprocess,whichrequires participatingagenciestomeetaseriesof132professionalstandardsintheareasofoperations, administrationandtraining.Accreditationstandard33.1requiresthatallswornpersonnelreceiveatleast21 hoursofinservicetrainingannuallyforeachofficer.Whiletheaccreditationprogramnowboaststhe participationof130agenciesaroundthestate,thisprogramispurelyvoluntary.Becausemanyagenciesfind itdifficulttosatisfyalloftheprogramsmandates,agenciesarefrequentlydroppedfromthelistofthose accredited.Asofthiswriting,fewerthanhalfoftheswornofficersworkingindepartmentsoutsideofNew YorkCityworkinaccreditedagencies.
P a g e |46
trainingfacility....WhatIamsuggestingisthatshouldyourinquiryidentify trainingdeficiencies,theremustbeameanstoinsuretherequisiteremedial trainingisdevelopedandalllawenforcementagenciesundertheauspicesof MPTCarerequiredtocompletethistraining. Allofourwitnessesfromwithinlawenforcementsharedthisconsensusview favoringuniformtrainingandanexpansionofthecurrenttwohourmandatefor confrontationtrainingwithpolicerecruitsonly.WilliamKilfoil,Presidentofthe NewYorkStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice,saidheissurethatrecruitandin servicetrainingprograms...willservetohelppreventdeadlypoliceonpolice confrontations.AllpoliceagenciesthroughoutNewYorkStateshouldbeconducting themaspartoftheirongoingtraining.CharlesWilson,nationalchairmanof NABEO,similarlysaid,Trainingregimensmustbechanged.Notonlymustofficers betaughtpropermethodsforrecognitionandresponse,itmustbecontinuously reinforced.LarryBrown,representingtheWestchesterRocklandGuardians Association,explained,Providingamere2hourblockofinstructionduringtheir recruittraining,regardlessofitsconfiguration,doesnot,norcaniteverproperly prepareBlackorWhiteofficersfortheseinteractions.JohnBilich,Deputy CommissionerofDCJS,emphasizedthatitiscriticalthatofficersbetrained repetitivelyinscenariobased,lifelikesettingsregardingshootanddontshoot scenariossothattheyarecognizantthattheremayalwaysbethepossibilitythat anystreetencounterwithanarmedindividualmayinvolveaplainclothes, undercoveroroffdutyofficerregardlessofrace.Mistakeshappenthesemistakes needtohappenintraining.Perhapsmostimportant,MichaelHagan,presidentof theWestchesterPBA,focusedontheimportanceofuniformtrainingthroughouta region: [W]emustinsistonstandardizedtrainingthroughoutthestate.Westchester Countyalonehasover40jurisdictions,ifeachofthesejurisdictionshaseven minordifferencesintrainingandtacticsinvolvingoffdutyorplainclothes confrontationsitrendersallofthetrainingineffective.Thetrainingneedsto beconsistent....Therehasalreadybeenmuchworkdoneonimproving training,thebiggerchallengeistohavethePoliceCommunityadoptone consistentpolicythatisuniversallyacceptedandpromoted. Atastatelevel,thereisnorequiredtrainingonanysubjectformiddlemanagers(e.g., lieutenantsandcaptains)ornewlypromotedpolicechiefsorexecutives.TheMPTC mandatedsupervisorytrainingprogramisonlyfornewlypromotedfirstlinesupervisors, suchassergeants.Yetitispreciselythelieutenants,captains,assistantanddeputychiefs, aswellaspolicechiefsandcommissionerswhomustguideadepartmentandits communitythroughthetraumasthatanyuseofforceentails,especiallywhentheuseof forceismixedwithissuesofrace.Thesearethesamepolicemanagerswhomustleadtheir unitsandorganizationsastheyandtheircommunitiesbecomeevenmorediverseand stretchtoreducetheinfluenceofracialandethnicstereotypesinallaspectsofpolicing. Thisrequirestraining,yetonlytheNYPDinNewYorkStateprovidesacomprehensiveand
P a g e |47
rigorousprogramoftrainingforofficersastheyrisethroughthesemiddleandseniorranks ofincreasingmanagerialresponsibilityandleadershipdemands. UnderstandingthechallengeandpotentialofpolicetrainingonthisoranyissueinNew YorkStaterequiresseparateconsiderationoftheNYPD.TheNYPD(usingitsownpolice trainingacademy)providesfarmoretrainingateverylevelthanthestaterequiresandit employsmorethanhalfoftheswornofficersinthestate.Inaddition,theNYPDsapproach illustrateshowtrainingcanbeintegratedintothecareerofeverypoliceofficerandintothe cultureofanorganization. TheNYPDsbasictrainingfornewrecruitsexceedstheMPTCsminimumhours requirementsbynearly250hours.NYPDrecruitsreceived97hoursoffirearms training,includingoffdutyincidentsandconfrontationscenarios.Thedepartments recentlyadoptedAdvancedTacticalFirearmsTrainingCourseplacesrecruitsin highstressscenariosdesignedtosimulatesituationsthattheymayencounter whileonpatrol. TheNYPDrequiresalluniformedofficerstoundergofirearmsrequalificationtwice annually,consistingofeighthoursofclassroomtrainingonconfrontationsituations andtheappropriateuseoffirearms.Inaddition,theNYPDrequiresofficersand detectivesannuallytocompleteitsinservice,scenariobasedInTaccourse. Changesofassignmentoftenentailtraining.Officersmovingintoplainclothes assignmentsreceiveafourdaytrainingcourseincludinginstructiononpersonal weapons,arrestmechanics,teamtactics,grappling,weaponretention/disarming, escapetechniques,tacticalhandcuffing,andlegalissues.Newlypromotedsergeants andlieutenantsreceivetheNYPDsBasicLeadershipCourseandAdvanced LeadershipCourse,respectively,eachofwhichincludesinstructionontheuseof force,lesslethalalternatives,andtacticalsupervision. Anarrayoffurthertrainingisavailableforcaptainsastheyriseintomore responsibleleadershippositionsinthedepartment.
Thedesignoftraininginanypoliceorganizationshouldalwaysbeaworkinprogressand anassessmentofthestrengthsandweaknessesoftheNYPDtrainingprogramiswell beyondthescopeofourreview.WeareencouragedthattheNYPDhasalreadymade improvementstoitstrainingspecificallyinresponsetotheshootingdeathofOfficerOmar Edwards,andwetrustthatthiscommitmenttocontinuousimprovementoftrainingon policeonpoliceconfrontationsandunconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshootdecisions willcontinue.TheNYPDsnewpoliceacademyshouldsoonpermitthedepartmentto furtherincreaseitsuseofscenariobased,simulationtrainingonconfrontationsituations.
TheContentandMethodofConfrontationTraining
TrainingforOutofUniformOfficersandConfrontedOfficers
Beforeapoliceonpoliceconfrontationbegins,typicallyanoutofuniformofficermakesa decisiontotakepoliceaction,andoftenalsodecidestodisplayaweapon.Trainingonthe decisionwhenandhowtotakepoliceactionoutofuniformisthefirststepinavoiding

ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings P a g e |48
policeonpoliceshootings,yettrainingonthissubjectisimpossiblewithanyrigorifitis notconsistentwithstandardpoliciesandpractices.Itturnsout,however,thatthesevary acrosspoliceagenciesandseveralmajorpoliceagenciesinNewYorkStatehavenopolicy atall.Ofthe30midsizedtolargepoliceagenciesparticipatingintheDCJSsurvey,11 indicatedhavingnospecificpoliciesorproceduresthatregulatewhenandhowoffduty officersshouldinterveneinongoingcriminalactivity,andfiveoftheNYSACOPagencies indicatedinfollowupinterviewsthattheyalsohadnopoliciesinplace. Trainingwithintheframeworkofconsistentpoliciesisimperative,anditshouldbe repeatedregularlyforofficerswhochoosetocarryaweaponoffduty.Wehavealready notedtheinconsistencyacrossjurisdictionsevenacrosssubstantialpoliceagencies withinNewYorkStateonwhetheroffdutyofficersarerequiredormerelypermittedto carrytheirweaponsoffduty.Thosedepartmentsthatarefollowingthecurrenttrendto permitratherthanrequireoffdutycarrying,alsohaveanopportunitytorequireannual trainingonoffdutyuseoftheweapon. Policeexecutives,trainers,andtacticalexpertsareremarkablyconsistentintheirviewson theappropriatecontentoftrainingforofficerswhocouldbetemptedtotakepoliceaction outofuniform,whetheroffdutyorworkingplainclothesorundercover.Thebroad consensuscanbesummarizedinfourruleswhenconsideringintervention,andfourrules whenactuallychallengedbyanotherofficer.61 Thefourruleswhenconsideringinterventionare: 1. Donottakeenforcementactionoutofuniformifthereisanyalternative.Call911or usearadiotosummonuniformedofficers.Serveasagoodwitnessratherthan interveningunlesssomeoneslifeorpersonalsafetyisatstake. 2. Ifyoumustinterveneortakepoliceaction,call911oruseapoliceradiotoalert otherpoliceunitstoyourpresence,includingyourphysicaldescription,thatyouare armed,andthatyouareinplainclothes. 3. Displayyourbadgeprominentlywhenengagedinenforcementaction,especially whenyourweaponisdrawnandvisible,andkeepthebadgeclosetothefirearm. 4. Communicatefrequentlyyouridentityasapoliceofficerinaloudandclearvoice. Thefourruleswhenconfrontedare: 1. Whenyouhearthecommand,Police!Dontmove!assumethecommandis addressedtoYOU,notjustthesuspectyouarepursuing.Lockyourselfinposition. Dontmove.
61WederivedthisparticularversionoftheappropriatecontentfromthetestimonyofDeputyChiefWilliamG. BrooksIIIoftheWellesley,MassachusettsPoliceDepartment,whoappearedatourpublichearinginHarlem onDecember3,2009.InadditiontoChiefBrooksotherduties,hehasbeenapoliceacademyinstructorfor overtwentyyears.Hisviewsandrecommendationswereechoedbymanyoftheexpertwitnessesand advisorsweconsulted,andcontradictedbynone.
P a g e |49
2. Resistreflexivespin,thenaturaltendencytoturntowardsthevoicethatis confrontingyou,aseventheturnofyourheadmaybegintobringyourweapon aroundcausingtheconfrontingofficertofeelthreatened. 3. Useyourvoicetoidentifyyourselfloudlyandclearlyasapoliceofficer. 4. Obeythecommandsofthechallengingofficer,includingacommandtodropyour weapon,anddonotmakeanymovementwithoutthepermissionofthechallenging officer;regardlessofyourrankorposition,theuniformedofficerisincommand. Theserulesthemselvesareneithercomplicatednorcontroversial;thedifficultyisthatthey instructpoliceofficerstoactinwayscontrarytotheirmostfamiliarpatterns.Forexample, whileitwasoncecommonforpoliceofficerstobeconsideredalwaysonduty,todays policeleadersoftendiscourageoffdutyofficersfromgettinginvolvedinincidentsunless theydeemitnecessarytoprotectlife.62Policiesvarywidelyabouttheprotectionof property.Yet,manypoliceofficerstoldusthatpartoftheirpersonalitiesandtheir identitiesaspoliceofficersisthetendencytointervenewhenanycrimeisbeingcommitted infrontofthem.Policeofficers,asageneralrule,getinvolved.Sothetrainingtoserveasa witnessratherthanaherowhenoffdutyorinplainclothesisdifficulttofollowinpractice. Similarly,whenanofficerisconfrontedandorderedtodrophisorherweapon,ones inclinationistoholdontotheweaponandtopersuadetheconfrontingofficerofyour identity.Itisonethingtotrainaconfrontedofficertoobeythecommandsofthe challengingofficer,butitisanotherthingaltogetherfortheconfrontedofficertofollow thattrainingintheheatofthemoment.Thisiswhysomanyoftherecommendations abouttrainingonthissubjectconcernthemethodoftrainingratherthanjustthecontent. Inresponsetoourquestionnaire,manycurrentandformerlawenforcementofficersin NewYorkStateindicatedthattheyhadundergoneconfrontationtraininginbasicpolice trainingorininservicetraining.Butmostofthemweretrainedonlythroughlectures, printedmaterials,andvideos.Whilethesemethodsmaysatisfysometraining requirements,theyarefarlesseffectivethansimulations,roleplaying,andinteractive, scenariobasedexercises.Thereissimplynosubstituteforthesescenariobasedexercises, bothduringbasicandinservicetraining,whichsimulatehighpressuresituations.
TrainingforChallengingOfficers
Trainingforchallengingofficersisequallyimportant.Whilemostpolicedepartment protocolsplacetheonusfordefusingconfrontationsontheconfrontedofficer,thebest trainingweencounteredemphasizedequallythelessonsforchallengingofficers.AnNYPD trainingvideo,forexample,revisedaftertheshootingdeathofOfficerEdwardsandnow beingrevisedfurther,providesanexcellentexampleoftheapproachtotrainingthatcould benefitallofficersandsavelives,particularlywhencombinedwithscenariobased training.63Itsmessagesforchallengingofficersaredirectandwellexplainedbyfrontline officers:
62Theconsensusonthispointisimpressive.Forexample,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice
(IACP)recommendsthatoffdutyofficerswhowitnessacrimecallforassistanceratherthanpullinga weapon. 63NYPDPoliceAcademy,VideoProductionUnit,PreventingFriendlyFire,versionofJune1,2009.
P a g e |50
1. Recognizethatapersonwhoappearstoyoutolooklikeacriminalsuspectmay wellbeapoliceofficer.Asoneoftheplainclothesofficersinthevideoexplains: Youshouldntgooutandrightawaysay,Thatpersonsaperp,thatpersonsa perp,causetheresnosuchthingasapersonlookinglikeaperp.Justbecauseyou workinanurbanarea,thatdoesntmeanthateveryblackpersonyouseeisaperp. 2. Takecover.Onceyougetcover,youcantakealittletimetoestablishwhothe personisyoureconfronting.Iftheysaytheyreapoliceofficer,youcanorderthem toshowtheirshieldslow,toputtheirgundown,andsoon.Coverbuysyoutime itgivesyouthoseextracoupleofsecondsforanidentificationprocesstooccur. 3. Shout,Police!DontMove! 4. Broadenyourfocusfromthegun.Focusingonlyonthegunisanaturalfirst response,buttrainingteachesofficerstolisten,look,andanalyzeawidearrayof cluestounderstandthesituationquickly.Thatincludesknowingthecolorofthe day.
Thesebasicrulesareanexcellentstartingpoint,buttheycanbesupplementedwith additionaltrainingforchallengingofficers.Forexample,TaskForceadvisorWilliamGeller arguesthatpoliceofficersshouldcollectasmuchaccurateinformationaspossiblebothin anticipationof,andduring,aconfrontationsituation.Inthemoment,thisincludesengaging indialogueandexchange,sizingupthesituationthroughclearverbalcommunicationand commands.Dr.Gellerencouragespolicedepartmentstoenhancetheirsystemsfor communicatingfullandaccurateinformationtoofficers,suchaschecklistsfor911 operatorsanddispatcherstocollectandconveythebestphysicaldescriptionspossibleof offduty,plainclothes,andundercoverofficerswhomaybeonthescene,aswellas similarlyaccuratedescriptionsofcriminalsuspects. Scenariotrainingisjustasimportantforconfrontingofficersasitisforthosewhoare confronted,andyetitremainstheexceptionintraining.Mostofficersnationwideundergo mandatoryfirearmsrequalificationtodemonstrateproficiencywithfirearmssafetyandto practicehowtoshoot,butnotenoughtrainingisgearedtowardmakingtheshoot/dont shootdecisionandtohandlingthedifficultanddangeroussituationsthatmanyofficers inevitablyencounter.AsTaskForceadvisorDr.WilliamLewinskidescribesit: Mostofourfirearmstrainingbeginswithclassroominstructiononthe applicationoflawandpolicytoforceanddeadlyforcesituation.Thenext leveloftrainingisonthemanipulationofthetoolswhetherthatbea handgunoranotherinstrumentofforce.Fewdepartmentsthengoonto spendconsiderabletimeontherecognitionofpatternsofbehaviorandthe strategyandtacticsofforceanddeadlyforceencounters.64
64Lewinskireportpg.6(AppendixF).
P a g e |51
Weappreciatethedifficultyoftraininginthedifficultzonewheretheuseofdeadlyforce wouldbejustifiedbutmistaken.Considerthefollowingrealexample,describedforusby retiredpoliceexecutiveHenryDeGeneste: Inthelate60s/early70s,wegotacallofsomeonebreakingintocarsina garage.Isawashadowandduckedimmediatelybehindacartotakecover. ThenIsawaflashthatlookedlikeagun;itturnedouttobeaSaturdayNight Special.Itoldthekid.Imacop,dropthegun.Ifyoudontdropthegun youregonnagetshot.Hedroppedthegun.Somecopsworkingforme wouldhavetakentheshotanditwouldhavetechnicallybeenjustified.65 Tomostpeople,thisisastoryofpolicingatitsbest:experience,confidence,andjudgment comingtogetherinthemindofaveteranofficer,sparingthelifeofaboywhomaless courageousofficermighthavekilled.Yetmuchpolicetrainingisfocusedonscenarios wherehesitationcancostofficerstheirlives.Sometrainerswouldworrythatanytraining thatencourageshesitationcompromisesofficersafety.Onlyexperiencecanbuildthekind ofconfidenceandcouragethatthestoryaboveconveys,butthelatestsimulatorsand interactivetrainingtechnologyaretheclosestthingtothatexperiencethatatraining programcanprovide.Forexample,afterreviewingitshistoryoffirearmsdischarges,the NYPDdesignedandimplementeditsAdvancedTacticalFirearmsTrainingCourseatwo day,realitybasedfirearmstrainingprogramthatplacesofficersinhighstressscenarios similartothosethathaveledtotragicmistakes.Thistypeofprovinggroundcangreatly enhanceanofficerstacticalskills.
TrainingforCiviliansonConfrontationswithPolice
ThisTaskForceischargedtoconsidertheimplicationsofpoliceonpoliceshootingsnot onlyforimprovingofficersafety,butalsoforimprovingthesafetyofthepublic.Sincewe concludethattheseincidentscontainlessonsthatcanimprovetrainingofpoliceofficersto deescalateaconfrontationwithotherofficers,wenowaskifthelessonsherecouldalsobe sharedwithcivilians,increasingthechancethattheytoocanlearntodeescalate confrontationswithpolice? Manypoliceandcommunityledorganizationsalreadyprovidethistypeoftraining,often gearedspecificallytowardyoungpeopleinurbanareas.Asimplesearchoftheinternetfor informationaboutpoliceencountersyieldsliterallydozensofguides,videos,andother adviceabouthowcivilianscanhandleencounterswiththepolice.Awidearrayof organizationsfromtheNationalBlackPoliceAssociationtotheAmericanCivilLiberties Unionofferadvicetociviliansregardingwhattodowhenstoppedbythepolice.66Several witnesseswhospokeatourpublichearingsendorsedthetrainingthatalreadytakesplace onavoluntarybasisinhighschoolsandcommunitycentersinsomeheavilypolicedurban
65StatementofHenryDeGeneste,January29,2010. 66SeeAmericanCivilLibertiesUnion,KnowYourRights:WhattoDoIfYou'reStoppedbythePolice(July30,
2004),http://www.aclu.org/druglawreform_immigrantsrights_prisonersrights_racialjustice/knowyour rightswhatdoifyoureandNationalBlackPoliceAssociation,WhenStoppedBythePolice:a Community/CitizenGuide,http://www.blackpolice.org/Stopped.html.
P a g e |52
communities.Forexample,theWestchesterRocklandGuardiansAssociation,an organizationofblackpoliceofficers,conductsatrainingprogramforyoungpeoplein WestchesterCountytitled,WhatToDoWhenStoppedbythePolice.Theprogram providesbasicinstructiontoyouthonhowtohandlepotentialconflictwithpoliceofficers, urgingthemnottomakeanysuddenmoves,tobehavecourteously,tokeeptheirhands visible,toavoidarguingevenwithadisrespectfulpoliceofficer,andtoaddress disrespectfulbehavioratalaterpointbyfilingaformalcomplaint.AtourWhitePlains Publichearing,formerWestchesterRocklandGuardiansPresidentLarryBrownnotedthat programssuchasthesehavebeenfoundtobehighlyinstrumentalinexplainingnotonly citizenrightsbuttheoveralllawenforcementprocess,andhaveservedasaneffectivetool incommunity/policerelationships.67 Manypeopleofcolor,includingmanypoliceofficersofcolor,toldusthattheyraisetheir childrenwiththesamelessons.Yetitseemswrongtousthatinstructionforyoungpeople onstayingsafeduringencounterswithpoliceshouldbeconcentratedincommunitiesof color.Ifsuchtrainingisvaluableandweareconvincedthatitisthenitshouldbe universal.Wedonotthinkthatyoungpeopleofcolor,particularlythosegrowingupin lowincome,urbanneighborhoods,shouldgettheimpressionthattheyneedspecial instructiononhowtohandlepoliceencountersthatarenotapplicabletotheirwhiteor wealthycounterparts.Indeed,wenotethatacrosstheUnitedStates,themostcommon involuntaryencountersciviliansexperiencewithpoliceoccurinthecontextoftrafficstops, andtheseoccurroughlyproportionatelyacrossraceandethnicity,althoughblackand Hispanicdriversaresignificantlymorelikelytobesearchedduringthosetrafficstopsthan arewhitedrivers.68Wereturntothepossibilitieshereinourrecommendations.
67TestimonyofLarryBrown,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).AlsoappearsinViewpointsof
CharlesP.WilsononbehalfoftheWestchesterCountyGuardiansAssociation,December4,2009. U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,April2007,NCJ215243, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
68SeeMatthewR.Durose,EricaL.Smith&PatrickA.Langan,ContactsBetweenthePoliceandthePublic,2005,
P a g e |53
4.
Recommendations
Wemakeninerecommendations,eachdesignedtomakearealdifferencebothindividually andaspartofacomprehensivesetofproposals,eachwithspecificimplicationsfor multipleagenciesandlevelsofgovernment.Webelievethatifpromptlyadoptedand faithfullyimplemented,theserecommendationscansavelives. Wehavedeliberatelyavoidedmakingrecommendationsthataresonumerousordetailed thattheywouldstandlittlechanceofbeingimplemented.Wearealsomindfulofthe dangerofthatnewtrainingandreportingrequirementsmaybeviewedasunfunded mandates.Forthatreason,wehaveconfinedourrecommendationstocosteffective,high impactstepsthatwebelievecansavethelivesofpoliceofficersandofcivilians. Inmakingourrecommendations,weacknowledgethecreativeanddiligentworkthatthe NYPD,theMountVernonPD,theWestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublicSafety,and otherpoliceagenciesacrossthenationhavealreadyundertakeninresponsetomistaken identity,policeonpoliceshootingsthathavestruckmembersoftheirowndepartments. Wehavetriedtospotlightthebestofthatworkinearliersectionsofthisreportandwe hopethattheireffortssucceed.Forourpart,weconcentrateonactionsthatotherscanand shouldtaketoeliminateorreducethenumbersofthesetragicpoliceonpoliceshootings andothermistakenshootingsaswell.Ourrecommendationsarethereforedirected,first, atpoliceagenciesthathavenotrecentlyexperiencedafatalshootingofthiskind;second, atthegovernmentoftheStateofNewYork;andthird,attheUnitedStatesgovernment generally,andattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeinparticular.
1.DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations
Protocolsfordefusingpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsmustbeestablishedabovethelevel ofindividuallawenforcementagencies.Withmanyofthefatalshootingsinvolvingofficers frommorethanonepoliceagency,preventingfurthertragediesrequiresthatprotocolsbe standardizedatleastatthestatelevel,ifnotnationwide. InNewYorkState,thistaskcouldbetakenupbytheMunicipalPoliceTrainingCouncil (MPTC),whichhasrepresentationfromtheNYPD,theFBI,andfromsmallandmidsized policeagenciesacrossthestate.TheMPTCneedstogofurtherthanithasgonesofar, specifyingasimple,consistentprotocolthatdoesnotleavecrucialelementstobeinvented byofficersinthemidstofthesecriticalincidents. Werecommendthatthisprotocolhavethreecomponents,eachconsistingofasetofrules: thefirstaddressedtoofficersoutofuniformwhoareconsideringtakingpoliceaction,the secondaddressedtothoseoutofuniformofficerswhoarechallengedbyanotherofficer, andthethirdaddressedtoallofficersconfrontinganarmedindividualwhomayormaynot beapoliceofficeroutofuniform.OurrecommendedprotocolappearsinFigure4.1.
P a g e |54
Mostofwhatappearsinthisprotocolisalreadywidelyrecognizedasbestpractice.Weadd oneelement,suggestedtousbyretiredNYPDDetectiveCaptainFrankA.Bolz,Jr.,to addressthefactthatconfrontedofficersarenotcurrentlyinstructedhowtoidentify themselvesverballyasgenuinepoliceofficers.Leavingittoeachindividualintheheatof themomenttocomeupwithwordsthatwouldonlybeknowntopoliceofficersistoo vagueanapproach.Ontheotherhand,specifyingtoosimplearesponsetothecommand, Police!DontMove!wouldinviteoffenderswhoarenotpoliceofficerstopretendtheyare. WethereforerecommendthatcodedlanguagealreadyusedbySWATofficersasan instructionnottofirecodesthatarenotgenerallyknownoutsideofpolicingbeapplied inthesesituationsaswell.
Figure4.1ProposedProtocolforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations ForOfficersTakingActionOutofUniform 1. 2. 3. 4. OnlyIntervenetoProtectPersonalSafetyorAnothersSafety;otherwise,beagoodwitness InformthePoliceDispatcherorcall911ifYouareTakingAction,Armed,andinPlainclothes DisplayYourShieldProminentlyPriortoTakingAction IdentifyYourselfFrequentlyandLoudlyasaPoliceOfficer
ForConfrontedOfficers 1. 2. 3. 4. DontMove AvoidReflexiveSpin IdentifyYourselfLoudlyasaPoliceOfficer,UsingSpecificCodedLanguage ObeytheCommandsoftheConfrontingOfficer
ForOfficersChallenginganArmedIndividual 1. 2. 3. 4. DontStereotype TakeCover Shoutclearlyandrepeat:Police!DontMove! BroadenYourFocusfromtheGuntoAssesstheSituation
Atanationallevel,weurgetheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetoendorsethissameprotocol, encouragingconsistencyacrossthecountry.TheU.S.Congresshasalreadybegunthe processofencouragingoffdutyofficerstravelingacrossstatelinestotakepoliceaction whennecessarythroughLEOSA.Asaresult,thefederalgovernmentcannotescape responsibilitytoassurethatoutofuniformofficersarequicklyandreliablyidentified wherevertheyareinthenation.
2.RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations
Thisisthefirstofthreerecommendationsonpolicetraining,andlikethenexttwo requiresactionatthelevelofpolicedepartments,stategovernment,andthefederal government.Trainingonconfrontationsisessentialtoavoidmoredeathsandserious
ReportoftheTaskForceonPoliceonPoliceShootings P a g e |55
injury,andthattrainingmustbeinteractiveandmustcontinuethroughoutanofficers careerandacrossallranks. InNewYorkState,thecurrenttwohourblockofconfrontationtrainingrequiredbythe MPTCforallnewrecruitsshouldbeexpandedandmadeinteractive,makinguseof simulationsandroleplays,witheveryrecruitplayingtherolesofboththechallengingand theconfrontedofficertoexperienceconfrontationsfrombothsidesofthegun. WestchesterCountysZone3PoliceTrainingAcademyhasalreadyincorporatedthis recommendationintoitsentryleveltrainingprogramanditmayserveasthemodelfor statewideimplementation.Inaddition,trainingontheinteractivetrainingonthe protocolsshouldbereinforcedthroughoutthecurriculum,particularlyduringannual firearmsrequalification. ItispasttimetorequireinservicetrainingforpoliceofficersinNewYorkState.TheState LegislatureshouldamendNewYorkExecutiveLaw840toexpandtheauthorityofthe MPTCtorecommendtothegovernorrulesandregulationswithrespecttorequirements formandatoryinservicetrainingwiththeabilitytocustomizeannualtrainingcycles.The MPTCshouldthenrecommendtotheGovernoraminimumrequirementof21hoursof annualinservicetrainingforallstateandlocallawenforcementofficers,toinclude firearmsrequalification,scenariobasedtrainingwithintegratedpoliceonpolice confrontationsituations,reviewofstandardsforappropriateuseofforce,legalupdates, andcontemporaryissuesasidentifiedbytheCouncilforthatcycle.Wefurther recommendthattheMPTCdisseminateitsrecommendationtotheheadsofalllaw enforcementagenciesoperatinginNewYorkStateandthatitencouragethosenot specificallygovernedbyitsrecommendations,suchastheNYPD,theStatePolice,andother stateandfederalagencies,toadoptthesameminimumstandard.Sucha21hourannualin servicetrainingrequirementwouldbringalllawenforcementagenciesinNewYorkState inlinewiththecurrentrequirementforaccreditedagencies.ItisourhopethatDCJS,the MPTC,theNewYorkStateSheriffsAssociationandtheNewYorkStateAssociationof ChiefsofPolicecanthenworkcollectivelytodevelopthisrequiredannualinservice programforallpoliceagencieswithinthestate. Similarly,itistimetorequiresomebasictraininginmanagementandleadershipfor lieutenants,captains,assistantanddeputychiefs,andothermidlevelpolicemanagers,as wellaschiefsandcommissioners.Itisunacceptablethatstaterequiredtrainingdoesnot extendintoapolicecareerbeyondanofficerspromotiontosergeant.Werecommend, therefore,thattheNewYorkStateLegislatureamendNewYorkExecutiveLaw840, empoweringtheMPTCtorecommendtothegovernorrequiredtrainingprogramsin managementandleadershipformiddlemanagersandpoliceexecutivesateveryrank.The MPTCshouldthenrecommendtotheGovernortrainingrequirementsthatinclude governingtheuseofforce,strengtheningcommunityrelations,interactingwiththenews media,andleadingondiversity. Thefederalgovernmenthasadoublerolehere.Mostdirectly,federallawenforcement agenciesmustpreventpoliceonpoliceshootingsamongtheirownofficersandthestate andlocalpolicewithwhomtheyconductjointoperations.Equallyimportant,however,the
P a g e |56
U.S.DepartmentofJusticecanleadimprovementsatthestateandlocallevelthroughthe OfficeofJusticePrograms,theOfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices(theCOPS Office),theCommunityRelationsService,theCivilRightsDivision,andtrainingprovided bytheFBI.69WethereforerecommendthattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeandtheU.S. DepartmentofHomelandSecurityintroduceinteractive,confrontationtrainingaspartof theestablishmentofeveryjointtaskforcewithstateandlocalpolice,andthatsuchtraining continuetobeprovidedasnewofficersareaddedtoanysuchtaskforce.Thiswillhelp withthefederalgovernmentsdirectrole,whilesimultaneouslyexposingpoliceagencies acrossthecountrytohighqualitytrainingonthissubject,settingabenchmarkforthe developmentofstateandlocaltraining. WefurtherrecommendthattheU.S.DepartmentofJusticedevelopandmakeavailable,at locallevelandfederalexpense,interactive,confrontationtrainingforanyoffdutyor retiredofficertravelingwithaconcealedweaponacrossstatelinespursuanttoLEOSA. Thistrainingshouldbeprovidedbyexistingstateandlocalpolicetraininginstitutions,but thetrainingshouldbedevelopedandfundedbytheU.S.DepartmentofJusticesothatitis standardacrossthenationanddoesnotfurtherburdenstateandlocaltrainingbudgetsfor whatisanationalresponsibility. Finally,weurgetheU.S.DepartmentofJusticetoworkwithoneormoreofthenational associationsofpoliceexecutivesandwiththeWestchesterandWhitePlainsPolice Departments,theNYPD,andotheragenciesthathaveenduredthesetragedies,tocreatea leadershiptrainingmoduleontheresponsetomistakenidentitypoliceonpolice shootings.Thetrainingmoduleshouldbebasedonahypotheticalcaseofamidsized policeagencyandshouldbeconstructedasacomposite,drawingonelementsofthe shootingsofOfficersRidleyandEdwards,andperhapsothers.Thefocuswouldnotbeon thefrontlineofficersinvolved,butontheresponseofleadershipatthelevelsofcaptainand above.Issuestobecoveredwouldincludealineofdutydeathpolicy,notificationoffamily members,managementofthecrimescene,communicationwithinthedepartment, communicationwiththemedia,managementoftheinvestigation,identificationofissuesof race,managementofracialtensionsthroughbothinternalandexternalcommunications, treatmentofthechallengingandshootingofficers,andactionstopreventrecurrence, amongothers.Themodulecouldbeofferedinstatetrainingprogramsaswellasat nationalconferencesandconventionsoftheassociationsofpoliceexecutives.Sucha trainingmodulewouldcontainvaluablelessonsapplicabletoawiderangeofmanagement andleadershipchallenges,wellbeyondthesepoliceonpoliceshootingsthemselves.It woulddrawonthedramaticandemotionalpowerofthesetragediestoteachskills essentialtopoliceleadershiptodaydoingaservicetothefieldwhilemarkingthelegacy oftheseofficers.
69TheOfficeofJusticeProgramsincludesseveralrelevantagencies,inparticulartheNationalInstituteof
Justice,theBureauofJusticeStatistics,andtheBureauofJusticeAssistance.
P a g e |57
3.DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasin Shoot/DontShootDecisions
Amongthemostpromisingdevelopmentswehaveencounteredisthedevelopmentof testingthatcanidentifytheexistenceofunconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshoot decisions,alongwiththesuggestioninearlyresearchthatpolicetrainingandexperience mayreducethisbias.Thislineoftestingandtrainingmightsavenotonlythelivesofpolice officersofcolorinpoliceonpoliceconfrontations,butofmanyciviliansaswell. Thescientificbasisforthistestingandtrainingremainsuncertain,andmuchmore researchisneeded.TheNewYorkPoliceDepartmenthastakentheleadinthisfieldby beginningitsownexperimentswiththistesting,incollaborationwiththeresearcherswho havepioneeredthiswork,andweurgeotherlargepoliceorganizationstofollowthe NYPDsexamplehere. Thedevelopmentofthistoolmightproceedalongapathsimilartothattakenbycrime mappingtechnologyfifteenyearsago:withmanyindividualpoliceagenciesexperimenting ontheirown,withagrowingnumberofuniversitybasedresearchersmakinguseofthe tools,andwiththeNationalInstituteofJusticecreatinganationalcentertoconvene interesteddepartmentsandresearchersannuallyandtobringfederalresourcestobearon theearlyapplicationofthetools.Thedevelopmentofthesemethodsfortestinglevelsof unconsciousracialbiasinshoot/dontshootdecisionsiscertainlyassignificantforthe propercontroloftheuseofforceasgeocodingandcomputermappinghaveproventobe fortheresponsetocrime. WethereforerecommendthattheNationalInstituteofJusticeissueaspecialsolicitationto researchersworkinginpartnershipwithlawenforcementagenciestodevelopandapply thepotentialofthistesting.Wefurtherrecommend,followingtheexampleofcrime mapping,thattheNationalInstituteofJusticecreateacenterforinherentbiasreduction thatwouldbothdevelopapplicationsandconvenethoseactiveinthefieldoverthenext fiveyears,andhighlightpolicetrainingprogramsandothereffortsthatareshownto reduceunconsciousracialbiasasmeasuredinthesetests. Atthesametime,weurgelargepoliceagenciesnotonlytoexaminetheearlyresearchand tofollowtheresultsoftheexperimentsintheNYPD,butalsotobegintheirown experimentationwiththistestingtechnology.Breakthroughsinthisareahavethe potentialtocontributebothtoofficersafetyandgreaterpublicsafetysimultaneously withoutdivertingattentionfromtheimportanceoftrainingofficersonhowtohandle themselveswhenconfronted.
4.ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPolice Agencies
Whilemostpolicetrainingcurriculatodayincludeunitsontheimportanceoftreatingall personsequally,regardlessofgender,race,ethnicity,nationalorigin,religion,language, sexualorientation,andotherfeaturesofidentity,thereislittlefocusondiversitywithin
P a g e |58
policeorganizations.Yetpoliceorganizationsarebecomingsubstantiallymorediverse alongalloftheselines.Forexample,theNYPDreportsthatithasseenasignificant demographicshiftoverthepastdecade,withofficersofcolorcomprisingjustover35 percentoftheforcein2001,butnowcomprisingnearly47percentofuniformedpersonnel andover53percentofthoseholdingtherankofpoliceofficer.70 Werecommendthatpolicetrainingondiversityaddresstheseinternalissuesofdiversity, evenwhiledepartmentscontinuetomaketheirexistingtrainingonpolicecommunity relationshipsmoreeffective.Policeonpoliceconfrontationsprovideapowerfullens throughwhichtheseissuesmightbeunderstoodanddiscussedinatrainingcontext, especiallywhentheofficersinvolvedbelievethatissuesofappearanceandracialand ethnicidentitymayhaveinfluencedtheconductofofficersintheencounter.Those developingsuchtrainingmightbeginbysurveyingtheirownofficersaboutoffdutyand plainclothespoliceonpoliceconfrontations,andaskingaboutissuesofappearanceor identitythatmighthavecontributedtoanyaspectoftheconfrontation.Thesesurvey responsescanprovidecompellingstoriesaboutthechallengesofdiversitywithinpolicing. Moregenerally,thosedevelopingthistrainingmightcollectawidevarietyofoffduty experiencesfromtheofficersofcolororotherminoritiesrepresentedwithintheir agencies,usingthesetointroducediscussionsofthediversityinthewidercommunities theseagenciesserve. Manycurrentandretiredofficersofcolor,includingmembersofourTaskForce,believe thatamongthecontributionstheycanmaketoimprovedpolicingistohelptheirfellow officersavoidstereotypingbydressorotherfeaturesofpersonalappearance,especially amongyoungpeopleofcolor.Weencouragepolicetrainingdepartmentstotakeadvantage ofthisdesiretohelpandtomakeuseofthegrowingdiversitywithinlawenforcementto groundtrainingintheexperienceoftheofficerswithineachagency.
5.DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthat ExperienceaPoliceonPoliceShooting
WehopethatNewYorkStateneverseesanotherfatal,policeonpoliceshooting.Still,it wouldbeirresponsibletobeunpreparedtorespondtosuchatragedyshouldoneoccur againsomewhereinthestate. Theresponseofanyorganizationtoarareeventisalwaysdifficultbecausetheskills learnedandinstinctshonedthroughexperiencearelessdeveloped,andmistakestherefore occurmoreeasily.Policeonpoliceshootingsarepreciselysuchrareevents,andthe difficultiesinherentinanyrareeventarecompoundedherebytheemotionsthatthese shootingsinevitablystirinallpoliceofficers.Indeedfatal,mistakenidentity,policeon policeshootingsareprobablythemostdifficultshootingsthatapoliceinvestigatoror commandereverconfronts,inpartbecausetheinvestigatorsandcommandersdealing withanyindividualcaseandtheemotionsitstirsuphaveneverdonesobefore.
70SeeAppendixD,LetterfromNYPDCommissionerRaymondW.KellytoGovernorDavidA.Paterson,Nov.
25,2009at6.
P a g e |59
Whatkindofsupportwouldadepartmentwantandneedinthefaceofsuchashooting? Chiefswhohavefacedthesesituationstellustheywereunpreparedtodealwith notificationoffamily,psychologicalsupporttoofficersonthesceneandtothosewho workedwiththeofficerwhowasshot,communicationwiththepublic,andmore. Investigationscanalsoproveunusual,withofficersfromacrossthedepartmentinvolving themselves,offeringinformation,andtryingtohelpbringwitnessesforward.Asupport teamshouldbepreparedtoofferadviceandassistanceinalloftheseareas. Thequestionsofcredibilityintheseinvestigationsarealsocomplex.Iftheshootingis controversial,thecontroversyislikelyonedividingthepoliceagencyitselforpittingone agencyagainstanother,withsomepoliceofficersandtheirfamiliesquestioningthe credibilityofotherpoliceofficers.If,inaddition,theshootingraisesissuesofrace,awider debatemaybeswirlingaroundtheinvestigation.Thesupportteamshouldtherefore includeinvestigativeexpertise,includingdetectivestrainedinpreviouspoliceonpolice shootingsandabletobringthelessonsfromearliercasestotheinvestigationofanewone. Thecostofsuchasupportteammustbemodest,forgovernmentswillbereluctantto investsubstantialsumsinpreparationforaneventthatmayneveroccur,anditwillbe especiallydifficulttosustainanyinvestmentastheserecentshootingsbecomemore distant.Butbecausenospecializedcapacitytodayexiststorespondtotheseshootings anywhere,thecreationofsomecapacityinNewYorkStatecouldbeofserviceelsewhere, andmightalsorecoversomeofitscost,ifitshelpisrequestedbyanotherstateorbythe federalgovernment. Forthesereasons,werecommendthatacommitteeoflawenforcementexecutivesfrom thethreeorfourlargestlocalagenciesinNewYorkStatebeconvenedtodesigna specializedsupportteamtoassistanydepartmentintheStatewithanyfuturepoliceon policeshootings.Thiscommitteeshoulddeterminewhatnumberandtypeofpersonnel shouldbeincludedandhowitshouldbeledandmanaged. Tokeepthecostslow,werecommendthatthisnotbetheprincipalassignmentforany memberoftheteam.Rather,werecommendthatmembershipontheteambean assignmentinadditiontoregularduties,andthatitcarrymerelyanexpectationof participationinjointtrainingatinceptionandthenonaregularbasis.Wedonotbelieve, however,thattheteamshouldbehousedeitherwithintheStatePoliceorDCJS.Thiswould needtobeanoperational,locallycredibleanddiplomaticteamthatcouldrealistically operateinNewYorkCityoranyotherjurisdictionwithinthestate. WerecommendthattheGovernorconvenethisplanningcommitteetoestablishtheprecise operationalrequirementsforsuchateam,tospecifythevariousrelationshipsthatsucha teammighthavetoanyspecificcaseandtoidentifykeyresourcestosupportits operations. Inevitably,therewillbedelicateissuesofcomityandrespectwiththedeploymentofany supportteamincludingofficersfromoutsidethelocationofapoliceonpoliceshooting. Thesesensitivitieswouldprobablymakethedeploymentofsuchateamonanyregular
P a g e |60
basisimpossible;butpoliceonpoliceshootingsveryrare.Ifthesupportteamwe recommendisassembledwithcareandsensitivitytotheseissues,webelievethatitwould bewelcomedbypoliceleadershipinajurisdictionthatexperiencesoneoftheseshootings. SuchateamwouldhaveatleastfourbenefitsfortheStateofNewYork.First,itwould bringtobearthehighestqualityresponsepossibletotheserare,highprofile,tragiccases. Second,itwouldaddalevelofcredibilitytotheresponsebecauseoftheparticipationof expertsfrommultipleagencies.Theteammembersmightevenincludeforensicexperts fromafederallawenforcementagencyoracivilianlegaladvisor.Weleavetheprecise compositionoftheteamtotheplanningcommittee,buttheteamshouldbecomposedwith aneyetothecredibilitythatitisdesignedtobringtothesecases.Third,itwouldgradually spreadexpertiseinthesesensitivecasesthroughoutthestate,asofficersfromseveral agenciesrotatedthroughtheteam,eachgainingrigoroustrainingintheresponseto complexcases.Fourth,itwouldestablishNewYorkStateasaleaderintheresponseto thesepoliceonpoliceshootingcases.Wecaneasilyimaginethatthisteam,once established,wouldbecalledupontoassistdepartmentsinotherstateswithfatalpoliceon policeshootings,muchasotheremergencyresponseteamsarecalledupon.Fundingfor anydeploymentsoutofstateshouldcomefromtherequestingjurisdictionorfromthe federalgovernment,butwerecommendthatthisteambeopentosuchrequests,aseach willaddtoitsexperienceandexpertise.
6.EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearms DischargesandaVoluntary,AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceon PoliceConfrontations

Mostpoliceonpoliceshootingsarepreventable,butonlyifsupervisors,trainers,and officersthemselvesunderstandhowtheyhavehappenedinthepast.Inthewakeofthe deathofOfficerOmarEdwards,theNYPDwasabletocollectinformationonprevious policeonpoliceshootingswithinthedepartmentfatalornotbecauseithadearlier beguntomaintainarecordofallpolicefirearmsdischarges.Asaresult,theNYPDisableto learnfromitsexperience.Thesameisnottrueatthestatelevelbecausemanydepartments donotkeeparecordofallshotsfired,andnoneofthemarerequiredtoreportthis informationtothestate.Thatshouldchange. AlllawenforcementagencieswithinNewYorkStateshouldberequiredtorecordand reporttoDCJSarecordofallpolicefirearmsdischarges,includingthoseinwhichcivilians aretargets.71Timely,accurateandcomprehensiveinformationaboutpoliceshootingswill alsohelptobetterinformthepublicaboutbothproblemsandprogress,particularlywithin communitiesofcolor.
71See,forexample,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment,AnnualFirearmsDischargeReport,2008.Thevalueof
thiskindofreportingwasdescribedbyDonnaLiebermanandChristopherDunnoftheNewYorkCivil LibertiesUnion,intheirwrittensubmissionofDecember2,2009,totheTaskForce:Ifcompletefactual informationaboutshootingsisfreelyavailabletothepublicadvocates,electedofficials,academics,the media,andotherlawenforcementagenciesitwillgreatlyenhancethelikelihoodthattheroleofracein shootingswillgetathoroughreview.
P a g e |61
Weconsideredandrejectedtheideathatpoliceagenciesberequiredonlytorecordand reportpoliceonpoliceshootings.Lawenforcementexpertsadvisedusthatadepartment wouldonlybeabletoaccuratelyreportpoliceonpoliceshootingsifitwereroutinely recordingandreportingallfirearmdischarges.Werecognizethatinorderforadata reportingrequirementtobefaithfullyimplemented,itmustcomplementexistingreporting obligations,formatsandmethods.Aspecialprocessforreportingonlypoliceonpolice shootingswouldbeunreliable.Furthermore,wealsobelievethattheresultsofthis reportingwillonlybevaluablewhenviewedinthewidercontextofallfirearmsdischarges. WethereforerecommendthattheGovernorsubmitandthattheNewYorkState Legislatureadoptlegislationrequiringalllawenforcementagenciesinthestatetoreportto DCJSannuallyallfirearmsdischargesbyitsswornofficers.Thelegislationshouldspecify thatthesereportsshouldappropriatelyidentifydemographicinformation(including,but notlimitedtotheage,rank,gender,race/ethnicity,dutyassignment,etc.)ofallparties involved,alongwithsummaryinformationaboutthecircumstances,injuriestoanyparty, andotherrelevantinformation.AnditshouldalsorequireDCJStopublishannualreports onthisfirearmdischargedata. Weconsideredandrejectedtheideathatallpoliceonpoliceconfrontationsbereportedto thestate.Wearepersuadedthatthevastmajorityoftheseconfrontations,eventhose involvingthedisplayofaweapon,arenotreportedthroughanyformalchannel,andmost arenotreportedeveninformally.Withsomenotableexceptions,theofficersinvolvedon bothsidesareusuallyembarrassedandapologetic,resolvingthemisunderstandingamong themselves.Anyefforttorequirereportingoftheseconfrontationswouldfail. Atthesametime,werecognizethevaluefortrainingandpreventivepurposesofasmuch informationascanbegatheredaboutconfrontationsthatdonotinvolveshotsbeingfired. Wethereforerecommendasacomplementtothemandatoryreportingofpoliceonpolice firearmsdischargesthattheLegislaturealsorequirealllawenforcementagenciestooffer thechancetoallofficersduringannualfirearmsrequalificationtovoluntarilycompletean anonymousquestionnairereportingthedetailsofanypoliceonpoliceconfrontationsin thelastyear.FullcopiesofthesecompletedquestionnairesshouldbeforwardedtoDCJS foranalysisandinclusioninanannualreportonpoliceonpoliceshootingsandother confrontations.WefurtherrecommendthatDCJScooperatewiththeInternational AssociationoftheChiefsofPoliceintheireffortstoestablishanationaldatarepositorythat wouldincludepoliceonpoliceshootings.72 Withanyphenomenonthisrare,thereisnosubstitutefornationaldata.TheFBIsLEOKA programalreadycollectsinformationaboutfatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsandfelonious
72Asaresultofthesignificantlimitationsontheavailabilityofnationaldataregardingdutyrelateddeaths
andinjuriesofpoliceofficers,theInternationalAssociationofChiefsofPoliceisplanningtoestablishaCenter forthePreventionofViolenceAgainstthePolice.TheproposedCenterwouldserveasarepositoryof nationaldataandanincubatorforresearchandthedevelopmentofbestpracticesforthepreventionof violenceagainstlawenforcementofficers.TheTaskForceenthusiasticallysupportstheestablishmentofthis CenterandapplaudstheIACPfortakingtheinitiativeinthisarea.Carefulandcomprehensivedatacollection andanalysiscanbepowerfultoolsinpreventingthetragedyofmistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootings.
P a g e |62
assaultsofpoliceofficers.Atpresent,however,fatalpoliceonpoliceshootingsare subsumedinalargeraccidentalshootingcategoryandnonfatalpoliceonpolice shootingsarenotcapturedinLEOKAdataatall.WeencouragetheU.S.Departmentof JusticeandtheFBItoenhancetheLEOKAprogramsdatacollectioneffortstoincludeand clearlydelineatemistakenidentitypoliceonpoliceshootingsinitsstandarddata categories.WefurtherrecommendthatLEOKAconductfollowupinterviewswiththelaw enforcementagenciesinvolvedinanyreportedfatalornonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings orconfrontations.Currently,itsfollowupinterviewsarelimitedtoincidentsinvolving feloniousassaultsonofficers.
7.PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceon PoliceShootings
Anyindividualpoliceonpoliceshootingmayormaynotresultinprosecutionofoneor moreoftheofficersoncriminalcharges,thoughthisseemsnottohaveoccurredanywhere inthelast30years.Somepoliceonpoliceshootingsleadtocivillitigation.Nevertheless, thepossibilityofprosecutionandlitigationinthesecasesshouldnotbeanexcusefor withholdinginformationfromthepublic.Webelievethattransparencymustbeamongthe primarygoalsofallinvestigatorsandprosecutorsdealingwiththesecases.Theneedfor transparencycould,incertaincircumstances,begroundsfortheappointmentofaspecial prosecutorunderexistingstatutoryauthority,butwebelievethatelecteddistrictattorneys canhandlethesecasesascrediblyasanyspecialprosecutoriftheymaintainacommitment topublictransparencywithinthelimitsofexistinglaw. Werecognizethatsomeadvocateshavecalledfortheappointmentofastanding,fulltime specialprosecutortohandleoneorallpoliceonpoliceshootingcasesinNewYorkState. Morecommonhavebeencallsforanindependentinvestigativebody.Forexample,inhis presentationtotheTaskForce,DamonJones,PresidentoftheNortheastRegionofthe NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA),explainedhisviewthatanindependent investigativeunitcouldreviewincidentsfromthestart,whenevidencecollectionand interviewingwitnessesismostimportant.73Similarly,DetectiveAnthonyMitchell, PresidentoftheWestchesterChapteroftheNBPA,testified: ImplementingaStatewideIndependentInvestigativeUnitwilleliminatethe perceptionofinjusticewithinthelawenforcementranksandensurethat boththeofficersandtheallegedvictimsreceiveafairandimpartialthorough investigation.Itwilluncoverthetruthbasedontheevidence,whichmay resolvesomanyunansweredquestionswhilecontinuouslybuildingtrust betweenlawenforcementandthecommunity.Therehavebeentoomany incidentsinvolvinglawenforcementwithtoomanyquestionsandnot enoughanswers.Wearecallingformoretransparencywithinthesystemto protectbothourlawenforcementofficersandthecitizensinthecommunity inwhichtheyserve.74
73TestimonyofDamonJones,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing). 74TestimonyofAnthonyMitchell,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing).
P a g e |63
CharlesWilsonoftheNationalAssociationofBlackLawEnforcementOfficersechoedthese sentimentsatourAlbanyhearing: Theinvestigativeprocessfortheseincidentsmust...becomemore transparent,asithasbecomeincreasinglyclearthatthecommunity,and manyoftheofficersthemselves,havelittleornofaithinthemethodologyby whichthepolicepolicethemselves.Independentinvestigativebodies shouldbeputinplace,whetherbylegislativeactorexecutivefiatthatwill havetheabilityandauthoritytoconsidertheactionsofallpartiesinvolvedin theseincidents,aswellasthepowertobringtobeartheforceofthejustice systemuponthosewhotransgress.75 Nevertheless,webelievethatthecreationofthestatewidesupportteamrecommended above,combinedwithacommitmenttotransparencyinprosecutorialdecisionmaking, willachievethegoalsmanyoftheseadvocatesseek.Investigationsbypoliceand prosecutorsshouldbepursuedwithacommitmenttoeventualfulldisclosureofwhat happenedandhowtheinvestigationwasconducted. Wedonotfindcompellingreasonstoprioritizeconfidentialityovertheneedforpublic confidence.Whiletheneedforsomeconfidentialityisunderstandable,itmustbebalanced withthepublicsneedtoknowthattheirpolicedepartmentscanbetrustedtopolice themselves.Andgiventheirroleinamassinginformationforgrandjuryproceedings, DistrictAttorneysareinthebestpositiontoensuretransparency.Experienced,skillful prosecutorsknowhowtohonorgrandjurysecrecywhilestillpermittingampleandtimely publicdisclosure.Inshort,prosecutorsconsideringcriminalliabilityinthesecasesshould erronthesideofpublicdisclosure,usingthegrandjurytoinvestigatebutnottoshroudthe caseinsecrecy.TheGovernorandtheAttorneyGeneralshouldusetheirpowerstoappoint specialprosecutorsorassumetheprosecutionthemselvesonlytotheextentthatdoingso representsthemosteffectivewaytomaintaintransparencyandcredibilityforthepublic.
8.ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPolice CivilianShootings
OurchargefromtheGovernorwastoexaminetheimplicationsofpoliceonpolice shootingstoenhanceofficersafetyandpublicsafety,andthismustincludeapplyingthe lessonswehavelearnedtosavecivilianliveswheneverpossible.Wehaveconcludedthat protocolsandtrainingforconfrontedofficerscanhelpthemavoidanddefusearmed confrontationswithotherpolice,andwebelievesimilarbenefitswouldcomefrom protocolsandtrainingforcivilianswhofindthemselvesinconfrontationswithpolice. Advicetoremainabsolutelymotionless,toobeythecommandsoftheofficerincharge,and toavoidturningtowardstheofficermightallbeapplicabletocivilians.Forthosewitha limitedunderstandingofEnglish,itmightevenbeusefultoidentifyoneselfloudlyand
75TestimonyofCharlesWilson,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).
P a g e |64
clearlyassomeonewhoisfluentonlyinacertainlanguage,orassomeonewhodoesnot understandEnglish. Indeed,manypoliceorganizationsalreadyparticipateinvoluntarytrainingprogramsthat helpciviliansnavigatehighstressencounterswithpoliceofficersduringtrafficstopsand pedestrianstops.Yet,theexisting,voluntaryprogramsarelargelyaimedatyouthofcolor inurbancommunities.Weareconcernedthatthisfocusmayinadvertentlycommunicate thattheseyoungpeopleneedinstructiontocomplywithpolicecommandsinwaysthat theirwhiteorwealthycounterpartsdonot.Ifadviceandtrainingisusefulforcivilianswho findthemselvesinconfrontationswithpoliceofficers,itisimportantitbeofferedona universalbasis,notonlytocertainpeople. WerecommendthatDCJSconveneacommitteeofnonprofitorganizationsthatcurrently offerprogramsoftrainingforciviliansonhowtohandlethemselvesduringconfrontations withpolice.Thatcommitteeshouldreviewthelessonsdrawnfromthepoliceonpolice shootingsandconsiderdevelopingcommonadviceforciviliansthatcanbedisseminated byanyinterestedorganizationsondeescalatingconfrontations.Thatadvicemightbe usefullydividedbetweenadvicefortrafficstopsandadviceforpedestrianstops.Inboth cases,theadvicemightemphasizetheimportanceofremainingstill,keepinghandsvisible, andobeyingtheinstructionsoftheofficerstoppingyou.Theguidelinesshouldbe developedtobebroadlyapplicabletovariouscontextssothatasimplesetofguidelinescan servecivilianswellinasmanysituationsaspossibleandcanbecomecommonknowledge. Inordertounderscoretheuniversalnatureofthisadvice,werecommendthattheadvice forhandlingoneselfinatrafficstopbeincludedamongthequestionsaskedaspartofthe writtenportionoftheexaminationforadriverslicenseinNewYorkState.Requiringthis knowledgeasuniversallyaspossiblewillhelptospreadtheknowledgewidelyandremove anyunintendedstigmathatmightbeassociatedwiththeneedforthisguidance.Themost recentnationalsurveydatasuggestthatthelargestcategoryofpolicecivilianencounters occurintrafficstops,andtheseoccurroughlyequallyacrossracialandethniclines.76
9.ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor
Wereturn,inourfinalrecommendation,tothemoststrikingfactrevealedbyour examinationofalmost30yearsofpoliceonpoliceshootings:officersmistakenfor offendersandkilledwhileoffdutyhavealmostallbeenofficersofcolor,whereasofficers killedwhileworkingplainclothesorundercoverhavebeenofallracesandethnicities.Why areofficersofcoloratsuchspecialriskwhentakingactionoffduty? Theanswertothatquestionisunknown,butcertainlycomplicated.Yetthescholarshipon policingintheUnitedStateshasvirtuallyignoredtheoffdutyexperiencesofofficersof color.Althoughresearchonpolicinghaspenetratedalmosteveryaspectofthisdangerous work,ithasrarelyifeverfollowedofficersofcolorbackhomeattheendoftheirshifts.
76Durose,etal.,http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.
P a g e |65
ThreeoftheninemembersofthisTaskForcearecurrentorretiredofficersofcolor,asare manyofthosewhoofferedtestimonyorwrittensubmissionstous.Together,theyand othershavealertedustothespecialstrainsandtensionsthatofficersofcolorfacewhen theytakeofftheiruniforms.OneAfricanAmericanformerpolicechiefdescribedbeing stoppedbypoliceofficerswhodidnotrecognizeherwhenshewastryingtoenterherown home;anotherformerchieftoldusofwarninghisson,alsoapoliceofficer,tobeonhis guardbecausehisblackskinmakeshimdifferentfromotherofficers. Aspoliceagenciesacrossthenationbecomemorediverse,theleadersoftheseagencies needtounderstandmoreaboutthelifeexperiencesoftheirofficersofcolor,especiallythe experienceswhileoutofuniform.Weurgepoliceexecutivesacrossthenationtoengage theirofficersofcolorinstructuredconversationsabouttheseexperiencesonaregular basis.Equallyimportant,weurgetheNationalInstituteofJusticeandtheOfficeof CommunityOrientedPolicingServices(theCOPSOffice)tosupportresearchintothis largelyignoredareaofcontemporarypolicingandtoengageabroadspectrumofofficersof colorandthevariouspolicefraternalorganizationsthatrepresentthemindialoguewith policeexecutivesandresearchersabouttheseissues.Itshouldnottakeapoliceonpolice shootingtoshakethefieldintoawarenessabouttheneedtorespect,support,andembrace officersofcolorastheystrivetodotheirduty,servetheircountry,andbringsafetyand justicetocommunitiesthatneedthemsodearly.
P a g e |66
Figure4.2SummaryofRecommendations
1. DevelopStateandNationalProtocolsforPoliceonPoliceConfrontations a. InNewYorkState,theMPTCshoulddevelopstatewideprotocolsfortakingpoliceactionoutof uniform,protocolsforconfrontedofficers,andprotocolsforchallengingofficers. b. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshouldendorsethesameprotocolsencouragingconsistency acrossthecountry. 2. RequireContinuing,InteractiveTrainingonConfrontations a. InNewYorkState,theMPTCshoulddoublethecurrent2hourmandateandshouldrequirethat thetraininguseinteractivesimulationsandroleplaying. b. Policeagenciesshouldincludeconfrontationtrainingasapartofannualfirearms requalification. c. TheNewYorkStateLegislatureshouldamendNYExec.LawSec.840togivetheMPTCthesame authorityoverinservicetrainingthatitcurrentlyexercisesoverrecruittraining. d. TheNewYorkStateLegislatureshouldamendNYExec.LawSec.840togivetheMPTCthesame authorityoverpolicemanagementandleadershiptrainingthatitcurrentlyexercisesover recruittraining. e. TheMPTCshouldestablisha21hourinservicetrainingrequirement,toincludeconfrontation training. f. Federallawenforcementagenciesshouldrequireinteractiveconfrontationtrainingofall membersofalljointtaskforces g. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshoulddevelopandsponsorannualtrainingopportunitieson confrontationsavailabletothoseretiredandoffdutyofficerswhoseektocarryweaponsacross statelinespursuanttoLEOSA. h. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeshouldcollaboratewithoneormorelargemunicipalpolice agenciestodevelopaleadershiptrainingmoduleonrespondingtocrossracial,mistaken identity,policeonpoliceshootingsdrawingontheexperienceofthepoliceagenciesthathave facedthesetragedies. 3. DevelopTestingandTrainingtoReduceUnconsciousRacialBiasinShoot/DontShootDecisions 4. ExpandDiversityTrainingtoIncludeIssuesofDiversitywithinPoliceAgencies 5. DesignateandTrainaSpecializedTeamtoSupportDepartmentsthatExperienceaPoliceon PoliceShooting 6. EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearmsDischargesand Voluntary,AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceonPoliceConfrontations a. TheNYLegislatureshouldadoptandtheGovernorshouldapprovelegislationrequiringannual reportsofallfirearmsdischarges. b. TheNYLegislatureshouldrequiretheDivisionforCriminalJusticeServicestoconducta continuing,voluntary,anonymoussurveyofalllawenforcementofficersundergoingfirearms requalificationregardingpoliceonpoliceconfrontations. c. TheU.S.DepartmentofJusticeandtheFBIshouldrefinetheLEOKAreportingsystemtocollect informationonallfatalandnonfatalpoliceonpoliceshootings,pursuingthesetothesame levelofdetailthatiscurrentlyappliedtofelonious,fatalshootingsofpoliceofficers. 7. PromoteTransparencyinProsecutorialDecisionsRegardingPoliceonPoliceShootings 8. ApplytheLessonsofPoliceonPoliceShootingstoReduceMistakenPoliceCivilianShootings 9. ExpandUnderstandingoftheLifeExperiencesofOfficersofColor
P a g e |67
Acknowledgements
Ourwork,andthepublicationofthisreport,wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthetremendous effortsofourdedicatedstaffandadvisorslistedatthefrontonthisreport.Inaddition,wethankall ofthosewhotestifiedatourpublichearings,metwithusontheirowntime,andprovided statementstous.ThechairisespeciallygratefultotheOpenSocietyInstituteforenablingthe PrograminCriminalJusticePolicyandManagementattheHarvardKennedySchooltosupportthe workoftheTaskForce.Thefollowingindividualsandorganizationsallprovidedvitalsupportin variousways.WearedeeplygratefulfortheircontributionstotheworkoftheTaskForce.
ExecutiveChamber CharlotteHitchcock, ChiefofStafftothe Governor ClemmieHarris TerriBrennan SenyTaveras LatiaCurry LaurenPassalacqua RichardThomas JosephSimenic BrandonKelley MarcoCarrin SandraHawkins ThomasAiello JamesHanson ThomasIrvin JennyReyes HaroldMoore KhalilNobles StacieBennett MichelleClark PeterYacobellis NeldaRobinson AnnieMonroeConnor JeanetteCepeda MichelleDuca MaryBernet NYSDiv.ofProbation& CorrectionAlternatives RobertM.Maccarone, StateDirector
NEWYORKSTATEGOVERNMENT NYSDivisionofCriminal JusticeServices MaryKavaney, DeputySecy.forPublic Safety&HomelandSecurity SeanByrne, ActingCommissioner DeniseE.ODonnell, formerCommissioner JohnBilich, DeputyCommissioner GinaBianchi, DeputyCommr.&Counsel PatriziaGreco MarkBonacquist JohnCaher RichardBellucci JuliePasquini HilaryMcGrath LucyVerrigini MicheleKordrupel TerrySalo ToddNelson JodieYu PatriciaJohnston JohnJoel LoriWheelock JamesTagliento AlbertKolar ThomasMitchell RosemariaWilson JonathanVanderwerken
OfficeforTechnology MarilynCordell ChristineL.Thayer DarleneWood NoraOwens RandiBrice OfficeofGeneralServices WillieWalker DeborahRodriguezCook NYSFdn.forScience, Technology&Innovation JanetteM.Rond NYStateInsuranceFund FrancineJames, ChiefDeputyExec.Dir. JohnMurdaugh EmpireStateDev.Corp. MichaelH.JonesBey OrrinJ.Getz RickyToledo CharlesAlvarez CarmenCordero
P a g e |68
FederalBureauofInvestigation,Criminal JusticeInformationSystemsDivision DanielD.Roberts,AssistantDirector RobertCasey CharlesMiller FrankieL.Kelley DorothyKisner TimReid JimCarder U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture SATessdelCarmen U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity GraylingWilliams,Director,Officeof CounternarcoticsEnforcement U.S.DrugEnforcementAdministration SACJimmyS.FoxIII SACJohnSutton(ret.) SACGarfieldHammonds(ret.) ActingDep.AdministratorArtLewis(ret.) AssistantSACWilliamFaiella U.S.MarshalsService DavidTurk,U.S.MarshalsHistorian NewYorkStatePolice Supt.HarryCorbitt(ret.) FirstDep.Supt.PedroPerez(ret.) Dep.Supt.DeborahCampbell InspectorHectorLebron AddisonPoliceDepartment(TX) Capt.DeannaRobinson AtlantaPoliceDepartment ChiefRichardPennington(ret.) AustinPoliceDepartment LaurieNajjar BostonPoliceDepartment CommissionerEdwardDavis DeputySupt.MichaelA.Cox
LAWENFORCMENTAGENCIES
BrightonPoliceDepartment(AL) ChiefJohnnieJohnson EastPaloAltoPoliceDepartment ChiefRonaldL.Davis MountVernonPoliceDepartment ChiefBarbaraDuncan OfficerPatrickJeanJerome NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment CommissionerRaymondW.Kelly DeputyCommissionerWilburChapman AssistantCommissionerPhilipMcGuire DeputyChiefJohnDonohue DeputyInspectorKimRoyster Det.Captain.FrankA.Bolz,Jr.(ret.) LieutenantWillieShaw(ret.) OaklandPoliceDepartment ChiefAnthonyW.Batts ProvidencePoliceDepartment Chief,Col.DeanEsserman SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment Sgt.MichaelNevin UniversityofCentralFloridaPoliceDept. AssociateDirectorMichaelZelanes WellesleyPoliceDepartment(MA) DeputyChiefWilliamG.BrooksIII WestchesterCountyDept.ofPublicSafety DemosthenesLong,formerDeputyCommr. Lt.MichaelCindrich Sgt.DanielLangford P.O.JeffreyWeiss WhitePlainsPoliceDepartment CommissionerDavidE.Chong ChiefJamesM.Bradley Sgt.DennisP.Doherty Det.PeterC.Martin Det.RickLee DianeCouzens
P a g e |69
OtherNewYorkPoliceDepartmentsParticipatingintheDCJSandNYSACOPSurveys AlbanyPoliceDepartment AmityvilleVillagePoliceDepartment AuburnPoliceDepartment AvonPoliceDepartment BathVillagePoliceDepartment BeaconPoliceDepartment BinghamtonPoliceDepartment BuffaloPoliceDepartment CamillusPoliceDepartment CanajohariePoliceDepartment ChathamVillagePoliceDepartment ChesterTownPoliceDepartment ClarkstownTownPoliceDepartment CoeymansTownPoliceDepartment ColonieTownPoliceDepartment EastchesterTownPoliceDepartment EllenvillePoliceDepartment ElmiraHeightsVillagePoliceDepartment ElmiraPoliceDepartment EndicottPoliceDepartment EvansTownPoliceDepartment FallsburgTownPoliceDepartment FreeportVillagePoliceDepartment FultonCityPoliceDepartment GardenCityPoliceDepartment GreatNeckVillagePoliceDepartment GreenburghTownPoliceDepartment HamburgVillagePoliceDepartment PalmyraPoliceDepartment PelhamManorPoliceDepartment PortChesterVillagePoliceDepartment PortWashingtonPoliceDepartment PoughkeepsieCityPoliceDepartment PoughkeepsieTownPoliceDepartment QuogueVillagePoliceDepartment RensselaerPoliceDepartment RochesterPoliceDepartment SchenectadyPoliceDepartment SkaneatelesPoliceDepartment SouthNyackGrandViewPolice Department SpringValleyVillagePoliceDepartment StonyPointTownPoliceDepartment HempsteadVillagePoliceDepartment HighlandFallsPoliceDepartment HudsonPoliceDepartment JamestownPoliceDepartment JohnsonCityPoliceDepartment KenmorePoliceDepartment KingstonPoliceDepartment KirklandTownPoliceDepartment LittleFallsPoliceDepartment LloydTownPoliceDepartment LowvillePoliceDepartment LyonsVillagePoliceDepartment MacedonTownPoliceDepartment MalvernePoliceDepartment MiddletownPoliceDepartment MountKiscoPoliceDepartment MountPleasantTownPoliceDepartment NassauCountyPoliceDepartment NewHartfordTownPoliceDepartment NewRochellePoliceDepartment NewWindsorTownPoliceDepartment NewYorkMillsPoliceDepartment NewburghCityPoliceDepartment NewburghTownPoliceDepartment NiagaraFallsPoliceDepartment NorthTonawandaPoliceDepartment OldWestburyVillagePoliceDepartment OneidaIndianNationPoliceDepartment SuffolkCountyPoliceDepartment SUNYCortlandPoliceDepartment SUNYOneontaPoliceDepartment SyracusePoliceDepartment TonawandaTownPoliceDepartment TroyPoliceDepartment TuxedoTownPoliceDepartment UlsterTownPoliceDepartment UticaPoliceDepartment WaterfordPoliceDepartment WatertownPoliceDepartment WebsterPoliceDepartment YonkersPoliceDepartment NYSDept.ofEnv.ConservationPolice NYSParksPolice
P a g e |70
POLICEASSOCIATIONS,FRATERNALORGANIZATIONS&UNIONS
AmericanPoliceOfficersHallofFame LoriShepard FederalLawEnforcementFoundation AnthonyBergamo,Chairman InternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice DanielN.Rosenblatt,ExecutiveDirector JamesW.McMahon,Dep.ExecutiveDir. MarkLomax JeffreyMagers,Ph.D.,ChairPolice AdministrationCommittee MajorCitiesChiefsAssociation TomFrazier,ExecutiveDirector NationalAssociationofBlackLaw EnforcementOfficers Lt.CharlesP.Wilson,NatlChairperson CynthiaHadleyBailey NationalBlackPoliceAssociation(NBPA) RonaldHampton,ExecutiveDirector DamonK.Jones,N.E.RegionPresident ChristopherCooper RogerL.Abel RodneyWilliams RobertRivers NationalLatinoOfficersAssociation AnthonyMiranda,ExecutiveChairman NationalLawEnforcementOfficers MemorialFund BernetaV.Spence,DirectorofResearch JeremyBorrego JeniferAshton NationalOrganizationofBlackLaw EnforcementExecutives(NOBLE) ErnestE.GreenIII,President JilesH.Ship,SecondVicePresident JessieLee,ExecutiveDirector ElsieScott,Ph.D.,SpecialAsst.tothePresident WilmaeLeach
NationalOrganizationofBlackLaw EnforcementOfficers Lt.CharlesP.Wilson CynthiaHadleyBailey NOBLENewYorkCityChapter Asst.ChiefJerryNelson,President GregoryA.Thomas SophineCharles,Ph.D. NYGrandCouncilofGuardians CharlesBillups,Chairperson NYPDGuardiansAssociation BonitaZelman,Esq.,Counsel NYStateAssociationofChiefsofPolice (NYSACOP) ChiefWilliamKilfoil,President JohnP.Grebert,ExecutiveDirector MarkSpawn,DirectorofResearch PoliceConferenceofNewYork RichardWells,President PortAuthorityofNY&NJPoliceDept. OfficerCorvetCurley(ret.) WestchesterCountyDepartmentofPublic SafetyPoliceBenevolentAssociation,Inc. MichaelHagan,President WestchesterCountyNBPAChapter Det.AnthonyC.Mitchell WestchesterRocklandGuardiansAssoc. CynthiaHood,President LarryBrown NormanDownes
P a g e |71
CenterforConstitutionalRights VincentWarren,Exec.Director DariusCharney AnnetteDickerson SunitaPatel CityofMountVernon,NY Hon.ClintonI.Young,Mayor ConsortiumforPoliceLeadershipinEquity (CPLE) PhillipAtibaGoff,Ph.D.,Exec.Dir.ofResearch TracieL.Keesee,Ph.D.,Exec.Dir.ofOperations JohnDovidio,Ph.D.,DirectorofTraining JoshuaCorrell,Ph.D. DetectiveChristopherA.RidleyFoundation StanleyRidley FelitaBouche DSMSafetyProductsLLC Sgt.MikeLessman ForceScienceInstitute WilliamLewinksi,Ph.D.,Exec.Director ScottBuhrmaster ChuckRemsberg GreaterCentennialAMEZionChurch Rev.W.DarinMoore,Pastor HarvardKennedySchoolofGovernment, PrograminCriminalJusticePolicy&Mgmt. ChristineM.Cole,Exec.Director AnthonyA.Braga,Ph.D. BrianWelch KlaraKabadian JohnJayColl.ofCriminalJustice JeremyTravis,President DeloresJonesBrown,J.D.,Ph.D. JonShane,Ph.D. KarenTerry,Ph.D.
ACADEMIC,RESEARCHANDCOMMNITYORGANIZATIONS
TheLawOfficesofR.JackAyres,Jr.,P.C. R.JackAyres,Jr.,Esq. NatlAssociationfortheAdvancement ofColoredPeople(NAACP) HazelN.Dukes,NationalBoardMember& President,NYStateConf.ofNAACPBranches Hon.LauraBlackburn,InterimGen.Counsel RobertRooks,Dir.ofCriminalJusticePgms. NiazKasravi,Ph.D.,Sr.Mgr.forLaw EnforcementAccountability NationalActionNetwork Rev,AlSharpton,President TamikaMallory,ExecutiveDirector NewYorkCivilLibertiesUnion DonnaLieberman,ExecutiveDirector ChristopherDunn PsychologistsinPublicSafety GuyO.Seymour,Ph.D. PoliceAssessmentResourceCenter(PARC) MerrickBobb,President RochesterInstituteofTechnology RonWhitlock,MBAcandidate WesternConnecticutStateUniversity Prof.TerrenceP.Dwyer,Esq. WVOX1460AMNewRochelle AbdulQadaar,ChristopherRidleyRuckerShow ErnieDavis,ConversationswithErnieDavis
P a g e |70

Police On Ppoliceolice Shootings

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Police On Ppoliceolice Shootings

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

NewYorkStateTaskForceon PoliceonPoliceShootings

5TestimonyofPedroPerez,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing). 6TestimonyofRichardBellucci,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing). 7Theremaybetimeswhenlawenforcementagenciesdonotshareinformationabouttheiroperations.For

9TestimonyofDavidChong,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing). 10TestimonyofJohnBilich,December4,2009(WhitePlainspublichearing). 11Thebill,alsoknownasHR218,iscodifiedat18U.S.C.926B,926C.

identifyingthemselvesaspolice.Bythesametoken,LEOSAgivesthefederalgovernment anopportunity,andperhapsaresponsibility,totakeamoreactiverolehere,assuringthat standardprotocolsandtrainingareestablishednationwidetopreventmistakenidentity, policeonpoliceconfrontations.

policeofficersinthegreaterNewYorkCitymetropolitanareasensethatfatalpoliceon policeshootingsareoccurringwithgreaterfrequency,thoughtheyremainextremelyrare. TheonlyothersuchfatalshootingsintheNortheastsince1981occurredinRhodeIslandin 2000andinPennsylvaniain1997and2004.

TrendFive:Almostalloftheofficersofcolorkilledintheseincidentsweretakingpolice actionwhileoffdutyatthetimetheywerekilled(9outof12),whereasalmostnoneofthe whiteofficerswereoffdutyatthetime(1of13withknowndutyassignments),asFigure 2.5showsingreaterdetail.

policedepartmentmaycompelanofficertomakestatementsinadministrativeproceedingsunderthreatof beingfiredorfacingotherdisciplinaryaction,thesestatementsmaynotbeusedinsubsequentcriminal prosecutionsbecausedoingsowouldviolatetheofficersFifthAmendmentrightagainstselfincrimination.

41SubmissionfromLieutenantWillieShaw,NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment(ret.) 42QuestionnaireResponse#5123056. 43TestimonyofLt.CharlesP.Wilson,November16,2009(Albanypublichearing).

19,674 35,844 4093 4851 1448 3449 69,359

28.4% 51.7% 5.9% 7.0% 2.1% 5.0% 100%

collectedtrainingofferedinselectedjurisdictionsnationally;and elicitedopinionsonthebestpracticesandrecommendationsfrompoliceofficers expertsinpolicetraining.

Beforeapoliceonpoliceconfrontationbegins,typicallyanoutofuniformofficermakesa decisiontotakepoliceaction,andoftenalsodecidestodisplayaweapon.Trainingonthe decisionwhenandhowtotakepoliceactionoutofuniformisthefirststepinavoiding

(IACP)recommendsthatoffdutyofficerswhowitnessacrimecallforassistanceratherthanpullinga weapon. 63NYPDPoliceAcademy,VideoProductionUnit,PreventingFriendlyFire,versionofJune1,2009.

2004),http://www.aclu.org/druglawreform_immigrantsrights_prisonersrights_racialjustice/knowyour rightswhatdoifyoureandNationalBlackPoliceAssociation,WhenStoppedBythePolice:a Community/CitizenGuide,http://www.blackpolice.org/Stopped.html.

CharlesP.WilsononbehalfoftheWestchesterCountyGuardiansAssociation,December4,2009. U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,April2007,NCJ215243, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf.

ForConfrontedOfficers 1. 2. 3. 4. DontMove AvoidReflexiveSpin IdentifyYourselfLoudlyasaPoliceOfficer,UsingSpecificCodedLanguage ObeytheCommandsoftheConfrontingOfficer

ForOfficersChallenginganArmedIndividual 1. 2. 3. 4. DontStereotype TakeCover Shoutclearlyandrepeat:Police!DontMove! BroadenYourFocusfromtheGuntoAssesstheSituation

6.EstablishaMandatoryStatewideReportingSystemforPoliceFirearms DischargesandaVoluntary,AnonymousSystemforReportingPoliceon PoliceConfrontations

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen