DRAFT 08/26/03

Team 8 Monograph

PART ONE

I. Breeching Air Traffic Control and Continental Air Defense Systems

A) How the FAA watched airspace pre 9/11
1. Crowded skies - graphic freeze frame
2. Safety first vs. security
B) NORAD's mission and capabilities

II. Indicators and Warnings (8:15-9:10)

A) AA11
B) United 175 (introduce confusion)
C) Sounding the alarm (9:10 am)

III. Bad Information (9:10 - 10:15 am)

A) Chasing the phantom A l l
B) Missing AA 77
C) Changing the Rules of Engagement (shoot-down decision)
D) United 93

IV. More Alarms

A) Scrambles
1. NORAD (push into the air)
2. DEFCON 4 and 3
3. Chasing phantom AA 11
B) Chasing Phantom UA 93
C) Warning the Russians
D) More false alarms
1. Delta 89 / Chicago
2. Air Canada
3. KAL 85
4. US Air 36
E) SCETANA

V. Lessons
A) Indications and Warnings
B) Command and Control
C) Homeland Defense

PART TWO

I. Emergency Readiness on September 10th

A) General Principles
1. Public sector entities
2. Building owners of WTC
 DRAFT 08/26/03

3. Tenants of WTC
4. Pentagon
B) Response upon Impact
1. Tower 1
2. Tower 2
C) Critical Choices (8:46 prior to towers failing)
1. NYPD
2. FDNY
3. Private sector
4. NY OEM
5. FEMA
6. Other(s)
D) Collapse
1. NIST structural assessment of why the towers fell
2. Other(s)

II. Pentagon
A) What happened (damage, fire, casualties)
B) Critical choices

III. Consequence Management

A) Rescue
B) Security

IV. The Remains of the Day

A) NY response
B) Pentagon response
C) Recovery and initial lessons learned (NY and Pentagon)

V. Crisis Management for National Recovery

A) Agenda at Cabinet level September 11
B) Process for taking decisions
C) Reflections (what worked and didn't work)
D) How critical private sector actions turned out to be

VI. Lessons Learned and Best Practices