Past Sufferings, Present Glories:

Grassroots Neo-Nazi Extremism in the Russian Federation

Jennifer Sorensen Rider University Spring 2012 Advisor: Lucien Frary

Introduction
In 2007, a gruesome online video of skinheads brutally murdering two minorities went viral in Russia. The video was released in response to the arrest of 22 year-old Maxim Tesak Martsinkevich, the leader of the defense branch of a major neo-Nazi organization.1 Tesak was responsible for many other viral videos of the same nature of skinheads ganging up on unsuspecting minorities, burning their passports and beating them almost to death. It was his

job to create propaganda for his organization, and he took great pride and pleasure in doing so. Since his arrest, he has become a martyr for todays grassroots neo-Nazi movement in Russia.2 But how did such a movement even begin? And more importantly, how did it become so capable of widespread violent destruction? Given the stormy history of Russian-German relations in the twentieth century, the emergence of mainstream neo-Nazism in Russia appears unusual. The Soviet Union became a world superpower for crushing the Nazi regime in World War II, but a few decades later, it became the home of a new ultra-patriotism which propagated the very ideology they had defeated. Journalists and human rights activists are especially perplexed by the emergence of neo-Nazism in Russia in the 1990s, interpreting it as a complete shift between the extremes of linear politics.3 However, further examination of the history of far right-wing ideologies shows

Julia Vail, Extremist Held After Debate, The St. Petersburg Times, July 6, 2007, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=22228 . C. J. Chivers, Beheading and Shooting by Russian Neo-Nazis on Video, The New York Times, August 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15 /world/europe /15russia.html. 2 Christof Putzel, Vanguard: From Russia With Hate, Current TV, 2007, http://current.com/shows/vanguard/ 84906361_from-russia-with-hate.htm. 3 Steven Lee Myers, In Russian City, a Rampage of Ethnic Violence, The New York Times, September 13, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/13/world/europe/13russia.html?pagewanted=all. Sergey Stephanishev and Semyon Charny, Neo-Nazi Trends in the Country that Defeated Fascism, Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 2005, http://antirasizm.ru/lv/English_rep_007.doc.

that todays neo-Nazi organizations have deep roots in the Russian past. The objective of this essay is to challenge the notion that neo-Nazism is a new phenomenon for Russia. This essay investigates the rise of grassroots neo-Nazism in Russia during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It aims to demonstrate that the theoretical underpinnings of post-Soviet neo-Nazism not only existed for a very long time in Russia, but they also had a substantial following. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union created a state of national crisis which exacerbated the appeal of neo-Nazism and extreme patriotism. Part one of the essay investigates the theoretical underpinnings of neo-Nazism. It tracks the development of far-right ideas in Russia over time and demonstrates that ideas like xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and ethnic superiority maintained their allure. The period from the 1970s to the 1990s is especially important to understanding the current neo-fascist movement because it was during this time when major beliefs like ethnic superiority and anti-Semitism began to take root. Nikita Khrushchevs de-Stalinization initiative left many people confused about their culture and identity as Russians. 4 Despite strong laws regarding freedom of speech and press, a new awakening of Russian nationalism flourished at this time. Part two of the essay analyzes the waning years of the Soviet Union and the birth of the Russian Federation. It addresses the new realities and sufferings that overwhelmed Russians during the collapse of the Soviet empire. The state of national crisis in the early 1990s and new rights of self-expression served as a catalyst for the far-right extremists to finally try and make an impact in Russian society. It is essential to understand the social and political climate in which the first neo-Nazi groups emerged. In order for a society to combat neo-Nazism, the social

William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 270-299.

context of the dawn of such a movement must be understood, for this will shed light on the frustrations and beliefs of the movements biggest followers. The core of the essay, part three, focuses exclusively on prominent groups that emerged during the first wave of neo-Nazism from 1985 to 1999. This part closely examines two groups in particular: Pamyat and Russian National Unity (RNE). Pamyat was the first largescale group in Russia that promoted radical anti-Semitism and ethnic superority. While no longer active, Pamyat is the group in which later neo-Nazi leaders began their affiliation with this movement. RNE took the reins of Russian neo-Nazism in 1990, introducing military-esque physical training and the glorification of violence to the neo-Nazi agenda. This had enormous implications for the future of Russian neo-Nazism; todays leading neo-Nazi groups, like the one led by Tesak, still partake in paramilitary training and activism. The essay concludes with a brief examination of the neo-Nazi movements second wave in Russia, from 2000 until the present. There are many differences between the first and the second wave, primarily that the second wave is much more aggressive. The escalation of neoNazi violence and hate crimes is often attributed to the lack of attention given to the first wave of neo-fascism. In modern times, racist extremism is often ignored in scholarly discussions. There is a general concern that by including groups like Pamyat or ideologies like neo-fascism in intellectual discourse, scholars may inadvertently make these social forces seem like legitimate matters worthy of their recognition. However, this practice is flawed. Failing to acknowledge the severity of such issues has never proved successful. Intolerance of this caliber must be fully understood in order to directly combat its cultural persistence and influence. By addressing the

significance and appeal of grassroots neo-Nazism in Russia, this essay challenges the prevailing method of dealing with modern discriminatory movements.

Survey of Sources and Literature

This essay draws on a variety of primary sources, ranging from street graffiti to reports by international human rights organizations. 5 Leading neo-Nazi organizations utilize the

internet to spread their ideas. Publications from these organizations, as well as photographs and slogans from neo-Nazi rallies, are widely available on the websites of individual organizations.6 Russian human rights organizations, like the SOVA Center and the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, published many elaborate reports on the dangerous of neo-fascist extremism. 7 After statistics of hate crimes in Russia reached alarming rates in the 2000s, Amnesty International published similar comprehensive studies.8 Newspapers of the Russian far-right, like Pamyat and Russkoye Voskreseniye, are difficult to find, especially if they were published before the dawn of the internet. But scholars have preserved and translated important articles from this time; these are either printed full-text in secondary literature or published in anthologies of Soviet

John Bushnell, Paranoid Graffiti at Execution Wall: Nationalist Interpretations of Russias Travail, in Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev , ed. Adele Marie Barker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) 397-413. 6 Russian National Unity, Archive of All-Russian Newspaper Russian Order, http://soratnik.com/ main/english.html. Movement Against Illegal Immigration, News, http://www.dpni.org/articles/publikacii/. Slavic Union, History of the White Race and the Ideology of National Socialism, http://www.demushkin.com/content/articles/. 7 Semyon Charny, Skinheads in Contemporary Russia, Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 2005, http://antirasizm.ru/lv/English_rep_015.doc. Murders and Attacks Based Upon Aggressive Xenophobia, Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 2008, http://antirasizm.ru/lv/English_chrono_002.doc. SOVA Center, Crime and Punishment Statistics, http://sova-center.ru/files/xeno/tables-10-10-18.doc. 8 Amnesty International, Dokumenty!: Discrimination on Grounds of Race in the Russian Federation (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2003). Amnesty International, Russian Federation: V iolent Racism Out of Control, 2006, http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR46/022/2006/en/3b1925a5 -d432-11dd-8743d305bea2b2c7/eur460222006en.pdf.

journalism.9 Keston College in England has a voluminous archive of samizdat papers from the 1970s and 1980s, including issues of Veche and Moskovskii Sbornik, some of the first significant far-right journals.10 Other Russian newspapers from this time, such as Izvestiya and Pravda, documented the emergence of neo-Nazi groups in the late 1980s, paying close attention the activities and leadership of Pamyat.11 Although the Russian neo-Nazi movement is a recent phenomenon, post-Soviet politics and society are well-documented in scholarship by historians, political scientists, journalists, and anthropologists. Walter Laqueurs Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia is one of the first historical publications on this topic.12 His major contribution to this field is that he establishes a continuity between the far-right ideas of the 1970s and the far-right extremism of the 1990s. Laqueur also launched this topic into the spotlight of academia and is potentially responsible for the mass amount of literature on this subject since 1993. Anti-Semitism has a very deep history in Russia and has long been closely linked to Russian ethnic nationalism and right-wing politics.13 Supplementing the work of Laqueur, Semyon Rezniks The Nazification of Russia is an elaborate study of modern anti-Semitism in the Russian Federation.14 The book uniquely synthesizes Rezniks personal observations of Russian anti-Semitism with sophisticated

Vladimir Petrov, Pamyat and Others, in Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press, ed. Isaac J. Tarasulo (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1989) 143-153. 10 Stephen K. Carter, Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow (New York: St. Martins Press, 1990), 107. 11 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 113. Isaac J. Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1989). 12 Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993). 13 Salo W. Baron, The Russian Jew Under Tsars and Soviets (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., inc., 1976). I. Michael Aronson, Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990). Zwi Gitelman, A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present (New York: Random House, 1988). 14 Semyon Reznik, The Nazification of Russia: Anti-Semitism in the Post-Soviet Era (Washington: Challenge Publications, 1996).

historical analysis. Rezniks work sheds light on the return of anti-Semitism in the 1980s and why right-wing nationalism is still connected to this ancient discrimination. Lastly, Robert Service, an established historian of modern Russia, published an elaborate examination of Russian society and daily life during the last few years of the USSR.15 Russia: Experiment With A People provides broader historical context for the fall of the Soviet Union and brilliantly captures the mood and struggles of every day Russians at this critical time. Scholars are just beginning to recognize the significance of the far-right wing in postSoviet Russia. A majority of works on the subject focus only on Russian ultranationalism in the political domain.16 Although there are a number of influential Russian politicians who are allies of the neo-Nazis, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Nikolai Kuryanovich, the grassroots movement is still neglected in academic works. Russian Nationalism: Yesterday, Today,

Tomorrow by Stephen Carter focuses on nationalist thought between the 1970s and the 1990s and how it became more paranoid, extremist, and defensive near the end of the Soviet Union.17 Carter focuses mostly on Russian politicians and parties, but he takes time to address Pamyat and its appeal to patriotism at this turbulent time. Stephen Shenfields Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements offers a comprehensive study of Russian fascism at the political and cultural level.18 Shenfields greatest contribution to the scholarship on grassroots neo-fascism is a lengthy chapter on RNE a prominent yet under-studied organization.

15 16

Robert Service, Russia: Experiment With a People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Stephen E. Hanson, Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Mikhail A. Alexeev, Ballot-Box Vigilantism? Ethnic Population Shifts and Xenophobic Voting in Post-Soviet Russia, Political Behavior 28:3 (2006): 211-240. Alexander Verkhovsky, Ultranationalists in Russia at the Onset of Putins Rule Nationalities Papers 28:4 (2000): 707-722. 17 Carter, Russian Nationalism. 18 Stephen D. Shenfield, Russian Fascism: Traditions, Tendencies, Movements (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).

The most valuable works on Russian affairs in the 1990s are by journalists who personally witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union and experienced the following period of national crisis.19 Lilia Shevtsovas Putins Russia and Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies provides a vivid image of the social issues which plagued Russia in the 1990s.20 Shevtsova does not explicitly address the threat of far-right extremism, but she paints a vivid picture of the experience of the masses during this transitional period. Finally, the neo-Nazi subculture has recently gained attention from anthropologists. Hilary Pilkingtons study Russias Skinheads: Exploring and Rethinking Subcultural Lives addresses the subculture of skinheads and their ties to racism and second-wave Russian neo-Nazism.21 This study explains how and why this subculture and its associated ideas still attract followers; she believes that the subculture offers a comforting feeling of solidarity. This bond is a primary factor of why todays youth find themselves drawn to the skinhead subculture.

Part I: Theoretical Underpinnings

The Russian Question
The history of Russian nationalism is rich and cannot be briefly summarized in one essay. While it is of immense historical significance, Russian nationalism is outside of the scope of this

19 20

David Remnick, Lenins Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New York: Random House, Inc., 2003). Lilia Shevtsova, Putins Russia, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, trans. Arch Tait (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 21 Hilary Pilkington, Elena Omelchenko and Albina Garifzianova, Russias Skinheads: Exploring and Rethinking Subcultural Lives (London: Routledge, 2010).

essay and has been researched and documented with great sophistication elsewhere. 22 However, the new Russian far-right frequently evoked nationalist sentiment from the nineteenth century and the Soviet era. Therefore, the evolution of the Russian ethnic identity and patriotism during these eras should be discussed. The Russian Empire (1721-1917) gained international power and prestige after Peter the Greats (1696-1725) modernization efforts. As a result, the line distinguishing Russia from Western Europe became blurred. Nationalism was one of the few things that could preserve a sense of national individuality and uniqueness.23 While Western European nationalism typically nation as a civic or territorial-political unit, Russian nationalism defined it by its ethnic populations and, more specifically, their shared blood and heritage. 24 The Eastern Orthodox Church and the Russian language were key aspects of the Russian national identity. Orthodoxy and the Slavic language made Russia stand out among the other European powers. Russians were unique: neither Eastern nor Western, neither European nor Asian. 25 All of these things the shared ethnicity, the uniqueness of Russia played a big role in the shaping of the national Russian identity, which was promoted and praised by Russian nationalists. Slavophilism, an intellectual movement which highlighted Slavic ethnicity and denounced the West, emerged in Russia during the 1840s and 1850s. As Hans Rogger writes: All [the Slavophiles] abhorred in the empire created by Peter the Great from its capital with its non-Russian and aspect and its Prussianized army and civil service

22

Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 189-274. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 67-111, 155-162. 23 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 5-10. 24 Ibid., 4. 25 Ibid., 6-7.

to the injustices a Europeanized upper class inflicted on an enserfed people seemed to them to be of Western origin.26 Slavophilism was a response to the growing presence of Western culture and ideas in Russia. Slavophiles were very critical of the West, asserting that they were too individualistic, and they were nearly always at war with one another or in some type of turmoil. They believed Western civilization had reached its peak, and Russia was going to be the next leader of progress. 27 Some Slavophiles also promoted pan-Slavism, the belief that all Slavs should live unified in one country.28 Slavophilism was not nearly as defensive or exclusionary as the neo-fascists of the 1990s, but the far-rights appeal to the Russian culture and ethnicity, as well as its anti-Western sentiment, was undoubtedly influenced by Slavophile literature. It was never the intention of the Slavophiles to inspire such a violent and paranoid ultranationalism, but they are still a critical part of the prehistory of the Russian far-right.29 The uniqueness of the Russian ethnicity was undermined by the Bolshevik revolutions of 1917, albeit briefly. One of the key tenets of Marxism-Leninism is the rejection of bourgeois imperialism, for it was unfair for a wealthy, capitalist country to take over and appropriate a poorer country. This internationalism was reflected in the early policies of Vladimir Lenin.30 After the revolution, Lenin provided the non-Russian ethnic groups of the Soviet Union with rights and opportunities of cultural self-expression. 31 Josef Stalin later reversed this tolerant multiculturalism by creating a new breed of Soviet patriotism, which praised the Russia ethnic

26

Hans Rogger, Russia, in The European Right: A Historical Profile, ed. Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 453. 27 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 16-23. 28 Ibid., 19-21. 29 Rogger, Russia, 453. 30 Geoffrey Hosking, Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Belknap, 2006), 70-89. 31 Service, Russia, 65.

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population over the others. This attitude was reflected in changes in the ethnic composition of the politburo under Stalins rule: as Laqueur writes, The non-Russians who had been so prominent during the Revolution and the Civil War gradually disappeared and were replaced by Molotov and Voroshilov, and later by Zhdanov and Malenkov.32 Stalin also utilized the Second World War to reinforce Soviet patriotism. The war pressed national consciousness deep into the psyche of Russians.33 After the Red Army defeated the Nazis in 1945, Stalin declared that the victory was a result of the traditionally courageous Russian spirit. He also evoked the historical struggle of the Russians, proclaiming that the defeat of Japan was revenge for the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. 34 By 1950, Russian nationalism had found its way back into official state policy.

Russophobia
Post-Soviet Russian nationalism, particularly in the far-right wing, was notoriously paranoid and xenophobic. Russophobia refers to a discrimination or rejection of all things Russian. During the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Russians felt a sense of Russophobia from the outside world, especially from non-Russians living in Soviet republics. The redrawing of Russian borders left twenty-five million ethnic Russians living outside of the new Russian Federation in the territory of newly-independent successor states. These displaced Russians came to receive discrimination from the new governments. As a result, new Russian nationalists became very defensive.35 As the former Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak said,

32 33

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 62. Service, Russia, 53. 34 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 63. 35 Reznik, Nazification, 130.

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A totalitarian system leaves behind it a minefield built into both the countrys social structure and the individual psychology of its citizens. And mines explode each time the system faces the danger of being dismantled and the country sees the prospect of genuine renewal.36 The collapse of the Soviet Union was not only the failure of the longest communist experiment in history, but it was the failure of a uniquely Russian ideology. This was an incredibly humiliating experience which deflated Russian national pride. The new right saw the failure of the previous generation as an opportunity to reclaim Russias role in the world. But rather than collaborating with new world powers and seeking reasonable and progressive reforms, the new right started propagating Russophobia and called for a defensive stance against imagined enemies. Between 1970 and 1990, the stream of Russian nationalism swelled into a flood and the neo-fascist and aggressively anti-Semitic variety of nationalism became more voluble.37 Russophobia permeated Russian national consciousness well into the 1990s. In August of 1999, after a severe bombing of residential buildings in Moscow left over 300 civilians dead, the Kremlin declared that this attack had a Chechen trace. People in Russia immediately became highly suspicious of anybody who looked Chechen, and police began to round up suspected Chechens.38

Right-Wing Extremism
As previously stated, none of the ideas that the post-Soviet far-right promoted were new to Russia. The seeds of this movement were planted long ago, even before the Bolshevik

36 37

Qtd. in Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 37. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 146. 38 Shevtsova, Putins Russia, 36.

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uprising. The Black Hundred movement of 1905 was, as Laqueur describes, a halfway house between the old-fashioned reactionary movements of the nineteenth century and the right-wing populist (fascist) parties of the twentieth. 39 The movement was short lived, but it holds enormous significance with regard to later developments of the far-right. Much like the postSoviet far-right, the Black Hundred was xenophobic and relentlessly anti-Semitic. They

instigated pogroms and public demonstrations against Jewish influence in Russia. Surprisingly, the authorities tolerated these actions.40 The legacy of the Black Hundred also played a role in far-right extremism outside of Russia. After the 1917 revolutions, Black Hundred members fled to Germany and, as Rogger writes, [transmitted] the instructive experience of their brief success and their larger failure to a budding National Socialism.41 One member, M. Markov, even worked for the Nazi Party; he later reflected that the ideology of the Black Hundred was actually very similar to National Socialism.42

Anti-Semitism
Discrimination against Jews is one of the oldest forms of prejudice. In the past, antiSemitism was largely based on religious differences, but it became racial around the end of the nineteenth century. It was during this era that a mysterious document emerged in Russia: the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a conspiracy doctrine that apparently contains verbatim reports of Jewish world leaders and their detailed plot of world domination.43 Some of the accusations it

39 40

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 16-17. Rogger, Russia, 483. 41 Ibid., 499. 42 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 16-17 (footnote 2). 43 Ibid., 32-33.

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made are simply absurd. For example, the Protocols argue that the Elders were behind all political upheavals and assassinations in history, and were responsible for all evil and suffering in the world. However, many people, even Tsar Nicholas II, bought into the myth. 44 AntiSemitism was not only common in Russia at the turn of the century, but it was also endorsed by the Tsar. Nowadays, the Protocols are dismissed as an anti-Semitic hoax, especially after the reputation of anti-Semitism has been permanently stained from the Third Reich. The Protocols were not approved for mass publication under the Soviet Union, but around the 1970s, anonymous dissidents began publishing the Protocols in samizdat papers. These illegal copies reached far and wide in Russia, and are possibly responsible for the extreme anti-Semitism of the new Russian far-right, who praised and quoted the Protocols frequently.45 Anti-Semitism continued to exist during the Soviet era, although beginning in the 1960s it was instead referred to as anti-Zionism. This name change was most likely an effort to distance Soviet ideas from similar views of the Third Reich. Anti-Zionism in the Soviet Union thrived as a result of rising military tensions between Israel and the Soviet-allied Arab countries. The Soviets withdrew all diplomatic ties with Israel after the Six-Day War in June of 1967, in which Israeli forces humiliated Arab militaries with a quick and crushing defeat. The 1973 Yom Kippur War ended similarly.46 But the Russian anti-Zionist literature of this time was not limited to criticizing Israel. As Laqueur writes, It is clear from this literature that the target was not a small state in the Middle East whose existence was of some limited interest to Soviet policy

44 45

Qtd. in Laqueur, Black Hundred, 33. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 78. 46 Reznik, Nazification, 35-36; Laqueur, Black Hundred, 107.

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makers.47 Soviet anti-Zionist literature was the same racial anti-Semitism, just under a new name. Not surprisingly, a majority of the previous anti-Zionist writers joined the developing farright movement at this time. The rise and fall of the Third Reich largely discredited anti-Semitism as the world saw the horrors that can result from state-orchestrated discrimination. One fundamental development of post-World War II anti-Semitism is Holocaust revisionism the belief that the atrocities committed by the Third Reich were either overstated or, in more extreme cases, a complete myth. Holocaust revisionism emerged as a way to defend anti-Semitism against its now Once anti-Zionist literature was approved by the Soviet

permanently-tarnished reputation.

censors, Holocaust revisionism works were also widely published. One work from the mid1970s argued the following: Hitler and the other Nazi leaders had been mere puppets in [the Jews] hands; they had incited Hitler to make war against the Soviet Union in 1941. They had connived with Hitler at the destruction of certain groups of poor Jews during the Second World War, but the number of Jews killed had been grossly exaggerated. The aim of this intrigue was to get international sanction for the establishment of the state of Israel. But Israel was a mere sideshow; the real aim was world domination.48 In the 1980s, the Russian prejudices towards Jews changed in response to new attitudes in the USSR. As Russians began to re-evaluate and even criticize the Soviet Union and

communism, the far-right began to tweak their arguments to this new perception. Rather than accusing Jews of being anti-communist, they started to emphasize the involvement of Jews in the Bolshevik revolution and how this involvement brought untold misery on the Russian

47 48

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 108-09. Ibid., 107.

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people.49 The combination of the politically unstable 1980s in Russia and the re-emergence of the Protocols was dangerous: The intricate conspiracy theories of the Protocols, which are impervious to proof or disproof, have fallen on fertile ground in the current state of confusion and rapid but often ill-considered political reform. The search for scapegoats and Zionist conspirators has begun.50 This left a major imprint in Russian society. One telephone poll in Moscow from 1992 reported that 18% of respondents strongly believed that the Russian people had become victims of the Jewish conspiracy, and 25% of respondents considered this explanation of their hardships a serious possibility. 51 Anti-Semitism is unfortunately a long-term trend in Russia and it continues to be a problem today.

Part II: The Fall of the USSR

On Christmas Day in 1991, after ruling the Soviet Union for a tumultuous six years, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made his last television address to the Russian people, indicating the end of the Soviet government. 52 The dissolution of the Soviet Union had enormous consequences on all aspects of Russian life. Russians found themselves overwhelmed with urgent social issues; nationwide anxiety and uncertainty emerged as people in the new Russian Federation had no idea what was in store for them. Once again in her stormy history

49 50

Ibid., 109. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 109. 51 Reznik, Nazification, 12. 52 Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition, 333.

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Russia has entered a smuta, an age of troubles which may last long and the outcome of which is unpredictable.53

The Beginning of the End: Gorbachev and Glasnost

Gorbachev came into power in March of 1985, immediately beginning a new era of Soviet history marked by rapid change. 54 Glasnost, or openness, was the most drastic of Gorbachevs reforms. For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union, the Partys tight grip on civil liberties was loosened. Russians got a small taste of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. On paper, glasnost was a great idea. After decades of oppression, people of the Soviet Union could finally enjoy some simple freedoms. But these new rights awakened the people of the Soviet Union. Coupled with the abundance of social issues plaguing Soviet society at this time, glasnost was a catalyst in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, and from this rubble would emerge the first wave of neo-Nazism. A majority of the new voices that emerged under glasnost were critics of the Soviet state and, consequently, Gorbachev. His reputation among young Soviets and the new far-right was tarnished. Membership in Komsomol, the state youth organization, declined by four million people from 1985 to 1988; Gorbachevs reforms did not put as much pressure onto the Soviet youth to join, but many young people defiantly decided not to join as an act of protest.55 It is important to note that the generation of these young dissidents would later make up the majority of the far-right. The far-right that already existed at this time was also upset with Gorbachevs policies not necessarily with glasnost, but they blamed all of Russias current troubles on

53 54

Laqueur, Black Hundred, viii. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 2. 55 Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost, 128.

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Gorbachev (and later on, Boris Yeltsin) for failing to help solve their countrys problems.56 One Pamyat publication in 1988 expressed deep frustration with the regime for not doing enough it asked its readers, What in fact has happened to our country?57 On August 19, 1991, pro-Soviet forces stormed the White House in an attempt to overthrow Gorbachev and steer the Soviet Union away from its current path to self-destruction.58 The conspirators, some of whom were close friends of Gorbachev, formed the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) and declared a state of emergency in Russia. Gorbachev, who was on vacation in the Crimea at the time, was put under house arrest after refusing to comply with their ultimatum of resignation or supporting the coup. 59 As ordered by GKChP members, newscasters announced that the GKChP had taken over the government and that Gorbachev resigned due to health troubles.60 Yeltsin arrived at the White House in the early afternoon and declared the coup unconstitutional. He urged Russians to form a nationwide strike against it. By the end of the day, two crowds of protesters formed outside of the White House: one honoring Yeltsins request of resistance, the other praising the GKChP. By August 21, the coup had failed. Gorbachev returned to Moscow, though the Russia he left was not the same as the Russia he came home to.61 On August 24, he resigned as General Secretary; the Party was dissolved by the Parliament three days later, and Yeltsin became the first President of the new Russian Federation.62

56 57

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 164. Qtd. in Carter, Russian Nationalism, 113. 58 Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition, 332. 59 Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 453-455. 60 Ibid., 465. 61 Ibid.,, 466-468 484-489. 62 Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition, 332.

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The new Russian far-right was very critical of Yeltsin. Aside from already blaming all of Russias current troubles on the administration, they were unhappy with his lack of ethnic patriotism. When he spoke on television, Yeltsin addressed his viewers not as russkie but as rossiyane. The linguistic distinction was deliberate. Russkie is the word for Russians implying ethnicity; it specifically excludes the other national and ethnic groups living in Russia. By contrast, rossiyane is an inclusive word and refers to all citizens of the Russian state.63 This was perhaps an effort to make all ethnicities in the new Russian state feel welcome, unlike Stalins wartime speeches, which specifically praised the russkie Russians over the other Soviet ethnic populations. Neo-Nazi organizations, who constantly employed the slogan Russia for Russians, were very unhappy with their Presidents lack of ethnic Russian pride. 64 Many neoNazis believed that Yeltsin was part of the Jewish anti-Russian conspiracy, believing his name to actually be Borukh Eltsin and spray-painting this in several popular places in Moscow.65

Russias New Problems and the National Identity Crisis

The chaos and instability of Russia during the 1980s and 1990s had a major influence on the new right-wing. According to Service, Russia was in confusion about its borders, national attitudes, institutional legitimacy, and political purposes; Shevtsova adds to this, Russian society, cut off from its traditions, uncertain of the future, disoriented and helpless, was stuck between floors in the elevator of history between past and future. 66 Drug use and drug

addiction rates were at an all-time high, corruption ran deep in the government, and the economy

63 64

Service, Russia, 24. Putzel, From Russia With Hate. Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 86. 65 Reznik, Nazification, 217. Bushnell, Paranoid Graffiti, 402. 66 Service, Russia, 7. Shevtsova, Putins Russia, 40.

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was in shambles.67 The creation of the new Russian Federation did not alleviate any of these issues in fact, Yeltsins Russia sank even deeper into social and economic crisis. Shevtsova lists Russias most pressing concerns of the Yeltsin era as follows: Falling life expectancy (for men, from 64.2 years in 1989 to as low as 57.6 years in 1994); a resurgence of contagious diseases that had been eliminated in the Soviet Union; decaying schools; hundreds of thousands of homeless children; millions of migrants; a shrinking economy during Yeltsins tenure contracted in real terms by 40 percent; and finally, rampant lawlessness and corruption that had become a lifestyle passing for normal.68 The far right saw these general issues as the moral degeneration of Russia. Traditional values were lost. It was very upsetting for them to see what had happened to their beloved Mother Russia, and they sought to re-institute their traditional national values, to establish an atmosphere of stability and continuity.69 Two problems of the Gorbachev era were especially important to the new Russian ultranationalists: first, the slow loss of empire, and second, historys return to Russia. The process of the Soviet collapse began with the 1989 Velvet Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The eastern bloc crumbled as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany,

Romania, and others abandoned communism and declared independence from Soviet control.70 The success of these revolutions inspired national independence movements in other Soviet satellite states like Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.71 As many Soviet republics started to fight for autonomy, it became clear to the rest of the world that communism was not infallible.

67 68

Tarasulo, ed., Gorbachev and Glasnost, 174-176. Shevtsova, Putins Russia, 8. 69 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 161. 70 Service, Russia, 167. 71 Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition, 332.

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Loss of empire and national humiliation can kick nationalism into overdrive, especially during times of social crisis, in which the future of a country is threatened. As Carter further explains, Every great nation faced with a retreat from empire suffers a crisis of identity and a painful but necessary adjustment to new realities. When that nation is a nuclear superpower which has been imbued for decades with a millennial ideology, with expectations (at times fervently believed) of ultimate geopolitical leadership and expansionism, that crisis of identity must indeed be incipiently traumatic.72 Resentment towards other countries grew as a result. Nationalists began to blame the fall of the Soviet Union on the West, the Caucasus anybody but the Russians. Historys return to Russia refers to Gorbachevs brutal honesty about the true history of the Soviet Union, a facet of glasnost. David Remnicks Lenins Tomb argues that historys return to Russia was a major factor of the Soviet Unions collapse, for it imposed a national identity crisis onto Russians.73 Stalins reputation in Russia at this time was still positive despite Khrushchevs de-Stalinization campaign, but as the people of the Soviet Union began to learn of the skeletons in Stalins closet, they became disenchanted with communism and the Soviet Union as a whole.74 In 1990, one Russian colonel was assigned to excavate mass graves of Polish soldiers killed by Stalins orders. With every new grave, he felt himself more deceived. He had believed deeply in Communism and the Soviet Union. He served first in the navy and then, after studying law in Ukraine, signed on in the military for life. He served nearly four years in East Germany and even volunteered to be sent to Czechoslovakia in 1968, the year the Soviet Union crushed the Prague Spring. I was dumb, [he] said. I believed in it all. I would have given my life for the Motherland on a moments notice.75

72 73

Carter, Russian Nationalism, 3. Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 4. 74 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 58. Taubman, Khrushchev, 270-273. 75 Qtd. in Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 5.

21

Russians were faced with the question, What part of our cultural heritage do we accept, and from what do we dissociate ourselves?76

Part III: The First Wave of Russian Neo-Nazism (1985-1999)

Informal groups, which were any sort of organization or club unaffiliated with the Communist Party, emerged in the early 1980s. The appearance of such groups came as a result of the new policy of socialist pluralism, which permitted such groups to exist, just as long as the Communist Party continued to be recognized as the primary authority.77 By 1988, over thirty thousand informal groups were created, some of which fall under the neo-Nazi category. 78 Before discussing any of these groups in-depth, it is important to briefly review some broad characteristics about Russian groups of this nature. Geoffrey Hosking identified three characteristics of the Soviet state that influence these groups: first, such groups formed in a country that had recently broken away from totalitarianism; second, these groups tend not to collaborate with one another for fear of being persecuted by the state; and third, a widespread mood of mutual distrust still exists in Russia despite democratization efforts. This distrust discourages political discussions and, as a result, many informal Russian groups are not politically competent.79 Alexander Verhovsky published his own lists of characteristics about Russian extremist groups since the 1990s. Trademarks of Russian extremism are as follows:

76 77

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 127. Tarasulo, ed, Gorbachev and Glasnost, 127. 78 Petrov, Pamyat, 152. 79 Hoskings ideas are summarized in Carter, Russian Nationalism, 8-9.

22

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

propaganda or practice of political violence; propaganda or practice of violence on national, racial, or religious grounds; formation of combat units; propaganda or attempts at forceful assumption of power; propaganda about conscious, brutal, and systematic violation of human rights, including discrimination on racial or religious grounds.80

Verkhovsky also lists several beliefs that aggressive ultranationalist groups share. First, they emphasize the concept of the Russian people. Second, they share the belief that external forces of evil, such as the West, have been a threat to the Russian people and state in the past, and continue to do so in the future. Third, these groups tend to believe in an international Zionist or Jewish-Masonic conspiracy. Fourth, they possess animosity towards other non-Russians, particularly from Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern Europe. And fifth, the groups support some degree of militarization. They glorify violence and boast of their physical strength and combat-fighting ability.81

Pamyat
Pamyat did not begin as a neo-fascist organization. It was formed around 1979 or 1980 in Moscow, and its initial cause was the restoration of Russian monuments, memorials, and other public historical commemorations hence the name of the group, which means memory in Russian. The organization was legally permitted to exist at this pre-glasnost time because it was actually attached to the Soviet Ministry of Aviation Industry. 82 1985 marked a change in

80 81

Verkhovsky, Ultranationalists, 708. Ibid., 708-709. 82 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 39; 109.

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leadership and direction for Pamyat: Dmitry Vasiliev became one of the groups leaders and changed the drive of the group from community service to extreme patriotism.83 Vasiliev was a freelance painter and actor prior to taking over Pamyat. He came from a poor family and only attended school until the eighth grade. Although he had no experience with politics or collective activism, he had enough charisma and persuasion to mobilize over 20,000 Pamyat members within Moscow. 84 Vasiliev was one of the first neo-Nazi activists to

reintroduce the Protocols to Russia; he frequently quoted them in meetings and rallies and urged his followers to distribute copies of it downtown.85 At one protest, he revealed that copies of the Protocols (as well as other books about the Protocols) were found in Lenins library. He asserted that, if the deified leader of the Bolshevik uprising had faith in the conspiracy, then its legitimacy could not be denied.86 He constantly spewed anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that grew more and more radical by the day. At one 1985 meeting, he argued that the worldwide Zionist conspiracy had planned to take over the world by 2000. He once said that Adolf Eichmann was working for the Zionists, and that the mass murders he was responsible for were only part of the larger Zionist conspiracy. 87 He publically blamed Jewish people for all of Russias ills, like food shortages, Chernobyl, and even alcoholism, claiming that Jews were slipping alcohol into the yogurt supply.88 Occasionally, he would return back to Pamyats initial

83 84

Carter, Russian Nationalism, 109. Petrov, Pamyat, 147. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 112. Petrov, Pamyat, 147. Reznik, Nazification, 108. 85 Although Pamyat emerged at a time when the reputation of Bolshevism was under criticism from many Russians, Pamyat praised Lenin (and oddly enough, Nicholas II); they criticized Trotsky and other notable Jewish Bolsheviks who worked with Lenin in the early days of the USSR. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 110. 86 Reznik, Nazification, 110-111. 87 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 110. 88 Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 90.

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aim of monument restoration, but he blamed the defacing of such monuments on Jews. 89 Vasilievs followers all regarded him as the top expert on the Zionist conspiracy.90 Pamyat already received a lot of publicity prior to Vasilievs membership, but their fanatical anti-Semitism and theatrical public activism brought them even more attention and followers. They marched in black military uniforms and stood in formation as Vasiliev bellowed from his podium. Vasiliev, a brilliant orator, drew in many curious listeners and onlookers.91 Vasiliev was an expert at getting his groups voices heard. They were widely known for their noisy street presence and militant organization.92 In 1987, as a result of persistent rallying in Moscow, Yeltsin agreed to meet with four hundred Pamyat members to discuss their complaints.93 In 1989, Pamyat organized a massive protest outside of the Moscow TV Center in which they rallied against the supposed Jewish manipulation of the media, holding banners that read, We are sick and tired of Tel-Avision! and Give us a Russian TV screen!94 Pamyat frequently made national headlines and eventually gained their own sphere of influence in the Russia press. In 1990, they created and funded their own journal, Pamyat; the following year, they also obtained a radio station. 95 They were also the subject of public deliberation many Russian citizens submitted their criticisms of Pamyat to newspapers, and Pamyat supporters were always quick to respond. Most supporters would write that any

89

Ironically, his organization defaced many Jewish cemeteries and monuments with swastikas and other highly offensive slogans. Carter, Russian Nationalism, 121. Remnick, Lenins Tomb, 86. 90 Reznik, Nazification, 109. 91 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 206; 218. 92 Carter, Russian Nationalism, 125. 93 Carter, Russian Nationalism,110. Reznik, Nazification, 116-117. 94 Reznik, Nazification, 125. 95 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 218-219.

25

criticism or attack on Pamyat was anti-patriotic, and such critics are direct enemies of Russia.96 One supporter even wrote, We know the goals that Pamyat pursues. They are the preservation of cultural monuments and the struggle for society. Stop persecuting Pamyat! 97 Clearly, the message of Pamyat was something that a lot of people were interested in. Despite constant media exposure and a following of tens of thousands, Pamyat started to fracture in 1987 as a result of internal tensions. By 1990, new Pamyats had divided and merged to the point where Vasilievs original group only had a few dozen members.98 The new Pamyats were no different than the original Pamyat in terms of ideology and practice. The division

which offered the most competition to Vasilievs Pamyat was created by Igor S ychev in 1987. Sychevs group was a lot more active and had a better reputation; they committed more time to the original iniative of Pamyat, restoring memorial sites and laying memorial wreaths for military heroes.99 However, Sychev was equally as extreme and anti-Semitic as his rival; he made national headlines after a December 1988 speech in which he blamed a recent and devastating earthquake in Armenia on the Jewish geologists who failed to predict it.100 Though Pamyat was short-lived compared to other neo-Nazi organizations, its significance cannot be overstated. In a crowd of over 30,000 informal groups, Pamyat stood out. They re-ignited paranoid anti-Semitism by mass producing the Protocols. They were rowdy, present, and fully utilized the Soviet press to spread awareness about their ideas. And most importantly, it was the first neo-Nazi organization in modern Russia to gain a substantial

96 97

Carter, Russian Nationalism, 116. Qtd. in Petrov, Pamyat, 146. 98 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 206-213. 99 Ibid., 217. 100 Reznik, Nazification, 124.

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following. It was the first in a field that later on became crowded.101 Decentralized leadership and internal drama led to its demise, but the new branches of Pamyat continued to endorse neoNazi ideas. The leaders of future first-wave and second-wave neo-Nazi organizations often got their start by working with Pamyat. At the very least, Pamyat was the spark that ignited their way of thinking.

Russian National Unity (RNE)

In September of 1990, RNE was created by a disappointed Pamyat member, Alexander Barkashov.102 Barkashov was born to a poor family in Moscow in 1953.103 Like Vasiliev, he had no political experience or expertise, having spent most of his life working as an electrician. He joined the military and did very little in his service, although he boasted to his followers of having direct experience dealing with the Zionist threat to Russia because he purportedly trained Arab troops during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.104 Barkashov was not a great speaker, but he had mastered the art of cultivating his image as an honorable leader through RNE publications. He had a reputation as a courageous national hero, especially after participating in the failed 1993 coup against Yeltsin, for which he served a short prison sentence.105 The size and scope of RNE is a matter of dispute. Naturally, RNE propaganda boasts of having more than 50,000 members throughout Russia. Shenfield argues that it is probably half that amount, while Verkhovsky believes that they only have 15,000 members.106 Prior to their decline, they had documented branches in 350 Russian cities. Their highest concentration of

101 102

Laqueur, Black Hundred, 221. Service, Russia, 240. 103 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 116. 104 Reznik, Nazification, 210. 105 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 118-119. 106 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 160-164. Verkhovsky, Ultranationalists, 717.

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members is in the northern Caucasus (especially in the Stavropol and Krasnodar territories), Voronezh, and Moscow. 107 RNE is organized like a military. It is a centralized hierarchy consisting of three ranks: supporter (storonnik), the lowest level; candidate (spodvizhnik), the middle level; and comrade-in-arms (soratnik), the top.108 Each promotion offers more prestige, which motivates new members to work hard and keep active in order to be promoted. Barkashov joined Pamyat in 1985 and rose quickly through the ranks. In 1989, he was second only to Vasiliev.109 Drama between Vasiliev and Barkashov culminated in 1990, when Barkashov left the group, bringing many members with him. From an objective standpoint, Barkashov was more alluring than Vasiliev. Though Vasiliev was a fantastic speaker, he placed high emphasis on returning Russia to its tsarist, traditional roots. Many of the group members were disgruntled adolescent males who had no interest or appreciation for this traditionalism or their countrys history. RNE draws a lot of inspiration from Hitler and German National Socialism. Barkashov has blatantly admitted, I am a Nazi Our organization is based on National Socialism.110 RNE adopted central facets and symbols of Nazism, but reinterpreted them in terms of Russian patriotism. For example, they justified their use of the swastika by claiming it was an ancient symbol popularly used throughout Russian history. They have also claimed that their black uniforms are a tribute to the Black Hundred movement of the early 1900s.111 RNE, like most far-right extremists, believe in the international Jewish conspiracy. In 1994, Barkashov wrote

107 108

Reznik, Nazification, 211. Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 164. Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 130-31. 109 Ibid., 117. 110 Qtd in Reznik, Nazification, 212. 111 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 119 .

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that the creation of the Russian Federation restored the rule of Jewry in Russia. As a result, the Russians were now threatened by Jewish-orchestrated enslavement or genocide but, as Barkashov declared, the era of Russia approaches.112 Barkashov also believes that there are two centers of Russophobic hostility in the world: the first is the Western center, which is led by the United States and the Jewish financial oligarchy, and the second is the Eastern center, which includes Japan, India, and China. The Eastern center allegedly relieves its domestic problems, such as overpopulation, by sending their people to conquer Russian land. 113 Prospective members also have to pass a preliminary screening in which they prove the ethnic purity of their ancestors and that their bloodline is clear of any undesirable traits.114 Accepted members are then required to undergo combat training and political instruction.115 RNE was much more radical than Pamyat. It must be remembered that Barkashov is a man who has broken away from an existing extremist organization on the grounds of insufficient extremism.116 RNE leaders have even drafted official RNE policies that would be implemented if RNE were to take power over Russia. Their nationalities policy is left vague, perhaps deliberately; members of the Russian press claim to have secret RNE documents that hint at enforcing genocidal policies against non-Russians. They also would ban mixed-race

marriages.117 RNE has a stronger mastery of propaganda and the press. They create black propaganda forged propaganda against them from their adversaries, in an attempt to either

112 113

Qtd. in Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 121. Ibid., 122. 114 Ibid., 114-115; 133. 115 Ibid., 133. 116 Ibid., 240. 117 Ibid., 124-125.

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gain more publicity or counter popular criticisms in their own publications.118 Towards the end of the 1990s, RNE spent less time protesting and more time inciting ethnic violence. Members of RNE have never faced serious charges for these actions, even though it is widely believed that they were involved with the rise of murders and hate crimes during this time. Many observers believe that RNE has some form of protection within the legislative and judicial branches of government.119 For the first time in the history of RNE, the Moscow city government launched an antiRNE campaign in 1998. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, declared in 1998 that an upcoming RNE Central Committee conference would not be permitted and, furthermore, all future RNE conferences would be banned. 120 This is the only instance to date of Russian

governmental interference with neo-Nazi extremism. RNE still had the right to assemble and express themselves in Moscow, but the Mayors campaign against them seriously weakened their regional influence.121 In 2000, RNE ousted Barkashov as their leader, unsatisfied with how he handled the Mayors campaign. It has since, like Pamyat, splintered in several directions.122 Despite its downfall, RNE left a huge impact on Russian society and held enormous appeal. It helped mobilize the post-Soviet generation towards neo-Nazism. Not only would the major groups of the second wave of neo-Nazism form under previous RNE leaders, but these groups also continued RNEs militant and violent style of activism. Their appeal to the Russian youth cannot be overstated. The combat skills that all RNE members learned (for free) improved

118 119

Ibid., 144-145. Ibid., 168-171. 120 Ibid., 182-183. 121 Ibid., 184-185. 122 Ibid., 186.

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self-esteem of members and also equipped them to enter certain job fields. Sometimes, RNE would even arrange jobs for its members, utilizing its ties with private companies that funded the organization. But most importantly, RNE members felt a sense of purpose in their involvement. As a member of a wolves pack, he would have companionship, a sense of identity and superiority, an outlet for his understandable feelings of frustration and resentment, the security of being reliably protected in a dangerous environment by a powerful organization, the excitement attendant upon the anticipation of violence, and a purpose in life.123 Anna Politkovskaya believed that the strength of the RNE lay in the weakening or collapse of all components of the previous system of upbringing.124 As Russia made its transition from the Soviet Union, important institutions that played a large role in the socialization of young Russians fell by the wayside. Schools, youth organizations, and family lost their importance; RNE stood as the alternative. The RNE may be likened to a suction apparatus, ingeniously designed to draw in the members of Russias abandoned post-Soviet generation and transform them into the foot soldiers of an unknown future war.125

Conclusion: The Future of Neo-Nazism

The Second Wave of Russian Neo-Nazism: 2000 Present
In 2003 and 2006, Amnesty International published comprehensive reports on the violent racism and discrimination in Russia, criticizing Russia for violating numerous international human rights treaties and conventions they have signed and ratified.126 Law enforcement and other local authorities insufficiently protect ethnic minorities who are attacked (or at risk of

123 124

Ibid., 134. Politkovskayas findings are summarized in Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 135. 125 Shenfield, Russian Fascism, 135. 126 Amnesty International, Dokumenty. Amnesty International, Russian Federation.

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attack) from new neo-Nazi organizations.127 The SOVA Center documents 3,559 hate crimes in Russia between 2004 and 2010, 498 of which were murders, and fifty percent of which occurred within Moscow. 128 Two murders in particular drew international attention: the first on

September 21, 2003, in which a six year-old Tajik girl, Nilufar Sangboyeva, was murdered in St. Petersburg.129 In February of the following year, Khursheda Sultanova, a nine year-old girl of Tajik descent, was stabbed nine times, also in St. Petersburg. 130 International human rights organizations can only do so much to promote awareness of the abundance of hate crimes in Russia true change must come from the federal government. The second wave of neo-Nazism is dominated by three organizations: the National Socialist Society (NSO), led by Dmitri Rumyantsev; Slavic Union (SS), led by Dmitri Demushkin, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI).131 In addition to annual marches on Adolf Hitlers birthday and regularly protesting in public, these organizations have efficiently utilized the internet to share their ideas and disperse propaganda. For example, Slavic Unions website offers free access to 437 elaborate articles by notable Holocaust revisionists.132 Some organizations, especially the NSO, upload videos and photos of members violently attacking ethnic minorities or participating in physical training exercises. 133 By using the internet as their primary tool of outreach, second wave neo-Nazi groups can now spread their ideas to

127 128

Amnesty International, Dokumenty, 26-30. SOVA Center, Crime and Punishment Statistics, 1. 129 Charny, Skinheads, 4. 130 Despite witnesses stating her assailants were yelling neo-Nazi slogans like Russia for Russians! at the time, the charges for racially-motivated crime were dropped; the suspects were either charged with hooliganism, or found entirely not guilty. Amnesty International, Russian Federation, 21-22. 131 Putzel, From Russia With Hate. Stephanishev and Charny, Neo -Nazi Trends, 4. Amnesty International, Russian Federation, 27. 132 Slavic Union, Holocaust Revisionism ( ), http://www.demushkin.com/revisio/. 133 Putzel, From Russia With Hate.

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more people and places than ever before. intimidating reputation.

They can also maintain their dangerous and

Like their predecessors, the organizations of the second wave are not unified. The organizations themselves remain decentralized in leadership; regional branches do not have to report to one central leader. This lack of clarity and organization is, once again, a major reason why the neo-Nazi movement lacks political potential. Although there is one political party in Russia the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) that expresses racist and far rightwing beliefs, most Russians regard its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as a buffoon. In the past, he has expressed quite irrational and obnoxious beliefs: he will bury radioactive waste along Russias border with Lithuania and then install fans to blow radiation into the betrayer republic; he will replace all dark-haired or dark-eyed television employees with blonde, blueeyed announcers; he believes that Jews provoke anti-Semitism and has openly stated that some of Hitlers ideas were not so bad.134 Zhirinvosky has run for president in nearly every election, but has never received more than ten percent of the votes.135 According to a study in Political Behavior, most of Zhirnovskys votes are a response to major shifts in regional ethnic population, and these voters typically live in regions that have very high concentrations of other ethnicities the highest share of Slavs voted for Zhirinovsky in the ethnically mixed VolgaUrals area.136 The political future for the grassroots neo-Nazis look bleak, but what they lack in unity and political ability they make up for in violence and fear-mongering. Recent events in Russia have shifted the attention of grassroots organizations to protesting Vladimir Putins

134 135

Reznik, Nazification, 8. Verkhovsky, Ultranationalists, 718. 136 Alexseev, Ballot-Box Vigilantism, 211.

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United Russia party for electoral fraud, which could alter the prospects of neo-fascist influence in Russias future.137 It is clear by the continuation of such neo-Nazism that this new Russian extremism will not go away. Individual organizations have splintered and failed, but their ideas persist. In the past, the federal government has responded with apathy or ignorance. Even though Yeltsin met with Pamyat members in 1987, he never addressed the growing threat of racist extremism in any of his speeches.138 Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev have occasionally remarked that neoNazi extremism will not be tolerated in Russia, but no real action followed.139 History shows that anti-Semitism and other forms of blind discrimination have the potential to mobilize masses into persecuting and exterminating entire populations. In order to confront the threat and

influence of any dangerous extremist movement, the appeal of such a movement must be analyzed and understood, and federal intervention is absolutely necessary. The emergence of neo-Nazi extremism in the waning days of the Soviet Empire should not be perceived as unprecedented. The ideological foundations of this movement are deeply embedded in Russian history and continued to hold relevance and allure throughout the twentieth century, even during a totalitarian regime. Soviet leaders constantly promoted the resilience of the Russian spirit and pardoned overt anti-Semitic publications. The seeds of neo-fascist

extremism were sown long before the Soviet Union began to decline. The mood of national anxiety that the fall of the Soviet Union created was a breeding ground for paranoid nationalist

137

Michael Schwirtz, Russian Liberals Growing Uneasy With Alliances, The New York Times, January 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/world/europe/russian-liberals-weigh-alliance-with-nationalists.html. 138 Laqueur, Black Hundred, 207. Reznik, Nazification, 217. 139 In fact, the federal governments actions have done more harm than good. In 2001, Russia launched a State Program on Tolerance and Prevention of Extremism in Russian Society, which would fund anti-racist education in Russian schools until 2005. But in 2004, the funding for the program was cut. Amnesty International, Russian Federation, 26-27.

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extremism. The humiliating defeat of communism left many Russian patriots longing to restore Russias international reputation, and for people like Tesak, neo-fascism was well-equipped to fulfill this challenge. Organizations such as Pamyat and RNE lacked the skill and leadership to infiltrate the political domain, but their mastery of mass communication and violence make them and their second-wave successors a force to be reckoned with.

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