Sie sind auf Seite 1von 1

Repu bli c v.

Purisi ma

Fact s:

A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in
the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff
being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,
Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits
of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be
shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of
Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Iss ue:

WON the respondent’s decision is valid

Rulin g: No.

Rat io na le:

The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent."

"The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is a
logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right as
against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a
principle does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for its
continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of their
money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to
judicial tribunals for final adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in
practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-
widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist,
is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of
what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so many
years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co.,
Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]

***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by
Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding
force on the government.