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Mohamed Soffar

The Political Theory of

Sayyid Qutb
A Genealogy of Discourse

Verlag Dr. Kster Berlin

Schriftenreihe Politikwissenschaft
Bd. 6

D 188
(Dissertation Freie Universitt Berlin)

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet ber abrufbar.

1. Auflage Oktober 2004 Copyright 2004 by Verlag Dr. Kster 10965 Berlin

Verlag: Dr. Hans-Joachim Kster, Eylauer Str. 3, 10965 Berlin Tel.: 030/ 76403224 Fax: 030/ 76403227 e-mail:

ISBN 3 - 89574 - 539 - 1



The Political Theory of Sayyid Qutb A Genealogy of Discourse

Presented by

Mohamed Soffar
from Cairo, Egypt

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Friedemann Bttner Zweitgutachterin: Prof. Dr. Gudrun Krmer Eingereicht am 04.04.2004 Disputation am 27.09.2004

Table of Contents
Introduction .......1 Research problem ........2 Hypotheses and case-study ...3 Scope, task, and structure of the study .......5 Meta-methodology .......9 Conceptual framework .........14

Introductory remarks ...48 Chapter One Temporal Dislocation.......52 The conception of time .......52 Modernitys time consciousness ..54 Modernization and temporal dislocation .......56 The first scene: Temporal disembeddedness .....59 The second scene: Temporal annexation ..65 The third scene: Present-imprisonment ....71 The Muslim Daseins closed temporal horizon .83 Chapter Two Cultural Schizophrenia.....86 Heideggers conception of Understanding ....86 The existential conception of schizophrenia .....91 Symptoms of cultural schizophrenia ....93 The first scene: Structural violence ....105 The second scene: Structural duality ..115 The Muslim Daseins no-where reality ...122 Chapter Three Existential Anxiety...125 Heideggers notion of death ..125 The existential structure of anxiety ....129 The scene of secularization ...138 The Muslim Daseins encounter with death 155 Chapter Four The Being Question...158 Shakib Arslan ...158 Muhammad Abduh ...161 Ali Abdul-Raziq ...165 Taha Hussein ...169 Rashid Rida .................................................................................................172 Hasan al-Banna 175

Introductory remarks .... 182 Chapter One Enunciative Function......188 Qutbs discourse as a theatrical experience .188 Dramatic environment ..189 Qutbs conception of critique ....190 Qutbs strategies of critique ...193 Qutbs innovation of the Being question 208 Chapter Two Discursive Themes.....217 Dramatic construct ...217 The climax of Qutbs dramatic performance ...218 Flashback to the beginning of Qutbian drama .225 The middle of Qutbs dramatic performance ..228 The solution of the Qutbian dramatic plot ...231 An open-end style of Qutbs dramatic performance ....234 Chapter Three Concepts...244 Language of drama ...244 Qutbs inner language of authenticity and consistency ...245 Qutbs outer language of the tree of Islam ....249 The root level of Aqida, fitra, and reality ...251 The stem level of Sharia, fiqh, and Manhadj ..256 The fruit level of Niam and peace .263 Djihad and the natural growth of Qutbs dramatic language levels ...269 Chapter Four Objects...277 Dramatic characters ..277 The nature of Qutbs dramatic conflict ...278 The main characters of Qutbs dramatic performance ..278
The protagonist camp of Islam .278 The antagonist camp of Homo Occidentalus .....284 The swingers camp of masdjid al-dirar ..291

The choral characters of Qutbs dramatic performance 295 Two characters-related end-scenes of Qubs dramatic performance ..300
Blowing off the swingers camp .300 Sayyid Qutb, the director of performance, appears onstage ..302

Introductory remarks .....308 Chapter One Mode of Subjection.....315 Qutbs notion of al-ilal .315 The hermeneutical approach of al-ilal ..320 The hermeneutical mechanisms of al-ilal .325 The rebirth of the Quran 330 Aesthetics of the Quran .331

Politics of the Quran .337 Qutb special emotional experience of the Qurans personal authority ...342

Chapter Two Asceticism..344 Foucaults view of Islamic self-techniques .344 The conceptual substructure of Islamic asceticism ..345 The political economy of obligations .353 Instances of Islamic self-techniques ...358 1. Core self-techniques ..359 2. God-related self-techniques .363 3. Man-related self-techniques 366 4. People-related self-techniques .369 The political nature of Islamic self-techniques 375 Chapter Three Ethical Substance.....377 Kierkegaards definition of the self 377 The basic components of the self ...378 The affective structure of the self ...390 Unique potentialities and capabilities of the self .396 Chapter Four Teleology...403 Islamic teleology ..403 The pillars of the Rabbani-Insani worldliness..404 Uluhiya and Ubudiya .405 Al-kawn (Universe) .............................................................................412 Al-nubuwa (Prophethood) .414 Al-mudjiza al-Quraniya (Quranic miracle) .....416 Al-umma al-wasat (Middle Umma) ......416 Al-imama (Islamic government) 419 Human history ...421 The foundational values of the Rabbani-Insani worldliness .426 Al-iman (Faith) ...426 Al-djamal al-haqiqi al-kamil (Real and perfect beauty) ..427 Al-aqq (Right) ..428 The peak of the Rabbani-Insani worldliness: Global disclosure ...429


Sayyid Qutbs Weltanschauung and political theory .435 Comparison of Qutbs conception of power with other power thinkers ...453 Critique of Qutbs thought by different scholars ...460 Looking back and looking out474

NOTES .....477 REFERENCES .517


Political theory is the pivot of the field of political science; an umbrella discipline as it might be called, it trades concepts, analytical tools, and theoretical constructs with the various political science disciplines. Despite its overtly acknowledged centrality among other political science disciplines, obstacles always confront every attempt to define what political theory can possibly mean or at least to set the boundaries between political theory and other social sciences, not to mention the unsolvable problem of determining its focus of study. Political theory could be presumably defined as the art through which political existence is perceived and such a perception translated into concepts signifying the political phenomenon. I shall draw on Terence Balls endeavor to recycle the work of German conceptual historians in order to remedy the problem of definition. Ball invested the term Critical Conceptual History in his attempt to study conceptual change in Anglophile political discourses. His work shared close affinity with the modern genre known as Begriffsgeschichte, whose leading defender and practitioner is Reinhart Koselleck. Conceptual history, commences Ball, is about conceptual change, the destruction and reconstruction of the world of words in which we live. Don Quixotes dilemma was that he did not grasp the idea of conceptual change, which was that codes and concepts of one age are apt to be unintelligible in another. This would undoubtedly invoke a sense of distance, difference, and incomprehension regarding historical discourses, practices, and institutions. Solving Don Quixotes dilemma means to chase and race the twists and turns of conceptual change in order to understand the present(s) in all their strangeness and uniqueness. This requires us to stretch or even wrack the temporal dimension of our own concepts and categories. Therefore, one of the most crucial tasks of a conceptual historian, suggests Ball, is to address the recurring sense of astonishment and incomprehension, not to make it any less astonishing but to make it more comprehensible and, in doing so, to stretch the linguistic limits of present-day political discourse (Ball, 1988:1-3). While certain types of conceptual change enable us to stretch the critical distance from present discourses and practices, others diminish this capacity and imprison us within the thick, uncrossable walls of the present. If the struggle over the correct concepts, as quoted from Koselleck, becomes socially and politically explosive, then the conceptual historian [shall attempt] to map the minefield, as it were, by examining the various historical turningpoints or watersheds in the history of concepts constitutingpolitical discourse. This involves not only when and for what purposes new and now-familiar words are coined. but tracing changes in the meaning of older terms (9). Lastly, asks Ball what exactly is critical about critical conceptual history? Critical histories, his answer follows, show that conceptual change is not just a possibility for the political discourse but its marking feature. Such histories also highlight the fact that conceptual changes, brought through identifiable processes and mechanisms, are not in the least politically neutral, as they were inspired by agents who transform the discourse of their day. More gravely and reflexively, he warns us in advance that nor, by this same token, can conceptual histories [themselves] be politically neutral [emphasis added] (16-17).

Research Problem:
Don Quixotes dilemma of conceptual change described by Terence Ball was time-bound; the codes and concepts of one age are incomprehensible in another. By contrast, the dilemma underpinning this research problem is context-bound; the codes and concepts of one cultural context are unintelligible and astonishing in another. Such dilemma that pertained to the issue of spirituality or rather political spirituality was expressed in three non-related instances, yet in almost the same words. In a remarkable interview, Abdel Salam Yasin, the leader of the Moroccan Islamic group al-adl wa al-isan complained that pour vous, cette region spirituelle reste volontairement opaque. Vous ne voulez pas y voir, vous ne voulez pas y regarder. Je ne sais pas par quel accident de lhistoire ou par quel malheur lhomo occidentalus, comme vous dites, a gar cet organe qui permet de percevoir les choses spirituelles... Il ne reste sa disposition que les seuls lments danalyse conomique, politique, sociale..., le terrestre en quelque sorte (Burgat, 1988: 71-2). On portraying the Iranian revolutionary drama, the French philosopher Michel Foucault recognized cette chose dont nous avons, nous autres, oubli la possibilit depuis la Renaissance et les grandes crises du christianisme: une spiritualit politique. Jentends dj des Franais qui rient mais je sais quils sont tort (Foucault, 1994: 694). He was even, in a follow-up interview, wondering: people always quote Marx and the opium of the people. The sentence that immediately preceded that statement and which is never quoted says that religion is the spirit of a world without spirits. Let us say, then, that Islamwas not the opium of the people precisely because it was the spirit of a world without spirits (Foucault, 1988: 218). In the introduction of his work The Sufi path of knowledge, the American scholar William Chittick wrote: Many important thinkers have concluded that the West never should have abandoned certain teachings about reality which it shared with the EastOne result of this ongoing research for a lost intellectual and spiritual heritage has been the rediscovery of the importance of imagination. In putting complete faith in reason, the West forgot that imagination opens up the soul to certain possibilities of perceiving and understanding not available to the rational mind (Chittick, 1989: ix). Echoing such issue of spirituality, the research problem sounds as follows: against the background of the medieval religious divisions, controversies, and wars, the Aufklrungimprinted political theory undoubtedly reflected a certain perception of religion with its cultural and historical connotations and embodied an attitude towards, if not against, it with its social and political consequences. Secularization of political theory, which was the other side of the privatization of religion coin, was viewed as one of the most rigid and untouchable landmarks of the political landscape. Political theory has been ever since moving within the entrenchment of a certain conception of the political; a conception based upon unshakable dualities with impassible boundaries, like religion and politics, public and private, and theory and practice. However, the legitimacy and rationalization of such signposts and borderlines must be fundamentally questioned, when another religion and another cultural context are at stake, namely Islam. Religion, on the other side of the Mediterranean, was not a historical correlative of the socio-political existence, but simply its 2

raison d tre. To put it in plain words, what kind of theorization could be produced, if Islam understood, not as a religion in the conventional Western sense of the word, but as a mode of life, a loyalty to a history and a civilization as Foucault put it and as a response to a call that comes from the depth of the human soul as Yasin put it were to be taken as the main basis of such a theoretical venture? How would such an art of theorization be able to perceive the political existence from new angles and to approach and embrace the political phenomenon through a different plethora of concepts? In what way could this endeavor, soaked in the religious heritage of the Wests cultural other, revolutionize a disqualified body of knowledge, reactivate a subjugated set of practices, and finally offer possibilities of self-liberation from the self-imposed pseudo-modernization, with its discontents or malaises, reinforced by the Wests cultural and political domination?

In response to the previous questions constituting the research problem, this work proposes two main hypotheses. First hypothesis: Religion-based aesthetics, artistic understanding of religion, or to use Schleiermachers term Kunstreligion that constitutes a reflection of spirituality opens up different possibilities of perceiving, understanding, and conceptualizing the political phenomenon. Through situating the political phenomenon on a new landscape, where the political and the spiritual encounter and explore each other afresh, such Kunstreligion offers an art of political theorization that transcends what is available to the rational mind in terms of axioms and foundations, consciousness and motivations, objectives and orientations, themes and objects, concepts and approaches, as well as conclusions and consequences. This art-anchored understanding of religion indissolubly hyphenated with political existence, a hyphen this hypothesis is actually situated upon, can be clearly read in the following passages of Sayyid Qutb. Islam is a comprehensive innovate movement in art and life. Islam is an innovate, creative movement that targets to establish a human life unprecedented in pre-Islamic times and unprecedented in all other systems that followed Islam (FTFM: 22). Islam draws a certain picture for human life, a coherent picture, in which the human model to be constructed, the economic and social relations holding the society together, and the system of government and international relations organizing public life are defined (25) Second hypothesis: This art of political theorization premised upon an existential attitude that discards the distinction between theory and practice and substitutes it by a distinct sort of praxis inspires action-oriented politics. Such political theorization does not set as its objective the production of speculative or deductive knowledge that deals with abstract notions and concepts, but actually targets transforming knowledge into a driving force to change reality; hence the action-oriented politics. The quasi-existentialist1 dimension or action-oriented nature of such art of political theorization can be easily spotted in the following statements of Sayyid Qutb. We should be 3

aware of the dangerousness and erroneousness of any attempt to transform the lively dynamic faith, which loves to be personified in a growing, lively, and dynamic reality as well as in an organic dynamic fusion (tadjamu udwi wa haraki), into a theory for study and cultural knowledge (MFT: 45). Its method [i.e. of Islam] is to grow through living persons, active organization, and realistic movement till it reaches its theoretical and practical fruition at one and the same time and does not get separated in the form of a theory but remains personified in the form of a dynamic reality.. Every theoretical growth preceding the dynamic growth of reality and not personified in the latter is an error and a danger according to Islams nature, objectives, as well as its mode of self-construction (46).

In this context, I contend that the intellectual project of Sayyid Qutb represents a suitable case study for responding to the research problem and examining the hypotheses of this work. The various twists and turns of his critical enterprise were able to unchain political theory from a whole mass of notions disseminating the controversies of medieval and Enlightenment axioms. Through retrieving the foundational text from underneath the debris of formalistic legal knowledge (fiqh) and re-evaluating the text from an aesthetic perspective, Qutb produced a religion-anchored art of political theorization, where the political, the aesthetic, and spiritual, though undoubtedly not without problems and tensions, encounter each other; a possibility, albeit long forgotten since the Renaissance and the grand crises of Christianity, never escaped Marx as manifested by his never-quoted statement of the spirit of the world without spirits as Foucault informs us. Four noteworthy considerations, intrinsic to the nature of Qutbs theoretical enterprise, justify committing this study to its full and close scrutiny. 1. The major objective of the Qutbian discourse was the search for identity and authenticity, in the milieu of political, social, cultural, and religious turmoil in the Muslim World in general and in modern Egypt in particular at the turn of the 19th century, and vis--vis the grinding forces of the Wests civilizational challenge (cultural and technical) and its political and military encroachment. 2. The method Qutb pursued this existential question was quite unique in many respects. He followed his target along different lines and on various levels; the constant shifting of his own position (literary criticism, social critique, religiously-oriented political ideology, Quran exegesis) and picking up new intellectual lenses are cases at hand. Qutbs profession as literary critic never left him while proceeding towards his objective, as a consequence he was able to open a novel space in the modern Arab political thought, on which he situated the whole load of our multifarious existence i.e. the aestheticization of existence (conceiving existence as a work of art that blends the sacred and the profane, the earthly and the heavenly, the political and the spiritual). On this level, the retrieved pure essence of Islam can relieve Muslims of their psycho-economic malaise, break down the blockage of their cultural 4

alienation, and provide humanity with a long missed dimension akin to its existence. The exegesis Qutb produced during his long years of imprisonment is quite distinguished by all measures, in the sense that Qutb tried to salvage the pristine message of the text from underneath the ruins of classical fiqh through drawing it to the ground where Qutb himself was a master of letters and the text itself considered a miracle. It is here that Qutb provides a new approach in perceiving the political phenomenon based on the aesthetic reading of the foundational text. 3. Qutbs tragic life, which was sealed by sentencing him to death, invested itself fully in a literary dramatic way to foster the credentials of his intellectual venture. It is not that he became the victim of his political activism or revolutionary ideology. Rather, it was the perfectly full realization of what he aimed at. That is, the re-creation of the self as a piece of art through its involvement in a certain Quranic-based technology of the self, whose other side is revolutionizing of knowledge, to abolish the status quo and create it anew, even at the price of sacrificing this same self. 4. Finally, Sayyid Qutb represents a remarkable figure in the history of Islamic political thought put on par with Ibn Taymiya and Ibn al-Qayyim, but he is nevertheless a most controversial one portrayed in extremely different colors. Although his works, as attested by the number of their editions (in the case of fi ilal al-Quran it is 17 editions) are frequently and widely read, his thinking was never properly debated. The vast literature on his works not just failed to deeply address the intellectual underpinnings of his thought, but also, if taken as a vantage point, thwarted every attempt to reach a suitable perspective for dealing with the problems of Qutbs thought and its resulting controversies. This was either because of ideological partiality that instrumentalizes fragments in his works held as representative of his whole thought for no other purpose than defamation, or because of cultural prejudices that dislodge his works from their context, separating them from their genesis, locus, function, tasks, and objectives in their own cultural system and imposing on them axioms, notions, problems, and experiences of a totally different, if not opposing, cultural context, for no other purpose than condemnation. In both cases, the literature misrepresented and covered up the works of Sayyid Qutb with every print run. Qutb remains the person most spoken of but also the most silenced.

Scope, task, and structure of the study:

Digging out the political theory of Sayyid Qutb, which involves carrying out a conceptual historians role of addressing the recurring sense of astonishment, not to make it less astonishing but to make it more comprehensible, necessitates at the outset determining the scope, task, and structure of the work that addresses itself to such objective. This study focuses on the original works of Sayyid Qutb, after his commitment to the Islamic Weltanschauung; it dispensed with reviewing the secondary literature on Qutb, since such task can only deviate it from its main target, yet certain works of importance shall be 5

consulted in the suitable time and place. Nor does this study provide an intellectual biography of Qutb, since it situates Qutbs works on the intersection-point between the disposition of power relations constituting the historical context, from one side, and the regime of discursive statements making out the discursive space, from another side. A list of Qutbs works, including their reference keys throughout this study, is provided here: 1. (M) Muqaddima, in Al-Nadawi, Abu al-Hassan, Madha khasara al-alam binitat almuslimin?, Cairo: Maktaba Dar al-Uruba, 4th ed., 1961. 2. (MFT) Maalim fi al-tariq, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1980. 3. (AII) Al-adala al-idjtimaiya fi al-Islam, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 12th ed., 1989. 4. (1-6) Fi ilal al-Quran, 6 volumes, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 16th ed., 1990. 5. (SAI) Al-salam al-alami wa al-Islam, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 10th ed., 1992. 6. (AAR) Amrica allati raayt, Alexandria: Al-Madain, 1st ed., 1993. 7. (DI) Dirasat Islamiya, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 9th ed., 1993. 8. (MIR) Marakat al-Islam wa al-rasimaliya, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 13th ed., 1993. 9. (MNA) Manahidj al-naqd al-adabi: usuluh wa manahidjuh, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 7th ed., 1993. 10. (MHD), Al-mustaqbal li-adha al-din, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 13th ed., 1993. 11. (NMI) Nawa mudjtama Islami, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 10th ed., 1993. 12. (IMH) Al-Islam wa mushkilat al-adara, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1993. 13. (TFQ) Al-taswir al-fanni fi al-Quran, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 14th ed., 1993. 14. (FTFM) Fi al-tarikh..fikra wa manhadj, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1995. 15. (MSFH) Muhimat al-shair fi al-aya, Kln: Al-Kamel Verlag, 1 st ed., 1996. 16. (HD) Hadha al-din, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 17th ed., 1997. 17. (KTI) Khasais al-tasawur al-Islami, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 14th ed., 1997. 18. (MTI) Muqawimat al-tasawur al-Islami, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 5th ed., 1997. 19. (MMY) Marakatuna maa al-yahud, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 13th ed., 1997. 20. (TMQ) Tifl min al-qariya, Kln: Al-Kamel Verlag, 1 st ed., 1999. 21. (AR) Afra al-ru, It is worth mentioning that I totally disregarded a collection of some of Qutbs replies to the military prison investigators in 1965, published under the title Limadha adamuni? (Why did they execute me?) in 94 pages, because it is undoubtedly impossible to exclude the probability that such confessions were taken under torture, nor that the Egyptian censor that deliberately leaked such document took the liberty of omitting, adding, and falsifying what ever necessary to incriminate Qutb. I even dispelled the temptation of using any clues or following any leads provided by this document to expand on the controversies of Qutbs thought, for instance those encapsulated in his maalim fi al-tariq. Bringing down to earth the conceptual historians task of mapping the conceptual minefield, in the sense of examining the various turning points and watersheds in the trajectory of concepts constituting political discourse, means that I gave myself the liberty of 6

playing two roles: reader and writer, foregrounding the one in the other. On the one hand, the role of the reader was to reverberate or amplify the two indissociable dialogues constituting the fabric of any work; or as Umberto Eco formulated it: Whrend der Arbeit laufen zwei Dialoge: einer zwischen dem entstehenden Text und allen zuvor geschriebennen Texten (jedes Buch wird aus anderen und ber andere Bcher gemacht) und einer zwischen dem Autor und seinem gedachten Wunsch-, Modell-, oder Musterleser(Eco, 2003: 55). To carry out such role, I had no intention of murdering the author, in the philosophical, literary sense, because, as I wrote somewhere in my work, the Egyptian military authorities spared me that effort and killed the author, in the dictatorial, literal sense. I simply wanted the author to rest in peace by sparing him the police morality promptly followed as his works fell under the inspection of government investigators in his life as well as academic scholars after his death. This confession-oriented morality forced upon our thinker two single choices: either to fully admit the whole list of allegations related to him or to desperately plea for insanity due to long imprisonment and brutal torture. On the other hand, the role of the writer, seen by Eco as a cosmological act, mounted to the construction of a whole world of events, relations, conceptions, images, and persons, a world that gives birth to several Being possibilities, to use Heideggers term, as well as to various Discursive strategies, to use Foucaults. On the intersection-point of possibilities and strategies, one can situate the intellectual project or oeuvre of Sayyid Qutb. It is in this world that I silently slipped, letting myself be carried away by its tides; losing myself to find it again; and bumping into faces I will never have to see in the future. But no matter how high in the cosmos writing can reach, as an act of construction, it remains on the ground regardless of its accuracy and skillfulness applying a language with words, sounds, expressions, images, and rules. Thus, to carry out the cosmological act of writing, I had to start by leveling the linguistic playfield or, to use Wittgensteins favorite term, setting up my own Sprachspiel. Since my work was premised on decentering Universality or representation claims of Western historical experience, fundamental values, as well as ontological categories, it had to confront the problem of writing in a Western language, that is to say, how to communicate to a Western reader a non-Western message by using his own language, though my analysis aims to break with it!! I was faced with the choice of using Western equivalents of Islamic historical and religious terms, a choice that exactly runs opposite to my objective, because it summons images and connotations that can only squeeze the Islamic experience in the medieval box. Had I opted for that choice, I would have ended up defeating myself by disproving, from the very debut, what I set out to prove. However, the choice I opted for throughout my work could be labeled re-initiating tabula rasa; I decided to use the same Arabic words, opening up a new semantic space with novel words, which might at the beginning seem shocking to the readers (in specific those has no prior knowledge of Arabic), before his eyes get familiarized with the new words. Through this option, I can attain all my objectives with one stone, for I will not only purge the cognitive space of the reader from images and connotations of Western equivalents, in fact carrying him away from his own cultural context, but also I will open up a new space that I will authoritatively fill up with Arabic terms independently defined to reflect the particularity of the Islamic experience. 7

Imagine, just for a second, how devastating it could have been to my whole analysis, had I chosen the word dogma as a translation for the Arabic Aqida, instead of using the latter and gradually building up its semantic structure in the mind of the reader. In order to grasp the Qutbian conceptualization of the political phenomenon from within the contours of his intellectual project(s), the structure of my study consisted of the following parts: Part I. The context of Qutbs discursive practice: its main goal was to map the existential condition (temporal dislocation, cultural schizophrenia, and anxiety in the face of death), in which the Muslim Dasein found himself. Such existential condition represents the non-discursive context of the discursive practice of Sayyid Qutb (other intellectual enterprises as well) was anchored in. Added to this, the Muslim Daseins Being question as presented in some monumental attempts to respond, reshape, and even disfigure its almost inalterable formula in terms of concepts, themes, strategies, and objects locates the Qutbian discursive practice in its discursive context. It noteworthy that the purpose of this part is neither to review well-known events nor to reconstruct the history of a certain historical period, but to redraw, based on the works of acknowledged historians, the temporal and spatial contours of the non-discursive context that opened the way for the projection of certain discursive possibilities, among which was Qutbs intellectual project. Notions of repetition, boredom, discontinuity, ugliness, and nonsensicality as unmistakable characteristics of the Muslim Daseins sort of Being, in this specific historical period, had to reflect themselves on the way the historical context was constructed and presented in this part. Part II The discursive practice of Sayyid Qutb: its objective of was to pinpoint twists and turns of the Qutbian discourse. Not only was Foucaults notion of discourse modified to suit the purpose of analysis as well as the regime of truth of a different cultural context, but also its analytical procedures experienced structural change through their fusion with the notion of theatrical experience in order to dramatize the whole Qutbian discourse. Reversing the analogy of a group of American feminists (Case & Reinelt 1991) theatre as a discourse of power to be discourse as a theatre of power, I intended to enliven in vivid theatrical figures the mechanisms and relations of power at play in Qutbs discursive practice. Each discursive element of the original Foucaultian notion will be metamorphosed into its corresponding counterpart in the theatrical experience (enunciative function became theatrical location, concepts became language, themes became dramatic construct, and finally objects became persons) as a basis for analyzing the archaeological level of Qutbs discourse. In this part, notions of innovation, excitement, continuity, growth, beauty, and meaningfulness as integral parts of the discursive fabric were be the discursive counterpoise that reflected itself on the analysis of the discourses archaeological level the characteristics of the non-discursive context. Part III Reconstructing Sayyid Qutbs conceptualization of power (the subarchaeological level): it seeks to account for the internal discursive movement of cast-off and return that manifested itself in the various discursive components: the shift of critique strategies from one aspect to another; the growth of the conceptual tree of Islam; the soul8

body dynamics animating the discursive events and unfolding its discursive possibilities; and the redefinition of the driving conflict and the resorting of dramatic camps. It is through the sub-archaeological or textual level that the overall direction of discursive movement with its forms, scope, and intensity on the archaeological level could be explained. For the Quran that represents the peak of authenticity was after all the Qutbian discourses aspired destination as attested by its movement. Foucaults concept of ethics, with its four components: mode of subjection, asceticism, ethical work, and teleology, proved itself to be applicable for digging out the textual level, which hosts a patient and meticulous construction process of a central discursive subjectivity that represents the discourses audience, that is, the Muslim personality. The construction and codification of power relations between the sub-units of such politicized grand subjectivity that can resist, challenge, redress, and even surmount the asymmetrical power relations through the aesthetic approach to the Quranic text, with all the resulting concepts, terms, and perceptions, constitute the fabric of Qutbs political theory, found stretched upon the sub-archaeological level, at the end of the day. Al-ilal represents an immanent notion throughout this whole part. Literally meaning shades but actually referring to reliving the Quran in the age of interpretation, it transforms, due to its underlying temporal structure, the hermeneutical practice into an existential or a political practice that undermines existing power relations by projecting on reality a future possibility of existence by aid of Islamic self-techniques.

The meta-methodological attitude underpinning this study pertains to an understanding of the subject-object relationship that takes off from Norbert Elias arguments about involvement and detachment. It is worthwhile to reiterate what Elias noted that the uncritical submission to and dogmatic application of thinking styles, concepts, and categories originating from physical sciences to social sciences, regardless of the different nature of their problems, can only cover up the unique nature of the subject-object relationship, with its tensions and problems. For the mechanical diffusion of the scientific model recommended as a magical solution for all problems leads to the creation of both a faade and an illusion. On one hand, the application of scientific model to problems and events conceived under the impact of strong involvements gives the appearance of a high level of objectivity that those who apply it are actually lacking. It creates a faade of detachment masking a highly involved approach. On the other hand, the scientific model excludes from the field of systematic research a wide range of problems that do not let themselves be disclosed to its techniques extracted from the exploration of physical phenomena. This exclusion is justified by the illusion that problems not lending themselves to the investigation of the model are no concern of people engaged in scientific research (Elias, 1987: 17-19). In contradistinction from natural sciences, social sciences focus on conjunctions of persons. Herepeople face themselves; the objects are also subjects. Whilst social scientists face the task of exploring the patterns of formation, change, and configuration that 9

bind people together, they are themselves an integrative part of theses patterns; they experience them directly or by identification (12). The reflexivity of the subject-object relationship leads to that the image of the subject of knowledge is not a knower in vacuum, an I without we, you, and they. Quite the contrary, it is an I as a part of we, nobody can know without starting from a group of knowers that shares a common fund of knowledge, a specific group-language, and even a theory of knowledge (xxii-iii). It could be therefore clearly discerned that the dilemma underlying the uncertainties of human sciences bears on the reflexive relationship between the subject and object of knowledge; such reflexivity produced human sciences in-built tension between the social role of participation and the scientific role of investigation. Although the scientific role demands that the researcher tries to see from a detached perspective the structure and functioning of the studied collectivity and to hold up the mirror this collectivity can see itself in, the social role leaves no doubt that such scientific inquiry is not only difficult due the influence of emotions, interests, tensions, and threats resulting from the researchers belonging to the collectivity, but also it may reduce the cohesion and solidarity of the collectivity and endanger its capacity to survive (15-16). Elias cautions us that dealing with the inherent tension between both roles in order to rid human sciences of their dilemmas and uncertainties cannot be attained through discarding one of them in the favor of the other. Such solution proves itself to be erroneous, because the reflexive relationship between the subject and object in the case of human science makes both roles actually interdependent. For participation and involvement constitute an indispensable condition for comprehending and investigating the problems the inquirers set out to solve. As Elias put it, in order to understand the functioning of human groups one needs to knowfrom inside how human beings experience their own and other groups, and one cannot know without active participation and involvement (16). As such, what is recommended to us is in fact changing equilibria between sets of mental activities which in human relations with others, with objects, and with selfhave the function to involve and detach in order to suite the case at hand (4). Through more than 14 pages, Elias went on commenting on Velazquezs famous picture Las Meninas as a particularly striking illustration of the complexities of the involvement-detachment balance2 (lii). In the words of Elias, the painter was someone, who stood outside, observed the world and formed pictures of it, and at the same time was very much part of this world he was detached and involved at the same time (ixviii). Since Las Meninas, which, as Elias remarked, is at any rate open-ended and thus open to ones own imagination (lxv), represents quite instructive an instance for the involvement-detachment balance, I shall try to capitalize on Las Meninas, or to be accurate its interpretation by Foucault, in order to highlight the specific nature of the object of study and as a result pinpoint the form of involvement-detachment balance adequate to deal with it throughout this work. Shifting his attention a little bit to the left side of the portrait, Foucault spotted the blind point that the canvas occupying the whole of the extreme left with its back turned to the spectator represents in the portrait. As Velazquez took one step to his left, inside 10

of the portrait, distancing himself from the canvas and turning his eyes to the viewer, outside of the portrait, he reconstituted an unseen space that entrapped in invisibility whatever was visible to him. From the eyes of the painterthere runs a compelling gaze that we, the onlookers, have no power in evading: it runs through the real picture and emerges from its surface to join the place from which we see the painter observing us. Actually, the painters gaze is directed not to any of the portraits figures but to the void confronting him outside the picture, a void that accepts as many spectators who happen to occupy the same position as his subject. Thus, in thisneutral space, the observer and the observed take part in a ceaseless exchange. No gaze is stablesubject and object, the spectator and the model, reverse their roles to infinity [emphasis added] (Foucault, 1970: 4-5). Two questions need to be addressed here: what is the relationship between Velazquez and his Las Meninas, on one hand, and Qutb and his oeuvre, on the other? And how does such relationship pave the way for instituting an involvement-detachment balance suitable to the case at hand and guiding this study all along? Let me first try to establish the relationship between Velazquezs Las Meninas and Qutbs oeuvre through utilizing, what I contend to be, unmistakable commonalities to scan the latter with the light of the former. From one side, Qutb assumed the role of a painter throughout his works, a role that could be testified by his definition of a poet, in his very first work the mission of a poet in life, as the painter who throws upon the picture a shadow of himself and his imagination, so that his character appears distinctly in the picture (MSFH: 21). He devoted a whole work Artistic representation in the Quran to the analysis of the various artistic methods in the Quran centering around portraying and portraits as the Qurans distinctive method, constant plan, and comprehensive specialty (TFQ: 37). In the introduction of his autobiography A child from the countryside, he described his task as depicting pictures of the village life contemporaneous to my childhood andto which I did nothing more than copying from the memory page to the paper page (TMQ: 5). Commenting on a Quranic scene in his monumental work In the shades of the Quran, he wrote passionately glimpse by glimpse, thought by thought, and move by move has the Quranic style portrayed as if it were a painting brush, not just expressive words, but actually as if it were a movie recording the scene shot by shot (6: 3757). In a word, Sayyid Qutb was painting pictures all along. From another side, the elements spotted by Foucault in Las Meninas (the painters selfportrait, his instantaneous appearance, his direct and compelling gaze to the spectator, and the ceaseless exchange of gazes and roles) were by no means less existent or less recognizable in the Qutbian oeuvre. That Qutb painted himself bent on his work and allocated himself a markedly prominent place, albeit not the most prominent, can be witnessed in the following self-description; the person who is writing these lines spent forty years of his life in reading books and in research in almost all aspects of human knowledge... Then he returned to the fountainhead of his Aqida and worldview to find that whatever he had read so far was nothing in comparison to that immense fund of knowledge. He does not, however, regret what he spent forty years doing (MFT: 143-4). Statements of this sort are scattered throughout the Qutbian oeuvre that it would be impossible to cite all of them or even a representative sample. Moreover, Qutbs presence, not withstanding its dominance, was a momentary appearance 11

resulting from distancing himself from the portrait (al-ilal) he is painting in his oeuvre to contemplate it and then on finishing his task he will simply have to disappear. His depiction of his Quran-hermeneutical role as gap bridging and intimacy founding between the reader and the Quranic text sheds light on Qutbs instantaneous appearance. More often than not, I stand in front of the Quranic texts so fearful to touch them with my defective human style and so depressed to pollute them with my mortal human expression. I always feel the huge gap between what I feel and experience in the Quran and what I interpret in these ilal. I therefore urge the readers not to make al-ilal their ultimate goal, but to read it to come closer to the Quran itselfand then to drop these ilal (4: 2039). The direct and compelling gaze like a straight-line that pierces the picture in the direction of the onlookers, or say the void outside it that accepts as many spectators as would be, can be faced in a statement, in which Qutb turns his eyes towards the reader, any reader coming across the pages, to actively engage him in the portray he is painting. My brother who is reading these words, do you agree with me about this imagination?! Are you with me trying to imagine?! that revelation coming from there. Did I say: there?! No. It is not there. It is coming from nowhere and no timefrom the ultimate absolute, the eternal and perennialMy brother who is reading these words, do you feel what I feel behind such interrupted phrases through which I try to deliver what spreads through my whole being? (5: 3170). The ceaseless exchange of roles between the observer and the observed, the reader and the writer, or the subject and the object can never be better personified than in the incessant dialogue between Sayyid Qutb and Asab aldawa(the audience of his discourse). The indication for such dialogues prominence in the Qutbian oeuvre goes way beyond the dedication of Social justice in Islam to the youths (alfitya) whose coming I glimpsed in my imagination, then I found them existing in real life (AII: 5) or even the homage to the Islamic avant-garde to whom I have written maalim fi al-tariq (MFT: 12). Rather, the ilal as a whole represents a continuous dialogue between Qutb on one side and the Ashab al dawa on the other side. Such dialogue, in which tactical and strategic directives intertwined with spiritual contemplation and cognitive images assign maalim fi al-tariq fi ilal al-Quran (signposts on the way in the shades of the Quran), not just dotted al-ilal but actually constituted the almost invisible structure holding together its 4012 pages. The Qutbian oeuvres dialogue structure, so loud, passionate, and political in maalim fi al-tariq, could not have escaped the eyes of Nasser, who as a conspirator to the tips of his fingers commented, on reading al-maalim, that there must be undoubtedly a secret organization (Hanafi, 1989: 48). Having attempted to sketch the subject-object relationship in the works of Sayyid Qutb in the light of Foucaults interpretation of Las Meninas and of the innately artistic nature of Qutbs enterprise, I shall try now to work out an involvement-detachment balance (which is Elias recommended solution to the tensions of the subject-object reflexive relationship in human sciences), whose configurations match the Qutbian oeuvre and can, therefore, pitch landmarks on the way of my analysis. The aspired equilibrium is in fact a double intersectionpoint between involvement and detachment as well as between deconstruction and reconstruction. Whereas the first pair represents a mode of dealing with Qutb as an author, 12

artist, thinker, or subject, the second pair mounts to be a mode of dealing with Qutbs works as an oeuvre, portray, thought, or object. More than this, both sides of the equilibrium function simultaneously and interdependently. On one hand, involvement, which targets to replay the incessant exchange of gazes between Qutb and his reader, is coupled with deconstruction, which seeks to meticulously separate the various components, relations, dynamics, and forms of his thought. On the other hand, detachment, which aims to arrest the mobility of the subject-object relationship, is fused with reconstruction, which aspires to patiently re-establish the works of Qutb as an integrated whole. It is noteworthy that detachment-reconstruction and involvement-deconstruction are not divided among the parts of this work. Rather, a doublet might according to the issue at stake prevail in a certain part, chapter, or even division, without excluding the other doublet from the analysis; hence the simultaneousness, interdependence, and internal balance of both side of the equilibrium. Moreover, the components of each doublet can freely switch partners; parts, in which the general orientation is reconstruction, can host chapters, in which involvement is the case, and vice-versa. The way such proposed equilibrium functions in practice could be discerned in the following steps. First, the theoretical framework will utilize concepts that show a high degree of sensitivity to the subject-object problems as well as of adequacy to the nature of the case at hand. Heideggers Dasein based on a deconstruction of the Western metaphysical tradition ameliorates the subject-object relationship. Since the Dasein is not a subject severed from the world, but it is actually Being-in-the-world. Foucaults understanding of discourse with its underlying archaeology of silence accommodates in the analysis areas that were previously excluded or simply silenced. Second, the first part seeks detachedly to reconstruct the historical context that produced the problems and tensions spurring the thought of Sayyid Qutb. Through applying Heideggers structures of the Dasein to describe the Arab-Islamic culture in a moment of rupture (this moment extends to cover the whole 19th century and continues till the present), this part, looked at from outside, establishes the For-the-sake-of of Qutbs thought i.e. its significance. Third, in the second part, involvement to animate the whole enterprise of Qutb is joined by the deconstruction of its components, mechanisms, and levels. The involvement-detachment doublet demonstrates itself respectively in the occupation of the discursive heart of Qutbs oeuvre through trying to map its enunciative locus in order to highlight the inner discursive relations as well as in the attempt to metamorphose Foucaults discourse into theatrical experience to define the discursive elements in their specificity. In this part, the ceaseless exchange of roles in Qutbs relation to his reader was allowed to appear in all its clarity and dynamism. In the third part, by contrast, such relationship was arrested through its pinning down to a subjective mode of interaction with the Quranic text, which the analysis distanced itself from through its comparison with an objective mode of interaction described by Jansen. Such act of detachment was coupled by a total reconstruction of the sub-archaeological or textual level that explains the discursive movements of the archaeological one, a task made possible by the application of Foucault concept of ethics. Fourth, the conclusion is based on the predominance of detachment that will turn into complete separation from Qutb and his work as well as on the diminishing of reconstruction to mere synthesis. After recapitulating the political theory of Sayyid Qutb, it 13

will be isolated by two rings: localization, through situating it in the context of other power thinkers, namely Arendt and Fanon; and criticism, through reviewing the critical treatment of Qutbs thought by representatives of different thought trends, like Hasan al-Hudaibi, Hasan Hanafi, Leonard Binder, and Gilles Kepel. It goes without saying that whether the proposed involvement-detachment balance suited the case at hand and succeeded in attaining its objectives is for the reader to judge, not for me.

Conceptual framework:
The main target of a conceptual framework is to lay down the foundations for a certain study, in the sense of paving the way, opening up new spaces, and providing new leads to come to grips with the phenomenon at hand. Counted as a prominent strength point of any analytical framework is not only its ability to engulf but also to be dyed by the theme it mixes itself with, to the extent that one loses track of the line separating the frame from its contents. Otherwise, the lively studied case would be tightly squeezed in a calcified theoretical toolbox. In other words, the phenomenon is racked or amputated in a procrustean3 fashion. As a consequence of the multi-sidedness of this study, no single theoretical suitcase can either neatly fit or at least match the purpose of the analysis. Rather, an integration of certain concepts would provide the analysis with its theoretical ground and facilitate the assimilation of other conceptual constructs and theoretical leads as it goes along.

1.Dasein4: In Heideggers masterpiece Sein und Zeit, the bone of contention of his existential investigation was mainly to amplify or to work out the question that sprang out of Platos dialogues. Whether you are really acquainted with what you mean, when you use the expression Seiend, we however thought that we understand it, but now we have become perplexed. The question of the meaning of Being was thus newly forced to emerge into being. The problem, in Heideggers words, was not only that an answer to the question was missing, but also the question was even dark and lacking any sense of direction (Heidegger, 2001: 4). To highlight the dark question and give it an orientation, Heidegger hammered down the formal structure of the question of Being. Every question is actually a sort of seeking that derives guidance from what it seeks. This cognizant searching takes the form of researching, when it lays bare and determines what exactly the question is seeking. In this sense, the peculiarity of the question lies in that the inquiry makes itself transparent according to the constitutive characteristics of a question. Before erecting the structural elements of the question, it is indispensable to consolidate the basis on which the structure is built. The meaning of Being must have always been there, due to the simple fact that we are already moving ourselves in a Seinsverstndnis (understanding of Being), out of which grows the 14

question of the meaning of Being. Although it is not known to us what Being means, we are holding ourselves in a certain understanding of Being that cannot be conceptualized, when we are simply asking the question what is Being? (5). What is looked for in the question of Being is not totally unknown, even if it would not be graspable at all. The main pillars of the question would accordingly be: a) das Gefragte, a question is basically asking about, therefore that which the question asks about and aims to work out in this case is Being. Being is not the Seiend itself, rather it is what determines the Seiend as a Seiend and on whose basis the Seiend is to be understood. The first philosophical step to understand Being is to avoid telling stories, in the sense of defining the Seiend as a Seiend through tracing it back in its origin to another Seiend. b) das Erfragte, in what is asked about lies what is to be found out by asking or that where the question finds its goal. The meaning of Being, as the target of inquiry, requires its own conceptualization (Begrifflichkeit) that distinguishes itself essentially from the concepts where the Seiends acquire their determinate signification. c) das Befragte, the Seiend itself turned out to be what is interrogated or to whom the question is directed. Because the nonfalsified characteristics of the Being of such a Seiend is exactly what is targeted, it must then be ensured that the Seiend becomes accessible. The success in answering the question of Being depends on winning and securing in advance the right access to the Seiend. Coupled with this is to define what the Seiend is, for we call a lot of things by this name; Seiend is everything we talk and think about, and comport ourselves to, it is how and what we are. Being lies in reality, subsistence, presence-at-hand, Dasein, and the there is (es gibt). From which Seiend then can the meaning of Being be distilled? Or which Seiend could be pinned down as an exemplar for other Seiends and in which way does it have priority? d) das Fragende, working out the question of Being requires to explain: how Being is to be looked at, how it could be understood and grasped conceptually; preparing the way for the right selection of the exemplary Seiend; and working out a method that provides a genuine access to that Seiend. These constitutive activities of inquiry (viewing, understanding, conceptualizing, selecting, and accessing) are themselves modes of Being of a particular Seiend, which we ourselves are, the inquirers. Asking the question of the meaning of Being is a Seinsmodus of a certain Seiend, simultaneously it is to this Seiend that the question is addressed. The Seiend that we are and to which inquiry is one of its possibilities of Being (Seinsmglichkeiten) is termed Dasein (6-7). If Heidegger attempted to give the question of Being some clarity and a sense of direction, one can legitimately ponder on the direction that this question is taking. To situate and define the Seiend in its own Being is the prelude for spelling out the question of the meaning of Being. When the question demands as a prerequisite or as its starting point what it seeks to answer or its end goal, could not its course be then described as going around itself in circles (Zirkel)? According to Heidegger, there is absolutely no going in circles concerning the question of the meaning of Being. The Seiend can be defined in his own Being without that the explicit concept of the meaning of Being would be available. Otherwise, the whole body of ontological knowledge, whose factual endurance is undeniable, could have never existed. The presupposition of Being took the character of taking a look at it (Hinblicknahme auf Sein), out of which the Seiend could be articulated in its Being. This 15

taking a look at Being grows out of the average Seinsverstndnis in which we are swinging. There is no circularity in the question because its answer is not a derivative-oriented grounding (ableitende Begrndung), rather it is an exhibiting and laying bare-oriented grounding (aufweisende Grund-Freilegung). What engulfs the question at hand is not circularity, rather a remarkable backwards or forwards referentiality (Rck- oder Vorbezogenheit) of Being (what is asked about) to the question as the Seinsmodus of a certain Seiend. It means that the Seiend having the character of Dasein has a special relationship to the question of Being (8). In plain words, Heidegger was trying to clarify that the course of the question of Being is not circular, yet it might seem so due to its backwards and forwards referentiality i.e. reflexivity. This reflexivity takes two forms on one and the same level: it is the centrifugal act from the Seinsverstndnis that belongs to the essential constitution of the Dasein to the articulation of the meaning of Being; and it is the Seiend interrogating the Seiend (its own self) about the meaning of Being (its own Being). The relationship between Dasein and the Being question is equally reflexive and overlapping. On one hand, the Dasein acquires its own identity as a questioner (Fragend) through being one of the integrative components of the structure (Gefragte, Befragte, Erfragte) of the Being question (Seinsfrage). On the other, the activities constitutive to the Being question belong to the Seinsmodus of the Dasein, and it is this Seinmodus that gives him priority over other Seiends. Dasein is a Seiend, whose Seinsart (way of being) encompasses scientific research and the question of Being itself. However, scientific research is neither the Seiends only Seinsart nor is the most close to it. Dasein is not just a Seiend existing among others, but it is ontically distinguished, due to the fact that for this Seiend (in its own Being), its own Being is the issue. That is, it is the only Seiend that problematizes its own Being. It belongs to the constitution of the Daseins Being (Seinsverfassung des Daseins) that Dasein in its own Being has a relationship to this Being. It is with and through its own Being that Being itself is disclosed to the Dasein. Understanding Being is itself a definite characteristic of Daseins Being (Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins). Because the essential definition (Wesenbestimmung) of Dasein is not extracted from a certain subject-matter (ein sachhaltiges Was), and because its essence lies in the fact that Dasein has to be its Being and as its own Being5, therefore the term Dasein was chosen to depict this Seiend. The Being to which the Dasein comports itself in one way or another is called Existence. Dasein always understands itself out of its own Existence i.e. the possibility of Being itself or not Being itself. Dasein has either chosen these possibilities, got itself into them, or even grew up in them. Existence is determined through the way that the Dasein takes hold of it or neglects it, but in any case the question of existence is not straightened out except through existing itself (das Existieren selbst). The understanding of oneself is called existentiell. The context of the structures of Existence is designated as Existentiality, which is the state of Being constitutive of the Seiend that exists. Certainly, in the idea of such a state of Being is the idea of Being itself already included. To the Daseins understanding of Being (Seinsverstndnis) belongs with equal primordiality (gleichursprunglich) an understanding of the world and the Being of other Seiends that are accessible in this world (12-13).


There is no way to describe Dasein comprehensively other than in Heideggers words:

Dasein exists as a Seiend, for which in its Being its Being itself is an issue. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected (designed)6 itself on its Seinknnen (potentiality-for-being) before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its projection, it is revealed as something that has been thrown. It has been thrownly abandoned to the world and falls anxiously in it. As care that is, as existing in the unity of the projection, which has been fallingly thrown the Seiend is disclosed as a Da (there). As Mitseiend (Being with others), it maintains itself in an average way of interpretation, which is articulated in discourse and expressed in language. Being-in-theworld has always expressed itself as a Being alongside Seiends that are to be encountered in the world, it constantly expresses itself in approaching and discussing the object of its anxiety (406).

Based on the previous definition of the Dasein, one can figure out the marking features of the Dasein. Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein) is a constitutive state of Dasein which is necessary a priori, yet it is not sufficient to cover the whole Being of Dasein. Being-in does not designate a relationship of Being that two entities extended in space have to one another regarding their location in space, for example the water is in the glass. But since Being-in as a state of Daseins being is existential, thus it cannot be thought of as a corporeal thing present at hand. Nor can Being-in denote a spatial relationship in the sense of something in something. In is a derivative from innan to reside or to dwell, and an signifies being accustomed to or familiar with. The Seiend to which Being-in, in this sense, belongs to is that which I myself am (ich je selbst bin). Bin is connected with bei, so that ich bin denotes I dwell alongside the world which is familiar to me in such and such way. Being-in is a formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. Being alongside the world does not in any mean the side-by-side-ness (das Nebeneinander) of the Dasein with the world, rather it means to be absorbed in the world. A Seiend can encounter or touch another present-at-hand, within the world Seiend, only when it has Being-in as its own mode of Being and when with its Being-there (Da-sein) something like the world is revealed to it, so that from out of that world another Seiend can manifest itself (in touching or encountering) and becomes accessible in its Being-present-athand. The facticity of Daseins Being denotes that a Seiend within-the-world has a Being-inthe-world in such a way that it understands itself as bound up in its destiny with the Being of other Seiends that it encounters in the world. The facticity of Dasein is such that its Being-inthe-world dispersed or even split itself into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these ways could be exemplified in the following: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something, looking after something, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, finding out, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining These ways of Being-in have Besorgen7 (concern) as their basic kind of Being (Seinsart). Not all modes of Besorgen are efficient, rather there are deficient modes where the possibilities of Besorgen are kept to a bare minimum like: renouncing, neglecting, leaving something undone, taking rest, etc. The meaning of Besorgen 17

would lean more to the connotation of the following phrase: I am concerned8 that this undertaking [might or shall9] fail (ich besorge, da das Unternehmen milingt). Here Besorgen means something like being afraid (befrchten). Besorgen is to be understood as an ontological structural concept that depicts a possible way of Being-in-the-world. It helps to make visible how the Being of Dasein itself is Care10 (Sorge). Being-in-the-world is not a property that the Dasein can sometimes have and in others can do without. The case is not that man is then has, by way of extra, a relationship of Being to the world, rather such a relationship to the world is only possible because Dasein is Being-in-the-world. As Dasein is a Seiend in the world, it can explicitly discover the other Seiends it encounters environmentally, it can know them and avail itself to them, and therefore it can have a world. This state of Being is somehow familiar to the Dasein itself, and if it is to become known, then this knowing (Erkennen) of oneself would take itself as knowing the world (Welterkennen). In this sense, knowing the world functions as the primary mode of Being-inthe-world (53-59). Equally primordial with Being-in-the-world are Being-with (Mitsein) and Dasein-with (Mitdasein), as the Daseins structures of Being. Dasein is not only in his everydayness (Alltglichkeit) in the world, but it comports itself in a dominating mode of Being to the world, because Dasein is for the most part fascinated with its world. Being absorbed in the world as well as the Being-in underlying it determines essentially, who the Dasein is in his everydayness (113-114). The world is not a way of characterizing the totality of these Seiends, which could be encountered in the world and which the Dasein essentially is not, rather it is a characteristic of the Dasein itself. As a pre-ontological existentiell signification, the world could be characterized as that wherein a factual Dasein as such can be said to live[or] the public we-world or ones own closest (domestic) environment (die ffentliche Wir-Welt oder die eigeneund nchste (husliche) Umwelt11) (64-65). Being-in points quite clearly to the fact that there is no bare subject without a world, and there was no such thing before, nor was there an isolated I without the Others (die Anderen) (116). The range of what is encountered in the world could be narrowed down to equipment ready-tohand, Nature present-at-hand, or Seiends with a character other than that of Dasein. The kind of Being of the Dasein of Others that are encountered in the world differ from readinessto-hand and presence-at-hand. The Daseins world gives freedom to Seiends (that distinguish themselves completely from equipment and Thing) which, according to their kind of Being as Dasein themselves, are ways of Being-in-the-world and are to be encountered in the world. The Seiends are like the freedom-giving Dasein (das freigebende Dasein), in that they are there, and there with it (es ist auch und mit da). If the Seiend within-the-world is to be identified with the world, one can say that Dasein too is world. By Others, it is not meant everyone else except me and from whom I distance myself, rather they are those from whom one cannot distinguish oneself because it is among them that man is too. Being-with-too does not have the character of an additional property that the Being-with-present-at-hand enjoys within the world. Rather, with is an existential characteristic of the Dasein and too denotes the sameness of Being-in-the-world. By reason of this, Being-in-the-world designates the world that I share with others. The world of the Dasein is a With-world (Mitwelt). Being18

in is Being-with the Others, whose Being-in-the-world is in this sense Mitdasein (118). The Others are to be encountered not in the manner of a differentiating seizure in advance of ones own subject (that is present-at-hand) from the rest of the subjects, nor even in the fashion of a subjects looking at itself in a way that the opposite pole of a distinction is ascertained. The worldly encounter of the Dasein with what is closest to its nature goes so far to the extent that Dasein itself discovers about itself as it turns its sight away from experiences and the center of its actions. Dasein finds itself (in what it performs, needs, avoids, expects) when it encounters environmentally the things ready-at-hand, with which it is concerned (119). Being-with is an essential characteristic of Dasein, even when no Other is present-at-hand or conceived, therefore Being-alone is Being-with, due to the simple fact that the Other can only be lacking in a Being-with. However, Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with and its very possibility is a proof of this. The occurrence of a second human being or more beside one does not help getting rid of Being-alone, even if more human beings are present-at-hand, the Dasein can still be alone. Being-alone among many does not mean that they are merely present-at-hand alongside us. It means that they are with us, but their Mitdasein is encountered in a mode of indifference and alienation. These modes of Mitdasein are only possible because Dasein as Being-with allows for the Dasein of Others to be encountered (120). The character of Daseins state of Being as Being-with, when the Dasein comports itself to Seiends that are themselves Dasein, is Frsorge (welfare). Concern for food, clothing, and the nursing of a sick body are forms of Frsorge, even Welfare as a social arrangement is ground in Daseins state of Being as Being-with. On one hand, the urgency of Frsorge is motivated by the fact that Dasein maintains itself for the most part in deficient modes of Frsorge. Being for, against, without one another, passing one another by, not mattering to one another are indifferent and deficient modes that characterize the everyday average Beingwith-one-another. On the other, there are two extreme positive modes of Frsorge: it can leap in for the Other; and it can leap ahead of him. The first sort of Frsorge takes over for the Other what he had to concern (besorgen) himself with, the Other is in this sense thrown out of his position and steps back. He waits until the matter has been taken care of in order to take it over or to disburden himself of it completely. Such a form of Frsorge makes the other totally dependent and dominated. Whether this domination was silent or hidden from the Other is a matter of no difference. The second sort of Frsorge leaps ahead of the Other in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not take his care, but to give it back to him. This Frsorge pertains to authentic care to the Other not to the What with which he had to concern himself with, therefore it helps this Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it (121-22). It has become now clear that Being-with-Others belongs to Daseins Being, as a result Dasein as Being-with is essentially for the sake of Others (umwillen der Anderer). This has to be understood as an existential statement, for even if Dasein does not turn to Others and supposes that it does need them or manages to get along without them, it is nevertheless in the way of Being-with. In Being-with as the for sake of of Others, the Others are disclosed in their Dasein. This constituted disclosedness of the Others, based on their Being-with, makes up Significance/ Referentiality (Bedeutsamkeit) or Worldhood that is tied with the existential idea of For-the-sake-of. It is this Worldhood of 19

that world that enables us to encounter what is environmentally ready-to-hand as something with which we are concerned together with the Mitdasein of Others (123). In conclusion, Being to Others is ontologically different from Being to Things present-at-hand, because the other Seiend has the same type of Being like Dasein itself. Being with and to Others lies in a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. This relationship is in each case constitutive of Dasein, which has an understanding of its own Being and therefore relates itself to its Dasein. Thus, this Being-relationship to Others will become a projection of ones own Being-towardsoneself into something else. The Other, accordingly, is a duplicate of the Self (125). Having said this, it seems crucial to throw a quick glance at death as an existential structure that determines what Dasein is. If death belongs to Daseins Being, then it must be defined through the character of its being as Being towards an end. The interpretation of death as something that is uttermost not-yet outstanding is completely misleading because it encloses the ontological perversion of making Dasein something present-at-hand. The uttermost not-yet has the character of something to which Dasein conducts itself. Death is not a present-at-hand that is not yet there, nor is it something outstanding (ausstehen) that could be reduced to a minimum, rather death is the end standing before (bevor stehen) Dasein. Standing before Dasein had many incidents, for example a journey, a dispute with others, or even relinquishing something. Such activities have in common that they represent Daseins own Seinsmglichkeiten that are rooted in Being with others. In this sense, death is a Seinsmglichkeit that Dasein itself must overtake. In such a possibility, what at stake for Dasein is simply its own Being-in-the-world, because death represents for Dasein the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. Therefore, in this possibility where Dasein stands before itself all its relations to other Dasein have been undone. Death as a Seinsmglichkeit is Daseins own, uttermost non-relational (unbezglich) possibility. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. The existential possibility of death, as what stands before and approached, is embedded in the fact that Dasein is disclosed to itself in the sense of being ahead-of-itself. Being-ahead-of-itself as a crucial element of the structure of care (Sorge) finds its concretion in death as Being toward an end. Deaths ownmost, unavoidable, uttermost, and non-relational possibility is not something that Dasein acquires in the course of its Being, rather on existing is Dasein thrown in this possibility. Daseins thrownness in death reveals itself primordially and impressively in the Befindlichkeit of anxiety. Anxiety in the face of death is actually anxiety in the face of Daseins ownmost, non-relational, and yet unavoidable Seinknnen. That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world, while that about which one has anxiety in Seinknnen. Anxiety in the face of death is not an accidental or random mood of weakness belonging to certain individuals, but it is the Grundbefindlichkeit of Dasein that discloses that Dasein exists as a thrown Being towards its end. As Being towards its end, death belongs essentially and primordially to Daseins Being and exhibits itself in Dasein everydayness (250-51). Heidegger is extremely careful to demonstrate that what is meant by death is different from demise that covers up Daseins structural nothingness. Death is Daseins existential possibility of having no possibilities that is much close, yet not similar, to the annihilation of 20

all possibilities at lifes end. It is the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all (Dreyfus, 1991:310-11). Lastly, I would like to round up the discussion of Heideggers notion of Dasein by hinting at two crucial elements of the existential constitution of the Da (there) of Dasein. Dasein moves itself equiprimordially in the existential structures of Understanding and Befindlichkeit that are ontologically overlapping. However, I shall postpone the detailed discussion of both aspects, each in its due time and place. It is through the instrumentalization of both existential structures and their equiprimordial constituting of Daseins Da that it would be possible to grasp and assimilate Foucaults concepts of discourse and selftechniques as well as to close the ranks of this theoretical framework in a fashion that ensures the consistency and coherency of the whole load of my analysis.

2. Discourse: The word discourse, which springs from the Latin root discursus or discurrere that denotes running back and forth, means speech, dialogue, or discussion. It also designates the form taken by a series of expressions and judgments and with it the way through which knowledge comes to being. Therefore, one can talk about scientific, religious, or even poetic discourse. Another connotation of discourse is praxis controlled by rules that an interdependent system of statements gives rise to as a form of knowledge, for example medicine, psychiatry, or biology (Hgli & Lbcke, 2000:153). However, before dealing with Foucaults notion of discourse itself, on whose level this whole work could be situated, I have to embed it in Heideggers existential analysis concerning the question of the meaning of Being. This rearwards move is justified on two main accounts. It helps close the ranks of the theoretical framework, in the sense of establishing a symbiotic relationship among its components. This symbiosis shall prove itself to be useful in highlighting some of the shady aspects of Foucaults notion of discourse. It is noteworthy that Foucault, while carrying on his archaeological enterprise, has not tried to disclose the basic foundations of this mode of critique. Rather, he coined and modified his notion of discourse simply by applying it to the European scientific discourse in the classical age. Although he attempted to formulate a quasitheory of discourse in the aftermath of his archaeological turn and went several steps ahead on the way of demonstrating the bonds between power and discourse, all this succeeded in covering up all traces of the foundational aspects of his incessantly moving conception of discourse. On viewing Understanding, as one of the existential structures, in which the Being of Da moves itself, it would be the Grundmodus of the Being of Dasein. Being-in-the-world as existent is disclosed in its For-sake-of, this disclosure is termed Understanding. In Understanding of For-the-sake-of, the basic Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) is also disclosed. Therefore, the disclosure of Understanding (as a disclosure of Significance and equiprimordially of For-the-sake-of) is actually a disclosure of the Dasein as Being-in-theworld. The term Understanding is to be existentially perceived as the mode of Being of 21

Dasein as a Seinknnen. Dasein is not something present-at-hand that acquires as an additional characteristic the ability to do something (etwas zu knnen), but this ability is its primary Mglichsein. Dasein is what it can be and the way its possibilities are (Heidegger, 2001:142-43). The existential possibility is the most primordial and the last positive ontological determination of the Dasein. From one angle, it is not a freely swinging Seinknnen in the sense of libertas differentiae, but Dasein, due its moving in Befindlichkeit constantly, enters into definite possibilities. As a Seinknnen, it lets these possibilities pass, it permanently waives the possibilities of its Being, it seizes upon them and makes a mistake. Dasein is a Mglichsein delivered over to itself, as a thrown possibility through and through. This Mglichsein could be transparent to itself in different ways and degrees. From another, Understanding as a Being of such Seinknnen is not something that is still outstanding as not yet present-at-hand or never present-at-hand accompanying Daseins Being in the fashion of an inevitable predestination. Rather, Dasein is such that in every case it understood or even did not understand that it is to be this or that. Understanding as such knows what it is capable of or what its Seinknnen is capable of. Yet this knowing does not grow out of an immanent self-perception, it belongs to the Being of Da, which is essentially Understanding. Only because Dasein is understandingly its Da, it can go astray or even fail to recognize itself. Moreover, as it is always in Befindlichkeit, it has the possibilities of losing itself, not recognizing itself, and more importantly to find itself once more in its possibilities (144). Projection12(Entwerfen) is an existential structure that Understanding has in itself, in the sense that Understanding projects the Daseins Being on its For-the-sake-of and equiprimordially on its Significance as the worldliness of the world. Projection is the Beings existential constitution (existenziale Seinsverfassung) of the leeway (Spielraum) of the Seinknnen, thus Dasein as something thrown is actually thrown in the Seinsart of projection (als geworfenes ist das Dasein in die Seinsart des Entwerfens geworfen). However, projecting is not in the least comporting oneself to a previously thought out plan, according to which Dasein erects its own Being. Dasein has already projected itself, and as long as it is, it is continuously projecting (entwerfend), that is, Dasein always understands itself out of possibilities. In this way, the projection character of Understanding is to be grasped factually rather than thematically. Due to the fact that the Being of Da is constituted through Understanding and its projection character, that is, because it is what it becomes or what it does not become, it can then say to itself understandingly: become, what you are13 (145-46). Since Daseins projection of its Being on possibilities is actually its Seinknnen, this projection has the possibility akin to itself of developing itself (sich ausbilden). Such developing of Understanding could be termed Interpretation (Auslegung). In Interpretation, which is existentially grounded in Understanding, Understanding will not be something else other than what it is, it will become only itself. Furthermore, Interpretation14 is not acquiring knowledge of what is understood, rather it is more deeply working out the possibilities projected in Understanding (148). The question that deserves to be raised here is: what can possibly be the relationship between Understanding (and with it its projecting character as well as Interpretation) as an existential structure of the Da of Dasein on one side and discourse on the other? How can this 22

relationship, situated on the existential level, affect the structure of discourse and the possibilities it assumes? Understanding and Befindlichkeit constitute the existential structure of the Da of Dasein. On one hand, Understanding with its projecting character encloses in itself the possibilities that are to be interpreted. On the other, Befindlichkeit, equiprimordial with Understanding, holds itself in a certain understanding. The link between Interpretation as the working out of the possibilities projected by Understanding and language is to be found in a derivative of Interpretation called assertion/statement (Aussage15). The statement shows clearly that language as a phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Daseins disclosure. Discourse is to be grasped as the existential and ontological foundation of language and as a result existentially equiprimordial with Understanding and Befindlichkeit. If discourse is the articulation of Interpretations intelligibility, then it underlies both Interpretation and statements. Sinn could be defined as that which could be articulated in the Interpretation and equiprimordial with it the discourse. What is articulated in the discursive articulation is known as the totality of significance (Bedeutungsganze). The discourse as the articulation of the intelligibility of Da is primordial existential disclosure that was primarily constituted through Being-in-the-world, thus discourse must have its definite worldly Seinsart. Discourse is an existential language because the Seiend, whose disclosure is articulated in the form of significations through discourse, has the Seinsart of Being-in-the-world, a Being thrown and dependent on the world. In a word, discourse is constitutive of Daseins existence, because it is the existential constitution of Daseins disclosure (160-61). Having laid down the existential basis, where Foucaults notion of discourse is to be localized, the concept of discourse, on which the whole load of this analysis shall be situated, can unfold itself freely. Nothing in this respect can better characterize it other than Foucaults own concluding remark in The archaeology of knowledge:
Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but do not imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than he (Foucault, 1972: 211).

From the previous statement, I shall endeavor to recapitulate Foucaults conception of discourse through disentangling the multiplicity of its interwoven thought elements and couching what is extracted in the frame of his Order of discourse, which represents Foucaults final attempt to re-focus his archaeological enterprise. Other elements scattered throughout his other works will also be invited or even encapsulated to assist in molding this frame. As the main task of this frame shall be to catch a more comprehensive glimpse of Foucaults discourse, it will be divided into four interrelated parts: the theoretical foundations of the notion of discourse or anti-humanism; its methodological and epistemological functions and purposes or archaeology; the components of discourse as an analytical tool or the order of discourse; the relation between discourse and both the subject and power. At the bottom of his notion of discourse, Foucault was actually amplifying Zarathustras sighing exclamation that the old man has not yet heard that God is dead! The death of God


does not in any way designate a final historical judgment of his non-existence, rather the end of that ahistorical limitless entity that sets the limits of our existence. It ushers a constant space of experience, where the limits of the limitless that structure our life are completely denied and where it would be guaranteed that no entity as such will ever announce again the exteriority of Being in order to reincarnate the dead God and rise from his ashes. Death of God, in this light, is an explosive reality that discloses as its own clarification the intrinsic finitude, the limitless reign of the Limit, and the emptiness of those excesses in which it spends itself. However, the death of God does not restore us to a limited and positive world, but to a world exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which transgresses it. This means a constant condition of transgressing the limits of ourselves; which mounts to the removal of any notion of an exterior transcendental Being (Foucault, 1977:32). Foucault pushed Nietzsches principle the death of God to its logical far end in an attempt to cleanse the cognitive space from all smears of transcendence. He declared his own principle the death of man, which means the removal of this other ahistorical entity that was created as an object of knowledge in the human sciences, which even failed to maintain their promise of revealing its human essence, rather they constructed an ever-moving subjectivity. Through various techniques of power men never ceased to constitute themselves in an endless series of subjectivities that never led to the final destination: man. Man was nothing but an animal of experience involved in infinite processes of change that forms and deforms him as a living subject (Foucault, 1991:123-4). The meeting-point of man and God pinned down by Nietzsche and highlighted by Foucault was the idea of agency or the founding subject. Man and God were two sides of the same coin. It was the founding subject in its various forms that obscured the reality of discourse in philosophical thought, as he was assigned the task of animating the empty forms of language with his motives, aims, and intentions. Through his movement, the subject allotted to the empty forms the meaning lying deposited in them and as a result stretched the horizon of meaning beyond time to demarcate an external space where propositions, facts, and sciences are to be anchored. No wonder then, signs, marks, traces, and letters were in fact at his disposal or even under his sway so as to enable him to play the role of the creating/creative subject (Foucault, 1984:124). By such massacres, Foucaults discourse created at its heart a gap that deprived its mode of non-dialectical mode of critique of any moral ground. It is in this sense that archaeology as a methodological strategy was invested to cover up this gap and to render the historical-philosophical twists and turns of his enterprise possible and justifiable in the subjectless space. The problem of finding a suitable definition of the term archaeology was pinpointed even by Foucault himself, it is a dangerous word, for it seems to imply traces that have fallen outside time and are now frozen into silence. Archaeology designates that label under which an inventory of the general characteristics of the discursive practices and the proper methods to analyze them could be made. That is, it is an attempt to describe discourses in the sense of demonstrating that these discursive units that form autonomous domains are governed by rules. Furthermore, they are incessantly in transformation and anonymously without a subject but imbuing a great many of individual works. Accordingly, it could be 24

indicated in a very general manner that the archaeological analysis is moving in the direction of the distinction between savoir16 and conaissance17 (Foucault, 1989:11). Archaeology seeks to dig out the nexus that hyphenates the power(s)-knowledge(s) complex. It is not at all a matter of describing what power is and what knowledge is and how one would repress or abuse the other. There is no one power or one knowledge that would operate in themselves, rather both constitute an analytical grid; no element of knowledge does not conform to a set of rules or does not possess power effects and inversely no mechanism of power can function without the deployment of techniques, procedures, objects, and instruments of a validated system of knowledge. Archaeology is basically concerned with highlighting the interplay of relay and support between them: an element of knowledge captures the effects of power in a given system where it is classified as true, uncertain, or false; and a procedure of coercion acquires a justification of a rational, efficient, or calculated element (Foucault, 1997:50-53). To carry out this task, archaeology identifies the procedures that control, select, organize, and redistribute the production of discourse in society. Archaeology takes aim at the heart of what might be called discursive regime or episteme which is a discursive apparatus that determines what governs statements and the way they govern each other in order to constitute a discursive practice, therefore it permits sorting out from among all the statements that are possible those that would be accepted within a field of scientifity, which are in their turn could be falsified or verified by scientific procedures (Foucault, 1984:109). Certainly, archaeology is the studying of discourse as a discursive war in which statements create their subjects, furnish them with weapons, assign for them in advance the battles time and place, and finally destroys them. Discourse is the continuation of war, albeit by other means. The question that demands to be addressed in this context is how archaeology operates on discursive formations? In its attempt to individualize and describe discursive formations, archaeology must compare them, oppose them to one another in their simultaneity distinguish them from those that do not belong to the same time-scale, relate them on the basis of their specificity, to the non-discursive practices that surround them. The characteristics of comparison as the keyword for archaeologys operational method on discursive formations and spaces or even gaps could be summarized in the following: 1) The comparative method of archaeological analysis is limited and regional. The comparisons main goal is not to reveal general forms of rationality on the basis of a reduced model and a particular domain, but to outline particular configurations of a tightly and well-determined set of discursive formations whose interrelations could be depicted. As a comparative analysis, archaeology does not intend to reduce the diversity of discourses through outlining the unity that totalizes them, but it seeks to break down their diversity into different figures. 2) Comparison of discursive formations wishes to uncover the play of analogies and differences at the level of rules of formation. Therefore, it pins down archaeological isomorphism, which designates how different discursive elements are formed on the basis of the same rules; it highlights the archaeological model that depicts whether or not these rules are applied in the same way, linked together in the same order, and arranged in accordance with the same model in the different types of discourses; it demonstrates archaeological shifts that denote how a single notion (possibly labeled by a single word) can have neither the same role, the same place, nor 25

the same formation in two distinct archaeological configurations; it reveals archaeological correlations that indicate how relations of interplay, support, exclusion, subordination, or complementarity exist between different discursive formations. 3) Archaeology reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, events, practices, and processes) neither in order to disclose a substratum of cultural continuity among different fields nor to identify mechanisms and directions of causality. The main objective here is to uncover how the rules of formation of discursive practices are linked to non-discursive zones. The thrust of the matter is how and in what form such a non-discursive field contributes in the conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning of certain discourses. However, the suspension of the themes of reflection and expression or of that of causality does not bestow sovereignty and independence on discourse. Rather, it wishes to expose the whole domain of institutions, practices, and processes on which discursive practices enjoying autonomy and specificity can be articulated (Foucault, 1972:157-64). I would like to take up now the third dimension of the frame I have been trying to pitch, namely the main components of discourse as an analytical tool as well as the procedures governing the production of discourse or the order of discourse. In his Rsum des cours, Foucault winks swiftly at what might be expected whenever discursive practices are referred to as the buzzword for his archaeological analysis.
Discursive practices are characterized by cutting out a domain of objects, by the definition of a legitimate perspective for the subject of knowledge, by the fixation of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Each one of these elements supposes a game of prescriptions that administrate exclusions and choices [emphasis added] (Foucault, 1989:9-10).

These practices are not congruent with individual uvres though they manifest themselves through these uvres. Similarly, such practices do not coincide with what is conventionally known as science or discipline, but it might occur that a certain discursive practice assembles different disciplines or sciences or that it traverses them. Discursive practices are not a simple and pure mode of fabrication of discourses. Rather, they find their embodiment in various techniques, institutions, patterns of behavior, and types of transmission and diffusion that impose and maintain them at one and the same time. Underlying and pervading discourse is a set of exclusion and choice principles whose presence is multiple and transformations relatively autonomous. These principles do not emanate from a historical or transcendental subject of knowledge who invents them successively or situates them on a basically foundational level. On the contrary, they designate a will to knowledge (une volont de savoir) that is anonymous, polymorphous, vulnerable to regular transformations, and absorbed in a game of recordable dependence (prise dans un jeu de dpendance reprable) (10-11). Foucault admits that instead of reducing the fluctuating meaning of the words discourse and statement, he added new usage to their meanings. Discourse is used sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualized group of statements, and in others as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. The statement exhibits itself as an ultimate indecomposable element that could be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other elements. It is a point without a surface,


butcan be located in planes of division and in specific forms of groupings. A seed that appears on the surface of a tissue of which it is the constituent element. The atom of discourse [emphasis added] (Foucault, 1972:80). By this token, a statement, Foucault explains, is a unique event18 that neither the language nor the meaning can consume. It is a rather strange event: firstly, it is related to a gesture of writing or an articulation of speech, and also it carves for itself a niche in the field of memory, in the materiality of manuscripts and books, or in any other form of recording; secondly, it is subject to repetition, transformation, and reactivation; thirdly, it is a double-conjunction point of the events that produce it and those that it gives rise to, on one hand, and the statements that precede it and follow it on the other. Relations between statements (even if they do not belong to the same author; or even if an author or a group of authors are aware neither of these relation nor of each other), relations between groups of different statements (even if the do not concern the same or even adjacent fields), relations between statements, groups of statements, and events of a quite different kind (social, political, economic, technical) constitute the cement of a discursive formation. The analysis of a discursive field, seen from this angle, is not to close the space, in which discursive events are deployed, upon itself, but to take the liberty of describing the interplay of these relations from within and from without. This analysis heads to a quite different destination, as the question most akin to it would be: what is the specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else? It therefore seeks to restore to the statement the specificity of its occurrence; to determine its conditions of existence, fix its limits, and establish its relationship with other statements; to show that discontinuity is one of the greatest accidents creating cracks in the geology of history as well as in the simple fact of the statement; and lastly to manifest why a statement could be nothing other than itself, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, and how it assumes a place that no other can occupy amidst these others and in relation to them (28-29). From such a relational perspective, it is quite legitimate to put forward the question of what is the main hallmark that constitutes a discursive formation in the sense of a valid unity individualizing a group of statement together? Or much simpler how to describe the relations between a certain group of statements? There are four hypotheses that could be put in effect as a way out of this riddle. Firstly, the object could be perceived in the first instance as a grouping point for statements different in form and dispersed in time. However, on taking a closer look, it becomes clear that a group of statements is far from referring to a single object, which was created as fait accompli. The object of a group of statements taken as their focus was actually constituted by what was said in these statements that named it, divided it, described it, explained it, traced its origin and developments, mapped its correlations, and lent it its voice in the form of articulating a discourse about it. Moreover, within this group of statements, it could be clearly witnessed that they are not dealing with the same object, because the object is never preserved indefinitely as the horizon of an inexhaustible ideality. On the contrary, it is plain that each cluster of the different statements within this discursive unity constituted its own object and worked it out to the point of transforming it altogether. The unity of discourses or groups of discourses would be the interplay of the rules that enables objects during a certain period of time to come to being or emerge and maintain 27

their existence, also the interplay of the rules defining the transformations of these objects, their internal breaks and shifts, and their discontinuity that suspends their permanence. Secondly, another hypothesis is to describe a group of relations between statements according to their style, or their form and type of connection. A discursive field could be considered as that which presupposes a constant manner of its statements in looking at things, the same division of the studied field, the same system of transcribing what one conceived in what one said (same vocabulary and play of metaphors). Yet, scrutinizing specific discourses led to the conclusion that discursive practices are imbued with hypotheses, practices, decisions, regulations from which a certain discursive style cannot be abstracted. Rather, such a style was only one of the formulations present in this specific discourse. Therefore, what must be characterized in this respect is the coexistence of dispersed and heterogeneous statements as well as the system governing their division, degree of interdependence, their fashion of interlocking with and excluding one another, their transformations, and the interplay of their arrangement and replacement. Thirdly, another direction to establish the unity of statements might be determining the permanent and coherent concepts infiltrating and wrapping them up. The unity is then chased in the conceptual architecture that shall be dug out of a certain discourse to reconstitute its focus. However, the solid architecture of concepts dissolves through waves of transformations that concepts undergo as well as by the appearance of new concepts, of which some might be derived from the first, while others are heterogeneous and few are even compatible with them. Discursive unity cannot as a result be discovered in the coherence of concepts, but in their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the gaps and wedges separating them, and even in their disharmony and incompatibility. In a word, it is the interplay of appearance, dispersion, and disappearance of such concepts. Fourthly, another principle for regrouping statements would be the account of identical and persistent themes galloping on the discursive landscape. Nevertheless, it was observed that a certain thematic finds its articulation through two different clusters of concepts and consequently two various sets of analysis. Or that a set of concepts, on which a certain theme is based, can splinter this thematic into different sorts and options of explanation. Thus, it is much more convenient to mark the dispersion of the points of choices and draft the field of strategic possibilities prior to any option or thematic preference. In conclusion, one can firmly assume that the main task of discourse analysis was to set free the whole discursive field through obliterating concepts disseminating continuity. Such analysis, instead of reconstituting chains of references or charting tables of differences, lays down systems of dispersion. Certainly, one must be fully aware of the danger of such a sort of analysis, in the sense that instead of providing solid basis for what already exists, it forces one to flee the familiar territory and embark on another far beyond the certainties with which one is accustomed. In this uncharted land with its unforeseeable conclusions, all tools and equipment of analysis that provided researchers with the comfortable feeling of being at home may simply disappear to leave behind them nothing but a blank indifferent space that is always playing exteriority and lacking any promise (Foucault, 1972:32-39).


The production of discourse in all societies is controlled, selected, and organized by a number of procedures which carve out the order of discourse and whose role is to gain mastery over discursive events, ward off the discourses power and danger, and evade the weight of its materiality (Foucault, 1984:109). The first set of procedures are those of exclusion, which operate in a sense from the exterior and function as a system of controlling and delimiting discourse through exclusion in order to get hold of that dimension of discourse that capitalizes both power and desire. Prohibition is the most famous and familiar form of this sort of procedures, because in any society no one has the right to say whatever he wishes to say at any time and under any circumstances whatsoever. Discourse is not the revelation or concealment of desire, but the object of desire. Simultaneously, it is not the shadow of struggles and systems of domination, rather it is the prize of struggle and the power to be seized (109-10). Following this line, silence (that which is declined to be said or forbidden to be spelled out) as the other side of prohibition is less the absolute limit of discourse. The manifest discourse is not the repressive existence of what is not said, which in its turn is nothing but a hollow that undermines all that is said from within. Rather, the non-said functions alongside the things said and in relation to them as an integral part of the strategies underlying and permeating discourses (Foucault, 1972:25). Division and rejection19, which belongs to the set of procedures of exclusion, refers mainly to the opposition between reason and unreason or madness derived from the European historical experience. But it could be abstracted on a higher level to animate that profound existential structure of Daseins Being as Mitdasein or Being-with-others. The sane/insane or rational/irrational division reflects a certain formulation and projection of the existential relationship of the Self-Other as a component of the self (Foucault, 1984:110). The opposition between true and false or the will to knowledge is the third system of procedures governing the discursive formations. Certainly, this constraint on discourse is regarded as too arbitrary to be a starting point of understanding discourse. At best, it is organized and distributed around historical contingencies, which are not only modifiable but more gravely in perpetual displacement. The true-false division, viewed from the inside of discourse, which is another scale of viewing things, is neither arbitrary, nor institutional, nor modifiable, nor violent. In fact, it rests upon a pervasive will to knowledge that underlies and permeates discourses, therefore what at stake here is what type of division governs and animates this will to knowledge that was handed over across so many centuries. The historical division that gave the will to knowledge its general form never stopped shifting to the extent that some great mutations in scientific thought are less attributed to new discoveries than to the appearance of new forms of this will to knowledge. It might even seem that this will to knowledge has its own history not that of constraining truths, but the history of the range of objects to be known, of the functions and propositions of the knowing subject, of the material, technical, and instrumental investment of knowledge (Foucault, 1984:111-13). The second set of procedures governing discourse exercise their own control on discourse from within; they function as principles of classification, order, and distribution in order to master another dimension of discourse, namely its events and chance. Commentary is the prime example of this type of procedures, because all human societies have their own 29

foundational narratives, which are recited, repeated, and propagated; they assume the form of texts and ritualized sets of discourses to be recited in specific circumstances and then carefully preserved because there is always a secret or a treasure behind them. Accordingly, there is a structural gradation20 of discourses under two categories: the ordinary daily discourses; and those which are formalized and circulated and give rise to new speech-acts, they are discourses that are said indefinitely, remain said, and or to be said again. Religious, juridical, literary, as well as scientific texts are manifestations of these discourses. Another principle of rarefaction of discourse is the author, not in the sense of the founding subject or speaking individual that produced the text, but as an organizing principle around which discourses are grouped, as the unity and origin of their meanings, and as the focus of their coherence (Foucault, 1984:114-16). At this point, I prefer to drop the discussion of the author as an organizing principle of discourse to pick it up later on in its due time and place and also in details. A third principle of limitation is discipline or discursive policing, which is relative and mobile. It is at odds with both principles of the author and commentary. It is opposed to the first, because discipline represents in fact an anonymous system under the thumb of anyone willing and capable of using it. While the principle of commentary is always moving in the horizon of repetition and vocalizing the hidden half-silent murmurs underlying the day-to-day discourses, discipline as an impersonal anonymous system allows for the reproduction of new statements and paves the way for new propositions, ad infinitum. But discipline is not the sum of statements said about some object classified as true, nor is it the set of what could be accepted in the light of some principle of coherence or systematicity. In order for a proposition to be integrated in a discipline, it should fulfill certain conditions: it must address itself to a determinate plane of objects; it should apply a set of conceptual instruments of a well-defined type; more than this, it has to inscribe itself in a certain theoretical horizon. In this way, the conditions to which propositions must abide to belong to a discipline are more complex and stricter than the binary categorization of true and false. Discipline as a principle of control over discourse fixes limits of discourse by the action of an identity which takes the form of a permanent re-actuation of the rules (118-20). The third set of procedures governing discourse imposes a number of rules or preconditions concerning the individuals who hold the discourse and can have access to them. It deals with the problem of accessibility or rarefaction of speaking subjects, for not everyone shall be allowed to enter the discursive zone without fulfilling some requirements or owning certain qualifications. The procedures of accessibility or rather of its restriction allow the creation of discourse as an apprenticeship in which the roles of speaking and listening are not interchangeable. The act of writing institutionalized in the book, publishing system, authors and publishers rights and the distinction between the author and other speaking or listening roles, all this testifies to the existence of society of discourse and to its functioning though along other lines of exclusivity and disclosure. Doctrines that are political, philosophical, or religious tend to be diffused and circulated as their accessibility is attained through the single prerequisite of recognition and conformity with the same truths. More than this, doctrines differ from scientific discourses in that the discursive controls apply to the statement as well as the speaking subject. From one side, the speaking subject is put in question on the basis of 30

the statement through mechanisms of exclusion and rejection that operate when the speaking subject formulates inassimilable statements. Thus, heresy and orthodoxy are not derived from fanatical exaggerations of doctrinal mechanisms, but belong fundamentally to them. On the other side, doctrines question statements on the basis of the speaking subject in the sense that they always stand as symbol, sign, or manifestation of something else (a prior adherence to class, race, nationality, revolt, resistance, etc.) and they always point beyond themselves. Doctrines bring about a double subjection: individual are bound to certain sorts of enunciation and forbidden from all others; these definite sorts of enunciation bind individuals amongst themselves and differentiate them by that very fact from all others (120 & 122-23). The last dimension of the framework that remains to be worked out to carve Foucaults notion of discourse pertains to the relationship between discourse and both power and the subject. Subjectification is at one and the same time the way discourse shows its majestic power and the main core of the relationship between the subject and power. At the point of intersection between a certain technique of power and a mode of discursive practice, two processes emerge and condition one another: since that which became the object of discourse is the secret of its own nature, though it is oblivious of this, it is required to narrate the truth of itself, reveal it and decipher it; it is also required to disclose to us the truth of ourselves which we think that it lies in our immediate consciousness. A trade-off takes place; through our deciphering of the object we disclose its truth and through delivering the part that escaped us it discloses our truth. The shift of the discourse on sex from ars erotica to scientia sexualis is a case at hand that testifies to this trade off. This interplay that evolves along epochs creates knowledge about subject concerning what divides and determines him, but above all what makes him oblivious of himself. The unconscious of the subject as well as its truth find an opportunity to be established and deployed in discourse. As a result, subjectivity is created as a self-made focus-point of discourse that embodies its truth and helps in the production of this truth (in the example of sex) as it is related to an intensification, multiplication, and even creation of its own pleasures. The subjects are thus erected by the pleasure of the discourse on pleasure (68-71). Another example of the discourses capacity to create subjects through the unfolding of discursive shifts is the appearance of the notion of the dangerous individual21 in criminal psychology, which inherited the position of monomania in accounting for capital crimes lacking motivation, justification, or rationalization even to the individuals who committed them. The locus of such a creative discursive shift was the interactive mechanisms between medical or psychological knowledge and the judicial system. The subject of discourse, in this sense, is the product of various discursive operations and conditions that pave the way for new operations and statements. It is a position fixed in a domain constituted by a finite group of statements or localized in a series of discursive events that must have already occurred. The subject of the statement is not to be described as that who carried out certain operations, rather as a vacant place determined by the prior existence of a number of discursive operations and conditions. For example, sentences like I suggest, I propose, I have already shown, or I conclude depict the relationship between the subject and the statement; the subject is born through discursive 31

operations and, through these operations and the statements embodying them, he links them to future statements and operations (Foucault, 1972: 94-5). One can also recognize fictitious splits in this subject: the I that concludes refers to a position that completed a certain task; the I that supposes assumes a level of demonstration that is attainable to anybody who will follow a certain set of procedures; both Is are different from that I which justifies and explains the meaning of the work done, and proceeds to deal with the remaining problems (Foucault, 1991-b: 112-3). Thus conceived, discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined. Similarly, it must now be recognized that it is neither by recourse to a transcendental subject nor by recourse to psychological subjectivity that the regulation of its [statements] should be defined (Foucault, 1972:55). After all, discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not be reconciled to death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but do not imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than he (211).

3. Ethics: Aestheticization of existence, which is creating oneself as an object of art with the aid of technologies of the self, represents one of the most significant features of Foucaults intellectual mainland. It suits the purposes of this study to assimilate this conception in its theoretical fabric, yet before this it is quite necessary to accommodate Foucaults notion of ethics in Heideggers existential analysis of Dasein. Befindlichkeit22 constitutes equiprimordially with Understanding two main existential structures in which the Being of Daseins Da moves itself. Befindlichkeit is what is most known in everydayness as mood and Being-attuned. The daily moods of everyday life like displeasure or equanimity and the way we slip from one to the other and then again in the opposite direction clearly highlight that the Dasein in every case is always attuned or finds itself (befindet sich) in a certain mood. The lack of mood (Ungestimmtheit), which is not to be confused with bad mood (Verstimmung), means only that the Dasein has become weary of itself and that Being manifests itself as a burden. One does not and also cannot know much why this is the case with his mood, because the disclosure possibilities of cognition fall short of reaching anything in comparison to the primordial disclosure possibilities of mood (Heidegger, 2001:134). I would like to dwell briefly on what is meant by mood in Heideggers sense of the word, drawing on Hubert Dreyfus commentary on the first division of Sein und Zeit. Heidegger rejects the conventional view that conceives mood as private feelings that the individual projects on the world and discovers through reflecting on his experience. Nothing would be more alien to Heidegger than saying that mood is an experience in us. On the contrary, he asserts that we are always moving in a certain mood because the latter is both public and social. Mood, so to speak, is already there like an atmosphere in which we are soaked and by which we are determined not just in what we do but more 32

profoundly in the way things show up for us. The way Heidegger invests the term in his other works suggests that mood expresses a cultural sensibility akin to a specific culture or epoch, for example the fundamental mood (Grundstimmung) was wonder at the Greek beginning of philosophy, while it is alarm (Erschrecken) in the modern culture. Cultural sensibility is a mode of Befindlichkeit that is public and is prior to mood in that it governs the range of available moods. This fundamental mood determines for our Dasein the place and time which are open to its Being. In other words, things that make their appearance in one culture as signs pointing beyond themselves or symbolic occasions for celebrating the sacred might bump in the face of another culture as a threat to its existence and survival (Dreyfus, 1991:169-72). In having a mood, Dasein is disclosed as the Seiend that is delivered to the Being that, in existing, it has to be (das es existierend zu sein hat). To be disclosed, in this sense, does not mean to be known as such. Dasein even in its harmless indifferent everydayness bursts that it is and has to be (da es ist und zu sein hat). This pure da es ist shows itself, but Whence (Woher) and Whither (Wohin) remain in the dark (Heidegger, 2001:134). This characteristic of Daseins Being, this Da es ist veiled in its whence and whither is described as the thrownness23 of the Seiend in its Da (there). Dasein can and should become the master of its moods through knowledge and will, in this sense the priority of both violation and cognition is clearly underlined. However, this does not lead to denying that from an ontological perspective mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to cognition and violation. Consequently, mood provides the basis for intentionality or rather for the specific ways things and possibilities show up. Mastering a mood is in fact done through a counter-mood; therefore one is never free of moods. The first essential characteristic of Befindlichkeit is that it discloses Dasein in its thrownness and for the most part in the manner of turning away. The bare mood discloses the Da and simultaneously closes it off more stubbornly than any not-perceiving (Nichtwahrnehmen). This is quite clear in bad moods, where the Dasein becomes blind to its own self and also to the environment it is concerned with. The second essential characteristic of Befindlichkeit is that the negative posture of disclosedness is balanced with a positive one, namely that the mood, which has been disclosed, enables us first of all to be oneself towards something. Because Befindlichkeit itself as disclosedness is essentially Being-in-the-world, it constitutes the existential basic sort of the equiprimordial disclosedness of the world, Mitdasein, and existence. A third characteristic of Befindlichkeit is that the prior disclosedness of the world that belongs to Being-in-the-world and that is partly constituted by Befindlichkeit is what permits what is within the world to be encountered. To let something be encountered, which is primarily circumspective not in the sense of sensing something or staring at it, has the character of becoming somehow affected (Betroffenwerden). To be affected, for instance, by the threatening character of something ready-at-hand is ontologically possible when Beingin is existentially determined in a manner that what is encountered within the world is a matter of concern (angegangen werden). Only something which is in the Befindlichkeit of fear or fearlessness can discover that what is ready-to-hand is threatening. Thus, the attunement (Gestimmtheit) of Befindlichkeit constitutes existentially Daseins openness to the world (13537). 33

Anxiety is the basic Befindlichkeit; it manifests itself formally according to the twopoles structure of about which and the in the face of which of anxiety. These two aspects are in the case of anxiety congruent, not in the sense of melting in one another but that the Seiend that fulfills both is the same i.e. the Dasein (342-3). The in the face of which (Wovor) of anxiety is not to be encountered as a definite thing that is concerned about, nor even that the threatening element emanates from certain presence-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Rather the main point about anxietys Wovor is that all presence-at-hand or ready-to-hand does not converse with Dasein, for they have lost their referentiality or significance to the environmental Seiend. (343). The indefiniteness of anxietys Wovor materializes itself in the irrelevance of innerworldly Seiend, present-at-hand, and ready-to-hand to anxiety and its Wovor. The whole of referentiality or significance discovered within the world and on which present-at-hand and ready-at-hand as well as other Seiends could be located collides in itself and loses its importance. The indefiniteness of this Wovor disables anxiety from spotting in its spectacle a certain here or there, from which danger emanates and comes closer. As such, the threatening posture characterizing anxietys Wovor could be localized in Nowhere. The threatening Wovor cannot be viewed as approaching from a specific direction within a definite proximity, rather it is already here but nowhere; it is so close that it chokes one and stifles his breath, yet it is still nowhere. The innerworldly nothingness and nowhere typical in this case lead to the conclusion that anxietys Wovor is the world as such, because both characteristics refer to the meaninglessness24 of the world (186-7). By this token, the innerworldly Seiend becomes in itself completely insignificant to itself. What is oppressed here is not this or that present-athand or even their sum, rather it is the possibility of presence-at-hand that is missing. As the nothingness of presence-at-hands possibility is primordially rooted in the world and the latter in its turns belongs to Daseins Being as Being-in-the-world, therefore one is led to conclude that anxietys Wovor is Being-in-the-world as such. That about which of anxiety (Worum) is not a specific Seinsart or a possibility of Dasein, since the threat itself is not definite and can target this or that concrete Seinknnen. Anxietys Worum is Being-in-the-world itself, since in anxiety the innerworldly Seiend as well as that environmental ready-at-hand sink away to the extent that the world would be unable to offer anything and even much less could the Dasein of others. Anxiety steals from Dasein the possibility to understand itself out of the world and also its public interpretation of such an understanding. It throws Dasein back on what it worries about most i.e. its authentic Seinknnen-in-the-world and as such it individualizes and reduces Dasein to its authentic Being-in-the-world that projects itself essentially on possibilities (Mglichkeiten) (187). Now it remains to address the question concerning the existential explanation of anxiety as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Dasein. The peculiar condition of indefiniteness, in which Dasein finds itself when it is anxious, comes to expression through Nothingness and Nowhere. Thus, in anxiousness one feels uncanny (unheimlich25) which means the same as Not-being-at-home (Nicht-zuhause-sein). This could be deducted from the phenomenal display of Daseins constitutional structure (Grundverfassung) of Being-in that depicted it as residing-alongside or familiarity-with and that should be strikingly distinguished from the 34

spatial or physical phenomenon of insideness (Inwendigkeit). Daseins homelike character could be made clearer and more concrete through the everyday public life (alltgliche ffentlichkeit) of Dasein to which the self-evident Being-at-home (Zuhause-sein) belongs as the most tranquilized self-assurance of that everydayness. Anxiety drags Dasein out of its homely absorption in the world and thrusts it in a condition where the innerworldly familiarity manifest in Daseins everydayness collapses in itself. Dasein (as a Being-in-the-world still in spite of this) is consequently isolated and enters a mode of homelessness (Un-zuhause) which is nothing other than what uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) denotes. If anxiety as Grundbefindlichkeit belongs to the basic constitution of Dasein as Being-in-the-world that is always in a certain factual mood i.e. Befindlichkeit, then this homelessness should be grasped and conceptualized existentially and ontologically as a primordial phenomenon. Based on this, the tranquilized (beruhigt) and familiar Being-in-the-world is only a mode of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) and not vice-versa (188-89). The phenomenon of anxiety through what it disclosed (being anxious is the Grundbefindlichkeit of Being-in-the-world, its Wovor is this Being-in-the-world, and its Worum is the possibility or potentiality of Being-in-the-world) was able to shed light on one of the most crucial structures of Dasein. The fundamental ontological elements of Dasein that determine it existentially do not represent scattered pieces, but are penetrated by a primordial connection that comprises the overall unity of these defining structures. Such overall unity that reveals itself in anxiety is the fact that Dasein is that Seiend to which its own Being is a matter of concern and problematization. This self-problematization of Dasein exhibits itself in Understanding as a primordial structure of Daseins Being and as well in the projection of its Being to its own Seinknnen. In this fashion, anxiety undresses the Dasein and displays its nude Free-Being (Freisein) of Seinknnen to be or not to be itself as the possibility that it is. Self-projection or Being towards Seinknnen designates that Dasein is to itself in its own Being already ahead-of-itself (je schon vorweg). Or that Dasein is forever already beyond itself not as a behavior to other Seiends that it is not, rather as Being towards Seinknnen that it really is. This structure of Being of self-problematization or self-projection is called Beingahead-of-itself (191-92). Again, it could be asked, in what way can this Being-ahead-of-itself as a structure engulf the totality of Daseins constitution? Firstly, Being-ahead-of-itself is not a tendency of a nonworldly subject, but it characterizes Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In order to be fully comprehended, Being-ahead-of-itself could be paraphrased as Ahead-of-itself-in-alreadybeing-in-the-world. Secondly, based on the In-the-world characterization of Being-ahead-ofitself, the worldliness structure of Dasein could be seen in new light. The referential totality constituting the meaningfulness that comprises the structure of worldliness is fixed firmly in the multiplicity of the For-the-sake-of-which (Worumwillen) and In-order-to (Wozu) relations. The linking together of both the referential totality of worldliness and the selfproblematization of Dasein (worum es dem Dasein geht) denotes in no way the fusion of a world of objects with a subject. Quite the contrary, this linkage is the expression of the primordial constitution of Dasein, whose wholeness is brought about explicitly in the formula Ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-alongside (192). 35

The existential totality of Daseins ontological structures labeled as Being-ahead-ofitself (whether Ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-the-world, when it concerns the facticity of innerworldly Being or Ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-alongside, when it encounters an innerworldly Seiend) is actually nothing other than Care (Sorge), which should be employed in an ontological-existential manner (192). Care should be ontologically understood in this context in the sense of making an issue of oneself or self-problematization, which in its turn takes many forms, from the most involved use of equipment to sheer, disinterested staring. Care is not to be ontically understood, because it has nothing to do with psychological conditions like melancholy or tribulation or their opposites gaiety and happiness, which one meets ontically in every Dasein. However, it owes to the fact that Dasein is ontologically understood as care that these cases are ontically possible. Heidegger wanted to ward off the understanding of care as worry or pragmatic concern, an understanding that overshadows the connotations of the German word Sorge. In an interview with Heidegger, he rejoiced that the connotations of the English word care are love and tenderness, because what he meant with Sorge (care) was the general fact that Sein geht mich an (Dreyfus, 1991:238-9). By this token, care is a primordial structural totality lying before every attitude and situation of Dasein, in an existential fashion. Care does not however lead to favoring practical behavior to theoretical one; taking political action, beholding something to ascertain it, or taking rest and enjoying oneself are equal concerning the character of care in each. Theory and practice are possibilities of Being (Seinsmglichkeiten) for a Seiend whose Being must be defined as care. On characterizing Being-in-the-world as essentially care (Sorge), Being-alongside others could be depicted as Besorgen and that with Mitdasein of others which could be encountered within the worlds as Frsorge. Care (Sorge) is the most basic structure of Beingin-the-world that defines the latters different modes and encroaches the unity or totality of structures determining this Being. Care can never be understood as an isolated conduct of a certain I toward itself; thus, following the analogy of Besorge and Frsorge, the term selfcare (Selbstsorge) is actually a tautology. The impossibility of conceiving care as an isolated conduct towards oneself can be derived from the fact that Being-ahead-of itself, characterizing care, posits Being-ahead-in with Being-ahead-alongside together as the structural elements of care (Heidegger, 2001:193). The care-structure depicted by Heidegger as the meaning of Daseins Being constitutes the long-awaited answer to the ontological question about the meaning of Being. Care is nothing but the Daseins fully occupying itself with making itself an issue i.e. selfproblematization, which covers a wide array of attitudes theoretical as well as practical, from the most involved use of equipment going through political action to the most disinterested staring. Perceived as self-problematization, care lies as an existential structure at the basis of morality defined according to Foucault as the manner in which one ought to form himself as an ethical subject through models proposed for setting up and developing relations with oneself, self-reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, deciphering oneself, and transformations to be operated on oneself (Foucault, 1985:29 & 26). Therefore, one can justify reversing Foucaults opinion26 to ascertain that care in Heideggers sense of the term is 36

not one form of ethics; rather ethics (self-problematization in order to create a moral subject) is essentially a form of care. In this fashion, one can be able to let the care-structure carved by Heidegger slide over the ethical space uncovered by Foucault in his analysis of morality. Or one might be able to let Heideggers existential conceptualization of care peep from underneath Foucaults ethical guise27. Morality is an ambiguous word due to the wide span of meanings it refers to, not to mention being a value-laden term colored by individual experience, socio-economic context, and cultural biases. Foucault proposes an extensive definition of morality to capture its essence, enclose its various contents, and even classify them. First, morality of code refers to a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the familyeducational institutions, churches, and so forth. Moral rules might represent in some cases a coherent doctrine or body of teachings, while in others they could be transmitted in a diffused manner. Second, morality of behavior depicts the real behavior of individuals in relation to rules and values that are recommended to them.[It] designates the manner in which they comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey or resist an interdiction or a prescription. However, concealed behind ones behavior, which is the manner in which one ought to conduct oneself, is the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code (Foucault, 1984:25-6). Seen in this light, morality, in the broad sense of the word, comprises two constitutive elements (code of behavior and ethics as a form of subjection) indissociable from one another. Yet, they are relatively independent of each other, as the moral action cannot be reduced to the level of an act conforming to a rule or a law, but it covers a wider space that includes a relationship with the reality in which it is performed and another relationship with the self. Put it differently, there is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without modes of subjectification and an ascetics or practices of the self that support them. In this sense, different kinds of moralities could be sorted out according to the stress they lay on a specific moral element. Under the code-oriented category fall these moralities emphasizing the code, its systematicity, richness, and comprehensiveness of the different areas of behavior. This type of morality focuses more on the instances of authority enforcing the moral code, thus it attains its subjectification through a quasi-juridical form (conducting oneself under the authority of the code instead of committing offenses that make one liable to punishment). Another category of morality is ethics-oriented, where the strong and dynamic element is the forms of subjectification and the practices of the self. The observance of a specific code and its enforcement through juridical forms are rudimentary in this case. The main axis of the ethics-oriented morality is the forms of relation with oneself, the methods and techniques to be experimented on oneself, and the practices enabling one to transform his own mode of being (28-30). By this token, Foucault narrowed down the scope with which one scrutinizes morality so as to focus on the manner of self-conducting as a moral subject, for him ethics 37

was that integrative part of morality that concerned the relation to oneself (rapport soi) (Olivier, 1996:53). Ethics is the process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself [emphasis added] (28). It is this sort of relationship one should have with himself and which determines how one is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his actions. This relation with oneself is not self-awareness but self-formation as an ethical subject (Foucault, 1983:238). From this specific conception of ethics, one can detect that the self-to-self relation constituting the heartland of morality is based on four main pillars. The determination of the ethical substance or substance thique is the way in which the individual constitutes this or that part of himself as the prime material that is going to be worked over by ethics. For instance, the practice of fidelity was established through the strict observance of interdictions and obligations, yet that part of the self on which this practice was brought to consolidate its authority i.e. the ethical substance was constantly shifting from the acts that one performs, to the desires against which one sets himself in a fervent combat, and to the quality and intensity of feelings that one experiences vis--vis the partner. Mode of subjection or mode d assujettissement is the form in which the individual is invited or incited to establish his relation to the rule in the sense of recognizing the nature of the moral obligation and simultaneously recognizing himself as obliged to enforce that obligation. For instance, it might be a divine law that was revealed in a text, a natural law designating a cosmological order where all occupy the same position, a rational law designating as in the case of Kant the laws governing knowledge a priori before any experience, or an attempt to give our existence the most beautiful form possible. Asceticism or pratique de soi is the ethical work (travail thique) that one performs on oneself not only to bring oneself in compliance with a certain moral code, but more importantly to transform and elaborate ones own self into the ethical subject of ones behavior. The self-forming activities involve various means through which one change himself to become the ethical subject he really is. For instance, learning, memorization, and regular checking of conduct to measure the exactness of ones moral compliance; sudden, comprehensive, and definite abdication of pleasures; or continuous, detailed, and painstaking decipherment of ones own desires in their most hidden and obscure form even to ones own self, all these are examples of different sets of self-practices fulfilling the morality of sexual austerity. Teleology or Telos represents the kind of being one aspires to accomplish on behaving himself in the way prescribed by a certain morality. Such mode of being shall be characteristic of the ethical subject one longs to become. Telos plays a crucial role, because an act is not moral in its singularity (en soi mme), only when it represents a benchmark of ones possible advance in the continuity of his life stages. An act is morally established in reference to the place it occupies in a definite pattern of conduct; it is telos that allots positions to different and dispersed acts and institutes them morally in their referentiality to one another and to the morality of which they are integrative parts (Foucault 1985: 26-28 & Foucault, 1983:238-39). 38

Before exploring more aspects of Foucaults notion of ethics, it seems quite useful to focus at the moment on modes of subjectification that Foucault would later on call techniques or technologies of the self. The significance of these self-forming techniques could be justified on the account that it is through them that political power, immortality, and beauty are linked at a certain moment. It is this aspect of ethics that can constitute a linkage between the aesthetic and the political (239). The analysis of these techniques of the self is quite difficult for two reasons: there are invisible techniques and do not require a material apparatus like that of the production of objects; more importantly, they are linked to other techniques28 for the direction of others. In an educational institution for instance, managing others is at the same time teaching them to managing themselves (250). Foucault emphasizes that techniques of power always function in concert with certain techniques of the self, in the sense that the former overlaps with processes where the individual acts upon himself and inversely the latter is integrated into structures of coercion or domination. Accordingly, government denotes the intersecting point where a versatile equilibrium is established with complementarity and conflicts between power techniques and processes through which the individual constructs and modifies himself by his own self (Foucault, 1997:181-82). Technologies of the self29 constitute a type of techniques which permit individuals to perform, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct in such a way that they transform themselves, modify themselves, and reach a certain state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on (181). They are arts of existence that refer to intentional voluntary actions by means of which menseek to transform themselves, to changes themselves in their singular [distinguished] being, and to make their life into an uvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria (Foucault, 1985:10-11). They are procedures, undoubtedly existing in all civilizations, which are proposed to individuals to fix, maintain, or transform their identity to attain a certain number of ends, by dint of certain relations of mastering the self through the self. These procedures seek to answer a very demanding question: how to govern oneself (se gouverner) on exercising certain actions, where one himself is the object of such actions, the domain where they are applied, the instrument to which these actions resort, and the subject that functions?(Foucault, 1989:134). On defining the term government broadly in the sense of determining the behavior of another party in terms of a strategy through resorting to a number of tactics, one can govern by and large a society, a group, a community, a family, an individual, or even sub-individuals (Foucault, 1997:155-56). As such, techniques of the self are nothing but the government of the self by the self (le gouvernment de soi par soi). From another angle, this rule of the individual over himself (self-government) broadens into an experience in which the self-to-self relation takes not only the form of domination but also of an enjoyment without desire and without disturbance of creating the self anew. In this manner, the task of testing oneself and monitoring oneself through a series of practices, taken as an instance of self-techniques, gives shape to the question of the truth concerning what one is, what one does and what one is capable of, which is central to the formation of the self as an ethical subject (Foucault, 1990:68). Technologies of the self as practices of liberation 39

autonomously takes part in the constitution of subjectivities on the basis of rules, styles, and inventions, found in a given cultural context (Foucault, 1988:50-51). After having narrowed down my scope to focus on the ascetic aspect of ethics embodied by the technologies of the self as self-government techniques creating the self as an ethical subject, it seems highly convenient to widen the scope in order to pick up once more the earlier discussion of ethics in its totality as a self-to-self-relation and to bring to focus the aesthetic essence of this self-relationship, previously termed as the aesthetic of existence. I shall start by utilizing the criticism directed against Foucaults aestheticization of ethics as a vantage point for understanding of what might be meant by aesthetic in this context, its relation to ethics as a relation to the self, and its connection to the political sphere. Through expressing loudly Nietzsches gushing that art recalls us to a state of animal vigor, in the sense that becoming more beautiful shall be the expression of a victorious will, Foucaults aesthetics was charged with hedonism. It posits desire as a fundamental unit of analysis and sanctions a mode of life not subject to reason but to the body and its pleasures; it is nothing but a morally suspect vitalism. On being stripped of its ascesis, Foucaultian aestheticizationsignifies bondage to the body, its craving, emissions, and obsessions. [It] is a dangerous discourse of the body (Bennett, 1996:662). However, Foucault distinguishes between 2 sorts of pleasure: on one hand, middle range pleasures that make up the daily life of everybody amount to being nothing that one would be able to recognize and organize his life for the purpose of accommodating them or giving them centrality in this life; on the other, complete and total Pleasure is very difficult to reach and one always feels that he is unable to feel it. The complete pleasure must be incredibly intense that one aspires to die of an overdose of that kind of pleasure and as such it is related to death (Foucault, 1988:12-13). Moreover, Foucault highlights the existence of a specific relationship between power and pleasure that assumes the form of incessant spiraling. Through pleasure, power techniques (no matter on what level they are applied, collective or individual) are furnished during their exercise with an impetus and an emotion that reward them and enlarge their Lebensraum. In the pressure of confession, the one who answers receives pleasure as power attracts the secrets it previously kept watch on; pleasure is drawn to the power that harasses it while power of resistance anchors the pleasures it unmasks. Power operates as a double-impetus mechanism: there is the pleasure generated from exercising power and the pleasure that delights in evading and fooling it; and there is the power that is invaded by the pleasure it pursues and the power that establishes itself in the pleasure of resisting or showing off. The circular incitements and evasions constitute the power-pleasure spirals30 (44-5). The previous notion of pleasure, with its dubious relationship to death, and its incessant spiral relationship with power all these constitute the substrata belying Foucaults notion of aesthetics of existence. Foucaults aesthetics of existence does not cling to a certain subjectivity or a preferred identity and decree it for us. The bone of contention of Foucaultian aesthetics of the self lies not in a particular beautiful subject but in the process of self-formation (subjectification) as an art. Therefore, Foucault was winking admiringly at dandysme of Baudelaire as a model of self-invention and production to be undertaken despite the predominance of subjection mechanisms in the contemporary world (Simons, 1995:76). In an attempt to refocus the 40

definition of modernity as an ethos rather than a historical period, Foucault sketches what Baudelaire meant by the aesthetic relation to the self or dandysme. It is a deliberate attitude of modernity that takes oneself as an object of a complex and difficult elaboration. [It] is mans indispensable revolt against himself[and] the doctrine of elegance which imposes upon its ambitious and humble disciples a discipline more despotic than the most terrible religions. The dandy, in this light, makes his body, behavior, feelings and passions, and even his very existence as a work of art. Eventually, modern man does not set off to discover the secrets and hidden truth of himself but endeavors to invent himself; modernity does not liberate man in his being but faces him with the task of producing himself (Foucault, 1997:117-18). From this perspective, Foucault exclaims uneasily why art was specialized by experts who are professional artists and simultaneously confined to the realm of objects not individuals or life in general, why should the lamp or the house become a work of art? Could not everyones life become a work of art? (Foucault, 1983:236). The final goal or objective of these arts of the self, regardless of their different types, can be summarized in the principle of conversion to self, which could be understood in different ways. First, it represents a change of activity in the sense that the chief objective one should set for oneself is to be pursued within oneself. It follows from this that one must pave a way, escaping all dependencies and external constraints, in order to access oneself and ultimately rejoin it. Second, it denotes a mastery of oneself in the sense that the relation to the self that constitutes the final destination of conversion to the self is often conceived in terms of the juridical model that one becomes his own master and he is accountable only to himself. Third, conversion to the self cannot be confined to the juridical model but lends itself a type of relation to the self where one takes delight in oneself as something that he possesses and has before his eyes. The experience of self-formation is not simply the experience of taking possession of oneself, but more profoundly it is the experience of the pleasure that one takes in himself; having succeeded in gaining access to oneself, one becomes for himself the object of pleasure. This pleasure is no state accompanied or followed by bodily or mental disturbances or agitation, because it arises out of ourselves and within ourselvesand once given no external event can rend it. This pleasure is quite different from that which emanates from objects outside ourselves and whose presence can never be assured (Foucault, 1990:6466). It is quite legitimate at this point to capitalize upon the previous roaming of the different elements of ethics in order to capture the essence of ethics. Ethics is a relation to the self that revolves around the axis of taking oneself as an issue or a problem to occupy oneself with. This self-problematization of ethics is actually self-formation in terms of taking oneself as an object of art and transforming it to an uvre. It could be therefore deduced that ethics in this sense corresponds to what Heidegger perceives as care in terms of problematizing the Being of oneself and taking it as an issue for one to be occupied with. The congruence of ethics and care as the meaning of Being allows for an understanding of ethics as care, which in its turn reverses Foucaults conviction; the care of the self is one form of ethics (rapport soi) not that ethics is the care of the self. Having said this, the question to be raised is 41

whether such a perception of ethics can stand up to the challenge of Heideggers warning that care is in no way the conduct of an isolated self absorbed in itself and its activities and cut off from the world. This question is extremely crucial, because if it were negatively answered, Foucaults ethics would be nothing but theatricality masquerading passiveness and an escapist dream of the colorful fairyland of moral self-autarky. It is in this direction that I shall undertake to drive the analysis at the moment. Let me now take the recasting of Foucault intellectual enterprise under the weight of his ethical turn in a follow up interview on his three volumes History of sexuality as a vantage-point for answering Heideggers challenging warning.
Q: You say that liberty must be practiced ethically? MF: Yes, for what is morality, if not the practice of liberty, the deliberate practice of liberty? Q: That means you consider liberty as a reality already radical in itself? MF: Liberty is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the deliberate form assumed by liberty [emphasis added] (Foucault, 1987:115).

Foucault makes two important assumptions in this formulation of the relationship between liberty and ethics: ethics gives a coherent form to the exercise of freedom; derived from this, coerced practices cannot be counted as ethical practices. In this sense, the previous formulation recognizes that ethics accounts for a coherent experience of the self or the subject and of freedom with respect to the self (Lamb 1995:456-57). The relationship between ethics and politics is embodied in the theme of the return to oneself or the care for oneself often interpreted as an alternative offered to civic responsibility and public political activities. The cultivation of the self was also presented in the guise of the choice between participation and abstention. Nevertheless, it is not in withdrawal from the active political life that the care of the self accommodates its values and practices. Rather, it is concerned with carving a clear definition of the relation with the self in order to accommodate in it forms and conditions of political action, participation in offices of power, and the exercise of political functions as well as to render all these activities possible and acceptable if not necessary. The return to the self reverses the direction of power systems, which seek to define their subjects of power through power relations over others (political status or birth rights). It defines and recognizes oneself as the subject of ones actions through a relation of sovereignty exercised over ones own self. It is a new form of the political game where the response to intensifying the external power relations was flanking them through constructing an adequate counter-balancing relationship with oneself (Foucault, 1990-b: 85-6). Symmetrically, power relations represent the context, which fashions the way ethics as a practice of liberty is unfolded. Such relations could be described as capillary in the sense that they infiltrate all levels and fields of social relations. The whole network of relationships of power operates between individuals, in the family sphere, in the field of educational institutions, in the political body, and even within the individual himself. Power relations as such are characterized by being variable, dynamic, and reflexive that they allow different partners the possibility of constant shifting and even reversing of their positions. However, in


a state of domination, the dynamic power relations and strategies congeal and find themselves firmly set in a deadlock. This takes place when a single individual or a social group has the ability to block the field of power relations and prevent all their reversibility of movement through economic, military, or political instruments. A state of domination, where ethics as practice of liberty does not exist or might exist in an extremely limited fashion, underline the fact that liberation (a new codification of power relations and not the vacuum of such relations) provides new relationships of power that shall be taken over by practices of liberty i.e. ethics (Foucault, 1987:114-15). The conversion of power is another form of the relationship between power relations and ethics exemplified by care for self. Falling in slavery was not the only risk facing the Greek notion of liberty; there was also the great danger of abuse of power. It is here that care for self as possessing a positive ethical sense could be understood as a sort of conversion of power in terms of controlling and limiting it. The abuse of power is the condition of undue power where one exceeds the legitimate limits of practicing power in order to inflict his whims, appetites, and desires on others. In this sense, the tyrant, on practicing undue power, is actually the slave of his own desires and appetites that he cannot resist or control. Tyranny is the other side of the coin of self-enslavement, while care for self is that of self-mastery. Therefore, a good ruler, who takes care of himself in terms of controlling his whims and desires and exercising power on himself, is the one who precisely because of this exercises his power on others correctly. In contrast, a tyrannical ruler, who dominates others and exercise despotic power over them, did not care for himself and became the slave of his own desires (119). This relates to the art of government, which occupied an outstanding position in the political thought of the imperial epoch. In knowing how to conduct himself, the ruler shall be able to lead others properly because the rationality of the government of others is the same as that of the government of the self. The art of government was elevated to the status of a crucial political factor, whose importance exhibited itself in the attention paid to the emperors virtue and his ability to control his passions as a guarantee to his setting a limit on his exercise of power. However, the art of government was not confined to the highest of echelons of the Greek polity, but as a principle it applied to anyone who governs; he must attend himself, take care of it, and establish his ethos (Foucault, 1990-b: 88-89). It is noteworthy that the work on the self with its concomitant austerity was not imposed on individuals by means of law or as a religious obligation. It was an ethical and political choice of the individual to take care of himself or not. The question concerned the individual decision of applying aesthetic values to oneself, ones life, and ones whole existence as a work of art (Foucault, 1983:244-45). To recapture Foucaults perception of the relation between ethics as a practice of freedom and politics, one can ponder on the attempts of both Lawrence Olivier and Gilles Deleuze to lay bare the nature of such relationship. Deleuze argues that if power constitutes the primary matter of human relations, then the link, proposed by Foucault, suggests the multiplication of the relations of force with others by a relation with the self in order to produce what permits us to resist and reverse the game of life and death in the face of power. In other words, he declares that it is possible to utilize this force and to deploy it on oneself 43

instead of on others in order to change ones identity and experience other modes of being through unearthing the being that we are. (Olivier, 1996:64-5). Like Olivier similarly put it, the work on the self does not permit an escape of power relations, which have no durability or end and nothing can exist exterior to them, rather it permits their utilization to achieve other objectives. Resistance is not the end of refusal of power but to manifest its limits and render possible other advancements and novel developments of such boundaries as well as strategies of power which are to extend their sway over other spaces. Only death can deliver us from them [power relations], that is to say this effacement of the self, this limit-experience through which I risk my existence what I am for myself and for the others [emphasis added] (67). Ethics as a practice of freedom in the sense of transgression of limits unfolds itself on the level of knowledge production. The relationship between ethics and knowledge was quite evident in the fact that technologies of the self were directed towards the formulation of a certain truth concerning the self, which was to be fabricated right from scratch or to be discovered and deciphered. In the example of Senecas technique of self-examination the whole administrative review of ones performed activities results in the accumulation of knowledge about these deeds. Such knowledge, assimilated in the juridical-administrative pattern of self-scrutiny, produces or creates the individual as an ethical subject in relation to this specific moral act. In this case, the culmination of knowledge concerning the mistakes or failure committed does not seek to beget feelings of remorse, but to discover through the reconsideration of such mistakes the most rational, appropriate equipment to reach the desired end. It is through the culmination and scrutiny of knowledge that the self-correcting subject in created in relation to a certain moral act (Foucault, 1990-b: 61). The care for the self, another example, is evidently knowledge of the self in terms of the knowledge of a certain number of rules of conduct that are at the same time truths and regulations. To care for oneself is to fit oneself in these truths and regulations. It is exactly here that the overlapping between ethics and the game of truth could be detected (Foucault, 1987:116). Local criticism is the work where the role of theory is not to form the global systematic theory that allocates to everything its position and the value attached to it, but it analyses the specificity of mechanisms of power and locates their connections, extensions, and displacements in order to build up gradually a strategic sort of knowledge. Theory is not an abstraction derived from a certain practice, which in its turn would be an application of a certain theory. Rather, theory is the relay from one practice to another as much as practice is a relay from one theory to another. Theory is practice (Foucault, 1981:145). What gives this sort of criticism its local character is that it is an autonomous, non-centralized kind of theoretical productionwhose validity is not dependent on the approval of the established regimes of thought (81). In specific terms, it makes matters appear more fragile through demonstrating how and why things were able to establish themselves and at the same time proving that they were established through a precise history, therefore what appeared once is obvious would not be obvious or self-evident any more. Consequently, it is through establishing the historicity of the self-evident that a whole field of action possibilities is opened. Historicity tears off comfortably seated facts from their evidentiary status and throws them back to the mobility they have had and should continue to have (Foucault, 1997:16144

62). Local criticism integrates also a new dimension that could be termed as the the insurrection of subjugated knowledges. Subjugated knowledge refer the to whole body of historical knowledge which was present yet disguised by means of the hegemonic harmonization of functionalist and systematizing theory and which criticism was able to unleash. These are low ranking knowledges that were disqualified and located low down the hierarchy beneath the required level of scientificity. It is through the re-appearance of such knowledges that criticism performs its task, because it is exactly in the eruption of these knowledges that the memory of hostile encounters, with which these knowledges have been confined to the margins, lies. Such knowledges owe their force to the sort of harshness with which they were opposed by everything surrounding them (Foucault, 1981:82-3). Ethics is a practice of freedom inasmuch as it is relevant to acts leading to the reconstitution of power dispositions and regimes of truth creating the self, to which one relates himself and to which he relates to the times in which he exists. In this analysis, politics, knowledge, and spirituality are not only instances or even manifestations of different sorts of ethics as acts of transgression; rather they constitute a transgressive ensemble or tripod. Transgression requires the will and desire to transgress as well as the knowledge of oneself (what is desired to be transgressed). It is on the level of power relations that the desire to transgress is stimulated, which in its turn shall erect itself on the level of knowledge, where what is transgressable is caressed. In the tenderness of spirituality, ethics as an act of transgression reaches its climax, for spirituality is the quintessence of transgression. Spirituality refers in this context to a subjects acceding to a certain mode of being and to the transformations which the subject must make of himself in order to acceded this mode of being (Foucault, 1987:125). The acceding of another mode of being bounces on the symbiotic relationship between construction and destruction, therefore it alludes in this fashion to a certain relation to death and fear. It can even be based on the acceptance of death, not in the Christian sense of the desire for death as a means of salvation, it is rather a movement to articulate ones existence to the point where there would be nothing else before it but the possibility of death (120). It is not a matter of fascination with death, because it will not represent any more a preoccupying fear that one seeks to detach from life because in its nothingness it is the annihilation of life. Quite the contrary, death is not to be detached from life because it is life in the sense of the invisible existence, the absent that is always there. As a result, death takes one from his hand and relates him to the permanent duty of reinstituting life and to struggle to make that right triumph (Foucault, 1994:686). If fear is one on the most crucial aspects for power techniques to function and maintain their existence, then spirituality reverses completely the whole game of life and death with its tearing the fear of death off and intensifying the courage to transcend the limits of capabilities in the time of danger. Life under power is the fall in ultimate mortality but self-sacrifice to achieve liberation is the rise to the utmost immortality (Foucault, 1988:220). One might wonder not without right: what on earth is it that can set in an individual the desire, the capacity, and the possibility of an absolute sacrifice without our being able to recognize or suspect the slightest ambition or desire for power and profitIt was something else entirely (Foucault, 1991:13645

37). It is exactly here that this spirituality will be soaked in political struggle and would as a result become political spirituality. It signifies another reality that is external to ones existence yet very close to it; it is a reality in which one is an agent or an actor and for which one risks so willingly his life. Political spirituality animates traditional and seemingly nonpolitical structures to come to the fore and play an important political role. It sustains the multiplicity of such political furnaces kindled not only as anchorage points for resisting, but more importantly as the source of a new political creation. What is impressing about this political spirituality are its efforts to politicize indissociable social structures and to open a spiritual dimension in response to actual daily problems. Political life should stop being the obstacle of spirituality but its ferment, occasion, and receptacle. The spiritual dimension shall be given a privileged place in the future political life of the invisible present and the absent that is always there. One might feel embarrassed to recount the ideal of spirituality and Westerners might begin to grin when the spiritual element is mentioned. However, it is this spiritualit politique, which one searches for by paying his life as a price. Westerners, the others of those people, are completely wrong about it because they have forgotten its possibility since the Renaissance and the grand crises of Christianity (Foucault, 1994:692-4). The question that deserves being posed is: what kind of change can ethics produce as a liberating, transgressive act, whose quintessence is political spirituality? The dynamics of political spirituality as well as its explosive potentialities could be easily compared with a poudrire, no matter what label might be pinned to it (759). Certainly, the desired change or transgression could not be described as a revolution in terms of an insurrection of the ruled and the reversal of their power relations with the rulers (the prisoner and the guard exchanging their positions within the same machinery of power). It is the upheaval of the bare-handed against a power oppressing them, because they wanted to overthrow that formidable weight that lays an unbearable burden on each and every one: the weight of a whole global order. It is a grand act of insubordination declared against the whole planetary system through a movement traversed by the wind of spirituality which focuses more on changing this world than preaching another world (716). In this sense, this change opens the possibility to turn the political givens in whole regions upside down, and consequently the Global strategic equilibrium. Above all, it is about chang[ing] ourselves, our way of being, our relationship with others, with things, with eternity, with God, etc. There will only be a true revolution if this radical change in our experience takes place. It is about a fascinating desire to innovate the whole existence through returning to a profound spiritual experience even at the cost of sacrificing this same existence (Foucault, 1988:217-18).


Part I.

The context of Qutbs discursive practice

Introductory remarks
The main objective of the previous part was to weave the threads of a theoretical framework that would enable me to situate the whole load of the analysis on it. To attain such objective, I had to make many moves forwards and backwards and shift my focus and footing accordingly. Nothing would be further from the truth and less representative of what I was trying to do than to claim that I was unwaveringly following a straightforward path lying open ahead of me. Rather, I was going in circles to spin a cobweb that was centered on the notion of Dasein, always picking up threads from it and permanently steering my course back to it. However, I dealt uncritically with the terms and notions I integrated in the fabric of my theoretical framework and also left some gaps that needed to be filled. It was my aim to save the filling of blank spaces and the critical transfiguration of concepts for the time I reach a suitable position(s) on the net where it would be inevitable to oil its threads. The issue at hand in this part is to situate the Qutbian intellectual enterprise in its discursive as well as non-discursive contexts. There is no gainsaying that any discursive practice does not start the sentence but completes what has already been said in a certain institutional context. It slips in an already established discursive condition with a silent paddle and lets itself be carried away by its tide under the mercy of its waves. Before delving in the context of the Qutbian discourse, I intend to clarify three crucial points that represent fixed signposts, giving me a sense of direction, on the way of analyzing this context. First: I shall apply elements of Heideggers notion of Dasein on a cultural level in order to explore the context of Qutbs intellectual enterprise. Muslim Dasein will not then refer to the Arab-Islamic culture from its dbut up till the present moment, but it denotes the contemporary Arab culture as it is lived and understood nowadays in the sense of its representation of a very manifest historical rupture with its classical sources and structures. With the heyday of Western hegemony, the Arab-Islamic culture cracked from inside into two broad, distinct historical phases: pre-Western domination and Western domination phases. Western hegemony unleashed a gradual, but extremely violent, rupture in the historical trajectory of Arab culture, in fact of all non-Western cultures. All the developments, conflicts, and problems of the current phase are associated with this historical rupture to the extent that they would be incomprehensible or were even completely unthinkable without it. It is this historical rupture that forced the Arab cultural heritage to appear under the label of tradition in the current debates and imposed on the Arab culture in its totality a priori accommodations and compromises that trespass its basic foundations right from the beginning (Ghalioun, 1990:40). In other words, it is the Muslim Dasein in the post-Almoaidin1 era that I intend to narrow down my focus on in this part. Second: The elements of Heideggers Dasein that will be carried over to the cultural level to constitute what I call the Muslim Dasein do not join together to form a simplified version of causality, one leading to the other and so on. Nor do they represent components of a mlange that conglomerate together in the sense of a cause producing multiple effects or even of an 48

essence possessing multifarious manifestations. They could be neither referred to a common origin from which they broke in different ways, nor would they be driven to an end destination where they are to join their ways. The phenomenon at hand could be only compared to the legendary figure of the hydra, to use the metaphor for a better understanding, whose terrible heads grew again when cut off. The hydra-like nature of the Muslim Dasein prevents me from approaching it in a straightforward manner, because it forces me, on being confronted with the terribleness that it is (and which is also what I am), to cognize it through fleeing from its face(s) and seeking my refuge in a dark labyrinth bumping into petrifying faces I shall never have to meet again. In concrete terms, let me take as a tangible example the institutional transplantation, which represents the main core of the modernizing act in the Arab world. This act is temporally dislocating in the sense of displacing the Dasein in a marginal zone where different times collide with one another, at the same time it cracks the self and confuses the positions of the self and the other in a schizophrenic manner, also it decentralizes the self and disqualifyingly marginalizes it in the manner of issuing a sentence of death or declaring the impossibility of Daseins possibility to exist any more. Certainly, conceiving time as the horizon of our existence the way Heidegger did would bring the temporal element to the fore of the analysis and bestow on it a central position. Yet, on understanding time as a social construct or an end product of a socio-historical trajectory chained by a certain cultural context, the solid notion of time (taking the clock-time as its underlying model) dissolves in the air or at least will be full of numerous pores through which other elements fight their way out and come equiprimordially to the fore of existence. Third: The vagueness of the relationship between re-investing the Islamic codes and symbols in a pseudo-modernized secular political context (which is what the Islamic resurgence is all about) on one hand, and the issue of its temporal direction (future-oriented or past-oriented) on the other, reflects itself in a very dazzling fashion. Western version of historicity that claims the status of an all-encompassing universal history follows schematically a line starting from the antiquity of Greece (that was idolized and taken for a human revelation) to the dark Middle Ages (where the feudalistic economic and social system was wedded in a marriage of convenience to the Church that toppled and replaced the Roman empire) and finally reaching the modern age (where reason triumphed over dogma, the civil society over the clergy, and the capitalistic mode of production over the feudal lords). The Other played in this story the role of a semi-villain who provided Europe with civilizational challenge and motive for conquest and liberation. The Others role was also to preserve the heritage of Greece of antiquity intact during Europes dark ages and to pass it over from behind his own back to Europe, so that the West can be able to retrieve its civilizational origins, on which the whole Renaissance was to be founded. The Other should afterwards fade out behind the shades of historical forgetfulness till his rediscovery by colonizing, modernizing Europe. In the context of this version of historicity, any attempt of the Other, having been wholly identified with and engulfed by Europes Middle Ages, to make an independent comeback on the stage of history, apart from his predestined roles, will summon back, by logic if not by justice, all historical associations with Europes backward ages and will be condemned as a throw back in its dark 49

historical dungeons. Against this background, the direction of change ushered by Islamic discursive practices can never be clearly seen from medieval-based version of history. I shall try to replay two completely different scenes, where the vagueness of the situation has been come across, before determining my own position regarding this issue. Emmanuel Sivan recounts that as he was strolling in the streets of Cairo, he was drawn to stacks of books by the master theoreticians of the djihad in the late Middle ages, above all Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Kathir, which were quickly snatched from the book shelves by people in all walks of life, but especially by youngsters in modern garb. He noticed that the editorial forewords and commentaries accompanying them were not a simple paraphrasing of thirteenth- and fourteenth-century texts, nor were they belonging to the shallow propaganda of Nassers time. The reader of these books, he added, would note an evident effort quite learned and certainly creative to reflect upon the meaning these texts could have for a modern and totally different historical situationInnovative application of underlying principles of Islam was what the authors attempted. On engaging himself in discussions with many a book buyer and a bookseller, he was struck by the degree to which the basic message of these writings had been driven home, even though not allinterlocutors had the benefit of a traditional education. More than this, Sivan also observed that the readers were neither nostalgiaseekersnor simple-minded reactionaries.yet their ferocious attention in detail in these medieval texts showed this past to be a living reality for them, capable of guiding [them] in the later third of the twentieth century in all realms of life, including politics [emphasis added] (Sivan, 1985:ix-x). Less sympathetic and more cynical was Salman Rushdies comment on the re-Islamization of laws in the wake of the 1979 revolution in Iran, which were adorned Ali Shariatis famous words a revolt against history. [In] spite of all the pedantry, all the restoration of ancient laws, time in Iran has persisted in running forward. Picking up Tom Narins depiction of the manner, in which nationalism progresses as a Janusheaded movement, Rushdie sets off demonstrating that this pattern of historical movement applies to Islam not only in the current time but also from its very first days. In his opinion, Islamic revelation manifested itself as a plea for a return to the code of the nomadic Bedouin. So we may say that the ideas of the Quran are in this sense backward-looking, nostalgic, against the current. Nevertheless, history did move forward; nomadism did not once again become the Arab norm. The birth of Islam was presided over by two Gods: Allah, and also Janus. As such, he concludes that when Khomeini speaks of a revolt against history, we can argue that he echoes, in his fashion, the Prophet himself; for Muhammads revelation, too, was a revolt against his time (Rushdie, 1992:383-85). In an incisive article whose title (Une volont de retour au pass?) discloses interest in this same problem of Islams Janus-headed manner of historical procession, Franois Burgat forwarded a thesis, with which a lot could be shared. He argues that the relationship between the Islamic forces and modernity is not of simple total rejection, as it might seem at first, but of a covert complex reconciliation. The vocabulary of total rejection, which the Islamic discourse circulates, does not faithfully reflect the inherent logic of a complicated process, which this rejection is only one of its multiple facets. It is the process through which Islamic societies re-introduce referential codes and symbols of their local 50

Islamic culture to all realms of life and on different levels. Certainly, this complicated process of restoration of local references, operating on the symbolical level and in societies, where such local codes have been exiled long ago from the center of existence, must take the form of an anti-modern, anti-Western rupture with progress, whose imported models were dominating the technical, intellectual, and political existence of these societies. What is actually taking place is not a total rejection of the attributes and givens of modernity but a differentiation of those elements of modernity that could be appropriated in accordance with the local heritage. The Eurocentric components of modernity and the historical references bestowing on it its legitimation in the Western collective consciousness are the targets of such process of transfiguration. Muslim societies do not have to celebrate those elements of modernity which Western industrial societies cherish and adore; they would not obligatory write their modernity with the same symbolical and historical terminology like the Europeans. After all, the final product of such a process might be something completely different (Burgat, 1994:767). One might not be so sure like Burgat whether Muslim societies are producing a new version of modernity in their own codes or that they are just innovating or even galvanizing their own symbols by modern charges. Nevertheless, when it comes to the relationship between the Islamic discourse and modernity (the present time), I lay all the stakes of my analysis on his selective appropriation thesis. Now let me roll the dice.


Chapter one: Temporal dislocation

IT WAS the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way in short, the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only (Dickens, 1994:13).

The times Dickens was so keen to unroll before our eyes in the first paragraph of his Tale of two cities were actually nothing but turbulent times. They were really hard times, and they were horrible times as well. These were modern times. In this chapter, I shall try to portray the features of the temporal horizon of the Muslim Dasein. Before doing this however, the theoretical grounds that underpin the notion of temporal horizon have to be clarified.

The concept of time

In the last page of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger made clear it is quite impossible to carry out researches about Being without a secure horizon for question and answer. He concludes that [t]he existential-ontological constitution of Daseins totality is grounded in temporality. Therefore, the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. He asks in an exclamatory tone in the last line: Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? (437). If Heidegger grants time the primordial position of a horizon1 in Daseins projection of its own Being, one is forced to ask: but what exactly is time? Dasein as care means that it is in its Being always on the front (vorweg) and ahead-ofitself (ber sich hinaus). Care in this sense assumes that something will happen then, that something already found its completion before, and that something has to be made up for now (that has failed on a former occasion). Understood in terms of care, then expresses awaiting, on that former occasion retaining, and now making present. If in the then lies the now-not-yet and in the on that former occasion lies the now-no-longer, then both are understood with relation to a now, which is making-present. Making-present must necessarily temporalize itself in unity with awaiting and retaining, even if these take the form of forgetting. Therefore, it seems quite obvious that there is a structural relationship between now, then, and on that former occasion that is called datability (Datierbarkeit). Whether this datability is attached to a more or less fixed date on the calendar or not is a secondary matter that does not affect in any way its very existence. This could be understood simply because the structural relationship, which is always made use of on a daily basis even if not plainly expressed, emanates from the fact that on addressing itself to objects of its


concern Dasein is actually expressing its Being as Being alongside that ready-to-hand (it interprets itself in this fashion), which is based on a making-present. This making-present (as a dimension of temporality) is only possible as something, which is ecstatically open (capable of being extended). The making present which interprets itselfis what we call time . The datability structure of now, then, and on that former occasion is in this vein reflecting the ecstatical character of temporality and is also evidence that these are time. The interpretative expressing of the now, the then, and the on that former occasion, is the most primordial way of assigning a time (406-7). Heidegger insists that true time cannot be attributed to the three traditional temporal dimensions, because time is in fact four-dimensional. According to Heidegger, the fourth dimension is the interplay of the original three dimensions or rather of their relational structure. Yet, this fourth dimension is really the first dimension in the sense that it allows the nearness of past, present, and future to remain open to each other. It is actually recommended that in order to follow Heideggers way one must distinguish between and among the past, the present, and the future and the fourth temporal dimension, which underlies the first three. Heidegger refuses to consider making-present (the fourth dimension2) in terms of a now, duration, or simultaneity, rather he offers as an approximation of the dynamics of presencing [making-present] the notions of past-present-future reaching into one another and of past-present-future offering themselves to one another. However, the metaphorical shell of reaching and offering hinders one from catching a glimpse of the structure of what is reaching toward what or what is being offered to what (White, 1984:88-9). Immersing time as a horizon of Being, in Heideggers terms, in the social medium liberates the different, social temporal domains from the authoritarian unity of time on one hand, and manifests the dynamism, vitality, and multiplicity of these dominions, which escape all attempts of being enframed, on the other. It seems convenient to take this social conceptualization of time in another direction. The fourth dimension of time pinpointed by Heidegger, which institutes the unity of the other three dimensions, is based on the ecstatical character of making-present as a demonstrative, self-interpretive act of addressing objects of concern in a manner of Beingalongside. On being immersed in the social waters, this fourth dimension, which accounts for the relational structure of then, before, and now called datability-structure, reflects itself in the instrumental character of time i.e. time as an authoritative act. The term time has different meanings that interlocutors exchange with one another during their communication; it is related with a certain pattern of remembrance and connotation that we playfully and artfully bind together on exchanging words. The clock of a train station, for example, sends signals to those who know (through a socially institutionalized process) how to interpret them or attach them to the right meaning, and then they conduct themselves accordingly (Elias, 1988:xlv). Time stands therefore as a symbol for a certain type of a socially in-built synthesizing process. Only for human beings, it makes sense to organize a relationship between processes of the universe or of light and that of the suns circulation around the earth. This capability to synthesize enables one to perceive the sequence of events and the circulation of the sun, with the help of social symbols, together and simultaneously. It needs a long period of social development so that a human being would 53

learn how to develop symbols for complicated representations, without which humans are unable to communicate with one another. Nor would they be able to orient themselves in the first place (xxxix). Based on this, one might say that time is not an uncrossable horizon that is the same for every one; rather we live in different temporal domains. No two men would be experiencing the same time, but each has his own time-perspective or time-scale that reflects an individual and a social pattern as well of synthesizing physical and social realms and producing out of this regulative and orienting symbols to be communicated. In this virtue, living in different temporal domains has far-reaching consequences for every one (Jacque, 1990:21). Times dependence on its socio-cultural setting reveals two results concerning the conceptualization of time: there is no prototype of time in the sense of an objective flowing of existing points; and time is not an apriori of all experiences but it is in itself a form of a lived, socially constructed experience3 (Elias, 1988:xv). Time is actually an authoritative act that has a double meaning: on one hand this authoritative act consists of bringing together in a certain socially constructed order the dispersed moments, which have no sense in themselves and attaching this order to a fixed social meaning4 (compare this with Heideggers making-present or the fourth dimension of time); on the other the authoritative act is embodied in the functioning of the socially constructed order of time as a closed horizon that exerts a hegemonic power5 on the individual and social levels in terms of regulation and orientation of behavior. To understand the doublenature (instrumental-coercive) of time as an authoritative act, based foremost on the ecstatical nature of making-present, it is quite worthy to acknowledge that man is able to direct himself autonomously to some extent, but he is subordinated to the compulsion of different forces (nature, society). His decision leeway (Entscheidungsspielraum) is determined by the possibility of manipulating in different ways the flexible balances between the various sorts of compulsion instances that are always in flux (Elias, 1988:xliii-xliv).

Modernitys time consciousness

If time is a socio-cultural product that demarcates the horizon of our existence through its fourth dimension that bestows on time its instrumental character, then the question that begs insistently to be addressed right now is: what might be modernitys own perception of time or how did modernity fall upon this specific perception? In order to answer this question, it seems quite necessary to hold as a premise Webers own description of modernity as the rational process of disenchantment which led in Europe to a disintegration of religious world views that issued in a secular culture. Habermas comments that what Weber depicted was not only the secularization of Western culture, but also and especially the development of modern societies from the viewpoint of rationalization. Therefore, in clearer terms what Weber meant by modernity was not only the cultural aspect of secularization but also the institutional aspect that, in Habermas words, has taken shape around the organizational cores of the capitalist enterprise and the bureaucratic state apparatus (Habermas, 1987:1-2).


To catch modernitys time consciousness, I will have to chase it swiftly along these two tracks: the philosophical and the institutional. Concerning the philosophical aspect of modernitys time consciousness, it is to be glimpsed through what Habermas referred to as the mentality of aesthetic modernity. The expression modernity repeatedly articulates the consciousness of an era that refers back to the past of classical antiquity precisely in order to comprehend itself as a result from the old to the new. What is characteristic however is the glorification of the new, the present, and the most recent that assisted the self-renewing historical contemporaneity of the spirit of the age to finds its objective expression. Then, this moment of novelty will be surpassed and devalued by fresh, new innovations of the next style. The mentality of aesthetic modernity, in this sense, developed around a transformed consciousness of time, which is expressed in the metaphor of the avant-guard. The avant-guard explores unknown territories, defeats undetermined future, and makes its way through rough, uncharted domains. The anticipation of an indefinite and contingent future signifies the glorification of a contemporariness that repeatedly gives birth to new and subjectively defined pasts. As a result, it could be justifiably deducted that it is modernity itself that creates its own classical status. The yearning for a lasting and immaculate present constitutes the main essence of modernitys aesthetic mentality as a self-negating movement, always seeks to surpass itself to the newest, the novelest, and the most recent. Therefore, individual historical epochs lose their marking features the moment they are subjected to the melting heat of the heroic present. The subversive forces of this time consciousness always yearning for an immaculate and everlasting present through rebelling against the norm-giving achievements of tradition account for the anarchistic explosion of the continuum of history that it effects. This was actually noticed by Adorno, who assured that the wounds inflicted by disruption represent the seal of authenticity for modernityand the acts of explosion is itself one of [its] invariants. In a very dramatic tone, he adds that modernity is a myth turned against itself; the timelessness of myth becomes the catastrophe of the moment which disrupts all temporal continuity (Habermas, 1996:39-41). One might finally comment that modernitys time consciousness is a double-edged sword: one on hand its valorization of the most novel represent its drivingengine for self-renewal, it is on this account that modernity could be viewed as an unfinished project, if not a never-ending one; on the other the anarchistic explosion of historys continuum and rebelling against the tradition will always create problems concerning modernitys unsatisfiable need for self-reassurance having been unable to escape its temporal horizon and extremely unwilling to anchor itself in another historical epoch or to submit to norms other than of itself. If modernity, as Giddens defines in association with a time period and with an initial geographic location, refers to the modes of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the 17th century onwards and which subsequently became more or less world wide (Giddens, 1996:1), then the institutional side of modernity proves itself to be extremely crucial to extract a definite understanding of modernitys time conception. In his Discipline and punish, Foucault provides an extensive analysis of what he labels a political anatomy of power, where time was created anew in modern disciplinary institutions that integrated 55

duration6 in the economy of penalty to facilitate the proper action of punishment. Otherwise, if the convict cannot, after a certain period, take advantage from the constraints imposed on him, then reforming him would be no better than torture and it would be costly and troublesome for the society (Foucault, 1997-b: 107-8). Methods of temporal regulation like rhythms, imposed occupations, and regular cycles of repetition were refined through the increase of time division into minute parts: quarter of hours, minutes, and seconds. In the army and the factory, not only did quantitative partitioning of time become more detailed, but also the quality of the time used had to be ensured through supervisors who guarantee the elimination of any disturbance or distraction to constitute a totally useful time. Precision and utility were the virtues of disciplinary time. It is a sort of anatomo-chornological schema through which time invades the body carrying on its back all meticulous controls of power. Underlying this temporal anatomy was a principle of a positive economy of time that implants an ever-increasing utility of the exhaustive and intensive use of the slightest moment and its fragments through extracting from time more moments and from each moment more useful forces. The more time is broken down, the more its subdivisions multiply...the more one can accelerate an operation or...regulate it according to optimum speed. It is as if time was inexhaustible or that there was an ideal point where maximum speed and maximum efficiency could be attained (149-52 & 154). Inversely, the temporal dispersal is brought together through dividing duration to successive segments and phases, organizing this succession of elements and combining them according to increasing complexity, and drawing a series of series that lays for each individual according to his level, seniority, and rank the operations that match him. This seriation7 produces profit and leads to mastering a duration that would otherwise slip ones grip. More importantly, the temporal segregation-aggregation techniques reveal an evolutive time: a linear time whose moments head towards a terminal point. This evolutive time crept on the individual level through individual series to produce genesis, at the same time it founded its collective overlay of progress through administrative and economic techniques of control. Evolutive historicity and its correlatives of the progress of society and the genesis of individual were effects of a mode of power that integrates the temporal, continuous, and cumulative dimension in exercising its control and domination (157-60).

Modernization and temporal dislocation

But what is it exactly that modern power mechanisms portrayed to the minutest of details by Foucault did to time and how did it create it anew? The answer to this question lies in the process of temporal dislocation (time-place distanciation in terms of Giddens) that represents one of the vehicles of modernitys disembeddedness. In all pre-modern societies, time was linked with space to the extent that no one could tell the time, which was certainly imprecise and variable, without socio-spatial indicators. The question of When was universally connected with Where. The diffusion of mechanical time, embodied by the clock, to all members of the population played a key role in the separation of time from space. This owes 56

to the fact that the clock expressed a uniform dimension of empty time, quantified in such ways as to permit the precise designation of zones of the day. The total separation of time from space occurred when the uniformity of time measurement was translated into uniformity in the social organization of time. Mechanical time was unified in different areas and penetrated regions of the same state, though on the borders between different states the situation was chaotic. With calendars, the standardization of time became worldwide, so that everyone followed the same dating system and the advent of a new year became a global event. Though different new years continue to coexist, they are subordinated to the same mode of dating, which has become to all intents and purposes universal. It is certainly not the case that tearing time apart from space was a linear development that was all encompassing and had no reversals. On the contrary, the process had its dialectical side and provoked set backs and opposing characteristics. On the social level, the time-space separation was the basis of their being functionally recombined in relation to social activities, which is demonstrated by the example of the timetable. The timetable of a railway station might seem at first glance as a temporal chart deciding the times in which trains run, yet it actually coordinates these times with places to which trains travel (Giddens, 1996:17-19). The time-space distanciation and re-unification is quite crucial for modernity. On one hand, its standardized dating system provides the basis for the appropriation of a unitary history (history is the systematic appropriation of the past to help shape the future) that is taken for granted, worldwide, and given the status of an overall mapping of the globe. This radical historicity emanating from modernity and balancing the emptiness of its time depends actually on modes of insertion into time and space (timetables and maps for instance) unavailable to previous civilizations (20). More than this, the homogenous empty time would offer an incomparable chance to assimilate other civilizations (such civilizations developed quite separate from the known history of Europe, Christianity, and Antiquity and their genealogies lie outside of and inassimilable to European history) in this radical version of historicity based on the foundations of modernity as a particular European historical experience (Anderson, 1996:69). In brief, empty time creates and propagates the Eurocentric version of a universal history. On the other, it constitutes the prime condition for the phenomenon of disembeddedness, which denotes the lifting out of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space. The dissemination of quantified empty time, generated from the separation of time from place, and its universalization disembed the social activity from its particular context. This opens manifold possibilities of change through doing away with local habits and traditions (Giddens, 1996: 20-21). Disembeddedness is one of the strongest vehicles of modernity that lubricates its dissemination in institutional terms on a worldwide scale, and thus gives it the pretence of a human, universal project and consolidates its unitary version of history. It is on this level of temporal disjunction or dislocation that one might be able to situate the modernization process in Egypt as a part of a prevalent trend in the whole Muslim world. Crucial is also the fact that the modernizing act, taking place in one or more countries of the Muslim world, did not produce temporal disjunction as a consequence that was to appear afterwards in the short or the long run. Rather, modernization was in itself a 57

temporally dislocating act. It is not then a cause-effect relationship, but just different angles of looking at the same thing. Before dealing with modernization as a temporally disembedding act, two encapsulated definitions of both modernization and temporal disjunction, which will be later unrolled, should be introduced in order to pitch stable landmarks on the way of scrutinizing the issue at hand. Temporal dislocation denotes that moment in which the fourth dimension, which according to Heidegger wraps up the other three dimensions of time in a structural unity and establishes the basis of times datability, simply dissolves and the unity of the three dimensions is shattered. Making-present as the main basis of the structural relationship between the three dimensions of time depends on the ecstatical characteristic of the present moment, in the sense of its ability to stretch its arms to other Seiends ready-to-hand and to the other dimensions of time. In the condition of temporal dislocation, the present loses its ecstatical character and falls upon itself so that the mode of temporality to be established is neither awaiting nor retaining. Rather, it is the mode of forgetting, where temporality ensnares itself in the present, it waits for nothing. In Heideggers words, it says pre-eminently Now! Now! . The extensive horizon of time, where the three dimensions explore and embrace one another, cracks into infinite prison cells of the present moment, where the Dasein is sentenced for life. There are three characteristics of the state of temporal dislocation: disembeddedness from the original context-bound temporal horizon; annexation to a marginal temporal zone, where two temporalities collide violently into one another and as such irreparably crack down the Dasein temporally into infinite splinters; imprisonment in the present moment, where all free possibilities of change, on which Dasein projects itself, are being reduced to an empty pattern of cyclical repetition. Modernization is the process through which Western institutions and organizational techniques were imported from their original socio-political and economic setting in 19th century Europe and transplanted in the Arab soil. Modernity was a unique cultural process that is aware of itself by naming itself, by situating itself in relation to its past and its present, and designating the operations that it must carry out within its own present (Foucault, 1988:89). By contrast, modernization attempts in the Arab World were sporadic and selective: the first phase of modernization started with the military and police forces; in another phase, the bureaucratic and educational systems were Westernized; in a later time, a whole sale process of importing Western laws and institutions opened a secular political space for the first time in Muslim history. Contrary to the modernization via colonization thesis, importing Western institutions took place because these models were demanded and integrated by importing actors8 (acteurs importateurs) and according to their own strategies, calculations, and individual choices. However, this process should not be regarded solely as an effect of free choice, nor did it set off on a linear path ahead of its time. It was, in fact, a vulnerable and shaky compromise between local choices and global strategies none of the local actors had direct control upon. No wonder then that the course it took was in all its qualities and historical contingencies a zigzag way (Badie 1992, 125 & 144).


In order to understand the modernization episode in the Arab world as a temporally dislocating act, I will attempt to construct three historical scenes, which explore each of the three aspects of temporal dislocation. Although each scene encloses more than one aspect, I have arbitrarily chosen to expand on one aspect at a time, so that the discussion would be more focused and the scenes would fit in the end together to form an overall episode of temporal dislocation.

The first scene: Temporal disembeddedness

The first scene concerns the aspect of time disembeddedness, which signifies uprooting the temporal structure in an act of disenchantment from its socio-cultural setting. As Giddens noticed, in the European experience time disembeddedness was related to and fostered by the liberation of space from the shackles of face-to-face interaction localities through the discovery of remote regions of the world by Western travelers (Giddens, 1996:18-19). The space, in which time was emptied from its local social context, took the form of the whole globe charted in universal maps. By contrast, disembeddedness of time in the Arab context was effected by and hinged upon an acute confinement of space to very narrowly defined local settings that shut out remote zones, previously considered as being in unity with them. The space, in which time was emptied from its social content, assumed the form of house arrest projected on the very hierarchy of a prison. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century the people of Egypt were made inmates of their own villages. A government ordinance of January 1830 confined them to their native districts, and required them to seek a permit and papers of identification if they wished to travel outside. The village was run like a barrack, its inhabitants placed under the surveillance of guards night and day, and under the supervision of inspectors as they cultivated the land and surrendered to the government warehouse its products. It was certainly not the first time that the agricultural wealth of the Nile valley was to be dominated and exploited by Cairo. What was actually new in this scene was the nature of this control. Wherever people looked, they were to be inspected, supervised, or instructed. If they left the village, it was generally under guard, forcibly drafted into the still harder discipline of the corve or the military campSpies were placed at every point, and the hierarchy of supervision and inspection was to ascend from the field and the shop, through the levels of village, district, regional and provincial supervision, to the central Bureaux of Inspection (dawawin al-taftish) under the direct supervision of the Governor. No one has ever before thought of organizing the whole country the way one would barrack and discipline an army (Mitchell, 1989:34). Nailing down the rural population in their local setting was in fact a precondition for the production of cotton and other commodities for European consumption. Therefore, penetrating and controlling the processes of production to guarantee the flow of regular revenues towards the center (Cairo) was carried out through a continuous and meticulous system of inspection and subordination. In December 1829, a sixty-page booklet was issued concerning the Programme for successful cultivation by the peasant and the 59

application of government regulations, which described in details the tasks the peasants had to carry out in the fields, the crops that they must cultivate, their confinement in their villages, and the duties and assignments of their watch-guards and supervisors. While performing his prescribed tasks in the field, the peasant was to be monitored and supervised by a ghafir. Such watchdogs inspected the peasants daily and watched them on a regular basis in order to prevent them from fleeing their villages. Acts of insubordination or failure to perform the required tasks were reported to Shaykh al-balad, the government-appointed head of the village entitled to punish the peasants, who committed such a criminalized behavior by whipping him 25 times with a kurbadj. If after three days the same peasant failed to accomplish whatever he was previously punished for, he will receive 100 lashes. The head of the village was under the supervision of a district official hakim al-khut, who had the authority of chastising the Shaykh on the first offence (neglecting the supervision of peasants) and ordering him to be flogged with 200 lashes on the second offence and 300 on the third. A regional official the ma mur, who can punish the former by warning or 50 strokes of the cane, supervised the Hakim. The Ma mur was responsible to the provincial official the mudir, who was to submit a weekly report to the central Bureau of Inspection. This hierarchy functioned on the occasions of distribution of crops, collection of taxes, provision of men for the army and corve (40-41). Based on this regime of spatial confinement, discipline, and supervision, a new method for control was employed in the 1840s through placing groups of villages in the custody of individual officials, members of the ruling family, and European merchants. The novelty of this method was not in organizing the villages as personal estates, on which the production for the European market would depend, because the same methods of discipline and punishment were also being applied. Rather, the spatial confinement of the village population was accompanied this time by a certain politics of space or disciplinary architecture providing the foundations of a chronological anatomy, through which time invades the confined space carrying on its back all meticulous controls of power. The buzzword for this new complex method of spatio-temporal control was model housing. In 1846, the village of Kafr al-Zayat was one of the first locations for reconstruction of the villages of Egypt under the supervision of French engineers. The inhabitants of the village were instructed to present lists of their families, animals, possessions, and professions. On the basis of the submitted lists, new houses were built to which they were ordered to move. The wretched mass of huts formerly piled together without a plan was removed altogether, and replaced with a new village. The model house for an ordinary family consisted, according to the description of the French engineers, of the following spaces: a courtyard of which the floor is raised 0.10 m above the level of the street, 8 m long by 4.34 m wide and thus able to accommodate, at night, at least three large animals and three small a room on ground level, of which the floor is raised 0.10 m above the floor of the courtyard, and thus 0.20 m above the level of the street, 4.35 m long by 3.70 m wide, illuminated by two windows: one high up, barred, overlooking the street, the other plain, overlooking the courtyard; containing at the rear a divan, large enough for two beds end-to-end.a room on the first floor, with a small covered balcony overlooking the courtyard. In the plan of village construction and model 60

houses, the space of rooms, courtyards, and buildings was specified to the nearest centimeter. The same plans were used to rebuild other Egyptian villages like Neglieh eleven miles to the south and Ghezaier in the governorate of Menufiyya. Moreover, these same plans were elevated to the status of a module and were used in the same period by French administrators for the reconstruction of villages in Algeria. In the Algerian case the construction of villages following the previous patterns was connected with achieving military control over the defeated colony. Enormous number of Algerian villages was destroyed and their inhabitants were deported to new settlements, where it was easier to establish discipline and surveillance. The question that deserves to be forwarded is: what is it exactly that was taking place and how does it relate in any way to the temporal structure of the affected villages? The essence of this order is to introduce space as something apparently abstract and neutral, a series of inert frames or containers, which is an effect of building and distributing items on space according to the strict distinction between container and contained. The division of space enabled to rank, standardize, and localize the houses, the families, and the animals. For instance, the different models of houses in the village that were to be constructed were intended to fix and make legible a determined social hierarchy (beside the ordinary house of a peasant, there were dwellings for the well-to-do, the rich, and the Europeans). Within the designed space, items could be isolated, enumerated, and kept (three small animals and three big ones in the courtyard, two beds end-to-end per room) to the extent that French plans did not forget to specify the position of pots, water jars, and food reserves. Also, the system of construction was designed to install in the houses a family of any number of individuals (people as well as animals). Dividing the internal space of house into separate partitions made the room like individual cells that could be interconnected in any combination. As such, families of a large number of members could be contained by opening a doorway through the dividing walls. The network of cellular containers was fixed and flexible at the same time (it could be expanded and contracted) without ever losing the character of composing a system whose separate parts were in harmony. Interlocking with this neutralization of space was the breaking down of life into a series of discrete functions sleeping, eating, cooking, and so on each with a specific location. The order of the reconstructed village was to be achieved by reducing its life to this system of locations and the objects and the functions contained there. Breaking down the peasants activities and distributing them on spaces as functional sites was balanced by composing a new seriation of activities, which produces profit and leads to a mastering of durations that would otherwise slip ones grip. This harmony of spaces and durations offers the reconstructed village the possibility of increasing its productivity as a unit, not to mention the better knowledge and control of its inhabitants (44-47). The temporal disembeddedness shades of this scene, in the negative sense of being uprooted from a certain setting without being able to strike new roots, could not be easily regarded by dint of the fact that the sparkling new order does not only prove itself to be functional, but most importantly order of this kind claims to be order itself, the only real order that can ever exist. Therefore, temporal disembeddedness must be viewed against the background of the setting that the horizon of time was uprooted from. That is, the local setting on the eve of modernization. I shall rely in this regard on Pierre Bourdieus account9 of the 61

time perspective of Kabyle villagers in Algeria and its elaboration by Timothy Mitchell. For a Kabyle peasant awareness of time is not an aspect of his life experience, but the form in terms of which that experience is stylized. This time consciousness is embedded in a symbolic system from which the ritual calendar emanates, whose divisions adjust the rhythm of the Kabyle peasants life. This symbolic world outlook does not perceive natural phenomena as such in a descriptive way, because each phenomenon reveals significant aspects that are treated as functional signals of a complex symbolism (Bourdieu, 1990:219). Nowhere is this symbolic outlook better manifested than in the structure and elements of the Kabyle house. It is described as follows: it is rectangular in shape, and a double door gives access from the courtyard. Inside there is a low wall, dividing the interior parts in two. One part, slightly larger than the other and raised slightly higher, is reserved for human use. The fireplace is at its far end, and a weaving room is assembled by the sidewall opposite the doorway, the source of daylight; the other sidewall, in which the door is set, is called the wall of darkness. The smaller, lower part of the house, occupied by animals, has a loft above it where tools and animals fodder are stored, and where women and children usually sleep, especially in winter. Bourdieu suggests that the associations and oppositions between the different parts of the house and the places, where activities are performed or things are kept are not merely symbolic but at the same time functional. The house is ordered according to a set of homologous oppositions: between fire and water, cooked and raw, high and low, light and shade, day and night, male and female fertilising and to be fertilised. Mitchell remarks that it would be misleading to view the house as a neutral space that persons and items are arranged in. Rather, the space is polarized through the previous set of polar oppositions that consume every activity carried out within the house. The whole house itself could be seen as one polarity in relation to the rest of the village; it denotes the female world (especially in the seasons when men do not reside in the house) in opposition to the male world of the places of assembly, the fields, and the market place. More than this, these oppositions are not fixed categories of a rigid structure but an unstable interplay of polar forces. The male includes the female, the light includes the dark, and the dry includes the wet and vice versa, for each term occurs only as the uncertain disappearance or postponement of what it differs from. In the Kabyle house every item presents itself not as a mere object but as a certain force or potential. Grain, for instance, is a potential of fullness whose relation to water and fire determine its position. The grain set aside for consumption is kept in large jars against the end wall of the upper part of the house near the fireplace. Thus, consumption grain that feeds the household and ensures its wellbeing is associated to fire that will transform it into bread. By contrast, sowing grain is stored in the dark part of the house in wooden chests under the conjugal bed. The grain set aside as seed corn is associated with dampness and water, on which swelling depends, and also with the woman for the swelling of the seed is analogous to the swelling of the pregnant womans belly (Mitchell, 1989:49-51). Exactly like the house was the Kabyles consciousness of time itself immersed in the same symbolic world outlook of homologous oppositions. In opposition to ploughing and sowing there is the harvest; to weaving, the seasonal counterpart of ploughing, the firing of pottery is opposed. Spring is opposed to autumn, summer to winter, all aspects of a larger and 62

clearer contrast between the dry season (spring and summer) and the wet season (autumn and winter). In opposition as well are night and day, light and shadow, the rising and the setting sun, East and West. The homologous oppositions of nature determine the agricultural operations and the activities related to them in terms of division of labor between sexes and of the season and times they are to be carried out in. The same logic of polar forces interplay adjusts in the same vein the rhythm of social life, the season of feasts, and the cycle of past times as well (Bourdieu 1990:219-20). Due to the harmonization of the peasants existence with the ritual symbolic calendar based on the previous outlook, this calendar of labor and feasts established the temporal cohesion of the group through preventing individual conducts not abiding to the rhythm of collective activities and through guaranteeing at the same time the predictability of the social rhythm. After all, the social order is in itself nothing but the harmonization and synchronization of single activities to form one collective rhythm or tempo. Conforming to the social order is in this vein respecting this rhythm and trying to keep pace with it i.e. not swimming against the tide of time (Bourdieu, 1977:40-41). The life of the Kabyle peasant is embedded in the nature-oriented annual cycle of tasks and rites lying at the heart of agriculture. The cycle is based on an endless interaction between Man and nature, so that the great moments of the agricultural year (ploughing and harvest) are the climaxes of the drama played by both characters. Far from being in conflict with nature and attempting to subjugate it, the Kabyle peasant views himself as a part of nature and immersed in it. This feeling of kinship and solidarity with nature leads him to keep pace with the passage of time scanned in the rhythms of nature. As a result, he is free from the tyranny of the clock, sometimes called the devils mill as well as worries and concerns of timetables. Even when the alarm clock and the watch were introduced to the countryside, they merely provided another time-reference that was more precise than the rhythmic movements of nature. Having a different temporal attitude circulating around the rhythms of nature could be misread as an attitude of submission and of nonchalant indifference to the passage of time which no one dreams of mastering (Bourdieu, 1990: 220-22). The temporal disembedding nature of model housing manifested itself in the sporadic reactions it stirred. In the Egyptian case, the reaction that highlighted temporal uprooting the most was abscondence. Enormous numbers of peasants actually fled their villages to the extent that even in the 1840s as Egypt was stripped of its military power government troops were employed to gather peasants not in their place of origin and return them forcibly to their native villages. In April 1844, an official communiqu issued by a government minister to district officials announced that Tillage and Agriculture are the foundation of the comfort, happiness, and prosperity of the Egyptian population and as such it is quite necessary that all those who absented themselves from their primitive homes should return back to their native villages. According to the same official notice, death by hanging was the punishment awaiting any one harboring peasants that absconded from their villages like Suliman Badruddin, who was gibbeted in the market place for committing this crime. However, public hangings were much less effective in deterring the population from abandoning their villages and fleeing, because the regimentation of the villages productive forces made cultivation and forced labor a duty as oppressive as spending a sentence in 63

prison. The only relief [remaining] for peasant families was to abandon their homes and abscond (Mitchell, 1989:42-43). In the Algerian case, the symptoms of temporal disembeddedness exhibited themselves not only in the form of fleeing the local setting but before this in losing control over the present, having no ambition to lay hold of the future, and opting for survival not only as the minimalist strategy of existence but as the only one available. The Algerian society has no ambition to lay hold of the future and of chance; it attempts only to offer the least purchase to them; it does not choose to transform the world but to transform its own attitude toward the world. Mastering the future through whatever means one can lay his hands on presupposes a minimum hold upon the present. In other words, the absence of a positive future attitude reflects a deep feeling of mistrust towards the present to the extent that it is not possible to take possession of it. This could be understood in the light of the phenomenon of cultural disintegration set in motion in Algeria by the impact of Western civilization and by the colonial situation. The destruction of traditional balances will reflect itself negatively on the effort to shelter oneself against the future, because the assurances it is based upon were simply uprooted. The peasant knows that whatever he may do, he will not succeed in meeting his ends needs, and he resigns himself to living day to day. On finishing his resources, he will have to leave for the city or for France in search for work. What difference does it make if the day comes a year sooner or a year later? In other words, the doubtful attitude concerning the future is a product of the peasants being threatened incessantly in his very existence, constrained by dispensing all his energy to maintain a perilous equilibrium with the external world, haunted by the care for duration, and choosing to conserve for the sake of self-conservation more than to transform it for the sake of transformation. Convinced in this fashion that he lacks any means to control his future, the peasant cannot feel any responsibility for success or failure, rather he submits to natural forces and resorts to a mythical imaginary realm where all that is possible he has no control on. Economic activities taking place under the mercy of the endless cyclical movement of natural forces will as a result have no other end than to assure the reproduction of the social and economic order. The agitating subject will only experience a prolongation of the duration of the world it is part of rather than discovering itself as a historical agency, whose actions with or against the present order are only meaningful in relation to the future order it seeks to produce (Bourdieu, 1977:40). The minimalist-strategy of survival that orients the economic order does not present itself as the best possibility but as the sole possibility available in this context. Against this background, losing all control on the present and being unable to lay hold on the future (the means of transforming the world or orienting oneself towards that transformation), this society practically denies itself prospects of any conception of progress and as such lets itself be excluded from history (42-43).


The second scene: Temporal annexation

The second scene reflects another aspect of temporal dislocation that concerns annexation with and subjugation to a different temporal zone. As a result, the Muslim Dasein will be imprisoned in a marginal, subordinate position, where the constant collision of two opposing temporalities shall be the earmark of its existence. It seems crucial to note that temporal annexation was not a sequel of temporal disembeddedness in a certain sequence of events heading towards climax, but both constitute one and the same act. The perspective, from which temporal dislocation is perceived, is what accounts for the difference between both aspects; disembeddedness is regarded from the side from which time is torn off, whereas annexation is viewed from the other side to which time is appended. Historically, both aspects took place almost in simultaneity with one another. However, to disentangle the intertwined nature of temporal dislocation, I opted for shifting the focus in the second scene so as to include other dimensions of the modernization act that did not make appearance in the first. Muhammad Ali was neither a legitimate monarch, nor was he even secure, and he had strong doubts about continuity for his line unless he took steps to establish and institute such continuity, by the sword if necessary. Therefore, laying down the foundation for a government that would resist change and time was his main and sole target which led to the creation of a centralized bureaucracy, and involved a series of ad hoc decisionswhich created the trappings of a modern state (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:100). Along this line, it is neither difficult to understand the centrality of creating a disciplined, professional army in the modernizing act, nor is it ungraspable that all the imported institutions were structurally subservient to it. The dismantling of Muhammad Alis army in 1840 led to the dispersal of the network of modern institutions centered on it. Fascination with the dramatic Prussian victories in the Seven Years War attracted the Pasha in 1815 to the creation of a new army on the modern European style. The new form of order was referred to as ni am djadid, which was the Ottoman name for a plan shortly introduced to reorganize the Ottoman troops as well as the taxation system underlying it. Ni am djadid referred more specifically to the main target of the plan: a new infantry corps, to be trained and organized according to the new techniques developed by the Prussians and the French. Defeated officers and engineers of Napoleons army found in Egypt a haven, where the new order was to be established by relying on their services and experience. The Ottoman pamphlet draws a clear picture of how the new army would be organized in terms of its composition, strategies, and techniques. The new army should not be composed of temporary recruits engaged in other professions like boatmen, fishermen, coffeehouse keepers, or baccals. Nor would it be an occasional body composed of non-professional elements brought together for seasonal campaigns. Rather, the new army must be a professional, organized force created out of men permanently under training even at peace time; they should reside day and night in their barracks, go daily through military exercises and inspections, and scrutinize their weapons and equipment that should always be ready for immediate service (Mitchell, 1989:36-37). In Foucaults words, the Ottoman pamphlet was actually describing LHomme-machine, which was not only a way of illustrating an organism[but] also 65

political puppets, small-scale models of power [of] Fredrick II, the meticulous king of small machines, well-trained regiments and long exercise. Discipline, which was the token of such artificial machines or human toys, was the political anatomy of details: through meticulous and minute techniques it was an attentive malevolence that turns everything to account; through small acts apparently innocent but profoundly suspicious it was endowed with a great power of diffusion and subtle arrangements that obeyed too shameful economies to be acknowledged (Foucault, 1997-b: 136-9). The French and Prussian models of disciplinary control of the body that Ni am djadid sought to copy were making an exhaustive use of time. The subdivision of time into hours, minutes, and seconds will help create a chronometric measurement of activities that are to be governed to the slightest details by orders that should be immediately obeyed. The quality of time was guaranteed through the pressure of supervision, so that anything that might disturb or distract the constitution of useful time would be fully eliminated. Belonging to the same module was the temporal elaboration of acts or the conjugation of time with the body, which was but another way of adjusting the body to temporal imperatives. It is a sort of anatomo-chronological schema of behavior composed of: the precise breaking down of acts into gestures and movements; defining accurately the articulation of the bodys position and its limbs with such movements; assigning to each movement a certain direction, aptitude, and duration. This obligatory rhythm imposed on the body from outside to ensure the elaboration of its actions and to control their development and stages from inside. As such, time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power. In the correct use of the body that makes an exhaustible use of time, nothing should remain idle. Rather, every part of the body should support such an act because the well-disciplined body is the operational context for a neatly performed act. Moreover, discipline defines the bodys relation to the object it manipulates which could be called the instrumental coding of the body that breaks the act into two parallel series: that of parts of the body to be used and that of parts of the manipulated object; the different correlations between the two kind of parts in simple acts; then the fixed sequence of the body-object correlated acts. The regulation imposed on the body and fastening it to the object constitutes a body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine complex. This obligatory syntax is what the 18th century military theoreticians called manoeuvre. (150-53). When not in time of war, continued the Ottoman pamphlet, the soldiers were confined to their camps or barracks where they were guarded and kept closely to the pitch of discipline. They were set apart from the civilian community by their confinement in barracks, but also by wearing a uniform dress. The soldiers of the ancient troops had no unified code of dress, which facilitated their desertion from the army, as they would not be distinguished from ordinary people. In the new army, the troops shall have a uniform of their own so that deserters could be easily detected. An ordinary soldier was expected to put on his uniform, be fixed to his post, perform the duties assigned to him, and serve the duration determined for him (Mitchell, 1989:38-39). Barracks and training camps were ordered to be built on the previous model near the major towns along the length of the Nile, from Aswan to Cairo and out across the Delta, with each of the barracks to hold one thousand trainees and soldiers, and to be placed a quarter of an hours distance from the 66

town. The sudden spread of this new kind of settlements, barracks, and camps along the villages of the Nile marked the event of the countrys regimentation. The peasants were snatched from their fields to be confined in these barracks in order to be trained and introduced to disciplined life, and in the end to be transformed into professional soldiers. It was actually organizing the whole country the way one would barrack or discipline an army in the most literal sense of the word (36). The Pasha set as one of his main objectives to establish a grand army, by the measures of the day, therefore he spared no effort to increase the number of its soldiers and establish new branches and units. The British consul in Egypt John Bowering estimated its troops to be 127,150 soldiers in 1837. The Revue Britannique that published an article on the armed forces under Muhammad Ali gave figures in details. The infantry that consisted of 3 regiments was formed of 111,600 men, whereas the cavalry had 13,180 men with 15 regiments and the artillery troops with only 25,890. The total number of troops of the three military branches mounted to 158,970 men (Al-Surudjy, 1967:20-21). In 1822, the diwan al-djihadiya (ministry of war) was founded as one of the 7 diwans charged with aiding the Pasha in administrating the country. This specific diwan was assigned the task of supervising the military affairs in their totality in terms of education, training, armament, barracks construction, hospitals, weapons and ammunition imports. The diwans structure was so simple and extremely centralized in order to be able to carry out expeditiously the Pashas directives. It was headed by Nadhir al-djihadiya, whose main duty was to receive the orders issued by the Pasha and supervise their implementation and who was assisted by two Copt secretaries who edited and transmitted the necessary directives and communiqus to the various branches of the army (275). The new military order with its training camps and barracks was situated on a network containing dozens of schools for training specialized military cadres including cavalry, artillery, infantry, and naval officers, signalmen, doctors, veterinarian, regimental bands, and engineers. The instructors of such schools were French military personnel from Napoleons officers or non-foreign officers who were trained at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. It goes without saying that these schools applied the same disciplinary techniques and methods, prescribed in the Ottoman pamphlet and adopted from the Prussian and French models (Mitchell, 1989:39). The model school in Cairo and the Egyptian school in Paris are two models that highlight what was meant by the new schooling system appended to the army. The model school (al-maktab al-unmudhadji) was set up in 1843 by Ibrahim Adham in a large room attached to the military school. The Egyptian school in Paris was founded in 1844 to instruct students in the arts of war. The French war minister Poinot was entrusted with the administration of the school aided by a committee of 6 officers to regulate the educational process. The model school followed the example of Joseph Lancasters Central school in London, where Adham was sent to study the organization of factories. The Lancaster school was organized like a factory; it consisted of a single large room, where rows of benches with individually numbered places were arranged. Each bench constituted a class of 8 to 10 pupils under the supervision of a senior student. Students were taught to measure their steps silently to attain discipline and order on going around so that they would not tread on each others 67

heel or push about. The monitor of each class was responsible for the cleanliness, order, and the improvement of every boy in it. The numbered instructions10 that students received were few and often repeated, therefore their authority was diffused systematically over the whole school and delegated to any agent without diminution. To ensure the diffusion of authority, instructions were transmitted by means of a semaphore telegraph. Such telegraphic signals trained the pupils in implicit obedience, which created a system of order. For instance, it was possible with one command in a school of three hundred pupils to inspect three thousand fingers and thumbs in a minute. The school was a perfect disciplinary toy, where its components (students) were always busy moving from task to task with every motion and every place. Time was inexhaustively regulated and exploited, so that at every moment the student would be either receiving an instruction, issuing one, supervising a task, or inspecting the other students. In short, it was a technique in which the exact position and precise task of each individual at every moment was coordinated, to perform together a machine. The Cairo school was put under the supervision of Abdel Rahman Rusdie, who studied the Lancaster method in England and was to become later on the minister of schools. It seems that the Cairo school model met success, thus in 1847 an order was issued to establish a school on the Lancaster model in each of the 8 sections in Cairo. However, the new schools were not for creating soldiers, but they aimed to create disciplined individuals of the community. It was in the same period that the Egyptian school, which introduced a similar regime of order and obedience, was set up in Paris. Similar to the Lancaster school, learning was a disciplinary process; like the army the school applied techniques through which students were allocated to functional sites in order to carry out meticulously the tasks assigned to them. Every hour of the day was divided into activities that were well defined in the abstract terms of their duration. The timetable11 of the school was a framework that contains the daily activities of studying, eating, exercising, and sleeping. Time [was] written upon the exterior surface of the day. As any disciplinary institution, individuals were distributed among pre-arranged positions, for instance a student was not allowed to change his place in the classroom without permission. Inspection, as in the Lancaster model, was also in the Paris school an essential part of discipline. At 5.15, the time of waking up, the students were inspected, their written homework was subject to similar inspection and so was their behavior and work in class. They were under constant surveillance so that any act distracting attention, talking for example, was forbidden and penalized. The effect is a rigorous discipline of movement, sound, and gesture (69-74). The 1820s and 30s witnessed a sprout of military schools as well as those seeking to provide graduates for specializations needed by the army. In 1825, a French officer called Planat founded the staff school, which was followed by the cavalry and artillery schools in 1831 and the infantry school in 1832. In 1827, a school for military music bands was already established (Al-Surudjy, 1967:18). A new plan in February 1835 called for the reorganization of the military training schools and for laying the basis of a system of fifty primary schools for military recruitment, four in Cairo and the rest in the provincial towns. Moreover, the plan demanded the establishment of two preparatory schools, one in Cairo for 1,500 students and the other in Alexandria. The plan set a framework for the schooling system through 68

laying down uniform rules governing discipline, physical fitness, curriculum, exams, clothing, rations, teaching staff, administration, and inspection for these schools. In a report on Egypt, John Browing, the friend and biographer of Jeremy Bentham who served as an advisor of Muhammad Ali, wrote that the introduction of Western organization into the armies of the Levant brought with it other important results, for the appliances of mechanical art, of education, of knowledge, and a general system of dependence and subordination, were the needful companions of the new state of things.[It] was in itself the establishment of a principle of order which spread over the whole surface of society [emphasis added] (cited in Mitchell 1989:39-40). The question that persistently imposes itself is: how would such an establishment of a principle of order (by means of introducing Western organization and disciplinary techniques) that spread over the whole surface of the society constitute in any way an act of temporal annexation? The answer to this question lies in shifting the focus to the other side of the scenes temporal horizon, from which temporal annexation is unfettered. It is a common knowledge, recounts Foucault, that the seventeenth century created enormous houses of confinement; it is less commonly known that more than one out of every hundred inhabitants of the city of Paris found themselves confined there, within several months. By a strange act of force, the absolute power using lettres de cachet and arbitrary imprisonment created for a century and a half the regime of confinement. 1656 could serve as a landmark, because it was in this year of our Lord that a decree was issued to found the Hpital Gnral in Paris. The confinement institutions had to accept, lodge, and feed those who presented themselves or those sent by royal or juridical authority. Form its inception, it was clear that the Hpital Gnral was no medical establishment, rather it was a semi-juridical structure or an administrative body which decides, judges, and executes alongside the already constituted powers and at their external limits. Suiting the taste of the monarchical and bourgeois order in France, this extra-legal entity extended its network over the whole of France. In June 1676, an edict of the King prescribed the establishment of an hpital gnral in each city of his kingdom. The local authorities were not just spectators, as they had already instituted their own confinement institutions to the extent that over the entire face of France, hpitaux gnraux were opened; on the eve of the Revolution, they were to be found in thirty-two provincial cities. Even the church, which was deliberately excluded from organization of hpitaux gnraux was not willing to remain a stranger to the movement, for it reformed its own hospitals, redistributed its financial resources, and created congregations similar to those of the Hpital Gnral in purpose. The Order of Good Sons opened hospitals of this nature in the north of France. The Brothers of Saint John of Godfounded the first Charit of Paris in the Faubourg Saint-Germain. Confinement was a European-wide phenomenon as its localization in time was just the same, although the forms it assumed were quite different. In German-speaking countries, it took the form of houses of correction (Zuchthusern) of which the one opened in Hamburg around 1620 antedates the French houses of confinement. The rest followed in the second half of the century: Basel (1667), Breslau (1668), Spandau (1684), Knigsberg (1691). They continued to multiply in the eighteenth century. In 69

England, the confinement had remote origins in the 1575 act for the punishment of vagabonds and the relief of the poor that demanded the construction of houses of correction, to number at least, one per country, backed up financially by taxes and voluntary donations. It became completely unnecessary to obtain a permission to open a house of correction, for anyone who pleased might do so. More than this, any justice of peace was subject to a fine of five pounds, if he had not established one in his area of jurisdiction. The workhouses, where trades, workshops, and factories were installed to aid the finance and sustenance of their inmates, were deemed as success. In 1697 several parishes of Bristol united to form the first workhouse in EnglandAnother was established at Worcester in 1703; a third the same year at Dublin; then Plymouth, Norwich, Hull, Exeter. By the end of the eighteenth century, there were 126 of them.In several years, an entire network had spread across Europe. John Howard, who made a pilgrimage to all the chief centers of confinement in England, Holland, German, Spain, Italy reported that the same walls were abusively enclosing an amalgam of heterogeneous elements. On explaining the reality of confinement as a phenomenon that swept Europe and shut up overnight enormous numbers of people (the Hpital Gnral contained 6000 persons or nearly 1% of the population) who were excluded more severely than lepers, Foucault referred it to a social sensibility, common to European culture, that suddenly began to manifest itself in the second half of the seventeenth century. According to the 1656 edict that personifies the first moments of confinement, the Hpital Gnral set itself the task of preventing mendicancy and idleness as the source of all disorders. Confinement was in this vein the last great measure since the time of the Renaissance to put an end to unemployment and begging effected by the wars of religion, the siege of Paris, economic recesses, dismantling the guilds as a result of the appearance of large manufactories, and the riots of workers. The Hpital Gnral represented a new philosophy concerning the problem of labor; instead of excluding and punishing the unemployed, an implicit system of obligation was established Confinement for food. The unemployed was taken care of because he had the right to be fed, yet that was on the expense of the nation and at the cost of his individual liberty (Foucault, 1973:38-48). Outside the times of crisis, confinement institutions had another function in the sense of giving work to those who were put out of work to ensure the prosperity of all. It played a double role: cheap manpower in the periods of full employment and high salaries; and in the periods of unemployment, reabsorption of the idle and social protection against agitation and uprisings. After all, it was in the most industrialized parts of England (Norwich and Bristol) that the first houses of confinement appeared; the first hpital gnral was opened in Lyon before that of Paris. In Germany, each housework had its special trade; spinning in Berlin, Kassel, and Bremen, and weaving in Hanover (51). However, the houses of confinement were in fact to be regarded as a failure on being measured by their functional value. They have actually conducted an experiment not in the sense of the prices-production dialectic, but in terms of creating an ethical consciousness of labor, which was recognized as the remedy to all forms of poverty. Since the Fall, man had accepted labor as a penance and for its power to work redemption. It was not the law of nature which forced man to work, but the effect of the curse. For Catholic and Protestant thinkers all the same the obligation to work was not 70

related to the dialectic between man and nature, nor did it bear on the reward of mans toiling. For Calvin, nor do we believe, according as men will beskillful, according as they will have done their duty, that they can make their land fertile; it is the benediction of God which governs all things. The obligation to work was founded on moral not natural grounds, for instance the idle man who refuses to work and waits for God to come to his aide is disobeying the law of scripture: Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God. As Calvin contended, reluctance to work is trying beyond measure the power of God and constraining the miracle that is granted daily to man as a reward for his labor i.e. redemption. Pride was the sin of man before the Fall; but the sin of idleness is the supreme pride of man once he has fallen. In a word, when the line of demarcation that ran between labor and idleness replaced the exclusion of leprosy, the asylum was substituted for the lazar house, in the geography of haunted places as in the landscape of the moral universe (55-57).

The third scene: Present-imprisonment

The third scene concerns present-imprisonment as an aspect of temporal dislocation, which dwells upon the backbreaking weight of the present moment that squeezes the two other dimensions of time forcefully into one single time-point encroaching the Being of Dasein. The past is compelled to sink in oblivion, because it is considered as poids mort that one has to break with in order to be able to carry on. The future as a wide array of possibilities transcending the horizon of the present will be confiscated and reduced into one single pattern that repeats itself incessantly, and as such the future falls back on the present or the present thrusts itself on the future in the most monotonous and torturous fashion. When this present moment is extinguished, it is re-incarnated again and again in the form of an iron historical pattern that imposes itself on the new present(s) in the same setting and blocks any different prospects for future change in other settings as well. The prison of the present is constituted of a non-stopping and ever-widening dialectic that is uniformly repetitive and existentially boring in the superlative degree of comparison. Therefore, the Dasein is thrown behind temporal bars in the fashion of a Greek legend, where the day replicates itself endlessly and time runs inescapably in a vicious circle. Prospects of change in any form are excluded, because most painfully with every cycle of the temporal wheel one does not have a new beginning but an absolute nil. As a result, temporal annexation and present-imprisonment are not two different things due to simultaneity of occurrence but because it was the same temporal annexation acts that brought down the bridges between the three dimensions of time and raised up the walls of the present-prison at one and the same time. The difference between this scene and the previous two lies in that the former scenes were situated on the same horizontal level of temporality, while the latter, in order to be properly apprehended, has to be located on the vertical racking of temporality. The historical pattern, which constitutes the present-prison, is in actuality this endless dialectic between order and disorder or chaos; after order has been successfully established, the resurrection of disorder will create the need for restoring order that will sink into disorder 71

and the dialectic goes on and on. The symbiotic relationship between order and disorder is the driving-engine of such a dialectical interaction. In the absence of order embodied in the system of disciplinary techniques and mechanism, chaos or disorder has no existence. Disorder does not represent a threat fundamental to the human condition, against which order is established, maintained, and developed. Rather, disorder is a condition created conceptually only in the mirror of order. It is visible and thinkable only as[a deviation from]the geometric lines, the equal intervals, the regulated movements of a system of order. Based on this, disorder goes with order, as the polarity and boundary of a particular sort of world. Although disorder seems, in this sense, to stand on par with order, it is does not have the same value. It is the unequal end of the polarity, the negative element that has to be incessantly obliterated to allow order to be established and re-established (Mitchell, 1989:82). In a word, the norm-founding nature of disciplinary techniques results in establishing other behaviors deviating from the norm as abnormalities, which otherwise would have been conceived as different behavioral forms standing on par. This could be easily witnessed in linguistic terms in the prefix of both words disorder and abnormal, whose prefixion reflects the dialectic underpinning this scene. In a joint note sent by England and France to the Egyptian government on January 12, 1881, amidst the complications of the Urabi movement, it was stated that The English and French governments consider the maintenance of His Highness on the thronewas alone able to guaranteethe good orderin Egypt[Their] being closely associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all complications, which might menace the order of things established in Egypt [emphasis added] (cited in Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1968:14-15). Colvin, the British member of the Dual control, reported The Egyptians beingincapable of conducting the administration of affairs, I think we are rapidly approaching a state of affairs which differs little, if at all, from anarchy [emphasis added]. At the same time, the British Consul-General wrote the country is virtually under a Military dictatorship,the government its mouth-piece, the chamber its servant and the Khedive powerless. In a memorandum to the Foreign office, Colvin wrote It is for Her Majestys Government to decide when, and at what point, anarchy is established, the country is at this moment without an effective government, and in imminent danger of disorder [emphasis added] (1618). In his speech at the International Conference in 1882 in Constantinople, which Britain suggested in the face of the riots of Alexandria in the same year, the British ambassador Dufferin gave the reasons for calling the Conference: during the last few months absolute anarchy has reigned in Egypt. We have seen a military faction, without even alleging those pretences to legality with which such persons are wont to cloak their designs, proceed from violence to violence, until insubordination had given place to mutiny, mutiny to revolt and revolt to usurpation of the supreme power [emphasis added] (23). The previous dispatches draw for us a picture of a situation of lawlessness, insubmissiveness, anarchy, and chaos. In this vein, disorder as a threat fundamental to the human condition is constructed in the mirror of order as its sine qua non. However, the interchangeability of the terms chaos, anarchy, disorder, and insubordination is quite misleading, since it conveys the false impression of a political situation, where power 72

relations simply collapsed and left behind them a gorgeous power vacuum that needs to be filled. On viewing this picture of the chaotic, anarchic situation against the background of the disciplinary measures and procedures that covered the surface of the whole society, as manifested in the first and second scenes, it becomes clearer that the term anarchy covers up the reality of the situation. Chaos did not denote in actuality the absence of government, rather it was the product of the mushrooming of disciplinary institutions i.e. over-stating the government. Two examples can provide strong evidence for this argument: the judiciary system at that time was composed of four court systems (Shari i courts, native courts, mixed courts, and consular courts), each having its laws, procedures, language, judges, and legal jurisdiction; the local administration system comprised a modern police force, the traditional system of Omadds and Ghafirs, and the system of Procureur-Gnral copied as it is from France. Disorder and chaos were eventually effects of the tumor-like swarming of disciplinary institutions. But, does not the fact that the riots of Alexandria provide a ripe example of anarchy, lawlessness, and chaos undermine this argument of the disciplinary tumor? Is not the act of rioting and military insurrection a reflection of the lack of government and the vacuum of power, which is actually what anarchy is all about? Quite the contrary, these riots were triggered off by a very trivial incident (a quarrel between a drunken Maltese and an Egyptian donkey-boy who was killed) that developed into a bloody confrontation, where the number of the people killed was 49 of whom 38 were Europeans (21). As such, the riots reflect more the explosion of the ruled in a display of mob hysteria due to culminating tensions and frustrations under the weight of the tumor of odd disciplinary mechanisms than the lack of mechanisms of social control corresponding to the Hobsian state of war of all against all. Witness the words of Lord Milner, the commencement of the administrative regeneration of Egypt dates, not from the British occupation, but from the fall of Ismail and the establishment of the Dual Control (Milner, 1899:22). Let me drop arguing about the nature of chaos as resulting from inflation or absence of social control mechanisms, because this thesis will let itself be proved with the unfolding of this scene. To construct this scene, I shall rely heavily on the account of the British reforms in Egypt provided by Lord Milner, who did not intend to give a catalogue of reforms but more importantly to illustrate the general tendency of our work and the spirit which has animated it (289). It was argued that Britain was at first unwilling to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt following its policy12 of preventing the possessions of the Ottoman state from falling in the hands of any European power. However, disorder, no matter how it might be understood, which plagued the situation in Egypt in 1882, was the main pretext of Britains intervention in Egypt. No wonder then that the chapter dealing with the prelude of British intervention in Milners account was to be titled Restoring Order. In his back-sight of the events, Milner assured: We had gone to Egypt professedly with no other object than to restore order nor can be there the smallest doubt of the absolute bona fides of that profession. Here was a country, he continues, which during the last half-century had been becoming more an appendage of Europe. And this countrywas now threatened, not with bankruptcy merely, but with a reign of blank barbarism. He emphasized that the state of disorder already 73

reached was of the extremist gravity and then he concluded in a decisively commanding tone Let it always be remembered that Great Britain did save Egypt from anarchy [emphasis added] (Milner, 1899:12-14). The question that deserves being posed and with whose answer Milner occupied himself in the rest of this chapter was about what might be meant with our famous policy of restoring order. The restoration of order could be a very simple matter, depending on the nature of circumstances which caused authority to be upset. It can happen that a strong and well-established government system becomes liable to accidents, for instance the mob taking control of a quarter of the most civilized city. Against this, deploying police forces can get the better of the mob[and] everything returns rapidly, and almost of itself, to its original condition. Restoring order, in the case of Egypt, does not fall under this category, because the collapse of authority comes from within; where its overthrow is dueto inherent weakness; where the riot or the rebellionis not the real cause, but merely one of the results, merely an acute symptom, of a deep-seated malady. Restoring order, as in the case of Egypt, cannot content itself with the removal of the symptom but must go deeper and seek to cure the diseases [emphasis added] (18-19). Therefore, restoring order through the aid of foreign janissaries, a strong ruthless despotism ready for suppression or even through a faithful Prtorian guard was completely excluded, because this barbarous policy is determined to base order upon mere external force. The other alternative that was really opted for and put into practice based order upon internal stability; it was nothing but to reconstruct radically the whole administrative machine, to overhaul the government in all its branches. However, restoring order in the sense of reforming the Egyptian administration root and branch refers less to the recasting of the system through the introduction of new principles and new methods. In fact, it ultimately involved new menthe education of a body of rulers capable of providing the people with orderly government (21-23). The words of Milner imply the introduction of modern disciplinary techniques for the first time to a despotic oriental setting suffering from inner rottenness due to the long history of excessive misgovernment. However, it is a historical fact that modern disciplinary mechanisms were injected in the body politic of the country two times before, on the hands of both Muhammad Ali and Ismail. Nevertheless, Milner insists on distancing the British reforms (the radical reconstruction of the whole administrative machine) from the previous attempts of modernizing or disciplining the power structure. Evidently, the British masters did not construct the disciplinary machine, because it has already been constructed regardless of other claims. Milner himself, despite of his previous argument, gives hints in other places to the essence of the British reforms in Egypt. It is the besetting sin of Orientals, when attempting to copy European institutions, that they do so without a sufficient regard to the difference of conditions recounts Milner in a complaining tone. He adds that the Westerneducated section that possesses the progressive and free-thinking attitude, which is prepared to bolt Western ideashas not the power to digest them. It goes without saying that the consequence is the importation of some European system without any adequate recognition of the modifications which are required to make it suitable to its new home [emphasis added] (266). By dint of this fact, the British discipline master has the unique opportunity of putting 74

the relations between the two parties [disciplinary techniques and traditional power structures] upon a proper footing. For if their authority [traditional structures] is undermined, the whole machines falls out of gear (272). In this, as in so many other matters, it is probably the wisest course not to change your machinery, but to improve it [emphasis added] (276). Now, the British mans burden was not the construction of the disciplinary machine right from scratch amidst a setting of oriental despotism in order to create order. Rather, it comprised specific tasks, pointed out by Milner, which have everything to do with the reconstruction of the disciplinary machine in order to restore order in a country that was in fact an appendage of Europe. First, the disciplinary machine that has not been properly copied from the European context and as a consequence was put out of shape, if not completely deformed, has to be rejuvenated through repairing the form and function of its parts and eliminating any elements causing their malfunction in order to raise its performance efficiency to the level it was designed to reach in its original homeland. Second, the disciplinary machine has to go through certain modification and acclimatization measures that are inevitable for the success of its transplantation in its new home. This would take place through forcing the disciplinary machine into a marriage of convenience with traditional power structures to upgrade the whole administrative apparatus. In a word, the restoration of order announced by the colonial masters was nothing more than fixing the gears of the machine, tightening its screws, and lubricating its joints with local grease. The reforms carried out by the British masters in Egypt, which attest to the double-fold task of repairing and accommodating disciplinary techniques, will construct a module for the rejuvenation of the disciplinary machine. Such a module that closes the ranks of temporal annexation and seals the gates of the present-prison will invest itself endlessly in the form an inescapable historical pattern that is going to be replayed on and on. Let me now disassemble some important elements of this rejuvenation module. British reforms of the army could be adorned with the logo The Fellah as Soldier, which was originally Milners title of the chapter dealing with this theme. Milner commences the chapter with a scene, designed to impress his audience, in which he throws into comparison two quite contradictory dispatches concerning the performance of Egyptian troops in Sudan. The first is an extract from a telegram of General Baker justifying his defeat by the fact that Egyptian troops threw down their arms and ran, allowing themselves to be killed without the slightest resistance. The second is an extract from Colonel Holled-Smiths reporting his victory the troops, however, stood their ground, and did not yield one inch throughout the line[emphasis in original]. On this non-accidental contrast Milner comments that it was the same attacking enemy, the same region of storm-swept desert, and more importantly the same human material on the side of Egypt. He asks in an exclamatory tone: why does the old army stand almost unequalled in history for cowardice and incapacity? Why has the new army, composed of very much the same elements, so soon achieved an honorable record? [emphasis added](138-39). On replying to the first question, he examined very thoroughly and incisively the methods and conditions of the disciplinary machine in the army. At first, he certifies, no one can pretend that the Egyptian peasant, in his native condition, ranks very high as a fighting animal. He also assures that this peasant is 75

nevertheless healthy, well built, easily led, not easily overcome by hardship.and though wanting in dash not wanting in a certain fearlessness in the presence of danger.You may call it insensibility to dangerand not true courage. But, call it what you will, it is an extremely valuable quality in war(141). As a result, the answer to the question of what made these men, who are capable of such courage, become a by-word for cowardice should be sought in the treatment to which they had previously been subjected in the disciplinary institutions. The fellah has not received the required training that would enable him to become a fighter; rather he was completely demoralized by bad management, in Milners words he was exposed to an amount of degrading ill-usage which would have knocked the manliness out of a Viking. The officers, responsible for training and leading the peasants, were selected not due to their qualification but only on merit; they banged their men about in the most cruel and disheartening manner. More than this, the rank and file soldiers were wretchedly paid and even the little payments they received were often intercepted through officers, who embezzled the money that ought to have provided the soldiers with food and clothing. There was a disastrous lack of any means for providing a living condition that could be described as human, if not comfortable, for the barracks were filthy beyond descriptionand provision for the sick and wounded. Although laws regulating the military service existed, they were, like most other laws completely disregarded. The recruit was snatched from his village and never knew where he was going to be sent or for how long. No wonder that the conscripts had to be led away in chains, under the blows of the kurbash, and amidst precisely the same violent exhibition of grief on the part of their relations as usually attend a funeral. Under such circumstances, what could be unreasonable than to complain of a want of spirit in the Egyptian soldier? In conclusion, Milner remarks in a disheartening tone that no ingenuity could have devised a system more likely, more certain, to destroy the spirit of any man. Against this background, the first thing to be done in order to raise the efficiency level of the disciplinary machine was to reverse these de-humanizing conditions. The number of conscripts was reduced to 6000 men, which was not great a tax on a population of 6 million. On arriving at the training camps, the men found themselves properly fed, clothed, and housed. Although discipline was very strict, proper conduct of the soldiers kept them safe from oppression. The payments of soldiers were reasonable in amount and were steadily rolling; they never stopped except for misconduct. When a soldier fell ill, he was taken good care of, which inspired respect and confidence in the troops. Having won the respect and confidence of their men, the new officers were easily able to knock them into fair military shape. The military training of soldiers on the hands of professional officers made the best of the Fellahs submissiveness to the extent that the soldiers had actually to be prevented from practicing their drill in their leisure hours. The emergence of this fellah once again in his village after absencein barracks not crawling back, mutilated or smitten by some fatal disease, butwalking in as a visitor, healthy, well dressed, and with some money in his pocket was like the vision of a man risen from the dead. On March 31, 1883, the new army made a creditable show on parade, which called forth the praises of independent military critics who were present on the ground, after only three months of its formation. The task of making the fellah a soldier or to create that very complicated piece of machinery, a fully 76

organized army could not be dreamt of to take place in a short time. Rather, years of laborious work must be granted for the completion of the machine (142-44). Having laid down the foundations of a modern army, the British discipline masters decided to increase its numbers to cope with the extension of its duties as the turn of events in Sudan took another course. The number of 6000 soldiers, originally fixed by Lord Duffin, could not have sufficed that the new army would ward off single-handed the dangerous invasion threatening from the far south. Therefore, new battalions were recruited exclusively from the fellahin or the Sudanese Negroes were added to the new army to increase the number of its troops (146-47). To brief the current condition of the new army in May 1892, Milner stated it consisted of fourteen battalions of infantry (eight Egyptian, five Sudanese, and one depot battalion, amounting in all to nearly 10,000 men), ten troops of cavalry (about 800 men), three field batteries and one garrison battalion (about 900 men), one camel corps (300 men), besides staff, military police, medical corps, engineers, transport companies.The full establishment was 12,902 officers and men (154-55). On comparing these figures with those of Muhammad Alis army, it could be concluded that the drastic reduction of the armys size was matched by the promotion of its efficiency and professionalism. In short, under the British masters the country was not allowed to have a big army, yet it was a well-disciplined and very professional one. Another site, where further aspects of the rejuvenation module would be revealed, is the local administration reforms, because it was in this domain that the British masters deployed all their disciplinary skills to modify the imported disciplinary machine in order to put it on a proper footing with traditional structures and as a result let it be successfully rooted in its new home. The organization of the police was a burning issue, because it has been one of the weakest points in the reconstruction of a government system in Egypt. There was the unsolvable puzzle of how to unite vigor and promptitude in the maintenance of order and the repression of crime with a jealous respect for the rights of individuals. On restricting the inhuman ways, with which the police force conducts its functions, it is not improbable to run the risk of rendering this force impotent. The long tradition of oppression equated the maintenance of order with heavy-handed and arbitrary practices on both sides of the borders (those who practice authority and those on whom it is practiced). Therefore, restricting the autocratic power of the police would lead the official to give up the game of maintaining order altogether as much as it would boost illegality on the side of those not used to be deterred by non-violent means of control. It is in this context that it has been found an easier business to put a stop to the abuse of the power of the Police, and to protect private individuals from violence and injustice on the part of the authorities, than to maintain a strenuous administration of the law under the new and milder rgime. The abolition of the kurbash was one of the earliest signs on the course police reforms were to be navigated along. However, the organization of the police was subject to conflict of principles that everything about them, down to their uniforms, has been changed, and changed and changed again. At first, the police was divided into two separate bodies, the larger was a semi-military Gendarmerie and the smaller and less important was a genuine police force. No effort was spared to raise the standards of the Gendarmerie and to develop its men into real soldiers. The 77

disproportionate amounts of funds and improvements devoted to the Gendarmerie resulted in the suffering of the police proper. However, another reform policy was followed to change the organization of the police through getting rid of the whole Gendarmerie and substituting it by a small and well-paid volunteer force for the conscripts of whom the Police originally consisted. Although this latter attempt failed to change the composition of the force, it succeeded in introducing new principles regarding its administration. The picture gets complicated on regarding the police question from the angle of its relationship with the provincial authorities of Mudirs and Ma murs. In the old system, the police was laid under the authority or even disposal of the Mudirs, which had detrimental consequences in the field of crime prevention. Mudirs used police force just as they saw fit and it became in their hands a powerful instrument of oppression, often employed for purposes of private greed or spite. Such treatment degraded the police and diverted it from its proper work, and therefore made the introduction of any general system of discipline for the whole body impossible. Yet, the solution opted for, which represents the mirror-image of the old system, proved itself, according to Milner, to be erroneous, because the entire government of district centers in the Ma mur and that of a province in the Mudir, and as such undermining their authority will lead the whole machine to fall out of gear. Therefore, it was not quite wise to set the police as an independent apparatus that lies under the control of the British Inspector-General rather than the provincial authorities, which has actually taken place and bruised the authority and prestige of these provincial authorities. Time was needed till an opportunity might appear on the horizon in order to put the relationship between the two parties on a proper footing. The police of each province was arranged in a way that it would be under the authority of the Mudir, yet his orders must be delivered through the polices local chain of command. The Mudir has absolutely no authority to interfere in the discipline and organization of the force, nor can he make use of it except for the legitimate purposes of maintaining order and repressing crime. Any complaint against the police conduct has to be appealed by the Mudir to the Ministry of Interior, which deals with the case through the Inspector-General. Milner remarked the officers of Police have now a better appreciation of the respectdue tothe Mudirs; while the latterhave begun to recognize that a properly disciplined and independent police forceis calculated to strengthen their hands in the execution of the law(268-74). This element of the rejuvenation module is extremely crucial, for it does not only concern putting the disciplinary machine in new shape, nor would it be only related to accommodating the machine with its new home. Rather, it is about guaranteeing that the machine would function in its adopted homeland with the expected punctuality, but more profoundly would sustain its existence and work automatically even when the British masters would hand it over to their fellahin subjects. If the main prelude of the British intervention was to start Egypt on the high-road to good government, a job that could not have been left to be continued by native agents and that needs, in the words of Cromer, perhaps longo intervallo, then this task had to involve the creation of new men through the education of a body of rulers capable of supplying orderly and honest government (Newman, 1928: 136 & Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1968: 59 & Milner, 1899: 23).


It is in this respect that the site of education will be of a precious political value. When the natives came in contact with the Europeans pouring in their country, they could not but be impressed by the advantages of their educational system in the practical business of life. Therefore, some of them began sending their sons to Europe, whereas others made use of the numerous European schools already been established in Egypt. The most famous of these schools were the French Catholic foundations, the American Mission schools, as well as Italian and Greek schools, which were secular and aimed at the education of children of their respective nationalities numerously represented in Egypt. However, since 1887 a great change came over the government schools and the way they were seen. The public schools of the Egyptian government are now for the first time in their history, organized, and conducted in accordance with approved educational principles. Evidently, this was not due to an increase of financial resources because the Convention of London reduced the budget of the Ministry of Public Instruction. The credit for this change could not only be attributed to Mr. Douglas Dunlop the first of our countrymen who has held any position of influence in the Egyptian Ministry of Public Instruction, but also to the increase in number of European teachers and the improvement of their quality. There are now fifteen English and twenty-four French masters in the Primary and Secondary Schools, besides thirty-four Egyptians who teach in English and fifty-six who teach in French. Instead of multiplying the number of subjects to be instructed and sacrificing quality for quantity, the present method of designing curriculums is diametrically the opposite. For instance, students are taught just one European language very well rather than dabbling in several European languages. To teach the pupil one European language, but to teach it thoroughly, and to teach other subjects through it, is the principleadopted with most encouraging success in Government schools. It provides students with tremendous opportunities of making a useful practical acquisition of the language they learnt, of undergoing the invaluable training of translatingthoughts into a new form, and of obtaining the means of studying[subjects that] cannot be at present studies in Arabic. Concerning the want of attention to discipline, to deportment, and to physique, this has been overcome by introducing exercises on regular basis as well as by encouraging English games that the scholars became fond of. Though the spirit of reform reached the educational system very slowly, there is no branch in whichit has borne richer fruit. The main target was not to create a great crowd of scholars, but the scrupulous, scrutinizing training of a limited number, because Egypt has to create a native professional class.and has to educate the men who are destined to fill the Government Service. From this perspective, it is of great importance to maintain high standards in Colleges of professional instruction, because that will in its turn raise the standards of subordinate schools supplying these colleges with students. To reach this objective, the old system, allowing students to pass from one educational phase to another without having proved their capacity to benefit from superior instruction or to understand what they have been previously taught, was substituted by the introduction of a well-conceived and properly conducted system of primary and secondary examination. It is quite important to note that this movement was expected to have a great effect on the educational progress in Egypt through bringing the traditional institutions of Islamic education in harmony with modern educational innovations. 79

This rests on the governments unwavering support to and insistence on giving its pupils thorough modern education, while carefully avoiding any needless offence to religious prejudices. But without steady support at the outset from the protecting arm of the state, and without the presence of a strong dominant European element in the Schools and Colleges, progress would soon be arrested, and Education would relapse into the old grooves. The political stakes of the Government schools, which should be of peculiar interest to Englishmen, are quite high, because our object, as I understand, is to develop the capacity of self-government in Egypt. It is through the reform of Government schools, if the present satisfactory state of things is maintained, that a way out of the problems facing the Government service full of authority abuse and recruitment on merit rather than qualification could be opened. It will increase the number of competent candidates, while the Primary and Secondary certificates already referred to will supply a better test of efficiency than the existing haphazard examinations for admission to the several offices. The importance of such reform in the educational system should never be underestimated, because it will guarantee the maintenance of the administration machine through ensuring a respectable standard of education, and the knowledge of at least one European language, among the chief provincial authorities. It was in this vein that a decree was passed in 1892 making it an obligation that no future vacancy should be filled among the higher class of Assistants in the Governing Staff of the provinces except by men who had passed the Secondary examination. From these Assistants, the Mudirs and Mamurs are to be chosen in the future to run the whole administrative apparatus (299-308). The results achieved by the rejuvenation module were successful and impressive, for Lord Cromer (the first British discipline master) became the uncrowned ruler of Egypt. Although in theoretical terms the British Consul-General had the sole function of presenting friendly advice and he even asserted I never interfere in matters of detail, things took another posture in practical terms. Thus the advice could always take the substance, if not the form, of a command.[It] had to be tendered in a more or less unobtrusive manner so as not to shock the susceptibilities of the Powers. Yet, Cromers power was growing tremendously until he was said to have a hand in every detail of Egyptian life, no matter how trivial they might be.This ranged from major political issues, to helping an elderly shaykh to elope, and attempting to prevent a female member of the royal family from striking her husband on the mouth with a slipper the moment he opened it (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1968:66-7). So far the rejuvenation module has been explored in its function of completely closing the ranks of temporal annexation and reducing the dimensions of time to construct presentimprisonment. It remains now to kick the module one step forward to examine briefly how it represents an iron historical pattern that subjugates other periods to the extent that its constant replay will make out of Egypt a military society. Anwar Abdel-Malek recounted, On December 10, 1952 the government announced the abrogation of the constitution. Censorship of the presshad been restored on October 21 in order to prevent any press campaign against the installation of the military dictatorship. On January 19, 1953, the political parties were dissolved, their property confiscated and their leaders were put under 80

house arrest pending trial. In the same month the purge of the army began. Abdel-Malek gave a detailed account of the officers who were struck from the list, members of the Revolutionary Council forced to resign and put under arrest, or those who were courtmartialed on charges of conspiracy and were imprisoned for life (Abdel-Malek, 1968: 91-92). One cannot but put these measures under the same category with the procedures taken by Lord Cromer to amputate the tumor of disciplinary techniques and to absorb the mushrooming of its institutions. Witness reducing the number of the troops of the old army (which was the remnant of two attempts to create a modern disciplined army out of the Fellahin) and cutting the funds of unneeded institutions in the domains of justice and education which were hindering the course of British reforms. On putting aside charges of corruption and enemy of the people, one cannot fail to notice that what was taking place was molding a frame that disciplines and brings order to political life. Abdel-Malek tells us on January 23, 1953, a single political party was founded. It was called the Liberation Rally and on February 6 Gamal Abdel Nasser became its secretary-general. The Liberation Rally gave way to the National Union that in its turn was replaced by the Arab Socialist Union. The political frame designed to barrack political life changed its name, laws and regulations, and membership composition. However, one variable remained absolutely unchanged, which was its monopoly of political life and the servitude of its branches and institutions to the non-British disciplinary masters. Abdel-Malek relates an incident or even an anecdote that reveals the way this disciplining frame used to function. In September [1958], Anwar el-Sadat sent for a leader of the Communist partyand for seven consecutive hours endeavored to persuade him to bring his party into the National Union; otherwise, he said, the Communists had to understand that they would undergo the fate of the Moslem Brotherhood, which meant destruction by way of torture [emphasis added] (127). The epidermic, elitist nature of political institutions facilitated their being swept away from the political scene, but this was not the case when the army went to action on the economic front(107). One can put the events recounted by Abdel-Malek together in order to depict schematically a picture of the economic organization that was envisaged by the military government. On January 15, 1957, three laws Nos. 22, 23 and 24 were promulgated in Cairo: thenceforth all commercial banks, insurance companies and foreign commercial agencies would have to become Egyptian corporations owned by Egyptian capital and under Egyptian management. The military government intervened in the economic field through two instruments the High Committee for National Planning (established by Presidential order on January 13, 1957) and the Economic Agency (created by Law No. 20 of the same date). Establishing entities of economic planning was justified on the basis of the lack, if not nonexistence, of agencies that are competentto propose and initiate, in quasi-automatic fashion and within a reasonable time, the basics required by an increase in investments and production. Commenting on the armys arrogation of the power of decision and direction in economic matters, Abdel-Malek stated that hereit [the army] renewed its ties with the great monolithic tradition of Egypt. The other instrument of intervention in the economic field was the Economic Agency, whose first role according to the plan was to combine under a single head all the functions assumed by various ministries and departments in the 81

companies of mixed typewhich amounted to L.E. 17 million However, the Economic Agency did not content itself with this role but as events unfolded it created new enterprises, and by way of its investments, played a more and more important part in the realization of the Plan. It was really the representative of state capitalism in this period (108-111). During the period of 1959-1961, there was a considerable increase in the intervention of the state in the economy even at the detriment of the private sector. This occurred through expanding the functions of the Economic Agency as well as the state-owned projects and issuing a tighter network of laws that ensures the states control industry and corporations (129). These were crucial signposts on the road towards a Statist economy, which was officially celebrated with the famous socialist laws of July 1961 that nationalized the major economic undertakings in the whole country. It is noteworthy that the tightening of the militarys grip on the economy was not shaken by the 1967 defeat, which did not only demonstrate the abortion of the promises of development and social justice, but more profoundly the failure of the military regime in its own playground and as a result the loss of a sizable part of the countrys territory. Quite the contrary, in 1969 new laws of land reform were issued to reduce for the third time the maximum limit of individual and familial ownership of land; the execution of these laws in the countryside was quite harsh as ever. The heart of the matter was the power of decision in the economic and social sphere. It was hardly the principle of private property that was at issue here, but rather the question of[who] would have the power to select the means of accomplishing[his] visions of things to be, within the Egyptian structure, commented Abdel-Malek on the socialist laws of July 1961 [emphasis in original] (141-42). Certainly, the wheel has made a full circle; the gears and cogs of the disciplinary machine were functioning automatically and beautifully as well. It does not really matter who was pushing the button to start it off; whether it was President Cromer or Lord Nasser, it was all the same. On addressing the question of the form assumed by the Iron historical pattern that captured the present and replicated itself incessantly, it could be emphasized that such a historical pattern has as its driving engine the non-stopping dialectic between order and disorder that represents the corner-stone of the rejuvenation module explained before. The imprisonment of the present obeys a strange chronology, in which one sees, in orderly succession, the establishment of order, then the recognition of its failure; then the rise of reform projects to be implemented; and the screw is given another turn on and on. However, there was in fact a synchronized movement in two directions: the horizontal diffusion of disciplinary techniques and mechanisms in the form of an ever-widening vibration to cover the face of the whole society; and the telescoping of the different elements of disciplinary techniques to cut deep in the flesh of the body-politics reaching individual depths and social levels it had not infiltrated before. If there was any constancy or linear evolution in the present-prison, then it was this double-fold movement of disciplinary techniques and mechanisms. It was not without reason that Abdel-Malek titled the last chapter of his masterpiece covering the socialist experience under Nasser An evolution in crisis. He noted that the pace of progress has been the pace of the destruction of freedoms and that the official picture of Egyptian society fifteen years after the seizure of power was a series of 82

fruitful accomplishments interspersed with anomalies. The anomalies-accomplishments hybrid that hampered the historical evolution in Egypt, according to the Marxist thinker, was that the destruction of the semicolonial state had a counterpart the destruction of the political partiesthe advance of national socialism progressed over the destruction of the Marxist socialist wing of the national movementnew strength was infused into the economy and the military while the hopes of internal democracy vanished; the completion of one new school every second day could not hide the deterioration in scholastic achievements; the will for anti-imperialist Arab Nationalism was expressed in an unmistakably imperial style. The list could be continued indefinitely (380-81). Nowhere is the attitude towards time under imprisonment better characterized than in the previous amalgam of accomplishments and anomalies presented by Abdel-Malek. This paradoxical attitude towards the present is composed of: being absorbed in the immediate surroundings in order to achieve the full mastery of the impinging moment; and relying on an idea of a beyond-the-present future to escape the limits of the present, because without this idea of after-life the prisoner faces the possibility that life ends in prison (Cohen & Taylor, 1990:178-80). No wonder then that for the modernist Marxist, who recognized beyond doubt that socialism was supposed to be built without socialists, the failures of the military rulers arbitrariness were just anomalies to the inevitable social evolution that certified and guaranteed the after-life dream for the prisoner of the present. It was also not without reason that he contemplated at the future to foresee that The basic exigencies of economic and social development will compel a confrontation, meanwhile strengthening a little more every day the function and possibilities of action of the positive elements: proletariat, intelligentsia, technocrats above all, the peasants. Here, unremittingly, time is on the side of the resurgence of the social dialectic [emphasis added] (383). The tale of progress and evolution was not only the after-life component of the paradoxical attitude towards time in imprisonment, more importantly rehearsing them again and again was the prisoners sole means to force time to pass and to occupy himself with anything instead of endlessly waiting behind the bars of the present until something might happen. In exorably too, because it must [the resurgence of social dialectic], the necessity of freedom will take shape were the last words Abdel-Malek ended his work with (383).

The Muslim Daseins closed temporal horizon

So far the main task was to try to press on temporal disjuncture as a socially constructed horizon determining the Muslim Daseins Being and its relation to modernization as an institutional transplantation process subdued by the pragmatic considerations of governance. The modernizing act sublimates time itself as well as many elements with which time as a socio-cultural construct used to conjuncture in the local setting on the eve of modernization. Emptying the temporal horizon from its locally bound social content and disassembling it into the mechanical rhythms of disciplinary clock-time was labeled as temporal disembeddedness and annexation. Dislocating the temporal horizon will drag the Muslim 83

Dasein in a temporal boundary-zone, where two temporalities clash constantly with one another. Nowhere can this boundary-zone manifest itself in clear and concrete fashion than in the calendar used in Muslim countries, when Anno Domini confronts the Hidjri year, the sundetermined months stand face to face with their moon-centered counterparts, and the figures of the days and vacations belonging to both months and years collide into one another. To make the situation more complicated, in Egypt a third temporality is added to the calendar, that is, the sun-based Coptic year so accurate in corresponding to the weather conditions and accordingly important for determining the agricultural seasons of planting and harvest. The dragon-headed calendar shows up everyday on the blackboard of Egyptian schools, where the same day makes a dual-appearance in the form of two dates belonging to two completely different systems of datability. In the words of Dickens, there was no pause, no pity, no peace, no interval of relenting rest, no measurement of time. Though days and nights circled as regularly as when time was young and the evening and morning were the first day, other count of time there was none (Dickens, 1994:270). Through annexation, the temporally dislocating modernization act imposes a fragment of the past of another culture on the present of another that is completely different in its foundations, axioms, historical trajectory, and socio-economic setting. Yet the act of annexation succeeds in establishing structural basis on the ground for assimilating retrogressively that non-Western culture and history in the Eurocentric version of historicity. More than this, the incessant replay of the modernizing scene in the same Muslim country along different periods or its diffusion in others (Turkey, Iran, Algeria, or Morocco) besieges in the present the historical existence of the Muslim Dasein as a socio-cultural entity and closes off the horizon for other prospects of socio-political change other than the monotonous cyclical pattern of establishing order and breakout of disorder. However, the repetition and diffusion of the same scene lends more credibility to the Universal claims of Western historicity as a global process. According to Foucault, modernizing the Muslim countries l Europenne was in fact a dead weight, because it was a remnant of an episode that started many years ago in these same countries. Although the Shah as an instance for the modernizing monarch presented himself as looking afar at the year 2000 beyond the backwardness of the traditional social structures and the retrogressive clergy, he was 100 years backward because the modernizing act was simply archaic (Foucault, 1994:681). The standstill nature of the present based on the entrenchment of the Muslim Daseins historical existence and blockage of the ways of future change was covered up through cloaking the disciplining act in the garbs of the value-laden, context-bound Western historicity that takes evolution as its driving force. This version of historicity, claiming the status of an all-encompassing universal history, follows schematically a line starting from the antiquity of Greece (idolized and taken for a human revelation) to the dark Middle Ages (where the feudalistic economic and social system was wedded in a marriage of convenience to the Church that toppled and replaced the Roman empire) and finally reaching the modern age (where reason triumphed on dogma, civil society on ecclesiastic institution, and capitalistic mode of production on feudal lords). The Muslim Dasein played the role of a semi-villain who provided Europe with civilizational challenge and motive for conquest and 84

liberation. The others role was also to preserve the heritage of Greece of antiquity intact during Europes dark ages and to pass it over unconsciously from behind his own back to Europe, so that the West can be able to retrieve its civilizational origins on which the whole Renaissance was to be founded. In the context of this version of historicity, the Muslim Dasein has been wholly identified with and engulfed by Europes Middle Ages and imprisoned for life in their dark dungeons. On this basis, the tale of progressive evolution provides the modernizing procedures with their ideological coverage that rationalizes the present situation and legitimizes the infliction of more disciplining techniques on the social body of these societies. As a result, not only the present situation would be justified, but more detrimentally the temporally dislocating procedures of modernization will be introduced and re-introduced in the same setting or in new ones. Moreover, with every cycle of the modernization wheel its procedures, having acquired a strong momentum and a colorful ideological portrait, will take an extremely radical or rather eradicative posture against traditional structures and authentic values, whose tearing down can only mean liquidating the foundational structures of the Muslim Dasein. Also, the progress tale will play down the pains of the slow and endless moments of the present situation through designating it as a transitional phase all non-Western cultures have to go through on their way to emancipation from Mans old age of ignorance and traditionalism. Temporal dislocation as the horizon of the Muslim Dasein created on the ground foundations of a structural and institutional character that will lend every justification and credibility to the act of its imprisoning in retrogression in the Western version of historicity. And the medieval-centered historicity, imprisoning the Muslim Dasein in its dark dungeons, will in its turn provide the temporal dislocation procedures with their positive ideological coverage and the circularity goes on and on.


Chapter two: Cultural schizophrenia

[A]nd bounding from my bed I rushed to the mirror. At the sight that met my eyes, my blood was changed into something exquisitely thin and icy. Yes, I had gone to bed Henry Jekyll, I had awakened Edward Hyde. How was this to be explained? I asked myself; and then, with another bound of terror how was it to be remedied? [emphasis added] (Stevenson, 1999:134).

Heideggers structure of Understanding

According to Heidegger, Understanding as one of the existential structures, in which the Being of Da moves itself, does not signify to confront something or to be able to comprehend it as a characteristic or ability that the Dasein possesses by way of an extra. Rather, Understanding must be existentially defined as the Daseins primary Mglichsein, so that Dasein is actually what it can be and what its possibilities are. These possibilities (Mglichkeiten) designate what is not yet real and what is not necessarily inevitable, but simply what is only possible. In this sense, Mglichsein of Dasein is neither a freely swinging Seinknnen in the sense of libertas differentia, nor is it an outstanding possibility akin to Daseins Being in the fashion of an inevitable predestination (Heidegger, 2001: 143-4). It is essential at the outset not to think of Understanding as a cognitive phenomenon, because for Heidegger primordial Understanding is know-how. Understanding signifies the ability to manage something, being a match for it, or the competence to do something. For instance to understand a hammer does not mean to know its material, characteristics, usage procedures, or purposes, rather it means primordially to know how to hammer. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger clearly stated that the meaning intended for the term Understanding is anchored in the German ordinary language expression sich auf etwas verstehen in the sense of being skilled in something or being an expert at it, which is actually possessing its know-how. In making skillful coping possible, this know-how is more basic than the distinction between thought and action, because it is primarily the condition for all sorts of comportment practical as well as cognitive (Dreyfus, 1991:184-5). Projection (Entwerfen) is that existential structure of Understanding enabling Dasein to project its Being on its For-the-sake-of and equiprimordially on its Significance in the worldliness of the world. However, projecting is not comporting oneself to a previously thought out plan, due to the fact that the Dasein already projected itself, and as long as it is (continues to exist), it is always projecting (entwerfend). Understanding is permeated by different possibilities, yet the resort to one of the basic possibilities of Understanding does not exclude the others, though it effects an existential modification of the projection structure as a whole (Heidegger, 2001: 145). One might reasonably raise the question of how can the Dasein be always projecting and have already projected? Certainly, the human organism must at some time have begun to face itself and press into human possibilities, because projection is not carried out by reflex action or animal directedness. Before it can humanly cope, a baby 86

must be socialized into shared, ongoing activities by imitating people and accumulating the necessary experiences until it begins to do what one does for-the-sake-of whatever it is one is. As soon as the baby is seen as up to do something, i.e. its activity can be seen as making sense, then it can be seen as Daseining, i.e., as already projecting on possibilities. The Dasein structure does not suddenly take over the human organism, but the organism starts Daseining1 as Light dawns gradually over the whole (Dreyfus, 1991: 187-8). In a word, projection is the existential constitution of the Daseins room for maneuver (Spielraum) or range of possibilities, so that Dasein as something thrown is actually thrown in the Seinsart of projection (als geworfenes is das Dasein in die Seinsart des Entwerfens geworfen) (Heidegger, 2001:145). The existential possibilities, occupying the room of maneuver, refer to live options designating those activities that are existentially possible or actually open in a specific situation. What Heidegger is getting atis some subset of all the things that are logically or physically possible in a situation. To illustrate the idea of existential possibilities, Dreyfus picks up the example of an American student who finds himself in a situation, where his paper was not ready on time. The student can opt for the following possibilities: work on the assignment all night; get an extension from his course coordinator; get drunk and enjoy the evening with friends; or quit his studies and leave the town. The room for maneuver is defined by the range of possibilities the Dasein knows in a given situation without reflection. Thus the existential possibilities open in any specific situation can be viewed as a subset of the general possibilities making up significance. Existential possibilities are not empty logical alternatives in the fashion of intentionalistic, first-person possibilities that one can undertake from a detached perspective. Therefore, the American student cannot decide for embarking on an acting career to become a President like Ronald Regan, nor would he travel to Bolivia and launch a guerilla war like Che Guevara. The question to be asked pertains to what defines this room for maneuver or range of possibilities, is it the considerations of the situation affronting the Dasein or the cultural medium, in which projecting was developed and which defines for the Dasein the common sense background? According to Dreyfus, just as the sensibility of a culture allows only certain moods, so the for-the-sake-of-whichs, the norms, and the equipmental whole in which I am always already involvedallow in any specific situation an open-ended but limited range of possible activities to show up as sensible. In a word, it is the existential possibilities available in this current situation and in the culture (Dreyfus, 1991:189-91). I would like to inch my way between both cultural sensibilities and situation considerations to stipulate their role in defining the room for maneuver or the range of possibilities the Dasein presses into. The cultural medium could be engulfing if not encroaching the considerations of the moment, so that cultural sensibilities would have the upper hand in a given situation to define the range of possibilities available. Take as an example Dreyfus student who was unable to finish his assignment on time, it would never occur to him to commit hara-kiri to resolve the situation, for such an act does not make any sense to him from within the contours of his culture. Even if he grew desperate of his academic life and decided to commit suicide by using a knife, this possibility would not be 87

considered hara-kiri, because the latter act has a certain meaning within its cultural context that bestows on it a degree of viability and thus makes it available in a particular situation arising in its specific cultural context. However, a specific understanding of cultures as solid isolated blocks so distanced from one another that they have no chance to enter into interactive communication underlies the previous example. As such, it exalts cultural sensibilities role high above the situation considerations in defining the availability of possibilities and accordingly the Daseins room for maneuver. By contrast, on seeing temporality as the horizon defining our existence and the present (from which we perceive our whole existence including the notion of culture) as a minute point to be located on it, one can certainly be able to figure out situations where, in the words of Peter Berger, the walls protecting cultures and civilizations would be shattered through certain communication and transportation technology and the previously absolute and immune worlds of meaning would be deeply penetrated and become ipso facto vulnerable and relative by dint of external cultural effects (Berger, 1977:60-3). Based on this, a specific historical situation could embrace more than one culture in an interactive communicative fashion. The possibilities that previously might have made no sense in the cultural medium would be viable and make sense by virtue of the considerations of a particular current situation i.e. available. The influence of external cultural effects and the considerations of the moment will therefore restructure the range of possibilities in a fashion that stretches or curtails the range of possibilities available to a certain Dasein. To use Heideggers terms, the resort to one of the basic possibilities of Understanding does not turn down the others; rather it depicts an existential modification of projection as a whole. Let me pick up another example, the tensions generated by the Churchs doctrinal understanding of Christian dogmas, on which the Church as an economic and political authority was based gave rise in the 8th century to a movement against the use of images in religious worship in churches of East, known as iconoclasm or breaks of images. Iconoclasm was an available possibility in this specific situation due to the external cultural influences of the Islamic culture (the dominant culture in Europes Middle Ages), whose belief in the directness of the relationship between Man and divinity as well as its notion of non-similarity of God with anything worldly denounced icons and images as forms of idolatry. Icons and images made sense according to Christian dogmas and rituals, yet in this specific situation in the 8th century the existential modification of the Christian Daseins projection as a whole took place due to the availability of an external possibility that only made sense under the weight of the considerations of the moment dominated by what-makes-sense of another culture and in opposition to the local cultural medium. The dynamism of interactions lead to the fabrication of new possibilities and new relations between them and as such the existential modification of projection as a whole would be incessant. The exaltation of certain possibilities above others in a particular situation leads to the constant shuffling of the room for maneuver. More importantly, it generates tensions between the different possibilities; such tensions are inevitably working at the basis of the self-reproduction and self-renewal of any culture. Yet these tensions can also play a very destructive role that sabotages the cultural potentialities from within, when historical 88

conditions lead to conflictual interactions and ruthless confrontations between the previous possibilities as opponents rather than components of the whole structure of projection. As these tensions escalate and become wholly unfettered, the culture at hand cracks from within; it loses all contact with itself (its projection dynamics) and all control on its world (its referential totalities). This self-obliteration dilemma represents nothing but a declaration of this cultures total dissolution and degeneration (Ghalioun, 1990: 85-6). Understanding projects the Being of Dasein equiprimordially on its for-the-sake-of as well as on its Significance, as the worldliness of its current world (Heidegger, 2001:145). This statement reveals that projection is a constant interaction between the Dasein and the world. But what actually is the structure of the world? What is its relation with the Dasein as Being-in-the-world? And what is the relation between the Dasein as Being-with-in-the-world and the Other? According to Dreyfus, Heideggers original contribution is the description of the world as having a distinctive structure of its own that makes possible and calls forth Daseins ontic comportment. Having distinguished between the different ways of using the term world, Heidegger understands it in an existential-ontological sense as worldliness. This is the way of being common to our most general system of equipment and practices and to any of its subregions. When another reality is to be imagined like in science fiction, only our world changed in some details could be figured out. The structure of the world cannot be abstracted from all instances to be understandable to a rational being outside the world. Nevertheless, certain prominent aspects of the world can be highlighted, namely involvement (Bewandtnis). If equipment is defined by its in-order-to (function) in a referential whole, in order to actually function it has to fit-in in a context of meaningful activity. This fitting-in is involvement. But an involvement instance can be discovered only on the basis of the prior discovery of an involvement-whole (Bewandtnisganzheit), which makes sense of particular involvements. For instance, in a workshop the involvement-whole that exists earlier than any single item of equipment constitutes the availableness (the Being-there) and discloses the worldliness (the Being-way, Seinsart) of the item. In addition to the in-order-to that makes sense of an equipment item in its relation to an equipment whole, the use of equipment highlights a wherein (a practical context), a with-which (another equipment item), a towards-which (goal), for-the-sake-of (final point). To improvise the enlightening example given by Dreyfus: I am writing on my computer, in my apartment, with the keyboard, in order to chart Heideggers concept of Understanding, as a step towards2 explaining the notion of cultural schizophrenia, for the sake of my being Doctor of Philosophy (Dreyfus, 1991: 8992). The relationship between the Dasein and the world is one of interdependence that manifests itself through the disclosure of the Being of both on encountering one another. When the Dasein lets something be or sets it free in Heideggers words, he is actually using them and coping with the world, which is what Understanding was all about in the first place. In doing so, the Dasein encountering equipment for instance discloses them in their involvement whole and equipment context and simultaneously Daseins Being is disclosed through being located in relations of referentiality with other Mitdaseins, Seiends and equipment as Being-in-the-world. The for-the-sake-of signifies an in-order-to; this in its 89

turn, a towards-this; the latter, an in-which of letting something be involved; and that in turn, the with-which of an involvement. These relationships are bound up with one another as a primordial wholethey arethis signifying in which Dasein givesits Being-in-theworld as something to be understood. This relational whole termed as Significance makes up the structure of the world, which is actually the Wherein that the Dasein is already in. Significance as the structure of the world or Daseins Wherein is both the background, upon which Seiends can make sense and activities can have a point through a certain life-organizing self-interpretation as well as the basis, on which the world as such can be disclosed. The relationship between Dasein and the world can never be viewed in subject-object terms, because their interdependence makes them intertwined with one another that one cannot separate them. In the referential whole of significance, the in-order-to relations (functions) are tied up with the for-the-sake-of pertaining to Daseins Being, but this does not mean that a world of objects was wedded to a transcendental subject. Since equipment is defined by its inorder-tos that only makes sense in terms of the for-the-sake-ofs, and Daseins selfinterpretation is assigning itself to the for-the-sake-ofs intertwined with referential involvement wholes. On the one hand, Dasein needs referential whole and involvement whole to be itself. On the other handequipment is organized in terms of for-the-sake-ofwhichs that are ways of being Dasein (96-8). In the light of the worldliness of the world and the Daseins projection of its Being, how could the Other be regarded? Being-in points quite clearly to the fact that there is no bare subject without a world, nor was there an isolated I without the Others (Heidegger, 2001:116). Being-with is an existential structure of the Dasein, even when no Other is present-at-hand or conceived, therefore Being-alone is Being-with, due to the simple fact that the Other can only be lacking in a Being-with. Different modes of Mitdasein are only possible because Dasein as Being-with allows for the Dasein of Others to be encountered (120). By Others, it is not meant everyone else except me and from whom I distance myself, but those from whom one cannot distinguish oneself, because it is among them that one too actually is (118). In this vein, Being-with-Others actually belongs to Daseins Being, as a result Dasein as Being-with is essentially for the sake of Others (umwillen der Anderer). This has to be understood as an existential statement, for even if Dasein does not turn to Others and supposes that it does need them or manages to get along without them, it is nevertheless in the way of Being-with. In Being-with as the for sake of Others, the Others are disclosed in their Dasein. This constituted disclosure of the Others, running along with their Being-with, sets up Significance (Bedeutsamkeit) or Worldhood that is tied with the existential idea of For-thesake-of (123). However, Being to Others is ontologically different from Being to Things present-at-hand, because the other Seiend has the same type of Being like Dasein itself. Being with and to Others lies in a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein, a relationship that is constitutive of the Dasein. Thus, this Being-relationship to Others will become a projection of ones own Being-towards-oneself into something else. The Other, accordingly, is a duplicate of the Self (124). There is no doubt that the Other is the duplicate of the Self by virtue of the fact that both as Being-with and Being-in project their Being on the world. Projection, in this sense, is 90

a common denominator not between isolated subjects but between different rooms of maneuver, which is what the Dasein is all about. Accordingly, projection, as an exteriorization of ones own Being-towards-oneself into something else, will uncover the nature of the Other as the duplicate of the Self. However, this same projection (common between different Daseins) as pressing into possibilities will establish the otherness of the Other. If the Dasein is thrown in the Seinsart of projection that projects its Being on the referential whole of Significance that makes out the structure of the world (Daseins wherein), then each Dasein will, by dint of the different locations on which it is thrown in the referential whole of Significance, have a particular room for maneuver constituted of a distinct constellation of possibilities to press its Being in. The different positions on the referential whole of Significance that open a distinct range of possibilities for each Dasein is what constituted the Otherness of the Other in the existential sense of the term. The dynamic nature3 of the relations of the referential whole will not permit any Seiend to have a fixed sponsored position or continuity of movement, thus the essential differentiation between the Self and the Other would be impossible. Rather, there will be a constant shifting of positions and modification of relations on the network of the referential whole. An appropriate example for this constantly changeable otherness (location on the referential whole) is the case of the naval destroyer Ilat during the retaliation war between Egypt and Israel. Let me try to locate Ilat on Heideggers referential whole, this naval-destroyer belonged to the Egyptian navy (equipment context) and carried out with other navy barges and marines (with-which) military operations (practices and activities) against the Israeli invasion (towards-which) in order to defend Sinai peninsula (for-the-sake-of) during the 1967 war (the situational considerations). With Egypts defeat in the war, this naval destroyer was captured by the Israeli navy and given its name Ilat; by that time, it belonged to the Israeli navy and launched military operations with the Israeli naval pieces stationed in the Gulf of Aqaba against Egyptian targets to sustain the Israeli occupation of Sinai. Blowing up Ilat, considered by the Egyptian side a heroic victory, was an operation that the military high command of the Egyptian armed forces planed on the orders of the President himself. The example of Ilat pinpoints the constant existential modification of the Daseins range of possibilities vis--vis other Daseins and with this the playful changeability of locations, positions, and relations on the referential whole or the wherein of Daseins projection.

The existential conception of schizophrenia

Against this background, it would not be difficult to project an existential conception of schizophrenia. It designates a particular strategic situation, in which the range of possibilities or room for maneuver of a certain Dasein is restructured by means of power relations linking it to other Daseins. Of course, the structural adjustment of the Daseins room for maneuver through being engaged in power relations with other Seiends does not constitute in itself any defect or inauthenticity in the structure of Understanding. Rather, it is the particular nature of the strategic situation, in which the different power agents find themselves, bound with the 91

way (techniques and strategies) power is exercised, as well as the specific form of the range of possibilities (having been restructured) that make out the character of schizophrenia as a defect in the structure of Understanding (coping with the world or knowing-how). The interjection of a power relation through the systematic manipulation of the Daseins wherein of projection and through the playful recycling of involvement relations and referential whole, by means of which the Dasein lets itself and other Seiends be encountered and disclosed, will instigate a breach between the Dasein and Being and will force the Daseins existentiality (relations between its existential structures) to fall out of gears. As a consequence, the structure of projection as a whole will be plagued by serious malfunctions disabling the Dasein from localizing itself on the referential whole and as such depriving it of any life-organizing self-interpretive centrality. The abduction of existential possibilities from their ontological status of being possible and their confusion them with predestination and floating logical plans are exacerbated by the withdrawal from the factual referential whole through the fabrication of a non-realistic worldliness and historicity. The Daseins projection as whole will be split from within into two single ranges of possibilities (not as existential possibilities but as destinies), in the distance separating them the Daseins whole existence will be racked, unable to join one against the other, to bridge the wedge between them and reconciliate them together, or even to escape this existential trap altogether through projecting a brand new possibility as an existential possibility. Put it differently, the interjection of a certain power relation will produce a fascination with the Others existential possibilities and an otherization of the selfs existential possibilities. From a spatial perspective, neither the room for maneuver nor the wherein of Dasein will belong to the same level, rather projection will be hanging and swinging between two levels. This strategic situation will be produced and re-produced, since the Dasein as long as it exits is always projecting, thus projection will be the constant exteriorization of a previously interiorized power-relationship, which leads to its being more profoundly interiorized and more extensively outstretched. Cultural schizophrenia, given the formula otherization of the self and fascination with the Other is nothing but the malfunction of the existential structure of Understanding, in which the Dasein projects its Being through pressing it in the possibilities of the Other and pushing its own existential possibilities to the margins. Nowhere was cultural schizophrenia, as the product of power relations in a specific strategic situation, better perceived and conceptualized than in the thesis of Ibn Khaldun that the defeated is permanently enchanted by following the example set by the victor in his symbols, dress-fashion, attitudes, and the rest of his conditions and habits. The reason behind this, he explains, is that the self always believes in the perfection of that who defeats and subordinates it. This self-produced legitimation of the interjection of the victorvanquished relationship in the defeated and its ejaculation on all domains of life (symbols, dressing-fashion, habits, etc..) are rooted in one of two factors that Ibn Khaldun singled out. Either the extra-glorification of the victor leads to considering him as perfect. Or, more profoundly the defeated is completely unwilling to acknowledge the real cause lying behind his own defeat (in the case of Ibn Khaldun, it was the lack of the power of Aabia, certainly


in other settings and socio-historical conjunctures it must be something completely different) (Ibn Khaldun: 147). Let me expand briefly on this second factor, in order to capitalize upon Ibn Khalduns characterization of schizophrenia. Instead of assuming the responsibility for his own defeat and trying to find out the defects standing behind it, the defeated, in a manner of complete self-deceitfulness, blurs the limits between the reasons of his own defeat and the factors behind the victory of the other side. More distractingly, he pushes intentionally the blame away from himself and assigns it to the other side in a semi-fatalistic fashion that relieves him of all responsibility for his own defeat. In this fatalistic vein, assigning the blames for his defeat on the other side is carried out through establishing or rather fabricating a causal relationship between the victory of the other side (not his defeat) and the conditions (a fabricated notion of perfectness or the attitudes and traditions) of the other side (not his own conditions). At first, laying the blame on the other side, in a fashion that relieves one completely of responsibility, will take the form of extra-glorification of the other side, which will manifest itself in the act of imitating him and following his example. With the continuation and radicalization of the uncritical wholesale adoption of dress, habits, ideas, traditions, and all conceivable conditions of the other side, the defeated, who assumes that he is arming himself with the means of power of the other side (his means of transportation, his administrative systems, his military arsenal), is in fact willingly lubricating the interjection and the infiltration of the unbalanced power relationship with that Other. He partakes on one side in smashing his own social, cultural, political, and economic forces and in liquidating their corresponding institutional forms, and on the other in giving rise to institutional forms embodying the victor-vanquished relationship, re-embedding it over and over in the jointless social existence, and lastly facilitating the consolidation and exacerbation of his down trodden position. No wonder then that the glorification of the other, with its accompanying successive imitation(s) will end up being in a wedlock or even a dead-lock with feelings of selfresentment or an inferiority complex that would certainly be functional to justifying the extensive and penetrative hegemony of the other, but self-deceptively in relieving one fully of the responsibility of his own defeat, and more profoundly to covering up the reason(s) behind the defeat one is really unwilling to admit.

Symptoms of cultural schizophrenia

By proceeding on a pragmatic basis and avoiding theoretical complications, Kurt Schneider attempted to isolate a number of frequent and recognizable first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that distinguishes it from others psychotic disorders (Ciompi, 1988:197). I shall try to invest some of these symptoms in the existential analysis in order to figure out the symptoms of cultural schizophrenia as a defect affecting the Muslim Daseins existential structure of projection.


The first of these symptoms is auditory hallucinations, which regardless of its sensual source refers to a perception of an external object that has no actual presence of its own. Periods of social turbulence are characterized by the dissolution of historical perspectives that define for individuals and social groups their location in time and place. The temporal-spatial dislocation will result in the lack of parameters defining basic existential conditions, required behaviors and acts, and self-interpreting goals and objectives. Therefore, such condition of historical blindness would also be characterized by surrender to impulsive actions or externally stimulated reactions. The lack of a vision charting the field of actions and grand choices undermines the ability to undertake any historical initiatives, and as such historical sense, conception, and action are done away with (Ghalioun, 1992:21-22). The grand narrative of progress lavishes amidst such disorientations, because as a civic-religion it performs the function of providing the individual and social existence with a new vision that re-draws the field of action. Although the notion of evolution is backed by scientific evidence and collected data, progress is a purely moral and ideological notion. Whereas evolution pertains to objects that constitute the material world independent from human existence, progress weighs heavily upon social norms and moral standards. The inventive-imaginary act of the progress narrative lies in stretching the notion of progress to cover the dynamics of evolution, so that every change would be seen as progressive. Through such mechanical understanding of historical change, it appears that morality had been completely dubbed; yet dressing change in the garb of progress is in fact formulating new historical morals that are mainly materialistic and could be easily switched to being anti-human. The Marxist interpretation of history points out that religious and moral conceptions are quite irrelevant to the historical progress towards social justice, rather the later is the inevitable product of historical determinism that ushers the transition from capitalism to socialism, just as it sanctified the shift from feudalism to capitalism. The evolutionary historical forces can never be hindered by the will of single individuals or even social groups, because the latters consciousness is defined and determined by socio-economic circumstance, namely modes and relations of production. Scientific thought as distinguished from utopian thought can only play the role of driving and speeding up the wagon of historical transitions i.e. revolution. The evolutionary version of history was deeply rooted in the medieval historical trajectory of Europe. The excessive authority of the Church and the massive exploitation of the feudal system prevented Europe from grounding a stable social system on the basis of an unshakable spiritual and psychological balance. Rather, as destabilizing factors they gave rise to structural distortions concerning the relationship between man and nature as well as his fellow men. The animosity between the aspirations towards freedom and the coercive theological rule generated humanities at first as a domain independent from theology and then as frame for bringing Man, nature, and society to terms with one another in an attempt to re-embed human existence in the social and natural mediums. By contrast, Islam enjoyed successfully social and organizational authorities that kept Man in good terms with his social and natural mediums. Since Mans will was a derivation from or an extension of that of the Supreme Being but not subservient to it, the contradiction between the human and the divine never occurred in Islam. Eventually, the rift between theology and humanities as an incarnation or 94

rather radicalization of the Man-God duality and as an attempt to turn around it by obliterating one of its sides never materialized in Islam. Rather, the Sharia laws (as a social institution) played the role of a balance-holder between the interests of the various social factions. When the balance was shaken against the favor of vulnerable social group(s), the Sharia (as a transcendental yardstick) nourished revolutionary potentials by providing non-worldly incentives to the worldly struggle for a minimum level of social justice based on a balance between moral and material needs on individual as well as on collective levels (29-30). However, evolution-based Western version of historicity derives its importance from responding to the Wests needs of psychological stability and social self-organization in the nation-frame. Moreover, the central, leading role of the West as a cultural and social entity in this version of history provides the West with self-defense and supremacy-asserting cultural and psychological mechanisms vis--vis other cultures and societies. The over-stretching of this Eurocentric version of historicity to engulf the historical trajectories of other cultures is performed through digging out the cultural (Weber), economic (Marx), and social (Durkheim) foundations of Western supremacy and explaining them by overwriting the histories of other cultures in codes and syntax derived from the Wests particular history. The globalization of such a grand historical narrative is in fact an integrative part of a self-protection mechanism that preserves the balance of the Western thought system by imposing its historicity on the dominated peoples, whose own history would be in this light nothing but shady replicas of the original version. Assimilating the concepts and perspectives soaked in Western historicity as an ideological or meta-methodological basis for the different fields of knowledge in Muslim societies did not remedy the problem of their decaying historical perspectives or lack of historical sense, understanding, and action. Rather, the situation was aggravated because Western historicity did not only widen the chasm between Muslim societies and their own history, but more seriously closed off every horizon of new historical changes that would unbalance the Western global domination. The extra-glorification of progress is in fact the other side of the Muslim Daseins original sin inherited from the West; having not developed and still unable to develop through the phases portrayed by Western historicity, the Muslim Dasein condemns its history and its whole existence as a sin. Progress means the transition from the religion-dominated Middle Ages to the reason-based modern age; whose price must be paid by accommodating materialistic values, needs, and ideologies in the Muslim homeland and subjecting the moral, social, spiritual, and material existence to the rational cultural models and the organizational logic of industrial capitalism and state-bureaucracy. It is only the illusion of the earthly paradise of rationalism, where technology would be the magic recipe for all ills (poverty, need, sickness, and death) that justifies the great cultural, psychological, and social sacrifices of Western historicity (34-35). Personality crack in the fashion of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is the most salient feature of schizophrenia that the whole syndrome had been reduced to it, yet what distinguishes this symptom mostly is the kind of relationship between the components of the doublet. Scientific researches underline a sense that the patients own experience has been invaded by an external, alien force. In other words, a profound disturbance of identity has occurred, with a 95

blurring of the limits of the self and a loss of distinction between internal and external reality (Ciompi, 1988:198). Let me first try to topologize this fissure in the aim of outlining afterwards the way its components interact with one another. This rift pertains to the relationship between the Muslim Dasein and the Other and across it to itself as long as the Other became the medium and the inroad for problematizing ones Being. It encloses the deep, tragic hiatus within ones existence that helps construct the double-duality of self-denial versus acceptance of the Others civilization and resentment of the Others culture versus selfassertion. Both dualities are accompanied by chronic moods: self-contempt and selfhumiliation through injuring self-critique to facilitate being assimilated in the Other; as well as nostalgic clinging to archaic traditions, paranoia, and unjustified hostility towards the Other to preserve ones Being (Ghalioun, 1990:35). Consequently, the Muslim Dasein surrendered to the fate of seeing itself and the Other only through interchangeable pairs of dualities modern/traditional, progressive/backwards, East/West, religious/secular, fundamentalist/modernist, civil/military etc(Ghalioun, 1992:119). The original rift that circulates these pairs of dualities reflects the fall of the Muslim Dasein in an existential state (Befindlichkeit) of indecision and perplexity between contradictory desires, choices, and possibilities that it can neither relinquish in part without obliterating itself, nor reconcile together to resume its historical agitation. Quite the contrary, the Muslim Dasein turned into a divided will and a self-contradictory awareness resulting in inability of action and escalation of self-conflict. Racked between two poles each drawing with the same strength, the Muslim Dasein is pinned down unable to step forwards or backwards, but also unable to stop moving in this standstill situation. The Muslim Daseins dilemma encompasses yearning for transcending its existential impasse coupled with lack of vision and control over its current conditions (123-24). The existential states of perplexity and indecision underlying the schizophrenic hiatus with its famous dualities are in fact the product of a subordinate relationship with the West. On one hand, the West considers itself a unique human experience and, by dint of its achieved progress, still bears infinite potentialities and possibilities for the future of humanity that the West represents its evolutionary upshot, true spirit, and historical destiny. On the other hand, the backward East will linger in its dark ages as long as it does not receive the Wests universal Gospel of rationalism, modernity, and progress that constitute the essence of the West. The West provides norms and values for judging other cultures, which are rank-ordered according to their distance from the model projected and marketed by the West. Since it was the Wests awareness of itself and its Other that produced the previous duality, therefore a subjugation relationship with the West will be embodied in an externally imposed field of existential possibilities that invaded the Muslim Daseins existential structure of Understanding (Shalaq, 1993:98-99). The schizophrenic schism materialized in two versions of worldliness or simply two grand perspectives, whose deafening loud clashes paralyzed the Muslim Daseins projection. The history of the Muslim Dasein in the post-Almoaedin era is nothing but the history of the various conflicts, tensions, and compromises of those two grand perspectives on trying to take over the structure of projection. Therefore, all attitudes towards the West, civilization, religion, science, authority, or the future are only amplified echoes of the clashing encounters 96

of these two perspectives. The disorienting encounter between the two perspectives does not confine itself to the ranks of intellectuals, but cuts deep in the flesh of Muslim societies to crack them from within into two hostile camps; each having its own evaluation of the present, vision of the past and the future, version of historicity, conception of reason and what constitutes rationality as a norm, and social and political objectives. The first camp identifies itself with authenticity founded upon religion, while the other sided with modernity based on science. Underlying both perspectives is a silent consensus that makes identity synonymous to subjectivity and reduces the heritage to its religious aspect, on one hand, and makes modernity and civilization congruent and abridges culture to its technical side, on the other. The combat between the two camps circulating clashing codes (authenticity versus modernity, religion versus science, progress versus conservatism) went through different historical phases and assumed various forms suiting the political and social conditions and the dominant thought trends and ideologies of the day. The late 19th century witnessed heated discussions and polemics between the party of Islamic reformism (Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Shakib Arslan) and that of scientific social evolutionism (Farah Antoun, Shibli Shumayyil, Salama Mussa, Taha Hussein). Also the first half of the 20th century experienced the continuation of earlier debates, which due to Western military occupation forced the two camps to assume a political guise and raised the slogans of collaboration versus resistance. With the aspirations of independence and liberation in the 50s and the 60s, the temper of the conflicting parties calmed down to a large extent and kept the disputed issues in the shades. However, the political and economic failures of the Nation-state rekindled the conflict once more and charged it with new frustrations. Actually, the division is much more profound than the borders between the two hostile camps, it denotes a split of the Daseins present between two moments that draw the Muslim Dasein from its existence and from its world as well. As such, the schizophrenic hiatus was not confined to the ranks of intellectuals or different social groups, but interceded the relationship between the individual and himself. Therefore, the two opposing perspectives could, not without difficulties, reconcile themselves and cohabit the same school of thought or even the same thinker. All the different theoretical and ideological formulations dominating the cultural projection scene were but an attempt to resolve the incessant conflict between the two poles through excluding one of them in the favor of the other or through molding them together more or less coherently. Most dramatically, such endeavors not just failed in bridging the schizophrenic hiatus, but only succeeded in its projection on the various fields of day-to-day life and its deepening in the different existential structures more and more (Ghalioun, 1990:22-25). Finally, the schism became consolidated in the following trends: the first aims to inculcate new ideas and values in the Arab-Islamic culture in order to remake it fully, the basic religious outlook of life and the universe should be discarded and replaced by a secular world-view rooted in rationalism and technology; the second is committed to the religious elements of the Arab-Islamic culture that must dominate the whole cultural space which in its turn must be purged from all external, mainly Western, influences, conformity with the pristine essence of Islam is the only way to revive the traditional values and institutions prevalent in the heyday of Islamic civilization, science and rationalism are not negated but 97

considered modern products of earlier Muslim efforts of the golden days of Islam that must be re-acquired; the last trend tries to reconciliate the previous attitudes, it considers Arab-Islamic culture to be viable in modern times, but it needs some of its elements to be re-interpreted in the light of modern needs and experience, reforming not transforming the Arab-Islamic culture through discarding some of its traditional values and institutions and supplementing them with modern equivalents would enable it to function better in modern times and to stand up to the Wests political, cultural, and economic challenges (Boullata, 1990:3-4). Now it seems quite crucial to outline how the rift components (the Self and the Other as two ranges of existential possibilities) interact with each other. According to Abdallah Laraoui, any identification of an I refers implicitly to an Other, which in the case of the Muslim Dasein always signifies the West. More than this, the Muslim Daseins identification of itself is not only intertwined by its conception of the West, yet more gravely determined by it (Laraoui, 1995:24). Therefore, the diagnosis of the contemporary problems and dilemmas facing Muslim societies is centered on a certain image of the West. However, the term West, which designates the Other and stands in a line as the last of several previous signifiers like, Christians, Franks, Romans, Europeans, and finally Westerners, has been constantly shifting its signification (35 & 37-38). Or, the various significations of the West were coexisting more synchronously than diachronously in the Daseins existential structure of Understanding. Although the sequence of such significations reveals their relative weight in the light of the conditions giving rise to them, establishing such a diachronic relationship arbitrarily distorts the self-other interaction pattern in the Daseins structure of projection (52). However, for analytical purposes one can isolate three significations of the Other cohabiting the same moment; it goes without saying that the three significations of the Other were also self-identification of the Muslim Dasein. The religious signification was presented by the Sheikh, who situated the East-West conflict in its traditional religious context. It was the thousand-year old struggle between Islam and Christianity along the Mediterranean coasts from Andalusia to the Levant, whereby victory and defeat were exchanged between Islam and the West. The Christian West was lingering in its dark ages under the theocratic rule of the Church that prosecuted and humiliated scientists and philosophers like Galelio, Descartes, and Rousseau. Christian dogma, superstitions, and obscuritanism dominated Europe in its medieval times, whereas the Muslims were embarking on new scientific adventures and opening novel theoretical horizons in Baghdad, Damascus, and Cordoba. The rational spirit, on which the Renaissance was raised, spread from the scientific and cultural centers of Andalusia that stand not only for territorial losses, but more importantly for the scientific spirit that has to be regained. The liberal signification was depicted by the statesman who came in closer contact with the secular culture of 18th century France. This century fascinated the statesman, because it disclosed the crimes and violations of the Church and with them all required evidence to condemn the theocratic rule of Christianity. It also introduced a plethora of political utopias, where the philosophers would institute the social and political rule of reason. The West shone under new light; it was not any more the West of the Pope, the Church, and the feudal lord, rather it symbolized Enlightenment as a coherent thought system 98

that erected a liberal political model. Under the spell of Montesquieus Spirit of Laws, the East was identified with despotism and lack of freedom; it was the victim of tyrannical rulers who usurped political authority and exploited the masses throw monopolizing trade and heavy taxation. However, Islam was not fully assimilated in this newly projected self-image, it was rescued though the differentiation between an Arabic Islam raising the banner of tolerance and freedom and a Turkish Islam based on despotic rule and resulting in civilizational decline. It is through assimilating the liberal thought (coinciding with the spirit of the Arabic Islam) and transplanting the democratic institutions of constitution and parliament (corresponding to the Shura establishment of the early Islamic caliphate) that the dilemma of Muslim societies could be solved. The technological signification was pictured by the technology zealot that discovered that the West is neither a dogma-free religion nor a democratic state-system, but simply a materialistic power based on disciplined and organized labor and applicable knowledge. Taking Japan as a model for an oriental country that was able to achieve a civilizational leap and join the ranks of civilized nations, it could be then deducted that technology and industrialization are the secret codes of progress and as such the real signification of the West. Derived from this, the problem of the East could be solved by using the same recipe, which in fact deals a coup de grce to the whole cultural heritage that proved to be completely useless. Unlike the Sheikh, the technology zealot did not lament on past glories, but he will sacrifice his own culture, seen as past shackles, for the sake of the future, reduced to importing Western technology; he feels quite at home on using Western languages, cultural codes, and logic of thinking. In contrast to the statesman, he convinces himself of the irrelevance of liberalism and democratic rule to progress. On the contrary, despotic rule does not constitute an obstacle in the face of progress but its essential condition. After all, did not the two great industrial nations Great Britain and France enter the age of industrial revolution through the despotic rule of Cromwell and Napoleon? No wonder then that the technology advocate will rejoice the systematic dismantling of democratic institutions by means of military coups throughout the 1950s and the 1960s (39-48). The frequency of these significations interchangeability constitutes the basis of their synchrony and depicts the hyper-interactive nature of the self-other duality. Furthermore, these significations, viewed as a splinter of the same moment of self-other confrontation, represent a ceaseless exchange of gazes that results in an endless reversibility of roles and positions in a reciprocal field of visibility. Eventually, the confusion of roles based on their endless reversibility would lead to a complete assimilation of the range of possibilities of the Other in the existential structure of Projection. Yet, the Others maneuver room is truncated through using packages of reductive wisdom to give everything a simplistic explanation. The new outlook is actually mutilated, for it had not emerged in the aftermath of an authentic archaeological shift, but has simply appeared like the last offspring of an amputated line, not even of its genealogy, because it remains split from the archaeology of knowledge preceding it. Put it differently, the intersection of the old paradigm and the new results in their mutual distortion: modernity is measured with the yardstick of Tradition, while Tradition is subjected to the violent stresses of modernity. A divorce springs between the mutilated outlook of the self and the other and the psychic attitude that conditions it, because the latter 99

has not been adapted to the archaeological breaks but remained rooted in the old emphatic vision of things prevalent on the eve of the schizophrenic split. To characterize this mutilated outlook and its underlying paranoid ravings of modernization and authentication, Shayegan wrote:
If we mix Hegel devoid of the conceptual apparatus of systematic reasoning and intellectual phenomenology, with a Marx stripped of theory and praxis, and an Islam cut off from its poles (mabda origin and maad return), we obtain a thick soup all of whose elements seem divested of their ontological tenor, as they have been separated from the base from which they are made and which justifies their existence. Such a thought can only be a thought which has no purpose, and therefore no place (54-55).

A third symptom of schizophrenia is a critical disturbance in the area of information processing, that is, the overtaxing of certaininformation-processing systems, whichwere already unstable and partially defective (Ciompi, 1988:200). The main reason behind the systemic failure of projection illustrated in this symptom is the lack of a philosophical atlas, locating the areas and currents of thought in an appropriate overall framework. Rather, projection is shackled to incoherent blocks of knowledge and torn between scattered fragments of learning in no particular context, which loses one purposefully in the labyrinth of human knowledge. These holes in the fabric of knowledge do not only make it impossible to fashion a coherent body of knowledge in concert with the Dasein projection, but also they are filled with hasty approximations and fanciful conclusions that lead to the most extravagant views (possibilities) imaginable. These distortions and systemic failures accumulate until the existential structure of Understanding is left in a world of distorting mirrors where all the essential ideas are vitiated to some extent (Shayegan, 1992:122-23). One of these understanding distortions is civilizational analogy, which is an operation consisting of three elements fragmenting, eclecticism, and fabrication. Fragmenting refers to breaking down arbitrarily coherent bodies of knowledge and experiences into fragments; one gallops from one to the other in a very sporadic fashion. Eclecticism and fabrication complement each other, in the sense of selecting those elements that bear the slightest resemblances and gluing them in an incoherent whole in order to lend ideological justification to an already taken theoretical or practical stance. Analogy as defective information-processing does not seek to reach a comprehensive conception of the situation at hand or even to attain additional information that would lay bare hidden its aspects. Quite the contrary, analogy by dint of its triology excludes by all means any attempt to reach out for new existential possibilities, for it is an instrument for justifying worn out ones (Shalaq, 1993:100-101). For instance the two main thought trends of modernity and authenticity, regardless of their secondary differences, represent two mirror-image applications of the analogical toolkit. Both deconstruct, select, and combine splinters dragged out of their context concerning the West and Islam to construct an idealized model according to which comparisons are drawn in order to reach previously prepared conclusions. While the West (more accurately its fabricated image) is taken as the norm that measures the whole load of the Daseins existence for the modernizing trend, Islam (or rather its representation) 100

occupies the same position for the advocates of authenticity. In this vein, both perspectives were able to circulate and exchange the same pairs of dualities to project their outlook of reality, but each colored these pairs with its previously prepared conclusions (99). However, analogy, on being rightly applied, was originally one of the most successful instruments of projecting an articulated thought system in the centuries preceding the rise of Islam. But, on being abused, it became an extremely destructive tool dismantling the structure of projection and sealing the debauched range of possibilities imposed on the Muslim Dasein and as such lost all its value of projecting new possibilities and embarking on new fields in theory and practice. The defected mode of projection was now only able to produce the most impractical, logically empty plans, and through bestowing on them the ontological rank of predestination it entrapped itself into the most odd positions in practice. For example, radical political regimes followed very pragmatic if not conservative policies, whereas their conservative counterparts initiated policies counted as unthinkable. The complete absorption in details was quite essential for analogy, as they provide it with raw material to be splintered, selected, and added together. Besides, the influx of details as well as their purposeful accumulation represent a deceitful compensation for the lack of any consistent, coherent worldview, laying the basis for an established order of things, by way of providing a thin scientific faade to the distortions of analogy (101-102). Methodological vagueness is another complex of understanding distortions that denotes the tendency to confuse historical, cultural, religious, social, and philosophical factors with one another and to compress them together to substitute or even to mask one another. For example, the discussion of democracy disguises the unwillingness to stir the question of despotic rule just like that of secularism conceals the question of minorities, in spite of the fact that these issues are unmistakably not identical. Consequently, one finds himself facing issues entangled with one another to form labyrinth that has neither end nor beginning. Despotism finds its origin in the lack of rationalism, which in its turn stirs the question of inadequate socialization that stimulates the critique of religion. As such, one goes in a vicious circle, by dint of which one leaps from political issues to intellectual problems passing through grand historical crises without any ability to resolve any of these problems or even take a decisive stance. The playful usage of concepts is predominantly a salient feature of methodological vagueness. Concepts are actually signifiers that are transformed or even transfigured according to change in time, fields and objects of knowledge, amount of accumulated information, and comprehensiveness of understanding reality. However, the playful usage of concepts ignores these crucial considerations and utilizes concepts without paying any attention to clarify their signification and connotations or even to discipline their application in a scientific fashion. Rather, the inaccurate use or say abuse of concepts is wedded to their careless interchangeability, so that any concept can substitute the others in the most chaotic and painful sense. The confusion between the concepts of reason, culture, ideology, discourse, and utopia is a case at hand. This facilitates the frequent occurrence of another understanding distortion, that is the proximity between the different levels of analysis and the incessant slippage from one to the other; one springs often from epistemological analysis to theory of knowledge, then to sociology of knowledge, and to ideological critique 101

without any distinction or justification. The spontaneous summoning of thoughts based on the most formalistic resemblances lubricates the wheel of slippage, whose circling was made possible by the playful usage of concepts. Slipping from one level to another or from a particular knowledge domain to another will incarnate the different problems in the form of a gross dragon with a thousand heads that can never be tackled. To slay this dragon, another understanding distortion will be disposed, which is mainly the fabrication of an eternal omnipresent origin, whereby all borders between the multiple knowledge domains and the differences between its premises, problems, and objects simply dissolve. The eternal point of origin reduces the different cognizing processes of perception, comprehension, conception, comparison and experimentation to one standardized procedure (analogy for instance). Consequently, results and conclusion reached in one field of knowledge or experience will be transformed into sweep generalizations that are universally valid to provide quite simplistic and mechanical explanations for the most complicated of dilemmas. Take as an example the way the 1967 defeat was studied and explained; philologists concluded that the defeat could be referred to the perverse nature of the Arabic language and its resistance to progress, whereas ideologues stressed that the immaturity of the nationalist component of the Arab political culture. In this example, results of epistemological or ideological research were overstretched to explain issues of socio-historical nature without any awareness of the illogical shift of focuses, themes, and domains that took place (Ghalioun, 1990:53-5). The last symptom of the Muslim Daseins cultural schizophrenia reflects a progressive retreat from the shared world of external reality into a private inner world (Ciompi, 1988:200). As such, one has to review how the Dasein deforms its own worldliness (the wherein of projection) as well as the inauthentic world it seeks refuge in. First, the Dasein finds itself besieged by formalistic possibilities and interpretations that close it off from the world and reduces its Being-with to its absolute minimum. Stepping outside reality into the vicious circle of an inauthentic range of possibilities, formulated under particular temporal conditions and from a specific worldly-position or perspective, amputates the Dasein from its world and disables its projection structure from acquiring suitable methods and strategies to cope with the world. Reality will be rather experienced in a secondhand fashion or even filtered by formalistic sets of possibilities and pairs of dualities taking as their driving-engine the elements of analogy. In other terms, when projection will be thrown behind the bars of abstract logical possibilities having no contact to reality, except in the most absurd fashion, analogy will constitute the radius of an Understanding that does not seek to authentify its possibilities by means of reality (pushing Dasein in possibilities derived from the situation) but to project the Dasein, through instrumentalizing the palest resemblances with an assumed origin or model, on another reality (leading the Dasein astray in abstract plans assuming the rank of predestination). Projection goes completely out of control and circulates in its own closed orbit, as its centrifugal movement around the pivot of formalistic analogies gains more momentum, which accounts for the excessive proliferation of empty possibilities totally severed from reality and the attempt to reconciliate them into formless mixtures. Rather than being perceived as a network with a multiplicity of domains and levels, 102

reality is represented as a solid block that has either to undergo wholesale change (gradual or radical) or to be kept absolutely intact. Such a perception of reality does not only reflect its romantic denial and refusal, but more profoundly it underlies a tragic failure to cope with it. Witness the example of a Durkheimian sociologist, pumped as he would be with concepts of individual, industrial project, class, and Nation, he does not commence his research by analyzing social structures and interactions in his reality the way they are. Rather, he will try so hard to discover those social relations that he can squeeze in his already-made theoretical boxes at the cost of trimming reality if not amputating it altogether. On discovering that the social structures do not function according to the Durkheimian norms or even do not match wholly the sociological conceptual arsenal, he does not disqualify his conceptual toolkit and try to modify it. Rather, he condemns in the strongest humiliating terms the backward, traditional, irrational social structures of his reality that cannot rise to the level of modern, rational, institutional organizations of an imagined reality (Ghalioun, 1990: 57-8). Secondly, in spite of or even because of freezing reality into one solid block to be mummified or buried, there is a tendency to anatomize reality or dissect it into parts that are treated as self-contained autarkic essential units. Reductionism of reality not only originates from defective Understanding unable to formulate a coherent outlook of the world, but also reflects a systematic dismantling of the referential wholes Understanding projects the Daseins Being on. The reductionistic tendency manifests itself clearly in historical researches, where accounting for the despotic nature of post-colonial state would not lead to the scrutiny of social, political, and economic factors, but to fabricate a despotic essence that was always steering the course of political changes. Discourses, culture, religion, and a fabricated notion of the self will be subjected to a process of excavation to dig out the despotic essence. Consequently, critique drives to the construction of an essentially defeated reality, whose demolition in the realm of theoretical practice, would be thought of, due to slippage between levels of analysis, as identical to its treatment in praxis. Compartmentalizing reality, through considering it a dead body made out of concepts, values, and experiences and uprooting it from its socio-historical context, is an instrument providing evidence that support the mutilated outlook of the self and the Other as well as eliminating evidence that undermine such outlook. Consequently, reality will be not only fragmented but also completely deformed in a manner that prevents any serious attempt to fathom its depth from establishing a clear picture of its referential wholes and their mechanisms of interaction (60-1). Thirdly, pressing oneself in different possibilities through projection presumes that the Dasein assumes responsibility concerning its relation to its Being, other Seiends, Daseins, and the world as a whole, on which it projects itself by means of such possibilities. Therefore, the wholesale refusal of reality that assumes the form of resorting to empty planning and formalistic possibilities is nothing but exempting oneself from the responsibility of coping with reality through laying the blame on the other side and pushing it away from oneself. Laying the blame on the imperialist historical conspiracy of the West against the Arabs or the perverse nature of traditional social structure and Arab archaic mentality masks the inability to cope with the Other and the local setting as well as the unwillingness to admit failure and bear its consequences. It is for this reason that no serious theoretical revision of leftist Arab 103

thought took place up till now. Also, exempting oneself from responsibility could take the form of sweeping judgments or waving charges against the most basic concepts like reason, consciousness, or religiosity to relieve oneself of serious scrutiny and research. It was in this vein that accusations were leveled against Ibn Taimiyya for hampering modernization and rationalization in the Muslim countries. Thus, declining historical responsibility can only ordain the Dasein to stagnation, because it resigned and fled from its reality and declared its total capitulation in the face of change forces. It is the true expression of an existential impasse of the Muslim Dasein after having lost its control on itself, its world, and its fate (636). However diverse they might seem, these ways of connection, or in fact disconnection, to reality have one characteristic in common: They do not adhere to reality. Rather, such distortions as closed structures, which generate their own categories and live on their own fantasies project a domain which confuses time with space, petrifies perception and makes it difficult to maintain anyrelationship with the changing flux of real life. What is projected here is a world of sub-reality in which reality is conjured out of sight behind tawdry masks, where a lie can become an end in itself and lead an autonomous existence. Each and every element of this fictitious world melts on being dragged out of its closed structure, because its lack of any content does not enable it to stand up against reality (Shayegan, 1992:102). In fact, this somewhere else situates the Dasein in a sort of nonplace in which it never transcends its conditions, never rises above itself, but collapses under its own weight; never fully attains what it is supposed to represent, endlessly pursues its idea of itself, but never catches up. In this world that is actually nowhere, things kept on the margins of existence no sooner come into being than they are old enough to pass away (108). To the question of who the Dasein is, the answer is what I myself am or my own Being. However, if the I is the essential determination of Dasein, then it must be interpreted existentially (Heidegger, 2001:117). That is, the Daseins identification with a certain I is not to be thematically undertaken in terms of a certain fixed essence, but existentially in terms of the range of possibilities available to it (this range encompasses what it is and also what it is not). No wonder then that cultural schizophrenia as a defected art of projection can only hamper any basic determination of Dasein or its identification in terms of a certain I. The existential understanding of cultural schizophrenia explains the inability to construct a particular I with which the Dasein identifies itself, which is what is commonly known as identity crisis. Suffice it, identity crisis is the epitome of cultural schizophrenia. The Egyptian case provides strong evidence for this argument as it represents a prototype for identity crisis in other Muslim countries. The major political, economic, and cultural changes generating modern crises of identity took place earlier in Egypt than in other regions of the Muslim world. The infiltration of European ideas and philosophy provided alternative notions to the most basic concepts of man, time, and place (Gershoni & Janowski 1986:3). Such changes propounded the question of collective identity as an unsolvable problematic to a degree unparalleled in the past. The discussion of Who are we?, What do we want?, What are we to become?, and Where does Egypt fit in the world? as fundamental 104

questions concerning the countrys collective identity was to take place in public and on the widest scale. The answers of Egyptianism, Islamic nationalism, and Arab nationalism4, provided to these questions, highlight Egypts identity crisis as a case for the Muslim Daseins schizophrenic existence. It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the October war of 1973, the influential journalist Muhammad Hasanein Heikal, set out to explain to Henry Kissinger that Egypt was more than a state on the banks of the Nile, that it was an idea and a historical movement. On such a messianic vision of the countrys identity, Fouad Ajami commented cynically that the idea or rather the illusion is all that remains. Both the Mediterranean temptation of Egypt being piece of Europe and the pan-Arab illusion have run aground (Ajami, 1995:88). In contradiction to the long standing conviction that schizophrenics are living in an autistic world cut off from their environment, contact exists in an altered form and at times quite extensively to the extent that non-communication is [in itself] a form of communication. Hence, psychotic states of mind, however, are not innate to the schizophrenic, but occur to healthy persons as well. It is just that the healthy person can, at least for certain periods, escape such disordered condition, whilst the schizophrenic is trapped inside it like a prisoner due to the effect of the destabilizing environment (Ciompi, 1988:211-12). By this token, cultural schizophrenia as a flawed process of Daseins projection into possibilities must take place in an environment charged with structural disorganizers that systematically create and perpetuate such an existential condition. I shall try to reconstruct two cross-sectional historical scenes that exhibit how the modernization act, as developed in the previous three scenes, was that disordered environment that our schizophrenic Dasein was trapped inside like a prisoner.

The first scene: Structural violence

Modern power mechanisms are in fact couched in a specific political economy of the body, where it is always the body that is at issue the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission. The investment of the body in the political field (in relations of power and domination) through a system of subjection is bound up with its constitution as a force of production. The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body. The political investment of the body is undertaken through direct, physical, pitting force against force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violenceit may be subtle, make use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order [emphasis added] (Foucault, 1997-b: 25-6). From one angle, the notion of docility, which lies at the center of the political economy of power, signifies that discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) through handling it as a capacity to be promoted and diminishes the same forces (in political terms of obedience) through reversing the course of energy generated by the body and turning it into a relation of subjection. The ingenuity of discipline lies not only in its conduciveness to the growth of the bodys skills, nor in its intensification of the coercion 105

and supervision of its activities, but in the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes[the body] more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely (136-38). From another angle, the cost of exercising power demonstrates that discipline was less costly than any other power technique. The non-corporal disciplinary power throws off the physical weight; there are no bars, chains, heavy locks, because what was needed was a meticulous economy of details to engulf the body according to a codification of times, spaces, and movements. By minimizing its economic expenditure, discipline maximizes its political assets, as it dispenses with suppressing rebellions and other forms of unrest that are politically as well as economically expensive, since the tighter grip costs more resources and certainly erects more resistance. The supremacy of disciplinary techniques lies in balancing both sides of the political economy of power (in terms of costs and benefits) through establishing a positive link between the political and economic spheres. (Foucault, 1981:154-55). The corner stone of such political economy, the indissoluble subjection-docility bond, is that power as a coercive practice or relation is passed over to the other sideof its surface of application. He who is subjected to[it], and knows it, assumes for the constraints of power; he makes them spontaneously play upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection. In brief, the indissoluble bond between the growth of skills (docility) and the intensification of coercion (subjection), which represents disciplines stroke of ingenuity in terms of the political economy of power, hinges upon disciplines physical non-corporal and non-violent modality, where the subjected becomes his own principle of subjection (Foucault, 1997-b: 202-3). Docility and subjection did not escape the minds of the modernizers in Muslim countries, since in several instances they represented the outspoken goals of modernization. Assessing the nascent textile industrys condition in Egypt, Muhammad Ali asserted that he was setting up his factories in order to accustom the people to manufacture more than for any immediate profit that was expected (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:174). He even went furthermore to proclaim: I have seized everything, but it was in order to render all productive; it was a question of production, and who could do it other than me? Who would have shown the methods to be adopted, the new cultures to introduce? (189). My claim is that, on implanting modern power mechanisms in the local setting, malpractices, whose drive was not docility and utility but more gravely malleability and exploitation, shattered completely disciplines indissoluble bond between subjection and docility. Therefore, subjection (as a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge) never succeeded in creating the autonomous individual who inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles and becomes the principle of his own subjection in Foucaults words. Rather, in Milners words, the Fellah became a by-word of cowardice that he ran away in the battlefield from a mere handful of half-naked Arabs armed with spears. The treatment they were subjected to, explained Milner, demoralized them completely; the fellah was never properly taught his business[but] he was exposed to an amount of degrading ill-usage which would have knocked the manliness out of a Viking [emphasis added] (Milner, 1899:142). 106

This scene shall attempt to expand on such exploitative and demoralizing malpractices of micro-power techniques that deformed docility into malleability and aborted the disciplinary powers process of individualization. As previously mentioned, the Ottoman pamphlet that decreed nizam djadid as an attempt to create a new army on the modern European style was actually describing what Foucault termed LHomme-machine. The French and Prussian models of disciplinary control, copied by nizam djadid with their anatomo-chronological schema of behavior aimed to promote the aptitudes of each body, rank-order them in a certain hierarchy, raise the degree of self-coercion (or the meta-capacity of creating new capacities), and as such create the individual soldier as a means and effect of a political anatomy of details that collectivized the individual soldiers into small machines, well-trained regiments or human toys. Similarly, the model school (al-maktab al-unmudhadji) in Cairo and the Egyptian school in Paris applied the disciplinary techniques meticulously organizing the bodily conditions of students, daily activities, pre-arranged positions, pattern of communication, and even gestures. As a perfect disciplinary apparatus, the school was a site, where the exact position and precise task of each individual at every moment were coordinated to function as a machine. The plans model housing applied to reconstruct the villages of Egypt under the supervision of French engineers specified the spaces of rooms, courtyards, and buildings to the nearest centimeter, fixed and made legible a determined social hierarchy, isolated and enumerated items, animals, and inhabitants in the designed space, and finally broke down the peasants daily activities and distributed them on functional sites. Such disciplinary sites were not expected to function automatically; rather they were permeated and underlain by surveillance mechanisms that guaranteed the regular functioning of the disciplinary machine through punishing and exterminating erupting irregularities. Surveillance practices represent the intersection points, where modern disciplinary mechanisms will collide with the native malpractices on the micro as well as the macro level of power relations. No wonder then that the political economy of power (docility-subjection) will be severely damaged. Let us take the example of model housing, whose plans were elevated to the level of module to be applied throughout the Egyptian countryside and even in the villages of Algeria. Model housing uprooted the peasants from their local temporal horizon and emptied space from its social content to establish partitioned, functional sites, where the prescribed daily activities can be productively carried out. As such, this was in fact an act of violence that shattered the complex symbolic system the cultural, social, and historical experiences were stylized in. Note the contrast between the neutral spaces and partitions of the model house and the value-laden symbolic nature of the Kabyle house. Symbolic violence of model housing took the form of house arrest and was erected on the very hierarchy of a prison. The January 1830 ordinance confined the peasants to their native districts and prohibited them from traveling except through permits and identification papers that they simply never applied for. The village was barracked and its inhabitants were put under the surveillance of guards day and night to prevent them from fleeing and under the supervision of inspectors to scrutinize their cultivation activities and check their delivery of agricultural products to government warehouses. Spies were placed at every corner and wherever people looked they were to be inspected, supervised, and instructed. Even when 107

they left the village, it was under guard and they were forcibly drafted to the corve or military camps (Mitchell, 1989:34). The December 1829 Programme for successful cultivation by the peasant and the application of government regulations laid down the surveillance hierarchy extending from the peasant working in the field to the central Bureaux of Inspection. What is striking about the Programme is not its detailed description of the tasks the peasant had to perform for the production of cotton and other commodities of European consumption. Nor was it the multileveled hierarchy of supervision and surveillance from the Central bureaux to the provincial official mudir to the regional official mamur to the district official hakim al-khutt to the head of village shaykh al-balad to the local guards ghafir to the shops and fields of the fellah. Rather, it was that economy of penalties to be applied on each of the previous levels in case of failure to perform the required tasks. On failing to cultivate his field as required, the fellah was punished by being whipped 25 times with the kurbadj at the first time, 50 lashes at the second time after 3 days, and another 100 lashes after 3 more days. The negligence of shaykh al-balad to supervise the peasants was punished with chastising on the first offence, 200 lashes on the second, and 300 on the third. Hakim al-khutt himself was to be punished with a warning on the first offence and with 50 strokes on the cane on the second (40-41). The codification of such penalties reveals the fact that the structural violence of model housing was based on an economy of power, whose branding mark was physical violence in the most dehumanizing sense. Violence and physical humiliation were not the outer limit of disciplinary practices distinguishing them from traditional technologies of power, as was the case in Europe, rather they were fully integrated in the political economy of disciplinary mechanisms as an economic and political asset to be appropriated and capitalized upon. Differently said, whereas discipline in Europe threw off its costly physical weight, imported discipline invested structural violence that developed into a modus operandi of discipline rather than an anomaly or a malfunction of the modern power machine. From hence, modernization as an act of disciplining was imprinted by brutal eradication and violent extermination. The full assimilation of physical violence in the political economy of discipline reveals itself plainly in the famous practice of corve as another instance of uprooting the peasants from their world. The major public works aimed at the construction of a modern irrigation system were, according to Clot Bey, 32 canals (tira) were built, ten djisr or dykes, including one that was 6 meters wide and 2 meters high going from Djabal al-Silsila to the Mediterranean on the either side of the Nile, forty-one dams and barrages. Carrying out such public works and their upkeep in terms of cleaning the canals, shoring their banks, and tending to the dykes required a tremendous manpower, which was provided by putting corve in practice. Orders were sent yearly to demand the local administration to provide the assumed manpower in order to shore up the dykes and clean and dredge the canals before the flood water arrives. In one such circular, the Pasha threatened all his nuzzar in Upper Egypt and ordered 24,000 men to be summoned, he warned the local officials against disregarding this obligation, if you say it upsets the fellahin then I say a boy does not willingly go to school but is forced by his parents until he grows older and knows the value of learning, so 108

driving all the men to dykes and canals is difficult for them but is necessary. In case the fellahin showed any signs of resistance or even unwillingness to be driven, the nuzzar must summon soldiers from the governorand force the fellahin out (qaran wa djabran). Although a circular regarding work on the Mahmudiyya Canal in 1819 reported that corve was not unpaid forced labor, rather the workers were paid wages, fed soup morning and evening, and even given meat every few days, foreign observers accused Muhammad Ali of working his people without payment. Corve labor did not only involve the physical abuse of the peasant but also the disruption of his life, because he was driven away from his village and torn from his wife and children, who had no other means of subsistence and suffered therefore from want and deprivation (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:150-51). Exploitation of the fellahin was a common practice as attested by the plenty of complaints against government officials ranging from dual taxation, to abuse of authority, to taking bribes. For instance, the governor of Buhaira province reported that to restore the village ruined by a disastrous flood its peasants asked the government official for help in return for mal on the harvest, yet the official demanded the mal twice from this same village. It was also complained that some government officials, cavalry commanders, and infantry soldiers exploited the fellahin through coercive levies and sometimes through sharing their crops. The government also lent the peasants funds to carry out sowing in cases of disasters, and the money lent was deducted from the price of the crops sold to the government. Lending the fellahin money arose out of dire necessity and out of a desire to see that no one other than the government exploited the fellahin (110-11). Structural violence as a modus operandi of modern disciplinary mechanisms also materialized in the methods followed to recruit the fellahin in the new army. The orders of the Pasha defined for each province governor the number of peasants to be gathered from his district in order to provide the imperial army with its human raw material. Such orders were passed to the lower levels of local administration till it reached the village chiefs and local guards, who had to carry out the obligation of raiding the villages in a sudden act so that its inhabitants would only be aware of their sons driven in shackles to the provincial capital. It was demanded that the majority of the hunted peasants should not be old, sick, crippled, or deformed, rather they should be young, healthy, and strong. Recruitment did not follow a system of collection, records of recruits, or any standard procedures, rather it was brutal force that threw the villagers in the grip of the army. Thus, the usage of shackles was inevitably needed to prevent the hunted peasants from escaping on the way to the selection and deportation centers in the provinces (Al-Surudjy, 1967:61). The violence of such methods exceeded all limits to the extent that the Pasha himself sent orders to substitute such brutality by mobilizing the local preachers to propagate among the peasants that such recruitment was done for the defense and triumph of Islam. The Ulemma of the villages were asked to remind the Muslims that when the French occupied Egypt, the Copts responded swiftly to the appeal of their co-religionists to join the French army. However, such arguments convinced few among the recruits or the rest of the peasants. At first, the recruits returned home after three years of service with a stamped certificate that protected them from recruitment raids. Yet, when the demand for new recruits outnumbered the supply of hunted peasants by dint of the 109

Pashas expansionist military policies, neither the length of service nor the certificate was respected. More than this, the French experts who aided the Pasha in founding his modern army provided him with the model of recruitment methods applied in France after and before Napoleon by the racoleurs, who received a fee for every man they dragooned into the army. Those who attempted to escape were chased and forcibly dragged back and the punishments inflicted upon them ranged from branding with iron to death. The same system was adopted in Egypt; orders were issued to punish the family of the recruit who escaped and taking another member of his family in his stead, if none was available, then another peasant was taken and the village chief was punished for allowing this to happen and so was the person who sheltered the deserter. On failing to escape from the army and the recruitment raids, the fellahin resorted to maiming themselves by putting a rats bane in their eyes, drawing out the front teeth so they could not bite the bullet, cutting off the first joint of the index finger so they could not pull the trigger, or blowing off a toe so they could not march (Lutfi AlSayyid, 1994:128-29). Such acts of resistance were not only punishable by imprisonment, lashes with the kurbadj, and death, but most unfortunately proved to be useless, as they did not exempt the villagers from recruitment. For Muhammad Ali gave orders to admit the maimed and deformed in the ranks of the army and lumped them together in one of the armys companies (Al-Surudjy, 1967:60). The correspondence of Muhammad Ali with his subordinates sheds light on the nature of the relationship between the different parts of the administration machinery. In the words of Foucault, it is an apparatus that circulates distrust.the perfected form of surveillance [that] consists of a summation of malveillance (Foucault, 1981:158). In a letter to mamur aldiwan, he classified his entourage as well as the inhabitants of the country into three categories: the first group cares only for personal benefits and comforts; the second does not distinguish the good from the bad by virtue of its excessive brutality; and the last leads the life of animals and can think of nothing better than idle talk. For sure, the first two categories fitted his protgs and top executives of the bureaucracy, while the third of animals referred beyond doubt to the native population. Such an attitude explains the way the Pasha dealt with his subordinates, he neither trusted his men nor respected most of them. He set them to check each others work and even to spy on one another, and the reports that reached his ears were seldom favorable or reassuring. More than this, he bombarded them regularly with threats and homilies to keep them on the right path, not to mention his intervention in the slightest details of their work. Most of the men of administration earned his favorite expressions epithet donkey or pig son of pig (khanzir ibn khanzir), and the bureaucrats were often threatened with being hurled into the sea or river, buried alive, beheaded, impaled, whipped, or having the hairs of their beards plucked out one by one. The most famous form of warning was to be beaten by the nabut until the waist was broken (yiksar wistak), a colloquial expression meaning beaten within an inch of ones life. Although such threats of bodily harm fell only upon the lowest level of administration village chiefs and local guards, they were an effective technique that kept all subordinates alert through inspiring fear of the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent Pasha (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:112-13 & 29). 110

It is against this background of integrating structural violence in the political economy of power that the disciplinary reforms were silhouetted; by dint of this specific political economy the disciplining act acquired its salient features in the non-European context. The benefits of violence in the form of whipping or torture was expressed by Major Newman on recounting that the sudden suppression of the kurbash among a people long accustomed to the use of whip increased, for the moment, the difficulties of governing the country. It was regarded as a sign of Government weakness (Newman, 1928:145). Not withstanding such usefulness, violence has undermined disciplinary reforms through adding physical costs to the practice of power that shattered the indissoluble bond of utility-subjection and as such dealt a severe blow to the political economy of power in terms of costs and benefits. After all, discipline as a new technology of power was attuned to reduce its economic and political cost by increasing its effectiveness and by multiplying its circuits (Foucault, 1997-b: 89). Added to this, the raison d tre of the physical-oriented, but non-corporal disciplinary reforms was not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body [emphasis added] (82). Subjection (creating subjectivities on the individual and collective levels) as the main mechanism of discipline took place only through the deep insertion of power into the social body. Violent methods, which entered into direct sensual contact with the body of the ruled, damaged completely the insertion of power into the body (passing the power relation to the other side that interjects it and plays both roles) through eroticizing the body of the ruled and allowing for a reversal of the power relationship5. Let me now expose how violence unbalanced completely the political economy of power, blocked the insertion of power relations (creating subjectivities), and as a consequence branded the disciplining-modernizing act with its unmistakable scars. From the angle of subjection, some historians recounted five major peasant revolts taking place during the reign of Muhammad Ali, others even raised the figure to seven revolts. Such insurrections took place in 1812, 1820-1, 1822-3, 1824 in Minufiyya and Qusair, and in 1846. All these insurrections were clear examples of resistance to government policies of various kinds: to conscription, to corve, to the new tax, the firda, imposed in 1822, to an increase of land taxes that went up to 22 per cent. It was reported that in 1812 a series of uprisings broke out in Upper Egypt against tax collectors and the troops sent to back them. The government reaction was extremely harsh for not only were acts of insubordination quelled, but also several villages were burnt down and their inhabitants slaughtered. The population was inhumanly handled because the uprisings were in fact an attempted revolt against Muhammad Ali on the assumption of an imminent return to power of the mamluks. In the region of Said, revolts began with one in 1820 under Shaikh Ahmad al-Salah, whose followers reached allegedly 40,000 men. He became so conceited that he appointed his followers as governors and took over government stores and funds. However, an army sent to the region ended the rebellion with the first shot. A year later, another Ahmad surnamed al-Mahdi instigated a similar revolt near Luxor in protest against the innovations introduced by Muhammad Ali. The followers of al-Mahdi mounted to 3000 and were convinced that the Prophet and the angels would be 111

fighting with them and no bullets or cannon balls can hit them. The following year, a third Ahmad stirred up the local population in a similar movement on refusing to pay taxes upon his goods imported at Qusair on his way back from Mecca. Ahmad went to Qina, Isna, and Farshut to mobilize the peasants immensely dissatisfied with conscription in the Pashas army. In the Delta region, an insurrection in 1823 was provoked by the high exaction of the Pashas agents and by military conscription. In 1846, entire villages rose in armed revolt against the officers of the government and in opposition to forced labor. It was noted that the absence of Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim in Istanbul encouraged certain regions to revolt, and even some village chiefs refused publicly to pay customary taxes to the government or to send conscripts to the army and public works. In many instances, government executives were beaten off from the village by force or by intimidation. The peasants broke into acts of violence when their rights were infringed, when they were too shamelessly exploited, or when the government grip became too tight. Such periodic outbreaks of violence manifested the peasants resentment of the government and its policies as well as their discontent with tax collectors and local authority figures. Alongside open revolts, acts of passive resistance did take place assuming the form of rural disorder, brigandage, piracy, crop burning, and crop sabotage. Realizing that the prodigious results and the means employed to found his system raised resentment and discontent, the Pashas feared that his work, once attacked, will find many hands to demolish it, and willcollapse in a little while; such fears were not really unfounded (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:132-36). From the angle of utility, the different forms of maiming and deformation the peasants applied to themselves to escape the army recruitment could be regarded as an act of insubordination or even negative resistance against subjection techniques imposed by the government. However, such acts of passive resistance taking as their battlefield the same points of the body disciplinary mechanisms sought to exploit and render docile could be regarded all the more as offensives against the disciplinary machinery by sabotaging those bodily forces and aptitudes it needed to co-opt for balancing its political economy. It is on this level that the decision of Muhammad Ali to admit the maimed and amputated to the army and form out of them a whole company could be understood as flanking such acts of resistance through recapturing these bodily energies and forces secreted by the peasants, and as such redressing the unbalanced political economy of power (Mitchell, 1989:42). Passive resistance in response to government exploitation that existed in all peasant societies compensated the fellah for his inability to revolt for fear of the coercive power of the government. Forms of passive resistance comprised cheating the land lord, pilfering some of the crops, slowing down work, sabotaging crops. Passive resistance had its own economic rationality, as the fellah aimed to minimize the risk of disaster rather than to maximize his average return, and his final test is what is left to him not what is taken by the state. This explains why passive resistance outdid acts of organized violence (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:122). Absconding was the most salient method of resistance to the extent that in the 1840s the government mobilized its troops to gather up peasants not in their place of origin and return them forcibly to their native villages. In a government circular issued in 1844 concerning the comfort, happiness, and prosperity of the Egyptian population, notice was made that punishment by death 112

awaited anyone harboring peasants who had absconded from their villages. A description was given of a certain Suliman Badruddin who on giving shelter to absconders was sent to the gibbets in the Public market. Despite countermeasures of punishing the absconder and his accomplices as well as taking members of his family in his stead, peasants continued deserting their lands to avoid government policies of conscription and exploitation. Public hangings failed to inspire fear or even to deter entire populations from fleeing their lands and villages (Mitchell, 1989:42-3). The centrality of structural violence in governmentality dealt the disciplinary reforms a severe blow, since it sabotaged the non-corporal insertion of power in the social body and ruined the political economy of power in terms of costs and benefits. More gravely, disciplinary mechanisms were voided from any economic rationality, functional significance, or logical meaning; they only targeted creating the mere appearance of order. This pointlessness of disciplinary reforms is exactly what Milner referred to on condemning the besetting sin of Orientals, when attempting to copy European institutions, that they do so without a sufficient regard to the difference of conditions (Milner, 1899:266). The shallowness of disciplinary mechanisms in the host-soil can explain the ease, with which major reforms were displaced and simply called off. That is, their irregular fluctuation. The regional and central system of surveillance and inspection that began the regimentation of rural Egypt in the mid 1820s was replaced by another method in the 1840s, which was to place groups of villages under the custody of individual officials. The organization of villages as personal estates allowed model housing to be a common feature of these new estates. Although the system of model housing led to the demolition of the wretched houses formerly piled together without a plan, such plans of conjuring a neutral surface or space in rural Egypt have not survived. Plans for the reconstruction of villages in Algeria outlived their Egyptian counterparts, because they were more directly connected with attaining military domination (Mitchell, 1989:42-45). Taking as a pretext the incident of looting shops, stores, and houses in Cairo by the troops returning from the Hidjaz campaign, Muhammad Ali issued his orders to replace these troops by a modernized army. The Albanian soldiers dissatisfaction with the strict discipline of the new army tried to assassinate the Pasha who was able to escape in secret by virtue of a timely warning. Since the Ottomans placed an embargo on sending new Mamluks to Egypt because of their suspicion of the Walis intents, the latter directed his attention to the Sudan, whose slaves will be the soldiers of the new army. Although some of the regiments from the Sudan became a part of the new army, the attempt to create an army out of slaves failed. On recruiting the Maghribi troops to the army, the Pasha gave strict orders not to take any fellah who might mingle among the Maghribis. Only necessity forced the Pasha to recruit the peasants in order to help the main army in the Sudan (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1994:127). The organization of the Police has been the battle-field of conflicting principles. Everything about them, down to their uniforms, has been changed, and changed and changed again. At first, General Valentine Baker organized the police into two separate bodies, the larger was semi-military Gendarmerie and the smaller was a less important police force. During Mr. Lloyds presiding over the Police, he changed the organization entirely and got rid of the Gendarmerie in order to substitute a small and well113

paid volunteer force for the conscripts of whom the Police originally consisted. However, such an attempt to obtain volunteers was a complete failure, because the Turks who were enlisted by Mr. Lloyd turned out useless and unruly, and were disbanded after his departure (Milner, 1899:270-71). The failure of disciplinary reforms to reach their assigned objectives due to structural factors led to the inflation of disciplinary mechanisms and their crisscrossing each other. The stretching of disciplinary methods to cover the surface of the whole society was not the gradual and profound infiltration of the social body by disciplinary norms and institutions. Rather, it was the inflation or tumor of disciplinary faades that ran in different directions, and such dashed and neutralized the effects of one other. As a consequence, every new round of disciplining had to cut down the massive tumor of these institutions in order to clean the ground for creating new ones. This was the logic of the British rejuvenation of the disciplinary machinery constructed by Muhammad Ali and his successors. Such rejuvenation comprised repairing the form and function of the machines parts through eliminating the elements causing the machines malfunction in order to raise its performance efficiency. For instance the army troops were drastically reduced after the British occupation to 6000 men, which on Milners account were no great tax on a population of 6 million. The British reforms of the army were directed to knocking the fellah into fair military shape or to create that very complicated piece of machinery, a fully organized army. Having laid the foundations of a modern army, the British disciplinary masters decided to increase its numbers to cope with new circumstances, the fixed number of 6000 soldiers was almost doubled 12,902 officers and men. Such figures must be compared with those of Muhammad Alis army to conclude that the British masters cut down the mushrooming troops of the Pasha to re-create a welldisciplined and professional army (144 & 155). The disciplinary tumor was nowhere more manifest than in the branch of government known as justice. In the words of Milner, there is not one judicial system in Egypt, but four. There were the religious courts applying the Islamic laws of Sharia concerning the personal affairs of Muslims. The system of Mixed Courts dealt with civil interactions between the foreigners of different nationalities or between them and the natives. The jurisdiction of this system was slightly extended to deal in a small degree with criminal offences of foreigners. The system of consular courts took care of the main body of foreign crime. Finally, the system of Native courts dealt with civil actions and crimes of the natives. Dealing with the multi-headed judicial system proved to be extremely difficult for the British masters, for instance the system of Mixed Tribunals in bad need of profound modifications required the consent of the fourteen Powers that established such courts. The Consular Courts full of scandals could only be touched either through extending the criminal jurisdiction of Mixed Tribunals or improving the Native Courts. Only the Native Courts remained for the British disciplinary masters to reform (264-65). The complexity of the situation even in this narrow judicial niche made the British reforms nothing more than ameliorating means to guarantee to a limited extent the regular functioning of the judiciary machine. For instance, the number of judges was reduced to five for a Court of First Instance and eight for a Court of Appeal (267). A Committee of Judicial Control was established not to interfere with particular cases or sentences, but it aimed chiefly at maintaining, by vigilant 114

supervision, general purity of decision and sound interpretation of law. The committee visited the different tribunals to examine their files and make sure that arrears should not accumulate and that courthouses were supplied with good law libraries (Colvin, 1906:228-29). Amputating the disciplinary tumor through establishing a new disciplinary frame was carried out on a massive scale by Nasser, whose policies of social and political engineering (nationalization and central planning) succeeded in dismantling the land aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie. Not to mention the repeated attempts to integrate the different political forces in the one-party system, which confiscated the multiplicity of political parties under the rule of the monarchy, even through destruction by means of torture. Such features of disciplinary reforms lost the modernization project any coherent object-oriented policies. The shallowness and aimlessness of modernizing materialized in the field of schooling, where new schools were built without any rational account of the societys needs and the quality of the educational services they provide. Rather, the increase in the number of new schools, which was celebrated as a sign of a new Renaissance, was only matched by the ever-declining qualities of its teachers, students, and syllabuses. The same occurred in the field of industrialization, where the import-substitution orientation effected a sprouting of industries and factories sacrificing the most basic principles of economic rationality only to build up a modernizing faade for military dictatorships (Ghalioun, 1992:7). The ever-mushrooming disciplinary techniques criss-crossing and destabilizing one another by virtue of their fluctuation, reversibility, and superficiality did not only destroy the political economy of power but also aborted the process of subjection. As a result, the unified subject, supposed to be the product of investing the body in the modern power machines as well as of their coordination and harmony, was replaced by an endless multiplicity of divided subjectivities due to the complexity of conflictual disciplinary dispositions, which racked the body and crushed its aptitudes.

The second scene: Structural duality

Space and architecture are not utopian designs; rather they reflect and channel power relations. From the 18th century, a specific type of architecture developed which was involved in problems of health and population and corresponded to the need to use the disposition of space for economic and political ends. This architectures purpose was no longer to demonstrate or exhibit but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control; an architecture that makes its inmates docile and knowable. The undifferentiated spaces gave way to the specified and functional space that masters the calculation of openings and of empty and filled chambers, and the passages and the transparencies. The distribution of individuals on cells to be easily controlled and supervised and thus creating a coercive space was the salient feature of the 18th century Europe. This model spread into the existing social institutions, colonized them from within, and finally transformed them to disciplinary spaces. The disciplinary architecture secreted control machinery that created around men an apparatus of observation, recording, and training. The circular architecture of the Panopticon made 115

possible for a single gaze or a perfect eye to establish a central point for both the source of light that illuminates everything and the locus of knowledge about everything (Foucault, 1981:148-9 & Foucault, 1997-b: 172-5). Power creates complex spaces that are at the same time architectural, functional, and hierarchical. These spaces provide fixed positions and permit circulation. They are mixed spaces: real as they govern the disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture; and ideal as they are projected over the arrangement of characterizations, assessments, and hierarchies6. Ranking individualizes bodies by a location that gives them no fixed position, but distributes and circulates them in a network of relations (Foucault, 1997b:141-8). Viewed from this angle, the European societies are much less Greek than they believe, as their major architectural model is not the theater. After substituting religion for the state, they offer the first example of the civilisation de la surveillance compared to the civilisation du spectacle. They are neither in the amphitheater, nor on the stage, but [caught] in the panoptic machine...[which they] are part of (Foucault, 1989:44 & Foucault, 1997-b: 217). Modernizers in Muslim countries were not unaware of the role that politics of space (real or ideal) as a macro-technique of power plays in creating docile and knowable bodies. The architecture of schools, factories, hospitals, and villages played the same role of permitting an internal, articulated, and detailed control. Witness the organization of space in both the model house of the 1820s and the model school copying the Lancaster example. However, modern forms of architecture transplanted in an alien soil that has its own architectural forms and designs also had the psychological purpose of demonstrating or exhibiting the greatness of the transferred power techniques, which what the modern project was all about. The scrupulous care for modern architecture did not in fact cover up the functioning of micro-techniques within its space rather it disguised their malfunctioning. The psychological effect modern architecture was designed to provide was one of the main factors that aborted the politics of space tout ensemble. On discussing the aesthetic aspect of modern Cairo, French experts insisted on the exclusion of the older part of the city, because there could be no organization of the older part. It was argued, The Arab town must be reserved to show future generations what the former city of the Caliphs was like, before there was built alongside it an important cosmopolitan colony completely separate from the native quarterThere are two Cairos, the modern, infinitely the more attractive one, and the old, which seems destined to prolong its agony and not to revive, being unable to struggle against progress and its inevitable consequences. One is the Cairo of artists, the other of hygienists. However, the preservation of the old city was advocated after the citys inhabitants increased by 70% in the first 25 years of colonial rule due to the migration of the poor from rural towns and villages to Cairo. There was also an internal movement in Cairo itself because the Europeanization of certain quarters pushed the poor population to the crowded streets of what will be later named the old city. The rapid growth of poor classes in slums of the worst type and the packing together of families in large numbers in the byways and backstreets of such suburbs rendered such places the exact counterpart of the modern city. Mitchell argues that under such circumstances the old city and the Oriental were creations of that order of the colonial city and was required to maintain the latters existence. The colonial order depended 116

upon at once creating and excluding its own opposite. Or, the modern identity of the new city is contingent upon the exclusion of its opposite. To identify itself as the locus of order, reason, cleanliness and civilization, the modern city had to project outwardly its counterimage that is disordered, irrational, dirty, and barbarian. The city requires this outside in order to present itself, in order to constitute its singular, uncorrupted identity (Mitchell, 1989:163-65). The main argument here is that modern politics of space (real establishing a material order of things as in architectural forms, or imagined space establishing a psychological hierarchy as in chains of commands) created a structural ambiguity through locating its limit within itself rather than on its outskirts. Put it differently, at the heart of modern space (real or imagined) lies a gap between an outside that is depended upon by means of excluding it (though in fact it lies inside) and an inside that identifies and dominates by means of being imposed at the center (though in fact it lies outside). It is the open confrontation between those two uneven levels that damages the role of politics of space in creating docile and knowable subjects. Rather, the political paradox it represents projects itself from the spatial domain into that of subjectivity (creating subjects through insertion of power relations). In the previous scene, the main theme was how structural violence that plagued microtechniques of power sabotaged its political economy and subjection mechanisms. As a result, the unified subjectivity that was supposed to result from the application of modern power mechanisms was substituted by a multiplicity of divided subjectivities. The main theme of this scene is to demonstrate how attempts to restructure the political space aborted the same process of subjection due to its mechanisms of exclusion and self-identification with the mirror image of the excluded. Therefore, politics of space always created a structural duality of two unbalanced levels of reality, which projected itself from the spatial domain to that of subjection. The two scenes abet each other to seize the environment responsible for cultural schizophrenia as an existential phenomenon. Let me now illustrate how seclusion-oriented politics of space was responsible for creating the fore-mentioned structural duality. The construction and stretching of model houses in the countryside according to the plans of French engineers had the effect of highlighting the original houses of the peasants as wretched mass of huts piled together without plan. Such a contrast between the wretched huts and the neatly organized spaces of model houses provided the strongest factor in legitimizing the demolition of the peasants houses altogether and their substitution by model houses (Mitchell, 1989:44). Demolition was not however the only possible way to deal with the excluded part. Rather it was much more useful to besiege it and let it remain until it falls apart by itself in order to demonstrate to the future generations that the cities of the Caliphs were only destined to prolong in agony and not to revive. The inability of the excluded part to struggle against the historical forces of progress or to arrest the consequences of such changes would be the best way to legitimize modern reforms. Nowhere was that clear than in the re-construction of the urban space in Cairo as well as other main cities like Alexandria and Tanta. The return of Ali Mubarak from Paris marks the appearance of the new politics of space on a large scale, for there followed the greatest period of construction and demolition in the city since the growth of Mamluk Cairo in 117

1300s. The whole space lying between Cairos northern and western edges and its gateway from Alexandria witnessed a new structure laid out with plots, which were made available for anyone wishing to construct a building with a European faade. The reconstruction of the Cairos space comprised the leveling of waste land around the city, the opening up of main streets and new arteries, the creation of squares and open places, the planting of trees, the surfacing of roads, the construction of drains, and regular cleaning and watering. Such measure of spatial ordering could not have left the existing city intact; rather it required the removal of certain human agglomerations. For instance, in order that the Boulevard Muhammad Ali, which was two kilometers long, would plough diagonally through the old city, four hundred large houses, three hundred smaller ones, and a great number of mosques, mills, bakeries, and bath-houses had to be destroyed completely or to be halved and left standing like dolls houses with no outer wall. The scene resembled a city recently bombarded; houses in all stages of dilapidation, though still inhabited, giving most odd views of domestic interiors, frowning down upon you. The politics of space that occurred in Cairo was also a political hygiene for the dirty slums and narrow streets were considered havens of crime and disease. Contagion as the theory explaining the transmission of diseases implied not only the elimination of the sites from which the foul vapors were given off, such as cemeteriesas well as sewers, cess pools and all places of rottenness and decomposition but also the demolition of houses to allow the unobstructed passage of air and light. Simultaneously, open and well-lit streets and avenues embodied the principle of visibility and inspection, which made the dark interior easier to police and control (64-7). Following the same principles of political hygiene, the British disciplinary masters implemented their own plans of spatial re-ordering of the urban space. Mr. Clifford, Lloyd who founded the department of public health as a branch of the Ministry of Interior, took it on himself to remedy one of the greatest scandals of Egypt, that is, the grossly insanitary condition of the town and villages. The insanitary condition is summarized in the fact that the whole business of providing for the populations health is thrown on the shoulders of the government. Apart from the European hospitals and doctors, there were no hospitals, doctors, nurses, dispensaries, or sanitary institution of any kind that was not supplied by the Government; that extended beyond its capabilities to supply all these things for six million with only E 90,000 each year. Moreover, the towns and villages were filthy, and the canals, which are the only sources of water-supply to the bulk of the population, are subject to every kind of population. Birkas or stagnant swamps lying in the neighborhood of many inhabitants and exhaling miasma are used for drinking. At the center of the grossly insanitary condition plaguing the country lied the Mosques, which are probably the principal offenders against those laws [of health]. More often than not, the mosques are the centers of infection and of poisoning the drinking water through draining into the Canals. Nevertheless, such a matter must be handled with great delicacy, because any interference with the mosques might easily excite a fanatical opposition, which would stand seriously in the way of all sanitary reform. The British disciplinary masters laid their hopes on future generations of the natives to undertake such sanitary reforms rather than raising antagonism between the modern measures and the excluded part by British or foreign intervention (Milner, 1899:292-96). 118

The same logic of leaving to future generations of the natives the task of demolishing what modern politics of space kept untouched guided the British policy towards the system of Endowments (al-awqaf). In 1884, an order was issued to abolish the niara (ministry) of alawqaf and re-establish the public diwan of al-awqaf as an administrative entity independent of the foreign-dominated ministries so as not to arouse religious antagonism. After all, al-awaqf foundations were responsible for financing the majority of Islamic institutions in the fields of education, social activities, worshipping like Al-Azhar, the Islamic schools, the holy shrines in Hijaz, and other domains whose domination by the British as non-Muslims would raise feelings of religious resentment. However, the British followed a double-fold policy concerning al-awqaf. On the one hand, in contrast to the reforms of military troops, prisons, hospitals, and schools, they launched no serious attempt to reform the disorder and malfunctions of the system under the pretext of not interfering in a sensitive religious domain. On the other, they shelled the system of al-awqaf with severe criticism for its chaos and corruption and strove to dominate it through its integration in the state-dominated bureaucracy (Ghanim, 1998:397). This double-fold policy meant preserving the decadent status quo of alawqaf foundations for future generations (as debris of the city of the Caliphs) and letting them fall into agony and not to revive by virtue of the inevitable forces of historical progress. It was the future generations of natives who were to be the agents of historical progress dealing alawqaf system a coup de grce and dismantled its foundations totally. Ghanim recounts in details four steps that the Nasserist regime took on the way of demolishing al-awaqf. Firstly, in September 1952, a large portion of al-awaqf institutions dedicated to the financial support of private purposes were completely dissolved and its revenues and assets constituted the backbone of the socialist land reform. Secondly, in May 1953 the public-oriented waqf foundations were taken over by the government that sought to dominate their administration by integrating them in the bureaucratic apparatus of the government, which lead to the exploitation of waqf revenues by the government to finance its own social and health-care projects and add to its own prestige rather than their investment in the services al-awqaf were designed to provide. Thirdly, al-awqafs infrastructure was completely dismantled through allocating its resources to finance the governments projects of industrialization, housing, establishing sport clubs, and military faculty facilities; not to mention that al-awqaf surrendered its schools, hospitals, and commercial enterprises to the public sector to the extent that by the beginning of the 1960s the ministry of awqaf was without any awqaf or revenues. Fourthly, the Christian awqaf were favorably treated since they were never confiscated or nationalized, rather they were delivered to the Orthodox Church and were run by The Coptic Awqaf institution independent of any government intervention (For more details, view Ghanim 1998:460-85). Structural duality resulting from the application of space politics is nowhere better incarnated than in the education system, whose image represents in fact the face of the existing Egyptian society. In 1849, as Abbas I. succeeded his grandfather in power, he abolished all government instruction. A proposal for reviving national schools on the Lancaster model was presented to Said Pasha (the successor of Abbas I), but it met no luck. It was only five years after Ismail came to power in 1863 that a comprehensive plan for 119

institutions of elementary instruction throughout the whole country was projected and became known as the Organic Law. The order and discipline of modern schooling were to be the hallmark and the method of a new form of political power. It is actually a sophisticated method of power that works on an entire population one-by-one; in the words of Ismail: We, the masters, should seize on our subjects in early youth. We shall change the tastes and habits of the whole population. We shall build up again from the very foundations and teach the people to live a frugal, innocent, busy life after the pattern of our laws. The Organic Law described in details the subjects to be taught in every school, who were supposed to teach them, those who administered the education process, the text books to be used, the time-table of instruction, the uniform to be worn by the students, the plan of buildings, the layout of the classroom and its furniture, the registration of students, etcThe Organic Law determined in details everything that related to learning as a major realm in which the state apparatus was deeply involved to exist and build relations of power. It is quite crucial to mention that the distribution of schools throughout the country reflected the hierarchy of the administrative apparatus. For instance, elementary schools were to be classified according to their size which corresponds to the size of the village of town; every village with a population of 2000 to 5000 was to have a third-class elementary school (1 teacher and 40 pupils), a town, whose inhabitants are between 5000 and 10000, was to have a second-class elementary school (2 teachers and 2 classes), every large town was to have a first-class school, every provincial capital was to have a secondary school, and in Cairo the highest schools were located. The schools were precisely distributed according to their size and to cover the whole country to the extent it was claimed that the separate schoolrooms distributed all over the country, regulated by the organic law, would form a whole by their coordination. The rank-ordering of schools corresponded to the pyramid of social classes; primary schools were offered for all children rich and poor all alike, secondary education was of a higher status than primary, thus it was less spread among the people, higher education was for members of the political elite, who possessed power, wealth, and social status. From inside, the schools had the same sort of spatial order as decreed by the written regulations and constructed in desks, benches, and walls. Thus, the classrooms had identical lay out and furniture. From outside, the buildings of a school were put in a geometrical relation with one another to have the same appearance of order. The government school in Cairo wasdescribed as follows: around a large courtyard stand four main buildings. The largest, at the rear, is for the classrooms; the one on the right, for kitchens and refectories; the one on the left, for the infirmary and the wash-house; the remaining one, which faces onto the street, contains the dormitories. The geometric pattern was copied in the primary schools that were built afterwards in Alexandria, Benha, and Asyut. More than this, the construction of new schools at Giza (1880), Shibin al-Kum and Damanhur (1883), Suez and Fayyum (1888), and Isna (1890) followed plans of similar sorts rankordered according to the correct passage of air and light. The same regularity dominated the division of interior space of school buildings used for eating and sleeping. In the refectory there are seventeen tables, with thirty places to each table. In the dormitories the beds were placed at intervals of one to every 21 cubic meters of respirable air. Commenting on what was actually taking place by dint of such procedures, Mitchell stressed that it was an attempt 120

to construct an order that restructured the whole political space just like the order of streets, gardens, and quarters that reshuffled the physical space through stretching a surface that can be partitioned and marked out into functional sites, where individuals are distributed. Furthermore, the appearance of order through geometric patterns with their regularity and uniformity disguise the measures of space politics that shuffled, stretched, divided, and distributed quietly and incessantly. For the act of distributing and fixing in places on being repeated in the same sequence and rhythm would create the impression that the cycles and sequences are givens rather than products of a certain politics of space that established them. As Mitchell put it, the appearance of order means the disappearance of power. Power is to operate more and more in a manner that is slow, uninterrupted and without external manifestation (Mitchell, 1989:76-9). The measures of establishing a modern system of education will effect a structural duality through excluding and establishing the original system of education as its mirrorimage traditional, disorganized, and irrational. It is in these terms that the old style of learning at al-Azhar would be described by the Inspector-General: A thousand students of every age, of every colorscattered into groups, the diversity of costumes. The earmark of learning at al-Azhar was chaos and absence of order, for the teachers do nothing but sit at the pillars of the mosque giving lessons without bothering to record the absence or presence of students or to monitor their progress through different lessons. A writer described the students as moving from a professor to another and from a text to another without understanding anything of the comments and explanations their masters issued in a language completely archaic and nonunderstandable. The living conditions of al-Azhar students fell under heavy criticisms, since the lack of partition of spaces and fixation of individual in them led to constant noise and perpetual movement. Some are sleeping on their matssome eat, some study, some engage in argument, vendors move haphazardly among them selling water, bread, and fruit. Organization was completely missing and anarchy dominated the scene that quarrels and fights break suddenly and a master must interfere between the combatants and reestablish order through two or three blows of the whip. The teaching style of al-Azhar attracted most of the criticism as the apparent chaos and lack of discipline were attributed to the pedagogical methods that were in fact a technique of individual instruction. The instructor never gives a lesson to an entire class, but to a single student who goes up to the master, sits down beside him, recites what he has learnt, shows what he has written, receives a new task and returns to take his place among his fellow students (80-81). The politics of space implemented in the domain of education is crucially significant not only because it replicates the restructuring of the spatial order carried out in other areas of reform. Rather, by virtue of the created duality it offered an image of the existing sociopolitical reality stretched over the whole country. The question to be addressed is: what kind of reality was being created through the secluding politics of space? It was a virtual reality that existed in a no-where zone in the sense of a reversible game of representations or a double-personification play in which the actors were acting that they were acting and the audience was actually a set of actors. The traditional part was in fact an integral part of the modern city and a product of the reconstruction measures that excluded it from the sphere of 121

innovation, deformed it and made it appear as an anomaly that escaped historical evolution and thus is destined to undergo agony and decadence till it withers away. The modern part of the city was simply a disciplinary facade since its political economy was unbalanced and its power insertion mechanisms were sabotaged. Such a virtual reality was lightly touched upon by Mitchell on refuting the claim that original centers of learning like al-Azhar are designated as places of traditional education, since this is a misapprehension of the kind of practice sustaining the life of the Muslim community. It is to take a dominant practice of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, and project it back onto a world in which it did not exist. Similarly, the introduction of classrooms, timetables, benches and desks, and surveillance techniques was not the reform of so-called traditional schooling. Rather, schooling was the disembedding of learning centers from their socio-cultural context, as designated by the word sinaa7 meaning profession or craft, and establishing them as neutral spaces separate from life itself (85-6). It is this kind of reality lying no-where, in which an endlessly reversible game of representations that was the product of applying the modern politics of space.

The Muslim Daseins nowhere reality

Notwithstanding the fashion of imperial boastfulness and colonial propaganda, Milners introductory chapter titled The Land of Paradox portrayed this lying-nowhere reality of ambiguity justifying Britains civilizational mission in Egypt. Although he started the first lines of his work by leaning on Herodotus singling out Egypt as pre-eminently the land of wonders, he assured that now it is a mere speck on the map.... it has dwindled into insignificance. The succession of different historical phases (glory and decadence) or religions (paganism, Christianity, and Islam) had not been able to change the main essence of the country. Egypt is still, like the Egypt of Herodotus, the chosen home of what is strange and unexampled and paradoxical. Amidst the countless changes that this country went through, one attribute was untouched by change, Egypt...remains unalterably, eternally abnormal.... Paradox seems rooted in the soil. Thus, according to Milner, Egypts essence or reality from time immemorial till the present moment was an anomaly that escaped the rule and an abnormality that has to be corrected. Milners account of the paradoxical nature of the country is a ripe example of what Mitchell noticed that after establishing order (no matter how it looks like) power disappears or falls in oblivion (no matter how it was practiced). However, it is of no importance here to argue that such a paradoxical reality or essence that was Egypt only appeared in the 19th century as an incarnation of the structural duality of space (real and imagined) created by modern power mechanisms rather than being the pretext for their intervention and application. What is really important was the main features of this essentialized entity Egypt, because its earmarks will imprint those who are to identify themselves with it and therefore to be known as Egyptians. Let me scan swiftly the paradoxes listed by Milner. Nowhere in the world did the peasantrys life contain odd elements like the fellahin in Egypt. Nowhere do the contrast between East and West become so flagrant and with more grotesque results than in Egypt. And nowhere, surely nowhere is 122

civilized government carried under more incredible conditions. Milner continued recounting a long tale of peculiarities, some superficial and some essential that would be easy to a list of the anomalies, the intricacies, and the shams with which the Political system in Egypt...bristles. He assured that the strangeness of such incidents to modern observers was only matched by that of ancient Egyptian customs as they appeared to the astonished eye of the great Greek historian. Imagine the most docile population falling under the control of the most intolerant and fanatical religion. Imagine the stagnant population wrapped in their conservatism and stormed by European innovative spirit and restlessness. Imagine a country full of trouble-making foreigners whom the police cannot arrest except for petty crimes. Imagine a government carrying on its affairs in a foreign tongue, which is not the tongue of the countrys population. Imagine government decrees liable to being negated completely by courts of its own creation. Imagine the local police being instructed by the representative of a foreign state. Certainly, for Milner Egypt was this nowhere land and its reality was beyond the limits of human reason that one has to use exhaustively his powers of imagination to grasp it. Let me quote him at length in trying to make the last adjustments to his portray of the reality which is Egypt: Yes, imagine all these things, and then realize that they are no Mikado-like invention of a comic opera, no nightmare of some constitutional theorist with a disordered brain, but prosaic, solid fact an unvarnished picture of the political Egypt of to-day. And yet if one of the new extinct race of political philosophers, who used to amuse themselves with framing ideal politics, who had gone out of his mind, and if in that madness, with all his theories mixed up and all his principles topsy-turvy, he had evolved a model constitution, the result might have been something like this. It surely could not have been anything more apparently irrational, anything at first more incompatible with the most elementary kind of decent government, to say nothing of development and progress (Milner, 1899:1-5). To play on what was suggested to Foucault in his interview with geographers, the madman was discovered in the closed space of the asylum, the criminal in prison, the patient in the hospital, the student at school, the proletarian worker in the factory, and the citizen within the space of national confinement. In the last case, the geographical discourse of nationalism justified confinement within the frontiers of the national space an infinitely vaster and less solitary space whose inmate was the national man (Foucault, 1981:73). By this token, the Egyptian, as the inmate of this unbalanced political and moral space and whose self-consciousness is nothing but an awareness of a deep-seated inferiority complex, was discovered in Egypt, the land of paradox. By virtue of this, the Egyptian was located or even racked between the backward Orient and the progressive West, and to the defects of his character were attributed all the social and political illness plaguing Egypt with such paradoxes. The British occupation itself was taken as a proof of such defects of the Egyptian and his mental inferiority. Through the endless comparisons condemning him, the Egyptian was never born alone but was always an underling twin of the British, the French, or the Japanese. The political task that he had to undertake was to metamorphose himself, exterminate his inferior character and detrimental traits, and to wipe out the abnormality that he essentially is. Born with the original sin of being what he essentially is, the Egyptian was 123

the Untermensch, whose life task was to live in order to live no longer. Nowhere is this betokened other than in the colloquial word (baladi) that literally means my country and refers to anything connotes native or local, yet the usage of the term signifies vulgarity, ugliness, and meanness.


Chapter three: Anxiety in the face of Death

In 1958, the Algerian poet Jean Amrouch wrote:
From the Algerian was taken everything home and name language and holy scripture the wisdom that clears the way for humans Banished from every human home the Algerian was made an orphan lowered to be a prisoner of a today with no memories and no future (cited in Ben Jelloun, 2000:82).

Heideggers notion of death

For Heidegger, death is an existential structure that determines what Dasein is, that is, Being towards an end. Death is not to be understood as something present-at-hand that is not-yet outstanding (ausstehen), to which the Dasein conducts itself. Rather, it is the end standing before the Dasein (bevorstehen) like for instance a journey or a dispute that has to end at a certain point of time. As Dreyfus pointed out, Heidegger was extremely careful to demonstrate that what is existentially meant by death is not demise or annihilation that covers up the Daseins structural nothingness. But it is that Being-possibility (Seinsmglichkeit), where all other possibilities of Being are simply impossible; it is the possibility1 of the impossibility of any existence at all (Dreyfus, 1991:310-11). However, what is of interest to Heidegger is not death as an event in which life ends but how death is at work during life itself. Heideggers real theme was not basically death; rather it was human mortality (Sterblichkeit), which is exactly what Being towards an end meant (Hgli & Han, 2001:139). In this light, death is not a thing acquired by Dasein in the course of its Being and thus could be avoided or even reduced to a minimum, rather it is a Seinsmglichkeit the Dasein finds itself inevitably thrown in. Heidegger depicted five elements that make out the existential-ontological structure of death as Seinsmglichkeit. Death is the Daseins own most, non-relational, uttermost, and as such undefined, irremediable possibility2 (140). Having said this, let me attempt to flank Heideggers existential understanding of death from two interrelated sides. Firstly, Heidegger defended strongly the thesis of the irrepresentability of death (Unvertretbarkeit des Todes). Death, in contrast to other Seinsmglichkeiten, whose sharability is constitutive of Being-with-one-another, can not be experienced except by the one who is dying. In what seems to be a replay of a famous statement of Luther about death, Heidegger opined, no one can take from another his dying (Sterben), but one can certainly die for someone else (137-8). Secondly, in his comment on Heideggers conception of mood (Stimmung), Dreyfus assured that the term expressed a certain cultural sensibility akin to a specific culture or epoch. For instance, the fundamental mood at the beginning of Greek philosophy was wonder, whereas alarm predominates the 125

modern culture. Cultural sensibility is a mode of Befindlichkeit that is public and prior to mood in that in governs the range of available possibilities. This culturally-determined fundamental mood defines for our Dasein the where, when, and how dimensions of encountering other Seiends out of the world. Therefore, in cultures with longstanding sensibilities signs and symbols are perceived and handled in completely different manners; what is celebrated in one culture as a symbol pointing beyond itself could be seen in another as a detrimental threat to its whole existence (Dreyfus, 1991:169-72). Cultural sensibility and irrepresentability of death construct together that perspective occupied by a specific Dasein and determining for it the different dimensions of its encounter with and disclosure to the world. As such, it is not without right that death for the Muslim Dasein must mean something completely different from Heideggers depiction of it, and so would be its Grundbefindlichkeit that reveals this specific Daseins relation to death. This issue was masterfully pointed out and eloquently formulated by Leonard Binder, who fell upon it on applying Gadamers existential hermeneutics to Arab discourses of authenticity. Is the historicality of Islam related to its eternal truth in a manner inverse to that of Christianity? Heidegger could only be a Christian even though his teaching has widely influenced nonChristians. Only a Christian could write of being-toward-death as the ontic verity of Dasein. What is the Islamic equivalent? [emphasis added] (Binder, 1988:296). To answer this challenging question posed by Binder, one must first seek the guidance of historical situations, where the Muslim Dasein has addressed itself towards death or, in Heideggers words, has taken over the existential possibility of death. Commenting on the events of March 1968 in Tunisia, Foucault exclaims what on earthcan set in an individual the desire, the capacity, and the possibility for an absolute sacrifice without our being able tosuspect the slightest ambition or desire for power and profit (Foucault, 1991:133-7). In a similar situation but different location, the main scene of the Iranian revolutionary event, Foucault goes on explaining that in a religion that calls from time to time for commemoration and struggle, there is no fascination of the dead. Rather, the martyr occupies more space than victory. Death was not a preoccupying fear that one seeks to detach from life as Westerners do. For Muslims, death is not something that should be detached from life precisely, because it is the dead that attaches them to life. The dead take Muslims from their hands to relate them to the permanent duty of accomplishing justice. The dead talk to them about the right and the struggle to make that right triumph (Foucault, 1994:686). It was the ever-growing trees3 and branches of martyrdom that uprooted fear from the Iranians. There was an absence of fear and intensity of courage. The limits of their capabilities were transcended in the time of danger; in their revolution bare-handed Iranians surmounted the barriers of fear and danger posed by machine-guns continuously confronting all of them and massacring many of them (Foucault, 1988:220). Consequently, the life and death game was completely reversed; life under power was the fall in ultimate mortality, self-sacrifice to achieve liberation was the rise to utmost immortality. The Arabic word for Martyr (Shahid), which literally means the witness, exemplifies most accurately this reversibility of presence and absence or appearance and disappearance.


Now let me address myself to Binders question of what the Islamic equivalent might be. The existential structure of death for Muslims is much more complicated than that portrayed by Heidegger, despite the existence of similar elements. Death itself has a dual meaning that goes far beyond Heideggers basic differentiation between death (the possibility of impossibility of existence) and demise (structural nothingness of Dasein or its annihilation). Death owes its dual nature to the Muslim perception of bifurcated existence. The two levels of existence constitute the basic foundation of the religiosity classification of Muslim, faithful, hypocrite, and non-believer4. The duality of existence finds its strongest expression in the distinction between this life, whose Arabic word (al-dunya) denotes the lower or undignified Being, and the other life, whose Arabic word (al-akhira) signifies the last or the eternal. Certainly, the existential balance sways clearly to the side of the other life, in the words of the Quran What is the life of this world but play and amusement, but verily the home of the hereafter that is life indeed (Quran, 29:64). What is meant is that the finitude and pettiness of this lifes possibilities make the worldly existence something playful and almost non-real. By contrast, the infinitude of possibilities in the hereafter exalts it to the level of being real existence. This connotation is quite clear in the term al-akhira (the last life), which denotes infinitude since nothing comes after the last and therefore it is endless. In the previous verse, the word used to describe the home of the hereafter is not al-aya (which literally means life) but al-ayawan (which means the vitality of existence, that is, Seinknnen in Heideggers terms). The existential sway to the side of the hereafter does not result in severing the two levels of existence from one another as two separate and completely independent realms. Rather, it is in fact redressed by what might be called the normative-pragmatic logic of the loan that not merely links the two levels of existence, but actually embeds them in one another, so that the non-worldly level of existence, which does not yet exist, will be fully existing and actively at work in the worldly level of existence in the fashion of virtual reality. Who is he that will loan to God the beautiful loan, which God will double unto his credit and multiply many times? It is God that giveth want or plenty and to Him shall be your return (Quran, 2:245). The beautiful loan consists on one hand of a worldly investment taking place in this life, which is taking over actively the Seinknnen according to the principle of Istikhlaf, and on the other of cashing what has been previously invested in the life hereafter, which is crossing to the real and exalted level of existence. By virtue of this existential-normative investment, the non-real but existing level of Being will inevitably be the sole route to the real but not-yet existing level of Being, and as such both levels are irremediably bound together. Death is, in this sense, not the end of life or the possibility of existences impossibility that instigates anxiety as the Grundbefindlichkeit of Dasein, but it is the majestic gate that lies at the end of the limited worldly existence and opens on the infinitude of the higher and exalted Being. However, death proves to be more complicated to be considered a checkpoint or gateway between the two levels of existence. For the dual nature of existence will be reflected upon the perception of death or mortality as suggested to be Heideggers real theme. This bifold nature of death exemplifies itself in the differentiation between Istishhad (martyrdom) and Intiar (suicide). Martyrdom is not a desperate mood or a sporadic act of violence, nor is 127

it a cult of self-sacrifice. One does not go through martyrdom because he hates his worldly Being and yearns to escape to the one hereafter. Rather, it is a calculated risk to take over the Seinknnen as energetically and actively as possible in the sense of overstretching the range of possibilities available for Daseins Being to the extent of bordering or even transcending the limits of what is possible. Having mobilized all his potentials and energies behind a certain existential possibility, the Shahid succeeds in transcending the human barriers of fear (anxiety in the face of death in the literal sense) and as a result doubles his capacity to project his own Being even at the cost of his very physical existence. It is only in this sense that the Shahid continues to be present, as the Arabic word suggests, in spite of his physical nonexistence. Through surpassing the limits of his Being to attain a certain purpose, the Shahid has passed from one level of existence to the other through the gateway of death. Death is for him less painful than the prick of a needle. Although the Shahid is thrown in death as his own most, irremediable, indefinite, and uttermost possibility of existence, death is not the possibility of the impossibility of existence. Rather, it the possibility of opening new horizons and infinite ranges of possibilities of Being even at the cost of Daseins Being. By contrast, Intihar that literally means butchering or throat slitting is for the Muslim Dasein what Heidegger means by death. It is an existential act that denotes the failure of Dasein to take over his Seinknnen and to achieve his authentic existence. Faced with an existential vacuum, in which there were no more possibilities to be achieved, that is, the not-yet outstanding was totally eradicated, the Muntair has willingly refused to assume the responsibility of upholding his Seinknnen and preferred to escape the situation by demolishing in one stroke his Seinknnen in the most literal sense. According to the logic of the loan, the Muntair failed to make the worldly investment and even damaged his existential assets, and therefore he shall be unable to transcend his own Being and pass over the other level of existence. For him the gateway of death was turned into an impasse that imprisons him in the lower and undignified level of existence and denies him the right to reach the real existence. Suicide as the fall in absolute mortality is the Muslim version of the fall, yet it exceeds it in that it is not a fall in mortality but in repeatable annihilation that is incessantly painful. In conclusion, the Shahid linked the two levels of existence and through laying his Seinknnen at risk he made one the route for the other, and therefore for him there was no death but a continuous presence. Inversely, the Muntair separated both levels of existence, which not only prevented him from cashing his worldly investment (benefiting from his Seinknnen), but also made his Being (existential asset) appear to be most nonsensical and purposeless in the first place. Locked up in one level of existence, the lower and undignified, he was doomed to incessant and painful finitude. The separation of the two levels of existence is for the Muslim Dasein Intiar, incessant and painful perishing, or death in Heideggers sense of the word. If one will have to agree with Heidegger that the Muslim Dasein is also Being towards death, then death has to be understood in the previously mentioned double-sense. It is actually the main purpose of this chapter to depict the historical conjuncture, in which the Muslim Dasein became Being-towards-Intiar and anxiety in the face of Intiar, Heideggers death, became his Grundbefindlichkeit.


The existential structure of anxiety

The main task of the turath literature, whose main figures Binder tried partly to analyze, was to salvage, reaffirm, and appropriate historical elements that constitute the authenticity of the Muslim Dasein. The fervent search for existential authenticity and historical meaning underpinning that very rich, varied, and growing body of works motivates it to employ a wide range of interpretation methods in order to liberate Islamic thought from the rigid limits of traditional legalism. The problem, as Binder put it, was that the search for a historical authenticity of the Muslim Dasein would transform the whole issue to the juxtaposition of the contemporaneously authentic vs. the merely fallen in the Islamic experience(Binder, 1988:294-95). Regardless of the direction, in which the question of authenticity develops, what seems to be plausible is that raising such a question and providing it with different answers could only be taken as an unmistakable sign for acute existential anxiety. Tackling the question of authenticity on another level, John Donohue spanned a corpus of 246 articles selected from different Arab periodicals appearing between 1945 and 1970. He points to the fact that the increased concern for authenticityis accompanied by a similar increase in criticism of Western culture, which was seen as domineering, subversive, hypocritical, egoistic, materialistic, anti-Islamic, amoral, and unrealistic (Donhue, 1983:50-2). What seems to be quite odd is that inasmuch as the quest for authenticity represents a signal of existential anxiety, it had to be concerned only with the Being of the Muslim Dasein. What has the West5 even though it is regarded as a challenging cultural alternative, encroaching economic system, colonial or non-colonial hegemonic power, or even a purely theoretical category got to do with existential anxiety pertaining to a specific Daseins Being-in-theworld? In my opinion, the Khaldunian domination thesis cannot solely account for the interjection of the West in this Grundbefindlichkeit or to put it differently the relationship between domination and interjection was not direct and mechanical. Interjection was in fact the manifestation of a Western self-projection structure that held up its own mirror for the Muslim Dasein to see its face. The West is not that in the face of which of anxiety from whom the Muslim Dasein is petrified and horrified, nor is that about which of anxiety as this element is reserved for the Muslim Daseins own Being-in-the-world. Rather, the West stands right in the center of the anxiety structure, because its act of holding up the mirror for the Muslim Dasein circuits and links both structural elements of anxiety about which and in the face of which in an incessantly reflexive fashion. Differently said, the West set up the structure of the Muslim Daseins anxiety in the face of death and gave it a self-sustaining institutional form that continued to produce and reproduce this anxiety. To the Muslim Dasein, the encounter with the West will have to be necessarily disorienting, since it is not an encounter with the Other (the West in this case) but with ones own Being. The comprehensive nature and multi-sidedness of the project of Orientalism capacitated the West to architect the Muslim Daseins structure of anxiety and sustain its incessant circulation. I shall rely upon Edward Saids definition of Orientalism as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles (Said, 1978:2) to extract appropriate insights that 129

account, through instrumentalizing extensively the arguments forwarded in his master-piece Orientalism, for the way such a mode of discourse structured the Muslim Daseins anxiety in the face of death. Orientalism is premised upon the logic of exterior representation, since the Orientalist makes the Orient speak and renders its riddles plain and understandable for and to the West. Added to this, the Orientalist that represents the Orient insists on locating himself outside the Orient as a moral and existential fact. The exteriority of representation is governed by the truism that was simply and bluntly put by Marx in The Eighteenth of Brumaire: Sie knnen sich nicht vertreten, sie mssen vertreten werden. Self-evidently, it is the West through Orientalism as a discipline and the efforts of its scholars that will have to undertake the task of representation for itself and for the poor Orient as well. Representation does not indicate a natural act of depicting the Orient as such but a dramatic re-enactment of its presence; representation is an immediate re-presence (20). An accurate and practical instance of representation could be witnessed in Arthur Balfours lecture to the House of Commons on the problems facing England in Egypt. In his representation, the ruled population figured as a fallen race, whose great centuries were plagued by the sin of despotism that deprived it of any capacities for self-government. For him, the British rule represented a business to be carried out without any gratitude from the population or any consideration of benefits and losses of the selfless administrators working amidst tens of thousandsbelonging to a different creed, a different race, a different discipline, different conditions of life. The pronoun we expressing Balfours self-consciousness was used in the full sense of distinction and powerfulness to represent not only the best qualities of his own nation but the civilized world at large. Although he does not speak directly for the Orientals, he senses what they feel and knows their history, present reliance on him, and future aspirations. Yet he speaks for them in the sense that what they might have said if they were asked and had the ability to answer would have uselessly confirmed what he already knew (33-4). In fact, representation was a theatrical idea that sought to confine the whole East in the stage of Orient, on which figures will appear whose role is to represent the larger whole from which they emanate. The Orient was transformed into a locale appropriate for the production of Oriental figures (Arab, Islamic, Indian, Chinese), which were but deformed, second-class imitations of a great original (Christian, European, Western) they were poorly incarnating. Related to the Orient as a theatrical stage affixed to Europe were the Orientalists, whose knowledge Europe was responsible for and responsive to, the way an audience interacts historically and culturally with works of drama presented to it. In the depths of this Oriental stage stands a prodigious cultural repertoire whose individual items evoke a fabulously rich world of figures, heroes, settings, terrors, pleasures, and desires (62-3). Such theatrical figures and tropes were to the Muslim Dasein as stylized customs are to characters in a play. For alongside knowledge of the Orient that seemed to be advancing, Western mythology was by large put at the service of representation efforts. Theatrical representation sought to incorporate it [the Orient] schematically on a theatrical stage whose audience, manager, and actors are for Europe, and only for Europe (71-2).


If the late 18th century Orientalism is to be taken as a model for dealing with the Orient, one can unambiguously perceive Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. Orientalism was neither an impartial depiction of Orient performed by selfless scholars nor a load of lies emanating from European fantasy. Rather, it was an accumulation of statements, theories, and practices focused on the Orient and produced by considerable intellectual and material investments that instituted Orientalism as a system of knowledge about the Orient with an accepted authority. The efflorescence of Orientalism went hand in hand with Europes domination of wide areas of the globe, which makes Orientalism a particularly valuable sign of European-Atlantic power over the Orient. The colonial advances6 of European powers mainly Britain and France overlapped with, and more often than not incited, the Orientalist enterprise, whose vastness of dimensions pertaining to disparate realms (the whole of India, the Levant, the Biblical lands) and formidable scholarly corpus of innumerable experts with a wide range of interests (Semitic languages, history of old civilizations, geographic discoveries) provided the colonial project with its cultural coverage and hegemonic instruments. The point is that Orientalism derives its prestige from the close relationship experienced by European powers like Britain and France with the Orient by virtue of dominating it. Under the umbrella of Western hegemony of the Orient, the 18th century Orientalism created a complex Orient suitable for study in the academy, for display in the museum, for reconstruction in the colonial office, for theoretical illustration in anthropological, biological, linguistic, racial, and historical theses about mankind and the universe (3-4 & 6-7). In the cold war era, the American hegemony transformed Orientalism into Area studies and interdisciplinary work, where in the words of Gibb the director of the Center for Middle Eastern studies at Harvard the traditional Orientalist plus a good social scientist [would be] working together; the Orientalists expertise shall be at the disposal of his colleague in area studies to remind him that to apply the psychology and mechanics of Western political institutions to Asian Arab situations is pure Walt Disney (cited in Said: 106-7). The structure of Orientalism as a mode of discourse is designed in a fashion that secures a central position, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the Orient without ever losing him the relative upper hand (7). The central position7 of the West in the discursive architecture was loaded with quite distinct emotional charges across the different historical phases. For the Greeks as manifest in The Bacchae of Euripides, the Orient was a source of danger, since the excesses of Oriental mysteries threatened to undermine Western rationality and all what seems to be normal values. Nothing came to symbolize terror, devastation, the demonic, hordes of hated barbarians more than Islam in the Middle Ages. For Europe, Islam was a lasting trauma(57 & 59). With the Renaissance, the mood changed to narcissism, for the Orient was portrayed not as a source of peril but a pale imitation of a European original it is diametrically inferior to (72). Western narcissism found its expression in the air of superiority and objectivity, through which the modern Orientalist detached himself unsympathetically from the Oriental figures (104). This asymmetrical relationship was characterized by Anwar Abdel Malek as the hegemonism of possessing minorities and anthropocentrism allied with Eurocentrism. For the conviction that 131

the Westerner is a true human being unlike the Oriental lurks behind his prerogative right not only to manage the non-white world but also to own it. The exterior representation of Orientalism succeeded only in disregarding, essentializing, denuding the humanity of nonEuropean cultures, whose existence remained for the West fixed in time and place and whose entire cultural, political, and social history was but faint responses to the West. The West was exalted to the level of the main actor to whom the Orient was a passive reactor; The West is the spectator, the judge and jury, of every facet of Oriental behavior (108-9). For instance, the style of impartial impersonality of Lanes Manners and customs of the modern Egyptians cannot conceal the sheer egoistic powers of the European consciousness at its center. The authority of the Orientalists ego reaches its peak as the internal structure of the work synonymous with comprehensive interpretation seeks to restructure and re-vision the Orient and in this way create it anew (158). For the narrative voice in Lanes text is an ageless ego expressed by a first-person pronoun that moves through Egyptian customs, rituals, traditions, habits, festivals, and brutal rites as an Orientalist device to scrutinize and capture otherwise inaccessible information. Through distancing himself from those lived among as an unsuspected Muslim, Lane was not merely assuring his European identity or scientific objectivity, but more profoundly he was establishing the Orientalists ego, which he is, as a super-ego for his Oriental subject, the modern Egyptian (160). After all, Orientals were best dealt with when intimidated, and there is no better instrument of such intimidation than a sovereign Western ego (193). The techniques of representation, political domination, and discursive subjugation were sustained by the Orientalist apparatus, which incited and upgraded the industry of knowledge about the Orient. The 19th century witnessed the sprouting of learned societies, for example Socit asiatique founded in 1822, the Royal society in 1823, the American Oriental society in 1842, and so on. The European occupation of the entire Near Orient created commercial, political, cultural, and military interests tended by a complex of organizations. Thus, early organizations like the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (1689) and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (1701) were succeeded by the Baptist Missionary Society (1792), the Church Missionary Society (1799), the British and Foreign Bible Society (1804), the London Society for Promoting Christianity Among the Jews (1808). These missions abetted the colonial expansion of Europe alongside the trading societies, geographical exploration funds, translation funds, schools implanted in the Orient, missions, consular offices, factories, and even large European communities abroad (99-101). By the middle of the 19th century, the Orientalist apparatus was consolidated and the agencies and institutions promoting the dissemination and propagation of Orientalists works were to be found everywhere. As a consequence, Orientalistic research was transformed from the labour of a gifted amateur-enthusiast to a rigorously coordinated knowledge production process about the Orient. Orientalism as a scientific discipline witnessed an agreement concerning its research problems, dominating paradigms, methodological approaches, and even results. The Orientalist apparatus secured the regularity and uniformity of Oriental studies and as such Orientalist scholarship became a guild with publicly accredited traditions.


To be an Orientalist meant a special university training in Oriental studies, subvention for ones travel, and accredited form of publication (191). The wovor (in the face of which) of anxiety, which was the Muslim Daseins image constructed in the Western mirror of Orientalism, conveyed one simple message to the Muslin Dasein, as it looked in the depths of the mirror; Islam is, in its essence, stationaryIslam is lifeless; and, because lifeless cannot grow, cannot advance, cannot change, and was never intended so to do. Stand still is its motto, and its most essential condition. As a social system Islam is a complete failure. As a polity, Islam is sterile (Colvin, 1906:412). The message underlying the image of the Muslim Dasein was no less than a sentence of death; in the words of Cromer the educated Egyptian was a demuslimized Muslim (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1968:63). The tradition of linear hermeneutics of Islam as such, to use Armando Salvatores expression, or its essentialization was soaked in Hegels conception of history. Attempting to give meaning to the whole human history, Hegel started from the basic category of the spirit that creates and animates society and culture; the relations between the different spirits was not conflictual, since they were all manifestations of the same universal Spirit and could therefore be arranged on a temporal scale. Figuring strongly in Hegels notion of history was the evolutionary idea of development, where all which is part of a continuous, self-creating, self-maintaining process, changingthrough the operation of some force which works upon matter to produce even more complex forms; and that the goal process is not something beyond it, but its own last and highest phase. History was in this sense the gradual and progressive self-realization of Reason, which makes itself along the different phases the embodiment of the idea of freedom. The end of this process will be reached, when Reason becomes fully free and conscious of its being; the incarnation of reason in forms of art and thought and in liberal social and political institutions (free society and state), where the private and general wills are in harmony shall bring about the complete realization of human essence or the universal Spirit that was behind the progress of history. According to Hegel, there had been four main stages of history: the Oriental phase, where the law existed as an external means of coercion; the Greek world, where the Spirit became aware of itself; the Roman stage, where tyranny dominated both the state and society but the Spirit was able to realize itself in the domain of individual faith; and finally the German world, where the Spirit was incarnated in the liberal state. The question is where does Islam stand in this process and or what was its relationship with what came before and after in order to bring about the selfrealization of the universal Spirit? Islam was the catalyst that helped to bring the fourth and final phase of history into existence. The fall of the Roman empire on the hands of the barbarians, who were free to follow their own aims yet lacking the existence of a single will, common aim, or even an accepted principle or law, stamped public life by chance and spontaneousness. Islam was the antithesis of such disharmony and disunity by bringing about the principle of pure unity underlying its worship of the one God, the absolute object of attraction and devotion. The main principle of Islam, enabling it to play a role in history through producing moral elevation and instituting virtues that appertain to magnanimity and valour, bore the seeds of its failure by dint of its excesses. For Islam, all other elements of 133

the secular existence were absolutely nothing in comparison to the One and therefore it lacked the special relationship existing in Judaism between the One and human beings and which led in Christianity to the return of the Spirit back form the One to the human world. Islam had no interest in the human world except as an adoration and enthusiasm to the One and recognized no natural bond between human beings except their servitude to the One. Enthusiasm and fanaticism, an innate tendency of Islam resulting from its absolute devotion to the abstract principle of Oneness, were in fact destructive, for on fading away they gave place to worldly interests like the love of power and glory. Nevertheless, Muslims can never maintain a real bond with the worldly domain by virtue of the revival of the abstract enthusiasm for the One. This alteration of mood that made Islam ephemeral left nothing to the Muslims except sensual enjoyment and repose, thus Europe to which the Spirit moved away from Islam has the historical mission to absorb the antithesis of Islam into thesis. Islam has long vanished from the stage of history, and has retreated into oriental ease and repose (Hourani, 1980:55-7 & Hourani, 1991:26-7). In considering Islam, Hegel laid his emphasis on Islams contribution to the dialectical self-realization process of the Universal spirit or its relation with what was before it. Renan conceived Islam from within the same Hegelian perception of history, though he shifted the emphasis to Islams relation with what came after it. It is from this angle that Renan perceived Islam as a barrier against progress due to its obstruction of individual or collective qualities necessary for living in the modern world, mainly its opposition to science. Apart from some poetry, the Semites have no political life, art, or literature for everyone who has been in the Orientwill have been struck by the kind of iron circle in which the believers head is enclosed, making him absolutely closed to science, and incapable of opening himself to anything new (Hourani, 1991:30). For Renan, the moving force of history was not the Hegelian dialectics but the spirit of race and the cultural and religious units were only manifestations of such a spirit, Islam and Christianity included. Islam as the characteristic product of the Semitic spirit is a religion that prevented the use of reason and growth of science; in fact all religions share this characteristic, when they go beyond their real purpose of inspiring high ideals to action and thought, but Islam blocks the use of reason in a special way. Islam is a religion that cannot tolerate science, because its society is based on an idea most opposed to progress and its state on a pretentious revelation or dogma dominating the social system. There had never been and there cannot be a Muslim scientist, for although science existed and was indeed tolerated in Islamic societies, these scientists and philosophers were not really Muslims. The so-called Arab sciences were a continuation of Greek sciences that were taken over by the Persians not the Arabs, that is, by Aryans. The golden age of Islamic thought was the Abbasid, but the Caliphs themselves were hardly believers. The culture of the court and the imperial traditions was a revivification of the Sassanian culture by Persian secretaries and administrators, who were hardly Muslims but scorned the religion they were forced to follow. The sole contribution the Semites made to human culture was the notion of monotheism, which after having been established was handed over to the Aryans. The essential task of the Semites was to abolish polytheism and the enormous complications, in which the religious mind of the Aryans has lost itself. After having accomplished such a 134

mission, the Semitic spirit, whose monotheistic religion was simple, patriarchal, without mythology, and without any sense of the creative richness of life, retired rapidly and handed over the torch of civilization to the Aryan race, whose destiny is to lead humanity (Hourani, 1980: 61-2). Marx followed the same progressive linear conception of history, though for him material conditions incarnated in the dialectics between the modes and relations of production represented the driving force of history. He dealt indirectly with Islam through situating the whole load of Oriental societies on what he identified in India as the Asiatic mode of production. In his analyses of British rule in India, Marx assured that such colonial intervention, notwithstanding its brutality and rapacity, was making possible a real social revolution in Asia. He opined that such local communities peacefully leading their traditional way of life might apparently seem harmless, but in reality constitute the solid foundations of Oriental despotism. The narrowness of their local perspectives shackled human mind with superstition, enslaved it underneath the traditional rules, and lost it all grandeur and historical energies. England was in fact fulfilling a double mission in India: the one destructive, which is the demolition of the Asiatic mode of production; the other constructive, which is laying the foundations of the capitalist mode of production and Western culture in Asia. Therefore Englandwas the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution. After all, history could not realize itself without inducing a revolution in the social conditions of the Orient (Said, 1978:153-4). Despite his polemical argumentation against Marxs economic determinism, Weber retained the main characteristics of the linear interpretation of history, but cultural factors were the driving force of history; hence the Protestant ethics of capitalism. Weber gave the game of construction of Islam as a culmination of deficits its scientific status and was therefore able to overcome the epistemological embarrassment that has always affected thinkers in Christendom. For there were no categories found in terms of which Islam could be understood; to judge by Houranis statement is was neither East nor West, neither Christian nor equivocally non-Christian and, wherever one places it, being linked with Europe by a long and intimate, an ambiguous and usually a painful relationship. For Weber, Islam was more important than any other non-Christian religion, even more relevant than Judaism, to the central concern of his work pertaining to the reconstruction of the reasons for the uniqueness of Western development from the side of historical preconditions for Western capitalism and from the side of its contrastive particularity. For Webers sociological study, Islam, as Salvatore elegantly briefed it, was supposed to play the role of the villain in the narratives of his well-known Protestantism-thesis, according to which the uniqueness of Western rationalization culminates in the innerworldly elaboration of the Calvinist idea of the double decree that cements the doctrine of predestination. The apparent similarity between Islam and Calvinism was the absolute faith in Gods transcendence, which reaches unparalleled limits in the case of Islam. However, the distinctive features, which might seem at first common, cannot provide clues for understanding the differences of performance between both religions in terms of rational conduct manifested by the degree economic development. It is the solution of the question of theodicy (vindication of divine providence in 135

view of the existence of evil) that represents for Weber the bone of contention distinguishing or even distancing Calvinism from Islam. Islams solution was providing a plain predestination underlain by a generic cosmopolitan view, devoid of any forceful stress of salvation, mediated a strict version of legalism, and as such not suitable to develop any rational economic ethics. By contrast, Calvinism proved to be unique through producing a coherent doctrine of predestination that promoted mundane engagement through generating a double decree that makes the inner realm of freedom, manifesting itself through religion, govern the outer realm of mundane powers, subjecting the individual exteriorly. The undeniable success witnessed in the early days of Islam could be accounted for by the centrality of Djihad as a belated manifestation of Near Eastern monotheism: the motivational strength of Islam could only be found in extraordinary situations like war, where the scramble for booty and the soldiers sensual paradise provided the main impulse for Islams successful military conquests. The historical failure to develop world mastery in the form of rational capitalism was referred to the cyclical motion of reforms in the history of Islam that represented the continuous negation of the systematic and rational shaping of life conduct by means of relapsing into the ethic of world domination and conquest which Islam was all about. Whenever a rational element seemed to play a role in the history of Islam, it turns the ethos of life conduct into political game; hence the syndromatically political character of Islam. Islam, in contrast to Calvinism that represents the quintessence of Western spirit and achievement, has a particular predisposition against rationalism and modernity by virtue of its doctrinal setting (Salvatore, 1997:97-105). The worber (about which) of anxiety relates to the condition, in which Daseins Being-in-the-world is jeopardized in the sense not only that the Dasein cannot locate itself on the network of referentialities, where it finds itself, but more gravely that the referential totality linking the Dasein to other Seiends, present-at-hand, available-for-hand is being systematically dismantled. As such, the Daseins Seinsart of encountering others, disclosure to them, or even its projection in the first place is simply invalidated. In a work, whose subtitle the ordeal of Arab culture inspires agonizing concerns for the same issue, Ghalioun portrayed, albeit in his own terms, the existential impasse the Muslim Dasein is experiencing and as well as the anxiety about its very existence. The rise of European hegemonyin the whole world announced the end of classical civilizations and the beginning of the dissolution of their main structures; it made them enter a long moral and material dilemma. The Arab civilization was not far from such a historical tremble but right at its heart, since the consolidation of the [Western] military and civilizational supremacy in the 18th century led to the gradual decomposition of the largest Islamic empire and the flaring of its member, at the beginning of the 20th century, in all directions. Western supremacy drilled continuously the permanent traditional basis of internal hegemony and social authority and deprived its political, economic, and intellectual systems of effectiveness and competence. Each historical impasse bears the seeds of deconstruction of the cultural system and forces its elements to reassemble themselves within a new frame in order to keep pace with the rising hegemonic power. But the failure of such elements to melt themselves in a new mould 136

maintaining their existence will certainly lead to their disintegration and re-integration in the dominant cultural power. This acknowledges the final and wholesale liquidation of the culture and the Umma (Ghalioun, 1990:5). Evidently, the historical impasse transcends minor political, social, or cultural problems pertaining to the limited interests of certain social groups. It relates to the global blockage of all realms of change for the whole Arab existence; the persistence of such existential crisis suggests that all existential possibilities outstanding before this existence were simply eliminated (13). The historical impasse or the existential blockage has extremely detrimental aspects. Firstly, the Arabs ability to deal with reality was severely damaged, since he could not institute a balance between his potentials or capabilities and his aspirations. Such a balance would have enabled the Arab to define for himself a leeway for maneuver in the world, to establish and consolidate his position in history, and as a result to found a solid basis for encountering his Other. What follows from the unbalanced relationship to reality was that the Arab could not accept or even refuse such reality, but cut off himself from it and fell back on himself in a solipsist fashion. He even became a renegade par excellence rebelling against his reality, as well as swinging between absolute surrender and unfettered insubordination, masochistic criticism and narcissism, and denial of the Other and its consecration. Secondly, the Arab is constantly at war with himself. For Arab societies are laid bare to ruthless and torturous self-interrogation endeavors, so comprehensive to include the different life domains, so profound to unearth the basic foundations of their existence and raison d tre, and so obstinate to be experienced by every one on a daily basis. Thirdly, the existential blockage entrapping the Arab throws him in unparalleled existential misery and embarrassment. This mood the Arab experiences is far more destructive to his spirit of creativity and initiation as well as to the moral and material bonds constitutive of his societal existence than the repressive nature of the post-colonial modern state system or the social and political conflicts reproducing such an existential impasse and psychological conditions affiliated to it (36 & 41). Fourthly, the Arab exists in what might be called the barbarian society lacking accepted, meaningful rules and standards moral, spiritual, material, and rational and where brutal force or coercion would be the only regulating principle for relations in the family, at school, with the state, and among members of the society in general. It is actually a society acting on impulse and dominated by instincts of fear, narcissism, and aggression in the stead of creativity, achievement, and initiation, which makes it lose all control over mechanisms of change; such change will be inset as individual, tribal, sectarian, or political conspiracies. Cultural heritage, religion, scientific knowledge, and means of production are not lacking in the barbarian society, but what earmarks such society is the rapid disintegration and collapse of these structures, their increasing social incredulity and ineffectiveness, and their transformation into means of perpetuating and renewing the inner conflicts tearing the whole society (115). Fifthly, the only choice offered to the Arabs is to remain an object of history and an arena for the struggle and domination of other nations. The Arab consciousness feels itself not without right as a lifeless matter. What fell upon the Arab civilization along the last few centuries was the natural phenomenon of aging that affected the classical civilizations with all its accompanying symptoms of stagnation, lack of creativity, and cognitive sclerosis. For the identity crisis and the retreat in the face of 137

modernity are only effects of the inability of the local culture not only to proliferate innovations or regenerate its main structures but also to sustain its very existence due to the ossification of its dynamics. What the Arab culture is experiencing with the rise of Western cultural and military domination is exactly what happened to Europe in the Middle Ages in face of the efflorescence and preponderance of the Islamic civilization. That is, the compulsory retreat from authority position in the realms of spirit, thought, and social association (Ghalioun, 1993:247-50).

The scene of secularization

So far this chapter endeavored to depict, from within the leeway of cultural sensibility, the Muslim Daseins structure of anxiety in the face of death. More profoundly, it seeks to explain the way such anxiety became the Grundbefindlichkeit the Muslim Dasein found itself besieged in. Can the flow and exchange of codes, symbols, and images on the transcultural space8 Armando Salvatore mapped provide a sufficient explanation? In my opinion, anxiety in the face of death has less to do with the Daseins disorienting encounters with other Seiends in the world than with structural elements dismantling the referential totality constituting his world, his Seinsart as Being-in-the-world. To explain this, I shall reconstruct one last historical episode, the secularization scene, that attempts to reply to the question: why is it then that secularization means for the Muslim Dasein death in the sense of offering solely the possibility of impossibility of existence i.e. Intiar?. Related to this is how is it that secularization turned from a Being-possibility to be projected into the Being-inevitability decreed upon the Muslim Dasein?. The most celebrated definition of secularization coined by the Dutch theologian Cornelis van Peursen and circulated by secularist champions underlines the deliverance of man first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language. Loosening the world from the religious understanding of itself, dispelling selfcontained world views, and defusing supernatural myths and sacred symbols, all fall under the rubric of secularization viewed as a historical process, whose end product would be complete historical relativism. Three integral components could be discerned in this context: disenchantment of nature, desacralization of politics, and deconsecration of values. Disenchantment of nature, a term borrowed from Weber, means the exorcising of animistic spirits, gods, and magical power from the understanding of nature that should no longer be seen as a divine entity but a domain for the free play of scientific enquiry. Desacralization of politics refers to suspending the sacred basis of political legitimation in order to pave the way for a political change process expected to bring about the complete rationalization of politics. Deconsecration of values alludes to rendering relative and even volatile cultural creations including world religions and moral values through situating them in an evolutionary process having an end-destination. Secularization, by this token, is the process of historical evolution


emancipating humanity from its infantile condition and delivering it to the state of maturity (al-Attas, 1985:14-16). However, secularization cannot be perceived as the marginalization of Islam but the complete negation of the world of Islam through dismantling all the referential relations thereupon. Immanence and transcendence comprise a universally valid antithesis cutting across many cultures and religious systems. Immanence derived from the Latin verb immanere that means to dwell refers to anything that is self-contained, self-operating, selfactivating, and self-explanatory. The world of immanence denotes therefore a highly unified world with no space separating its constituent parts from the others, for all could be reduced to one operating force or organized principle (means of production, the libido, or the Universal Spirit). Transcendence originating from the Latin verb transcendre (trans means beyond and scandre means to climb) designates surmounting the ordinary experience falling within the reach of scientific explanation. In the Islamic tawhidi paradigm, the one, absolute, transcendent God created the world (man and nature) ex nihilo and maintained a distance from it, a space that separates creator from created. The space separating the transcendent God from Man limits the latters will and freedom and places moral burdens on his shoulders, yet it is these very limits that create the human space through growing from the simple state of nature to the complex state of culture. The space between the transcendent Creator and His creations might widen and even turn into an abyss or it could be so narrow that God could, as described in the Quran, be nearer to Man than his jugular vein. Nevertheless, the space is absolutely uncrossable, since the erosion of that space, as in some extreme Sufi trends, will mean the fanna or annihilation of man through his complete dissolution in and identification with God. Man is leveled down, becoming part of a larger entity, completely lost in it, with no space separating him from other creations. Similarly, Mans dwelling in nature resembles his relationship to the embryo in his pre-natal days; he lives in it, depends on it, and constitutes with other parts an organic monism. But to maintain his existence Man has to guard the space distancing him from nature through growing out of the embryonic state. Otherwise, he will perceive himself as part of nature and his essence will dissolve in the natural material world. In the fully human state, a space must be guarded separating man from larger non-human entities like God and nature, since the eradication of such spaces will bring about the annihilation of human existence (Elmessiri, 2000:58-63). The nature-based paradigm operating at the bottom of comprehensive secularism and reducing man to an insignificant part of it that abides to natural laws does not only fit in the loop-hole of fanna (annihilation), but it also multiplies it with itself. As a form of immanence metaphysics, secularism obliterates the transcendental through circumventing the problem of deism, and therefore it erodes the space separating Man from the transcendent God. Coupled with this, through locating Man in nature the space separating Man from the natural world is erased. By means of doing away with the spaces separating man from non-human entities and defining his human space, human existence collapses and Man falls into absolute immanence; after being initially seen as a free moral agent controlling and dominating agent he becomes an insignificant part of it, subject to its laws, and denied all room for morality and choice.


As a matter of fact, secularism sprouted from the political, cultural, and spiritual conditions of European societies; Reformation and Counter-Reformation, Renaissance, scientific positivism, industrial capitalism, nation-state bureaucracies, and colonial expansion. Inversely, it was introduced to or imposed upon Muslim societies by enthusiasts of the West as well as colonial authorities. Exemplifying the alien, exterior nature of secularism in the Arab-Muslim context is the absence of an Arabic term to describe secularity or secularism. The neologism almaniya appearing only at the end of the 19th century to translate the French term Lacisme was coined by a Christian Lebanese scholar named Boutrus Al-Bustani. Almaniya derived from alam (world) as well as Ilmaniya from ilm (science or knowledge) were preferred in current usage to la-diniya (non-religious), which, implying negation of religion, would have been certainly rejected by Muslims right from the start. The debate around whether Almaniya or Ilmaniya is the right translation is still a heated one and gave rise to a plethora of definitions of secularism; Elmessiri managed to collect 18 different definitions from modern Arabic literature (Tamini, 2000:17 & Keane, 2000:35). Notwithstanding the ferocious debates concerning the accuracy of the neologism, the transplantation of the notion of secularism to a different political, cultural, and spiritual context never succeeded in treating it critically in the light of its underlying philosophical foundations and historical (religious and political) experience. Rather, the uncritical utilization of secularism was shackled to the medieval imageries of Inquisition and other excesses of the Catholic Church and was sealed by a militant anti-ecclesiastical attitude. The notion of secularism, having been rigorously reduced to the goal of founding a noncompromising secular state-apparatus la France, was therefore established as a transcendental norm surmounting whatever realities, European and non-European all the same, and transformed into an instrument for re-evaluating (actually condemning) historical experience and engineering contemporary conditions. Such a huge abyss between the notion and reality, springing from the total equation of Muslim societal dynamics and cultural particularities with the European Middle Ages in all aspects tout court, discharged the secular notion from any moral, social, or even practical values and degenerated it into a lifeless idol lacking legitimacy and credibility. Insofar as the anti-religious (even anti-Islamic) tendencies dormant in the original concept were concerned, Arab notion(s) of secularism erected a radically immanent ideology (or religion) that set as its objective the complete separation of cultural, social, economic, and political spheres from religion through the demolition of the religious basis of individual existence and social association (Ghalioun, 1993:363 & 366). In many countries, secularism developed into a political dogma or doctrine or even an imperative that determines what is rational and normal. Esposito coined the term militant secular fundamentalism to underline its transformation into an organized religion which, on the hands of its faithful believers, was installed as an authority resembling the Church in medieval Europe (Esposito, 2000:9 & Tamimi, 2000:28). The idolization of the secular notion in the importing context could be clearly witnessed in the writings of Arab secularists, whose first pioneers were mainly Syrian or Lebanese Christians, who immigrated to Egypt and, through dominating the Arabic periodical press for a whole generation, had a rather great influence on the Arabic-reading public. Shibli 140

Shumayyil and Farah Anton were two main figures of this founding generation that tried to launch a secular Arab culture. After studying medicine at the Syrian Protestant college and then in Paris, Shumayyil settled in Egypt practicing his profession and contributing to the secular-oriented journal al-Muqtataf. He belonged to the 19th century intellectual movement, to which science was the key to the secret of the universe, even a mode of worship. Science meant for him the metaphysical system, constructed out of Darwins hypotheses by Bcner the translation of whose commentary on Darwin was Shumayyils main work and at the basis of which was the idea of the unity of all being. All things are formed of matter through spontaneous processes existing from time immemorial and becoming more complex with every stage of evolution; each stage arises from the one preceding it without consuming the forces inherent in matter itself. Man is the culmination of the evolutionary process, since he is the first being able to partake in it and control it through changing his outer environment and substituting the struggle for existence by cooperation and labour division. Through further developing his intellectual power and instituting the principle of cooperation, Man continues the process of his perfection. The unity of matter, maintained by Shumayyil with the fervor of a new religion, had political and social implications. On the basis of natural sciences that provide the sound laws of existence, theocracy and despotism are to be condemned as both unnatural and false. Since theocracy used spiritual authority to hamper the intellectual development of the human mind and despotism denied individual rights from the start, it could be concluded that both were in fact obstructing the universal law of gradual progress. It is therefore necessary that government would be based on laws that are in complete harmony with the laws of the universe or nature, which allow for the universal process of development to continue and man to live in accordance with himself. If replacing the struggle for existence with coexistence and division of labour is the sign for the development of the society, cooperation should be the supreme law governing the society, whose laws and institutions were arrangements contributing to and guaranteeing the social cooperation and welfare. Social unity as the prime precondition for the law of cooperation to function could be only secured through the separation of religion from public life, for the latter was always a factor of division. Since religious men sew the seeds of disagreement and disunity that weakened their societies, nations grew stronger as religion grew weaker. This conclusion is as true for Europe, which became strong only after the French Revolution disrupted religions tight control on society, as for Muslim societies. For a society based on the concept of religious community, Shumayyils arguments could only have the implications of transcending religious differences through national unity, that is, replacing religion by nationalism (Hourani, 1970:248-52). Farah Antun, a journalist by profession, emigrated from Tripoli to Cairo and spent the rest of his life editing Arabic periodicals and writing novels that gave expression to European thought trends of his time. The long study he produced on the life and thought of Ibn Rush, marked by the intellectual influence of Ernst Renan, was an attempt on his side to contribute to the heated debate on science and religion. The views expounded in his work revolved around the idea that the science-religion conflict could be solved through assigning to each a separate zone, since the intellect and the heart are two completely different human faculties, 141

each with its own rules, field of activity, and truth methods. Whereas the intellect functions through observation and experiment and is directed to this world, the heart moves by accepting without examination what is in the sacred books and is concerned with virtue and vices and the after-life. Antun presented his work to those new shoots of the east, who refuse to mingle worldly matters with religion in order to maintain their unity and join the tide of European civilization instead of being swept by it. He aimed at purifying the east from disuniting elements through showing the pointlessness of considering one religion superior to all others, since modern times based on science, philosophy, and mutual respect between religions have discarded such an outlook. Such views were not purely theoretical, but like those of Shumayyil had their own political implications: laying the fundamentals of a secular state, in which Muslims and Christians took part on the basis of equal citizenship. Secularism was based on the supposition that all religions, on reducing different religions to their basic foundations and doing away with their accidental form, are essentially the same in terms of principles, moral obligations, and legislation. Evidently, religious dogmas and legal codes have no meaning in themselves but are functionally means to an end. Thus, religions could and in fact must be interpreted in order to fulfill their proper function, even if it means interpreting them allegorically. Furthermore, secularism, understood as a theory of state, whose secular power is autonomous of control, was premised on the inevitable separation of temporal and spiritual authorities. Antun listed five reasons justifying, in fact decreeing, such a separation of Church and state. Firstly, religion and government have two completely different and even contradictory aims: on the one hand, every religion assumes that it monopolizes the truth and guarantees the path to salvation by dint of its revealed texts, thus granting political power to religious authorities will lead to the persecution of all those who disagree with them; on the other, governments main concern is to preserve human freedom and to deliver the public good prescribed by the constitution, as such governments on being granted autonomous power will not persecute men because of their thoughts and beliefs. Secondly, the good society is based on equal citizenship and loyalty to the nation that transcends religious divisions. Thirdly, religious authorities legislating for the other world should not be allowed to interfere with government affairs mainly geared at this world. Fourthly, states based on religion are necessarily weak, because religious authorities are always at the mercy of the feelings of the masses. Laying their emphasis as they do on what divides men rather than what unites them, they weaken their own societies as well as religion itself through exposing it to all the dangers of political life. Fifthly, religious governments are aggressive to other peoples, for although religions could be reduced to one and the same principle, different religious interests will always be extremely hostile to one another. Since religious sentiments are strong among the masses, it would be always possible to incite their feelings (253-65). The second generation of secularists sought to adapt the secular notion and to let it take root more deeply in the local political and cultural life. A central figure was Lutfi alSayyid born in an upper-class rural family of a local leadership tradition, educated in a modern secondary school in Cairo and then in the School of Law, and a friend and disciple of Muhammad Abduh. His writings and ideas gained such currency and recognition in Egypts 142

intellectual life that he was named the teacher of the generation. Islam was not the guiding principle of his thought, for he attempted neither to defend it nor to restore it as the moral basis of a society, though he recognized that as a religion it is relevant as far as it represents one of the constituent factors of society. He did not even insist that a certain religion or a specific ethical system should be relied upon for its sake, but since the main principles of morality are grounded in the essence of religion, it follows that religion judging by its moral implications must be the basis of general education. The question Lutfi al-Sayyid raised did not concern the flourishing and decay of Muslim societies, but the conditions any society might flourish or decay in, thus the answer was in terms of modern European progress. Influenced by Comte, Renan, and Durkheim, he conceived of irreversible and irresistible natural laws leading toward an ideal state characterized by the domination of reason, the spread of individual liberties, and the replacement of status and religion-based relations by free contract and individual interests. Since the social ills of Egypt were due to the successive despotic governments nurturing in their subjects the vices of servitude, the cure should be a liberal democratic state performing the minimal functions of defense, security, justice, as well as guaranteeing individual liberties. A true government based on free agreement, which is in harmony with the innate sense of justice, is the only natural form of government, to which every community is entitled. The nation, which was a natural association subject to natural laws and the great law of freedom, occupied a central position in the thought of Lutfi alSayyid. It was not to be defined in terms of language or religion but of territory; he did not have in mind an Islamic or an Arab nation but an Egyptian nation that brings together the dwellers of Egypt. The Egyptianness of those who live in that territory, which counterbalances differences of religion and language, was so strong, in his opinion, that it needed no emphasis on other bonds of unity necessary for creating a nation. The idea of the land of Islam as the homeland of all Muslims is but an imperialist principle oriented at expansion and hegemony; pan-Islam as a political force has no value in itself, since it was created by the British to stir European feelings against the national movement (171-78). In order to better understand the secular scene, it must be shown how the mechanisms of immanentization were at the same time set at work on the non-discursive level resulting in the dismantling of the Muslim Daseins semantic and non-semantic referential networks. According to Perlmutter, modernization was in fact an affirmative attitude toward establishing authority that imposes [a] central value system [in] that society. The whole movement of modernization has revolved around the authority of the center. Establishing a central secular authority, as the main mission of modernization in Egypt, necessarily implied ousting the Church and its Ulemma priesthood from the political domain (Perlmutter, 1974:28-30). Such a holistic horizontal view of modernization efforts in terms of a secularizing center struggling to stretch its authority over the traditional periphery can explain why Muhammad Ali, the first modernizer of Egypt, was not impressed by Machiavellis Prince. He even stopped Artin Pasha, after reading a part of it, from continuing its translation boasting: I have nothing to learn from it (the Prince) for I know more tricks than he knows (Ismail, 1993:77-78). If modernization was intended to re-design 143

the whole political space, through sending religion to Coventry, in order to architect a secular political center that authoritatively surveys, divides, adds up, and controls the inhabitants of that space, it is not without right to conclude that the modernization project was simply all about building up a global Panopticon9. The architectural figure of the Panopticon was based on the circular principle of the tower and the ring, a principle that facilitated the reign of one homogenizing gaze. Yet, it also needed another geometrical relay that would make the tower a hierarchized apparatus that can supervise its own mechanisms. That is, the pyramidal principle (Foucault, 1997-b: 174). The circular principle, which shall be addressed now, never found better expression than in the words of Marshal Lyautey, the colonial governor of Morocco in the early part of the 20th century. On his tour with a group of French engineers and journalists in the newly built colonial capital of Rabat, he went on explaining the philosophy of the thing. The buildings as a whole form a fan. At the center of the fanthose are the administration. Beyond them, where it broadens out, are the Government ministries placed in the logical order.For example, here Public Works. Next to it: Roads and Bridges, and then Mines. Next to Agriculture, ForestsThe building [that] has not yet been builtwill be intercalcated in its logical place [emphasis added] (cited in Mitchell, 1989:161). Through disciplinary techniques, I have tried to portray such techniques of enclosure, partitioning, making functional sites, and ranking in the previous two historical scenes, but in this scene I view them from a holistic horizontal perspective the Panopticon creates and colonizes the spatial units of the ring or the circular space, according to a particular logical order: as many cages or theaters, from the perspective of guard-inmate relation, penetrated by visibility as its inmates will be incessantly controlled, watched, and created as individuals by means of the towers surveillance (that is individualization); and as separate cells, from the angle of inmate-inmate relation, isolated from one another through the side walls erected to make such partitions, yet created as a collectivity by means of the omnipotent majestic gaze (that is collectivization). It is noteworthy that such panoptical techniques utilized by the British master were intended to architect an ethno-logical order that solves the Egyptian puzzle through throwing the dwellers of Egypt each in his ethno-logical place. Now let us make a visiting round to those cells with their inmates created in order to mould into something really useful with a view of his becoming eventually autonomousthe rawest of raw material as well as to raise them morally and materially from the abject state in which he finds them (Cromer, 2000:125&131&130). Modern Egypt measures 1000 miles from Alexandria to Wadi Halfa with breadth of about 200 miles from Port Said to Alexandria. The habitable area covers about 33,607 square kilometers or approximately 8,000,000 acres (126). Its dwellers could, more on the basis of political and social conditions than on that of religious belief, be classified into four categories: Muslims; Christians, Europeanized Egyptians, and Levantives. The first category Muslims could be subdivided into Turks and Turco-Egyptians, Muslim Egyptians, and the Bedouins. The Turk is the conqueror of Egypt still living and behaving accordingly, although, through processes of Egyptianization like intermarriage, there is no pure Turk to be found. By 1882, all Turks had already degenerated into TurcoEgyptians who were more Egyptian than Turkish, though they look down on the Egyptians 144

whom they regard as a lower race. Turco-Egyptians occupy key government-posts and continue, under allegiance to the Mohammedan Pope, the plundering of Egypt that their ancestors in Constantinople initiated. The Turco-Egyptian is only capable of impotent hatred to everybody: to the Englishman who curbs his authority; to the pure Turk whom he fears; and to the Egyptian whom he regards as his prey. Nevertheless, his characteristics of command, leadership, and elementary honor qualify him to get on well with the Englishman. The Muslim Egyptians could be further divided into three sub-categories the Ulama hierarchy, the administrative squirearchy, and the fellaeen. The Ulama of al-Azhar Mosque constitute a religious corporation divided into different level recognized by the government. The number of Ulama is limited for the rank of Alim obligates certain studies and examinations at the University of al-Azhar, therefore many who can officiate religious service are not technically speaking Ulama. The three chief Ulama are: the Grand Mufti, the chief law-doctor who issues fatwas about doubtful points of the sacred law and whose spiritual authority, despite the archaic and backward nature of his views, has to be respected by English reformers; the head of al-Azhar University, who exercises a measure of control in temporal matters on the Ulama, since he himself is an Alim; and lastly the Grand Qadi, the greatest of all Ulama, who is always a Turk from Constantinople (169-76). The religious hierarchy is also composed of a crowd of Imams, inferior Qadis, and other agents scattered all over the whole country to keep alive the ecclesiastical influence. The whole religious hierarchy is more or less hostile to the British reformer on two grounds: the reforms will raise embarrassing questions about their appropriation, as a privileged class, of religious funds intended to support mosques and feed the poor; and certainly the British reformer, by dint of his creed, is anticipated to shake the sentiments and foundations of their ancient faith. Since the village is the administrative unit in Egypt, the squirearchy of Omdas and Sheiks of villages, responsible for securing public order, represent the corner stone of provincial society. These are composed of landed proprietors lying midway between the Pasha and the fellah; their great submissiveness to the Pashas was only tempered by the Urabis rebellion considered to express the aspirations of Sheikdom against the domination of Pashdom. They have mixed feelings about the British reformer: on the one hand, the British occupation deprived them from plundering the fellah and consolidated their submission to the Pashas; on the other, they hope that British intervention would pad the heavy hand of the Pashas. After all, it was the British rule that taught them that they are humans who have rights to be defended; yet there would be always feelings of resentment due to Englands curbing their time-honoured tyranny over the fellaheen. The fellah is the most interesting and sympathydeserving class among the dwellers of Egypt. His importance for the British reformer springs from two facts: the fellaheen constitute the immense majority of the population in Egypt; and they possess absolutely no privilege since they stand on the lowest rank of the social ladder, they are indiscriminately robbed and flogged by everyone. Certainly, the fellah has everything to gain and nothing to lose from the efforts made on his behalf by the British reformer. It is doubtful that he can appreciate this, though he is wise enough to know that he was far better off than he was prior to the occupation. The fellaheen are, politically speaking, ciphers. They are too apathetic, too ignorantto give utterance in any political audible form to their 145

opinions even when they have any. In spite of his ignorance and ingratitude, it is hoped that in the future the descendants of the fellah would appreciate the fact that it was the AngloSaxon race that delivered them from their oppressors, bestowed on them the material blessings of Western civilization, and opened to them the path for moral progress and thought elevation. Even less important are the Bedouins, the last category of Muslim dwellers, who are semi-sedentary nomads, characterized by cruelty, aggressiveness, and aptitude to cause various sorts of disturbances. They despise the fellaheen whom they consider an unmanly race. They do not exercise any political influence; there has been a tendency among them to settle in villages and abandon their nomadic way of life (184-99). The second category Christians may be divided into three sub-categories the Copts, the Syrians, and the Armenians. The 1897 census showed that there are 608,000 Copts in Egypt, who belong mainly to the Orthodox Church, though few Catholics and Protestants also exist. It has to be stressed first that the Coptic Christian remained stagnant like the Egyptian Muslim, whose traits and characteristics were assimilated by the Copt. Unlike the Muslim, whose immutability is irremediable because of his religion, the stagnation of the Copt, whose religion sanctions progress, was because he was Oriental, that is, surrounded by associations antagonistic to progress (201-202). Due to long centuries of Muslim oppression, the Copt developed mediocre aptitudes: he manifests great flexibility in adapting himself to changing situation; he contents himself with the crumbs falling from the Muslim table; he managed to make himself useful and even indispensable to his oppressors through his mastery of an archaic system of mathematics and land measurement. Although it might be logically expected that the Copt, bound to the British reformer by a general community of religion, was to be allied to the latter who rescued him from the Muslim oppression, illogically enough the Copt was animated by unfriendly manner towards the British reformer. This was because while the British occupation aroused at first in the Copt high hopes for a privileged treatment, thought to be fair enough in relation to the Muslims, the impartial treatment of the Englishman to both Muslims and Copts aroused in the latter feelings of resentment. Besides, under the British auspices the Copt was under the threat of being supplanted by his rival the Syrian Christian (207-209). The Syrian Christians form a small community much less in number than the Copts, yet they derive their importance from their public positions and personal qualities. For considerable number of upper and middle-class Syrians occupy important positions in the government bureaucracy. This brought on him the resentment and jealousy of both Muslims and Copts yearning to occupy his place as well as the dislike of the mass of the population, who sees in the Syrian a merciless moneylender. The Syrian Christian has extremely important qualification: he speaks both Arabic, the language of the population and French, the language of the administration; and through his French education he acquired knowledge and logical thinking. Therefore, he was more useful to the modernizing governments than the Copt or the Muslim and under the same circumstances he is godsend to the British reformer (214-16). A high-class Syrian is a refined and civilized gentleman on the European style, whose intellectual level and self-confidence rank him high above the Copt and the Europeanized Egyptian. Like the Copt, he does not exhibit his unfriendly attitude openly towards the British reformer, since he is attracted to French administrative methods, 146

but he renders himself useful to the Englishman and accepts all what is given to him. However much small the Armenian community, which consists mostly of shopkeepers, might be, it is distinguished by occupying very high positions under the Egyptian government. The Syrians, despite their high qualifications, never pushed beyond secondary places, but the Armenians attained the highest administrative ranks. For instance, Nubar Pasha was one of the prominent prime ministers and his son-in-law Tigrane Pasha was for a long time the Under-Secretary for Foreign affairs and subsequently became Foreign minister (218-20). The third category Europeanized Egyptians deserves a special rank of its own, due to its inmates somewhat important position among other dwellers of Egypt. As long as Egypt advances on the route of civilization, Europeanized Egyptians will grow in number and will experience major changes; they will become more European in spirit and less Egyptian. They represent a class many of whom are, at the same time, demoslemised Moslems and invertebrate Europeans. The majority of Europeanized Egyptians are Muslims, who grew extremely agnostic by dint of their European education, which in its turn brought them closer to the European and further from the traditional Alim, who was considered as a social derelict and utilized for political purposes, yet need not be respected by the Europeanized Egyptian. Although the Europeanized Egyptian has lost his Islamism, orthe best part of it and as such he is cut off from the main foundations of his creed, he rarely makes an approach towards Christianity. Some of them, however, make use of worthy portions of their religion that permit them to have a lax moral code largely adapted to their tastes and conveniences in worldly matters. The Europeanized Egyptian, who is not by any means a true Muslim, has torn himself from his creed as well as his culture. Therefore, he is much unlike the European free-thinker, who might attack the Christian dogma but cannot fail to recognize the value of Christian morality and its progressive aspects and to find cultural footing in his social medium. Having amputated himself from the creed of his forefathers, the Europeanized Egyptian is left only with cynicism and egoism as the main motives for his social and cultural conduct. Furthermore, he is reduced to a pseudo-European imitator of the European system and cannot comprehend that behind the external eccentric movements of the European civilization is deeply seated Christian morality. Unaware of his defect, the demoslemised Moslem is inferior because he does not have behind him 1900 years of Christianity (22833). Contenting himself with aping French organizational procedures and legal codes that relieved him of the responsibility to think for himself or take any initiative, the Europeanized Egyptian, with few exception, is Anglophobe and the intensity of his unfriendly feelings has unfortunately increased along the years of occupation (240 & 243-4). The last category The Europeans, who mounted to 113,000 persons according to the 1897 census, cannot be classified by nationalities, since many of them are Levantines. The Levantine is a European resident of the Ottoman dominions situated in the Levant, who by virtue of his long stay in the Levant acquired Levantine characteristics, or even had them in his own country of origin before immigrating to the Levant. Levantines are in fact orientalized Europeans in the manner of Egyptian Muslims who, by virtue of their European education, are Gallicised Egyptians. Nevertheless, a Levantine repels being designated by that appellation because he is aware of its low-ranking connotations as well as of the material 147

benefits bestowed on him by his foreign nationality towards which he often develops an ardent degree of nationalism. Germans and English rarely develop into Levantines for they preserve their characteristics more or less intact, whereas Italians, who exist in large numbers in Egypt, are considered to be typical Levantines. The Levantines, who constitute a very industrious and laborious class of merchants, professional men, and shopkeepers, suffer in reputation due to mediocre attitudes exhibited by a small minority. Such a few individuals perceive the Egyptians as their prey from prince to peasant; they have enhanced whatever national defects they had as they arrived in Egypt; and they utilized and even exploited the ignorance, low moral standards, and weakness of native Egyptians. The small amount of good they have done by introducing European capital to Egypt was outmatched by their behaviors that related the name of Europeans in the mind of Egyptians with a total absence of scruple in the pursuit of gain (245-50). Towards the British reformer and other British subjects residing in Egypt, they developed a mixed attitude. For, on one hand they respect British officials for their fine qualities, though British regulations and procedures face them with an enigma. On the other hand, they looked askance at British reforms that hindered them from plundering the Egyptian upper class as well as the fellaheen, though they realize that it is the British occupation that protects them in the event of an eruption of Muslim fanaticism (2556). Similarly, the non-British master utilized the same panoptical structures and techniques to architect a class-logical order that solves the Egyptian question through throwing its inhabitants each in or at times out of his class-logical place. The structure of the Panopticon with its partitions, passages, and cells remained more or less intact, yet the cells were replenished with new inmates, whose badges and uniforms were newly tailored; and the whole place was even given a couple of brushes. Now let us make a new visiting round to those fresh painted cells with their newly uniformed inmates, which the non-British master created in order to establish Arab socialism, to make social solidaritythe basis of Egyptian society, and to realize the aims of the revolution of July 23, 1952, the creation of a co-operative socialist society, free of any political, social, or economic exploitation (AbdelMalek, 1968:288-9). The first class the landed aristocracy or upper-bourgeoisie constituted 0.5% of the landowners in Egypt and possessed 34% of the cultivated land. A group of large owners (280 owners) held 583,400 feddans, which makes out 10% of the total landownership. The landed aristocracy could be divided into two sub-groups. The first group was composed of those magnates, who managed their property by leasing it to compradors, for by the year 1952 75% of the owned land was leased. This group, comprised mainly of the ex-monarch and his family, was backed in its exploitation of the peasants by a network of supplementary methods: multiple taxes; rise in land rental to match the rise in prices of crops; sale of fertilizers; rental of machinery; and usurious loans. The second group engulfed the rich cultivators, a minority of the large land proprietors, who preferred to work their lands themselves to produce raw materials for manufacturing or to sell consumer goods to the local and international markets (Abdel-Malek, 1968:57-9). Through the Agrarian reform law of 1952, fixing the ceiling of 148

landownership at 200 feddans per person and decreeing the expropriated lands distribution to the peasants, the landed aristocracy was simply liquidated (71). Added to this, the abolition of the party-system represented not only the end of the landed aristocracys power but its extermination from the political space once and for all (83). The second class the industrial bourgeoisie was actually given a new impetus during the First World War through supplying the British forces; hence the establishment of numerous mercantile firms and many factories of spinning and weaving, oil pressing, tanning, grain milling, and metalworking. The new bourgeoisie of the cities, consisting of merchants, industrialists, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and engineers, opened new investment alleys for the funds of the rich landowners. This was manifested by the national fund-raising project, stirred by the Wafd partys call to boycott English products and banks in order to promote Egypts commerce and industry under the auspices of Bank Misr. It is argued that the bourgeoisie had two wings: the national bourgeoisie that represented the rural rich, the merchants, and the intellectuals; and the upper bourgeoisie that had a very complex structure. The upper bourgeoisie, attracted to industry only when foreign capital infiltrated it and made huge profits from it, directed its investments to the field of industry in collaboration with foreign corporations as a junior partner (9-11). In 1948, the total capital of all corporations reached 117,935,000 L.E, of which 61% belonged to foreigners. The monopolist character of the industrial bourgeoisie was to be seen in the sugar, cement, fertilizers, and distilleries industries (14-15). Unlike the landed aristocracy whose extermination was one of the most pressing priorities of the 1952 regime, the bourgeoisie entered for almost ten years into alliance with the military junta. For the latters willingness to launch major economic development projects made it necessary to offer private capital the opportunity to take part in industrial projects alone or in cooperation with the public sector. Assuring the patriotic character of the national bourgeoisie, as a part of the government-led popular coalition, in contradistinction from the landed aristocracy and foreign corporations, as arms of imperialist intervention and exploitation, as well as nationalizing the latters economic assets and properties proved to be a blessing, since it rid the bourgeoisie, with on stroke, of all its local and foreign rivals and boosted its economic and political status (132-3). Yet, with one stroke the socialist laws of July 1962, the assets and corporations of the national bourgeoisie, now lumped with the other reactionary forces acting in collusion with the imperialists to sabotage the socialist experiment, were completely nationalized and the whole class had been simply dismantled (160-61). The two compartments of the popular working-forces alliance and the reactionary forces collaborating with imperialism were dynamically used to brand and intern the different social classes in Egypt; the rich landowners, the middle-class Muslim brotherhood, or even the labour movement leaders and members of the communist party. For instance, the Muslim brotherhood was deported from the first to the second (refusing to cooperate with the military junta and being demolished by means of torture), whereas the communists and unionists were herded exactly in the opposite direction (disbanding the communist party and joining the ranks of the one-party). The third class the new technocracy or the managerial class was actually created by the military regime, after having turned its back on politicians, managing directors, and law 149

experts of aristocratic and bourgeois origin, in order to administrate the huge public sector intended to lead the economy along the socialist path. The civilian ministerial group of 1961 was composed of technicians, economists, and engineers with Anglo-Saxon training; they were graduates of London school of economics, Harvard, and the MIT. With the nationalization laws of 1961 and 1962, those who occupied middle-management positions in private companies were kicked upwards to top management reserved previously for large stockholders and their favorites. The corporations boards were completely reshuffled in the favor of the new class; in April 1962 the figures of a government report on the distribution of the managerial personnel among 38 public agencies showed that of 301 board members there were 57 engineers and scientists, 57 holders of doctors degrees, and 187 high state officials, army officers, and company officials, most of which were graduates in law or business administration, or even literature and engineering. To fill the ranks of middle-management level 30,000 students were in 1960 admitted to trade schools, such figure rose in 1961 to 37,000 of which 11,315 were in high schools and 1,250 in technical institutes. Nevertheless, the class the military regime created and provided with real opportunities to join the ranks of the ruling elite along with the members of the military junta had been politically sterilized through laws regulating professional association in a manner guaranteeing their regimentation like trade unions (174-7). The classes of peasants and urban workers were always lumped together as the backbone of the government-created working-people forces alliance. Both classes were conceived to be the main beneficiaries of the political revolution, ousting the imperialists, political parties, and the monarchy, as well as of the social revolution, dismantling the social and economic structures of exploitation designed by the landed aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Concerning the peasants, the successive agrarian reforms benefited mainly the rural middle class, which, according to landownership, could be classified into three strata: the owners of 5-10, 10-50, and 50-100 feddans. The first group increased its average amount of land from 8.8% to 10.1%, whereas the seconds average landownership decreased from 18.7% to 14.9%, though its amount of possessed land increased from 21.6% to 21.9%. The third group profited from the agrarian reform for it owned a higher percentage of land (10.5%). As to the poor peasant group (owning less than 5 feddans), their percentage increased from 35.4% to 54.7% and their average landownership rose from 8.8% to 10.1%. The elimination of feudal classes and rich peasants (owning more than 200 feddans) created a political and economic space to be filled by rural middle classes. However, this class, perceived as the main beneficiary of agrarian reforms, was much more politically impotent than it was prior to 1952. Although many army officers of the ruling junta had a rural middle class background, the influence of such class was severely curtailed and reduced to a supporting group of the military regime (Perlmutter, 1974:117-22). As for urban workers, claimed to have tangibly gained from the policies of nationalization and heavy industrialization, their numbers increased drastically; 100,000 workers were added between 1950 and 1963. Workers in modern industry, who could be classified as proletariat, represented almost 3% of the total population in Egypt and 10% of city dwellers, whilst the lumpenproletariat, composed of unskilled handicraft workers, represented 56% of the working 150

class and 16.6% of the whole population. The 3% of skilled workers have had their economic conditions and political representation significantly improved. This could be attested by the fact that their representatives held 13.5% of the seats in the 1964 Parliament as well as their key role in toppling down Nassers political rivals and being one of the few organized groups supporting him. Yet, neither the improvement of their economic lot nor the high proportion of their parliamentary representation reflected any increase of their political power, since their representatives, classified by the government as workers, belonged to the professional and governmental employee groups. It is noteworthy that the governments manipulation of class categories through basing them on occupational classification covered up the actual class division and exaggerated the political power of these classes. Neither the working class nor the rural middle class, despite supporting the military regime and profiting economically from its policies, served as a major source of political power (122-4). After having depicted the different parts of the Panopticon, Foucault noticed that this most terribly omnipresent and most ruthlessly omnipotent machine has a diabolical aspect10. It was this diabolical aspect of the Panopticon, where power is no longer identified with a person but is a machinery of its own that rendered useless both the eagle and the sun (Foucault, 1997-b: 217). In fact, Foucaults focusing on modern power-techniques in France and Northern Europe, as Mitchell has incisively pointed out, blinded his analysis from taking into consideration their colonizing nature. After all, the Panopticon was a colonial invention devised on Europes colonial frontier with the Ottoman state, and its examples were for the most part built not in northern Europe but in colonial settings (Mitchell, 1989:35). Following this line of critique, one can argue that the diabolical aspect of the European Panopticon rendering useless the sun and the eagle was matched by, for want of a better term, a lordly aspect of the colonial Panopticon designed to render more efficient the sun and the eagle. To put it in spatial terms, what seemed to be diabolical about Foucaults Panopticon was that the circular principle and the pyramidal principle intersected in too many echelons and in infinite locations, which deprived the Panopticon of a single fixed point to which the global unifying gaze could be entrusted. By contrast, our Panopticon, which did not spontaneously evolve but was willingly constructed by modernizers and colonizers, was designed in a way that, no matter in how many locations the circular and pyramidal principles came into contact with one another, both were bound to intersect with one another only in one single location, where the machine is granted an absolute fixed point all its powers were to be entrusted to. The lordly aspect of the transplanted Panopticon manifested itself in that all the strings and chords connecting the different parts of the machine were held by one single, invisible or visible, hand. In a word, Foucaults Panopticon had no exterior because it internalized everything, whilst our Panopticon excelled it by exteriorizing from within just one single point that majestically transcends this incessant internalization. The lordly aspect was nowhere better demonstrated than in Cromers position of lordship as the single intersection point between the circular principle, I have just portrayed, and the pyramidal principle, I will deal with now, and as the only real head of the triplehumped Panopticon he constructed. The lordship position constituted that portion of the 151

government machinery, whose functions are incapable of exact definition, but whose existence are none the less real, since the functioning of the whole machine depends on it, even if it went unnoticed by superficial observers. The unseen is often more important than the seen. Although it is defective that huge authorities were vested in the hands of the British Consul-General, under the existing condition of affairs in Egypt, it is impossible to substitute anything better in its place. One of the first duties to be fulfilled by the British ConsulGeneral was to set moral standards in public and private life of the Egyptians, to curb corruption in the administration, and to teach the Egyptian mind the values of honesty. Since there was no definite policy set by the British government to be implemented in Egypt, the course of action of the British Consul-General was decided according to the merits of each case he had to deal with. For instance, he had to encourage reformers but to check their enthusiasm, lest it shakes the social fabric; he had to explain to the archaic world of Mohammedans the difference between the 7th and the 19th centuries; he had to support the supremacy of the Sultan without allowing any Turkish interference leading to relapse to barbarism, and so forth. The lordship position was not only about concentrating all the strings of the machine in one hand but most importantly to make this hand invisible. I had to maintain British authority, explained his lordship, and, at the same time, to hide as much as possible the fact that I was maintaining it. To see but not to be seen was after all the logic of the panoptic machine. (Cromer, 2000:321-5). The whole pyramidal machine, to which the British reformer was the unseen head, consisted of the following constellations of parts. The first was created by virtue of international arrangements preceding the British occupation. Therefore, the functioning of its parts as well as their constitution cannot be changed without the approval of the Powers. This constellation consists of commission of the public debt, railway board administering the telegraph department and the port of Alexandria, Daira administration, and domains administration. Added to this, justice was administered by the following courts: mixed tribunals; native tribunals; consular courts; and makama shariya. The second constellation, the Turkish-Egyptian consisted of the following parts. First, of the Sultan, whose relation to the Khedive was laid down by a variety of firmans stating among other things that Egyptians are Ottoman subjects and taxes should be levied in the name of the Sultan, that the Khedive has no right to conclude international treaties with foreign states, that no territorial concession could be made on the side of the Khedive, and that the coinage of Egypt is to be issued in the name of the Sultan. Second, of the Khedive, who is theoretically the Wali appointed by the Sultan but lately succeeded in constitutionalizing his position relatively by governing through and with his Council of Ministers and at the same time asserting his legitimate prerogatives. Third, of the Ministers, each minister presides a department of the Egyptian administrative machine; the seven departments are foreign affairs, finance, justice, war, public works, education, and the interior. The position of an Egyptian minister is delicate due to the existence of European officials subordinating him in every department; the relations between the two parties are not without problems and conflicts, but the Ministers relations with their British coadjutors were most cordial and friendly. Fourth, of a local supervision and administration frame composed of several councils initiated by the Organic Law of 1883. The 152

provincial council, consisting of from 8 to 3 members according to the size of each Mudirieh, was presided by the Mudir and had to deal with local matters. There existed 70 of such provincial councils. The legislative council was composed of 30 members, 14 of each were appointed by the government, another 14 elected by the provincial councils, and the remaining 2 members chosen from Cairo and Alexandria. The council was entitled to discuss legislations, which could not pass without being examined and approved by the council, as well as budget plans, although the government was not bound by the views of the council on such matters, yet it had to give its reasons in case of turning them down. The legislative assembly consisted of 82 members, who were the 6 ministers, the 30 legislative council members, and 46 delegates to be elected from the population according to specific conditions. The assembly had to be consulted in matters of railways and canals construction, public loans, and land classification according to the payment of land-taxes. Although it could express its views on economic, administrative, and financial matters, the government was under no obligation to adopt such views, but reasons for this had to be stated (263-73). The third constellation, or the strong motive power, without which the whole government machine would not have functioned, was furnished by the British officials in the service of the Egyptian government (279). To succeed in performing the tasks allotted to them as a body, British officials must be endowed with specific qualities, for instance high character, sufficient elasticity of mind, sound judgement, being well mannered and conciliatory. But, above all a British official must efface himself as much as possible. Although the British Consul-General can give him advice from time to time, he had to rely mainly on his individual judgement and force of character. In a word, the British official had to make the fact that the soldiers of his nation are in occupation of the country felt without flaunting their presence in any brusque fashion before the eyes of his Egyptian superior (281-3). The Financial Adviser is one of the most important position held by British officials, since the financial affairs of the country had to be organized after the Urabi revolt. The British Financial Adviser, Sir Auckland Colvin had no executive authorities and there had been no attempt to define his duties in a precise manner, yet he had to be present at the meetings of the Council of Ministers. He guided the Ministers on financial matters, kept the British Consul-General well informed, and often gave palatable advice on his behalf (286-7). The department of justice based on the French model was completely at mess that there was no Egyptian minister able to cope with the situation. Therefore, it was agreed upon to appoint a British official, Sir John Scott to the post of Judicial Adviser, to whom the country owes the establishment of a sound judicial system. Although the Public Works Department was presided by French officials, it was consented to appoint a British Under-Secretary, Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff to supervise the canalization system in Egypt. There were three sub-departments affiliated to the Ministry of Finance, the Customs, the Lighthouses, and the Post Office; the first two were under British supervision and the Post Office was reorganized by a British Director-General. The Police was first commanded by a British Inspector-General with few British officers under his command, then this post was replaced by an Adviser, Sir Eldon Grost. The head of the Sanitary Department is British, who was also the Director-General of Prisons. The Education Department became 153

under the guidance of a British Adviser, Mr. Dunlop (290-3). The function of Lord Cromer as well as other British officials was to offer friendly advise to the Egyptian government on matters of administration. Certainly, advise had the full meaning of a command, for the governments that opposed it collapsed and the personnel that ignored it were sent to oblivion. As a matter of fact, the role of British officials was to combine chastely chords of the machine into the hands of the British Consul-General who became the uncrowned ruler of Egypt (Lutfi Al-Sayyid, 1968:66). The British reformer constructed a panoptic machine so that the lordly aspect rendering more efficient the sun and the eagle would be most immanent. But, in spite of this or even because of this, he was extremely faithful to the panoptic logic of invisibility to see but not to be seen. The machine was constructed so as to have a majestic head from whose eyes the omnipresent gaze was alertly peeping to permeate and engulf all its parts. Yet, all necessary precautions were taken to bury this head in and hide it carefully behind the various important and unimportant parts of the machine. It was this faithfulness to the invisibility principle that distinguished the Lord-administered colonial Panopticon from the Presidentdirected domesticated one. The panoptic machine was functioning perfectly, since it not only took root in the colonized soil, but also struck down its deceptive humps (the Turkish and the international). Most importantly, the machine, after having consolidated its position, raised its cautiously hidden, real head high above the other parts, weighed so heavily upon them, and unveiled its omnipresent eyes with their piercing gazes. After all, the Arabic word for President Rais is grammatically an exaggeration-form that literally means the huge head. At the center of the panoptic machine and on top of its pyramid of political power stood now the Rais, Gamal Abdel Nasser. He was the most important decision maker, wielding almost unlimited executive and legislative power. The former members of the Free Officers and the Revolutionary Command Council, abolished in 1956, aided the Rais and held the highest government posts under Nasser. For example, the percentage of officer members in the cabinet fluctuated from 45% in 1952, to 32% in 1956, to 47% in 1965. Army officers as a ruling group were distributed on key government institutions in economics, industry, and diplomacy. This ruling group composed of 1000 loyal officers headed by the Free Officers veterans enjoyed since 1952 like no other group a tremendous increase in its share of the highest political and economic privileges (Perlmutter, 1974:111-2). The National Union was established to give the nation a solid foundation in the political, social, and economic realms, and to provide the necessary link, lacked by the Revolutionary Council, between the Republic and the Popular base (144-5). Its structure of the National Union gives a clear idea of the Panopticons post-colonial pyramidal principle, since the party structure paralleled that of the UARs government, and was always indistinguishable from it. It should however be noted that the complex hierarchy of the organization was more a blueprint than an operating mechanism, because only the supreme organs and the higher echelons were put into operation. It was not possible on the middle and lower levels to distinguish between the organs that were actually in operation and those that were merely tentative plans. The highest authority in the NUs pyramid was the Supreme Executive Committee, headed by the President of the NU and the UAR and composed of the inspectors general of the two regions 154

(Egypt and Syria), and the UAR cabinet consisting of 18 Egyptian and Syrian ministers. This organ linked the party to the government and was in fact the highest executive authority of both. The NUs national organs were divided into two administrative areas: regional and national. First, the northern and southern regional congresses, which were responsible for local and regional activities, had their membership fixed by the Rais in Cairo. The head of each congress was the inspector general of the region who was appointed by the Rais (AbdelHakin Amer for the North and Kamal el-din Hussein for the South) and who directed the Ministry of local government. Each congress had 17 functional committees to aid it in performing its tasks in the domains of finance, industry, health, art, science, and so forth. Second, the General Congress, which was the main national organ convening once a year at the direction of the Rais, included in its membership persons nominated by the Rais, regional inspectors, as well as local committees. At the middle level of the NU, there was the Executive Committee of the Governorate composed of the executive committees of district and town members as well as members of the General Congress. At the bottom of the NU pyramid was the Popular base, an elected body intended to mobilize popular support through providing the necessary link between the higher echelons and the lower ranks in order. This was done through the Local Government Central Committee consisting of a group of ministers appointed by the Rais (149-51). The importance of the NU lay in that it was constructed to assimilate the Syrian provinces in the UAR and mobilize popular support in both regions for the newly born state. However, the building up of a pyramid of local, regional, and national committees reaching to Cairo proved to be unsuccessful for the chain broke off before it reached the center. The head of the Panopticon was weighing heavily on all other parts; the Egyptian-Syrian Union collapsed after only 3 years through the efforts of the Syrian Unionists who had once invited the Rais to rule Syria (154-5).

The Muslim Daseins encounter with death

Certainly, the wheel has made a full circle; the colonized became the colonizer. The Muslim Dasein was caught up in the cogs and gears of the panoptic machine that tore up his body (for he was its prisoner and prison-guard) and shattered his soul (for he was swinging in the space between his cell and his watching room). This could be understood in two ways: Firstly, modernization was all about re-centering the whole body-politic around the coercive state, since reform signified neither doing away with the ancien rgime nor imbuing the administration with the principles of freedom and justice. Rather, Nizam djadid aimed at strengthening the traditional Ottoman army and providing it with modern weaponry and expertise in order to maintain the status quo. This was what Bertran Badie called la logique tatique dominating the behaviour and policies of the acteur importateurs. This logic had the side effect of drawing the contours of a counter-legitimacy, because it simply ousts Islam altogether from the public space. In contrast to European secularizations ending the historical rivalry between the two authorities through striking a historical compromise and laying down a division of jurisdiction between religion and politics, secularization in the importing context 155

lacking any ecclesiastical institution, signified cleansing the political space from the intermediary role of the Ulemma, unfettering the state-apparatus from any legal or religious checks, and subjugating the whole polity to the majestic will of one person; the Pasha, the Lord, or the President. In a very symbolic gesture, Muhammad Ali exiled Ummar Makram and other Ulama who dared to oppose his policies publicly and who have actually brought him to power. Sheikh Nury of Iran was executed publicly for defending the comprehensive jurisdiction of Sharia during the 19th century constitutional revolution. The abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk deprived the whole Muslim Umma from its thirteen-century old central institution and from the political expression of its religious unity. Minor-status Arab modernizers took pleasure in ridiculing publicly the main pillars of the Muslim faith as well as its rituals in the name of Djihad for modernization as the new religious duty; Bourghibas breaking the fasting publicly in Ramadan was only a gesture of an eradication faith to which the state-apparatus was converted. Secondly, modernization was all about establishing a government machinery, where each wheel is regulated to a nicetythat each portionis adapted to perform a certain specified bit of work and is under such perfect control that it cannot interfere with the functions of any other portions. It was about producing a highly finished piece of workmanship (Cromer, 2000:260-1). The panoptic machine, functioning through techniques of individualization and collectivization, will establish the artificial bonds necessary for creating an imagined community, the dwellers of Egypt. In the words of Cromer, it will mould into something really useful with a view of its becoming eventually autonomousthe rawest of raw material (Cromer, 2000:131). This imagery of machinery was not simply a suspension of the classical imagery of the Muslim community which in its care and mercifulness is like the one body, whenever one of its organs complains (of illness or weakness), the others will summon themselves to watch for it and protect it. Rather, underlying the imagery of mechanization was that of Islam as a body, which is not, indeed, dead, and which may yet linger on for centuries, but which is nevertheless politically and socially moribund, and whose gradual decay cannot be arrested by any modern palliatives. For anyremedy proposed would be either inefficacious or would destroy not only the fungus but at the same time the parent tree (184). One has always to keep in mind that the rusty principles laid down thirteen centuries ago by Mohammed i.e. Islam cannot be reformedreformed Islam is no longer Islam; it is something else (263 & 229). This imagery does not suggest by any means the clean mechanization11 of the body, but it pertains to the building up of a pyramidal machinery standing upon the stinking and decaying body of Islam and crushing its main social and political joints in order to speed up its natural decomposition process. Let me round up this chapter with one short but striking scene that sums up the whole story. During the investigation of Sadats assassin, he declared proudly I am Khaled alIslambuli, I killed the Pharaoh, and I do not fear death (cited in Esposito, 1992:96). Several attempts were made to decipher the message enclosed in this statement through explaining the link between the re-investment of the religious tradition of Pharaonism and the open political 156

rebellion against the presumably modernizing autocrat12. I contend that the previous statement could be only existentially understood. When Khaled Al-Islambul opened fire on his ruler and struck him dead, he was simultaneously highlighting with his bullets a certain power relationship between both men and ardently trying to redress its huge irreceprocity. Such asymmetrical political relationship was originally forged in the Panopticon that colonized the whole public space and sliced the whole Umma into sharply distinctive military or praetorian societies. The panoptic machine, having struck its roots in the colonized settings, did not only grow a huge head pounding heavily on the other parts and unveiled its majestic eyes with their piercing gazes. More than this, it spoke the local language of power in the most deafening tone; the machine has actually succeeded in giving life to and bestowing modern garbs on the millennial pre-Islamic traditions of Oriental despotism in the colonized settings. Did not the Muhammad Ali, the Mamluk adventurer, confess that he greatly admired the Pharaohs? Did not Sadat describe himself as the last Pharaoh and Nasser as a great Pharaoh? And are not the governments key-institutions, bridges, and squares, up till the present moment, inside the country as well as abroad, dressed in Pharaonic clothing? The newly born Panoptic-Pharaonic tradition of governance and its accompanying political relationship faced the Muslim Dasein with the existential possibility of death. Thus, the Muslim Dasein was vehemently avenging itself from the head of the machine colonizing his body-politic and dismantling his very existence by means of historical instruments refashioned for the occasion. Added to this, at the moment of confrontation, when the whole political relationship exploded and with it the head of the Pharaoh, the Muslim Dasein was able to transcend the barrier of his anxiety in the face of death or, in Heideggers words, to take over strongly the possibility of death. Through liberating himself from his political subjectivity (the role of integral marginalization assigned to him in the political space) centered on such existential anxiety, he has masterfully redressed the irreceprocity of the strategic situation and consequently reversed the game of life and death.


Chapter four: The Question of the meaning of Being

The Being question represents the discursive context of the Qutbian discursive practice, accurately demarcating its Spielraum and furnishing it with starting-points, motivation, sense of direction, mode of action, intermediate goals, and final destination. Seeking to highlight the missing question of Being and to give it new orientation, Heidegger hammered down its formal structure. The first two elements of this structure concerning the interrogated (das Befragte) and the interrogator (das Fragende), which were the Muslim Dasein in our case, were extensively dealt with in the previous part. This chapter aims to vivify the two remaining elements Being (das Gefragte) and the conceptualization of Being (das Erfragte) through relocalizing both in what Talal Asad calls authorial intentions. These are certainly not the unconscious motives of the author as such, but simply those intentions the structure of the text itself discloses to the reader. It is through the successive formulations subordinate to twists and turns of the works formal structure of the Muslim Daseins question of Being that the meaning of its Being as well as its conceptualization revealed themselves reticently. For although the existential condition weighing upon the Muslim Dasein forced it to cross-examine the meaning of its very Being, a task carried out meticulously and torturously, the Being question all the more restrained by this existential burden was sometimes metamorphic, at other times very elusive and slippery, and most of the time understated. To side-step this obstacle, I opted for grappling with three elements throughout the analyzed works: the acknowledged condition of affectedness stimulating the Being question; the different forms it assumed; and the fashion it was played with and pushed in different directions and corners.

Shakib Arslan
Although Arslan was not the first to affront the Being question, nor was he even capable of providing the most satisfactory response to it, his tentative deserves to be favorably cast before other attempts to wrestle with the Being question. For he presented in a semi-prophetic fashion its most salient formula that ciphered the problems besieging the Muslim Dasein and bore the traits of its existential genre. The Arslan formula remains, up to the present moment, the secret password for modern Arab political thought en masse, without which there is no entry, but most tragically its enigma, with which there is no exit. Most of the theoretical detours of modern Arab thought (Qutbs endeavor included though in a very unique style) are but successive editions and variations of Arslans formula having no other objective than breaking its codes, sometimes in the literal sense. The novelty of Arslans endeavor, characteristic of the post-Almoahedien era, to deal with the Being question shines on comparing it with al-Ghazalis. Though al-Ghazali, as Ali Umliel pointed out, was unwinding his thought during the first crusade, his Ihya ulum al-din enclosed no mention of the Other or any consciousness of inferiority in comparison to him, nor was there even an inquiry regarding the Others means of progress to be imported. If al-Ghazalis inquiry was premised 158

on the wedge between the corrupt condition of Muslims and the transcendental yardstick of Islam, a wedge to be bridged by al-Ihia (revival), Arslans was in contrast haunted by the dualism of European progress and Muslim backwardness. Since, from the 19th century onwards, the Other will irremediably show albeit in different colors and costumes in our Being question with all his ontological axioms, historiography, grand meta-narratives, social and cultural norms, and political recipes (Umlil, 1985:20). Petrifying anxiety about Islams very existence, which represented the undercurrent condition peeping through the structure of Arslans work, unveiled itself boldly in three instances. The first instance was a glimpse of European colonialism: the colonial hymn assuring Italian mothers that their sons are dying for the sake of crushing the accursed nation, fighting the Islamic religion, and erasing the Quran (Arslan, 1985:57); French colonial strategy seeking to eradicate the religion of Islam and the Arabic language (closing Islamic schools, imprisonment for the Ulama who taught the Quran to children, abolition of many Ulama-associations, and preventing Quran teachers from entering the Berber zones); Frances encouraging its flock of priests and preachers to roam the whole Maghreb, build Churches, and christianize Muslim Orphans and homeless (62-3). The second instance was a sparkle of local collaboration: it does not concern the liability of a few corrupt individuals, rather it is the responsibility of the whole Umma that vindicated injustice, corruption, dissension, and treachery to the extent that the Muslims archenemy became the Muslims themselves. In fact, the whole Umma is in danger (64-6). The third instance is a glitter of the geographical Muslims or the last solution: these are persons who boast of their individual non-religiosity and anti-religious politics, since it is only in this fashion that they can earn European honorary titles of modern, civilized, and moderate; and only can the Muslim become civilized and favored when he turns a blind eye on the de-Islamization of his fellow Muslims all over the world (73-4). Though all other nations acquired knowledge, achieved progress, and at the same time kept their faith, the only solution for the Muslim, in order to win progress, is to set aside his Quran, beliefs, moral principles, dress, food, drink, literature, art, and everything else, and to sever himself from his history (99). That is, to be a Muslim no more. The Arslan code epitomizing in hindsight the burning question of Being was the semiexclamatory question entitling his famous work1: Why did the Muslims retrogress and others progress?. It is noteworthy that Arslans double-headed paraphrasing of the question reflects accurately the duality of its original formulation. Actually, there were two questions: What are the reasons of the Muslims weakness and inferiority? and What are the reasons of the progress of Europeans and Americans?. However, the question was even more complex for it secreted a double-intersection point of four themes playfully conversing with each other. On the one hand, there is the contrast between the condition of religious and worldly inferiority and weakness of Muslims and the Quranic principle of the exaltation of the faithful, such a contrast leads to the secondary question: is it correct that the faithful would claim that he is exaltedonly because God said: Eminence belongs only to God, his Prophet, and the faithful?. On the other, there is another contrast between the insurmountable progress of Europeans and Americans and the probability that Muslims become like them in their 159

progress, such a contrast leads to the secondary question: can the Muslims still keep their religion Islam on following the European means of progress? (37-8). The four themes abetted each other to unveil in another location the occulted question that represents the main pivot of Arslans treatise: does Islam still remain among the Arabs and they retrogressed despite its existence and with themthe rest of the Muslims? Or it was lost among them and all what remains of belief is its formality? (42). Put it directly, is Islam the obstacle against progress and the main reason of Muslims backwardness? Behind the colorfulness of the four secondary themes with their emblematic intersection point, a strategic shift2 was prudently silhouetted: normative Islam as a self-correction mechanism for reform (as in the case of alGhazali), expressed in the principle of exaltation, was disposed of; the vacuum left behind was filled by the European-bound norm of progress in order to re-evaluate the Muslim historical and social experience; however, the transition was neither complete nor unalterable, but there had always been a vacillation between exaltation and progress. Therefore, to answer the real question a strategy taking exactly the opposite direction was put in effect: the norm of progress is to be domesticated to prove not only that Islam constituted no obstacle to progress but that Islam itself is progress. To implement such a strategy on the ground, three successive moves were played: identification; vacillation; and differentiation. The first move was to identify Islam with progress in two opposite but complementary ways: Islam was progress and progress is Islam. On one hand, a model was constructed to account for the progress of Muslims in the old times, according to which all progressive elements could be ascribed to the Islamic faith; for the Quran created the Arabs anew and brought them out of their peninsulato dominate the whole globe. PreIslamic civilizations of the Arabs are of no value because they did not aspire to universal mastery or forming global events. By this token, the backwardness of contemporary Muslims could be explained by the fact that they have lost the main cause of their progress; since Verily never will God change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves3. Islam was progress (41-5). On the other hand, another model was constructed to account for the progress of Europeans nowadays, according to which the European glories nations could be attributed to human and financial sacrifices for their nations and beliefs; for instance the Germans lost 2 millions in the First World war, the French almost 1.5 millions, the Italians 460,000, the British 600,000. By this token, the backwardness of contemporary Muslims could be judged by the fact that they emptied their religion and turned it to pure rituals and prayers, instead of making Djihad with their souls and fortunes like the Europeans; since If you help the cause of God, He will back you and plant your feet firmly4. Progress is Djihad (45-8). The second move was a clear vacillation between two antithetical norms in order to construct a synthetical model combining both as a guide for Muslims in their future course of action. From one side, there is the Quranic norm of Istikhlaf carried out by those who believe and do righteous deeds and God will, of a surety, grant them in the land inheritance, as He granted it to those before them; He will establish their religion, the one which He has chosen for them, and He will change replace their state of fear by security and peace5 (69). From the other side, there stands the Western norm of scientificism carried out by the 160

Europeans who spared no effort to embark on new fields of knowledge and promote their cognitive capacities. Since all human matters are relative in the sense that every age is formed by its own fields of knowledge, technical achievements, industries, and arts, the Muslims should struggle to acquire Western knowledge and technology. Otherwise, they will continue to linger in their current state of backwardness, but more important is that they should have the will and spirit animating mental faculties and benefiting from scientific achievements to found Western progress on the Nomos of God (78-7). The fusion of both norms was instigated by the question of whether acquiring Western means of progress leads to complete assimilation in the West and dissolution of Islam. The answer was that natural law as it exemplifies itself in the history of European societies attests to a tendency permeating all nations, to judge by the behavior of the English, the Irish, the Finish, the Danish, the Germans, and the Serbs, to conserve their languages, religions, traditions, arts, and even dresses. However, the fusion of both norms in a synthetic model to be followed by the Muslims to acquire progress is incarnated in the Japanese experience. Since Japan balanced the impossible equation of taking over European scientific and technological inventions to the extent of becoming a serious challenge to Europe, but simultaneously it attended to its culture, language, religion, rituals, traditions, and feelings (88-94). After domesticating the norm of progress through melting it with the norm of exaltation, the third move of differentiation between the progressive Islam and the backward Muslims was easily taken to provide a final answer to the Being question. Ossification was pinned down as the main cause of Muslim inferiority that prevented them from scientific research, confined them to the fields of language and religion, and as a consequence hindered them from investing their economic resources. It plays in the hands of the Europeanized for it turned the Muslims to useless Darwish and proved on the ground Western arguments regarding the backward and fatalistic nature of Islam (101-4). As a result, Muslims lost their self-confidence and interjected an inferiority complex towards Westerners, which materialized in unshakable pessimism and passivity blocking all opportunities and even hopes for reform (141-2). By contrast, Islam was the religion of civilization and invention as attested by the glorious history of the Islamic civilization in its golden ages (119-20). More than this, its principles inspire the spirit of scientific research and sanction intellectual achievement (133-6). Finally, Islam is no obstacle in the face of progress; Muslims can develop like the Europeans and Japanese and attain progress and prestige, only when they follow the route of Djihad, decreed by the Quran, through sparing no human or financial sacrifices for this goal. Muslims can progress and keep their faith, because progress is achieved by Djihad (163-4).

Muhammad Abduh
Abduhs significance in modern Arab thought lies in the fact that he was, to use Foucaults terms, a discursivity founder, since the trajectory of his multiple discursive confrontations led him to a new discursive terrain or a transcultural level, to use Salvatores word. Modern Arab thought was always guided or even misguided by the milestones set by Muhammad 161

Abduh, who was also in his right the founder of a new intellectual tradition. But Abduh was not writing as a faqih in the classical sense, for he spared no effort to criticize and reform the archaic intellectual tradition of al-Azhar. Nor was he even a mutakallim because in his several works he rebelled against the traditional frames, argumentation methods, and terminology of ilm al-kalam. Nevertheless, Abduh, as Laraoui correctly observed, remained faithful to the attitude or supreme goal of al-mutakallimin, which was to re-institute the belief organizing the society and defend the faith against the accusations of non-believers (Laraoui, 1996:35). For his sole target was actually to disburden Islam from the responsibility for the backward condition of contemporary Muslims; that is, de-linking Islam and backwardness (23). Existential horror concerning the very Being of Islam, which was clearly the condition of affectedness, in which Abduhs discursive practice found itself, could be felt from his vexed reaction to the French foreign ministers declaration that Muslim subjects of French dominions were to be granted the right to exist, only if they were whole-heartedly loyal and fully submissive to French authorities. Otherwise, on persisting stubbornly to be ruled by an Islamic authority as their religion decrees, the French State will have to exterminate them or deport them to another continent. Furthermore, such condition of anxiety will, on unearthing the similarity and continuity of structural anti-Muslim sentiments between the French foreign minister and the monk who roamed Europe and incited its rulers to launch the first Crusade, undermine French flamboyant claims of civility, humanism, and Enlightenment, which intoxicated Europeanized Muslims. Existential anxiety was wedded to a perception of the whole condition as an all out war, in which there was no other option than to defeat or to perish (Abduh, 1993:219-20). More revealing of the state of war was the blunt statement that every conflict is a war, every competitionis a struggle, every achievement of one party to win the competition is Djihad, every means to be acquired is a weapon, every gain to be preserved or snatched is a booty, and every right lost or interest sacrificed is a defeat. The intents and policies of colonialism demonstrate unmistakably that Muslims are amidst a battle for existence, where they have to acquire European means of power in order to beat them or at least establish a balance of power, since it is easier in the latter case that the fighting sides reconcile their interests, as revealed by the case of Japan. Muslims had to take more seriously the Quranic verse against them ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including strides of war, to strike terror in the hearts of enemies of God and your enemy6 (238-9). The thesis7 Abduh fiercely confronted was double-fold: Christianity was distinguished from Islam by its tolerance to science and philosophy, which resulted in the flourish of fields of knowledge and in the protection of thinkers and philosopher; Islams discrimination against thought and knowledge finds its origin in the inseparability of religious and secular authorities of the Caliph office, in contrast to Christianity whereby rendering unto Caesar what is Caesars and unto God what is Gods allowed for separating both realms and overcoming the Christian discrimination against science. To better affront this thesis, it had to be dissected into four primary items: Muslims were more tolerant to thinkers belonging to their religion than to those of other religions; the various Islamic sects were fighting each other because of their religious differences; the flourish of modern civilization finds its roots in the blessings of 162

Christian tolerance; intolerance to science is intrinsic to the nature of Islam just as tolerance is intrinsic to Christianity (263-6). In short, the main problematic Abduh affronted that Islam was not conducive to progress by dint of its obstructive, anti-scientific essence. To respond to this challenge, a strategy has unfolded itself: on the one hand, the nexus between the backwardness, mainly irrationality, and Islam had to be broken; on the other hand, the norm of progress was to be re-instituted on an Islamic basis. The concrete example for this strategy was the resuscitation of the principle of Tawid (monotheism) as the telos of a historical evolution of religions and as the norm for the mental progress of different nations, contemporary as well as ancient. As a consequence, the different civilizations Indian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, ancient Egyptian, and medieval Christian were rank-ordered on a ladder, on whose top stood the religion of Islam with its incomparably pure monotheism (229-32). To execute this strategy on the battlefield, Abduh opted for the idea of a parallel structure in the grammatical sense of the word, but, before pitching this parallel structure, one move had to be taken to stretch the levels of his analysis. In deducting from the contemporary condition of Muslims the defects of the basic foundations of their faith, which was the thesis Abduh confronted, one finds an upwards swing from the sociological to the phenomenological level seeking to account for the former by the latter and as a result ended up squeezing both violently into one another. Therefore, through his statement that on judging a religion with regard to a certain issue, one has to seek its pure essence separated totally from the deviations and habits occurring to it on the hand of its followers, Abduh was actually trying to meticulously distance the two levels from each other and carefully situate the whole structure of his work on the phenomenological level. In other words, he sought to essentialize both religions through recurring to their fundamentals as manifested by the sayings and deeds of the founder and the first followers who received the pure essence in order to judge their historical attitudes towards science and tolerance. Although Abduh preferred to locate the parallel structure on the phenomenological level, which was gravely menaced by the aforementioned thesis, he afterwards went exactly in the opposite direction of the confronted thesis and made a downwards spring driving the structure from the phenomenological to the sociological level8(276). Therefore, a parallel structure of principles and results contrasting Christianity and Islam was erected. On the one hand, Christianity was premised on the following principles: belief in wonders and miracles; ecclesiastical authority between the believers and their Creator; passivity and an anti-worldly attitude; the contradiction between faith and reason; the omniscient nature of the sacred texts concerning theological as well as scientific and worldly matters; and discrimination against non-Christians. As a consequence, with the heyday of Christianity Europe witnessed the following phenomena: demise of philosophical and scientific thought and the vicious circle of religious wars; censor and control of all publications by the Catholic Church as well as setting the inquisitive tribunals to resist philosophy and science of the Arabs; persecution of Muslims and Jews as well as their coercive conversion to Christianity; undermining the secular authority and suppressing freedom of thought and belief (277-91). On the other hand, Islam was founded on the 163

following principles: critical thinking as prerequisite for having faith and abstinence from deploying miracles as a proof for its truthfulness; precedence of reason to the sacred text in case of contradiction; abandonment of declaring anyone as apostate; existence of laws organizing natural as well as human life domains; undermining the basis for any clerical hierarchy; tolerance and cooperation with non-Muslims; harmony between worldly and nonworldly interests. Therefore, the golden days of Islam witnessed the following phenomena: laying the scientific basis for fields of language, literature, and art, only 20 years after the Prophets death; the flourish of fields of medicine, chemistry, astronomy, and philosophy as scientific disciplines with deep-seated methodologies; the establishment of private and public libraries in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Cordoba, and Samarqand; the spread of scientific and religious schools with stable didactic and academic traditions; assimilating Greek sciences, Eastern philosophies, and Indian mathematics to form a new epistemological perspective enriching these fields of knowledge with new findings (296-326). However much neat and harmonized was this jumping from one foot to the other, the parallel structure bumped into a double-paradox, where the phenomenological was not only unable to account for the sociological, but more importantly collided with it by and large. The paradox suppressing the first formulation of thesis was expressed in its reformulation: concerning Christianity if what you mentioned was exactly what the sages of Europe admitted about the opposition between science and religion what is this topsyturvication happening in Europe and what is this tolerance enjoyed by science in its countries nowadays? (296); with regard to Islam if we agree with you that the nature of Islam tolerates science and knowledge are not Muslim scholars now the archenemy of natural sciences and modern arts? (330). The strength of the bang forced the structure to fall completely from the phenomenological to the sociological and to reverse its sides backhanded. From one side, the freedom of science in Europe was dislodged from the science-promoting, linear version of European historicity to the field of Islamic intellectual history. Since it was explained by several factors originating from the constructive influence of Islamic culture in the Mashriq and the Maghreb. The swarming of societies promoting science and culture gave birth to a rebellious scientific spirit against the dogmatic suppression of the Church. The unbearable religious oppression of the Church as well as the ferocious religious atrocities between the various Christian sects led to wanness of religious belief and tolerance to non-believers. The destruction of the economic and political power of the ecclesiastical institution by the French revolution brought to power secularists and intellectuals, who promoted intellectual freedom. The infiltration of the anti-religious secular ideology amongst the masses as well as the clergy resulted in the withering away of the Christian anti-scientific attitude (353-6). From the other side, the cultural ossification of Muslims is not essential but a temporary condition that could be surpassed. It could be explained by two historical factors. Firstly, the policy of recruiting non-Arabs in the Muslim army and promoting them to Generals vested in them vast political authorities that they manipulated the Caliphate and dominated the government. Non-Arab Generals lacking any cultural or religious consciousness and only aware of their political and economic interests discriminated against the Ulama institution, their rival for power, whom they sought to 164

instrumentalize to provide their rule with ideological coverage. Secondly, a generation of Ulama emerged, who were more power brokers than real intellectuals, such Ulama forsook their organic role and became government-functionaries producing and propagating the ideology that the rulers were ordained by God and therefore unaccountable before anyone. Due to renouncing their intellectual role of Idjtihad, they idolized ancient theories and axioms and confined Islam to its ritualistic side (335-7). It is this coalition politics between turbanbearers and authority-holders, which was historically responsible for archaism and ossification, that suppresses up till the present moment religion and freedom of thought. Do not say that this politics is part of religionit is the farthest from religion (334-5 & 347). Ossification could be remedied by returning to the faith and re-instituting the relationship between reason and widjdan, thought and feelings, body and soul on its sound basis. Besides, Muslims should better understand Gods Nomos manifesting itself in conditions of other nations, whose means of power must be acquired. By this token, Islam would never be an obstacle to civilization, rather Islam will trim it and purify it (350-1). Muhammad Abduhs parallel structure responding to and re-producing Arslans belated formulation of the Being question will continue to be the underlay of the discursive terrain modern Arab thought was roaming. The post-Abduh Arab thought will however witness a major split of his parallel structure into two thought streams responding to Arslans double-headed question, yet more importantly recycling it in different ways in terms of disposition, focus, and margin. The first trend, exemplified here by Ali Abdel-Raziq and Taha Hussein, gave the question a new turn in the direction of why did Europeans progress and why did others retrogress? whereby it focused mainly on the first part and marginalized the second that was never ignored, but covertly stated and answered with the first in terms of following Europe in its good and evil. In contrast, the second trend, exemplified here by Rashid Reda and Hasan al-Banna, gave the question another turn in exactly the opposite direction of why did Muslims retrogress and why did others progress? whereby it focused mainly on the first part and marginalized the second that was never ignored, but covertly stated and answered with the first in terms of healing the last of this Umma with the cure of its first. Although both trends seem to be turning their backs on one another, the disguised parallelism and congruency could not go unnoticed. Since both bore the traits of Abduhs parallel structure, and also the foundational question underlying both streams substituted Arslans original formula in its ontological and epistemological location and took over its functions.

Ali Abdel-Raziq
The condition of affectedness inciting Abel-Raziqs discursive practice as revealed from his forewords first few lines is one of challenge, determination, relentlessness, and even insubordination. However, one can easily sense mixed feelings due to the copulation of an allusion to credibility through referring to the long experience in the judiciary institution with 165

a confession that the painstaking effort to study the issue at hand fell modestly short of encompassing all its aspects and was full of significations, metaphors, and indications that could be easily misinterpreted. Because these few papers were the fruit of long years9 of interrupted work, years full of tragic events, great pains, and various worries, the work at hand did not reach the level of sophistication and perfection it was aspired to attain10. But there is consolation that no effort was spared in producing such work, and hope that future researchers, who might find it something of novelty, can take it as a basis for construction and as a guide to truth and righteousness (Abdel-Raziq, 1925:xvii-vxiii). In spite that Abdel-Raziqs question was hardly stated in a direct formulation, the title of the work Islam and the fundamentals of governance and the course of analysis unraveled it indirectly. It was: what is the basis of governance in Islam or what are the fundamentals of the Caliphate in Islam, but as the structure of the work unfolded itself the question turned out to be is Islam responsible for this despotic institution and politics (the Caliphate) that choked scientific progress, arrested societal evolution, and led Muslim countries to their current condition of backwardness?. To answer the previous question, a strategy typical of a faqih was followed, as signified by the word fundamentals in the title that alludes to the fundamentals of jurisprudence. This means that politics or the Caliphate (as a practical conduct of Muslim adults) will be exposed to the fundamental sources of Islamic legislation (Quran, Sunna, Idjma, interests, historical precedence) in order to classify it under one of the known behavior categories (obligation, prohibition, non-favored, favored, non-pretension). Through dislocating the Caliphate from the category of obligation (what is according to the sources decreed as a must) to the category of non-pretension (what one can freely make and unmake according to reason, social preferences, or historical experience because the sources were silent about it), Abdel-Raziq was actually issuing a negative fatwa discrediting the scriptural Caliphate and decreeing rational politics in order to throw in historical oblivion the main obstacle depriving the Muslims of free political thinking and societal evolution by means of its falsified sacred pretensions, though it was itself a product of a specific sociopolitical context. In order to apply the classical fiqhi strategy, the first move to be taken was to formulate a concrete conception of the question (al-masala) to be scrutinized. Therefore, Abdel-Raziq started defining Khilafa from a linguistic angle, mentioning even the plural forms of the term, and then he passed on Imama as a synonym of khilafa in daily usage of Muslims. Afterwards, the Caliph was defined as the one who occupies the position of the Prophet in terms of political and administrative jurisdiction, execution of penalties and laws, and supervision of religious affairs. He even stated that whoever holds this position attains, in the view of Muslims, the most exalted status for a human being. But the conceptualtheoretical construct was allowed to slip suddenly without a prior warning to the sociohistorical level and to integrate eclectically in its corpus despotic political practices of the Umayyad and the Abbasid rulers. Although Abdel-Raziq was fully aware of Ibn-Khalduns argument of the historical conversion of the Caliphate into monarchic rule, he insisted on effacing the strongly held long-standing differentiation between al-mulk (despotic rule) and al-khilafa (just rule) and taking one for the other. Furthermore, the strong negative 166

vocalization of the divine origin of the Caliphs authority, exalting him even to the level of God11 himself, was much louder than the soothing acknowledgment of its contractual basis (1-11). The Caliphate model12 constructed at the basis of Abdel-Raziqs conception was a despotic rule based on repressive force and religious pretensions despite its socio-historical origin, a model hybridizing the medieval theocratic rule of the Catholic Church and Hobbes Leviathan. The heavy weight of the model the Sheikh invoked to formulate his fiqhi question distorted his conception of the Caliphate and led astray his tentative by lumping together Istikhlaf (a norm defining the existential role of man on earth), khilafa (a system of governance based on religious norms), baya (mechanism of power succession that was historically deformed), rida (support as the basis of authority legitimation), khalifa (the office-holder who can deviate from the norms of just governance), and siyasa (the political practice en masse that could be based on faith and reason, reason alone, or bias and desire). The second move to be taken was to present the formulated conception of al-masala to the different sources of Islamic legislation in order to extract their attitudes in regard to the question at hand. Nevertheless, the strategy seeking to relieve Islam of the responsibility of such a despotic rule based on repression through delegitimizing its religious pretensions geared this move towards producing a negative fatwa in every sense of the word. Instead of inviting each source to spell its stance in order to reach an opinion (ray), in this specific case the interrogation attempted to silence by all means the sources through invalidating (kashf alshuba) their stances fabricated by the fuqaha in order to reach the opinion that there was absolutely no opinion to be found. In the Quran, there was no evidence that establishing the imam-office is an obligation; by God, if there had been one single evidence in the Book, the Ulemma would have not hesitated to refer to it. Those verses on the ones to obeyed or those who have the command referred to the Prophets generals, commissioners, or his grand companions, but not in the least to those who hold the caliph-office (13-5). In the Sunna, there was no evidence concerning the obligatory nature of the Caliphate, since all the Prophets sayings relied upon to legitimize the Caliphate were simply referring to the reign of Quraish, al-baya, or al-jamaa. There is no single saying that recognized the Caliphate as the substitution of the Prophets position among the Muslims. Rather, these were inauthentic connotations falsified and consecrated by the fuqaha as the true meaning of the language of Islam (16-8). The source of al-qiyas (analogy) was swiftly reviewed to close the door on any deduction from the teachings of the Prophet (concerning divorce, purchasing, freeing slaves, or paying alms) that they have an obligatory nature. For when Jesus rendered unto Caesar what is Caesars, he was not in any way legitimizing Caesars rule as a part of Gods legislation or Christian belief (18-9). Concerning the principle of consensus (Idjma) of the first Muslims, a logically structured argument was forwarded to devour it. The Caliphate was a repressive rule characterized by its reliance on the sword, which was waved every time al-baya was taken to a ruler from Yazid up till Faisal I. of Iraq. The repressive nature of the Caliphate, as manifested in the reign of Umayyads and Abbasids, was extremely sensitive to any critical research touching the basis of its authority. The underdevelopment of political science in the brightest days of scientific flourish of the Muslims signified the intentional suppression of this branch of critical thought (22-24). Since explicit consensus was lacking 167

due to the absence of any critical political study expressing a mature public opinion, and since implicit consensus, as in the case of Yazids baya, was imposed by the swords blade, therefore there had been no consensus at all upon which one could base a real opinion concerning the issue of Khilafa (30-31). Logically, the third move to be taken was to re-examine in three whole chapters the Prophets political practice in order to refute the claims that he founded a governance system in Medina. In this vein, the original question of Abdel-Raziq assumed a new form: was the Propheta head of stateor a messenger of a religious call and a leader of a religious unit? After reviewing the judiciary arrangements in the time of the Prophet, they were judged as vague and insufficient to conclude on an indisputable basis that this main branch and function of government ever existed (39-47). On distinguishing between kingship and prophethood and stressing that not all Prophets combined both, the question was paraphrased: was Muhammadof those, to whom God combined kingship and prophecy, or was he just a Prophet but not a king? The dominant opinion of the laity and the Ulama, Abdel-Raziq set out to refute, was that the Prophet was a messenger and a ruler who founded a state that he administered and ruled. Yet, after reviewing the Prophets policies bearing real resemblance to government characteristics like: Djihad, financial administration, and appointing rulers, the question was grudgingly modified to account, in a plainly retreating fashion from the first attitude, for these policies. Was his foundingof an Islamic kingdom and his administration of it beyond the limits of his prophethoodor was it a part of what God sent him for and revealed to him? After leaning heavily on the opinion that the prophetic kingship was a separate act from the prophetic mission, though Abdel-Raziq have by now modified the used terms from characteristics of government to prophetic government to the Prophets statesystem, the Sheikh returned once more to the question to pour on it all his perplexity generated by the pressure of the modern liberal-state model and manifested by the complex form the question assumed this time. If the Prophet founded a state why did it lack the main pillars of government? Why was his system of appointing judges and rulers unknown? Why did not he speak to his subjects about kingship and Shura principles? Why did he leave the Ulemma in such confusion concerning the government system of his time? Why and why! Having been unable to unravel such riddles, though he reviewed the different opinions about them, including a stance he would have taken, he confessed, he will seek another way to solve this problematic (50-8). Such a solution was sought in distinguishing between the prophetic leadership and kingly leadership. Since although the former is based on bodily and spiritual perfection, prestige, social rank, and capability to bear the calls responsibility, both have two completely different and separate domains of jurisdiction: the former over the soul by means of sincere and willful belief and the latter over the body by means of submission and coercion. Therefore, it could be, certainly not without difficulty, concluded: on one hand, the Prophet had nothing to do with kingship, his role was to spread the faith, and his authority had nothing to do with the whims of kingship and interests of governments; on the other, Islam is a religious call to God to guide and purify mankind and has nothing to do with politics (64-71).


In conclusion, the Sheik was able to issue a negative fatwa of three main points: there has been a confusion supported by despotic rulers between the historically constructed Caliphate and the pillars of Islamic belief; Islam denounces completely that governmentsystem that does not belong to it in any way and caused the backwardness of Muslims; Islam has no pretension concerning politics but left this matter completely to reason, rules of politics, and historical experience of other nations; and lastly, there is nothing in Islam hindering the Muslims from destroying this archaic system and re-building their governance system on rational thought and other nations experience (102-3).

Taha Hussein
He is the last great representative and most systematic writer of a generation of men of letters who dominated the cultural scene in the 1920s and 1930s with European education and strong footing in Islamic culture. More than this, he was the writer who has given the final statement of the system of ideas which underlay social thought and political action in the Arab countries for three generations (Hourani, 1970:326). Egypts long-awaited independence wrapped Husseins The future of culture in Egypt with an atmosphere of joy and gaiety, for it was a historical event that signifies sealing off the historical stagnation, in which the country was languishing for ages, and starting a new historical era, in which it has to toil over very serious tasks and grave responsibilities (Hussein, 1993:5). He speaks with the tone of a responsible thinker, who aims to disseminate his ideas among rulers and intellectuals, but who feels most responsible to the youth seeking guidance concerning the future direction of his country (7-8). Independence and freedom should not be celebrated as goals in themselves; rather they should be regarded as means of incessant work in the direction of progress and perfection. But the feeling of deep responsibility, which Hussein mixed with the cheerfulness of freedom, secreted fears and historical inferiority complexes. I fear was a clause repeated three times to refer to his anxiety that the responsibilities of freedom could not be well handled and the country relapses into retrogression, that the Europeans might think Egyptians fought for independence but did not know what to do with it, and lastly that the continuous failures force us to feel the gap allowing the European to treat us condescendingly and lightly and make us despise our own selves (10-11). Hussein hailed a philosophy of history, whose end-goal was reasons control over life through a gradual disenchantment process divided into several phases. Europe stands on top of such evolution as an icon for the ideal balance between reason and faith, in which each reigns in its own sphere. Since the European model summarizes human experience and is globally valid, non-European countries have the burden of following the same evolutionary path and surmount the time lag separating them from Europe (Hourani, 1970:328-9). It is only in this sense that Egypts independence was cheered as an earth-shattering event signifying that the country has taken few steps on the route of progress. The question implicated in the first few pages was what is to be done and which direction to be taken in the future? Freedom and culture are two means of progress, but freedom alone is not sufficient to sustain 169

and promote progress, for there were peoples, whom freedom alone did not benefit. Culture is in fact the main basis of progress: it does not only add to the peoples civilization, but also safeguards freedom and independence, and had not Egypt lost its culture, it would have never needed a fierce struggle for independence (Hussein, 1993:9). But this culture has to be cast in a specific time horizon, because Egypt cannot sever its present from its past and cannot build its future except on its ancient past and current present. Therefore, the Being question had to be unearthed and expressed in the following terms: does Egypt belong to the East or to the West [in cultural not geographic terms], is the Egyptian mentality Eastern in its perception, understanding, and judgment or Western? (12-3). To deal with this question, Hussein followed an essentialization-via-historicization strategy: recasting Egypt in the European linear version of historicity through re-periodizing its history and summoning in each period those elements that construct Egypts essence and copulate that period with its European counter-part. As such, signposts of the past, present, and future were firmly fixed to anchor Egypts European origin, to map the historical gap, when the country lagged behind historical evolution, and to navigate along the European path with in its goods and evils. The first move to be taken was to ditch Egypts past to Greece of antiquity. The ancient times were characterized by continuous cultural, political, and demographic interactions between Egypt and Greece, for the former among other Eastern civilizations contributed in forming Greek mentality and culture. Therefore, one can conclude that the main influence on Egyptian mentality came from the Mediterranean peoples family presided by Egypt. Apart from the Near East, with which Egypt shares historical origin and evolution, religion, and language, Egypt had often been in closer contact with the Mediterranean peoples (16-7). With Alexanders conquests, the Easts contacts with the West intensified, and Egypt was totally Hellenized that Alexandria became one of Antiquitys prominent capitals. Such an unbreakable bond continued under the Roman rule (21-2). Concerning Islam, religion has proved that it never was a principle of unity among states and societies, since from the second Hidjri century Muslims based their politics on pragmatic interests instead of religious and linguistic bonds. By the fourth Hidjri century, the multiplicity of political units in the Islamic world was an established fact that certified this development regardless of disputes about it. Centuries before Europe, the Muslims realized that religion and politics are two separate domains and founded their political life on such a conviction. However, Egypt never really submitted to foreign domination of Persians, Romans, or Arabs, rather it pioneered other countries in reviving its original identity (18-20). Measuring on Europe, which Christianity did not easternize, though an integral part of European mentality, Islam, having the same essence and Eastern origin of Christianity, has never easternized Egypt, rather the spread of Islam extended the Hellenic cultural reign. The unity of essence between Christianity and Islam made them have the same kind of contact with philosophy that was once Christianized and then Islamized. Moreover, it was Europes contact with Islam, having kept Greek philosophy intact and given it the flavor of Illuminism, that ushered Enlightenment and as such Islam became a component of European mentality. In a word, this common political, social, cultural, and economic life around the Mediterranean is what makes Egypt part of Europe. Just as the Germanic invasion of Rome initiated the Middle 170

Ages, the Turkish invasion threw Egypt into weakness, ignorance, barbarity, and dissolution. Yet, Egypt, having stood up to the Turkish invasion, protected the human heritage for the second time by preserving the legacy of Islam as it guarded the Greek legacy in the Middle Ages from the Mongol invasion. In conclusion, if the European mentality is comprised of Greek legacy, Roman systems, and Christianity, one can undoubtedly argue that the Egyptian mentality has the same three components, for Christianity and Islam are essentially the same (23-9). The second move to be taken was to define Egypts position in the present. In the modern age, contacts and interactions with Europe became the cornerstone of daily life to individuals as well as societies. Egyptians, according to their different social and intellectual shares, are so keen to acquire material means of modern life to the degree that they assimilated European norms of civilization and progress as their own. The moral life witnessed a whole sale importation of institutions, systems, legislation, and regulations in the various fields, so that even local despotic rule resembled more the absolute reign of European monarchs than ancient forms of Sultanic despotism. Not only is the political life overloaded by modern institutions, but also the most traditional institutions like al-Azhar or the Sharia courts became modernized that they broke off from their medieval forms. The international treaties signed by Egypt certified the common cultural heritage with Europe, but more importantly ratified a commitment the Egyptians have taken on themselves in front of the whole civilized world to follow its path towards progress. All signs point to the fact that Egypt is toiling to be part of Europe in form and essence, for after all there is absolutely no difference in essence between Egypt and Europe but a time-lag of four centuries that could be overcome in a short interval by capitalizing on local capabilities and modern methods. However, in comparison to Japan, an Eastern country that has no common religious and intellectual heritage with Europe but was able to acquire modern means of progress and compete with Europe, Egypt is still backward. It has, therefore, become a national duty after independence to spare no time and effort to disprove that we are made out of a different clay than the Europeans but that all human beings, as demonstrated by Japan, have the capability to progress if provided with favorable and just conditions. Egypt still needs to consolidate its nascent national power through building a modern Europeanized army, attaining economic independence on the European style, and promoting freedom of arts, knowledge, and literature, so that we understand the European, feel as he feels, accept what he accepts, and refuse what he refuses. If freedom on the European style is the goal of Egypts progressive path, it has to acquire European means, for there are only two exclusive alternatives: to relapse into backwardness or to move forwards and attain freedom and exaltation (30-44). However, a double complex had to be dealt with. From one side, to remove any feelings of inferiority, it was argued that the Europeans adopted in their medieval times Eastern scientific achievements and educational methods and curriculums exactly like what the East is doing now. From the other, to quieten the fears of identity loss and to remove the self-contradiction of overtly refusing the West and covertly consuming its products, it was argued that there is no fear that Islam would be lost. On one hand, Islam was not harmed but enriched by contacting Persian and Roman cultures in its first days. On the other, because the real conflict 171

was between progress and the ecclesiastical institution not religion itself, later on a balance was reached in Europe between reason and faith. Therefore, having no clergy, Islam can easily avoid all medieval odds and harms, preserve its identity and legacy, and reconcile itself with the modern world (46-52). Laying out future plans for Egypt was the last move. Egypts role is not just to load itself with Europes goods and evils, rather it has its own mission civilisatrice; to enlighten other Arab peoples and lead them en route of progress and civilization. The country is wellequipped to undertake such leading role: throughout the Islamic phases, Egypt has been a cultural and scientific metropolitan for other Arab countries, a role it gave up under Turkish rule but it can resume now that it has revived its identity; in modern times, Egypt, by dint of its geographic relation and early Renaissance, is qualified to be a melting-pot for various cultural influences the Egyptian mentality can assimilate and disseminate in its Arab Lebensraum (380-1).

Rashid Ridda
In his correspondence to Rashid Ridda, Muhammad Abduh always began with the form our dear/virtuous son. The close relationship between both men came to light as Abduh threatened to sacrifice his forty-year-old friendship with someone who wanted to draw a wedge between him and Rashid Ridda. Explaining his deep commitment to Ridda, he assured God has sent me this young man to replenish my efforts and extend my lifehe has founded for me parties and created for me disciples and companionsI am ashamed of myself that I have not done anything for him and he has done everything for me (Abduh, 1993:135). It was not then without reason that Rashid Ridda considered himself a spiritual heir and intellectual guardian of al-ustadh al-imams legacy, though Abduhs ideas suffered some change at his hands (Hourani, 1970:226). The condition of affectedness, in which Riddas work The ease of Islam and the fundamentals of Islamic legislation was produced, was extremely complex and charged with different moods. One finds rage in the face of the bewilderment of Muslims by materialistic ideas, philosophical chaos, excessive hedonism, relinquishing Islams message, and mimicking European immorality and atheism. There was also dissatisfaction with al-Azhars texts couched in the dry technical language of fiqh and beyond undoubtedly unable to block the deluge of Westernization or to spread Islam in the West (Ridda, 162). On attempting to confront congealment and imitation as the origin of the problem by means of critical works and discussions, one feels a sense of responsibility to stand up against the continuous process of partial (in Egypt) and total (in Turkey) de-Islamization, sweeping Muslim countries and leading to their loss of identity under the pretext of Islams invalidity in modern times (8). Furthermore, there was a growing embitterment due to the divisiveness of Muslims into three opposing parties. First, the congealed imitators adhere to a scriptural attitude concerning the legal and theoretical production of past generations. Second, the Europeanized mimics hail a wholesale importation of Western systems, laws, and philosophies, because Sharia is not 172

valid for modern times. Third, the Islamic reform party opts for the revivification of Islams pristine message to guide human lifes different aspects through dropping historical details and combining Islamic principles with adequate methods of modern civilization (9-10). The main question pervading the corners of Riddas work was has Sharia become obsolete in modern times that it cannot form the basis of government and society and should be replaced by Western codes? and what are the main reasons behind its congealment?. Riddas problematic was in fact the congealment of Sharia as the main cause of its falling behind times and as a result its obsoleteness. This could be detected from his brief historical review of the negative development of Sharia along successive historical phases from its first simplicity and flexibility to a formalistic block of codes and antagonistic legal schools. Such historical development was a product of an abetment between unqualified Ulama favoring imitation and scripturalism and unjust rulers aiming to hold the Umma in grip, an abetment that corrupted Sharia, caused large-scale disinclination for it, and resulted in its being discarded in many Muslim countries. To respond to this real challenge, a very multi-sided strategy expressed clearly in the title of Riddas work was put in practice: to retrieve the spirit of Islamic laws from under the rubble of minute technical problems, empty conflicts between different legal schools, and blind support and replication of each schools formalities and techniques, so as to re-institute the main fundamentals of Islamic legislation on a solid basis; and to reshuffle these fundamentals in order to cleanse the legislative process from forms and mechanisms of ossification and to open new legislative horizons characterized by its ease and facilitation as well as a new historical balance between the foundational text and reason13. The first move to be taken was to map the spaces of human thinking defined by the foundational text itself through digging out their Quranic-prescribed negative and positive limits, which are supposed to exhibit the spirit of Islamic legislation characterized by Yusr (ease, tolerance, and flexibility) and raf al-haradj (lifting hardships). Based on reviewing different interpretations of two seminal verses14 as well as the Prophets sayings and the occasion related to them, three different spaces were discerned, with which human thinking interacts. The first zone concerns metaphysical questions about the nature of God, creation, or the last day, which were treated very symbolically in the Quran. Such matters, surpassing the human cognitive capabilities, were to be taken only as articles of belief, since they shall represent for human thought unsolvable riddles dissipating precious human efforts that could have been consecrated to the Ummas serious problems (Ridda: 60&65). The second zone pertains to wasteful loopholes of legal formalization; making up unrealistic cases for technicalitys sake and trying to find out their solutions through empty logical classifications and hierarchizations. Applying formalistic tools constraints deep understanding of the text and serious research of reality, consumes legal scholarship in wasteful conflicts, and lessens the chances of reaching any consensus about real problems (64-7). The last zone, representing a margin of freedom the text strongly reserved and safeguarded for human thought, alludes to worldly matters that the Quran itself kept silent about. The Prophet himself discouraged Muslims during his lifetime from seeking his advice concerning such issues, lest they overload themselves with unneeded obligations and unalterable legislation and block change 173

prospects through over-taxing Idjtihad (35-6). Sharias spirit of ease and flexibility manifested in protecting human reason from useless metaphysical and logical loopholes and protecting its freedom margin in worldly matters, animates the fundamentals of Islamic legislation. These are: the perfection and the absoluteness of Islam as guidance to humanity; lifting of hardships as the main check of legislation; the Quran is the main basis of matters of belief but civil matters of politics, war, economic transactions are left to Muslims to regulate through Shura practices (44-6); original permissiveness is the basis of Islamic laws but prohibitions are defined only by God in a very precise manner; Sharias main objective is worldly and non-worldly happiness, thus decreeing fundamental and secondary matters of faith, but prescribing only the outlines of worldly matters and leaving timely elements to Shura and Idjtihad (47-9); and the whole Umma will never agree upon error (53). Having demarcated the limits of Islamic legislation and re-instituted its absolute constants, it became easy to take the second move of highlighting and de-mystifying historical variables whose consecration as integrative parts of the faith congealed Sharia and corrupted its spirit of simplicity and tolerance in order at the moment to close the doors of Djumud. Analogy received the lion's share of attacks, for it over-stretches the sacredness of Quranic prescriptions and prohibitions on alterable matters and as such sacralized human opinions got exempted from critical thought, the way of innovation blocked, the freedom margin recommended by the text narrowed down severely. To disenchant analogy as a human invention, different opinions of classical fiqhi authorities in regard to it were reviewed in depth. Ibn Hazms arguments aiming to invalidate analogy as a reliable legislation fundamental on par with Quran and Hadith, through seeking the support of the other jurisprudence fundamentals, were thoroughly scanned (68-80). Numerous cases were listed, where analogy was condemned by the Prophet and his companions as a method of deducting solutions to religious problems, since it allowed for misunderstanding the text and reaching false conclusions that will be sacralized (92-4). Ibn al-Qayims opinion on the incorrectness of the absolute validation and invalidation of analogy was leant heavily upon. Since abolishing analogy led to overloading the texts with signification and far connotation through twisting their direct meanings, and abusing analogy will lead to detaching the texts from their legislative purposes and objectives through the mechanical application of Quranic regulations on matters they did not extend to (94-102). The discussion ended by approving al-Shawkanis opinion that analogy should be neither sacralized nor abolished, but it should be critically treated, so as not to be allowed to collide with the Quranic-expressed purpose of legislation, which analogy should abide to by all means or it would be considered corrupt (138-40). The whole discussion of analogy was located in a classification of the various kinds of human opinions in their relation to the text: first, false opinions that are undoubtedly at odds with the text should not be applied; second, right opinions that pertain to civic matters not mentioned in the texts should be put in practice according to timely mechanisms of Shura and Idjtihad; third, vague opinions which could not be approved or refuted could be freely dealt with (8591). After melting blocks of historical congealment, the third move to be taken was to show how the cleansed fundamentals of jurisprudence function in harmony with the text in 174

order that Sharia would resume its prior role of regulating the different spheres of life. In a word, the last move was to re-open the doors of Idjtihad in modern times. Idjtihad should be based on Malek ibn Anas legal theory that discerns two interrelated but different fields with Sharias jurisdiction: Ibadat and Muamalat. According to Malek, the Prophets Sunna should have the upper hand in ruling the first field concerning matters revolving around the relationship between the Muslim and his Creator like articles of faith, rituals, and pure acts of worship. By contrast, the second field referring to interactions between members of the Muslim community like social, political, and economic matters is governed by al-masali almursala defined by Sharia as the yardstick for permission and prohibition. Malek, though a staunch contender of the Sunna as a source for legislation, instituted al-masali as a reliable fundamental of Islamic legislation. Al- masali was more elaborated and upgraded in terms of theory and practice at the hands of Imam al-Shateby. However, al- masali thesis was boosted by Imam al-Toufy who assured that, due to their relevance to the rights and duties of Muslim adults, al- masali known by reason and tradition could outweigh the text and consensus in cases of contradiction. But such cases have to be well founded and specified so that they would not give way to the suspension of the texts authority (141-7). In the end, Ridda concludes as an answer to his opening question that those fields (Muamalat) in which the Sharias jurisdiction is nowadays severely damaged had to be governed by the rules of benefits and harms as developed by al-Shateby. This was embodied in the administrative, political, and military decisions of the guided Caliphs as well as the Idjtihadat (innovative works) of al-Iz ibn Abdel-Salam. However, due to the Ulamas fear that despotic rulers manipulate Sharia laws and subjugate it totally to their whims and prejudices, they ignored this fundamental source of legislation and adhered to a strict scriptural and analogist attitude. But this precautionary procedure was extremely damaging. On one hand, it played into the hands of despotic rulers, who found among the Jurists those ready to tailor interpretations and falsify analogies to justify decisions most contradicting with Islamic principles. On the other, it led to the ossification of Sharia through closing the doors of Idjtihad as well as burdening it with wrong precedents and fabricated decrees animated by political and personal interests but disguised under religious pretensions. The real guarantee of an unbiased application of Sharia should have been to restore the Shura system in the sense that those who loosen and bind appointing and dismissing rulers would have safeguarded al- masali al-musrsala as the basis for legislation and prevented them from corruption at the hands of rulers. It was despotism that resulted in the manipulation of Sharia and its congealment (152-3).

Hasan al-Banna
Al-Banna succeeded in dislocating15 the Islamic discourse from its classical fiqhi terminology and molded it in a modern language structured to make it accessible to anyone. At heart, he was a Sufi16 who he invested that pursuit of a direct relationship with God as a guiding principle for a disclosing encounter with oneself, other Seiends, as well as with Being itself. 175

From hence, he renounced Sufi practices propagating retirement from life hardships (solipsism) and opted for an activism disseminating the Sufi spirit of devotion and engagement in all life domains (Daseining). Because the Collection of al-Imam al-Shahid messages was written on different occasions, one senses different and at times opposing moods wrapping the whole work. There is a passion towards our people that lightens all sacrifices for freedom, glory, dignity, and religion, and enables one to touch the condition of indignity and humiliation, work in the way of God more than for himself, and mainly feel the pains of the contemporary miserable condition (al-Banna, 1990:17-8). One feels a mood of hopefulness due to the boiling agitation in all walks of life aiming to rid Eastern countries of their congealment and lifelessness. This optimism is also premised on Gods laws governing the rise and fall of nations, which, as revealed in the Quran17 and the Prophets sayings, promise the downtrodden to win the battle against tyranny and corruption (35-6). Yet, one also is affected by a grieving anxiety amidst a tumultuous condition, whereby the Umma suffers massively and Islams enemies apply all methods at their disposal to put off the light of the faith, suspend the application of its laws, spread defeatist attitudes among its followers, and falsify its message and misinterpret its teachings. However, there is the consoling conviction that Islam can, in this stormy condition, provide the right path and guidance for its followers as well as for humanity at whole, such conviction fuels relentlessness and enthusiasm for the mission of reviving the call of Islam and guiding humanity along its course (99-100). With the existential Sufi attitude and under the weight of a tormenting, stormy condition, Hassan al-Banna put forward the Being question in its purest form without any philosophical jargon. On being asked by a journalist to present himself, he replied I am a wanderer seeking the truth and a human being looking for the meaning of humanity.I am a mutadjarid who realized the secret of his Dasein and declared that my praying, piety, life, and death are all for the sake of God. Then, he abruptly reversed the conversation to ask his interviewer that is what I am but who are you? (13). To respond to this challenge, he opted for several basically existential tactical moves, which directed and reformulated the Being question along its turns. The first move to be taken was to assign an existential fixed point, bestowing meaning on Being and to map the historical deviation of Muslims from it. If the Quran were to be taken as a transcendental yardstick referred to by the Ummas members in their search for knowledge, norms, and judgment, one must put forward the question: have the Muslims really understood its goals, believed in its teachings, and applied its commandments in their social life?. The Quran has actually discerned different end-goals of human existence on earth: pleasure and satisfaction of materialistic needs like animals; prestige, arrogance, fortune accumulation, conspicuousness, and playfulness of timely existence; corruption, evil deeds, and instigating conflicts and sedition. Islam has raised its believers above the meanness of such inclinations and assigned to them the lofty obligation of guiding humanity to truth and goodness through spreading the word of God. The Quran, by this token, entrusts the Muslims with caring for mankind and gives them the right to reign over the whole globe to serve such a noble purpose. Islamic reign is, however, not subordination and exploitation privileging 176

Muslims, but a continuous sacrifice of fortune, souls, and efforts taken on their side in order to help the whole mankind. From hence, Islamic domination brought civilization, knowledge, and virtuousness to the opened lands, which are to be contrasted with the miseries and hardships brought by Western colonialism on its conquered peoples. However, in the last few centuries18the Muslims had been subjugating their whole existence to hedonistic pleasures and materialistic purposes, they enslaved their souls to their bodies and subordinated both to decadent matter. They disburdened themselves from their existential mission assigned by the Quran to fall in the purposelessness and meaningless of impulses, pleasures, technology, capital, and all other components of human existence that can hold together only by means of an existential For-the-sake-of (41-4). They have emptied their faith from any serious content through confining it to absent-minded ritualism and facades of exaggerated piety. Islams spirit of benevolent engagement had been disfigured into artistically decorated, but empty mosques, long beards, routine prayers, festivals, and vacations (112). It is not then without reason that Muslim countries were swept by a strong tide of Westernization, since Western philosophies, ideas, beliefs, systems, regulations, technologies, and companies occupied the vacuum created by the Muslims themselves. Furthermore, new generations were fed with the notion that Islam is a lifeless body of rituals and codes that are useless to recognize, but even useful to bury in historical oblivion in order to adopt aptly everything from the West, its evils and its goods all the same (113). The second move was to re-invest this existential fixed point to define critically our contemporary existential position through providing an answer to this very basic question who are we and who are you?. On one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood is premised on the conviction that Islam as a comprehensive Weltbild, wrongfully reduced to rituals and spirituality, lays a sophisticated order for all life domains and provides innovative solutions for contemporary problems facing mankind (23). The Brotherhoods vocation distinguishes itself from secular ideologies through three marking features: absolute devotion (fanaa) by means of sacrificing ones time, effort, fortune, and even life itself for the sake of spreading Islamic call; clarity, since the Brotherhood summons the Umma to a precise principle that everyone knows and believes to be the sole cure for our sick human existence; and real faith that motivates one for action, harmonizes his deeds and sayings, and opens new alleys for existential innovation (20-1). As a result, the call can integrate and reproduce these ideologies issues and problems through assimilating the real needs behind them, soaking their symbols and slogans in religious authenticity, washing them from their original antireligious stains, and bringing them completely in line with the basic principles of Islam. Take for instance patriotism that rose as a response to Western subjugation of Eastern peoples and as a sign of their struggle for liberation. What seems for others not understandable is that Islam encompasses many elements patriotism claims to exclusively own, like love for ones country, its inhabitants duty to free it from Western colonialism, strengthening the bonds between those inhabitants, and carrying the banner of Islam to the corners of the globe. But Islam denounces strongly patriotism, if it meant factionalism and opportunism seeking to deviate the Umma from its existential mission by colored postures underlain by personal interests and factionalist prejudices. Islamic patriotism is distinguished from other 177

conceptions of patriotism by two elements: first, faith not geography demarcates its borders, therefore wherever a Muslim exists one finds a Watan (homeland) that enjoys sacredness, loyalty, and devotion from all Muslims as patriots of the same Umma caring and tending for one another; second, material aspects are not its end-goals, but it has the obligation of guiding the whole world with the light of Islam in order to win freedom and happiness for mankind and destroy all injustice, exploitation, and subordination enslaving humans (24-7). On the other, the people are composed of four types: the faithful, who believes in our vocations value and admires its principles, is welcome to join it because his faithfulness would be meaningless, if it does not motivate his striving and sacrifices; the hesitant, who cannot figure out our goals and intentions and therefore lingers in indecision, is recommended to contact us, read about us, and visit our clubs in the aspiration that he warms to our vocation; the opportunist, who seeks material benefit and prestige, is to be in earnest informed that our members are poor, humble, and unknown, who only look forward to Gods reward, thus he is welcome only on this basis; the prejudiced, who mistrusts us and insistently imprisons himself in his doubts and illusions concerning our goals and means, is to be sincerely advised about his suspicions and informed that there will always be a place for him. It is time that Muslims come to realize their intents, direction, and goals from within the previous frame, instead of their current unconsciousness, unshrewedness, and blind obedience to every imposture (1920). Having set a fixed point and defined our historical deviation from it and current position in relation to it, then the third move would be to define the future course of action that bridges the rift between the existential center and the current location of Muslims. If the role of the brotherhood is to return the Umma and the whole humanity to the principles and systems outlaid by Islam, the question19 to be raised is what is to be done and from where to begin?. In an age of reformation, Muslims have to reform themselves in order to re-create the Umma. The means of action needed for this purpose are composed mainly of a great psychological force underpinned by four elements: unshakable will, unwavering devotion, dear sacrifices, and deep faith. The model20 built by the Prophet highlights the inevitability of these elements as the eternal law for construction and destruction of Ummam. Certainly material force is needed, but though necessary it is not sufficient in itself and cannot stand by itself as the main pillar for re-building the Umma, rather it has to be based on and limited by a spiritual-moral force. By this token, the brothers are so keen to purify their souls and strengthen their moral principles in order to be able to change the current conditions and direct the Umma on the lines of Islamic morals (53-5). The course of action to be taken in order to re-construct the Umma has to begin from the individual Muslims conscience, who, having changed himself, would be able to found a Muslim family, whose juxtaposition with other families will constitute the Muslim people, which carries to power the Muslim government. The repetition of such model in each Muslim land will re-establish the Muslim homeland, whose imperial government will carry Islam to the whole world and establish Universal lieutenancy (101-2). Such phases cannot be skipped or squeezed together by means of usurpation of authority and revolution, rather the Umma has to develop, strike its roots, grow its branches, bear its buds and fruits very gradually that it might consume all along tens 178

of decades and hundreds of generations. Gradualism of application might frustrate and burden youthful enthusiasm for the call, but this is the law of God, which cannot be opposed but must be utilized (178).


Part II.

The discursive practice of Sayyid Qutb

Introductory remarks
In the previous part, my main objective was to map the context of the Qutbian discourse in the light of what I thought to be the main characteristics of the Muslim Daseins existential structures of Understanding and Befindlichkeit located in a particular time horizon. Temporal dislocation, cultural schizophrenia, and existential anxiety provided useful insights to the features of such cultural Dasein. In doing so, I tried to expand critically upon terms and notions integrated in the fabric of my theoretical framework and to fill some of the gaps saved for the suitable time and place. My task in the current part will be to capitalize on the findings of the previous part in order to address myself to the objective of re-animating the Qutbian discourse and fathoming its depths. The existential condition of the Muslim Dasein in the post-Almoahedien era, which represents the context of the Qutbian discourse, forced the Muslim Dasein to question the meaning of its Being. The different discursive practices such existential context incited were in fact variations of the Muslim Daseins question of the meaning of Being. This existential question defines the contours of the discursive space the Qutbian discourse was restlessly roaming. However, before slipping in the Qutbian discourse with a silent paddle and letting myself be carried away by its tide, I would like first to settle some accounts with Foucaults concept of discourse in order to lay out my course of action. In his Order of discourse, Foucault presents us with neatly wrapped technical procedures designed for undertaking discourse analysis. Even more, he decrees for us with the certitude of experience four methodological requirements1 that should solemnly govern the work to be done. Through dismantling this take-away discursive package, scrutinizing its integrative parts, refashioning each one of them, and piecing them together in a new whole, this part can claim to have critically profited from Foucaults notion of discourse to spot the discursive practice of Sayyid Qutb. Let me first in this introductory word unearth this package or liberate it from the fettering rigidity of the methodological requirements soaked in the late Foucaults methodological certitude, by means of reverting it to the initial state of methodological incertitude and rigor, in which the early Foucault embarked on his archaeological adventure. In its first application, discourse analysis was overshadowed by an experimental attitude, for it had to be borne in mind that it cannot be regarded either as definitive or as absolutely valid; it is no more than an initial approximation that must allow relations to appear that may erase the limits of this initial outline (Foucault, 1972:30). Furthermore, its structure was presented as composed of four attempts, four failures and four successive hypotheses. They must now be put to the test (37). The methodological rigor animating discourse analysis manifested itself in a process of conceptual cleansing, where a whole mass of notions and obscure forces disseminating and diversifying the theme of continuity had to be ousted from the analysis (21-2). Such an operation proved to be an august capacity of discourse analysis for two main reasons: it jellified the solid structures and categories previously accepted without any examination or scrutiny; and it set free a vast field of effective statements constituting the material with which one is dealing in its raw, neutral state, a population of 182

events in the space of discourse in general (26-7). But Foucault was under no illusion that he was presenting a magical formula able to solve all the problematics of history of knowledge par un coup. In a very enlightening passage, he narrated in retrospection how he, with inadequate methodological control, fashioned and re-fashioned the rules of individualization of discursive formations throughout his works. He even asserted that such rules are certainly far from completion, as some aspects are still in need of closer and fuller analysis to be carried out in the future (64-5). More than this, he was fully aware that the application of discourse analysis and putting its hypotheses to the test involved going through considerable risks and dangers. After all, there was no proof that the initial probe making use of certain fairly loose, but familiar, groups of statements would not be lost at the end of the analysis, nor that I shall discover the principle of their delimitation and individualization, nor even that the isolated discursive formations may introduce unexpected boundaries. Less certain was that, at the end of the archaeological enterprise, one may really escape the notions initially suspended out of methodological rigor. Even more grave was the danger of failing to provide any basis for what already exists so that one might lose all the comfortable certainties and instruments and advance beyond familiar territory towards an as yet uncharted land and unforeseeable conclusion. To suffice it, one runs the danger that all signs might disappear leaving for analysis a blank, indifferent space, lacking in both interiority and promise (389). This experimental attitude rooted in methodological incertitude and rigor can allow me, through capitalizing on the capacities of discourse analysis and sidestepping its risks and dangers, to re-open Foucaults notion of discourse to application flexibility, cultural sensibility, and case-studies suitability. By this token, the nominalistic manner (of mutualfashioning that neither squeezes the raw material to be processed nor over-stretches the equipment to be used) of dealing with the discursive toolkit does not seem to be unjustified. Having said this, there are three main issues that deserve special mention. Discontinuity represents not only one of the overriding principles of Foucaults discursive notion, but more profoundly it was the main target motivating his archaeological enterprise. He actually lavished on the dominant trend of history of thought, of knowledge, and of philosophy to seek and discover more discontinuities. For discontinuity was transformed from being an external condition or an obstacle to the work of a historian seeking continuous trends and fresh beginnings to being a positive element determining the objective and course of analysis (9). Shifting the focus of historical analysis towards discontinuity proved to be extremely profitable through bringing under new light whole discursive spaces previously left deranged and disqualified as anomalies, only because the historian failed to assimilate them in his all-encompassing schemata. More than this, this same focal shift brought to light conditions and dynamics of change through bringing down boundaries between separate knowledge domains and bringing together distant discursive formations locked up in the solid structures of such fields. However, focusing solely on thresholds, ruptures, and breaks risks not only unbalancing the analysis, but also most gravely devouring all fixed points2, by virtue of which such changes, ruptures, and breaks could be recognized and measured in the first place. In my opinion, this imbalance could be redressed through focusing on the dialectical relationship between discontinuity and continuity; that is, taking both aspects of the change 183

equation in consideration through pinning down specific fixed points, in the fashion of a dynamic equilibrium, in order to catch a glimpse of the whole scene not just the discontinuous side. To put it in Foucaults words, fixed points must not be rejected definitively of course we must define in what conditions and in view of which analyses certain of them are legitimate; and we must indicate which of them can never be accepted in any circumstances (Foucault, 1972:25-6). The author was one of the figures that Foucault exiled from his discursive space through deconstructing systematically the author-function in the context of its historical trajectory as a scientific and commercial trademark for a specific system of ownership (Foucault, 1991-b: 108-10). Transforming the author into a taboo for discourse analysis seems to be justified on two accounts: first, as a principle for the individualization of discourses, the author figure is the direct incarnation of the founding subject having at its disposal signs, traces, marks and letters, animating the empty forms of language with his aims, and laying down horizons of meaning history will unfold itself beyond; second, as an embodiment of the never-ending tracing-back to the point of origin, it quells the incessant proliferation of signs and discourses and arrests the chance-element in discourse through imposing on it from outside the limits of a repressively omnipresent individuality. However, Foucaults antiauthor attitude was not so firm and unitary, as it might have seemed in the first instance. On one hand, he continued to hold that the real author, who bursts into the midst of all these worn-out words, bringing to them his genius or his disorder is inscribed in the authorfunction, as he receives it from his epoch, or as he modifies it in his turn. On the other, he has continuously modified his stance regarding the authors position; it would be of course absurd to deny the existence of the individual who writes and invents (Foucault, 1984:1167). The adjustment of such an attitude even became so plain on recognizing the status of these authorsin a position which we shall call transdiscursive, like Homer, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers; or the position of founders of discursivity, who did not just author their own works, but also established an endless possibility of discourse, through producing the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts, like Marx and Freud (Foucault, 1991-b:113-4). Furthermore, murdering the author blinds the analysis from viewing other authorial levels that became in this case indiscriminately lumped together under the category of the majestic author. It would be just as wrong to equate the author with the real writer as to equate him with the fictitious speaker [emphasis added] (112). By this token, there exist three authorial levels. First, there is the author, who was ousted from the analysis for being no more than a commercial and ideological function, and whose repressive presence neutralized the contradictions of discourse and effaced the traces of its transformations, distortions, and diverse modifications through inventing a unity of writing. Second, there is the real writer or the signs-transmitter, whose existence is beyond any doubt, for it was him, who manipulated the linguistic game and tied and untied codes, symbols, and signifiers. Third, there is the fictitious speaker or the first-person pronoun, who narrates and stands behind the events in the fashion of a veiled pronoun (damir-musstatir) in Arabic grammar, and whose presence is referred to by signs, like personal pronouns, adverbs of time and place, and verbs conjugation. Certainly, doing in the authorial figure la Foucault 184

liberates the discursive formations from the hegemonic presence of the grand auteur and unveils the authoritatively suppressed contradictions, changes, inconsistencies, and ruptures in their specific occurrence. However, slaying the author should not be allowed to take with it promiscuously other authorial levels, in specific the fictitious speaker, whom the dissolution of the author allows to appear in all his dynamism, incoherency, and contradiction, but nonetheless in his constancy, coherency, and consistency. Only in this vein, it could be taken as the principle for grouping or individualizing discursive formations; a theoretical stance that this part firmly holds to. Now let me try to locate the figure of Sayyid Qutb on the different authorial levels. In a manner of literary conspiracy, the Nasserist authorities have already, to our analytical pleasure, taken care of beheading the author in the most literal sense. Ironically, the author Sayyid Qutb, as a part of a subjectivity created by the military regime on unleashing its disciplinary techniques to play on the prisoner Sayyid Qutb, was annihilated as a part of a case prepared by the same military regime against the defendant Sayyid Qutb to pin down his legal and political responsibility and eventually execute the condemned Sayyid Qutb. In the same fashion of literary conspiracy, the Nasserist authorities, on sentencing Sayyid Qutb to almost 12 years of imprisonment in the whole 1960s, the most creative phase of his intellectual production, have in fact forced the real writer to reside in his discursive space and thrust him into the position of the fictitious speaker, with which he consequently became completely identified. Inside his prison cell, Sayyid Qutb had no other existence except his discursive existence as a first-person pronoun; he was locked up inside the discursive space and only by means of discursive enunciation was he able to transmit signs of life. In a word, Sayyid Qutb was a discursive subject or rather prisoner par excellence, for, as Salvatore watchfully noticed, his representative character has been witnessed only ex post facto (Salvatore, 1997:190). The fusion of the signs-transmitter and the fictitious speaker into one non-hegemonic, at times disunited and inconsistent discursive subjectivity justifies, in my opinion, the elevation of the double-figure of Sayyid Qutb to be the individualization principle of specific discursive formations lying within the boundaries of a particular discursive space. Although the principles of specificity and exteriority portray the discourse as a violent practice always playing on the exterior limits with out discursive providence or hidden nucleus, Foucaults critical task of desubjegation, requiring a patient labour on our limits and giving form to our impatience for liberty, involved the insurrection of subjugated knowledges. These are blocks of historical contents produced by the ruptural effects of conflict and struggle, but the order imposed by functionalist and systematizing thought was designed to mask them. They also include popular or naive forms of knowledge located down on the hierarchy beneath the required level of scientificity and thus disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated. It is through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of these local popular knowledges, these qualified knowledges, that criticism performs its work3 (Foucault, 1981:81-2). It is in this light that one can understand the difference between two discursive levels: the epistemological level, which is concerned with the formulation of problems, scientific discoveries, and clashes of controversy, and seeks to describe the processes and products of the scientific consciousness; and the archaeological level that 185

eludes the consciousness of the scientists and yet it is part of scientific discourse, and comprises the formation rules of theories, concepts, and objects circulating in the discursive space. It was the main goal of discourse analysis to dig out the archaeological level of positive unconsciousness of knowledge (Foucault, 1966:xi). However, such terms of consciousness and unconsciousness should not be perceived in a Freudian sense of liberating the unconscious of thought and setting free the non-said of discourse through alluding to a hidden nucleus or prediscursive providence. For Foucaults anti-humanistic premises can only allow them to be understood as discursive levels he intended to turn inside out and wager that man could be erased, like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea (387). Yet, Foucaults attempt to depresentify the discourse through renouncing the ahistorical referent does not exclude any effort to uncover and freeprediscursive experiences from the tyranny of the text (Foucault, 1972-a: 47). It is exactly in this place that one can open the loosely knit discursive package to the influences of another cultural context, where the idea of bottomlessness and exteriority, as Foucault himself certified, is completely alien to its basic mental foundations. It is in fact the problem of a different attitude towards the truth: Muslims do not have the same regime of truth as ours[I]t is largely modeled on a religion that has an exoteric form and an esoteric content. Everything that is said under the explicit form of the law also refers to another meaning. It is not the condemnable ambiguity of saying one thing and meaning another, on the contrary it isa necessary and highly prized additional level of meaning another deeper meaning, which cannot be assimilated in terms of precision and observation (Foucault, 1988:223). It is quite crucial to take in consideration such cultural sensibilities, stressed in strong terms by Foucault himself, on attempting to approach the discursive zone referring to itself as the Islamic discourse. A discourse bears the characterization Islamic, defining its outer limits and regulating its inner dynamics, not by virtue of its being produced and consumed by Muslims in their native countries or some exclusive rights to circulate specific cultural codes. Rather, it is Islamic by dint of having a special relationship with the Quranic text as the basic source of the circulated signifiers and the legitimate bedrock of the discursive river, deciding its velocity and direction. In a word, the Islamic discourse is that which recognizes the authority of the Quran as the foundational text for the whole cultural medium it is produced and received in. The particularity of the Islamic discourse faces the discursive package suggested by Foucault with very serious challenges regarding how to deal with the Quranic text: Is it to be included in the discursive space or to be set aside from its dynamics? And in both cases what would be the relationship between the foundational text and the discursive practices in its cultural medium? The answer to such challenges could be sought in a didactic statement of Erwin Rosenthal whom I shall now quote at length to guide students of Islamic studies. We must realize that no matter what modern research has established with regard to the origin and development of Muslim law and its three-fold foundation in Quran, Sunna, and Hadith, it is, in a Muslims consciousness, divine law and binding on all members of the Muslim community. Otherwise, we cannot hope to understand what was in the minds of Muslim writers whose political thought we consider (Rosenthal, 1962:7). It is certainly a matter of faith that the Quran is the revealed word of God embodying the absolute truth, but it is a matter of fact that for Muslims 186

it is the absolute truth revealed by God. If political thought cannot aspire to understand those thinkers under consideration without taking full account of that basic attitude, similarly discourse analysis cannot hope to understand the dynamics and formation rules of the Islamic discourse without holding to this same attitude. This attitude, taking in consideration the cultural particularity of the Islamic regime of truth and the special status of the Quranic text in its cultural medium, must reflect itself on discourse analysis so as to allow for a particular relationship between the discourse and the foundational text and to make place in its structure for a sub-archaeological level functioning as a starting-point and end-goal for the discursive practice. Such additional level, viewed as a spatial sub and supra as well as a temporal pre and post, represents an ontical ahistorical referential point that incites the Islamic discursive practice and that the latter incessantly seeks refuge in, on searching for novel existential meanings and fresh historical horizons by reading, re-reading, and again re-reading the foundational text; hence the literal meaning of the word Quran, what is incessantly being read. Any endeavor to apply discourse analysis can never hope to account for Islamic discursive practices on severing the relationship between the discursive practice at hand and the foundational text: either through dislodging the text from its referential status and squeezing it in the two discursive levels (epistemological and archaeological); or through simply obscuring the different patterns of dynamic interaction between the two levels and the sub-archaeological one.


Chapter one: Enunciative Function

The nominalist fashion pledged by this part, on dealing with Foucaults notion of discourse after having retrieved its initial state of methodological incertitude and rigor, involves viewing the discursive practice as a theatrical experience. To put it in concrete terms, Discourse as a theatre signifies not just capturing the theatrical aspect of a discourse but more profoundly perceiving it predominantly as a spectacle. Theatrical discourse designates, by this token, a special kind of space [where] the audience joins with a company of players to become ciphers in this great accompt. What is accomplished is an image of the world and all that dwell therein. It (the image) can only be felt while experiencing the play that expresses the image (Culp, 1971:2-3). Discourse as a theatrical experience designates the simultaneous play of three overlapping, interactive processes. First, there is the collective focusing of attention on the performed event, which gives life to its images and symbols. The significance of this process is that though difficult for an individual alone, it seems quite easy for this same individual in a collectivity, since the activities of others around him multiply his ability to feel and expend. Thus, the degree of a collectivitys attention becomes amplified, supported, and reinforced only by dint of its collectiveness. Second, impersonation, the direct result of the previous process, signifies re-arranging the montage of roles defining oneself through losing the selfconsciousness and finding it again in what is impersonated. Such a process takes place through three successive steps: the spontaneous identification with other experiences and characteristics; the rationalization or justification of the role taken over; and the projection of the new montage on ones surroundings. Third, aesthetic engagement1 is the total involvement in the performed event so that any exteriority or alienation would be eliminated. The pace, according to which the aesthetic distance or alienation to the performed event is erased, could measure the success of the performance as an appel au mouvement. Imitation was therefore perceived as the main goal or purpose of the performance for it is the highest degree of impersonation (4-7).

Sayyid Qutbs discourse as a theatrical experience

Applying the notion of theatrical discourse to metamorphose Foucaults discursive elements, in the sense of each discursive element intertwining itself with its theatrical counterpart, a task that the following chapters will be devoted to, could be legitimized on three grounds. First, in order to lay bare within the field of theater studies the performance of power embedded in texts, methodologies, and the academy itself, a group of American feminists opted for the term theatrical discourse i.e. theatre as a discourse of power2. Through notions of discourse and semiotics, their work invested the theatrical analogy to accommodate in theatricality the materialist perception that there is a playing out of power relations, a masking of authority, and a scenario of events (Case & Reinelt 1991:ix-x). In contrast, this part will attempt to cross the theatrical analogy exactly from the opposite direction discourse 188

as a theatre of power in order enliven in vivid theatrical figures the mechanisms and relations of power at play in Qutbs discursive practice. Despite the different approach of the theatrical analogy, the attitude to be shared is that in all cases power is a spectacle. Second, Sayyid Qutb was a professional literary critic3, since his first major work presenting him to the public was on poetry and literary criticism, and he was appointed as a member of the editing staff of Al-Ahram. During the 1930s and 1940s he sank to his ears as a disciple of Al-Aqad in critical reviews, literary polemics, and dramatic controversies with the countrys most prominent figures in literature and poetry (Musallam, 1990:182-3). In his work on the Quran, he treated revelation as a panorama or a silver screen that creates meanings by utilizing imagery and characters, colors and portrays, music and rhythms, as well as other dramatic tools. Thus, it does not irritate me in the least to pay Sayyid Qutb with the same coin and apply his own aesthetic perspective to his discursive practice through dressing it in the theatrical costume. Third, the horizontality of the theatrical cognitive and material space will help level the verticality of the discursive space through bringing on the same playground the different discursive levels. To put it in concrete terms, the locus of theatrical experience is the audience, in whose cognitive space the theatrical work is played. The same logic goes for the discursive experience, but it is just the dispersion of its audience that hides the functioning of the same theatrical mechanisms. Since the hidden sub-archaeological level plays the role of the theatrical audience, applying the theatres spatial imagery of two levels facing and interacting with each other helps personify this invisible level. The Muslim Dasein is the audience of the Islamic discourse and is located on the sub-archaeological level, where the contact with the foundational text takes place. It is only in this way that the discursive production process could be made accessible and understandable.

Dramatic environment
The enunciative function, the first discursive component that this chapter seeks to deconstruct, designates a discursive position determined by a specific arrangement of a number of effective operations, of a finite group of statements, or of a series of enunciative events. It is in fact the law operating behind all these discursive elements, and the place from which they come. It is crucial to note that this location occupied by a certain speaking subject within a discourse is not to be confused with it. Since the formation of enunciative modalities was at the same time attributed to non-discursive mechanisms of power (institutional sites and power techniques), enunciative function therefore represents the discursive theatres back door through which non-discursive factors come to play on the stage (Foucault, 1972:50-55 & 935). Having treated these non-discursive power mechanisms in Part I., it remains for me here to deal with the role of discursive power relations in constructing the discourse production location. In fact, this position corresponds to the dramatic environment defined as the place in which the play is occurring and cannot be escaped. More than this, it serves to unite all the dramatic forces, collect the dramas image and ideas, and symbolize the total community as 189

well (Culp, 1971: 15). It seems also quite crucial to underline the reflexive relationship between the theatrical environment and the play: inasmuch as the theatrical environment frames the play, the latter encompasses it for each play decides independently its own theatrical location. Such circularity invests itself on the discursive level in a doubleconditioning fashion. The discursive location, which determines the influx of all the diverse discursive elements, including the speaking subject, is in return fixed by conjunctional discursive formations (strategies) pulling together the whole discursive fabric. By this token, the dramatic environment of Qutbs discourse could be envisaged as consisting of critique strategies and a three-headed Being question.

Sayyid Qutbs conception of critique

Critique as hermeneutics: Qutbs discursive practice was moving itself in a peculiar conception of critique that was hermeneutical, as a matter of fact too hermeneutical. One can schematically hack out this hyper-hermeneutical conception from an initial attempt of Qutb to lay down an integrated literary criticism method. The point of departure of such method was to define the oeuvre, as it is the target of critique. An oeuvre is an expression of an emotional experience in an inspiring form, or it is a union between emotional and expressive values that have no recognizable separate existence in the oeuvre. The emotional experience, though it animates expression, does not suffice in itself to constitute the oeuvre, because, regarded from the angle of the oeuvres existence, it is only existent when it finds a precise form of expression that realizes the oeuvre. Expression of an emotional experience is not a goal in itself, rather it aspires to entice emotional engagement with others. What seems to be quite unique is that what defines an oeuvre is not the type of its theme but its emotional engagement with any theme (NAUM: 9-10 & 21). On addressing itself to the oeuvre, critique carries out its task through performing certain functions4 that coalesce in deciphering (in a sense reconstructing) the oeuvre in search for a hidden meaning perceived to be located beyond the text. Thus, critique signified nothing but a hermeneutical act, put in Gadamers words, of such transference (bertragung) from one world to the otherfrom the world of a foreign language to the world of ones own (Gadamer, 1999:92). If the determinant of an oeuvre is not its theme but emotional engagement, then the whole world could be viewed as an oeuvre to be understood, interpreted, and even replayed, as long as emotional engagement is aroused. As an act of surmounting the boundaries between two worlds in search for a hidden meaning linking both of them, critique, making the whole world its oeuvre, is in fact a major act of transcendence. It is exactly here that Quranic codes and symbols come5 into play to fulfill two interrelated objectives par un coup. Embodying absolute transcendental meanings in worldly signification, the Quranic language, once taken as the premise of the hermeneutical practice, guarantees, by dint of its exteriority, the act of transference from one world to the other intrinsic to critique. Simultaneously, encrusting an absolute yardstick for truth, the Quranic language lays down a frame safeguarding the hermeneutical practices arrival to the true interpretation(s) and as such enables it to pass the tests of consensus and validation6. 190

However, by virtue of its distanced divine origin, the Quranic language hinders that the hermeneutical interpretation would soar from a relative and limited human understanding to expropriate the unlimited transcendental meaning. The buzzword for this is the clause Allah alam7 that must seal every hermeneutical practice regardless of its ingenuity or originality. By this token, the critical practice, once it strikes its roots in Islamic symbolism, falls under Al-Djerjanis definition of Tawil (hermeneutics) leading the signifier away from its apparent signification to a probable one on condition that the latter is at accords with the Book and the Sunna (Al-Djerjani, 1985:72). Double-hermeneutics: The moment the hermeneutical practice begins laboring on reality with its various aspects and levels as an oeuvre to be interpreted, reconstructed, and transcended through reaching out for Islams symbolic capital and reintroducing it to this reality, the hermeneutical practice becomes multiplied in itself and on a higher level. In the words of Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, Qutb takes it upon himself to delve into a complex reconstruction of the past as a means of deconstructing the present and rendering it meaningful. Qutb leaves no doubt about hissense of the Islamic past (Abu-Rabi, 1996:111). The reconstruction of Islamic symbolism unleashed by its reintroduction in the critical practice means at first situating it on a new temporal horizon other than the age of revelation, such an act extends in temporal terms the Spielraum of Islamic codes and symbols. Paired with this is that the insistent present-moment needs weigh upon the critical practice to re-interpret the symbolic capital in the aim of reaching viable solutions for present problems. As a result, new dimensions and levels are opened in the Quranic language, and its signification space gets as much doubled as the critical practice stretches its scope to integrate new aspects in its oeuvre. Not only new levels of meanings are opened in the Quranic language, but also more profoundly the act of their reintroduction in a new age erects an emotional engagement with the foundational text. Such engagement re-establishes in its turn a spiritual-aesthetic relationship with the Quran that recaptures in the present time the same attitude of the first generation who received the revelation first-hand. This reconstruction of Islamic symbolism and meanings assumed the form of a meticulous systematization effort that William Shepard8 demonstrated to have undergirded Qutbs critical practice and underlined its intellectual value9. Politics of hermeneutics and closing the hermeneutical circle10: The reconstruction trade-off between reinterpreting reality and refashioning Islamic symbolism does not mount to be the final destination of the hermeneutical practice. Rather, re-understanding or re-living the Quran only grants the hermeneutical practice a transcendental fixed point to perform an accurate ontology of the present not just by rooting the present in the perennial Prophetic times, but also through historicizing the present. That is, to highlight the contingency of the present as one of many possibilities available in the past, as a contingent possibility that man-made decisions and circumstances enabled to establish itself as our lived reality now. The ontology of the present as the last step in the hermeneutical practice is actually too political; since the application of transcendental norms on realitys multi-sided manifestations devours


the legitimacy of this we located in the now. Furthermore, re-establishing the reservoir of available possibilities, with which the present stands on the same or even lower level on applying transcendental moral standards, prescribes future possibilities for change. Added to this, reconstructing the historical scenes in which one possibility excluded the others screens the factors responsible for realizing the present condition, which reveals practical ways of undermining the predominant possibility (the present) as well as means of attaining future ones. It is exactly here by changing this reality that the hermeneutic circle be closed and the interpretation of reality as an oeuvre reach its peak. From the angle of hermeneutics, interpreting and changing the world are simply one and the same thing. Only in this fashion, the political nature of Qutbs discursive practice could be grasped. Let me cite him at length to demonstrate how politics of hermeneutics pervaded his discursive practice. What is the use of writing? What is the worth of these articles filling newspapers? Is not it better than all this to get yourself a pistol and a few bullets and then you hasten to settle with these bullets your account with unjust, despotic heads? What is the use of your sitting behind a desk and pouring out your rage in words and wasting your effort in nothing that reaches those heads that ought to be chopped off? I have always sensed that the writings of freedom fighters do not go in vain, because they awaken the sleepy, inflame the senses of the half-hearted, and lay the ground for a mass-oriented trend following a specific goal, even if it was neither crystallized nor clear. But something must have been happening under the influence of these pens (DI: 134-5). I am fighting the same battle on the pages of different news papers under the banner of Islam. For me, such newspapers are nothing but battlefields and if I found others striving (for the same purpose) I would support them as much as I can (97). Writers can make a lot of difference but under one condition; they ought to die so that their ideas would be able to live (139). Reflexivity of hermeneutics: The hermeneutical ring, spurred by emotional engagement, was revolving in a double sense. It was turning around the different aspects of reality (regarded as expressive manifestations of a certain emotional value), which fell under the categories11 of poetry and literature, Quranic aesthetics, philosophy of social justice, sociology of religion, Quranic exegesis, and Islam and the West. Simultaneously, such hermeneutical practice was rotating around itself, because, perceiving itself as an open oeuvre (an incessant interpretation of reality having no separate existence from it), it inflicts on itself a rather harsh type of critique following the same measures. A hidden footnote, in which the hermeneutical rings double-rotation was clearly disclosed, relates how the hermeneutical practice was fatigued by a puzzling issue, whose unsatisfactory explanation was painfully held for lack of a better one in earlier editions. In an attempt to widen the hermeneutical circle, the readers were even urged to share their opinion with the author. The account, however, ends with the comfort of reaching an illuminating interpretation that opened the right path for the hermeneutical act in the current edition (1: 238). This double-rotation, which betokens the salient feature of Qutbs discursive practice as thought on the march12, could be accredited to its multiplicity of critique strategies and its relentless, often misunderstood re-positioning and displacement13.


Sayyid Qutbs strategies of critique

1. Temporal critique It is a discursive strategy that re-accommodates the dislocated temporal horizon and as such charts a modus operandi that is to be grasped as a radical amelioration of Heideggers temporal structure14. Historical evidence points to Islams resilient biding across the different historical ages: it hampered the Ummas dissolution on the hands of the crusades and colonialism in the past; its avant-gardes everywhere continue to challenge its enemies in the present; and it still has a Universal role to play in the future (MLD: 90-2). The spirit of Islam is the fourth dimension of time15. For its Aqida embodying the absolute truth of Being represents that eternal moment (al-ladha al-laduniya), where all the barriers of form, time, space, and image separating the different manifestations of Being dissolve, and where the unity of Being shines in all its nakedness. As a solid bedrock raising the temporal structure above the corrosiveness of time, place, and beings, it demarcates the temporal horizon and as such opens new ways for action and unfetteredness (5: 3149 & 3191-2). Mining the age of reference was quite crucial to provide the temporal structure with a fixed point of anchorage amidst the incessant influx of the now(s). Qualified to play such role is the age of revelation16, because it was a period of direct contact between the eternal and the temporal, a contact that crystallized in events, words, scenes, and conditions. It was the timely embodiment of timelessness, and therefore could be accessed (5: 2832). It follows that an attempt was undertaken to re-assemble historical events within the referential age and reinterpret their meanings to dig out the model, which embodies the Islamic essence and engulfs the different aspects of human existence (for example criteria of social justice, minority rights, professional norms of governance, recruitment and succession, Universalism, and legal justice) (AIFI: 128-82 & HD: 82-7 & MIR: 71 & NMI: 109-24). The past experience was to be critically reviewed and re-evaluated, according to the norm of akimiya, to chart the successive historical events or even shocks that led to its discontinuity, from the grand fitna, where power succession and remittances-distribution policies deviated from Islamic norms, up till the present moment blazed by Western hegemony, where Islam ceased to exist as Aqida, Sharia, and Niam by any means i.e. the total secularization of Muslim societies. Recasting the present, or opening it to the reestablished past via the age of reference, is apparent in the application of akimiyas criteria (Islam as Aqida, Sharia, and Niam) on the present condition, albeit the negative evaluation of the present as devoid of Islam. Nevertheless, it was emphasized that the sour conditions of the present should by no means lead to disillusionment and foreclosure of future (AIFI: 1826). The presents reaching for the past signifies neither its negation nor the extraglorification of the past, but fixing a point of departure for the presents approaching the past, the future, and above all itself. That the temporal structure or presencing is located in the present and thus very much imprinted by its conditions reveals itself in two ways, both of which unravel the whole present dimension. First, there is a hypersensitive consciousness of 193

the present often laid bare even from underneath the garbs of Djahiliya that denotes in the first instance the renunciation of the present as a relapse into the condition of pre-Islamic primitiveness. Stripped of this negativity, the following passage17 conveys that present consciousness: We are today in a similarity of this situation (Djahiliya) not in its sameness.Such difference obligates a new Idjtihad18 reconciling the historical precedentsand the nature of the current era and its changing imperatives [emphasis added] (4: 2122). The negativity of Djahiliya is in itself hypersensitive to the present, because it reveals the willingness to set clearly and decisively a starting-point for action, without which no action can be possible, through laying bare the illegitimacy of present conditions camouflaging themselves by Islamic garbs. Distancing the presents claims from its reality, in order to open up a new field of action, is the function of Djahiliyas negative characterization of the present (4: 1946 & 3: 1643). Second, hypersensitivity to the present founded a critical attitude seeking to anatomize its various aspects under new light; such an attitude accommodates the other strategies of critique that will be dealt with and that constitute presencing in the present dimension, because they disclose future possibilities animated by the present and as such constituting its opening to the future. In this fashion, the present dimension would be squarely balanced in its simultaneous opening to the past, the future, and to itself and as such providing the fourth dimension anchored in the past with its location. Opening up the future is to be gained through resuming the Islamic Lebensart. Put it the other way round, by dealing a coup de grce to the Western notion of evolution19 that, with its logic of self-otherization and internalizing the Other, closed up the future leeway save for the breathless aping of the West, resuming the Islamic Lebensart actually liberates this Westernconfiscated future dimension. Nevertheless, one might possibly wonder like Abu-Rabi, whether resuming the Islamic Lebensart is but a nostalgic glorification of the past that seeks to establish a link with it, and thereunder the future is in fact confiscated and totally closed up by an incessant replay of the past (Abu-Rabi, 1996:110). The model delivered by the age of reference rescues the temporal structure from such a grave loophole by virtue of the balance between both of its two components fact and style20, which are often confused with one another. The Islamic system is not restricted solely to a replica of the first form of the Muslim society, but encompasses every social form governed by the total Islamic view of life. [It] has room for tens of forms, which are compatible with the natural growth of a society and the new needs of the contemporary age, as long the total Islamic idea in its extensive perimeter dominates these forms It is one of these formsthat we wish to realize when we say: we are willing to resume the Islamic Lebensart (MIR: 66). On one hand, the Islamic spirit defining the extensive perimeter establishes historical continuity with the past. On the other, the Islamic style allowing for tens of forms, not only that of the age of reference, opens up the future dimension and guarantees anchoring the temporal structure in the present. Furthermore, premised on the differentiation between abstract conceptions and realistic experience, opening up the future dimension promotes to new endeavors on assuring that future possibilities are no indifferent arbitrariness free-floating in space but realistic projects soaked in societal experience. It was not the Islamic fiqh with all its rules that founded the Muslim society, but the later with its


movement first to affront Djahiliya and then to grapple with real life needs that established the Islamic fiqh from the fundamentals of Sharia. Islamic fiqh neither originates nor lives in spaceit does not emanate in heads and papers rather in real life and not just any but that of a Muslim society in specific [emphasis added](4: 2010).

2. Historical critique It is a discursive strategy that seeks to anatomize the historical extension of the present through redressing the Self-Other imbalances in the methodology and practice of Islamic historical studies. On the methodological level, the goal was the re-institution of authentic Islamic historiography. The definition of history had first to be moved from a checklist of events to an explanation of these events by following manifest and latent links that relate these events in their scatteredness and make out of them a unity of coherent rings, interacting parts, and temporal and spatial extension21. Arab historical studies were criticized as a deficient response for they were plagued by three fatal defects. First, due to importing Western approaches soaked in materialism and experimentalism, the spiritual component was completely absented from the analysis and thus depriving the historiographer of a keyelement in the observation, characterization, comprehension, explanation, and evaluation of the historical phenomenon. The suspension of spirituality comprises no minor analytical error of explanation or characterization but a major methodological flaw. Second, assuming that personal and religious prejudices as well as the long historical animosity to Islam could be neutralized, Western approaches remain innately Euro-centric. That is, Europe is placed at the center of the Universe as an observation locus for all historical events. The uniqueness of incidents and experiences belonging to other cultural contexts are blurred on being viewed from this narrow perspective and disguised in European-derived historical forms. All events have to be perceived, explained, and evaluated in this fashion regardless of the scientific legitimacy or feasibility considerations (FTFM: 37-41). Third, through internalizing a selfimage alien, if not hostile, to Muslim beliefs, history, perceptions, core values, culture, and sentiments, these historical studies are not just dotted with methodological distortions. But, as school texts, they represent par excellence mechanisms of hegemony and intellectual dependency. For they disseminate a self-decentered view of history, where Europe solely plays the first role in human history, and thus galvanize a magical field of fascination with everything European, which indissolubly binds the colonized to the colonizer (56-8). These methodological distortions sought to be fended off by the new Islamic historiography actually provide the latter with its guidelines. First, apart from relying on the content of Arabic sources and then the technicalities of Western sources, the new historical study should be purely self-centered in the sense that the historian would let himself be affected only by the internal logic of events through preoccupying his soul, thought, and senses with reliving Islam as Aqida, concept, and system. Opening up the historians various faculties renders possible his perception of Islamic life, in any of its phases, as a living organism in whose body he has to accommodate the events via his internal engagement with


its soul22. Second, the real overriding factors unleashing human behavior in the historical context of Muslim Lebensart should be reconstructed and connected to incidents, developments, and radical changes. Thus, there is a dire need to develop an accurate understanding of Islams revolutionary spirit (not only its apparent effects on patterns of social, economic, and political organization, but also its underlying view codifying existential, human, and social relations) in order to orient the explanation of historical events. Since the combination of factors explaining historical events are designed and rank-ordered differently by historical researchers owing to the philosophical approach each is vested in. It is exactly here that a Muslim researcher outbids others, because he is versed with that worldview deeply relevant to the factors triggering these specific events, and therefore his analysis sheds light on aspects that remain totally in the dark for Western researchers. Certainly, peculiar historical conditions decided by the fashion Muslims comprehended their Aqida and translated it into societal organizational forms of each phase in Muslim history determine the relative weight of the factors proposed to explain historical events. Third, the peculiarity of Muslim historical experience should not however deny the fact that it was a human experience inseparable from human history, influencing it and influenced by it, especially those factors that constituted the pre-Islamic setting and continued thereafter affecting human experiences. Thus, a study of Muslim history must give full account of the religions, social habitat, political structures, economic conditions, moral values, and intellectual views of the pre-Islamic world23. This highlights the reality of Islams role, the worlds attitude to it (approval or renunciation), as well the historical patterns of interaction (conflict, compromise, and exchange) between both. (44-50). On the level of practice, the objective was the reconstruction of a self-centered version of Islamic history. Islam had to be dislodged from Western historicity and re-lodged in itself through unraveling the distinction of a Muslim social system from other Western forms (slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism) in terms of genesis, change, and form. In its origin, a Muslim society is distinguished from other societies by its unique relationship with Sharia. For whereas it was fashioned by a transcendental God-given Sharia existing in its completeness as a fait accompli, other social systems were just responses to their local temporary circumstances of class conflict and contradiction between means and relations of production. In their historical development, Muslim societies deviated at times from the Sharia-decreed norms of the social system, due to foreign influences or local developments. Yet, Islamic fiqh, through its adequate responses to various changes, preserved the relationship between the social structures and Sharia-norms unsevered and enabled the latter to determine the direction of social change. Therefore, sociological laws and historical generalizations applying to Western social systems are not valid to explain the emergence and development of Muslim societies (NMI: 62-6). In their historical form, Muslim social systems distinguished themselves strongly, despite frivolous similarities, from Western ones unfolded throughout the trajectory of Western history. Islam dawned at a time when a mixed system of slavery and feudalism dominated the Roman Empire and another of primitive nomadism and slavery pervaded Arabia. Emerging amidst such socio-economic conditions, Islam invalidates material dialectics and historical determinism, because it is unthinkable, according to such


notions, that a legal system (superstructure) encompasses principles that surmount the existing production systems (base-structure) and bears resemblances with not-yet existent social systems at that time (capitalism and socialism) (73-4). Although Muslim societies, due to the deviation of distributive policies from Islamic norms, witnessed large land ownership, they experienced neither serfdom la europen as a political, economic, and legal institution nor its underlying principles in any historical phase (78). As a result, the economic forces, which directed Western societies along the capitalist path, were totally absent in Muslim societies that certainly neither followed the same historical tract nor were their legal foundations or economic structures affected by the capitalist system24. The resemblances between Islam and capitalism are too superficial25 to suggest the latters influence owing to the fact that Islam preceded capitalism by almost 8 centuries and that principles of property and investment have totally different religious foundations and social functions in a Muslim context (81-3). The Islamic system is not slavery, it is not feudalism, it is not socialismThe Islamic system is just the Islamic system (91). It is against this background that it was avowed that Islamic history has an independent existence and ought to be periodized in the light of signposts firmly rooted in its own path. The first phase, Islam in the time of the Prophet, dealing with the first days of the Islamic vocation, focuses upon the efforts of the Prophet to lay the moral foundations of the first Muslim community. The various interactions between the nascent order and its medium of geographical environment, tribal structures, psychological conditions, social relationships, and economic conditions should be depicted to clarify how they conduced to or blocked a certain historical event. The phase of Islamic flow treats the period of the flourish of the Muslim civilization as Islam spread in an unprecedented way to different parts of the globe. The major spiritual, social, and intellectual transformations that the spread of Islam unleashed and that radically redirected the historical path of humanity should be focused upon. The fashion Islam, across a vast area of different and rich cultural regions, affected and was influenced by various religious experiences, social systems, philosophies and theories, and historical remains provides a clear picture not only of the Muslim world but also of the world at large. Such a picture was completely disfigured by Western attempts to paint it in medieval colors. The third phase, Islamic retreat, could be studied in the light of the previous phases in order to answer various questions related to this phenomenon. To what extent was the retreat a product of internal factors related to the Islamic value-system and organizational structures or of external factors? Was this retreat total or partial, profound or superficial? What was its effect on the historical path of humanity in spiritual, social, political, and economic terms? What is the relative weight of beliefs, ideologies, and systems humanity improvised in Islams absentia in comparison to their Islamic equivalents? What did humanity lose or gain from Islamic decline and Western dominance? In this fashion, human history becomes a series of chained rings, Islams role would be defined in the past and the present, and its lines in the future get more clear in the light of the past and the present. In conclusion, historical critique fulfills a major mission of liberation. Redeeming Islams role, its Lebensart, and the progress its world order offered humanity, liberate the Muslims from Western ethnocentric illusions and their resulting mastery-slavery relationship. Restoring the spiritual


aspect emancipates mankind from the monolithic materialistic view of human existence that dooms its history to a deformed replay of Europes historical trajectory. This also has the practical value of laying the foundations of good relations between the different peoples through uncovering the real motives and values behind controversial historical incidents, whose different interpretations deliver long-lasting hostilities among nations (FTFM: 51-60).

3. Socio-economic critique It is a discursive strategy that endeavors to dissect the socio-economic morphology of the present through addressing itself to class conditions26 on the national as well as the international levels. On the national level, the social condition that paralyzes the forces of production represents a polarization between the coalition of regression and the hungerstricken masses. Those forces making up the coalition of regression are: the exploiters, who are unwilling to bear the costs of social justice; the oppressors, who cannot tolerate the loss of their illegitimate excessive powers; the hedonists, who by all means decline the slightest moderation of their impulses and gratification; mercenary writers and hired journalists, who disguise unjust social conditions by propagating the dominant ideology; and last but not least the professional men of religion, who provide any fatwa to religiously sanction the existing social condition. On the far end of the social scene stand millions of the masses, or that mutilated, wretched human wreck, so deformed by unjust social conditions that they lost the innermost human sense of the intolerability of injustice and that their existence level had been debased to that of animals nourishing on garbage (MIR: 6-7). It is against this background that the hegemonic function of the various superstructure components could be reviewed. The party system does not, by dint of its formation and interests, represent the masses but the interests of the rich classes, who can financially afford to become parliament members via party bodies. There is therefore a fundamental clash of interests between the masses and the existing parties, whose controversies were never relevant to the masses interests but their own. For when capitalist interests seemed to be slightly at peril, party rivalries were substituted by class solidarity in the face of the foreseen danger. Blocking all reform projects that might infringe any economic or social responsibilities upon the capitalists attests to that party members represent the capitalist class even prior to their own parties. Party politics, parliament speeches, fiery declarations, electoral campaigns, government reshuffles, all play the role of mobilizing the support of the masses, in a fashion similar to that of local wizards, behind policies at odds with their real interests. No party was even serious about the issue of independence that was certainly among business-as-usual tools for conducting party politics, because by instincts these parties realize that colonialism is the last defense line for the real interests they represent. As a commercial institution, the press is farthest from representing the masses, due to the simple fact that the piastres the poor public pays cannot finance a daily or weekly newspaper. Actually, the huge gap between the costs of a single copy and its public price is bridged by other financial sources, like advertisements for capitalist institutions, party or government contributions, and secret donations of intelligence


services. Owing to this, the press can never side with the concerns of the masses versus the exploiters; rather they abet the exploitation process by drugging the masses with pornography and social gossip. The pictures of bare thighs and tits are the entertainment the capitalists press presents to the deprived masses to deviate them from the immoral enjoyment of these real thighs and tits by capitalists, not just their pictures (113-9). Because Islam does not consider religion a profession, save for teaching its principles, which is to be treated like any other branch of knowledge, it has no clergy, or men of religion who earn their living by speaking in the name of religion (105). However, there exist in current times those professional men of religion [who] are farthest of Gods creatures from representing [Islams] true image by dint of their education, behavior, and attire (63). Their intellectual sclerosis, narrow-mindedness, and ignorance coupled with their role of blessing repression and exploitation in the name of the Quran make them Islams archenemy (100). [They] have a cardinal function27 in feudal and capitalist societies, a function that the state finances them for and facilitates its performance and the reaping of its profitsit is the function of stupefaction and deception of the hard-working, exploited, and deprived masses. Nowadays, they are just cogs in the exploitation apparatus. And they are beneficiaries and exploiters in their turn (106). The professional men of religion drain Islams worldly social and economic content and transform it to a non-worldly formal structure comprised of truncated rituals, opium-like spirituality, endless celebration of religious feasts and carnivals, useless argumentation about purely theological issues, and a sacred hierarchy of infallible personnel. This new Islam fabricated out of superstitions and trivialities and metastasizing fatalism in the whole social body under the guise of sacred codes and symbols legitimates unjust social arrangements and delegitimates any resistance against them through intentionally misinterpreting28 the whole social condition. It is in this sense that the profession of religion is a part of unbalanced social systems and an integrative part of their ruling apparatuses (103-4). As expressed by the Quranic verse When We decide to destroy a town, We enact Our command to its voluptuous inhabitants, but they continue to transgress and thus comes true the word and we destroy them utterly, this social condition sows the seeds of its own destruction and therefore it cannot go on and finds itself at crossroads29. First, subordinating capital investments to the owning classes interests leads to under-exploitation of natural resources and to under-employment of the working forces. Thus, the nations production will fall short of its needs, a condition that aggravates an already unbalanced income distribution and threatens with an economic collapse. Second, unjust social conditions transforming the majority of the population to homeless needy, poor rural workers, or house servants turn the slogan the nation is the source of authority into an illusion. For it is a nation composed of millions of exploited, ignorant, and hungry masses that cannot afford the luxury to think beyond buttering their bread. Third, moral corruption is the inevitable result of the societys polarization into a haves and havenots, because it constitutes the fertile soil for a trade-off maintaining the release of the richs excessive bodily energy and the satisfaction of the poors dire survival needs. Among the poor a strata of middlemen, playing the role of pimps, will con its way out of poverty through brokering such immoral deals


between the two parties (8-13). Fourth, through proving on the ground the fallacy of equity of chances or rendering delusive the principle of proportionality between effort and reward, the psychological foundations of the individuals and the society will be violently shaken, and the social capital will be turned into apathy, mistrust, and confusion (16). Fifth, the superstructure institutions are unable to provide a hegemonic footing in the shape of a unified, coherent, and dominant ideology that can re-produce the production relations or at least shortly maintain their existence. Sixth, the polarization of the international system between two hostile blocks, each having its own ideology that addresses certain classes within the society (capitalism swishes to the ruling classes, whereas communism hails the exploited ones) and that attempts to impose its socio-economic model from outside, shakes the very foundations of the whole socio-economic system (23-5). This takes the socio-economic critique to its next level, namely the international terrain, where there is a clear connection between economic dynamics of imperialism and cultural mechanisms of hegemony, the latter is far more dangerous than military occupation, political subjugation, or economic exploitation. A division between the colonized societies and exploitative colonialism dominates the international scene. On the one hand, the colonized societies, as exemplified by the Muslim Umma bear the following characteristics: alienated, downtrodden, and robbed of independent path; besieged by a self-loathing mentality of slaves30 to any masters; torn by degrading economic conditions that lose these societies human dignity or clear vision; being scramble objects to international powers; and disfigured by a funny carnival of laws, dresses, and philosophies of the colonial masters. On the other, the whole Western world, capitalist as well as communist, fall under the category of imperialism due to the hostility of its various countries tout entire to the Umma. Britain and France, whose colonial policies replay the atrocities of the Middle Ages and the barbarity of the Crusaders under the guise of a mission civilisatrice, occupy vast areas of the Muslim Umma and shackle their quasi-independent colonies with treaties of common alliance. Just as America discredited its own liberal values by disseminating hate and scorn to everything Islamic or oriental through its huge propaganda machine as well as the racial discrimination against the blacks, the Soviet Union sidestepped its communist (non-religious and nonnationalist) principles by recognizing and supporting Israel, the only state on earth founded on a religious basis (26-33). There is no gainsaying that the imperialist powers are in a state of alliance with the dictatorial regimes, feudal and capitalist classes, mercenary intellectuals, professional men of religion, and lax sensualists. Such a patron-client alliance, which constitutes the main pillar of the colonizers-colonized relationship, is based on the common interest of its parties to obliterate Islam from life, because its governance on any level devours their whole existence (93).


4. Cultural critique It is a discursive strategy that attempts to fathom the cultural aspect of the present through discerning the various overlapping dynamics of hegemony entrusted with the incessant reproduction and circulation of the colonizer-colonized relationship on the cognitive-imaginary level i.e. the colonization of imagination. The dynamic process of hegemony assumes the form of a circuit of two opposing currents between its two poles. The first current from the colonized peripheries to the colonial center is generated by the usury-based global banking system, whose interest rate fluctuation, waged by profit motives and determining investment and employment levels, makes the whole economic system too shaky. This system, since the money-lender profits in all cases, helps transfer cash sums from different parts of the world to a very few number of money-lending institutions that are in fact the real owners of various economic projects worldwide, whereas the formal local owners, whose various decisions are dictated by the former, are nothing but underlings in this huge semi-invisible machinery. For, in order to disburden themselves from the high loan payments, these investors do hand over to moneylenders not only the workers surplus value over via low salary policies, but also indirect consumer taxes through pricing policies. Both policies brand the capitalist system with its bones-crushing competitiveness (AII: 105-6). By contrast, the second current heading from the colonial center to the peripheries is engendered by a constellation of delicately soft mechanisms. On the popular level, fabricated social customs subjugate the vast majority of the population due to their inescapable control over various social life aspects and the great pains taken to fulfill their almost meaningless obligations. Fashions and dressing styles, as the most widely spread manifestation of social customs authority, have the most detrimental consequences in terms of squandering badly needed economic resources, dissolving internal moral authority, and devouring lofty goals and interests of life. Thanks to the multiplicity and absurdity of dressing styles, hairstyles, and cosmetics, as a new form of degrading enslavement, large economic profits find their way to fashion houses, production companies, Jewish money-lenders, and to all those who wage a dehumanizing war on humanity, not by bullets and troops, but by nerves-crushing, vaguelyfabricated, purposeless, and yet unquestionable social traditions abetted by generously financed and highly sophisticated scientific theories, moral philosophies, and University curriculums (3: 1219). Another instance is the worldwide circulation of the women liberation fallacy, beneath which the universal exploitation and commercialization of the woman body takes place in order to reap economic gains by inflaming the sexual instinct of the woman-commodity customers. As such, employing females in economic and political institutions like companies, stores, embassies, hotels, journals, and airlines, a process instigated historically by the desire to acquire cheap labor through taking advantage of womens financial needs and rising demand on jobs, intentionally eroticizes the transaction medium by investing in it the womans body and special skills with the aim of accelerating the transactions rate and maximizing their profits (AII: 50). On the intellectual level, Orientalism is given credit for the fabrication of a scholarship tradition and knowledge constructions in order to re-create the colonizer-colonized.


Orientalists (the intellectual tool of Zionist-Crusaderist colonialism) carry out serious and profound researches31 on Islam, but they are not motivated by a willingness to establish facts, reach the truth, or certainly be fair to this religion. Rather, they toil to comprehend Islams individual self-activation and social self-projection mechanisms, which make out its main strength-point, in order to extract effective means of completely neutralizing, if not demolishing, it. Having very systematically drained32 and intentionally misinterpreted33 the essential content of its conceptions and views to encompass the most alien and destructive conditions, systems, and views to Islam under the pretense of respecting its beliefs, a meticulous counterfeit of counter-alternatives and neo-formulations on the formal pattern of Islam is made possible in order to fill the void of the original content and even to root out its faint remaining sentiments among its followers. In this objectifying fashion, Orientalism transforms Islam from a dynamic movement to establish Gods right on earth and oust the aggressors to a frozen cultural movement, lifeless theoretical studies, and sterile theological and fiqhi argumentation. Researches on Islam, which are published with the rate of one book per week in one of the foreign languages, signal the profound knowledge of the tiniest details of Islam (its history, beliefs, rules, means of resisting it and spoiling its directives). But, rather than launching a direct attack on Islam, lest it might arouse the religious consciousness of Muslims, Orientalists seek a delicate method; the caressing flattery of Islams greatness drugs any religious heedfulness and wins the readers confidence in the objectivity of the research. Islam is certainly a great religion, but notwithstanding past glories it has to adapt its dogmas, views, and regulations in order to keep pace with modern civilization. Thus, Islam must sanction European social, political, and moral measures and turn itself into internal belief severed from and indifferent to real life matters that should be ruled by the policies and methods of Western modern civilization. That is, Islam has to secularize itself to continue being a great religion (2: 1061-2). Therefore, Orientalists hailed the secularist path epitomized by the Kemalist experience, which they sought ardently to assure its Islamic credentials and described as the most successful Islamic movement in modern history that Muslims have to emulate to the letter in order to preserve Islams existence (AII: 184). They also exerted extreme efforts to distance Turkeys secularist model from any accusations of atheism, because it was bridled by such accusation from achieving its remote objective of emptying religious commitments and formulations of their meaning and bestowing them on Jahili forms and conditions worldwide, though its limited role of dismantling the last panIslamic state on earth was beautifully played (3: 1221). As a result of Orientalists efforts, a huge army of collaborators in the image of teachers, philosophers, doctors, and researchers follow in the footsteps of these powers [the Orientalists] and sometimes writers, poets, artists, and journalists who bear Muslim namesAnd some of them are even Ulama. This army of collaborators is instructed to shake the foundations of Aqida in the souls by all means34 necessary. This has taken the form of research, science, literature, art, and journalism. [In addition to] weakening its foundation, the intent is to belittle the importance of Aqida and Sharia alike, and to interpret it in an unsuitable manner, and to emphasize its reactionary character, and call for leaving it aside (1: 414-5).


5. Political critique It is a discursive strategy that seeks to unearth the political aspect of the present through laying bare the foundations and methods of political governance. The incisiveness and success of this strategy lies in that, as Gilles Kepel masterfully noticed, it was launched at the Egyptian independent state from the very special vantage point of one of its concentration camps. And it is exactly from this depth that it was able to fashion categories that could be used to analyze all the worlds Muslim states on the morrow of their independence (Kepel, 1993:52 & 57). Coupled with the critiques vantage point, one senses a hypersensitive consciousness of the present animating its strategic moves and leading themes. For the context [of the verse dealing with ruling by Gods laws] is sealed by portraying the crossroads between Djahiliya and Islam (MTI: 177). akimiya and Sharia[represent] a matter of Aqida and religion, before being a matter of government and order. It is an issue of belief or disbelief in God before being one of the forms of government or social systems. It is an issue of the existence of this religionor its eradication (180). The disjunctive nature stamping this statement encloses the same present consciousness that the phrase at crossroads discloses. Added to this, no other discursive strategy in the Qutbian oeuvre can fit more neatly in the hermeneutical ring pattern than political critique. From the angle of government foundations, the secular basis of government is the product of an irrational importation process that readily does away with authentic spiritual and intellectual foundations as well as viable indigenous alternatives to be extracted from them. Two genealogical moves were taken to beleaguer that secularist foundation. First, secularisms foreignness was traced all the way back to early Christianitys highly spiritual purification, whose attachment to the Kingdom of God and detachment from worldly affairs rendered it inadequate to European circumstances of bloody tribal conflicts and of austere, impoverished environment, hence the separation between religion and life. However, the clergy, unable to ensure their material interests due to the churchs isolation from worldly matters, abused their spiritual jurisprudence in the public sphere to build up a worldly authority that counterbalances that of the absolute monarchs. The spiritual and intellectual ill practices of the ecclesiastical institution (excommunication, Inquisition, exoneration) as well as its historical alliance with exploitative classes created an unbridgeable rift of hate and wrath between society and religion. Second, secularisms incompatibility was chased in the particularity of Islams doctrine and history. Having as its most basic objective the establishment of a novel and perfect form of human life, Islam extends its field of action to human life in its entirety; its spiritual as well as its material sides included. It can never exist in isolation from human life, because it is an indivisible unity composed of ibadat (rituals), muamalat (transactions), and nuum (systems). Ibada (literally means worship) does not confine itself to the practice of spiritual rituals, but encompasses all human activities (social as well as individual) directed to God. Islams historical experience assured its doctrinal premises, since it experienced neither an ecclesiastical institution nor a divine right of Kings. Therefore, there was no conflict between a temporal authority and a spiritual one over political and economic stakes. Religious abuses of the type of the


Inquisition were almost unknown in Islams history apart from politically motivated exceptions that do not represent the main stream of Islamic life. Certainly there existed men of religion who sided with the rulers against the masses, but it is equally true that at the same time the Ulama openly confronted these rulers in an act of solidarity with the masses and paid their lives for this. In conclusion, there is no single reason, neither doctrinal nor historical, that invites Muslims to cut off their religion from life. Rather, it is ignorance about the nature of Islam and historical facts, mental and psychological idleness to reevaluate the civilizational assets, and the comically superficial imitation of other societies that lead to the adoption of secularism as a basis for the socio-political existence (AII: 7-18). From the angle of government methods, demoralization is the common denominator between the policies of the British masters and whoever inherited the same administrative structures. Two main institutions exemplify this structural continuity. The military establishment is misguided by the same spirit of the British army commissioner, for the White English, after leaving their positions in the government administration, entrusted the darkskinned English, succeeding them in these same positions, with finishing up their uncompleted work. The main task of the English was to destroy the moral spirit through sowing seeds of despair and weakness and implanting the conviction of self-impotency in the minds of the people. Therefore, in order to create a huge rift within the military, they granted huge salaries and privileges to officers, who were picked up from rich aristocratic families, whereas they recruited soldiers from the poorest classes unable to pay the exemption-tax (albadalia). Among the procedures followed, in order to weaken religious and patriotic loyalties of military personnel as well as and to undermine the discipline of the institution as a whole, were squandering the military budget to make it insufficient for armament, unmanning the officers by means of luxurious and delicate life, and even encouraging moral laxity among military academy students and cadets. Through the extremely low salaries of soldiers, which deprived the families of their sustainers and thus led to their destruction, and the extremely brutal and bestial treatment of soldiers, which lowered them to being slaves for their officers, the military service was demonized in the eyes of the people as no less equal to destruction, humiliation, and misery. The dark-skinned English followed suit this same pattern with full devotion, conviction, and craft (MMY: 9-11 & 17). The legal institution exemplifies the same policies yet in a different vogue. The legislators, having received their legal training under the sway of a foreign legislative mentality, do not only know little about Islamic Sharia, but also mock the idea that it can furnish modern legislation with solutions for current life problems. Rather, they continue the same parasitical attitude of thriving on a foreign culture, to which they contributed absolutely nothing, and of applying the same French codes, unaware of the repercussions of 70 years of such experiment. The constant repulsion between the spirit of the imported laws and that of the people did not only result in their lack of conviction in legal justice, but more dangerously it begot the solidarity of the people with outlaws as heroes to be admired for rebelling against such incomprehensible, incompatible, and most of all unjust laws that outlaw them in the very first place (MIR:67-8). This initial, preemptive critique makes room for the reinvestment, say reconstruction, of two Quranic notions that engulf the basis and method of governance in Islam. As the basis


of the political relationship, the notion of akimiya, betokened in the first article of Muslim faith La ilaha illa Allah, got intertwined in a game of semantic relations. On one hand, there is the authoritative misinterpretation of akimiya by Taghuti authorities, which have lost Gods sovereignty its real signification and metamorphosed it into empty words by straitjacketing it in meaningless rituals and ceremonies severed from the realm of government, in which these authorities reign. Only in this sense, or rather non-sense, Gods sovereignty would be tolerated for it not only does not disturb the basis and legitimacy of government, but also indirectly sanctions such basis through normalizing the usurpation of Gods authority in the individual conscience. On the other, political critique seeks to resuscitate to the notion of akimiya its full, original connotation through tearing it off from the distorted interpretation of Taghuti authorities. akimiya, accordingly, connotes restoring the full Rububiya (deity) to God through the utter submission only to Gods laws and the denunciation of and disobedience to any other authority that decrees to humans the laws governing them. By this token, the notion of akimiya can only have one signification; to drag the authority from the hands ofTawaghit (usurpers) and return it to its proprietor, which means from their view point corruption on earth! Or, as described by todays Jahili lawsit is an attempt to subdue the government system (muawala li qalb niam al-ukm). From the viewpoint of Jahili Tawaghit that usurp the authority of God that is, usurp Rububiya (deity) and perform His tasks even if this was not spelt out this is topsyturvication (Qalb) of government system. Notwithstanding such derogatory description on the part of these authorities, whereas government system in the Djahiliyas is based on the Rububiya of one person above the others, the vocation to Godmeans that the Rububiya above all humans would be only to their Creator. The relentless opposition of such authorities to the true signification of akimiya becomes understandable, because it devours their government through disclaiming its very basis of legitimacy (3: 1330-1). In a word, La ilaha illa Allah signifies a revolution against the worldly authority usurping the first attributes of Uluhiya, a revolution against the existing conditions based on this usurpation, and above all a rebellion against the authorities ruling by laws not prescribed by God (MFT: 26). By this token, akimiya as a declaration of Gods Rububiya signifies the total liberation of Man through unshackling him from relations of obedience and submission to any entity other than God, whether these relations take the form of human legislation, social traditions, political systems, or even his own internal whims and desires (1346). The notion of Shura is not just the form of the political government decreed by Islam, based on the principle of akimiya, but it is one of the main fundamentals of the Islamic way of life that covers a range much wider than the field of political governance. Furthermore, Islam did not specify Shuras techniques and methods by a special system or rules, but completely left them, as an organizational matter, to the needs, capabilities, and facilities of each age and place to satisfy the requirements of the Shura principle. The field of Shura encompasses worldly matters (Shuun duniawiya) in need of experience and profession, or what might be contemporarily called purely scientific and technical-practical matters. Legislative (shariya) issues related to the individual, his relations to others, and the limits between rights and duties are to be referred to the corresponding Islamic laws, general


principles, or the total view of Islam. Initially, the scope of Shura, as a purely organizational matter depending on the requirements and facilities of each age, was at first confined to Medina, because it represented the Ummas Consultation College (ahl al- ray), but with the expansion of the Muslim state Shura was extended to include Mecca. Since Shura has no Quranic-specified system, rather it was the practical circumstances of each age that defined clearly the Consultation body (ahl al-shura), this flexibility leaves the door open for a multiplicity of forms and methods that can materialize the Shura principle. Nowadays, for instance, Shura has to be extended to all the masses rather than their representation by a certain city or group, and as such the methods and technique guaranteeing this universal consultation have to be secured. In concrete terms, this means that the obstacles, which sabotage the electoral process and distort its representation of the will of the Umma, because the voters are subordinated to landowners, employers, or rulers as the case is today, should be totally wiped out. Concerning the main political relationship between the ruler and the ruled, two matters precondition obedience to the rulers authority. On one hand, the ruler is obeyed not because of himself i.e. his personal or religious status, but due to his own subservience to the authority of God and Sharia. Once the slightest deviation from Sharia occurs on his side, the ruled become totally unbound by his authority, which is instantly rendered illegitimate. On the other, the will of the ruled constitutes the source of the rulers authority, since voluntary choice (al-baya al-ikhtiariya) is the only legitimate way to assume power as supported by historical precedents in the age of reference. Both preconditions distance Islamic governance from theocracy, because they highlight the difference between executing religious laws by a civil ruler chosen by the people and could be therefore dismissed from office and deriving authority from a spiritual status. It is a distinction between the function of governance and the source of its legitimacy (MIR: 72-3 & AII: 81-2). The reconstruction of both notions of akimiya and Shura opened up a whole new semantic field for launching critique against the political authorities of the day and even, in the words of Kepel, all the worlds Muslim states on the morrow of their independence (Kepel, 1993:52). The password for this field of political critique was the Quranic term Taghut, which was defined as every authority that does not derive its power from God; every government that is not based on Gods Sharia; and every assault on the rightand the assault on Gods authority, his Uluhiya, and his akimiya is the most repugnant aggression and the worst Tughian, which I include within the connotation of Taghut, its word as well as its meaning (2: 926). The first pillar of this semantic field, in contemporary terms, was the ruling authoritys usurpation of the legislative function through the suspension of Gods laws in their societies and solely legislating in their stead according to their own perceptions, interests, and whims, which is actually establishing the rule of Djahiliya. Such consolidation of Djahiliyas rule, whether acknowledged or not, is disguised by arguments of the sort of the almost superhuman abilities of the rulers to adapt human laws to current needs, to choose the best alternative for the masses, to know better their interests than God and certainly than those masses themselves, to handle the deficiencies of Sharia, and even to overcome its inability to grapple with unforeseen circumstances and needs of modern times (2: 905 & 5: 3152). The second pillar was the ruling authoritys imposition of a social organization form not


necessarily based on the negation of the existence of God, but actually limiting the domain of His powers to heavens and isolating Him from the here and now. Such social form does not apply the divine laws and the eternal values to the social existence, and even prevents its members from demanding that Gods laws govern their existence, though it would permit people to worship God in synagogues, churches, and mosques. That is nothing but establishing a Jahili society under the banner of a secularized enlightened Islam that has nothing whatsoever to do with daily life matters (MFT: 116-7 & 103). The third pillar was the ruling authoritys determination of the bond of social and political unity th