Bribes To California Judges Fictitious Wage Campaign Contributions

S______
In the Supreme Court of the State of California

____________________
!
____________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
Petitioner / Appellant,
vs.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF ORANGE
Respondent;
Kamala Harris, James Otero,Otis D. Wright, II, George H. King,
Dolly M. Gee, Jan Levine, Gloria Molina, Don Knabe, Zev Yaroslavsky, Michael
Antonovich, United States of America, State of California,
County of Los Angeles, Chris Ryan Legal, Sr., Does 1-10, (any judge assigned to
this case who received Judicial Benefits) DOE #1, Derek Hunt
Real Parties in Interest.
____________________
!
____________________
from the Judgment of the Superior Court, County of Orange,
Case No.: 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
Hon. Derek Hunt, Judge Dept C24 (657) 6225224
____________________
!
____________________

PETITION FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDATE
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION TO TRIAL COURT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOR CJP ANALYSES

____________________
!
____________________
Dennis Ettlin. Pro Se
27222 Paseo Lomita
San Juan Capistrano, CA 92675
310-795-9507

STAY REQUESTED FOR February 11, 2014 HEARING

Related Appeal Pending : E058417, E058420

""
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL ii

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES
The real parties of interest in this case are as follows:
1. Defendants in case 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC:
County of Los Angeles, Chris Ryan Legal, Sr., Does 1-10, (any judge assigned to this
case who received Judicial Benefits), Derek Hunt (DOE #1)
2. Plaintiffs Daniel Cooper and Anthony Locatelli in cases B241184, B240813
and E058417, E058420
3. All justices of the Second Appellate District participating in the recusal from
cases B241184 and B240813.
4. All justices of the Fourth Appellate District who are or may be assigned cases
E058417 and E058420 or who may be assigned to this case on appeal.

Full name of person Nature of Interest (Explain)
1

1-Cynthia Aaron CJA past pres., CJA
2
sponsored SBX2 11
1-Gilbert Nares Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-James A. McIntyre Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Joan K. Irion Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Judith L. Haller Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Judith McConnell Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Patricia D. Benke Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Richard D. Huffman Received Superior Court judicial benefits
1-Terry B. O'Rourke Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Art W. McKinster Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Carol D. Codrington Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Betty Ann Richli Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Douglas P. Miller Judicial Council member
3,

Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Jeffrey King Received Superior Court judicial benefits

"""
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL iii
2-Manuel A. Ramirez Received Superior Court judicial benefits
2-Thomas E. Hollenhorst Past CJA official
2
, CJA sponsored SBX2 11
3-David A. Thompson Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-Eileen C. Moore Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-Kathleen E. O'Leary Member of Judicial Council
3

3-Raymond J. Ikola Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-Richard D. Fybel Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-Richard M. Aronson Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-William F. Rylaarsdam Received Superior Court judicial benefits
3-William W. Bedsworth Received Superior Court judicial benefits

1
Information from Fourth Appellate District website

2
California Judges Association
3
Judicial Council wrote and sponsored SBX2_11

5. Members of the Commission on Judicial Performance

Pursuant to rules 8.208 and 8.488 of the California Rules of Court,
Petitioner hereby certifies that there are no other interested entities or persons
that must be listed in this certificate.

Dated: February 3, 2014
Respectfully submitted,
______________________________
Dennis ETTLIN, In Pro Per
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

"#
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PARTIES ....................................................... ii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1
JURISDICTION ..........................................................................................................4
PARTIES ......................................................................................................................4
AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS .............................................................................6
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................7
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......................................................................8
BASIS FOR RELIEF ...................................................................................................9
ABSENSE OF OTHER REMEDIES .......................................................................11
BENEFICIAL INTEREST .......................................................................................13
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ...........................................................................................14
VERIFICATION .......................................................................................................15
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES .........................................16
AMNESTY AND RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY ..................................................17
I. SBX2 11 UNCONSTITUTIONAL .....................................................................18
A. FIRST STURGEON CHALLENGE .............................................................18
B. HASTY RESPONSE IN SBX2 11 .................................................................18
C. SECOND STURGEON CHALLENGE ........................................................19
D. DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST JUDGES ........................................................21
E. CJP CHALLENGES SBX2 11 .......................................................................22
F. AG DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE ..........................................................23
II. PAYMENTS ARE BRIBES ..............................................................................25
III. COUNTIES ARE NOT SOVEREIGN ...........................................................26
IV. LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY .........................26
V. BAUMAN JUSTIFIES A WRIT .......................................................................27
A. NO OTHER ADEQUATE RELIEF ..............................................................27
B. DAMAGE NOT CORRECTABLE ...............................................................28
C. ORDER IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS .........................................................28
D. OFT-REPEATED ERROR ............................................................................29
E. NEW LEGAL ISSUES ....................................................................................30
VI. FRAUD ON THE COURT ...............................................................................30
CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................33

#
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL v

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A Request for Recusal .................................................................. WA-5
APPENDIX B Judge Hunts Denial of Disqualification ............................... WA-25
APPENDIX C Complaint ................................................................................ WA-31
APPENDIX D Superior Courts Demurrer .................................................. WA-363
APPENDIX E Supervisors Demurrer .......................................................... WA-395
APPENDIX F Attorney Generals Demurrer ............................................... WA-442
APPENDIX G Supervisors Anti-SLAPP .................................................... WA-471
APPENDIX H Petitioners Reply To Demurrers and Anti-Slapp ................. WA-500
APPENDIX I Register of Actions ................................................................. WA-550
APPENDIX J Government Code Section 68206.6 ...................................... WA-555
APPENDIX K Proof of Service for Federal Defendants .............................. WA-557

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) .................................................................... 32
Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) ............................. 27
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. 868 (2009) ............................ 3, 16, 31
Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 ................................... 32
Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 ........................... 32
County of Madera v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d at page 670 .................... 24
Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) ....................................... 31
Estate of Sanders v. Sutton, 40 Cal.3d 607 (1985) ........................................................ 31
In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) .................................................................. 20
Interactive Multimedia Artists v. Superior Court (1998) 62,Cal.App.4
th
1546, 1550 ... 11

#"
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL vi
Mallarino v. Superior Court, 115,Cal.App.2d 781 (1953) ............................................ 11
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ............................................................. 31
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 ...................... 31
Residents for Adeq. Water v. Redwood Val. Co. Water. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 42
CR2d 123, 125 ............................................................................................................ 32
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, rev. denied 12/23/08 18
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 191Cal.App.4th 153 ......................... 1, 16, 18
U.S. v. Adams ................................................................................................................. 25
U.S. v. Frega .................................................................................................................. 25
U.S. v. Malkus ................................................................................................................ 25
U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) ...................................................................... 31
Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) ................................ 31

Statutes
18 U.S.C. Section 1346 .................................................................................................. 25
SB 1248, code section 68206.6 (Chapter 1060, Statutes of 1985) .................................. 2

Other Authorities
27 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 338 (1956) .................................................................................. 24
59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 496, 497 (1976) .......................................................................... 24
61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 388, (1978) ................................................................................. 24
California Code of Civil Procedure 170.3 (d) .............................................................. 26
California Code of Civil Procedure, 1085 ..................................................................... 4
SBX2 11 .................................................................................................................. passim
Constitutional Provisions
California Constitution, Article VI, 10 .......................................................................... 4
California Constitution, Article VI, 19 .................................................... 4, 9, 13, 18, 24

$
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO APPOINT 3-JUDGE PANEL 1
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners complaint seeks civil relief from individuals of the Los
Angeles Board of Supervisors, Superior Court and certain Federal Judges for
violations of his 14
th
Amendment Due Process rights resulting from the practice
of county supplemental judicial benefits.
Orange County Superior Court Judge Derek Hunt failed to voluntarily
recuse himself from the case due to his own receipt of such supplemental
judicial payments. He then denied Plaintiffs written request for recusal,
claimed the public records reminding him of his receipt of such payments were
hearsay, threatened to deny any request for a change of venue and then based
his denial on one side of the very legal issues at stake in the case.
The first hearing on the case will take place February 11, 2014. Petitioner
seeks a stay of that hearing until a 3-Judge panel, newly appointed by this Court,
can rule on the statewide issue of judicial immunity for taking county payments.
Such a ruling will protect the Judges from bad legislation, provide a legal path
for salary increases, reduce the workload of the courts and resolve this state issue
before and without involvement of the Federal Courts.
The Attorneys General have ruled in 1956, 1976, and 1978 that
supplemental judicial payments made by 35 California counties to state judges
are unconstitutional because they do no properly prescribe the payments. The
Sturgeon I
1
case held that the payments were thus unconstitutional and Sturgeon
II
2
held SBX2_11 (WA-247) was temporarily constitutional. The California
Commission On Judicial Performance (CJP) legal analyses (WA-281) have
determined that SBX2_11, specifically Sections 2 and 5 are unconstitutional and
they requested an opinion from their legal counsel, the Attorney General (AG).

1
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 CalApp4th 630, 84 CalRptr3d 242 (2008)
2
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 191Cal.App.4th 153 (2010);

%
Both AG Brown and AG Harris have refused to rule on the matter, suppressing
the issue, and denying the CJP access to legal counsel and their legal remedies.
Petitioner seeks a ruling on those CJP analyses to determine if Judge Hunt has
immunity and if the real parties in interest are violating his 14
th
Amendment Due
Process rights.
Petitioner has requested the I.R.S. Criminal Investigations-Public
Corruption Unit and Congressman Darryl Issas office to review the county
payment process as a new campaign finance mechanism called fictitious wage
contributions which have no limits and very limited reporting requirements.
The record of Los Angeles Superior Court and County suggests a
fraudulent implement of SB 1248, code section 68206.6 (Chapter 1060, Statutes
of 1985) by authorizing payment of supplemental benefits in spite of the
explicit prohibition in SB 1248.
Nothing in this section, and no procedure adopted pursuant to this section,
shall increase or decrease any compensation or benefits available to, or received
by, superior court judges as a result of being paid from a state payroll.
Petitioner seeks civil relief from the criminal judicial actions and the bias
caused by the county payments. The Fourth Appellate Courts Sturgeon II ruling
explicitly encouraged this challenge of the unconstitutional payments. (WA-265)
Petitioner is one of three Plaintiff taxpayers in Los Angeles County who filed 10
civil suits in 2011. Plaintiffs requested Judges who never received such
payments to rule on the issue. On appeal, all the judges of the Los Angeles
Second Appellate Court recused themselves. This Court then assigned those 10
cases to the Fourth Appellate, Division 2 in Riverside.
Petitioners claim for civil relief hinges on the legal analyses laid out by
the CJP. Judge Hunts denial of disqualification did not address any of the CJP
issues incorporated by Plaintiff. His action clearly pre-judges the key legal issues
and arguments in Petitioners case. Petitioner has no recourse in the Appellate

&
Court and therefore seeks an unbiased 3-Judge panel to evaluate the CJP
arguments and the constitutionality of SBX2_11 in all its severable parts,
BEFORE the case is heard in the trial court.
The issue presented in this Extraordinary Writ addresses the fact that
Justices in both the Second and Fourth Appellate Courts, as well as most
Appellate districts, and most members of this Supreme Court lack personal
jurisdiction to rule directly on this matter. Only this court can constitute a 3-
Judge panel with personal jurisdiction to resolve the legal issues in Petitioners
case and the violation of the U.S. Supremacy Clause guaranteeing Petitioner his
full (not interim) Due Process rights. Failure by this Court to issue an
appropriate Writ will leave no choice to those Defendants, employed as Federal
Judges, for removal to Federal Court on RICO charges and where the absence of
this Courts certification of the constitutionality of SBX2 11 can be invoked by
the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to Rule 29.4(c), Rule 14.1
(e)(v) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(b).
Judicial immunity, and especially retroactive immunity, depends on the
constitutionality of the legislative fix, SBX2 11. Petitioner asserts that arguments
by the CJP demonstrate that SBX2 11 fails to permanently remedy the situation,
violates the federal Equal Pay Act, grants unconstitutional retroactive immunity,
and leaves the Californias judges open to real and imagined charged of bribery.
While Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. 868 (2009)
applied an objective standard, Petitioner requests a strict scrutiny legal standard
be applied to the matter of judicial compensation in California since the
California Courts, Attorneys General, Legislature and Governor are unable,
after, many years, to clearly resolve this matter.

'
PREVENTING ANY JUDGE WHO RECEIVED COUNTY BENEFITS
FROM TAKING UNDER CONSIDERATION OR RULING ON THE
DEMURRERS WITHOUT THE REVIEW AND FULL FINDINGS OF THE
3-JUDGE PANEL

PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF MANDATE
TO CONSTITUTE A 3-JUDGE PANEL FOR REVIEW OF NEW
LEGISLATION ASSURING FULL AND IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE OF
JUDICIAL COMPENSATION WITH CALIFORNIAS CONSTITUTION,
ARTICLE VI, SEC.19 AND WITH THE RESULTS OF THE CERTIORARI
FOR THE CJP ANALYSES

OF SBX2_11, AS PROVIDED TO THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under California Constitution, Article VI, 10
and also under California Code of Civil Procedure, 1085.
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff, Dennis Ettlin, was a resident of Los Angeles County at the time
the underlying actions took place. He is now a resident of Orange County.
2. Kamala Harris, sued as an individual, is an elected official also employed
as the California Attorney General (AG).

(
3. Jan G. Levine, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is
employed as a judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
4. (Samuel) S. James Otero, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles
County and is employed as a judge at the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.
5. Otis D. Wright, II, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County
and is employed as a judge at the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.
6. Dolly M. Gee, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is
employed as a judge at the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.
7. George H. King, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and
is employed as a judge at the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles.
8. Gloria Molina, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is
an elected official employed as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
9. Zev Yaroslavsky, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and
is an elected official employed as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
10. Don Knabe, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is an
elected official employed as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
11. Michael Antonovich, sued as an individual, resides in Los Angeles County
and is an elected official employed as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
12. Chris Ryan Legal, Sr., is a reluctant Plaintiff, and named as a defendant
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 19(a)(1)(A and B).
13. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and/or capacities of defendants sued
herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues said defendants by
such fictitious names. The Doe defendants include Judges presiding over THIS
case who received supplemental judicial benefits from either a county or a
court.
14. Derek Hunt, sued as an individual, resides in Orange County and is
employed as a judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange.

)
AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS
I, Dennis Ettlin, in Propria Persona, certify pursuant to the California
Rules of Court, that all the Exhibits and the Appendices of this Writ, labeled
numerically and consecutively paginated, are true and correct copies of original
documents, except for the supporting declarations which are themselves original
documents.
The exhibits and appendices are incorporated herein by reference as
though fully set forth in this petition and are paginated consecutively from page
WA-1 WA-574 in the concurrently-filed Appendix of Exhibits. The exhibits are
referenced by their tab or, where applicable, by page number (e.g., Appendix A,
or WA-1).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed, at San Juan Capistrano, California on February 3, 2014.

______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

*
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner filed his current complaint on August 22, 2013. He completed
service on the state, county and court Defendants as well as Mr. Legal on August
27, 2013. Petitioner served Requests for Admissions and for Production of
Documents on September 17, 2013. The federal judge defendants were served
on January 22, 2014. Derek Hunt was served on January 30, 2014. No separate
service has been made on the United States of America, the State of California,
or the County of Los Angeles.
Defendants Levine and Harris filed demurrers on September 25, 2013.
Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich, and Yaroslavsky filed for removal to
federal court on September 26, 2013. Defendant Harris fully complied with the
discovery requests and the Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich, and
Yaroslavsky provided absolutely nothing. On November 22, 2013 the District
Court considered the Motions to Strike, the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
and the Motion to Remand, ultimately granting Petitioners request for remand.
Absent any activity by Superior Court of Orange, Petitioner filed with the
Omni court on December 11, 2013, a request for assignment to a judge who
never took judicial benefits. On December 19, 2013 the case was re-assigned to
Judge Derek Hunt, who set February 11, 2014 for a hearing on the Demurrers.
On January 9, 2014 Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich, and Yaroslavsky
filed their Demurrer, Request for Judicial Notice and the Anti-SLAPP Motion.
On January 14, 2014 Petitioner responded to all the documents. On January 21,
2014 Petitioner requested Judge Hunts recusal for cause under 170.1. His denial
was filed January 24, mailed on January 27, and received on January 29, 2014.
The Sturgeon II decision plainly called for additional taxpayer challenges
to SBX2_11 and to the supplemental judicial payments. Petitioner is one of
three taxpayers in Los Angeles County who filed 10 civil suits in 2011. Plaintiffs

+
requested Judges who never received such payments to rule on the issue of bias
and damages. On appeal, all the judges of the Los Angeles Second Appellate
Court recused themselves. This Court then assigned those 10 cases to the Fourth
Appellate, Division 2 in Riverside. All briefs for E058417 and E058420 were
submitted by June 2013. The Riverside justices also have no personal
jurisdiction but have so far refused to recuse themselves. The clerk has
informally indicated a 1-2 year wait and suggested a motion to transfer to a
different, less-overworked court. The Notice of Interested Parties suggests that
other Appellate Courts may also recuse themselves as those Justices are in turn
subjected to civil challenges. Petitioners case is likely to be passed around until
a definitive ruling and legislation are reached. Petitioner requests this Court issue
the necessary Writs.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether and how long the SBX2_11 law and 14
th
Amendment Due Process
rights can be temporary?
2. Under what conditions can the California Legislature suspend Federally
guaranteed civil rights (i.e. the interim SBX2_11) ?
3. Whether the ethical and legal issues of $415,000 of improperly reported (or
likely undisclosed) county payments, with an appearance of bribery, by a
candidate for a federal judgeship (State Judge James Oteros application)
prior to his appointment as a United States Judge are subsumed into the
presumption of unbiasedness normally accorded Article III judicial
appointees?
4. Whether the absence of SBX2_11, Sec. 5 retroactive immunity (if the CJP is
correct that SBX2_11, Sec.5 is invalid) voids all judgments by James Otero
in cases where Los Angeles County was either a named party or an interested

,
party in prior Superior Court or District Court cases? For what actions does
Sec.5 supplant the prior judicial and legislative immunity protections?
5. Whether Petitioner can also make payments as an individual to California
Judges prior to their appointment to the federal bench?
6. Whether Petitioner can also make wage and salary payments as an
individual to Californias declared political candidates using fictitious
wages and retirement contributions in the same manner as Los Angeles
County or any of the other counties?
7. Whether operating funds from the local Superior Courts can be used by
Judges to supplement the advertised salary of Commissioners and other
direct employees of the Superior Court?
BASIS FOR RELIEF
1. The Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) has carefully concluded
that SBX2_11 is fatally flawed, that judges have no immunity, and payments
by Superior Courts to Commissioners (temporary judges) are a mis-use of
public funds. This Court can oversee new legislation to properly implement
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution.
2. Two Attorneys General have carefully concealed and thwarted the legal
challenges sought by the CJP. This court can restore the CJPs ability to carry
out its constitutional duties.
3. The recusal of the Los Angeles Appellate District and the conflicting
opinions of the San Diego Appellate Districts Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II
decisions present conflicting Appellate court interpretations of the law
requiring a resolution of the conflict by this Court. Both sides claim Sturgeon
II supports their position. Petitioner is entitled to legal certainty under the law.
4. Petitioners claim for relief is based on the Fourth Appellate Courts
ruling that SBX2_11 is only an interim measure. State judges are required to

$-
follow U.S. law, specifically Article 6, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution (the
supremacy clause) and the U.S. 14
th
Amendment does not permit temporary
lapses of Due Process rights.
ruling on SBX2_11, which failed to address the issues in Sections 2, 4, and 5.
encouragement to challenge the law. The Sturgeon II conclusion states,
However, on its face SBX2 11 is not a permanent response to either the
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of
adopting a compensation scheme that deals with varying economic
circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be
remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the
Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular
challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if
not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX2 11 plainly
contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers
or members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of
judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are
confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to
adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.
7. The Section 5 immunity in SBX2_11 supersedes and calls into question
all of the other statutes and cases law providing legislative and judicial
immunities. This Court must protect those existing immunities from faulty
legislation such as SBX2_11.
8. The county payments to the vast majority of the judges in California place
the judges at risk of criminal indictment by federal authorities for RICO, tax
evasion and for election fraud. This court can resolve the legal issues and
initiate remedial actions before the involvement of outside agencies.
9. This issue is of widespread interest to 36 million Californians and
presents a significant constitutional issue, which transcends the jurisdiction of
any one court.

$$
10. The trial courts order denying disqualification deprived Petitioner of an
opportunity to present a substantial portion of his or her cause of action and
pre-judges Petitioners other legal remedies such as a venue change.
11. Judge Derek Hunts trial courts order on disqualification is clearly
erroneous as a matter of law and prejudices petitioners case in the trial court.
12. Direct Appeal is not a viable remedy because Petitioner cannot receive an
unbiased decision in any California Appellate court as regularly constituted.
Thus Petitioner will suffer harm or prejudice.
ABSENSE OF OTHER REMEDIES
Petitioner is not seeking to jump to the front of the line. Petitioner simply
seeks to prevent a drawn out shell game of case transfers and ensure a valid
result after the wait. This court has already demonstrated it is unable to assign
Petitioners case E058417 to a regularly constituted Appeals Court where all the
Justices have personal jurisdiction (i.e. have not taken supplemental judicial
benefits). The appeal decision in case E058417 will likely be void and will thus
not be an effective remedy. For this very similar case, a lengthy appeal will
likely be void, and thus further appealable, also not and effective remedy.
The three Plaintiffs in all 10 cases to date (consolidated into E058417 and
E058420) have all requested jury trials to determine the facts of the cases with
regard to bribery and campaign finance violations. This case is number 11. The
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District has held that delayed review on
appeal from a final judgment is not an adequate remedy, for it cannot undo the
harm done by the further vexation and useless expense resulting from denial of
the fundamental right to a jury trial. Mallarino v. Superior Court,
115,Cal.App.2d 781 (1953) Writ relief is appropriate to secure the right to a
jury trial, see Interactive Multimedia Artists, Inc v. Superior Court (1998)
62,Cal.App.4
th
1546, 1550. This case raises the same fundamental constitutional

$%
issues as the previous 10 cases and, as there, the appeal of any void order on the
Demurrers by Judge Hunt will not be an adequate review and only delay the jury
trial.
The Calif. Department of Justice and the 35 county (those making judicial
payments) District Attorneys have refused to investigate or prosecute the issue.
The Attorneys General were made aware of this criminal activity almost five
years through personal delivery of the CJP analyses. Both have done nothing.
The Legislature has done nothing. This Court has an opportunity to restore the
state and federal constitutional rights violated by the county payments.
Compensation of judges is a state responsibility. Seeking relief in the
federal courts is premature until the California Judiciary has had ample
opportunity to remedy the situation. This Writ to the Supreme Court is one more
such opportunity. Petitioner sought remand to the state courts to provide that
opportunity to the Court. If this Court fails to act, Petitioner will have no
alternative remedy but to join the federal Defendants seeking federal jurisdiction.
A spokesman
3
for the Los Angeles Superior Court provides a roadmap to
understand the Superior Court actions (WA-348) and characterized that attitude
as follows:
The fact that those payments had been, strictly speaking, illegal for years
was never addressed ...
..there were courts, a couple of them, that were illegally diverting Court
operating money to pay extra benefits, so the farther the AOC [Administrative
Office of the Courts] got into it, the clearer it became that there was the makings
of a widespread scandal about self-dealing, and self interest by judges

3
Media coverage by Full Disclosure The News Behind The News 2012,
AAW/Full Disclosure Network ; Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery
#630-632; Release Date: November 16, 2012, (A-244)
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/2012/11/court-insider-exposes-judicial-treachery/

$&
BENEFICIAL INTEREST
Granting the Writs requested by Petitioner will greatly benefit the
following stakeholders:
1. All judges paid by the state benefit from clarity and legality as to their
compensation.
2. The CJP can return to its constitutionally designated duties.
3. The Legislature will be better able to craft the appropriate legislation.
4. Campaign finance officials gain clarity on the use of fictitious wage
contributions in the upcoming 2014 and 2016 election cycles.

$'
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court:
1. Issue a peremptory or alternative writ preventing the trial court from taking
under consideration or ruling on February 11, 2014 on the demurrers pending
the review and findings of this Courts new 3-Judge panel.
2. Issue a peremptory or alternative writ for Writ for Certiorari of the CJP
analyses of SBX2_11, as provided to both Attorneys General. Such Certiorari
to be made available to the 3-Judge panel by July 1, 2014
3. Issue a peremptory or alternative writ of mandate to constitute a 3-Judge
panel for review of new legislation assuring full and immediate compliance
of judicial compensation with Californias Constitution, Article. VI, Sec.19
before January 1, 2015.
4. Issue a peremptory or alternative writ for defendants to comply with
discovery rules of the California Code of Civil Procedure within 30 days.
5. Award Petitioner costs and attorneys fees for this action and to bring
Petitioners documents up to proper evidentiary standards for use by the 3-
judge panel.
6. Award such other or further relief may be just and proper

Respectfully submitted, ______________________________

$(

VERIFICATION

I, Dennis Ettlin, declare:
I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter.
I have read the foregoing Petition and know the contents thereof.
The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters, which
are therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I
believe it to be true. This verification was executed at San Juan Capistrano,
California on February 3, 2014.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully submitted, ______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

$)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Sturgeon I made county judicial benefit payments illegal. On December
23, 2008, over 1400 California judges lost all judicial immunity for any case in
which a county was remotely an interested party. Two months later, on February
20, 2009, the legislature hastily passed SBX2 11, convicted all those 1400 judges
and then attempted to give them all an unconstitutional
5
retroactive immunity.
Sturgeon II declared the situation after SBX2 11 to be the same as before
Sturgeon I. Furthermore, the Court refused to prescribe a fix for the problem,
proffered its trust in the legislature but encouraged real change through legal
action by taxpayers and judges. The Fourth Appellate District acknowledged the
likelihood and even encouraged taxpayer civil suits, such as this one and the 10
similar cases in Los Angeles County, challenging SBX2 11.
Los Angeles Court Counsel has spewed the same absolute judicial
immunity hogwash to each of the judges striking statements of disqualification
in Los Angeles County and to the Orange County Superior Court judge
appointed for an independent CCP 170.3(c)(5) review. The U.S. Supreme Court
would not have wasted its precious time on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Company, Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) if judges had the absolute judicial
immunity envisioned by Los Angeles Court Counsel.
These underlying cases against bribed judges bear striking similarity to a
northeastern Pennsylvania judge ordered to spend nearly three decades in prison
for his role in a massive juvenile justice bribery scandal that prompted the state's
high court to toss thousands of convictions. The judge remained DEFIANT after
the jury verdict, INSISTING the payments were legal and denying he
incarcerated youths for money.

5
California Constitution, Article 1, Section 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.

$*
AMNESTY AND RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY
In 1965, the very idea of "retroactive immunity" was so radical, so
repugnant to the most basic principles of the "rule of law," and so profoundly
offensive that Sen. Robert Kennedy (who had been the Attorney General when
the banks broke the law with their mergers), as well as then-Attorney General
Nicholas Katzenbach, together engaged in extraordinary efforts to try to put a
stop to the Congressional travesty, where Congress, in 1965, attempted to enact a
law retroactively legalizing the mergers by six large banks, which clearly -- as a
federal court found -- were illegal under our nation's antitrust laws.
The banks knew at the time they were violating anti-trust laws, did it
anyway; and when courts began ruling that their behavior was illegal, they ran to
Congress for a law granting them amnesty, claiming that the consequences
would be ruinous if they were held accountable under the law.
Likewise, the California Fourth Appellate Court, in Sturgeon I, held the
judicial payments were unconstitutional; the Administrative Office of the Courts
knew the consequences were HUGE if they were held accountable under the law
and they scared the legislature into passing, without public hearings and under
the cover of darkness, the hasty and flawed SBX2 11 with retroactive immunity
for all sitting judges and county officials. The California Fourth Appellate Court,
in Sturgeon II, again held that judicial compensation was a state responsibility,
that SBX2 11 was a temporary fix, stated they themselves were unwilling to stop
the county payments and instead they deferred to, and encouraged, citizen
actions to hasten legislative action. The Fourth Appellate Court was surely aware
of the magnitude of the consequences of their decision and allowed the
retroactive immunity to continue under SBX2 11.
Likewise, Kamala Harris is equally aware of the huge impact of this issue
and is unwilling to act. She, too, allows retroactive immunity under SBX2_11.

$+
I. SBX2 11 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Judge Hunts immunity depends on the constitutionality of the legislative
fix, SBX2 11. While it is true that the courts have ruled SBX2 11 to be
temporarily and narrowly constitutional, the Court did not rule on the key
Sections 2 and 5 and the very same court encouraged these challenges.
Petitioner is simply following the direction of the court, asserting his rights and
defending the Constitution.
A. FIRST STURGEON CHALLENGE
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84
Cal.Rptr.3d 242 rev. denied 12/23/08 (Sturgeon I) held that the L.A. County
payments to L.A. Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the
California Constitution because the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding
Act, while it DID authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT set any standards for
exercising the delegated authority and THUS the authorization under Lockyer-
Isenberg of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court judges
was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
Sturgeon I made county judicial benefit payments illegal. On December
23, 2008, over 1400 California judges lost all judicial immunity for any case in
which a county was remotely an interested party
B. HASTY RESPONSE IN SBX2 11
To address the Sturgeon decision, the Judicial Council and the California
Judges Association jointly sponsored SBX2 11 (A-6). The State legislature,
without public hearings, passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11,
which became effective 5/21/09. The judiciary, with the lobbyist for the judges

$,
along with the legislature tried to do in two months what they failed to do in 30
years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional.
Senate Bill SBX2 11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such that no
governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or
disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official
action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the
ground that those benefits were not authorized under law. With that one line the
Judicial Council simultaneously CONVICTED all those who gave or received
the payments and attempted to replace all the State and Federal authorities
protecting judges.
While SBX2 11 attempted to give immunity for receiving the money
which was unconstitutional, Senate bill SBX2 11, Section 5, did not, however,
give retroactive immunity to judges or temporary judges who had received the
county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases in which the
county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified as a judge
in the past, present or future.
Senate bill SBX2 11 acknowledged both the criminality of the payment of
judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of immunity
protections under current state and federal laws by attempting to give all parties
to the payments limited retroactive immunity (WA-248, Sec 5). Most
importantly, the attempted immunity is itself unconstitutional under the
California Constitution, ARTICLE 1 Section 9 that states A bill of attainder,
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be
passed. Furthermore, the legislation conflicts with the constitutional
responsibilities of Californias CJP.
C. SECOND STURGEON CHALLENGE
The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon II concluded,

%-
As the parties have recognized, SBX2 11 both preserved the status quo
ante Sturgeon I The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the
complex policy problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which
both assures recruitment and retention of fully qualified judicial officers
throughout the state while at the same time providing equity between judges in
different parts of the state. By the same token our role in ensuring that the
more general requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our
system of separate governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)
Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are
not a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (with conditions under
SBX2 11) to terminate or reduce all payments and since the county is clearly an
interested party in a large number of cases; therefore the continued payments
must be in the countys interests. Those county interests are, for example, the
large Title-IV-D incentive payments and huge reimbursements as well as the
large penalty assessments on traffic tickets.
SBX2 11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal
immunity. Even the Calif. Judges Association recognized the appearance of
illegality. Senate bill SBX2 11 did not even attempt to give immunity for the
biases inherent in the nature of a bribe. Judges Otero, Levine and Hunt did not
disclose the county payments in their past and then issued decisions in a case
where the County is a very interested party.
Judge Oteros actions of taking the payments, not disclosing such and the
resulting fraud on the court have denied Petitioner due process by denying him
the right to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
If Judge Otero cannot see the bias of his own receipt of unconstitutional
payments, how is Petitioner to trust his review of Judge Kings possible biases?
The Sturgeon II decision acknowledged that SBX2 11 is not a permanent
response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be temporarily

%$
constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. A strict scrutiny review is
needed. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court acknowledges the contradiction and
encourages taxpayer challenges.
D. DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST JUDGES
On March 16, 2011 the California Supreme Court denied a review of
Sturgeon II. In early 2011 several unsuccessful actions were taken to void the
decisions and judgments of judges receiving unconstitutional payments. The first
Sturgeon II challenge was filed in Los Angeles County on June 16, 2011, case
number YC064994. These civil suits directly challenged individual judges, and
temporary judges, seeking multi-million dollar damages for civil rights
violations. Since then, eight additional civil suits have been filed in Los Angeles
County and one in San Diego County.
In June and July of 2011 all 36 judges in the Torrance and Santa Monica
Courthouses recused themselves from presiding over these nine cases regarding
judicial payments and sent the cases downtown to the Central District. For the
Sturgeon I case, all Los Angeles County Superior Court judges recused
themselves. Stung by that decision and setback, all the downtown Central
district supervising judges decided to hold the line under Sturgeon II and will not
individually recuse themselves.
Ten citizens claims of biased and void orders are firmly supported by
documented judicial payments and evidence on the Title IV-D monies received
by Los Angeles County and the partnership of the Superior Court Judges
with the countys Title IV-D agencies.
The nine cases were assigned to a Superior Court Central District Judge,
who also received payments from 1988 to 1998, refused to recuse himself, and
the Second Appellate Court denied a Petition for Writ of Mandate and upheld his
refusal on August 25, 2011.

%%
Plaintiffs then filed a Motion For Change Of Venue and made their own
selection for a new venue. Their analysis excluded the 35 counties paying bribes,
identified three candidate counties, and finally requested a Humboldt County
venue. That analysis is included in the Appendix (WA-342). The change of
venue was denied.
On appeal, the entire Los Angeles Appellate Court, the largest in the state,
then RECUSED itself from the appeal of those ten cases! The California
Supreme Court assigned the appeal back to the California Fourth Appellate
Court, but this time to Riverside, California.
E. CJP CHALLENGES SBX2 11
The analyses of SBX2 11 by the Commission on Judicial Performance
(CJP) have also determined that SBX2 11 is unconstitutional. On April 3, 2009,
the CJP requested an opinion from then-Attorney General (AG) Brown. He did
not respond. On May 23, 2011 the CJP again requested an opinion from the new
California AG. It is not known if the CJP has requested a decision by the
California Supreme Court. Only the California Supreme Court can adjudicate the
CJP concerns
7
.
According to the CJP, the SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague
about the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date. The terms
and conditions are not defined anywhere and thus are arbitrary (and thus
unconstitutional). Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No authority is
provided for the Superior Court to continue to use state court-operating funds to
illegally pay Commissioners or Court Counsel.

*
Cal. Constitution Article 6, Section 18 (d); in relevant part, Upon petition by the judge
or former judge, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant review of a
determination by the commission

%&
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is
now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others. The
CJPs biggest concern about SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is that it directly
conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the CJP. The extensive CJP
analysis and arguments show the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional
powers. The AG has refused to issue an opinion after 32 months.
F. AG DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
AG Kamala Harris has not responded to the CJP, appears to be delaying
and also effectively refusing to honor the CJP request. An AG request for
clarification was answered promptly by the CJP on June 22, 2011. The current
delay is under the guise of not interfering with ongoing litigation, i.e. the
Ringgold case (2:11-CV-01725-R-PLA) currently before the 9
th
Circuit. Kamala
Harriss claim in the Ringgold case is that the public release of the CJP analyses
does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. The CJP documents are
marked PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL and were not available to the
public without a Freedom of Information Act request. Thus, the AG claim
appears to be a self-serving and conscious attempt by the AG to provide her own
retroactive immunity to all Judges who have taken the unconstitutional
payments. No doubt the current California AG is aware of previous AG rulings
and of the Legislatures and Fourth Appellates unwillingness to fully resolve the
issues. She also clearly does not wish to alienate the California Judges and thus
violates the 14
th
Amendment constitutional standard with her own deliberate
indifference to the last 55 years of consistent AG ruling against the
supplemental judicial benefits.

%'
In 1956, the Attorney General issued an opinion
8
concluding that superior
and municipal court judges and certain personnel of the superior courts were not
county employees and were thus ineligible for county-sponsored health
insurance. (27 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 338 (1956).) In 1976, the Attorney General
issued another opinion, specifically stating that the version of Government Code
section 53200.3 then in effect was unconstitutional. Citing the 1967 Judicial
Council Report to the Governor and the Legislature on this provision and the
opinion in County of Madera v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d at page
670, the Attorney General stated: "Because of the use of `prescribe' the
Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19
of the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be
constitutionally invalid." (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 496, 497 (1976).) The opinion
concluded that "that section [Gov. Code, 53200.3] is an unconstitutional
attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate a nondelegable duty." (Id., at p.
501.) [ 222 Cal.App.3d 1145].
In 1978, the Attorney General issued another opinion, stating that the
Legislature had failed to remove deficiencies. (61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 388,
(1978)).
In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel,
advised Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that
it would be permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges,
although he acknowledged the Attorney General does not agree.
In about 1988-1989 Los Angeles County and the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County began making payments to Judges and Commissioners.

+
Documented in County Of Sonoma v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 222 Cal.App.3d
1133 (1990) Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Three. August 14,
1990. See http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=5&xmldoc=19901355222
CalApp3d1133_11282.xml&docbase=CSLWAR2-1986-2006&SizeDisp=7

%(
In 1995, the California Law Revision Commission
9
, reviewing a
precursor to the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, acknowledged the
judicial benefits were probably illegal and the negative consequences were
HUGE (WA-336) but then suggested it was unlikely that anyone would object,
a case can be made that this will not occur. (WA-335) No one had objected to
the 1988-1995 payments by Los Angeles County. Fortunately, Sturgeon did
object. Other citizens are objecting. Just as the legislature failed in 1977 to pass
constitutional legislation, so they failed again in 1997 (Lockyer-Isenberg) and
again a third time in 2010 (SBX2 11). Throughout this lengthy period, the judges
continued to collect their supplemental county benefits and deny litigants due
process.
The California Courts, the CJP and the AG appear to be consciously
providing retroactive immunity to all Judges who have taken the unconstitutional
payments. This Court must review the Constitutional issues affecting the due
process rights of 36 million Californians. Only then can this court assess the
biases inherent in the County payments to individual judges.
II. PAYMENTS ARE BRIBES UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
These judicial payments by a party have been held to be "bribes" under
California law in U.S. v. Adams, U.S. v. Frega and U.S. v. Malkus, where the
judges were convicted of violating the intangible right to honest services 18
U.S.C. Section 1346.
Under Article 6, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution (the supremacy
clause), state judges are required to follow U.S. law.
The California Appellate Court in Sturgeon II did not follow the due
process clause of the U.S. Constitution and did not follow 18 U.S.C. Section

,
Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision
Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995

%)
1346 in deciding that the payments to the judges were an interim solution. Such
county payments could not exist under any circumstances as they violate the due
process clause and supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution and U.S. law.
III. COUNTIES ARE NOT SOVEREIGN
The counties are not sovereign entities. Under the 11
th
amendment, only
the Federal Government and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the
United States of America. Therefore, under Lockyer-Isenberg and under SBX2
11, Los Angeles Countys actual payments to a judge are no different than
payments (hypothetically) by Petitioner. Both might be considered bribes.
The Superior Court also makes supplemental payments to its employees -
- Commissioners and Court Counsel. The payments are dispersed by the County,
disguising the fact that the checks are actually warrants; payable from a Court
operating funds account. These funds would not be considered bribes but
simply a misuse of government funds by the judges of the Superior Court.
IV. LOS ANGELES COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY
The Superior Courts have a many-fold interest in maintaining the county
payments to the judges. The most obvious are the huge flows of Federal funds to
the Child Support and Foster Care agencies. The most visible are the flow of
traffic ticket assessment fees (WA-78). The most calculated are the Litigation
Manager reports published by Los Angeles County (WA-196). The most
unconscionable is the bullying of the homeless and poverty-stricken.
The stated purpose of County payments (at least in Los Angeles) is to
retain judges in Los Angeles County. The favorable disposition related to job
location choice reasonably and easily carries over to a general pre-disposition in
favor of Los Angeles County, its supervisors and its law enforcement officials

%*
and its Superior Court in matters of county interest. Denial of a change of venue
also retains jurisdiction within a favorable venue.
V. BAUMAN JUSTIFIES A WRIT
The only remedy for a refusal to recuse is a Writ of Mandate. This
Petition meets all five of the factors under Bauman v. United States Dist. Court,
557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) used to justify a Writ of Mandamus. Each factor
used in deciding whether to grant mandamus relief is addressed below. The most
important is item E.
A. NO OTHER ADEQUATE RELIEF
The Petitioner has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to
secure relief. Under California Code of Civil Procedure 170.3 (d) The
determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an
appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the
appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding.
Under Federal Rules
10
Often, a challenge to a judges refusal to recuse
occurs on appeal. All courts of appeals permit a party to seek interlocutory
review via mandamus, reasoning that, at least in some cases, the damage to
public confidence in the justice system (or perhaps to the litigants) would not be
undone by post-judgment appeal.
Thus if Judge King denies Movants Motion for Intervention, Petitioner
has little or no control over the appeal by the Plaintiff in that case. Secondly,
appellate review would then have multiple issues to resolve and could deny
based on either of two judicial actions, one an administrative action by Judge

$-
Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law, Second Edition, Federal Judicial
Center, 2010; Page 97

%+
Otero and the other a serious issue of standing by Judge King. Judge Otero has
already stated that he believes these challenges to be frivolous. Thirdly, a Writ
Of Mandamus is appropriate to quash an illegal order,.
B. DAMAGE NOT CORRECTABLE
Petitioner will suffer damage not correctable on appeal from final
judgment. Petitioner seeks to intervene in a case before Judge King. Denial of
the intervention is a final order for Petitioner/Intervenor. An unbiased Judge is
essential to protecting his due process rights. Otherwise his confidence in the
judicial system will be irreparably harmed. Furthermore, the direction and scope
of the underlying case is unpredictable, has already taken 2! years and this
particular $415,000 bias by Judge Otero may not be further addressed in the
issues actually brought to trial or addressed by the Court.
C. ORDER IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
Judge Hunts order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. Judge Hunt
took the county payments. Judges Levine, Wright and Otero took the payments.
Past Attorney General rulings and the current CJP analysis show the payments
are unconstitutional. The legislature has deemed the payments criminal and in
need of retroactive immunity for 1,400 judges. The Courts own ex-
spokesperson calls the payments illegal. The Judges refusals to recuse are
clearly erroneous.
The evidence of judicial receipt of county payments is irrefutable. (A-9)
The California Attorney General and the California Supreme Court have both
refused to certify the complete constitutionality of SBX2 11. The California
Attorney General has ruled 5 times over 57 years that county payments such as
those received by Judge Otero are unconstitutional. The extensive analysis by

%,
the CJP determined the law SBX2 11, reauthorizing the payments and granting
retroactive immunity, to be unconstitutional.
California Senate Bill SBX2 11 acknowledged both the criminality of the
payment of judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of
immunity protections under current state and federal laws by attempting to give
all parties to the payments limited retroactive immunity. The immunity extends
to the government officials making the payments and to the Judges who also
used operating funds to pay temporary judges the supplemental payments.
Furthermore, the legislation usurps the constitutional responsibilities of
Californias CJP.
Similarly, review of filings with the California and Federal Election
Commissions and with the Internal Revenue Service will likely show these
monies were in whole or part not reported. (Medical benefits paid on behalf of
employees are not reported as employee income, and show the sophistication
of this scheme.)
D. OFT-REPEATED ERROR
This failure to recuse in all cases where a county has an interest is an error
repeated frequently by Superior Court Judges and by U.S. District Court Judges
who previously served in Californias courts. One media source
11
reported an
estimate by a Ph.D. mathematician of a combined 10 million felonies committed
by California Judges. Any estimate for the district court judges serving
California would undoubtedly find a large number. While the receipt of the
unconstitutional payments is grounds for recusal, the California law SBX2 11
did not give retroactive immunity to judges who had received the county
payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases in which the county

11
Full Disclosure Network, quoting Daniel Gottlieb

&-
had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified as a judge in the
past, present or future. Civil cases seeking monetary damages against 10 judges
by three different individuals are currently in separate litigation.
E. NEW LEGAL ISSUES
A Writ of Mandate is appropriate if the order raises new and important
problems or legal issues of first impression.
Voiding most of the state court judgments in the last 25 years in
California is HUGE. Establishing TRIBUNALS to sort through the cases where
the counties had an interest is HUGE. Bringing justice to all those cases is
HUGE. This is a HUGE California judicial scandal. This Supreme Court has
the opportunity to get out ahead of this issue if they act soon. Without the
immediate writs only the Federal Courts will have the power to stop and correct
this denial of Due Process rights. In 2010, the Fourth Appellate Court of
California recognized the enormity of the situation and deferred to and even
challenged all citizens and judges to take action. This is such an important issue
and HUGE problem that Appellate Justices in California will not upset the
proverbial apple cart. In addition to the large number of void orders, there is
significant risk of judicial mis-conduct charges with FEC and IRS filings by
judges. This requires real courage of the Judiciary to protect the right of due
process and, more importantly, protecting the integrity of the judiciary.
VI. FRAUD ON THE COURT
Past acceptance of county judicial payments Judges Hunt, Otero, Wright
and Levine plus their sitting on cases in which the county was an interested party
voids their orders. Failure to disclose those payments constitutes fraud on the
court. Senate Bill SBX2 11 gave retroactive immunity because of benefits
provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity. Senate bill

&$
SBX2 11 did not give present or retroactive immunity to judges who had
received the county payments, did not disclose such and then presided over
cases in which the court had an interest.
Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. In U.S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878), the U.S. Supreme Court stated at page 66:
Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract (citing
Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over
which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.
In essence, by making all Orange and Los Angeles Superior Court judges
eligible for the county payments, the counties bought the entire Superior
Court. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. ___ (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part:
...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar fears of
bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a man chooses a
judge in his own cause.
Extrinsic fraud tends to encompass almost any set of circumstances
which deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing. Estate of Sanders v. Sutton,
40 Cal.3d 607 (1985). The U.S. Supreme Court further emphasized in Vallely v.
Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920), at 353-354 that no court
could validate a void judgment.
Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot act beyond the power
delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in
contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They
are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. (Citations
omitted) (Emphasis added) Also, see Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.)

&%
328, 340 (1828): Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27
Sup.Ct. 236
Since fraud on the court vitiates the entire case, all orders from that
court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter
jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; a void
order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain
validity by the passage of time. See Vallely. A void order is void at all times,
cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by the passage of
time. The order is VOID AB INITIO.
The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd.
337,343 (1962): If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based upon it
is also void.
Judges Hunt, Otero and Levine each denied Petitioner his constitutional
right to due process. Since the Judges committed fraud on the court, their
orders are void. Any order giving effect to that void judgment is itself void and
appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199;
Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888; Residents for
Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801,
1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125].
SBX2 11 provided immunity to all those governmental persons associated
with the paying or receiving of judicial payments. SBX2 11 did not address
fraud on the court. It did not address any of the BIASES bought by the
payments.
Oral arguments on October 13, 2010 in the Fourth Appellate Court
acknowledged the great turmoil
12
among the judges over Sturgeon I.

12
Media coverage by Full Disclosure The News Behind The News, Are Judicial Double
Benefits Constitutional? Judges To Rule on Judges Benefits Round II, Release Date:
November 21, 2010

&&
Following those oral arguments, and only one week before a decision on
Sturgeon II, Chief Justice Ron George, a strong and long-time proponent of
increased judicial salaries, reasserted his interest and assigned the Sturgeon II
Presiding Judge Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting Chief Justice of a new
appointed California Supreme Court, for another high-profile case. This collegial
plum of an appointment had no purpose other than to influence Sturgeon II.
(WA-340-341) On December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II decision claimed the
Justices have limited authority to enforce the California Constitution, refused to
declare SBX2 11 unconstitutional, and dared the people of California to stand up
for their due process rights. Now both the legislature in 1995 and the judiciary in
2010 have dared the people to fight for their due process rights!

CONCLUSION
For all of the above stated reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to
grant extraordinary relief as prayed including an immediate stay of trial.

______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
&$-.*,(.,(-*

&'
CERTIFICATE OF LENGTH
I, Dennis Ettlin, certify pursuant to the California Rules of Court,
that the word count for this document totals approximately 10,500
words, excluding the tables, this certificate, and any attachment
permitted. This document was prepared in Microsoft Word and this is
the word count generated by the program for this document.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed, at San Juan
Capistrano, California on February 3, 2014.

_______________________________

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I, Dennis Ettlin, hereby certifies that pursuant to Rule 8.204(c)(1) or
8.360(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court, the enclosed Petition for
Extraordinary Writ is produced using 13-point Roman type including
footnotes and contains approximately 10,500 words, which is less than the
total words permitted by the rules of court. Counsel relies on the word count
of the computer program used to prepare this brief.
____________________________
Dennis ETTLIN , In Pro Per
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

$

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of
or employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or
business address is
2465 E. Orangethorpe Ave., Fullerton, CA 92831

On February 3, 2014, I served a copy of the following document
With Appendix

by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE
ATTACHED SERVICE LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy
thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid,
addressed as stated on the attached service list. I deposited such envelope
in the mail. According to F.R.C.P. Rule 5(b)(2)(C), in which event
service is complete upon mailing;
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and
the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on February 3, 2014 at Orange County, California,

________________________________
Debbie Peterson

%
SERVICE LIST
Case No. 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC

Kamala Harris
Douglas E. Baxter, Esq., Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
110 West A Street, Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101

Jan Levine, Derek Hunt
Kevin McCormick, Esq.
Benton, Orr, Duval, &Buckingham
39 North California Street, Post Office Box 1178
Ventura CA 93001

Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, Michael Antonovich
Natalie Price, Esq.
Lawrence Beach Allen and Choi PC
2677 North Main Street Suite 370
Santa Ana, CA 92705

Chris Ryan Legal, Sr.
Counsel: Pro Se
Authorized Email : chrislegal55@yahoo.com
P. O. Box 5133,
San Pedro, CA 90731

George King, James Otero, Dolly Gee, Otis Wright II
(NO RESPONSE, THEREFORE NO SERVICE REQUIRED,
COURTESY COPY OF PETITON ONLY - NOT APPENDIX)
Contact Info: U.S. Attorneys Office, Civil Process Clerk
300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516
Los Angeles, California 90012

INFO COPY ONLY -- Hon. Derek Hunt
Courtroom C24
700 Civic Center Drive
Santa Ana, CA 92701

FILING COPIES 10+ORIG
Supreme Court of California Telephone: 415-865-7000
350 McAllister Street
San Francisco, CA 94102-4797
S__________

In the Supreme Court of the State of California

____________________
!
____________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
Petitioner / Appellant,
vs.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF ORANGE
Respondent;
County of Los Angeles, Chris Ryan Legal, Sr., Does 1-10, (any judge assigned to
this case who received Judicial Benefits) DOE #1, Derek Hunt
Real Parties in Interest.
____________________
!
____________________
from the Judgment of the Superior Court, County of Orange,
Case No.: 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
Hon. Derek Hunt, Judge Dept C24 (657) 6225224
____________________
!
____________________

PETITIONERS APPENDIX
Volume 1 of 1, Pages 1-574
____________________
!
____________________
Dennis Ettlin, Pro Se
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507
STAY REQUESTED FOR February 11, 2014 HEARING

WA-1
S__________

AUTHENTICITY OF EXHIBITS
I, Dennis Ettlin, in Propria Persona, certify pursuant to the California
Rules of Court, that all the Exhibits and the Appendices of this Writ, labeled
numerically and consecutively paginated, are true and correct copies of original
documents, except for the supporting declarations which are themselves original
documents.
The exhibits and appendices are incorporated herein by reference as
though fully set forth in this petition and are paginated consecutively from page
WA-1 to WA-574 in the concurrently-filed Appendix of Exhibits. The exhibits
are referenced by their appendix number or, where applicable, by page number
(e.g., Appendix A, or WA-1).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
and the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed, at San Juan Capistrano, California on February 3, 2014.

______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

WA-2
S__________

APPENDICES
ALPHABETIC INDEX FOR RULE 8.124 APPENDIX

APP ENTRY DATE PAGE
A APPENDIX A Request for
Recusal
January 21, 2014 WA-5
B
APPENDIX B Judge Hunts
Denial of Disqualification
January 24, filed
January 27, mailed
January 29, recd
2014
WA-25
C
APPENDIX C Complaint
August 22, 2013 WA-31
D APPENDIX D Superior Courts
Demurrer
September 25,2013 WA-363
E APPENDIX E Supervisors
Demurrer
F APPENDIX F Attorney
Generals Demurrer
September 26, 2013 WA-442
G APPENDIX G Supervisors
Anti-SLAPP
H
APPENDIX H Petitioners
Reply To Demurrers And Anti-
Slapp
January 14, 2014 WA-500
I APPENDIX I Register of
Actions
February 2, 2014 WA-550
J APPENDIX J Government
Code Section 68206.6
K APPENDIX K Proof of Service
for Federal Defendants
January 31, 2014 WA-557

WA-3
S__________

APPENDICES
CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX FOR RULE 8.124 APPENDIX

APP ENTRY DATE PAGE
C
APPENDIX C Complaint
August 22, 2013 WA-31
D APPENDIX D Superior Courts
Demurrer
September 25,2013 WA-363
F APPENDIX F Attorney
Generals Demurrer
September 26, 2013 WA-442
E APPENDIX E Supervisors
Demurrer
G APPENDIX G Supervisors
Anti-SLAPP
H
APPENDIX H Petitioners
Reply To Demurrers And Anti-
Slapp
January 14, 2014 WA-500
A APPENDIX A Request for
Recusal
B
APPENDIX B Judge Hunts
Denial of Disqualification
January 24, filed
January 27, mailed
January 29, recd
2014
WA-25
K APPENDIX K Proof of Service
for Federal Defendants
January 31, 2014 WA-557
I APPENDIX I Register of
Actions
J APPENDIX J Government
Code Section 68206.6

WA-4
!
APPENDIX
A
APPENDIX
WA-5
WA-6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Request for Recusal with Cause of Derek Hunt 1
Ettlin_Wright_Super-Recusal Hunt-r4.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF ORANGE

Case No: (Orange County)
30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
Dennis ETTLIN, an individual;
Plaintiff
REQUEST FOR RECUSAL OF
JUDGE DEREK HUNT
UNDER CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
BASED ON BIAS DUE TO ORANGE
COUNTY JUDICIAL BENEFIT
PAYMENTS

OBJECTION UNDER CCP 170.3(c)(1)
TO REFUSAL TO RECUSE

RENEWED DEMAND FOR JUDGE
WHO NEVER RECEIVED COUNTY
JUDICIAL BENEFITS

vs.

Kamala Harris, an individual,
James Otero, an individual,
Otis D. Wright, III, an individual,
George H. King, an individual,
Dolly M. Gee, an individual,
Jan Levine, an individual,
Gloria Molina, an individual,
Zev Yaroslavsky, an individual,
Don Knabe, an individual,
Michael Antonovich, an individual,
United States of America,
State of California,
County of Los Angeles,

Does 1-10,
(any judge assigned to this case who
received Judicial Benefits)
Defendants

C.C.P. 430.90
CCP 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii)
CCP 170.3(c)(1)
Code of Judicial Ethics,
Canon 3E(1) and 3E(2)

WA-7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

The Register of Actions item #21 indicates this case was reassigned to the
OMNI court and placed on hold for the duration of the federal proceedings. Upon
remand, and pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, C.C.P. 430.90 and 28
U.S.C. 1447, Plaintiff Dennis Ettlin (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) requested
(Register of Actions (RoA) #26) the OMNI Court to assign a judge who had not
received judicial payments and that the assigned judge be willing and prepared to
rule on the analysis of the Commission on Judicial Performance contained in
Appendix 6 (pages A-173 to A-196) of the complaint. The OMNI court denied the
request (RoA #28) and re-assigned this case back to the Hon. Derek Hunt. Since it is
not clear that Judge Hunt read the RoA #28 document, Plaintiff has attached it for the
courts convenience.
Plaintiff requests the recusal of Judge Hunt based on attached Exhibit 4. Since
Derek Hunt has himself received the payments at issue in this case, he cannot render
an unbiased opinion and must recuse himself.
To assist the court in selecting a judge, a change of venue analysis was
contained in Appendix 12 of the complaint (page A-235). An equal concern is the
unbiasedness of the Appellate Court venue for this case.
The Judicial Council of California report titled, Historical Analysis of Disparities in
Judicial Benefits, dated December 15, 2009, and mandated under SBX2 11, stated that
90% of all Judges statewide and 100% in Orange County, receive supplemental
benefits from the county. RoA #26, Exhibit 4, confirms that such benefits were still paid
in 2011. Based upon the taking of such payments and its presumed bias against
Plaintiff challenging those benefits, any judge in the County of Orange must disqualify
him/her-self under the standard set forth in the cases of Michael v. Aetna Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 925, as modified at 89 Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz
v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 723 (1998); Ceriale
v. AMCO Ins. Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).
It is Plaintiffs understanding and belief that Derek Hunt presently and in the
WA-8

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

past is a recipient of the county payments. Judge Hunt has failed to recuse himself
and not informed the parties of his receipt of county payments.
For any and all judges who received such payments, Plaintiff objects for cause
under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) and 170.1(a)(3).
Further, Plaintiff objects under CCP 170.3 to any refusal to recuse by such judges.
Any assigned bench officer who took money from the Superior Court or from the
County would also be violating the Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1), which states,
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is
required by law. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) then states, In all Trial Court
proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification.
Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, and has no personal or professional ties to judges/commissioners in Orange
County. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a change of venue to a
county where the judges are not receiving supplemental judicial payments.
Based upon the presumed bias against Plaintiff, Judge Hunt must disqualify.
On the encouragement of the California Fourth Appellate Court, Plaintiff objects to
any Judge or Commissioner who has taken these payments. This objection is also
a formal CCP section 170.3 objection to Judge Hunts anticipated refusal to
disqualify himself for cause under CCP 170.1(a)(3) and 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii).

Dated: January 21, 2014
______________________________
By: Dennis ETTLIN, In Pro Per
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

WA-9

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
A

WA-10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Request for Case Assignment 1
Ettlin_Wright_SUPER_ReAssignment-r1c.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

COUNTY OF ORANGE

30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
Plaintiff
REQUEST FOR CASE ASSIGNMENT
TO JUDGE WHO NEVER RECEIVED
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL
BENEFITS
vs.


Does 1-10,
Defendants

C.C.P. 430.90

WA-11

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

PLAINTIFF DENNIS ETTLINS
REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF JUDGE WHO NEVER RECEIVED
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL BENEFITS

TO: OMNI Court
The Federal Court has remanded this case back to Superior Court, Exhibit 1.
Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, C.C.P. 430.90 and 28 U.S.C. 1447,
Plaintiff Dennis Ettlin (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) requests that Superior
Court of California, County of Orange assign this case to a judge who never received
supplemental judicial benefits. Plaintiff also requests that the assigned judge be
willing and prepared to rule on the analysis of the Commission on Judicial
Performance contained in Appendix 6 (pages A-173 to 196) of the complaint.
For any and all judges who received such payments, Plaintiff objects for
cause under California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) and
170.1(a)(3). Further, Plaintiff will object under CCP 170.3 for any refusal to recuse
by such judges and will add that assigned judge as a DOE defendant to the case.
Any assigned bench officer who took money from the Superior Court or from the
County would also be violating the Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3E(1), which states,
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which disqualification is
required by law. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2) then states, In all Trial Court
proceedings, a judge shall disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant
to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification.
To assist the court in selecting a judge, a change of venue analysis is contained
in Appendix 12 of the complaint (pages A-235). An equal concern is the unbiasedness
of the Appellate Court venue for this case.
The 2009 report by the Judicial Council of California states that all Judges in
WA-12

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Orange County receive supplemental benefits from the county. Exhibit 4 confirms that
such benefits were still paid in 2011. Based upon the taking of such payments and its
presumed bias against Plaintiff challenging those benefits, any judge in the County of
Orange must disqualify him/her-self under the standard set forth in the cases of Michael
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 925, as modified at 89
Cal.App.4th 406; Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 62 Cal.App.4th
716, 723 (1998); Ceriale v. AMCO Ins. Co., 48 Cal.App.4th 500,506 (1996).
Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, and has no personal or professional ties to judges/commissioners in Los
Angeles County. The Court must inform the parties if this requires a change of venue
to a county where the judges are not receiving supplemental judicial payments.

Dated: December 11, 2013
______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

WA-13

4

PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am a resident of or
employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or business address
is

On December 12, 2013, I served a copy of the following document

REQUEST FOR CASE ASSIGNMENT
TO JUDGE WHO NEVER RECEIVED
SUPPLEMENTAL JUDICIAL BENEFITS

by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED SERVICE
LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with
postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as stated on the attached service list. I
deposited such envelope in the mail.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State of
California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on December 12, 2013 at Orange County, California,

________________________________
Debbie Peterson

WA-14

5

SERVICE LIST
Case No. 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC

Kamala Harris
Email: douglas.baxter@doj.ca.gov
San Diego, CA 92101

Jan Levine
Email: kmccormick@bentonorr.com
Ventura CA 93001

Natalie Price, Esq.
Email: nprice@lbaclaw.com
2677 North Main Street Suite 370 Santa Ana, CA 92705

Counsel: Pro Se
P. O. Box 5133, San Pedro, CA 90731

WA-15

EXHIBIT
1

WA-16
CV - 103 (09/08) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL - REMAND TO SUPERIOR COURT (CIVIL)
TERRY NAFISI
District Court Executive and
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
312 North Spring Street, Room G-8
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Tel: (213) 894-3535
SOUTHERN DIVISION
411 West Fourth Street, Suite 1053
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516
(714) 338-4750
EASTERN DIVISION
3470 Twelfth Street, Room 134
Riverside, CA 92501
(951) 328-4450
Re: Case Number:
Previously Superior Court Case No.
Case Name:
Dear Sir / Madam:
Pursuant to this Courts ORDER OF REMAND issued on , the
above-referenced case is hereby remanded to your jurisdiction.
Attached is a certified copy of the ORDER OF REMAND and a copy of the docket sheet from this
Court.
Please acknowledge receipt of the above by signing the enclosed copy of this letter and returning it
to our office. Thank you for your cooperation.
Respectfully,
Clerk, U. S. District Court
By:
Deputy Clerk
! Western ! Eastern ! Southern Division
cc: Counsel of record
Receipt is acknowledged of the documents described herein.
Clerk, Superior Court
By:
Date Deputy Clerk
November 25, 2013
Orange County Superior Court
Central Justice Center
700 Civic Center Drive
Santa Ana, CA 92701
SACV13-1515 DOC (JPRx)
30-02013-00670581
Dennis Ettlin v. Kamala Harris et al
November 22, 2013
Trina DeBose
(714) 338-4568
Case 8:l3-cv-0l5l5-DOC-JPR Document 33 Filed ll/22/l3 Page l of l Page lD #:827

WA-17

EXHIBIT
2

WA-18
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/430.10-430.txt
430.80. (a) If the party against whom a complaint or
cross-complaint has been filed fails to object to the pleading,
either by demurrer or answer, that party is deemed to have waived the
objection unless it is an objection that the court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the
pleading or an objection that the pleading does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
(b) If the party against whom an answer has been filed fails to
demur thereto, that party is deemed to have waived the objection
unless it is an objection that the answer does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a defense.
430.90. (a) Where the defendant has removed a civil action to
federal court without filing a response in the original court and the
case is later remanded for improper removal, the time to respond
shall be as follows:
(1) If the defendant has not generally appeared in either the
original or federal court, then 30 days from the day the original
court receives the case on remand to move to dismiss the action
pursuant to Section 583.250 or to move to quash service of summons or
to stay or dismiss the action pursuant to Section 418.10, if the
court has not ruled on a similar motion filed by the defendant prior
to the removal of the action to federal court.
(2) If the defendant has not filed an answer in the original
court, then 30 days from the day the original court receives the case
on remand to do any of the following:
(A) Answer the complaint.
(B) Demur or move to strike all or a portion of the complaint if:
(i) an answer was not filed in the federal court, and (ii) a demurrer
or motion to strike raising the same or similar issues was not filed
and ruled upon by the original court prior to the removal of the
action to federal court or was not filed and ruled upon in federal
court prior to the remand. If the demurrer or motion to strike is
denied by the court, the defendant shall have 30 days to answer the
complaint unless an answer was filed with the demurrer or motion to
strike.
(b) For the purposes of this section, time shall be calculated
from the date of the original court's receipt of the order of remand.
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/430.10-430.txt (3 of 3) [3/11/11 1:20:11 PM]
WA-19

EXHIBIT
3

WA-20
WA-21
WA-22

EXHIBIT
4

WA-23
WA-24
!
APPENDIX
B
APPENDIX
WA-25
WA-26
WA-27
WA-28
WA-29
WA-30
!
APPENDIX
C
APPENDIX
WA-31

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CIVIL COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGES AND SUPERVISORS 1
Ettlin_HARRIS_SUPER_r8.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

COUNTY OF ORANGE

Case No:
Plaintiff
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF AND FOR DAMAGES

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

DEMAND FOR JUDGE WHO
NEVER RECEIVED COUNTY OR
SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL BENEFITS
vs.


Does 1-10,
Defendants

42 U.S.C. 1983:
1
st
, 4
th
, 14
th
Amendments
California Constitution
Article I, 2, 3, 7, 13
CA Penal Code 92, 93
CA Civil Code 52.1
SBX2_11

WA-32
30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 6
JURISDICTION ........................................................................................................... 8
ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE ....................................................................................... 8
STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................... 10
PARTIES ................................................................................................................... 11
STATEMENT OF FACTS .......................................................................................... 14
FIRST AMENDMENT EXERCISE ............................................................................. 16
FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION -- UNLAWFUL ARRESTS .................................. 17
4
TH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION -- UNLAWFUL SIEZURE ........................................ 17
14
TH
AMENDMENT DENIALS OF DUE PROCESS .................................................. 18
FAILURE TO ACT UNDER MISPRISION OF FELONY ............................................ 21
ELDER ABUSE VIOLATIONS ................................................................................... 23
VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PAY .................................................................................. 24
RULE OF LAW CORRUPTED BY JUDICIAL PAYMENTS ....................................... 25
SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ......................................................................... 26
A. FIRST STURGEON CHALLENGE .............................................................................. 26
B. HASTY RESPONSE IN SBX2_11 ............................................................................... 26
C. SECOND STURGEON CHALLENGE ......................................................................... 28
D. DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST JUDGES ........................................................................ 29
E. CJP CHALLENGES SBX2_11 .................................................................................... 30
F. AG DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE ............................................................................ 31
PAYMENTS ARE BRIBES ........................................................................................ 33
COUNTY IS NOT SOVEREIGN ................................................................................ 38
COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY .................................................................... 39
APPEARANCE OF BIAS ........................................................................................... 40
BIAS IN CIVIL COURT .............................................................................................. 42
BIAS IN FAMILY COURT -- TITLE IV ....................................................................... 43
BIAS IN TRAFFIC COURT -- PENALTY ASSESSMENTS ....................................... 47
BIAS IN CRIMINAL COURT ...................................................................................... 47
DISQUALIFIED JUDGES ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT IMMUNITY ..................... 48
AMNESTY AND RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY ........................................................... 49
FRAUD ON THE COURT .......................................................................................... 50
BAUMAN FACTORS REQUIRE A RECUSAL .......................................................... 56
D. OFT-REPEATED ERROR ............................................................................................. 57
E. NEW LEGAL ISSUES ................................................................................................... 58
JUDICIAL ETHICS .................................................................................................... 58
OPINIONS NEEDED ON CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ..................... 59
SUMMARY ................................................................................................................ 61
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 62
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................. 63
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 64
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION .................................................................................. 65
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 65
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION ...................................................................................... 66
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................ 67
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION ................................................................................... 67
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ..................................................................................... 68
DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE .......................................................................... 69
REQUEST FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................... 70
WA-33

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A County payments and tax documents to James Otero, Denial of Recusal . A-2
APPENDIX B Judge Wright Superior Court service, Payments, and Void Orders ............. A-8
APPENDIX C County payments and tax documents to Jan Levine ................................. A-24
APPENDIX D Judge Gee Void Order, encouragement of independent complaint .......... A-28
APPENDIX E County payments to Kenneth Taylor, Refusal to Recuse, Void Order ....... A-34
APPENDIX F County interests in Bail Add-On Assessments, Traffic Court Biases ......... A-40
APPENDIX G County Budget Critical Budget Revenue Impacts, Vehicle Fines .............. A-48
APPENDIX H City Control of Traffic Revenue Machine ................................................. A-65
APPENDIX I County Child Support Services Budget, Court collaborative partner ........... A-67
APPENDIX J Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties ..................................................... A-73
APPENDIX K Court Counsel battles Judge Pellman over Title IV-E funds ...................... A-80
APPENDIX L ABA 10 Myths, Custody and Domestic Violence ........................................ A-85
APPENDIX M County Litigation Cost Manager Report, Public Summary ........................ A-88
APPENDIX N Superior Court payments to Brett Bianco, False San Diego Information .. A-94
APPENDIX O Court Counsel Conflict of Interest and Harassment of Plaintiff ............... A-101
APPENDIX P Order For Payment of Fee, Loss of Immunity .......................................... A-115

APPENDIX 1 Sturgeon I (2008) decision from California 4th Appellate ......................... A-118
APPENDIX 2 Text of SBX2_11 ....................................................................................... A-135
APPENDIX 3 Sturgeon II (2010) decision from California 4th Appellate ........................ A-143
APPENDIX 4 County Trial Court Operations Budget Summary ..................................... A-159
APPENDIX 5 Judicial Council Report on Benefits ........................................................... A-164
APPENDIX 6 CJP Analyses Show Unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 ................................ A-173
APPENDIX 7 California Judges Association Rebuttal to CJP ......................................... A-197
APPENDIX 8 Limited History of Judicial Compensation ................................................. A-202
APPENDIX 9 1988 Zolin Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court ...................................... A-211
APPENDIX 10 1995 Calif. Law Comm. Memo on Court Unification ............................... A-219
APPENDIX 11 Appointment of Patricia Benke ................................................................ A-230
APPENDIX 12 Analysis Recommending Humboldt County ........................................... A-235
APPENDIX 13 Superior Court ex-Spokesman Describes Mysterious Contract ............. A-240
WA-34

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Cases Page
Austin v. Smith,
312 F2nd. 337,343 (1962) ............................................................ 51
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
566 U.S. 868_(2009) .................................................. 16, 35, 41, 51
Carlson v. Eassa
54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888 (1997); ............................. 51
Carr v. Kamins
151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196, 199 (2007) .................... 51
Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol,
26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340 (1828) ................................................. 54
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
492 U.S. 229 (1989) ..................................................................... 14
In Re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ....................................................... 29, 59
Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ..................................................... 35, 41, 50
Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough,
204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236 .......................................................... 53
Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist.
34 CA4th 1801, 1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125 (1995) ......................... 51
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
167 Cal.App.4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 (2008) ................. passim
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles
___Cal App.4th___(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010) .......................... passim
Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (1968), P. 392 U.S. 16. ............................................... 63
United States v. Frega,
179 F.3d 793, 80910 (9th Cir. 1999) .................................... 33, 35
United States v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61 (1878) ......................................................................... 53
Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co.,
254 U.S. 348 (1920) ............................................................... 51, 53
Wells,
Res Adjudicata, Section 499 ........................................................ 53

Statutes
18 U.S.C. 4 ...................................................................... 21, 22, 25
18 U.S.C. 1346 ................................................................ 33, 34, 36
18 U.S.C. 1951 ............................................................................ 34
18 U.S.C. 1962(d) ........................................................................ 33
28 U.S.C. 455 ................................................................................ 6
28 U.S.C. 1331 .............................................................................. 8
28 U.S.C. 2403(b) ........................................................................ 60
WA-35

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

29 U.S.C. 206 ......................................................................... 24-25
U.S. Code Title 42, Ch. 7, Sub. IV, Part D, Sec. 654 ..................... 45
U.S. Code Title 42, Ch. 7, Sub. IV, Part D, Sec. 655, -658, -666 .. 46
42 U.S.C. 1988 ............................................................................ 72
Calif. Civil Code 52(h), 52.1, 52.1(h)6, 8, 16, 18-20, 24, 48, 61,70-2
California Penal Code 92, 93 ..................................................... 34
1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act ..................... passim

Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Constitution, 1st Amendment ............... 7-8, 16, 19-24, 39, 62-3
U.S. Constitution, 4th Amendment ...... 7-8, 16-17, 19-21, 23, 60, 63
U.S. Constitution, 14th Amend ...... 7-8, 16, 18-19, 21, 23, 32, 60, 64
U.S. Constitution, Article VI, CL 2 ............................................ 34, 35
Calif. Const., Art. I, 1-3, 7, 9, 13 ........... 8, 16, 23, 27, 46, 52, 62-4
Calif. Constitution, Article VI, 18(d), 19 ......... 23, 26, 30, 32-35, 55

Other Authorities
California Senate Bill SBX2-11 ............................................... passim
California Code of Judicial Ethics ....................................... 58-59, 61
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) ...................................... 12
California Code of Civil Procedure ............ 8-10, 54, 58-9, 61, 70-72

WA-36

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

INTRODUCTION
1. This action arises from the refusal of Jan G. Levine
1
(hereinafter, LEVINE) to
recuse herself voluntarily from Plaintiffs earlier limited civil suit for civil rights
damages under C.C.C. 52.1. Plaintiff demanded a judge who never received
supplemental county payments.
2. This action arises from the refusal of S. James Otero
1
, (hereinafter Judge Otero
or OTERO) to recuse himself in a civil case where Los Angeles County was a
Defendant and after OTERO took approximately $415,000 from that Defendant
during 14 years. Those monies have been deemed to be unconstitutional and
determined by the legislature to be illegal and requiring retroactive immunity.
3. This action arises from the refusal of Otis D. Wright
1
, II, (hereinafter Otis Wright or
WRIGHT) to recuse himself in a civil case where Los Angeles County was a
Defendant and after WRIGHT took approximately $75,000 from that Defendant
six years earlier. Those monies have been deemed to be unconstitutional and
determined by the legislature to be illegal and requiring retroactive immunity.
4. This action arises from the refusal of George H. King
1
(hereinafter, KING) to re-
assign Judges Otis Wright and James Otero from reviews of recusal requests
under 28 U.S.C. 455, when those requests were predicated on the very receipt
of supplemental county payments under review.
5. This action arises from the refusal of Dolly M. Gee
1
(hereinafter, GEE) to request
a re-assignment of the review of the recusal request directed at her when she
became aware that her colleagues Judges Wright and Otero had both received
supplemental county payments. She also failed to inform Judge King of the
seriousness of the matter.

1
Plaintiff intends no disrespect of the Judges, but simply a differentiation from their official judicial
duties and their distinct capacities as individuals where they took or condoned the taking of
unconstitutional county payments.
WA-37

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

6. This action arises from the refusal of Kamala Harris (hereinafter, HARRIS) to
respond to the California Commission on Judicial Performance and thus grant
retroactive immunity to all those who gave or received supplemental county
payments. She also failed to address the misappropriation of judicial funds by the
county Superior Courts, which paid Commissioners and other employees these
benefits from state operating funds.
7. This action is also against four individuals who misused their offices as Los
Angeles County Supervisors, Gloria Molina, Zev Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, and
Michael Antonovich (hereinafter SUPERVISORS) by allowing the authorization of
supplement judicial payments. There is no official duty, which requires
unconstitutional behavior and certainly not the payment of bribes. Therefore the
supervisors undertook this activity as individuals. Since these actions also
increased their own personal and individual compensations from the county, this
self-interested authorization of judicial payments is also not constitutional.
8. The supplemental judicial payments have been deemed to be bribes. All the
statutes normally providing judicial immunity no longer apply to many judges.
SBX2_11 legislation deemed this payments criminal and attempted to provide
retroactive immunity. SBX2_11 is unconstitutional and therefore the immunity is
unconstitutional. Los Angeles Superior Court judges have no immunity from
matters relating to the county or to the judicial payments.
9. No authority exists for elected officials to authorize bribes and therefore payments
of such monies must be deemed an individual act not authorized under official
duties. No authority exists for a judge to accept monies from the county without a
separate contract and Plaintiff is not aware of any such past contract. Therefore
the judge also accepts those monies as an individual.
10. Plaintiff seeks damages for denial of his 1
st
, 4
th
and 14th Amendment rights to due
process by WRIGHT, OTERO and LEVINE. Defendants received illegal
supplemental judicial benefits from Los Angeles County, did not disclose such
WA-38

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

payments to Plaintiff, refused to recuse themselves and issued a decision
involving Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant SUPERVISORS for
denial of his 1
st
, 4
th
and 14th Amendment rights to due process resulting from
payment of the judicial benefit payments to all judges of the Superior Court.
Plaintiff seeks damages from KING, GEE and especially HARRIS for failure to
comply with the Misprision of Felony statute. Plaintiff sues all Defendants for
damages resulting from violations of Plaintiffs civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983.
11. This action by Plaintiff arises in direct response to the California Fourth Appellate
Courts challenge to taxpayers on page 14 of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles
(2010) Cal.App.4
th
(4th Dist., Div. 1) (Sturgeon II)
! that interim remedy [SBX2_11], if not supplanted by the
more comprehensive response SBX2_11 plainly contemplates,
most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers!
JURISDICTION
12. Plaintiff sues for violation of his several civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1983; United States Constitution, 1
st
, 4
th
, 14
th
Amendments; 28 U.S.C. 1331;
Calif. Constitution Article 1 I, 2, 3, 7, 13; CA Civil Code 52.1; SBX2_11 5.
ASSIGNMENT AND VENUE
13. Plaintiff resides in Orange County. The acts and omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs
claims occurred in Los Angeles County, California. However, Plaintiff seeks a
judge who has not received extra judicial benefits from any county or superior
court, and has minimal personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los
Angeles, or southern California counties.
14. California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 397 provides, in pertinent part:
397. The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following
cases: !!!!.
WA-39

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

(b) When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had
therein. !!!..
(d) When for any cause there is no judge of the court qualified to act. !..
Plaintiff, is simply seeking an unbribed judge, Plaintiffs request is consistent with
the spirit of CCP 397 (b) and (d) and the facts of denial of due process in Los
Angeles, Orange and San Diego County.
15. Plaintiffs case challenges as illegal, unauthorized by law, and, most importantly,
unconstitutional the payment of and the receipt of the extra judicial benefits by
both the counties and the courts. Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, (2008) 167
Cal.App. 4th 630, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 242 Rev. denied 12/23/08 (Sturgeon I) held that
the extra judicial benefits were unconstitutional. Sturgeon v. County of Los
Angeles (2010) Cal.App.4
th
(4th Dist., Div. 1) (Sturgeon II) also held the
payments to be unconstitutional. The California Attorney General (AG) ruled in
1976 that county judicial benefits were unconstitutional. In 1995, the California
Law Revision Commission, reviewing a precursor to the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial
Court Funding Act, acknowledged judicial benefits were probably illegal but
suggested it was unlikely that anyone would object. In February 2009, the
legislature passed SBX2_11, attempted to give retroactive immunity and
authorize continued payments to judges and justices. In 2009 and 2011, the
California Commission On Judicial Performance (CJP) determined that key points
of SBX2_11 were unconstitutional and requested an updated opinion from the AG
on the constitutionality of SBX2_11 and the payment of extra judicial benefits.
16. In light of the above facts, most Superior Court judges (certainly all the judges of
the Superior Court in Los Angeles and Orange County) and many of the justices
in the California Appellate Courts have an inherent conflict of interest, were they
to attempt to rule on any portion of Plaintiffs case. Were they to rule, they would
be ruling on issues that effect their own personal and financial interests. Thus, all
WA-40

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

of the judges and Justices in Orange and Los Angeles counties are essentially
disqualified to act on Plaintiffs case under CCP 397 (d).
17. Even if there were a judge or Justice in Orange or Los Angeles counties who had
not received the illegal benefits, said judge/Justice might very well be unduly
influenced by his or her colleagues or be unduly sympathetic to them for the bad
position in which they find themselves. The chance of bias against Plaintiffs case
is quite high and such a bias would prevent an impartial trial under CCP 397 (b).
18. The widespread, pervasive and negative nature of the bribes paid by Counties
and by the Superior Courts make it impossible in Los Angeles or nearby southern
California counties to accomplish pretrial and jury-trial actions against
Defendants, and thus to resolve the claims by ETTLIN. A different venue is
necessary.
19. Appendix 12 (A-236)
2
incorporated herein in full, analyzes the data in the Judicial
Council report of December 2009 on statewide patterns of supplemental judicial
payments (See Appendix 5 (A-165)). The data indicates that neither Humboldt
County nor the Humboldt County Superior Court pay supplemental or extra
judicial benefit bribes to the judges. The conclusion is that Humboldt also offers a
less biased Appellate venue, and Humboldt is likely to be sufficiently removed
from the influence of the California Judges Association.
20. Plaintiff seeks a court with integrity and judicial officers who do not require
immunity under SBX2_11 or were associated with the writing, lobbying or
decisions regarding passage of SBX2_11. Plaintiff also seeks an appellate venue
free of such potential bias.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
21. A strict scrutiny standard of review is needed. The Sturgeon II decision
acknowledged that SBX2_11 is not a permanent response to the constitutional

2
References to the Appendix and page number are indicated by (A-xxx)
WA-41

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

issues. How can a law be temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not
constitutional. The answer comes from the federal supremacy clause, which
clearly makes SBX2_11 unconstitutional. Again, the Fourth Appellate Court
acknowledges the contradiction and encourages taxpayer suits such as this one.
However, on its face SBX 211 is not a permanent response to either the
circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be
remiss in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the
Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular
challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if
not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX2_11 plainly
contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or
members of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of
judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are
confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to
adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation. (A-158)
PARTIES
22. Plaintiff, Dennis Ettlin (ETTLIN), was a resident of Los Angeles County, State of
California at the time the underlying Occupy Los Angeles actions took place. He is
now a resident of Orange County.
23. Kamala Harris (HARRIS), sued as an individual, is an elected official also
employed as the California Attorney General (AG).
24. Jan G. Levine (LEVINE, collectively Defendant JUDGES), sued as an individual,
resides in Los Angeles County and is employed as a judge of the Superior Court
of California, County of Los Angeles.
25. (Samuel) S. James Otero (OTERO, collectively Defendant JUDGES), sued as an
individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is employed as a judge on the
United States District Court for the Central District of California.
26. Otis D. Wright, II (WRIGHT, collectively Defendant JUDGES), sued as an
WA-42

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is employed as a judge at the U.S.
District Court in Los Angeles.
27. Dolly M. Gee (GEE, collectively Defendant JUDGES), sued as an individual,
resides in Los Angeles County and is employed as a judge on the United States
District Court for the Central District of California.
28. George H. King (KING, collectively Defendant JUDGES), sued as an individual,
resides in Los Angeles County and is employed as a judge at the U.S. District
Court in Los Angeles.
29. Gloria Molina (collectively member of Defendant SUPERVISORS), sued as an
individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is an elected official employed as a
Los Angeles County Supervisor.
30. Zev Yaroslavsky (collectively member of Defendant SUPERVISORS), sued as an
individual, an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is an elected official
employed as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
31. Don Knabe (collectively member of Defendant SUPERVISORS), sued as an
individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is an elected official employed as a
Los Angeles County Supervisor.
32. Michael Antonovich (collectively member of Defendant SUPERVISORS), sued as
an individual, resides in Los Angeles County and is an elected official employed
as a Los Angeles County Supervisor.
33. Chris Ryan Legal, Sr., (CR LEGAL), also doing business as (dba) Occupy Los
Angeles, is a reluctant Plaintiff, and named as a defendant under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 19(a)(1)(A and B).
34. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and/or capacities of defendants sued herein
as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues said defendants by such
fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and
capacities when ascertained.
35. The Doe defendants include Judges presiding over THIS case who paid or
WA-43

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

received supplemental judicial benefits from either a county or a court.
36. The Doe defendants include individuals, who caused, participated in, and/or failed
to intervene to prevent the conduct complained of herein. Plaintiff is informed and
believes and therefore alleges that each of the Doe defendants is legally
responsible and liable for the unconstitutional payments, for the fraudulent tax
withholding practices, for injuries and damages claimed herein, and that each Doe
defendant proximately caused said injuries and damages by reason of their
negligence, breach of duty, negligent supervision, management or control,
violation of constitutional and legal rights, or by reason of other personal,
vicarious or imputed negligence, fault, or breach of duty, whether severally or
jointly, or whether based upon agency, employment, or control, or upon any other
act or omission. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this complaint to insert further
charging allegations when such facts are ascertained.
37. Each of the defendants, including defendants DOES 1 through 10, caused, and is
responsible for, the unlawful and unconstitutional conduct and resulting injuries
suffered by Plaintiff by, among other things, personally participating in the
unlawful conduct, or acting jointly, or conspiring with others who did so; by
authorizing, acquiescing in, or setting in motion policies, plans or actions that led
to the unlawful conduct; by failing to take action to prevent the unlawful conduct;
and by ratifying the unlawful conduct that occurred by agents and officers under
their direction and control, including failing to take remedial or disciplinary action.
38. In doing the acts and/or omissions alleged herein, defendants, and each of them,
acted under color of authority and/or under color of law.
39. In doing the acts and/or omissions alleged herein, defendants, and each of them,
acted in concert with and with the consent of each of said other defendants. The
immunity intended by SBX2_11 acknowledged the criminality of all those
participating somehow in the judicial payments scheme
WA-44

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

STATEMENT OF FACTS
40. The Los Angeles County Supervisors have authorized unconstitutional judicial
payments to all judges of Los Angeles Superior Court since at least 1990.
Payments to OTERO, WRIGHT and LEVINE by Los Angeles County are shown in
the appendix (A-5, -15, -25). The Judicial Council report (A-165) of December
2009 on statewide patterns of supplemental judicial payments states that the
County of Los Angeles pays all judges in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
41. Omitted from the report are the payments by the Los Angeles Court from its own
operating funds to temporary judges (Commissioners) (A-186) and other court
personnel (e.g. Court Counsel) (A-97). Significant discrepancies exist within the
report; such as the disparity between the report (A-100) and the Freedom of
Information letter from the San Diego Superior Court (A-99).
42. Defendant SUPERVISORSs annual salaries are linked to the salary of Superior
Court Judges. Since the Superior Court Judges salaries are set by the state, the
payments by the county allow the Defendant SUPERVISORS salaries to be
increased in tandem with the combination of judicial compensation from the state
AND the supplemental payments from the county.
43. On information and belief, the Defendant SUPERVISORS control the flow of
payments in a sophisticated RICO scheme having all the elements required in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). To conceal
the true nature of the bribes, the county issues an annual W-2 form to each
judge. According to the county auditor, the cafeteria plan benefits [are] paid as
taxable cash and Professional Development Allowance payments are reported as
taxable wages on an employees W-2. (A-3) Presumably, the retirement
contributions are shown in a retirement box of the W-2. Since, the judges are
NOT employees, the W-2s are a deceptive sham allowing a significant
underpayment of taxes by the judges and possible tax fraud by the Defendant
WA-45

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

SUPERVISORS because inadequate taxes are withheld by the so-called
employer.
44. Allan Parachini, former spokesperson for the Los Angeles Superior Court, said in
an interview
3
that after the Sturgeon victories, one judge even told him, Well,
there goes my Hollywood Bowl season tickets (A-244). Parachini continued, the
majority of Judges were beside themselves, !.. there were courts, a couple of
them, that were illegally diverting Court operating money to pay extra benefits, so
the farther the AOC got into it, the clearer it became that there was the makings of
a widespread scandal about self-dealing, and self interest by judges; leading
the reporter to state in other words, stealing on a grand scale by the judges,
statewide.
45. Mr. Parachini stated that a one-page contract exists between the judges and the
county (A-243). The Superior Court refused to produce such a document in
response to a Freedom of Information Act request.
46. The issues closely related to the payments encompass the BIAS that arises from
a bribe. Judges decide individual cases every day and any case in which the
county has an interest and a judge refuses to voluntarily recuse him/herself
creates a void order. The number of void orders outstanding today is in the
millions. It is the individual responsibility of judges to voluntarily identify to any
litigant anything in his/her past, which might indicate a bias. It is the height of
arrogance, for example, for OTERO and WRIGHT to assert that the retroactive
unconstitutional immunity applicable to them under SBX2_11 is frivolous.
Plaintiff proceeds as a Pro Per litigant because he believes it would be
professional suicide for any lawyer to represent him in challenging judges.

3
Interview and media coverage by Full Disclosure The News Behind The News 2012, AAW/Full
Disclosure Network ; Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery #630-632; Release Date:
November 16, 2012 [mp4 17:40-18:20] http://www.fulldisclosure.net/2012/11/court-insider-exposes-
judicial-treachery/
WA-46

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

47. Plaintiff is aware of the Los Angeles Court Counsels hogwash of absolute
immunity for Los Angeles judges. Court Counsel also receives supplemental
payments and is so motivated to retain the payments, he forced Plaintiff to file a
civil harassment claim against him (A-101). The U.S. Supreme Court would not
have wasted its precious time on Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc.,
566 U.S. (2009) if judges had the absolute immunity envisioned by Court
Counsel.
48. Plaintiff seeks damages for the loss of his constitutional rights, for obstruction of
justice, for damage to his livelihood and for emotional distress of taking on the
entire California judiciary. Plaintiff is suing for damages and for violations of his
civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983; United States Constitution, 1
st
, 4
th
,
14
th
Amendments; California Constitution Article 1 I, 2, 3, 7, 9, 13; and CA Civil
Code 52.1.
FIRST AMENDMENT EXERCISE
49. Plaintiff ETTLIN, exercising his free speech rights concerning the unconstitutional
payments, held a press conference at 9PM Sunday evening, November 27, 2011
in front of Los Angeles Police Department headquarters. Plaintiff left the area at
about 3 AM Monday morning.
50. Plaintiff returned Tuesday evening, November 29, 2011, around 9:00 PM. The
tent/homes in City Hall Park had established tenancy at will and were no longer
subject to first amendment time, place and manner constraints. Plaintiff was a
visiting guest of the occupant of space #5 as well as other occupants. Plaintiff
carried a large three-foot by five-foot sign with his free speech message printed
thereon. Plaintiff walked the sidewalks at the corner of 1
st
Street and Main Street
for two hours, taking rest breaks at the CalTrans plaza on the Southeast corner.
That corner was well lit and closer to where any police announcements might be
made. Plaintiff made a couple of rounds along the 1
st
Street sidewalks. There he
WA-47

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

observed a large crowd two or three blocks up 1
st
Street attempting to reach City
Hall Park, but prevented by barricades and a large police presence. Plaintiff
understood those people were also attempting to visit the tent/home dwellers at
City Hall. Plaintiff also observed the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department buses at
the ready.
51. Plaintiff was in the crosswalk at 1
st
and Main about 12:15AM, November 30, 2011
when he saw police officers running from City Hall Annex across Main Street into
the encampment.
FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION -- UNLAWFUL ARRESTS
52. Plaintiff retreated to the east sidewalk of Main Street and was observing the
surprising police activity. LAPD had posted flyers that all protesters were to leave
the park area. Plaintiff witnessed multiple tent/homes on the sidewalk, protected
by the Jones Agreement, being furiously shoved into the street and dismantled.
Plaintiff also observed the belongings of tent/home occupants being destroyed
and placed in garbage bags for disposal, a violation of the intent of the LAVAN
Federal Injunction. Approximately 1 AM Plaintiff noticed police officers behind him
on the grass. A few minutes later the sprinklers came on. There seemed to be
directions for the officers to move to the sidewalk to avoid the sprinklers. Plaintiff
was not able to understand or hear any police instructions from the golf carts in
front of the headquarters, there were no announcements from the officers behind
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was not aware of any other police announcements. The
overall scene had an extremely chilling effect on Plaintiffs willingness to continue
exercising his right to free speech and free association. Plaintiff decided to leave.
4
TH
AMENDMENT VIOLATION -- UNLAWFUL SIEZURE
53. Plaintiff had no intention of getting arrested that night and so, at about 1:15 AM
Plaintiff turned around to continue his protesting at a safer distance or to leave by
WA-48

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

heading away from the crowd and police activity, towards Little Tokyo. At that
point, Officer Tan, in riot gear, baton in hand and pointed at Plaintiff, made clear
his intent to prevent Plaintiff ETTLINs access to the eastbound sidewalk. Plaintiff
told him he wanted to leave and did not want to get arrested. TAN said only one
thing, Go over there, that direction. Plaintiff was alarmed at that point. Officer
TAN indicated again that if Plaintiff wanted to change location he should only go
across the street and into the crowd in front of the Police Headquarters building.
54. Plaintiff began to reconnoiter. The direction that TAN indicated was directly into
the crowd, which was not moving and looked like certain arrest. Plaintiff started to
walk up Main Street toward Temple. A short way up, another demonstrator
indicated that an exit route existed at the corner of Main and Temple. Plaintiff
hurried and got to the stairs going down to Temple just as five or six officers were
exiting the bridge at those stairs. Plaintiff asked no questions, hustled past the
bridge officers and down the stairs, where more officers were gathering and
apparently getting ready to close the stairs. Plaintiff walked east along Temple,
did not see any officers anywhere and then turned south to return to his car on 4
th

Street near Spring Street. Plaintiff got to his car about 2AM and was home by
about 2:30 AM. Plaintiff understands that a declaration of unlawful assembly and
order to disperse was issued at about 2AM.
14
TH
AMENDMENT DENIALS OF DUE PROCESS
55. Plaintiff sought relief under C.C.C. 52.1 in Los Angeles Superior Court. The
Superior Court refused to provide a judge who had not taken the unconstitutional
judicial payments from Los Angeles County. Not only had Judge Levine taken
$472,276 from the Defendant SUPERVISORS, she refused to recuse herself
(defensively stating that all judges receive those payments), and refused to treat
the defendant Christopher Tan, as an individual. The Bane Act, C.C.C. 52.1, is
specifically targeted at INDIVIDUAL responsibility and the fine is appropriately
WA-49

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

capped at $25,000. LEVINEs refusal to recuse denied Plaintiff his 14
th

amendment rights and made LEVINE an accomplice to the violations of Plaintiffs
C.C.C. 52.1 rights as well as his First and Fourth Amendment rights.
56. Plaintiff was requested to intervene in the only active Occupy Los Angeles case
being prosecuted at the time. Plaintiff sought relief in federal court for his civil
rights violations of November 30, 2011. He subsequently requested recusal of the
assigned Judge King. Review of the recusal request was assigned to Judge
Otero. OTERO took approximately $415,000 in judicial payments (A-5) from Los
Angeles County during 1990-2003, at least some of it from Defendant
SUPERVISORS. OTERO failed to disclose that fact or to voluntarily recuse
himself. Los Angeles County is a defendant in that case. Plaintiff made this
information known to OTERO and requested OTEROs recusal from the review.
OTERO not only refused, he ruled on his own recusal and deemed the allegations
frivolous, just as he had on other Pro Se requests (A-7). OTEROs order is void,
the Ninth Circuit mandate is void and therefore Plaintiff sues OTERO as an
individual for due process violations, which also make OTERO an accomplice to
the violations of Plaintiffs C.C.C. 52.1 rights and violations of his First and
Fourth Amendment rights. (Appeal of Judge Oteros decision is currently before
the U.S. Supreme Court.)
57. Subsequently, another Occupy Los Angeles case came to the Federal Court
before Judge Gee. Since those Occupy Los Angeles protesters were represented
by legal counsel, Plaintiff again sought to intervene. Judge Gee ignored false or
misleading statements by the originating Plaintiffs about related and on-going
cases. She allowed scurrilous, inaccurate and highly prejudicial allegations to be
made regarding the supplemental payments issue. Those pleadings reflected
opposing counsels ignorance, fear and terror at the thought of suing the Los
Angeles Superior Court. Judge Gee became familiar with the county payments
issue through several filings by Plaintiff with her court and did nothing. When it
WA-50

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

was clear that GEE was also highly biased against Pro Se litigants and Occupy
Los Angeles litigants, Plaintiff sought recusal of Judge Gee prior to her ruling on
his motion to intervene.
58. Review of the recusal request was assigned to Judge Otis Wright,II. WRIGHT
took approximately $75,000 from 2005-2007 (A-9, -10) in judicial payments from
Defendant SUPERVISORS and worked as an employee of the Los Angeles
Sheriffs Department. WRIGHT failed to disclose either fact or to voluntarily recuse
himself. Los Angeles County is a named defendant. Plaintiff made this information
known to WRIGHT (A-16:7) and requested WRIGHTs recusal from the review.
WRIGHT not only refused, he ruled on his on recusal and deemed the allegations
frivolous (A-23). WRIGHT made several citations to the OTERO rulings and
presumably read the underlying material. WRIGHT seemed to be totally unaware
of the unconstitutionality of his county payments (A-13, first annot.). WRIGHT also
called the issue frivolous. WRIGHTs order is void, the Ninth Circuit mandate is
void and GEEs denial of intervention is void. Therefore Plaintiff sues WRIGHT for
due process violations, which also make WRIGHT an accomplice to the violations
of Plaintiffs C.C.C. 52.1 rights and violations of his First and Fourth Amendment
rights.
59. OTERO and WRIGHT concealed the unconstitutional payments and promulgated
a system that methodically denied state court litigants due process. They
perpetuated a system that previously denied Plaintiff his rights in Family Court,
Traffic Court and Civil Court. Their refusal to recuse themselves in federal court
gives this case uniqueness because it continues the denial of due process where
Los Angeles County has an interest. Two federal judges have no immunity from
their direct actions or from their failure to report the felonies of the supervisors and
other bench officers. Los Angeles bribes infect the federal bench.
WA-51

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

FAILURE TO ACT UNDER MISPRISION OF FELONY
60. George King and Dolly Gee are undoubtedly friends and colleagues of both
OTERO and WRIGHT. Defendants KING and GEE became aware of the
unconstitutional payments issue, failed to report the felonious conduct and
attempted to conceal the unlawfulness of the Los Angeles Superior Court bribes.
Their failure to act is itself a crime under federal law which judges are sworn to
uphold. Misprision of felony is still an offense under United States federal law
after being codified in 1909 under 18 U.S.C. 4:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission
of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals
and does not as soon as possible make known the same to
some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.
61. Judge King is the supervising judge of the U.S. District Court, California Central
District. In November 2011, Judge King took (assigned) two earlier Occupy Los
Angeles cases to himself. He also took a third case in January 2012. Interestingly,
he did not take the Occupy Los Angeles case that was assigned to Judge Gee. It
is Judge Kings responsibility to be aware of related cases (like the Occupy Los
Angeles cases) and the reasons for recusals. Judge King is responsible for the
integrity of the Central District court. He made the personal choice to ignore the
severe breaches of judicial ethics alleged against OTERO and WRIGHT. Judge
King did nothing. Judge KING is an accomplice (under the Misprision of Felony
statutes) to the violations of Plaintiffs due process, first, 4
th
and 14
th
amendment
rights. Plaintiff asserts that KING has no official duty to ignore, conceal or
otherwise immunize OTEROs and WRIGHTs refusal to acknowledge the
payments issue and his failure to act is a further and continued denial of Plaintiffs
rights. KING is thus also an accomplice (under the Misprision of Felony statutes)
WA-52

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

to the RICO actions of his judicial colleagues and thereby also the actions of the
SUPERVISORS.
62. While Judge Gee likely never took the county payments herself, she was clearly
exposed to malpractice claims for her actions as private counsel before Superior
Court judges prior to her appointment to the federal bench. Attorney Gee would
have been required to seek recusal of any judge, who took payments from a
county or a Superior Court, in any of her cases where the county had an interest.
Judge Gee is an accomplice (under the Misprision of Felony statutes) to the
violations of Plaintiffs several civil rights and the RICO actions of her judicial
colleagues and the Defendant SUPERVISORS.
63. Similarly, OTERO, WRIGHT, and LEVINE all violated the Misprision of Felony
and RICO statutes with regard to the unconstitutional county payments by
Defendant SUPERVISORS.
64. Just as the Pennsylvania Judge
4
Ciavarellas close friend, pleaded guilty to
failing to report a felony (MISPRISION of FELONY) so each Defendant is now
also liable for damages for not reporting the appearance of bias and denying
Plaintiff his civil rights. Liability stems not from any friendship but from the
knowledge and deliberate failure to act.
65. The legal issues surrounding the countys supplemental judicial payments are the
responsibility of the California Department of Justice, headed by Attorney General
Kamala Harris. Defendant HARRIS received a direct request (A-176) from the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) to rule on the constitutionality of the
payments. Her refusal to do so is a personal choice, not an official duty, and a
deliberate concealment of multiple felonies for her own personal and political
gain. It is a denial of Plaintiffs civil rights for which Plaintiff includes HARRIS as a
defendant. HARRISs failure to act is a direct violation of 18 U.S.C. 4 and it

4
See New York Times article at,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/us/09judge.html?ref=markaciavarella
WA-53

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

makes her an accomplice to the denial of Plaintiffs 1
st
, 4
th
, and 14
th
Amendment
rights as well as the similar provisions under the California Constitution.
66. Defendant HARRIS is uniquely in a position to grant her own retroactive immunity
to all parties in the payments scheme. Her failure to bring criminal prosecutions is
a violation of California Constitution Article 1 9 prohibiting retroactive immunity.
This is the same retroactive immunity she granted all the mortgage-processing
banks. Again, the same immunity she grants to the City of Los Angeles for
violating the Jones agreement and the spirit of the Lavan injunction on November
30, 2011.
67. Defendant HARRIS has violated her oath of office. She has sworn to support and
defend the constitution and to well and faithfully discharge her duties. The
county payments issue is not just an opinion
5
that needs to be rendered. It is a
widespread scandal of self-dealing, and self interest by judges. It is a huge
violation of the California Constitution Articles VI 19 and Article I, 9. It is much
bigger than her so-called mortgage fraud settlement.
68. Defendant HARRISs failure to prosecute criminal behavior of Defendants
SUPERVISORS and JUDGES is the more egregious because she is the top law
enforcement official in the state. Her refusal to address the widespread scandal
about self-dealing, and self interest by judges (A-244) is purely a personal and
political one. Her failure to initiate organizational and funding changes with the
court system or to initiate criminal prosecutions is a violation of the Plaintiffs civil
rights. Defendant HARRISs actions erode public trust in the entire justice system.
ELDER ABUSE VIOLATIONS
69. Defendants failure to respect guaranteed civil rights creates a special hardship on
seniors. Plaintiff is 66 years old and will be even more hesitant to express his first
amendment rights of speech and especially of association. Defendant Harris

5
See number 11-603 at http://oag.ca.gov/opinions/monthly-report
WA-54

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

refuses to enforce CCC 52.1 on the members of law enforcement to hold them in
check and Defendant JUDGES further protect offending government agencies by
not respecting the constitution either with regard to payments to themselves or the
biases associated with the payments. Plaintiff is fully aware of the mistreatment
and abuse of those incarcerated. This has a very chilling impact on Plaintiffs
exercise of his first amendment rights. Defendants chose, for their own personal
gain, not to adequately protect those exercising their rights from the police and
judicial agencies.
VIOLATIONS OF EQUAL PAY
70. Defendant HARRIS is the top law enforcement official in California. Her duties
would likely require her to enforce equal pay for men and women. Her choice to
not do so must be construed as a personal choice. Her personal decision to not
enforce the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. 206) is both ironic and
unfortunate.
71. The unequal pay of male and female judges is just one of the many failures by the
Legislature to properly prescribe judicial compensation. Both Lockyer-Isenberg
and SBX2_11 create unequal pay for equal work. Female Judges in 23 counties
make only $178,000 from the State while male judges in Los Angeles County
make $178,000 from the State plus $58,000 from Los Angeles County. Female
commissioners (temporary judges) employed by the Los Angeles County Superior
Court receive approximately $236,000 ($178,000 from the State plus $58,000
from the L.A. Superior Court) while male commissioners in 23 counties make only
$178,000 from the State.
72. In addition to the inequality of direct pay comparisons, female superior court
judges receive approximately $236,000 while those on the Federal bench receive
only $174,000. Thus, the career path for Los Angeles female commissioners is
stunted because advancement requires a significant cut in pay. (Temporary
WA-55

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

judges in Los Angeles make more than the Supreme Court Associate Justices
and even Chief Justice Roberts $223,000.)
73. While pay raises at the state-level are difficult to increase and the Los Angeles
Commissioners may deserve their compensation, the supplemental benefits
implementation by the counties (and the Superior Courts) is unconstitutional and
violates Federal law.
74. Defendant HARRISs refusal to rule on the constitutionality of SBX2_11, or to
prosecute Superior Courts in the offending counties, or to prosecute Defendant
SUPERVISORS violates Plaintiffs due process rights in both the lower and the
Appellate courts, as well as fosters a system of bias and inequality for the highest
bidder. Plaintiffs analysis indicates he should file this civil suit in Humboldt County
to increase his chances of success. However, the certain appeal would be back in
the San Francisco Appellate Court with all its previously bribed judges, the timid
Supreme Court and of course HARRISs own lobbying.
75. Superior Court judges LEVINE, OTERO, and WRIGHT participated with
Defendant SUPERVISORS in a violation of the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963
29 U.S.C. 206 and Judges KING and GEE failed to act under 18 U.S.C. 4.
RULE OF LAW CORRUPTED BY JUDICIAL PAYMENTS
76. The duty of the sovereign government to provide for the administration of a fair
and equitable judicial system has been compromised. While judges and public
officials may deserve increased salaries, the current California system fosters
disrespect and contempt. Just as the Federal Courts have stepped in to protect
the civil rights of prisoners in California, so too will another Federal Court need to
halt the county payments and restore due process to 36 million Californians.
77. Defendant HARRIS has failed to prosecute the criminal activity of paying and
receiving supplemental judicial payments (she cannot immunize Defendants from
federal tax fraud). She has given illegal retroactive immunity to all individuals
WA-56

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

associated with the payments. She has failed to determine the constitutionality of
SBX2_11 so that others could interpret their actions properly. She has failed to
enforce federal equal pay statutes. She has denied due process rights and
fostered severe bias in the administration of justice. Plaintiff seeks damages
against Defendant HARRIS and the other Defendants for denial of his several
constitutional rights.
SBX2 11 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
78. Defendants immunity depends on the constitutionality of the legislative fix,
SBX2_11. While it is true that the courts have ruled SBX2_11 to be temporarily
and narrowly constitutional, the very same court decision encouraged these
challenges because the court knew the federal supremacy clause clearly makes
SBX2_11 unconstitutional. Plaintiff is simply following the direction of the court,
asserting his rights and defending the Constitution. For the sake of defending the
Constitution, Plaintiff will endure being called frivolous and disgruntled.
A. FIRST STURGEON CHALLENGE
79. Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev. denied
12/23/08, (Sturgeon I) (A-119) held that the L.A. County payments to L.A.
Superior Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution
because the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID
authorize judicial benefits, it did NOT set any standards for exercising the
delegated authority and THUS the authorization under Lockyer-Isenberg of
judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior Court judges was an
unconstitutional delegation of power.
B. HASTY RESPONSE IN SBX2_11
80. To address the Sturgeon decision, the Judicial Council and the California Judges
Association (A-136) jointly sponsored SBX2_11 (A-140). The State legislature,
without hearings, passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2_11, which
WA-57

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

became effective 5/21/09. The judiciary, with the lobbyist for the judges along with
the legislature tried to do in two months what they failed to do in 30 years. It is no
surprise that SBX2_11 is also unconstitutional.
81. Senate Bill SBX2_11 attempted to give retroactive immunity such that no
governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or
disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action
of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that
those benefits were not authorized under law. (A-141) With that one line the
Judicial Council simultaneously CONVICTED all those who gave or received the
payments and attempted to replace all the State and Federal authorities
protecting judges.
82. While SBX2_11 attempted to give immunity for receiving the money which was
unconstitutional, Senate bill SBX2_11, Section 5, (A-141) did not, however, give
retroactive immunity to judges or temporary judges who had received the county
payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases in which the county
had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified as a judge in the
past, present or future. The Los Angeles County interest in the Occupy Los
Angeles case is the critical point avoided by Judges OTERO and WRIGHT (A-7,
A-22).
83. Senate bill SBX2_11 acknowledged both the criminality of the payment of judicial
benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of immunity protections
under current state and federal laws by attempting to give all parties to the
payments limited retroactive immunity (A-8, Sec 5). Most importantly, the
attempted immunity is itself unconstitutional under the California Constitution,
ARTICLE 1, Section 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, the
legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of Californias CJP.
WA-58

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

C. SECOND STURGEON CHALLENGE
84. The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, Cal
App.4
th
(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called Sturgeon II concluded on page 14:
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status
quo ante Sturgeon I !! The Legislature is uniquely competent to
deal with the complex policy problem of establishing a judicial
compensation scheme which both assures recruitment and retention of
fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same time
providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the
same token our role in ensuring that the more general
requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our
system of separate governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis
added) (A-157)
85. (The current legal wrangling over prison crowding contradicts the Fourth Appellate
Courts statement about their role in ensuring the Constitution is met because the
federal court is very strenuously exerting its power to ensure the Constitution is
met. Just as the Governor and Attorney General are stonewalling the federal court
on prisoners rights, the California legislature, judges and elected officials are
doing nothing on Californians rights to comply with the Sturgeon decisions.)
86. Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not a
county responsibility, since the county is even allowed (with conditions under
SBX2_11) to terminate (A-141) or reduce all payments, since the county is
clearly an interested party in a large number of cases and since the county faces
significant pressure to reduce overall expenses; therefore the continued
payments must be in the countys interests. Those county interests are, for
example, the large Title IV-D incentive payments, the huge Title IV-D and IV-E
reimbursements, the large penalty assessments on traffic tickets, as well as the
rewards to developers contributing to Defendant SUPERVISORS when the court
denies unfavorable environmental impacts reports.
WA-59

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

87. SBX2_11 deemed prior payments as criminal and in need of criminal immunity.
Even the California Judges Association recognized the appearance of illegality.
Senate bill SBX2_11 did not even attempt to give immunity for the biases
inherent in the nature of a bribe. Defendant JUDGES did not disclose the county
payments in their past and then issued a decision in a case in which L.A. County
is a very interested party.
88. Judge OTEROs decision clearly protects L.A. County and his previous employer,
the City of Los Angeles, from liability in its treatment of the homeless and of first
amendment protesters without any evidentiary hearings. That same bias is
consistent with the goals of the county Litigation Cost Manager (A-89).
89. The Defendant JUDGES actions of taking the payments, not disclosing such and
the resulting fraud on the court have denied Plaintiff due process by denying him
the right to an impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). If
Judges Otero and Wright cannot see the bias of their own receipt of
unconstitutional payments, how is Plaintiff to trust their reviews of Judges Kings
and Gees possible biases?
D. DAMAGE SUITS AGAINST JUDGES
90. On March 16, 2011 the California Supreme Court denied a review of Sturgeon II.
In early 2011 several initial actions were taken to void the decisions and
judgments of judges receiving unconstitutional payments. The first Sturgeon II
challenge for damages was filed in Los Angeles County on June 16, 2011, case
number YC064994. Since then, eight additional civil suits have been filed in Los
Angeles County and one more, in San Diego County. These civil suits directly
challenge individual judges, and temporary judges, seeking multi-million dollar
damages for civil rights violations and the damages resulting from the case-
particular biases- i.e. family law biases, traffic bail assessment biases and civil
court biases.
WA-60

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

91. In June and July of 2011 all 36 judges in the Torrance and Santa Monica
Courthouses recused themselves from presiding over nine of these cases
regarding judicial payments and sent the cases downtown to the Central District.
92. The Superior Court Central District Judge (who also received payments from
1988 to 1998) hearing nine of these cases refused to recuse himself, the Second
Appellate Court denied a Petition for Writ of Mandate and upheld his refusal on
August 25, 2011. But, on appeal, the entire Los Angeles Appellate Court, the
largest in the state, then RECUSED itself from the appeal of those ten cases! The
California Supreme Court assigned the appeal back to the California Fourth
Appellate Court, but this time to the division in Riverside, California. The San
Diego division did not want this case for a third time!
93. Ten citizens claims of damages due to biased and void orders are firmly
supported by documented judicial payments and evidence on the Title IV-D
monies received by Los Angeles County and the partnership of the Superior
Court Judges with the countys Title IV-D agencies. By making the payments
available to every L.A. Superior Court judge, no party in a divorce case received a
fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to benefit the L.A. County Child Support
Services Department over the interests of the parties to the case.
E. CJP CHALLENGES SBX2_11
94. The analyses of SBX2_11 by the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP)
have also determined that SBX2_11 is unconstitutional. On April 3, 2009, the CJP
requested an opinion from then-Attorney General (AG) Brown (A-185). He did not
respond. On May 23, 2011 the CJP again requested an opinion from the new
California AG (A-176). It is not known if the CJP has requested a decision by the
California Supreme Court. Only the California Supreme Court can adjudicate the
CJP concerns
6
.

6
Cal. Constitution Article 6, Section 18 (d); in relevant part, Upon petition by the judge or former
judge, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant review of a determination by the commission
WA-61

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

95. According to the CJP, the SBX2_11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about
the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date. (A-177) The terms
and conditions are not defined anywhere and thus are arbitrary (and
unconstitutional). Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients. No authority is
provided for the Superior Court to continue to use state court-operating funds to
illegally pay Commissioners or Court Counsel.
96. The SBX2_11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is now
paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others. (The
payments in SBX2_11 Section 2 made by L.A. County to Commissioners are
called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they are issued by L.A.
County but funded by the Judicial Council. These warrants continue the
subterfuge.)
97. The CJPs biggest concern about SBX2_11 Section 5 immunity is that it directly
conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the CJP. The extensive CJP
analysis and arguments show the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional
powers.
F. AG DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
98. Attorney General Kamala Harris has not responded to the CJP, appears to be
delaying and also effectively refusing to honor the CJP request. An AG request for
clarification was answered promptly by the CJP on June 22, 2011. The current
delay is under the guise of not interfering with ongoing litigation, the Ringgold
case (11-56973), currently before the 9
th
Circuit. Kamala Harriss claim in the
Ringgold case is that the public release of the CJP analyses does not qualify as
newly discovered evidence. The CJP documents are marked PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL and were not available to the public without a probing Freedom
of Information Act request. Thus, the AG claim appears to be a self-serving and
conscious attempt by the AG to provide her own retroactive immunity to all
Judges who have taken the unconstitutional payments. No doubt the current
WA-62

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

California AG is aware of previous AG rulings as well as the Legislatures and
Fourth Appellates unwillingness to fully resolve the issues. She also clearly does
not wish to alienate the California Judges. She thus violates the 14
th
Amendment
constitutional standard with her own deliberate indifference to the last 55
years of consistent AG ruling against the supplemental judicial benefits.
99. In 1956, the Attorney General issued an opinion
7
concluding that superior and
municipal court judges and certain personnel of the superior courts were not
county employees and were thus ineligible for county-sponsored health
insurance. (27 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 338 (1956).) In 1976, the Attorney General
issued another opinion, specifically stating that the version of Government Code
53200.3 then in effect was unconstitutional. Citing the 1967 Judicial Council
Report to the Governor and the Legislature on this provision and the opinion in
County of Madera v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d at page 670, the
Attorney General stated: "Because of the use of `prescribe' the Legislature cannot
delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution.
Any attempt to make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid." (59
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 496, 497 (1976)) The conclusion, "that section [53200.3] is an
unconstitutional attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate a nondelegable
duty." (Id., at p. 501)[222 Cal.App.3d 1145].
100. In 1978, the Attorney General issued another opinion, stating that the
Legislature had failed to remove deficiencies. (61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 388, (1978)).
101. In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised
Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be
permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges, although he
acknowledged the Attorney General does not agree.

7
Documented in County Of Sonoma v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 222 Cal.App.3d 1133
(1990) Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division Three. August 14, 1990. see
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=5&xmldoc=19901355222CalApp3d1133_11282.xml&d
ocbase=CSLWAR2-1986-2006&SizeDisp=7
WA-63

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

102. In about 1988-1989 Los Angeles County and the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County began making payments to Judges and Commissioners. With the
CJP, they all ignored 30 years of Attorney General rulings.
103. The payments to Judge Otero began in 1990 as documented by the L.A.
County Auditor.
104. In 1995, the California Law Revision Commission
8
, reviewing a precursor to
the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, acknowledged the judicial benefits
were probably illegal and the negative consequences were HUGE (A-229) but
then suggested it was unlikely that anyone would object, a case can be made
that this will not occur (A-228). No one had objected to the 1988-1995 payments
by Los Angeles County. Fortunately, Sturgeon did object in 2006. Other citizens
are objecting. Just as the legislature failed in 1977 to pass constitutional
legislation, so they failed again in 1997 (Lockyer-Isenberg) and again a third time
in 2009 (SBX2_11). Throughout this lengthy period, the judges continued to
collect their supplemental county benefits and deny litigants due process.
105. The California Courts, the CJP and the AG appear to be consciously providing
retroactive immunity to all Judges who have taken the unconstitutional payments.
This Court must review the Constitutional issues affecting the due process rights
of 36 million Californians. Only then can this court assess the biases inherent in
the Los Angeles County payments.
PAYMENTS ARE BRIBES
106. These judicial payments by a party have been held to be "bribes" under
California law in United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 80910 (9th Cir. 1999),
where the judges were convicted on RICO conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C.
1962(d) and violating the intangible right to honest services 18 U.S.C. 1346.

8
Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision Commission
Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995
WA-64

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

This charge was based on allegations that the three defendants had conspired to
conduct the affairs of the Superior Court through a pattern of racketeering activity
consisting of multiple acts of bribery in violation of Sections 92 and 93 of the
California Penal Code and extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951.
107. Under Article 6, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution (the supremacy clause),
state judges are also required to follow U.S. law.
108. The California Appellate Court in Sturgeon II did not follow the due process
clause of the U.S. Constitution and did not follow 18 U.S.C. 1346 (Intangible
Right To Honest Services) in deciding that the payments to the judges were an
interim solution. Such county payments could not exist under any circumstances
as they violate the due process clause and supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution and U.S. law. The county payments are an OBSTRUCTION OF
JUSTICE
109. The payments to Los Angeles Superior Court judges were held to violate
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon, supra.
SBX2_11 did not change the California Constitution, did not make the judicial
benefits a county obligation, and therefore continuing payments also violate the
Constitution. The Sturgeon II decision acknowledged that SBX2_11 preserved
the status quo ante Sturgeon I
110. Appendix 4 (A-159) incorporates herein as if set forth in full a true and correct
copy of the L.A. County Fiscal Year 2010-2011 Proposed Budget Trial Court
Operations pages 60.1 to 60.4. Such section shows that the judicial benefits are
required (A-160) to be paid under the 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding
Act. This is a false statement as the Sturgeon case held that the 1997 Trial Court
Funding Act did not prescribe the payment of judicial benefits by counties under
Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution. All of the L.A. County budgets
from 1998 onwards contain the same false statement.
WA-65

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

111. Senate bill SBX2_11 did not give immunity to a judge who did not disclose the
county payments and then presided over a case in which the county had an
interest or was a party. For example, the L.A. County Child Support Services
Department is an interested party as it establishes financial ...support obligations
for children, enforces existing spousal support orders... as required under federal
and state law and is a collaborative partner with the Superior Court (A-70).
112. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which
he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice. In essence, by making all
L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for the L.A. County payments, L.A. County
has bought the L.A. Superior Court. The bribe amounted to over 25% of each
judges salary and thus constituted the "extreme facts" that create a "probability of
bias." The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. 868 (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part:
!!..just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar
fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other
parties, a man chooses a judge in his own cause.
113. By making the payments available to every L.A. Superior Court judge (A-169),
no party in a divorce case received a fair trial, as the judge was biased to rule to
benefit the L.A. County Child Support Services Department over the interests of
the parties to the case. No party in traffic court received a fair trial. No party in a
land use dispute received a fair trial, as the judge was perceived as biased in
favor of the developers who were also contributors to the same Defendant
SUPERVISORS who paid the judges.
114. In addition to fraud on the court and the denial of due process, the non-
disclosure of illegal payments and the Title IV-D partnership are also violations
of 18 U.S.C Section 1346 the intangible right to honest services (which U.S.
Constitution Article 6, CL 2 requires state judges to obey), which mandates that
WA-66

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

payments by a party in a case to a judge are illegal, particularly in California which
has a unique bribery statute. Skilling v. United States, (Decided June 24, 2010)
561 U.S. ___(2010) [referring to 18 U.S.C Section 1346] criminalizes only the
bribe and kick-back core of the pre-McNally case law, page 45 of opinion. In the
case of Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1994), 8 Cal.4
th
630,
661-663 (Adams I) the court represented ! conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. and in U.S. v.
Frega, U.S. v. Malkus, and U.S. v. Adams (1999) 179 F. 3d 793 (the payment by
a party and attorney appearing before a judge to such judge are bribery and
violate 18 U.S.C section 1346 the intangible right to honest services) starting at
805-807;
Because no linkage of payment and specific official act is required
under California law and because the indictment incorporates the
relevant state bribery statutes, which, in turn, state the elements of the
bribery offenses, the indictment is valid in this respect.
115. But for the refusal of public officials (like Defendant HARRIS) to perform their
sworn duties, these judges and all other judges who received Superior Court
payments would be removed from judicial office and imprisoned for bribery,
obstruction of justice and violation of the intangible right to honest services.
116. California and Federal statutes and case law show that judges who take
money from persons appearing before them are guilty of accepting bribes, will
be disqualified from the case, removed from office for ... conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. and
imprisoned for bribery and violation of the intangible right to honest services 18
U.S.C. 1346.
117. The result of these actions is that any case before LEVINE, OTERO, and
WRIGHT in which the Los Angeles Superior Court or Los Angeles County had a
direct or indirect interest, such as Occupy Los Angeles, family law, traffic ticket or
land use related cases, were vitiated and all orders and judgments in the cases
were void. After being made aware of such payments and the resulting denial of
WA-67

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

due process, the failure of KING and GEE to call into question Los Angeles
County payments, is itself a further denial of Plaintiffs due process rights. These
failures of the judges makes it possible and easier for Los Angeles County to
continue making the payments and to continue the constitutionally dubious flow of
Federal and State dollars to the county. An entire legal system is corrupted by the
payments to the judges and the unwillingness of any judge to uphold the
constitution.
118. The Sturgeon I decision in 2008 officially declared the payments received
by Defendant JUDGES illegal. Anyone with a sensible understanding of bribes
could have come to the same conclusion. LEVINE, OTERO, and WRIGHT
could have reached the same conclusion. They likely did not because of the
long-held and prevailing attitudes among Los Angeles County Judges. A
spokesman for the Los Angeles Superior Court recently characterized that
attitude as follows:
..like so many people in Court who havent yet gotten confortable
with the fact that the Court is no longer a County agency and that is why
you see this particular court locked in such a futile battle with the AOC
[Administrative Office of the Courts]!.
Judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court still are not ready to
accept that!. the County Courts became entities of the State and the
State runs the show!
The Los Angeles Court is not ready to agree that power has shifted
and the judges here no longer have it.
[Sturgeon] held that Boards of Supervisors didnt have the statutory
powers to make those payments because the Legislature had never
specifically enacted a law allowing that, so the overall purpose of that bill
[SBX2 11] was to clean that up!
The fact that those payments had been, strictly speaking, illegal for
years was never addressed !
..there were courts, a couple of them, that were illegally diverting
Court operating money to pay extra benefits, so the farther the AOC got
WA-68

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

into it, the clearer it became that there was the makings of a widespread
scandal about self-dealing, and self interest by judges
9

119. Judge Otero currently displays a very strong appearance of bias in favor of
Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles City Attorneys office due to his past
receipt of county judicial payments and his additional 11 years employed by
Defendant City of Los Angeles, City Attorneys office. James Oteros normal
judicial immunities did not apply to the county payments and that is why
SBX2_11 Section 5 attempted to give retroactive immunity. Such retroactive
immunity is unconstitutional in California and therefore James Otero has no
immunity for taking the payments. Therefore, Superior Court Judge Otero had
no personal jurisdiction on any case where Los Angeles County had even a
remote interest. His attempt to retain jurisdiction violates Plaintiffs rights.
COUNTY IS NOT SOVEREIGN
120. Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity. Under the 11
th
amendment, only
the Federal Government and each of the 50 states are sovereign within the
United States of America. Therefore, under Lockyer-Isenberg and under
SBX2_11, Los Angeles Countys actual payments to a judge are no different than
payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff. Both are unconstitutional and both are
considered bribes.
121. The Superior Court also makes supplemental payments to some of its
employees -- Commissioners and Court Counsel. The payments are dispersed by
the County, disguising the fact that the checks are actually warrants; issued by
the county, payable from a Court operating funds account. These funds would

9
Media coverage by Full Disclosure The News Behind The News 2012, AAW/Full
Disclosure Network ; Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery #630-632; Release
Date: November 16, 2012, (A-244)
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/2012/11/court-insider-exposes-judicial-treachery/
WA-69

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

not be considered bribes but simply a misuse of government funds by the judges
of the Superior Court. While the county may act like and claim sovereignty, the
court cannot.
COUNTY IS AN INTERESTED PARTY
122. The County interests include all the interests and messages represented by
the signs, the tents, the marches, the chants, and most importantly, the free
speech and assembly actions regarding (to name only a few):
All OccupyLA home foreclosure demands directly impact property tax revenue
All OccupyLA banking demands impact all the accounts and financial flows
All OccupyLA demands and objections to time, place and manner restrictions
123. The public interests of Los Angeles County, the Superior Court of Los Angeles
and also the individual private salary interests of the Defendant SUPERVISORS
are critically impacted by the messages and demands of Occupy Los Angeles.
124. The Los Angeles Superior Court as well as Los Angeles County both have a
many-fold interest in maintaining the county payments to the judges. Further
budget cuts or increased services by the county in furtherance of the demands by
Plaintiff (a First Amendment participant in Occupy Los Angeles) threaten to
reduce judicial payments.
125. Judge OTERO, WRIGHT, KING and GEE worked just across the street and
had frequent exposure to the process, demands and activities of the Occupy Los
Angeles protesters for over 60 days. The stated purpose of Los Angeles County
payments is to retain judges in Los Angeles County. The favorable disposition
related to job location choice reasonably and easily carries over to a general pre-
disposition in favor of Los Angeles County, its supervisors and its law
enforcement officials and its Superior Court in matters of county interest.
126. The Sturgeon I opinion stated that when a valid public purpose is ascribed to
the supplemental judicial benefits, the monies cannot be considered a gift
WA-70

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

under the law. The reason most frequently stated by the union of judges, the
California Judges Association (CJA) and cited in Sturgeon I is to recruit and
retain qualified bench officers in high cost-of-living counties. In Los Angeles
County, of course, some taxpayer could also credibly assert that Los Angeles
pays the benefits to help Los Angeles overlook the denial of constitutional
guarantees in order to collect Federal subsidies. After all, in 2004-05, Los Angeles
County Child Support Services spent $175 million but after reimbursements from
Title IV-D had a $6.4 million surplus. (A-71) By denying fathers equal custody
and abrogating both parents rights and responsibilities the judges were, in
substantial measure, able to ensure that county funds were not spent on child
support and were thus available to fund judicial priorities. The county and court
are interested parties.
127. While the nature of the public good gift to the judges was debatable by the
Appellate Court, the fact that the County of Los Angeles pays judges money not
covered by California Government Code Section 68203 is a fact. SBX2_11 affirms
the criminality of such payments by attempting to provide immunity for those
payments. That is also a fact. The unconstitutionality of such payments is
discussed previously.
128. When the CJA proposes and then sponsors with the Judicial Council laws
such as SBX2_11, that have the appearance of constitutionality by virtue of being
proposed by the Judicial Council, or when judges apply laws in a way to make
more money available to their governmental bodies (judicial organizations),
directly or indirectly, then the Superior Court itself also becomes a party to a case.
APPEARANCE OF BIAS
129. The Judicial Council report of December 2009 on statewide patterns of
supplemental judicial payments (A-165) states that the Superior Court of Los
Angeles pays all its judges. This creates a conflict of interest with more than an
WA-71

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

appearance of BIAS. Furthermore, the BIAS of one judge then infects the
reputation and appearance of bias of all the others. With payments to all judges,
Los Angeles County has bought the entire Court without the consent of the
other party opposing them.
130. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which
he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice. Again, in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566 U.S. (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant
part:
!!..just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar
131. Los Angeles County is not a sovereign entity and therefore its actual
payments to a judge are no different than payments (hypothetically) by Plaintiff.
Both Sturgeon decisions stated that the judicial benefits are not state payments.
Thus they constitute a bribe and are illegal. SBX2_11 deemed prior payments as
criminal and in need of criminal immunity. The bill granted immunity for monies
received prior to July 2009. The same payments, which received immunity prior
to July 2009, no longer have criminal immunity. The Appellate court in 2010
affirmed the county payments are optional and admitted in Sturgeon II that it did
not fully address all the Constitutional issues. Plaintiff contends the same
payments, which received immunity prior to July 2009, no longer have criminal
immunity under SBX2_11.
132. The Judicial Council and the Legislature did not consider within SBX2_11 the
injury and damage to those who appeared before the judges or the injury by those
prosecuted due to void orders. There is no SBX2_11 immunity from fraud on the
court or civil rights violations.
133. The judges know there is conflict within the laws of the state and the payments
WA-72

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

bias the judges in favor of the interests and financial health of the county. Judges
have to be bribed to deny people their constitutional rights. That is the real
purpose of the payments. It is corrosive to the rule of law and the judges know it.
134. Likewise, Kamala Harris ignores the CJP because if the state continued the
benefits (currently around $50,000,000 per year), the fair and equal distribution of
judicial benefits to the entire state would likely cost the state at least $100 million
more per year. More importantly, if the judges upheld the constitution, the loss of
federal revenues alone could cost the state over $1 billion per year. Neither of
these estimates includes the cost of re-litigating 25 years worth of void orders and
bias claims.
135. Kamala Harris ignores the CJP because she needs the judges support for
state programs and her own political ambitions. By doing nothing, she gives
retroactive immunity to all current and past judges as well as the court and county
officials who broke the law and paid the judges. The refusal to overturn SBX2_11,
or to initiate replacement legislation is solely to appease the states judges and
further her own individual personal goals and career.
136. In a similar vein, Kamala Harris gave retroactive immunity to all banks and
bank officials when she failed to bring any criminal prosecutions. She opted
instead, only for small monetary payments to a few homeowners. Retroactive
immunity is unconstitutional.
137. Los Angeles County is the largest user of the Superior Court of California,
County of Los Angeles services. There are approximately, 2.7 million new cases
each year: about 1.7 million traffic tickets, 500,000 criminal cases, 120,000 family
law cases, and 150,000 civil lawsuits.
BIAS IN CIVIL COURT
138. The Office of the County Counsel provides quarterly reports to the supervisors
on the projected costs to the county from on-going litigation. This report is
WA-73

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

confidential and thus protects strategic and tactical planning discussions from
being exposed to the public. Appendix M (A-89-93) contains the 2007-2008 public
report signed by the Litigation Cost Manager. In fact, during 2005-2007 there
were no decisions against the county when the case was decided only by the
judge. The judicial payments have an excellent rate of return as an investment by
the SUPERVISORS from the perspective of the Litigation Cost Manager. But the
judges bias is extremely valuable to the county revenues in other areas as well.
BIAS IN FAMILY COURT -- TITLE IV
139. The 120,000 annual Family Law cases involve a large potential liability for the
county. Federal funding of the Title IV-D programs covers many of the potential
county costs but only if the state and county comply with federal guidelines.
Specifically, the Title IV-D money is based upon the expenses of the state-
chartered Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department (CSSD) with a
Floor payment plus an incentive.
140. A true and correct copy of the Fiscal Year 2005-2006 L.A. County Budget for
Child Support Services Department pages 59-62 is included in Appendix K and is
incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Such document shows the Child Support
Services Department establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical
support obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders ... as
required under federal and state law (page 59). The Child Support Services
Department received federal and state Title IV-D funding fiscal years 2003-2006
(pages 61-62).
141. The L.A. County budget for the fiscal year 2005-2006 shows that the L.A.
County Child Support Services Department received $103,083,000 Federal Tittle
IV-D and $72,487,000 State Title IV-D for fiscal year 2003-2004; $125,545,000
Federal Tittle IV-D and $63,674,000 State Title IV-D budgeted for fiscal year
2004-2005, and $124,578,000 Federal Tittle IV-D and $62,475,000 State Title IV-
WA-74

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

D proposed for fiscal year 2005-2006. The budget shows that the Child Support
Services Department has the Superior Court as a collaborative partner (A-70)
and that it establishes, modifies, and enforces financial and medical support
obligations for children, enforces existing spousal support orders and determines
parentage for children as required under Federal and state law. (A-69) Among
the services it provides are establishing parentage and child support orders,
modify court orders and enforce support obligations amongst others.
142. The L.A. County payments to the L.A. Superior Court judges influences the
judges to create non-custodial parents and then to order the higher support
awards from noncustodial parents and establish mechanisms to require/enforce
the ordering of higher support awards from noncustodial parents. This enables
L.A. County to receive greater monies under the Title IV-D rules from the Federal
and state governments to operate their Child Support Services. The higher
awards by the judges are made possible because there is no downside for the
county. The higher awards reduce the likelihood that children and supported
spouses will seek indigent aid from the county or the state. The higher awards
also increase the need and likelihood for enforcement. The punitive enforcement
mechanisms and excessive interest rate increase the CSSD operations budget.
Title IV-D sections 655 and 658 pay a percentage of the expenses related to
support orders as well as incentives, related to a floor payment for a fiscal year.
143. Page 61 of the 2005-2006 L.A. County budget shows that the Title IV-D
federal and state payments to L.A. County literally paid for the entire budget of
Child Support Services Department for the fiscal years 2004-2006 (A-71).
144. The higher the number and monetary amount of support orders against non-
custodial parents, the higher the expenses of the L.A. County Child Support
Services Department, the higher the amount of Title IV-D federal and state
funding. L.A. County has a direct interest in the judge setting the greatest number
WA-75

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

and the highest monetary child support orders. L.A. County is a real party in
interest in every divorce case as it reaps a financial benefit.
145. The payments by L.A. County to the judge in a divorce case have no purpose
other than to influence the judges decision to create a non-custodial parent and
its resulting high child support order, thus protecting the county interests.
146. The Los Angeles County Superior Court is an interested party in every divorce
case because the Judicial Council (composed of some of those same bribed
judges) implemented the cooperative financial arrangements into the California
family code as directed by,

U.S. Code Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 654 states
in relevant part:
A state plan for child and spousal support must
(1) Provide that it shall be in effect in all political subdivisions [counties] of
the state;
**********
(4) provide that the state will --
(a) Provide services relative to ....the establishment, modification, or
enforcement of child support obligations...
(b) Enforce any support obligation established with respect to --
(1) A child with respect to whom the state provides services under the
plan; or
(2) the custodial parent of such child.
*******
(7) Provide for entering into cooperative arrangements with appropriate
courts and law enforcement officials...
(a) To assist the agency administering the plan, including the
entering into of financial arrangements with such COURTS and
officials in order to assure optimum results under such program,
and
(b) with respect to any other matters of common concern to such
COURTS or officials and the agency administering such plan
*********
(13) Provide that the state will comply with such other requirements and
standards as the secretary determines to be necessary to the
establishment of an effective program for locating noncustodial parents,
establish paternity, obtaining support orders and collecting support.
WA-76

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 655 sets forth the
payments to the states and shows the amount of payments to the states.
Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 658a provides for
incentive payments to the states.
Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, Part D, Section 666 requires the
states to have statutorily prescribed procedures to improve the
effectiveness of child support enforcement.
147. There is no denying the partnership between the Superior Courts and the
states Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) enforcement agency. Title
IV-D funding relies on a myriad of rules and incentives for judges to deny fathers
equal parenting rights by arbitrarily giving mothers unequal custody.
Administration and compliance with those unfair and onerous rules creates a
bureaucracy that is then funded over 90% by Title IV-D but only if the judges and
state agencies work together. By merely participating in establishing support
orders, and then by enforcing Title IV-D requirements that are inconsistent with
the California Constitution Article 1 Section 1, the family law judges caused the
county of Los Angeles to estimate a DCSS budget surplus of $701,000 for 2011.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles has certainly become an interested party in
every divorce case. Every time a Superior Court family law judge uses the DCSS
child support calculator, the Los Angeles Superior Court affirms its ties to the
County interests. The welfare cost savings implemented by the Superior Court for
the county are available to fund judiciary requests for salaries, facilities and larger
benefits for the judges.
148. As state employees and elected officials, judges also have an interest in
supporting Title IV-D at the state level. The state has an incentive to encourage
Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements because whatever general welfare
responsibilities the counties do not pick up, could easily be shifted to the state.
Plus the state is the conduit by which Title IV-D is implemented. The normal
judicial immunity protects the judges from any liability for bias based on the
sovereign states compensation payments to them. But as soon as the courts
WA-77

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

participate in the profit for justice funding, that money must meet all federal and
state legal and constitutional tests.
149. The Title IV-E Foster Care program provides similar federal reimbursements,
$14,000 annually per child, to the county for children removed from their parents
home. The bias in favor of the county is evident in the actions of the Los Angeles
Court Counsel. Plaintiff understands that a drama has developed in the Title IV-E
Foster Care program. Judge Amy Pellman receives the Los Angeles County
payments but is not perceived to be keeping the bargain. She prefers to keep
children with their parents, but Los Angeles Superior Court Counsel portrays
Judge Amy Pellman
10
as biased against the County Foster Care program.
Keeping children with their parents causes a loss of Title IV-E Foster Care
revenues for the County. The Court is shifting cases to other judges to benefit the
County!
BIAS IN TRAFFIC COURT -- PENALTY ASSESSMENTS
150. There is no denying that traffic tickets fund a major portion of the judicial
facilities for the Los Angeles Superior Court. (See Appendix G) Traffic ticket
revenue funds the county operations as well as the judiciarys own building funds
(A-46, A-50). The traffic court judges of Los Angeles Superior Court are an
integral part of county revenue streams. The Superior Court of Los Angeles is an
interested party in every traffic ticket. This collaboration with Los Angeles City and
County directly (A-66) increases revenue for the county and indirectly for the
court. The Superior Court now has shared interests with the County interests.
BIAS IN CRIMINAL COURT
151. The following are only two examples of the criminal court bias favoring county

10
See Jim Newton, Los Angeles Times; http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
newton-column-dependency-court-judge-20121105,0,458283.column
WA-78

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

law enforcement agencies.
152. Plaintiff abandoned his earlier CCC 52.1 civil suit because of Judge Levines
initial decision showing bias in favor of law enforcement. Plaintiff had recently
witnessed several criminal court judges in other Occupy Los Angeles cases fail to
recuse themselves, make their own interpretation of the facts, not just the law,
and thus deny arrestees their civil rights in favor of County law enforcement.
Plaintiff saw the same behavior unfolding in his CCC 52.1 civil case.
153. There are over 450,000 misdemeanor criminal cases in Los Angeles County
each year. The bail penalties and assessments typically multiply the fine by two to
four times and are a significant source of revenues for the county and especially
for the court building funds. Releasing arrestees on their own recognizance (OR)
without bail thus disturbs this funding stream. To maintain this funding source, the
Superior Court seeks to constrain individual judges and publishes a bail schedule
with an informal policy of accepting the prosecutors charges and
recommendations for bail. This policy is in direct conflict with California Penal
Code 853.6. Plaintiff believes defendants are fully aware of this policy conflict
and that the county payments are made by Defendant SUPERVIORS to influence
Defendant JUDGES to ignore this conflict and implement the policies favored by
or benefiting Los Angeles County.
DISQUALIFIED JUDGES ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT IMMUNITY
154. Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not a
county or court responsibility, since the county and courts are allowed (under
SBX2_11) to terminate all payments; therefore the continued payments must be
in the court and the countys interests. Those interests are the basis for judicial
recusal and void orders in any cases where the court or county have an interest.
155. Judges LEVINE, OTERO, and WRIGHT (as well as other Judges, including
the 9
th
Circuit Court who may have) received past county judicial payments and
WA-79

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

thus, lack personal jurisdiction to rule on matters related to those payments or to
the County. This makes their orders void and any subsequent orders void.
156. A disqualified judge who continues to sit on the bench does so as an
individual, at risk, without the immunity protections normally afforded a bench
officer. It is worth Judicial Notice that on September 29, 2011 Judge E. L. Strauss
in San Diego Superior Court case 37-2011-00093476-CU-CR-CTL ordered
Thomas Trent Lewis, employed as a judge in Los Angeles County, to pay court
fees as the defendant in a similar civil rights damages case, and thus treated
Thomas Trent Lewis as an individual, without judicial immunity for refusing
to recuse himself for taking the bribes.
157. Both sides presented oral and written arguments at the September 23 hearing
and the court upheld the key civil rights claim against the judge. The decision
(A-116) denied the judges claim that the case was erroneously sued against
an individual, denied the judges claims of judicial immunity and legally
recognized the judge as an individual in that case. The judge requested
clarification from the court but then paid the fees. (A-117) The judges payment
further acknowledged the Courts decision on the loss of judicial immunity!
AMNESTY AND RETROACTIVE IMMUNITY
158. In 1965, unlike current state and local leaders in California, the very idea of
"retroactive immunity" was so radical, so repugnant to the most basic principles of
the "rule of law," and so profoundly offensive that Sen. Robert Kennedy (who had
been the Attorney General when the banks broke the law with their mergers), as
well as then-Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, together engaged in
extraordinary efforts to try to put a stop to the Congressional travesty, where
Congress, in 1965, attempted to enact a law retroactively legalizing the mergers
by six large banks, which clearly -- as a federal court found -- were illegal under
our nation's antitrust laws.
WA-80

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

159. Likewise, the California Fourth Appellate Court, in Sturgeon I, held the judicial
payments were unconstitutional; the Administrative Office of the Courts knew the
consequences were HUGE (A-229) if they were held accountable under the law
and they scared the legislature into passing, under the cover of darkness, the
hasty and flawed SBX2_11 with retroactive immunity for all sitting judges and
county officials. The California Fourth Appellate Court, in Sturgeon II, again held
that judicial compensation was a state responsibility, that SBX2_11 was a
temporary fix, stated they were unwilling to stop the county payments and instead
they deferred to, and encouraged, citizen actions to hasten legislative action. The
Fourth Appellate Court was surely aware of the magnitude of the consequences
of their decision and allowed the retroactive immunity to continue under
SBX2_11.
160. The CJP actions spotlight the California Attorney Generals complicity in the
retroactive immunity and her amnesty to Judges and the officials in 35 counties.
FRAUD ON THE COURT
161. Judge OTERO, WRIGHT and LEVINEs past acceptance of Los Angeles
County judicial payments and their sitting on a case in which the county was an
interested party voids their orders. Failure to disclose those payments constitutes
fraud on the court. Senate Bill SBX2_11 gave retroactive immunity because of
benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity.
Senate bill SBX2_11 did not give present or retroactive immunity to judges who
had received the county payments, did not disclose such and then presided
over cases in which the court had an interest. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated
in the case of Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954): A judge receiving a
bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the
appearance of justice.
WA-81

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

162. In essence, by making all L.A. Superior Court judges eligible for the L.A.
County payments, L.A. County has bought the L.A. Superior Court. The U.S.
Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 566
U.S. (2009) at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part:
...... just as no man is allowed to judge his own cause, similar
163. Extrinsic fraud tends to encompass almost any set of circumstances which
deprive a party of a fair adversary hearing. Estate of Sanders v. Sutton 40 Cal.3d
607 (1985). Since fraud on the court vitiates the entire case, all orders from that
court or any subsequent court are void as none of the courts had subject matter
jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; a void order
is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge, nor does it gain validity by
the passage of time. See Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348
(1920) a void order is void at all times, cannot be made valid by any judge,
nor does it gain validity by the passage of time. The order is VOID AB INITIO.
The 9th Circuit has stated in the case of Austin v. Smith, 312 F2nd. 337,343
(1962): If the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based upon it is also
void.
164. Plaintiff sought to achieve certainty under the law with judicial officers who had
not taken the illegal bribes. Defendant JUDGES denied Plaintiff his constitutional
right to due process. Since Defendant JUDGES committed fraud on the court,
their orders are void. Any order giving effect to that void judgment is itself void
and appealable. [Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 CA4th 929, 933-934, 60 CR3d 196,
199; Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 CA4th 684,691, 62 CR2d 884, 888; Residents
for Adequate Water v. Redwood Valley County Water Dist. (1995) 34 CA4th 1801,
1805, 41 CR2d 123, 125].
WA-82

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

165. Sturgeon I made county judicial benefit payments illegal. On December 23,
2008, over 1,400 active California judges lost all judicial immunity for any case in
which a county was remotely an interested party. Two months later, on February
20, 2009, the legislature hastily passed SBX2_11, convicted all those 1400
judges and then attempted to give them all an unconstitutional
11
retroactive
immunity. On December 28, 2010, Sturgeon II declared the situation after
SBX2_11 to be the same as before Sturgeon I. Furthermore, the Court refused to
prescribe a fix for the problem, proffered its trust in the legislature and even
encouraged taxpayer actions, such as this one, challenging the constitutionality
of SBX2_11.
166. SBX2_11 provided immunity to all those governmental persons associated
with the paying or receiving of judicial payments. SBX2_11 did not address fraud
on the court. It did not address or even acknowledge any of the BIASES bought
for the county by the payments.
167. Oral arguments on October 13, 2010 in the Fourth Appellate Court
acknowledged the great turmoil
12
among the judges over Sturgeon I.
168. Following those oral arguments, and only one week before a decision on
Sturgeon II, Chief Justice Ron George, a strong and long-time proponent of
increased judicial salaries, reasserted his interest and assigned the Sturgeon II
Presiding Judge Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting Chief Justice of a new
appointed California Supreme Court, for another high-profile case. This collegial
plum of an appointment had no purpose other than to influence Sturgeon II. On
December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II decision claimed the Justices have limited
authority to enforce the California Constitution, refused to declare SBX2_11
unconstitutional, and dared the people of California to stand up for their due

11
California Constitution, Article 1, Sec 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing
the obligation of contracts may not be passed.
12
Media coverage by Full Disclosure The News Behind The News, Are Judicial Double Benefits
Constitutional? Judges To Rule on Judges Benefits Round II, Release Date: November 21, 2010
WA-83

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

process rights. Now both the legislature in 1995 and the judiciary in 2010 have
dared the people to fight for their due process rights!
169. Defendant JUDGES acceptance of the L.A. County bribes and their sitting on
a case in which L.A. County was an interested party voided all their orders and
judgments. Senate Bill SBX2_11 attempted to give retroactive immunity because
of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity.
Senate bill SBX2_11 did not give retroactive immunity to judges who had received
the county payments, did not disclose such and then presided over cases in
which the county had an interest.
170. Since Los Angeles Superior Court judges are interested parties in appeals
cases, divorce cases, traffic cases, and domestic violence cases (A-86 to -87),
among others; and since the judges receive payments from an entity other than
their employer (the State of California); and since Sturgeon I determined those
payments to be illegal (bribes), the judges must at a minimum inform any parties
with cases in such matters that the judge is receiving such payments. Failure to
do so is FRAUD ON THE COURT. Unfortunately, judges judging judges has not
worked since Sturgeon I.
171. Extrinsic fraud is a basis for setting aside an earlier judgment. The U.S.
Supreme Court stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878):
There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates
the solemn contracts, documents and even judgments
The Court continued at page 66:
Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a
contract... (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499)
The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine
Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920):
Courts are constituted by authority and they cannot [act] beyond the
power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and
WA-84

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are
regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and
this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U. S. (1
Pet.) 328, 340 (1828): Old Wayne Mut. Life Assn v. McDonough, 204
U.S. 8, 27 Sup.Ct. 236
172. Defendant JUDGES are not alone in committing fraud on the court by
refusing to disclose the Court payments, refusing to disqualify themselves in
cases in which Los Angeles County or Superior Court was a party or had an
interest, and in violating Canons 4D(1), 3E(2), 3E(1) and CCP Section
170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii). It appears to be a tacit agreement amongst all of the Los
Angeles Superior Court Judges, who have received Court payments, and Los
Angeles County and Los Angeles Countys attorneys, to conceal such payments
from opposing parties and participate in committing fraud on the court in any
case in which Los Angeles Superior Court or Los Angeles County is a party or
has an interest.
173. Furthermore, the legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of
the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP). Appendix 6 (A-173) contains the
extensive CJP analysis and arguments that only became available through a
request under the Freedom of Information Act. The CJP has not publicized its
analyses showing the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers from the
CJP and their requests for an opinion from the California Attorney General on the
constitutionality of SBX2_11. Appendix 7 (A-198) contains the California Judges
Association (CJA) response to the CJP.
174. The CJP analyses have also determined SBX2_11 to be unconstitutional.
They start by acknowledging that Sturgeon II did not address sections 2 or 5 of
SBX2_11. Their analysis is that the SBX2_11 Section 5 retroactive immunity is
unconstitutional because, among other flaws, it takes away the constitutional
authority of the CJP to oversee discipline of the judges. The CJP is concerned
WA-85

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

SBX2_11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because it allows one group of state
employees to give compensation raises to themselves (judges), bypassing the
legislatures Article VI section 19 responsibility to set judicial compensation. The
CJP has also requested the California Attorney General (AG) to confirm their
analysis that Section 2 unconstitutionally allows Superior Court employees to
usurp the legislatures authority and raise the compensation of Judges. The
continued payments by the Judicial Council under Section 2 now makes these
payments by the courts a continued obligation. This conflicts with Section 4.
175. The California Attorney General (AG) ruled in 1976 that county judicial benefits
were unconstitutional. In 1995, the California Law Revision Commission
13
,
reviewing a precursor to the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, noted the
AG position and acknowledged judicial benefits were probably illegal but then
suggested it was unlikely that anyone would object. In May 2011, the CJP
requested an updated 2011 opinion from the AG on the constitutionality of
SBX2_11 and the payment of judicial benefits.
176. Senate bill SBX2_11, Section 5, did not succeed in giving complete retroactive
immunity to judges or temporary judges who had received the county or court
payments because it failed to address circumstances where the court or county
was an interested party. In cases where a judge accepted benefits and the court
had any direct or indirect interest, the judge must recuse him- or herselves. Thus,
where a judge accepted the payments, and did not disclose such, and failed to
recuse himself and presided over cases in which the county had an interest,
then the judge has no immunity. SBX2_11 did not give immunity for being
disqualified as a judge in the past, present or future.
177. The banks knew at the time they were violating anti-trust laws, did it anyway;
and when courts began ruling that their behavior was illegal, they ran to Congress

13
Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority; California Law Revision
Commission Staff Memorandum; Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995
WA-86

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

for a law granting them amnesty, claiming that the consequences would be
ruinous if they were held accountable under the law. Likewise, the Fourth
Appellate Court, in Sturgeon I, held the judicial payments were unconstitutional;
the Administrative Office of the Courts knew the consequences were huge if they
were held accountable under the law and they scared the legislature into passing,
under the cover of darkness, the hasty and flawed SBX2_11 with retroactive
immunity.
178. If SBX2_11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by the court,
why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels quite limited
in ensuring the Constitution is met, is not willing to force the legislature to fully
address this issue, is not willing to overrule the SBX2_11 immunity for all judges
and lastly is unwilling to face continued harsh criticism from their fellow judges.
179. The Sturgeon cases and SBX2_11 only address the judicial benefit payments.
This civil action is undertaken, in part, as one of the citizen challenges
encouraged by Sturgeon II but, more importantly, to address the issue of bias, the
non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on the court that Sturgeon
does not address.
BAUMAN FACTORS REQUIRE A RECUSAL
180. On appeal of the refusal to recuse by OTERO, all five of the factors under
Bauman v. United States Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977) strongly
justified a recusal. The failure of OTERO and WRIGHT to recuse themselves
violated Plaintiffs civil rights. Their orders were clearly erroneous as a matter of
law. Both judges took the county payments. Past Attorney General rulings and the
current CJP analysis show the payments are unconstitutional. The legislature has
deemed the payments criminal and in need of retroactive immunity for 1,400
current judges. The Courts own ex-spokesperson calls the payments illegal.
California Senate Bill SBX2_11 acknowledged both the criminality of the payment
WA-87

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

of judicial benefits by the counties to the judges and also the loss of immunity
protections under current state and federal laws. OTERO and WRIGHT are like
the Pennsylvania judge; DEFIANT after a jury verdict, and INSISTING the
payments were legal after his trial on racketeering, bribery and extortion.
181. Judge Oteros failure to recuse himself from a case involving the interests of
the City or County of Los Angeles after taking $415,000 from the county is clearly
erroneous under the law. Similarly, review of Defendant JUDGES filings with the
California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and with the Internal
Revenue Service will likely show these monies were in whole or part not reported.
(Medical benefits paid on behalf of employees are not reported as employee
income, and show the sophistication of this RICO scheme.) The two critical
Bauman factors are highlighted below.
!" $%&'()*)+&)! )(($(
182. This failure to recuse in all cases involving Los Angeles is an error repeated
frequently by U.S. District Court Judges who previously served in Californias
courts. One media source
14
reported an estimate by a Ph.D. mathematician of a
combined 10 million felonies committed by California Judges. Any estimate for the
district court judges serving California would undoubtedly find a large number.
While the receipt of the unconstitutional payments is grounds for recusal, the
California law SBX2_11 did not give retroactive immunity to judges who had
received the county payments and did not disclose such and presided over cases
in which the county had an interest. It did not give immunity for being disqualified
as a judge in the past, present or future. Civil cases seeking monetary damages
against 10 judges by three different individuals are currently in separate
litigation
15
.

14
Full Disclosure Network, quoting Dr. Daniel Gottlieb, Ph.D., mathematics
15
Consolidated Case #B241184 to #E058417, and Separate Case #B240813 to #E058420, Calif. 2
nd

Appellate Court, recusal to the Calif. 4
th
Appellate Court in Riverside, CA.
WA-88

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

E. NEW LEGAL ISSUES
183. A Writ of Mandate is appropriate if the order raises new and important
problems or legal issues of first impression. Voiding most of the state court
judgments in the last 25 years in California is HUGE. Establishing TRIBUNALS to
sort through the cases where the counties had an interest is HUGE. Bringing
justice to all those cases is HUGE. This is a HUGE California judicial scandal that
only the Federal Courts have the power to stop and correct. In 2010, the Fourth
Appellate Court of California recognized the enormity of the situation and deferred
to and even challenged all citizens and judges to take action. This is such an
important issue and HUGE problem that Appellate Justices in California will not
upset the proverbial apple cart. In addition to the large number of void orders,
there is significant risk of judicial mis-conduct charges with FPPC and IRS filings
by judges and the possibility of failure by the County to properly withhold taxes
due on the payments. This requires real courage of the Judiciary to protect the
right of due process and, more importantly, protecting the integrity of the judiciary.
JUDICIAL ETHICS
184. California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from
engaging in any financial and business dealings that involve the judge in frequent
transactions or continuing business relations with lawyers or other persons likely
to appear before the judge or before the court in which the judge serves.
185. Defendants OTERO, WRIGHT and LEVINE, while with the Superior Court,
violated Canon 4D(1) by taking payments from L.A. County, violated Canon 3E(2)
by not disclosing such payments on the record, and violated Canon 3E(1) and
CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying themselves.
186. The evidence of the payment of judicial benefits by the county to OTERO,
WRIGHT and LEVINE is presented in Appendices A, B and C. There is no time
frame for bias, especially the appearance of bias. California Code of Judicial
WA-89

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Ethics Canon 4D(1) prohibits a judge from engaging in any financial and business
dealings that involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business
relations with lawyers or other persons likely to appear before the judge or before
the court in which the judge serves. This would include lawyers for Los Angeles
County and other entities related to the Court or County such as DCSS and the
Los Angels traffic enforcement officials. Of course, it also includes the likelihood
of all the Superior Court judges involved in appeals.
187. Canon 3E(2) requires the judge to disclose on the record information that is
reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil
Procedure (CCP) Section 170.1, even if the judge believes there is no actual
basis for disqualification.
188. Canon 3E(1) requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding
in which disqualification is required by law.
189. CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) states A judge shall be disqualified if any one
or more of the following is true: .... A person aware of the facts might reasonably
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.
190. Defendants OTERO, WRIGHT and LEVINEs actions of taking the bribes in
the past, and now the current fraud on the court and failure to recuse
themselves have denied ETTLIN due process by denying him the right to an
impartial tribunal. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
OPINIONS NEEDED ON CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
191. United States Supreme Court Local Rule 29.4(c) requires that any appeal
of the constitutionality of a State or Local law requires the state courts to be
informed of the legal challenge and to state whether the court has certified
to the Attorney General the constitutionality of that law. The California
Supreme Court has refused to positively affirm the constitutionality of SBX2_11.
The current and past California Attorneys General refused to provide opinions to
WA-90

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

the California CJP whose own analyses showed SBX2_11 to be unconstitutional.
Since California has not voluntarily affirmed the constitutionality of SBX2_11,
Plaintiff requests this court to request such a certification from the Supreme Court
of California.
192. Defendants OTERO, WRIGHT and LEVINEs immunity depends on the
constitutionality of the legislative fix, SBX2_11. Plaintiff, the Appellate Court and
the CJP assert SBX2_11 fails to remedy the situation, violates the federal Equal
Pay Act, and violates additional provisions of the California Constitution because
it grants retroactive immunity and usurps the authority of the independent CJP,
chartered under the California Constitution. The California Attorney General has
never certified the constitutionality of SBX2_11 pursuant to Rule 14.1 (e)(v) and
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2403(b) (A-4).
193. Furthermore, the California 4
th
Appellate Court has stated "While an Attorney
General opinion is entitled to our respect and careful consideration, it does not
bind this court." (Watershed Enforcers v. Department of Water Resources (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 969, 984, fn. 11.) Therefore, any opinion eventually made by the
AG is non-binding.
194. Plaintiff asks this Court to issue a Certified Question requesting a certification
from the California Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of SBX2_11 in each
of its severable parts. Plaintiff further requests a decision from this court, on
whether judicial benefits from a county or court, received in the past, but not
currently, will continue to influence or bias the judicial officer and thus still
constitute a disqualifying event.
195. If this case remains before Judges who have taken the county payments, it will
immediately and again deny Plaintiff his 1st, 4th and 14th Amendment rights,
resulting in a travesty of justice and a waste of judicial resources.
WA-91

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

SUMMARY
196. The Fourth Appellate Courts decisions in the so-called Sturgeon I and II cases
clearly stated that the judicial payments were unconstitutional. The legislature
confirmed the payments were illegal by giving the judges limited immunity due to
the bribes. Plaintiff has established the nature of the bias bought by the Court.
The orders and judgments of Defendant JUDGES are void. OTERO, WRIGHT,
and LEVINE refused to recuse themselves, committed fraud on the court and
denied Plaintiff his constitutional rights of due process. Judges KING and GEE
attempted to validate those void orders and therefore their orders are also void.
197. Plaintiff seeks damages for the injuries done to Plaintiff by Defendants.
Plaintiff is a victim of fraud on the court, violations of the Canons of the Code of
Judicial Ethics, violation of the California Code of Civil Procedure and violations of
his rights under the California and United States Constitutions. Plaintiff needs due
process and his Constitutional rights restored.
198. Plaintiff is seeking a jury trial on the issues because judges judging judges
does not provide due process when most judges, likely to be assigned the case,
are bribed and judging the actions of fellow judges.
199. This civil complaint seeks damages against Defendants for their denial of
Plaintiffs civil rights. The current court partnership, built over 25 years of court
and county bribes and federal incentives, is corrosive to the State of Californias
due process and equal protection guarantees and even to its fundamental
constitutional guarantee that,
SECTION 1. All people are by nature free and independent and
have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,
and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.

WA-92

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
First Amendment to the United States Constitution (42 U.S.C. Section 1983);
California Constitution Article I I, 2, 3;
CA Civil Code 52.1
200. Plaintiff ETTLIN re-alleges and incorporates by reference paragraphs 1
through 197, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the Appendix
and all paragraphs of all causes of action) as if the same were fully set forth
herein.
201. County payments biased Defendants to deny Plaintiff his rights of free speech
and free association guaranteed by the 1
st
Amendment of the United States
Constitution and his similar rights under Article I, I, 2, 3 of the Constitution of
the State of California
202. Defendants payments, Defendants receipt of payments as well as Defendants
(acquiescence and failure to act) conspiring to protect those payments had a
chilling affect on Plaintiffs exercise of his first amendment freedoms in November
2011. No state judicial recourse exists to protect those rights and thus the chilling
effect continues.
(acquiescence and failure to act) protecting those payments have a chilling affect
on Plaintiffs rights under California Constitution Article I I. Defendants actions
resulted in Family Court denial of his liberty, his ability to protect his property and
his ability to be free and independent. It removed all authority figures from the
children and prevented Plaintiff from pursuing the safety and happiness of his
children. Defendants denied Plaintiff his rights in order to retain their county
payments, increase their personal incomes and to increase revenues from the
federal government for their own personal professional/political gain.
204. Plaintiffs claim for relief seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages from
each Defendant for the willful and egregious violations of his constitutional rights.
WA-93

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)
Violation of California Constitution Article I 7

herein.
206. Plaintiffs person was seized and arrested according to Terry v. Ohio 392
U.S. 1 (1968), P. 392 U.S. 16. County payments biased Defendants to deny
Plaintiff his right to be free from search or seizure guaranteed by the 4
th

Amendment of the United States Constitution and his similar rights under Article I,
7 of the Constitution of the State of California
207. Defendants payments, Defendants receipt of payments, as well as Defendants
on Plaintiffs exercise of his first amendment freedoms. No judicial recourse exists
to protect those rights.
(acquiescence and failure to act) conspiring to protect those payments had a
chilling affect on Plaintiffs exercise of his first amendment freedoms in November
2011. No state judicial recourse exists to protect those rights and thus the chilling
effect continues.
209. Defendants payments, Defendants receipt of payments, as well as Defendants
on Plaintiffs rights under California Constitution Article I 7. Defendants actions
resulted in Family Court denial of his liberty, his ability to protect his property and
his ability to be free and independent. The horrible gender biases of the family
WA-94

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

code and the courtroom practices bought by collaboration with the County
agencies, denied him equal protection and presumption of innocence. It removed
all authority figures from the children and prevented Plaintiff from pursuing the
safety and happiness of his children. Defendants denied Plaintiff his rights in
order to retain their county payments, increase their personal incomes and to
increase revenues from the federal government for their own personal
professional/political gain.
210. No state judicial recourse exists to protect those rights.
211. Plaintiffs claim for relief seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages from each
Defendant for the willful and egregious violations of his constitutional rights.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (42 U.S.C. Section 1983)
Violation of California Constitution Article I 13

herein.
213. County payments biased Defendants to deny Plaintiff his rights in an effort to
protect the interests of Los Angeles County. The unconstitutional payments, the
void judicial orders, and the deliberate judicial indifference each demonstrated
Defendants disdain for the rule of law and violated Plaintiffs right to due process.
214. Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant SUPERVISORS for the denial of due
process in Family Court, in Traffic Court, and in Civil Court (both Unlimited cases
and the Limited case).
215. Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant JUDGES for denial of due process
WA-95

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

during proceedings in their respective courtrooms.
216. Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant HARRIS for denial of due process by
refusing to rule on the CJP questions regarding the constitutionality of SBX2_11,
by giving the appearance of granting retroactive immunity to Defendant JUDGES
and Defendant SUPERVISORS.
217. Plaintiffs claim for relief seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages from
each Defendant for the willful and egregious violations of his constitutional rights

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Return of judicial payments from Los Angeles County

herein.
219. The publicly disclosed county budget amount for Trial Court Salaries and
Employee Benefits for 2011-2012 is $ 31,826,000. That is for county payments by
Defendant SUPERVISORS to all Superior Court Judges, including Defendant
LEVINE. The payments are bribes, paid to influence the courts and reduce court
and county liabilities.
220. Plaintiff seeks individual damages equal to one years judicial payments taken
or paid: LEVINE $58,000; OTERO $58,000; WRIGHT $58,000; SUPERVISORS
(one years worth) ~ $5,000,000 each; HARRIS (one years worth for L.A. County
using 2011-12) ~ $32,000,000.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
RICO
WA-96

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Return Salary Increases resulting from judicial payments

herein.
222. Defendant SUPERVISORS conspired to link their salaries to judges salaries,
then artificially increased the judges salaries and in turn then oversaw the
increase in their own salaries. After Sturgeon II the SUPERVISORS appear to
have delegated the amount of judicial payment increases to the County Chief
Executive in order to distance themselves from the decision. Plaintiffs claim for
relief seeks $2,000,000 in compensatory damages from each Defendant
SUPERVISOR for the willful and egregious conspiracy to profit from violations of
Plaintiffs multiple constitutional rights.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Misprision of felony)
herein.
224. Defendants failed to report and attempted to conceal the unlawful Los Angeles
County payments and then made or accepted rulings that were void. Accepting a
void order gives the appearance of validating the void order. This is a crime under
federal law which judges are sworn to uphold.
225. Failure by all Defendants to report and attempt to conceal the unlawfulness of
Los Angeles County bribes is a further breach of judicial ethics.
WA-97

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

226. Plaintiffs claim for relief seeks $500,000 in compensatory damages from each
Defendant for the willful and egregious violations of his due process constitutional
rights and the failure to take action when confronted with felonious actions and
breaches of judicial ethics. Plaintiff claims an additional $5,000,000 in
compensatory damages from Defendant HARRIS because of her knowledge of
the detailed CJP analyses and her refusal to act.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(ELDER ABUSE)

through 197, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the
Appendices and all paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the
same were fully set forth herein.
228. Plaintiff broke no laws. Plainitff is 66 years of age. Plaintiff seeks damages to
compensate for the elder abuse by Defendants in their systematic intimidation
and denial of his civil rights. Plaintiffs claim for relief seeks $500,000 in
compensatory damages from each Defendant for the willful elder abuse.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(LEGAL FEES)

through 197, inclusive, of this Complaint (including all paragraphs of the
Appendices and all paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the
same were fully set forth herein.
230. Plaintiff broke no laws. Plaintiff seeks costs and fees according to proof, but no
WA-98

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

less than $2,000,000 to fully prosecute this case.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
and all paragraphs of all preceding causes of action, if any) as if the same were
fully set forth herein.
232. The Sturgeon, supra, case is an example of judges judging judges. Under the
best of circumstances this process upholds the rule of law. Introduction of bribes
corrupts the process. Payment of judicial benefits to 90% of California judges
over a 20-year period not only corrupts the individuals but also the entire system.
233. Plaintiffs first choice was to have this matter fully addressed, decided and
remedied by the Appellate Courts. The Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division, in
its December 28, 2010 ruling on Sturgeon II refused to order additional actions
to eliminate the unconstitutional county payments. The court did not in any way
rescind or modify its prior determination that the bribes were illegal. Therefore, the
Fourth Appellate Court, Fourth Division noted that, following its Sturgeon II ruling,
it anticipated additional challenges and remedies by taxpayers. The court, on its
own, would not uphold Plaintiffs constitutional rights.
234. The Fourth Appellate Court, Division One has now also failed to uphold
Plaintiffs constitutional rights.
235. Individual judges and the court system will not stop this corruption and denial
of civil rights. Plaintiff, therefore, seeks a jury trial to achieve declaratory relief,
compensatory relief and also punitive relief.
236. Plaintiff seeks remediation of his impaired civil rights. The countys welfare
biases introduced by the bribes can be partially ameliorated with an un-bribed
judge. However, finding an un-bribed judge who is also un-biased by over 25
years of county-participation in Title IV-D funding incentives will be difficult.
WA-99

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Plaintiff is seeking his constitutional rights, not easy solutions.
DEMAND FOR UNBRIBED JUDGE
237. Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, from any County Superior Court, has no experience with Family Law, Title
IV-D, Domestic Violence programs and has no personal or professional ties to
lawyers or judges in Los Angeles County.

WA-100

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows with regard to each of the above causes of
action:
AS TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $20,000,000 for injury and compensatory damages for the
willful and egregious violations of his constitutional rights;
2. For attorneys fees and costs of suit herein according to proof;
3. For interest as allowed by law
4. For such other and further relief as the court deems just.

AS TO THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks damages for injury equal to about one years worth of the
bribes taken and estimates that to total of $5,000,000.
AS TO THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. Plaintiff seeks $20,000,000 for injury and compensatory damages.

AS TO THE FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
WA-101

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

AS TO THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

AS TO THE SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

AS TO THE SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION:

AS TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION ABOVE:
1. For general and compensatory damages for violation of plaintiffs federal and
state constitutional and statutory rights, and for pain and suffering.
2. For punitive and exemplary damages in amounts to be determined according
to proof as to the individual defendants.
3. For an award of statutory damages and penalties pursuant to Cal. Civil Code
section 52(b) to be determined according to proof.
4. Plaintiff seeks no damages against Chris Ryan Legal, Sr.
5. For any awards to be placed in a charitable trust benefitting Plaintiffs children
and such non-profit organizations as he may designate. CA Family Law 3651
WA-102

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

bias still applies to the success of this complaint.
6. For attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 and California Civil Code
section 52(b) and section 52.1(h) and California Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5.
7. For costs of suit herein according to proof;
9. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.
10. In accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure Section 631, Plaintiff
hereby demands a jury trial for all issues triable by jury.
11. Plaintiff seeks a judge who has not received judicial benefits from any
county, and has no personal or professional ties to lawyers or judges in Los
Angeles County.

Dated: _______________, 2013
______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507
WA-103
August 22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

DECLARATION OF DENNIS ETTLIN

I, DENNIS ETTLIN, DECLARE as follows:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.
2. I have read the foregoing Complaint with included authorities and Appendix of
cited material, and I know the contents thereof.
3. I was arrested (liberty denied) by Officer Tan and the LAPD on Nov. 30, 2011.
I was not cited or incarcerated on that night.
4. I was age 64 in 2011 and ceased my protesting due to fear of the rough
physical abuse that I would suffer if incarcerated by the LAPD or LASD.
5. I personally asked Judge Levine if she received judicial benefits.
6. I personally requested the recusal of Judges Otero, King, Wright, and Gee.
7. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters, which are
therein stated on information and belief, and, as to those matters, I believe it
to be true.
8. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my information and belief.

Dated: August 19, 2013
By: _________________________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
In Pro Per

WA-104

PROOF OF SERVICE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF ORANGE
___________________

PLAINTIFF: Dennis Ettlin,
DEFENDANT: Kamala Harris, et al.,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing document and all
exhibits were transmitted to all counsel of record, as shown on the service
list below, this date by the electronic service provider system. There are no
known litigants or parties without email service.

Dated: August 19, 2013
_________________________
DENNIS ETTLIN
27222 Paseo Lomita
Email: dennis@ettlin.net

WA-105

SERVICE LIST
OC Superior Court #: ___________________

Defendants:

Kamala Harris Counsel:
Email: Kamala.D.Harris@doj.ca.gov
Personal Service: 300 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90013

James Otero Counsel:
Email: Victor_Cruz@cacd.uscourts.gov
Personal Service: 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012-4701

Otis D. Wright, II Counsel:

George H. King Counsel:

Dolly M. Gee Counsel:
Email: DMG_Chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov

Jan Levine Counsel:
Personal Service: Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 N. Hill St. Los Angeles, CA 90012

Gloria Molina Counsel:
Email: molina@bos.lacounty.gov
Personal Service: 500 W. Temple Street, Rm 383, Los Angeles, CA 90012

Zev Yaroslavsky Counsel:
Email: zev@bos.lacounty.gov

Don Knabe Counsel:
Email: don@bos.lacounty.gov

Michael Antonovich Counsel:
Email: FifthDistrict@lacbos.org

Chris Ryan Legal, Sr. Counsel: Pro Se
Email: chrislegal55@yahoo.com
Personal Service: corner of 3
rd
and Broadway, Los Angeles, CA 90012

WA-106

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A County payments to James Otero, Denial of Recusal .......................... A-2
APPENDIX B Judge Wright Superior Court service, Payments, Void Orders ............ A-8
APPENDIX C County payments and tax documents to Jan Levine ......................... A-24
APPENDIX D Judge Gee Void Order, encouragement independent complaint ....... A-28
APPENDIX E Payments to Kenneth Taylor, Refusal to Recuse, Void Order ........... A-34
APPENDIX F County interests in Bail Add-On Assessments, Traffic Court Biases . A-40
APPENDIX G County Budget Critical Budget Revenue Impacts, Vehicle Fines ...... A-48
APPENDIX H City Control of Traffic Revenue Machine .......................................... A-65
APPENDIX I County Child Support Budget, Court collaborative partner .................. A-67
APPENDIX J Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties ............................................ A-73
APPENDIX K Court Counsel battles Judge Pellman over Title IV-E funds .............. A-80
APPENDIX L ABA 10 Myths, Custody and Domestic Violence ................................ A-85
APPENDIX M County Litigation Cost Manager Report, Public Summary ................ A-88
APPENDIX N Superior Court payments to Brett Bianco, False San Diego Info ........ A-94
APPENDIX O Court Counsel Conflict of Interest and Harassment of Plaintiff ........ A-101
APPENDIX P Order For Payment of Fee, Judge Lewis Loss of Immunity ............. A-115

APPENDIX 1 Sturgeon I (2008) decision from California 4th Appellate ................. A-118
APPENDIX 2 Text of SBX2_11 ............................................................................... A-135
APPENDIX 3 Sturgeon II (2010) decision from California 4th Appellate ................ A-143
APPENDIX 4 County Trial Court Operations Budget Summary ............................. A-159
APPENDIX 5 Judicial Council Report on Benefits .................................................. A-164
APPENDIX 6 CJP Analyses Show Unconstitutionality of SBX2 11 ........................ A-173
APPENDIX 7 California Judges Association Rebuttal to CJP ................................ A-197
APPENDIX 8 Limited History of Judicial Compensation ......................................... A-202
APPENDIX 9 1988 Zolin Memorandum to L.A. Superior Court .............................. A-211
APPENDIX 10 1995 Calif. Law Comm. Memo on Court Unification ....................... A-219
APPENDIX 11 Appointment of Patricia Benke ....................................................... A-230
APPENDIX 12 Analysis Recommending Humboldt County ................................... A-235
APPENDIX 13 Superior Court ex-Spokesman Describes Mysterious Contract ..... A-240
WA-107
!
APPENDIX
A
APPENDIX
A-2
WA-108
Mr. Ettlin:

In response to your inquiries please see my responses below in blue.

From: Dennis M Ettlin [mailto:dennis@ettlin.net]
Sent: Friday, June 07, 2013 10:47 AM
To: Revuelta, Jennifer
Subject: Re: Tax withholding payments documentation for Judge James Otero

Dear Ms. Revuelta,
Mr. Iverson said that their was no evidence that any W-2 or 1099 was generated or sent to Judge Otero for
the period 1990-2003. Normally, I understand your statement about payments being reported on a W-2.
However, Judge Otero was an employee of the State not the County, but he received money from the
county. My main question is whether any tax document was provided to Judge Otero covering the judicial
payments from the county and secondly, whether any withholding was made by the County for Fed and
CA taxes.
I understand the confidentiality issue regarding a W-2, so I am really asking
1) if James Otero received any kind of tax document from the county Yes
2) what the form number of that document might be, and W-2
3) if the county paid any withheld taxes on behalf of James Otero for any of the years 1990-2003.
Personal withholding(s) is personal, confidential information.

For now, I am not asking for amounts or copies of the appropriate documents from the County. I am not
seeking information on the judges compensation from the State (I doubt you would have that).
I hope this clarifies my request.
Thank you,
Dennis Ettlin

On Jun 7, 2013, at 9:39 AM, "Revuelta, Jennifer" <jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov> wrote:
Mr. Ettlin:

In response to your inquiry, cafeteria plan benefits paid as taxable cash and Professional Development
Allowance payments are reported as taxable wages on an employees W-2. We are unable to provide
a W-2 or 1099 information because this is confidential information.

On behalf of Mr. Iverson, I apologize for the miscommunication. Mr. James Otero is a retired judge for
the Superior Court.

Sincerely,
Jennifer

"Revuelta, Jennifer" <jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov>
To: Ettlin Dennis
RE: Tax withholding payments documentation for Judge James Otero

June 17, 2013 11:02 AM
A-3
WA-109

From: Dennis Ettlin [mailto:dennis@ettlin.net]
Sent: Friday, June 07, 2013 9:05 AM
To: Iverson, Gregg M.
Subject: Re: Tax withholding payments documentation for Judge James Otero

Dear Mr. Iverson,
Thank you for your response. When you say you could not find any employee by the name of james otero,
I will assume that means within the particular databases you were searching for tax records. I would also
like to complete this request by confirming that there was no tax withholding by the County on the judicial
payments, shown further down in this email, for James Otero.
Thanks again,
Dennis Ettlin

On Jun 5, 2013, at 10:35 AM, "Iverson, Gregg M." <GIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov> wrote:

Mr. LLLlln,

l dld noL locaLe W-2 documenLs for !ames CLero. l also Lrled Lo search on Lhe name !ames CLero, and l could
noL flnd a currenL or pasL employee by LhaL name. Also, a 1099 would noL be used Lo reporL employee beneflLs
(or pay). AnyLhlng reporLable regardlng pay or beneflLs would be reporLed on a W-2. l hope Lhls helps.

Sent: Wednesday, June 05, 2013 7:05 AM
Subject: Tax documentation for Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge James Otero

Dear Mr. Iverson,
I would like to know if any year-end type tax documents are prepared and address the benefits to James
Otero. Such a document might be a W-2 or a 1099. Preferably it would be for amounts equal to or less than
the total county benefits. I am NOT looking for Otero's total compensation, only the supplemental part
from the county. Please let me know the cost for his records search so I can send the required payment to
you and start the data collection.
Thank you,
Dennis Ettlin

On Oct 22, 2012, at 11:51 AM, "Revuelta, Jennifer" <jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov> wrote:
The benefits are for James Otero. I apologize for the confusion.

Sent: Monday, October 22, 2012 11:38 AM
Subject: Re: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge James Otero

Dear Ms. Revuelta
A-4
WA-110
Thank you for the quick turnaround. Please clarify if the benefits are for Luis Lavin or James Otero
Sincerely

On Oct 22, 2012, at 11:30 AM, "Revuelta, Jennifer" <jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov> wrote:
Mr. Ettlin:

Per your request, the following are the local judicial benefits paid to Superior Court Luis A. Lavin. If
you have questions, please contact me by e-mail at jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov

Year
Cafeteria
Plan
Benefits
401(k)/457
County
Contribution
Professional
Development
Allowance
James Otero
1990

6,690.59 3,265.57 4,012.00
1991

15,192.52 3,474.76 1,960.00
1992

18,866.40 4,726.56 4,704.00
1993

18,866.40 4,332.68 5,162.50
1994

19,731.22 2,067.85 5,004.00
1995

20,354.56 7,442.24 5,161.50
1996

20,404.08 7,667.64 5,184.00
1997

20,404.08 7,420.97 5,331.00
1998

20,659.16 5,175.66 5,352.00
1999

21,594.24 5,409.92 5,499.00
2000

22,627.29 8,651.91 5,520.00
2001

25,114.87 11,315.72 5,814.00
2002

26,290.67 12,121.39 5,856.00
2003

6,625.11 3,054.51 990.00

Jennifer Revuelta
Auditor-Controller
Countywide Payroll Division

From: Iverson, Gregg M.
A-5
WA-111
Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2012 11:15 AM
To: Dennis M Ettlin
Cc: Qi, Heather; Revuelta, Jennifer
Subject: RE: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge James Otero

!"# %&'( )' *++,-.

Sent: Wednesday, October 10, 2012 10:35 AM
Subject: Re: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge James Otero

Gregg Iverson
County-Wide Payroll Division Chief
Los Angeles County Auditor Controller
500 W. Temple Street, Suite 505
Dear Mr. Iverson,
I am preparing a document for the court that is waiting for the amount of payments to Judge James Otero. I
would like to know the cost for his records search so I can send the required payment to you and start the
data collection.
Thank you

Dennis Ettlin

On Oct 8, 2012, at 4:12 PM, Dennis M Ettlin <dennis@ettlin.net> wrote:

Dear Mr. Iverson,
I was told to send you a separate email for this request. I am seeking information on supplemental judicial
payments made by Los Angeles County to a past Superior Court Judge.
I would like to know the amount and type of any payments to Judge James Otero, from 1988 to the
present. I believe he received those payments from 1988-2003.
Please let me know what the charges are and I will send a check for that amount.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin

A-6
WA-112
Priority
Send
Enter
Closed
JS-5/JS-6
Scan Only
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CASE NO.: CV 12-00297 GHK (JCx) DATE: July 31, 2012
TITLE: Occupy Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, et al.
========================================================================
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul Cruz
Courtroom Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter
COUNSEL PRESENT FOR MOVANT:
Not Present
COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Not Present
========================================================================
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER DENYING MOVANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
JUDGE GEORGE H. KING AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE JACQUELINE CHOOLJIAN [Docket
No. 91]; ORDER DENYING MOVANT'S REQUEST FOR RECUSAL [Docket Nos. 95, 96]
This action is before the Court on Movant Dennis Ettlin's ("Movant")
1
Motion to Disqualify Judge
George H. King and Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Chooljian ("Motion"), filed July 12, 2012.
Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify was referred to this Court pursuant to General Order 08-05 and
Local Rule 72-5.
After the Motion was referred to this Court, Movant filed a Request for Recusal (Req. for Recusal,
July 23, 2012, ECF No. 95) and an Amended Request for Recusal (Am. Req. for Recusal, July
26, 2012, ECF No. 96). The Court has fully considered the arguments put forward in the Request
for Recusal and the Amended Request for Recusal. The Court finds that the grounds upon which
Movant seeks recusal are frivolous. The Court will not self-recuse.
The Court has fully reviewed and considered the arguments put forward in the Motion to Disqualify
Judge King and Magistrate Judge Chooljian. The Court finds these arguments to be frivolous, as
well.
For the foregoing reasons, Movant's Request for Recusal and Amended Request for Recusal and
DENIED. For the foregoing reasons, Movant's Motion to Disqualify Judge King and Magistrate
Judge Chooljian is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
1
Movant filed a Motion to Intervene in this action on March 16, 2012. (Mot. to Intervene,
ECF No. 42.) This Motion to Intervene has not yet been ruled upon.
MINUTES FORM 11 :
CIVIL GEN Initials of Preparer Page 1 of 1
Case 2:12-cv-00297-GHK-JC Document 97 Filed 07/31/12 Page 1 of 1 Page ID #:1376
A-7
WA-113

Case No. 12-9994
_________________________________________

In The
Supreme Court of the United States
____________________
!
____________________

DENNIS ETTLIN,
Petitioner,
v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA,
LOS ANGELES,
Respondent

____________________
!
____________________
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
____________________
!
____________________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
____________________
!
____________________

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507
dennis@ettlin.net

WA-114
A-7b
!
APPENDIX
B
APPENDIX
A-8
WA-115
6/4/13 9:41 PM Otis D. Wright II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Page 1 of 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otis_D._Wright_II
Otis D. Wright II
Judge of the United States District Court for the
Central District of California
Incumbent
Assumed office
April 16, 2007
Appointed by George W. Bush
Preceded by Gary L. Taylor
Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court
In office
20052007
Appointed by Arnold Schwarzenegger
Preceded by Lorna Parnell
Personal details
Born 1944
Tuskegee, Alabama
Alma mater California State University at Los
Angeles (B.A.)
Southwestern Law School (J.D.)
Otis D. Wright II
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Otis D. Wright II (born 1944) is a United States District
Judge on the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.
Contents
1 Early life and education
2 Judicial service
3 Notable cases
3.1 Ingenuity 13, LLC v. John Doe
4 References
5 External links
Early life and education
Born in Tuskegee, Alabama,
[1]
Wright received a B.A. from
California State University at Los Angeles in 1976 and a J.D.
from Southwestern Law School in 1980. He was in the
United States Marine Corps from 1963 to 1966, remaining in
the United States Marine Corps Reserve until 1969. He was a
deputy sheriff in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department from 1969 to 1980. He was a deputy attorney
general in the Office of the Attorney General, California
Department of Justice from 1980 to 1983. He was in private
practice in Los Angeles, California from 1983 to 2005.
Judicial service
On October 28, 2005, California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger announced that he would be appointing
Wright to serve as a judge on the Los Angeles County
Superior Court.
[2]
Wright replaced Judge Lorna Parnell.
[2]
Wright was nominated to the United States District Court for the Central District of California by President
George W. Bush on January 9, 2007, to a seat vacated by Gary L. Taylor.
[3]
He was confirmed by the United
States Senate on March 15, 2007, and received his commission on April 16, 2007.
[3]
A-9
WA-116
WA-117
A-10

O


CHERYL AICHELE, JONATHAN
ALEXANDER, CARINA CLEMENTE,
MICHAEL PRSYNER, and JAMES
WEITZ, individually and as class
representatives,

Plaintiffs,
v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES, MAYOR ANTONIO
VILLARAIGOSA, CHIEF CHARLIE
BECK, and DOES 110,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:12-cv-10863-DMG(FFMx)

ORDER DENYING MOVANT
DENNIS ETTLINS REQUEST FOR
RECUSAL OF JUDGE DOLLY M.
GEE [36]

Would-be Intervenor Dennis Ettlin requests that Judge Gee recuse herself from
this case under 28 U.S.C. 455. (ECF No. 36) Ettlins request was referred to this
Court for independent review. (ECF No. 37.) Having considered Ettlins arguments,
the Court deems the matter suitable for decision without oral argument and DENIES
his request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15.
The standard for disqualification of a judge is established by 28 U.S.C. 144
and 455. In giving Ettlin the benefit of the doubt as a pro se movant, the Court
construes Ettlins request under both statutes. Section 144 permits a party seeking
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 42 Filed 06/05/l3 Page l of 4 Page lD #:850
A-11
WA-118

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
disqualification to file an affidavit setting forth facts and reasons for his belief that the
judge has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse
party. 28 U.S.C. 144. When determining the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, the
factual allegations in the affidavit must be accepted as true, although general or
conclusory allegations will not support disqualification. United States v. Zagari, 419
F. Supp. 494, 50001 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Further, the alleged bias must be from an
extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case. United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966).
Under 28 U.S.C. 455, a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. 455(a). But the
substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 144 and 28 U.S.C. 455 is the
sameWhether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude
that the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. United States v.
Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 145354 (9th Cir. 1997).
Ettlins request begins with specific citations to 455(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4).
Ettlin freely acknowledges that [r]ecusal under Section 455(b)(1) is required only if
actual bias or prejudice is proved by compelling evidence. (Req. for Recusal 3);
see also Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
Nevertheless, Ettlins request for disqualification (at least insofar as it relies on
455(b)(1)) is rife with speculation and groundless conjecture. For example, Ettlin
surmises that because Judge Gees office is located directly across the street from
the site of the Occupy Los Angeles encampment at City Hall, Judge Gee undoubtedly
formed opinions and first hand impressions of Plaintiffs during the 60 days of the
Occupy presence. (Req. for Recusal 3.) Ettlin also speculates that Judge Gee has
[e]xtra judicial knowledge of Judge Kings decision to deny Occupy LAs request
for a TRO in another Occupy LA case, though he fails to elucidate how this supposed
knowledge translates to personal bias or prejudice toward Ettlin. 28 U.S.C.
Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 42 Filed 06/05/l3 Page 2 of 4 Page lD #:85l
A-12
WA-119

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
455(b)(1). This scattershot speculation comes nowhere close to making the showing
necessary to merit recusal under either 455 or 144.
Ettlin also argues that Judge Gee should recuse herself under 455(b)(2)
because her prior specializ[ation] in employment and union law biases and
provides extrajudicial knowledge to Judge Gee in matters of the supplemental judicial
benefits to Superior Court judges in California. (Req. for Recusal 3.) Whatever this
statements relevance (or meaning, for that matter), it fails to establish that Judge Gee
was a lawyer in this case, practiced with a lawyer concerning th[is] matter, or was
or worked with a material witness concerning this case. 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(2)
(emphasis added). Ettlins request therefore fails under 455(b)(2), as well.
Most of Ettlins arguments regarding recusal under 455(b)(4) are recycled
from the litany of recusal motions hes levied at Judges King, Otero, and Chooljian in
Occupy Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:12-cv-00297-GHK-JC (C.D. Cal.
filed Jan. 11, 2012). See id. ECF Nos. 95, 96, 98, 151. Judge Otero denied each of
these motions as frivolous. See id. ECF Nos. 97, 99, 157. This Court agrees that
Ettlins arguments under 455(b)(4) are frivolous and do not reasonably call into
question Judge Gees impartiality.
Ettlin then takes aim at Plaintiffs and their attorneys: according to Ettlin, Judge
Gee has allowed a deep-seated disrespect for Pro Se litigants by Plaintiffs to permeate
her courtroom. (Req. for Recusal 6 (emphasis added).) But Ettlins gripes to this
end go nowhere beyond insisting that Judge Gee should force Plaintiffs to be nice to
Ettlina would-be Intervenor who isnt even a party to the case yet (and may never
be). And while Plaintiffs incivility towards Ettlin is certainly unfortunate, Judge
Gees inability to control what goes on outside her courtroom has no bearing on her
impartiality.
The remainder of Ettlins motion advances a deluge of other qualms Ettlin has
with Plaintiffs conduct and filings in this case. None of these arguments merit
serious discussion, as they in no way relate to Judge Gees impartiality in this matter.
Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 42 Filed 06/05/l3 Page 3 of 4 Page lD #:852
A-13
WA-120

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
If Ettlin has concerns about the adequacy of service, deprivations of due process, or
conflicts of interest Plaintiffs counsel may have with any intervenor other than those
chosen by Plaintiffs[] counsel, he should raise these concerns in the first instance
before Judge Gee.
In sum, the Court finds that Ettlins request fails to state sufficiently compelling
extrajudicial facts to reasonably call into question Judge Gees impartiality in this case
under either 28 U.S.C. 144 or 455. Ettlins request is therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 5, 2012

___________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
A-14
WA-121
A-15
WA-122
A-16
WA-123
A-17
WA-124
A-18
WA-125
A-19
WA-126
A-20
WA-127
A-21
WA-128


CHERYL AICHELE, JONATHAN
ALEXANDER, CARINA CLEMENTE,
MICHAEL PRSYNER, and JAMES
WEITZ, individually and as class
representatives,

Plaintiffs,
v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES, MAYOR ANTONIO
VILLARAIGOSA, CHIEF CHARLIE
BECK, and DOES 110,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:12-cv-10863-DMG(FFMx)

ORDER DENYING MOVANT
DENNIS ETTLINS REQUEST FOR
RECUSAL OF JUDGE OTIS D.
WRIGHT, II [48]

This matter originally came before this Court when Ettlins Request for Recusal
of Judge Dolly M. Gee was referred to here for decision. (ECF Nos. 36, 37.) After
that request was referred to this Court (but apparently before this Court ruled on the
request), Ettlin filed a second request seeking to disqualify this Court from
adjudicating his request for Judge Gee to recuse herself. (ECF No. 48.)
Judge Wright is not listed as a party to this case, nor has this case been assigned
to this Court. Thus, any motion to disqualify Judge Wright is voluntary and will be
deemed a request for the Court to self-recuse. The Court has fully considered the
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 49 Filed 06/07/l3 Page l of 2 Page lD #:938
A-22
WA-129

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
arguments put forward in the request for recusal now before the Court. The Court
finds Ettlins arguments frivolous and will not self-recuse.
Further, Ettlins request to recuse Judge Wright largely advances the same
accusations he levied at Judge Gee in his request for her recusal. (Compare ECF No.
36 with ECF No. 48.) The Court has already considered and specifically rejected
those arguments. (Order Denying Movant Dennis Ettlins Request for Recusal of
Judge Dolly M. Gee, ECF No. 42.)
Finally, the Court notes that as a non-party to this action, Ettlin has no standing
to continue seeking recusal of the judges assigned to this case.
Ettlins Request for Recusal of Otis D. Wright, II (ECF No. 48) is therefore
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 7, 2012

___________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
A-23
WA-130
!
APPENDIX
C
APPENDIX
A-24
WA-131
Mr. Ettlin,

I thought the information was provided to you, nonetheless the following are
the local judicial benefits paid to Superior Court Judge Jan G. Levine.

Jan G. Levine
Year
Cafeteria Plan
Benefits
401(k)/457
County
Contribution
Professional
Development
Allowance
2003 - - 516.00
2004 27,329.28 12,600.24 6,192.00
2005 28,256.14 13,027.59 6,528.00
2006 29,177.76 13,452.48 6,838.50
2007 32,965.52 15,198.83 7,075.50
2008 33,969.96 15,661.92 7,366.50
2009 33,969.96 15,661.92 7,404.00
2010 35,182.87 17,729.92 7,404.00
2011 35,182.87 15,661.92 7,614.00
2012 27,095.39 10,983.60 2,229.50

From: Dennis Ettlin [mailto:dennis@ettlin.net]
Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2012 8:06 PM
Subject: Fwd: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge Jan Levine

Dear Ms. Revuelta,
WIl you also be providing information for Judge Jan Levine? I did already
"Revuelta, Jennifer" <jrevuelta@auditor.lacounty.gov>
To: Ettlin Dennis
RE: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge Jan Levine

October 31, 2012 9:17 AM
A-25
WA-132
drop off a check in person while Mr. Iverson was out. Your office should
have received two checks for two requests; judge Levine and judge Otero.
Thanks,
Dennis

Begin forwarded message:
From: "Iverson, Gregg M."
<GIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov>
Subject: RE: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county
to Judge Jan Levine
Date: September 26, 2012 4:50:34 PM PDT
To: Dennis M Ettlin <dennis@ettlin.net>

I am responding to your request for documents showing
supplemental judicial payments from LA County commonly known as
local judicial benefits for LA Superior Court Judge Jan G. Levine
from 2000 to the present..

Responding to your request will require extracting employee master
file information from the Countys legacy mainframe payroll system
and sequence registers from the new payroll system. Once
extracted, we must manually review the records and extract the
specific information you are requesting (e.g., Megaflex cafeteria plan
benefits, 401k and 457 contributions and professional development
allowance.) This can require reviewing and extracting information
for up to 22 reports per employee.

As provided by County Code section 2.170.010, Fees for providing
information, a requestor shall be charged a fee of $22.50 for each
hour of time expended by county employees; and the first full hour of
such time expended on all requests of any one requestor each month
shall be provided free of charge.
It is estimated that your request will take two hours of staff time to
A-26
WA-133
retrieve, extract and consolidate the requested information.
Factoring in one hour of time provided free of charge, the total cost to
provide you with the requested information will be $22.50 (1 hour x
$22.50). Please provide a check for $22.50 payable to the Los
Angeles County with a copy of this e-mail to the following address:

County of Los Angeles
Department of the Auditor-Controller
Attn: Gregg Iverson
Kenneth Hahn Hall of Administration
500 West Temple Street, Room 505
Los Angeles CA 90012-3873

Once your check is received, we will begin the process of preparing
the requested information. If you have questions, please e-mail at:

giverson@auditor.lacounty.gov

Sent: Thursday, September 20, 2012 9:33 PM
Subject: Judicial Payments by Los Angeles county to Judge Jan Levine

Dear Mr. Iverson,
I am seeking information on supplemental judicial payments made
by Los Angeles County to a Superior Court Judge.
I would like to know the amount and type of any payments to
Judge JAN G LEVINE, from 2000 to the present.
I believe you stated that one lookup per month would be free.
A-27
WA-134
!
APPENDIX
D
APPENDIX
A-28
WA-135
CIVIL MINUTESGENERAL

Case No. CV 12-10863 DMG (FFMx) Date June 6, 2013

Title Cheryl Aichele, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. Page 1 of 5

CV-90 CIVIL MINUTESGENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk vv

Present: The Honorable DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

VALENCIA VALLERY NOT REPORTED
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s) Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)
None Present None Present

Proceedings: IN CHAMBERSORDER DENYING DENNIS ETTLINS MOTION TO
INTERVENE [DOC. # 6]

I.
INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 2012, Plaintiffs Cheryl Aichele, Jonathan Alexander, Carina Clemente,
Michael Prysner, and James Weitz filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendants City of
Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, Antonio Villaraigosa, Charlie Beck, and Does 1-10. [Doc.
# 1.] The Complaint seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for (1) violation of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, Article I 2, 3;
(2) violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution, Article I 7; (3) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, Article I 7; and (4) violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, Article I 13.
The Complaint also seeks relief for (5) false arrest and/or false imprisonment; (6) violation of
Cal. Civ. Code 52.1; and (7) negligence. The Complaint seeks relief on behalf of two Sub-
Classes of plaintiffs, defined in the Complaint as:

(a) All persons who were arrested while participating in the Occupy protest at Los
Angeles City Hall on November 30, 2011 (Occupy Sub-Class);

(b) All persons who were arrested in the vicinity of City Hall on November 30,
2011, but who were not participating in the Occupy protest and who complied
with all police orders prior to their arrest (Vicinity Sub-Class).

(Compl. 38.) Plaintiffs claims are based on the allegedly unlawful arrest and detention of
individuals engaged in protests at Los Angeles City Hall on November 30, 2011.

Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 45 Filed 06/06/l3 Page l of 5 Page lD #:9l5
A-29
WA-136




On March 25, 2013, Dennis Ettlin filed a motion to intervene as a Plaintiff in the action,
set for hearing on June 7, 2013. [Doc. # 6.] Ettlin filed a First Amended Motion to Intervene
on April 9, 2013, which includes what appears to be an Amended Complaint in Intervention
(ACI) and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities. [Doc. # 8.] Plaintiff opposed the motion
on May 14, 2013.
1
[Doc. # 22.] Defendant County of Los Angeles filed an Answer to the
Complaint on May 17, 2013. [Doc. # 25.]

In his motion, Ettlin seeks to supplement the Complaint by adding two Sub-Classes of
individuals who were participating in or attempted to participate in the protests on and around
November 30, 2011 but who were not arrested (the Tent and Barricade classes). (ACI 3.)
Ettlin alleges that Defendants conduct with respect to the Sub-Classes named in the Complaint
had a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech rights by members of the Tent and Barricade
classes. Ettlin also seeks to add the Superior Court of California as a Defendant in the action due
to the courts alleged bias in favor of the City and County of Los Angeles in adjudicating civil
rights actions. (See, e.g., id. 12.)

The Court deems Ettlins motion to intervene appropriate for decision without oral
argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

II.
LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) requires a court, upon timely motion, to permit
intervention of right by anyone who claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movants ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties
adequately represent that interest. When analyzing a motion to intervene of right under Rule
24(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit applies a four-part test:

(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a significantly
protectable interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and

1
In his reply, Ettlin asks the Court to strike Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to intervene, apparently
based on his belief that Plaintiffs used the ECF system to obscure and hide the identities of Defendants and their
Counsel. (Reply at 4.) Plaintiffs fully complied with their service obligations by electronically filing their
opposition through the Courts ECF system and by mailing the opposition to Ettlin via first class mail.
Accordingly, Ettlins request to strike the opposition is denied.
Case 2:l2-cv-l0863-DMG-FFM Document 45 Filed 06/06/l3 Page 2 of 5 Page lD #:9l6
A-30
WA-137




(4) the applicants interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the
action.

Wilderness Soc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting
Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). Where intervention is not mandatory,
the Court has discretion to allow intervention by anyone who (1) is given a conditional right to
intervene by a federal statute, or who (2) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action
a common question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

III.
DISCUSSION

A. Ettlin May Not Intervene as of Right

First, the parties agree that Ettlins motion was timely. (See Oppn at 2.) Second, to
determine whether an applicant has a significantly protectable interest necessary for
intervention, the Court considers (1) whether the interest is protectable under some law, and (2)
whether there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the claims at issue.
Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Assn, 647 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011). The
intervenor satisfies the relationship requirement if the resolution of the underlying litigation
actually will affect the applicant. Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 410 (9th Cir.1998); see
also Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2001) (An
applicant demonstrates a significant protectable interest when the injunctive relief sought by
plaintiffs will have direct, immediate, and harmful effects upon a third party's legally protectable
interests.).

Ettlin fails to show that he has standing to pursue several of his proposed claims. He was
not arrested on November 30, 2011 and he does not allege any damage to a tent-dwelling or
other property that would support some of his new proposed claims. (See ACI 21-23, 52-56.)
Even assuming that Ettlin has alleged an interest that is protectable under the lawfor example,
that his exercise of speech activities was chilled by Defendants unconstitutional conduct vis
vis the arresteeshe has not shown the existence of a substantial relationship to the claims at
issue, which center on violations that arose during the course of Plaintiffs arrest and detention.
That Ettlins claims may have arisen in connection with the same event does not alone make
them related for purposes of intervention. See Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 410 (denying mandatory
intervention where claims of gender-based discrimination against female employees would not
affect discrimination claims of male employees who sought to intervene). Ettlins claims are not
so intertwined with Plaintiffs such that the resolution of Plaintiffs claims actually will affect
A-31
WA-138




Ettlin because they encompass different facts and rights. See United States v. City of Los
Angeles, 288 F.3d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, much of Ettlins motion also seeks to add new claims regarding the Citys
policies and practices with respect to the property rights of homeless individuals or tent-dwellers,
and the alleged bias of the Los Angeles County Superior Court in adjudicating actions against
the City and County of Los Angeles. (FAM at pp. 29-46.) These claims are wholly unrelated to
Plaintiffs claims, which arise out of their allegedly unlawful arrest and detention. Ettlin is free
to bring an independent action based on his own experience at the November 30, 2011 protests,
but such an action would not be affected by the outcome of this case.

Ettlin has not established a relationship between his own rights and the claims alleged in
the Complaint. Accordingly, he is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 24(a).

B. Ettlin May Not Intervene Permissively

The Court has discretion to allow intervention under certain circumstances even where
intervention is not required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Rule 24(b)(3) requires the Court to
consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original
parties rights. See Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir.
2009). As discussed above, because Ettlin admittedly was never arrested, his claims do not share
common questions of law or fact with Plaintiffs claims or those of their proposed Sub-Classes.
Moreover, Ettlins desire to expand the action to include new Sub-Classes is not feasible because
pro se plaintiffs cannot represent other class members. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546
F.3d 661, 664 ([C]ourts have routinely adhered to the general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs
from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity.). In sum, allowing
intervention would only serve to undermine the efficiency of the litigation process. Donnelly,
159 F.3d at 412.

Ettlin has failed to establish either that he is entitled to intervene in this action as a matter
of right or that he should be allowed to intervene in the Courts discretion. Accordingly, Ettlins
motion to intervene is DENIED.

C. Ettlins Requests for Injunctive Relief are Denied

In his reply, Ettlin requests a determination as to whether this action is related to several
actions pending in federal and state court, and he seeks injunctive relief prohibiting the parties
A-32
WA-139




from introducing matters or discussion related to those cases in the instant action. (See
Reply at 3.) These requests for relief fail for a number of reasons. First, because Ettlin is not a
party to this action, he is not entitled to a determination as to whether his proposed related cases
are in fact related to this action. Second, as a non-party, Ettlin has no standing to seek injunctive
relief in this actionlet alone to seek such relief in his reply brief in support of a separate and
independent motion. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must file a properly noticed
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65; C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-4. Finally, Ettlin has not established
that he is entitled to any injunctive relief as a matter of law. See Toyo Tire Holdings of Ams. Inc.
v. Contl Tire N. Am., Inc., 609 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiff seeking injunctive relief
must demonstrate (1) likelihood of success on the merits of claims; (2) likelihood of irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) that
an injunction is in the public interest) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 55 U.S. 7,
20, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008)).

IV.
CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Ettlins motion to intervene is DENIED. The June 7, 2013
hearing is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
A-33
WA-140
!
APPENDIX
E
APPENDIX
A-34
WA-141
From: "Iverson, Gregg M." <GIVERSON@auditor.lacounty.gov>
Subject: Request for Local Judicial Benets
Date: June 9, 2011 3:25:33 PM PDT
To: "cyberidme@gmail.com" <cyberidme@gmail.com>
Dear Mr. Ettlin:

Im responding to your request for amounts paid for judicial benefits (commonly referred to as Local Judicial Benefits)
from 1985 to 2010. I have provided the requested information below for years 1989 through 2010. I do not have
records for years prior to 1989. Please note, all except for Kenneth H. Taylor are Los Angeles County Superior Court
Judges. Mr. Taylor is a Superior Court Commissioner.

As for who pays the cost of Local Judicial Benefits, the Los Angeles County, not the Court, pays for the cost of Local
Judicial Benefits for Superior Court Judges, but the Court pays the cost for commissioners.

Please email me at giverson@auditor.lacounty.gov if you have any questions.

Year Cafeteria
Plan
Benefits
401(k)/457
County
Contributions
Professional
Development
Allowance
Kenneth H. Taylor
2009

27,944.65 13,195.52 5,553.00
2010

45,322.16 1,162.73 7,404.00

Marjorie S. Steinberg
2001

2,106.66 - 1,220.00
2002

26,190.23 11,057.49 5,856.00
2003

26,845.62 12,485.22 6,150.00
2004

27,329.28 12,600.24 6,192.00
2005

28,256.14 13,027.59 6,528.00
2006

29,177.76 13,452.48 6,838.50
2007

32,965.52 15,198.83 7,075.50
2008

33,969.96 15,661.92 7,366.50
2009

33,969.96 15,661.92 7,404.00
2010

33,969.96 12,246.26 7,404.00

A-35
WA-142
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
November 28, 2010
Kenneth H. Taylor,
Commissioner
Metropolitan Courthouse
1945 South Hill Street
Dear Sir,
I am requesting any written information on the November 22, 2010 proceedings regarding Case
No. A377663 in Los Angeles Superior Court, Department 61, Metropolitan Courthouse. There
was no court reporter available.
My recollection of the proceedings is briey as follows. I inquired if you were indeed
Commissioner Kenneth H. Taylor. I then asked if you was receiving Judicial Benets from Los
Angeles County. You refused to provide a direct answer. Initially, you told me it was none of my
business, then admitted that it might be a matter of public record, then suggested I get the
information from the county. Then you asked, Anything else?
I then requested and you denied a request for Change of Venue to a county that does not pay
judicial benets. You ignored my citation to Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) and Canon 3E
(1) and then overruled my oral C.C.P. Section 170.3 objection.
I am appealing your ruling on this matter due to the appearance of bribery and your fraud on
the court.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
cc:
Presiding Judge Charles McCoy, Jr.
A-36
WA-143
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
November 28, 2010
Charles McCoy, Jr.
Presiding Judge
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street
Dear Sir,
I am writing to inform you that Commissioner Kenneth H. Taylor, presiding over Los Angeles
Superior Court, Metropolitan Courthouse, Department 61, committed fraud on the court.
The L.A. County Budget 2009-2010 states that all judges (and commissioners) are paid judicial
benets by L.A. County. When Commissioner Taylor was asked if he was receiving these judicial
benets from Los Angeles County, he refused to provide a direct answer. Initially he told me it
was none of my business, then admitted that it might be a matter of public record, and then
suggested I get the information from the county. Then he asked, Anything else?
Commissioner Taylor also denied a request for Change of Venue to a county that does not pay
judicial benets, overruled an oral C.C.P. Section 170.3 objection and ignored Code of Judicial
Ethics Canon 4D(1) and Canon 3E(1).
I am appealing Commissioner Taylors ruling on this matter due to the illegal judicial benets
and the appearance of bribery in this case.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
cc:
Commissioner Kenneth H. Taylor
A-37
WA-144
A-38
WA-145
A-39
WA-146
!
APPENDIX
F
APPENDIX
A-40
WA-147

BAIL SCHEDULE
for
INFRACTIONS and MISDEMEANORS
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
2011
A-41
WA-148
1
BAIL SCHEDULE FOR INFRACTIONS AND MISDEMEANORS

GENERAL PROVISIONS
Uniform Bail Codes
The following state codes have a single bail amount for all misdemeanor offenses within that code:

CODE UNIFORM BAIL
Civil Code $250
Code of Civil Procedure $250
Education Code $250
Election Code $250
Financial Code $250
Food and Agricultural Code $500
Government Code $250
Insurance Code $250
Labor Code $250
Public Utilities Code $1,000
Revenue and Taxation Code $250
Streets and Highways Code $100
Unemployment Insurance Code $250
Unlisted Misdemeanors
For all offenses chargeable as straight misdemeanors for which there is no uniform bail and which are not otherwise
provided for in this schedule, including unlisted subdivisions, the bail is $500, except that if the minimum fine for the
offense (not including any penalty assessments) is greater than $500, then the bail is the amount of the minimum fine.

For all offenses chargeable either as a felony or a misdemeanor ("wobblers") for which there is no uniform bail and which
are not otherwise provided for in this schedule, the bail is $750 (not including any penalty assessments), except that if
the minimum fine is greater than $750, then the bail is the amount of the minimum fine.

All violations of County ordinances constituting misdemeanors for which no provision is made in this schedule shall have
bail of $250. All misdemeanor violations of the California Code of Regulations for which no provision is made shall have
bail of $125, except that if the minimum fine for the offense (not including any penalty assessments) is greater than
$125, then the bail is the amount of the minimum fine.
Unlisted Infractions
For all violations of state statutes, provisions of the California Code of Regulations or county, municipal and agency
ordinances constituting infractions, which are not otherwise provided for in this schedule or in any other bail schedule
approved by the Los Angeles Superior Court, including unlisted subdivisions, the bail is $35, except that if the minimum
fine is greater than $35, the bail shall be the amount of the minimum fine.
A-42
WA-149
2
GENERAL PROVISIONS (continued)

Use of this Bail Schedule
The purpose of this bail schedule is to fix an amount upon which a person who is arrested without a warrant may be
released from custody prior to appearance in court. At and after the defendant's first appearance, pursuant to Penal Code
section 1269b(b), the amount of bail, if any is allowed, shall lie with the sound discretion of the judicial officer before whom
the defendant appeared, and which may be greater or less than the amount set forth in this schedule, subject to the
provisions of Penal Code section 1275. This schedule may also be used by a magistrate in fixing bail pursuant to Penal
Code section 815a at the time an arrest warrant is issued, the amount of which lies with the sound discretion of the
magistrate.

When a defendant is booked for or charged with two or more misdemeanor offenses, bail shall be the amount computed
under this schedule for the charge having the highest bail except where the offenses are committed against separate
victims or on separate dates.

Penalties and Assessments
"P." designates the state penalty, county penalty or any additional penalty required by law. When an offense listed in this
schedule requires a court appearance ("Ct."), the assessment shall not be added to the bail amount. Upon conviction,
however, the assessment shall be added to the fine imposed.

An additional penalty of $28 shall be levied upon every $10, or part of $10, upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture
imposed by and collected by the court for criminal offenses. The additional penalty is calculated as follows:

State penalty required by PC 1464................................................................................. $10
County penalty required by GC 76000(e) ....................................................................... $ 7
State court construction penalty required by GC 70372(a)............................................. $ 5
DNA Identification Fund penalty required by GC 76104.6 and 76104.7......................... $ 4
Emergency medical services penalty required by GC 76000.5...................................... $ 2

Penal Code 1464(b) provides that in the case of multiple offenses, the amount of "additional penalties" is to be
determined by the total base bail or fine for all the offenses cited, and if the fine or base bail is suspended in whole or part,
the "additional penalties" shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of suspension.

In addition to the penalty calculated above, Penal Code 1465.7(a) requires imposition on criminal offenses of a state
surcharge equal to 20 percent of the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment as specified in Penal Code
1464(a).

Penal Code 1465.8 requires imposition of an additional fee of $40 for court security on every conviction for a criminal
offense, including a traffic offense, except parking offenses as defined in Penal Code 1463. This fee will be reduced to
$30 on July 1, 2011, unless a later enacted statute deletes or extends that date.

Government Code 70373 requires the imposition of a conviction assessment, on every conviction for a criminal offense,
including a traffic offense, in the amount of $30 for each misdemeanor and $35 for each infraction.

For additional penalties and fees relating to Vehicle Code violations see page 23.

Abbreviations
"Ct." designates "court appearance."
"I" designates "infraction."
"M" designates "misdemeanor."
"P." designates "penalty." See above for further information on penalties.

Footnotes
Footnotes are at the end of the document. Unless otherwise specified, a footnote applies to every bail indicated for a
section.

A-43
WA-150

Penalty Assessment Example (Effective January 1, 2009, the penalty assessment
amount increases from $24 to $26):
If one is fined $25.00, the Penalty Assessment charge will be $78.00 (3 X
$26.00), plus the original fine of $25.00, plus any other assessment.
For every $26.00 of Penalty Assessment collected, the money is allocated as follows:
$ 5.00 State Courthouse Facilities Construction Fund (70372a GC)
$ 1.00 State DNA Identification Fund (76104.6 GC)
$ 10.00 State Penalty Fund (1464 PC)
$ 2.00 County Emergency Medical Services Fund (76000.5 GC)
$ 7.00 County Penalty Fund (76000 GC)
Traffic Fee Table
Fee Type Amount
Penalty Assessment (1464 Penal Code, 76000
Government Code)
$26 for every $10 of bail
or fine or fraction
thereof.
Night Court Fee (42006 Vehicle Code) $1
Court Security Fee (69926.5 Government Code,
1465.8 Penal Code)
$30 per Bailable
Convicted Violation
Criminal Surcharge Fee (1465.7 Penal Code) 20% of the base bail or
fine
Criminal Conviction Assessment Fee (70373
Government Code)
$30 for each
misdemeanor violation
$35 for each infraction
violation
Abstract Fee [40508.6(b) Vehicle Code] $10
Proof of Correction Fee (40611 Vehicle Code) $25 per correctable
violation
Sheriff's Inspection Fee $15
Civil Assessment (1214.1 Penal Code) $300
Certification Fee [70626(a)(4) Government Code] $25
Copy Fee, per page [70627(a) Government Code] $0.50
Non-Sufficient Funds Check (71386 Government
Code)
$65
Traffic Violator School Fee (42007.1 Vehicle Code,
11205 Vehicle Code)
$64 (non-refundable)

Penalty Assessments
Effective June 2010
A-44
WA-151
Traffic Fee Table
Fee Type Amount
$28 for every $10 of
bail or fine or fraction
thereof.
Penalty Assessment (1464 Penal Code, 76000
Government Code)
Night Court Fee (42006 Vehicle Code) $1
Court Security Fee (69926.5 Government Code,
1465.8 Penal Code)
$40 per Bailable
Convicted Violation
Criminal Surcharge Fee (1465.7 Penal Code) 20% of the base bail or
fine
Criminal Conviction Assessment Fee (70373
Government Code)
$30 for each
misdemeanor violation
$35 for each infraction
violation
Abstract Fee [40508.6(b) Vehicle Code] $10
Proof of Correction Fee (40611 Vehicle Code) $25 per correctable
violation
Sheriff's Inspection Fee $17
Civil Assessment (1214.1 Penal Code) $300
Certification Fee [70626(a)(4) Government Code] $25
Copy Fee, per page [70627(a) Government Code] $0.50
Non-Sufficient Funds Check (71386 Government
Code)
$65
Traffic Violator School Fee (42007.1 Vehicle Code,
11205 Vehicle Code)
$64 (non-refundable)
Accounts Receivable Fee [1205(d) Penal Code] $30

Penalty Assessment Example (Effective June 10, 2010, the penalty assessment amount increases from $26 to
$28):
If one is fined $25.00, the Penalty Assessment charge will be $84.00 (3 X $28.00), plus the original fine of
$25.00, plus any other assessment.
For every $28.00 of Penalty Assessment collected, the money is allocated as follows:
$ 5.00 State Courthouse Facilities Construction Fund (70372a GC)
$ 10.00 State Penalty Fund (1464 PC)
$ 2.00 County Emergency Medical Services Fund (76000.5 GC)
$ 7.00 County Penalty Fund (76000 GC)
Penalty Assessments
Effective April 2011
A-45
WA-152
SuperiorCourtofCalifornia,CountyofSanBernardino
Why is Your Bail or Fine So Much?
What is a Penalty Assessment?
t is an amount added to the base bail and base fine amounts on infraction, misdemeanor and felony offenses. The
current penalty assessment (effective January 1, 2009), is $26.00 for every $10.00 of the base amount or portion thereof
as set forth by the California State Legislature. The $26.00 penalty assessment is charged pursuant to Penal Code 1464
and Government Codes 76000, 70372, 76104.6, 76104.7 and 76000.5.
n addition to the penalty assessments above, the following amounts are added to your base bail or base fine amounts:
Pursuant to Penal Code 1465.7, there is a 20% State Surcharge imposed on the base bail or base fine amount.
This 20% is not included in the base fine used to calculate the penalty assessments above.
Pursuant to Penal Code 1465.8 & SBX4 13, there is a $30.00 court security fee imposed for each infraction,
misdemeanor or felony violation resulting in a conviction.
Pursuant to Government Code 70373, there is a $30.00 assessment imposed for each misdemeanor or felony
conviction and $35.00 assessment imposed for each infraction conviction.
Pursuant to Vehicle Code 42006, there is a $1.00 assessment imposed for violation of any section of the vehicle code
or local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code.
Pursuant to Vehicle Code 40508.6, there is a $10.00 administrative assessment imposed for administrative costs
for maintaining a record of a defendant's prior convictions/notifying Department of Motor Vehicles of the attachment
or restriction for all defendant's whose drivers license or automobile registration is attached or restricted.
Example of a Vehicle Code Fine Where the money goes:
Base Fine Amount 25.00 $ Court Automation 2%, County Funds 15%; City Funds 83%
Penalty Assessments ($78.00) 30.00 State Penalty Fund-PC 1464 ($10.00 for every $10.00)
21.00 County Penalty Fund-GC 76000 ($7.00 for every $10.00)
15.00 State Court Facilities Const Fund-GC 70372 ($5.00 for every $10.00)
6.00 DNA dentification Fund-GC 76104.6/GC 76104.7 ($2.00 for every $10.00)
6.00 County Emergency Medical Services-GC76000.5 ($2.00 for every $10.00)
State Surcharge 5.00 State General Fund-PC 1465.7 (20% of Base Fine)
Court Security Fee 30.00 Fund Security for Courts-PC 1465.8 ($20.00) & SBX4 13 ($10.00)
Conviction Assessment 35.00 Fund Building/Maintainance for Courts-GC 70373 ($35.00 per conviction)
Night Court Fee 1.00 Fund Night Court Operations-VC 42006 ($1.00 per case)
Administrative Assessment 10.00 Fund Administrative Costs-Priors/DMV-VC 40508.6 ($10.00 per case)
Total Fine 184.00 $
Traffic School
The bail/fine amount for traffic school is calculated the same as above plus an Administrative Fee of $54.00 (Vehicle
Code 11205(e) & 42007.1). The school for Traffic School will also charge a fee for the cost of instruction.
Proof of Correction
Pursuant to Vehicle Code 40611, when submitting proof of correction on a correctable violation, the transaction fee
is $25.00 for each correctable violation.
The Courts Responsibility
The trial courts are required to follow the laws passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor. They
are not responsible for creating those laws. f you are concerned with the amount of your fine, contact your
state legislator.
Note: This is for informational purposes only. This may not represent your complete legal obligation.
Rev. 9/09

A-46
WA-153

Local Court Form, Optional Use Visit the Courts website at: www.sanmateocourt.org
TR-07 Aug 2009

Why is My Bail or Fine So Much?
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN MATEO


What is a Penalty Assessment?
It is an amount added to the base bail/fine amount on infraction, misdemeanor and felony offenses. The
current penalty assessment (eff. January 1, 2009), is $26 for each $10 or portion of $10 of fine or bail as
set by the California State Legislature. The $26 Penalty Assessment is charged pursuant to Penal Code
Sec 1464 and Government Codes 76000, 70372, 76104.6, 76104.7 and 76000.5.

In addition to the penalty assessments, a $30 court security fee will be added for each infraction,
misdemeanor or felony violation that occurred on or after August 17, 2003 resulting in a conviction
pursuant to PC 1465.8. Effective Jan 1, 2009, an assessment in the amount of $30 for each convicted
misdemeanor or felony violation and $35 for each convicted infraction violation will be added (GC 70373).
There is also a 20% State Surcharge, effective since Sept 20, 2002 imposed on the base bail or base fine
amt. This 20% may not be used to calculate the Penalty Assessment per each $10 of fine.
These penalties are also included in the calculation for traffic school.

What is a Night Court Assessment?
Pursuant to Vehicle Code Sec 42006, in addition to the Penalty Assessment, one dollar ($1) is collected
for violation of any section of the Vehicle Code or local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code.

Example of a fine amount for a Vehicle
Code infraction violation:
Distribution (Where the money goes):
Base fine amount ($25) $25.00 Court automation 2%, County Funds 15%; City Funds 83%
Penalty Assessment ($78) $30.00 State penalty fund (PC 1464)
$21.00 County penalty fund (GC 76000)
$15.00 To the state court facilities construction fund (GC 70372)
$6.00 DNA Identification Fund (GC 76104.6 and GC 76104.7)
$6.00 County Emergency Medical Services (GC76000.5)
State Surcharge 20% $5.00 State Gen Fund (PC 1465.7)
Court Security Fee $30.00 To fund security in the trial courts (PC 1465.8)
Conviction Assessment Fee $35.00 To fund building/maintaining trial courts (GC 70373(a)(1))
Night Court Fee $1.00 Fund night court operations (VC 42006) (If applicable to
traffic violations).
Total Fine $174.00

Traffic School
Traffic School calculation is based on base fine + Penalty Assessment + Security fee + State surcharge +
Conviction Assessment + Administrative fee. This does not include the cost of traffic school instruction,
which is a separate fee paid directly to the selected school.
Effective January 1, 2009, the Traffic School Administrative Fee is $57.

Proof of Correction
Effective Jan 1, 2009, when submitting proof of correction on a correctable violation, the fee is $25 for
each correctable violation.

The Courts Responsibility
The trial courts are required to follow the laws passed by the Legislature and signed by the
Governor. All of the penalties and assessments listed above are such laws. The trial courts are
not responsible for creating those laws. If you are concerned with the amount of your fine,
contact your state legislator.
A-47
WA-154
!
APPENDIX
G
APPENDIX
A-48
WA-155
A-49
WA-156
!
"

$
%
&
%
'
&
&

!
(
)
*
+

,
-
.
/
0
1
!
"
2
3
-
)
1
"

3
!

+
3
4

*
)
/
0
+
0
4
4
-
5
5
*
6
"

4
2
7
0
.
-
+
0
4
83)()/ 9065(14
60/(3)*+ 9+*))()/ : ;<=>?<@A?B;% : ;<?%><CA=BA> : =<C%A<%%% : =<C;;<%%%
131*+ +(20)404 9065(14 D !6*)27(404 : @=<>$=<>>>B=@ : ?><CA$<$&CB$& : ?@<%&?<%%% : ?@<%=&<%%%
!()04 !36!0(1-604 D 90)*+1(04
E07(2+0 23.0 !()04
,0*2704 D 7*6,364',0*27 : =;&<?;@B&? : AA$<;?&B@@ : =A?<%%% : @$;<%%%
3!!(20 3! 9-,+(2 4*!01" =A&<=?>B@; =;A<?@%BA>
9*6F4 *). 60260*1(3) A&=BC% C%;B@? &<%%% &<%%%
4706(!! ' 23-)1" 406E(204 =>A<%%% =>A<%%%
4706(!! ' 9*163+ A<=>@<%>;BC& ><@A@<$&&B?% ><@=C<%%% &&<$?A<%%%
16(*+ 23-61 3906*1(3)4'530 23)16(,-1(3) A<$CC<&?$B?& @<A=;<%&>B@; @<A%&<%%% @<A%&<%%%
+()F*/04 4-99361 963/6*5 !-). @$?<@C>B$% A>A<>=$BAC ?>@<%%% ?>@<%%% +()F*/04 4-99 96/ !.
9-,+(2 70*+17 ' 41*17*5 !-). &<;?&<@;ABC$ &<;?A<%@$B>@ &<;$$<%%% &<;$$<%%% 97'41*17*5 !-).

31706 23-61 !()04
.(416(21 *1136)0" : >>%<%A>BC? : C>A<=$@B$? : A?%<%%% : A?%<%%%
9*6F4 *). 60260*1(3) $<@??B%C $<CC$BC& &<%%% &<%%%
963,*1(3)'!(0+. 406E(204 &<C@><&=&B?> $<&CA<A=$B>@ CA=<%%% &<@A=<%%%
963,*1(3)'4-99361 406E(204 $@=<&;%B=C &A?<=&&B=A
16(*+ 23-61 3906*1(3)4'530 23)16(,-1(3) &;$<A@;<;?;B?C &$><$$=<&;AB%> &;%<>%?<%%% &;%<>%?<%%%
23-6173-40 23)416-21(3) !-). $&<&A?<=&=BCA $&<%>%<C=%B=; &><%%%<%%% &><%%%<%%% 23-6173-40 2)416 !.
26(5()*+ G-41(20 !*2(+(1(04 105936*6"
23)416-21(3) !-). $=<?$$<@?AB@% $=<&@%<$@&B>> $%<%%%<%%% $%<%%%<%%% 26(5 G-4 !*2 23)41
.35041(2 E(3+0)20 963/6*5 !-). @A;<$>?B@@ @;><C&%B%% ?AA<%%% ?AA<%%% .35041(2 E(3+0)20 !.
!(47 *). /*50 9639*/*1(3) !-). $%<%CAB;A ;$<==%B?C &><%%% &><%%% !(47 D /*50 9639 !.
9-,+(2 70*+17 ' 27(+. 40*1 60416*()1 +3*)06 !-). ;>&<C&@B&A ;&@<%@?B;= ;%@<%%% ;%@<%%% 97'27+. 40*1 +3*) !.

90) ()1 D 23414'.0+ 1*H04
*/6(2-+1-6*+ 2355(44(3)06'I0(/714 *). 50*4-604 : $&&<%&%BC= : &>A<$?=B$; : ;%%<%%% : ;%%<%%%
*4404436 ;$@<CA;B&A $$A<@$%B>$ >$<%%% &==<%%%
/0)06*+ !-). ' !()*)2()/ 0+050)14 $C<=?@<?%?B$% ;&<%%$<?&AB%?
)3).09*6150)1*+ 60E0)-0'*-.(136J23)163++06 @?<C>?<C;$BA= ?><&AC<&?CB=> ?&<@CA<%%% ?&<@CA<%%%
9-,+(2 I36F4 &&<@$CB>? &==<@CAB@? $%;<%%% $%;<%%%
160*4-606 *). 1*H 23++02136 =<;@><>>;B;% ;<A>C<;$$B;; =<?A&<%%% =<?A&<%%%
70*+17 406E(204 ' 50*4-60 , 4902(*+ 1*H !-). &<=A&<;@@B== &<@CC<C=AB>A 74'50*4 , 4902 1H !.
4270.-+0 @
.01*(+ 3! *..(1(3)*+ !()*)2()/ 43-6204 ," ,-./01 -)(1 *). *223-)1
23-)1" !-).4
!(42*+ "0*6 $%&%'&&

,-./01 -)(1J!() 43-620 2*10/36"J !" $%%>'%C !" $%%C'&% !" $%&%'&& !" $%&%'&& )*50 3! ,-./01 -)(1
!() 43-620 *223-)1 *21-*+ *21-*+ 6023550).0. *.3910. K/0)06*+ -)+044 31706I(40 ().(2*10.L
K&L K$L K;L K=L K?L K@L
A-50
WA-157
!
"
#
#
$
%
&

!
(
)
*
+
"
,
*
!
-
&

.
/
0
/
1
0
0

-
2
3
$
,

4
"
+
5
*
6
!
"
(
7
"
3
6
&

7
-

,
7
!

$
3
5
*
,
*
!
8"4,2( ,24%$%& 9:;<=>.?=> 9@=<90>?=. 8"4 ,24%$%&15*3
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !7,2+ A$!6* #$3$5*#*36 -"3+ 0=<;@.?:@ 0@<09/?>@ ./</// ./</// 8A1!7,2+ A$!6* #5#6
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !8*(2$, %7$+ +2!6 C0 00<==0?9= 00<@;@?>= 0.</// 0.</// 8A1!8(, %7$+ +6 C0
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !8*(2$, %7$+ +2!6 C. @<>/;?0. @<9=>?>@ 9</// 9</// 8A1!8(, %7$+ +6 C.
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !8*(2$, %7$+ +2!6 CD ;<@0:?=. ;<9;@?/9 ></// ></// 8A1!8(, %7$+ +6 CD
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !8*(2$, %7$+ +2!6 C; :</.@?>D :<..9?0; :</// :</// 8A1!8(, %7$+ +6 C;
8"4,2( A7%B! 1 !8*(2$, %7$+ +2!6 C> .=<=D@?90 .=<9DD?;= .@</// .@</// 8A1!8(, %7$+ +6 C>

-7%-*26"%*! E 8*3$,62*!
$!!*!!7% F ;<0D.<99=?/= F D</;9<.=@?== F D<>@=</// F ;<0=D<///
4*$()*! E )$%47%!14*$() G;><09=?//H
+2!6%2(6 $667%3*& =;<DD/?/= =<D;;<.;.?>> 0<=//</// 0<=//<///
)*$,6) !*%I2(*! 1 $+#232!6%$6273 =<@::<>@0?=: =<;>:<9@>?=. 9<;:.</// 9<;:.<///
8$%B! $3+ %*(%*$6273 .</// .<///
8%74$62731-2*,+ !*%I2(*! .//</// .//<///
8%74$62731!8*(2$, !*%I2(*! 0:0<:0>?9D ;9<@@0?.;
8"4,2( )*$,6)18"4,2( )*$,6) 8%75%$#! 9D</=>?>@ 00;<.:/?>: D/</// D/<///
!)*%2-- 1 $+#232!6%$6273 @@?>D 0</// 0<///
!)*%2-- 1 5*3*%$, !"887%6 !*%I2(*! 0<0@;<:D@?>9 0<0.D<9:.?:@ :.0</// :.0<///
!)*%2-- 1 8$6%7, .</// .<///
6%*$!"%*% $3+ 6$J (7,,*(67% ;D?9/ ;0?.9
+2!6%2(6 $667%3*& 1 $!!*6 -7%-*26"%* -"3+ :.0</;0?=9 =9D<./;?.. 0<///</// 0<///</// +$1$!!*6 -7%-*26"%*
+3$ 2+*362-2($6273 -"3+ 1 ,7($, !)$%* ></D><@@=?9. ;<@.><;D:?>= ;<>//</// ;<>//</// +3$ 2+ -+1,7( !)$%*
)$K$%+7"! A$!6* !8*(2$, -"3+ ;=><0.D?9. =9=<@::?.D D//</// D//</// )$K$%+7"! A$!6* !8(,
)*$,6) !*%I2(*! 1 *#! I*)2(,* %*8,$(*#*36 -"3+ 0>/<///?// )!1*#! I*) %*8, -+
)*$,6) !*%I2(*! 1 )7!826$, !*%I2(*! $((7"36 :<0@:<@D>?=D ><=/;<.D>?@9 =<99D</// =<99D</// )!1)7!8 !I(! $((6
)*$,6) !*%I2(*! 1 8)&!2(2$3 !*%I2(*! $((7"36 0;<@90</>@?@9 0D<//0<9.=?;9 0><:=9</// 0><:=9</// )!18)&! !I(! $((6
8"4,2( )*$,6) 1 $,(7)7, $4"!* *+"($6273 E
8%*I*36273 -"3+ :0;<D/=?@@ :>9<9:.?00 99@</// 99@</// 8)1$,( $4!* *+"( 8%I
8"4,2( )*$,6) 1 $,(7)7, $3+ +%"5 -2%!6 7--*3+*%
+"2 -"3+ =/@</// =/@</// 8)1$E+ 0!6 7-- +"2
8"4,2( )*$,6) 1 $,(7)7, $3+ +%"5 8%74,*#
$!!*!!#*36 -"3+ @9=<;/@?;9 9@9<;90?9. @9;</// @9;</// 8)1$,( +%"5 8%74
8"4,2( )*$,6) 1 $,(7)7, $3+ +%"5 !*(73+ 7--*3+*%
+"2 D//</// D//</// 8)1$E+ .3+ 7-- +"2
!()*+",* =
+*6$2, 7- $++26273$, -23$3(235 !7"%(*! 4& 4"+5*6 "326 $3+ $((7"36
(7"36& -"3+!
-2!($, &*$% ./0/100

4"+5*6 "326L-23 !7"%(* ($6*57%&L -& .//91/: -& .//:10/ -& ./0/100 -& ./0/100 3$#* 7- 4"+5*6 "326
-23 !7"%(* $((7"36 $(6"$, $(6"$, %*(7##*3+*+ $+786*+ G5*3*%$, "3,*!! 76)*%A2!* 23+2($6*+H
G0H G.H GDH G;H G>H G=H
A-51
WA-158
!
"

$
%
&
%
'
&
&

!
(
)
*
+

,
-
.
/
0
1
!
"
2
3
-
)
1
"

3
!

+
3
4

*
)
/
0
+
0
4
4
-
5
5
*
6
"

4
2
7
0
.
-
+
0
4
8-,+(2 70*+17 ' *+2373+ *). .6-/ 17(6. 3!!0).06
.-( 9:%%% 9:%%% 87'*;. <6. 3!! .-(
8-,+(2 70*+17 ' .6-/ *,-40 0.-2*1(3) ; 860=0)1(3)
!-). &>:?<@A%9 &>:9B>A$$ &?:%%% &?:%%% 87'.6-/ *,-40 0. 86=
8-,+(2 70*+17 ' 41*17*5 *(.4 0.-2*1(3) !-). B:@><A$C ?:?<9A@> 9:%%% 9:%%% 87'41*17*5 *(.4 !.
8-,+(2 D36E4 ' 63*. !-). &9A%? 8D'63*. !-).
8-,+(2 D36E4 ' 43+(. D*410 5*)*/050)1 !-). &%:?$?A%% C$:C%&A%% 8D'43+(. D*410 5/51
4706(!! ' *-135*10. !()/0686()1 (.0)1(!(2*1(3)
4"4105 !-). <:<>C:&CBA& $:?<%:%%% $:?<%:%%% 4706(!!'*-13 !)/86)1
4706(!! ' 23-)1"D(.0 D*66*)1 4"4105 !-). $:9%%:%&?AB9 $:?9<:>@CA>@ $:%%%:%%% $:%%%:%%% 4706(!!'23 D*66 4"4

131*+ !()04 !36!0(1-604 ; 80)*+1(04 F <?<:9<$:>C%A>9 F <>$:<%?:>>9A<< F $@B:&@9:%%% F <%&:<%&:%%%
60=0)-0 ' -40 3! 53)0" ; 8638
60)14 ; 23)2044(3)4
,0*2704 ; 7*6,364',0*27 F <:$$$:9&BA?B F $:C<@:CBCA?C F $:BB$:%%% F $:BB$:%%%
,0*2704 ; 7*6,364'5*6()* >&:%CC:9?BA?% >&:&>@:<@?A%> >%:?9>:%%% >%:?9>:%%%
27(0! 0G02-1(=0 3!!(206 @&@:C@CA>% &:$&>:9><A&> &:?@%:%%% &:?@%:%%%
0G16*36.()*6" 5*()10)*)20 &:%%%:%%%A%%
()106)*+ 406=(204 9:@%9:@>%A<@ B:&9@:%B?AC% B:?B9:%%% B:?B9:%%%
)3).08*6150)1*+ 60=0)-0'31706 $:C@$:$&@A$@ &:@9C:C@$A9& &:?%B:%%% &:?%B:%%%
)3).08*6150)1*+ 60=0)-0'60*+ 8638061"
863/6*54 &:?><:?B<A@& &:<$$:?9BA&B >B?:%%% >B?:%%%
8*6E4 *). 60260*1(3) &%B:BCCAC& <$>:@9@A?@ <%B:%%% <%B:%%%
863,*1(3)'H-=0)(+0 ()41(1-1(3)4 406=(204 9>:&>>A9B >$:%9<A?C &$C:%%% &$C:%%%
60)1 0G80)40 &:BC%:%@<A%% <:<@B:%$?AB? >:$B>:%%% >:$B>:%%%
4706(!! ' 2-413." &>$:&%CA&& &9%:@$BA>@ $%%:%%% $%%:%%%
10+0873)0 -1(+(1(04 @%:B>>A?& 9?:><&A?@ 9%:%%% 9%:%%%
-1(+(1(04 I<%&A%CJ
2(=(2 20)106 058+3"00 8*6E()/ !-). >:>&C:@?@A>? >:?<C:B<$A9? >:@%C:%%% >:@%C:%%% 2(= 216 058 8E/
23-6173-40 23)416-21(3) !-). >?:<%&A<< $%:%%% $%:%%% 23-6173-40 2)416 !.
.0+ =*++0 *A2A3A !-). &:>$?A%% &:>$?A%% .0+ =*++0 *23 !.
!36. 170*160 .0=0+3850)1 !-). &>$:$$BA$> &><:9B<AC@ &>%:%%% &>%:%%% !36. 170*160 .0= !.
5(44(3) 2*)"3) +*).!(++ 2+34-60 5*()10)*)20 $:$<<A$9 9?:<&@A>9 &<:%%% &<:%%% 5(44(3) 2*)"3) +*).!(++ 2+34-60 5*()1
8*6E4 *). 60260*1(3) ' 8*6E (5863=050)1 4802(*+
!-). $C9:%?9A@$ <&<:@><A%9 $B%:%%% $B%:%%% 8;6 8E (586= 4802 !.
4270.-+0 9
.01*(+ 3! *..(1(3)*+ !()*)2()/ 43-6204 ," ,-./01 -)(1 *). *223-)1
23-)1" !-).4
!(42*+ "0*6 $%&%'&&

,-./01 -)(1K!() 43-620 2*10/36"K !" $%%C'%@ !" $%%@'&% !" $%&%'&& !" $%&%'&& )*50 3! ,-./01 -)(1
!() 43-620 *223-)1 *21-*+ *21-*+ 6023550).0. *.3810. I/0)06*+ -)+044 31706D(40 ().(2*10.J
I&J I$J I<J I>J I?J I9J
A-52
WA-159
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !" 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
/0)05*+ !-).
,0*2604 *). 6*5,354

#$%&
#$%'()*% /0)05*+ !-). +'(),)(-
50250*1(3) 7 2-+1-5*+
4058(204
50250*1(3) !*2(+(1(04
#- /00!102 #- /002130 #- /002130 #- /030133 #- /030133
'4+%56 #7*8
+&9 :$&56( ';+<<)#)'+()*% +'($+; +'($+; +&9 :$&56( 76'*886%&6& +&*=(6&
#)%+%')%5 $<6<
4*+*5(04 7 09:+3"00
,0)0!(14 ; &<=>&<=<?@AB@ ; &C=@B>=<$BA>B ; $%=?&?=%%% ; &C=D$?=%%% ; &C=C&%=%%% ; E@%?=%%%F
4058(204 7 4-::+(04 &@=D&>=>?&A@B &B=?>$=@??A<D &D=BC?=%%% &D=?%?=%%% &D=%C>=%%% E@CB=%%%F
31605 26*5/04 @=%DC=&&>A@B ?=B%>=>%CA$B ?=>?D=%%% ?=D<D=%%% ?=D<D=%%% E&D%=%%%F
2*:(1*+ *44014 ' 0G-(:90)1 B$DAB% &@<=%%% E&@<=%%%F
31605 !()*)2()/ -404 B=%??=CC<A%% $=%<%=&@$A%% $=&>?=%%% &=$>>=%%% &=@&?=%%% E<<%=%%%F
57*<< (*(+; ; @&=B@%=$%<AC@ ; @%=@$%=&&%A>D ; @?=%<$=%%% ; @%=>C%=%%% ; @&=%C<=%%% ; E&=C<B=%%%F
()15*!-). 15*)4!05 E?C=$$CA<DF E?@=%&@A<&F EB=%%%F EB=%%%F EB=%%%F
%6( (*(+; ; @&=B%%=C<>A&> ; @%=?>D=%CDA&B ; @?=%D<=%%% ; @%=>>B=%%% ; @&=%C$=%%% ; E&=C<B=%%%F
5080)-0 B>=&%C=%C$A&& BC=>?%=?<<ABB B<=><D=%%% BC=<?@=%%% BC=>>$=%%% $=%%D=%%%
%6( '*$%(- '*<( ; E&D=D%>=&&?AC?F ;E&C=@@@=$>&A@%F ; E&@=>%C=%%%F ; E&>=>@C=%%%F ; E&>=<C%=%%%F ; E?=C>&=%%%F
,-./010. :34(1(3)4 $BDA% $BDA% $BDA% $@BA% $BDA%
76,6%$6 &6(+);
31605 +(20)404 7 :059(14 ; ?&=???AB% ; @@=@&%A%B ; &%=%%% ; ; ; E&%=%%%F
:+*))()/ 7 0)/()005()/
4058(20 $=@D<A@D B=$$BA&>
15*)4!054 () ?$$=<@CA%%
,-4()044 +(20)404 &B@=>%%A%% &D?=%%%A%% $>%=%%% &B%=%%% &B%=%%% E&?%=%%%F
23)415-21(3) :059(14 &B$=%%@A@& &C?=$%%AD? &@B=%%% &@B=%%% &@B=%%%
50)14 7 23)2044(3)4 @@=?&&=$<BA%< @?=C>C=$<?AD$ @$=BB$=%%% @?=??D=%%% @?=??D=%%% <>@=%%%
()105041 $?D=<&%AD> &BB=$$>A<% $?>=%%% &<?=%%% &<?=%%% EDB=%%%F
41*10 ' 31605 ?%=$DBAC? E?=??BA$$F
31605 4*+04 $B%=%$BA%% $B%=%%% E$B%=%%%F
9(420++*)03-4 >%@=>D$A%& C$>=<B&A$@ &=$C%=%%% &=$C%=%%% &=$C%=%%%
806(2+0 23.0 !()04 @?&=B?DA&B <<$=?B&ADD ?%%=%%% @<B=%%% D$?=%%% ?$?=%%%
26*5/04 !35 4058(204 '
31605 &&=?@B=B?%A$B &?=BB?=CB<AC$ &$=CBD=%%% &@=&DB=%%% &@=&DB=%%% &=$%C=%%%
4*+0 3! 2*:(1*+ *44014 ?B=B?$ADB <?=@CCA<<
!35!0(1-504 7 :0)*+1(04 E@B=&>DA%%F
(*(+; 76,6%$6 &6(+); ; B>=&%C=%C$A&& ; BC=>?%=?<<ABB ; B<=><D=%%% ; BC=<?@=%%% ; BC=>>$=%%% ; $=%%D=%%%
A-53
WA-160
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"" 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
/0)05*+ !-).
3!!(20 3! 6-,+(2 4*!01"

17 897:;<= 897>=?>;7@ A79 8B>97@CD =E8F7G==CD B@< 8978=9>;=C 7A 27H@>G <=8B9>E=@>C IJ;?J ?7@>9B?> A79 CH?J C=9:;?=CD B@< >7 897:;<= B
CBA= =@:;97@E=@> A79 >J7C= IJ7 HC= 27H@>G 8B9KC B@< 9=?9=B>;7@ B9=BCL 1J= 3AA;?= 7A 6HMF;? 4BA=>G ;C ?7EE;>>=< >7 EB;@>B;@;@N B F=:=F 7A
897A=CC;7@BF =O?=FF=@?= BE7@N ;>C CI79@ 8=9C7@@=F >JB> I;FF =@CH9= >J= CBA=>G 7A >J7C= 9=?=;:;@N C=9:;?=CD BC I=FF BC 897>=?>;@N >J= CBA=>G
7A 7H9 87F;?= 7AA;?=9CL

#$!$%!! '()*+,( -.(/,+
1J= $%&%'&& *<78>=< ,H<N=> 9=AF=?>C >J= >9B@C;>;7@BF ?7C>C BCC7?;B>=< I;>J >J= ?7@C7F;;7@ 7A >J= 3AA;?= 7A 6HMF;? 4BA=>G >7 >J= 4J=9;AAPC
<=8B9>E=@> BC B<78>=< MG >J= ,7B9< 7A 4H8=9:;C79C 7@ 3?>7M=9 &D $%&%L
0.1(
0.12+3)1 /0)05*+ !-). '2+343+5
6-,+(2 6531021(3) 63+(20 6531021(3)
05 #$$6%$7 05 #$$7%!$ 05 #$$7%!$ 05 #$!$%!! 05 #$!$%!!
28'1/, 09):
'(; -.(/,+ 2<'==3032'+3)1 '2+.'< '2+.'< '(; -.(/,+ 9,2)::,1(,( '()*+,(
031'1231/ .=,=
4*+*5(04 Q 0R6+3"00
,0)0!(14 S TUDVWTD%$$L&V S UXDX%%DWU&LUX S V%D$V%D%%% S S $DUYZD%%% S [TWDZ$$D%%%\
405](204 Q 4-66+(04 UVDWTVDUVXLWT T%D$VYDWW$L%Y TYDTWVD%%% [TYDTWVD%%%\
31^05 2^*5/04 &UWDYZTL$X W%XDW$&LTZ ZZ%D%%% [ZZ%D%%%\
2*6(1*+ *44014 ' 0_-(6R0)1 &YYDTU&L&V
/9)== +)+'< S &%&DW&$DU&ZLYV S &%%DZWUD$YTL&% S &&UDW&VD%%% S S $DUYZD%%% S [&&$D$WZD%%%\
()15*!-). 15*)4!05 [UYD&$&D$V$LTW\ [U$DZ&$DXY$LVW\ [UZDUWZD%%%\ UZDUWZD%%%
1,+ +)+'< S TZDTX&D&TTLWX S TZD%V&DY%$LUY S VVD$YZD%%% S S $DUYZD%%% S [VYDZ%%D%%%\
50]0)-0 UUDW%UD%$WLT% UUDWT$D&Y%LZU UZDXW$D%%% [UZDXW$D%%%\
1,+ 2).1+5 2)=+ S &YDZZWD&$ZL$X S &YDY%XD&W&LTX S &WD$VVD%%% S S $DUYZD%%% S [&UDZ$ZD%%%\
,-./010. 634(1(3)4 W&XL% VVVL% VVVL% [VVVL%\
9,4,1., (,+'3<
!0.05*+ ' 31^05 S &ZDVW%L$$ S S S S S
23-51 !004 Q 23414 &VTL%%
15*)4!054 () &ZD%%%L%% &UDWUULWW &ZD%%% [&ZD%%%\
41*10 ' 31^05 YD%UULWZ Z%D%%%L%%
R(420++*)03-4 Z&DZZWL$U X$DWTWLUX UZD%%% [UZD%%%\
+*` 0)!3520R0)1 405](204 UUD%XUDXWYL$X UUD&&&DT$VLXU UZDU&XD%%% [UZDU&XD%%%\
]0^(2+0 23.0 !()04 UW&DUTZLVY UYWDTV%LWZ UZWD%%% [UZWD%%%\
2^*5/04 !35 405](204 '
31^05 YXTL%% $%%L%%
4*+0 3! 2*6(1*+ *44014 &TDTXZLYU &TD&WTLZV
+)+'< 9,4,1., (,+'3< S UUDW%UD%$WLT% S UUDWT$D&Y%LZU S UZDXW$D%%% S S S [UZDXW$D%%%\
A-54
WA-161
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"# 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
/0)05*+ !-).
4605(!!

47879 :8; <=8>?9@ 7=9 4=9>ABB ;A7= 7=9 >9@CDE@AFA:A7G DB F9AE? 7=9 <=A9B :8; 9EBD><9H9E7 DBBA<9> DB 7=9 2DIE7GJ 1=9 4=9>ABB 9EBD><9@ 47879
:8;@ 8EK 2DIE7G D>KAE8E<9@ AE 7=9 IEAE<D>CD>879K 8>98L ;=A<= <DM9>@ NO C9><9E7 DB 7=9 7D78: @PI8>9 HA:9@ ;A7=AE +D@ *E?9:9@ 2DIE7GL
8EK A@ >9@CDE@AF:9 BD> H8AE78AEAE? :8; 8EK D>K9> AE 8:: <A7A9@ ;A7=AE 7=9 2DIE7GJ 1=9 4=9>ABB C>DMAK9@ KA>9<7 7>8BBA< 8EK ?9E9>8: :8;
9EBD><9H9E7 @9>MA<9@L 7=>DI?= <DE7>8<7L 7D Q$ <A7A9@L 7=9 +D@ *E?9:9@ 4IC9>AD> 2DI>7L 7=9 4DI7=9>E 28:ABD>EA8 59?ADE8: 58A: *I7=D>A7G
RS97>D:AETUL 7=9 +D@ *E?9:9@ 2DIE7G S97>DCD:A78E 1>8E@CD>787ADE *I7=D>A7GL 8EK 7=9 2DHHIEA7G 2D::9?9 .A@7>A<7@J
$%&'
$%&()*+& /0)05*+ !-). ,()*-*).
V-,+(2 V531021(3) V3+(20 V531021(3)
$. 011231" $. 011"3!1 $. 011"3!1 $. 01!13!! $. 01!13!!
(4,&56 $7+8
,'9 :%'56) (;,<<*$*(,)*+& ,()%,; ,()%,; ,'9 :%'56) 76(+886&'6' ,'+=)6'
$*&,&(*&5 %<6<
4*+*5(04 W 0SV+3"00
,0)0!(14 X$L&%YL%O$LQ%$J&Z X$L&[YL&Y%LYNYJZ& X $L&YNL&ZYL%%% X $L%N[L&NQL%%% X $L&Q$L[Q%L%%% X R$QL\OYL%%%U
405](204 W 4-VV+(04 [%ZL[QZLNYOJOZ [%YL[$$LN$[J%Z Q&&L\[\L%%% QN$L%&YL%%% QZOL&$&L%%% \[L$\[L%%%
4 W 4 0^V0).(1-50
.(415(,-1(3) RY&LN[$L%%%U RYOLY%$L%%%U RO\LO\OL%%%U [L&QNL%%%
)+),; <67-*(6< > <%==;*6< X [%ZL[QZLNYOJOZ X [%YL[$$LN$[J%Z X [O%L&%YL%%% X Q%YLQ&QL%%% X Q[YLO[YL%%% X \YLQ[%L%%%
31605 26*5/04 Y%L[&ZLOY&JOQ Y&L$%[LN[QJ\% Y$L\NYL%%% Y[L[ONL%%% YOLZ\%L%%% [L&%QL%%%
2*V(1*+ *44014 ' 0_-(VS0)1 &%L[Z[LNYZJ$[ &YLZYZL&Q[JZ$ $\LONZL%%% [[LY&%L%%% Y%LQ\OL%%% [&LZ%YL%%%
57+<< )+),; X$LQ\YL&&OLQZ\JOO X$LO$%LYOYL$N\JN$ X $LY%\LNONL%%% X $LONYLOOOL%%% X $LN%OL[Q&L%%% X ZYLO\QL%%%
()15*!-). 15*)4!05 ROLQ%\L%O\JYOU ROL%YOLYOQJ$QU RO%LNYOL%%%U R&&ZLO[$L%%%U R&%YLQZ$L%%%U ROOLN$NL%%%U
&6) )+),; X$LQ\%LN%NLQ[ZJZ% X$LO&OLOZ%LY$QJQ\ X $LOONLZZ$L%%% X $LQONL%$[L%%% X $LOZ\L\QZL%%% X Q%L\ONL%%%
50]0)-0 &L&Y[LO%$LNN%J$& &L$%OL&O%L$\YJOZ &L$[ZL\&OL%%% &L$&ZL$\$L%%% &L$\[LOZQL%%% Q[LNNZL%%%
&6) (+%&). (+<) X&L[&NL$%QLYYZJYZ X&L[&%LQQ%L[[NJ\Z X &L[&\L&NNL%%% X &L$[NLNQ&L%%% X &L[&OL$OOL%%% X R$LZ$$L%%%U
,-./010. V34(1(3)4 &\L[OQJ% &\L[QNJ% &\L[QNJ% &\LO&OJ% &\LNQNJ% Q%%J%
76-6&%6 '6),*;
31605 /3]05)S0)1*+
*/0)2(04 X &&OLNNOJ%% X &L$Y&L[$[J%$ X $LNN[L%%% X &YNL%%% X &YNL%%% X R$LY%YL%%%U
!0.05*+ ' 31605 $$LN$NLNYQJ&[ [NLYQYLZ[OJ%[ [ZLNYNL%%% [%L$&%L%%% [[LN[$L%%% RYL%[OL%%%U
15*)4!054 () ZLZ$NLQ[%J%Z &YLZ$YLYY\J&% [&LN%$L%%% &YL$$$L%%% $NLN$&L%%% R[LZ\&L%%%U
,-4()044 +(20)404 $%LZ%%J%% $%L$%%J%% O[L%%% O[L%%% O[L%%%
50)14 W 23)2044(3)4 &Q$L&%\J&& &Y%LZ$NJQZ Z[L%%% $%%L%%% $%%L%%% &%NL%%%
41*10'2(1`) 3V1 V-,
4!1"R23V4U [L\ZNL$NNJ%Q QL%$[LYOQJZ\ &L$QZL%%% [L[QZL%%% [L[QZL%%% $L&%%L%%%
41*10 ' 31605 &NLOZ%LQYYJ&% &%LY&\L$Q\JYN [%L%QNL%%% $%L%QNL%%% &&LQY%L%%% R&\LO\NL%%%U
31605 4*+04 O&LZNZJO% O%L\Z[J&Q &Q%L%%% &Q%L%%% &Q%L%%%
S(420++*)03-4 &YL%$ZL&ZZJZ$ &OL&[&L[Z\JO& $QLONYL%%% &YL$%YL%%% $QL\N$L%%% $ZYL%%%
A-55
WA-162
!"#"$%& ()#*
(+ ,-.-/.. (0#%& 1)*!"2 !"# 34)#2+ 4( &45 %#!"&"5

$%!%&!! ()*+,-) ./)0-,
267 ,-.-/.. %89:;78 1<8=7; >7?@7A;B ?<C8DC= ?9> C7=9;DE;78 BE@E>D7B EC8 7F:@9G77 H7C7?D;B DCA>7EB7BI >7;D>7F7C;I >7;D>77 67E@;6
DCB<>ECA7I B7J<E@ EBBE<@; KD; HEAK@9=BI :E;>9@ B7>LDA7B DC <CDCA9>:9>E;78 E>7EBI EC8 M<H@DA 5E?7;G %<=F7C;E;D9C (<C8 ;>ECB?7>N %@B9
>7?@7A;B ?<C8DC= ?9> 73%M5 FEDC;7CECA7I B<FF7> =EC= B<::>7BBD9C EA;DLD;D7BI &%/$035 O9HD@7 *E;E 39F:<;7> PO*3QI 39CB9@7 5RD;A6
0C;7>?EA7I EC8 %<;9FE;DA S76DA@7 &9AE;9>I EB R7@@ EB ?<C8DC= ?9> A@9B78 AD>A<D; ;7@7LDBD9C E; O7CTB 37C;>E@ UED@I EC8 ?<C8DC= ;9 B<::9>;
A9CB9@D8E;D9C 9? ;67 4??DA7 9? M<H@DA 5E?7;G ;9 ;67 567>D??TB *7:E>;F7C;N 0C E88D;D9CI >7?@7A;B >78<A;D9C DC 9L7>;DF7I 87@7;D9C 9? ,.VN-
:9BD;D9CB 8<7 ;9 ;67 89RCBDWDC= 9? ;67 MD;A67BB *7;7C;D9C 37C;7> / #9>;6 (EAD@D;GI EC8 7@DFDCE;D9C 9? X--N- LEAEC; 87:<;G B67>D?? =7C7>E@DB;
:9BD;D9CB ;6>9<=69<; ;67 *7:E>;F7C;TB 9:7>E;D9CB C77878 ;9 E88>7BB ;67 39<C;GTB :>9Y7A;78 B;><A;<>E@ ?<C8DC= 87?DAD; ?9> ;67 ,-.-/..
1<8=7;N (DCE@@GI >7?@7A;B AE>>G9L7> ?<C8 HE@ECA7 EC8 E88D;D9CE@ );D@D;G )B7>B 2EJ / O7EB<>7 ) ;9 :E>;DE@@G FD;D=E;7 H<8=7; A<>;ED@F7C;BN
&%Z "#(4$3"O"#2 5"$S03"5 [.,I\V.I]\,N-- [,-I[^XI[,VN_V [-VI,--I--- [\,I]VXI--- [^.I.X.I--- \]I_X.I---
$"34$*0#! (""5 X^ÎX,VNX, ]-Î_X^N\\ ^]]I--- V--I--- V--I--- PV]]I---Q
S"`03&" 34*" (0#"5 \IV^]I-^XN_. Î]\]I,..N[- Î]V_I--- _I.X]I--- ..I\VVI--- XI-_[I---
52%2"/M$4M .\, M)1&03
5%("2+ V]VI^._I-],N[_ V[-IV.VI^],N,^ V^[I..Î--- VX_I]^]I--- V]_I]_,I--- P.[IV,]I---Q
3`%$!"5 (4$ 5"$S03"5 /
42`"$ VIVX-I.X-N[X XI[.-I^[,N]\ ]I,.]I--- XI^]-I--- XI^]-I--- P,IX[]I---Q
5%&" 4( 3%M02%& %55"25 V[VI-[^N,] []Î.-_N]\ [,.I--- .^-I--- Î,_-I--- \I\]_I---
(4$("02)$"5 a M"#%&20"5 .I.\[I-.[N.. .I.,XI^_,N_\ _,VI--- _,VI--- _,VI---
30S0& M$43"55 5"$S03" ]I^._I\[\N\\ ]I]][IVV\N\. ]I-VXI--- ]I\VXI--- ]I\VXI--- \--I---
0#5202)204#%& 3%$" a 5S5 _VI]^[I\][N^X .,\I.[Î._\N.V _]I^\Î--- __I..]I--- __I..]I--- ,I,XÎ---
,*,(1 2-3-4/- )-,(51 b.I.]XI[-,I\\-N,. b.I,-[I.[-I,^]N[_ b .I,X_I^.[I--- b .I,._I,^,I--- b .I,^XI[_VI--- b VXI\\_I---
67 $%%8&%" 67 $%%"&!% 67 $%%"&!% 67 $%!%&!! 67 $%!%&!!
9:(40- 62*;
()< ./)0-, 91(==5659(,5*4 (9,/(1 (9,/(1 ()< ./)0-, 2-9*;;-4)-) ()*+,-)
A-56
WA-163
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"" 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
/0)05*+ !-).
4605(!! ' 23-)1" 4057(204

89:;<=>? @9:A>BA<:C D:9 @EA9:C?F >G@H:I>>?F EC= @9:@>9A<>? :D 2:JCAI =>@E9AG>CA? KL<BL B:CA9EBA D:9 ?>BJ9<AI ?>9;?F EC= @9:;<=>? E
?ED> >C;<9:CG>CA D:9 AL:?> KL: J?> 2:JCAI @E9M? EC= 9>B9>EA<:C E9>E?N

!"#"$## &'()*+' ,-'.+*
1L> $%&%'&& *=:@A>= ,J=O>A 9>DH>BA? DJC=<CO D:9 AL> B:C?:H<=EA<:C :D AL> 3DD :D 8JPHAI K<AL AL> 4L>9<DDQ? .>@E9AG>CA E?
E@@9:;>= PI AL> ,:E9= :C .>B>GP>9 &RF $%%SN
/-0'
/-01*2(0 /0)05*+ !-). &1*232*4
8-,+(2 8531021(3) 83+(20 8531021(3)
/4 !""5$"6 /4 !""6$#" /4 !""6$#" /4 !"#"$## /4 !"#"$##
17&0.+ /8(9
&': ,-'.+* 1;&<<2/21&*2(0 &1*-&; &1*-&; &': ,-'.+* 8+1(99+0'+' &'()*+'
/20&0120. -<+<
4*+*5(04 T 0U8+3"00
,0)0!(14 V V V V W&F%SSF%%% V W$F&WXF%%% V W$F&WXF%%%
4057(204 T 4-88+(04 Y$FZ%ZF%%% Y%FS$XF%%% Y%FS$XF%%%
4 T 4 0[80).(1-50
.(415(,-1(3) $RZF%%% $W%F%%% $W%F%%%
*(*&; <+8321+< = <-));2+< V V V V Y$FXZ$F%%% V Y&F&SXF%%% V Y&F&SXF%%%
31605 26*5/04 YX&F%%% YX&F%%% YX&F%%%
2*8(1*+ *44014 ' 0\-(8U0)1 R%%F%%% R%%F%%% R%%F%%%
.8(<< *(*&; V V V V &&YFSY$F%%% V &&YF]RWF%%% V &&YF]RWF%%%
()15*!-). 15*)4!05 ^ZRFXZRF%%%_ ^R%F$X%F%%%_ ^R%F$X%F%%%_
0+* *(*&; V V V V YSF%WWF%%% V ZYF%WWF%%% V ZYF%WWF%%%
5070)-0 YSF%WWF%%% YSF%WSF%%% YSF%WSF%%%
0+* 1(-0*4 1(<* V V V V V &YFSSXF%%% V &YFSSXF%%%
,-./010. 834(1(3)4 ZZ]N% ZXZN% ZXZN%
8+3+0-+ '+*&2;
U(420++*)03-4 V V V V YXF%%% V YXF%%% V YXF%%%
+*` 0)!3520U0)1 4057(204 YXFRY$F%%% YXFRYYF%%% YXFRYYF%%%
706(2+0 23.0 !()04 YXWF%%% YXWF%%% YXWF%%%
*(*&; 8+3+0-+ '+*&2; V V V V YSF%WWF%%% V YSF%WSF%%% V YSF%WSF%%%
A-57
WA-164
!"#"$%& ()#*
(+ ,-.-/.. (0#%& 1)*!"2 !"# 34)#2+ 4( &45 %#!"&"5
56"$0(( / 7%2$4&

789:;<=> ?@A =BC98D=E=BF >=8:;D= F9 9:=8 GHIJ,K. >LM@8= E;?=> 9C 39MBFN MB;BD98O98@F=< @8=@J @B< F8@CC;D D9BF89? @B< ?@A =BC98D=E=BF
>=8:;D= F9 P, D9BF8@DF D;F;=>J @B< F9 FQ= 59MFQ=8B 3@?;C98B;@ $=R;9B@? $@;? %MFQ98;FN ST=F89?;BUVJ FQ= &9> %BR=?=> 39MBFN T=F89O9?;F@B
28@B>O98F@F;9B %MFQ98;FNJ @B< FQ= 39EEMB;FN 39??=R= *;>F8;DF>W

$%&'
$%&()*+& !"#"$%& ()#* ,()*-*).
7)1&03 7$42"3204# 74&03" 7$42"3204#
$. !""01"2 $. !""213" $. !""213" $. !"3"133 $. !"3"133
(4,&56 $7+8
,'9 :%'56) (;,<<*$*(,)*+& ,()%,; ,()%,; ,'9 :%'56) 76(+886&'6' ,'+=)6'
$*&,&(*&5 %<6<
5%&%$0"5 X "T7&4+""
1"#"(025 Y H-IJZ[[J-H-WGH Y H.GJ-,.JKPHWKH Y H.GJ-,,J--- Y [PKJHPZJ--- Y [G,J[KGJ--- Y S,IJ,IZJ---V
5"$\03"5 X 5)77&0"5 ,IJ,ZKJH[PWGK ,.JI,-JHHKW.I ,.JI,.J--- Z.J[K,J--- Z,JZH[J--- .-J[IIJ---
5 X 5 "]7"#*02)$"
*052$01)204# .[HJ--- S,J.PHJ---V ,J-PGJ--- .JH[.J---
)+),; <67-*(6< > <%==;*6< Y ,IJ,ZKJH[PWGK Y ,.JI,-JHHKW.I Y ,.J[GGJ--- Y ,GJI-PJ--- Y ZPJPZIJ--- Y .,JIZ[J---
3%702%& %55"25 / "^)07T"#2 KJKIHJ--KWP, ,J-.HJI.GW[[ ,J-.GJ--- ..JZ.ZJ--- ..J,,GJ--- GJ,.-J---
57+<< )+),; Y HZHJ.H-JGI.WZK Y HP,JII.J-KZWK. Y HP,JHP-J--- Y [HIJ[I-J--- Y HZHJP,PJ--- Y SPJP.IJ---V
0#2$%()#* 2$%#5("$ S,J,I.J.PHWG.V S,JK,GJ[G.WHHV S,.J-G,J---V S,.J-G,J---V S,ZJ[ZIJ---V S,JIPPJ---V
&6) )+),; Y HZKJG.GJH.,WPP Y HP-J.Z.J,I.WIZ Y H,.J[PHJ--- Y [IKJIIHJ--- Y H.PJIHHJ--- Y S[J-I-J---V
$"\"#)" KGKJIG.J.H[WGI KGGJP-,JZ,-WG, I.,JPG,J--- KG-J--HJ--- I,[J-PPJ--- .PJKK,J---
&6) (+%&). (+<) Y ,P-J,,HJI,PWPH Y ,P-J[,HJGP-W[. Y ,-GJ,KIJ--- Y .[KJII-J--- Y .H[JIPPJ--- Y S,.JI.,J---V
1)*!"2"* 7450204#5 IJ-GZW- IJ-GPW- IJ-GPW- KJG.IW- IJ-,PW- S[-W-V
76-6&%6 '6),*;
426"$ !4\"$#T"#2%&
%!"#30"5 Y ..KJ[[KW-- Y .J,I.JZ,ZW-, Y .JIHPJ--- Y .I[J--- Y .I[J--- Y S.JK.[J---V
("*"$%& / 426"$ [J,P[J,Z,WP. KJK.ZJ,.IWI[ ..JGI.J--- ,JG.-J--- KJ-,.J--- SIJGP-J---V
2$%#5("$5 0# ,JZKIJZ[,WKP ,J,--J--- ,J,--J--- ,J,--J---
1)50#"55 &03"#5"5 .J--- .J--- .J---
52%2"/302_# 472 7)1
5(2+S3475V .J[IHJK,ZW-P .JKKKJ.,GW-[ .J,PGJ--- .J,PGJ--- .J,PGJ---
52%2" / 426"$ ,J[[GJ-.GWPH .J[.PJ,KGWHI ZPPJ--- .J-PPJ--- .J-KGJ--- [.KJ---
426"$ 5%&"5 K-WG[ .H.WZ-
T053"&&%#"4)5 KZPJK[-W[H KP,JP-PWZP [J--- Z--J--- HJGIIJ--- HJGKGJ---
&%` "#(4$3"T"#2 5"$\03"5 ZP-J[-PJPIPWHZ ZPGJG[,JHHHWZH ZP-JKIKJ--- ZK.J-GGJ--- ZKGJKH,J--- .GJ-.[J---
\"603&" 34*" (0#"5 [JPHIJ-HZWG. HJI[IJ,..WK- HJIPGJ--- HJIPGJ--- ..J,K[J--- ,JI-HJ---
52%2"/7$47 .[, 7)1&03
5%("2+ ,ZPJKI,JIH,WI- ,,[J,GIJPH-WKZ ,PPJH-GJ--- ,,.JHH,J--- ,Z[J-ZKJ--- S[J[[PJ---V
36%$!"5 (4$ 5"$\03"5 /
426"$ PHIJ[,PWPP PGGJ,GKW[. K--J--- K--J--- K--J---
5%&" 4( 3%702%& %55"25 IJ-I-WK- .PJKKHW-- K,.J--- KJ--- KJ--- SK.IJ---V
(4$("02)$"5 X 7"#%&20"5 ,J--- ,J--- ,J---
)+),; 76-6&%6 '6),*; Y KGKJIG.J.H[WGI Y KGGJP-,JZ,-WG, Y I.,JPG,J--- Y KG-J--HJ--- Y I,[J-PPJ--- Y .PJKK,J---
A-58
WA-165
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"! 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
/0)05*+ !-).
15(*+ 23-51 3605*1(3)4

178 +9:;<8='(>8?@8=A 1=BCD 29E=F !E?GB?A *:F H12!*I 9J &KKL H*>>8M@D< ,BDD $NNO 27CPF8= QR%O 4FCFEF8> 9J &KKLI P=9SBG8> D9?A'F8=M
JB>:CD =8DB8J F9 :9E?FB8> @< :CPPB?A F78 :9E?FB8>T :9?F=B@EFB9? J9= :9E=F 9P8=CFB9?>U 178 12!* =8VEB=8> :9E?FB8> F9 MC;8 C? C??ECD
WCB?F8?C?:8 9J 0JJ9=F HW30I PC<M8?F F9 F78 4FCF8 J9= >EPP9=F 9J F=BCD :9E=F>U 178 1=BCD 29E=F !C:BDBFB8> *:F H48?CF8 ,BDD &LN$O 27CPF8=
&%Q$O 4FCFEF8> 9J $%%$I CEF79=BX8G F78 F=C?>J8= 9J =8>P9?>B@BDBF< J9= :9E=F JC:BDBFB8> J=9M F78 :9E?FB8> F9 F78 4FCF8 C?G =8VEB=8> F7CF :9E?FB8>
MC;8 29E?F< !C:BDBFB8> 6C<M8?F H2!6IU 17B> @EGA8F CD>9 P=9SBG8> JE?GB?A J9= :8=FCB? :9E=F'=8DCF8G 8YP8?GBFE=8> >E:7 C> B?GBA8?F
G8J8?>8O D9:CD ZEGB:BCD @8?8JBF>O C?G :9DD8:FB9? 8?7C?:8M8?FU
!#"#$"" &'()*+' ,-'.+*
178 $%&%'&& *G9PF8G ,EGA8F =8JD8:F> JE?GB?A J9= PC<M8?F 9J 29E?F<T> WCB?F8?C?:8 9J 0JJ9=F HW30I 9@DBACFB9? F9 F78 4FCF8 C?G J9= :9E=F'
=8DCF8G 8YP8?GBFE=8> F7CF =8MCB? F78 29E?F<T> =8>P9?>B@BDBF9 B?:DEG8> :9E=F JB?8> C?G J88> =8S8?E8 [7B:7 B>
@EGA8F8G :8?F=CDD< C?G B> E>8G F9 PC=FBCDD< JB?C?:8 F78 W30 9@DBACFB9? C?G :9E=F'=8DCF8G 8YP8?GBFE=8>U
/-0'
/-01*2(0 /0)05*+ !-). &1*232*4
6-,+(2 6531021(3) \-.(2(*+
/4 !##5$#6 /4 !##6$"# /4 !##6$"# /4 !#"#$"" /4 !#"#$""
17&0.+ /8(9
&': ,-'.+* 1;&<<2/21&*2(0 &1*-&; &1*-&; &': ,-'.+* 8+1(99+0'+' &'()*+'
/20&0120. -<+<
4*+*5(04 ] 0W6+3"00
,0)0!(14 ^ $QO$&_OKLRU$_ ^ $QOK&KOLR_U%R ^ $KO&_%O%%% ^ N%OQRÒ%%% ^ N%OK%QO%%% ^ &OL`QO%%%
405a(204 ] 4-66+(04 Q_OL&LOR_QUQL LLO%&QO_%$U`K LLON&$O%%% _$O&R%O%%% LLO%&KO%%% H$KNO%%%I
31b05 2b*5/04 $Q$OK&Ò%$_UQK $K&ONQ%O`K_U_` $KROKNQO%%% $KÒ_R%O%%% $KÒ_R%O%%% H&O$QQO%%%I
.8(<< *(*&; ^ NKLOQ`QORL&U%$ ^ NKLON&QOQRRU&Q ^ `%$O`&%O%%% ^ NQLO_RÒ%%% ^ `%$ORLLO%%% ^ &_LO%%%
0+* *(*&; ^ NKLOQ`QORL&U%$ ^ NKLON&QOQRRU&Q ^ `%$O`&%O%%% ^ NQLO_RÒ%%% ^ `%$ORLLO%%% ^ &_LO%%%
50a0)-0 &R&OQQ$OK$$U_` &`ROQRLO$RKURL &`QO_`KO%%% &`QO$&QO%%% &`QO$&QO%%% H`N&O%%%I
0+* 1(-0*4 1(<* ^ $`ROK_RO_`QUNQ ^ $R&O`_&ORKRU_& ^ $RNOL_&O%%% ^ $NKO`N_O%%% ^ $RÒNRKO%%% ^ RKQO%%%
,-./010. 634(1(3)4 R%U% R%U% R%U% R%U% R%U%
8+3+0-+ '+*&2;
31b05 +(20)404 ] 605W(14 ^ &LNO_L%U%% ^ &RKOQ_%U%% ^ &_%O%%% ^ &_%O%%% ^ &_%O%%% ^
23-51 !004 ] 23414 LOR`ROL__U$N _OL&_OQ_$UQN LOK_Ò%%% _OL$KO%%% _OL$KO%%% H&O$NRO%%%I
15*)4!054 () KO%%% KO%%% KO%%%
,-4()044 +(20)404 `%%U%% &%O%%% &%O%%% &%O%%%
41*10 ' 31b05 L$O%%% HL$O%%%I
41*10'15(*+ 23-514 &`Ù%%
W(420++*)03-4 $`%O$&LUL` &_KON%LUQN $NRO%%% $NRO%%% $NRO%%%
50235.()/ !004 &&_OQ%RU%% &%LO%_%U%% &N%O%%% &N%O%%% &N%O%%%
a0b(2+0 23.0 !()04 LO$KKO&R$UR& _OL`NO%&QU_N _OL%&O%%% _OL%&O%%% _OL%&O%%%
31b05 23-51 !()04 &N$OL_NONRNURK &$QO$$Ò&NLU%Q &N%O`&QO%%% &N%OQ%RO%%% &N%OQ%RO%%% NQLO%%%
+0/*+ 405a(204 NOL`NO`&NURL NOLNLO%&NU$% $OKR%O%%% NO`NKO%%% NO`NKO%%% `QKO%%%
*(*&; 8+3+0-+ '+*&2; ^ &R&OQQ$OK$$U_` ^ &`ROQRLO$RKURL ^ &`QO_`KO%%% ^ &`QO$&QO%%% ^ &`QO$&QO%%% ^ H`N&O%%%I
A-59
WA-166
!"#"$%& ()#*
(+ ,-.-/.. (0#%& 1)*!"2 !"# 34)#2+ 4( &45 %#!"&"5
2$0%& 34)$2 46"$%204#5/74" 34#2$01)204#

$%&'
$%&()*+& !"#"$%& ()#* ,()*-*).
6)1&03 6$42"3204# 8)*030%&
$. !001203 $. !0032"0 $. !0032"0 $. !0"02"" $. !0"02""
(4,&56 $7+8
,'9 :%'56) (;,<<*$*(,)*+& ,()%,; ,()%,; ,'9 :%'56) 76(+886&'6' ,'+=)6'
$*&,&(*&5 %<6<
429"$ 39%$!"5 : ,;,<=.><-,?@;= : ,=.<A;-<>=?@?> : ,=B<=A;<--- : ,=><?B-<--- : ,=><?B-<--- : C.<,;;<---D
&6) )+),; : ,;,<=.><-,?@;= : ,=.<A;-<>=?@?> : ,=B<=A;<--- : ,=><?B-<--- : ,=><?B-<--- : C.<,;;<---D
$"E"#)" .B.<;;,<=,,@?> .>B<;>-<;BA@=; .>;<BFF<--- .>;<,.;<--- .>;<,.;<--- CAB=<---D
&6) (+%&). (+<) : .A.<-A.<.->@,B : .>B<BA=<?>,@?? : .>F<A?.<--- : .>?<>A,<--- : .>?<>A,<--- : C=,=<---D
76-6&%6 '6),*;
429"$ &03"#5"5 G 6"$7025 : .FA<?F-@-- : .B=<;?-@-- : .?-<--- : .?-<--- : .?-<--- :
34)$2 (""5 G 34525 FB<F??@,A ?<F.?<;?,@;A F<=?><--- ?<F,=<--- ?<F,=<--- C.<,AB<---D
2$%#5("$5 0# =<--- =<--- =<---
1)50#"55 &03"#5"5 >--@-- .-<--- .-<--- .-<---
52%2"/2$0%& 34)$25 .>>@--
7053"&&%#"4)5 ,>-<,.F@F> .B,<=-,@,> ,AB<--- ,AB<--- ,AB<---
$"34$*0#! (""5 ..?<;-B@-- .-F<-?-@-- .A-<--- .A-<--- .A-<---
E"903&" 34*" (0#"5 F<,==<.B,@B. ?<F>A<-.;@?A ?<F-.<--- ?<F-.<--- ?<F-.<---
429"$ 34)$2 (0#"5 .A,<F?A<ABA@B= .,;<,,><.AF@-; .A-<>.;<--- .A-<;-B<--- .A-<;-B<--- A;F<---
&"!%& 5"$E03"5 A<F>A<>.A@BF A<FAF<-.A@,- ,<=B-<--- A<>A=<--- A<>A=<--- >;=<---
)+),; 76-6&%6 '6),*; : .B.<;;,<=,,@?> : .>B<;>-<;BA@=; : .>;<BFF<--- : .>;<,.;<--- : .>;<,.;<--- : CAB=<---D
A-60
WA-167
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"# 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
4502(*+ !-).4
+()6*/04 4-55371 573/7*8 !-).
19: +;<=>?:@ 5AB?A>C DABE;F:@ GBCDA:9:<@;E:H IB<?'J:AC @:AE;G:@ KBGL@:F B< J9: DA:E:<J;B< BK DA:C>JLA: BA ;<>DDABDA;>J:
;<@J;JLJ;B<>I;M>J;B< BK KA>;IH >J A;@=H BA KL<GJ;B<>IIN ;CD>;A:F >FLIJ@H >?: &O N:>A@ ><F BIF:AP

$"%"&%% ()*+,-) ./)0-,
19: $%&%'&& *FBDJ:F ,LF?:J A:KI:GJ@ >< ;<GA:>@: ;< KL<F;<? KBA GB<JA>GJ @:AE;G:@ JB >;F KA>;I :IF:AIN ><F ;CD>;A:F >FLIJ@ ;< BAF:A JB >EB;F
DA:C>JLA: ;<@J;JLJ;B<>I;M>J;B@: ;@ KLIIN KL<F:F QN KL<F Q>I><G:H G><G:II>J;B< BK F:@;?<>J;B< ><F >< ;<GA:>@: ;< DABR:GJ:F
A:E:<L:P
1/2)
1/23,4*2
+()6*/04 4-55371 573/7*8
!-). (3,454,6
5-,+(2 *44(41*)20 31S07 *44(41*)20
16 $""7&"# 16 $""#&%" 16 $""#&%" 16 $"%"&%% 16 $"%"&%%
38(20- 19*:
(); ./)0-, 3<(==4143(,4*2 (3,/(< (3,/(< (); ./)0-, 9-3*::-2)-) ()*+,-)
142(23420 /=-=
407T(204 U 4-55+(04 V W%%H%%%P%% V WW&HXY%PXZ V W[[H%%% V [$XH%%% V [$XH%%% V &W$H%%%
31S07 !()*)2()/ -404 WZH%%%P%% W&HZW[P%% WWH%%% WWH%%% WWH%%%
*55735 !37 23)1()/0)2" XZH%%% $\ZH%%% &Z%H%%%
/7344 131*+ WWZH%%%P%% Y%\HZ&[PXZ [$YH%%% [OZH%%% &H%&OH%%% $X$H%%%
573T !37 704].04
.04(/)*1(3)4 ZWH%%%P%% ZWH%%% ^ZWH%%%_
131*+ 704].04 ZWH%%%P%% ZWH%%% ^ZWH%%%_
,*,(< 142(23420 /=-= V WWZH%%%P%% V YZOHZ&[PXZ V [[&H%%% V [OZH%%% V &H%&OH%%% V $Z[H%%%
142(23420 =*/93-=
!-). ,*+*)20 V &\&H%%%P%% V $&XH%%%P%% V $&XH%%% V &W\H%%% V \O[H%%% V &YOH%%%
2*)20+ 704].04 &HXO\P%% $[HXX$P%% ZWH%%% ZWH%%% ZWH%%%
70T0)-0 Y\XH[&[P$% [O[HOZ$P[X WW$H%%% WOYH%%% WOYH%%% \ZH%%%
,*,(< 142(23420 =*/93-= V [[$H[%%P$% V &H%\ZHO\ZP[X V [[&H%%% V [OZH%%% V &H%&OH%%% V $Z[H%%%
9-5-2/- )-,(4<
8(420++*)03-4 V &ZH%&XP%% V V V V V
T0S(2+0 23.0 !()04 Y$WHYXOP$% [O[HOZ$P[X WW$H%%% WOYH%%% WOYH%%% \ZH%%%
,*,(< 9-5-2/- )-,(4< V Y\XH[&[P$% V [O[HOZ$P[X V WW$H%%% V WOYH%%% V WOYH%%% V \ZH%%%
A-61
WA-168
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !"# 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
4502(*+ !-).4
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 26(+. 40*1 70417*()1 +3*)07 !-).
189: ;<=>? @<A8BC9DE> <=>EC 2@F9;BC=9@ GE89HFE 2B>E 4EHA9B= $IJK%? LCBM9>E: A8@A @ LBCA9B= B; ;9=E: HBFFEHAE> ;BC M9BF@A9B=: B; A8E H89F>
CE:AC@9=A F@N OE @FFBH@AE> AB HB<=A9E: ;BC A8E BLEC@A9B= B; @ H89F> CE:AC@9=A FBN'HB:A L<CH8@:E @=> FB@= LCBPC@QR

"$%$&%% ()*+,-) ./)0-,
18E $%&%'&& *>BLAE> ,<>PEA HB=A9=<E: LCBPC@Q ;<=>9=P A8CB<P8 A8E <:E B; @M@9F@OFE ;<=> O@F@=HE? CEQ@9=9=P ;<=>: ;CBQ A8E
>E:9P=@A9B=? @=> CEME=<ER
1/2)
1/23,4*2
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 26(+. 40*1
70417*()1 +3*)07 !-). (3,454,6
5-,+(2 5731021(3) 31607 5731021(3)
16 "$$7&$# 16 "$$#&%$ 16 "$$#&%$ 16 "$%$&%% 16 "$%$&%%
38(20- 19*:
(); ./)0-, 3<(==4143(,4*2 (3,/(< (3,/(< (); ./)0-, 9-3*::-2)-) ()*+,-)
142(23420 /=-=
31607 !()*)2()/ -404 S JT&?UJVRUV S V$I?W$JRJJ S W$I?%%% S W$I?%%% S W$I?%%% S
*55735 !37 23)1()/0)2" WU?%%% J%?%%% X$U?%%%Y
/7344 131*+ JT&?UJVRUV V$I?W$JRJJ WTK?%%% W$I?%%% WWI?%%% X$U?%%%Y
573G !37 704Z.04
.04(/)*1(3)4 &?TI&?%%%R%% &?T&V?%%%R%% &?T&V?%%% &?KJW?%%% &?KJW?%%% X&IU?%%%Y
131*+ 704Z.04 &?TI&?%%%R%% &?T&V?%%%R%% &?T&V?%%% &?KJW?%%% &?KJW?%%% X&IU?%%%Y
,*,(< 142(23420 /=-= S $?$W$?UJVRUV S $?$V&?W$JRJJ S $?V%%?%%% S $?&K$?%%% S $?&U$?%%% S X$%T?%%%Y
142(23420 =*/93-=
!-). ,*+*)20 S U&?%%%R%% S &$I?%%%R%% S &$I?%%% S V$?%%% S I$?%%% S XWW?%%%Y
2*)20+ 704Z.04 &?U%I?%%%R%% &?TI&?%%%R%% &?TI&?%%% &?T&V?%%% &?T&V?%%% XWI?%%%Y
70G0)-0 JT&?U&KR&I J&K?%KWRJV V%$?%%% J%K?%%% J%K?%%% XUK?%%%Y
,*,(< 142(23420 =*/93-= S $?JIU?U&KR&I S $?J&V?%KWRJV S $?V%%?%%% S $?&K$?%%% S $?&U$?%%% S X$%T?%%%Y
9-5-2/- )-,(4<
31607 23-71 !()04 S JT&?U&KR&I S J&K?%KWRJV S V%$?%%% S J%K?%%% S J%K?%%% S XUK?%%%Y
,*,(< 9-5-2/- )-,(4< S JT&?U&KR&I S J&K?%KWRJV S V%$?%%% S J%K?%%% S J%K?%%% S XUK?%%%Y
A-62
WA-169
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !!! 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
4502(*+ !-).4
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 41*16*7 !-).
189 4:;:8;< !=>? @;A 9A:;BCDA89? BE 28;F:9G HH&I 4:;:=:9A JK &LM%I @8DN8 D<FJA9? ; F9>;C:E ;AA9AA<9>: J> NJ>ODN:9? ?G=>P ?GDO9GAQ
189A9 K=>?A <=A: B9 ?9FJAD:9? D>:J ; AF9ND;C K=>? BE :89 NJ=G:A D> 9;N8 NJ=>:EI ;>? <=A: B9 =A9? :J JKKA9: :89 NJA: JK :G9;:D>R ;CNJ8JC
;B=A9Q

"#$#%$$ '()*+,( -.(/,+
189 $%&%'&& *?JF:9? ,=?R9: G9KC9N:A ;> D>NG9;A9 D> FGJRG;< K=>?D>R ?=9 :J ;> D>NG9;A9 D> G9O9>=9 ;>? ;O;DC;BC9 K=>? B;C;>N9Q
0.1(
0.12+3)1
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 41*16*7
!-). '2+343+5
60*+16 *). 4*)(1*1(3) 60*+16
05 "##6%#7 05 "##7%$# 05 "##7%$# 05 "#$#%$$ 05 "#$#%$$
28'1/, 09):
'(; -.(/,+ 2<'==3032'+3)1 '2+.'< '2+.'< '(; -.(/,+ 9,2)::,1(,( '()*+,(
031'1231/ .=,=
3160S !()*)2()/ -404 T &IU%HI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &XI%%%
*55S35 !3S 23)1()/0)2" &I%%% &%VI%%% &%$I%%%
/S344 131*+ &IU%HI%%%Q%% &IV$WI%%%Q%% &IV$MI%%% &IVU$I%%% &IUUXI%%% &&WI%%%
5S3Y !3S S04Z.04
.04(/)*1(3)4 $LI%%%Q%%
131*+ S04Z.04 $LI%%%Q%%
+)+'< 031'1231/ .=,= T &IUVXI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%%Q%% T &IV$MI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IUUXI%%% T &&WI%%%
031'1231/ =).92,=
!-). ,*+*)20 T &UWI%%%Q%% T HUI%%%Q%% T HUI%%% T $%I%%% T &$VI%%% T XLI%%%
2*)20+ S04Z.04 $LI%%%Q%% $LI%%% [$LI%%%\
S0Y0)-0 &IVX&IHVWQL$ &IVXWI%H$QMH &I$VXI%%% &IV$$I%%% &IV$$I%%% MWI%%%
+)+'< 031'1231/ =).92,= T &IULMIHVWQL$ T &IUX%I%H$QMH T &IV$MI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IUUXI%%% T &&WI%%%
9,4,1., (,+'3<
Y06(2+0 23.0 !()04 T &IVX&IHVWQL$ T &IVXWI%H$QMH T &I$VXI%%% T &IV$$I%%% T &IV$$I%%% T MWI%%%
+)+'< 9,4,1., (,+'3< T &IVX&IHVWQL$ T &IVXWI%H$QMH T &I$VXI%%% T &IV$$I%%% T &IV$$I%%% T MWI%%%
A-63
WA-170
!" $%&%'&& !()*+ ,-./01 !!! 23-)1" 3! +34 *)/0+04
4502(*+ !-).4
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 41*16*7 !-).
189 4:;:8;< !=>? @;A 9A:;BCDA89? BE 28;F:9G HH&I 4:;:=:9A JK &LM%I @8DN8 D<FJA9? ; F9>;C:E ;AA9AA<9>: J> NJ>ODN:9? ?G=>P ?GDO9GAQ
189A9 K=>?A <=A: B9 ?9FJAD:9? D>:J ; AF9ND;C K=>? BE :89 NJ=G:A D> 9;N8 NJ=>:EI ;>? <=A: B9 =A9? :J JKKA9: :89 NJA: JK :G9;:D>R ;CNJ8JC
;B=A9Q

"#$#%$$ '()*+,( -.(/,+
189 $%&%'&& *?JF:9? ,=?R9: G9KC9N:A ;> D>NG9;A9 D> FGJRG;< K=>?D>R ?=9 :J ;> D>NG9;A9 D> G9O9>=9 ;>? ;O;DC;BC9 K=>? B;C;>N9Q
0.1(
0.12+3)1
5-,+(2 60*+16 ' 41*16*7
!-). '2+343+5
60*+16 *). 4*)(1*1(3) 60*+16
05 "##6%#7 05 "##7%$# 05 "##7%$# 05 "#$#%$$ 05 "#$#%$$
28'1/, 09):
'(; -.(/,+ 2<'==3032'+3)1 '2+.'< '2+.'< '(; -.(/,+ 9,2)::,1(,( '()*+,(
031'1231/ .=,=
3160S !()*)2()/ -404 T &IU%HI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &XI%%%
*55S35 !3S 23)1()/0)2" &I%%% &%VI%%% &%$I%%%
/S344 131*+ &IU%HI%%%Q%% &IV$WI%%%Q%% &IV$MI%%% &IVU$I%%% &IUUXI%%% &&WI%%%
5S3Y !3S S04Z.04
.04(/)*1(3)4 $LI%%%Q%%
131*+ S04Z.04 $LI%%%Q%%
+)+'< 031'1231/ .=,= T &IUVXI%%%Q%% T &IV$WI%%%Q%% T &IV$MI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IUUXI%%% T &&WI%%%
031'1231/ =).92,=
!-). ,*+*)20 T &UWI%%%Q%% T HUI%%%Q%% T HUI%%% T $%I%%% T &$VI%%% T XLI%%%
2*)20+ S04Z.04 $LI%%%Q%% $LI%%% [$LI%%%\
S0Y0)-0 &IVX&IHVWQL$ &IVXWI%H$QMH &I$VXI%%% &IV$$I%%% &IV$$I%%% MWI%%%
+)+'< 031'1231/ =).92,= T &IULMIHVWQL$ T &IUX%I%H$QMH T &IV$MI%%% T &IVU$I%%% T &IUUXI%%% T &&WI%%%
9,4,1., (,+'3<
Y06(2+0 23.0 !()04 T &IVX&IHVWQL$ T &IVXWI%H$QMH T &I$VXI%%% T &IV$$I%%% T &IV$$I%%% T MWI%%%
+)+'< 9,4,1., (,+'3< T &IVX&IHVWQL$ T &IVXWI%H$QMH T &I$VXI%%% T &IV$$I%%% T &IV$$I%%% T MWI%%%
A-64
WA-171
!
APPENDIX
H
APPENDIX
A-65
WA-172
Budget Critical Item
A-66
WA-173
!
APPENDIX
I
APPENDIX
A-67
WA-174
A-68
WA-175
A-69
WA-176
A-70
WA-177
A-71
WA-178
A-72
WA-179
!
APPENDIX
J
APPENDIX
A-73
WA-180
3/20/11 11:29 AM Child Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)
Page 1 of 4 http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/
Home | Food Stamp Guide | Case Summaries | Google

These are electronic copies of materials distributed with the permission of the various presenters of this
training. The materials are organized by the corresponding topics presented. Included are other
documents useful to advocates working on child support issues, including copies of or links to relevant
federal and state statutory and regulatory resources, select court orders and essential administrative
forms. The documents are either Web (HTML) pages or Adobe Acrobat (PDF) files which should open in
your Web browser when you click on the document links, below. We recommend you install MS
Internet Explorer 6.x for optimal viewing. To access the PDF files, you need to have the free
Acrobat Reader installed on your computer.
Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planning within the Department of
Child Support Services (Presenter: Curt Child, Director of California Department
of Child Support Services)
Child Support 101 | Basic Services | Basic Remedies (Presenters: Brian
Paddock, Paddock & Mastin and Stephen Goldberg, Legal Services of Northern
California)
Child Support Distribution and AB 1449 | Medical Support Remedies and
Enforcement (Presenter: Sarah Kurtz, National Center for Youth Law)
California Child Support Services Regulations | CSS Letters
California CSS Administrative Forms
Court Documents
Additional Online Child Support Resources
Current Policy Perspectives and Future Planning
within the Department of Child Support Services
CSS Program Performance and Statistical Report - Annual Report (2001) (103 pages)
CSS Program Draft Strategic Plan (October 17, 2002) (14 pages)
Child Support 101
Basic Services | Basic Remedies
A-74
WA-181
3/20/11 11:29 AM Child Support Services in California: Rights and Remedies (December 6, 2002)
Page 2 of 4 http://www.lsnc.net/trainings/child_support/
Title IV-D Child Support Program Duties (Brian Paddock: November 2002)
Making the Child Support Program Work for Your Clients, or the Best Way to Fight
Poverty Is Money! - Tennessee CLE Child Support Outline (Brian Paddock: October 16,
2001)
Child Support Distribution and Disbursement (Paula Roberts, Center for Law and Social
Policy (CLASP): October 1, 2000)
Rulings in the Harp distribution, processing fees, recoupment and notices case
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)
National Electronic Child Support Resource System (NECSRS)
OCSE regulations, action transmittals and policy documents
ACF Action Transmittals - Listed by Year (1975-2002) - for example, AT 97-13
deals with State Distribution Units (central collections); AT 97-17 deals with the
distribution of support, etc.
Action Transmittal OCSE-AT-98-24 - re distribution of support
collected to TANF families
Financial Institutions Data Match (FIDM) - for finding assets.
Index of California Child Support Services (CSS) Letters (2000-2003)
CSS Letter 01-09 - retroactive support.
CSS Letter 01-16 - case closure.
CSS Letter 01-28 - revisions re retroactive support.
CSS Letter 02-04 - AB 891 re 5% of Title II limit.
CSS Letter 02-14 - clarification re AB 891 (credit toward child support obligation
for Social Security dependent's benefits.
CSS Letter 02-15 - enforcement against SSI benefits
CSS Letter 02-18 - duplicate case transfers.
Local Child Support Agency (LCSA) Letter 02-34 - case transfer coordinators.
22 CCR 119184 - Barnes notice
CSS Regulatory Time Frames - key time frames for case openings, location of
information, enforcement, interstate claims, transfers, closures and complaint resolution.
Child Support Distribution and AB 1449
Medical Support Remedies and Enforcement
How Child Support is Distributed in California: A Guide for Advocates (Sarah Kurtz,
National Center for Youth Law (NCYL): November 2001)
AB 1449
New Law Can Help Reunite Families (Youth Law News: September-October
2001)
A-75
WA-182
!
Most states define "diligent efforts as attempting all appropriate statutory
mechanisms for serving process and repeating such attempts as soon as new information
becomes available or yearly, whichever occurs first.
Page 1 of 4
TitIe IV-D ChiId Support Program Duties
I. Location of NoncustodiaI Parents and/or their Assets
Duty: f location of the non-custodial parent (NCP) or his/her assets is or becomes necessary, use all
appropriate sources to locate the NCP or his/her assets.

Time: Within 75 days after the V-D agency figures out it needs location information for the next step in
the case.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.3(b)(3).
ExampIe of FaiIure: Custodial parent's (CP) case is open, she provides the V-D agency with name of
the NCP and certain location information, such as the NCP's home or business address, Social
Security number, name of bank or location of property. The V-D agency does nothing.
Duty: f initial location efforts fail, repeat as long as there is adequate identifying and other information
to meet the requirements for submittal for location efforts.
Time: Every 90 days or immediately upon receipt of new information which may aid in location,
whichever occurs sooner. Quarterly attempts may be limited to automated sources, but must include
state Unemployment nsurance records.

Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.3(b)(5)
ExampIe of FaiIure: CP finds out that NCP has a new job and reports that information to the V-D
agency, preferably in writing. The V-D agency does nothing within 75 days.
II. EstabIishment of Paternity and Support Orders
Duty: f a support order must be established, regardless of whether paternity has to be established,
establish a support order or complete service of process or document unsuccessful attempts to serve
process in accordance with state's guidelines for diligent efforts.
1
Time: Within 90 days of locating the NCP.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.4(d)
ExampIe of FaiIure: A support order is needed. The V-D agency locates the NCP, but after 90 days
has failed to establish support or serve with process or even diligently attempt to serve. Note, if the V-
D agency serves the NCP, but never follows up to get the support order, the V-D agency may still be in
compliance with federal regulations.
A-76
WA-183
!
Service of process other than notice by mail is not required for most post-
judgment enforcement actions. Action directed to assets held by third parties, such as a
bank, or for criminal enforcement may require service of process.
Page 2 of 4
III. Enforcement of Support Orders
Duty: Maintain and use an effective system to monitor compliance with support orders and identify the
date that an NCP fails to pay an amount equal to one month's support.
Time: N/A
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.6(a)
ExampIe of FaiIure: This can be a systemic failure, or the failure of a worker to act on the case when it
reports that the NCP is delinquent. This problem may be corrected by an administrative grievance and
hearing process or the duty to monitor may be enforceable by an injunction or mandate in state court.
This may be the kind of system or administrative requirement which may not be enforceable by a CP
under Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S.Ct. 1353 (1997) especially since Gonzaga University v. Doe, 112
S.Ct. 2268 (2002)
Duty: Notify employer to start income withholding.
Time: Within 2 business days following entry of a support order or locating the employer or learning of
a new employer.
Law: 42 U.S.C. 654A(g)); 45 C.F.R. 303.6(c)(1). [45 C.F.R. 303.100.(e)(2) and (3) incorrectly still
refer to 15 days.]
ExampIe of FaiIure: The V-D agency obtains a support order with an authorization for income
assignment (required in every case), but does not know the NCP's employer. The V-D agency later
learns of the NCP's employer, from the CP or otherwise, but fails to send the Order/Notice to Withhold
ncome within 2 business days.

Duty: Enforce the child support order.
Time: f service of process is not required, within 30 days of identifying a delinquency or locating the
NCP, whichever occurs later. f service of process is required,
2
service must be completed and
enforcement action taken within 60 days of identifying delinquency or locating the noncustodial parent,
whichever occurs later or the V-D agency must document unsuccessful attempts to serve process in
accordance with state's guidelines for diligent efforts. Use of income withholding and federal income
tax refund intercepts is also required.
Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.6(c)(2)
ExampIe of FaiIure: The NCP misses support payments equal to one month's current support
amount. He is self-employed and the V-D agency knows where he is. Sixty days go by and the V-D
agency does nothing. Note, if just 30 days go by, the V-D agency could argue that they were planning
to take action that required service of process, such as a contempt proceeding. Note also that the CP
is unlikely to know about (but can request in writing) other enforcement activities that the V-D agency
could (or must) take, such as initiating the process for driver's license or professional, or business
license revocation.
A-77
WA-184
Page 3 of 4
IV. Modification of Support Orders
Duty: Notify all CPs that modification services are available. Review support orders for modification if
requested by the CP, the NCP (or The LCSA if the CP is on CalWORKS). Send notice of any proposed
modification to the parents and then adjust the order, as appropriate.

Time: Within 15 days of a request from the custodial parent or NCP the agency must determine if a
review is necessary. Within 180 days of determining that a review is necessary or of locating the non-
requesting parent, whichever occurs later, complete review and obtain modified order from the court, if
appropriate.

Law: 45 C.F.R. 303.8
ExampIe of FaiIure: Custodial parent has asked in writing for a review and has provided the V-D
agency with all requested information. The V-D agency knows where the non-custodial parent is and
has sufficient information about his/her income to proceed. The modification will increase the order by
the amount set out in DCSS guidelines and/or medical support will be ordered. 180 days have passed
and the V-D agency has not completed a requested modification or notified the CP or NCP that it will
not seek modification and provided a notice of appeal rights.
V. TimeIy Distribution of Support.
Duty:
As of 10/1/98, the time limit for distribution of current support became two business days,
provided there is sufficient information to identify the CP and there is no appeal on amount of
arrearages. 42 U.S.C. 654B(c)(1).
Law: 45 C.F.R. 302.32(f), 302.5; (OCSE Action Transmittal 97-13, Sept. 15, 1997, details the
obligations of a State Distribution Unit. CA lacks both a single automated system and a single SDU.
ExampIe of FaiIure: The LCSA receives a support collection for a CP (except support collected from a
federal tax refund intercept), knows to whom it must be sent, but fails to send the support on to the CP
within 2 business days. (Business days are days the State agency is open for business.)
VI. Accurate Distribution of Support.
Duty: Accurately distribute child support collected on behalf of families receiving V-D agency services.
A family not receiving TANF - CalWORKS cash benefits should get all support collected each
month up to the amount ordered for current support in the order.
Effective 10/1/98, post-TANF families must be paid all past-due support owed to the family
before the state receives any welfare recoupment (unreimbursed assistance) except for
permanently assigned arrears arising from periods of AFDC prior to October 1998. The total
amount of child support kept to repay unreimbursed assistance must never exceed the dollar
total of all aid previously provided.

f a family is receiving TANF - CalWORKS cash benefits, the CP should get the first fifty dollars
of support collected. This is a single month maximum amount for the CP and all the children of
which she has custody, no matter how many court orders the CP has, or how many NCPs pay.
A-78
WA-185
Page 4 of 4
VII. Accessing IV-D agency FiIes
Obtaining information from the V-D agency concerning an individual case can be frustrating.
For all cases, the V-D agency must, within 20 days following the application for services or referral
from the welfare department, establish a case record, and determine the necessary actions to be taken.
45 C.F.R. 303.2(b). Under 45 C.F.R. 303.2(c) the V-D agency has a continuing duty to supplement
the case record "with all information and documents pertaining to the case, as well as all relevant facts,
dates, actions taken, contacts made and results in a case.
We suggest using standard DCSS or other record release forms and requests and that the
cover letter quote and cite the above regulation. You also may want to target your requests to the
record of case actions necessary to determine if the V-D agency has taken timely action. You may
want to state that you are not seeking any information or records which may be protected because they
are from the RS, contain confidential address information in domestic violence cases or otherwise are
required to be held confidential by law. Ask that any LCSA claim of confidentiality or privilege should
be specific as to the nature or source of the document or information and the privilege or confidentiality
law invoked to deny release or review of the record.
VIII. LegaI Resources:
Rulings in the Harp distribution, processing fees, recoupment and notices case
http://www.Divorcetn.com
Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE)
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/
National Electronic Child Support Resource System (NECSRS)
http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/
OCSE regulations, action transmittals and policy documents
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/poldoc.htm
ACF Action Transmittals - Listed by Year (1975-2002) - for example, AT 97-13 deals with State
Distribution Units (central collections); AT 97-17 deals with the distribution of support, etc.
http://ocse.acf.dhhs.gov/necsrspub/federal/at/chrono.cfm
Action Transmittal OCSE-AT-98-24 - re distribution of support collected to TANF families
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/at-9824.htm
Financial nstitutions Data Match (to find assets):
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/fct/fidm/index.htm
(Revised: November 25, 2002)
A-79
WA-186
!
APPENDIX
K
APPENDIX
A-80
WA-187
7/29/13 10:01 PM Jim Newton: A Dependency Court judge catches heat - latimes.com
Page 1 of 4 http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-newton-column-dependency-judge-20120730,0,698841.column
Newton: Targeting an L.A. judge
Last week, when a boy in Los Angeles foster care appeared before
Judge Amy Pellman, she welcomed him warmly and clearly knew
his history. Pellman asked how his martial-arts class was going,
complimented him on his grades and urged him to enroll in a pro-
gram that would help prepare him for college.
Another case that morning involved a 19-year-old woman prepar-
ing to emancipate from foster care. She boasted of keeping her
grade-point average above 3.0; Pellman called that "awesome."
And when Pellman saw two boys at the back of the court stirring
restlessly, she asked if either would like a teddy bear or a book.
"A book," one replied. "Right answer," she said, and pointed him
to a shelf full of choices.
That's the way Pellman's court works. It's all about the needs of
children, unsurprising given Pellman's background. Before be-
coming a judge in 2008, she served for five years as the legal direc-
tor for the Alliance for Children's Rights. She's written extensively
about children and the law, focusing most specifically on the fos-
ter-care system. In 2003, the American Bar Assn. gave her its
Child Advocacy Law Award.
So Pellman seems an unlikely candidate to be accused of endan-
A-81
WA-188
gering children. But that's exactly what is happening as part of a
strange battle between her and the L.A. Department of County
Counsel, whose lawyers lately have been routinely filing papers
to remove Pellman from cases they handle. The challenges do not
require explanation, so the reasons behind them are a bit murky.
But the county counsel has succeeded in having Pellman taken off
many cases in recent weeks, and that in turn has forced other
judges at the Los Angeles Dependency Court to absorb her load.
James Owens, an assistant county counsel who oversees the of-
fice's Dependency Division, declined to comment in detail about
the Pellman case, saying, "We don't discuss judges in public." He
also declined to say precisely how often lawyers with his office
have filed motions to remove Pellman. Producing such a number,
he said, "would take a lot of work." He did allow that the objec-
tions have been filed "frequently."
Others familiar with the conflict said county lawyers believe that
Pellman is too skeptical of the Department of Children and Fami-
ly Services and, over the objections of social workers, too willing
to return children to homes where there has been domestic vio-
lence.
Whether to return children in foster care to their parents is one of
the toughest issues dependency judges have to deal with. Foster
care is rarely a good long-term solution, and reunification can be
A-82
WA-189
the best option if the custodial parent has taken responsibility for
ensuring a safe environment for the child. On the other hand, re-
turning a child to an unsafe situation can result in tragedy and
it has on more than one occasion in Los Angeles County.
Pellman would not comment on the challenges being filed against
her, but I've watched her handle several dozen cases in recent
months, courtesy of a new openness that prevails in Los Angeles
Dependency Court since Juvenile Court Presiding Judge Michael
Nash opened the courthouse to the press earlier this year.
At least in my experience, Pellman is the opposite of reckless with
the fates of the children before her. To the contrary, she's attentive
and efficient and demonstrably engaged in the lives of children.
Her bench is bracketed by teddy bears, and a SpongeBob
SquarePants tapestry covers one courtroom wall. Last week, one
young woman who's in foster care complained to Pellman that
she'd gone without the right eyeglasses since early this year and
that when her foster home was changed, her clothes were left be-
hind. The judge listened patiently and then admonished the
child's social worker for the breakdown that has compounded the
girl's troubles and prevented her from landing a summer job.
"I don't feel enough effort was put in," Pellman sternly remarked.
That kind of admonishment also is typical of Pellman. She's hard
on social workers and on the lawyers who represent them. And
A-83
WA-190
she's been at odds with the Department of Children and Family
Services for years, dating to her time with the alliance, when Pell-
man fought to close the county's orphanage and the department
resisted. Given that history and her temperament, Pellman's de-
fenders believe that the campaign against her is not really about
defending children so much as it is about retaliating against a
judge who's tough and sharp-tongued.
Nash concedes that the county counsel has the right to object to
Pellman, but he's perplexed by the controversy. "She's profession-
al and focused a great lawyer, a great child advocate," Nash
said. "She's not a nasty cuss like I was at times."
And as for the allegation that Pellman is putting children at risk?
Nash did not mince words: "I just think that's ludicrous."
Jim Newtons column appears Mondays. His latest book is "Eisenhower:
The White House Years." Reach him at jim.newton@latimes.com or fol-
low him on Twitter: @newton_jim.
A-84
WA-191
!
APPENDIX
L
APPENDIX
A-85
WA-192
A-86
WA-193
A-87
WA-194
!
APPENDIX
M
APPENDIX
A-88
WA-195
A-89
WA-196
A-90
WA-197
A-91
WA-198
A-92
WA-199
A-93
WA-200
!
APPENDIX
N
APPENDIX
A-94
WA-201
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
T 310-356-6947
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
July 15, 2011
Administrative Records Request
c/o Central Civil Operations Administration
Room 109, Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street
Dear Sir or Madam,
I am seeking information on payments made by Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles to the following persons from 1990 to the present while these persons were California
state employees.
D. Brett Bianco
Frederick R. Bennett
Glenda Veasey (Commissioner)
John Slawson (Commissioner)
Carolyn Kuhl (Judge)
Sandy Kriegler (Judge)
In addition to their compensation by the state, the Los Angeles County Auditor says they were
eligible to receive additional judicial benets payments (matching those paid by Los Angeles
County). For each of the persons above, I would like to know the amount and type of any
payments for each benet below for each year from 1990 through 2011:
1. Matching payments into the Countys 401K/457 Retirement Savings Plans
2. Cafeteria fringe benet plan (approximately $34,000)
3. Professional development allowance (approximately $7,000)
I would also like to know the name, nancial object or other identier name for the account
from which these payments (accounting transactions) were made.
I appreciate your help in this matter and I look forward to your response.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
A-95
WA-202
A-96
WA-203
A-97
WA-204
A-98
WA-205
A-99
WA-206
Los Angeles $53,860
Orange $22,042
Sonoma $21,403
San Luis Obispo $19,147
San Bernardino $16,413
Yolo $15,905
Napa $15,105
Santa Clara $14,956
San Diego $14,745
Tuolumne $13,938
San Mateo $10,960
Ventura $10,146
Solano $8,579
Siskiyou $8,202
San Francisco $8,036
Kern $6,505
Riverside $6,279
Kings $5,862
Glenn $5,632
Monterey $4,033
San Benito $3,291
Contra Costa $3,225
Sacramento $1,510
Mono $1,263
Alameda $972
Mendocino $750
Nevada $639
Tulare $526
San Joaquin $449
Trinity $336
Calaveras $275
Mariposa $212
Fresno $166
Butte $150
Placer $85
Alpine $0
Amador $0
Colusa $0
Del Norte $0
El Dorado $0
Humboldt $0
Imperial $0
Inyo $0
Lake $0
Lassen $0
Madera $0
Marin $0
Merced $0
Modoc $0
Plumas $0
Santa Barbara $0
Santa Cruz $0
Shasta $0
Sierra $0
Stanislaus $0
Sutter $0
Tehama $0
Yuba $0
A-100
WA-207
Raw data
A-171 Total Expense
divided by
A167 Number of judges
!
APPENDIX
O
APPENDIX
A-101
WA-208
9/19/11 12:17 PM Los Angeles Superior Court - Civil Case Summary
Page 1 of 1 http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civilCaseSummary/casesummary.asp?Referer=index

Case Summary
Case Number: BS132755
DENNIS ETTLIN VS. BRETT BIANCO
Filing Date: 07/12/2011
Case Type: Civil Harassment (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Dismissed - Other 07/12/2011
Future Hearings
None
Documents Filed | Proceeding Information
Parties
BIANCO BRETT - Defendant/Respondent
ETTLIN DENNIS - Petitioner
Case Information | Party Information | Proceeding Information
Documents Filed (Filing dates listed in descending order)
07/12/2011 Application for TRO
Filed by Petitioner
Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed
Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)
07/12/2011 at 02:00 pm in Department 75, Carol Boas Goodson, Presiding
Exparte proceeding - Denied
Case Information | Party Information | Documents Filed | Proceeding Information
A-102
WA-209
A-103
WA-210
A-104
WA-211
A-105
WA-212
A-106
WA-213
A-107
WA-214
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt
CALIFORNIA CODES
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
SECTION 415.10-415.95
415.10. A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of
the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Service
of a summons in this manner is deemed complete at the time of such
delivery.
The date upon which personal delivery is made shall be entered on
or affixed to the face of the copy of the summons at the time of its
delivery. However, service of a summons without such date shall be
valid and effective.
415.20. (a) In lieu of personal delivery of a copy of the summons
and complaint to the person to be served as specified in Section
416.10, 416.20, 416.30, 416.40, or 416.50, a summons may be served by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office
hours in his or her office or, if no physical address is known, at
his or her usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal
Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge
thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and
complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be
served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were
left. When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at
least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof.
Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th
day after the mailing.
(b) If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable
diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as
specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may
be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the
person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of
business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal
Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the
household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office,
place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United
file:///Users/FastDennis/Desktop/00001-01000/415.10-415.txt (1 of 8) [3/11/11 1:20:05 PM]
CH-100, Item 12, Temporary Order
Letters not mailed
A-108
WA-215
Letters not mailed
A-109
WA-216
Letters not mailed
A-110
WA-217
A-111
WA-218
A-112
WA-219
Dennis Ettlin
4520 Toucan Street
Torrance, CA 90503
T 310-356-6947
C 310-795-9507
cyberidme@gmail.com
June 29, 2011
Brett Bianco
Court Counsel
Stanley Mosk Courthouse
111 N. Hill Street, Room 546
Dear Mr. Bianco;
This letter is in response to your actions complicating and interfering with the service
of court documents. As a Plaintiff waiting for a fee waiver determination and looking
forward to having a summons and complaint served on four different judges, I nd
your actions very confusing.
The civil suits are being led against the judges for actions they took as individuals.
The individuals accepted monies made available to them by or through the County of
Los Angeles. The damages are associated with the favors to Los Angeles County
shown by the defendants subsequent actions as bribed bench ofcers. Those biases/
favors were perpetrated by and as individuals who attempted to cover up their fraud
on the court by not disclosing such payments to litigants.
The matter of whether the individuals are acting in their ofcial judicial capacities or
as individuals is not an issue here. The judiciary-drafted SBX2 11 decided that the
affected individuals were to be given retroactive criminal immunity. The bureaucratic
resistance to moving forward on the issue of judicial payments since June 2009 and the
illegality of the current payments is exactly why the Commission on Judicial
Performance (CJP) has asked the Attorney General for a determination. The CJP would
prefer to not be the sanctioning body.
The Commission on Judicial Performance submitted two questions to Harris in late May, in-
quiring whether lawmakers would have the authority to pass a measure which purports to pre-
clude the [CJP] from disciplining California superior court judges for authorizing supplemental
compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds, and/or receiving that supplemental
compensation, on the ground that such benefits were or are not authorized by law.
While I applaud your pro-active response and thoughtfulness, your actions as a state
employee to volunteer state legal services to these individuals, as stated on the
summons and on the complaint, may itself be illegal and possibly an obstruction of
Letters not mailed
A-113
WA-220
justice. I have requested county payment information from the County Auditors ofce
for you and Fred Bennett to help clarify your interest in these judicial benets cases.
One of the rst motions to the court will now request a determination on the adequacy
of service.
While I have no objection to providing you courtesy copies of the complaints, until I
see written evidence that supervisors of bench ofcers, acting in their ofcial
supervisorial capacity are promulgating Superior Court command media or specically
directing the bench ofcers to accept monies offered by Los Angeles County, and, in
the absence of such, until I see a signed private agreement between the individual
persons and yourself as private counsel, I will continue to believe and must assume the
POS-010 form for individual service is the proper form and process for serving these
individuals and is in compliance with California Code of Civil procedure Section
415.10 or 415.20.
On a related matter from Mr. Bennetts letters to me, the county auditors ofce has
provided a small clarication that I will be pursuing in the weeks ahead. While
Commissioners and Judges both receive payments from the County of Los Angeles, the
payments to Commissioners are from an account funded by the Superior Court. The
payments to the judges are funded by a county judicial operations account. Thus, it
appears that there is no separate reimbursement transaction by the Superior Court to
the county.
This accounting arrangement does, however, bear directly on the Attorney Generals
inquiry of the question of whether judges may be disciplined for authorizing
supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds.
Sincerely yours,
Dennis Ettlin
Plaintiff, In Pro Per
case # YC064994
Letters not mailed
A-114
WA-221
!
APPENDIX
P
APPENDIX
A-115
WA-222
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
STREET ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway
MAILING ADDRESS: 330 West Broadway
CITY AND ZIP CODE: San Diego, CA 92101
BRANCH NAME: Central
FOR COURT USE ONLY
PLAINTIFF(S)lPETITIONER(S): Anthony Locatelli
DEFENDANT(S)/RESPONDENT(S): Thomas Trent Lewis
Short Title: Locatelli vs. Lewis
NOTICE OF SIGNING OF AN ORDER RE CHANGE OF VENUE AND
REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF FEES
CASE NUMBER:
37-2011-000934 76-CU-CR-CTL
An order for transfer of the above-entitled case to Los Angeles was signed and filed on 9/2312011 by Richard Strauss,
Judicial Officer of the Superior Court.
Thomas Trent Lewis must submit fees, Attn: Change of Venue Desk, as indicated below:
A check for payable to the Clerk of the Court (Change of Venue fee for San Diego Superior Court)
A check for $395,00 payable to the Clerk of the Court (Initial Filing fee for receiving court)
Submit two separate checks
Failure to submit fees within 30 days may result in a hearing and sanctions may be imposed. (If the required fees have
not been paid by party named above within five days after service of this notice, then any other party interested in the
case may pay the fees.)
CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
by: __ .... _ _ _ _________ ... ... .... , Deputy
Date: 09/29/2011
Catherine Spies
Page: 1
NOTICE OF SIGNING OF AN ORDER RE CHANGE OF VENUE
SDSC CIV,735 (New 5/08) Code CIY. Pro. 399
AND REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF FEES
A-116
WA-223
A-117
WA-224

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
1

A-118
WA-225
1 of 100 DOCUMENTS
HAROLD P. STURGEON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent.
D050832
COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,
DIVISION ONE
167 Cal. App. 4th 630; 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242; 2008 Cal. App. LEXIS 1585
October 10, 2008, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Modified and rehearing denied by Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 2008 Cal. App.
LEXIS 1735 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Nov. 7, 2008)
Review denied by, Application granted by Sturgeon (Harold P.) v. County of Los Angeles, 2008 Cal. LEXIS 15051
(Cal., Dec. 23, 2008)
Subsequent appeal at Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 2166 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Dec. 28,
2010)
PRIOR-HISTORY:
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. BC351286, James A. Richman, Judge.
HEADNOTES-1
CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES
(5) Judges 1.2--Compensation and Benefits--Lockyer-Isenberg Act.--The Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding
Act of 1997 (Gov. Code, 77200 et seq.) does not prevent payment of judicial benefits beyond the compensation set by
the Legislature but, rather, under any fair reading of the act, authorizes them.
(13) Judges 1.2--Compensation and Benefits--Prescribed by Legislature.--Because the benefits provided by a
county to its superior court judges were compensation within the meaning of Cal. Const., art. VI, 19, and because the
record did not establish that those benefits had been prescribed by the Legislature, the trial court erred in granting the
county's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by a taxpayer who challenged the validity of the benefits.
[Cal. Forms of Pleading and Practice (2008) ch. 466, Public Entities and Officers: Taxpayers' Actions, 466.21; 2
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Courts, 8; 9 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Taxation, 18.]
COUNSEL: Judicial Watch, Inc., Sterling E. Norris and Paul J. Orfanedes for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jones Day, Elwood Lui, Jason C. Murray and Erica L. Reilley for Defendant and Respondent.
Page 1
A-119
WA-226
JUDGES: Opinion by Benke, Acting P. J., with Nares and Haller, JJ., concurring.
OPINION BY: Benke
OPINION
BENKE, Acting P. J.--Section 19, article VI of the California Constitution requires that the Legislature "prescribe
compensation for judges of courts of record." The duty to prescribe judicial compensation is not delegable. Thus the
practice of the County of Los Angeles (the county) of providing Los Angeles County superior court judges with
employment benefits, in addition to the compensation prescribed by the Legislature, is not permissible. Accordingly, we
must reverse an order granting summary judgment in favor of the county in an action brought by a taxpayer who
challenged the validity of the benefits the county provides to its superior court judges.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Judicial Benefits Provided by County
Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that at some point in the late 1980's the county began providing
its superior and municipal court judges with employment benefits in addition to the salary prescribed by the Legislature.
Over the years that program has been expanded and altered as the county has modified the benefits it provides its
salaried employees.
Currently, the largest component of benefits provided to judges is the county's contribution to its MegaFlex
Cafeteria Benefit Plan (MegaFlex). The county pays its salaried employees an amount equal to 19 percent of their
monthly salary in the form of a tax-free contribution to MegaFlex. Each employee can use the county's contribution to
purchase medical, dental and vision coverage or life and disability insurances. Any portion of the county's contribution
that is not used to purchase benefits is paid to the employee as taxable income. The county treats its superior court
judges as salaried employees of the county for the purpose of the MegaFlex contributions and thus the county's superior
court judges receive MegaFlex contributions equal to 19 percent of their salary.
1
1 As of January 1, 2007, the Legislature set the salaries of superior court judges at $ 172,000. (See Gov. Code,
68202, 68203 and formulas provided thereunder.) Thus for fiscal year 2007 MegaFlex benefits amounted to $
32,680 per superior court judge.
In addition to the MegaFlex contributions, the county provides its judges with a professional development
allowance (PDA). According to the county, the PDA permits judges to participate in educational and professional
development programs. Each judge is given discretion in the manner in which his or her PDA is expended. In fiscal year
2007 the PDA amounted to $ 6,876 per judge.
The county will also match the contribution of each of its salaried employees to a "401(k)"
2
program up to 4
percent of his or her salary. In fiscal year 2007 this amounted to an additional $ 6,880,
3
the judges were eligible to
receive. Finally, the record indicates that since July 1, 1997, the judges have also received employment benefits
provided by the state.
2 A "401(k)" program permits an employer and employee to make pretax contributions to an investment fund
which can earn untaxed income during the employee's working years. (Int.Rev. Code, 401(k).)
3 See footnote 1, ante.
In sum, in addition to the salary, benefits and retirement prescribed by the Legislature, in fiscal year 2007 each
superior court judge in Los Angeles was eligible to receive $ 46,436 in benefits from the county. This amount
represented approximately 27 percent of their prescribed salary and cost the county approximately $ 21 million in fiscal
2007.
Page 2
A-120
WA-227
B. Plaintiff's Challenge
Plaintiff and appellant Harold P. Sturgeon is a county resident and taxpayer. In April 2006 Sturgeon filed a
complaint against the county under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a in which he challenged the validity of the
benefits the county provided its superior court judges. Sturgeon alleged the benefits the county pays its judges are
"unlawful under Cal. Const., Art. VI, 19-20, Cal. Const., Art XVI, 6, and Cal. Gov. Code 77000, et seq., among
other relevant statutes and provisions of law, and constitutes an unconstitutional gift of public funds under Cal. Const.,
Art XVI, 6." Sturgeon asked for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The county answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment. The county argued the benefits it provided
to its judges were authorized by the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (Lockyer-Isenberg) (Gov. Code,
4 77200 et seq.; Stats. 1997, ch. 850, 1, 46) and therefore were neither gifts nor a waste of public funds. The county
argued that even in the absence of Lockyer-Isenberg, the benefits were not gifts because, in light of the high cost of
living in the Los Angeles area and the high salaries paid to lawyers in the region, the benefits were needed to attract and
retain skilled and experienced judges. The county argued the Legislature's authorization of the benefits was not an
impermissible delegation of the Legislature's duty to prescribe judicial compensation because the benefits were
consistent with the Legislature's fundamental approach to judicial compensation and because the marketplace placed
inherent limits on how much in the way of benefits the county would be willing to provide its judges.
4 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise specified.
The trial court granted the county's motion. The court found the county's benefits contributions were neither gifts of
public funds nor a waste of public funds and in fact were authorized by Lockyer-Isenberg. Sturgeon filed a timely notice
of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
"A defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and
the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.] ... We review the record and the determination of
the trial court de novo." (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 990, 1002-1003 [4 Cal. Rptr. 3d
103, 75 P.3d 30].)
II
Like the trial court, we do not believe Sturgeon can establish that the benefits the county provides its judges are
gifts of public funds which violate the terms of Article XVI, section 6 of our state Constitution or amount to the waste of
public funds within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.
By its terms, article XVI, section 6 of the state Constitution prevents the Legislature from making or authorizing any
gift of public funds for private purposes. This prohibition applies to counties and general law cities. (See Goodall v.
Brite (1936) 11 Cal.App.2d 540, 544-545 [54 P.2d 510]; 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 02-711 (2002).)
5
"The term 'gift' in the
constitutional provision 'includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable
claim,' even if there is a moral or equitable obligation. [Citation.] 'An appropriation of money by the legislature for the
relief of one who has no legal claim therefor must be regarded as a gift within the meaning of that term, as used in this
section, and it is none the less a gift that a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation, if the motive does not rest
upon a valid consideration.' [Citation.]
5 The constitutional ban on gifts of public funds does not apply to charter cities. (See Tevis v. City & County of
San Francisco (1954) 43 Cal.2d 190, 197 [272 P.2d 757]; Los Angeles G. & E. Corp. v. Los Angeles (1922) 188
Cal. 307, 317 [205 P. 125].)
Page 3
A-121
WA-228
" 'It is well settled that the primary question to be considered in determining whether an appropriation of public
funds is to be considered a gift is whether the funds are to be used for a public or private purpose. If they are to be used
for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of this constitutional prohibition. [Citation.]' [Citation.]"
(Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122].) Importantly, "[t]he
determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature, and its discretion will not be
disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis. [Citations.]" (County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 746 [97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953].)
With respect to a public employer's provision of benefits to its employees, including bonuses for work already
performed, the cases have been fairly uniform in finding that such benefits serve public rather than private purposes. In
Jarvis v. Cory (1980) 28 Cal.3d 562 [170 Cal. Rptr. 11, 620 P.2d 598] the plaintiff challenged the Legislature's
decision to award lump-sum payments to certain state employees for work performed. In rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that the payments were gifts of public funds, the court stated: "[T]he Legislature found that the adjustments
made by the bill were 'necessary to ensure the continued recruitment and retention of qualified and competent state
employees.' We will not disturb the Legislature's finding of a public purpose so long as it has a reasonable basis.
[Citation.]
"In this case, we cannot doubt the substantiality of the purpose stated. Nor can we doubt [the legislation] serves the
purpose by assuring state employees they will not be abandoned in troubled times, and by raising salaries to a level
more competitive with those in the private sector." (Jarvis v. Cory, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 578, fn. 10.)
In San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 83 [113 Cal. Rptr.
912] a retroactive salary increase was also challenged as a gift of public funds. In rejecting the challenge, the court
stated: "It is an incontestable fact of governmental employment practices that governmental agencies must compete in
the labor market with non-governmental employers. Such competition includes not only salaries but sick leave time,
vacations and numerous other conditions of employment. It has been, for instance, a judicially noticeable practice of
governmental agencies to correlate vacation time allowed to the years of service by an employee. ... We cite these
examples only to show that in the area of employment, public agencies must compete, and if to so compete they grant
benefits to employees for past services, they are not making a gift of public money but are taking self-serving steps to
further the governmental agency's self-interest in recruiting the most competent employees in a highly competitive
market." (Id. at pp. 87-88.)
As in Jarvis v. Cory and San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin, here there can be
little doubt the benefits that the county provides its judges enhance the recruitment and retention of judges who serve in
Los Angeles. Indeed, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the county relied upon a 1988 report on judicial
compensation that found judicial salaries were not by themselves sufficient incentive to retain or recruit judges in the
Los Angeles area. Thus, as in Jarvis v. Cory and San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin,
the benefits the county provides promote the public interest in recruiting and retaining high caliber judicial officers and
therefore are not gifts within the meaning of article XVI, section 6 of the Constitution.
For much the same reason we must reject Sturgeon's contention that the benefits constitute waste within the
meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. " '[T]he term "waste" as used in section 526a means something more
than an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discretion. To hold
otherwise would invite constant harassment of city and county officers by disgruntled citizens and could seriously
hamper our representative form of government at the local level. Thus, the courts should not take judicial cognizance of
disputes which are primarily political in nature, nor should they attempt to enjoin every expenditure which does not
meet with a taxpayer's approval. On the other hand, a court must not close its eyes to wasteful, improvident and
completely unnecessary public spending, merely because it is done in the exercise of a lawful power.' [Citation.]"
(Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1138-1139 [232 Cal. Rptr. 814, 729 P.2d 80].)
In County of Ventura v. State Bar (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1059-1060 [41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794], the court, in
Page 4
A-122
WA-229
discussing the propriety of Ventura County's payment of the noncompulsory portion of its attorney bar dues, stated:
"The proper question in reviewing a perquisite of employment for waste of public funds is whether the perquisite is
necessary or useful or provides a benefit to the public agency. [Citation.] Normally the answer will be yes. Payment for
a non-essential perquisite--such as vision care insurance, a private office, or a decent desk chair--benefits the public
agency in that, as part of an overall employee benefits package, it helps attract and keep superior employees. Such
expenditures are beneficial, useful, and as a practical matter necessary to the staffing of a high quality office of public
attorneys." (Fn. omitted.)
In this regard we recognize that the Legislature, by way of Lockyer-Isenberg, has assumed responsibility for trial
court funding. ( 77200.) However, even following Lockyer-Isenberg, counties still have a continuing legitimate
interest in assuring that the judges who administer justice to their residents are competent and skilled.
6
Because they
improve recruitment and retention of judicial officers, the disputed benefits the county provides serve a public purpose
and thereby defeat Sturgeon's waste theory as well as his gift of public funds contention.
6 Because the benefits the county provides its judges promote the administration of justice within the county,
this case is not subject to the holding in City of Ceres v. City of Modesto (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 545, 555-556
[79 Cal. Rptr. 168].
III
We also agree with the trial court that nothing in Lockyer-Isenberg prevents the county from providing its judges
with the disputed benefits, and in fact Lockyer-Isenberg appears to contemplate payment of such benefits by the county.
Section 2 of Lockyer-Isenberg states in pertinent part: "The Legislature finds and declares ... . [] ... [] (f) It is
increasingly clear that the counties of California are no longer able to provide unlimited funding increases to the
judiciary and, in some counties, financial difficulties and strain threaten the quality and timeliness of justice." (Stats.
1997, ch. 850, 2.) In section 3 the Legislature declared its intention to: "(a) Provide state responsibility for funding of
trial court operations commencing in the 1997-98 fiscal year. [] (b) Provide that county contributions to trial court
operations shall be permanently capped at the same dollar amount as that county provided to court operations in the
1994-95 fiscal year with adjustments to the cap, as specified. [] (c) Provide that the State of California shall assume
full responsibility for any growth in costs of trial court operations thereafter." (Stats. 1997, ch. 850, 3.) Importantly,
section 3, subdivision (g) of the act states: "In adopting this plan, the Legislature intends ... : [] (1) To provide that no
personnel employed in the court system as of July 1, 1997, shall have their salary or benefits reduced as a result of this
act."
The Legislature effected its intention of relieving counties of any increases in the costs of operating courts by
requiring that, in fiscal year 1998, each county submit to the Department of Finance an annual "maintenance of effort
payment" (MOE) which was set at the amount each county paid in the 1994-1995 fiscal year for court operations. (
77201, subd. (b)(1).) Of some relevance here, the Legislature permitted counties to deduct from their 1998 MOE
payments the amount of benefits they provided to judges in the 1994-1995 fiscal year. ( 77201, subd. (c)(1).) Under
section 77201, subdivision (c)(1), counties were required to "submit a declaration to the Department of Finance ... that
the amount it is required to submit to the state ... either includes or does not include the costs for local judicial benefits
... . Upon verification that the amount the county is required to submit to the state includes the costs of local judicial
benefits, the department shall reduce ... the amount the county is required to submit to the state ... in which case the
county shall continue to be responsible for the cost of those benefits." In the event there was any dispute with the
Department of Finance as to the amount of either the MOE or the deduction for judicial benefits, the counties were
permitted to ask for an audit by the Controller. ( 77201, subds. (c), (d).)
7
7 We take judicial notice of the documents setting forth the MOE that counties provided the state in 1998 and
the MOE submitted by the county on July 9, 2008.
Page 5
A-123
WA-230
Contrary to Sturgeon's contention, the deduction for judicial benefits permitted under section 77201, subdivision
(c)(1), was not limited to deductions from the MOE due for fiscal 1998. By way of section 77201.1 the Legislature
reduced each county's respective MOE for each year after fiscal 1998 and, in section 77201.1, subdivision (b)(4),
expressly continued the adjustments permitted by section 77201, subdivision (c).
Although section 77201, subdivision (c), permitted counties to request an audit in the event there was any dispute as
to the amount of the adjustment for judicial benefits, such an audit was not required in order to make the adjustment.
Thus contrary to Sturgeon's alternative argument, the reference in section 77201.1, subdivision (b)(4), to the procedures
set forth in section 77201, subdivision (c), including in particular the audit procedures, cannot be read as limiting the
judicial benefits adjustment to counties which in fact requested an audit. As the trial court noted, such a reading of the
statutes would have required a county to request an audit even when the Department of Finance did not challenge the
amount the county submitted in its declaration. We cannot adopt a statutory construction which would lead to such an
absurd consequence. (See Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal. Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].)
For our purposes the most significant aspect of Lockyer-Isenberg is what is not in the act: nothing on the face of the
statute prevents a county from continuing to provide judicial benefits, such as those the county provides its judges. The
provisions of Lockyer-Isenberg that the parties have vigorously disputed--the circumstances under which a county may
receive an adjustment of its MOE for the payment of such benefits--do not directly impact Sturgeon's claims. Even if
Lockyer-Isenberg did not provide for an adjustment for judicial benefits, the statute would not otherwise prevent
payment of the benefits by the county. Rather, in the absence of the adjustments allowed by sections 77201, subdivision
(c), and 77201.1, the cost of the benefits would be borne entirely by the county.
Although the adjustment provisions of Lockyer-Isenberg do not directly impact Sturgeon's claims, they are relevant
in that they support the county's contention that the Legislature was well aware of the benefits the county provides and,
in permitting the adjustments, expressly approved those benefits. This inference is of course buttressed by the express
statement in section 3 of Lockyer-Isenberg that the Legislature intended that no court personnel suffer any reduction in
salary or benefits. The inference is also supported by the provisions of section 69894.3, which was enacted in 1959 and
provides in pertinent part: "Employees of the superior court in each county having a population of over 2,000,000 shall
be entitled to step advancement, vacation, sick leave, holiday benefits and other leaves of absence and other benefits as
may be directed by rules of the court. Where statutes require implementation by local ordinances for the extension of
benefits to local officers and employees, these may be made applicable by rule to court personnel, including but not
limited to jurors, and judges." Los Angeles Local Rule 1.12 in turn provides: "In accordance with Government Code
section 69894.3 all County of Los Angeles benefits extended to employees and local officers by local ordinance are
applicable to Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, personnel, jurors and judges." (Super. Ct. L.A.
County, Local Rules, rule 1.12; see also 53200.3.)
In sum, Lockyer-Isenberg does not prevent payment of judicial benefits beyond the compensation set by the
Legislature but rather, under any fair reading of the act, authorizes them.
IV
The fact the Legislature appears to have authorized the benefits by way of Lockyer-Isenberg does not end our
inquiry. Section 19, article VI of the California Constitution requires that the Legislature "prescribe compensation for
judges of record." (Italics added.) In Sevier v. Riley (1926) 198 Cal. 170, 174-175 [244 P. 323], the court interpreted the
precursor to this portion of section 19, article VI, and stated: "There is no room for doubt as to the interpretation to be
given to this clause in said amendment to the constitution, since it makes manifest as clearly and tersely as words could
do the intent of the framers thereof that the entire matter of the compensation of justices and judges of courts of record
in this state, both as to the amount thereof and as to the time and manner of payment thereof, should be transferred from
the constitution and reposed in the legislature. This is made all the more manifest when we take note of the meaning of
the word 'prescribed' as employed therein. The term 'prescribe' is defined by the lexicographers as meaning, 'To lay
down authoritatively as a rule of action; to ordain, appoint, define authoritatively.' (Century Dictionary.) 'To lay down
Page 6
A-124
WA-231
authoritatively as a guide, direction, or rule of action; to impose as a peremptory order; to dictate, appoint, direct,
ordain.' " In Sevier v. Riley, supra, at pp. 174-175, the court considered a previously adopted constitutional limitation on
the Legislature's ability to increase salaries and noted the substantial disparities it created among the salaries that could
be paid to judges in various counties. The court found, in light of the clear intention of the amendment to give the
Legislature unfettered authority over judicial compensation, that limitation was repealed by implication. (Id. at p. 176.)
A. Attorney General Opinions
In two opinions the Attorney General has concluded that in light of section 19, article VI, counties may not lawfully
provide superior court judges with the same employment benefits they provide their own employees. (See 59
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 496, 501 (1976); 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 388, 390 (1978).) In the Attorney General's first opinion he
analyzed the then current version of Government Code section 53200.3. By way of sections 53200-53210 the
Legislature authorized local governments, including counties, to provide health and welfare benefits to their officers and
employees. In section 53200.3 the Legislature further provided: "For the limited purpose of the application of this
article, judges of the superior and municipal courts and the officers and attaches of said courts whose salaries are paid
either in whole or in part from the salary fund of the county are county employees." (Stats. 1957, ch. 472, 1, p. 1508.)
In finding this provision unconstitutional, the Attorney General noted that a duty which is prescribed by the Constitution
is a nondelegable duty. (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 497; see also County of Madera v. Superior Court (1974) 39
Cal.App.3d 665, 670, fn. 3 [114 Cal. Rptr. 283].) Thus the Attorney General noted any attempt to delegate such a duty
would be unconstitutional. (59 Ops.Cal. Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 497.) The Attorney General, based on his prior opinions
and on legislative reports on the issue, further concluded employee benefits were part of an employee's compensation.
(Ibid.)
The Attorney General noted a legislative body may give another administrative body the power to determine facts
subject to a rule or standard determined by the Legislature and thereby avoid an improper delegation of its power. (59
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen, supra, at p. 500.) "Several equally well established principles, however, serve to limit the scope of
the doctrine proscribing delegations of legislative power. For example, legislative power may properly be delegated if
channeled by a sufficient standard." (Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.2d 371, 375-376 [71 Cal. Rptr. 687, 445 P.2d
303]; see also Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal.2d 228, 235 [18 Cal.Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d
101].) However, the Attorney General concluded the power channeled to the counties by section 53200.3 "is totally
without standards and thus would not satisfy this requirement set forth in Kugler." (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p.
500.)
In response to the Attorney General's first opinion, the Legislature amended section 53200.3 by adding to the first
sentence of the statute the phrase "and shall be subject to the same or similar obligations and be granted the same or
similar employee benefits as are now required or granted to employees of the county in which the court of said judge,
officer, or attach is located." (Stats. 1977, ch. 106, 1, p. 537.) In his second opinion the Attorney General found the
amended statute was invalid for the same reason the original statute was defective: "[A]s was the case prior to the
amendment, the Legislature authorizes the individual county legislative bodies to determine if, and in what form, and to
what extent judges shall be compensated with county-sponsored health insurance benefits. [Citation.] There is a
complete absence of effective legislatively established standards to guide county authorities in the making of this
determination. The Legislature has thus failed to address itself to those omissions that caused the original statute to be
constitutionally defective." (61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 390.)
B. Section 1241
The county asks that we reject the Attorney General's opinions. In particular, the county argues the Attorney
General erred in concluding employee benefits are part of judicial compensation within the meaning of section 19,
article VI of the California Constitution. The county relies on the Legislature's enactment in 1987 of section 1241,
which states: "Whenever a section of the California Constitution uses both the terms 'salary' and 'compensation,' with
respect to a public officer or employee, the terms shall be construed to apply only to salary." The legislative history of
Page 7
A-125
WA-232
section 1241 indicates it was enacted as a means of excluding employee benefits from the term "compensation"
wherever the terms "compensation" and "salary" appeared in a single provision of the Constitution. (See Off. of Sen.
Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1357 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 10, 1987; Off. of Local
Government Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1357 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 22, 1987, p. 1.) By its
terms, section 1241 applies to section 19, article VI, because the second paragraph of the constitutional provision
prevents any judge from receiving his or her "salary" if any matter before the judge has been pending more than 90
days.
We recognize we owe deference to interpretations of constitutional provisions enacted by the Legislature. (See
Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 693 [97 Cal. Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161]; San Francisco v.
Industrial Acc. Com. (1920) 183 Cal. 273, 279 [191 P. 26].) However, such a legislative construction is only permitted
"[i]f the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the ...
Constitution." (County of Los Angeles v. Legg (1936) 5 Cal.2d 349, 353 [55 P.2d 206].)
Our consideration of the express language of section 19, article VI of the state Constitution, its origins and purposes
and the potential consequences of adopting a narrow interpretation of its scope, convince us that notwithstanding
section 1241, the employment benefits provided by the county are part of each judge's compensation and therefore must
be prescribed by the Legislature.
1. Constitutional Interpretation
"The principles of constitutional interpretation are similar to those governing statutory construction. In interpreting
a constitution's provision, our paramount task is to ascertain the intent of those who enacted it. [Citation.] To determine
that intent, we 'look first to the language of the constitutional text, giving the words their ordinary meaning.' [Citation.]
If the language is clear, there is no need for construction. [Citation.] If the language is ambiguous, however, we consider
extrinsic evidence of the enacting body's intent. [Citations.]" (Thompson v. Department of Corrections (2001) 25
Cal.4th 117, 122 [105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 18 P.3d 1198].) In interpreting constitutional provisions, courts have relied on
such extrinsic evidence as ballot materials and contemporaneous interpretations by the Legislature and administrative
agencies. (See, e.g., Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44
Cal.4th 431, 444-445 [79 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 187 P.3d 37]; ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco (1985) 37 Cal.3d 859, 869 [210 Cal. Rptr. 226, 693 P.2d 811].)
2. Express Language
The ordinary and common understanding of the word "compensation" is broad, unrestricted and encompassing:
"[S]omething given or received as an equivalent for services, debt, loss, injury, suffering lack, etc." (Random House
Dict. of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 417, italics added.) "Something given or received as an equivalent or as
reparation for a loss, service, or debt; a recompense; an indemnity." (American Heritage Dict. of the English Language
(1976) p. 271, italics added.) "[P]ayment for value received or service rendered: REMUNERATION." (Webster's 3d
New Internat. Dict., Unabridged (2002) p. 463.) "Remunerate" itself is defined as: "[T]o pay, recompense, or reward for
work, trouble, etc." (Random House Dict. of the English Language, supra, at p. 1630.) Importantly, in its common
understanding the term "compensation" is not restricted to any particular method or mode of payment: "[T]he ordinary
meaning of the term 'compensation,' as applied to officers, is remuneration in whatever form it may be given, whether it
be salaries and fees, or both combined." (State v. Bland (1913) 91 Kan. 160, 167 [136 P. 947, 949], italics added, cited
by Black's Law Dict. (rev. 4th ed. 1968) p. 354.)
Although in many contexts "salary" is used interchangeably with "compensation" (see, e.g., Sevier v. Riley, supra,
198 Cal. at pp. 172-173; Martin v. Santa Barbara (1894) 105 Cal. 208, 212-214 [38 P. 687]), "salary" is usually
defined somewhat more narrowly than compensation. "[S]alary ... a fixed compensation periodically paid to a person for
regular work or services." (Random House Dict. of the English Language, supra, at p. 1693.) "A fixed compensation for
services, paid to a person on a regular basis." (American Heritage Dict. of the English Language, supra, at p. 1144.)
Page 8
A-126
WA-233
"[F]ixed compensation paid regularly (as by the year, quarter, month, or week) for services." (Webster's 3d New
Internat. Dict., Unabridged, supra, at p. 2003.) "Salary: ... In a more limited sense a fixed periodical compensation paid
for services rendered; a stated compensation, amounting to so much by the year, month, or other fixed period, to be paid
to public officers and persons in some private employments, for the performance of official duties or the rendering of
services of a particular kind, more or less definitely described, involving professional knowledge or skill, or at least
employment above the grade of menial or mechanical labor." (Black's Law Dict., supra, at p. 1503.)
Still narrower than "compensation" or "salary" is the related term "wages." "Wages" are: "money that is paid or
received for work or services, as by the hour, day, or week." (Random House Dict. of the English Language, supra, at p.
2136.) Alternatively, a "wage" is "[p]ayment for services to a workman; usually, remuneration on an hourly, daily, or
weekly basis or by the piece." (American Heritage Dict. of the English Language, supra, at p. 1440.) Significantly,
"wage" has also been defined as "a pledge or payment of ... monetary remuneration by an employer ... for labor or
services ... according to contract and on an hourly basis and often including bonuses, commissions, and amounts paid by
the employer for insurance, pension, hospitalization, and other benefits." (Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict.,
Unabridged, supra, at p. 2568.)
Given the breadth of the term "compensation," any common understanding of it includes the employment benefits
the county provides its judges. In this regard it is significant for us that, in a host of cases that have arisen since the
middle of the last century, when such benefits became relatively commonplace, courts have uniformly determined such
benefits are part of an employee's compensation, salary or wages. In Wise v. Southern Pac. Co. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 600,
607 [83 Cal. Rptr. 202, 463 P.2d 426], the defendant in a wrongful discharge case argued that, because under its
collective bargaining agreement it was only required to pay an unfairly dismissed employee his lost "wages," the
plaintiff should not have been provided a recovery which included the cost of replacing his fringe benefits. In rejecting
this argument, the court stated: "[E]ven if it be assumed without deciding that the contract could properly limit
plaintiff's damages to the extent and in the respect for which defendant contends, it is our view that in an action for
wrongful discharge, and pursuant to the present day concept of employer-employee relations, the term 'wages' should be
deemed to include not only the periodic monetary earnings of the employee but also the other benefits to which he is
entitled as a part of his compensation." (Ibid.)
In Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 35, 44 [100 Cal. Rptr. 791], the
plaintiff argued amounts due under the terms of his employer's profit-sharing plan were part of his wages within the
meaning of Labor Code section 229, which prevented employers from compelling arbitration of wage disputes. In
agreeing with the plaintiff and finding the plaintiff's claim to amounts due under the profit-sharing plan were not subject
to arbitration, the court stated: "In its legal sense, the word 'wage' has been given a broad, general definition so as to
include compensation for services rendered without regard to the manner in which such compensation is computed." (24
Cal.App.3d at p. 44.)
In Foremost Dairies v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 560, 579 [47 Cal. Rptr. 173], the court rejected
an employer's contention it should receive a credit against its workers' compensation liability to an injured worker for
amounts paid on behalf of the worker by an employer-funded health plan. The court rejected the claim because it
determined the benefits, whether funded by the employee or the employer, were part of the employee's wages: "The
record discloses that the policy was provided by the employer as a fringe benefit to the employee and as such formed a
portion of the wages paid to decedent as an employee. Thus, in effect, the employee paid the premiums. The result is the
same whether the employer paid the premiums as an employment benefit to the employee or whether he paid the
employee direct and the employee procured his own private medical insurance." (Ibid.)
In Martin v. City & County of S. F. (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 570, 574-576 [336 P.2d 239], the court was called upon
to interpret a city charter provision which required certain skilled workers receive the same "rate of pay" as their
counterparts in the private sector. In the private sector those workers received an hourly wage plus health benefits. The
court found the city could not deduct the cost of the workers' health benefits without diminishing their rate of pay. "[I]t
is clear that in the instant case the plaintiffs were not receiving the same 'take home pay' as their counterparts in private
Page 9
A-127
WA-234
industry, because of the compulsory deduction by the employer for the city's health plan." (Id. at p. 578.)
The holding and rationale in People v. Alves (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d Supp. 870, 871-872 [320 P.2d 623], has
additional import here because in that case the court found health and welfare benefits were wages within the meaning
of our Constitution. In People v. Alves the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor violation of the Labor Code for
failing to pay the benefits required under a collective bargaining agreement. The defendant argued that under our
Constitution he could not be imprisoned for debt. (See Cal. Const., former art. I, 15.) In rejecting the defendant's
argument, the court noted an employer's liability for wages was not a debt subject to the constitutional proscription
against imprisonment for debt, and criminal liability could be imposed for failure to pay wages. The court then found
the health and welfare benefits were part of an employee's wages within the meaning of the Constitution. "There is no
doubt that payments to a health or welfare fund made as part of the compensation for services rendered by employees
are wages as that word is used in the foregoing [case]." (People v. Alves, supra, 155 Cal.App.2d at p. Supp. 872.)
We agree with the county's contention that at the time the predecessor of section 19, article VI of the state
Constitution, was adopted by voters in 1924, employment benefits such as the ones the county provides were not as
commonplace as they are today. However, they were not entirely unknown. For instance, in 1889 the Legislature
adopted "An Act to create a Police Relief, Health, and Life Insurance and Pension Fund in the several counties, cities
and counties, cities, and towns of the State." (Stats. 1889, ch. 62, p. 56.) It provided police officers in the state with a
pension as well as disability and death benefits. Moreover, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries the term
"compensation" was, as it is today, interpreted broadly rather than narrowly. (See, e.g., State v. Bland, supra, 136 P. at
p. 949; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491]; Martin v. Santa Barbara, supra, 105
Cal. at pp. 212-213.)
In addition to the fact that employment benefits somewhat similar to those provided by the county existed in
limited areas of the employment market in 1924 when the predecessor of section 19, article VI of the state Constitution
was adopted, we note such benefits were widespread in 1966 when the Legislature placed on the ballot, and the voters
adopted, as part of the comprehensive revision of the Constitution, section 19, article VI, as it now appears. The drafters
of the 1966 Constitution certainly were aware both that employers provided such benefits and that courts consistently
found such benefits were part of an employee's wages or salary.
In sum, the term "compensation" is itself broad, and courts have had no difficulty over the last more than
half-century in repeatedly finding employment benefits such as the county provides are part of the relatively narrower
terms "wages" or "rate of pay." Moreover, during that period of time, when such employment benefits became more
commonplace, the people readopted the broad language which now appears in section 19, article VI of the state
Constitution. Under these circumstances, where the plain meaning of the Constitution appears to clearly encompass the
benefits in dispute, arguably our analysis is complete. (See ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 868.) However, in an abundance of caution, we will nonetheless consider whether any
variance from that plain meaning can be found in either the history surrounding the limitation or any manifestation of its
underlying purposes. (Ibid.)
3. Judicial Compensation
The ballot materials with respect to both the 1924 amendment to the state Constitution which initially gave the
Legislature the responsibility for setting judicial compensation and to the 1966 revision which readopted that delegation
of responsibility do not discuss judicial compensation. Admittedly, we do have, in section 1241, the Legislature's
interpretation of compensation. However, as the court noted in City and County of San Francisco v. County of San
Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 563 [41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 896 P.2d 181], it is contemporaneous constructions by the
Legislature which are persuasive in interpreting ambiguous provisions of our Constitution. (See also Board of
Supervisors v. Lonergan (1980) 27 Cal.3d 855, 866 [167 Cal. Rptr. 820, 616 P.2d 802].) The 1988 enactment of section
1241 was by no means contemporaneous with either the 1924 adoption of an amendment giving the Legislature the
obligation of prescribing compensation or with the 1966 reenactment of that provision as part of the comprehensive
Page 10
A-128
WA-235
revision of the Constitution.
8
Thus we turn to the historical origins of the term "compensation" as it has been used with
respect to the judiciary.
8 We also note the legislative history of section 1241 suggests the most immediate concern of the Legislature
was application of the limitation on legislative compensation set forth in former article IV, section 4 of the
Constitution. The limitation on legislative compensation was added to the Constitution in 1966 and was deleted
from the Constitution in 1990.
Concern over judicial compensation existed at the time the federal Constitution was adopted. The federal
Constitution's compensation clause guarantees federal judges a "Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office." (U.S. Const., art. III, 1.) "[T]he Compensation Clause, along with the Clause securing
federal judges appointments 'during good Behavior,' U.S. Const., Art. III, 1--the practical equivalent of life
tenure--helps to guarantee what Alexander Hamilton called the 'complete independence of the courts of justice.' The
Federalist No. 78, p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton thought these guarantees necessary because the Judiciary is
'beyond comparison the weakest of the three' branches of Government. Id., at 465-466. It has 'no influence over either
the sword or the purse.' Id., at 465. It has 'no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.' Ibid. It has
'neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.'" (United States v. Hatter (2001) 532 U.S. 557, 567-568 [149 L. Ed. 2d
820, 121 S. Ct. 1782].)
The drafters of our 1849 state Constitution went further in protecting judicial independence by not only limiting the
power of the Legislature to reduce the compensation of judges during their respective terms of office, but also in
preventing the Legislature from raising judges' compensation. Article VI, section 15 of the 1849 Constitution provided
judges shall "receive for their services a compensation ... which shall not be increased or diminished during the term for
which they shall have been elected." The drafters of the 1879 Constitution carried this limitation forward. (See Cal.
Const. of 1879, art. VI, 17.) In addition to continuing this limitation, the drafters of the 1879 Constitution added a
separate provision which stated: "No Judge of a Superior Court nor of the Supreme Court shall, after the first day of
July, one thousand eight hundred and eighty, be allowed to draw or receive any monthly salary unless he shall take and
subscribe an affidavit before an officer entitled to administer oaths, that no cause in his Court remains undecided that
has been submitted for decision for the period of ninety days." (Cal. Const. of 1879, art. VI, 24.)
In 1906 the judicial compensation provision of the 1879 Constitution, article VI, section 17, was amended. (Stats.
1909, p. xxxiv.) Under the 1906 amendment, the compensation of justices of the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal
were set by the Constitution itself at annual salaries of $ 8,000 and $ 7,000 respectively. (Ibid.) With respect to the
superior court judges, the amended version of section 17 provided: "The salaries of the Judges of the Superior Court, in
all counties having but one judge, and in all counties in which the terms of the Judges of the Superior Court expire at the
same time, shall not hereafter be increased or diminished after their election, nor during the term for which they shall
have been elected." (Ibid.) As the court in Sevier v. Riley explained, this limitation on judicial salaries combined with
the Legislature's addition of new judges in various counties created some disparity among the salaries paid to superior
court judges: "[T]he state legislature, responding to the demands of the more populous counties of California, due to
their increase in population and corresponding increase in litigation, adopted various enactments increasing, and in
some counties again and again increasing, the number of superior judges assigned to such regions, and in so doing
provided for the expiration of the terms of these additional judicial officers at different times from that of those holding
office under previous conditions of the law. The result of these changes in the statutes, especially since 1906, has been
that of enabling a goodly number of the counties of the state to be exempted from the constitutional inhibition against an
increase in the salaries of their superior judges to become effective during their respective terms of office, by the simple
expedient of adding one or more to the number of their superior judges with terms expiring at different times than those
already provided. The result of these changes in the constitution and statutes prior to and up to the year 1924 was this:
that as to the supreme and appellate justices the salaries of these, both as to the amount and payment thereof, were
rigidly fixed by the terms of section 17 of article VI of the constitution; that as to superior judges the salaries of these
were subject to fixation by the legislature, limited by the provision in said section 17 of article VI of the constitution to
the effect that in counties having but one superior judge, or, if more, having the terms of these expiring at the same time,
Page 11
A-129
WA-236
there should be no legislative increase in the salaries of these one or more judges which could become effective during
their terms of office; while as to counties which had by legislative action effected an increase in the number of their
judges so worded as to make the terms of their judgeships expire at different times, the constitutional inhibition was
inapplicable and that the increases in such salaries as the legislature from time to time provided for in such counties
became effective immediately." (Sevier v. Riley, supra, 198 Cal. at pp. 173-174.)
In 1924 the voters approved a number of amendments to the Constitution, including an amendment establishing the
municipal courts. In addition to establishing municipal courts, the amendment added the following language to section
11, article VI: "The compensation of the justices or judges of all courts of record, shall be fixed and the payment thereof
prescribed by the legislature." (Stats. 1925, p. xxv.) Although the amendment adopting this provision did not expressly
repeal the limitations of former section 17, article VI, in Sevier v. Riley the court found those limitations had by
implication been repealed. The court found retention of the earlier limitations "would be hostile to the spirit and intent
of the amendment in so far as the latter was designed to commit the matter of judicial salaries in all these various courts
of record to the flexible control of the legislature rather than to the rigid limitations of the constitution ... ." (Sevier v.
Riley, supra, 198 Cal. at p. 176.)
In 1966 the Constitution was once again revised, and section 19, article VI, was adopted in its current form. The
first sentence of section 19, article VI, is derived from former section 11, article VI, and the second sentence is the same
language which appeared in former section 24, article VI of the Constitution.
9
9 We note that in 1972 the voters adopted Proposition 6, which added article III, section 4 to the Constitution.
As initially adopted, article III, section 4, stated: "Salaries of elected state officers may not be reduced during
their term of office. Laws that set these salaries are appropriations." In 1980 article III, section 4, was amended
to permit the Legislature to terminate prospective, but unrealized, increases in salaries. Neither Sturgeon, nor the
county, has relied upon or briefed article III, section 4, and we express no opinion on it with respect to the issues
raised in this appeal or that may be raised in the future, including the rights of others to intervene in this
litigation.
Nothing in the foregoing history of section 19, article VI, suggests that at any time since the term "compensation"
was first used in the Constitution in 1849 did the drafters intend that it have a narrow or constrained meaning. Rather, it
is clear that while the drafters of the 1849 and 1879 Constitutions were, like the drafters of the federal Constitution,
concerned about protecting judges from political influence, in 1924 those concerns gave way to a concern that judges be
paid on some rational and relatively uniform basis. Neither the need to provide protection from political influence nor
the desire to give the Legislature plenary power over compensation as a means of promoting rationality and uniformity
support a narrow reading of the term "compensation."
4. The County's Judicial Benefits
On this record, notwithstanding section 1241, the benefits the county provides to judges are compensation within
the meaning of section 19, article VI of the state Constitution. The MegaFlex benefits provided by the county equal 19
percent of a judge's salary, and judges may elect to receive that benefit in cash as taxable income. The judges are not
limited in the manner in which they choose to use their respective PDA's and, if they are willing to suffer the adverse
tax consequences, they can have access to their 401(k) accounts. Thus the judges have a great deal of control over the
benefits once they are paid. We also note that the county, in opposing Sturgeon's gift and waste theories, made a
convincing case both in the trial court and here on appeal that the benefits were needed for recruitment and retention. In
this factual context, any common understanding of the term "compensation" would include these benefits because of the
judge's access to them once they are paid and because of the purpose they serve.
In addition, we believe the benefits are compensation within the meaning of the Constitution because collectively
the benefits substantially increase the amount Los Angeles judges receive for their services. The size of the benefits and
the resulting potential for disparity with the remuneration paid to judges in other counties directly implicate the very
Page 12
A-130
WA-237
reasons the Legislature was given plenary power over judicial compensation by way of adoption of the precursor to
section 19, article VI. (See Sevier v. Riley, supra, 198 Cal. at pp. 174-175.)
C. Prescribed Compensation
The county also argues that even if the judicial benefits it provides are compensation within the meaning of section
19, article VI of the Constitution, the Legislature has adequately prescribed those benefits. As we explain more fully
below, we do not find any statutory provision or other enactment which meets the requirements of the Constitution.
1. Prescribed Duties
When the Constitution has "prescribed" a duty "the named authority must itself exercise the function described; in
other words, it imposes a nondelegable duty. The more general term 'provide' is used when it is intended not to require
action by the named authority itself; in other words, it permits the delegation of the function to others." (Judicial
Council of Cal., Ann. Rep. (1967) pp. 65, 67, fn. omitted; see also Sevier v. Riley, supra, 198 Cal. at pp. 174-175;
County of Madera v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at pp. 669-670.) Importantly, even when a legislative body
bears a nondelegable duty, it may nonetheless permit other bodies to take action based on a general principle established
by the legislative body so long as the Legislature provides standards or safeguards which assure that the Legislature's
fundamental policy is effectively carried out. (Kugler v. Yocum, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 376-377.) "We have said that
the purpose of the doctrine that legislative power cannot be delegated is to assure that 'truly fundamental issues [will] be
resolved by the Legislature' and that a 'grant of authority [is] ... accompanied by safeguards adequate to prevent its
abuse.' [Citations.] This doctrine rests upon the premise that the legislative body must itself effectively resolve the truly
fundamental issues. It cannot escape responsibility by explicitly delegating that function to others or by failing to
establish an effective mechanism to assure the proper implementation of its policy decisions." (Ibid.)
In Kugler v. Yocum, supra, 69 Cal.2d 371, the court considered a proposed ordinance which set the minimum
salary of firefighters in the City of Alhambra by reference to the average pay of firefighters in the City of Los Angeles.
"In the instant case, the adoption of the proposed ordinance, either through promulgation by the Alhambra City Council
or by initiative, will constitute the legislative body's resolution of the 'fundamental issue.' Once the legislative body has
determined the issue of policy, i.e., that the Alhambra wages for firemen should be on a parity with Los Angeles, that
body has resolved the 'fundamental issue'; the subsequent filling in of the facts in application and execution of the
policy does not constitute legislative delegation. Thus the decision on the legislative policy has not been delegated; the
implementation of the policy by reference to Los Angeles salaries is not the delegation of it." (Id. at p. 377.) The court
found the proposed ordinance would not have unlawfully delegated Alhambra's lawmaking function to another body
because of the inherent interest of Los Angeles in not paying excessive salaries. (Id. at p. 382.)
The court reached a similar conclusion in Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 856, 860-862 [87
Cal. Rptr. 886] (Martin). In Martin the court approved legislation which set the salary of municipal court attachs in
Contra Costa County at the same rate as comparable county employees and expressly provided the court employees
would be entitled to the same raises as their counterparts in the county. In finding the Legislature met its constitutional
obligation to prescribe the salaries of municipal court attachs by tying their salaries and benefits to those of other
county employees, the court stated: "This provision is not an abdication of the Legislature's duty to prescribe the
compensation of the attaches of each municipal court. It fixes the compensation of the employees, declares a policy that
such compensation shall be commensurate with that furnished county employees with equivalent responsibilities and
provides for interim changes, subject to review by the Legislature, in the event there are local changes which would
otherwise cause discrepancies in compensation in violation of the legislative policy." (Id. at p. 862.)
2. Constitutional Considerations
In the context of judicial compensation, we must carefully observe the limits of legislative delegation. As we have
seen, early drafters of our Constitution were concerned about protecting the judicial branch from excessive and
Page 13
A-131
WA-238
improper political influence, and they imposed rigid limits on judicial compensation. In the interests of bringing
rationality and uniformity to judicial compensation, the responsibility of protecting the judiciary has now been left
largely in the hands of the Legislature. Because the legislative responsibility with respect to judicial compensation,
including of necessity the participation of the executive branch in the legislative process, is now the principal means of
protecting the independence of the judicial branch,
10
in considering compensation judges receive, we must be careful
that in fact the Legislature has exercised its prescriptive role. In particular, unlike the concern employees might receive
excessive pay which animated the litigation in Kugler v. Yocum and Martin, we must in addition be sensitive to the
potential that, in the absence of proper direction from the Legislature, judges might be subject to substantial variations
in compensation determined solely by local authorities.
10 See also article III, section 4 of the Constitution.
3. The County's Judicial Benefits
We have been unable to identify any enactment of the Legislature which prescribes the judicial benefits the county
pays its judges.
Although its framework is similar to the enactments considered in Kugler v. Yocum and Martin, as the Attorney
General concluded, section 53200.3 does not fully meet the requirements of the Constitution. Under section 53201,
subdivision (a), the Legislature gave local agencies the power to provide their employees "any health and welfare
benefits for the benefit of its officers, employees, retired employees, and retired members of the legislative body."
(Italics added.) There is no limitation on the amount or kinds of benefits a local agency may provide its employees or
any requirement the benefits be provided on a uniform basis to all classes and categories of employees, except that the
benefits provided to members of an agency's legislative body are limited to "the most generous schedule of benefits
being received by any category of nonsafety employees." ( 53208.5, subd. (b).) In the context of the wide range of
benefits allowed by section 53201, section 53200.3 only requires that each county provide its judges the same or similar
health and employee benefits it provides its "employees." Because, as section 53208.5 expressly recognizes,
11
the
benefits permitted under section 53201 may vary substantially between classes and categories of employees and may be
subject to abuse, the reference to benefits provided "employees" in section 53200.3 does not contain a readily
discernible standard or safeguard. In this regard the provisions of section 53200.3 are distinguishable from the
enactments considered and approved in Kugler v. Yocum and Martin. In both Kugler v. Yocum and Martin, the salaries
of certain employees were tied to salaries of other identified and comparable classes or categories of employees, thus
limiting the amount of salary to that of other similarly situated employees. Read in light of sections 53201 and 53208.5,
section 53200.3 contains no such safeguard as to the propriety and proportionality of judicial benefits counties may
provide.
12
11 Section 53208.5 states: "(a) It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section, to provide a uniform
limit on the health and welfare benefits for the members of the legislative bodies of all political subdivisions of
the state, including charter cities and charter counties. The Legislature finds and declares that uneven,
conflicting, and inconsistent health and welfare benefits for legislative bodies distort the statewide system of
intergovernmental finance. The Legislature further finds and declares that the inequities caused by these
problems extend beyond the boundaries of individual public agencies. [] Therefore, the Legislature finds and
declares that these problems are not merely municipal affairs or matters of local interest and that they are truly
matters of statewide concern that require the direct attention of the state government. In providing a uniform
limit on the health and welfare benefits for the legislative bodies of all political subdivisions of the state, the
Legislature has provided a solution to a statewide problem that is greater than local in its effect.
"(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the health and welfare benefits of any member of a
legislative body of any city, including a charter city, county, including a charter county, city and county, special
district, school district, or any other political subdivision of the state shall be no greater than that received by
nonsafety employees of that public agency. In the case of agencies with different benefit structures, the benefits
Page 14
A-132
WA-239
of members of the legislative body shall not be greater than the most generous schedule of benefits being
received by any category of nonsafety employees.
"(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, members of the legislative body of a city, including a
charter city, county, including a charter county, city and county, special district, school district, or any other
political subdivision of the state shall not be eligible to accrue multiple health and welfare benefits greater than
the most generous schedule of benefits being received by any category of nonsafety employees from two or
more public agencies for concurrent service except in the case of a member who serves as a regular full-time
employee in a separate public agency.
"(d) This section shall be applicable to any member of a legislative body whose first service commences on
and after January 1, 1995."
12 Moreover, as Sturgeon points out, section 53200.3, which was enacted in 1957, only applies to counties
where judges "are paid either in whole or in part from the salary fund of the county." Arguably, enactment of
Lockyer-Isenberg did away with the practice of paying judges from the salary funds of counties. (See 77003,
77200, subd. (b).) However this issue was not litigated in the trial court and we do not decide it.
Both section 69894.3 and the audit and credit procedures set forth in Lockyer-Isenberg are also ineffective as
legislative prescriptions. They do not require the payment of benefits, let alone set any standard or safeguard which
regulate the size or the conditions under which they should be paid. In giving counties the option of providing the
benefits, and placing no limitation on the kind and amount of those benefits, these statutes in no sense set a fundamental
policy with respect to benefits, provide any standard for applying such a policy, or contain any safeguards which would
insure that benefits are consistent with the Legislature's adopted policy. Indeed, without violating section 69894.3 or
Lockyer-Isenberg, the county could, in any given year, deprive its judges of MegaFlex benefits and continue to provide
them to other employees.
Admittedly, in one respect Lockyer-Isenberg goes beyond section 69894.3 and its own audit and credit procedures.
As we have noted, in section 3, subdivision (g) of Lockyer-Isenberg, the Legislature expressed its intention that no court
personnel employed as of July 1, 1997, suffer any reduction in salary or benefits as a "result of this act." (Stats. 1997,
ch. 850, 3.) As to court personnel, including judges, serving as of July 1, 1997, an argument can be made that this
provision of Lockyer-Isenberg set a floor on the benefits to which those judges were entitled. This provision nonetheless
would not bring the county's benefits program within the requirements of the Constitution. First, by its terms section 3
of Lockyer-Isenberg only applies to judges serving as of July 1, 1997. We would have to ignore its express provisions to
extend its protection to judges who began their service after July 1, 1997. There is also the difficulty posed by the last
phrase of section 3, "as a result of this act." That phrase undermines our ability to conclude that by way of
Lockyer-Isenberg, the Legislature intended to affirmatively prescribe benefits for superior court judges. However, these
defects are relatively minor compared with the absence in Lockyer-Isenberg of any standard or inherent safeguard by
which future increases or decreases in judicial benefits would be regulated. The fact the county itself has elected to tie
its judicial benefits to the benefits it provides other salaried employees is not a substitute for a legislative mandate that it
do so.
Finally, we recognize a sufficient standard or safeguard may also be found in looking at the overall purposes of an
enactment. (See Carson Mobilehome Park Owners' Assn. v. City of Carson (1983) 35 Cal.3d 184, 190 [197 Cal.Rptr.
284, 672 P.2d 1297]; Wilkinson v. Madera Community Hospital (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 436, 442 [192 Cal.Rptr. 593].)
By its terms Lockyer-Isenberg was enacted so that county contributions to trial court operations would be capped at the
level provided in fiscal 1994-1995 and that thereafter increases in court expenses would be the responsibility of the
state. The state's assumption of financial responsibility for increases in court operating expenses does not implicitly set
any minimum or maximum level of additional benefits counties must provide their judges.
Because the benefits provided by the county are compensation within the meaning of section 19, article VI of our
Constitution, and because this record does not establish those benefits have been prescribed by the Legislature, the trial
Page 15
A-133
WA-240
court erred in granting the county's motion for summary judgment.
13
13 We emphasize the record before us is limited to the benefits provided by the county. We express no opinion
with respect to the judicial benefits provided under other authorities in other counties.
Moreover, we have not separately considered whether all or part of the benefits the county provides its
judges are permissible under article VI, section 20 of the Constitution, a question which was not litigated in the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
As we have noted, there are valid reasons the county provides its judges with generous employment benefits
beyond the employment benefits provided by the state. However, the defect we have found in the method by which
those benefits have been provided is itself substantial and important. Under our constitutional scheme, judicial
compensation is a matter of statewide concern and the Legislature must set policy with respect to all aspects of judicial
compensation. As the cases we have discussed demonstrate, the Legislature's obligation to "prescribe judicial
compensation" requires that it set forth standards or safeguards which assure that fundamental policy is implemented.
The fact that the Legislature provided counties a credit for judicial benefits when it enacted Lockyer-Isenberg or that it
assured the counties that judicial benefits would not be decreased as a result of trial court funding does not meet these
requirements. The obligation is not onerous, but does require that the Legislature consider the specific issue and, at a
minimum, establish or reference identifiable standards.
Judgment reversed. Appellant to recover his costs of appeal.
Nares, J., and Haller, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 7, 2008, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.
Respondent's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 23, 2008, S168408. Werdegar, J., did not
participate therein.
Page 16
A-134
WA-241

APPENDIX
2

A-135
WA-242

!"#$%&'($" *+"+, -..&/$"+$&( &% !&0(+$,. 1"2 3445
!"#$%&%#' #) *+,,-./.'01- 2+3%4%1- 5.'.)%0&
*+//1"6 #) *578 99 :*0.%';."<= 8>>?@

5ABCDEFGHI
!"#$" %$ &'( )$**$+#', %-. /&00&,. $) 12 3445 %-. 6"#&* 7$8"% 98'(#', 1:% $) ;<<=5 0$>. :$8'%#.0 -&?. $/%.( %$
/&@ 08//*.>.'%&* A.'.)#%0 %$ *$:&* B8(,.0C 1*%-$8,- %-. ".:$"( #0 '$% .'%#".*@ :*.&" $' +-#:- :$8'%#.0 :8"".'%*@
&". /"$?#(#', B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%05 +. A.*#.?. %-&% &0 $) 9.A"8&"@ 3DD< %-$0. :$8'%#.0 #':*8(.(5 &% & >#'#>8>5 &**
$) %-. )$**$+#',E

1*&>.(& F#',0 G#?."0#(. H&'%& 7*&"&
7&*&?."&0 I$0 1',.*.0 H&:"&>.'%$ H$'$>&
7$'%"& 7$0%& J.'($:#'$ H&' 2."'&"(#'$ 6"#'#%@
9".0'$ J$'%.".@ H&' 9"&':#0:$ K.'%8"&
F."' L"&',. H&' J&%.$ M$*$

N' 3DDO5 & %&P/&@." )#*.( 08#% &,&#'0% I$0 1',.*.0 7$8'%@ $?." %-#0 #008. Q!"#$%&'( )* +'#(", '- .'/ 0(%&1&/25
:-&**.',#', %-. ?&*#(#%@ $) %-. A.'.)#%0C N' L:%$A." 3DDR5 & 0%&%. &//.**&%. :$8"% $?."%8"'.( %-. %"#&* :$8"%
(.:#0#$' S +-#:- -&( #'#%#&**@ )$8'( #' )&?$" $) %-. :$8'%@ S &'( "8*.( %-&% %-. /"$?#0#$' $) A.'.)#%0 A@ %-.
:$8'%@ +&0 8':$'0%#%8%#$'&* $' %-. ,"$8'(0 %-&% H.:%#$' ;<5 &"%#:*. KN $) %-. 7&*#)$"'#& 7$'0%#%8%#$' ".T8#".0
%-. I.,#0*&%8". %$ U/".0:"#A. :$>/.'0&%#$'V )$" B8(,.0C Q2.:&80. %-. I.,#0*&%8". -&( '$% &//"$?.( *$:&*
B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%05 %-. /"$?#0#$' $) 08:- A.'.)#%0 +&0 #':$>/&%#A*. +#%- %-. :$'0%#%8%#$'&* *#>#%&%#$'CW 6-.
7&*#)$"'#& H8/".>. 7$8"% $/%.( '$% %$ ".?#.+ %-. &//.**&%. :$8"% (.:#0#$'5 0$ %-. "8*#', #' !"#$%&'( 0%&'(0C

8>>? JKDL*JAMLNK EK*!FH*K MF MOK *MGEDKFH IKBL*LFH
6$ &((".00 %-. !"#$%&'( (.:#0#$'5 %-. X8(#:#&* 7$8':#* &'( %-. 7&*#)$"'#& X8(,.0Y 100$:#&%#$' B$#'%*@ 0/$'0$".(
H2Z3 ;;5 A@ H.'&%. !".0#(.'% /"$ 6.>/$". [&"".** H%.#'A.",C 6-. I.,#0*&%8". &//"$?.( %-#0 >.&08". #' %-.
3DD<\;D H.:$'( ]P%"&$"(#'&"@ H.00#$' &0 /&"% $) %-. ;=>$'%- A8(,.% ".0$*8%#$' &($/%.( #' 9.A"8&"@ 3DD<^
H2Z3 ;; +&0 0#,'.( #'%$ *&+ A@ %-. _$?."'$" $' 9.A"8&"@ 3DC _#?.' %-. .'&:%>.'% $) %-#0 >.&08". &0 & '$'
8",.':@ A#** #' %-. 0.:$'( .P%"&$"(#'&"@ 0.00#$'5 %-. >.&08". ,$.0 #'%$ .)).:% S /8"08&'% %$ :$'0%#%8%#$'&*
/"$?#0#$'0 S $' %-. <;
0%
(&@ )$**$+#', %-. &(B$8"'>.'% $) %-. 0/.:#&* 0.00#$'C 6-. 0.:$'( .P%"&$"(#'&"@
0.00#$' &(B$8"'.( /3(& 43& $' 9.A"8&"@ ;<5 >.&'#', %-&% %-. /"$?#0#$'0 $) H2Z3 ;; A.:$>. .)).:%#?. $' J&@ 3;5
3DD<C

6-. `.@ /"$?#0#$'0 #' %-. 08//*.>.'%&* B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%0 >.&08". ($ &** $) %-. )$**$+#',E

;C LA*#,&%.0 &'@ :$8'%@ %-&% +&0 /"$?#(#', 08//*.>.'%&* B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%0 &0 $) X8*@ ;5 3DDR5 %$ 080%&#' %-.
0&>. *.?.* $) A.'.)#%0 %-&% +.". .)).:%#?. $' %-&% (&%. )$" %-. !"#$ $) %-. B8(,.5 +-#:- *#>#%0 :$8'%#.0Y
*#&A#*#%@ %$ & >&P#>8> $) 0#P @.&"0 /." B8(#:#&* $))#:."^
3C 1**$+0 :$8'%#.0 %$ %.">#'&%. )8%8". $A*#,&%#$'0 A@ ,#?#', %-. 1(>#'#0%"&%#?. L))#:. $) %-. 7$8"%0 & ;RD(&@
+"#%%.' %.">#'&%#$' '$%#:.^
4C [.)#'.0 A.'.)#%0 %$ #':*8(. ).(."&**@ ".,8*&%.( A.'.)#%05 (.)."".( :$>/.'0&%#$' /*&'05 &'( /"$).00#$'&*
(.?.*$/>.'% &**$+&':.05 &0 0/.:#)#.(^
aC _#?.0 #>>8'#%@ %$ .'%#%#.0 %-&% /"$?#(.( 08//*.>.'%&* B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%0 /"#$" %$ %-. .)).:%#?. (&%. $) %-.
>.&08".^ &'(
bC G.T8#".0 %-. X8(#:#&* 7$8':#* %$ "./$"% %$ %-. *.,#0*&%#?. A8(,.% &'( B8(#:#&"@ :$>>#%%..0 A@ [.:.>A." 4;5
3DD<5 ".,&"(#', %-. /"$?#0#$' $) *$:&* B8(#:#&* A.'.)#%0C

A-136
WA-243
!"#$%&'($" *+"+, -..&/$"+$&( &% !&0(+$,. 1"2 3445
CSAC remulned neutrul on S8z for u number of reusons. llrst, the meusure rovlded u necessury sufeguurd
for those entltles thut hud rovlded und were contlnulng to rovlde judlclul beneflts rlor to und followlng the
!"#$%&'( declslon. lurther, severul countles exressed un lntent to sustuln judlclul beneflts for the foreseeuble
future.

!"#$%&#'( %*!" *% ("+&,('!&-" .&%/&%+
Although leglslutlve flndlngs und declurutlons ure not codlfled und, therefore, huve no force of luw, courts
routlnely tuke note of these for uroses of determlnlng leglslutlve lntent. lor thut reuson, we feel lt ls
lmortunt to stute for the record thut we object to the churucterlzutlon of u hlstorlc element descrlbed ln
Sectlon (b) of S8z , whlch stutes:

1hese countyrovlded beneflts were consldered by the Leglsluture ln enuctlng the Lockyer
lsenberg 1rlul Court lundlng Act of ,, ln whlch countles could recelve u reductlon ln the
county's mulntenunce of effort obllgutlons lf countles elected to rovlde beneflts ursuunt to
urugruh (l) of subdlvlslon (c) of Sectlon ,,zc of the Covernment Code for trlul court judges
of thut county.

1hls summury ls u mlsstutement of fucts. 1he 1rlul Court lundlng Act of , (A8 z) cued county
resonslblllty for court oerutlons ut the level. Resonslblllty for future court costs und growth
trunsferred to the stute. Countles were requlred to ldentlfy for thelr lndlvlduul jurlsdlctlons the hlstorlcul costs
of suortlng the trlul courts, bused on stututorlly deflned cost elements ("ullowuble costs') thut were
necessury und requlred to sustuln court oerutlons. 1hese elements were bundled lnto un oerutlons
Mulntenunce of Lffort (MCL).

1here were other elements outslde of the necessury und requlred elements of court oerutlons ("unullowuble
costs'), umong those were locully negotluted judlclul beneflts. (An lmortunt dlstlnctlon: 1here ure two tyes
of "locul judlclul beneflts.' 1he flrst tye wus rovlded to judges ucross the bourd, regurdless of jurlsdlctlon,
resonslblllty for those )"*"&+,-& judlclul beneflts trunsferred to the stute under A8 z. 1hls second tye wus
u cluss of sulementul beneflts thut cleurly fell outslde the stundurd beneflts judges recelved stutewlde. 1hese
beneflts were ugreed uon locully between the court und the county und mlght huve lncluded erqulsltes such
us u cur ullowunce or subbutlcul uy.)

1he stute took the osltlon thut thls second tye of beneflts wus unullowuble, for the followlng reusons: they
were dlscretlonury, were not "necessury und requlred' elements of court oerutlons, und, therefore, were not
urorlute for trunsfer to the stute. 1herefore, countles underwent u rocess to ldentlfy costs ussocluted wlth
these extru judlclul beneflts, thls cost element wus exclsed from certuln countles' ongolng obllgutlon to the
stute. 1he uctlon to umend u county's MCL to &./0#-& uny comonent ussocluted wlth locully rovlded judlclul
beneflts should not be construed us u beneflt to countles, lt wus ut the dlrectlon of the Leglsluture, ln
recognltlon of the fuct thut () the stute would not ussume resonslblllty for these dlscretlonury beneflts und
(z) rovlslon of those beneflts remulned electlve, ursuunt to locul declslons. Stuted dlfferently, there wus no
offset or reductlon to the MCL - just un excluslon of unullowuble costs thut were not golng to be ussumed by
the Stute. 1he leglslutlve flndlng ln S8z churucterlzes the MCL reductlon wus u "beneflt' to countles, when
lt ln fuct wus, us stuted revlously, slmly the necessury resonse to the Leglsluture's rejectlon of whut lt
deemed to be unullowuble court oerutlon costs.

01",!&*%,
lf we cun rovlde uny further lnformutlon ubout thls lssue or the seclflc leglslutlve meusure to uddress locul
judlclul beneflts, leuse do not hesltute to contuct Lllzubeth Eowurd ut ehowurdQcountles.org or 66c
8.
A-137
WA-244
3/15/09 10:35 AM Law.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
Page 1 of 2 http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427031446&rss=newswire
Law.com Home Newswire LawJobs CLE Center LawCatalog Our Sites Advertise

Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
State high court's unanimous vote means that judges will lose the perks
unless lawmakers decide to help
Mike McKee
The Recorder
December 29, 2008
Printer-friendly Email this Article Reprints & Permissions

Any hope the California Supreme Court might resolve a politically sensitive
imbroglio over extra judicial benefits dissipated Tuesday when the high
court refused to review the case that stirred things up.
The Supreme Court's unanimous vote -- minus participation by Justice
Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, who was absent -- means the judges will lose
the perks unless lawmakers decide to help.
The Supreme Court's decision to not take up Sturgeon v. County of Los
Angeles , S168408, lets stand a lower court ruling that could void L.A.
County's 20-year practice of supplementing judges' $178,000 salaries and
state-provided benefits with perks that amounted to almost $50,000 a
year.
The Oct. 10 ruling by San Diego's 4th District Court of Appeal held that
the practice violated the state Constitution's requirement that the
Legislature "prescribe compensation for judges." County-funded judicial
perks occur in many of the state's 58 counties, but Los Angeles' appear to
be the most lucrative.
The decision was a blow to judicial advocates who say the state already
has trouble attracting judges to the bench with salaries that often pale in
comparison to those of major law firms.
"I always thought it was likely there would have to be legislative action,"
Michael Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association, said
Tuesday. "But this certainly steps up the urgency."
The benefits package provided by the county includes travel and
professional development allowances that judges could take in cash, as
well as additional contributions to retirement accounts.
The CJA had filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court to
grant review in Sturgeon. "We have heard from judges who have indicated
it would be their intent to leave the bench," Belote said. "Just as we all
have financial obligations and need to plan, there are judges who believe
this completely disrupts their career plan."
CJA President Mary Wiss said Tuesday that Los Angeles County Superior
Court Judge Joseph Hilberman indicated in a recent news report that he
will leave the bench next month after only seven years partly because of
Sturgeon. Wiss, a judge with the San Francisco Superior Court, said it
"would be a shame to lose talent and experience from the bench because
of the loss of benefits and [because of] the difficulty in attracting quality
members of the bar to the bench."
Search Top Stories: Register for Legal Newswire | Legal Blogs | Newsletters | Feeds
Top Stories From Law.com
Legal Technology
Case Management: Time for a Tune-Up
In-House Counsel
Why Obama's Health Care Reforms Won't Be Easy
Small Firm Business
In Tough Times, Look Out for Legal Malpractice
Claims
MORE JOBS >>
POST A JOB >>
TOP JOBS
ATTORNEY
CONFIDENTIAL SEARCH
New York, NY
Air Force Judge Advocate
United State Air Force
Pennsylvania
Small Claims Made Easy
Your Small Claims Department CA's leader in online
submissions
www.smallclaimsdepartment.com
Compensation Management
Free Whitepaper - Tips to Improve Employee
A-138
WA-245
3/15/09 10:35 AM Law.com - Calif. Supreme Court Won't Take Up Judge Perks
Page 2 of 2 http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427031446&rss=newswire
About Incisive Media | About Law.com | Customer Support | Privacy Policy | Terms & Conditions
Copyright 2009. Incisive Media US Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
members of the bar to the bench."
California Chief Justice Ronald George has criticized some counties'
provisions for extra benefits, but has never tried to block it. Instead, he
has tried to raise judges' salaries and benefits statewide. George's recent
decision, along with Justice Marvin Baxter, to not participate in what was
very likely Judicial Council discussion of the Sturgeon case, had left
observers wondering whether he and Baxter were preparing to hear the
case in the high court.
Attorneys for the San Marino-based Judicial Watch Inc., which filed the
case on behalf of L.A. County resident and taxpayer Harold Sturgeon,
didn't respond to calls on Tuesday.
But in their brief arguing against review, they said the 4th District's ruling would still ensure that California judges would "remain
the highest paid" in the nation.
"Far from deviating from long-standing constitutional doctrines," attorney Sterling Norris wrote, "the ruling restores the Legislature's
proper constitutional role in setting the compensation received by the state trial court judges, a role that had been usurped by the
county."
Neither Elwood Lui, the L.A.-based Jones Day partner who represented Los Angeles County, nor J. Stephen Czuleger, presiding
judge of L.A. County Superior Court, returned calls seeking comment Tuesday.
But in his petition for review, Lui, a former justice on L.A.'s 2nd District, accused the Sturgeon court of cutting "a swath through the
law," imperiling "the livelihood of judges" and leaving "the law and bench in confusion."
"The ultimate victims," Lui wrote, "will be the people, who depend on quality in the courts."
Lui also predicted that the ruling could lead to "copycat suits by disgruntled lawyers and litigants" in other counties that offer extra
benefits.
Belote said the CJA now needs to step up its efforts to come up with a legislative solution.
"We've been talking to people ... about how you might craft a bill or a legislative solution," he said, "and actually we were kind of
getting down to a draft that might be workable and we'd hoped to have that in early January. But we are going to have to move
this thing as quick as possible."
Belote acknowledged that pushing for perks during a recession and budget crisis is a daunting task, but was still optimistic.
"I would say you could not have picked a more challenging time to discuss any issue that relates to money," he said. "But I would
say the legislators we have talked to, in general, have expressed a willingness to consider" the issue.

Subscribe to The Recorder
Marketplace
Is Your Database Safe? Free Database
Security Guid...
Get the 10 Best Practices for Database
Security. Download FREE Guide Now from
Application Security.
http://www.AppSecInc.com
Are You Six Sigma Certified?
Earn 100% Online-Six Sigma
Certificate From Villanova.
LEARN More Now!
www.VillanovaU.com/SixSigma
Investment Notebook Tool
Save, Organize & Monitor your
Investment Ideas with
ImpactOven - Free Trial.
www.impactoven.com
Compensation Processes.
SumTotalSystems.com/Compensation
Art Prints for Lawyers
Framed prints and paintings for Lawyers and Judges-
Shop Now!
www.LawGallery.com
Binder & Associates
Train accident and personal injury attorneys since 1973
www.binderassociates.com/
A-139
WA-246
Senate Bill No. 11
CHAPTER 9
An act to add Sections 68220, 68221, and 68222 to the Government Code,
relating to judges.
[Approved by Governor February 20, 2009. Filed with
Secretary of State February 20, 2009.]
legislative counsel
s digest
SB 11, Steinberg. Judges: employment benets.
The California Constitution requires the Legislature to prescribe
compensation for judges of courts of record. Existing law authorizes a county
to deem judges and court employees as county employees for purposes of
providing employment benets. These provisions were held unconstitutional
as an impermissible delegation of the obligation of the Legislature to
prescribe the compensation of judges of courts of record.
This bill would provide that judges who received supplemental judicial
benets provided by a county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall
continue to receive supplemental benets from the county or court then
paying the benets on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on
that date. The bill would authorize a county to terminate its obligation to
provide benets upon providing 180 days written notice to the
Administrative Director of the Courts and the impacted judges, but that
termination would not be effective as to any judge during his or her current
term while that judge continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the
election of the county, when that judge leaves ofce. The bill also would
authorize the county to elect to provide benets for all judges in that county.
The bill would require the Judicial Council to report to the Senate Committee
on Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and
both the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before
December 31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benets inconsistencies.
This bill would provide that no governmental entity, or ofcer or employee
of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution
or disciplinary action because of benets provided to a judge under the
ofcial action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of the bill
on the ground that those benets were not authorized under law.
This bill would provide that nothing in its provisions shall require the
Judicial Council to increase funding to a court for the purpose of paying
judicial benets or obligate the state or the Judicial Council to pay for
benets previously provided by the county, city and county, or the court.
96
A-140
WA-247
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. The Legislature nds and declares all of the following:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to address the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
630, regarding county-provided benets for judges.
(b) These county-provided benets were considered by the Legislature
in enacting the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, in which
counties could receive a reduction in the countys maintenance of effort
obligations if counties elected to provide benets pursuant to paragraph (l)
of subdivision (c) of Section 77201 of the Government Code for trial court
judges of that county.
(c) Numerous counties and courts established local or court supplemental
benets to retain qualied applicants for judicial ofce, and trial court
judges relied upon the existence of these longstanding supplemental benets
provided by the counties or the court.
SEC. 2. Section 68220 is added to the Government Code, to read:
68220. (a) Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental judicial
benets provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall
continue to receive supplemental benets from the county or court then
paying the benets on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on
that date.
(b) A county may terminate its obligation to provide benets under this
section upon providing the Administrative Director of the Courts and the
impacted judges with 180 days written notice. The termination shall not
be effective as to any judge during his or her current term while that judge
continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the election of the county,
when that judge leaves ofce. The county is also authorized to elect to
provide benets for all judges in the county.
68221. To clarify ambiguities and inconsistencies in terms with regard
to judges and justices and to ensure uniformity statewide, the following
shall apply for purposes of Sections 68220 to 68222, inclusive:
(a) Benets and benet shall include federally regulated benets,
as described in Section 71627, and deferred compensation plan benets,
such as 401(k) and 457 plans, as described in Section 71628, and may also
include professional development allowances.
(b) Salary and compensation shall have the meaning as set forth in
Section 1241.
68222. Nothing in this act shall require the Judicial Council to increase
funding to a court for the purpose of paying judicial benets or obligate the
state or the Judicial Council to pay for benets previously provided by the
county, city and county, or the court.
SEC. 5. Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or
ofcer or employee of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be
subject to prosecution or disciplinary action because of benets provided
96
2 Ch. 9
A-141
WA-248
to a judge under the ofcial action of a governmental entity prior to the
effective date of this act on the ground that those benets were not authorized
under law.
SEC. 6. The Judicial Council shall report to the Senate Committee on
Budget and Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget, and both
the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary on or before December
31, 2009, analyzing the statewide benets inconsistencies.
SEC. 7. The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this
act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other
provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.
O
96
Ch. 9 3
A-142
WA-249

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
3

A-143
WA-250

Filed 12/28/10

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD P. STURGEON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Intervenor and Respondent.

D056266

(Super. Ct. No. BC351286)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, James A.
Richman, Judge. Affirmed.

Sterling E. Norris, Judicial Watch, Inc., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jones Day, Elwood Lui, Brian D. Hershman and Erica L. Reilley for Defendants
and Respondents.
A-144
WA-251

2

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., and Kahn A. Scolnick, for
Intervenor and Respondent.

This is the second time this case has reached us on appeal. In our first opinion,
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (Sturgeon I), we
reaffirmed the principle that judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.
We found that by providing substantial employment benefits to its superior court judges,
defendant County of Los Angeles (the county) violated article VI, section 19 of our
Constitution, which requires that compensation for judges be prescribed by the
Legislature. Thus we reversed an order granting the county's motion for summary
judgment on plaintiff Harold P. Sturgeon's claim payment of the employment benefits
was unlawful.
Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the Legislature was in a
special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation which
addressed the constitutional defect we identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the
legislation required that all counties continue to provide sitting judges with whatever
benefits the counties had provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the
counties to terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after
giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180 days' notice.
On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three grounds. He
argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's proclamation calling the
special session, did not adequately prescribe benefits judges are to be provided, and in
A-145
WA-252

3

any event violated equal protection principles by continuing a statewide system of
unequal judicial benefits. The trial court rejected these contentions and granted the
county's motion for summary judgment.
The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an interim response
to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon I. As we shall explain, the
legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's proclamation, adequately prescribed
the benefits that must be provided to judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to
equal protection of the laws. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Sturgeon I
Sturgeon commenced these proceedings in April 2006 by filing a taxpayer lawsuit
against the county under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.
Sturgeon's lawsuit challenged the county's annual payment of employment benefits to
judges sitting in the county beyond the salary prescribed by the Legislature and in
addition to employment benefits, including health care, disability insurance and life
insurance provided to the judges by the state. In fiscal 2007 each judge in Los Angeles
was eligible to receive $46,436 in benefits from the county, which amounted to
approximately 27 percent of their prescribed salary and cost the county approximately
$21 million. Among other claims, Sturgeon alleged the benefit payments violated article
VI, section 19 of the California Constitution, which in pertinent part requires that the
Legislature "prescribe compensation for judges of record." The trial court granted the
county's motion for summary judgment, finding no merit in Sturgeon's claims under
A-146
WA-253

4

article VI, section 19. Sturgeon also claimed the benefits were barred by the Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (Lockyer-Isenberg) (Gov. Code, 77200 et
seq.; Stats. 1997, ch. 850, 1, 46) were unlawful gifts of public funds and amounted to
an unlawful waste of public funds. The trial court rejected those claims as well.
On appeal we agreed with Sturgeon's article VI, section 19 contention and
reversed the order granting summary judgment. (Sturgeon I, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p.
657.)
1
We held the benefits the county provided were compensation within the meaning
of the Constitution and had not been prescribed by the Legislature. (Ibid.) We noted
however that while the requirement of the Constitution that the Legislature prescribe
judicial compensation was important, it was not onerous and required only that the
Legislature "consider the specific issue and, at a minimum, establish or reference
identifiable standards" by which benefits would be provided to judges. (Ibid.)
B. Senate Bill X2 11
Our opinion in Sturgeon I was filed on October 10, 2008, and modified on
November 7, 2008.
2
On December 1, 2008, the Governor issued a proclamation calling
the Legislature into a special session. The proclamation convened the Legislature in
pertinent part: "To consider and act upon legislation to address the economy, including
but not limited to efforts to stimulate California's economy, create and retain jobs, and
streamline the operations of state and local governments." During the special session, the

1
We agreed with the trial court that the benefits were not barred by Lockyer-
Isenberg and were neither a gift nor a waste of public funds. (Sturgeon I, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at pp. 637-642.)
2
The Supreme Court denied review in Sturgeon I on December 23, 2008.
A-147
WA-254

5

Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 11 (2009-2010 2d Ex. Sess.) (Senate Bill X2 11),
which the Governor signed on February 20, 2009. Senate Bill X2 11 became effective on
May 21, 2009.
Section 1 of Senate Bill X2 11 states: "(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to
address the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 630, regarding county-provided benefits for judges.
"(b) These county-provided benefits were considered by the Legislature in
enacting the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, in which counties could
receive a reduction in the county's maintenance of effort obligations if counties elected to
provide benefits pursuant to paragraph (l) of subdivision (c) of Section 77201 of the
Government Code for trial court judges of that county.
"(c) Numerous counties and courts established local or court supplemental benefits
to retain qualified applicants for judicial office, and trial court judges relied upon the
existence of these longstanding supplemental benefits provided by the counties or the
court."
Section 2 of Senate Bill X2 11 added section 68220 to the Government Code.
Section 68220 provides: "(a) Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental
judicial benefits provided by the county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall
continue to receive supplemental benefits from the county or court then paying the
benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date.
"(b) A county may terminate its obligation to provide benefits under this section
upon providing the Administrative Director of the Courts and the impacted judges with
A-148
WA-255

6

180 days' written notice. The termination shall not be effective as to any judge during his
or her current term while that judge continues to serve as a judge in that court or, at the
election of the county, when that judge leaves office. The county is also authorized to
elect to provide benefits for all judges in the county."
3

Section 6 of Senate Bill X2 11 required that the Judicial Council analyze and
report to the Legislature on statewide benefits inconsistencies on or before December 31,
2009.
C. Proceedings on Remand
On remand and following the Legislature's enactment of Senate Bill X2 11, the
county again moved for summary judgment, arguing the Legislature had remedied the
deficiency we identified in Sturgeon I. Sturgeon opposed the county's motion and moved
for summary judgment himself. As we have noted, Sturgeon argued Senate Bill X2 11
was beyond the scope of the Governor's special session proclamation, did not adequately
prescribe the benefits the county provided, and did not provide equal benefits which
Sturgeon argued was required by the equal protection provisions of the state and federal
Constitutions. The trial court granted the county's motion, denied Sturgeon's and entered
judgment in favor of the county. Sturgeon filed a timely notice of appeal.

3
Section 3 of Senate Bill X2 11 added Government Code section 68221, which
provides in pertinent part that for purposes of Government Code sections 68220 and
68222: "(a) 'Benefits' and 'benefit' shall include federally regulated benefits, as described
in Section 71627, and deferred compensation plan benefits, such as 401(k) and 457 plans,
as described in Section 71628, and may also include professional development
allowances."
A-149
WA-256

7

DISCUSSION
I
We review de novo the trial court's order granting summary judgment. (Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) In particular, questions of statutory
construction are questions of law and also subject to de novo review. (Barner v. Leeds
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 683.)
II
Article IV, section 3(b) of the California Constitution states in pertinent part: "On
extraordinary occasions the Governor by proclamation may cause the Legislature to
assemble in special session. When so assembled it has the power to legislate only on
subjects specified in the proclamation . . . ." In Martin v. Riley (1942) 20 Cal.2d 28, 38-
41, the court considered the nature of this limitation on legislative power during a special
session. Martin v. Riley arose when, as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United
States entered World War II and the Governor promptly called a special session of the
Legislature to, among other matters " 'consider and act upon legislation augmenting the
appropriation for the operation, maintenance and organization of the State Guard . . . and
amending sections 321, 340, 395, and 555 of the Military and Veterans Code, with
respect to the pay, privileges, allowances, and rights for the State Guard.' " (Id. at p. 38.)
During the special session, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed legislation
which, in addition to the specific matters set forth in the Governor's proclamation,
A-150
WA-257

8

accomplished a major reorganization of the State Guard and gave the Governor the power
to call guard members into active service. (Id. at p. 31.)
In Martin v. Riley members of the guard challenged the validity of the
reorganization legislation on the grounds the legislation exceeded the scope of the
Governor's proclamation. In rejecting their challenge, the court stated: "[W]hen the
governor has submitted a subject to the Legislature, the designation of that subject opens
for legislative consideration matters relating to, germane to and having a natural
connection with the subject proper. [Citation.] Any matter of restriction or limitation
becomes advisory or recommendatory only and not binding on the Legislature." (Martin
v. Riley, supra, 20 Cal.2d at p. 39, italics added.) In broadly interpreting the Legislature's
powers during a special session, the court relied on a Texas case interpreting a similar
constitutional provision. In that case, Baldwin v. State (1886) 21 Tex. App. 591, although
the Governor called the Legislature into session to reduce both ad valorem and
occupation taxes, a bill which imposed taxes on occupations not previously taxed, was
approved. In finding that the new taxes were within the call, the court found: " 'To so
legislate as to reduce the taxes, and at the same time provide for the support of an
efficient state government, in our opinion, includes the power to levy taxes upon property
and occupations not taxed before. It might be wholly impracticable to accomplish a
reduction of taxes and at the same time to maintain the state government, without the
exercise of such power. . . . Legislative power, except where the constitution has
imposed limits upon it, is practically absolute; and where limitations upon it are imposed
they are to be strictly construed, and are not to be given effect as against the general
A-151
WA-258

9

power of the legislature, unless such limitations clearly inhibit the act in question.' " (Id.
at p. 39.) Thus in Martin v. Riley the court found that "when the Legislature acting under
a special call, undertakes 'to consider subjects and pass laws in response thereto, and such
laws receive the approval of the executive, courts are and should of right be reluctant to
hold such action is not embraced in such call, and will not so declare unless the subject
manifestly and clearly is not embraced therein.' " (Id. at pp. 39-40.)
In discussing the petitioners' specific objection, the court noted that the
reorganization of the guard accomplished by the challenged legislation could be
considered as pertinent to the " 'pay, privileges, allowances and rights for the State
Guard,' " specifically set forth in the Governor's call. Importantly, however, the court
went further and found that even if the changes made by the legislation were not pertinent
to the specific matters set forth in the call "we are again brought to the realization that the
call had submitted to the Legislature the subject matter of these sections and when so
submitted the Legislature could not be circumscribed in the enactment of any appropriate
legislation within that field." (Martin v. Riley, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 40-41.)
Here, as we have noted, the Governor called a special session to, among other
matters, address the economy and "streamline the operations of state and local
governments." Thus, under Martin v. Riley the Governor's call opened up the subject of
the operations of state and local governments. (Martin v. Riley, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp.
40-41.) Whether the legislation in fact streamlined those operations is not of concern to
us: the Governor's proclamation gave the Legislature the power to legislate in the area of
state and local government operations. (Ibid.) Our opinion in Sturgeon I plainly
A-152
WA-259

10

disturbed the existing relationship between the county and the judges sitting in the
county's superior courts and by it terms required legislative action if the disputed benefits
were to continue. In responding to our opinion, the Legislature plainly dealt with the
operations of both state and local government by requiring that local governments
continue to provide judges with the benefits pending the report of the Judicial Council
with respect to statewide inequity in the payment of those benefits. The legislation,
because it manifestly dealt with the operations of superior courts, their relationship with
the county governments where they are located and the Legislature's duty to prescribe
judicial compensation, was squarely within the area of state and local government
operations and hence within the scope of the Governor's proclamation.
III
Contrary to Sturgeon's contention, Senate Bill X2 11, although an interim solution,
satisfied the requirement of article VI, section 19 of the California Constitution that the
Legislature prescribe the compensation of judges.
As we found in Sturgeon I, even when the Legislature bears a nondelegable duty,
it may nonetheless permit other bodies to take action based on a general principle
established by the Legislature so long as "the Legislature provides standards or
safeguards which assure that the Legislature's fundamental policy is effectively carried
out." (Sturgeon I, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.) In Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69
Cal.2d 371, 377-382, the court approved a proposed ordinance which set the salary of
firefighters in the City of Alhambra by reference to the average pay of firefighters in the
City of Los Angeles. Although the ordinance did not set any explicit standards by which
A-153
WA-260

11

salaries were to be set, the court nonetheless found the ordinance contained sufficient
safeguards to ensure that the fundamental policy of parity would not be exploited to the
detriment of the city: "The proposed Alhambra ordinance contains built-in and automatic
protections that serve as safeguards against exploitive consequences from the operation
of the proposed ordinance. Los Angeles is no more anxious to pay its firemen exorbitant
compensation than is Alhambra. Los Angeles as an employer will be motivated to avoid
the incurrence of an excessive wage scale; the interplay of competitive economic forces
and bargaining power will tend to settle the wages at a realistic level. As we noted in an
analogous area involving the establishment of prices: 'the Legislature could reasonably
assume that competition . . . coupled with . . . bargaining power . . . would provide a
safeguard against excessive prices. In all probability, that safeguard is at least as
effective as any which the Legislature could be expected to provide by promulgating
explicit standards . . . .' [Citation.]" (Kugler v. Yocum, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 382.)
The court reached a similar conclusion in Martin v. County of Contra Costa
(1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 856 where a statute which set the salary of municipal court attaches
in Contra Costa County at the same rate as comparable county employees. "This
provision is not an abdication of the Legislature's duty to prescribe the compensation of
the attaches of each municipal court. It fixes the compensation of the employees,
declares a policy that such compensation shall be commensurate with that furnished
county employees with equivalent responsibilities and provides for interim changes,
subject to review by the Legislature, in the event there are local changes which would
A-154
WA-261

12

otherwise cause discrepancies in compensation in violation of the legislative policy." (Id.
at p. 862.)
As we have noted, Senate Bill X2 11 requires that counties continue to pay sitting
judges the benefits judges in each respective county were receiving as of July 1, 2008, for
the balance of any judge's term of office. As to those payments, the counties have no
discretion. Thus, as to sitting judges, benefit payments for the balance of their terms are
clearly now "prescribed" under even the strictest interpretation of the term.
Admittedly, under Senate Bill X2 11 counties are given the option of terminating
benefits to judges who were not sitting when Senate Bill X2 11 was passed and
terminating benefits for sitting judges when the terms they were serving when the
legislation was adopted expire. However, this discretion to terminate benefits is subject
to important and substantial safeguards which assure that the Legislature's fundamental
decision to continue the benefits is not disturbed in the absence of legislative oversight.
First, the face of Senate Bill X2 11 itself makes it clear the Legislature intended to
recognize that benefits were paid as a means of attracting qualified judicial officers and
that judges have a reasonable and legitimate expectation the benefits previously paid by
each county or court will be a part of their compensation. (See Sen. Bill X2 11, 1(c).)
Moreover, the Legislature, by requiring a report from the Judicial Council with respect to
inconsistencies in the payment of benefits, also expressed its intent that, as far as is
practical, benefits should be provided to judges on an equitable basis. (Sen. Bill X2 11,
6.) Finally, any county which terminates benefits must provide judges affected and the
Administrative Director of the Courts 180 days' notice. (Gov. Code, 68220, subd. (b).)
A-155
WA-262

13

This lengthy notice period provides the Legislature ample time in which to review and
abrogate any termination of benefits it believes is inappropriate. In sum, the Legislature
has plainly articulated its desire that judges continue receiving benefits from counties and
courts and that the benefits be paid on an equitable basis. Moreover, by way of the notice
requirement it imposed, the Legislature has established a powerful procedural safeguard
in the event any county or court acts in a manner inconsistent with the broad policies the
Legislature has articulated. By setting broad policies and establishing a safeguard which
will prevent any deviation from those policies, the Legislature has fully satisfied the
requirements of the Constitution. (See Kugler v. Yocum, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 381-382;
Martin v. Contra Costa, supra, 8 Cal.App.3d at pp. 863-864.)
IV
Finally, Sturgeon argues Senate Bill X2 11 is invalid because it does nothing to
immediately address the disparity in judicial benefits paid by various counties throughout
the state. Because Senate Bill X2 11 is an interim measure, awaiting further legislative
action, we find this argument unpersuasive.
We will assume without deciding that as a taxpayer Sturgeon has standing to
assert his equal protection argument under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. (See
Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 16, 29.) However, contrary to
Sturgeon's contention, the disparity in judicial compensation is not subject to strict
scrutiny. Unlike the discrimination based on wealth which was subject to strict scrutiny
in Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 765-766, here discrimination based on the
geographic location of judges is not a suspect classification. Moreover, the right to
A-156
WA-263

14

employment as a judge is not a fundamental right (see Rittenband v. Cory (1984) 159
Cal.App.3d 410, 418-419) and there is no fundamental right to a certain level of
compensation. (See American Federation of Teachers v. Los Angeles Community
College Dist. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 942, 945, fn. 1) Thus we consider the disparity
under the rational basis test and have no difficulty finding such a basis in the Legislature's
express recognition that payment of the benefits by various counties and courts is needed
to retain qualified judicial officers. (See Sturgeon I, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 639.)
CONCLUSION
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo ante
Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks to adoption of a
comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have explained, this response to
Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the Constitution and is wholly sensible under the
circumstances. The Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy
problem of establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment
and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at the same
time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state. By the same token
our role in ensuring that the more general requirements of the Constitution have been met
is, under our system of separate governmental powers, quite limited. (See Community
Redevelopment Agency v. Abrams (1975) 15 Cal.3d 813, 831-832.) Thus, whatever
permanent remedy the Legislature eventually adopts will be entitled to the well-
established "judicial deference to the legislative branch." (Ibid.)
A-157
WA-264

15

constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a
compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an equitable
and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if we did not
state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular
challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted
by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will
give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves. As we
noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county,
responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a reasonable period of time
will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of judicial compensation.
Judgment affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

HALLER, J.

A-158
WA-265

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
4

A-159
WA-266
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS
Budget Summaries
FY 2010-11 Proposed Budget Volume One 60.1 County of Los Angeles
Trial Court Operations
Trial Court Operations Budget Summary
2010-11 Budget Message
The Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997,
Assembly Bill (AB) 233, Chapter 850, Statutes of 1997, requires
counties to make an annual Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
payment to the State for support of trial courts and to continue
to fund certain court-related expenditures such as indigent
defense, collections enhancement, and local judicial benefits.
The Trial Court Facilities Act, Senate Bill 1732, Chapter 1082,
Statutes of 2002, authorized the transfer of responsibility for
court facilities from the counties to the State and requires that
counties make County Facilities Payment (CFP). Revenue from
court fines and fees is used to partially finance the MOE
obligation to the State and other court-related expenditures.
The 2010-11 Proposed Budget reflects funding for the Countys
$294.7 million MOE payment to the State, which is comprised
of $245.9 million base MOE; $37.6 million CFP; and
$11.2 million representing 50 percent of any excess above the
AB 233 fines and forfeitures MOE, and $93.0 million for
court-related expenditures that are the Countys responsibility.
The Proposed Budget reflects anticipated increases in costs
related to court collections enhancement.
Changes From 2009-10 Budget
FY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11 FY 2010-11 CHANGE FROM
CLASSIFICATION ACTUAL ESTIMATED BUDGET REQUESTED PROPOSED BUDGET
FINANCING REQUIREMENTS
SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITS $ 28,216,975.26 $ 28,865,000 $ 30,773,000 $ 31,130,000 $ 30,854,000 $ 81,000
SERVICES & SUPPLIES 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000
OTHER CHARGES 282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)
GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000
BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0
Gross
Appropriation
($)
Intrafund
Transfer
($)
Revenue
($)
Net
County Cost
($)
Budg
Pos
2009-10 Final Adopted Budget 385,657,000 0 146,302,000 239,355,000 50.0
Other Changes
1. Salaries and Employee Benefits: Primarily reflects
Board-approved increases in health insurance subsidies.
81,000 -- -- 81,000 --
2. Services and Supplies: Reflects an increase in costs for
the Courts Cost Recovery Program fully offset by fines
and forfeitures revenues.
3,276,000 -- 3,276,000 -- --
3. Intergovernmental Revenue: Reflects a reduction in
services and supplies due to the elimination of the grant
funding for the Drug Court program.
(72,000) -- (72,000) -- --
A-160
WA-267
Budget Summaries
4. Maintenance of Effort (MOE) Payment: Reflects a
decrease in funding for MOE payments offset by
reductions in revenues.
(1,288,000) -- (1,288,000) -- --
Total Changes 1,997,000 0 1,916,000 81,000 0.0
2010-11 Proposed Budget 387,654,000 0 148,218,000 239,436,000 50.0
Gross
Appropriation
($)
Intrafund
Transfer
($)
Revenue
($)
Net
County Cost
($)
Budg
Pos
A-161
WA-268
Budget Summaries
TOPE
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL
FINANCING REQUIREMENTS
SALARIES & EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
SALARIES & WAGES

$ 2,274,843.16 $ 2,416,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 2,602,000 $ 2,578,000 $ 0
CAFETERIA PLAN BENEFITS 14,714,097.48 16,669,000 17,643,000 17,698,000 17,662,000 19,000
DEFERRED COMPENSATION BENEFITS 5,908,251.79 6,055,000 6,776,000 6,786,000 6,759,000 (17,000)
EMPLOYEE GROUP INS - E/B 1,793,080.50 195,000 247,000 304,000 293,000 46,000
OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 3,180,170.50 3,234,000 3,202,000 3,246,000 3,225,000 23,000
RETIREMENT - EMP BENEFITS 346,531.83 296,000 327,000 494,000 337,000 10,000
TOTAL S & E B 28,216,975.26 28,865,000 30,773,000 31,130,000 30,854,000 81,000
SERVICES & SUPPLIES
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES 15,088,912.38 14,347,000 11,902,000 15,503,000 15,165,000 3,263,000
COMMUNICATIONS 398.00 0 0 0 0 0
COMPUTING-PERSONAL 1,021.26 0 0 0 0 0
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES 24,288.00 0 0 0 13,000 13,000
JURY & WITNESS EXPENSE 1,887,874.56 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 1,700,000 0
MAINTENANCE - EQUIPMENT 226.13 0 0 0 0 0
MAINTENANCE--BUILDINGS & IMPRV 9,608,247.26 135,000 135,000 184,000 135,000 0
MEMBERSHIPS 150.00 0 0 0 0 0
MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSE 13,734.32 14,000 80,000 80,000 33,000 (47,000)
OFFICE EXPENSE 69,394.99 150,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 0
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 58,303,389.94 57,231,000 43,458,000 59,968,000 43,458,000 0
RENTS & LEASES - BLDG & IMPRV 49,218.09 0 0 0 0 0
SMALL TOOLS & MINOR EQUIPMENT 70.23 0 0 0 0 0
SPECIAL DEPARTMENTAL EXPENSE 14,545.15 0 25,000 25,000 0 (25,000)
TECHNICAL SERVICES 1,614,094.51 2,030,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 1,546,000 0
TRANSPORTATION AND TRAVEL 42,004.05 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL S & S 86,717,568.87 75,607,000 58,946,000 79,106,000 62,150,000 3,204,000
OTHER CHARGES
TRIAL COURT-MAINTENANCE OF
EFFORT
282,914,026.89 294,596,000 295,938,000 295,938,000 294,650,000 (1,288,000)
GROSS TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
NET TOTAL $ 397,848,571.02 $ 399,068,000 $ 385,657,000 $ 406,174,000 $ 387,654,000 $ 1,997,000
REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
NET COUNTY COST $ 245,965,648.38 $ 255,348,000 $ 239,355,000 $ 256,959,000 $ 239,436,000 $ 81,000
BUDGETED POSITIONS $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 50.0 $ 0.0
REVENUE DETAIL
CHARGES FOR SERVICES
LEGAL SERVICES $ 3,743,413.57 $ 3,529,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 2,950,000 $ 3,439,000 $ 489,000
COURT FEES & COSTS 7,545,766.23 6,490,000 7,964,000 7,964,000 6,729,000 (1,235,000)
RECORDING FEES 116,805.00 104,000 130,000 130,000 130,000 0
TOTAL CHARGES-SVS 11,405,984.80 10,123,000 11,044,000 11,044,000 10,298,000 (746,000)
A-162
WA-269
Budget Summaries
TOPE
TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS BUDGET DETAIL (Continued)
REVENUE DETAIL
FINES FORFEITURES & PENALTIES
VEHICLE CODE FINES 7,299,152.51 6,469,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 6,701,000 0
OTHER COURT FINES 132,763,353.59 126,724,000 128,071,000 131,056,000 130,805,000 2,734,000
TOTAL FINES FO/PEN 140,062,506.10 133,193,000 134,772,000 137,757,000 137,506,000 2,734,000
INTERGVMTL REVENUE - STATE
STATE - OTHER 0.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)
STATE-TRIAL COURTS 144.00 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL I R - STATE 144.00 0 72,000 0 0 (72,000)
LICENSES PERMITS & FRANCHISES
OTHER LICENSES & PERMITS 173,670.00 160,000 160,000 160,000 160,000 0
BUSINESS LICENSES 400.00 0 10,000 10,000 10,000 0
TOTAL LIC/PER/FRAN 174,070.00 160,000 170,000 170,000 170,000 0
MISCELLANEOUS REVENUE
MISCELLANEOUS 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0
TOTAL MISC REV 240,217.74 235,000 235,000 235,000 235,000 0
OTHER FINANCING SOURCES
TRANSFERS IN 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0
TOTAL OTH FIN SRCS 0.00 9,000 9,000 9,000 9,000 0
TOTAL REVENUE $ 151,882,922.64 $ 143,720,000 $ 146,302,000 $ 149,215,000 $ 148,218,000 $ 1,916,000
A-163
WA-270

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
5

A-164
WA-271

Historical Analysis
of Disparities in
Judicial Benefits

!"#$!% %$ %'" (")*%" +$,,-%%"" $)
./01"% *)0 2-(+*3 !"4-"56 %'" *((",.37
+$,,-%%"" $) ./01"%6 *)0 %'" (")*%"
*)0 *((",.37 +$,,-%%""( $) 8/0-+-*!7

0"+",."! 9:6 ;<<=

A-165
WA-272

APPENDIX D
A-166
WA-273
!"#$%&
'#%("$)*+,
.#,/+&()0&
!"#$%&
'#%("$)*+,
.#,/+&()0&
!"#$%&
'#%("$)*+,
.#,/+&()0&
!"#$%&
'#%("$)*+,
.#,/+&()0&
!"#$%& (( )*)+#,) -. /&%0") /&$0) 12 )*34%# 5
*&$ )%6#*#$ (1- 7800# 95 :#"% 12 )+),&" 5
+#%,&/4%& 2 /)*);#")$ 5 :4%6$ 2 /&*8$) 5
+&%0#"#< 5= 6*#%% 5 +&%& 5 ,#* %&"0# 1
"4;#"$4,# -( +)"43&$) 5 &")%6# 995 #* ,&"),& -
$)% 7#"%)",4%& >2 %)3) - $)/")+#%0& -( ?8+7&*,0 >
$)% !")%/4$/& @9 %#;),) - $&%&+) 9. 4+3#"4)* .
$)% +)0#& 5- 3*)/#" 95 <&*& 99 4%<& 5
$)%0) /*)") >. $)% 7#%40& 5 *):# (
0"4%40< 5 $)% ,4#6& 91= *)$$#% 5
;#%08") 5. $)% A&)B84% 15 +),#") 9=
$)% *84$ &74$3& 95 +)"4% 9=
$4$:4<&8 ( +#"/#, 9=
$&*)%& 9. +&,&/ 5
08*)"# 5= 3*8+)$ 5
08&*8+%# ( $)%0) 7)"7)") 9.
$)%0) /"8C 9=
$?)$0) 99
$4#"") 5
$0)%4$*)8$ 55
$800#" @
0#?)+) (
<87) @
12 3"#$%&
454
.#,/+&()0&
46 3"#$%&
227
.#,/+&()0&
44 3"#$%&
829
.#,/+&()0&
8 3"#$%&
1:1
.#,/+&()0&
$DEEFGHGIJKF ADLMNMKF 7GIGOMJP QR /SDTJ
KP SO ADFR 9U 5==2
!"#;%<=>#;,+, ?+;+@)%& !"#$%=>#;,+, ?+;+@)%&
!"#$%= A;, !"#;%<=>#;,+,
?+;+@)%&
B" C#00D+E+;%AD ?+;+@)%&
A-167
WA-274
Supplemental Judicial Benefits in FY 2007-08
Funding
Source
Total Cost
Benefit
Available to
All Judges
Statewide Total $33,602,542
County Funded Supplemental Judicial Benefits County $30,388,289
Court Funded Supplemental Judicial Benefits Court $3,214,253
Alameda $67,047
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) Court $46,303 X
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) Court $20,744 X
Alpine $0
No Supplemental Judicial Benefits
Amador $0
Butte $1,800
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) Court $1,800
Calaveras $549
Life Insurance Court $504 X
Long-term disability Court $45 X
Mileage allowance Court N/A
Colusa $0
Contra Costa $122,560
County Total $14,582
457 County $1,764
Car allowance County $12,000 X
Life Insurance County $510
Long-term disability County $308
Court Total $107,978
457 Court $16,066 X
Car allowance Court $90,000
Long-term disability Court $1,912 X
Del Norte $0
El Dorado $0
Fresno $7,284
457 County $0 X
Bundled (Life and Supplemental) County $555
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) County $6,729
Glenn $11,263
Short-term disability Court $126 X
Humboldt $0
A-168
WA-275
Funding
Source
Total Cost
Benefit
Available to
All Judges
Imperial $0
Inyo $0
Kern $247,198
Car allowance Court $118,014 X
Mileage allowance Court $8,926
Kings $46,899
Dental County $3,270
General Health Care County $23,521
Vision County $570
Court Total $19,539
457 Court $7,764 X
Bundled (Life and Supplemental) Court $1,955 X
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) Court $0 X
Dental Court $0 X
General Health Care Court $0 X
Other Disability Insurance Court $9,747 X
Vision Court $0 X
Lake $0
Lassen $0
Los Angeles $23,482,932
401K County $3,957,130 X
457 County $2,001,295 X
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) County $14,454,245 X
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) County $3,070,262 X
Madera $0
Marin $0
Mariposa $424
Mendocino $6,000
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) County $6,000 X
Merced $0
Modoc $0
A-169
WA-276
Funding
Source
Total Cost
Benefit
Available to
All Judges
Mono $2,526
County Total $600
Wellness Stipend County $600 X
Court Total $1,926
Dental Court $720
Mileage allowance Court $101 X
Vision Court $499 X
Monterey $80,661
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) County $242
Other Life Insurance County $817
Other Cash Allowance/Stipend Flexible health care County $72,477
Other Cash Allowance/Stipend Professional expenses County $7,126
Napa $90,631
Dental Court $8,136 X
General Health Care Court $61,501 X
Life Insurance Court $1,008 X
Vision Court $384 X
Wellness Stipend Court $882 X
Nevada $3,831
Other Retirement Benefit Court $3,600 X
Orange $2,468,700
County Total $2,436,000
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) County $2,000,000 X
Court Total $32,700
Placer $1,020
Plumas $0
Riverside $401,865
457 County $231,478
Life Insurance County $4,109
Long-term disability County $1,507
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) County $164,771
Sacramento $96,664
Dental County $69,198 X
Life Insurance County $4,771 X
Court Total $22,694
Vision Court $16,004 X
A-170
WA-277
Funding
Source
Total Cost
Benefit
Available to
All Judges
San Benito $6,582
Supplemental Life Insurance (e.g. AD&D) Court $10 X
San Bernardino $1,280,175
Life Insurance County $1,652
Other Allowances/Stipends (not specifically designated) County $1,278,523
San Diego $1,916,803
Bundled (Health, Dental, Vision) Court $1,000,297 X
Other Allowances/Stipends (specifically designated) Court $7,595 X
San Francisco $409,831
General Health Care County $362,184 X
Vision County $0 X
San Joaquin $14,376
Bundled (Health, Dental, Vision) Court $14,376
San Luis Obispo $229,758
Continuing Education, Training, Prof. Dev. Court $50,400 X
Other Life Insurance Court $14,135 X
Wellness Stipend Court $520 X
San Mateo $284,950
Long-term disability County $836 X
Vision County $4,674 X
Santa Barbara $0
Santa Clara $1,181,531
Bundled (Health, Dental, Vision) County $1,133,106 X
Santa Cruz $0
Shasta $0
Sierra $0
Siskiyou $32,808
A-171
WA-278
Funding
Source
Total Cost
Benefit
Available to
All Judges
Solano $162,996
Vision Court $2,175 X
Sonoma $406,661
Long-term disability County $1,951 X
Vision County $3,059 X
401K Court $162,000
Stanislaus $0
Sutter $0
Tehama $0
Trinity $672
Dental County $480
Life Insurance County $192
Tulare $10,523
Wellness Stipend Court $10,523 X
Tuolumne $55,753
Equipment Stipend Court $360
Ventura $294,243
401K County $124,637 X
Cash Supplement (Flex Plans) County $167,185 X
Yolo $174,954
Bundled (Health, Dental, Vision) County $40,401 X
Bundled (Life and Supplemental) County $240 X
457 Court $3,500 X
Bundled (Health, Dental, Vision) Court $129,973 X
Bundled (Life and Supplemental) Court $840 X
Yuba $0
A-172
WA-279

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
6

A-173
WA-280
A-174
WA-281
A-175
WA-282
A-176
WA-283
A-177
WA-284
A-178
WA-285
A-179
WA-286
A-180
WA-287
A-181
WA-288
A-182
WA-289
A-183
WA-290
A-184
WA-291
A-185
WA-292
A-186
WA-293
A-187
WA-294
A-188
WA-295
A-189
WA-296
A-190
WA-297
A-191
WA-298
A-192
WA-299
A-193
WA-300
A-194
WA-301
A-195
WA-302
A-196
WA-303

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
7

A-197
WA-304
[CJA letterhead]
Mr. Marc J. Nolan,
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Ste. 1702
RE: Request for Comment Opinion 11-603
Dear Mr. Nolan:
On behalf of the California Judges Association (CJA), I appreciate this opportunity to comment on two
questions posed to your office by the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP), through its general
counsel, Victoria B. Henley. CJA is the largest private association of judges in the United States with 2,500
dues paying members. Its members represent three-quarters of the sitting justices, judges and subordinate
judicial officers in the state.
As discussed below, CJA believes the Legislature clearly intended to authorize supplemental compensation
to judges retroactively thereby clarifying that any such benefits received by judges are, and were, legal.
Further, CJA demonstrates the Legislatures plenary powers give it the authority to shield from liability,
even retroactively, actions by state employees and judges. The separation of powers doctrine is not
implicated where a narrow area of conduct is excepted from CJPs disciplinary reach.
Because CJA believes that a fair reading of SBX2 11 avoids the constitutional separation of powers issues
raised by the first question, our discussion begins with Question 2. (See People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4
th
497, 510 [If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it
constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise serious and doubtful constitutional
questions, the court will adopt the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of
the language used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, even
though the other construction is equally reasonable. [Citations.] The basis of this rule is the presumption that
the Legislature intended, not to violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its
constitutional powers. (Citations.)]).
Attorney General Letter
August 16, 2011
Page Two
Question 2:
Does section 2 of SBX2 11 (a) simply identify which judges are permitted as of the effective
date of SBX2 11 to continue receiving supplemental compensation from the effective date
forward, on the terms and conditions in effect on July 1, 2008, or (b) retroactively authorize
all or some portion of supplemental compensation provided by counties to judges, or to
judges themselves, so long as it was being provided as of July 1, 2008?
!
A-198
WA-305
A full and fair examination of SBX2 11s history and text leads to the conclusion that the Legislature
intended it to be applied retroactively.
For many years before trial court unification, trial judges received supplemental benefits from their counties.
(Historical Analysis Of Disparities In Judicial Benefits, Report to the Senate Committee on Budget and
Fiscal Review, the Assembly Committee on Budget and the Senate and Assembly Committees on Judiciary,
Administrative Office of the Courts, December 15, 2009, pp. 9-13.) These benefits served a public purpose
by improving recruitment and retention of bench officers. (Sturgeon v. Los Angeles County, 167 Cal. App.
4th 630, 639 (Sturgeon)).
Beginning in 1957, the Legislature demonstrated its intention to authorize these benefits. In that year, the
Legislature enacted Government Code 53200-53210, allowing counties to pay additional compensation
and benefits to their local judges. (Sturgeon, supra, at 643.)
In a 1976 opinion, however, the Attorney General opined this provision was unconstitutional because the
Legislature failed to set adequate standards by which such compensation could be paid. Thereafter, the
Legislature responded correcting this defect by refining Government Code 53200.3. But, in 1978, the
Attorney General again questioned whether the Legislature had adequately authorized these benefits.
In 1997, the law makers passed the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act (Lockyer-Isenberg). Lockyer-
Isenberg specifically sought to maintain judicial compensation and benefits at the level received prior to
unification. As the Court of Appeal concluded in
August 16, 2011
Page Three
Sturgeon, this legislation authorized counties and courts to provide supplemental benefit payments to trial
judges. (Sturgeon, supra at 642.)
In 2006, the Sturgeon lawsuit challenged the propriety of Los Angeles County Superior Courts
supplemental judicial benefits program. The trial court hearing the matter granted Los Angeles Countys
motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Fourth District held: the benefits were proper; the benefits
were not a gift of public money; the benefits were not waste; and the benefits were authorized by Lockyer-
Isenberg. However, the Court of Appeal said the Legislature needed to take a more active role in
prescribing benefit amounts; that task could not be delegated. (Sturgeon, supra., at 657.)
Consequently, in February 2009, the Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, SBX2 11, adding to the
Government Code 68220, 68221, and 68222. The statutory language of these provisions explicitly states
that the Legislature intended to correct any deficiencies identified in Sturgeon.
First, the Legislature reiterated the intent of the Lockyer-Isenberg bill: Judges should have received, and
should continue to receive, supplemental benefits under the law:
SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares all of the following:
(a) It is the intent of the Legislature to address the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sturgeon v.
County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4
th
630, regarding county-provided benefits for judges.
(b) These county-provided benefits were considered by the Legislature in enacting the Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997, in which counties could receive a reduction in the
countys maintenance of effort obligations if counties elected to provide benefits pursuant to
paragraph (l) of subdivision (c) of Section 77201 of the Government Code for trial court judges of
that county.
(c) Numerous counties and courts established local or court supplemental benefits to retain
qualified applicants for judicial office, and trial court judges relied upon the existence of these
!
A-199
WA-306
longstanding supplemental benefits provided by the counties or the court.
August 16, 2011
Page Four
It is difficult to imagine a more succinct, stronger statement of legislative intent than Section 1 of SBX2 11.
Further, it makes no sense to authorize the benefits only as of the date of enactment of SBX2 11, if the
purpose is to retain qualified applicants for judicial office and to recognize that trial court judges relied on
the existence of these longstanding benefits provided by the counties and court prior to court unification.
Second, 68220s plain language reveals its retroactivity:
Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental judicial benefits provided by the
county or court, or both, as of July 1, 2008, shall continue to receive supplemental benefits
from the county or court then paying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in
effect at the time. (emphasis added.) Cal. Govt Code 68220(a).
The words received and shall continue can only refer to actions started in the past and that should now
be on-going. The Court of Appeal rendered the Sturgeon decision in October 2008. Given that the courts
operate on a July 1 June 30 fiscal year, the July 1, 2008 date referred to in SBX2 11 contemplates its
application beginning in the fiscal year during which the Sturgeon decision was rendered.
Third, the Legislature makes clear in Section 5 its intention to make SBX2 11 retroactive:
Notwithstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee of a
governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to prosecution or disciplinary
action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental
entity prior to the effective date of this act on the ground that those benefits were not
authorized under law. (emphasis added.)
If the law were not retroactive, this section would be meaningless. With this language, the Legislature
makes clear its intent that supplemental judicial benefits received prior to the effective date of the act are
authorized by law. (See People v Alford (2007) 42 Cal. 4
th
749, 754 [A statute may apply retroactively if
there is a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended such a result.]). Section 5 goes far
beyond a clear and compelling implication; the statutory language clearly states the Legislatures intent
that SBX2 11 authorize supplemental judicial benefits retroactively.
I turn now to question 1, which concerns the separation of powers doctrine. As will be seen, there is no basis
to conclude that SBX2 11 violates that constitutional mandate.
August 16, 2011
Page Five
Question 1:
Does the Legislature have the authority to enact legislation that purports to preclude the
commission from disciplining California superior court judges for authorizing
!
A-200
WA-307
supplemental compensation to be paid to themselves from public funds, and/or receiving
that supplemental compensation, on the ground that such benefits were or are not
authorized by law?
The Legislature did not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it passed SBX2 11. The
Legislatures plenary authority encompasses the power to enact laws that significantly affect the Judiciary,
including matters of judicial discipline. That SBX2 11 has identified a narrow item of conduct for which no
discipline may be imposed (i.e.: a judges receipt of supplemental benefits on the ground that such benefits
were not authorized by the law) does not defeat or impair the CJPs core functions.
The separation of powers doctrine does not prevent one branch from taking actions that significantly affect
those of another branch. (Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State of California (2001) 25 Cal. 4th
287, 291.) The prohibition in SBX2 11 would not defeat or materially impair the CJPs role in Californias
scheme of judicial discipline. There is no suggestion in the Legislatures passage of SBX2 11 that the CJP
should not remain as the arbiter of discipline. Nor have the CJPs powers been removed or delegated to
another body. Rather, all that has taken place here is that SBX 2 11 has removed a potential ground for
discipline, i.e., a judges receipt of employment benefits before the effective date of the law.
The Legislature can make laws to protect one from liability, whether civil, criminal or administrative, for
past conduct. Whether viewed as a retroactive immunity from liability, a retroactive authorization of
conduct, or a retroactive reduction of penalties to zero, this is within the power of the Legislature.
Furthermore, where the issue is whether a judge can be disciplined for a violation of the law, as is the case
here, it is absolutely a legislative prerogative to determine what is and is not a violation of the law.
August 16, 2011
Page Six
In In re Estrada ((1965) 63 Cal.2d 740), the California Supreme Court held that where a criminal statute is
amended to reduce the punishment for that crime, but the statutory amendment occurs after the prohibited
act is committed but before judgment is entered, the amended criminal statute mitigating punishment applies
retroactively. Indeed, if a law is repealed, no one can then be prosecuted for a prior violation of the repealed
statute, unless the Legislature explicitly so provides by enacting a savings clause. (Id.)
The rule in Estrada also applies to civil penalties. As the Supreme Court held in People v. Durbin ((1966)
64 Cal.2d 474, 479): What [Estrada] said with regard to an amendatory statute lessening criminal
punishment equally applies to the reduction or elimination of civil penalties or forfeitures. (See also,
County of San Bernardino v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4
th
1140, 1148-1149 (applying Durbin)).
These long standing rules protect the legislative prerogative to enact SBX2 11 and permit the Legislature to
shield from liability judges who authorized or received supplemental compensation prior to enactment of
SBX2 11.
Thank you for your consideration.
Very truly yours,
Judge Keith D. Davis,
President, California Judges Association
!
A-201
WA-308

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
8

A-202
WA-309

"#
PLAINTIFFS NOTICE, MOTION AND AUTHORITIES FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Selective History of Legislative on Judicial Compensation
The only way to understand the actions of the Los Angeles Courts and the
Los Angeles Court Counsel is to understand the legislative history and the
powerful dynamics of judicial salaries.
The Chief Justices of the United States Supreme Court and the California
Supreme Court have spent years trying to simply increase the salaries of their
respective bench officers. They have had no direct success. The frustration in
California led to the passage of the unconstitutional 1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial
Court Funding Act under the just do it Chief Justice Ron George.
Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) Rev.
denied 12/23/08, held that the L.A. County payments to L.A. Superior Court
judges violated Article VI, Section 19 of the California Constitution because the
1997 Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act, while it DID authorize judicial
benefits, it did NOT set any standards for exercising the delegated authority and
THUS the authorization of judicial benefits payments by counties to Superior
Court judges was an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The unconstitutionality of judicial benefits is not new. In fact it is a long
simmering debate and intrusion by Judges, at least in Los Angeles County, into
the labor-management relationship between the State and the Judges. In 1976
the Attorney General issued an opinion that county payments for health insurance
benefits were unconstitutional;
The Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute
permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered
under county health insurance programs is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496
(1976). The constitutional provision at issue states:
The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of
courts of record. Cal. Const. Art. VI, 19 (as amended in 1974;
emphasis added).
A-203
WA-310

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of
prescribe the Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted
to it by Article VI, section 19 of the Constitution. Any attempt to
make such a delegation would be constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops.
Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General reasons that benefits
such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the effect
of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this
aspect of a judges compensation, and thus the statute is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority;
California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum;
Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)
In 1988 the County of Los Angeles, Office of the County Counsel, advised
Frank Zolin, County Clerk/Executive Officer of the Superior Court that it would be
permissible for the county to pay additional benefits for judges, although he
acknowledged the Attorney General had opinions otherwise (see Appendix 6).
Leading up to the new legislation for Trial Court Unification, a
memorandum was generated in 1995 that again laid out the law and updated the
Attorney Generals opinion on the unconstitutionality of such county benefits (see
Appendix 7). The Commission staff memorandum then expressed a fear of the
voters and went on to conclude that the legislature should take action and
gamble on the validity of the delegation of authority.

Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be
held to be an invalid delegation of legislative authority !., a case
can be made that this will not occur. The problems that would
be created if it is held invalid are substantial. (emphasis
added)
(see Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority;
California Law Revision Commission Staff Memorandum;
Memorandum 95-77, Study J-1201; November 27, 1995)
The Sturgeon I decision called the Legislatures bluff in the 1997 Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act. Now the substantial problems of bias and
A-204
WA-311

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

unconstitutionality accrued over the last 15 years must be made whole. Sturgeon I
was no surprise or rogue ruling.
In a last ditch effort to overturn the Sturgeon I decision, the California
Judges Association (CJA) filed an amicus curiae brief asking the Supreme Court
to grant review in Sturgeon. The review was denied December 28, 2008. Michael
Belote, lobbyist for the California Judges Association said, "I always thought it
was likely there would have to be legislative action, but this certainly steps up the
urgency." (See Appendix 10)
After the Sturgeon I decision, the State legislature hastily passed and the
Governor signed Senate Bill SBX2 11 on February 20, 2009 amidst all the frantic
activity on the state budget. There was no public debate and no legislative
analysis. The judiciary and the legislature tried to do in two months what they
failed to do in 30 years. It is no surprise that SBX2 11 is also unconstitutional.
Sturgeon II appealed the constitutionality of SBX2 11. The response was
swift and stiff from the County of Los Angeles, from the Superior Court of the
State of California, County of Los Angeles, and from all the current and former
judges of the Los Angeles Superior Court who were or had received judicial
benefits.
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.
The relevant description states:
Shortly after we filed our opinion in Sturgeon I and while the
Legislature was in a special session, the Legislature passed and the
Governor signed legislation which addressed the constitutional defect we
identified in Sturgeon I. In particular, the legislation required that all counties
continue to provide sitting judges with whatever benefits the counties had
provided as of July 1, 2008. The Legislature permitted the counties to
terminate this obligation, but not with respect to sitting judges and only after
giving the Administrative Office of the Courts and any affected judges 180
days' notice.
On remand Sturgeon asserted the legislation was invalid on three
grounds. He argued the legislation was outside the scope of the Governor's
proclamation calling the special session, did not adequately prescribe
benefits judges are to be provided, and in any event violated equal protection
A-205
WA-312

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

principles by continuing a statewide system of unequal judicial benefits. The
trial court rejected these contentions and granted the county's motion for
summary judgment.
The legislation Sturgeon challenges, as enacted, implemented an
interim response to the constitutional issues we addressed in Sturgeon II. As
we shall explain, the legislation fell within the scope of the Governor's
proclamation, adequately prescribed the benefits that must be provided to
judges and did not intrude upon any judge's right to equal protection of the
laws. Accordingly, we affirm.

But the disturbing portion of the decision is the final paragraph of the
decision, which contradicts the above opening statement by stating that SBX2 11 is
not a permanent response to the constitutional issues. How can a law be
temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not constitutional. Again, the Fourth
Appellate Court, acknowledges the contradiction and encourages these particular
civil suits by stating:
constitutional issues we identified in Sturgeon I or the difficult problem of adopting a
compensation scheme that deals with varying economic circumstances in an
equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss in discharging our duties if
we did not state that while the Legislature's interim response to Sturgeon I defeats
the particular challenges asserted by Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy,
if not supplanted by the more comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly
contemplates, most likely will give rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members
of the bench themselves. As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial
compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility. We are confident that the
Legislature within a reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide
system of judicial compensation.
The SBX2 11 Section 2 is unconstitutionally vague about the same terms
and conditions as were in effect on that date. Since the Fourth Appellate Court is
deferring to the taxpayers and judges, these civil cases will ask for jury decisions
on whether the countys terms and conditions were defined anywhere and thus
are arbitrary (and unconstitutional) or whether they were one year payments and
thus terminated on June 30, 2009. Section 2 only identifies judges as recipients.
No authority is provided to pay Court Counsel or Commissioners. The
A-206
WA-313

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) is also very interested in the
constitutionality of this section and has requested an opinion from the Attorney
General.
The SBX2 11 Section 4 is unconstitutional because the Judicial Council is
now paying judicial benefits to commissioners, Court Counsel and others, as will
be determined at trial. (The payments in SBX2 11 Section 2 made by L.A. County
to Commissioners are called warrants by the L.A. County Auditor because they
are issued by L.A. County but funded by the Judicial Council.) The continued
payments by the counties under Section 2 now makes these Judicial Council
payments a continued obligation, which is prohibited by Section 4. The opinions
(see Appendix 6 of the Writ of Mandate identified in this Appendix 1) of the CJP
are that these payments are unconstitutional. The CJP has requested the
Attorney Generals opinion in this matter because the judges are clearly biased.
Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,
these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the Superior Court
payments obligated by the county payments are legal and constitutional.
The SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity is unconstitutional, has not been
challenged in the Appellate Court and preserved the status quo ante Sturgeon I.
The attempted immunity is unconstitutional under the California Constitution,
ARTICLE 1, SECTION 9 that states A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. Furthermore, SBX2 11
Section 5 legislation conflicts with the constitutional responsibilities of the
Commission on Judicial Performance. The extensive CJP analysis and arguments
show the legislatures attempt to usurp constitutional powers and requests an
opinion from the California Attorney General on the constitutionality of SBX2 11.
Again, since the Fourth Appellate Court is deferring to the taxpayers and judges,
these civil cases will ask for jury decisions on whether the judges have immunity
A-207
WA-314

22

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

from civil liability and if so whether the Plaintiffs are due damages for the biases
bought by the L.A. County bribes
Behind the Scenes Judicial Turmoil and Stress
The California Court of Appeal 4th District in San Diego heard oral
arguments for Sturgeon II on October 13, 2010. Jones-Day Attorney Elwood Lui
(former Appellate Court Justice representing Los Angeles County) stated that the
Sturgeon I decision !was quite alarming to many judges throughout the state of
California; prompting Presiding Judge Tricia Benke to interrupt and concur, it
was very disruptive (emphasis from oral argument). Apparently the Appellate
Court justices have taken a lot of heat since Sturgeon I. Judge Gilbert Nares
suggested the court might just delay and see what happens; then he predicted a
Sturgeon III after the legislature acts
1
.
Sturgeon II Fizzled
The Sturgeon II decision was decided on only three very narrow grounds.
The Fourth Appellate Courts decision in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles,
__Cal App.4th_(4th Dist.,Div. 1) (2010), the so-called Sturgeon II concluded on
page 14:
As the parties have recognized, SBX 211 both preserved the status quo
ante Sturgeon I and commenced a process by which the Legislature looks
to adoption of a comprehensive judicial compensation scheme. As we have
explained, this response to Sturgeon I meets the requirements of the
Constitution and is wholly sensible under the circumstances. The
Legislature is uniquely competent to deal with the complex policy problem of
establishing a judicial compensation scheme which both assures recruitment
and retention of fully qualified judicial officers throughout the state while at
the same time providing equity between judges in different parts of the state.

1
Medla coverage by lull ulsclosure Lhe news behlnd Lhe news", !"# %&'()(*+ ,-&.+#
/#0#1(23 4-032(2&2(-0*+5 %&'6#3 7- 8&+# -0 %&'6#3 /#0#1(23 8-&0' 99: lnLerneL Lxcluslve
vldeo news 8log: 10:00 mln, hLLp://fulldlsclosure.neL/8logs/92.php, 8elease uaLe:
november 21, 2010,
A-208
WA-315

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

By the same token our role in ensuring that the more general
requirements of the Constitution have been met is, under our system of
separate governmental powers, quite limited. (emphasis added)
The Appellate Court continues with $%& '()$*+,(-. /0+$(0- 01 $%& '&2()(0- () $%&
1(-34 /3+3.+3/% 01 $%& '&2()(0- and contradicts itself on page 15,
circumstances in an equitable and efficient manner. Thus, we would be remiss
in discharging our duties if we did not state that while the Legislature's interim
response to Sturgeon I defeats the particular challenges asserted by
Sturgeon in this litigation, that interim remedy, if not supplanted by the more
comprehensive response SBX 211 plainly contemplates, most likely will give
rise to further challenges by taxpayers or members of the bench themselves.
As we noted at the outset, the issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a
county, responsibility. We are confident that the Legislature within a
reasonable period of time will act to adopt a uniform statewide system of
judicial compensation. (emphasis added)
How can a law be temporarily constitutional? It either is or is not
constitutional. If SBX2 11 meets the requirements of the constitution as stated by
the court, why would taxpayers challenge it? Clearly the Appellate Court feels
quite limited in ensuring the Constitution is met and is not willing to fully address
this issue. The bold Sturgeon I decision by the Fourth Appellate Court fizzled
when they decided Sturgeon II.
The key to understanding the Courts unwillingness to fully address their
responsibility is found in the Fourth Appellate Courts acknowledgment during oral
arguments on October 13, 2010 of the great turmoil among the judges over
Sturgeon I. Chief Justice Ron George then. Following oral arguments, and only
one week before a decision on Sturgeon II, Ron George, a strong and long-time
proponent of increased judicial salaries, reasserts his interest and assigns the
Sturgeon II Presiding Judge Tricia Benke, on December 22, 2011, as Acting Chief
Justice of the California Supreme Court, on another high-profile case. (See
Appendix 8 Media Advisories.) This collegial plum of an appointment had no
A-209
WA-316
11
/

"#

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

I
n

P
r
o
p
r
i
a

P
e
r
s
o
n
a

purpose other than to influence the Sturgeon II decision-making process. On
December 28, 2010 the Sturgeon II decision claims the Justices have limited
authority to enforce the California Constitution, refuses to declare SBX2 11
unconstitutional, and dares the people of California to stand up for their due
process rights. Now both the legislature (in 1997) and the judiciary (in 2010) have
dared the people to fight for their due process rights!
The Sturgeon case and SBX2 11 only address the payment of county
judicial benefits. Plaintiffs civil actions are undertaken, in part, as one of the
citizen challenges encouraged by Sturgeon II, but more importantly, to address
the issue of bias, the non-disclosure of the payments, and the resulting fraud on
the court that Sturgeon does not address.
Since Sturgeon I and Sturgeon II both affirm that judicial payments are not
a county responsibility, since the county is allowed (under SBX2 11) to terminate
all payments and since the county is clearly an interested party in all divorce and
traffic cases; therefore the continued payments must be in the countys interests.
Those county interests are the Title-IV-D incentives and reimbursements as well
as the penalty assessments on traffic tickets. Those county interests are the basis
for judicial recusal and void orders in most divorce and traffic cases. SBX2 11 did
not even attempt to give immunity for the biases inherent in the nature of a bribe.
A-210
WA-317

APPENDIX

"

APPENDIX
9

A-211
WA-318
lb:92
E>2&2372ee3
JUDICIAl WATCH
P4(j[ 17/43
. .

COUNTY OF L05 ANCELES
o FFICf Of TH COU Nl1' CO U N .s.! l

0' AO ,,,,, '.A'f'IO ...
00 ".CC"
,-os C.A"'''OAN'A .00'.
__.,., ..."",T. cov-yy
November 10. 1988
Mr. Frank S. %011n
countf Orfic.,
Court
11 North B111 Stre.t
tos Ang_l , 90012
Attention, Eric D. Webber, Chi,t Deputy
Rea 3udic1al Compens.tlon
Dear Hr. ZOlin:
You hive .sked out opinion concerning the le9ality
of judgea with County employee benetits such
the Flexibl. and Svin98 Plans.
It 18 oue opinion th.t judges' salaries mu.c b. set
by the Le91slature, but oth.r benefits may (and in ,ome
case. must) b. by the county.
ANALYSIS
Article VI, Section 19 ot tne California
Constitution provides#
Lev181ature shall prescribe compenaat1on for
judV ot court. ot recor4. A judge of court of
record ftal not rece!v. the .alary tor the ofticial
of tic. he d by the j udge while Iny cause before the
j
ud
9- remAin. pen41n9 .nd tor '0 days
after it ha. been 8ubmitte4 ear deci.lon.
u
.
/ I I:<
A-212
WA-319
02/2&/2eee 1&: 132 &2&231'28eJ JUDICIAl.
18/43
Mr. Frank S. &olln
Nov.abel" 10, 1988
Pa9. 'rW0
Aa generAl proposition, the word
o r191nally ...nt or salary,- but otber
b.net1t. ha it h to hev. a
ni n9, and 1. now use4 to include both 1Ary
and frLn9. benefit.. qu or whlch me.nln9 wa.
intended 1ft section 19 i. celtical, since the courts
h.ve th.t where th. Constitution requlr tbe
Le9i.1ature to cribe .ameth1n9, the Leg1alature
.Y8t do .0 It lf, .nd may not leave or deleqate the
tunctlon to another body or person. County of Kadera v.
Superior CoutS (1974) 39 C.A.Jd 665.
For reon. which vill belov, we
belleve that compen t1on- .s Ysed 1n Section 19 reCers
only to the l.ry which 1. the of the
judiclal ottlce. The Attorney Gener.l does not agree.
S , 9., S, Ope. Cal. Atty. Cent 496; 6l Ope. Cal.
Atty. a.n. 31S. w. note initially th.t jud9 , like
other elected .re p.id under the law
rule that the 11 an incident of the oflic
Consequently, they do not technically hay. such benefits
a. vacltlon, sick leave or overtime, which otherwise
alvht be considered a p.rt of compensation.
Rdin9 18 ae a whole, it appear. that the
word. "coapention- and ere
inte(chan9b1y; that is, "salary'l in the second
sentence 'PP4ars to refer to the "compensation-
prescrib4d purau.nt to the first sentence.
Th1. r dln9 of Section 19 i. supported by the t.ct
that Article VI, Section 20 provldes:
"The Legislature sh.l1 provid. for retir.ment, with
r onable .llowanc., of judgea of courts of record
tor a;e or dlsAb111t,."
If aa used in Section 19 was intended to
include triD98 ben.tit. such benerits,
there would b. no need for Section 20.

A-213
WA-320
82/26/2eBe 1&:82 6262372883
JUDICIAL WAT(>4 INC
Pc.GE 19/43
.'

Hr. Frenk S. Solin
Nov..be C' 10, 1 , as
'.9- Thr..
Prior to Art1cle VI, Section 19 (vhieh was
196'). jydlcial ..tlon w provided under
91, S.ctlon 11, which r d in p.rtl
added 1n

"The of the ju.t-Ices ot" j ud9 ot .u
court. 0 .h&ll be fixe4
f
.n4 th. payMent
ther80f pr cr1bed by the Le9ial.tuce.-
Thi. langU4V. a;a1n sU99tl
ratber than other benefita.
the payment ol a salary,
The pre4eceor to Article VI, Section
Article VI, Section 17, which pcov1deda
11
"The juetic of the Supreme Court and of the
Distr1ct of Appeal, and the judge. or the
.uperlot court., .hall leverallf' at times
during their continuance in oft ee, recelve for
their aervlce such compen tion a8 ia or shall
provided by lAW, The sal.ri of the ju49 of the
court, in all eounties heviMQ but one
judve, an4 1n .11 count i in which the term. of
the of the Bupecior court expire at the same
tl , .hall not her lter be incr d or
diminished .rter their election, nor the
ter. tor which they 'h.ll h&ve b n elected. Upon
the adoption this the s.la:1 then
e8t.b118hed by law shall be paid unitormly to the
juatleea and judges then 1n ottlee. The salaries
of the justice. ot the Supreme Court and of the
Olatrict of Appeal be paid by the
State. One h.lt of the SAlary of each sup.rioe
cour' jud9hall be by the St.t8J .nd
halt thereof .hAll paid by the county tor
which he 18 elected, On and after the first day of
J&nU8ry, A.D. 1907, the jUItice8 oC the Supreme
Court sh.ll each rlceive an annual salary of
$8,000, and the ju.tice. of the several Diatrict
Court. of App l shall .ach receive en annual
salarr of $7,000, the 1d salar1ee to be payable
IDOnth ,."
rer r Section
compensation-
11 elso to use the
and w l ary" lntlrchanQeably.
/1, '3
A-214
WA-321
1&: 82 6262312ee3
JUDICIAL WATCH
PAGE 2e/43
"
Hr. rcank S. &011n
November: 10, 1981'
P.g. rour
The laft9ua,. of former Sect10n 17 1. directly
trac.able to the COnatltutlon of 1879, an4 thence to the
Con.tltutloft of 11.9.
Artlcle VI, S.ctlon 15 at the Conetltutlon of 1849
prOYide4r
-The Juatlce8 of the Couct, and Jud9 ot
the Dlatrict Court, sh.ll severally, at stated
tl... durin; their continu.nce In office, reo.iv,
toe thelc servic a co-pen.atlon, to be paid out
of the tr which shAll not be incred or
d1.1n18hed duriA9 the ter- tor which they shall
have be.n .1ected. The County JUdqes shall 41so
v.call" at atated ti , r.celv. tor their
fyie- co.pentlon to paid out of the
county tr of their re.pect1ve counties, whjch
'hAll not be lncr or dimini.hed dur1n9 the
term which they eh.ll have been
It 1. 011' that weompensltion" as used in Section
15 meant M.alary.- POt th.t we doubt that
public offlcSal. in eith.r 1849 or 1879 received much in
the w.y 01 fr1nge benet1ta any
Thus, hlatorlc.l1y N compens.t1on" for judges has
bn and under.toO<! to m... n "salary," And this hAS
carried ovec to the pre nt day.
The Legi.lature ha. interpreted the constitutional
lan9uage in the way. 1.5 at Titl. 8 of the
Government Code (Sections 68200, et seq.) entitled
tlon of JU8tic or Court. ot
Record." It dl. with salary and not with
fring. benetit. or any other torm of
Similarly, Code Seceion 7S00J, which is a
part of the Jud9 - Retirement define. selaryM
follow.:
me.ns the eompens.tJon received by
judve a8 the eaolument. of the oEfie. of: judge .
Ie-! tj
A-215
WA-322
e2/2&IZeee 1&:62
JUDICIAL WATCH INC
PAGE 21/43
..
Kr. Frank S. Zo11 n
Novber 10, 1988
P.ge Five
we conclude that while the
Le91.1ature the .al.ry ot a auperior
court jud9. and ..y not d.leg.te r ponalbillty to
AnI otber pee.on or Artlcl. VI, Section l' of the
Ca do not prohibit the board ot
ot a county fra. providlno
b.netlta tor jud9 in eounty. In fact.
the Leqls1.ture h or required .uen
additional benetit. in .0 in.t.ncea.
ror pl., GOV8rnN.nt Code Section 53200.3
pcov14 th.t are dee.ed to be county e.ployees
tor the 11-1te4 pucpo.e or th. application ot th.t
article (d11n9 with 9roUP in.urance) and provides that
ju4ge8 are entitled to the lame or similar health and
weltlre benet its ace to of the
1n whioh the court i. loeated. Thua, judgee are
ele.rly .ntitled to dental and lite insurance
b.nctlte auch tho provided 1n the Fl ible Senefit

Government Code Section 53214.5
judge. to in deterred
compensation plan. establ1ahed by counties,
S.ct1on 53214.5 w probably inepired tn. existence
of d.ferred tlon plantablished purSuAnt to
Section 457 ot the Internal Revenue Cod., 401(k) plana
auah ouc Savln9a Pl.n are also dererred compensation
pl.nlf and health care .nd dependent C4ce reimbursement
accounts well salary reduction
under the Plexlbl, Benefit Plan ace deterred
campention An4 consequently we believe
that 'udge_' therein i8 author12ed by
Section 53214.5.
It 1. true that participlnt. in the Flexible
Benefit may elect to take ot all oe the
County'. contcibutlon aa taxable cAah, and that the
County provide...tehln9 conttibutlons to the 401(k)
plan. Wt b.118ve that thel. ben@flts are similarly
authorlze4 by Sectione 53200.) and 53214.5, linea they
Ir. part of the plana .uthorl1ed by those sections. In
addition, Government Code Sect10n 68206.6, whlch
prc9id for pay.ent of luperlor court jUQ9 solely
J'r; A
A-216
WA-323
&26'2371883
JUDICIAL WATCH
PAGE
.:
Mr. Fr.nk S. Zolln
November 10, 198'
Page st.x
tro county payroll, wdded tOt the speclfic
purpo ot to in
county caeeterla end 401(k) plan,.
low even that such benefit. are not
apec1t! ca111 by atatute, w. believe that the
provide them to , so 10n9 the
,"
Board of SUr_rYl.0rs tlndt that there i benefLt
the "dol"9 eo. This would a1.o be tcu. ot
other benefit. tor judge., such .8 prote ional
development allowance or bonu8.
Supecior court judge. are tech"1c.lly St.te
conatltutional ottieer., but they .re in re.pecta
qu i-county officecs. Ther rve the populatlon of a
particular countr' the1r .a arie. are paid in part by
the county ln wh ch they .it, and as noted above, they
are d.emed to be county ' eor purpose. or
partlclpatlon in h lth end 1 fe insurance program5
well aa in 4.rerr.d compensation plans.
The lary of a superior court judge is the m
tat.wide. Thus,. jud,e in a rural county m.y
be well compen ted bd upon the cOlt ot living there
.nd In eOMperleon to what he could rn in privat.
pract1ce. On the other han4, judgee 1n Loa Angel
County Are cONpen ted based upon the co.t of
l1vlnQ here and in to what th.y could in
private practice. The 90.rd of Supec v !8oce h
evidently found th.t 1n ocder to .ttraet and
retain quallfJed 'u4gel to .erve 1n this County, it i.
neceary and appropriate to provide with benefit.
luch .8 the Flexible Benetlt Pln contribution an4 the
401(k) matcb, which .re Available to employe in
the priv.te .ector, ae well as to CQunty and
court And employees other thAn jud9
lip
A-217
WA-324
282'8 1&:e2 6262372ee3
WATCH INC
PAGE 23/43
HI. rr.nlc s. %ol.in
Noveaber 10, 19
Page S...n
It .. be nec&ry tor the of Supervl.ors to
provide additional benet it. foe jud ges in the future in
order to .. a hi9h level of judicial competenee
and pertor.ance in th18 County.
It we oan be ot turth.r 1.tence to you in thl
..
..tter, pl lee u. know.
Very truly yours,
De WITT W. CLINTON
County Counsel
By "
ROGER M. WHITBY (
Senior A 1stant
county Counsel
APPROVED AND RELEASED:

County Counl
RMWr jk
NovlOW
I]
A-218
WA-325

APPENDIX

"#

APPENDIX
10

A-219
WA-326
CALI FORNI A LAW REVI SI ON COMMI SSI ON STAFF MEMORANDUM
Study J-1201 November 27, 1995
Memorandum 95-77
Trial Court Unification: Delegation of Legislative Authority
The trial court unification legislation, Senate Bill 162 (Lockyer), is effective
January 1, 1996. The measure provides that on occurrence of a vacancy in a
municipal court judgeship, if the Governor makes certain findings concerning the
conversion of the judgeship to a superior court judgeship, the number of
municipal court judges for the county shall then be reduced by one and the
number of superior court judges for the county shall be increased by one. Is this
a valid delegation of legislative authority?
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
The California Constitution provides:
The Legislature shall prescribe the number of judges and provide
for the officers and employees of each superior court.
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 4 (emphasis added).
The Legislature shall provide for the organization and prescribe
the jurisdiction of municipal courts. It shall prescribe for each
municipal court the number, qualifications, and compensation of
judges, officers, and employees
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 5(c) (emphasis added).
The statutes reiterate the mandate: The Legislature shall prescribe the number
and compensation of judges, officers, and attaches of each municipal court.
Govt Code 7200.
Pursuant to these provisions, the Legislature has prescribed the numbers of
superior court and municipal court judges in each county. See Govt Code
69580-69615 (superior court); 72600-74987 (municipal court).
Although historically the Legislature has prescribed a fixed number of judges
in each county, beginning a decade or so ago the Legislature began to allow the
boards of supervisors of some counties to provide for a greater number. The
statute governing the superior court in Los Angeles County, for example,
provides:
1
A-220
WA-327
In the County of Los Angeles there are 224 judges of the
superior court, any one or more of whom may hold court.
However, at such time as the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors finds there are sufficient funds for any number of
additional judges up to a total number of 14 and adopts a
resolution or resolutions to that effect, there shall be 224 judges of
the superior court plus the additional judge or judges provided by
this section, any one or more of whom may hold court.
Govt Code 69586.
PRESCRIBE v. PROVIDE FOR
Constitutional provisions that a governmental entity shall prescribe have
been construed to be nondelegable, in contrast with provisions that a
governmental entity shall provide for, which have been construed to be
delegable.
In Slavich v. Walsh, 82 Cal. App. 2d 228, 186 P. 2d 35 (1947), the issue was
whether the Legislature could constitutionally prescribe salaries of municipal
clerks. The controlling constitutional provision at that time was:
The legislature shall provide by general law for the constitution,
regulation, government and procedure of municipal courts. ... The
compensation of the justices or judges of all courts of record, shall
be fixed and the payment thereof prescribed by the legislature.
Cal. Const. Art. VI, 11 (as amended in 1924; emphasis added).
The court stated:
The proper interpretation of the clause of article VI, section 11,
conferring the power on the Legislature to fix the judges salaries is
that by that clause the Legislature itself must fix the salaries, while
as to other matters relating to the constitution, regulation,
government etc., of the municipal courts it is implied that the
Legislature can delegate to the respective municipalities control
over certain phases of such regulation, including the fixing of
attaches salaries as long as such delegation is effected by the
general law.
82 Cal. App. 2d at 235.
In County of Madera v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 3d 665, 114 Cal. Rptr.
283 (1974), the issue was whether a county ordinance consolidating two justice
districts was valid. The controlling constitutional language at that time was:
2
A-221
WA-328
The Legislature ... shall prescribe for each municipal court and
provide for each justice court the number, qualifications, and
compensation of judges, officers, and employees.
The court held that, while the Legislature was authorized by the constitution to
delegate the matter to the county, it had not done so, and therefore the ordinance
was invalid. The court reasoned:
Although the Legislature has the ultimate power to control the
justice courts, article VI, section 5, supra, states that the Legislature
shall ... provide for each justice court the number, qualifications,
and compensation of judges, officers, and employees. (Italics
added.) In wording this section, the Constitutional Revision
Commission used the word provide rather than prescribe to
indicate an intention to permit the Legislature to delegate this duty.
39 Cal. App. 3d at 669-670 (fn. omitted).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DELEGATION
Case Law
Despite plenty of cases stating the general common law proposition that a
delegation of legislative authority may be made if sufficient standards are
provided as part of the delegation, we have found only two cases actually
deciding the validity of a legislative delegation of authority in the face of a
constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall prescribe details of the
operation of the judicial system. Both cases upheld the delegation.
Martin v. County of Contra Costa, 8 Cal. App. 3d 856, 87 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1970),
determined the constitutionality of a statute that set municipal court employee
salaries but provided that any county ordinance changing benefits for county
employees generally would apply also to municipal court employees. The
governing constitutional language at that time was:
The Legislature ... shall prescribe for each municipal court and
provide for each justice court the number, qualifications, and
compensations of judges, officers, and employees.
The court upheld the constitutionality of this delegation, stating:
This provision is not an abdication of the Legislatures duty to
prescribe the compensation of the attaches of each municipal court.
3
A-222
WA-329
It fixes the compensation of the employees, declares a policy that
such compensation shall be commensurate with that furnished
county employees with equivalent responsibilities and provides for
interim changes, subject to review by the Legislature, in the event
there are local changes which would otherwise cause discrepancies
in compensation in violation of the legislative policy.
8 Cal. App. 3d at 862.
In Board of Supervisors v. Krumm, 62 Cal. App. 3d 935, 133 Cal. Rptr. 475
(1976), the municipal court ordered the hiring of two new marshals pursuant to a
statute that allows more than the statutorily prescribed number of deputies in
case of an increase of business of the municipal court or other emergency. The
board of supervisors contested this order on grounds that included the primacy
of the Legislature to determine municipal court staffing under Article VI, Section
5 of the Constitution. The court rejected the argument, stating:
Such argument proceeds from plaintiffs view of the effect to be
given to section 5, article VI, of the California Constitution, already
noted, which specifies that the Legislature ... shall prescribe for
each municipal court ... the number ... of... officers, and employees.
The short answer to that contention is that the Legislature itself
enacted section 72150 and within the constitutional prescription
thereby provided a specific mechanism for the staffing of municipal
courts under emergency circumstances.
62 Cal. App. 3d at 944.
Attorney General Opinions
On the other hand, the Attorney General has issued an opinion that a statute
permitting superior and municipal court judges to be covered under county
health insurance programs is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496 (1976). The constitutional provision at issue
states:
The Legislature shall prescribe compensation for judges of courts
of record.
The Attorney General argues that, Because of the use of prescribe the
Legislature cannot delegate the authority granted to it by Article VI, section 19 of
the Constitution. Any attempt to make such a delegation would be
constitutionally invalid. 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 497. The Attorney General
4
A-223
WA-330
reasons that benefits such as health insurance are part of compensation, that the
effect of the statute in question is to allow counties to determine this aspect of a
judges compensation, and thus the statute is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.
The Attorney General distinguishes the Martin case, pointing out that the
statute involved in that case was a detailed treatment of compensation of
employees in a particular county, and was subject to continuing legislative
review of the countys actions. The health care statute involved in the Attorney
General Opinion, on the other hand, is of statewide applicability, and is not
subject to continuing legislative control over subsequent changes by counties.
The Legislature responded to the Attorney Generals opinion by amending
the statute in 1977 to provide that judges would participate in the health plan
subject to the same or similar employee benefits as are now required or granted
to employees of the county. This was evidently an effort to make the statute
similar to the parity statute held constitutional in Martin. The Attorney General
did not buy it, again issuing an opinion that the statute is unconstitutional. 61
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 388 (1978). The opinion elaborates:
Thus, the Constitution explicitly mandates the Legislature to
itself determine the compensation of judges. Therefore if the
Legislature seeks to involve other agencies in this compensation
determining process, it would, at the very least, have to formulate
reasonably precise standards as a constraining statutory guide for
such agencies. (59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra. See Blumenthal v.
Board of Medical Examiners (1962) 57 Cal. 2d 228, 235. See also the
discussion in 59 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 496, supra, at pp. 498-500, of
the statutory standards approved in Kugler v. Yocum (1968) 69 Cal.
2d 371 and in Martin v. County of Contra Costa (1970) 8 Cal. App. 3d
856.)
61 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. at 390.
APPLICATION TO SB 162
Does SB 162, by vesting in the Governor the authority to increase the number
of superior court judges and decrease the number of municipal court judges in a
county, run afoul of the constitutional requirement that the Legislature shall
prescribe the numbers of superior court and municipal court judges? Cal.
Const. Art. VI , 4, 5.
5
A-224
WA-331
While the Constitution and rules of construction appear to be absolute, the
only authorities that have directly addressed the constitutionality of a statutory
delegation are more liberal. An argument can be made for constitutionality of SB
162 on the following grounds:
(1) The bill does not provide an across-the-board delegation, but requires the
Governor to consider the circumstances of each county and each judgeship
individually.
(2) The bill does not give unfettered discretion to the Governor, but provides
specific standards and findings that must be satisfied before the Governor may
act under the delegation of authority. Specifically under SB 162, the Governor
must find that there are sufficient funds and that the administration of justice
would be advanced. In making the determination, the Governor must consider
geographic separation of the courts, the fiscal impact of conversion, and the
existence of an adequate coordination plan in the county.
(3) The Legislature has prescribed the total number of judges in the county.
The Governor is not authorized to vary that number, but only to shift the
prescribed number between municipal and superior courts in the county.
(4) The history of allowing limited variation in numbers of judges by county
boards of supervisors during the past decade establishes a practice that must be
read as a gloss on the Constitution. If SB 162 were held unconstitutional, what
would be the implication for counties that have increased the number of judges
pursuant to statutory authority, and what would that do to the thousands of
judgments, orders, etc., made by unconstitutionally constituted courts?
An intangible in the effort to determine whether the delegation of legislative
authority by SB 162 would be held constitutional is the basic attitude of the
judicial branch towards unification. In the end the judicial branch, and not the
Attorney General or the legislative branch, makes the determination of
constitutionality. Statutes providing that municipal court employee benefits were
to be on a parity with those of other county employees, and for necessary
increases in the number of employees, were held constitutional by the courts. A
statute providing judges county health benefits was declared unconstitutional by
the Attorney General but not by the courts. Judges appear to be divided on the
matter of unification, both at the trial and appellate court level. However, we
believe that judicial opposition to the gradualist approach of SB 162 is muted.
6
A-225
WA-332
WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD BE DONE?
There is a risk that SB 162 would be held to be an invalid delegation of
legislative authority to the Governor. While an argument can be made for
constitutionality, the risk of an adverse determination is real. The stakes are high,
since a determination after the fact that a judgeship has been improperly
converted could cause a number of significant problems. Whether judgments
rendered by judges acting beyond their jurisdiction are void or voidable is a
question the staff has not yet researched, but this would be a concern.
What, if anything, can or should be done to minimize the risk? The staff
deems the following options, at least, to be worth considering.
Do Nothing
A plausible argument can be made that the SB 162 delegation of authority is
proper, despite what appears to be a plain limitation in the Constitution. It may
be that the validity of the delegation will never even become an issue, just as the
validity of statutes delegating authority to county boards of supervisors to
increase the number of judges in their counties have not become an issue. Over
time, as judgeships are converted and the system changes, it will become
impractical to undo the changes and the Constitution will be read in light of
long-standing practice. However, there are real risks, and the stakes are high.
Test Case
The Governor could convert a single judgeship to serve as a test case for a
judicial determination of validity; alternatively, declaratory relief might be a
possibility. This would enable a definitive determination of the issue without the
substantial problems involved if SB 162 were held invalid after full
implementation for a substantial period. However, this would delay
implementation of SB 162 for some time. It could also make it easier for a holding
of invalidity, since the consequences of such a holding would be minimal
compared to the problems that would be caused if SB 162 were in full operation.
Amend Statute
The statute could be revised in a manner that ensures it would fall within the
standards of the existing authorities. This would involve perhaps some
additional standards for conversion and some form of legislative review of
experience under the conversion process. This is not an attractive option, since
7
A-226
WA-333
the present scheme is the result of a compromise between all three branches of
government, reached after several years of work and negotiations; to suggest it
be redone would not be productive. Moreover, the existing standards in the
statute are probably sufficient, if a court follows the existing authorities. It is only
an absolutist reading of the Constitution that presents a danger, and amendment
of the statute would not help in this respect.
Amend Constitution
An obvious way to ensure the validity of the conversion of judgeships by the
Governor is to amend the Constitution to provide that the Legislature shall
provide for rather than prescribe the number of superior court and
municipal court judges. This approach has a number of drawbacks, however,
including:
Timing. SB 162 becomes operative January 1, 1996, but absent an emergency
the Legislature cannot could not even begin proceedings to amend the
Constitution until it reconvenes on January 3. Existing law requires a period of
131 days after adoption of a constitutional amendment by the Legislature before
the amendment may be voted on by the people. Elec. Code 9040. Since the next
statewide election date is the presidential primary, which in 1996 has been
moved forward to March 26, this would mean a delay until the November 5
general election before the measure could be voted on. It might be feasible for the
Legislature to exempt this measure from the 131-day waiting period, if the
measure can be passed quickly enough that a March 26 election date is
logistically feasible.
Retroactive Application. Revision of the Constitution could be deemed an
implicit acknowledgment that the existing delegation of authority to the
Governor is invalid. What would this do to any conversions of judgeships made
before the Constitution is revised? The problem could be avoided by keeping the
Governors office informed of the situation, and the Governor could refrain from
making appointments until the Constitution has been amended. Alternatively,
the constitutional amendment could include curative language that validates any
conversions made before the amendment. The staff would need to do further
research to determine whether curative language of this type would be effective.
Wrong Result. There is always the possibility that the voters would not
approve the proposed constitutional amendment. Then the fate of SB 162 would
be sealed, regardless of any uncertainty about its validity that might have existed
8
A-227
WA-334
before the election. There are interests opposed to unification, and the argument
that unification will increase judicial salaries has been effective with the voters in
at least one previous unification effort, despite the fact that unification should
yield overall savings to the judicial system. The fact that the Governor must
consider the fiscal impact of the conversion and find there are sufficient funds to
do it may help in this respect.
Add Statutory Savings Clause
One way to proceed is to assume the validity of SB 162, but to add curative or
savings language to the statute to deal with potential problems in the event it is
ultimately held invalid. This should be do-able, since before converting a
judgeship the Governor must consider the existence of a coordination plan in the
county that permits blanket cross-assignment of judges. The staff envisions a
statute along the following lines:
If conversion by the Governor of a municipal court judgeship to
a superior court judgeship under Section 68083 is determined by a
final judgment of a court to be invalid for any reason:
(a) All judgments, orders, decrees, and other acts of any
incumbent of that judgeship within the jurisdiction of the superior
court shall be deemed to be acts of the incumbent made as a judge
of the municipal court acting under cross-assignment pursuant to
the trial court coordination plan of the county.
(b) The Judicial Council shall reallocate to the municipal court
the funding in support of the municipal court salary and the
chamber staff positions and other previously allocated funding for
the judgeship, but all salary, benefits, and other payments made in
support of the converted judgeship before the effective date of the
final judgment shall be deemed to have been made as part of the
trial court coordination plan of the county.
We would need to consult with the Judicial Council to make sure that all bases
are covered in such a statute. The existence of such a statute could make it easier
for a court to determine the underlying invalidity of SB 162, however, by
lowering the stakes.
CONCLUSION
Although there is certainly a possibility that SB 162 will be held to be an
invalid delegation of legislative authority to determine the number of superior
court and municipal court judges, a case can be made that this will not occur. The
9
A-228
WA-335
problems that would be created if it is held invalid are substantial. The staff
believes something should be done in anticipation of this possibility. All of the
alternatives discussed in this memorandum have drawbacks. However, of the
alternatives, the staff prefers a savings clause that would validate actions taken
under the converted judgeship if the conversion is held invalid. This approach
appears to be low-key and workable; it could substantially minimize risks of
implementation without causing substantial delay of implementation.
Nathaniel Sterling
Executive Secretary
10
A-229
WA-336

APPENDIX

""

APPENDIX
11

A-230
WA-337

!"#$%$&' %)"*%$' )+
%&'$+),*$&
&#-$*$./,&/$01 )++$%1
)+ /21 %)",/.
345678 $9:;<=>?7;9 )::78@
ABB C;6D@9 C>?@ &E@94@
.>9 +<>987F8;G %& HAIJKLMNOO
PPPQ8;4<?79:;Q8>QR;E

AIBLONBLSSAJ

'T99 2;6?;9
345678 $9:;<=>?7;9 )::78@<
MEDIA ADVISORY
Release Number: 32 Release Date: December 21, 2010

Supreme Court Justices Disqualify
Themselves in State Building Sale Case;
Will Assign Temporary Justices

San Francisco The California Supreme Court today issued an order in
which all justices disqualified themselves from hearing an emergency
writ involving the states sale of California state buildings.
(Schwarzenegger v. Court of Appeal, S189114).

In addition to announcing the recusal of all members of the court from
hearing this matter, the Supreme Court order also directs that seven pro
tem justices from the state Courts of Appeal be assigned to hear the case
in accordance with applicable provisions of the California Constitution
and pursuant to the court's Internal Operating Policies and Procedures.

The order was signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter.

Previously, all members of the Supreme Court recused themselves, and
Court of Appeal justices were assigned in their place, in the case of Mosk
v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474.

The Supreme Court issued its order today in response to a petition for
writ of mandate and request for emergency relief filed by the Governor's
Office this morning.

-#-

A-231
WA-338
A-232
WA-339

!"#$%$&' %)"*%$' )+
%&'$+),*$&
&#-$*$./,&/$01 )++$%1
)+ /21 %)",/.
345678 $9:;<=>?7;9 )::78@
ABB C;6D@9 C>?@ &E@94@
.>9 +<>987F8;G %& HAIJKLMNOO
PPPQ8;4<?79:;Q8>QR;E

AIBLONBLSSAJ

'T99 2;6?;9
345678 $9:;<=>?7;9 )::78@<
MEDIA ADVISORY
Release Number: 33 Release Date: December 22, 2010

Supreme Court Assigns Temporary
Justices in State Building Sale Case

San FranciscoYesterday, the justices of the California Supreme Court
unanimously recused themselves in a matter involving the sale of
California state buildings, Schwarzenegger v. California Court of Appeal,
Sixth Appellate District, S189114. This morning, the California Supreme
Court issued an order assigning seven Court of Appeal justices to serve as
pro tempore (temporary) justices to the Supreme Court in that same
case.

The assigned Court of Appeal justices are: Justice Richard Aronson
(Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana); Justice William
Bedsworth (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana);
Justice Patricia Benke (Fourth Appellate District, Division One, San
Diego); Justice M. Kathleen Butz (Third Appellate District, Sacramento);
Justice Dennis Cornell (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); Justice Betty
Dawson (Fifth Appellate District, Fresno); and Justice Richard Fybel
(Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, Santa Ana.)

Justice Patricia Benke was assigned as Acting Chief Justice of the
California Supreme Court in this matter.

The justices were assigned according to procedures set out in the
Supreme Courts published Internal Operating Practices and
Procedures.

The order, signed by Acting Chief Justice Marvin R. Baxter, assigns the
Court of Appeal justices to the case starting today, December 22, 2010,
until they have completed and disposed of all related causes and matters
submitted to them, and all petitions for rehearing arising out of such
causes and matters. The immediate matter before the court is a writ of
mandate and request for an emergency stay filed by the Governors
Office on Tuesday, December 21, 2010.
A-233
WA-340
A-234
WA-341

APPENDIX

"#

APPENDIX
12

A-235
WA-342
ANALYSIS OF SUPERIOR COURTS BY COUNTY
SELECTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE
Draft

The conclusion of this analysis is that Humboldt County is the Plaintiffs
preferred choice for a new venue. There are 12 counties which do not pay
bribes and which have more than five judges in the county Superior Court.
Humboldt is geographically isolated, large enough to accommodate the jury
trials and small enough to likely be removed from the intense lobbying
influence of the California Judicial Association. Since travel costs are a major
concern, Superior Court of each county where the civil suit cases originate
should pay all costs associated with travel, video conferencing and media in
the interest of achieving a fair trial and due process for residents of that
county.

Unbribed Counties With
Fewer Than 5 Judges

County #
Judges
2007
Population
Lake 4 63,821
Tehama 4 62,093
Del Norte 3 29,207
Alpine 2 1,261
Amador 2 38,320
Colusa 2 21,945
Inyo 2 18,253
Lassen 2 36,223
Modoc 2 9,747
Plumas 2 20,891
Sierra 2 3,400

A-236
WA-343

County Appellate
District
# and City
Unbribed
Counties
#
Judges
Population
2007

Comments
Santa Cruz 6 San Jose 1 of 4 10 265,183 Small number of Appellate justices
Stanislaus 5 Fresno 3 of 9 22 523,095 Small number of Appellate justices
Madera 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 149,916 Small number of Appellate justices
Merced 5 Fresno 3 of 9 10 252,554 Small number of Appellate justices
Imperial 4 San Diego 2 of 6 9 174,322 Appellate already bowed to pressure
Shasta 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 11 181,380 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
El Dorado 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 6 178,689 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Sutter 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 95,516 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Yuba 3 Sacramento 11 of 23 5 71,612 Legislature and lobbyist Influence
Santa Barbara 2 Los Angeles 1of 4 19 425,710 Prima Facie evidence of bias
Marin 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 10 256,310 Proximity to San Francisco Judges
Humboldt 1 San Francisco 4 of 10 7 132,364 Isolated

Appellate District
Size

1
st
Appellate District has 20 justices
2
nd
Appellate District has 32 Justices
3
rd
4
th
5
th
6
th
Appellate District has only 7 Justices

A-237
WA-344

All Appellate reviews should be held in San Franciscos First District to
keep this issue in the forefront of the California Supreme Court. The First
District is the largest of the remaining districts, when the Los Angeles and
San Diego Districts are excluded. The Second Appellate is dominated by Los
Angeles with the highest bribe amounts and has provided the prima facie
evidence they are biased. The Fourth Appellate has bowed under judicial
pressure during its Sturgeon II decision, backing away from the uprightness of
its landmark Sturgeon I decision. Additionally, the Third Appellate District in
Sacramento is too susceptible to California Judicial Association lobbying.

A-238
WA-345
A-239
WA-346
MAP SHOWS PAYMENTS BY TYPE
red=County
orange=Court
green =NONE
blue = appellate districts

APPENDIX

"#

APPENDIX
13

A-240
WA-347
Case 2:09-cv-0l9l4-JFW-CW Document 78 Filed l2/26/l2 Page 28 of 43 Page lD #:957
A-241
WA-348
A-242
WA-349
A-243
WA-350
Case 2:09-cv-0l9l4-JFW-CW Document 78 Filed l2/26/l2 Page 3l of 43 Page lD #:960
A-244
WA-351
Case 2:09-cv-0l9l4-JFW-CW Document 78 Filed l2/26/l2 Page 32 of 43 Page lD #:96l
A-245
WA-352
A-246
WA-353
A-247
WA-354
A-248
WA-355
A-249
WA-356
A-250
WA-357
A-251
WA-358
A-252
WA-359
A-253
WA-360
Case 2:09-cv-0l9l4-JFW-CW Document 78 Filed l2/26/l2 Page 4l of 43 Page lD #:970
A-254
WA-361
Case 2:09-cv-0l9l4-JFW-CW Document 78 Filed l2/26/l2 Page 42 of 43 Page lD #:97l
A-255
WA-362
!
APPENDIX
D
APPENDIX
WA-363
WA-364
WA-365
WA-366
WA-367
WA-368
WA-369
WA-370
WA-371
WA-372
WA-373
WA-374
WA-375
WA-376
WA-377
WA-378
WA-379
WA-380
WA-381
WA-382
WA-383
WA-384
WA-385
WA-386
WA-387
WA-388
WA-389
WA-390
WA-391
WA-392
WA-393
WA-394
!
APPENDIX
E
APPENDIX
WA-395
WA-396
WA-397
WA-398
WA-399
WA-400
WA-401
WA-402
WA-403
WA-404
WA-405
WA-406
WA-407
WA-408
WA-409
WA-410
WA-411
WA-412
WA-413
WA-414
WA-415
WA-416
WA-417
WA-418
WA-419
WA-420
WA-421
WA-422
WA-423
WA-424
WA-425
WA-426
WA-427
WA-428
WA-429
WA-430
WA-431
WA-432
WA-433
WA-434
WA-435
WA-436
WA-437
WA-438
WA-439
WA-440
WA-441
!
APPENDIX
F
APPENDIX
WA-442
WA-443
WA-444
WA-445
WA-446
WA-447
WA-448
WA-449
WA-450
WA-451
WA-452
WA-453
WA-454
WA-455
WA-456
WA-457
WA-458
WA-459
WA-460
WA-461
WA-462
WA-463
WA-464
WA-465
WA-466
WA-467
WA-468
WA-469
WA-470
!
APPENDIX
G
APPENDIX
WA-471
WA-472
WA-473
WA-474
WA-475
WA-476
WA-477
WA-478
WA-479
WA-480
WA-481
WA-482
WA-483
WA-484
WA-485
WA-486
WA-487
WA-488
WA-489
WA-490
WA-491
WA-492
WA-493
WA-494
WA-495
WA-496
WA-497
WA-498
WA-499
!
APPENDIX
H
APPENDIX
WA-500

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Unified Response to Demurrers and anti-SLAPP 1
Ettlin_Wright_Super_DemurrerResponse-r4g.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

COUNTY OF ORANGE

30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC

Plaintiff

PLAINTIFFS UNIFIED REPLY TO:

DEMURRERS BY DEFENDANTS,

DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE,

AND

DEFENDANTS anti-SLAPP
MOTION
vs.


Does 1-10,
(any judge assigned to this case
who received Judicial Benefits)
Defendants

Date: February 11, 2014
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Ctrm: TBD

WA-501

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSES. .......................... 3
II. STURGEON I VOIDED ALL IMMUNITY PROTECTIONS. ............................... 4
III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM .......................................................................... 7
IV. ANTI-SLAPP ALLEGATION ............................................................................... 7
A. PROTECTED ACTIVITY .................................................................................... 8
B. LIKLIHOOD OF PREVAILING ............................................................................ 9
V. COUNTY OBSTRUCTION OF DISCOVERY AND REMOVAL .......................... 9
VI. DEFENDANTS JUDICIAL NOTICE IS IRRELEVANT ..................................... 10
VII. JUDGES: RESIST, RESIST, STONEWALL, STONEWALL ............................ 10
VIII. VOID ORDERS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK ......................... 11
IX. JURIDICTION - ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, ROOKER-FELDMAN ................ 12
X. I.R.S. TAX FRAUD ........................................................................................... 13
XI. DENIAL OF DEMURRERS .............................................................................. 14
XII. SUPREMACY CLAUSE GUARANTEES FULL (NOT INTERIM) 14TH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ..................................................................... 14
XIII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 16

Cases
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. 868_(2009) ...................... 6
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ................. 12
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) ........................ 13
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) .................................................... 12
United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 80910 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................. 3, 12
Statutes
C.C.C. 52.1 ............................................................................................................. 7
WA-502

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

I. FAILURE TO RESPOND TO CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSES.
Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to deny all Defendant demurrers for
failure to address the critical legal issues identified by Plaintiff. These issues
supersede any claims of immunity and control the legality of actions by the
Defendants. There is still no response to:
1. Why the Fourth Appellate Court encouraged challenges by taxpayers,
2. Why the Judicial Council felt SBX2 11 Section 5 immunity was needed,
3. Whether the Commission on Judicial Performance analyses invalidating
Section 5 immunity can withstand an unbiased Courts review,
4. The RICO enterprise elements and the use of bribes in violation of United States
v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 809-810 (9th Cir. 1999),
5. The employee status of the Los Angeles and Orange county judges as County
employees but without any employment contract, and thus the possible violation of
I.R.S. regulations and campaign finance statutes.
Plaintiff incorporates, by reference, the entire legal analyses of the
Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) (Plaintiffs Complaint, Appendix pages
A-173 to A-196). These legal analyses are critical to Plaintiffs case. Absent any
argument from Defendants, Plaintiff requests this court to accept the conclusions
and the validity of the CJP legal analyses and rule that SBX2_11 Section 5 is
invalid and the immunity it provides to the supervisors or to Defendant Harris is
invalid.
Absent any argument from Defendants about the need for SBX2_11, Sec. 5
immunity, Plaintiff requests this Court to rule that the Judicial Council and the California
Association of Judges, the authors of SBX2_11, clearly did not believe that existing
immunities, as now claimed by Defendants, were adequate to protect Defendants
against criminal charges. The legislative intent in passage of SBX2_11 was to provide
immunity that did not currently exist for the judges, supervisors and administrators of
WA-503

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

the county payments. Defendants arguments are not based on such immunity and
thus the Legislature and the Governor effectively convicted the supervisors and judicial
Defendants, otherwise immunity was unnecessary.
Absent any argument from Defendants about the employment status of the
Judges as county employees, Plaintiff requests this Court to rule that Defendant Levine
is not an employee of Los Angeles County and other Superior Court Judges are not
employees of their respective counties. The attached Declaration of Dennis Ettlin,
Appendix 3, contains a newly acquired public records document stating that Los
Angeles Superior Court judges have no employment contract with Los Angeles County
(page 2:1). Since the judges are not county employees, the payments should be
considered as campaign contributions, taxed and regulated as such.
It should be noted that Counsel Kevin McCormick flatly refused to provide any
discovery documents, one of which was the employment contract in Appendix 3. Chief
Judge Alex Kozinski has warned of an epidemic of Brady violations. Plaintiff can only
surmise that all the Defendants are in violation of Brady vs. Maryland.
II. STURGEON I VOIDED ALL IMMUNITY PROTECTIONS.
Defendants repeatedly claim they are immune from everything. Defendant
Levine (Demurrer, page 11, footnote 4) deceptively claims that Sturgeon I even
found the payments constitutional. But then on page 15:25 admits they are
unconstitutional. There can be no mistake, Sturgeon I declared the county
payments to Superior Court Judges unconstitutional because the Legislature failed
to properly prescribe the payments. The Sturgeon I determination plus the
SBX2_11 retroactive immunity convicted all judges and government officials
associated with those payments of bribery. The SBX2_11 immunity was required
because traditional immunity protections did not apply to taking of such county
payments. Defendants do not refute this, they just ignore it.
WA-504

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

When the California Court of Appeal 4th District in San Diego heard oral
arguments for Sturgeon II on October 13, 2010, Jones-Day Attorney Elwood Lui
(former Appellate Court Justice representing Los Angeles County) stated that the
Sturgeon I decision ...was quite alarming to many judges throughout the state of
California; prompting Presiding Justice Tricia Benke to interrupt and concur, it
was very disruptive (emphasis from oral argument). Justice Gilbert Nares then
suggested the court might just delay and see what happens; then he predicted a
Sturgeon III after the legislature acts. Defendants do not refute this and instead
suggest there was never anything to worry about!
Counsel Baxter never references the Sturgeon cases and does not argue the
SBX2_11 provisions or address any of the CJP issues. The CJP analysis was
hand-delivered to Defendant Harris and yet he refuses to acknowledge such in
discovery. Defendant Harris is sworn to uphold the Constitution but refuses to do so
for her own personal political gain. Her refusal to uphold prior AG decisions or to
issue her own decision denied Plaintiff his Due Process rights (before Judge
Levine) and in turn denied him redress (before Judge Levine) of his denied 1
st
and
4
th
Amendment rights. Her failure to act under Civil Code 52.1 is just as grievous as
Defendant Supervisors actions of paying her money.
Counsel McCormick suggests that Plaintiff makes a specious argument and
then he suggests the Sturgeon decisions plus SBX2_11 made everything just
hunky dory and everyone could continue business as usual. He fails to
acknowledge the CJP analysis or to explain why there might be any reason for a
Sturgeon III, or why the judges were still so agitated during the pendency of
Sturgeon II, or why SBX2_11 was needed at all, or why the CJP would call into
question the validity of SBX2_11. He also fails to address why the Sturgeon II court
encouraged Plaintiff to file this and other challenges to the county payments.
Counsel McCormick tries to suggest (Demurrer, page 14:19) that Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 566 U.S. 868_(2009) was just an extreme
WA-505

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

example of corruption and implies that little bits of bribery are acceptable. In fact,
Defendant supervisors spent $300 million on the annual easy-payment plan
instead of all at once. James Otero got $415,000, Victoria Chavez got $529,835,
John Slawson got $458,420, Sandy Kriegler got $439,733, Carolyn Kuhl got
$674,192 and her husband got $589,902. Using the county payroll system,
Defendant Supervisors made campaign contributions to non-employees that can
now be emulated by other political candidates.
These campaign contributions are not judicial functions and thus not
covered by the absolute judicial immunity cited by Counsel McCormick (Demurrer,
page 19:3).
Sturgeon I invalidated all of Defendants immunity protections under the
numerous citations of case law and that is why the judges were so agitated about
Sturgeon I. The California Judges Association and the Judicial Council saw the
need for complete replacement immunity (see Complaint A-136). They crafted
SBX2_11 and ram-rodded it through a special session of the Legislature without
hearings (see Complaint A-176, second paragraph) convicted Defendants
SUPERVISORS and Levine of criminal wrongdoing by granting them retroactive
immunity.
The CJP has determined the retroactive immunity to be unconstitutional,
because the CJP wants to determine any discipline for the judges. The CJP
requested an opinion from Attorney General Brown in 2009, but he did not
respond. The CJP has requested an opinion from Defendant Harris, who also has
not responded in over two years. Her delay stalls the CJPs constitutional
mechanism for disciplining the judges and effectively forestalls her duty to
prosecute governmental officers and employees (her own retroactive immunity).
WA-506

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

III. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
In Plaintiffs prior trial court cases, Judge OBrien (who also received
payments, and whose judgment is also void and under appeal, E058417) stated,
The Court sustains the demurrer to each and every cause of action without
leave to amend, except the court overrules the demurrer on the ground that the
complaint is vague, ambiguous and uncertain. Although the complaint is founded on
allegations of bribery and other misdeeds, the allegations upon which plaintiff relies
are clearly stated, and the issues, although unsound, are not uncertain, vague or
ambiguous. Plaintiff interprets that as cognizable. The Court should deny such
allegations by Defendants that the complaint is uncertain, vague or ambiguous.
Defendants recycle the same discredited claims and do not see what they
dont want to see. If Defendants do not recognize the critical issues in Section I, it is
understandable that Plaintiffs claims are not cognizable. It is also understandable
then, why the complaint would appear to consist of unintelligible, narrative
ramblings. (Id. page 7, line 3) The County Auditor-Controller documents in
Plaintiffs Complaint Appendix showing specific and actual county payments to the
Defendant judges would also seem irrelevant.
Counsel McCormicks suggestion (Demurrer, page 17:15) that the claim
against Defendant Levine has something to do with family law is ludicrous. The
Complaint, page 6, states that Defendant Levine denied Plaintiff due process while
he sought redress for civil rights violations under C.C.C. 52.1. Plaintiff seeks
damages for the loss of his 14
th
Amendment Due Process rights. Plaintiff seeks
damages to relitigate his claims for relief of those violations of his 1
st
and 4
th

Amendment rights before an unbiased tribunal.
IV. ANTI-SLAPP ALLEGATION
Ironically, it is Plaintiffs complaint that alleges Defendants denied his First
WA-507

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Amendment rights. Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich and Yaroslavsky made
campaign contributions to county judges in order to increase their own personal
compensation and curry favor with judges by paying for their campaign expenses.
Those payments in turn denied Plaintiff his 14th Amendment Due Process right to a fair
and unbiased hearing before Judge Levine (in this case) when Plaintiff sought redress
for the police bullying of his free speech activities.
The allegation that Plaintiff is somehow infringing the freedoms of County
Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich and Yaroslavsky to pay bribes is absurd. The
anti-SLAPP motion is just another attempt to divert attention from the real legal issues
at stake in this case.
A. PROTECTED ACTIVITY
Defendants do not have the free speech right to cry FIRE in a crowded
theatre. They do not have absolute immunity. There are time, place and manner
restrictions that apply. As early as 1988, County Counsel Frank Zolin acknowledged
that the payments were illegal (Plaintiffs Complaint, page A-213, second
paragragh). Failure by Defendant Harris to address these issues even in her own
defense also denies justice to Plaintiff.
Defendants demurrers also do not address the Fourth Appellate Courts
encouragement for taxpayers to further challenge the constitutional issue
identified in Sturgeon (Plaintiffs Complaint, page A-158, line 8). Plaintiff is following
the courts direction and challenging defendants, not depriving them of their
liberties!
The county budget is an administrative document. It is not a broad policy
setting document adding new sections to any county government code or
expressing any first amendment protected speech. It simply authorizes county
administrators to conduct their routine business. The time for free speech
WA-508

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

protections was during the debate over the budget. The time for limiting legal
liability for the bribes was during the budget discussion speeches voting.
B. LIKLIHOOD OF PREVAILING
The contention by County Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich and
Yaroslavsky that Plaintiff cannot prevail is mere hollow blustering. Their only hope
is that a bribed judge will rule in their favor. Since the Defendants (as well as
Orange County Supervisors) pay ALL the county judges, there is a good likelihood
a biased judges will return the favor.
County Defendants contention might have some merit IF they had seriously
addressed Plaintiffs legal issues in Section I. The further contention that Sturgeon
II is decided clearly in favor of the Supervisors is completely false and self-
serving. Plaintiff requests this Court address, in detail, each of the broader issues
raised by the 4
th
Appellate Court in Section I. Plaintiff will prevail on the strength of
the CJP analyses. Previous Attorneys General have also determined several times
that supplemental judicial benefits violate the constitution. Plaintiffs case against
the payments does not require a ruling from Defendant Harris. Defendant Harris,
however, is part of the RICO scheme that continues the payments for her own
personal political gain and denies due process to litigants.
V. COUNTY OBSTRUCTION OF DISCOVERY AND REMOVAL
In addition to a stern rebuke by the Federal Court for improperly removing the
case to escape discovery, County Defendants Molina, Knabe, Antonovich and
Yaroslavsky have refused to provide any discovery materials under Californias C.C.P.
This material might have clarified issues for the Court or for Plaintiff. Since Defendants
had an opportunity to provide material that could have led to mediation and resolution
of this issue, Plaintiff requests this court to deny the demurrers and to rule on the key
legal issues using Plaintiffs materials in the complaint Appendix.
WA-509

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

VI. DEFENDANTS JUDICIAL NOTICE IS IRRELEVANT
Defendants Request for Judicial Notice is another attempt to deflect the Courts
attention from the main legal issues identified in Section I above. The events of
November 30, 2011 are no longer relevant, superseded by Defendants actions (or
refusal to act) to deny Due Process. The 200 pages do not even include the case
involving Defendant Levine, 11K18669. Defendants clearly focus on the minor facts in
order deceive this Court and deflect attention from the critical issues in Section I.
Plaintiff is not a party and has never had legal standing in the cases noticed on pages
8-99 and 156-199 (Appendices A-F, M-N). Those 150 pages relate only to Defendants
King, Wright, Otero and Gee, who are not yet served. In fact, Judge Gee
recommended Plaintiff file his own case instead of intervening. Again, Plaintiff has no
standing in Mr. Daniel Coopers cases shown on pages 135-141 (Appendix J). They
were consolidated under Plaintiffs name for the convenience of the Court.
Defendants naturally omit the most significant fact in the 45 pages that do
relate to Plaintiff, which is the self-recusal of the entire Los Angeles Second
Appellate District on this issue of county payments. A majority of the Justices of the
Fourth Appellate and of the Supreme Court of California have themselves received
the supplemental judicial payments. There is no Court in California, which can
make a totally unbiased decision about the constitutionality and thus legality of the
county payments and thus give finality to the judgments in Plaintiffs cases.
Therefore, Plaintiff may be forced to seek relief in Federal Court.
VII. JUDGES: RESIST, RESIST, STONEWALL, STONEWALL
Californias prisons are currently under federal supervision because of the
Legislatures failure to uphold the constitutional rights of its citizens. The same
belligerent racketeering game is being played by all the Defendants to prevent any
WA-510

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

changes in their deliberate scheme to defraud 36 million Californians of their due
process rights.
The former public affairs officer for the Los Angeles Superior Court lays bare
the Defendants strategy. The delay, the resistance and stonewalling, the claims of
absolute immunity, all are designed to leave the current practices in place.
Unfortunately, the current practices are illegal. It is time to save the taxpayers of
Los Angeles County $30 million per year.
VIII. VOID ORDERS NOT SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK
Plaintiffs prior cases against individual judges are partially noticed on only 45
pages of the request. Plaintiff in the extant case has not named any of the Defendants
in a previous suit and therefore there cannot be a collateral attack. While the
underlying cause is similar, namely bribes by the County Supervisors, standing and the
particular county interests must be established uniquely for each case.
Each judge who received payments from the county is liable for each case
heard by that judge where the county had an interest and the judge failed to recuse
him/herself. Unless the judge and the facts are the same, there is no collateral attack.
Defendants attempt to portray the prior void judgments of a single bribed judge
as the definitive answer on Plaintiffs allegations is ludicrous. Only unbribed judges can
carefully decide the issue in all its ramifications. Many Appellate Justices have received
the county payments and so their judgments in those cases are also void.
Finally, the current case has a greater likelihood of success because the
analyses of the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP) were not available to the
public when Plaintiffs first civil suits were initiated. While retroactive immunity in
SBX2_11 fails the nose-test for the layman, the CJP lawyers provide the detailed
legal basis against SBX2_11s several parts.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant SUPERVISORS each made a personal
decision for their own personal monetary (salary) gain to make payments to judges
WA-511

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

and callously disregarded the resulting denial of civil rights in many areas of law
where the county had interests. The Defendant SUPERVISORS are not individually
named parties in any of the prior cases with void judgments. In this case, the
Defendant SUPERVISORS are named as the primary controlling instigators of the
RICO activities. Kamala Harris has a duty, by her sworn oath, to prosecute this
callous denial of civil rights. Her disregard of the request from the Commission on
Judicial Performance only aggravates the situation.
Under the Sturgeon decisions as well as the analyses by the CJP and past
Attorneys General, the county payments violate judicial ethics and violate the
California Penal Code on bribery under United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 809
10 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore the judgments are void. There are no decisions or final
judgments and therefore there is no collateral attack on something that does not
exist.
IX. JURIDICTION - ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, ROOKER-FELDMAN
Defendants are sued as individuals, not an entity covered by the 11
th

Amendment. Counsels for Defendant Harris and Levine are paid by and represent
entities of the State of California. Counsel forever abandoned any claims of 11
th

Amendment immunity when they consented to removal to Federal Court. The
Superior Court docket shows no actions by Defendants Harris or Levine to block
the removal or to remand the case back to the Superior Court.
A further argument allowing federal jurisdiction is the important exception
available under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the case of void orders and Fraud
on the Court. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) The Kougasian v.
TMSL, Inc., 359 15 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) case gives further precedent for the
District Court to have jurisdiction in the matter of Fraud on the Court. Also, since no
action was taken against Judge Levine in Superior Court, there is nothing for the
WA-512

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

district court to review. The original jurisdiction is whether her order is void and
whether any judge of the State judiciary is qualified to rule in the matter of orders
made void by supplemental judicial payments. The Ninth Circuit states, in relevant
part, If, on the other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly
illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar
jurisdiction. The biases inherent in the unconstitutional payments caused the
Superior Court itself to become an adverse party, and thus a federal Court does
have jurisdiction. A related question will be whether the presumption of
unbiasedness inherent in the appointment of an Article III Federal Judge overcomes
the bias and non-disclosure of the county payments during the selection process.
X. I.R.S. TAX FRAUD
Plaintiff has presented evidence to the IRS Criminal Investigation unit in
Orange County. They are now investigating tax fraud by the judges and County.
Plaintiff will not receive any status on that investigation. On information and belief,
Defendants Molina, Yaroslavsky, Knabe, and Antonovich control the flow of
payments in a sophisticated RICO scheme having all the elements required in H.J.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989). To conceal the true
nature of the bribes, the county issues an annual W-2 form to each judge. The
judges are not employees of the county (Declaration of Dennis Ettlin, Appendix 3),
yet they receive W-2s.
According to the Los Angeles county auditor, the cafeteria plan benefits
[are] paid as taxable cash and Professional Development Allowance payments are
reported as taxable wages on an employees W-2. (Complaint, page A-3)
However, according to the San Diego Superior Court Executive Officer (Complaint,
page A-99), only the unused flex credits are reported as taxable income for San
Diego Judges. This suggests a sophisticated scheme in Los Angeles of dividing the
cash into pre-tax and taxable payments. Presumably, the retirement contributions
WA-513

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

are shown in a retirement box of the W-2. Since, the judges are NOT employees,
the retirement monies are not exempt from current income taxes. The use of W-2s
is a deceptive sham allowing a significant underpayment of taxes by the judges and
possible tax fraud by the Defendants Molina, Yaroslavsky, Knabe, and Antonovich
for failure to withhold sufficient taxes.
The use of fictitious wages for campaign contributions is also a deceptive
sham for those regulating California judicial campaigns. Form-700 instructions allow
exclusion of a judges salary. Since the Los Angeles County payment is not really a
salary, all judges receiving county payments have improperly filed their Form 700s.
XI. DENIAL OF DEMURRERS
Plaintiff seeks denial of Defendants demurrers. 90% of the Judges and
Justices of the California judiciary
1
have now received county or court supplemental
benefits. There can be no blind justice on this issue in California. Plaintiff has
deferred to Superior Court in an attempt to address and clarify State issues. It
seemed premature, for judicial economy, to serve federal judge Defendants.
However, to protect Defendants King, Otero, Wright and Gee, it may now be
appropriate for Plaintiff to serve said defendants.
Plaintiff requested a judge who had not received judicial benefits. The Omni
Court has now twice denied that request. The case is again before a bribed judge.
Plaintiff waited for Defendant Supervisors to meet their burden of discovery. They
are in contempt.
XII. SUPREMACY CLAUSE GUARANTEES FULL (NOT INTERIM)
14TH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA
The Sturgeon II decision made clear the 4
th
Appellate Court deemed
SBX2_11 only a partial and interim measure. Plaintiff seeks a determination of

1
Complaint A-167, including OC Superior Court Judge Derek Hunt (see Exhibit 3 and 4).
WA-514

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

injury to his full Due Process rights under the Supremacy Clause of federal law,
which the state must uphold, regarding the constitutionality of the payments to state
judges.
The California law SBX2_11 could not give retroactive immunity to
Defendant Supervisors or to judges who had received the county payments and
then did not disclose such and then also presided over cases in which the county
had an interest. Those judgments are void, each and everyone of them, and may
be appealed or brought to a different court even under Rooker-Feldman.
In bringing this case, Plaintiff seeks damages not only from some of the
judges who lacked personal jurisdiction but also from those Supervisors making the
payments and those Dept. of Justice officials helping to cover up the
unconstitutional activity through a sophisticated RICO scheme.
Defendants Harris and Levine are plainly counting on their control of the
judiciary to defeat Plaintiffs legal claim, label him a vexatious litigant, burden him
with sanctions and costs and set an example for other Pro Se taxpayers not to
challenge the judiciary. Most lawyers in California already know the Richard Fine
saga and will similarly not challenge the judges or the judiciary. The RICO
enterprise enforcement and protection mechanism is solidly in place at the state
level.
While assignment of the case to a distant rural court (see Complaint A-235)
may provide an unbiased judge, appellate challenges will require special action by
the California Supreme Court to constitute a special court or tribunal of Justices
who have never received supplemental payments AND are aware of the possible
collegial or subject matter biases bought by the payments. The Supreme Court of
California has failed to provide such Justices in cases E058417 and E058420,
making it unlikely they will do so in the future. California Judges judging the
appropriateness of their own bribes does not give the appearance of Justice!
WA-515

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

XIII. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to deny the
demurrers and the anti-SLAPP motion.

Dated: January 14, 2014
______________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

WA-516

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e


I, DENNIS ETTLIN, declare:
1. I am a retired satellite systems engineer. I have a Masters Degree in
Economics. I am a Pro Se Plaintiff in case 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC. I make this
declaration based upon my own personal knowledge of the facts set forth below and, if
called to testify to those facts, would and could do so competently; except where I
indicate that my knowledge is based on information and belief.
2. I am a Plaintiff in case E058417 before the Fourth Appellate Court, Div 2 in
Riverside. It is my belief that my civil case E058417 may take 2-3 years before it is
heard by the Division 2 Justices. I also believe that after 2-3 years, the first action by
Division 2 will be to recuse themselves in response to the motion for judges who have
not received supplemental benefits and based on the APP-008 filing which shows 5 of
the 6 Justices themselves received county benefits. These actions will then be
repeated for many more years of delay. All of this violates Title 8. Appellate Rules
Rule 8.256 (d)(2) which states:
(2) If the Supreme Court transfers a cause to the Court of Appeal and supplemental
briefs may be filed under rule 8.200(b), the cause is submitted when the last
such brief is or could be timely filed. The Court of Appeal may order the cause
submitted at an earlier time if the parties so stipulate.
Following submission the court has 90 days to render an opinion.
3. I have reviewed correspondence from several sources and it is my belief that
the tax treatment of the supplemental benefits is fraudulent and exposes Los Angeles
County and individual judges to significant fines and interest charges from the Internal
Revenue Service.
4. Attached hereto, marked as attachment Exhibit 1, and incorporated herein as if
set forth in full is a true and correct copy of the news release announcing the Full
WA-517

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Disclosure Network interview of Allan Parachini. I downloaded such document from
the prnewswire.com website.
5. I performed a computer screen capture of the Full Disclosure interviews of Allan
Parachini. I merged them together for completeness and created a single video file for
my own personal use and suitable for viewing and transcribing.
6. I transcribed, as correctly as I can, a portion of the video interview of Allan
Parachini by Leslie Dutton. The portion of the interview, attached to this Declaration
and marked as attachment Exhibit 2 is a follow-on to the transcript included on pages
A-241 to A-255 of the Complaint.
7. I received from Leslie Dutton a copy of the response to a public records request.
Attached hereto, marked as attachment Exhibit 3, is the statement from the Los
Angeles Superior Court stating that no employment contract exists covering the
payment of county judicial benefits. I provided this document and other select pages
from the Complaint to the I.R.S. Criminal Investigation unit.
8. On information and belief, I have compiled a statement of uncontroverted facts
and conclusions of law. Defendants offered NO objections to any of the facts or
conclusions and therefore I conclude the facts and conclusions are indeed
uncontroverted.

I swear under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and the laws
of the United States that the forgoing is true and correct. Executed this 14
th
of January
2014 at San Juan Capistrano, CA.

__________________________________

WA-518
!
APPENDIX
1
APPENDIX
WA-519

Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery: Full Disclosure
Network Online Video Series
WASHINGTON, Dec. 5, 2012 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ --Allan Parachini, 25-yearveteran
newsman and writer with the Los Angeles Times who served for eight years as the ofcial
spokesman for the California Superior Court in Los Angeles appears in a newly released,
exclusive Full Disclosure Network cable series on California Superior Court
system. Parachini was serving with the Superior Court at the time of the 2009 Richard Fine
contempt of court sentencing. (BS109420).
The Back Story of Richard I. Fine
The interview series specically features "the back story" on the incarceration of former U. S.
Prosecutor Richard I Fine, Ph.D who was the target of judicial animosity in Los Angeles
Superior Court. Parachini explains the judicial animus toward Dr. Fine, an attorney, who often
was critical of the court and the judges. He describes Dr. Fine as having been a "political
prisoner" for eighteen months in the notorious Los Angeles County Central Men's Jail for civil
contempt of court. Two video previews, (3 minutes each) from the three-part series are
available for viewing at this web pagehttp://www.fulldisclosure.net/2012/11/court-insider-
exposes-judicial-treachery/
Judicial Animosity
Parachini explains why the judges' animosity toward Dr. Fine resulted in such extraordinary
and lengthy punishment of solitary "coercive connement" for a civil contempt of court offense.
The entire special series is available online and on public cable channels featuring the Full
Disclosure Network in many major cities across the nation.
In the series, Parachini also discusses the long-time secret contract between Los Angeles
County and the Judges of the Superior Court that provides "double benets" to the Judges that
have been held illegal in the 2008 Sturgeon vs County of L. A. that found the benets to be in
violation of the State Constitution. http://www.judicialwatch.org/cases/sturgeon-v-the-county-
of-los-angeles/
What is The Full Disclosure Network?
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/05
/OnePagerForReleases7-19-10.pdf
Contact: Leslie Dutton 310-822-4449 www.fulldisclosure.net
Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery: Full Disclosure Netw... http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?expire=&title=Cour...
1 of 2 1/13/14, 8:14 PM
WA-520
Full Disclosure Network
SOURCE Full Disclosure Network
RELATED LINKS
http://www.fulldisclosure.net

Find this article at:
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/court-insider-exposes-judicial-treachery--full-disclosure-network-online-video-series-
182157381.html

Check the box to include the list of links referenced in the article.

Court Insider Exposes Judicial Treachery: Full Disclosure Netw... http://www.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?expire=&title=Cour...
2 of 2 1/13/14, 8:14 PM
WA-521
!
APPENDIX
2
APPENDIX
WA-522

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Ettlin_Wright_Super_DemurrerResponse-r4e.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Dennis Ettlins TRANSCRIPT
April 12, 2013

ALLAN PARACHINI
INTERVIEW BY LESLIE DUTTON
2012 All Rights Reserved, AAW/Full Disclosure Network/Citizens Protection Alliance

Alan Parachini (former public affairs officer for the Los Angeles Superior
Court), talking about the standard court practice and attitude of the Los Angeles
Superior Court to any Public Records Request
2
. Allan explains how the Judges
work hard to keep the public out of their business.
Bear in mind, the Courts pretty consistent strategy to requests for
information from the public, that can be document requests or just ordinary
questions, the strategy has always been pretty uniform Resist, Resist, Resist;
Stonewall, Stonewall, Stonewall. Of course, there is a large faction of the judges
who really dont believe that it is any of the publics business how the court
operates. Its their view that public information and public relations is what one
judge told me (with emphasis) Keep THEM Out! meaning the media and the
public for that matter. It doesnt make any difference what you asked, they would
have stonewalled for as many months as they could. That is an instinctive and very
well entrenched mindset. !. They just simply dont want to cooperate with the
public
There are a large number of judges who see the courts as their possession.
The court belongs to them. They are independently elected state officials. So there
is no one who can tell them, You cant do that unless ultimately its a judge higher
than them at the appellate level. Their attitude is that until an Appellate Court forces
us to do something, if we dont want to do it, we arent going to. Cooperating with

2
http://www.fulldisclosure.net/2012/11/court-insider-exposes-judicial-treachery/ at Part 3 Preview
WA-523

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

the public is one of the things many judges and the judicial leadership dont want to
do. !!!!!!.
I do think that its clear, the judges financial self interest is so tied up in those
benefit payments that the judges of a court, which ever one it is, a judge of that
court has no business making any rulings on the propriety or impropriety of those
payments. !!!!!!
I think the judges, as a group, simply dont want confirmation publicly of the
provisions of that agreement. Its a document that many reporters have gone after,
to my knowledge no one has ever gotten it, and it becomes a situation of how long
can a court stonewall before !! that person gives up. The Court has an infinite
amount of time and if it is sued, the cost of defending that lawsuit does not come
out of that courts budget; it comes out of the budget of the AOC, the Administrative
Office of the Courts, up in San Francisco, from its budget as the administrator of the
overall judicial branch.
So if the court doesnt want to give something up, even if Mr. Bennett and
others know that this is information by any interpretation is public information or
could be, they have infinite patience and an endless checkbook to fight litigation
that would force them to give it up.
All other considerations aside, the appearance of conflict of interest on the
part of judges because they get money from the county that duplicates the
compensation they already get from the state, that is an insurmountable
appearance of conflict, and in public employment as many people have observed
over time, appearance is actually more important that whats actually going on.
Judges are blind to appearances; they dont get it. Thats too bad, and its one of the
things that surprised me the most when I got to the court was how in denial judges
are about how they do business or how it appears.
The baser instincts of the judges are also clear in their dealing with litigants
over the county payments. Again, Allan Parachini, And I think, unfortunately, Judge
WA-524

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Yaffee had succumbed to his own personal enmity and the extreme dislike of most
of his colleagues for Mr. Fine, and saw himself as the instrument through which
revenge could be sought against this annoying guy who had kept after the court
over benefits for so many years. The interviewer then asked what on earth was
going through their minds, what were they doing. Parachini responds, Revenge, its
that simple. The judges wanted revenge. They wanted Mr. Fine out of circulation
and they had the power to do it and did it.

WA-525
!
APPENDIX
3
APPENDIX
WA-526
------:-.Li)s .... ~...
/:"~:i<: ..,,;:1.1r":"'" FREDERICK R BENNETT
- ~v.."""--"",'lt;.,,,l' \ .
j C.'.b! ,"'~'.<, \, COURT COUNSEL
t tr:i~ ~I'.it> \
-( 8ft:' ~)~) 111 NORTH HILL STREET, SUITE 546
\,>g.;" ~/~J LOS ANGELES, CA 90012-3014
\,.~;......'r.'y'/ (213) 893-1224 Fax: (213) 625-3964
'\,,~\ CA(~~'~:~~'\~,:<\~ : ... / e-mail: FBennelt@LASuperiorCourt.org
'." ...,,,,,,,,~- ..,.-.
Superior Court of California
County oTLos Angeles
July 31, 2012
Ms. Leslie Dutton
Full Disclosure Network
337 Washington Blvd., Ste. 1
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
Re: Public Records Act Request.
Dear Ms. Dutton:
By the enclosed letter dated July 26, 2012, received by facsimile transmission, you
request certain documents under the Public Records Act and California Rule of Court 10.500.
With one exception that is not applicable here, the court is not subject to the Public Records Act.
Access to non-adjudicative records is governed by California Rule of Court 10.500. Pursuant to
the provisions of that Rule, the Los Angeles Superior Court has adopted procedures for requests
for documents covered by that Rule. Those procedures are set forth on the Court's website:
"Subject to reasonable accommodation for individuals with special needs, requests to inspect or
copy the court's administrative records other than case information must be made in writing by
mail or delivery. Email and facsimile requests are not accepted."
We will provide this response to your facsimile request. However, future requests must
be in writing by mail or delivery to: Administrative Records Request, c/o Central Civil
Operations Administration, Room 109, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, 111 N. Hill St.,
Los Angeles, CA 90012.
In your letter you request two items:
1.
"The contract between Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and the
Superior Court of Los Angeles covering payment of county benefits to Superior
,
Court Judges. ~t is believed that this document was first executed around 1997 or
1998 and is 0T page in length and is currently in force."
"Copies oftheladministrative and security policy, memos, Emails, advisory
notices that w
1
redistributed to court personnel throughout the Los Angeles Court
system duringlthe period of January 2000 through July 2012 addressing security
notifications and precautions that were to be taken if attorney Richard 1. Fine were
to enter any cdurt buildings."
2.
WA-527
Ms. Leslie Dutton
Re: Public Records Act Request
July 31, 2012
Page: 2
As to item one, we have found no contract between the Los Angeles County BOaTdof
Supervisors and the Superior Court of Los Angeles covering payment of county benefits to
Superior Court judges, and do not believe that there has ever been such a contract. Prior to 1997,
Los Angeles Superior Court judges and employees were treated as officers and employees of the
County of Los Angeles for the purpose of benefits. Government Code section 69894.3 has long
provided that officers and employees of superior courts in each county with a population of over
2,000,000 shall be entitled to county benefits as directed by the court. Los Angeles Superior
Court Local Rule 1.6(b) has long provided that employees and officers of the court shall be
treated as County employees for purposes of salary and benefits in accordance with section
69894.3. When the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 was passed, it specifically
provided that such local benefits should continue. Although the Legislature's mode of so
providing was initially invalidated by the court in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167
Cal.App.4th 630, the Legislature, in response, mandated the continuation of those benefits in
Government Code section 68220. That requirement was upheld as constitbtio'nal in Sturgeon v.
County of Los Angeles (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 344.
As to item 2, we have found no administrative or security policy memos, emails, or
advisory notices that have been retained by the court that were distributed to court personnel
throughout the Los Angeles court system during the period of January 2000 through July 2012,
addressing security notifications and precautions that were to be taken if attorney Richard 1. Fine
were to enter any court buildings. In response to my inquiry, the Court's Director of Security,
who administers the agreement with the Sheriff of the County of Los Angeles for providing court
security, including weapons screening and courtroom security, advised that a search of email and
retained files did not result in the discovery of any such policy memos, emails, or advisory
notices. However, in response to my inquiry to the Sheriffs Department, the attached
Memorandum dated March 4,2009, was provided. Please transmit to me your check in the
amount of $0.10, made payable to the Los Angeles Superior Court for the cost of this copy.
~.~
Frederick R. Bennett
Court Counsel
c: Presiding Judge
Executive Officer/Clerk
Director of Security
Administrative Records Administrator
WA-528
761551N25A - SH - AD - 32A (2172)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
"A Tradition of Service"
OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
DATE:March 4,2009
FILE NO.
FROM: Steve Wheatcroft, Sergeant TO: Richard J. Barrantes, Chief
Court Services, Judicial Service Unit Court Services
SUBJECT: Transportation and Booking of Richard Fine
Mr. Fine is a disbarred attorney who has filed several lawsuits against the
County. He has also filed several lawsuits against Judicial Officers
personally. Mr. Fine is part of a group known as "Judicial Watch."
Judicial Watch filed a lawsuit against all County Judges for additional
compensation issued to the Judges by the County. The lawsuit was
successful and the Judges were to lose the additional compensation.
Since the filing of the lawsuit the state legislature passed legislation
authorizing the additional compensation. This legislation takes effect on
March 6, 2009.
Mr. Fine is involved in a lawsuit which he lost against the County of Los
Angeles and a private company, Del Rey Shores. As part of that lawsuit
Mr. Fine was ordered to pay attorney fees and comply with specific court
orders. Those orders in part were to turn over and answer questions
regarding his finances due to his unwillingness to pay the costs. Mr. Fine
has refused to comply with the court orders and Judge David Yaffe,
Department 86 Stanley Mosk Courthouse, set a hearing for contempt on
March 4,2009. Judge Yaffe issued an order stating if Mr. Fine complied
with the court orders he would dismiss the contempt charges. Mr. Fine
refused to comply and was ordered remanded to the Sheriff's custody
until such time he complies with the court orders.
Mr. Fine was taken into custody in the courtroom at Judge Yaffe's order.
Judicial Services Deputies transported and booked Mr. Fine into custody
at IRC. The arrest, transportation and booking went without incident. The
IRC Watch Commander was advised as to the booking and given a copy
of the court order.
WA-529
!
APPENDIX
4
APPENDIX
WA-530

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Statement of Uncontroverted Facts 1
Ettlin_Harris_Uncontroverted Facts-r3f.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

SOUTHERN DIVISIONSANTA ANA

Case No.
8:13-CV-01515-DOC-(JPRx)
Plaintiff

PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF
UNCONTROVERTED FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

[F.R.C.P. Rule 65 (a)]
[Local Rule 56-1]
vs.
Otis D. Wright, II, an individual,
Does 1-10,
Defendants

Date: December 2, 2013
Time: 8:30 a.m.
Ctrm: 9D (Hon. David O. Carter)

WA-531

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Plaintiff hereby submits the following Statement of Uncontroverted Facts
and Conclusions of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
# Date Uncontroverted Facts
8:13-CV-01515-DOC
Evidence in Support of
Uncontroverted Facts
1 1956 In 1956, the Attorney General issued
an opinion concluding that superior
and municipal court judges and certain
personnel of the superior courts were
not county employees and were thus
ineligible for county-sponsored health
insurance.
(27 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 338
(1956).)

Documented in County Of
Sonoma v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd., 222 Cal.App.3d
1133 (1990) Court of Appeals of
California, First District,
Division Three. August 14,
1990.
2 2011 Los Angeles Superior Court
Commissioners and Court Counsel
(Brett Bianco) receive supplemental
judicial benefits paid by the Superior
Court from operations budgets to
match the County payments to judges.
Los Angeles Superior Court
Administrator of Public Records,
Complaint A-97
3 2011 Commission on Judicial Performance
(CJP) implies it is improper for
judges to pay supplemental
compensation to themselves from
public funds

CJP, Complaint A-186,
annotation
WA-532

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
4 2013 County Auditor-Controller states that
L.A. county payments to Judge Otero
(and presumably other Superior Court
judges) were reported as W-2 wages.
Verified Complaint of Plaintiff
Dennis Ettlin (hereafter
Complaint) page A-3 and -4
5 1976 In 1976, the Attorney General issued
another opinion, specifically stating
that the version of Government Code
53200.3 then in effect was
unconstitutional. Citing the 1967
Judicial Council Report to the
Governor and the Legislature on this
provision and the opinion in County of
Madera v. Superior Court, supra, 39
Cal. App.3d at page 670, the Attorney
General stated: "Because of the use of
`prescribe' the Legislature cannot
delegate the authority granted to it by
Article VI, section 19 of the
Constitution. Any attempt to make
such a delegation would be
constitutionally invalid." .
The conclusion, "that section
[53200.3] is an unconstitutional
attempt on the part of the Legislature
to delegate a nondelegable duty."
(59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 496, 497
(1976))

(Id., at p. 501)[222 Cal.App.3d
1145]
WA-533

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
6 1978 In 1978, Attorney General issued
another opinion, stating that the
Legislature had failed to remove
deficiencies.
(61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 388,
(1978))
7 1988 LA County Counsel advised LA
Superior Court to IGNORE Attorney
General and recommended
supplemental judicial payments
Complaint page A-212 to A-218,
Zolin memo
8 1990 Payments to Judge Otero by Los
Angeles County from 1990 to 2003,
from the L.A. County Auditor.
Complaint page A-5
9 1995 Analysis in precursor to the Lockyer-
Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act,
acknowledged the judicial benefits
were probably illegal and the negative
consequences were HUGE (A-229)
but suggested it was unlikely that
anyone would object, a case can be
made that this will not occur (A-228).
California Law Revision
Commission, Staff
Memorandum, Study J-1201,
Nov 27, 1995; Memorandum 95-
77 Trial Court Unification:
Delegation of Legislative
Authority;
Complaint page A-220 to A-229
10 1999 Judicial payments by a party have
been held to be bribes under
California law in United States v.
Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 80910 (9
th
Cir.
1999), where the judges were
convicted on RICO conspiracy in

United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d
793, 80910 (9
th
Cir. 1999)

WA-534

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) and
violating the intangible right to honest
services 18 U.S.C. 1346. This charge
was based on allegations that the three
defendants had conspired to conduct
the affairs of the Superior Court
through a pattern of racketeering
activity consisting of multiple acts of
bribery violating California Penal
Code Sections 92 and 93 and extortion
in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951.

violation of
California Penal Code Sections
92 and 93

extortion in violation of
18 U.S.C. 1951

11 2008 County supplemental judicial benefits
ruled unconstitutional by California
Fourth Appellate Court.
Sturgeon v. County of Los
Angeles, 167 I.4
th
630 (2008)
Rev. denied 12/23/08;
Complaint A-119
12 2008 Basis of Sturgeon I ruling is failure of
legislation to adequately prescribe
standards for judicial compensation.
the Legislature's obligation to
"prescribe judicial compensation"
requires that it set forth standards or
safeguards which assure that
fundamental policy is implemented. The
fact that the Legislature provided
counties a credit for judicial benefits
when it enacted Lockyer-Isenberg or that
it assured the counties that judicial
benefits would not be decreased as a
result of trial court funding does not meet
these requirements. The obligation is not

Angeles, 167 I.4
th
630 (2008)
Rev. denied 12/23/08;
CONCLUSION, last half para.
Complaint A-134,
WA-535

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
onerous, but does require that the
Legislature consider the specific issue
and, at a minimum, establish or reference
identifiable standards. (emp. added)
13 2009 Judicial Council and the California
Judges Association (A-136) jointly
sponsored SBX2_11 (A-140).
Govt Publication;
Complaint A-136, A-140
14 2009 SBX2_11 passed and enacted into law http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-
0050/sbx2_11_bill_
20090220_chaptered.pdf

15 2009 All judges and county officials given
retroactive immunity from
CRIMINAL prosecution
Text of law
SEC. 5. Notwithstanding any
other law, no governmental
entity, or officer or employee of
a governmental entity, shall
incur any liability or be subject
to prosecution or disciplinary
action because of benefits
provided to a judge under the
official action of a governmental
entity prior to the effective date
of this act on the ground that
those benefits were not
authorized under law.
WA-536

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
16 2009 UNCONTROVERTED ANALYSIS
BY CJP CONCLUDES SBX2_11
SECTION 5 IS NOT
CONSTITUTIONAL
Calif. Commission on Judicial
Performance (CJP) 2009 letters,
Complaint A-185 to A-196
17 2009 CJP Request to Jerry Brown to
confirm Unconstitutionality of
SBX2_11, especially Section 5.
Calif. Commission on Judicial
Performance (CJP) 2009 letters,
18 2009 Unequal pay violation statute of
limitations resets with each paycheck.
The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009 (Pub.L. 1112, S.
181) federal statute signed on
January 29, 2009.
19 2009 Unequal pay violations across counties
are a result from lack of state-wide
identifiable standards. Kamala Harris,
individually and organizationally her
Office of Attorney General (OAG)
allows female judges in Santa Barbara
County (no judicial benefits) to make
less than male judges in Los Angeles
County ($50,000 more) or Orange
County ($22,000)
Santa Barbara pays no judicial
benefits; source Judicial Council
report of December 15, 2009
Historical Analysis of
Disparities in Judicial Benefits
on statewide patterns of
supplemental judicial payments
(A-165)
20 2009 The state-wide total for county judicial
payments was $33,602,542 for FY
2007-08
Judicial Council report of
December 15, 2009 Historical
Analysis of Disparities in
Judicial Benefits (A-168)
WA-537

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
21 2009 Los Angeles County paid all judges in
the county $23,482,932 during
FY2007-08
Judicial Benefits
Supplemental Judicial Benefits
in FY 2007-08
Complaint A-169.
22 2010 Los Angeles County paid all judges in
the county $28,216,975.26 during
FY2008-09 and proposed $30,854,000
for FY2010-11.
County of Los Angeles, FY
2010-11 Proposed Budget
Volume One, page 60.1;
Complaint A-160.
The all is documented in
Judicial Benefits
Complaint A-169.
23 2010 Defendants Molina, Yaroslavsky,
Knabe, and Antonovich received
increases in their own salary tied to
the approximately 20% increase from
2007 to 2008 of the judicial
compensation paid by the county to
the judges
Los Angeles County Charter
(Article II, Section 4).
"They shall each receive as
compensation for their services a
salary, payable monthly from the
County Treasury, which shall be
the same as that now or hereafter
prescribed by law for a judge of
WA-538

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
the Superior Court in and for the
County of Los Angeles, except
that retirement benefits shall be
those now or hereafter provided
by law for officers and
employees of the County of Los
Angeles."
24 2010 Sturgeon II upholds SBX2_11 on
three narrow grounds only.
Angeles, 191 Cal. App. 4th 344
(2010); Complaint A-145
25 2010 SBX2_11 is not a permanent
response
26 NA Incompleteness of SBX2_11
constitutes an interim or partial denial
of Californians Constitutional rights,
especially of Due Process.
Converse re-statement of fact
#25 above
27 NA Supremacy Clause of U.S Constitution
precludes partial denial of 14
th

Amendment under California Law
Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S.
Constitution, known as the
Supremacy Clause
28 2010 Sturgeon II encouraged taxpayers to
challenge SBX2_11. . that interim
remedy, if not supplanted by the more
comprehensive response SBX 211
plainly contemplates, most likely will
WA-539

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
give rise to further challenges by
taxpayers or members of the bench
themselves.
29 2011 Plaintiffs challenges under
Sturgeon II began in Calif. Superior
Courts on June 16, 2011.
L.A. Superior Court Docket,
case YC064994
30 2011 CJP sent Request to Kamala Harris
with Analyses Showing
Unconstitutionality of SBX2_11,
especially Section 5.
CJP 2011 letters;
31 2011 AG assigns Manuel Medeiros to write
CJP opinion
OAG website;
Exhibit 1.
32 2012 Manuel Medeiros retires December
2012
Kamala Harris Tweet;
Exhibit 2
33 NA Only the California Supreme Court
can adjudicate the CJP concerns.

Cal. Constitution Article 6,
Section 18 (d); in relevant part,
Upon petition by the judge or
former judge, the Supreme Court
may, in its discretion, grant
review of a determination by the
commission
34 2012 Payments to Jan Levine by Los
Angeles County from 1990 to 2003,
documented by the L.A. County
Auditor.
Complaint page A-25
WA-540

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

8:13-CV-01515-DOC
35 Mar
2013
Supreme Court California requests
transfer as California Second
Appellate recuses itself for B241184,
B240813; reassigned to Fourth
Appellate Div 2, Riverside as
E058417 and E058420
Docket California Appellate case
B240813
36 June
2013
Calif. 4
th
Appellate cases E058417 and
E058420 fully briefed
Docket Appellate cases E058417
and E058420
37 June
2013
George King and Dolly Gee became
aware of the entire supplemental
judicial payments issue in filings
docketed in the notice of related cases.
They are thus aware of the issues and
liable under the Misprision of Felony
Statute.
Gee: 2:12-cv-10863-DMG-FFM,
Docket items 8, 12-2, 15.
King: 2:12-cv-00297-GHK-JC
Document 95, Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to SCOTUS 12-
9994, Complaint A-7b
38 Aug
2013
Plaintiffs challenges under
Sturgeon II continue in Calif. Superior
Court on August 23, 2013.
OC. Superior Court Docket 30-
2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
39 Sept.
2013
Clerk informs Plaintiff of 2-year wait
for hearing on Plaintiffs Appellate
civil cases. No earlier ruling expected
on APP-008 conflict of interest for all
Div 2 judges.
Declaration of Dennis Ettlin
Exhibit 3
Clerk of Riverside Appellate
Court

WA-541

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
F#x refers to facts above L#x refers to legal conclusions below

1. Attorney General ruled that Judges are not county employees in 1956. Similar
rulings in 1967, 1976 and 1978 re-enforce the Sturgeon II statement that ..the
issue of judicial compensation is a state, not a county, responsibility.
Therefore, use of a W-2 for reporting monies paid to judges by Los Angeles
County is not appropriate. (F#1, F#4-F#6, and F#8)
2. Los Angeles County and the State Legislature ignored all the Attorney General
decisions, and consciously and deliberately made and allowed to continue the
unconstitutional payments by the Counties. Those payments took the form of
wages reported to tax authorities on a Form W-2. (F#4, F#7 and F#9)
3. Payments to judges by parties have been held to be a bribe under California
law in United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 80910 (9
th
Cir. 1999). (F#10)
4. Payments to judges by counties were held to be unconstitutional by the CA
Fourth Appellate Court. This supports the earlier Attorneys General rulings.
(F#1, F#5,F#6, and F#11-F#12)
5. Section 5 of SBX2_11 granted retroactive immunity to judges, court officials
and county officials who made supplemental payments that could be construed
as criminal bribes. (F#13-F#15)
6. Judges already have significant immunities from prosecution if they abide by
the law and the rules of judicial ethics. The need for SBX2_11 Section 5
retroactive immunity to judges, court officials and county officials is confusing
if Defendants are truly entitled to ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE immunity. Confusing, incomplete or contradictory laws are
difficult to litigate. Plaintiff seizes on the one portion of Sturgeon II and
Defendants on another portion. An unbiased and immune party is needed to
resolve this conflict, not so much of individuals, as of law. (F#24-F#29)
WA-542

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

7. The Sturgeon II decision that SBX2_11 was both interim and
constitutional conflicts with the United States Supremacy Clause where no
such interim statement of Plaintiffs Due Process right is allowable. (F#25-
27)
8. The CJP analyses show, in the clearest and strongest terms, Section 5 of
SBX2_11 is clearly unconstitutional. The analysis raises additional questions
about Section 2 and by implication Section 4. When the organizations (OAG
and CJP) responsible for upholding the law and protecting the integrity and
reputation of Judges cannot perform their duty because of contradictory or
interim laws, neither Judges nor the broader public are well served by that
law. Certainly, the negative budgetary considerations do not help. (F#16)
9. If SBX2_11 Section 5 immunity was unnecessary, then inclusion of Section 5,
must have implicitly convicted all the named officials and judges of criminal
activity. Plaintiff must assume the traditional immunity statutes would not have
covered such criminal activity as the county payments. (L#8)
10. California Constitution, Article 1, Sec 9 states A bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed. The
retroactive part of Section 5 immunity is thus unconstitutional for all
participants.
11. The Commission on Judicial Performance ALSO provides detailed analysis that
Section 5 of SBX2_11 is unconstitutional because the legislature has usurped
their authority to discipline judges. If SBX2_11 Section 5 is unconstitutional,
then the immunity granted to the judges disappears. Although the immunity
disappears, the criminal action remains. It is that criminal action by judges in
any matter that involves Los Angeles County that is the basis of Plaintiffs
claims for judicial bias and for violation of his 14th Amendment right. (F#16)
12. Based on F#10, L#5 and L#9, the criminal action by a judge is related to
receiving money from Los Angeles County. In addition, any judge who
WA-543

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

received money from the county and accepted a case involving Los Angeles
County lost any personal jurisdiction. Any judgment by such a judge would be
void.
13. Based on L#3 and L#4, the criminal action by a county official is related to
paying the money from Los Angeles County. Based on L#9 the Defendants
Molina, Yaroslavsky, Knabe and Antonovich have no legislative immunity.
14. Based on F#21, Defendants Molina, Yaroslavsky, Knabe and Antonovich
received additional personal compensation due to the supplemental judicial
payments by Los Angeles County.
15. The office of Court Counsel employs and directs Counsel Kevin McCormick.
Since Court Counsel also receives supplemental judicial benefits, this Court
needs to determine if a conflict of interest exists to disqualify Counsel Kevin
McCormick. Is Mr. McCormick representing the recipient of money from the
County or representing a recipient of money from the Court, his employer?
(F#2). He made no disclosure in this matter.
16. The CJP implies that it is improper for the local Court to pay supplemental
compensation to themselves from public funds. That would suggest it is
improper for the Office of Court Counsel to defend thmselves using public
funds. (F#3)
17. The facts (her hand-delivered personal copy of the CJP analysis) show that
Kamala Harris is fully aware of the unconstitutionality of the county payments.
Mr. Medeiros in her Office of the Attorney General is also likely aware that this
issue was addressed by the CJP in 2009. Two members of the California
Executive Branch are aware of the enormous budgetary impact that has
accumulated with the judicial payments issue. The likelihood appears low that
they have not discussed the matter, and thus Plaintiff believes that they are both
intentionally denying him his Due Process rights. (F#30, F#17)
WA-544

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

18. The facts show that the state obligation for county payments in 2007-8 was
$33,602,542. Reimbursing the counties for 20 years might exceed
$300,000,000. This would make Kamala Harris very unpopular in Sacramento.
(F#20 to #23)
19. Kamala Harris is the top law enforcement official in California. By not
responding to the CJP, she has consciously chosen to not prosecute county
officials and to protect judges from disciplinary or criminal prosecution. She
has provided her own retroactive immunity. She has also allowed Article VI,
Section 19 of the California Constitution to be violated by the Legislatures
failure to properly prescribe judicial compensation. The failure to act against
the county officials and the judges is also a violation of the Misprision of
Felony statute, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, the California Penal Code Sections 92 and
93, and is a violation of her oath of office to defend the constitution. (F#18,
F#10)
20. There is sufficient evidence to proceed against Defendants in their individual
capacities.
21. Halting the unconstitutional and interim payments will incentivize the
Defendants to cooperate with discovery under Rule 26 and incentivize the
appropriate governmental bodies to cooperate to provide a permanent solution
to the last 50 years of constitutional wrangling and 23 years of unconstitutional
and/or illegal payments. There are serious deficiencies in the law as identified
by the California Fourth Appellate Court in its Sturgeon II decision. Five years
is long enough for the legislature and Attorney General to act. Five years is too
long to wait for Equal Pay.
22. Plaintiffs actions in California Appellate Court will be void orders and
inherently appealable as long as his due process rights are violated by
WA-545

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Defendants. Plaintiff is not alone. The 14
th
Amendment rights of 36 million
Californians are at risk. (F#38 and F#39)

Dated: October 30, 2013

Respectfully submitted by:
_________________________________
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

WA-546


I, DENNIS ETTLIN, declare as follows:
1. I am a retired satellite systems engineer. I am the Pro Se Plantiff in case
8:13-CV-01515-DOC-(JPRx). I make this declaration based upon my own
personal knowledge of the facts set forth below and, if called to testify to
those facts, would and could do so competently; except where I indicate that
my knowledge is based on information and belief.
2. I called the Clerks office of Division Two of the California Fourth Appellate
Court on about September 4, 2013. I learned that the Court did not consider
the cases submitted and that they would get around to it when they could. I
inquired how long that might be and was told 1-2 years. The Clerk stated
they were the busiest court in the state and were short staffed because of the
budget cutbacks. She added that civil cases were the lowest priority.
3. I swear under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California and
the laws of the United States that the forgoing is true and correct. This
declaration was executed on October 30, 2013 in San Juan Capistrano, CA.

__________________________________

WA-547
E
X
H
I
B
I
T
3
EXHIBIT 3

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

PROOF OF SERVICE

employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or business
address is

On January 14, 2014, I served a copy of the following document

PLAINTIFFS UNIFIED REPLY TO:

DEMURRERS BY DEFENDANTS,

DEFENDANTS REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE,

AND

DEFENDANTS anti-SLAPP MOTION

by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED
SERVICE LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as stated on the
attached service list. I deposited such envelope in the mail.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on January 14, 2014 at Orange County, California,

________________________________
Debbie Peterson

WA-548

D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

SERVICE LIST
Case No. 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC

Kamala Harris
San Diego, CA 92101

Jan Levine
Ventura CA 93001

Natalie Price, Esq.

Counsel: Pro Se

WA-549
!
APPENDIX
I
APPENDIX
WA-550
2/2/14, 10:14 PM Civil Case Access - Print Case Information
Page 1 of 4 https://ocapps.occourts.org/civilwebShoppingNS/PrintCase.do
Case Summary:
Case Id: 30-2013-00670581-CU-CR-CJC
Case Title: DENNIS ETTLIN VS. KAMALA HARRIS
Case Type: CIVIL RIGHTS
Filing Date: 08/22/2013
Category: CIVIL - UNLIMITED
Register Of Actions:
ROA Docket
Filing
Date
Filing
Party
Document Select
1
E-FILING TRANSACTION 352052 RECEIVED ON 08/22/2013
09:47:34 AM.
08/22/2013 NV
2 COMPLAINT FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS ON 08/22/2013 08/22/2013 331 pages
3
CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS ON
08/22/2013
08/22/2013 1 pages
4
NOTICE OF RELATED CASE FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS ON
08/22/2013
08/22/2013 3 pages
5
PAYMENT RECEIVED BY FOR 194 - COMPLAINT OR OTHER
1ST PAPER IN THE AMOUNT OF 435.00, TRANSACTION
NUMBER 11437778 AND RECEIPT NUMBER 11261690.
08/22/2013 1 pages
6
CASE ASSIGNED TO JUDICIAL OFFICER HUNT, DEREK ON
08/22/2013.
08/22/2013 1 pages
7
03:14:47 PM.
08/23/2013 NV
8
SUMMONS ISSUED AND FILED FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS
ON 08/22/2013
08/22/2013 2 pages
9
12:49:36 PM.
09/26/2013 NV
10
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FILED BY JAN LEVINE ON
09/25/2013
09/25/2013 31 pages
11
APPENDIX OF AUTHORITIES FILED BY JAN LEVINE ON
09/25/2013
09/25/2013 250 pages
12
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT SCHEDULED FOR 10/31/2013
AT 09:00:00 AM IN C24 AT CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER.
09/26/2013 NV
13
03:33:02 PM.
09/27/2013 NV
14
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FILED BY KAMALA HARRIS
ON 09/26/2013
09/26/2013 7 pages
15
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FILED BY
KAMALA HARRIS ON 09/26/2013
09/26/2013 21 pages
16
09/27/2013 NV
17
07:22:01 PM.
09/27/2013 NV
WA-551
18
NOTICE OF REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT FILED BY
MICHAEL ANTONOVICH; DON KNABE; GLORIA MOLINA;
ZEV YAROSLAVSKY ON 09/26/2013
09/26/2013 366 pages
21 CASE REASSIGNED TO OMNI EFFECTIVE 09/30/2013. 09/30/2013 NV
24
MINUTES FINALIZED FOR CHAMBERS WORK 09/30/2013
09:50:00 AM.
09/30/2013 1 pages
25
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL OC
GENERATED
09/30/2013 1 pages
26
03:49:41 PM.
12/12/2013 NV
28
03:18:00 PM.
12/18/2013 1 pages
29
GENERATED
12/18/2013 1 pages
31
CASE REASSIGNED TO DEREK HUNT EFFECTIVE
12/19/2013.
12/19/2013 NV
32
11:51:00 AM.
12/19/2013 1 pages
33
GENERATED
12/19/2013 1 pages
34
ORDER - OTHER (ORDER TO REMAND) FILED BY THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE ON 12/19/2013
12/19/2013 1 pages
35
NOTICE - OTHER (RECEIPT OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT)
FILED BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE ON
12/19/2013
12/19/2013 8 pages
36
12/19/2013 NV
37
12/19/2013 NV
38
THE DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IS SCHEDULED FOR
02/11/2014 AT 09:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT C24.
12/19/2013 NV
39
THE DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT IS SCHEDULED FOR
02/11/2014 AT 09:00 AM IN DEPARTMENT C24.
12/19/2013 NV
40
02:33:00 PM.
12/19/2013 1 pages
41
GENERATED
12/19/2013 1 pages
42
12:25:13 AM.
12/27/2013 NV
43
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FILED BY KAMALA HARRIS
ON 12/24/2013
12/24/2013 7 pages
44
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FILED BY
KAMALA HARRIS ON 12/24/2013
12/24/2013 21 pages
WA-552
45 AT 09:00:00 AM IN C24 AT CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER. 12/27/2013 NV
46
10:33:44 AM.
01/09/2014 NV
47
DECLARATION OF PREJUDICE CCP 170.1 (AS TO JUDGE
DEREK HUNT) FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS ON 01/08/2014
01/08/2014 19 pages
48
05:15:33 PM.
01/10/2014 NV
49
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED BY DON KNABE;
MICHAEL ANTONOVICH; GLORIA MOLINA; ZEV
YAROSLAVSKY ON 01/09/2014
01/09/2014 201 pages
50
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT FILED BY DON KNABE;
MICHAEL ANTONOVICH; GLORIA MOLINA; ZEV
YAROSLAVSKY ON 01/09/2014
01/09/2014 44 pages
51 PROPOSED ORDER RECEIVED ON 01/09/2014. 01/09/2014 4 pages
52 PROPOSED ORDER RECEIVED ON 01/09/2014. 01/09/2014 4 pages
53
MOTION FOR SLAPP FILED BY DON KNABE; MICHAEL
ANTONOVICH; GLORIA MOLINA; ZEV YAROSLAVSKY ON
01/09/2014
01/09/2014 24 pages
54
MOTION FOR SLAPP SCHEDULED FOR 02/11/2014 AT
09:00:00 AM IN C24 AT CENTRAL JUSTICE CENTER.
01/10/2014 NV
55
01/10/2014 NV
56
ORDER - OTHER (ORDER OF REMAND) FILED BY THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE ON 12/02/2013
12/02/2013 14 pages
57
03:05:30 PM.
01/15/2014 NV
58
REPLY - OTHER (TO DEMURRERS) FILED BY ETTLIN,
DENNIS ON 01/14/2014
01/14/2014 49 pages
59
ORDER STRIKING STATEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION
PURSUANT TO CCP 170.1 AND 170.3
01/24/2014 4 pages
61
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL (OUT OF
PROCESS) GENERATED
01/24/2014 1 pages
62
12:40:35 PM.
01/28/2014 NV
63
AMENDMENT TO COMPLAINT (DOE 1) FILED BY ETTLIN,
DENNIS ON 01/28/2014
01/28/2014 5 pages
64
10:52:21 PM.
01/31/2014 NV
65
PROOF OF SERVICE OF 10-DAY SUMMONS & COMPLAINT -
SUBSTITUTE FILED BY ETTLIN, DENNIS ON 01/31/2014
01/31/2014 17 pages
Participants:
Name Type Assoc Start Date End Date
GLORIA MOLINA DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
WA-553
ZEV YAROSLAVSKY DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
JAN LEVINE DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
BENTON, ORR, DUVAL & BUCKINGHAM ATTORNEY 09/26/2013
DENNIS ETTLIN PLAINTIFF 08/22/2013
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
JAMES OTERO DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
DON KNABE DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
DOLLY M. GEE DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
CHRIS RYAN LEGAL, SR. DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ATTORNEY 09/27/2013
LAWRENCE BEACH ALLEN & CHOI ATTORNEY 01/09/2014
MICHAEL ANTONOVICH DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
DEREK HUNT DEFENDANT 01/28/2014
OTIS D. WRIGHT, III DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
GEORGE H. KING DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
KAMALA HARRIS DEFENDANT 08/22/2013
Hearings:
Description Date Time Department Judge
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT 02/11/2014 09:00 C24 HUNT
MOTION FOR SLAPP 02/11/2014 09:00 C24 HUNT
Print this page
WA-554
!
APPENDIX
J
APPENDIX
WA-555
WA-556
!
APPENDIX
K
APPENDIX
WA-565
WA-557
27222 Paseo Lomita
310-795-9507

SOUTHERN DIVISIONSANTA ANA

Case No.
8:13-CV-01515-DOC-(JPRx)
Plaintiff

PLAINTIFFS
NOTICE OF FILING
PROOFS OF SERVICE OF THE
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT
ON DEFENDANTS
James Otero,
Otis D. Wright, II,
George H. King,
Dolly M. Gee,
And
DOE #1, Derek Hunt

vs.
Does 1-10,
Defendants

Date: February 11, 2014
Time: 9:00 am
Ctrm: C24

WA-558

1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF FILING PROOFS OF SERVICE 1
Ettlin_Harris_FED Summons PoS-r1.docx
D
e
n
n
i
s

E
t
t
l
i
n
,

P
r
o

S
e

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff has filed the completed Proofs of
Service of the summons, complaint, civil cover sheet, notice of interested parties,
and ADR notice. Copies of the signed Proofs are attached hereto.
Plaintiff did not serve separate summons and complaints on Defendants
United States of America, State of California, or the County of Los Angeles.
Plaintiff waited to find out if the Defendant individuals would be represented by
private counsel or public counsel. Since Defendants Gloria Molina, Zev
Yaroslavsky, Don Knabe, Michael Antonovich, are represented by Counsel for the
County of Los Angeles, Plaintiff considers the County as a party and duly
represented. Similarly, Defendant Harris is represented by the State of California
and Plaintiff considers the State of California as a party and duly represented.
Similarly, Plaintiff considers the expected United States Attorneys Office as
Counsel to represent any and all interests of the United States of America.


Dated: January 31, 2014; __________________________
WA-559
WA-560
WA-561
WA-562
WA-563
WA-564
WA-565
WA-566
WA-567
WA-568
WA-569
WA-570
WA-571
WA-572

1

PROOF OF SERVICE

employed in the county where the service took place. My residence or business
address is

On January 31, 2014, I served a copy of the following document

PLAINTIFFS
NOTICE OF FILING
PROOFS OF SERVICE OF THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON
DEFENDANTS
James Otero, Otis D. Wright, II, George H. King, Dolly M. Gee,
And
DOE #1, Derek Hunt

by first class mail, on the interested parties in this action (SEE ATTACHED
SERVICE LIST FOR PARTIES), by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as stated on the
attached service list. I deposited such envelope in the mail. According to F.R.C.P.
Rule 5(b)(2)(C), in which event service is complete upon mailing;
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States and the State
of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on January 31, 2014 at Orange County, California,

________________________________
Debbie Peterson

WA-573

2

SERVICE LIST
Case No. 8:13-CV-01515-DOC-(JPRx)

Kamala Harris
San Diego, CA 92101

Jan Levine, Derek Hunt
Ventura CA 93001

Natalie Price, Esq.

Counsel: Pro Se

George King, James Otero, Dolly Gee, Otis Wright II
Counsel: U.S. Attorneys Office, Civil Process Clerk
300 North Los Angeles Street, Suite 7516
Los Angeles, California 90012

WA-574

Bribes To California Judges Fictitious Wage Campaign Contributions

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Bribes To California Judges Fictitious Wage Campaign Contributions

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

S______

In the Supreme Court of the State of California

Case 8:l3-cv-0l5l5-DOC-JPR Document 33 Filed ll/22/l3 Page l of l Page lD #:827

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen