THIRD DIVISION ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, A.C. No. 7399 Present: - versus CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

, Acting Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated:
August 25, 2009

Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, Respondent.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

Additional member as per August 3, 2009 raffle.

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to -be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof .

Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.1[1]

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.2[2]

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere

109 Phil. 863 (1960); cited in Bernas, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 643 (1996). 2[2] Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 US 367, 71 S. Ct. 783786.

1[1]

with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.3[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly4[4] and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. 5[5]

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots. The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
3[3] 4[4]

Id. Osmena, Jr., supra. 5[5] Tenney, supra note 2. 6[6] 82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).

x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.

7[7]

Ali v. Bubong, A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005, 453 SCRA 1, 13.

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities. Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in con nection with her

application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8[8] have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.

At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; xxxx
8[8]

CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 8.

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9[9]

In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda ,10[10] we reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.

Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel12[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.13[13]

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, January 9, 1973, 49 SCRA 22, 26-27. A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 43. 11[11] No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441, 444. 12[12] No. L-27072, January 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1, 16-17. 13[13] Id.; citing People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851,855; Sotto, supra note 6; Malcolm, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 160 (1949); and People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946).
10[10] 9[9]

administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14[14]

Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhib ited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.16[16] This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
14[14] 15[15]

Vitriolo v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, April 1, 2003, 400 SCRA 172, 178. Gacias v. Balauitan, A.C. No. 7280, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 11, 12. 16[16] Id. 17[17] G.R. No. 159286, April 5, 2005 (En Banc Resolution).

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition. We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.18[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.

The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public institution.19[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the
18[18] 19[19]

Osmea, Jr., supra. Rule XXXIV, Sec. 93.

Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.20[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.21[21]

Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

20[20] 21[21]

Id., Secs. 95 & 97. Tiongco v. Savillo, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 48, 63.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993 INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B. MICOSA, respondents. Jimenez & Associates for petitioner. Santos & Associates for private respondent. NOCON, J.: Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz: C. Conviction and Previous Separation l. . . . 2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service. 1 On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house in Los Baos, Laguna. On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L. Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him possess. 2 On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance.

Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law. On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. 3 On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for homicide. On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the latter that said office found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his life." 4 On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from his job at IRRI. On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual. On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression; that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted to him. On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who recommended to the Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21, 1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to terminate effective May 25, 1990. On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal. On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is hereunder quoted: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby entered: 1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal; 2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate complainant Nestor B. Micosa to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt hereof; 3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full backwages computed from the date of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based on his latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.

4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay complainant's counsel the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00, representing his attorney's fees; and. 5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 5 On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31, 1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification deleting the award of attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. 6 Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues: 1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE OF THE LABOR CODE. 2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE. 7 The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations. In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including those concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It admits that Micosa's interests in his employment and means of livelihood are adversely affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that he should be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In this case, petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even the smallest possibility that said problems could occur considering that it is an international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance. It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance from the IRRI's Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code." 8 Thus, IRRI
could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause as defined by the Labor Code.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not one of these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c) nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article 282 (c) refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the employee's function. 9 On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the
employee under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work or to his employer.

In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related, his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or committed against IRRI or its authorized agent. Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February 6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special separation in a letter dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a letter dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying that they were mere pro-forma communications which it had given to numerous other workers. But whether or not such letters were "form letters, they expressed the message that were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued employment. In addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention. Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also found worthy of probation. This means that all the information regarding his character, antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical condition were evaluated as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole. In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination. Certainly, said termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual basis as well. Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.

Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa 11 and Tak Ng v. Republic 12 as
everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals.

As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. 13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of homicide involves
moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.

IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary to repel the attack. IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. 14 Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. 15 While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. 16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.

In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor Relations Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil and common traditions.
17

The abuse of discretion must be grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. # Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 13. 2 Records, p. 56. 3 Id., p. 57. 4 Id., p. 60. 5 Rollo, pp. 26 and 27. 6 Id., p. 32. 7 Id, p. 12. 8 Supra. 9 Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 79718-22, 172 SCRA 88 (1989). 10 G.R. No. 54258, SCRA 663 (1987). 11 41 Phil. 275. 12 106 Phil. 727. 13 Re: Victorio Lanuevo, Administrative Case No. 1162, 66 SCRA 245 (1975). 14 Hartman v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 66P. 2d 705, 706, 20 Cal. App. 2d 76; U.S. ex rel. Mongiovi v. Karnuth, D.C.N.Y., 30 F. 2d 825, 826, cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1206. 15 Cal. Brainard v. Board of Medical Examiners of California, 157 P. 2d 7, 8, 68 Cal App. 2d 591 cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1204. 16 Ariz. Du Val v. Board of Medical Examiners of Arizona, 66 P. 2d 1026, 1030,49 Ariz. 329, cited in 58 CJS, Moral Turpitude, p. 1205. 17 Panaligan v. Adolfo, G.R. No. L-24100, 67 SCRA 176 (1975). 18 Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Lucero, G.R. No. L-32550, 125 SCRA 337 (1983).

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 4947 June 7, 2007

ROSA YAP-PARAS, petitioner, vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, respondent. RESOLUTION GARCIA, J.: For resolution is this Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment1 dated April 11, 2005, filed by herein petitioner-movant Rosa Yap Paras against respondent Atty. Justo Paras, for the latter's alleged violation of a suspension order earlier meted upon him by the Court. The motion alleges: 4. That the respondent in this case admits that he has continued his practice of law and in fact filed pleadings in court after the receipt of suspension on the ground that the alleged filing of his motion for reconsideration suspends or interrupt (sic) the running of the period to appeal, and prays that for his violation of the suspension order, the respondent be declared in contempt of court and be disbarred. Briefly, the facts may be stated as follows: On September 9, 1998, herein petitioner-movant filed a verified Petition2 praying for the disbarment of her estranged husband respondent Atty. Justo J. Paras alleging acts of deceit, malpractice, grave misconduct, grossly immoral conduct and violation of oath as a lawyer committed by the latter. On February 14, 2005, the Court issued a Resolution3 finding Atty. Paras guilty of committing a falsehood in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, the Court resolved to suspend Atty. Paras from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, with a warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. Per records, the aforesaid Resolution was received by Atty. Paras on March 18, 2005. Thereafter, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 28, 2005.4 During the pendency of Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, complainant-movant filed with the Court the instant Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, alleging thereunder, inter alia, that Atty. Paras violated the suspension order earlier issued by the Court with his continued practice of law.

In time, the Court issued a Resolution dated July 18, 2005,5 denying for lack of merit Atty. Paras' motion for reconsideration, to wit: Administrative Case No. 4947 (Rosa Yap Paras vs. Atty. Justo Paras) Acting on the respondent's motion for reconsideration dated March 28, 2005 of the resolution of February 14, 2005 which suspended him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion for lack of merit. The Court further Resolves to NOTE: (a) the complainant's opposition dated April 11, 2005 to the said motion for reconsideration with leave of Court; (b) the respondent's motion dated May 6, 2005 for immediate resolution of the motion for reconsideration; and (c) the complainant's motion for contempt and/or disbarment dated April 11, 2005, praying that respondent be declared in contempt of court and ordered disbarred and to REQUIRE the respondent to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice. In the same resolution, the Court required Atty. Paras to comment on petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. After more than a year, or on September 12, 2006 Atty. Paras filed with the Court a Manifestation6 , stating that he had completely and faithfully served his one (1) year suspension from the practice of law from August 25, 2005, the day after he received the denial resolution on his motion for reconsideration, to August 24, 2006. It appearing that Atty. Paras failed to file a comment on the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment, the Court issued another Resolution dated November 27, 2006 requiring Atty. Paras to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for such failure and to comply with the said resolution within ten (10) days from receipt. Consequently, a Comment on Motion for Contempt and Explanation on Failure to Timely File Required Comment7was filed by Atty. Paras denying all the allegations in petitioner-movant's Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment. He likewise claimed that he had never done nor made any conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, nor undermine or put to naught or violate any of the pertinent causes enumerated in Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. Here, we are called upon to impose on Atty. Paras the highest punishment to an erring lawyer disbarment or to hold him in contempt for his failure to comply with this Court's resolutions. In a number of cases,8 we have repeatedly explained and stressed that the purpose of disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts and the public from members of the bar who have become unfit and unworthy to be part of the esteemed and noble profession. Likewise, the purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court to assure respect for court orders by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

We find no sufficient basis to support petitioner-movant's allegation that Atty. Paras violated the Court's suspension order, what with the fact that Atty. Paras himself took the initiative to inform the lower courts of his one- year suspension from law practice.9 It is clear, however, that all lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. It is well to emphasize again that a resolution of the Supreme Court is not be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.10 Court orders are to be respected not because the justices or judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government. This is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.11 Here, Atty. Paras admitted that he had been less than prudent, and indeed fell short, of his obligation to follow, obey and comply with the specific Order of the Honorable Supreme Court contained in Its Resolution dated July 18, 2005 due to his deteriorating health condition which required him to undergo a coronary angiogram and bypass graft12 . He likewise expressed his profound and immeasurable sorrowness amidst regrets for his delayed compliance with the Court's order. Given the above, the Court takes this opportunity to remind the parties in the instant case, as well petitioner-movant's counsels, to avoid further squabbles and unnecessary filing of administrative cases against each other. An examination of the records reveals a pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Atty. Paras and petitioner's counsels as evidenced by the number of administrative cases between them. It is well to stress that mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive sympathy from this Court.13 Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, fairness, candor and civility.14 All told, the Court deems a reprimand with warning as a sufficient sanction for Atty Paras' failure to promptly comply with its directives. The imposition of this sanction in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of a disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.15 ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Contempt and/or Disbarment is DENIED. However, Atty. Justo Paras is herebyREPRIMANDED for his failure to observe the respect due the Court in not promptly complying with this Court's resolution, with WARNING that a more drastic punishment will be imposed upon him for a repetition of the same act. SO ORDERED. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Chairperson, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 1062-1065.

Rollo, Vol. I at pp. 3-9. Id. at pp. 1000-1009. Id. at pp. 1021-1028. Id. at p. 1132. Id. at pp. 1139-1141. Id. at pp. 1165-1173.

Geeslin v. Navarro, Adm. Case No. 2033 and 2148, May 9, 1990, 185 SCRA 230; citing Diaz v. Gerong, Adm. Case No. 2439, January 16, 1986, 141 SCRA 46 and Daroy, et al. v. Legaspi, Adm. Case No. 936, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 304 and Mariano Y. Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Elena Embang, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154.
9

Rollo, p. 1136.

10

Ong v. Grijaldo, Adm. Case No. 4724, April 30, 2003, 402 SCRA 1 and Guerrero v. Deray, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1466, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 591.
11

Luis N. De Leon v. Joey Y. Torres, 99 Phil 462. Rollo, p. 1166. Asa vs. Castillo, Adm. Case No. 6501, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 309. Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility. Gamilla v. Marino, Jr., Adm.Case No. 4763, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 308.

12

13

14

15

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985 ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A. TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS, LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A. CURAMMENG, JR., respondents. Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf. Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.: Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in Illinois. In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint. We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in 1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker & Mckenzie. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3, respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p. 115.) WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

SO ORDERED. Teehankee, Acting CJ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur. Plana, J., took no part. Fernando, C.J., and Concepcion, Jr., J., are on leave.

TAN TEK BENG vs DAVID

on June 30, 2012

READ CASE DIGEST HERE.

Republic SUPREME Manila SECOND DIVISION A.C. No. 1261 December 29, 1983 TAN TEK BENG, complainant, vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID, respondent., of the Philippines COURT

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:
The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorneys fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads: December 3, 1970 Mr. Tan Tek Beng Manila Dear Mr. Tan: In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as follows: 1. On all commission or attorneys fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to

commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved. 2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent. 3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest. 4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over to

our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients. I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.

Very truly yours, (Sgd.) Illegible TIMOTEO A. DAVID P.S. I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients. (Sgd.) Initial CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of this letter. (Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng MR. TAN TEK BENG

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients. The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement. In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused. This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel. On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor Generals Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court. We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term malpractice (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:

34. Division of Fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility. 35. Intermediaries. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . . 38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure. (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics). We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better. Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidants office. SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur. Makasiar (Chairman), J., took no part.

People vs Tuanda - A case digest

A.M. Facts; Respondent was suspended for practicing his profession until further notice from the Supreme Court finding her guilty of violating BP 22. Atty. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged. Issue; WON the suspension of Atty. Fe Tuanda be lifted. Ruling; The Supreme Court ruled to DENY the respondent of his Motion to Lift Order of Suspension and affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals regarding the suspension. The court found Atty. Fe Tuanda guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude citing Secs 27 and 28 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional Responsibility. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs.ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant vs. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.

PER CURIAM: In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which: (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359; to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538360; and

to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 8538361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as follows: For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification. It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the reglementary period. In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent states: that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee. We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms. Marquez. The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms: xxx xxx xxx

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. . . . The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is prescribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 3(Italics supplied)

Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows: Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics supplied) Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics supplied) We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of respondent. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the result.