VolumeI I I Letter 8

J anuary 1961

H. . duB. REPORTS

Pari s, France
J anuary 1961: An
i mbalance
i n UNforeshadows the West' s i nsolvency.

Todayanomi nous 5la%o
o

evotes i n that worldbodyrepresent
8%of theworld' s populati on.

I nthe
narrowedeyes
of Afri cans (maki ng possi blethat
maj ori ty)
i s
reflected abursti ngsenseof power - -
engendere
bythe
si ght of fleei ngwhi tes.

Canni bali smi s acceptedlocal custom.

Di plomats
j okedi nthe
NewYear' s : cocktai l party- round
at
European
chancelleri es of a supposedcolleaguewho
entered thedelegate' s loungei n UNtofi ndalone
whi temani n a di stant corner .

Crossi ng
to
hi mheexclai med, "Dr . Li vi ngstone, I presume
: "
' 60' s end
sawso- called
"i nformed"
ci rcles emergesli ghtly fromthei r
euphemi sti c state - -
j olted only, however, bythe reali zati onthat markets donot
cli mb"Tefi ni tely and war i s not
"unthi nkable".

Thereali ty of Russi aholdi ngthe i ni ti ati ve halted
expressi ons of anti
Ameri cani sm.

Unswervi ngloyaltyto NatoandtheAtlanti c Pact
has becometheorder - - thus
bydeclarati ons of fai thdo. theyhopeto be permi ttedto sleeptranqui lly
for awhi lelonger, free
fromworryandi ntelli gent effort .
Thequesti onof Ri assi a' s i ntenti ons conti nues toi nsert i tself .

Theobj ecti ves of
theSovi et bloc
areknown- - the maneuver remai ns thequesti on; what place, whatorm
anZI the date.

The'
strategyappears tohrushchev' s "paci fi c" coexi stence, wi thi nteri or- subversi on
and
coordi natedanarchyona
world
scale: ' Not Mao' s di rect acti on, but menaces andconstant
pressures under
an
umbrella
: called
"ri skof
war"
.

AtopSovi etologi st sumcmedi t uptoour
correspondent : a
tougher li ne after
the21- dayNovember Communi st Summi t.

World
Communi sm' s key- men, manyfromcountri es whereCommuni smi s i llegal, cameabove
ground- - posedfor pi ctures for the fi rst ti me.

Explodi ngwi thconfi dence, thei rs i s nolonger
a
subversi veorgani zati on.

Thebourgeoi s cop' s long
armdares not touchthem.

Theyare
convi nced anewulti matephasehas begun,

TheCommuni st Conspi racyi s outdated
- - i noper-
ati oni s
the Communi st
Zlobal
War,

hi s
newatti tude
i s si gni fi cant
tothem!

I s i t tous,
theWest?

Kozlov' s speechof 1/ 11/ 60 provi des a
. key
to
the
new
tacti c.

"Thecourseo events,
hesai d, "shows that peoples
supported
bythepowerful Soci ali st world
can
force
thei mper
i ali st belli gerents torenounce. thei r plans for
war . "

The"peace" theme
agai n .

Anddi sarma-
ment, not bynegoti ati on, but uni lateral di sarmament under Communi st
threats andpressures.
Chi naandRussi abecome
a
massi ve, strategi c reservei angi ngi nthe15ac groan

avoi di ng
di rect i nterventi onwhenpossi ble, but. provi di ngani nterventi onthreat i f scatteredacti ons
meet resi stance.

Thi s reserve "i nbei ng" i s tocreateandai d everywhere
(and byall means)
thedi vi si onof the, Westernpowers - - and destroythei r i nfluence
i nthe
; world,
. Koslovti di ed
upK' s Bucharest statement, "We
shall
seethat the i mperi ali sts fry
themselves li kefi shi na
pan".

Communi smwi ll not bedefeatedbyWesterners,whoremai n
as comfortableas a teapot
i ni ts teacozy- - solet us exami nethetheaters of our potenti al "fryi ng".
Belgi urn
:
Our press stresses the cultural and soci al cleavages betweenthenorthCatholi c
emas

andtheFrenchspeaki ng andanti - . cleri cal' Walloons of the south.

Thi s suggests a
syntheti c nati onheldtogether bythethroneandmutual prosperi ty(i nsured bythe Congo) .

The
i nferencei s that popular di spleasurewi thPremi er GastonEysken' s austeri tybi ll i s alone
responsi ble
for thedi sorders - - that
a
spontaneous combusti onoccurred, touchedoff by
the
i nj usti ceof abi ll that hi t workers harder thanmanagement
.

Let us
bebrutally frank;

Hard
ontheheels of a cne- twopunch(the
econornni c and
psychologi cal effects of
the
loss
of
the
Congo) the austeri tybi ll produceda
God- gi venmoment totopple the Catholi c Li beral govern-
ment
- -
and
put theuni on- backedSoci ali sts i n the saddle.

Some700, 000 Soci ali st Uni on
members were
i nvolved, wi th800, 000 or soCatholi c uni on
merri bers standi ngbyli ke
J ambs
for
the
slaughter : -

Our correspondent poi nts out somesali ent
facts of thi s bloody
play
tospli t
a nati on.

The
effects of the Congo' s loss were
predi ctable
.

Theloss of 60%of Belgi um' s
revenuemadethe
austeri typrogrami nevi table.

The
Uni onleaders knewthi s.

Yet theI nter-
nati onal
Confederati onof FreeTradeUni ons
(of whi chthe Soci ali st Uni ons aremembers) di d
all i ni ts power
to hastenthe Congo' s i ndependence,

And
at
nopoi nt i nthe di sorders was any
Confederati on effort madeto restrai n
theri oters.

Ameri canuni ons fi nanced and
di rected
the
duB, Reports January
1961

Ps
formati onof the I nternat' 1 Confederati on.

Ameri candel egates pul l
the wi res behi nd
i ts acti on. ;
Dotheywant what i s happeni ng?

Thi s Bel gi umcri si s canhel p
onl ythe Communi sts
.

The
Confederati onwas formedwi th our
bl essi ng, onthe pretext
that i t woul d. oppose
Communi sm
.
But no Ameri canvoi ce was
rai sedto restrai nthi s offspri ng of
our monster.

I t was not
because thi s woul dbe meddl i ng.

Our
meddl i nghadoccurred
arreadywhenweorgani zed
uni on3
i n other countri es andai dedthei r
l eaders i nto pol i ti cal power .
Let us go astepfurther :

I vI r .
Foul Spaak, Bel gi umheadof Nato, i s
aBel gi anSoci al i st.
Twi ce- i n ' 60 he rej ectedcal l s to returnto
l eadhi s party.

Thereason? Hi s
i mportance el se
where.

Andwhydi dnot the I nternat' l Labor
Organi zati on(I LG) i n Genevacounsel
prudence?
George C. Lodge, Asst . U. S. Secretaryof Labor
for Forei gnAffai rs,
becamechai rman
of
I LG' s 60- mangoverni ng bodya month
beforethe Congo attai nedi ndependence.
As I LCi s
affi l i ate of UN, GeorgeLodgebecamethe
Genevaendof asonandfather (Cabot
Lodge) tearn
that di dnothi ng to bol ster the
Z
ysken' s gove
rnment agai nst the maneuvers maki ngthe
Bel gi um
vi ol ence i nescapabl e.

UNacti oni nthe Congo and
the i nj usti ce doneBel gi umi nthe General
Assembl yproduce
thi s questi on: cani t bethat UN, l i ke"the I nternat' l
Confederati on, wai ted
wi thmocki nnocence for
the Bel gi an- mobto take over?
Nowput the fi nal pi ecestogether :

i

enard, , ,
l eader of Bel gi um' s powerful General
Workers' Federati onspl i t hi s countrywi de
openanddestroyed$200 mi l l i onworth of pro=
for
aSoci al i st take- over .

Once i n control , through
amandate bysuchvi ol ence, onl yarn*r, e
vi ol ent moveto
the l eft canthrowthemout.
Spotl i ght
Soci al i st Labor' s audaci ous
pl an
to
take
over
' management byacqui ri ng nati onal
pol i ti cal
control .

I t i s the Reddoctri ne
that "antagoni sms of nati ons wi l l endwi th the antagon-
i sms
of
cl ass" .

Thenthe "peace' ' theme
agai n.

As Labor Soci al i st
governments cometo
power ' Left tal ks
best to
Left' '
becomes i nternat' l l abor' s si rensong.

Toi nsure
"peace"`
through
cooperati on, l abor governments must be i npower i neverycountry.

Thi s i s the Ahdr
Renard"ci vi l war"
i n
Bel gi um
stri ppedto i ts skel eton.

The anti - Communi st struggl e
i s
the
poi nted- to war horseof i nternat' l l abor,
whi chpubl i c l ai ssez- fai re andi ndoi ence accept
as
bonafi de.

I ntruth i t i s of l i ttl e consi derati onto
the "Uni on
of
uni ons" (set upbywhat Europe
refers to as the "Lovestonecommandoteam. ' ' ) . I nternat' 1 l abor
i s usi ng the anti - Communi st
fi ght to bl azeapower pathi nto Nato. Andre Renard' s
"ci vi l war" cut deep. Andone day,
overni ght the West' s publ i c wi l l fi ndanyopposi ti onto
uni onpol i ti cal power grabs branded
as
pro- Communi st,

- - - -

~ .
TheExecuti ve Counci l of the, I nternat' l Confederati onof Free
Trade
Uni ons announcedi n
Brussel s i n earl y12/60 that i t hadrunout of thi ngs to do i nAfri ca
- - the anti - col oni al struggl
has beenwon.

Whi l ethe Castropowder kegi s sti l l charged,
auni onmovement
conduci ve to
i ndependence for Marti ni que andGuadal upewi l l be thei r next obj ecti ve'.

Creati ngfurther di s-
turbance i nan. al readytroubl edCari bbeani s atechni queborrowedfromCommuni sm- - when
profi tabl e to fi sh i ntroubl edwaters keep- themtroubl ed!
AVi tal
Spot
i s
France, :
Threemonths ago our correspondent reportedFrance shoul dnot,
eou

noanc~ wonot l ose Al geri aandtheSahara.

Representi ng her hopes, France' s
i nvestments i n the Saharahave beenastronomi cal , the progress phenomenal .

But the
i nter-
l ocki ng networkof i nternat' 1 l abor uni ons (Ameri canuni ons' weal th gave themthe domi nati ng
voi ce) has madethe l oss of both Al geri aandthe Saharai nevi tabl e,

Whenthat l oss comes
hometo France,
De-
Gaul l e wi l l be the sacri fi ce to themob.

As i n Bel gi um, the same
forces
wi l l tryfor pol i ti cal power usi ngthe sameeconomi candpsychol ogi cal l oss- i mpact as
thei r
l ong- awai tedmoment;

Not ordi narypower, whi ch they nowhave, but the power to
i mpose
thei r wi l l andcol l ecti vi st pol i ci es.

Fl ashi ng backtoKennedy' s speeches of
mi d- ' 57, the
FrenchCenter canhardl yexpect anyreal i sti c Ameri cansupport.

Wi l l our press agai n
refer
to
i ts l eaders as fasci sts &ul tras - and
absurdl yreport
that
peace wi l l
cometo
Al geri awi th
i ndependence? I n real i tyAfri cawi l l be devouredbyCommuni sm

wi th the European
seal ed
out.
H.
du B.
Reports

J anuary
- 1961
Bymid- December, through
Ambassador Vinogradov, two Frenchattempts to persuade Moscow'
to changeRussia's
Al gerianpol icy hadfail ed.

Thepol icy was firminsistencethat "President"
Ferhat Abbas not yiel d aninch.

I ts purpose?

To causeFrance and the West to l ose dipl o-
rnaticface.

Russiawoul dthen
assure anFLN(Front National e. de l aLiberation) mil itary
victory.

Thel ong range
obj ective of Russia's bl ackmail puts de Gaul l ewherethe priceof
Russia's goodoffices withthe
rebel s is Frenchwithdrawal fromNato. andacceptance of a
negotiated "peace" onanyterms
.

The
short term?

Apossibl e civil . war uponthe arrival in
Franceof some800, 000homel ess
despoil edcivil ians fromAl geria.

Witheither ending,
Natowoul d become a
memory- - Soviet missionaccompl ished.
RussianStrategy, 1961
is basedonthe premise: 1- the West wil l not take a stand
; 2-
a
Summit

on
erencein, April ; 3- Britain's traditional rol eof riding the
center of the teeter-
totter
wil l be 1facmil l an

positionat the Conference;
4-
a
vast increaseinespionnage activity
;
-
5-
Redsubmarines are everywhere.

The West has
tal ked too muchof Russia's 6 nucl ear subs
in the
works.

Theindicationis Russiapurposel y emphasized
l eakageof number - 16.

Special ists
agree
that thereare probabl y

_ many more

but
attentionhas

eenfocusedon,6 end
6 wil l
at
al l times beaccountabl eonNatomaps
.
Onthe
menacefront Russianprogress continues
.

That armis destined. (so the
Fast bel ieves)
to
force the West intounil ateral disarmament
under threat of immediate
destruction.

The
stringof 3000- mil e rockets onthe Kamchatka
Peninsul a(knowntodefensepl anners as
"K- 1")
is a sceneof feverishactivity.

Long: range
bases wil l reinforce onl y. the
eight 1540- mil e
Siberian
bases aimedat Al aska, J apan, Okinawa
andFormosa.

The6000- mil e
bases extcn
from
WesternRussia.

Theformer can- detonate
another Zengakurenstudents'
unionriot
J apanat
wil l .

The l atter psychol ogical l y are
aimedat Europe's neutral ists
.

An.
additional
200nucl ear
inter- . continental missil es wil l be
readyfor Russianramps, 12/61.

Their rol e: a
dissuasionagainst Americansupport
of potential European, Asian,
Africanor' Caribbean
victims (possibl y West . Germanyinl ate
4/61),125 Russiandivisions
can
be
throwninto Europe
30 days after M- Day.

Americaninactionwoul dbe
expl ained to our publ ic as
"ThePriceof
Peace" - - the same
"peace" everyindefensibl e
Americanpol icy has
brought us.
Part : I n
a significant exchange
betweenthe Quai d'Orsay
and Whitehal l , aconfiden-
ftaff' report from
Britain's MoscowAmbassador
Sir FrankRoberts
was passedtothe French
Soviet
study office earl yin1260.

Under
combinedRussian,
Pol ish, andCzechpressure,
Red
China
agreedtotake a backseat.

The
fight was heavy. : Asa
former "victimo col onization"
China
wantedtocarrythe standardin
Africa. . Russiawon.

Said
the Roberts report,
"I t was
decidedthat the best subversiveagents
inAfricaarewhites
fromthe non- Communist
Left".
(The
previous monththePortuguese
ForeignOffice coMerre

withParis on
rtcns
i
.
a
agitated by twodel egates
of the American
. Committee
onAfrica) :
The
Africandecisiondidnot
affect Mao's
pl edge for '61 to
the Al gerian
rebel s (FLN) .

The
accord
cal l s for $60 mil l ion
for propaganda
(usedtowardpaying a
New
Yorkpubl ic.
rel ations
firmand
printingbil l ) . .
Pekingwil l buy
Araboil through
the provisional
Al gerian
government
- - permit a
2%or 3%- commission
for
the Al gerians, thus
, increasing
their prestige
withthe
Arabstates .
Heavymateriel
(fromthe
KoreanWar)
l 20- mm- mortars
and. recoil - l ess
75's
wil l be
forthcoming:

Officers,
pil ots and
17 battal ions
of vol unteers
at atraining
school
in
Canton
are onastand- by
basis for a
critical 'moment
in Al geria.
or some
Asiancrisis
(pre-
sumabl y
as anel ite
"vol unteer"
corps incorporated
inanative
army) .

This
l eaves
Peking
uncompromised!
Al bania, is Europe's
Mosl em
bastionand
Worl d
Communism's advance
base in
Europe.

The
e
3ngpl edge
to the Al gerian
rebel s was
fol l owed on
12`2 60 by an
accord
between_
Al bania's
Defense Minister
; General Bakri
Bal ouko
andChinese
DeputyChief
of Staff,
General
Tchang
Tsung- hsoun
making
Al baniaPeking's
arms
depot in the
Western
Hemisphere.

This
worsened
the al ready
erodedsituation
inI tal y.

TheAl bania- Peking
Accordwas
accompanied
bya
du
B.
Reports

J anuary
_
1961
Communist
upswing from. 35. 2%in ' 56 to 38. 9%in
I tal y' s municipal el ections
. .

The marreu e- rs
of 1_ inrico
Mattei, boss of I tal y' s
state- control l ed. oil power monopol y, indicate what I tal y
wil l
do
in ' 61.

Mattei thinks
the West' s shipis sinking. Hewil l ride the current,

Oneof the first
to
noteI nternat' 1 Labor' s
backingof the Al gerianFLN, he, too, has suppl iedthem, (with
an
eye
to expl oitingAl geria
and
an
Al gerianSaharaafter independence).

Thencamehis Russian
.
deal s- - their
oil for his steel tubing, oil pipel ine construction- andsynthetic rubber.

Eventual
Soviet
oil dumping, to runAmericaandBritain
off the worl dmarket,
wil l
come
through
Mattei (he can
dumpoil nowat 1930 priceif Russiagives the word) . Anastute worl doperator,
the West shoul d
not takehis estimateof us l ightl y.
- , co: America
evacuatedour immenseandcostl y Moroccan.
airbase (Frenchproperty
oan

ous) .

We
handedit to Moroccowhenwe
movedto Spainl ast year.

Russiainstal l ed
19
Migs there, as
gifts to Moroccowithaccompanying
technicians andinstructors.

Tosatisfy
Morocco, Russia
opposedMauritania' s admission
to
UN
(Moroccocl aimsMauritania) .

I n
return,
Russiawants the useof the base. into which
wepouredmil l ions. I t wil l formtheir
"Strategic Air Command"
center, al most in sight of Gibral tar, neutral izingour newSpanish
bases!

Thepatternis al ways a
Westernpul l - back.

The Worl dis not fool edwhen
we
preface
our retreats with"strategic
Russiais
a
genius at not
l etting
her
right handknowthel eft hand' s
action.

MoscowandCairo' s
Nasser
are partners inthe Guinea- Ghana
pl ottings.

Khrushchevhas gained
concessions
there
in Bl ack
Africa
as
insurance against
resurge- nt pan, - Arabism. . Hepl ans bases inGuineaand
Central Africa
for ' 61 - - onl y secondin
importancetothe Moroccan
instal l ation
weabandoned.
But at the same
timeK' pl ays onthe
fears of Tunisia' s Bourguibaand
Morocco' s MohammedV
of aNasser- dominated
independent
Al geria- - sl yl ypitting
Arabagainst ArabinNorthAfrica, .
3 #, j a. ;America
: FranciscoJ ul iao,
l eader of Brazil ' s fanatical l y
red
Peasants'
League
repor
e

as

, 000 strong),
probabl ywil l fil l the star rol e
inRussia' s dramathere.

Concl udin
an
accordwithCastroin
460andl engthy tal ks
inPekingin 12/ 60, J ul iaonowstands bywitha
pl an
to remol dBrazil
after the RedChinesemodel . `The
situationis grave. Sodissatisfiedare
Brazil iananti- Red
l eaders withAmerican
initiative, General HugoManhaes fl ewtoParis
to
confer withSoviet Affairs
Special ists whil e
J ul iaowas in Peking.
gs: Weaskedfor what
is happening.

Ayear agq.
Americawas tol dthat
we
hadforcedan
Z21"' - - Communist mil itary
groupout
of
power and
instal l edamoreneutral one, as "The
Priceof
Peace"
.

WegaveRedChina
andNorthVietnama green
l ight then- - andtol dLaotians, ready
to
fight for us, that theyhad
better maketerms.

Menacedbya Labor party (spl it
evenl y
over
unil ateral disarmament)
Britain' s Macmil l an
is not gpingto take a
.
firmstandinLaos
.

We
l iteral l y kickedthe French
out of I ndo- China
in
' 55
:

We- savedNasser whenhe was
in our
Al l ies' graspin11156.

Nowtheywil l not
hel pus in Laos.

WriteLaos off.

I t
is
tragic
but
everymanwho
counsel edcommon_ sense
was ignored.

News
story
emphasis
wil l be ongraft
of
Americanaid
.

I t waspeanuts compared
to el sewhere- - but
wil l beusednow
to excuseour
back- out,
General

hal l e: Nato
Commander- in- Chief
for Central Europe
observedat
a
dinne"r
of the
rent

Associationfor the Atl antic
.
Al l iance
inearl y November,
"Fromincident
toincident
onecanl ose a
war that was
never

ought. "

He'
added, "The

ncident . canbe cal l ed
Berl inor
Cuba.

I t does
not matter- , " We
must not be
discouraged.

There
is-
an
answer. . I t
is to fight
witha
pressure- offensive
of
our own.
This newsl etter
gives permission
for re- printing
withcredit
l ine. .
Our subscription rate
is tendol l ars
for ten newsl etters
.

Address
al l domestic
business
and
subscriptioncorrespondence
to H. duB.
Reports,
120 Fremont Pl ace,
Los
Angel es 5,
Cal i-
fornia
.

Address al l
foreignbusiness and
subscription
correspondence
to Hil aire
du
Berrier,
c/ oHotel
Lutetia, 43
Boul evardRaspail ,
Paris6,
France.
Hil aire du
Berrier, Correspondeni
Doris A;
Parks, Editor
VOLUMEI I I Letter
9
February
1961

H.
duB. REPORTS

Pari s,
France
1961
' s Pattern: Ei ther to hel pi nto
power di rectl y or to si t
qui etl ybywhi l e a
non-Communi st Left
hel ps aweak, l eft of center government i nto power
andthensei zes
compl ete control from
i ts
fal l i nghands
.

Let
us fi x our eyes careful l yonwhat
Sovi etol ogi sts regard
as the cl assi c exampl e
of thi s pattern--the Benes
government i nPrague.

I nfi l trated,
enci rcl edandundermi ned
suffi -
ci entl y to
fal l byl ate ' 47, nati ve subversi ves had
sappedi ts strength pati entl y.

OnFeb. 24, ' 48
the Reds refusedto si t wi th
"bourgeoi s members" of the
Nat' l Uni onGovernment .

I n
theory,
support
shoul dhave ral l i ed to Benes i nthe week-ol d
cri si s.

I t di dnot .

Hehad
destroyedhi s
breastworks
pi ecemeal .

To obtai nCommuni st support for
comparati vel yuni mportant bi l l s, he
had
bought ti me on
eachoccasi onbyl oppi ngoff amanor smal l groupobj ecti onabl e
to them.

Each
sacri fi ce was smal l --athi n sl i ce i n"Operati on
Sal ami ". Addedup, thi s process
l eads the
Communi st
opposi ti onto di smember i tsel f unti l
mi d-bal ance poi nt i s passed.

Feb. 24th
was that
poi nt .

The "Acti on
Commi ttees", armedworkers andmi l i ti a
groups (organi zedi neverycountry
where Communi sts work) camei nto the open.

Theyti edupthe ci tyal readyi mmobi l i zed
bya
general stri ke-cal l
that morni ng.

Benes was i sol ated--Cl ement
Gottwal dtookover . OnMarch
10th,
Forei gnMi ni ster J anMazeryk' s bodycrashedi nthepal ace
courtyard.

Hi s "sui ci de"
markedthe end
of another free nati on.

Si nce ' 46, free peopl es have di sappeared
beneathagreat
andnever recedi ngwave, l i ke beaches that remai npl easant onl y
i nmemory.

What Benes di d
under
duress
the
West i s nowdoi ngof i ts ownvol i ti on.

Later, i ncompl ete
contradi cti on,
wi l l
comeacti onout of aparal ysi s of that vol i ti on--the stage where
peopl es tryto buythei r survi val --
whi chtheyl earntoo
l ate has to be earned--cannot be bought .
The Pattern, USAVersi on:

Whether
as
freedoml ovi ngfol ks or j ust
l ack of i ndi vi dual di sci pl i ne
todayour ci ti zens do not l i ke bei ngorderedaround.

Yet Operati onSal ami , Ameri canStyl e, i s
al readyi n
Stage 2.
I ndi vi dual s l i ke
J oe McCarthywerethe targets i nStage one. Phasetwo i s a
Commi ttee. The concertedattacks onthe HouseUn-Ameri canActi vi ti es Commi ttee, often
supportedbypromi nent andapparentl yi rreproachabl e peopl e are part of The Pattern.

Al ongthe
l i ne,
at
astage al readynumbered, (but conti ngent onevents for
a
date) wi l l
be
the
attack
ai med
at
Edgar Hoover hi msel f andhi s organi zati on.

That date, unknowntoday, wi l l be for Ameri caBenes!
morni ngof Feb.
24, ' 48
.

TheCommuni st hand, so cl earl ydi scerni bl e
i n
manyof our acts
di rectedagai nst our Al l i es, i s nowshowi ngi nthe bi tter-endattack onour owni nsti tuti ons. Re-
sponsi bl e Europereads reports about us anxi ousl y. Asecret FrenchCommuni st communi cati on
touchedon
a
15-dayFordFoundati onsponsoredconference hel di nasmal l
New
Hampshi re Col l ege
pri or to our el ecti ons.

Descri pti on? An"establ i shment of humancontacts for peace".

The
communi cati onstatedEx. Sen. Wm. Benton(Conn. ), Prof . W. W. RostowandGeorge
Kennanmet
wi thKhrushchev' s fri end, author Koznei tchouk
and
ateam
of Russi anj uri sts, wri ters, movi epro-
ducers and "i ntel l ectual s" to i ronout "mi sunderstandi ngs" due to psychol ogi cal
factors--prel i m-
i naryto Kennedy-Khrushthev
tal ks i nNewYorki nMarchor i nVi ennai n May.
Pi eci ng Europeanl eaks together the pi cture grows i nto
thi s
:
uponel ecti on, wi thout wai ti ngfor
actual transmi ssi onof
power Kennedysent personal agents, Wal ter RostowandDr
. Wei sner to
Moscow
. Contact was thus establ i shed wi thout
goi ngthroughthe Ameri canembassy.

Theessence
of thei r messagefromthe new
Presi dent :

"Youwant to establ i shanewpol i ti cal cl i mate
wi th
Washi ngton?

Fi ne;
anythi ngi s possi bl e i f youwi l l settl e two i mmedi ate
probl ems: the detenti on
of the two offi cers
of the RB47, andthe cri si s i nLaos.

Al l Mr . Khrushchevhas to do i s pi ck up
the tel ephone
to makeMr . Kennedy' s arri val
i nthe Whi te House usher i nanewera
of Russi an
Ameri canrel ati ons".

The questi on
: was Kennedytri cki ngKv?
Leadi nghi mto expect concessi ons
i nahumani tari anpl ayto
obtai nthe rel ease of thetwo i l l egal l y
hel dAmeri cans?

Or was
he
maki ngpol i ti cal hay--enteri ngthe Whi te
Houseto the hul l abal l oo o
"new" Russi an-Ameri can
good
rel ati ons?
OnJ an. 21st, Ambassador Ll ewel yncabl ed
the "unforeseen,
stupi fyi ng, hi ghl y si gni fi -
cant ' I - news
that the two ai rforce offi cers
hadbeenrel eased.

Rostowand
Wei sner weremade
"Sci enti fi c Advi sers" attached
to the Whi te House.

Knowl edgeabl eEuropeans fel t l i ke
hel pl ess
passengers aboardour boat
.

Thi s tabl eaufi xed
al l eyes onthe rapi d
serve-and-returnof cabl es
and
phone cal l s betweenWashi ngton
andMoscowfol l owi ngJ an
. 20th. Kv. fol l owed
the RB47
offi cers' rel ease
wi ththree proposi ti ons:

1- a
di sarmament conference
(i nGenevaor
Vi enna)
coveri ngboth
conventi onal andnucl ear
arms; 2- aSummi t meeti ng
i nearl yJ ul y
i nei ther of.
those
H. -
duB. Reports

-

February 1961
Page
2.
ci ti es; 3- most pressi ngwas the i nvi tati on tothe new
Presi dent to vi si t
Russi a!

Wi thproposi -
ti ons andcounter- proposi ti ons crossi ngthe Atl anti c l i ke
tenni s bal l s, watchful Europe recei ved
her fi rst reassurancei nKennedy' s cauti ous repl ythat i t i s better
to pl anthi ngs wel l i nadvance
- - and
makeful l useof tradi ti onal
di pl omacybeforel aunchi nga
seri es of conferences.
Arneri ca' s New
Pol i cy
: I Bri tai n andGermany werethe fi rst
to take stock- - descri bi ngi t as neo-
neutral i sm, adi sconti nuance of emphasi s oneconomi c
andfi nanci al ai dfor nati ons al i gnedagai nst
Communi sm.

Theresul ts? Atransi ti onof smal l countri es to neutral i sm,
aneutral i smmade
acceptabl etoRussi a
throughthe
establ i shment of coal i ti on governments andthe
advancement of
pol i ci es of non- engagement.

Tothose rearedi n the
tradi ti on, "the concessi ons of the weak are
the
concessi ons of fear", therewas nodoubt that MoscowandPeki ng
woul dencroach on such
engagements
. Except
for some
nuances the newpl anwas remi ni scent of the Rapacki pl anof
threeyears ago- to separatethe twobl ocs byabuffer bel t of neutral i sm.

Li teral l y, i t i s a
death sentence
for
SEATO, anamputati onfor Nato.
Ameri ca' s NewPol i cy:
I I Germany
:
Here our newpol i cyhas proppedupthe arguments of
si l ver- tonguedBaronvonGuttenberg, exponent of di rect
tal ks wi thKv. andat l east defacto
recogni ti onof the East Germangovernment. Landowner Guttenberg, Chri sti anDemocrat,
orator andBavari anari stocrat i s i nhi s forti es.

Typi cal of thetradi ti onal
"j unker" hei s one of
the most audaci ous up- and- comi ngGermanpol i ti ci ans. Anoffi cer of the Wehrmacht duri ngthe
war, hewas
saved
from
executi on(for publ i cl yopposi ng
the l i qui dati on of the J ews) bydi stant
rel ati ves i n the Counci l tryi nghi m.

Themantowatch i s thi s "Herr Baron" .
Hi s pol i cy:
1- Russi awi l l never abandonthe most advancedbreastwork of her whol emi l i tary systemi n the
West ;
2-
Ameri cawi l l not remai ni nEuropei ndefi ni tel y; 3-
each day
the U. S
. A. i s l ess
l i kel y
to ri sk destructi on of NewYork for the preservati onof Berl i n; 4- hewoul d amputatethe can-
cerous 24. 3%of theGermanbodyandget i t over wi th.

AndtheLeft- wardswi ngof the Ameri can
government, madecl earer byeach succeedi ngappoi ntment, has awakenedeventhe most hesi tant
Germans to
a
suddenfear of afutureunder Wi l l yBrandt .
Ameri ca' s NewPol i cy: I I I
Bri tai n:

What the
Bri ti sh sawi n
our new
chapter j usti fi edthei r
darkest anti ci pati ons . Governor of the Bank of Engl and, LordCobbol dtol d hi s government the
West wi l l be shakenbyamonetarycri si s i n earl y summer .

Ameri cawi l l be forcedto somesort
of exchangecontrol - - andawaveof deval uati ons wi l l fol l ow.

LordCobbol dal so sawi nthi s
cri si s auni queopportuni ty to put the poundsterl i ngback i ni ts ol dposi ti on- - as the worl d' s
pri nci pal
forei gncurrency!

Sel wynLl oydhadreservati ons.

He foresawRussi a' s vast gol d
reservebei ngthrownonthe forei gn market topl ayWesterncurrenci es agai nst eachother- -
regards the recent rubl ereval uati on as a
prel i mi nary.
Macmi l l anhopedtovi si t Washi ngtonafter hi s J an28, 29,
1961 vi si t wi th
deGaul l e
.

J une was to
beMoscow; autumn, Peki ngand
towardthe endof ' 61 al l woul dmeet i n London, Chou- En- l ai
i ncl uded
. I n thi s atmosphere, Londoncontempl atedregai ni ngEuropean
l eadershi p- - ri di ngi n
onthe conti nental l eaders' general di strust
of theKennedyteamandAmeri ca' s "neo- neutral i st"
threat.

Thefi rst
set- back camei n awarni ngfromWashi ngtonAmbassador, Si r Harol d
Cacci a.
Kennedywas nomoreanxi ous tomeet Mac thenhe
was Khrushchev!
BonnandRussi a:
Bri ti sh andFrenchchancel l eri es i n Moscow
havebeenwatchi ngKv' s
rapprochement
wi thBonnsi nce the memorabl emeeti ng
of Oct . 18th. GermanAmbassador
Hans
Krol l
handedKhrushchev Adenauer' s
compl ai nt that onl y17 Germans had
been repatri atedi n
September . Gromyko, as
l i ne- feeder, protested- - Kv
pi ousl ysi l encedhi m.

Theymust
i nves-
ti gate- - maybethe
Germans wereri ght . Hehad
the greatest respect for Doctor
Adenauer .
Herr Krol l wal kedi nto that one- - asked
whythi s respect was publ i cl y
transl atedso often i n
such
i nj uri ous terms.

Kv roaredwi thl aughter- - sai dhewoul d
del ete the i nsul ts from
hi s next speech
hehad
al readywri tten.

Andafewdays
l ater hepubl i cl y
drank
to
Adenauer' s heal th.

The
commerci al treatyconcl uded
onDec. 31, ' 60 was
i n the works.

I t was that si mpl e.
H. duB. Reports

February
1961
Page3
Hol di ngof f f or
16 days, Germany
determi nedto
si gnonl y
anaccordcontai ni ng
awri tten
cl ause
conti nui ngthe ' 58
f ree-access-to-Berl i n
agreement.

Germanyl ooks
wi thnostal gi a
at the 24. 3%
of her ' 37
terri toryannexed
wi thout treaty
byRussi a
andPol and--but has
noi l l usi ons
about re-
uni f i cati on.

Thosebehi nd
the I ronCurtai n
are. remembered
.

36 mi l l i on
packages f l owed
tothe
Communi st
East-zonef or Chri stmas
.

But hopes of
ci ti zenshi pi n
aFreeGermany
f or the
reci pi ents havetaken
a sharper drop
onthe Cartesi an
graph si nce-
November thani n
anycom-
parabl eperi odsi nce
the ai rl i f t. Krupp' s
recent negoti ati ons
reachi ngi nto
Communi sm' s
heavy
i ndustry
markets, through
di stri buti ngagents
i nPol and, and
assuri ngaf oot i n
eachcampadmi ts
real i ty.

There are
onl ytwo
sol uti ons--not three.

Reuni f i cati onwi l l
comewi ththe
capi tal i zati on
of Pankow
or the
Communi zati onof Bonn.

Wei ghedon
aday-to-dayscal eof
events i s the West' s
determi nati on
tof orcel i berati on
whi l eRussi ashows
no si gnof
deserti ngher advanced
sal i ent i n
WesternEurope.
Germanysettl ed f or
aRussi anaccord
that di f f eredf rom
the ' 58 treatyonl yby
i ts ref erence
to Berl i n
as "adomai nof
appl i cati on" rather than
"adomai nof val i di ty" .

I t was
cl ear, however,
that the f ormer
i s astatus dependi ngon
the wi l l of the accordi ng
power.
ARamboui l l et
Meeti ng: I n
anai r of cordi al i ty(bornof
necessi ty) Macmi l l an
met deGaul l e.
Recal l edwerethe
twowar years when
Macmi l l an, representi ng
Bri tai ni nNorth
Af ri ca, was
f ri endl y to deGaul l e.

But unspokenwas the thought
that the recent
mutati ons i nthe
Frencharmy
wereti mel y
f or Franco-Bri ti sh
cooperati on(the el i mi nated
of f i cers have
al ways hel dMacmi l l an
personal l y responsi bl e
f or Admi ral
Darl an' s assassi nati on) .
Responsi bl ef or thi s
ai r of cordi al i ty
was the sharedf ear of
aKv-Kdi al oguewi thout
Franceor
Bri tai n
.

Wordhadcome
i nabout the ti me of
Macmi l l an' s l andi ng
at
Orl y
that Harri manwoul d
soongoto
Moscowto di scuss "f i nanci al
andeconomi c
matters" .

The expl anati on: bl ockade
of
the
Sovi et worl dhad
f ai l ed--nei ther
Russi a' s mi l i tarynor nucl ear devel opment
was hi ndered.
Onthe
other handi t had
f avoredBri ti sh andI tal i an sei zure
of Communi st
markets.

Accordi ng
to Macmi l l an' s
advi sers, anAmeri can
trade of f ensi ve i n Chi na
was i nthe of f i ng.

Bri tai nsawi t
as commerci al war wi thi n
the mi l i tary
al l i ance.

DeGaul l ethought
of Kennedy' s mi d-' 57
speech
on
Al geri a--sawNorth
Af ri caas apossi bl e
pawni n Ameri can-Russi an-Chi nese
negoti ati ons
.
Acl i mateof despai r
devel opedas de
Gaul l eandMacmi l l an
contempl atedthe gl obe' s
mass of
"oi l
spots" -- each created
or hastenedby a
"progressi ve" rather than
asensi bl epol i cy.

A
dri ve among
Af ro-Asi ati cs was af oot
to repl ace UN' s Hammarskj ol d
wi thKri shnaMenon.
Warsaw
embassi es reportedthe
rel ease soonof
U2
pi l ot
Powers--part of Russi a' s
mortgageonKennedy.
Present
strongsuspi ci ons that the
U2downi ngresul tedf rom
caref ul l y-ti med, pre-Summi t
treasonwerestrengthenedby
l eaks that Powers,
"f earf ul of repri sal at homef or
hi s testi mony
duri ngthe tri al ", woul dask
Lati nAmeri canasyl um.
I tal y' s oi l ki ng,
Mattei , was upsetti ng
petrol ' s status quo i nthe Mi ddl e
East--tempti ngspend-
thri f t
Arabpotentates wi thof f ers of anoutri ght
75%i nsteadof the 50%recei vedi nthei r
Western
oi l deal s.

Russi a
was happyto seeher potenti al Western
di stri butor rout us f romMi d-East
sources.

Bri tai n' s Cai roAmbassador
Si r Harol dBeel ey (exponent of the pro-Arab
school and
onexcel l ent
terms wi thSaud' s advi sers, Abdul
Azzi zel Mouamar andShei k Abdul l ah Tari ki ) was
assi gnedthe task of
reconci l i ngNasser andKassem--andf rustrati ngthe Sovi et-I tal i an combi ne.
Thi s meant Bri tai n' s reentryi ntothe Arabworl d.

Both General andPremi er, as theysat there
at Ramboui l l et, were
wel l awareof the contradi cti ons: 1-Bri ti sh
advances woul dri deonanti -
Ameri cansenti ment; 2- progressi veandmore
openencouragement f romBri ti shLabor MPs f or
the FLN
(Front del aLi berati onNati onal e) bureauoperati ng
i nLondonunder Tuni si angui dance;
3- under-the-tabl e
agreements f or whi ch I srael woul deventual l y
pay.

ToMacthe contradi c-
ti ons were, tempti ng.

Nasser has di abetes.

Overworked, hef ears "thebl ack camel " wi l l kneel
at hi s door bef orehi s task,
creati onof anI sl ami c Empi restretchi ngf romRabat to Damascus,
i s f i ni shed.

At the center of the teeter-totter, hehopes topl ayEast agai nst West.

Andi nturn
SekouTourepl ays on
the ri val rysuchambi ti ons rai sebetweenNasser andX' krumah
.

I nl ate
' 60 Nasser' s Staf f Chi ef , Gen. Amer, carri edhi s master' s
proposi ti onto Moscow.

Anexcel l ent
sourcereports Kv' s repl y of f eredto di vi de
Mosl emAf ri cabetween
Nasser andMorocco' s
MohammedV.

Nasser woul dhavepol i ti cal ,
Mohammedrel i gi ous power wi th
a restorati onof the
cal i phate
.

Under
MoroccanCrownPri nceMoual y Hassan,
aMosl emstri ki ng f orce
woul dbe
bui l t--ostensi bl y arms depots and
bomber bases f or war agai nst
col oni al i smbut morepreci sel y
to neutral i zeRussi a' s No. 1 enemy, Spai n.

Consi deri ng al l
thi ngs, the Bri ti sh
Ambassador to
Cai ro f eel s Bri tai nhol ds agoodhand
wi thwhi chto out-bi d Moscow.
Twoi tems f rom
the Franco-Bri ti shtal ks are si gni f i cant of
Nato' s decl i ne:

1- Macmi l l an
f ormerl ywas adamant i nopposi ng
aFrench nucl ear stri ki ng f orce--now
of f ers Vi ctor bombers
to transport the FrenchA-bomb; 2- Macmi l l ansupports
I tal i anAmbassador to Washi ngton,
Manl i o Brosi o,
as Spaak' s successor to headNato.

The Bri ti sh
Forei gnof f i ce expl anati on:
crusadi ng days are over .

I f weareto negoti ate
gl obal l y wi th the Reds, Nato must not been-
cumberedwi th ami l i tant SecretaryGeneral !
Another. Ramboui l l et Meeti ng: Adenauer' s turni nthat drawi ng room
came
10
days af ter Mac-
mi l l an' s vi si t .

As he
prepared
f or
thi s vi si t Adenauer hel dtwo l etters.

Onef rom
Macmi l l an
i gnoredthe possi bi l i ty of another Rapal l o (repeti ti onof
post
Worl d
War I treaty by whi ch
Germanyturnedtowardher "tradi ti onal al l y" i nthe East, Russi a. )
Heemphasi zedGermany' s
vi tal
need
of
Great Bri tai nandwarnedagai nst Bonncounti ng onany strength unl ess Bri tai nwas
a part of i t .

Heendedbyhopi ng Herr Ehrhardt woul dsoon
benamedas Adenauer' s successor .
The other l etter, f romKhrushchev, remi ndedAdenauer but di d not
restate verbal guarantees that
no
grave
cri si s woul d
beunl eashedthi s year by Moscow.
Real i ty today i s passed-upbyl ooki ng f or al l bl ack or al l bri ght spots i ntheworl dpi cture
.

The
real i st' s obj ecti ve i s to
recogni zethe
truth, whatever i t i s, i neach event andworl dtheatre.
There areaf ewbri ght spots.

Throughout J anuary the Peki ng Bri ti sh Consul atewas
under f i re
f romthe RedChi neseMi ni stry of Forei gnAf f ai rs--chargedwi th mai ntai ni ng a two-way stream
of spi es, agi tators andi nstructors and
a
f l ow
of arms to undergroundf orces i nKwangtung.
Out of North Chi nacamereports of typhoondestructi on- i nundatedcoal mi nes andf l oodedcrops.
Val i ant Serbs
harass
Ti to -- (prevented
f romopenoutbreak bythe ref l ecti onthat Ameri canarms
andf i nanci al assi stance, i nsteadof comi ng
to thei r ai d,
woul dthen
f urni sh Ti tothe wei ght wi th
whi chto suppress them) !

Abi gger storyi nthe Ukrai ne - sabotagei s ri f e
f or the
thi rdsuccessi ve
year
.

I t i s the Ki ev- Lemberg-Odessatri angl e, si te of the al l -i mportant Ukrai nemi ssi l e l aunch-
i ng bases.

Trai nedagents maki ng useof heavy woods andmountai nhi deouts
of Rutheni ahave
knockedout the whol e commandsystemof the compl ex Ukrai ni anbases threeti mes i nthree
months.

TheUkrai ni ans are ratedamongRussi a' s most brutal f i ghters.

Theywoul dhave f ought
f or Hi tl er agai nst Stal i nhadheknown
how
to treat them.

Betweenthemand
Moscowa
merci l ess
underground
war sti l l goes on.

Leader of the secret "Banderi vtsi Uni t", Ukrai ni anNati onal i st
StepanBandera' s mysteri ous death i nBel gi umwas an
unpubl i ci zed
paragraph
i nthe compl i ci ty
between
Bel gi umCommuni sts, weari ng aSoci al i st l abel , andMoscow' s secret agents.

I t i s a
saf e
guess that Ukrai ni ansabotagehas wi pedout scores of Russi anmi ssi l e speci al i sts
who
have
di ed
mysteri ousl y.
But the worl dbal ance sheet provokes
onl y one statement--one questi on.

Taki ng the Western
Al l i es col l ecti vel y and
i ndi vi dual l y the overal l i s asl ow, unendi ng day-by-day "Operati on
Sal ami " .
The questi on?

Wi l l
we
al l owthe sl i ces to thi ckeni n
1961?
Our
subscri pti onratei s tendol l ars a year
f or tennewsl etters.

Address al l
domesti c busi ness
andsubscri pti oncorrespondence
to H. duB. Reports,

; -Cai -
-f ernta.
Address al l f orei gnbusi ness
andsubscri pti oncorrespondenceto
Hi l ai reduBerri er,
c/o Hotel Luteti a,
43Boul evardRaspai l , Pari s
6, France.
Hi l ai re duBerri er,
Correspondent
VOLUME
I I I Letter 10
March-Apri l
1961

H. duB. REPORTS

Pari s,
France
GERMANY:

I f confi rmati onwere
needed that the bi g event
of 1961 i s l i kel y to
take
pl ace
i n Germany, the
Communi st Summi t
Conference set
for
March 28
i nMoscow
suppl i ed i t .
Not
si nce March, 1960,
has thi s report
devoted a whol e i ssue to
a si ngl e country.

Then
i t
was Afri ca. Events
bore out our darkest
predi cti ons. Thi s ti me
i t i s Germany,
subj ect
of the
di scussi ons
of theWarsawPact
nathns i nMoscowas thi s i s
bei ngwri tten.

Krushchev,
i t i s
bel i eved by
the Kobl enzerstrasse
(Bonn' s Forei gn Offi ce), meant
i t when he
sai d the
Berl i n
questi onwi l l be
sol ved i n 1961.

German el ecti ons are due i n
September .
West
Berl i n' s
Soci al i st mayor,
Wi l l y Brandt, has j ust
returned fromAmeri ca, on
a tri p to
seek
the support abroad
that wi l l strengthen
hi s el ectorate
at home
.
Adenauer i s
schedul ed
to fol l owhi mon
Apri l 12.

Hi s message
:

a bl unt warni ng that
separate peace
treati es
between
East Germany
and the WarsawPact
nati ons are i n the works.
The Berl i nprobl em
was not buri ed,
eventemporari l y by the
recent West GermanRussi an
commerci al accord.
Ti med to coi nci de
wi thWest German el ecti ons
and si de-showtroubl es
around the worl d, a
fi rst cl ass showdown
i s brewi ng.

Moscow' s
hi nts that di rect tal ks
betweenMoscow,
Pari s,
London and
Washi ngton are necessary "to avoi d
troubl e over Berl i n"
are a menace pl ayto
obtai n the meeti ng
wi thKennedywhi chthe
l atter has so far been i n no hurry
to accord.
I t
woul d be a by-product
of the Berl i nprobl em' s
di si nterment . A
hypothesi s ever present
i n the
mi nds of sovi ptol ogi sts
watchi ng bothforei gn
mi ni sters and chi efs
of state converge
onMoscowfor
the super-Summi t i s the
thought that Krushchevmay
have fol l owed one of
the
cl assi c strategi es
of the col d war i n gi vi ng
the i mpressi ontwo
months ago that wi ththe
new
commerci al treaty
wi thWest Germanythe Berl i n
questi onwas buri ed
for an i ndefi ni te
peri od.

The possi Ml i ty that
Krushchev empl oyed a ruse
to encourage Kennedy
to entangl e
hi msel f
i nextri cabl y i n Laos before
l aunchi ng a newand
unexpected offensi ve
on Berl i n i s
i nl i ne wi th
the Kreml i n' s bl ow
hot, bl owcol dwar
of nerves. Bri tai n' s
awareness of the
tri p was behi nd
MacMi l l an' s sudden
tri p to Pal mBeach.
WEST BERLI N,
as West Germany sees i t, i s
the Federal Republ i c' s
secondprovi nce, some
273
square mi l es of l and
wi thapopul ati on of over
2, 200, 000, the "free
i sl and" throughwhi ch,
accordi ng to Herr
Bi eboth, Presi dent of the Refugee
Associ ati on,
thi rteenmi l l i on Germans
have
sought freedomsi nce
Worl dWar I I ' s end.

Moscow, andEast Germany,
see Berl i n as no
concern
of theWest ei ther by
l awor fact .

I denti fi cati on
wi th exposed
Berl i nhas been
the pol i ti cal
card on whi chWi l l y
Brandt, West Berl i n' s
Soci al i st mayor, has
staked hi s
chances i n the
upward cl i mb toward the
chancel l orshi p. That,
bri efl y, i s the
si tuati on.
THE CANDI DATES.

I t was i nevi tabl e that
outsi de i nfl uence shoul d
enter i n. Bri tai n
supports
Ludwi g E hard,
the Vi ce-Chancel l or and mi ni ster
of Germany economy,
as Adenauer' s successor
.
Adenauer, undermi ned
onthe muni ci pal l evel by
a mi l i tant Soci al i st
party grown out of
l abor uni ons
organi zed i npost-war Germany
at Ameri can expense, has
so far been the bedrock
of Ameri ca' s
al l i ance agai nst the east .
Franz-J oseph Strauss, the
i ndefati gabl e Mi ni ster
of Defense, the butcher' s
sonwho stood al one for
atomi c weapons and arearmed
Germany
shari ng her obl i gati ons wi thi nNATO
whenBrandt the Soci al i st
was cl amori ng for neutral i ty
Pnd di sarmament, i s an outsi der i n
the race. Ameri ca' s l eft -
Soci al i sts and the arti cul ate
l abor uni ons that i n the eyes of Europe
and Afri ca speak for Ameri ca
- backs Brandt . French
observers thought, whenAdenauer vi si ted de
Gaul l e i n earl yFebruary,
that "the ol dfox"
-vas
pl ayi ng
age
and fati gue to avoi d preci se
commi tments.

I f so, consi deri ng
the shoal s
surroundi ng hi mand the i nternati onal forces
at work agai nst hi m, the
85-year-ol d chancel l or
had
every reason.

He i s pi l oti ngthe most exposed
nati on on earth. Let us take a
l ook at
i t .
WEST
GERMANY OF TODAYhas come far fromthe rui ns
of 1944. I t i s l i kel ythat Adenauer, i n
sp e o

s age an i nfi rmi ti es, may seek reel ecti on.
Bri tai n' s support of EhrhardI
i nsi ders bel i eve,
wi l l not prevent the showdownbetweenAdenauer
and Brandt . The Germany
theywoo i s a country
gorged wi th deutschmarks, ci gars, and good
food.

Thoughnei ther
candi date woul ddare admi t
i t, fewbel i eve that ei ther East Germany
or
West honestl y wants
reuni fi cati on. West Germany' s 70 mi l l i onpeopl e,
among the most energeti c and aggressi ve
on
earth, are too bi g a mouthful for the East to safel y
swal l ow
.
AnUl bri cht (head of the
East
German government) wi th hi s pro-Peki ng radi cal i sm,
ten ti mes more powerful and
headi ng
a nati on
quadrupl ed i n popul ati on,
woul dpose a probl em
for Russi a.

TheWest German
knows that the di vi si onhas brought hi m
prosperi tywi thi nthe
West
.

That prosperi ty
has beenWest Germany' s sedati ve.

Adenauer' s pol i cy, bri efl y, i s:

desi re to i mprove
rel ati ons wi thRussi a but refusal to
modi fy hi s pol i cy. toward
theWest .

"We shal l
work",
he decl ares, "i n cl ose cooperati onwi th our
al l i es i n order to convi nce
Russi a that
she
cannot attai n the obj ecti ves she covets. We
wi l l remove any i l l usi on
that she can
di vi de
the
West and i n
parti cul ar detach West Germany
fromthe FreeWorl d. "
I t has not been easy.

Hamburg has ri senfromher
shambl es, a ci ty of neon
l i ghts and
modern bui l di ngs of marbl e
and gl ass.

Forgotten
are some 55, 000 dead.
Under a mayor
that
returned as an Ameri can l abor organi zer
and rode hi s
Soci al i st uni ons i nto
pol i ti cal
power, Hamburg; a
l i ttl e over 30 mi l es from
East Germany, has become
the arms purveyor
to revol uti oni sts
around the worl d, i ncl udi ng
the Al geri anterrori sts
and Cuba. Agents
fromEast Berl i n' s FEDERATI ON
OF WORLDUNI ONS
have i nfi l tratedHerr
Brauer' s uni ons.
FLNnetworks work openl y under
hi s protecti on, j ust
as they do i n New
York behi nd the
screen
of uni ons wi th whi ch
Bergomaster Brauer i s
associ ated.

The "German
Associ ati on for
Peace i n
Al geri a" recentl ypresented
a German Communi st
namedMul l er as "Si
Mustapha", an
authenti c
Al geri an, "tortured by the
French" .

No paper,
ei ther i n Hamburg where
Axel
Spri nger' s
huge presses devour tenthousand
tons of newspri nt a
day, or el sewhere, exposed
the hoax. Adenauer' s
determi nati on to prevent
Russi a fromspl i tti ng
theWest i s
powerl ess
agai nst the dri ve of
a powerful Soci al i st opposi ti on
and hi s own al l i es,
on the i nter-
nati onal
Soci al i st l evel , to di vi de
the Western al l i ance
hori zontal l y agai nst
i tsel f,
al ways wi th
the pi ous excuse of "fi ghti ng
Communi sm" .

Prospects
of a West Germany
wi thout
the prudent
Adenauer as a brake and under
the Soci al i st Brandt
shoul d be the subj ect
of
attenti on everybi t
as meti cul ous as that whi ch
a cauti ous i nvestor
accords an unl i sted
stock.
SANTACLAUS:
Brandt' s campai gn di d not start
l ast Chri stmas .
Whatever our press may say
of hi m, every
change of tack and apparent
contradi cti on has been
toward the end of attai n-
i ng the
chancel l orshi p. Last December he and
hi s party took advantage
of the NewYear to
fl oodWest
Germany wi th postcards
beari ng
Wi l l y
Brandt' s pi cture and
the greeti ng,
"Your future chancel l or
presents hi s wi shes for
prosperi ty and a Happy
NewYear" . Adenauer,
on recei vi ng one from
a mal i ci ous Soci al i st, repl i ed
wi th a Chri stmas card sayi ng,
"Si nce
you andMr . Brandt seemto
bel i eve i nSanta Cl aus, I
send
you
hi s pi cture wi thmy
best
wi shes
. "

I n the days fol l owi ng
Wi l l yBrandt' s March 12
arri val i nNewYork i t was
evi dent
that bel i ef i nSanta Cl aus was
not mi spl aced.

Abarrage of
publ i ci ty i npri nt
and on the
ai r waves was di rected fi rst at the
Ameri can i n the street
to convi nce hi m
that hi s i nterests repose
i n a
Germany
under Soci al i st Brandt,
and second at the German
to convi nce
hi mthat Brandt i s Ameri ca' s man.
Never was the pri nci pal tenet
of Soci al i sm
better demonstrated
: that i t i s the duty of al l
Soci al i sts to hel p i nto power
Soci al i st
governments
el sewhere. Each such government
i nstal l ed i s i n turn dutybound
to gi ve
other
Soci al i st l eaders a boost by the si mpl e tacti c
of stal l i ng i n negoti ati ons wi th
anyone el se.
For anxi ous Europeans two thi ngs
emerged fromBrandt' s j unket to Ameri ca:

(1)

Defi ni tel y,
Santa
Cl aus exi sts for the Left ;

(2)
The wave of conservati smsweepi ng Ameri ca has not
yet
reached the proporti ons of a crescendo of
protests froma country ti red of bei ngl i edto.
BRANDT' S ARRI VAL I NNEW
YORKpreceded Adenauer' s by a month
.

I f the Madi sonAvenue type of
campai gnto
sel l hi mto the Ameri can publ i c was successful ,
i t coul d onl ybe because the
Ameri can
to whomi t was beamed was as nai ve as to i ts di recti on
as anyyokel bei ng spel l -
bound by
a corn and shel l game. Back i n Germany the i nference was taci t that
i f
"Ameri ca' s
man"
i s el ected, the Ameri candemand for marks mi ght be toned down.
Vi ctor
Reuther gave
the campai gn
a send-off wi th anAmeri cans for Democrati c Acti on di nner i nWashi ngtonon
March13. Leo Cherne, under
hi s I nternati onal Rescue o

tee i denti ty (the other two
are a research organi zati on and Ameri canFri ends
of Vi etnam) presi ded over a
di nner on
March 16 i nNewYork, at whi ch Brandt was gi ven the Admi ral Byrd Award "as a free nati on
H. duB. REPORTS

March--Apri l 1961

Page
l eader" .

Thi s i s the awardwhi ch I RC, under Angi er
Bi ddl e Duke (Kennedy' s new
Chi ef
of
Protocol ) and the former Austri anSoci al i st l eader, J osephButti nger,
created and
bestowed
for
the fi rst ti me
as a propaganda gi mmi ck onSouthVi etnam' s Presi dent
Ngo Di nh
Di em
i n
February
1957.

(Overl ookedby
a cooperati ve press was the coi nci dence that
the I nter-
nati onal Rescue Commi ttee' s l eaders bestowi ng
the award onDi emal so ranDi em' s
propaganda
set-up, Ameri canFri ends of Vi etnam, and that when
Di emrepl i ed by contri buti ng
$100, 000
of
hi s
Ameri can ai d to hel p the I nternati onal Rescue
Commi ttee he was i nreal i ty
payi ng
hi s own
propagandi sts. )
I NTHECHANCELLORI ES OF WESTERNEUROPE there was
cl ose scruti ny of Brandt' s capers
i n
Amer ca, l abor-Soci al i sm' s efforts

o sewup the
Ameri can
"vote",
and the wave of gl owi ng
reports
rel ayed back to Germany to make i t contagi ous. Brandt' s medi cal
hi story, hi s
personal background,
handwri ti ng anal ysi s, statements made l ong ago
and si nce forgotten,
evenhi s horoscope, came
i nfor study bymen411i ng
to
l eave no stone unturned
that mi ght
di vul ge the secret of what makes hi m
ti ck
.

Our al l i es are not voti ng for Brandt on
the
strength
of
a mani pul ated "good press" .

I f forced to accept hi m, they want to knowwi th
what sort of man they are deal i ng.

Thei r securi ty
may depend onknowi ng
.
Brandt so wel l
as to be abl e to predi ct wi th a degree of certai nty
what he mi ght do under any gi ven
ci rcumstance
.
Our publ i c has a ri ght to the same
sort of honest i ntel l i gence report .
I f we
are
goi ng to treat wi thSoci al i st Brandt, l et
us do i t
wi th our eyes open.
THE BI OGRAPHYGOES SOMETHI NGLI KE THI S:

Germansfi rst knewhamas Herbert Ernst
Karl Frahm.
He
never kneww7o

s

a

er was.

Morn onDecember 1$, 1913. . i n the Hanseati c ci ty of
Lubeck,
as the i l l egi ti mate
son
of a shop gi rl whose hobby was nudi sm, he was brought up
by hi s grandfather .

I t was the peri od of
post-Worl dWar r vi ol ence and
revol uti on.

Such
educati on as
he
recei ved he got fromhi s stri ke agi tator
grandfather
as they werechased
fromone pl ace to another for marxi st acti vi ty.

Street brawl s, subversi on, andthe
preachi ng of vi ol ence-provoki ng hate markedhi s youth
.
Once a j udge l ooked down at the
emaci atedboy and
out of
pi ty
bought hi m
a
l oaf
of
bread.

The grandfather rej ected i t
wi th
the
i nj uncti on that
no
grandson of
hi s woul daccept al ms froma mi ni on of the bour-
geoi si e
.
ASoci al i st
j ournal i st named
Leber
fi rst i ntroduced the young ruffi an, to books.
He was never, however, abl e
to
di sci pl i ne hi s di sci pl e' s thi nki ng or acti ons.

I n the
underground vi ol ence of the pre-Hi tl er years, Frahmdi sappeared andWi l l yBrandt emerged.
By
1933
thi ngs became too hot for
hi m
under the name of Brandt and he fl ed to Norway
wi ththe
mi stress of hi s
youth,
from
Lubeck.

Natural i zati on was easi er for a forei gner
marri ed to
a
Norwegi an, so Brandt
dropped
the
Lubeck gi rl and
marri ed one
from
Osl o.
Armedwi th hi s newNorwegi anpassport he fol l owed
the
onl y
career
he had ever known,
that
of
a cl andesti ne, semi -Communi st agi tator i n
Czechosl ovaki a,
Hol l and, Spai n, France,
andEngl and, duri ng the cri ti cal pre-war years i nwhi ch the seeds of the set-backs
we
have suffered si nce were bei ng pl anted. Terse reports that wi l l never be brought
out
as l ong as the West must, wi l l y-ni l l y, get al ong wi th Brandt attest to tal ents the hummi ng
publ i c rel ati ons machi nes i n Ameri ca are not menti oni ng.
Then came Apri l 9,
1940,
whenGerman shi ps appeared i n the fj ord of Osl o and
Norway was
Pt war . The German she hadshel tered fel t
under no obl i gati on to fi ght for Ki ng Haakon.
He fl ed to the i nteri or, where he
was cornered i n
a
snow-bl ocked val l ey i n earl y May.
There, whenthe fi ghti ng
was
over and the
anonymi ty to be gai ned by bei ng capturedwi th
a
bunch of sol di ers
was preferabl e to arrest and i nvesti gati on as a ci vi l i an,
Brandt
donnEd a. Norwegi an
uni form.

The Germans were fool ed, turned hi ml oose after
an easy
cppti vi ty, and off came
the uni form.

Brandt fl ed. , not to ral l yto the fl ag
that had
saved hi mtwi ce,
but to j oi nthe Soci al i sts i n Sweden.
The Chri sti an Democrats i n
Germany
have
si nce accusedBrandt of fi ghti ng agai nst
the fatherl and. There i s no truth i n
thi s
accusati on
; i f a sti gma exi sts agai nst Brandt i t i s that
he refused to defend the
l and
that took hi mi nwhenhe hadno hopes of
ever seei ng
Germany
agai n, gave. hi ma
passport
whi ch opened the rest of Europe to
hi m, andprotected hi mby i ts uni formwhen
hi s game
was up.

Onl y the fact that
he i s a l abor-Soci al i st saves hi m
fromuncompl i mentary
com-
pari sons
wi th Serge Rubenstei n, the sl acker .
H. du B. REPORTS

March-Apri l 1961

P
age
I t was from
a seat i n a Soci al i st
cl ubhouse i nStockhol m
that Wi l l ywatched
the war
.

He
l auded the Russi an
war effort,
returned to Osl o whenthe shooti ng
was over, and
si x
months after
Germany' s capi tul ati on
j oi ned the Soci al i st
streamconvergi ng on
West
Germany
as a Norwegi an
j ournal i st .

The fol l owi ng
year he went to Germany
agai n, thi s
ti me
i n an
offi ci al posi ti on, as
a press attache' wi th
aNorwegi anmi l i tarymi ssi on
.

Ameri can
l abor
del egates
and offi ci al s
wi th vague ti tl es,
i mbued wi th the fervor of the
Roosevel t
years,
were swarmi ng
over what was l eft
of free Germany.
Soci al -Democracy, as they
cal l ed
i t,
was on the ri se, and
i n
1947,
over two
years after Hi tl er' s fal l ,
Brandt became
German
agai n.

I n 1949 West
Berl i n el ectedhi mto
the Bundestag and i n 1957
he became mayor
of
West Berl i n, wi ththe
spotl i ght on hi msel f,
standard-bearer for the
machi ne.
Schumacher,
the
wi l y strategi st of the
party, was si ckl y.

Schmi d was obese. Ol l enhauer
wi thhi s
body of a deformed gnome
was repul si ve. Wehner
had both hi s face and an
unheal thy
Communi st
record agai nst hi m. By
contrast, the athl eti c young
Brandt had a ready
gri n and al l
the
attri butes
of charmnecessary
to a pol i ti ci an i n our
TVage;

al so, he was
experi enced
i n
ri di ng currents.

At that
ti me the partywas sti l l
uncompromi si ngl yxevol uti onary,
commi tted
to the nati onal i zati on
of al l economy, the
l evel i ng of soci ety,
neutral i sm,
di sarmament,
and no mi l i tary servi ce
. The repl y to
demands for a rearmedGermany
assumi ng
a share of responsi bi l i ty
wi thi nNATOwas a
ca-11 for i nsubordi nati on
.

Suddenl y
there came a. change.

The exact date at whi ch the
whi sper was put i n
Brandt' s ear that
Ameri can l abor coul d not
ral l yAmeri canpubl i c opi ni on
behi nd hi mon these
terms i s
unknown
.

That he was i nformed
i n no uncertai n terns
that hi s pol i cy
was unpal atabl e
to
the
Ameri canpubl i c there i s no
doubt .

Ti me al one
wi l l tel l whether the
change of garb
was permanent,
or l i ke the donni ng
of the Norwegi an
uni formi n
1940.

I n
ei ther case,
the
vol t face was compl ete.

Overni ght orders were
gi ven to pi pe down on
Marxi sm.

No

-
more tal

a
out
nati onal i zati on.

More
Vol kswagons, washi ng
machi nes and securi ty
for
the masses became
the newl i ne.
Ci rcumstances for the
sort of campai gn to whi ch the
Ameri can publ i c i s
bei ng subj ected
i n the
pl ay to acqui re our
arti cul ate backi ng for
Brandt hate beeni deal
. Though l i vi ng
under
a suspended sword she di d not
put there and from
whi ch she cannot move,
West Berl i n
must be
regarded as heroi c,
and
so her
mayor must be a
hero, too.

I t
woul d
appear that
the cards are
stacked agai nst Ehrhard, the
father of West
Germanprosperi tyy
for the
successi on.
The best we can hope for i s
the re-el ecti on
of the chancel l or whose
days
are numbered but
who has gi venus 7
di vi si ons wi thi n NATO
and promi sed 12 by1963
whi l e
the manour
uni onl eaders and l abor
Soci al i sts are seeki ng
to i mpose onGermany and
us
was preachi ng
neutral i smand i nsubordi nati on
.
Adenauer i s due
to reachWashi ngton onApri l
12
.
What we wi l l
gi ve hi mto showhi s
el ectorate,
andEast Germany, remai ns to be seen.
What we knowof the manwho
sooner or
l ater seems due to
succeedhi mi s not encouragi ng.

The odds, . as Krushchev' s
threatened
cri si s approaches, mi ght
have been i mproved for the West
hadthere beenavoi ce
powerful
enough to tel l the Ameri can
Left
to
stay out of forei gn
pol i ti cs. That, i n sum, i s the
pi cture.

Germany, i n the months
ahead, i s the pl ace to watch.
The subscri br-r wi l l note that thi s i ssue
i s for March and Apri l , due
to the fact that
your correspondent has beentravel i ng over the
past two months . An extra i ssue wi l l
be put out i n August to compensate for the j oi ni ng
of March and Apri l . Address al l
domesti c busi ness to Mr . J ames H. Bal l , H. duB.
Reports, Box
855y
Hunti ngton, I ndi ana.
Address al l forei gn busi ness and subscri pti on correspondence
to Hi l ai re du Berri er,
Hotel
Luteti a, 43 Bl vd. Raspai l , Pari s 6, France.
Hi l ai re du Berri er, Correspondent
J ames
H. Bal l , Managi ng Edi tor
VOLUME
I V
LETTER
2
MAY 1961

H. du B. REPORTS

Par i s, France
APRI L
1961
brought posi ti on-crumbl i ngs i n Afri ca and Asi a, a maj or
set-back i n Cuba,
and
tragedy i n France. Emergi ng fromthe l atter : reaffi rmati on
of the West' s determi nati on
to destroy i tsel f .
THE CUBA I NVASI ON. Reacti on of
a
non-Communi st, non-Soci al i st French
offi ci al i n the
fi rst encouragi ng hours :

"Thank
God
Ameri ca
i s movi ng before Peki ng has the
bomb: " Over
hi s desk for months. had passed reports on del i veri es
of Russi an tanks and MI LS,
pi l ots due
home fromCzechosl ovaki a, Russi an Z-type submari nes berthed i n Cuban creeks
and i nl ets,
and
presence
of
nucl ear-powered submari nes,
17
of whi ch are known to have come
down the
Whi te
Seaways of
Sereri odvi nska si nce
J anuary
.

Acti vi tywas reported among the
Chi nese
mi l i tary mi ssi on i n Havana' s l uxuri ous Ri vi era Hotel
.

Russi ans
pursued paral l el ways
i n
the Hotel Capri . Leaks di scl osed stand-byorders at Ameri ca' s
ex-base i nMorocco to re-
fuel an Al bani a-Morocco-Dakar-Cuba ai rl i ft . Agroup of Ameri can negroes
i n
a
Pari s hotel ,
l i nki ng Al geri an terrori sts, pro-Castro Reds, and a negro Mosl em
group
i n
Harl em, empha-
si zed the spread of the Cuban abscess, need to drai n i t before Chi na has her
bomb and
Russi a' s posi ti on at
center
of
the teeter-totter
i n Operati on Bl ackmai l i s establ i shed.
The j ol t, to
Europeans, was that we became i nvol ved
i n
such
an adventure wi thout bei ng
prepared to
carry i t
to
a successful concl usi on. The charge, by
al l but Communi sts and
Soci al i sts, was ti mi di ty, not i mprudence. Bl amed was an i ntel l i gence agencywhi ch has
sacri fi ced effecti veness
by recrui ti ng excl usi vel y
fromthe Left .

Deducti on of the
experts when Castro
offered
to
negoti ate
:

Peki ng and Moscow
had passed the word to the
boys
i n the Ri vi era and Capri , "Tel l Castro to stal l for ti me. " The
crowni ng i ndi cati on
of Ameri can pol i ti cal bankruptcy, to Europe' s capti ve i nvestors, came
when Kennedy cal l ed
I ke
and Ni xon, for whomno word was vi l e enough i n l ast November' s campai gn
based on the
sl ump i n Ameri can presti ge, and asked for advi ce. The revol t of the French
general s
shi fted the scene.
AFRENCHUPRI SI NG, to hal t a pol i cy l eadi ng to l oss of Al geri a (and the Sahara), was fore-
cast i n our Report of November-December ; barri ngthi s, a worse one after a permanent
l oss
i n Al geri a, when the economi c and psychol ogi cal effects hi t France, seemed i n the cards .
The fi rst has been tri ed
and
fai l ed
.
Ayear ago l oss of Al geri a was unthi nkabl e; nowthe
publ i c has been
condi ti oned
to
accept
i t
. The masses of
France were apatheti c when the
test came. What
has
been
pi ctured
as
overwhel mi ng support for
de Gaul l e came fromthe
Communi st
and Soci al i st Left . Out of the vi ctory a greater danger may
have come. The
Moscowdi spatch of Apri l 26 stated that the deci si ve rol e i n the defeat
of "fasci sts" was
pl ayed
by the worki ng cl ass whi ch "wrecked the ul tra col oni al i st adventure by
means of
thei r
mass meeti ngs, stri kes. , and demonstrati ons"
;
PREMI ERDEBRZcal l ed on the
popul ati on
of
Pari s, aski ng
them
to
ri se, to fl ock to any
poi nt where the parachuti sts
mi ght
l and
and di ssuade
themfromfool hardy acti on. On the
surface thi s strategy l ooked
good:

a humanshi el d between the armed camps .

The Communi st
apparatus sprang i nto
acti on. I ts l eaders had been at thei r posts
from
the mi nute
news
of the
outbreak reached Pari s . Debre' s cal l to acti on was al l theywanted.

I n a matter
of mi nutes
streets of Communi st-domi nated vi l l ages
and suburbs surroundi ng Pari s were
cri ss-crossed
by muni ci pal care wi th
l oud-speakers, cal l i ng
the popul ati on to assembl e i n
town
hal l s. St . Deni s,
Al fortvi l l e, Panti n, St . Ouen, I vry, Aubervi l l i ers, --the
"Red
Bel t"
was mobi l i zed i n
l ess than an hour .

The cl andesti ne apparatus of the party cal l ed
for
amass upri si ng; workers'
mi l i ti as, wi th headquarters i n town hal l s, were formed and
armed. Communi st Youth
members were di spatched to non-Communi st mai ri es
(muni ci pal
centers)
and to the Mi ni stry of the
I nteri or, where M. Mal raux was harangui ng the vol un-
teers
. The i dea: to enl arge
Communi st suppl y of arms. Mani festos began to
appear :
"Workers,
democrats, ari se en
masse;
stay
mobi l i zed. "

"Formsol i d anti -fasci st commi ttees
;
assembl e,
demonstrate i n l oca

es
and factori es, organi ze for the struggl e. " "I nsi st
that the
government gi ve you arms
. "
H
.
du
B.
REPORTS

May, 1961

Page 2
THE UNI TEDSOCI ALI ST PARTY,
not to
be outdone, rai sed i ts cry of "Fasci st
menace",
cal l ed for an upri si ng of parti sans to fi ght
i n the streets. On Monday afternoon
a
tri al stri ke- a testi ng of the potenti al
l evers- brought tenmi l l i on workmen
to thei r
feet and Pari s to a standsti l l . Al l uni ons,
reachi ng through Mendes-France' s
extreme-
Left Soci al i sts and i ncl udi ng Ameri can-supported
Force Ouvri ere, answered the Communi st
summons . Thorez and company, expl oi ti ng the psycro
.gl ca cl i mate as far as i t woul d
go,
hel d the wheel s of command. What was happeni ng:
Under pretext of protecti ng France and
supporti ng de
Gaul l e, the
Red apparatus
was prepared to out-pace the
government and sei ze
power .

The forei gn press cal l ed the response
to Debreand de Gaul l e overwhel mi ng
.
Actual l y, as Moscowboasted, the overwhel mi ng response
was froma Communi st-l ed
Left,
anxi ous for bl ood i n the streets and a chance to ri de de
Gaul l e as far as he was goi ng.
The thousands j ammi ng subway openi ngs on the afternoon of Apri l 23,
wai ti ng for the
test
stri ke to
end,
were onl y an
i ndi cati on
of the new"popul ar front" i n the
maki ng.

Auto-
mobi l es cal l i ng Communi st
shock troops to arms i n Bobi gny, wi th kl axons
shri eki ng, and
mobi l i zi ng
the Red bel t at ci ty hal l s, l eft the
party apparatus' secret weapon
undi s-
cl osed, awai ti ng
the
moment for the one-stri ke
showdown for whi ch i t i s bei ng
hel d.
WHENTHE REAL TEST COMES HERE I S WHAT WI LL HAPPEN. Three radi o
taxi l i nes serve Pari s,
di spatched and di rected by radi otel ephone froma central stati on. One has
an Al esi a
number_, another i s Port Royal
.
The thi rd i s cal l ed COTAXand di spl ays
tel ephone number
"BOL
77-77" .
Nei ther Mr . Fi el di ng nor
any
newspaper has tol d passi ng touri sts and
trust-
i ng Pari si ans that the COTAX
fl eet
i s
owned by
the
French
Communi st Party, and that the
HQfromwhi ch i t i s
di rected i s
al so a
pol i ti cal one. Pi cked
dri vers knowthe assembl y
poi nts
i n any di stri ct when the cal l comes over the ai r. Thei r
j ob: to pi ck up and
transport 5, 000 shock troops for sei zure of the ci ty.
THE AFTERMATH. The Communi st-domi nated front that has demonstrated i ts "l oyal ty"
agai nst
men i t wanted to l i qui date took ful l advantage of the occasi on.

I gnored by
a duped Ameri -
ca
as arrests mounted i n France and Al geri a was the fact that those who woul d be
the West' s
strength i n
a cl ash wi th the East were bei ng el i mi nated whi l e the i ron was
hot . GENERAL
CHALLE,
the center of the "fasci st" storm, was never a man of the ri ght .

He was i n-
scri bed i n the French Secti on of the I nternati onal Soci al i st Party. At the ti me of
Suez
he was Soci al i st Guy Mol l et' s mi l i tary
advi sor .
He
had
no ambi ti ons to govern. He was
an excel l ent sol di er, dedi cated to
an archai c pri nci pl e
that men gi vi ng l oyal ty fromthe
bottomupare enti tl ed to l oyal ty
fromthe top down. For si x years
FLNterrori sts had
threatened Al geri ans,
"J oi n us nowor have your throats cut when the French
abandon you
as they
di d El Gl aoui e' s fri ends i n Morocco. " The Al geri ans turned to French commanders
.
These, on orders fromPari s, repl i ed, "I
gi ve you
my word of honor, we wi l l stand by you. "
I t
became harder to cl ose thei r eyes as every
day
made i t more cl ear that de Gaul l e was
about to wri te off Al geri a
.

Dai l y
Chal l e and the army had
to
meet
Al geri ans and Europeans
to whom
they had pl edged protecti on
.

The pol i ti ci ans
on
whose
assurances they had made
personal
commi tments were ei ther out of
power or had washed thei r hands
of the
affai r .
Of
course, Chal l e coul d
have commi tted sui ci de. But i t woul d have accompl i shed nothi ng
for the Al geri ans . So,
and herei n l i es the tragedy, the army' s fi nest el ements attempted
sui ci de for an
abstracti on cal l ed honor . No attempt was made to bri ng Al geri ans and
European
ci vi l i ans i nto the fi ght . Brought out by Chal l e' s hopel ess gesture was l assi tude
of the Center
and Ri ght, as wel l as mi l i tancy of an unobstructed, uni ted Left
.
Chal l e
took ful l
responsi bi l i ty and surrendered. As
the purge got under way, Bri tai n' s Soci al i st
Sunday
OBSERVERtook up the
"fasci st" cry, procl ai med, "De Gaul l e di sbands crack uni ts,
200 offi cers, hundreds of ci vi l i ans
arrested. Never was democracy i ngreater danger than
l ast
weekend. " Ameri ca
was bl asted i n the same i ssue for feari ng a Communi st
government
i n Cuba. Your correspondent
fears that democracy' s bi g
i ssue today i s the danger ahead.
I f
we l ose, thi s "vi ctory" wi l l
have paved the way.
THE
SCENE SHI FTS TOLAOS
ANDSOUTHVI ETNAM.
Laos now, South Vi etnaml ater,
are about to
go. May 12,
date set for the Geneva
conference to guarantee
Laos' neutral i ty, wi l l fi nd
Vi et Cong (Communi st)
troops hol di ng
vi tal poi nts of the country
. Russi a
wi l l
hol d three
trumpcards: strategi c
possessi on of
terri tory, Soupphana Vong
and Souvanna Phouma.
H.
du B.
REPORTS

May, 1961

Page 3
I NTERNATI ONALI ZATI ONOF THE
LAOS C0I 7LI CT i s
the outcome of SEATOfai l ure
i n
Bangkok
i n
March. SEATOfai l ed because CI Aand the
State Department pl ayed agai nst
Phouma when he
was not under mortgage to Russi a, found the pri ce
too hi gh when i t came to
accepti ng hi m
as l esser of two evi l s after Moscowand Peki ng had hi mi n debt
. Lord Home carri ed
l i ttl e
wei ght when he sai d Bri tai n woul d stand by her commi tments .
Authori ti es esti mated
Bri tai n
coul d contri bute about 4000 men, None
bel i eved that Ameri ca, who woul d
not bomb Yal u
bri dges i n 1950 when Chi na was weak, woul d
confront Chi na now. Out
of
the
Geneva Confer-
ence wi l l come a temporary pause, sugar-coated
as neutral i ty. Kruschchev seems
l i ttl e
i ncl i ned to humi l i ate the l ost too far now,
wi shi ng to keep East-West rel ati ons
at a
poi nt where l i berty of acti on wi l l remai n hi s . He
wi l l
accept
a compromi se that wi l l gi ve
hi m
vi ctory whenhe
wants i t, probabl y
when he i s ready to rake i n Vi etnamchi ps,
too.
SOUTHVI ETNAMI S RI PE FOR
A
REDFOLLOW-UP PUNCH. At Worl d War I I end General Phi l l i p
Gal l agher was sent to I ndo-Chi na wi th a Shanghai Russi an for
a pol i ti cal advi sor and a
sl i ppery Vi etnamese named Le Xuan as i nterpreter . Mi ssi on:
to i mpl ement U. S. pol i cy,
i . e. , support Moscow' s man, Ho chi Mi nh, agai nst France.
Le
Xuan ten years
l ater was
hawki ng memoi rs of ni ne years i n whi ch he cl ai med he was duped i nto spyi ng for Ameri ca
i n Vi etnam, Thai l and,
Swi tzerl and, Germany
and Spai n. (He has si nce been re-empl oyed
i n
U. S. servi ce. ) He tol d i n these memoi rs howhe had hel ped form
AMEMERI CA1$-VI ETNAM
FRI ENDSHI P ASSOCI ATI ONas a propaganda front for Ho chi Mi nh.
Ho, whomAmeri ca supported for
a
ti me as a sol uti on for Vi etnam, was educated i n Moscow' s
Ori ent Uni versi ty, and had
been
expel l ed
from
Hong Kong i n
1931
as head of the worl d
revol uti onary movement i n
Southeast
Asi a.

OSS men opposed to backi ng hi m were ruth-
l essl y dropped
by the organi zati on, whi l e those who eased them
out went on to fi nd posi -
ti ons i n CI Aas
"speci al i sts i n Southeast Asi a affai rs" .
As
these
"speci al i sts"
were
proved wrong
by events, they went to greater and greater l engths to prove themsel ves
ri ght .

Entrenched behi nd offi ci al fi l es, smeari ng the menwho had seen the truth
and
chal l engeabl e by no one, they sat out the struggl e whi l e Southeast Asi a fl oundered.
When Korea came, these men l ay doggo for a whi l e. AMERI CAN-VI ETNAMFRI ENDSHI P ASSOCI A-
TI ON, whosemembershi p read l i ke
a
rol l eal l of subversi on, di sappeared wi thout a ri ppl e.
Ameri can l abor (see NewLeader, J une 27, 1955) deci ded to push Ngo di nh Di em, brother
of
Vi etnam' s l abor l eader . AMERI CANFRI ENDS OF VI ETNAM, beari ng
no
rel ati onshi p to fri end-
shi p for the country
but run by
a smal l
group
of acti vi sts determi ned to i mpose Di em
as rul er,
appeared.

I n J une,
1956,
they hel d ameeti ng i n Washi ngton
to si ng Di em' s
prai ses . Pri nci pal speakers were Senator Mansfi el d, referred to i n HARPER' S
of
J anuary
1956
as Di em' s "godfather", and Senator Kennedy.
Di scouragi ng reports soon dri fted back to
Washi ngton,
but so l i ttl e i nterested were
AMERI CANFRI ENDS OF VI ETNAM' s l eaders,
Angi er
Bi ddl e Duke, Austri an Soci al i st J oseph
Butti nger, and General
J ohn W. O' Dani el i n knowi ng what was goi ng
on
i n the country i n
whi ch they
were meddl i ng that, i n earl y 1957, they refused mai l del i very of a "Bl ack
Book" on Di em, put out
by
the
l argest anti -Communi st party
i n
South Vi etnam. Senator
Mansfi el d has si nce been
conspi cuous on commi ttees assi gned to i nvesti gate hi s "godson' s"
country. Angi er Bi ddl e Duke
i s Presi dent Kennedy' s Chi ef of Protocol .
LAOS' FALL WI LL MAKE
MAI NTENANCE OF DI EMI MPOSSI BLE WI THOUTMI LI TARY I NTERVENTI ON.

Here
i s the si tuati on
where we wi l l be fi ghti ng: LI FE correspondent Stan Karnow
wri tes i n
TI CREPORTER,
J anuary 19, 1961, that Communi sts
are
ki l l i ng
about 800 peopl e a month i n
Vi etnam, that
roads are unsafe wi thout escort,
and
that mai n
arteri es l eadi ng i nto Sai gon
are often
cl osed.

Unpopul ari ty of
Di emand hatred of- hi s fami l y have ai ded a
return
of
"ni ght
rul e" by the
Vi etmi nh (nowVi et Cong) . Both Karnowand REPORTER
rej ected warni ngs
that
such a si tuati on
was devel opi ng i n
1956,
whenthere
was yet ti me to save the
country. REPORTER' S
authori ty then was
Darrel Berri gen, edi tor of THE BANGKOKWORLD,
who, i n 1944,
145,
was defami ng Chi ang
Kai -shek i n SATURDAY EVENI NGPOST. On
August 22,
1957, when Di em' s
Bangkok vi si t so
enraged
the
Thai peopl e that Premi er Pi bul
Songgram
H. du B
.
REPORTS

May,
1961

Page 4
dared not
vi si t the ol d capi tal wi th hi m
and j ournal i sts were
searched for
revol vers
before bei ng al l owed
i nto hi s press conference,
USI S di spatches
were waxi ng
fatuous over
hi mi n Berri gents
BANGKOKWORLD. An i nqui ri ng
commi ttee mi ght ask
i f the I nformati on
Agency whose funds are
provi ded for the express
purpose of sel l i ng
Ameri ca had set
up
Chi ang' s
arch enemy i n the
BANGKOKWORLDi norder to
sel l Ngo di nh Di em
.

Some future
commi ttee
may pi n-poi nt the desk i n
USI Afromwhi ch a phone
cal l was made
to NEWS OF
THE
DAY i n NewYork,
i n
1956,
requesti ng
the di smi ssal of a Vi etnamese
who had
wri tten a
l etter to
WASHI NGTONPOST and CHRI STI AN
SCI ENCEMONI TORpredi cti ng
everythi ng
that has
occurred. Mr . Karnow
observed i n
REPORTERthat Di em' s brother Nhu
runs a cl andesti ne
organi zati on, "THE
REVOLUTI ONARY LABORPARTY",
wi th 70, 000 mem, ers
"i nfi l trated i nto
factori es, vi l l ages, government
offi ces, army uni ts,
school s and newspapers,
where they
spend part ofthei r ti me
col l ecti ng i nformati on
about thei r compatri ots.
Madame Nhu
commands the l adi es' auxi l i ary"
.

I n hi s next breath
Mr
.
Karnowsays that there
i s not a
si ngl e shred of evi dence that
Nhu
and
hi s wi fe are the heart
of most corrupti on. i n
the
country. Howcoul d there be, wi th
70, 000 i nformers wai ti ng
to add anyone who opens hi s
mouth
to the 40, 000 pri soners known to be
rotti ng i nthe country' s
"re-educati on camps"?
DI EM' S
RE--ELECTI ONi n Apri l , 1961, was hai l ed
as
a
vi ctory. Val i d Nati onal i st
l eaders
had been dri ven
i nto exi l e or had di sappeared. Phan quang
Dan, whomDi emnamed
as hi s
"l egal opposi ti on" i n
1957,
has not been seen si nce
November, i s bel i eved
to have di ed
under torture. TI ME (Apri l
21, 1961) quotes Col . Phamngoc
Thao: "We tol d the peopl e
that i f they di d not vote
they woul d have troubl e getti ng j obs and
hel p fromthe
govern-
ment . " "We" means Nhu' s force of 70, 000
i nformers, run by Col .
Thao, formerl y Ho chi
Mi nh' s I ntel l i gence Chi ef .

The
hel p dangl ed before thevoter was
Ameri can ai d.

I n the
ri ce paddi es we "bought" Di em' s
re-el ecti on. WASHI NGTONPOST (Mar .
11, 1961) reported
approvi ngl y that a NewYork publ i c rel ati ons man was
hel pi ng Di em' s campai gn.
THE
MOST
SHOCKI NGPART OF OURI NVOLVEMENT i n thi s di ctator-control l ed
country (to
whi ch
we have gi ven ai d esti mated by
LI FE May 13, 1957) at X400 mi l l i on
yearl y) i s yet to be
exposed.

An honest i nvesti gati on woul d
have to fi nd out who hel d
the l i d downon i nfor-
mati on, and who packed the
fi l es wi th reports di scredi ti ng every
Ameri canwho tri ed
to
warn Ameri ca before i t was
too
l ate; haw
the J usti ce Department was drawn
i nto a maneuver
to get a man whose reports on events i n
South Vi etnamwere correct,
and the coi nci dence
that Mr . Li ncol n Brownel l , brother of the Attorney
General , was one of the
l eadi ng
Ameri cans doi ng profi tabl e busi ness i n Sai gon at
the ti me
.
London
SUNDAY TI MES corres
pondent Ri chard Hughes sums i t
ups

"One thi ng i s
certai n.

Whether or not
Presi dent Di em
deci des to yi el d to popul ar concessi ons for more l i berty, the
proj ected i nternati onal
conference on the future of Laos wi l l be futi l e unl ess i t broadens
the scope of i ts agenda
to i ncl udethe co-rel ated but graver probl emof South Vi etnam. "
THE SCENE:

QUI TEXE, ANGOLA, shortl y after 7 A. M. onMarch 15, 1961.

Amerchant was
pushed
toward a rear door by hi s col ored
empl oyee,
who
cri ed,
"Go qui ckl y; they have
come
to ki l l
youl p The massacre, careful l y pl anned and
synchroni zed, had started. What
had seemed a usual morni ng crowd of customers became fanati cal
; nati ves shouted and drew
kni ves
to
cut throats and ri p open stomachs of women, chi l dren, and men.

I n nei ghbori ng
vi l l ages and
farms the story was repeated.

Terrori smhad hi t the
col ony where nothi ng
ever
happened and di scri mi nati on was non-exi stent .

The merchant saved byhi s servant
was
no unusual
case. The Bai l andu tri be remai ned l oyal , si gned i ts own death warrant by
taki ng
countl ess
ri sks to carry messages and save settl ements.

Cryi ng babi es betrayed the
women
and
chi l dren hi dden i n Madi mba. Navol a was
wi ped
out by 300 savages, drugged and whi pped
to frenzy by thei r sorcerers
. Behi nd the pri mi ti ve brutal i ty an
expert i ntel l i gence
servi ce mani fested
i tsel f, di recti ng kni fe-armed bands on centers where resi stance was
weak, usi ng
trai ned forces wi th automati c weapons el sewhere; co-ordi nati ng gueri l l a
rai ds over
a 300mi l e corri dor down whi ch arms were pouri ng fromKasavubu' s Congo.

Out
of the
atroci ti es came revol uti on' s fi rst requi si te: hatred between bl acks and whi tes.
H. du B. REPORTS

may,
1961

Page-
Antagoni sms of nei ther cl ass
nor col or had exi sted
previ ousl y.

They had to be
i ntro-
duced. The
UN
and the
l i beral press al i gned themsel ves
agai nst Portugal ,
i gnori ng cause
and effect and the arti fi ci al
foundati on of the
struggl e
.
Sai d Premi er Sal azar
i n
Li sbon. , "There are those
to whomraci al hatred i s
onl y a cri me agai nst bl acks. "
THE FACTORS:

To the north of Angol a i s the
Congo, whose BAkongo
peopl e speak the
same
tongue
.
Congo l eaders dreamof formi ng
a Bakongo Federati onheaded by
themsel ves whi ch
woul d restore
the Bakongo empi re of the 15th
century.

I n preparati on a
UNI ONOF THE
ANGOLA PEOPLES ai as set
up
i nLeopol dvi l l e, an underground
organi zati on trai ned.
Pl ans
i ncl uded terrori smsurpassi ng the Mau- Mau
. Fol l owi ng Congo i ndependence
acti vi ty i n-
creased.

By September 1960 the
Leopol dvi l l e cel l was publ i shi ng a fortni ghtl y
paper,
"VOI CE OF THE ANGOLANATI ON", i n four l anguages, and pl anni ng
a radi o stati on
to be
fi nanced by Ghana, Gui nea and Nasser' s Egypt .
SALAZARhad di scussed stormwarni ngs wi th Franco at Parador de
Meri da on J une 20,
1960
.
Wi thi n the framework of an I beri anMi l i tary Pact the two l eaders
put thei r dossi ers
on
the tabl e. Spani sh entry i nto NATO, rel ati ons wi th Ameri ca, subversi on
on the I beri an
Peni nsul a were di scussed.

Sal azar reported that agents of THE AMERI CAN
COMMI TTEE ON
AFRI CA, Frank Montero and . Wi l l i amSchei man, had establ i shed contacts wi th subversi ve
el ements i n Angol a i nMarch,
1960
.

Bl oody ri ots
fol l owed shortl y after .
ONOCTOBER3, 1960, Portuguese Forei gn Affai rs Mi ni ster Marcel l o Mathi as
went to Pari s
for a four- day tal k. Mathi as asked what to do about Ameri can- di rected subversi on,
such
as the Montero- Schei man vi si t to Angol a.

Spani sh- Portuguese notes di scl osed
that Franco
was i ncensed over undercover agents of State Department contacti ng hi s underground
opposi
ti on to esti mate chances of hi s fal l i ng.

I beri an revol uti oni sts, accordi ng
to Franco and
Sal azar, are bei ng coddl ed.
SUCHWERE THE CONSI DERATI ONS I NLI SBONas the
pattern
of the Angol a outbreak became
cl ear .
Three acti ons emerge as l eaders i n the bl ood- bath: Members
of Congo' s Force Publ i que,
who took to the brush, beari ng
huge
suppl i es of arms; Afri can and
European Communi sts;
and Sal azar' s enemi es, who hoped to harness bl ack vi ol ence
and use i t agai nst Li sbon.
Russi a has achi eved two obj ecti ves: Raci al peace i n Angol a, based
on centuri es of
assi mi l ati on, has cracked
.
Four mi l l i on peopl e, i ncl udi ng 350, 000 whi tes and
140, 000
assi mi l ated
bl acks, have been pi tted agai nst
each other by the cl assi c tacti c
of drawi ng
bl ood
.

Another
wedge has
been
dri ven
i t NATO.

And
our l ease of the Azores base
from
Portugal expi res next
year .
Thi s newsl etter
gi ves permi ssi on for re- pri nti ngwi th credi t l i ne.
Subscri bers
pl ease note that thi s i ssue i s VOLUME I V Letter 2. The March- Apri l 1961
i ssue was i ncorrectl y marked VOLUME I I I
Letter
10
and shoul d have been
VOLUME I VLetter 1.
As onl y
9
l etters were
publ i shed under
VOLUME I I I , 11
l etters
wi l l
be publ i shed
under
VOLUME
I Vto compensate and
to gi ve the subscri ber
10
l etters for the subscri pti on pri ce
of
$10
per year .
Address al l
domesti c busi ness to J ames H. Bal l , H.
du
B. REPORTS,
P.
0.
Box 855,
Hunti ngton,
I ndi ana.
Address
al l
forei gn busi ness and subscri pti on correspondence to
Hi l ai re du Berri er, Hotel
Luteti a, 43 Bl vd. Raspai l , Pari s 6, France
.
Hi l ai re du Berri er, Correspondent
J ames H. Bal l , Managi ng Edi tor
VOLUME I V LETTER
3
J UNE
1961

H. -
du B. REPORTS

Pari s,
France
Actual l y
the publ i c was
apatheti c as the
bi g state
vi si ts got under way.
De
Gaul l e went
to Bonn,
Kennedy to
Pari s, Vi enna and
London.
Fl ag- l i ned streets,
securi ty
measures and
the ocean
of newspri nt
l ent an ai r
of gai ety.
Peopl e caught i t,
fl eeti ngl y, but
they di d
not
respond as they
have before.
They have ceased
to expect
much fromsuch
encounters
and they
were not
di sappoi nted.
THE
MAGHREB. El sewhere
there were ampl e
cl ues to the
next bi g headache
the West, and
Ameri ca
i n parti cul ar,
i s bui l di ng
up for i tsel f .
Tuni si a' s Bourgui ba
went to Ameri ca
.
i n
mi d- May, was gi ven
red- carpet
treatment- - but the
si gni fi cance of hi s
voyage was
over-
l ooked.

Smothered may
be
a
better word.
Bourgui ba J uni or
spel l ed i t out i n
hi s radi o
broadcast
fromWashi ngton.

"My
father", he
sai d, "wi l l not refuse
the presi dency
of the
uni ted
Maghreb i f i t
i s offered to hi m. "
The reason for Bourgui ba' s
tri p, the
game afoot,
and the
troubl e ahead for the
West were al l i n that
l i ne. Ameri ca
refused to read
i t .
Maghreb comes
fromthe Arabi c
word meani ng west and
refers to Tuni si a,
Al geri a and
Morocco,
conquered by
the Emi r I bn
el As, whenI sl am' s empi re
stretched l i ke a great
sci mi tar from
Bagdad
to Cordova. The
condi ti onal , "i f i t
i s
offered
to hi m", provi ded
the key to the
pl an:
I t was to prepare the
publ i c for that offer,
when i t l ooked as though
Al geri a (and
the Sahara)
were about to fal l ,
that Bourgui ba went to
Washi ngton and the UN,
where hi s
grass- roots
support was .

(I t had
al ready been promi sed hi m, but
hi s presence was
needed
to set the stage
for publ i c
acceptance. )
AUNI TEDMAGHREB
and the l i kel i hood of Bourgui ba' s
headi ng i t have been
menti oned i n the
Ameri can press .
Questi ons as to the wi sdomof
i mposi ng Bourgui ba on hi s
nei ghbors were
si de- stepped by
constant repeti ti on of the i dea that
a Bourgui ba- rul ed Maghreb
i s i n the
nature of thi ngs- - and
desi rabl e, si nce i t woul d
thwart Nasser and "save North
Afri ca from
Communi sm" . The
ful l i mport of Bourgui ba' s
ambi ti ons, reasons for hi s rol e
as co- conspi r-
ator wi th the
Al geri ans, and what young
Ki ng Hassan I I of Morocco thi nks
of No. 2 pl ace i n
a greater Maghreb
for hi msel f, were passed
over
by a
cooperati ve press.

(Ki ng
Hassan' s
arch- enemy, pro- Communi st
l abor l eader Mehdi Ben
Barka, protege of the forces i n
Ameri ca
who support Bourgui ba,
who woul d not obj ect
to bei ng No. 2 or even No. 3 i n a
uni ted
Maghreb, i s i nEvi an
wi th the FLNdel egati on
as thi s i s wri tten. )
I n real i tywe have been taken
i n by a cunni ng group of Arabs
and forces i n our own country
acti ng as thei r accompl i ces
. As Bourgui ba campai gned i n
Washi ngton and before UNfor l ead-
ershi p of the proposed Maghreb, a
wel l - oi l ed Sovi et machi ne for
maki ng i t a satel l i te was
i n pl ace. Sovi et techni ci ans
were at work, hel pi ng to turn the
Moroccan fi shi ng port of
Al hucemas i nto a water base ai med at
Gi bral tar and strategi cal l y i nserted
between Spai n' s
protecti ve outposts, Cueta and Mel i l l a.
Ameri ca, eyi ng onl y Rabat, seei ng
nei ther MI G
bases nor Al hucema,
al l otted Morocco another $27. 5 mi l l i on i n Ameri can
ai d i n l ate May.
WHI LE BOURGUI BA' S CAMPAI GN
FORAMERI CANSUPPORT WAS BEI NGPUSHED a Communi st
4- power
con-
ference to deci de the fate
of the Maghreb was bei ng hel d i n Prague.

I t l asted. fromApri l
19
. to
25 .

Raymond Guyot of
the Pol i ti cal Bureau of the French Communi st Party and Rol and
Leroy of the party' s Secretari at- General
fl ewto
Vi enna,
to escape the attenti on of the
French I ntel l i gence, andwent on i n a Czech pl ane
fromthere. Representati ves of the Al -
geri an, Moroccan and Tuni si an Communi st parti es j oi ned themi n Prague
. Subj ect of the
meeti ng: A "Democrati c (Communi st) Uni ted Maghreb, " after Bourgui ba
cl ears
the way.
Out
of the Praguemeeti ng came an i mproved communi cati on systembetween the three North Afri -
can representati ves and Moukhi di nov' s Moscowoffi ce for Afri can Affai rs.

Amonth l ater,
on May 26, a fol l ow- up meeti ng was hel d i nMoscowbetween Larbi Bouhal i , Secretary- General
of the Al geri an Communi st Party, and Sousl ov, head of the Moscowoffi ce l i nki ng the Russi -
an Communi st Party wi thparti es abroad. Tal ks wi thMoukhi di nov fol l owed.

The i mmedi ate
resul ts: Reorgani zati on of the
Al geri an Communi st Party' s secretari at, di recti ves for
Al geri an and Tuni si an Communi st parti es to exert pressure i nMoscow, i n Al geri a, i n Tun-
i si a,
and
duri ng the Evi an
Conference, pl ans
for
further meeti ngs at regul ar
i nterval s.
H. du
B. REPORTS__

J une,
1961

Page 2
Here we
have the two stages vi sual i zed
f or the Maghreb:
The f i rst step by us,
Sousl ov-
Moukhi di nov
candi dates to take over f rom
there.
A
TORTUOUS WEB OF
I NTERNATI ONAL I NTRI GUE
covers the Maghreb
pl an
.

I t i s so compl i cated
that
there i s no way of putti ng
i t bef ore an uni nf ormed
publ i c wi thout goi ng
back to the
begi nni ng.
We are goi ngto
assume that the reader
of thi s report i s ti red of
sugar-coat-
ed si mpl i f i cati ons
and wi l l i ng
to make the ef f ort of .
studyi ng a background i f thi s
cor-
respondent
puts i t bef ore hi m.
Howdi d Bourgui ba
become Tuni si a' s l eader, i n
posi ti on to
use Tuni si a
as a spri ngboard toward
the Maghreb? Actual l y,
the "conventi on" that
nomi nat-
ed hi m
was an
AFL-CI O
Congress i n San
Franci sco i n September, ten years
ago.

The general
publ i c knewnothi ng
of i t, nor what
he promi sed i n return f or Ameri can
Labor' s support f or
pol i ti cal power
i n
a
country thousands of mi l es away
and not yet i ndependent . A
tri p to
UNf ol l owed: he shook
hands, oozed bazaar courtesy on
f atuous l adi es, and basked i n the
sun of a vast publ i c rel ati ons
machi ne.

(LI FE pi ctured hi m
as
a
heroi c exi l e shadi ng hi s
eyes and peeri ng i nto the
desert . ) The I nternati onal Conf ederati on
of Free Trade Uni ons
i n Brussel s
(I CFTU) gave the go-ahead si gn
to i ts af f i l i ates. Bourgui ba
was
bui l t
up
and
extol l ed
as col oni al i sm' s hei r and theWest' s
assurance agai nst Russi a' s grabbi ng North
Af ri ca.
Mendes-France' s Soci al i st government,
cl osel y ti ed i n wi th I CFTUthrough French
uni ons, granted
Tuni si a' s i ndependence, and Bourgui ba
was i n busi ness.
Thereaf ter
every promi se gi ven by Bourgui ba to France or
to hi s soverei gn, the Bey, was
systemati cal l y broken.
Di spossessed Frenchmen sawphotographs of thei r f arms
ci rcul ated
i n Ameri ca as exampl es of "Tuni si an
devel opment wi thAmeri can ai d" .

I n March, ' 58, Bri t-
ai n' s Harol d
Beel ey
and
Ameri ca' s Robert Murphy were di spatched
on
a good of f i ces mi ssi on
to settl e the di spute over French control . of
Bi zerta, presence of French troops on bases
previ ousl y granted, and supervi si on of ai rbases i n
Tuni si a. Bourgui ba, eyi ng Al geri a f or
hi s Maghreb, broadcast an ul ti matumthat
Ameri ca decl are hersel f f or or agai nst France i n
bothTuni si a and Al geri a. Thus Al geri a, and wi th i t
Ferhat
Abbas,
came i nto the pi cture.
Abbas had been Murphy' s protege i n 1942, and French
Communi sm' s i n ' 46.

Ameri can Labor,
purporti ng to speak f or Ameri ca, took a stand f or hi m
at the Tuni s Labor Congress i n
J une, 1957. Senator Kennedy' s speech supporti ng the Al geri an
rebel s f ol l owed.

I n France
i tsel f the Communi st Party, the Soci al i st Lef t and thei r
respecti ve l abor uni ons f ormed
a
negati ve mass, not powerf ul enough to f orce French
surrender i n Al geri a, j ust powerf ul
enough, wi th the support of f orei gn uni ons, to prevent
measures that woul d bri ng i n
a
de-
ci si ve vi ctory. The rol e of our uni ons, someti mes di rect,
someti mes through Labor' s
great
"hol di ng company", the I CFTU, must next be pati entl y expl ai ned i f the reader
i s
to under-
stand howwhat has occurred came about .
DI PLOMACY, LABOR LEVEL. Duri ng the Roosevel t admi ni strati on Labor' s power to meddl e i n
the af f ai rs of f orei gn countri es and i mpose pol i ci es took a bi g j ump ahead. Labor Attaches
were added to the Mi l i tary, Naval and Ai r Attaches i n embassi es abroad. The Mi l i tary At-
tacheand hi s associ ates worked f or Ameri ca.

The Labor Attacheworked f or Labor .

I t was
that si mpl e.

He of f ered money, organi zati onal know-howand advi ce to f orei gn uni ons and
l eaders of ten desi gnated by hi msel f or hi s Ameri canLabor del egate f ri ends i n countri es
wi thout i ndustry.

And he spoke f roman embassywi th the wei ght of Ameri ca behi nd i t .

Each
f orei gn l abor l eader hel ped i nto pol i ti cal power swel l ed the Soci al i st vote i n UN--f or
a
year or two,
bef ore goi ng the way of Gui nea, Ghana and Morocco. The I FCTUi n Brussel s,
where
Soci al i st uni ons tore Bel gi umapart l ast December i n a vi ol ent struggl e f or
pol i ti -
cal power, came to serve as a sort of central government and Forei gn
Of f i ce f or I nternat-
i onal Labor di pl omacy.
FROMMARCH3 to 17, 1961, I CFTU' s Executi ve Commi ttee,
under Bel gi an Transports l eader
Omer Becu,
sat i n sessi on. The outstandi ng deci si on: Approva
l . of the acti on f ormul a
proposed by
AFL-CI O, l abel ed "I nternal Rel ati ons i n the
I nternati onal Movement" . The
vi tal phrase: "I n some cases
i t i s possi bl e and even pref erabl e that
af f i l i ated uni ons
pursue thei r
acti vi ti es i ndependentl y
i n the i nternati onal f i el d,
on condi ti on that
the
H. du B.
REPORTS

J une,
1961
Page
3
I CFTU
be ful l y
consul ted. " Transl ated,
thi s
means, "At
ti mes, i n the
case of
agi tati ng
agai nst a
NATOal l y
(such as
Portugal , i n
Angol a, or
Bri tai n, i n Kenya)
i t i s
best that
AFL-CI O
and I CFTU
be kept out of
i t, but
we are to tel l
you what to
do. "
That agreed
upon, AFL-CI O
advanced
$3, 250, 000 to
fi nance I CFTU
"i nternati onal
acti vi ty"
for
the second
tri mester of
1961. Another
check for
$220, 000 was
voted to
cl ear up the
precedi ng
tri mester' s backl og,
and a pl edge
was gi ven
to i mpose
an addi ti onal
3 cents
per
month "contri buti on"
on
each AFL-CI Omember
for the
next si x to ni ne
months,
wi th
the
understandi ng
that the
total contri buti on
i s not to
exceed 18 cents
per person.
Formati on
of a UNI ON
OF ANGOLA
WORKERS was
announced for
mi d-May.

Wi th
al most $1
mi l - .
l i on a
month from
Ameri can Labor
al one, agi tators
i n Bl ack
Afri ca and uni on
supporters
of
the Maghreb
shoul d have a
l ot of fun.
An
earl y May
conference was
set up for Monrovi a,
to prepare for a
Casabl anca
meeti ng i n
l ate May.

I ts ai m:
Formati on
of a Pan-Afri can
Uni on, i n the works
si nce the Accra
meeti ng of Dec.
10-12, 1958
. An Afri can super-uni on,
strongest members
of whi ch
are pro-
Communi st, determi ned
to cut
ti es wi th Brussel s, and the
Prague-based
FEDERATI ONOF WORLD
UNI ONS
(over 107
mi l l i onmembers)
expects to swal l owthi s
Afri can confederati on,
neatl y
packaged
for themby the
men who are
forwardi ng the Maghreb,
before thei r Worl d
Congress
meets
i nMoscowat the
end of thi s year .

Pro-Communi st Ghana,
Gui nea, Egypt,
Mal i and
Morocco
organi zed the
Casabl anca congress
wi th the ai d of Abdoul aye
Di al l o, formerl y
Secretary
of the Communi st
Federati on of Worl d
Uni ons. Many of the
del egates no l onger
l i ve i n thei r countri es
; i nstead they
have moved behi nd the I ron
Curtai n. The Tuni si an
and Al geri an del egates
voted wi th the West,
wi l l refrai n fromrocki ng the
boat unti l Al -
geri an i ndependence and
the Maghreb have been
del i vered. Bourgui ba fel t
safe enough to
drop
hi s careful l y guarded
mask at the UNCorrespondents'
Associ ati on di nner i n
NewYork
onMay 12.
He stated, "There can
be no settl ement between
Arabs and J ews, and war
wi l l
break out agai n
i n Pal esti ne,
as
i n
Al geri a, unl ess I srael
abandons her posi ti on based
on ri ght
of conquest . "

(11, 000
Al geri an J ews had al ready been
transported to I srael at
I srael i
expense. )

The NewYork
statement saved hi mfrom
Nasser' s charge that he has been
"bought by
Ameri ca" .

AMoroccan
was el ected head of the new
Pan-Afri ca Uni on and the del -
egates
went home.
Such i s the
si tuati on. Wi th thi s background the
reader can eval uate for hi msel f
many
thi ngs that wi l l break i n the future
. Our pri mary mi stake was i n fai l i ng
to cope wi th
and contai n the Labor monster . I nstead
we gave i t di pl omati c status and exported
i t
abroad, to breed.
NA
SSER' S
REACTI ON
TOBOURGUI BA' S CLAI MTOTHE MAGHREB was: More
arms
and
heavy materi al
fromRussi a and Czechosl ovaki a. Franti c scurryi ng for the A-bomb.
Two German physi ci sts
Dr . Al fred Boetscher and Dr . Wal ter Schurr, are i n Cai ro, guarded ni ght and day,
on one
of the
most secret . proj ects Nasser has ever undertaken: Pl ans for atomi c reactors, man-
ufacture and
stocki ng of heavy water at the newpl ant at Aswan, fabri cati on of I sl am' s
A-bomb.

Bourgui ba' s statement at the UNdi nner was admi ssi on that the manwho l eads the
war agai nst I srael wi l l l ead I sl am. Our publ i c fai l ed to see i t .
PEKI NG' S ESTABLI SHMENT I NEUROPE.

The Laos Conference i n Geneva wi dened. the openi ng.
Thi ngs were not goi ng wel l at home when Marshal ChenYi (hi s gi ven name means obsti nacy)
descended onGeneva wi thhi s 25-manmi ssi on, accompani ed by 135 "assi stants" .

The thi rd
successi ve wheat
fai l ure
was hangi ng over
Chi na, strai ni ng the l oyal ty of a peasant army,
necessi tati ng massi ve i mportati ons of food
.
Neverthel ess,
negoti ati ons started at once
for purchase
of a
$190, 000
mansi on
as
a permanent home i n Geneva. I t wi l l serve as a l i s-
teni ng post
-and a stern remi nder to the West of Chi na' s presence. Sumptuous Ameri can cars
have been hi red, wi th ri ght-to-buy cl auses i nserted i n the 6-month contracts.
Conspi cuous
i n the teami s Chi Peng-fei , Peki ng' s speci al i st on German
affai rs
.
He opened the embassy
H.
du B.
REPORTS

I -J une, 1961
Page
4
i n East Germany.

Hi s presence
i s regarded as i ndi cati on of , an earl y
cri si s i n West Berl i n,
perhaps a show-down
where . Peki ng' s` wei ght wi l l
be thrown i n the bal ance, neutral i zi ng commi t-
ments K i s l ed
to ' make wi thKennedy.
Contact man for the mi ssi on i s suave,
Engl i sh-speaki ng
press attache
Wu Leng-hsi . Wu buys
dri nks, tal ks freel y, too freel y, on Al geri a, Laos,
Ken
nedy, and Berl i n.

He works cl osel ywi th the
Al geri an del egati on as wel l , and wi th smi l i ng
East
Germans pushi ng a new
l i ne--"You (the West) won' t
go to war over a l i ttl e thi ng l i ke West
Berl i n' !
Toweri ng above the anthi l l of
scurryi ng Chi nese i s the
taci turn 60-year-ol d Marshal l who has
never
been a l i eutenant, whose
status may be ei ther ci vi l i an or mi l i tary,
who became a member
of the Pol i tburo, Mi ni ster of Forei gn
Affai rs, di pl omat and Head of Mi ssi on wi thout
maki ng
di pl omacy hi s
career . Cl ose behi nd hi mand
accompanyi ng. hi mon al l i mportant meeti ngs i s a
40-pl us-year-ol d,
somberl y dressed l i ttl e woman, Madame
Kung Peng, whose presence i s expl ai ned
si mpl y as "counsel or
of the Representati ve" . The
secl uded house i n Geneva, surrounded by a
wi de garden,
wi l l formthe center' of a
web wi th l i nes extendi ng on one si de to the arsenal i n
Al bani a,
on another to the embassy i n Rabat,
where a commi ttee l i sti ng those marked for assas-
si nati on when Al geri a becomes i ndependent
i s reported
to
be si tti ng
.

Stal l i ng tacti cs of Rus-
si a' s
del egates to the Geneva negoti ati ons for a baP. on nucl ear testi ng are
bel i eved due to
Chen' s warni ng: Chi na wi l l have her A-bomb shortl y. Her fi rst testi ng wi l l bl ast any agree-
ment Russi a makes wi th the West .
DE GAULLE' S TRI P TOBONN.

I n the worl d cl i mate depi cted de Gaul l e vi si ted Adenauer onMay 20.
The questi on was :

Howcl osel y wi l l we sti ck together i f Kennedy makes concessi ons to Krush-
chev? Not
si nce 1958 has Berl i n fel t so menaced. Sui ci des mount, yet some 700 refugees a day
fl ock fromthe East,
anxi ous to
reach the escape hatchbefore i t
cl oses
forever .
Suppl yi ng
the 11, 000-man Al l i ed garri son
wi th
l atest Ameri can heavy tanks has not al l ayed German fears
that after 16 years the end of the road may be ahead. DeGaul l e tol d Adenauer that after Ken-
nedy' s
meeti ng he hi msel f wi l l go to Moscow,
but that has i ts
peri l s :
I t wi l l take great
counter concessi ons to get . K to cut off cl amorous
French Communi sts, demandi ng pay for thei r
orchestrated di spl ay of l oyal ty i n
Apri l .
KENNEDY CAME TOPARI S. I t was
a soci al success, but the deGaul l e l etter demandi ng ful l part-
nershi p
wi th Engl and i n nucl ear strategy whi ch has been gatheri ng dust i n a drawer
si nce Sep-
tember ' 58
i s
sti l l unanswered. DeGaul l e i s for fi rmness
vi s-a-vi s Berl i n, and the demands
of fi rmness may bri ng Ameri can bombers back to French bases
wi thout sati sfyi ng deGaul l e' s de-
mands for more voi ce i n thei r use. And France' s A-bomb
tests and H-bomb research conti nue,
drai ni ng resources that a renovati on of the MacMahon
Law
coul d
put to the servi ce of the West .
THE KRUSHCHEV MEETI NG.

Kennedy fl ewon
to Vi enna to shake hands wi th
the manwho one year ago
heaped i nsul ts on Ameri ca
.
Bonn
had proof i nFebruary (see March-Apri l
H.
du
B. REPORTS) that
Moscowwas determi ned to reopen the
German probl em, try to sei ze
control before East-West rel a
ti ons get any worse.

Bri ti sh
Ambassador to Bonn, Si r Chri stopher
Steel , was asked for assur-
ances .

London' s reacti on was not
what the Chancel l or hoped
for : Macmi l l an, l i ke deGaul l e
and
Kennedy, heads a government
behi nd whi ch Labor-i n-pol i ti cs
and powerful uni ons,
Soci al i st-
sl anted at best,
Communi st-i nfi l trated at worst,
exert pressure on every move
. That l eft de
Gaul l e--and Kennedy' s
meeti ng wi th. Krushchev--as
Adenauer' s hope.

Out of the tal ks--Pari s,
Vi enna, and London--wi l l
come the deci si on,
whether Berl i n i s
worth openi ng a road wi th
tanks.
That i s the ni ghtmare.
Summer' s end may
see us at the crossroads.
Whatever happens,
Europe-
an chancel l ori es
have a hunch that a
gradual wi thdrawal from
many Ameri can bases
around the
worl d i s i n the offi ng
. Thei r reasoni ng
We are pl aci ng l ess
i mportance on bases
cl ose to
fronti ers surroundi ng
the Sovi et Uni on,
counti ng more and more
on submari nes and
Pol ari s mi s-
si l es .

I f K shows hi msel f
agreeabl e on the
matter of Laos and
Cuba he may get
the gi ft for
whi ch he has
cl amored

Kennedy' s promi se- to
gradual l y di smantl e
the ri ng of bases
that have
gi ven K a psychosi s of
enci rcl ement .

I t
may al so encourage
hi mto ri sk an
adventure.
Thi s newsl etter
gi ves permi ssi on
for re-pri nti ng
wi th credi t l i ne.
J ames H.
Bal l , Managi ng
Edi tor

Hi l ai re du
Berri er, Correspondent
P. O. Box 855,
Hunti ngton,
I ndi ana.

Hotel
Luteti a, 43
Bl vd. Raspai l ,
Pari s 6, France.
VOLUME I V
LETTER 4

H.
du
B. . REPORTS

PARI S, FRANCE
J ULY
1961
BERLI N:
March
i ssue of
thi s report predi cted the cri si s . Here, as si mpl y as possi bl e, i s
the
background i nformati on the reader shoul d keep i n mi nd. Throughout J une Krushchev' s verbal
barrage gai ned i ntensi ty, prepari ng the way for an al l -out pol i ti cal offensi ve. On J une 21 K
turned toward Chi na and beyond Chi na the worl d. The pl ace: Al ma Ata, capi tal of Kazakhstan,
a consti tuent republ i c of the Sovi et Uni on,
east
and north of the Caspi an Sea.

The occasi on:
The 40th anni versary of Kazakhstan' s i ncorporati on
wi th Russi a,
and the 20th anni versary of
Hi tl er' s i nvasi on. Here, for the thi rd ti me i n
ten days, K
repeated:
He
cannot wai t much
l onger . The Berl i n questi on must be sol ved i n 1961 .
He
threatened a separate peace wi th East
Germany--hi s way of tel l i ng the West he i s about to hand the sword of Damocl es to Wal ter Ul -
bri cht,
that he ( K) wi l l not be responsi bl e i f Ul bri cht l ets i t fal l , but that he wi l l
come
to
Ul bri cht' s ai d i f
we do
anythi ng
about i t . K added that the Berl i n questi on wi l l
be settl ed
on hi s terms
. Thi s l eaves no roomfor negoti ati on.

I t was al so
a green l i ght for Ul bri cht .
Si mul taneousl y, out of Moscowwent a
streamof summonses
that remi nded one of Genghi s Khan
cal l i ng sub-chi efs and
sons to hi s gol den tent . Si gnatori es of
the
Warsaw
Pact, NATO' s
counterpart i n the I ron Curtai n worl d, were convoked for l ate J ul y or earl y August, a Com-
muni st Summi t, to present a
sol i d
front
when the West' s wi l l to resi st i s
chal l enged. Al ready
the l eaks fromWarsaw,
Prague and Moscowtel l us what K' s
stand at thi s
Red
conference wi l l
be: He wi l l say, "At
the moment we are stronger than
Ameri ca
. Our
l ead i s assured unti l l ate
1963.
I f we
force
a deci si on thi s fal l
they
( Ameri ca)
wi l l back up. When they do thei r whol e
posi ti on wi l l crumbl e. Al l i es wi l l dri ft
away i n .
a sea of neutral i sml i ke i ce fl oes breaki ng
apart i n Apri l . "
WEST BERLI N, , , THE
BONE I N COMMUNI SM' S THROAT
, wi l l be exami ned fromevery angl e
. To cal l i t
our
cancer mi ght be more apt . Here i s the West' s sol e propaganda vi ctory i n the col d
war--
essenti al l y
a
European vi ctory. Each day every three mi nutes, an
East
German votes agai nst
Communi smwi th hi s feet :

Si nce 1945 over 4 mi l l i on have passed through the
escape hatch
fromK' s systemto ours' . They travel by U-Kahn, bus and tramway, the
sol e breaches i n an 863-
mi l e border
bel t cal l ed the Pi ek ri bbon. There i s a l abor shortage i n East Germany.
66, 000
refugees poured through the Berl i n hol e i n the dyke i n the fi rst four months of
1
. 961
. 80%
were
young enough to work
;
25%were under
25.

There were professi onal men,
techni ci ans, pro-
fessors.
The effect on East Germany i s di sastrous. To retai n Professor
Manfri ed von Ardenne,
54-year-ol d
di rector
of the great atomi c research center i n Dresden ( whose
assi stant i s A-spy
Kl aus Fuchs) Ul bri cht i ssued an order permi tti ng Dr . von Ardenne to drawup to
$3, 000
from
the bank anyti me
he
wi shes. At the same ti me a Russi an order put hi munder day and ni ght
survei l l ance. I n seven years 15, 000 techni ci ans, 3000 doctors, 1200 denti sts and
700 profes-
sors have wal ked out "on busi ness" and not come back. Most escapees take
thei r chi l dren wi th
them. There were 450, 000 more 14-year-ol ds i n East Germany
ten
years
ago than there are to
day. As the average age of the East Zone i ncreases the
death rate j umps .

To permi t such a
condi ti on to exi st i s an admi ssi on of weakness. As Burke put i t, "The
concessi ons of the
weak are the concessi ons of fear . "

Communi st pol i ti cal real i sm
demands the removal of . any
doubt about thei r strength. Western survi val demands the same
of us . Top European sovi et-
ol ogi st teams, every bi t as real i sti c as the Kreml i n
and not pi cked for thei r
l i beral i sm,
work day and ni ght tryi ng to pi ece together the
pol i ti cal map that wi l l be put
before the
WarsawPact Leaders l ate thi s month or i n
earl y
August
. Here i s what they see
:
KRUSHCHEV ANDULBRI CHT wi l l bri ng
a convi nci ng thesi s to the tabl e.

Peki ng
wi l l expl oi t
any
si gn of weakness on thei r part . To
retai n Red l eadershi p, K
must avoi d hesi tancy. Thi s
i s
a strai t-j acket i n i tsel f
. Marshal Mal i novsky wi l l denounce
West Germany' s mi l i tari sm
;
Marshal Tchoui kov has
prepared a paper provi ng that
the Western al l i es di d not
take Berl i n,
and concl udi ng i t i s
ti me they get out . Marshal '
Cyri l Moskal enko' s report
wi l l serve as
the cl i ncher ; a Ukrai ni an,
he commands the Russi an
counterpart to our
Strategi c Ai r
Command,
and he i s counted upon to
assure fal terers i n the Red
camp that they
have nothi ng to
fear,
that Kennedy wi l l not
budge. Backed by such
convi nci ng reports from
the mi l i tary, K
wi l l
present hi s
convi cti on, based on personal
acquai ntance wi th
the West' s l eaders
and vol umi -
nous i ntel l i gence reports :

"I t woul d be absurd for
Kennedy to go to
war over West
Berl i n.
He won' t do i t . "
The magni fyi ng gl ass wi l l
then be turned on
Adenauer and de
Gaul l e.
H .
du
B. REPORTS

J ULY 1961
Page 2
ONWEST
BERLI N THE ADE
. NAUER- DE ,AUPOSI TI ON
I S
SI MPLI C
I TY
I TSELF
:

There i s
nothi ng to
negoti ate.

I f K si gns a separate
peace treaty wi th
Pankow, Ul bri cht' s government,
whi ch hol ds
no mandate
f rom
the peopl e,
wi l l repl ace the
Russi ans around Berl i n
. The East Germans are
ex-
pected
to put
up
a
road bl ock;
the West wi l l
be tol d to ask them
f or permi ssi on to suppl y the
ci ty.
Negoti ati on
wi l l be
tantamount to
recogni ti on. Thus there
are onl y two al ternati ves :
Another ai rl i f t
or openi ng
the road wi th
tanks . De Gaul l e and
Adenauer are f or f i rmness,
even
i f
i t means the
l atter . De
Gaul l e does
not share the bl ame f or Berl i n;
though he was an al l y,
he was
not i nvi ted
to the
pre- i nvasi on
European Advi sory Commi ttee sessi on at
whi ch Ameri ca' s
Ambassador
Wi nant,
Russi a' s Gusef f
and Bri tai n' s Si r
Wi l l i amStrang drewup the Berl i n pl an
wi thout a
si ngl e saf eguard
i n wri ti ng.
He had nothi ng
to say about Ei senhower' s stoppi ng at
Torgau, wel l
west of Berl i n,
nor the
i rresponsi bl e way i n
whi ch the Wi nant- Gusef f - Strang pl an
was put i nto
operati on as an
agreement, wi thout
f urther di scussi on and by
agents who even today
are
f acel ess .
The
WarsawPact pl anners
are aware of
Pari s- Bonn f i rmness,
but they are al so aware of the weak
spots .
Behi nd de
Gaul l e and Adenauer
are France and
Germany, twi n keyboards of rancor and
di s-
trust .
Communi sts qui ckl y
percei ved,
Ameri ca i gnored,
the propaganda si gni f i cance when a di s-
reputabl e
Frankf urt
publ i cati on and
a hi ghl y questi onabl e man,
not even a nati ve Ameri can,
were
abl e to remove
one of Ameri ca' s f i nest
general s f romhi s
German command on grounds that
he was
an "ul tra
Ri ghti st", i . e. , too
anti - Communi st- - and wi thout a wave
of protest i n Amer-
i ca.
There was a ti me
l apse,then the successf ul
sabotage of General Wal ker was extended
to
other
of f i cers, i n Ameri ca.
As Europe reads the storm
warni ngs, Ameri can of f i cers are expect-
ed to be
anti - Communi st, but
not too anti - Communi st .
I t
makes
a sel l - out seempossi bl e. The
Sovi et
Psychol ogi cal Warf are
Of f i ce coul d not have pl anned
a greater vi ctory, nor ti med i t
better . Al l Germany
knows that General
Wal ker' s anti - Communi st troop i ndoctri nati on course
has been hal ted,
f our months bef ore war and
peace are expected to. hang i n the bal ance. These
are
i mportant f actors
i n the pl anni ng of
Communi sts and anti - Communi sts i n western Europe.
K' s i ntel l i gence
servi ces are expl oi ti ng themto
the utmost .
BRI TAI N' S
POSI TI ON AS THE WARSAWGROUP
SEES I T. London, wi thout wi shi ng to appear weak, be-
l i eves that
negoti ati ons shoul d be opened, as qui ckl y
as possi bl e and bef ore the cri si s . Rus-
si a i s watchi ng the
Bri ti sh mood caref ul l y. Among the
detai l ed reports they wi l l spread out
on the WarsawPact tabl e
: Pl ans drawn up by Deputy Under- Secretary
of State Si r Evel yn
Shuckburg,
Central Department
head Mr
.
E. Tompki ns, and Western
Organi zati ons and Pl anni ng
Secti on
Chi ef Peter Ramsbottomf or an
urgent Western Summi t Conf erence thi s f al l .
Detai l s
on
Lord Home' s tal ks
wi th Dean Rusk i n
Washi ngton i n mi d- J une.
Chances of Lord Home bei ng
removed f romthe
Forei gn Of f i ce, to be repl aced by
a,commoner, el ected
to Commons and abl e
to tal k
to both Labor and the
House of Commons when the
showdown comes . Russi a
i s aware
that
af ter the Lord
Home- Dean Rusk tal ks i n Washi ngton
London was gi ven the go- ahead
si gnal
to start studyi ng
and l i sti ng the di f f erences
exi sti ng between London, Washi ngton, Bonn and
Pari s, f or
di scussi on at a Summi t Meeti ng
i mmedi atel y af ter the West German el ecti ons and
the
Congress of the Communi st Party i n
Moscow. Russi an reacti on was to step up attempts to
di vi de
the al l i es . Leaks to Pari s, and Bonn
i nf erred that Bri tai n was f i l i ng thei r gri evances
wi th the
i dea of pl ayi ng on al l i ed di sagreements to "di vi de
and rul e" . Further l eaks sowed
the thought
that Dean Acheson and Macmi l l an woul d try to
buy
ti me at cost
of
posi ti on by
rec-
ogni zi ng Pankow.
Actual l y, Bri tai n shoul d not be under- rated. Though most of the uni l ateral
di sarmament and
negoti ati on tal k has come f romBri tai n, Mr . J usti ce Wi nn di d what no man,
even the presi dent,
has been strong enough to do i n Ameri ca, when he exposed and cracked down
on Communi sts who, wi th l ess than
1%membershi p i n Bri tai n' s El ectri ci ans' Trade Uni on, not
onl y control l ed the
uni on, but made i t serve the Party' s pol i ti cal ai ms . I t was i n stri ki ng
contrast
to
Washi ngton' s sacri f i ce
of General Wal ker . One questi on mark:
Di d Russi a maneuver
Bri tai n onto the end of an Arab
l i mb
i n Kuwai t,
to f urther hamstri ng
the West?
AMERI CA' S POSI TI ON. Despi te presi denti al statements and studi ed "l eaks" to the press of mi l -
i tary
preparati ons f or any eventual i ty, Krushchev i s ri di ng on Europe' s convi cti on
that we
have not real l y deci ded. Fear i s general i n Bonn that
K
wi l l ri sk an adventure, that we have
not made i t cl ear that there wi l l be no
l i mi tati on on the use of the atomi c deterrent
.

Mon-
tana' s Senator Mansf i el d came f orward as spokesman f or what
i s
known i n Germany as the Ache-
H. du B.
REPORTS

J ULY 1961

Page_}
son Pl an.
Mansfi el d woul d
make West Berl i n
an open ci ty,
i n other words,
l eave 2, 500, 000
' Test Germans
to the mercy of a
Communi st
promi se, the val ue of
whi ch has
al ready been
proven
ni l . The
Acheson-Mansfi el d
reasoni ng
i s sai d to go
somethi ng l i ke
thi s:

The status
quo i s
both dangerous
and costl y.
By settl i ng
for an open
ci ty we can reduce
the ri sks,
di mi ni sh
the expense,
and cane out
wi th the cl ear
gai n of a
promi se whi ch wi l l
have the
val ue of al l
Russi an
promi ses--at most
fi ve to ten
years of ti me
. Krushchev i s
encouragi ng the
open ci ty
tal k, but
onl y for West
Berl i n. The
Germans, at whose
expense the
hypotheti cal fi ve to
ten
years
woul d be
bought, are
apprehensi ve.
They fear the Mansfi el d
statement was
a tri al bal -
l oon
wi th top-echel on
approval ,
suspect a
sel l -out on the
Oder-Nei sse fronti er wi th
Pol and
as wel l .
Actual l y,
Russi a i s at
no l oss for
methods to sowdi strust
among the West' s
al l i es.
Most of the
traps coul d
have been
avoi ded. Thei r mass
effect on our
smal l er al l i es i s
di sastrous.
WESTERN
EUROPE' S POSI TI ON
: West Germany' s
magnates, heads
of
the
great Krupp-domi nated
VER-
BANDDER
DEUTSCHEN I NDUSTRI E
(Uni on of German
I ndustry) are of l i ttl e
hel p to us . They fear
that Wi l l y
Brandt and hi s
Soci al i sts may ri de
to power on the i ssue
of West Berl i n, bri ngi ng
nati onal i zati on
and spol i ati on
vi a taxati on wi th
them. They feel that
they rebui l t German
prosperi ty
wi thout Berl i n
and i n spi te of
Berl i n, whi ch has been
nothi ng but a drai n on them.
The panorama
they see i s
di scouragi ng: Both the
pound sterl i ng and the
dol l ar are under at-
tack.
Russi a' s oi l offensi ve
has started.
Genoa i s the dumpi ng center,
I tal i an oi l ki ng
Enri co
Mattei the agent .
He has al ready contracted
for 12 mi l l i on tons of
Russi an crude oi l
over a
four-year
peri od at a pri ce barel y
equal to the taxes and
royal ti es bei ng pai d i n the
Mi ddl e
East . Even Spai n,
Russi a' s mortal enemy,
has made a barter deal for
Sovi et oft through
a
Bel gi an company.
Russi a' s ai mi s (1) to
control the oi l suppl y for Central and
Western
Europe; (2) to amass
reservoi rs of forei gn currency for
the use of nati ve Communi st parti es .
Mi l i tary men eye
Bonn' s 7 crack di vi si ons and refl ect
that Ameri ca sacri fi ced Meckl enburg,
Saxony and Thuri ngi a for
a ri ght of passage to Berl i n, a ci ty
we coul d have taken--and that
ri ght was never
put on paper . Our Bal l i sti c Mi ssi l es Earl y
Warni ng Systemi n Thul e, Green-
l and,
protects Ameri ca and Canada
from
the
east . Another BMEWS base i n Cl ear, Al aska, wi l l
cl ose
the gap i n Ameri can defenses. The thi rd post,
i n Fyl i ngsdal e, Engl and, desi gnated to
protect
Western Europe by di verti ng
or destroyi ng Russi an mi ssi l es i n fl i ght, wi l l not be
ready
unti l 1962. And the
cri si s i s faci ng us NOW.
THE PI CTURE
I S NOT ALL BLACK, but the West wi l l have to move wi th deci si on. Wal ter
Ul -
bri cht' s si tuati on i s far from
secure i n Pankow. The "Vol kskammer", East Germany' s Commu-
ni st
Party, i s studyi ng the same pi cture as
thi s report i s wri tten. Unrest i s rampant .
Reports
fromPol and showthe need of a Red di versi onary
movement, and some ki nd of vi ctory
before
wi nter .

i n Pol and, Gomul ka' s col l ecti vi zati on program
has started to ni bbl e on the
85%
of l and
sti l l pri vatel y owned and subj ect to the l aws
of i nheri tance.

Onl y 10%of thi s
l and
i s bei ng sei zed at once; i t i s the fi rst grab si nce
Gomul ka' s return to power i n ' 56,
but the peasants are gi rdi ng for a fi ght .
I t may affect the over-al l Communi st stand on
Berl i n. Another danger si gnal : Ul bri cht' s own pol i ce are dangerousl y
apatheti c, fai l ed to
l i ft a fi nger duri ng the recent demonstrati on agai nst the government i n Brandenburg. Unrest
i s mounti ng agai n i n the l ocomoti ve works at Henni ngsdorf, where the J une 17,
1953
upri si ng
started. Ul bri cht' s sol e consol ati on: The West exports onl y soci al i st revol uti on.
WHAT
KRUSHCHEV THI NKS OF ALL THI S i s not al together unknown.
K. sees Ameri ca' s forei gn pol -
i cy i n the context
of a pattern, a pol i cy i nheri ted fromRoosevel t,
conti nued by Truman,
passed on to Ei senhower and
nowgai ni ng momentum. The newteamsti l l has i ts i l l usi ons .
The free worl d may pay thei r
tui ti on. To date, to meet each cri si s we have i mprovi sed a
semi -passi ve defense and ceded a
l i ttl e
bi t
of ground. K sees no reason that we shoul d not
do so agai n. We have embraced "neutral i sm" .

I t i s i nconcei vabl e to K that we shoul d ri sk
war over West Berl i n,
that we shoul d refuse to retreat an i nch. Why thi s ti me more than any
of the
other ti mes? The Mansfi el d proposal , to hi m, i s tangi bl e proof that nucl ear bl ackmai l
sti l l
works, that by demandi ng the most and settl i ng for the l east he can conti nue to edge
forward
around the peri phery. I n "thi rd force" sol uti ons
he
has everythi ng to gai n and the
West has everythi ng to l ose. The one-si ded concessi ons wi l l never end. London
TI MES
of
October 21, 1960, expressed the cl i mate of thought on whi ch
Krushchev i s bui l di ng hi s cri si s:
H . du B.
REPORTS

J ULY
1961
Page 4
"There i s no doubt that Ameri ca wi l l honor
her engagements to come to the ai d
of a country
faci ng agressi on, but i t wi l l be i n a
manner whi ch she al one wi l l choose.
And she wi l l not
use nucl ear arms at the ri sk of sui ci de
. "
K knows that nothi ng short of nucl ear weapons
can stop the 25 ul tra-modern
Sovi et di vi si ons
poi sed i n Central Europe, whi ch
he
can
rai se to 40 i n a matter of days and
60 i n a month.
Ameri ca' s powerful 7th Army based i n
Cassel can save southern Germany, but the Bri ti sh
Army
i n North Germany i s exposed. Schl eswi g' s defense
hi nges on our hol di ng the Dani sh- German
l i ne, and
Denmark and Hamburg woul d be occupi ed i n a
fewhours . K i s sure that the West
knows thi s as
wel l as he does . I t i s the theme of hi s
psychol ogi cal
barrage
. But the card
up hi s sl eeve, the attack fromthe
rear to weaken the al l i ed front, may come i n the form
of
the offensi ve France' s Left
i s
prepari ng
agai nst de Gaul l e. I t i s ri sky busi ness, tryi ng to
predi ct what may happen i n vol ati l e
France thi s fal l . Troubl e seems i nevi tabl e. That de
Gaul l e' s
next chal l enge wi l l come fromthe
Left i s al most certai n.
DE GAULLE, FRANCE ANDNATO. As regards the
Berl i n cri si s they are one. De Gaul l e has done
nothi ng we are not conti nui ng to do.
He
has
di smantl ed the French Ri ght and Center, staked
everythi ng on hi s Left .
As
hi s i sol ati on i ncreases,
the Left' s
demands grow.
Fi rst
the
army was estranged. Then the Bri ttany
peasants revol ted. The
troubl e spread
.
Communi sts
took a hand. M. Monnervi l l e, the man desi gnated to take the rei ns i f anythi ng shoul d happen
to de Gaul l e, warned, "i f we conti nue to i gnore the el ected assembl i es, the peopl e wi l l turn
to other representati ves wi th nei ther a mandate nor responsi bi l i ty. " That i s what happened.
No
mi ddl e
course remai ns between the Presi dent and the mob i n the streets .
BEFORE WORLDWAR 11 four powers
exi sted i n France:

The executi ve, the l egi sl ati ve, the bi g
trusts and the press . I n 1961 there are two: de Gaul l e and the l abor uni ons . The others
have been suppressed. "Di rect democracy" has repl aced parl i amentary democracy. To stave
off the uni ons, de Gaul l e turns
to
the radi o, addressi ng the peopl e rather than parl i ament .
Today
onl y
the
uni ons
are abl e to force the government to gi ve ground when they real l y want
to. They
are
consci ous of
the three great i nternati onal forces reachi ng across fronti ers
and oceans to support
them: I nternati onal uni ons, Communi sts and Soci al i sts .
Thei r l ead-
ers have become
the newi ntermedi ari es between Chi ef-of-State and peopl e.
They feel that
they
saved
hi m(de Gaul l e) on Apri l
23,
that he i s thei r debtor
.
They
encourage hi mwhen
he
destroys thei r enemi es, the men who woul d be our hope i n a
show-down wi th the East .
Thus pol i ce cars wi th wi re-meshed wi ndows,
paddy
wagons
reserved for mass arrests of common
hoodl ums, dumped French offi cers i n Sante
and Fresne pri sons at fi fteen-mi nute i nterval s,
to
be thrown i nto common cel l s wi th cri mi nal s
who i nsul ted them, l eft for an i ndefi ni te
peri od,
eventual l y to be j udged and sentenced
i n batches . FLNterrori sts i n the same pri sons
enj oy
speci al pri vi l eges . The
effect
of
al l thi s : A ti ghteni ng of the ti es
between offi cers and
men who remai ned i ndeci si ve
l ast Apri l , a feel i ng of sol i dari ty wi th
the "martyrs" i n pri son,
stri pped of decorati ons they pai d for
wi th thei r bl ood i n the Resi stance,
I ndo-Chi na and
Al geri a. Over 270, 000 Frenchmen have
been repatri ated fromI ndo-Chi na,
Tuni si a and Morocco
si nce
1954
. They are sti l l awai ti ng
i ndemni ti es . More arri ve weekl y
. The exodus from
Al geri a has started, sendi ng the
al ready prohi bi ti ve pri ces of
Pari s apartments to new
l evel s .

Dai l y the number of those i n
France who woul d see the
regi me fal l wi th
sati sfacti on
i ncreases .
Thi s newsl etter gi ves
permi ssi on for repri nti ng
wi th credi t l i ne.
Address al l domesti c
busi ness to J ames H. Bal l ,
H. du B. REPORTS, P. 0.
Box
855,
Hunti ngton, I ndi ana.
Address al l forei gn busi ness
correspondence to
Hi l ai re du
Berri er,
Hotel Luteti a,
43
Bl vd
. Raspai l , Pari s VI ,
France.
Subscri pti on
pri ce: $10 per
year, for ten news
l etters .
Hi l ai re du
Berri er, Correspondent
J ames H.
Bal l , Managi ng Edi tor
VOLUME
I VLETTER5
AUGUST
1961

H. duB. REPORTS

PARI S, FRANCE
BOURGUI BA
.

I n J une
we report ed on Bourgui ba' s mi d-Mayt ri p t o Ameri ca,
descri bed i t as
a cl ue "t o t he next bi gheadache f or t he
West ", st at ed t hat i t s i mport ance was overl ooked,

i f
not del i berat el y
smot hered.

That report was
no shot i n t he dark: I t was a seri ous i nt el l i gence
report f or t he
reader, deemed i mport ant enough
t o f i l l 3 pages of our
J une
i ssue.
THE
FULLSTORY:
Fromt he
t housand and
one sources
of i nf ormat i on beyond
t he porous
f ront i ers
of t he Arab
worl d i ndi cat i ons
of a cri si s
bui l d-up l eaked f ar
i n advance.

Pal ace
rumbl i ngs
and bazaar
l eaks had i t
t hat Habi b
Bourgui ba was
pl anni ng somet hi ng
bi g,

but
dared not t ake
t he f i nal pl unge
wi t hout
approval f rom
Ameri ca.

"From
Ameri ca" meant
ei t her
Washi ngt on or t he
bi g l abor
uni ons whose
prot ege he i s .
But what was he up t o,
t hat
was t he
quest i on.
I NPARI S
men whose
j ob i t has been t o st udy
Bourgui ba over t he years were
deepl yconcerned.
They

knewhi s i nst abi l i t y,
hi s boundl ess ambi t i on, t he
vi t al necessi t yof provi ng hi msel f
t he st rong
man of t he Arabs, andhi s
superst i t i ous penchant f or t he
mont h of J ul y.

Hi s
count ryof 3 mi l l i on
i nhabi t ant s i s one of t he
poorest and smal l est i n Nort h Af ri ca; hi s
army
of 10, 000
men i s badl yt rai ned,
out numbered 2 t o 1 byarrogant Al geri ans
who f or f i ve years
have been t rai ni ng
on hi s soi l .

Bourgui ba had t o do somet hi ng
beyond a cl ai mt o l eadershi p
of t he
Maghreb ( Tuni si a, Al geri a,
Morocco) or a
UN
demand f or a sl i ce of t he Sahara: he
had t o prove t hat
he t oo was an enemyof t he i mperi al i st s
.

The t eamst udyi ng hi mknewhi s
vi ol ent
speeches byheart , had seen hi msend
a
NEWSWEEK
col umni st home t o pi ct ure hi m
as "The West -' s hope,
t he nat ural l eader of t he worl d' s uncommi t t ed
one-t hi rd. " The ruse
was t he t i me-t ri ed, i nf al l i bl e one of t he
bazaar gui de, whi ppi ng a nat i ve mob i nt o a f renzy,
t hen
t urni ng a serene vi sage t o t he west erner and sayi ng
i n
t he
west erner' s l anguage, "I t ry
t o
cal mt hem, but t hei r gri evances have made t hemvi ol ent .

Youmust gi ve me
what
I
re-
quest f or t hemor t hey wi l l depose me and t hen you
wi l l have t o deal wi t h someone worse. "
AMERI CAWASNOMATCHFORTHE
BAZAARCHI K.

Our "aut hori t i es" i n UNand Washi ng-
t on st aked Ameri ca' s prest i ge and t he
Medi t erranean worl d' s f ut ure on t hei r personal ac-
quai nt ance wi t h
Mr . Bourgui ba, i . e. , a handshake i n t he
bi g bui l di ng on East Ri ver or at a
recept i on i n Washi ngt on.

Ameri can of f i ci al s
i n Tuni s were t aken i n byt he cul t ured
and af -
f abl e Dri ss Gui ga, head of
Bourgui ba' s German-t ype secret pol i ce
.

Gui ga' s wi f e, Chacha,
l eader of t he
women' s group, OTHMANA, has t ravel ed
ext ensi vel y i n Chi na and Russi a.
She
and
her
husband
boast of havi ng used
t he Ameri cans.

Pri nci pal European
l i st eni ng post s of
t he Dri ss Gui ga i nt el l i gence net work are Lausanne and Geneva, but here C. I . A.
' s f ai r-
hai red boywas
an
Ameri can of Turki sh ori gi n who was hi msel f
a vi ol ent Arab Nat i onal i st
andpol i t i cal advi sor t o t he Tuni si ans andAl geri ans, wi t h Ameri can l oyal t i es runni ng a
poor
t hi rd.
Such consi derat i ons wei gh
heavi l yon t he mi nds of
t he Pari s
Forei gn Of f i ce t eampi eci ng
t o-
get her t he j i gsaw
scraps of i nf ormat i on
i n Mayand J une.

Bourgui ba' s speech at
Mahdi a, on
J une 19,
1958, was
caref ul l y st udi ed as one of
t he chart s t o hi s
t hi nki ng.

Here, a f ewdays
af t er si gni ng an
ami cabl e agreement
wi t h France, vi sual i zi ng
progressi ve
evacuat i on of
bases
i n Tuni si a, he screamedt o
hi s Tuni si ans,
"Our st ruggl e must
not dependon
di pl omacy.
At cert ai n t i mes bl ood
must f l ow.

There must be sacri f i ces
and a man. -t o-man
st ruggl e! "
The previ ous year, at Thal a,
on August
13, he t ol d a cheeri ng
mob, "When af f ai rs
are i n a
st at e of st agnat i on one
must appl y
pressure.

I f bl ood
f l ows i n t he process
one must
under-
st and t hat i t
i s necessary. "
Tuni si ans appl i ed
t hei r own
i nt erpret at i on t o such
i nci t ement s
t o vi ol ence.

Some
saw
i t as
t hrowi ng t he
gaunt l et at Nasser,
ot hers as
def i ance of t he
"i m-
peri al i st s" or as
f orerunner of t he
"Hol yWar" agai nst
I srael .

The Ameri can
press st i l l
H. duB. REPORTS

AUGUST1961

Page2
hawkedhi mas themanof peace
andf ri endof the West .
"WEHAVEALWAYSTAKEN
PRECAUTIONSANDKNOWNWHENTOPULLBACK"
Bourgui ba
tol dthemobat Mahdi a
.

"That
i s whyvi ctoryhas al ways beenonour si deandwehavenever
known
def eat .

I
haveal ways warnedyouto beware
of ami l i tary
f orcethat mi ght wi pe
youout .
Provokei t, but wi thi mpuni ty
.

Si de-steprather thanf i ght .

Therei s no i nconveni encei nthat .
Return,
stab- andthensi de-step.

That i s the
waywe
wi l l wi n
. "
At theti mehe spokehe
had
recei vedf romAmeri ca, Germany
andCzechosl ovaki asometenguns f or
every
Tuni si anof
mi l i taryage.

(Materi el captured i nJ ul y,
' 61, i ncl uded
quadrupl emachi neguns
onturni ng
turrets, thel atest Skoda(Czech)
automati c ri f l es, automati c pi stol s f romRussi a' s Radom
works, Bri ti sh
anti -tank guns andal argeassortment
of
Ameri canarms equal to anythi ng
possessedbytheFrench. Rol l i ng
materi el was French, Ameri can
andCzechosl ovaki an,
wi th
Frenchmost wi del yusedf or thesi mpl ereason
that
Tuni si ans weref ami l i ar wi thi t . )
DAY
BYDAYTHETRIPTOWASHINGTONTOOKONGREATERIMPORTANCE.

Theexperts
warnedthat Bourgui bawas cl eari ngthewayf or drasti c acti on, taki nghi s usual precauti ons,
getti ngreadyf or
a
bl ood-l etti ng,
to
break
out of stagnati on
.

Do not f orget that i t was i nJ une,
1957, that Reuther
andMeanywent to Tuni s f or al abor congress
that i ncl udedl ongtal ks wi th
Bourgui ba, f ol l owedbystatements that Ameri ca(whosemandatethetwo l abor bosses
cl ai med
to
possess) woul dstandbytheAl geri anterrori sts.

A
f ewdays
l ater Senator Kennedymade
the sameaf f i rmati on.

OnJ ul y25 Bourgui badeposedtheBey, procl ai medTuni si aa
Republ i c
and
hi msel f i ts Presi dent .

(Westerndo-gooders whose
hearts bl edf or Lumumbahavenever
askedwheretheBeyi s bei nghel dor whyhei s not permi ttedto l eavethecountry
. ) Eachof
Bourgui ba' s moves has beenprecededbyareaf f i rmati on
of support f romAmeri canLabor .
That i s
hi s precauti on.
THEREWERETHREEPOSSIBILITIESOFACTION
:

A
dri vei nto theSahara,
entryi nto the
Al geri anwar to sei zel eadershi p of theMaghreb(Tuni si a,
Al geri a, Morocco), or mi l i tary
acti on
agai nst Bi zerte. Sai dtheexperts,

"It i s goi ngto beBi zerte. Si nceJ une
1960 Bour-
gui bahas beendi ckeri ngwi thMattei . " Mattei , headof
thepowerf ul Ital i anoi l trust and
Krushchev' s acecardi nthepl anto run
Bri tai nandAmeri caout of theEuropeanmarket
by
f l oodi ngtheWest
wi thcut-ratesovi et oi l , hoped, throughBourgui baandthe
FLN, to mono-
pol i zetheSahara.

Aj oi nt Tuni si an-Ital i an
ref i ni ngcompanywas f ormedi nSeptember, 1960,
wi thanagreement to createa
ref i neryi nBi zertecapabl eof handl i ng1,
250, 000tons of oi l per
year bef ore 1962.

A
f ewmonths
l ater theyf ormedtheS. I .
T. E. P. (Soci ete-Ital o-Tuni si enne
d' Expl oi tati on
Petrol i ere) f or expl oi tati onof theSahara.

Mattei promi sedItal i ansupport
f or
Bourgui ba' s cl ai m
andal l -out pressure, wi thRussi an
assi stance, ontheAf ro-Asi ati cs.

A
si mi l ar
agreement was si gnedwi ththe
Al geri ans.

Themenwhosebusi ness
i t i s to know
Bourgui basai d,
"Def i ni tel y, thedri vewi l l comei n
J ul y, agai nst thenaval base.

Though
pl annedi nmi nutedetai l i t wi l l comeas a
suddenburst of anger . "
DEGAULLEBRUSHEDTHEMOFF.
Bourgui bahadpromi sedat Ramboui l l et onFebruary18,
1961, that hewoul dl et Bi zertesl eepunti l
af ter theAl geri anwar was ended.

Onnothi ng
moretangi bl ethanBourgui ba' s word, andthe
Ameri canassumpti onthat
themani nwhom
anti -col oni al i smandpro-Westerni smarehappi l yweddedwoul d
never
dare
ri skal i enati ng
Ameri ca
bygi vi ng
Castro aprecedent f or
attacki ng
Guantanamo, deGaul l e
stubbornl yref used
to
bel i evehi s
experts.

"He' l l
never betrayme, "
hesai d.

"Wemust
trust hi m. "

Your
correspondent hel d
uptheJ uneREPORT
f or 48 hours
bef orethedeci si on
was made.

Inthe
endi t was
a
hi gh
of f i ci al who
assuredus that
acri si s woul dbe
provokedbyaBourgui bapl ay
to
crystal l i zethe
organi zati onof the
Maghrebandsew
upi ts control .
H.
duB.
REPORTS

AUGUST
1961

Page
3
I TWASALL
AGAI NSTREASON.

I nt el l i gence report s had warned f or
mont hs t hat Mat t ei was
appl yi ng pressure f or
hi s ref i nery si t e.

Russi a
want ed Bi zert e t o change hands bef ore
t he
Berl i n
cri si s : Kwas
det ermi ned not t o l eave t hi s
ai r and naval base f or radar and submar-
i ne det ect i on --
t he most modern
bet ween
.
Mers-el -Kebi r and Cyprus -- i n French hands .
Not
a pl ane or submari ne
movement t akes pl ace i n t he Medi t erranean
wi t hout t ouchi ng of f an
al ert i n nerve cent ers
f ar beneat h t he wat er
at Bi zert e.

Bet t er t hat Bourgui bahol d i t , K
f eel s, and
t he l aunchi ng ramps
capabl e of coveri ng Europe f romt he Danube t o t he
Bal kans .
THEMENAROUNDDE
GAULLE,

now
most l y of Soci al i st f ormat i on, carri ed t he day. They
argued
t hat Tuni si a' s cl ai m
t o t he Sahara woul d be st rengt hened i f Bourgui ba coul d
present
hi msel f as l eader
of t he Maghreb.

Tuni si a,
count i ng on Washi ngt on f or 60/ 0 of i t s budget and
f or pol i t i cal
support i n t he f i ght
t o l ead Nort hAf ri ca, was st i l l i n our camp.

Bourgui ba
knew
t hat we coul d
deny hi mnot hi ng.

He al so knew
t hat
AFL-CI O' s handout
of
$3, 250, 000
f or "i n
t ernat i onal pol i t i cal act i vi t y
i n
t he
second t ri mest er of 1961" was on t ap.

Furt hermore, a
Pan-Af ri can Uni on Congress i n
Casabl anca had j ust gi ven Ameri can l abor' s del vers i nt o i n-
t ernat i onal
pol i t i cs somet hi ngt o worry about : The i nt erl ocki ng net work of Af ri can Uni ons
set
up at Ameri can expenseandby Ameri can del egat es
i f not by Ameri can approval had, as
shoul d have been
expect ed, sl i d f romour grasp, al t hough t hey had been f ormed as "bul warks
agai nst Communi sm" .

(Labor del egat e
I rvi ng
Brown ruef ul l y
admi t t ed
i n
pri vat e t hat
t hey
were l ost ,
al t houghhe was opt i mi st i c i n publ i c . ) When French Soci al i st s and l abor l eaders,
nowal l -powerf ul around
de
Gaul l e,
st at ed emphat i cal l y t hat t here woul dbe no resort i ng t o
f orce
over
.
Bi zert e, t hey i nf erred t hat t hey hadi nsi de i nf ormat i on f romi nt ernat i onal part i es
and uni ons di ct at i ng
Bourgui ba' s course.

That i s why t he reader was t ol d i n J une t hat t he
cri si s woul dbe over t he Maghreb.
THEEXPERTSDI DNOTGI VEUPWI THOUTAFI GHT.

St i l l hopi ng t o convi nce de Gaul l e
t hat t he dri ve woul d be agai nst t he naval base, t hey report ed t hat Mennen Wi l l i ams hadver-
bal l y agreed
t o
Tuni si an
act i on agai nst
Bi zert e, and t hat Bourgui ba al ready had t he support
of Reut her and Meany -- but de Gaul l e woul dnot be persuaded.

On J ul y 6 t he Tuni si an
t rench-di ggi ng st art ed, accompani edby meet i ngs, sl ogans, radi o broadcast s andprocl ama-
t i ons
.

Tuni si a was whi pped i nt o af renzy.

Women' and chi l dren were urged t o vol unt eer
. On
D-Day mi nus
1
t he
Tuni si an
General Workers' Uni on, organi zed by
I rvi ng
Brown, f i nanced
by us and answerabl e t o t he bi g Conf ederat i on of Brussel s, cal l ed a general st ri ke.

The
f ol -
l owi ng day i t s unarmedworkers spearheaded
t he of f ensi ve, marchi ng agai nst t he wal l s and
gat es of t he Bi zert e arsenal .

Ahead of Tuni si an t roops movedawave of f anat i cal
wcanen
and chi l dren wi t h t hei r st ri dent "you-you" cri es,
pot ent i al vi ct i ms f or st rengt heni ngt he
propaganda i n UNand amongt he Af ro-Asi at i cs .

Casual t i es were
heavy, heavi er t han Bour-
gui ba
ant i ci pat ed
: 670 ki l l ed and 1, 155 woundedby Tuni si an count .

Bourgui ba admi t t ed
t hat
Tuni si a f i red t he f i rst shot .
MR. HAMMARSKJ OLD
, wi t hout wai t i ngf or amandat e,
t ook t he f i rst pl ane f or Tuni si a,
conduct ed hi msel f
l i ke
a
sympat hi zer f l yi ng t o t he ai d of avi ct i m.
I t
t ook a
f ewdays bef ore
west ern anger agai nst Bourgui ba f or preci pi t at i ng a
mi nor Suez di ed down.

Bourgui ba sup
port ers, l i beral s andAf ro-Asi at i cs, bat t ened
hat ches andweat hered t he st orm.

Then t he
French cameunder at t ack f or
ret urni ng f i re and ref usi ng t o wi t hdrawt o
ori gi nal posi t i ons,
t houghBourgui ba
procl ai med, "I t i s onl y t he
begi nni ng.

The f i ght i s not f i ni shed. "

Hi s
emi ssari es f l ewt o Moscow, Dakar,
Turkey, Paki st an and Washi ngt on
t o pl ead f or hel p.

I n
Al bani a t he
Mosl emForei gn Legi on of Communi st
vol unt eers was ordered t o
st and by.

Over
ni ght Mosl emdi f f erences di sappeared
: Egypt , I raq, J ordan and
t he Arab League, al l
f ormer
enemi es, sang
t he prai ses of Bourgui ba.

For
t he 90,
000 French ci t i zens
remai ni ngi n Tun-
i si a (t here
were 250, 000 bef ore i ndependence) ,
t he spol i at i on st art ed.
Thepi pel i ne carryi ng
f rom24 t o 25, 000 t ons of oi l per day
f romEdj el e and
Zarzai t i ne, across Tuni s t o
t he port of
Ski ra i n t he Gul f of Gabes, was cl osed on
J ul y 22.

France l ost
about 2/ 3 of her oi l
consump-
H.
du
B.
REPORTS

AUGUST1961
t i on,
Bourgui ba
a heavy royal t y
on every t on.
Page 4
THE
NEXTMOVE:

Accordi ng t o t he
t hi nki ng of hi gh
of f i ci al s, Bourgui ba
i s l osi ng
hi s gri p
on hi s . part y, t he
Neo- Dest our .

The J ul y.
bl ood- l et t i ngwas
an act of desperat i on
.

I t f ai l ed.
The dynami c
youngul t ras, l ed
by Bourgui ba' s
own Mi ni st er
of t he I nt eri or, Tai eb
Mehri ,
who
cont rol s t he Garde
Nat i onal e,
have been gai ni ng
power .

Thei r hand i s
nowst rengt hened,
f or al most a
year t hey have been
on t he upsurge.

Thei r st at ed ai mi s not
t o t ake Tuni si a
i nt o t he Moscow
camp, but rat her i nt o t he
Arab League
andt he st ruggl e agai nst
I srael .
Bourgui ba has
been abl e t o hol d
t he rei ns onl y
because Ameri ca
pai d
hi s
bi l l s .

Fromnow
on
t he
det eri orat i on wi l l
be rapi d.

Russi a
wi l l support t he
young rebel s ; t he machi nery
i s al -
ready i n pl ace
f or t he t ake- over
when Bourgui ba
f al l s .

Tal k of "non- al i gnment "
i s al ready
i n t he
ai r .

Beyond
Bi zert e al l t he West ' s
bases around t he worl d are
bei ns si ght ed over
nat i onal i st i c
gun- barrel s- - Panama
i ncl uded.

Thus t he t wo worl d
camps are l i ned up as
de Gaul l e' s Oct ober
show- down
approaches, wi t h t he Lef t
heavi l y wei ght ed and t he west ern
worl d
f aci ng a deadl i ne i n
Berl i n .
FOREI GN
MI NI STERSOFTHE
BI GTHREE, Dean Rusk,
Lord Home andM. Couve de Mur-
vi l l e, were conf erri ng
i n Pari s as t hi s was
wri t t en. The subj ect : Berl i n. Mr .
Macmi l l an
was not
happy over Ameri ca' s
part i al mobi l i zat i on; he
was convi nced t hat t he West coul d
not
wi n i n a game of
bl uf f wi t h K.

Furt hermore,
Engl and was exasperat ed wi t h
prosperous
Germany' s assumpt i on of
a t one of command i n west ern Europe.

Det eri orat i ng rel at i ons
wi t h t he Red bl oc
were havi ng t hei r ef f ect on
a gravel y i l l pound st erl i ng.

Lord Home
pressed f or i mmedi at e
t al ks bet ween East and West , t o
rest ore Bri t ai n' s posi t i on as chi ef
medi at or .

The kni f e at Couve de
Murvi l l e' s back was t he report , wi del y di f f used
by French
Labor, t hat
anot her mi l i t ary put sch wi l l t hreat en de Gaul l e i n
Oct ober .

Thi s i s hi ghl y
possi bl e
; i f t here i s such a pl ot ,
Communi st and Soci al i st uni ons wi t h t hei r ef f i ci ent i nt el l i -
gence l i nes woul d be
t he f i rst t o hear of i t .

On t he ot her hand, t hey
maybe usi nga non-
exi st ent pl ot t o j ust i f y
unprecedent ed mobi l i zat i on o goon squads and act i on
cent ers, pre-
parat ory t o an aut umn at t empt t o sei ze power f or t hemsel ves .

When de Gaul l e st art ed hi s,
crack- down . on al l opposi t i on
l ast Apri l he f oresawwhat he cal l ed
a
posi t i on
of symmet ry, a
bl ow,
at t he Ri ght and a bl owat t he Lef t .

I nst ead
al l t he bl ows have been di rect ed t o Ri ght
and Cent er .

Troubl e of some sort i s cert ai n, perhaps
f roman unl eashed l ef t .

Herr von
Brent ano sat at t he conf erence t abl e by
i nvi t at i on as Adenauer' s f orei gn mi ni st er . He wei ghed
t he di vergenci es ; Ameri ca' s f i rmness, dai l y
evi dence t hat t he man i n t he st reet s wi l l i ng t o
f i ght , , was t he bri ght spot of t he- meet i ng.

I t di d more t han assure Adenauer' s
re- el ect i on.
THEWESTERN
TEAMS. WEREEYEI NG. KRUSHCHEV. Khad no i nt ent i on
of l osi ngt he i ni t i a-
t i ve. Report s came out of Russi a descri bi ng.
. ,
Sovi et : mi l i t ary mi ght .
Rocket s, ; t anks, at omi c
submari nes and gadget s f romt he surpri se box' of Russi a' s nucl ear arsenal were marshal l ed,
descri bed and count ed. Then Mr ; McCl oy, Ameri ca' s
di sarmament expert , was i nvi t ed t o
K' s
vi l l a at Sot chi t o recei ve. a personal messagef or t he Presi dent .

West ern embassi es i n
Moscowrecei ved urgent : re. quest s t o report at al l cost s t he cont ent s of t hat l et t er .

I t
was
not hard t o get :

t he Kreml i n. l eaked i t . -

To di vi de t he West , Ksai d, i n ef f ect , "Forget
about a Bi g- 4 meet i ng.
Ameet i ngbet ween oursel ves i s al l
t hat
i s necessary t o set t l e every-
t hi ng- - i ncl udi ng t he
German peace. t reat y and Berl i n. " I t
was a
di pl omat i c maneuver i n-
t ended t o coi nci de wi t h t he mi l i t ary and ci vi l psychol ogi cal of f ensi ves of
t he past
.
f our mont hs .
ANEW"PLANT" BYTHESOVI ETSI NTHEPSYCHOLOGI CAL
WARFARESTRUGGLE
I n
Al l i ed Def ense Mi ni st ri es around t he worl d, wi del y separat ed, conf i dent i al
report s on
Ameri can mi l i t ary st rengt h and. pot ent i al .
appeared i n May.

Supposedl y drawn up i n each
case by t he mi l i t ary, expert s
amongt he nat i ve mi ni st ry, t hey were so nearl y i dent i cal
t hat
t hey mi ght have been wri t t en by one man.

These report s t ake t he
l i ne t hat Ameri cahas
assumed t he burden of
prevent i ng war, l i mi t i ng dest ruct i on i n case of war, and creat i ng a
mi l i t ary
umbrel l a under whi chf orei gn pol i cy can devel op f reel y. Ameri ca' s al l i es are depend-
ant f nr t hei r aaf p
. t y nn Arnp. ri ra' SSt rnt eai r. Ai r Cnmmand.
l aunchi ng si t es . Pol ari s subs and
H. du B. REPORTS

AUGUST
1961 Page
5
st r at egi c bases .

The quest i on
i s
t hen
r ai sed: ar e t he
Al l i es maki ngami st ake i n
assessi ng
Amer i can st r engt h on t hese f act or s ? Amer i cahas
announced t hat she wi l l not st r i ke
t he
f i r st bl ow, and Russi a' s pr i me
obj ect i ve i n t he event of an
at t ack i s dest r uct i on of t hese
same
f act or s- SAC, l aunchi ng si t es and st r at egi c
bases .

I f t hey wer e successf ul ,
onl y t he el ement s
of Amer i can def ense whi ch
sur vi ve t he i ni t i al at t ack
woul d be i n posi t i on t o st r i ke back, so
Amer i ca' s r eal mi l i t ar y st r engt h ( t he t hesi s
cont i nues) i s not what she has on NATO
maps
t oday, but onl y what she wi l l st i l l
have af t er t hat at t ack.
THEI NSI DI OUSLI NEOFDEFEATI ST
TALKCONTI NUESt hat Sovi et I CBM
mi ssi l es have
demonst r at ed t hei r super i or i t y, and
t hat Amer i cadoes not have adequat e
communi cat i ons
and cont r ol syst ems
t o r ecei ve t he or i gi nal at t ack and t hen r et al i at i ng
ef f ect i vel y i n or der t o
dest r oy Russi a' s key ci t i es and
i ndust r i al pot ent i al .

I t i s sai d t hat onl y when Amer i ca can
make a Sovi et sur pr i se at t ack i mpossi bl e
wi l l
t he Amer i can det er r ent
be ef f ect i ve, and t hat
t hi s wi l l not be possi bl e bef or e 1970 .

I n t he meant i me, t hey r eason, t he onl y def ense agai nst
Sovi et super i or i t y i s t he di sper si on of SAC, t he mai nt ai ni ngof pl anes i n t he ai r i n a st at e of
per manent al er t , and t he const ant
movement of
mi ssi l e- bear i ng
submar i nes, i nf er i or i n
number t o t hose of t he enemy.

Russi an super i or i t y on t he abovebasi s ( says t hi s def eat i st
l i ne of t hought ) makes t ot al
war possi bl e, but not a West er n vi ct or y.

Ther ef or et her e must
be no f i ght over Ber l i n
now; i t mi ght l ead t o di sast r ous t ot al war .
THI S
UNJ USTI FI ED THOUGHT
OF
DESPAI R
ANDSURRENDER. 1S THE. PSYCHOLOGI CAL
WARFAREWEAPONbei ng used at gover nment l evel s by Ar xi er i ca' s hi dden ehemi e. s, par t of
t he campai gn t o go over t he heads of gover nment and r each t hei r ar mi es .

Asi mi l ar cam-
pai gn i s i n oper at i on
t o r eacht he peopl e
t hemsel ves
and
t o
t r y t o
make t he nat i on r evol t
agai nst any gover nment cal l t o ar ms .

The f acel ess peopl e who ar ' e. pushi ng t hi s l i ne of
t hought
hope t o wi n
a
t ot al vi ct or y agai nst t he West wi t hout f i r i ng a shot .
Amongour
Eur opean
f r i ends t he t hought l i nger s : 140 year s bef or e t he A- bombNapol eon sai d,
"Nat i ons t hat awai t at t ack ar eal r eady hal f conquer ed. " Russi a
nowat t empt s
t o
pr ove t hat
nat i ons t hat awai t at t ack ar e al r eady conquer ed.

To nat i ons dependent on us f or t hei r def ense
t he post - at t ack eval uat i on i s wor se t han di st ur bi ng. Oust i ngval i ant gener al s f or bei ng t oo
ant i - Communi st wi l l do l i t t l e t o r eassur e
t hem' and st i f f en t hei r r esol ve t o st and f i r m.
ASWEGOTO
PRESS
t wo i t ems pr esent
t hemsel ves f or car ef ul scr ut i ny by pat r i ot i c Amer i -
cans : ( 1) The Ful br i ght Memor andum,
whi chi s ai med . at suppr essi ngmi l i t ar y t r oopt r ai ni ng
pr ogr ams whi ch
speak out i n suppor t of basi c Amer i cani sm
andagai nst Communi smwher ever
i t may be f ound; ( 2) Fr enchi nt el l i gence
r epor t s t hat Kr ushchev has massed 20 speci al
di vi -
si ons f or at omi c war f ar e
and 2000 pl anes i n East Ger many,
det er mi ned t o f or ce us t o - back
down, convi nced
t hat t hi s wi l l cause our
whol e West er n Al l i ance t o cr umbl e l i ke dust .
J i

J , , J.

.
90 1 1 n "1 n
Thi s newsl et t er gi ves
per mi ssi on f or r epr i nt i ngwi t hcr edi t
l i ne.
J n J n J.
Addr ess al l
domest i c busi ness t o
J ames H. Bal l , H. du
B. REPORTS, P. O. Box 855,
Hunt i ngt on, I ndi ana.
Addr ess al l f or ei gn busi ness
cor r espondence t o Hi l ai r e du
Ber r i er ,
Hot el Lut et i a, 43
Bl vd. Raspai l ,
Par i s VI , Fr ance.
Subscr i pt i on pr i ce:

$10 per year , f or t en
newsl et t er s .
Hi l ai r e du
Ber r i er , Cor r espondent
J ames
H. Bal l , Managi ng
Edi t or
VOLUMEI V, LETTER6
SEPTEMBER
1961

H.
du
B.
REPORTS-

-

Pari
,
France
WESTERNEUROPE'SRETURNTO
REALI TY.

Backfromthe
beaches. andresorts
came
ahugemi gratory'-wave'
at the-end of Aukust
; i nsecuri tywasthedomi nant note
as vacati on
ers regarded
thefuture.

I n'ti ny
Kuwai t, menacedby
I raq's Kassem, - ZOBri ti shVi scounts
stoodreadytofl y the
country's rul er,
hi s haremand' treasure, to safety.

The
questi on
:
Wherei s
safety? From- smol deri ng
Berl i ntoBrazi l , wheretheshadowof
another,
Span-
i shCi vi l . War hungover thecountry,
Kuwai t' aSul tan, l i ke Europeans
i ngeneral , saw
onl y i nsecuri ty.
MOSCOW'STHEMECONTI NUED
toFreeWorl d
adherents andneutral s, !!Vote, p. ro-Sovi et
l eaders
i nto power or be: -bombed. " The
spotl i ght swungto. Berl i n, but thecri si s was not
real l ythere.

Thecri si s
was gl obal i nKrushchev's determi nati onto
test theWest's fi rm
ness' ;
West Germanel ecti ons, due
onSeptember 17, maydeci dethenextmove.

Phase
twocanbe>expected
to. take
a
shapeanyti meafter September- 20.
EASTGERMANY'SWALTERULBRI CHT,
hatredfor whomhas dri ven20%of hi s country's
popul ati on
i ntofl i ght i nfi fteenyears, maybethei nstrument
.

Ul bri cht i s aSaxon, 68years
ol d, son, of atai l or . '

Hi s. record:

Obedi ence-to Moscow, :
a
Stal i nman. -
-Per
s-oral
i ni ti ati ve:
None. - Most of. -hi s Popul ar Pol i cecome. fromhi s nati veSaxony. -Hi s
. key statement on
seal i ngEast' : Rerl i noff
fromtheWest was, "The. West dares not l i ft
a
fi nger. -,
.
. Theyhave
l ost thebattl e
. of,
. Berl i nandthey shal l l ose
that
of
thepeacetreaty, whi chwi l l be! si gned
nomatter what . tensi oni t causes. Germanyshal l bereuni tedi nCommuni smandbyCom-
muni sm: "

Moscow, . j udgi ngfromhi s
past
record, wrote . the-. speech.
Previ ous tohi s appearanceas aCommuni st agi tator
~
. at theendof Worl d
-War
I , J i ttl e
i s
knownof Ul bri cht's youth. Psychol ogi cal reports'descri be: l i mas cyni cal -hard, - danger-
ous. - Whenhe~ : becamea. Communi st deputy, Ernst Thael mann hi s Party. chi ef, stoodi n.
hi s way.

Ul bri cht wantedpower: - Therei s reasontobel i evethat hehi msel f del i vered
Thael mannto the'' Nazi s.

WhenHi tl er. camei ntopower, Ul bri cht fl edto Moscow. . Stal i n
di spatchedhi m
toSpai non'the
outbreak
of theCi vi l
War
. , Therewefi ndhi mi nAl bacete,
headof agroup" charged--wi th-ferreti hgout andexecuti ngTrotskyi tes bel i eved'-to' havei n-
fi l trated-the I nternati onal Bri gade. Theprel i mi narymethods werestri ki ngl y si mi l ar to
thoseusedto el i mi nateCommuni sml s enemi es fromtheAmeri canandFrenchArmyto-
day.

Pro-Sovi et "i ndi cators" poi nted:
out the
vi cti ms.

WhenStal i nsi gnedhi s-pact wi th
Hi tl er Ul bri cht becamewhat Madi sonAvenuewoul dcal l a, publ i c- rel ati ons
man
.
.
- Hi s j ob
wasto hawk
a
-l i ne: "Any Germanwhoattempts toweakenthe, treaty wi th=Moscow: . i s an
enemy
of
Germany
. "
Stal i n-del i vered-hundreds of anti -Nazi s who'had-taken-. refuge: . i nRus-
si ai ntoHi tl er's hands at theti me, but Ul bri cht remai nedsafel yi ntheHotel Lux, i nMos-
cow, wi th
.
hi s
mi stres, s,
Lotte
.. Kul m, who, becameFrauUl bri cht i n195-T.
I n1945, , whenthe. , Stal i npl anto takeover
Germany
was.
set i n, moti on; : Ul bri cht: was fl own
totheRussi an
sector-al ong. wi thWi l hel mPi eckwhocut East : Germany, "off from,
the, . West
by. the al most i mpenetrabl ebel t that . i s
knownas Pi eck'a; ri bbon. ^ Pi eck's death. -xai sed
Ul bri cht toNo. . 1 , .
Secretary-General of theUni tedSoci al i st, Party,
J Communi . stj , _ Presi -
dent-of
theCounci l _ of State, and. Presi dent of
theCommi ttee: of Defenseof tt eDemocrati c
GermanRepubl i c: . Rumors ci rcul ate
, that hei s asi ckman, . that he
has
no stomach,
that
heAs kept al i ve
. i n. . Ni ederschoenhaus'enCastl eonbaby. food
. Others: . havei t
that
hei s a
bundl eof energy, worki ngei ghteenhours. aday. On
onethi ngal l , whostudy hi magree:
He:
remai ns a
Stal i nman. . Whenthel i ne changedhegavei t . l i p
servi cebut that was as
far as i t . went : ' West Germanand
Europeani ntel l i gence; fi l es ampl y attest
to hi s hatred
of,
Krushchevwi th
al l thevenomof whi chthemani s capabl e,
.

For' years hebeggedfor
Page2.
H.
du
B: REPORTS

September, 1961

-

Pari s,
France
theshutti ng.
. of f of , East Berl i n.

Krushchevstoodi n
hi s
way:

Correspondencewi th
Peki ng
gai nedi nvol ume.

Ul bri cht,
Al bani a' s
Hoj a
andPeki ng' s
Mao standtogether
as _Commun-
i sm' s
bel l i gerent wi ng. . Si gni ng
of the; peace
treatywi th Moscowwi l l not gi ve
Ul bri cht
compl etel i berty
of =acti on.

The
Sovi et tanks andtroops are
thereas muchto assurehi s
obedi enceas to, protect
hi m, - but theel ement of . danger
remai ns.

Oncecontrol
of the
roadl i nki ng. Berl i n
wi ththeWest i s i nhi s
hands, i f Ul bri cht can
preci pi tateacri si s he
wi l l .
NA, TO-
PLANS,
as
surnethat
troops under General Norstad' s command
. canhol dupaRus-
si anof f ensi ve
f or- f our days bef orehavi ngto empl oy
tacti cal nucl ear weapons
to avoi dbe-
i ngoverrun. Thi s woul d
gi ve. . Krushchevf our f l ays i nwhi ch
to change. hi s mi ndas to west-
ernf i rmness
anddeci deto negoti ate.

Ul bri cht
has thef ul l support of Peki ng
behi ndhi m,
f or theshow- downand
agai nst negoti ati on, thei nevi tabl eprogressi on
f romtacti cal ' nucl ear,
arms
to A- bombto H- bombnotwi thstandi ng.

The
cri si s wi l l growworseaf ter September
20, - i f Ul bri cht andPeki ng
canarrangei t .
I CE: GAULLEI SMOST. FI RM
I NDETERMI NATI ONTO,. MEET, FORCEWI THFORCE, but
thereare
hi ddendanger ' spots behi ndhi m. OnAugust
15
Frenchl abor
cal l edastri ke of
customs i nspectors: : No responsi bl eof f i ci al
daredof f endl abor . . byobservi ng- - that thei n-
spectors hol di ngpower
to
pass wi thout search or hol dupi ndef i ni tel yal l l uggage- , enteri ng
France, byboat. , . pl aneor trai nwere. control l edby; a
Communi st uni on, theGeneral Con
f ederati onof Workers. . (CGT) .

Cl amori ng- that thegovernment was not taki ngsuf f i ci ent
measures agai nst another revol t bythe"f asci sts", theuni teduni ons
organi zedthei r own
shock
troops. - - (A~ctu' al l ytheyareprof i ti ngbydeGaul l e' s anger agai nst theopposi ti on. )
The- French,- Conf eAexati on
:
. of . - Chri sti an
Workers (CFT'
C), - whi ch
control s workers' empl oy-
edat
Amexi can: bases- :
andi nstal l ati ons, has swungto the. Lef t, i s tal ki ngof `droppi ngthe
wordChri sti an
f rom- - i ts; name
. : , FORCEOUVRI ERE, . throughwhi ch
Mr. : I rvi ng' Brown,
Ameri can
Laborl . . s del egate,
has meddl edi nFrenchpol i ti cs andpouredAmeri canmoney
i nto .
French
l ef t : wi ngmovernent' s, has j oi nedthel i neup. . Fol l owi ngPremi er Debre' s
f ranti cappeal ' l ast, Apxi l , . French`l abor_appoi ntedi tsel f theprotector of "democracy".
But
the-
C, ommuni st' CGT
hol ds
therei ns. . . Members
mai ntai ned
by
thethree. uni ons' to ex-
pel heckl ers
f rom
, congress. : meeti ngs. havebeenf ormedi nto ri ot uni ts: : Unempl oyedmem-
bers, general l yuaectto run- errands anddel i ver handbi l l s, havebeenmobi l i zed; - gi vena
regul ar
uni on
- "home=- guard" status. - : Pentagon- type` war,,: centers havebeenset- upbythe
uni ons, -
as
betweenal l i es: _
A
dontrol - roomtel ephonel i st, f or cal l i ntheevent of amove
by: - theso- - cal l ed!: ' f asdi sts"
i ncl udes pol i ce, f i redepartment anduni onshock- troop- l eaders.
I ntheevent of a
cri si sstel ephone~stati on' s are- orderedto keepthe=- l i ne- s' cl ear, to accept
onl yurgent cal l s.

Uni ons havesucceededi nacqui ri ngtoppri ori tyrati ng.

The
tacti c
theyhaveworkedout i s . : si mpl e: Key
l eaders arecal l edf i rst.

Theyi nturncal l trusted
l i eutenants
s' previ ousl y, chargedwi th thedef enseof nervecenters, transportati ongroups
andtel ecommuni cati ons

the. l c - ss
of ' whi chwoul d
seri ousl y
af f ect theLef t. "General - tanks
-
portati onwoul d
_behwl te: d; by, stri keorder, except certai n- approved,
l i nes- such
as
theCom-
muni st- owned.
: "COTAX", radi o
,;
control l edtaxi l i ne speci f i cal l y
set upf or>thetransporta-
ti on. of shocktroops: :
. Radi o andtel evi si on- stati ons woul dbemanned
byempl oyees consi d-
ered,
"sure"
bythe; . uni ons, whi chmeans-
"sure" byCGT: standards. Stand- by
groups have
al readybeenset up: Renaul t
. automobi l evorkers, wherethe
Communi st CGTi s
domi nant,
haveorders to bar the. pl ant . wi th. trucks. : and
trai l ers, to prevent the"f asci sts"
(bythat ti me
thegovernment) . f rom- acqui ri ng; transportati on
: . Anyshow- downi nPari s wi l l
degeneratei n
amatter of
hours i nto. ; , l abor
pl ay
: ; to - sei ze- . power,
di rectedbypol i ti cal l abor
commi ttees
domi natedbytheCommuni sts
.

October wi l l see
thebegi nni ngof a
seri es of stri kes
coi n-
Page3,
H.
du
B.
REPORTS

September,
1961

-
_Pari s,
France
ti di ngwi th thetensi oni nBerl i n
unl ess drasti c
measures aretaken.
beforehand.

There
i s
al essonto bel earnedbyAmeri cafrom
theposi ti oni nto
whi chtheFrench
government
has permi ttedi tsel f to
sl i de.
THE
TRIALSOFOFFICERS
IMPLICATED
IN
THE
GENERALCHALLE
REVOLTCON-
TINUES.

Testi monyby
aFrenchSecuri tyoffi cer recentl y
di scl osedexi stence
of aCom-
muni st
"Commi tteeof El i mi nati on", speci fi cal l y
chargedwi thdrawi ng
upa, l i st of offi cers
whoseel i mi nati onfromthearmyi s
i mportant to theCommuni st
party. Party
i ntel l i geri ce
l i neswerecharged
wi th gatheri ngevi dence
and. wi tnesses.

Those
whoi refusedto testi fy
i nsupport of
evi dence so gatheredweresubj ectedto retal i ati on.

Thenames of col onel s
sentencedon
such testi monyweregi ven: `There
werethosewhohi ntedthat the
Red-di
rectedel i mi nati on. campai gnwas gl obal .

Theycomparedthesentences
handeddowni n
thePal aceof
J usti ce' s 17th Correcti onal Mi l i taryTri bunal
wi th General Wal ker' s
remov-
al fromcommandi n
Germany. Asi mi l ar devel opment i nAmeri ca
i s, not i mpossi bl e.
Neverthel ess, l i ghts burnedal l ni ght i nthe. Nati onal
DefenseMi ni stry, ; ontheni ght
of
Aug-
ust
19
to 20.

Andthe
Frencharmy, though stri ppedof thefi nest'
offi cer cadre' i nthe
worl di na sui ci dal weedi ngout whi chour press
wi del yappl auded, waswi thus as' Col onel
Gl over S. J ohn' s j eep
rol l edacross Germanyat 20 mi l es anhour, fromMannhei m-tothe
checkpoi nt at Hel mstadt, at theheadof a1500-manconvoy. .
ITAPPEAREDONAUGUST
19. THAT,
GENERAL
NORSTAD' S4-DAYCOUNTDOWN. WAS
i mmi nent. Europeanmi l i tarypl anners woul d
havepreferredto throwtheworksonDay-
5' rather thani ntroducethesmal l , tacti cal nucl ear warheaddesi gnedto stoptheti deby
destroyi ngtroopconcentrati ons andai rfi el ds. . Thetacti cal weapon, as theysawi t ; woul d
bri ng
BombAandBomb
HfromKrushchev
. However, thedeci si onwas not' i nthei r hands.
Thebarbedwi reseal i ngoff theci ty towards whi chCol onel J ohn' s
j eepwas movi ngdown
theautobahnwas sol dto theUl bri cht government byWest Germani ndustri al i sts: Beyond
i t were10 Sovi et armoreddi vi si ons,
10
mechani zeddi vi si ons andsome2000 pl anes, sup-
portedbyEast Germany' s 200, 000-manmi l i ti a: .
THEAFRO-ASIATICS, whentheymet i nBel gradeonSeptember 1, summedupour posi -
ti onas "pi nneddown". Therewerea
number
of
i nteresti ng
aspects to the so-cal l ed
Bel -
grademeeti ngof the
unal i gned, of whi chthei r omi nous rej ecti onof theterm"neutral " as
mi sl eadi ngwas oneof thel east i mportant . Inthemi nds of real i sti cpol i ti cal thi nkers
therewas never doubt as to
howtheBel gradegroupwoul dstandwhenthecardswere
down, nor
whereBourgui bawoul dmovewhentheti mewasri pe.
BOURGUIBA' S
WELCOMEAMONGTHEUNALIGNEDwas purchasedbytheTuni si anat-
tack on
Bi zerte. But Bourgui bai nturn. demanded
proof
of
goodfai thfromhi s former
enemi es. For fi ve years
Nasser andtheArabLeaguehadsupported
hi s No. 1' enemy,
Sal ahben
Youssef . Bourgui ba' s terms were. si mpl e:
Sal ahbenYoussef' shead.

The
l ast ti mehesawSal ahwas
i n' Zuri chonMarch2,
1961
.

Hi s parti ngwords
were, `"Death
i s thebest
I canwi shfor you. "
Onthe
morni ngof August 12 Sal ahand
hi s
wi fe
were
i nthei r hotel i nWei sbaden
whena
cal l camefromtwoof hi s
trustedl i eutenants i nFrankfort, stati ng
that theyhadanurgent
messagefrom
Nasser.

TheSal ahs l eft
for Frankfort at once.

Thel i eutenants
greeted
Sal ah
warml y. Heaccompani ed
themto. Room53 i nthe
Royal Hotel , whi cha
Tuni si an
hadrentedthat morni ng.

Threehours
l ater MadameSal ah grew
ti red
of
wai ti ng' i na
cafe
andwent to the
hotel .

Her husband
wasdead.

Thetwo
l i eutenants andthe
Tuni si anwho
hadrentedthe
roomwereseenl eavi ngthe
hotel al oneashort
ti meafter
Sal ahwent upto
Page4. -
H. duB. REPORTS

September,
1961
Pari s, . France
Room53:

By
.
then1hey
werei nSwi tzerl and,
onTuni si anpassports :

Sal ah
was gi vena
mi l i taryfuneral
i nCai ro. twel vedays l ater
. OnAugust
21 Bourgui baannounced
; "I re
al i zenowthat Presi dent
Nasser' s i ntenti ons are
good.

I
shal l make
atri ptoCai ro
to
thankhi m
personal l yfor hi s support. "
Tuni si anI nformati on
Mi ni ster Masmoudi
stated
"Tuni si amust becomeas
anti - Semi teas Cai roi f weare
toreducethegrowi ng
i nfl uence
of theJ ewi shCommuni ty
i nour country. ' ' Afew
days l ater a$28mi l l i on
tradepact
was
: si gned
wi thRussi a.
Thepol i ti cal phi l osophythat
brought Habi bBourgui bafromhi s AFL- CI O
tri umphi n
San
Franci scoten- years
agothi s month
to
hi s
present peak, wi thhi s son
an<i nti mateof Pres-
i dent Kennedyandhi msel f
theprotegeof bothNasser
andHammarskj ol d, , mori ts
some
study. Hi s
basi cpremi se, as Bourgui ba
statedi t, i s, "I ntheOri ent,
when
amani s
dead
therei s no. . poi nt tal ki ng
about hi m. " Thepol i cy
of
physi cal
di sappearancefor one' s op-
posi ti oncameupagai n
i n
aconversati on
Bourgui bahadi nPari s l ast wi nter
regardi ng
possi bl etroubl es.
over, theSaharawi ththe so- cal l edAl geri an
"government" si tti ng
i n
Tuni s .

"Theycoul dbewi pedout i n
anhour", sai dBourgui ba, "and
i ntwodays noone
woul dtal k
about them. " Di scussi ngthemost effecti ve
way, of si l enci ngapol i ti cal , oppo-
si ti on, heobserved, "Youtakethe
most representati ve.

Hedi sappears- - a
dayor two
l ater No. 2 di sappears .

After that youdonot
havetol ook
for
No. 3; hei s` al readygone,
andtherest
have
scattered. "
Somuchfor themanMr. Hammarskj ol d
has champi oned
i ntheBi zerteaffai r .

.

.

s
UN' S
MR. "H" ,
as apossi bl enegoti ator of theBerl i ncri si s, i s understandabl ysomewhat
l ess thani deal
as
theFrenchandBel gi ans seehi m,

TheH
story
as tol d
by
aresponsi bl e
. off ci al i ntervi ewedbyyour
correspondent,
starts ei ght years agowhen- theRussi ans de-
ci dedtooust TrygveLi efor "compl i ci tyi ntheKoreanWar" . . France' s USTAmbassador
.
Henri - Hoppenot proposedMr . , Harranarskj 8l d, sonof aSoci al i st countryandafami l yen-
nobl edi n, 1610
: .
I I -
.
. was then47, - hespoke4l anguages,
coul d
work
20
hours a
day,
hada
fl awl ess, whi c

1s
to
say
col orl ess, recordas, afuncti onaryandadi pl omai npol i ti cal
economy. B=ngnoorator, heseemedunl i kel ytomeddl ei nthe, del i berati ons of
the
. , General Assembl y
.

Li terature, pai nti ngandmusi cwerehi s hobbi es .

Therewas. l i ttl e
possi bi l i tyofhi s marryi ng.

The. onl ypersoncl osetohi mwas an
I tal i an- Ameri canre-
ferredtoas hi s
body- guard.

Though, ambi ti ous, hewas abl etoconceal i t. .
, Thus
ahi ther-
tounknownSwedebecameoverni ght thehi ghest pai dpubl i c
servant i ntheworl d
:
. , Lodgi ng,
chauffeur, secretari es,
and$50, 000, tax- free, ayear .

Twoyears l ater hewent to
Pe-
ki ngonhi s. owni ni ti ati vetotrytol i berate
Ameri can
avi ators
bei nghel dbyMao.

Then
cameSuez andtheformati onof
UN' s "bl uehel mets" . . Ashort ti mel ater
UNI
s vast
pub-
l i c rel ati ons
machi nestartedreferri ngto. themas Mr.
H!
s
army.

TheUNof SanFran-
ci sco,
i nwhi chthe
Bi g
5 madedeci si ons, taki ng
i ntoaccount thewi shes of a
General
Assembl yi nwhi chthesmal l er
states wereseated, was dead.

Mr . Hhaddevel oped
.
a
techni queof corri dor
campai gni ngbywhi ch, once
assuredof the' support of the
General
Assembl y, .
he
coul ddi ctate. t
othefi ve great powers .

The
Secretary- General
of
UNbe-
ganto
regardhi msel f as theheadof an
emergi ngWorl dGovernment.

Smal l states abl e
tobal ancethei r budgets
onl ybygraceof the
Bi g
5,
enabl edMr .
H
to
di ctatetofour of
thegreat.

Toavoi dl oss of face
heevaded, ashow- downwi th
Russi a, thefi fth.

De
Gaul l e
was
thefi rst toprotest.

Krushehev, as l ongas
UNdi dnot stand
i nhi s way, remai ned
si l ent.

ThencametheCongo.

Mr . . Hsent "hi s army", :
preparedtogoverndi rect.

K
was pl ayi ngtheLumumba
card. Hebangedhi s
shoeonthetabl eand
demandedMr .
H' s
resi gnati on. Mr . ; H' s
defender was Tui ni si a' s .
UNAmbassador
Mongi Sl i m. Bythi s
ti me, around
theworl d, through
UN' s countl ess
affi l i ated
organi zati ons,
thecampai gn
was i nful l
swi ngtodi vert al l
di pl omacy
throughUN
.
Page5.
H. du
B.
REPORTS

September,
1961

-

_

Pari s,
France
OnMay20, 1960,
f ol l owi ngthef ai l ure
of thePari s
Summi t, Mr. H.
decl ared,
"TheUni t-
edNati ons f urni shes a
f rameworkf or di pl omacy
andal l di pl omati c
conf erences
onwhat-
ever l evel nati ons
wi sh to negoti ate.

The
organi zati onof f ers
asetti ngf or
permanent
negoti ati ons wi thout publ i ci ty( i . e. ,
Soci al i st and
secret)

i nwhi ch
i t i s possi bl e
to pl ay
thef ul l gamut of means
of agreement devel oped
through experi ence
andtradi ti onal
di pl o-
macy.

I hopethat al l
member nati ons, the
great powers andothers,
wi l l useto i ts
f ul l -
est the
opportuni ti es of f eredby
theUni tedNati ons andthei r
di f f erent organi zati ons
. "
I nJ ul y1960 theof f i ci al publ i cati on
of
THEWORLD
FEDERATI ON
OFWARVETERANS,
UN' s
war veterans' organi zati ongroupi ngal l
ex- sol di ers, i ron- curtai n
andotherwi se,
gavetheHammarskj ol d
sol uti onapl ug.

( Af ormer top- l evel
J apaneseagent heads the
publ i cati on' s edi tori al staf f ) .

Mr. Hwas pi ctured
as anol ympi anf i gure
l eani ngdown
f romapeak
to
of f er
scal i ngequi pment to deGaul l e,
Krushchev, Ei senhower and
Macmi l -
l an. . Thesamemagazi ne( MondeCombattant)
hadpl eadedi nNovember, 1959,
that Heads
of State
hol d"regul ar meeti ngs wi thi nthef rameworkof the
Securi tyCounci l rather than
conf erences set up i nf ear of ani mmedi ateconf l i ct or the
shadowof threateni ngconf l i cts
. "
Ten
days
af ter the
col l apse of theMaySummi t i n1960, theUNSecuri ty
Counci l voteda
resol uti ondemandi ngthat France, Bri tai n, USand
Russi arenewtal ks "wi ththeassi st-
anceof theSecuri ty
Counci l andother appropri ateorgans whi ch UNi s i n
posi ti onto pro-
vi de towards that end. " Theresol uti onwas passed
onMay27.

Si mul taneousl yaf i ght
was steppedupto removetheConnal l yReservati onwhi chprevents Ameri can
i nternal
probl ems f rombei ngdeci dedbytheI nternati bnal Court i ntheHague.

UN' s worl dwi de
af f i l i ates threwthewei ght of moral pressureandmass medi abehi nd theparal l el
dri ves.
FromGenevatheI nternati onal Labor Organi zati on, wherethesonof UN' s
Ameri candel -
egateCabot Lodgesat onthegoverni ng
body,
i ssuedaf l oodof di recti ves to i nternati onal
l abor
.

Ameri can
cul tural attaches andUSI nf ormati onServi ceof f i cers, recrui tedi n
manycases f romUNESCOandother
UN
bodi es, pl unkedf or
UN.
SEPTEMBER, 1961, f i nds Mr.
H' s
armyi nKatanga,
attempti ng
to sweepMoi seTshombe
f rompower .

European
observers ref l ect that Mr . H' s brother i s headof
a
Swedi sh-
Ameri canf i rm
recentl yi ncorporatedto expl oi t Katanga
mi nes, that Mr . H. has named
a
certai nMr. StureLi nerr,
of Stockhol m, representati veof Swedi shmi ni ngi nterests
wi th hugehol di ngs i n
theCongo, as
UN' s
mi ni ngexpert.
TheHammarskj ol d
mandatei nUNexpi res i n
Apri l , 1963 . Ani ron- curtai nSecretary-
General
i s al most certai n
to f ol l ow. Such i s the
UN
i nto
whosehands Ameri caandher
al l i es arebei ng
maneuvered through
theBerl i ncri si s.
To sum
uptheconcl usi ons of
theEuropeanexperts:
Acorporati onentrustedwi th the
sel l - out, rel i evi ng
i ndi vi dual members
f romresponsi bi l i ty, UNwoul dsuppl ant
theWhi te
House, rel egate
our Secretaryof
Stateandour al l i es'
f orei gnmi ni sters to rol es of at-
torneys f or
thedef ense,
wi th Bel grade' s
pro- Easternbut as yet
unal i gnedpowers f orm-
i ngthej ury,
provi di ngthepol i ce to
bri ngthedef endants to
thebar, andassuri ng
Mr. H
thepower
to j udge.

That
i s theprospect
f or October .
Thi s
newsl etter gi ves
permi ssi onf or
re- pri nti ngwi th credi t
l i ne.
J ames
H. Bal l

Hi l ai reduBerri er,
Correspondent
P. O. Box855

Hotel Luteti a, 43 Bl vd
. Raspai l
Hunti ngton,
I ndi ana.

Pari s
6, France
VOLUME
I VLETTER
' T
2CM4ER
1961
H
;
duB
REPORTS
"Youask
howwearegoi ngto get
out of thi s
( cri si s) .

To, know
howwearegoi ngto get
out of
i t you
. must knowhow
wegot i ntoi t . . We' got
. i ri to i t
through
bad
pol i ci es:

And
howwere
we
l edi nto. bad
pol i ci es ?

Byf al sei deas,
;
bythedesi reto,
f l atter the
publ i c i nsteadof
tryi ng to
correct
f al se. publ i c opi ni on
. " . ( Monsi eur
:
. Thi ers)
- . : Herearedetai l s
a: . f l attered' , ' '
publ i c
shoul d know
as weenter theautumn
of 1961, .

. . . .
I RANf aces
atest : Russi ai s.
throwi ngeverythi ng
i nto
a
bui l d- up. agai nI t `theShah
andAmer-
i ca. Ameri can.
counter- propagandai s,
enti rel yi nadequate.
- Experts- bel i eve- i t
i s nat the. us-
ual Russi an. bl ow- hot,
, bl ow- col d- techni : queAo
. provi de
conf us
onwhi l e
amai nof f ensi vei s
l aunched
el sewher, e: ; . Feveri shRussi an
acti vi ty. - - troopmovements
and- ' bombi shel ter~con-
structi onal ong; theTurki shf ro- nti e_r
i ndi cate- that .
troubl e. may
be
. general : i n, : that. area.
PEKI NG
: I nasudden,
r. pvgr satPeki ng- has: etoppe. d: di scouragi ngthe
studyandspeaki ngof
Engl i sh. andhas
startedd- raf ti ngEngl i sh
speaki ng studehts~f rom, Southeast : Asi a
. "- The
ex-
pl anati on
: . ,
Whatever_, i ts; _di sagreer~eri ts
i nternal l y, : the
Communi st worl di s i n compl eteac-
cord
:
onone
. poi nt : , Autumnof 1961, i s, the.
- Wes. tTa. peri ol
of
weakest resi stanceand: every
ad-
vantageof thi shoul db. - . expl oredq

When
wethi zkof thehi ghl ysuccessf ul
i nf i l trati on
of
Cubabythe
Svi , et~Chi neseCommuni sts, , thi s
l i ctl akes oI na. ' gravei mportance. , .
I NEAST. GERMANYa- newanti - Communi st
undergroundknownas"August 1
. 3
.
. Movement"
showed
strengthi n earl ySeptember but nowcompl ai ns of l ackof
support, moral
and
mater-
i al . , . Kennedy' s UN. speechwas
di scouragi ng; ,
so
was
I J N'
; s - di sarmament pl an : apparentl y
Ameri can- approved,
: whereby: i ndi vi dual : nati ona, woul dretai n suf f i ci ent-
f orces
- toi ri ai ntai n
i nternal order; : , entrusti ng
nati onal
def exrse
toa, ; red- domi nated UN
:

Germans: cannot seeUN
comi ngto
the, support . of Ameri ca- , i nthe~Ganal . Zone; Qr Weat Gormanyi n - Berl i nwhenthey
studytheprospects
f or.
Secretary
.
General :
Tuzasi a' . . s : : Mangi Sl i m, whos. e4. grandf ather . came
to that countryas, a sl ave,
U
Tenant ; . ; theBurmese. - Soci al i st, ~ or
Paul
Prebi ch
of
the: onrel i -
abl eArgenti ne. : . . Evenmore
- di scour
: . agi ng- i
. s, the. axrospect- of

UN,
. under Kri shnaMenonof
I N
BELGI UMthe; rest: _peri od - i s al most over . . - Last .
December
Andre
R&nard4l eader of
Bel gi um' s Metal Wo_rXers' Uni on, ~ torethecountryapart and- destroyed some:

1Q
.
0 : mi l l i on. '
worthof property, , i n sensel es

ri pti ng, -
i na
pl ay- 1aupset the. Eyskengovernment
and
bri ng
theSoci al i sts
i nto;
power. : I t
f ai l ed,
despi tethe
support' . Qf the: I nternati onal - Conf ederati on
of FreeTradeUni ons ( I CFTU) , whosehome. i s i nBrussel s but themaj or l ump of whose
f unds comesf rom
AFL- CI O.

( See
H.
du
B. REPORTS,
J une
1961
.
I ndi a.
. . .
.
Thi s wasan
out and out
l abor' revol t to take' - over
th' e government byci vi l war

Themai n'
reasoni t
f ai l ed' was' t1i at' the
l ef t wi ngof the
Fl emi shuni ons"' r' ef used
to- march.
Nopri son
sentences werehanded
out m, puri i shment
of thi s vi ol ence
because, theoperati on
vi ral con
ducted i n` the
nameof a
stri ke, ' aGrayout whi ch'
nocons`ei rvati ve' movement
enj oys
. '
Asi de
f romthe
f i nanci al l oss
themai nCasual ty
was Renard' s personal
reputati on

`: ' Paul Spaak,
whoten

ear' s ' earl i er
had
dethroned' Ki ngLeopol d
but whowas
i de~ntl f zed: wi tk
f reedom
and
resi stari ceto
Communi sm
because' of ' hi s
i mrri edi atepast as
head_ of `
NA}r0, resi gned`
and
_

P
.
rt
' Presi dent i : eo
Col l ard

i cked
returnedhome.

Pati entl y;
i ri eti cul o~u`sl y, heand
Soci al i st

a

y

_P
u

_the pi eces
a: nzi `reorgani zed
a. `Soc a
l i st Party, ' separated
f romCommu
i sml hy a,
t
P

hi nl i ne
that i n
Bel gi um`- i s~of ten
i nvi si bl e
. 7 At the
partycongress i n
Charl eroi .
on' September
24,
1961,
Bel gi anSoci al i sts
deci dedto ri sk
another
crossi ngof the
Rubi con, bai t
: - ' byanother
route.
Thi s ti mei t
wi l l bean
i ntermedi ate
measure: Faced
wi thFl emi sh
resi stance
( some
SQO, QQOCathol i c
Fl emi shuni pmmember
al ai agai nktADO,
DOW
extreme :
Lef t
- Wal l oons), any
attempt to%, take. , , Gver al l
- Bel gi umunder-thel abor`

i s out.,
Theal tetmAti v, 6:
~To take
,
hal f , of i t, creat mxWkI l ogm;
Otat e-. wi th,47edprati on?statua, :- -
through: 4-Socf i di st revol uti o' n'
- prOmi sod
, that
there
- woul d' be. ~nd vi ol ence, but
those
who
remembered
theevents of l ast wi nter wereunconvi nced
.

Therel sl i kel yao
:be
Fl emi sh
:resi stance, hence
af i ght .

Reasonf or theresi stance:
TheWal l oonmovement,
i f vi ctori ous, woul dpackage
the
Fl emi shCathol i cs i nati ght bokal ongi i i dkenergeti c
. no- hol ds- barredWal l oons
di rected
bya60%Soci al i st- Communi st
maj ori ty.

The
Fl ammandswoul d
bedevouredat l ei sure.
0:do hos ~ "y
FAANC~4-. , A- n- i i i npopul ar, :
goveri Lment at homeand, , , i i yun
.
dotgbvAl wnmd.
,
, mOv6ni 64t i nAl gf ri a, * the
OAS( Se- cr
.
ot' , -
ATM' Y
. , Or~gai i i i ati o~)- -. are:l ockedi na:
death- strti ggl d"l i ketwowrestl ers, ; - each un-
abl eto~116, ok-. I the~othb. r
. ~, - Ei ther coul di namatter of :weeks' ; - ' l ' f i ttook~a
strong' stand a"gai nst
outsi demeddl i ri gi .- :Aol i ve~, kthe?death
bl aw~to th*TL, . N
. `~- - ~
Th6- , OAS1; 6ppo-a, ed!t&, thS!bahd6nment
of Al geri aand
i nf avor of an"are- you- wi th- us- or- agai nst- us' . '

.
ul ti matumto France' s al l i es,
i s

61e~. ~DtG; i ul l &- i ,9, powerl ess to
stampout the, . 0~, %An- Al geEi za, - ~Th- e reasontha*OASi s un&6-f f. gt6uhd:, ' No*Abovel groundcam-
.
pai gnf oi a- - Frahch. Al geri aWri ol erated. i ndeCi andi al l
- sondol l W
Sel f
' Determi nati on!' pl an.
e

f Vr5bqi al i sts
.
. ti es theAhT- edvof A; prd- OAS' army
Putschraasax- n- okeu&e- to. mobi l tl 4e,, l ar :a:l "pi l t sth`bf thei r- d~w_ _ n
under
a`d6f eti i ewbf democracy"
l abel .

They- have
:i orAerl dpro- Lef t
el err%ents, 7' i n, the. &r1
; ny- 4o -prepAr6,
4' - 4i tt ' of - thei r of f i cers
l i kel yto support aRi ghti st dri veor a countermoveagai nst a Lef ti st one.

. TheFrencharmy
i
a
bei ng:deCaj:)i tat-. eA, . - . , ai t&ral l y, , - , - not i r-orn=tj xw., Lef Vbut . 1rGi nAh6, Eaat .
Ameri c4n:!, good*of ~i d. e, s' !- , :i ntervei . i ti 6i i :l ri :, - 19, 58- I edt6, , the1a- f f - i of
the
Gai l l ardgovei nxnent and
l ater the. , Fourth
:Republ i c, , . , - Ammei
i can- An%baasaddrl - ,. Wal tf tsl e6y- . :
( 6, xpd' c- ti zi gi 6- be
.
j ai hedbyMen-
wri tten) i s~~:~onf er~ri hg- ~dai l y~, , vvi i hi ni eni bett of thePtovi si onal
,
Al geri -
an. Govre' xnf nent( FLN)
:i mTuni s;
advi si ng ;:
promi si ng

df any
terms f rotnj deGaul 1e. za. a i neal i 6i , , of . ci ut
,
pa~i
.,
. ' the aASK-. whi l ei thd- &rmy- i s headl ess. -( Wehave
beenJ essanxi oua'
; , t&- ~6ai atv; i n&
recogni zeSyri an
i ndepi ~ndi snci ~_ ! The:-- abl uti 6rV
. adV6cat6d
by
deGaul l ewi l l , bri ng' ' a' - , reac- ti b4 ,, , when1- h~af ter- ef f ects' . hWFrance, :that - Wi l l
toppl e' the
Fi f th:
Republ i c. ModerateSoci al i st GuyMol l et andextremeLef t . Soci al i st Pi erreMendes- France
are- prepari ngtheSi xthRepubl i c; thei r onl ypoi nt of di sagreement i s whether
or not to use
theFrenchCorMraukt6t Party.
. . _ ( PMF_ 1i f or, i Lsi ngvi t . Y :Whi ch-7ever , wi ns- , :41the, Fri i ~' 4' C~h, . Com-
muni . st, - PartyW- i l l abe
i n=thef _ r_ a, y; Y_ taki *ng, , f thq f i ght , i nt6. the' streetsl r. ' ' Co-

Em' aui ni sri i l s
ti me=tri ed
g
. overi unei i t~. - , ?LeAni n~g. - 4d, , - . Comtnuri i srn- , ' ; i ntb; p6*ek, - andf romi ts f ai l _ f ai l -
i ng:hand- s- a-, e
,i z. 6tt[ ,mpl e- te
control ;
_ - , ( Readec:pl easi B~re. - re
; a&~the, 6bservat- i ai I of Monsi eur
~
Thi ers. 1-. , - - , . .
SYRI A:Nasser stoodf ri endl ess when
thebl owcame.

I srael , France, Bri tai n, J ordan,
Russi a an_ 4J raq. , J Lvd. scopee~aj tq

Ha

r. skj ol d
. R, 44ttl e
And
"#. y~ccke# 4g. mrrxa y
was, , h

. 1
i p- ~d, . an

S. o, N

untpF_
7_ aq~~pa, wrote
qo . 409,
_
.
j aF
.
mq!ed~. ; #F; , ,
bmayrogu4pposo
of f , w0pow0hy,

~,
strongest
hi s
we4p"~
f rorr

beams#
.. at , ; ~,
. vo. l ; ~tkl e
I sl am
qypT
the
ai rwaves ai ; wayea
9
gl uesFyq;
agents,

P~n#
PF$44i Xed, ,
byCol onel
I f ecrQ
. rqmgf i ned J ned
i n
Pea_

_

yf ~i a; , t#e~,, _ i s
'. i ptaF; t' .

warl i e. D; ruqow#UrXeq
up, byBri tai n, , 4gai nst
Franpp- , i !~J 9, 1,
_ . , F~a~ej n~, . hay

gpv~~t. n~. nep~, ~Ati ch i s corn
pqs. ed of F
.
n~, Orth
~

_ I

,

.
i ~g, V? ppat, i nthen~*
odqx, r- pe, kPa4
9

spr
as
thei r

el . . - As, i ~J
; t qqqorQ
. , aN
. ~aser, cal l to . ai ms
. agai nst I srael
wi l l
draw
; VQQaqf qntc
;
i ts- vortex.

I t W_

1#:al so
' bFi ng, ~~usoi ai nto
.
, . rake
~~up,

i nthi s
the; pawns pawns
strugal p.
`~. ' :"OOTOBERJ 961-
Page2
THEPI RE
UNSTARTED, N:KATANGAJS
`NOTFI NI SHED .
The' *brutal i tyofNehrul sGurk-
has,
: i ndi scri mi natel y shooti ng-at
anythi ngthat!woveC"i qa UN
acti ondei sI gned' not to pre-
sol ve
peace
but,
rathorto forva,asl i bbermnsal sol uti on, may
godowni nhi storyas UN' s"' Bu-
di pest". .. :
.Hereare
baokground~Awts!
the
I eaderQhoul dj b1ep,-,i n' i xi i nd thesenext
few
.
months;
wi thout them
nQt.ht-ng,,tl xa,t-l o~gai ttvto
happen--wi l l :cna.ke sense:
LMtJMBA, I N
JULY, 1960, cal l edon.UN
to-dri ve-out t
'
he Bel gi ans rei i i i i ni ng
under rode=
pendence agreements
as Advi sors andtechni ci ans..Thei r repl acement
byRussi ans and
,Czechs,
I oI l 9wL*d, 4pai d.-j xdes o

i i ti l

i nterVi ~i ed onSeptember
c,r
.t~-'
horror, .,
unti l C,, ol onel .-Mob;vtft~
I l k$9 rdn,put
the,,R
:eds, .

U- N

the,re,quest.of' the
:Ldopol dVi l l egovernment ; ' ordered
forei gn
advi sors
andi nat:rgc-to
.
-rs=4r.epor
,
tad-l y,aroi i i i d,5
.
00) to:' l ei ve Moi se,-Tshombel s
Kati nkaarmy.
Paul Spaal,,as,

soon, a$ 4,ef returned home,to, headthe
Bel gi anSoci al i st Party, madeadoubl e
i nterventi on
; i p, quppor~t -,Of 34,

~
.On
one, hand- he.
urged
UN' ahead, onthe other` -
hedi spatched
to
order
B

ri i be'
i

andto, .i i y' ,td persuade
el gi anxl d
qui t Tshom
-hi rn' tobow.tol e Leopol dvi l l e
.government.

Tshon-i be eras adamant andKai ang; i
was
strong-
l ybehi nd~ hi m,.- ~
Hammar skj oi d
,
Persuaded
the
General
Assembl y-to
voteamoti onfor ' .vi gor -
pus*I VN: acti on",
-, yi ; uo

I
O, ovv.

.,
:-ori ,SFj j Qb; rn20j thus UN,broke--thp
bounds
of
i ts ori gi nal
n
avyl

autho-ri ty6
TH
E
, SI T

T, 40-~; Q,,i on&,had al l i tAmi Ni Mi rde' c-dut-i tri es.: :, ~Leopol dvi l l e,' ' under
Kasabu-
api
uZ-n

- :but : not-to- .Leapol dyi l l p- 4ndrur~.br
,.Lwnuhi ba; l i g .Pprnmuni st
qe~, PSi 9#JoY*!,o,4

urnbi
governmentami zenter
of l aw
andorder Q

At hi s re-
quest, but
L=umba:.,,
: i n. order
to
create
chaos, ~had Oel i bei atel yrturned
k4i s
25,
000-man
FORGEPUBLI QUEagai nst.i ts,fbrpi : ' n.,o-
Yi coro, g f
Di sorder Apo.~qhi pq~,' wei e., n SkAry~ri j i

edr
,

R~tanoa
:f :r
Tshox4~e' were, to bd:harnmer

i nto sub-
0
e. . q

4et
bi t t9j sol at6
;
hi m.'
That was
pol d' d
thi 6~' cj

of the9pi bi

G

th

Arg vNi sh bee

rnmedfate~ecogni fi onby
numq., Foui .~roACucountr..~ze
.s ; :T-
shot4be' sa"had`ncrt
,,.
- X6.-, W6VW*ai
made
f&bi eak
Gi zenga
unc.o.i i i p.i rpri i i si rtg:stand*Fbf the- #45006ACorti mi tteel onAfri 6d:' El eanor
Roosevel t, Serj or
j ypmpreyi ,~
Arthi ~-rr
.Schl esi ngpxj
MY, yt&f

rdencedi d
p ,,ot

Mr
., H.
.dared not dffi ont' the--- dati 6ri s that
had
and; l ack;
oPni ti ve i ni negi VOTAWr than' UN' ri ' si i i i ni ng
: I n-
fl ueAc

.ar
ONFEBRUARY- 14, 1961, Mr .H,.- ,.pAr, 4uadedtheAf :r-o; i Asi ati cs
tovotes re-9bl uti on
re-
quest-i ngfurther
.UNi nterference i n
Congoi nternal affai rs,
ModerateCongol eaders got together
i n
Tananari voand,; rej -
acteqL-.,the.,VNsol uti on
.

Mr.H.; i 9"zi o.tei d them; UNj at the
top; " refused
to hel pthe
Congol ese: to; sottj r," mi x- di fferences
-peai i i abl y; : - andUN
-forces fAi the fi el d were
i nfl uenced by
the i ql evl ogi es of Ahem
respect
ents.Congd,=nati ohal ' ,
I enti xhents
~~were smothered,
.
by, a-
fl ood
of, :U.Nnewspri nt addthe, resul t was
~
that
the' =cbuntry no-l onger
bel ongedto, i t,ppopl ebut,
tovNehru' .s I ndi ans-and
UN,--am
a-~
: sted- pl ant- fbF, worl d
government .
I NEARLY
JULY,
1961,
Mr .H.sent
UN' s i ntel l i gence. chi ef,
was

Pi or Dj orn
.Egge, to
El i sa
bethvi l l etobui l dup-acase
agai nstt T4h(~ni be.

Gi zenga
.Wasnegoti ati ng
ani l l i afi ce' wi th
Bol i kango,
-Vi ce Pri me~
Mi ni ster of
the
qei ntral governz
--neht and
pri nci pal deputy
of Bengal a
H, , . du, B. REPORT
]Provi nce; the
pl an
wasto tgfel h,

~y~~. ` f, , C:z6chosl oval da,

Bol i kange0i
tenvotes,
wi thGi zengal s 65,
woul dgi vehi mten
. morethan
enoughto rul ethe
assembl y.

Gi zenga
di d
not want
114he.
front
~F. . gw~j nstead. - l i e
; Woul d
.
~W- 11h6, str,

4~0- pOavftl e po _
, ~W
* .
the
pro
- Communi st,
. A

G

- h

- Mo' bi d fi ~- i c4A
Sol i d
aF Aty. Party; , c9f, whi ch:

j zengmi b

tj j j ;
. . th, 6' ai i ti -
C
. o~pi , mpni qx,
aqQy

who- Ka~n the fed
.
~cl i pl,
( i rnats-
..
:Ogbd!44*MWE$Vmdqo
:tstgndt i i onbl etmi een
J ~4der ~_

:
Kasabuvuand
domi nati onbyKa
; ~ai tatu! sr :Re

~
d, ' pol i pol i ce

A
cwi I . wvgi r, ' 4t I di ggul s:t!- dJ A' 6 4-
preventi ve
war agai nst
ci vi l war) woul dti e upMobutul s
. army, endwi thhi mand
Tshombedestroyi n
each. other .

q~i ~~, ga, qrj c

j pj l
- eds- wp

a

- , J
ul d, pr6fi t - b3k,, i t, ,
Congq

J a, ,
Api qtur, 0d

l 46Yf, ' - `

ketf i n
an
. ' y 9,V
embracewi th
Hxxpmarqkj 6f

_Starve- . Li n- ~i erYbrdWdH
T6hori fb~, - ( , ~~"OGeti t4i b' fot=
ei gners

W_
:4. n- bstri rffaud- :1
nd

H*
.
ahd~' UN
ul trd"
. - di b~ra. l '
Rrdarp4va
. rni l i tary- , oHem- i *ei 6Oh6dti QUEArWWW
110106thi l
thi n
tQ1theyhqcUbeen
Apsureo- d1heycoul d- wfni , , j t
hbukUonhr- p0Wt- 1i e
, m
uni st _ ta
ke~, 79veF V. ~4Aki nzi scan
:.
UN"!, s qenerai

troops
cfi c~dl d V61nci t. ed"dg9i nstt- '
thei r whi te offi cers andwoul d
be
l ost wi thoutythi e~, . ' ~;
samel i ne as Lumu. mba!s
pre- i ndependence
dri ve- to . turn the F ORCEPU$LIQ_UE
agai nst i ts'
the, mandate
,
that,
#_, 4i
deri ved. j
; 9XW, po
. , ferventsdesi ref_qr i nd
j uga, on
~Q, 4eqpR, vj ~k- e!x

V- U-
- rp69L- df - real &i i i ngUN~of
the f i -
nappi al

Wthk
gQv0r=ea%6i f!a - , nothi ng- - . esi - thtL
. rt!i ErI
KA

' l

A
Wk
BY
SEPTEMBER9
Q
most
, of
the Bel gi ans
had, beenrbAgeQout ; _0, 1BJ ri eft' . &s

T' st' h' ambe
wasat hi s mercy.

OnMonday, September 11, he. fl ewa
pl ane- l oadof Congo fl ags i nto El i s
'
a-
vi l l reOnt- l th

rqqp
wtpoNvo.- thdi rtpoatti 6n4nd, , :UN=RUAt J rAi xt e- i f erence~i ri ' C: o
ngo-
, . .
t
- - t f , a Cc6M-
KQngygffaj F !~, , yv4 upr ej , 44
. . '; At
Root
~Dri anxi oui ktoepv~6, sLat -Mr
2Li ,
. _
j axi nqu~~ce4__~q ~4e~,. y4, qrl d
thgt
Apdep4nKi ttKata_wh, 4d
-:~=gased,
ti o exi st :
?Vha1J Retn6on
the
countexatta~k
. Aj axj po, ~rl a~angan- . qQJ ~nn- ~andQXPAII NWOL
Wdl y~two, , roonth

tkai ~ni hg, :
char gadfrom
thl b" ,
440. 01d" 40' - !

r~~en! s ~i qpe~s, qf upQdWnrxgthe,
pl ah4e_nl oaki ff. ~of J - 1a:gw
. 4i sa7ppeca_` i ed. - Al sr fury- agi i nst
r enph
_q4i q; q rp. , Whoh44, , , tr ai ppd
the
commhndvakQWznd:book, anA
- i fWAsthen- that"
O' bri ep
rai n
of, - truth t6- - i 4p6kAt- "
Havi ng
the. Mi n' , stqr;
pf
.
the- ' . - Interi ot, , c, hbi . ann6utYaed, i hat i ' Mt*EW' uhgd
. ' , h7ad: - or*der ed
the_ i yi assacre
of several Kasai Bal ubas
. -
The' Bal ubao; oi &nei hl l y- hb:te` d, ; 6ut' -
, :)4i ddh' * , - , 7 9, o-6d- ~*6i krnen
that theywere
necessarytoKatanganeconomy, hadnot
been massacred,
andt1e resul t
of the
propaganda. l i e, w.
an

- andtragi c
.
.
human_probl e~n
3QQP0j erredBqj qbas
dema; ndeCr- U-
protecti on :- _
F Dr. ., - a
&whdxi rs- UN' -- l b6ked
go6al
=
Then
ca~xne, __rpal i ty. - Uqq

.
Z, , andj dedi ng, ~
tci l i ti ep. : .wen~
, _
sel f r
eqpo- nsi ~l p, Aqpp
apapM, of hunger. ; axi d- , - t~hi rat
. *, c- r~k. z. edB~i :l dbi l
. stupgi ti ni g, ' 16rtl i '
, 6t - ni ght forays
to

to pro-
drag, back' vi ct~~r~a
:to; eat, v- T; ShgIx~b. e
mad:to dW
tect

W4i ch, - mayba. , vo been
whafO' Bri en, wanted.

The: Bal i zba
. p9i d, f6k, i t : ' A.
man-
hunt startedagai nst
the

al ubas
.
t
Meanwhi l e, :

A~, q~cpcktai l , par
i es-

yi l l - p. conti nueo- ,

Ignored- - ~vas.
the
~the
Poi nt that
U14
j r
_
. oqps
: wi th

LNthe
pi esexhAti onthf-

hadi nvaded
:r' QC' tmOBERj ' 1961
l ea:
e
'
4
! H. duB. REPORTS

OCTOBER, 1961

Page 5
a.
count r y,
at t ackedan ar my, at t empt edt o ar r est
ami ni st er andl i qui dat e
a gover nment ,
and
i n so doi ng had st ar t ed
awar wher e no t hr eat of one
exi st ed, awar t he end
of whi ch no
one
can see at t hi s moment .

Mr . H.
was st i l l smar t i ng under
t he Fr ench r ebuf f
at Bi zer t aand
deGaul l e' s r emar ks
i n Par i s .

To hi mt he set back
was due sol el y t o t he
despi sed
"advent ur -
er s" .

Wi t hout t hemever yt hi ng
woul dhave been al l r i ght ,
meani ngt hat
Kat angan cl ai ms t o
UN' s
el sewher e suppor t edr i ght of sel f - det er mi nat i on
woul dhave been
smot her ed.

O' Br i en
r equest edai r suppor t andbomber s.

Si nce Tshombehadno mi l i t ar y
est abl i shment s
t hi s
br ought t he pr ospect
of ci vi l i ans bei ng bombedby UN: One
of Nehr u' s Gur khas
t ol d aBr i t i sh
cor r espondent , "Weki l l ed al l t he Kat angans
we coul d. "
Whi l eMr . H. was ser vi ng col d chi cken and
whi skey and soda i n t he cool
gar den i n Leopol d-
vi l l e, t he
unpai d empl oyees i n Congo' s Al ber t
Nat i onal Par k wer e eat i ng t he
gi r af f es, Bal u-
bas i n
El i sabet hvi l l e wer e eat i ng Kat angans, andt he UN
sol di er s, t he Gur khas
f r omI ndi a,
wer e shoot i ng ever yone
i n si ght .

Ot her wi se an uneasy t r uce r ei gnedas Congo
t r oops moved
up
f or
i nvasi on.
THEFRENCHOFFI CERSI NKATANGA.
Mr . H. descr i bedt hemas "Dr egs
of t he Al ger i an
war ", andour Amer i can pr ess t ook up t hi s descr i pt i on- - but
l et us t ake al ook at t hem. Ther e
i s Capt ai n I ves de l a Bour donnai s,
as
i mpeccabl e
a gent l eman as Mr . H.

He dr ew
up
and
si gned
t he over - al l pl an f or Kat anga r esi st ance as advi sor t o Munungo, t he Mi ni st er
of t he
I nt er i or whomLi nner andO' Br i en wer e out t o sei ze
.

UN
I nt el l i gence Chi ef Egge l ear ned
t he pl an, embel l i shed i t , andpassed i t ont o t he Secr et ar y- Gener al ;
hence Mr .
H' s
hat r ed
of l a Bour dannai s .

Anot her
i s
Commandant Roger
Faul ques,
36
year s ol dandt he r eci pi ent
of
13
ci t at i ons f or val or .

Son,of apr of essor andabr i l l i ant st r at egi st he set up
a
school t o
t r ai n par at r ooper s andcommandos, ai ded
by
Capt ai n Hel t zen, an of f i cer of t he Legi on of
Honor .

They f or medagener al st af f , t ook over t he j ob of r eor gani zi ng an ar my i n t he gr i p
of compl et e anar chy. Most of t hi s ar my
had al r eady
madet r i ps t o Rhodesi a t o sel l t hei r
guns t o r ebel s encour aged by UNagent s .
I n Oct ober ,
1950
Faul ques l ed aFor ei gn Legi on Bat t al i on agai nst t he f ul l Vi et mi nhar my t o
save Fr enchuni t s cut of f at Langson and
Cao- Bang,
was br ought
back
ser i ousl y wounded,
wi t h
onl y
19
sur vi vor s . of hi s command.

Oper at i ons andbone- gr af t s f ol l owed.

Though pr o-
nouncedphysi cal l y unf i t , by sheer det er mi nat i on he got . back i nt o ser vi ce t o sur vi ve t heBat
t l e of Di en Bi en Phu.

Hi s speci al t y: Communi st psychol ogi cal
war f ar e, f r omLeni n t o Mao.
Hef ound i t bei ng appl i ed i n
Al ger i a
.

He was hi ghl y r espect ed; hi s men wer e devot ed t o
hi m,
andhe was
consul t edby deGaul l e i n Sept ember , 1959.

I n 1960 he r esi gned t o become
Tshombe' s advi sor .
"Sooner or l at er
UN
i s
goi ngt o at t ack you," he t ol d Tshombe
.

"Youmust pr epar e f or i t .
Di sper se your
f or ces, suppl i es, muni t i ons
i n smal l vi l l ages .

Get r eady t o f i ght i n t he
bush
wi t h
sudden commando r ai ds
andambushes .

Youar enot st r ong enough t o
r i sk open bat t l e
agai nst t hei r
mat er i el . " Het aught hi s men, "Never oper at e
wi t hout acover of 30 or 40
commandos. "
Whi l e t he cover i ng f or ces
i mmobi l i zedUNt r ucks andar med
car s, Faul ques'
f r eshl y- t r ai ned
speci al i st s st r uck
wi t h t er r i f i c r api di t y i n a
hi ghl y successf ul oper at i on,
whi l e or der was mai nt ai ned
i n t he i nt er i or by
Faul ques' f r i end Capt ai n
Egey, apar at r oop
her o of t he
Fr ench Resi st ance.

Your cor r espondent i s not
i r r esponsi bl e enough t o
wr i t e
of f as "dr egs" such
of f i cer s, t he pr i de of an
ar my t hat may be
askedt o hol d up t he
Russi an
advance f or us
i n af ewmont hs
andwho mi ght be l eadi ng
t hat ar my i n an act i on
on whi cht he
l i ves of t housands of
Amer i cans wi l l depend.
O' BRI EN' SDEFEATI N
ELI SABETHVI LLE
MARKEDTHE
ENDOF ACTI . As t he cur t ai n
r i ses f or
Act I I Communi st
di pl omats who
r ecogni zed
Gi zenga' s
Stanl eyvi l l e
gover nment
and
wer e dr i ven f r om
Leopol dvi l l e i n
September , 1960
ar ef l ocki ng
back.
Sovi et Char ge
d' Af f ai r es
Leoni de
Podgor skyar r i ved
onSeptember
20 ; the
Czechs, Pol es,
Yugosl avs,
Mal i ans,
Ghani ans,
Gui neans and
Chi nese f ol l owed
.

Lumumba
Uni ver si ty i n
Moscowi s
tr ai ni ng the
Congo' s
f u-
tur e gover nment .

Anef f i ci ent
pr opaganda j ob i s
bei ng done i n
Amer i ca
towar d thi s
end by
Mr . Mar af ,
No. 2 mani n the
Gui nea Consul ate
i n NewYor k
who i s handl i ng
the f i nanci al
back-
i ng andpol i ti cal di r ecti on
of the El i j ah
Mohammed
Bl ack Musl i m
Movement .

( Gui nea has r e-
cei ved $105
mi l l i onf r omthe
Sovi et bl ock, $15
mi l l i onf r omthe
West si nce
i ndependence)
Page
6
THE
FUTURE I S GRI M.
Eur opeans
who have stuck
i t out i n
Leopol dvi l l e ar e
packi ng thei r
bags
.

Tshombe has
r ecei ved or der s to
get r i d of Bel gi an
techni ci ans i nthe UNI ON
MI NI ERE' s
bi g pl ant and
r epl ace themwi th
Czechs .

Vi ctor Lundul a,
the cousi n
Lumumba
pr omotedf r om
ser geant to gener al , i s
movi ng f or ces f r om
Ki vuandthe easter n
pr ovi nces .

The obj ecti ves
of Communi sm
and the UNar e
f or the moment
i denti cal : To destr oy
Tshombe and
take over
Katanga.

Thei r tr ump
car d i s UN' s
I ndi antr oops, - al r eady
i nEl i sabethvi l l e, sent
ther e f or
pol i ti cal
r easons, not secur i ty.

Wi ththe suppor t f or
Leopol dvi l l e of 22
Af r o- Asi ati c UN
member s, UNwi l l
not of f i ci al l y r egar d
anattack agai nst
Katanga by the
centr al gover nment
f or ces
as a ci vi l war .

Thi s wi l l l et themout
of acti ng onthe
cl ause i n the
Secur i ty Counci l
r esol uti on
obl i gi ng
UN
f or ces
to pr event ci vi l war by
f or ce i f necessar y.

Cr ack I ndi antr oops
al r eady
i n El i sabethvi l l e
can, however ,
sabotage Tshombe' s def ense.
Agai nst these
pol i ti cal
f acts and
Congo tr oop movements
Tshombe i s amassi ng
ar ms bei ng moved
up to hi mthr ough
the Br azzavi l l e
Congo Republ i c of the
Abbe Ful ber t
Youl ou
.

The
hol ocaust
aheadwi l l be ter -
r i bl e
- .

Let us r egar d i t
nowas i nevi tabl e.
So muchf or the l egal
posi ti on of Tshombe.
_UN' s DEEPERRESPONSI BI LI TY
i n
star ti ng a war between
Af r i cans i s yet to be f aced
.

I f
Eur opeanof f i cer s,
ther e agai nst the
expr ess or der s of UN( whi ch
had no r i ght to i ssue
such
or der s) wer e r esponsi bl e f or UN' s
def eat, they wer e
al so r esponsi bl e f or the f act
that ever y
pr i soner taken
was not massacr ed.

UN
casual ti es wer e 3 or 4 ti mes
hi gher thanadmi tted.
O' Br i en
and Li nner dar ed not
publ i shthe extent of thei r
l osses .

Howmany
I r i shmenwer e
eaten, or cut up
and thr owni n the
Lumumbashi Ri ver , we shal l
never know.

Veter ans of
I ndo- Chi na
and Al ger i a wer e
appal l ed at the cr uel ty of
the menthey wer e tr yi ng to
di sci pl i ne .
When
Act
I I
star ts the r estr ai ni ng
i nf l uence of Tshombe' s
Eur opeanof f i cer s
wi l l not be ther e .
UNcr i es
that they br ought Tshombe
hi s vi ctor y bor e f r ui t wher e
ever y other i nci tement f ai l ed;
Katangans
r esented the i nf er ence
that they coul d not def eat Mr . H' s ar my
al one.

Look f or r e
newed hosti l i ti es whi ch
wi l l move i gni ted Af r i ca back
a hundr ed year s .

Wor se thanUN' s l e-
gal cul pabi l i ty i s i ts r esponsi bi l i ty
f or f utur e br utal i ty.

The Bl ack
Conti nent :

Wester n
pol i cy' s gi f t
to the East .
Thi s newsl etter
gi ves per mi ssi onf or r epr i nti ng wi th cr edi t l i ne.
Addr ess al l domesti c busi ness to J ames H.
Bal l ,
H.
duB. REPORTS, P. O.
Box 855,
Hunti ngton, I ndi ana.

Addr ess al l f or ei gn
busi ness cor r espondence to Hi l ai r e duBer r i er ,
Hotel
Luteti a, 43 Bl vd. Raspai l , Par i s VI , Fr ance.
Subscr i pti onpr i ce:

$10 per year , f or tennewsl etter s .
Hi l ai r e duBer r i er , Cor r espondent
J ames
H.
Bal l , Managi ng Edi tor
VOLUMEI VLETTER
8
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER
1961

H.
du
B,
REPORTS

PARI S,
FRANCE
ALGERI A.

TheAmeri can
publ i c i s soont o, recei ve
ashockfromNort h
Afri ca.

Thedegree
of t hat j ol t wi l l dependon
t heext ent . t o whi ch
Ameri cai s t ol dt he
t rut habout
t hei ncreasi ng
st at ureof t heArmy
Secret Organi zat i on
.
(OAS)
as apower
t o beconsi dered
.

Monsi eur
Lauri ol ,
adeput yfromadi st ri ct
out si deAl gi ers,
gavet he` French
Nat i onal
Assembl yan
i nkl i ng of t he
si t uat i onwhenhest at ed
onNovember
9, "Gent l emen,
what i nt erest
dowehave
i nanagreement concl uded
bet weent heChi ef
of St at e(General
deGaul l e) and
t heheadof
t he
FLN
when
nei t her t heonenor t he
ot her dares put
afoot i nAl geri a?"
OTHERHI GHLI GHTS
MERI TATTENTI ON:
The
bi gSoci al i st concl ave
i nBrussel s
ont he
weekend
of November 11, Russi a' s bi g
bomb, t heXXI I
Communi st Congress
i nMoscow, ' UN' s
at t empt t o wi peout i t s
humi l i at i oni nKat angaby
del i berat el yenfl ami ng
t heCongol ese
over
t he
deat hof Lumumba.

For
Ameri caandt hebedrock
of Ameri canprest i ge
t hecri si s over-
shadowi ngal l
el sei s t heapproachi ngmoment
of t rut hi nSout hVi et nam,
for t hi s
was our bi g
experi ment , Ameri ca' s fi rst
. at t empt t o st ep i nand
repl acet hedi scredi t ed
"col oni al s": -
SOUTHVI ETNAMI SSI NKI NG
. I t , coul dbe
saved, but i t , i s. not . l i kel y
t o be. `Ameri cai s goi ng
t o asksomequest i ons
when
i t
fl ounders . , Wepoured.. i nbi l l i ons,
. of dol l ars i nout ri ght
ai d, un-
t i l publ i c and
congressi onal pressureforceda
change-over t o ai di nanot her
form:

govern-
ment guarant eedl oans and
pri vat ei nvest ment s for whi ch
t het axpayer i s goi ng
t o pi ckupt he
t ab.

Whet her over-zeal ous l i beral s
or effi ci ent subversi ves hel dt he
l i don-report s out of
Sout h
Vi et namwhi l et hecount rywas pushedi nt o
t hearms of t heReds anhonest
i nvest i gat i ng
commi t t eeal onecandeci de
.

Suchacommi t t eewi l l l i kel ynever
si t ; herearesomeof t he
reasons
why:
SHOULDAMERI CASENDTROOPS?
Apress, awareof t he
si t uat i onbut st i l l not readyt oad'
mi t sevenyears of di shonest
report i ng, says no.

I f t roops arenot sent , t herei s
nopoi nt i n
t el l i ngt hepubl i ct hat t he si ght of Ameri canforces di sembarki ng
woul dst art al andsl i det o
wardt heReds .

Whyshoul dt heVi et nameseresent our. sendi ngan
armyt o savet hem? To
answer t hat quest i ont hewel l -meani ng, dupedAmeri can
i nt he st reet woul dhavet o bet ol d
t he
whol est ory.

A
NewYorkTi mes edi t ori al announced
onNovember . 7, 1961, "Thei r
(Ameri cant roops' ) presence, i nt heend, woul dveryl i kel ybeharmful
t o t heprest i geof t he
Sout hVi et namgovernment , whi chdoes not l ack
manpower. " Thet rut hi s, t heSout hVi et nam
government
has no prest i ge.

Tot heswi ndl ed. pr. ovi der of Ameri canai d, t heVi et namese
shoul dbegrat eful t hat Ameri capai danadmi t t ed8014 of hi s government ' s
expenses . al l , t hese
years andi s
now
wi l l i ng
t o gi veVi et nam
t hemi l i t ary
support t hat we. refusedt hebel eagured
garri sonof Di enBi enPhui n1954, whenHochi Mi nh' s armyhadspent
i t sel f i nat t acks ona
fort i fi edposi t i on,
t o
gai n
apsychol ogi cal vi ct oryt o expl oi t i nt henegot i at i ons i nGeneva.
Whyt henshoul d
t hey
resent our
comi ngi n
t o savet hem,
t heAmeri canreader asks .
And
t hat quest i oni s embarrassi ngt o edi t ors andcorrespondent s whosyst emat i cal l y, for one
reasonor anot her, suppressednews,
di st ort ednews,
or
del i berat el y
fabri cat ed report s
t hat
woul d
be
popul ar.
Fromwhat sl i ppedt hrough, a
t hi nki ngpubl i ccoul dhavegl eanedt hefact s.

But t hefact s were
hi ddeni nreams of propaganda, andt hepubl i c di d
not
t hi nk.

Now, t o begi nt o underst andt he
morass i nwhi chwefi nd
out sel ves,
we
aregoi ng
t o
havet o goback. t ot hebegi nni ng:
GI BBONWOULDSAY
OFUS, "FORTHEYTHEMSELVESORDAI NEDTHEI R
"FALL. "
Aft er
V-J DayAmeri cabackedMoscow-t rai ned
Hochi Mi nh, whohadbeenexpel l edfromHong
Kong
i n1932 as headof t he
Fourt hI nt ernat i onal Revol ut i onaryMovement for Sout heast
Asi a.

OSS
offi cers andACAS(Ai r-GroundAi dSect i on) t eams
worki ngbehi ndJapanesel i nes gavehi m
arms, moneyandsupport
.

Ameri canGeneral Gal l agher made
broadcast s over hi s radi o.
Ho' s prot egebecameGeneral
Gal l agher' s i nt erpret er and
THEAMERI CAN-VI ETNAM
FRI ENDSHI P
ASSOCI ATI ON
was formed
. I t hadnot hi ngt o dowi t hfri endshi p
for t heVi et -
namese; i t was an
out -and-out organi zat i ont o sel l
Communi st Hochi Mi nht o t he
Ameri can
1 UUE FEFCF3E

1CXE1EEF-LECE1EEF
1961
FeQe2
pecpI eerU
l rst eI I !l rl rXl et rer

1c c!l 1l r! t cI U
rcr-CcrrUrl st
Xl et rerese
I eeUers,
"YcUrUst Qet be!l rU
reerUreket !e
Arerl cers t !l rk
veerescI l UI y t cQet !er

l !eve
t !e
Arerl cers vl t !reerUcerQet
t !ert c Url vecUt
t !eFrerc!

3!er
vevl I I
!cI UeI ect l crs
erUycUvl I I
!eveycUr pI ecel rt !e
Qcverrrert "
3!l s erebI eU1c' s
Arerl cer
sUppcrt ers
t c sey, "t !erel s rc
crebUt 1cc!l 1l r! "
Kcree
I eUt !eect l vet crs cf
t !ep!crey f rl erUs!l p
essccl et l crt c Uecl Uel t
ves t l re
t c t eke
ccver

Wl t !cUt
erl ppI et !ey qUl et I y
Ul seppeereU, Wcrkers' Lef erse
LeeQUe
I evyer Fl c!erU
WeI s!
erUeUl t cr cf 3!eEccl eI l st
CeI I , Fcbert LeI scr,
ercrQt !er

3!el r rerbers!l p
I l st s!cUI Ul rt erest
eryccrQressl creI
l rvest l Qet l rQccrrl t t ee
rct Ucrl ret eUby
t !el r f rl erUs
CEE' s 1
l rE!erQ!el recel veU
crUers t c Ul srl ss t !ecre
Arerl cerv!ccppcseU
v!et ves
Qc-
l rQcr l rl rUc-C!l re
3vcyeers I et er 1c' s CEE
beckers vereEcUt !eest
Asl especl eI l st s
l r
C l A

3!ey erest l I I t !ere
AF3EF31E
CE1EXA
CC1FEFE1CE
CF1954,
v!l c!Ul vl UeUXl et rer, e
rerrereU1Qc
Ul r!Ll erves, by Arerl cerreqUest ,
reUeFrerl er 3!eErpercr EecLel
Qeve
!l re
c!eckf cr
e
rl I I l cr
pl et res, t c peyUercrst ret crs
t c crQerl ze"spcrt erecUs"
rerl f est et l crs
t !et vcUI Ul rpress t !e
Arerl cers

1Qc
Ul r!1!U, t !eprerl er' s
brct !er, ves
!eeUcf e
I ebcr ; Url crl r
Eel QcrerU!eUeeseU!l s rer
l rt c eI I t !el rt erret l creI
I ebcr crQerl zet l crs t c
l rsUre-t !l s "rcrl ret l cr"

3!Us Ll er,
t !e scrcf eccUrt cf f l cl eI
UrUer EecLel ' s f et !er,
e,
rerv!c!eUrerel reU
ebrceUv!l I et !ef l Q!t l rQves Qcl rQ
cr, ' ' Qcl rQt c Wes!l rQt cr
crveek-
erUs", f rcr!l s serl rery l r1ev
] ersey, "t cbUt t cr-!cI eEt et e
Lepert rert rererUccrQre ss-
rer, " es 3l 1E
1eQezl repUt l t (Aprl I 4, 1955),
ret UrreUt c Eel Qcrl r] Ure, ' 1954
1et cI U t !e
Xl et rerese, "YcUrUst Qet be!l rUre
erUreket !eArerl cers t !l rk
veere
scI -
l UI y t cQet !er

l
!eve
t !er
vl t !
re

l
vl I I Qet t !ert c Url vecUt
t !eFrerc!, erU
t !ervecer
!cI U eI ect l crs erUycUcer!eveycUr pI ece
l rt !eQcverrrert " 3!e1et l creI l st
I eeUers bl t
eQel r! A1EFl CA1FFl E1LE
CFXl E' 3' 1A1ves f crreU,
vl t !
rc
reI et l crt c f rl erUs!l p
f cr
t !eXl et rerese

l t ves t !ecI Ust cry
cver eQel r, e"f rcrt "
crQerl zet l crvl t !Eccl eI l st s
et
t !ev!eeI , set Upt c seI I
1Qc
Ul r!Ll er
t c
t !e
Arerl cerpecpI e(erUsUppress
repcrt s , et -
t erpt
l rQ
t c eI ert t !er) et Arerl cereperse

Arerl ce
ves t cI U, "t !erel s rc cre
bUt
1Qc
Ul r!Ll er
3!ef l rst crl sl s cere
l r
Eept erber
Ll er!eUrever beerpcpUI er ;
!eves eccept eUcrI y es
et erpcrery I eeUer, ebI ees Arerl ce' s f el r-!el reU
bcyt c evl ct !eFrerc!
Crcel r, !e
UseUArerl cersUppcrt t c ert rerc!!l rseI f erUt !eXl et rerese
sccrsevt !et t !eprcrl seU
vcl cel r
t !el r
Qcverrrert Wes
e
ccre-cr

Ec CerereI 1QUyerver1l r!, ,
C!l ef cf Et ef f cf
t !eerry, ves erccUreQeU
t c cUst Ll er, t !ercrt !errcUt sl Uer, erU' sevet !e
scUt !errers
f rcrv!et t !ey !eUccret c reQerUes
er
l rvesl cr

3l 1E
(Aprl I 4, 1955) t cI UArerl ce,
"1e
(Ll er) ccUI Urct ccpevl t !
1l r!

EUt t !rcUQ!\ E l rf I Uerce!ef l reI I y
vcr

' l
!eU
crI y
t c
I l f t ryt eI ep!cre, ' t !eQerereI , epI el reU, ' erUt !eccUpU' et et ves cr

EUt l
ves
t cI Ut !et l f l t !eppereUt !eArerl cers vcUI UcUt cf f eI I UcI I er el U "' l t l s sUrprl sl rQt !et
Arerl ceves sc Urvl se, psyc!cI cQl ceI I y, es t c bcest
cf
t !l s
"vl ct cry"
AI err
spreeU
t !rcUQ!EcUt !Xl et rer;
FcpeF!erccrQ3ec, cf t !eCec Lel Eect , !eUkept
CcrrUrl srcUt cf t !eeree!erUI eUf rcr
3ey
1l r! 1l s eI rcst t vcrl I I l crf cI I cvers !eU
ererry cf 25, DDDrer
3!e1ce
1ecsect (ercUrUerl I I l crerUe!eI f f cI I cvers) !eUseer
t !el r I eeUer be!eeUeUby, t !eXl et rl r!l r 1947 erU!eUrc I cve f cr t !eCcrrUrl st s - ArU
t !ereves t !eEl r!Uyererry cf CerereI LeverXl er, v!cUrcvet !eXl et rl r!f rcr!l s
sverps l r 1948 ef t er t !ey set UpererbUs!f cr
!l rerUeecUt eU!UrUreUs cf !l s rerv!cse
esprl t Ueccrps ves Uercrst ret eUby t !ef ect t !et t !ey vereQl verec!cl cecf
eecUt l crcr
Uef ect l crerU
c!cset !ef crrer
3!eset !reeveret !ecrI y f crces st erUl rQbet veert !e
pecpI eerUt !ecreepl rQ
st rerQI e-!cI U
of amanwhosef ol l owi ngwas
acrossthe9ceagn~TIME
. ( Apri l 4, 1955) tol d us,
"Hi s advi s-
ors
( Di em' s),

i ncl udi ng
thosef romthe. U
.
. S
.

cauti oned
hi xnto go sl owl y
. -- You
aretoo
weakto f i ght
now.

Invi tenegoti ati ons
; pl ay f or ti me.

Di em
"di ckered and
maneuvered
to
avert ci vi l war andwhi ttl e
down, thewarl ords
of the sects. "'
Unnaenti aned
wasthef act-
that
those
warl ords representedthemaj ori ty
of thecountry.

Arrned,
resi staAce, wasthe
onl y re-
si stancepossi bl eagai nst an
outsi de ; -i mposed
man
who l ocked up
or drove
but anyl eader
rai si ng voi ce a .
TheHoaHao general , Tri nhMi nh
The,
!ral l i ed"
i nFebruary, 1955,
f or. a, consi derati on
of
$2 mi l l i on
( i nAmeri canai dmoney!)
repQrj ed Raymond
Carti er. . i nPari s-AIATCH
of May
14, 1955. A nati vepastor:
namedPhamJ uanThai ,
f ormerl y
wi thanAmeri can
Seventh
Day
Adventi st
Mi ssi on, acted as i ntermedi ary
to buy
of f general s to whom
thel eaders, of the
sects hadconf i ded
thei r troops.
t
TIME( agai n,
Apri l
4,
1955)
wasi ndi gnant
whenCao Dai and Hoa
Hao l eadersand General
hevanVi eni ssued
an, ul ti matumthat Di emreorgani zehi s
government i n
March, 1955. '
Ameri cawas
gi ven
. , a crashcampai gnto, bl acken
thethreel eaders:
No
detai l sweregi ven.
onthegovernment to
whi ch
they obj ected.

It
wasdi shonest reporti ng. -
, Actual l y, the
gov-
ernment wasa shabby. l ot :
4
year
l ater f our of i ts Members
hadbeenthrowni n
pri sonor_
pl aced
under housearrest by Pi emi Awo
. bad f l ed to: Pari s and
another wasi n-di sgraceover
a. ri ce scandal ,
Thecoal i t
; i Onon-*
whi ch
the.
Vi etnamesepebpl q~pi nned
thei r. hopes
' '
. ,

' ' :
. .

was
def eated i nl ateApri l
!
1955.

The' Ameri c9npeopl e
were
tol d
how,
~
but si nce si nce-emphasi swason
!' our, rri an!s' . ` vi ctor
i t di d
not
regi ster
.

J ohn
Osborneadmi tted ( LIFE, . May
13, 1957) , that the
Paobai General ,
Nguyel th4uh-Phx; ong, . was. pai d $3. 6. mi l l i on
pl us Monthl ypayments
f or hi stroopsayd
a
si necure
commandf or, hi msol f to "ral l y": to
Di em
. - -The
total sumof
Ameri can,
ai d
i nvol ved
wasunstated. , . , TheH6aHao
general , branvai rSi oQ
.
accordi ng
to . rel i abl eRaymond
Carti er,
waspai d $3 mi l l i onal so , to def ect . . Thi s.
l ef t
Le
van: Vi en' s
f l anks
unprotected:

But hehad
beenf i rml y pl anted14theAmeri can
mi nd as anex-ri ver
l i rdeandthevi cel ord of Chol on,
so
Ameri ca, apparentl y
more
i nterested i n. cl owni ng i
.
up
vi ce
than
' f i ghti ng Communi sts,
made
no compl ai nt agai nst buyi ng, Di em .
a
vi ctory.
"
, th Coo Da` i -Popee:
: di 6d i nexi l ei nPhnom-penh,
sti l l harassed
byDi el mi s
agents
:
I

.

A

l X~.

I

-
Le
van
Vi en,
whom
the- Communi sts had
never-beenabl e
to
def eat,
was, b Ameri ca meri ca
and
Di em, dri ven- i nto, exi l eal so.

Pao Dai , _Hoa-Hao
. , ani d Bi nhXuyenstraggl ers roamed
the
D- ' ount

Yen
' t

U
xem. . w4i ch
. repl 4qpdthemdrov* ~the-mi nt
. o
the. arms
of the. Reds f or -protecti on!

AA' % f oi zner' f ol l o
, % ~ei i i r6i e"Ld"vi * Vi ei i
f romthe
:
northi n~1957,
"Di scontent i s ri f ehere.

If you
wi l l return
and l ead
us wewi l l comean4 everyrnanwi l l
bri ngtendeserters ( Communi st . ) wi thhi m. , "
Vi etnameseabl e
to obtai nvi sas4nd reachWashi ngtonwer
,
e, recei ved by StateDepartment
of f i ci al
Kenneth
Young, . who
. seal edi them
Af f 4f
thei r reports
~, were' al akmi ng.

Mr. ; Young.
AFL-CIO'
l ater becamepubl i c rel ati ons man-f ai r:
,
:
NEWLEADERMagazi ne( put out byAmeri canLabor Conf erenceonInternati onal Af f ai rs)
publ i shed' a speci al i ssueonJ une27, :
1955, wri tten- byAustri an
Soci al i st l eader J oseph
Butti nger ( natural i zed Ameri can), bl ami ngeverythi ng on
the
Frenchandurgi ng bl i nd sup-
port of Di em.

WroteSoci al i st Butti nger' , of Ho
chi Mi nh. ' s pqat-war government, "Al though
thegovermn, ent . of Ho
chi Mi nhwasdomi nated
by
Communi sts, thi s regi mehadagood chance
of devel opi ng al ong-
democrati c: l i nes i f Frenchcol oni al pol i ci es hadnot dri ven
the
peopl eof
Vi etnami nto theCommuni sts' -arms . "( What stupi di ty, or subversi on!, - to!betol d by. a
Europeansoci al i st
whohad seenone
government af ter another i sol ated andtakenover
by
a
Communi st mi nori ty, that Communi st -trai ned Ho chi Mi nh, , theFourthInternati onal ' s rev-
HduB. REPORTS`
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER
1961
ol uti onaryl eader i nSoutheast Asi a, woul dhave
-
l eda Communi st-domi nated
. government
to
devel op
al ongdemocrati c l i nes, had
i t
not beenf or theFrench!
Honest, l oyal CongressmanJ uddwas drawni ntotheDi emgame
throughmi sl eadi ng
i nf or-
mati ondi f f usedby
an
out-and-out publ i c rel ati ons set-up
andhi s own
devoti onto f reedom
f or theOri ent . Hewrote. approvi ngl y
i n"Ameri ca' s Stake. i nVi etnana' . ' ,
publ i shedby
Amer-
i can Fri ends. of Vi etnam, that our l eadi nggeneral ( Col l i ns) and
General El y, the
l eadi ng.
Frenchgeneral , went . hometowri ngthei r hands about
thei mpendi ngdemi se
of the country,
andwhi l e theywere- gone
General
O' Dani el ' ' eggedDi em
.
on"
to
go
i n andcl eanupthe
Bi nh
Xuyenandthe' sects . > No onewas abl e to
tel l CongressmanJ udd.
or theAmeri canpeopl e
that i n' that act a hi ghwaywas bul l dozedf or theReds: ' ( General
O' Dani el , f ormerl y
headof
Ameri ca' s Mi l i taryAdvi sory, Groupi n South
Vi etnam, onreti rement became
associ ated
wi thDi em' s publ i c
rel ati ons
of f i ce i nNewYork. ),
HARPERS' , of J anuary, 1956, carri ed
4. Di empropaganda pi eceby Senator Mi ke
Mansf i el d,
descri bedi nthebi ographi cal note
as
' !Di em' s
godf ather" .

Andhei s : our Senate
Forei gn
Rel ati ons
Commi ttee' s "authori ty onSouthVi etnam" ! . NATIONALREVIEW
( November 24,
1956) f eatured
. a Freda~Utl ey
pi eceon
Di emi nwhi chthe-reader coul dhave l earned,
i f the
pro-Di emsl ant hadnot been so heavyas: : to . di stract hi s attenti on,
that U. S. Inf ormati on
Agency
( theoreti cal l y out there
:
to sel l Ameri ca) was spendi ngmost-: of , ' i t$ : $750, 000.
ayear
i n SouthVi etnam
to
bui l dupconf i dence
i n
Presi dent
Di em' s government ; --,
By.
means
of
moti onpi ctures carri edanddi spl ayedbytrucks;
or of posters andpl acards whi chareread
out to thei r nei ghbors, -- i nf ormati onhal l s i ntowns andvi l l ages andboats operati ng
al ong
the canal s
.
"
Ameri cans woul d
l ove to havea. packof
f orei gners,
- knowi ngas muchabout Ameri ca as they
do about Mars, i nvade. our countrywi th. movi e trucks,
' pl acards, posters, i nf ormati onhal l s
andri ver boats, to cramdownour throats apresi dent theyhadsel ected; - aman
whom, two
years af ter hewas f oi stedonus, andaf ter
twi ce preventi ngus f romunl oadi nghi m, we sti l l
hadnot bought !

, .
THENEWSBLACKOUT: There
wereattempts to`breakthroughandal ert Ameri ca, but the
ci rcumstances weretai l or-madef or Di em' s publ i c rel ati ons boys to encl ose
Ameri cai na
l eak-proof vacuum. AnyonewhowarnedAmeri cathat aCommuni st resurgencewas i nevi -
tabl e, unl ess wewoke updrewthewrath
of
USIS, ICA, . StateDepartment and
thepr
es
s they
andLabor hadmustereddownonhi s headunder
charges
of "worki ngagai nst Ameri ca' ' ' .
Thosewho
knew
were gagged, strai t-j acketedandactual l y threatenedwhi l e very Vi etna-
mesel eader whomi ght haveopposedtheReds was' destroyed.
The
caseof theVi etnamese
boy, Hynh
sank Thong, i s anexampl e,
Hynh
was worki ng
i n
Washi ngtonandwatchi nghi s country go downthedrai n
. . Heknew
what Ameri cans hadno
way. of knowi ng: namel y, that; al l over Southeast Asi a. peopl e whoknewthetruthwerecom-
pari ngi t wi thwhat Ameri cawas bei ngtol d, `and
comi ng
to
despi se
us: Hynh
knewthat hi s
peopl e hadno Formosato
f l ee to, andhedeci dedto wri te somel etters.

OnJ an. 11, 1956,
he wroteto TheWashi ngtonPost andTheChri sti anSci ence, Moni tor :

Thesame
l etter
was
publ i shedi nbothpapers. : -, ( Chri sti an: Sci ence
Moni tor, J an. . 30,
1956)
.

Reacti onwas swi f t :
State Department di smi ssed. hi m; hemade. a connecti onwi th
NEWSOF. THEDAY, axrl on
Dec
.
28, 1956, ` j ust af ter
. Chri stmas
andthe
arri val of ababyi n. hi s. home, Mi ss Frances
Di nsmoor, of
NEWS. OFTHE- DAY, wrotehi m, "I f eel very apol ogeti c
about not havi ng
wri ttenyou
bef ore.

I hadatel ephone cal l f romthe
U. S. -Inf ormati onAgencyacoupl e
of
monthsago i nf ormi ngmethat
I was not to conti nue usi ngyou
i nthe
' ' OURTIMES" seri es.
My. si ncerebest wi shes. f or. thenewyear
. " ; Hynh. was si l enced.

Events of thenext f ew
weeks'
shoul ddrawsome
attenti onto themaker of that
phonecal l . . Never
was abl i ndf ol d
Hdu
B. KEPORTS' :
drawnover t he eyes- of a
nat i onwi t h`so much assi . t ance f rom
i t s l eaders and
f romt he
edi -
t ors who, by a. c: asual . ' g l . ance at . who was
l eadi ng t he. movement ,
shoul d have o
enedt hei r
p
eyes and st art ed: aski ng .
quest i ons . . . :
SYMPOSIUM
ONSOUTHVIETNAM
(Sept ember, 1956, publ i shed
byAmeri can
Fri ends of
Sout h. . Vi et nam)
st at ed on
P,
33, . "Morel hant wo,
t hi rds of
ICA
_(Int ernat i onal
Co- operat i on
Admi ni st rat i on) f unds
have
been
expendedt o est abl i sh
axed
mai nt ai ni nt ernal
securi t y.
Re-
sul t : t he i nt ernal
securi t yprobl emi s wel l ont he
ws. y
t o
. sol ut i on
. "
Transl at ed
i nt o pl ai n
Eng l i sh: . suf f i ci ent concent rat i on
camp. s `. have beenset
up
t o hol d f rom
. 30
, O
. OO
t o 50; , 000
pol i t i cal
. pri soners,
oundedup
=by Di em' s- - Arr}r
- t rai nedpol i ce; and
hi s. . brot her Nhu' s
pri vat e secret
pol i ce, runby; f ormer Communi st Int el l i g ence
Ghi e. f : Al bert Pham' ng oc
Thao
(al so headof t he' Credi t Of f i ceof
t he Ameri canAi d' - sect i onof t he Nat i onal
Bank of Sout h
Vi et nam. )
Not . unt i l Apri l
14,
1961, di dTIME
Mag azi ne- readers l earnt hat "Onecol onel ,
t aki ng over
a
new
post (i n Sout h Vi et nam), f ound
1,
500 i t ; j ai l and
di scoveredt hat t here was not a shred
of evi dence ag ai nst 1, ZOO
of t hem. ' `
By.
t hat t i meDi emapol og i st s who hadsuppressed t he
f act s whensomet hi ng coul d
have
been
done were cryi ng , "It - i s t oo l at e
t o make
achang e;
i f youremoveDi emnowt he Communi st s wi l l
comei n
.
These are onl y' af ewexampl es
: ,
They runi nt o
t housands,
.
andi nSout heast Asi a, where no
prot ect i ve
bl ackout exi st ed but where. USIA
. ,
subsi di zed i nt ernat i onal edi t i ons
andAmeri can
papers arri ved
on
every pl ane,
t he : resul t was : di sast rous .

Asort of cyni cal cont empt f or
our st upi di t y, of whi ch we' provi ded f i f t een years of i rref ut abl e proof ,
: became t he rul e.
Back i nNewYot k Mr . - Ang i er, Bi ddl e Duke headedt he Ameri canFri ends of Vi et namwhi ch
f ront edf or t hepubl i c rel at i ons.
f i rm; Ameri cans were support i ng t o brai nwash t hemsel ves .
Mr . Dukeal so headedInt ernat i onal RescueCommi t t ee, - secondedby Aust ri an- born
Soci al i st
J oseph. But t i ng er, whose NewLeader port rayal of Hochi Mi nh as apot ent i al l y spot l ess dem-
ocrat wehave ment i oned. Thus t he: l et t erheads of bot h org ani zat i ons were al t ernat ed
i n
t he
repet i t i onof Di em' s, vi rt ues, andapparent l y onl y
t he nat i ves
of
al l Sout heast Asi awere
bri g ht enoug ht o observe t hat
when
Di emvi si t ed Washi ng t on
i n
earl y 1957 i t was as Int er-
nat i onal Rescue
~Comxni t t ee
di rect ors
t hat hi s
propag andi st s
awardedhi m(ari d expl oi t edpub-
l i ci t y- wi se)
. ,
,.
"The Admi ral ByrdAwardt o. Free- Worl d
Leaders".

No one
el se hadas
yet
recei ved i t , so
i t was probabl y, . ,
creat ed as
apubl i ci t y
g i mmi ck f or j ust t hat occasi on.

Di em, wi t h. a st rai g ht
Ameri can

'
a

a.

b
e
- t
,
.
.
.

t .
nal Rescue
f ace; ' wrot e out a

$ 00, OU( check of

ai

money)
p
ya. , l

o

nt erna. f o
Commi t t ee, i . e. , hi s ownpropag andi st s,
Mi chi g anSt at e Uni versi t y provi dedDi em' s ' ' advi sors"
. (he has never beenknownt o t ake ad-
vi ce) andpubl i shedbooks on
hi m
i n
whi ch prof essors, pai dby hi s NewYork publ i c rel at i ons
chi ef , f ormedapool t o
quot e
each
ot her as "aut hori t i es onSout h Vi et nam".
; These "schol ar-
l y" works becamePol i t i cal Sci ence
t ext books.

Mi chi g anSt at e al so t rai ned Di em' s secret
pol i ce, whi ch hounded
downas at hreat
t o
i nt ernal securi t y ar~y. Sout h, Vi et namese
who ref er-
redt o Di emas "t he
.
parachut ed"
- - dropped
on
t he count ry f rom. above,
by
af orei g npower
(Ameri ca) and wi t hout root s i nt he soi l .

To t opi t
of f andprevent anyone f romreadi ng
any-
t hi ng `except mat t er t urned
out by t he prof essors usi ng mat eri al
f urni shed by t he huckst ers,
Mi chi g anSt at e broug ht out , anot her bookl et ,
"What
t o
Read
on
Sout h Vi et nam"
New
.
York Ti mes' readers coul dhavel earnedon
March 15, 1958, t hat t he headof
t he Sai g on
of f i ce of
Int ernat i onal Rescue Commi t t ee was he wi f e of amant rai ni ng : Di em' s
pol i ce
.

They
were not t ol d t hat f or every ant i - Communi st l ang ui shi ng i n
pri soni nBudapest (f or
whomt he
Rescue Commi t t eewas beg g i ng dol l ars)
anot her : was rot t i ng i none of
t hei r awardreci pi ent ' s
H
du
B. REPORTS

, NOVEMBER-DECE&AER, 1961
concentrati oncamps,
thanks to menl i ke the
husbandof thel adybei ng
l audedf or
her ai dtoo
ref ugees.
Page 6
THEQUESTIONTHATISGOING
TOPUZZLEAMERICA:
Wherewas
our conservati ve
press? It shoul d- surpri se
no onethat theBangkok-Worl d
rana USISdi spatch
gushi ngover
the si gni f i cance of Di em' s vi si t to
- Bangkok. onAugust 22, 1957, though
the. subj ect
of al l
thi s f l oweryprose
was so hatedthat Thai newsmen
were f ri skedf or revol vers
. bef ore
bei ng
al l owedi ntohi s press conf erence
; andPi bul Songgramdarednot
accompanyhi m
onavi si t
to
Thai l and' s
ol dcapi tal . : : The edi tor of
Bangkok Worl dwas REPORTER
Magazi ne corres-
pondent, Darrel Berri gen, who
. -i n 1944wastorpedoi ng Chi angKai -`s
ek i ntheSATURDAY
EVENINGPOST,
andwho
. '
i nREPORTER` of Sept . "20;
1956, extol l edDi em
NEWSWEEK,
onFeb. 17, 1958, thri l l ed
anti -communi sts wi tha stabi l i ty-i n-Vi etnam
story,
tel l i nghowval i ant
Vi etnamesehaddi ssembl edaspi nni ngmi l l i nNorth
Vi etnamand.
smug-
gl ed i t i nto. thef ree south.

Natural l y
i t causeda' sti r whenthe' i s' su' e hi t
Sai gon

BothNEWS-
WEEK
andthe
.
conservati ve-monthl ythat repri nted' ' the story
ref usedto pri nt i ts f ol l ow-up"--
that i nMay, : 1958, the- Sai gonedi tor who
tri edto' track downdetai l s onthe spi nni ngmi l l ,
smuggl i ng
andf oundthewhol e story a: propagandahoax was' sent topri son. . .
TheAmeri can
whohas pai dmoneyf or news andbeen
gi venpubl i c
rel ati ons
hand=outs i . s goi ngto demand:
Whywas; everyone, f romLef t to Ri ght, party to thi s conspi racy?
THEANSWER. IS`SHOCKING
; For onethi ng, our honest edi tors had
nopersonal
knowl edge-
. of South Vi etnam
.
Manyof themturnedto, themen
whomthey acceptedas authori ti es on
Chi na, andFormosa' spubl i c

rel ati ons manwas, Di em' s publ i c rel ati ons man' spal ! -
That,
bl untl y, waswhat manyof , themcameup"agai nst
.

In
1956Di emdeci dedto' f orce. ' Vi etna-
mese nati onal i ty, l anguage and"names on. the Chi neseand. Cambodi ans i nhi s country: . - Amer-
i ca tol dFormosanot to make ani ssueof i t .
.
Resul t : Peki ng, steppedi nas sol e sympathi zer
andprotector .

The
Bri ti shpress_ observedthat SouthVi etnam' s whol e' . economi c structure
wasi nthehands of i ndustri ous Chi nesewhosef el l owcountrymencompri sedhal f of the
pop-
ul ati onof Thai l andandwerepowerf ul i n Cambodi aandLaos. - Thei r al i enati on coul d, over-
ni ght, gi ve
.
Peki nga f i f th col umn
.
Di em' s publ i c rel ati ons set-upi nNewYorkqui ckl yhi reda Chi nese to tel l Ameri cathat
everythi ng was
f i ne andthat anyone sayi ngotherwi sewasal i ar .

Ani nteresti ngpoi nt:
TheChi nesef ronti ng f or thehucksters was
suppo,
sedl y. a devout Nati onal i st.

The
Di em
he was hi redto prai se hatedthe Chi nesewi th
a
pathol ogi cal hatred,
accordi ng
to
Mr . Li eb-
man, "Secretary of Formosa' s Commi ttee
of OneMi l l i on. Andthosemal i gnedby the Chi nese
"nati onal i st" were
to a
man
devotedsupporters of Formosa.
Ameri cansweretol dthat any,
cri ti ci smof Di em`was theembi tteredrear-guard`; act onof
Frenchcol oni al s
.

It
was
al i e but i t : was ef f ecti ve.

True, Georges
Chaf f ard, Far East
speci al i st f or the Pari s
di pl omati c paper ; ' - LEMONDE, wrote on"J anuary 5; - 1957,
"The
pol i ti cal dependence
f orced-on-the Vi etnamese government
byAmeri ca' s economi c l eader-
shi pi s
severel y commentedonbythepeopl e
. -But what means does onehave f or avoi di ng
pol i ti cal : meddl i ngby
theman. that hol ds- the` money?
, '
WhenGeneral
O' ' Dan
el
presi des over
a
meeti ngdeal i ngwi ththetrai ni ng of the-Vi etnamese
Army; i t of tenhappens that, . to i nn.
posehi s vi ews, hebangs
hi s f i st on
the' tabl e
and cri es,

Whoi s payi ng
f or thi s ?' The
Vi etnameseof f i cers_
request
a
recess f or' del i Verati on, - then'
they returnto announcethei r
acceptance
. "
OURBRAIN-WASHING. WASTOOCOMPLETE
:
Bl untl y, we
pai df or the campai gnto
del ude
oursel vesthat everythi ngwas- goi ng swi i nmi ngl y andthat`any
Ameri canwhowrote.
otherwi se
shoul dhavehi s, passport
l i f ted. - Ul ti matel y' our
ref i i sal to buy`
al armi ngnews made
f al se
H
du
B. REPORTS

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER1961'
reports prof i tabl e
.
n
The
same TI ME, arti cl e of Apri l
4
.o
,, 1955, that
en dearedDi em
to
mi l l i on s
bytel l i n ghow4e, . a. : Cathol i c hetook to ! ! austeri ty,
prayedacoupl e
of hours
every
dayan d
got
up
at f i ve to study",,
al so
presen ted
an other si de, , i f
psychi atry-con sci ous
Ameri cahad
been
wi l l i n gto see i t :

The,Di emwho' ' expl oded
i n to tan trums
i f i n terrupted," --
the Di em
that
"mayerupt i n to sudden vi ol en ce. . . Con si deri n g
someon ehedi sl i kes, he
wi l l
someti mes
spi t
across therooman dsn arl , ' Di rtytype! "'
Thi s was thepresi den t,
whoscattered
han dbi l l s
f rompl an es, promi si n g
amn esty, then sen ten ced
hi s an ti -Commun i st
pol i ti cal
oppon en ts
to
deathwhen they came i n , on groun ds
that theal l oted
ti me
peri od'
hadexpi red.

The
Ameri -
can publ i c won over byDi em' s. pi ety;
a
s:
-a Cathol i c was n ever tol d
that Dr . Nguyen
ton Hoan ,
l eader of the l argest. an ti -Commun i st partyi n the coun try,
theDai Vi et Party,
was a Cath-
ol i c al so.

Hoan hadn o l abor l eader f or a
brother .
J ohn Osborn e, i n LI FE
(May 13, 1957) tol dan yon ewi l l i n g to con j ecture
on the
reacti on of
oppressedci ti zen s watchi n g thebrother of an
un wan tedpresi den t- en ri ch
hi msel f howthi n gs
were goi n g.

WroteMr . Osborn e, "They(the Vi etn amese) -
remember that brother Nhu,
ri d-
i n garoun di n hi s pal ace Ci troen today, was worki n g an d
l i vi n g i n hi s un i on ' s
di rty, f l y
speckedquarters n ot
so l on g ago
. ".

, .

'
Af ter Ameri can mon eybought
vi ctori es over Gen eral Hi n han dthe armed
f orces of the sects
an dBi n hXuyen , al l hopes of getti n g ri d
of Di eman dhi s f ami l y
.
. ,
wi thout Commun i st
assi st-
an ce, recei vedthei r deathbl owon Nov. 11,
1960. Ameri can

n ks,
' comman dedbyan ephew
of Di em, def eateda groupof of f i cers deman di n gon l y abroaden i n g of the govern men t, n ot
even Di em' s
ousti n g.

Theof f i cers
had
been
def eated, theprevi ous mon thwhen Vi etn amese
i n theHi ghPl ateaucoun tryhadhel pedtheVi etcon g i n vaders, out of hatredf or Di em' s
f ami l y. , I f the armywas to
meet
a
Red
of f en si ve, thepeopl e hadto bewon over .

That was
thereason f or the revol t .
On e
l ast
bi tter pi l l was yet to come, at thepol l s.

Agai n
Ameri cawas tol dabout i t ; agai n
i t di dn ot regi ster .

TI MEexul tedover Di em' s vi ctoryi n Apri l ,
1961
.

("Most of hi s
maj or
oppon en ts, " admi ttedTI ME, "were,
i n j ai l . ! ") Al bert Phamn goc Thao, thef ormer Hochi
Mi n hI n tel l i gen ce Chi ef whon owrun s brother Nhu' s
secret pol i ce, was quotedas sayi n g,
"Wetri edabi t of propagan da oursel ves. . Wetol dthepeopl e that i f they di dn ot vote f or
Di emAmeri can ai dwoul dbe hal ted. " Not avoi cei n Ameri ca was rai sedagai n st ai dbei n g
usedas a cl ubto f ri ghten voters, an ymorethan when the samebl ackmai l , i mpl yi n g that
our i n terest was n ot i n acoun trybut i n aman , was usedto
bl udgeon
Gen eral Hi n h.
THATI STHE
PI CTURE.

Thi s report has on l y ski mmedthe surf ace
.

Bri ef l y, the shi p i s
goi n g down because
Commun i sm
i s
theon l y al tern ati ve to "our man " .

I t i s n ot of ten that
wedevote a
whol e i ssueto a si n gl e subj ect .

Thi s ti me webel i evethe seri ousn ess of
the
si tuati on meri ts i t .

Keepthi s Report as akeyto even ts of
the n ext f ewmon ths.

Bear i n
mi n dthat n obl ackout exi stedi n Asi a.
Al l thesethi n gs have been common kn owl edge
there.
Thepsychol ogi cal reacti on
to our bun gl i n g of our bi g experi men t wi l l be
un i versal , because
i t was
an ti ci pated,
WHATARE
THECHANCESOFSAVI NG
THEAREA?
Sl i m!
Af i rmstatemen t that
Di eman d
hi s
f ami l ywi l l l eave, that the
Vi etn amesecan cal l homethei r exi l edl eaders,
mud-spattered
bybothDi eman d
us, an del ect an an ti -Commun i st
presi den t of thei r own
choosi n g, mi ght
yet ral l y the coun tryf or a
l ast-mi n ute stan d.

But chan ces of
sucha statemen t are
sl i ght .
An gi er Bi ddl e Duke i s n ow
Presi den t Ken n edy' s chi ef
of protocol .

George
Crews McGee,
whowas
Assi stan t Secretaryof State
f or SouthAsi an Af f ai rs f rom1958 to
February,
1961,
i s chi ef of the
Secretaryof State' s pol i cy
pl an n i n g board.

Wal t Rostow,
accordi n g
to reports
reachi n g al armed
European experts,
i s urgi n g that
U. S. troops be
sen t i n .

I t
woul dbe
re-
gardedas on e more
U. S. i n terven ti on ,
man i pul atedbythe
same group, to
save
"our
man ",
HduB.
REPORTS

NOVEMBER:-DECEMBER
1961

Page8
not
thei r country. Whoever.
f ol l ows
Di em, everyAmeri canpresentl yi n
Sai gonwi l l
survi ve
hi m, pol i ti cal l y i f not
physi cal l y, byabout ten
mi nutes.

Thi s i s the, poi nt to
whi ch weal -
l owed
theboys who tol dus Ho chi Mi nh andhi s Communi sts woul d
becomegood
democrats
to takeus. . Yet, f ree.
Asi a' s bi tterness wi l l
bej usti f i ed; i t i s theVi etnamese
who aregoi ng
under .
Thi s newsl etter gi ves permi ssi onf or repri nti ngwi th credi t l i ne.
Address al l domesti cbossi ness to James.
H
. Bal l , H. du' -B
.
REPORTS,
; P.
O. Box855,
Hunti ngton, I ndi ana.
Address al l f orei gn busi ness
correspondencetoHi l ai re
du
Berri er, Hotel
Luteti a,. . . 43 Bl vd.
Raspai l ; Pari s; VI ,, France.
Subscri bers mayobtai n extracopi es of thi s i ssueat Z5~each.
Subscri pti onpri ce: $10per year f or tennewsl etters .
Hi l ai reduBecri er, Correspondent
James H.
Bal l , Managi ng
Edi tor