STALE DICHOTOMY

An examination of how Moscow views its security interests with regard to the United States

Maren Paslick Dr. Mark Katz GOVT 731 Fall 2013

1 Formerly cool girls must feel compelled to sympathize with modern-day Russia. Take for instance, Moya. Throughout the ruthless and seemingly interminable years of middle and high school, two astonishingly popular girlsMoya and Wandadominated and divided the student population for its loyalty. From sports team tryouts to student government races, and wooing the most attractive boyfriend, the two girls invested everything they had in prevailing over their arch nemesis (each other), basing every move on how it would contribute to their triumph. While the girls were too sophisticated to allow their hostility to turn violent, Moya, Wanda, and their respective cronies committed plenty of atrocities via social media and old-fashioned rumors to sully the others reputation. However, come senior year, the contest was decided as Wanda was crowned prom queen over Moya.

Not soon thereafter, the loser spiraled out of control. While Wanda left in the fall for college on a full scholarship, her former rival assumed the duties of a destitute singlemother living in her childhood home. The prom queen returns to town for the holidays to great fanfare, but fails to pay her former foe a visit. This evident inattention irritates Moya, whose pride and vanity convinces her that the rivalry endures. She continues to view the world through the eyes of her high school self. While Moya can easily tolerate Wandas animosity, what she will not stand for is neglect. Reflecting upon Russias swift demotion in status as a global superpower, a person who reached their prime in high school is readily positioned as a sympathizer. As Jeffrey Mankoff contends in his book about the complex nature of Russian foreign policy, Russia is offended by the perceived disregard of Russia as a Great Power by the United States

2 (131). If approached about her cold behavior toward Moya, Wanda might reply that it is nothing personal, that she in fact ignores all her former acquaintances. She is far too busy living the dream in college. However, this stance simply does not placate Moya. She is even prepared to ruffle some feathers in order to resuscitate her rank as a queen bee.

Similar to the post-high school dynamic between Wanda and Moya, the new relationship between Washington and Moscow of neither friend nor foe is unpredictable, and hence slightly dangerous. Despite its rocky history, the post-Soviet U.S.-Russian relationship does experience brief periods of agreement. Yet the sporadic nature of their cooperation, argues Mankoff, represents the underlying problem (102). In the absence of an immediate and shared security challenge, U.S.-Russian relations sour or worse yet, neutralize. The United States fixation on combating terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks signaled renewed hope for improved bilateral relations between the U.S. and Russia in the 21st century. The Kremlin recognized that their interests aligned with those of the White House in that both viewed violent extremists, particularly of Islamic origin, as the number one enemy. However, tensions quickly escalated between the two countries on a number of issues that steadily overwhelmed the weak connection. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, for instance, greatly troubled Russia. Russias dismay over the U.S. intervention in Iraq was multifaceted. Not only did Russia view Saddam Hussein as a strategic business partner, but it also perceived the U.S. as impervious to international norms (Mankoff 108). Similar to actions taken in Kosovo, Moscow viewed the United States as pursuing its own national interests over multinational cooperation. In Moscows point of view, the assertion of hegemony by the United States over measures

3 passed by the United Nations Security Council undermines the authority of international organizations. Russias next disappointment emerged over President Bushs announcement that the United States would unilaterally pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The withdrawal was based on claims that the Treaty frustrated efforts to implement a robust testing program and missile defense deployment (Garamone). Once again, the Bush administration demonstrated to Russia its indifference to multilateral agreements. Arms control and nonproliferation were seemingly more valuable during the Cold War. Now that President Bush had secured President Putins cooperation on key issues such as air rights, bases in Central Asia, and intelligence support, what need was there to establish clear limits on strategic offenses and defenses? In August of 2008, it was Russias turn to disappoint. The Russian-Georgian war superficially centered on the fate of two strategically inconsequential secessionist territories. Beneath face value, however, the war signified an opportunity for Russia to reassert its influence in its own backyard. Russia was not interested in playing the role of passive bystander to the Wests, particularly the United States, corrupting effect on its neighbors. The aggressive behavior exhibited by Russia in Georgia was intended to send a direct message to Tbilisi and Washington that the former Soviet Union did, and would continue to, figure prominently in Russias foreign policy.

The election of the spirited and idealistic Barack Obama to the presidency of the United States ushered in optimism for a new, less prickly strategy toward Russia. Obamas 2008 presidential campaign slogans based on feel-good messages such as hope and change

4 were non-subtle hints at a reversal of the previous administrations policies, including those toward Russia. In fact, President Obamas resolve to reset U.S.-Russian relations achieved several tangible results based on mutual interests, including the Bilateral Presidential Commission which served to expand communication (Mankoff 123). Despite the achievements of this period, recent headlines regarding U.S.-Russian relations suggest that a dormant chill is reviving.

What has prompted this latest diplomatic pause? While the next several paragraphs will allude to critical strains on the modern-day U.S.-Russia relationship, the first, somewhat comical issue addressed highlights Russias insecurities as well as the perpetual failure of the two countries to move beyond their extraction-based relationship.

In 2010, the revelation of the arrest of 11 Russian spies living across the U.S. for up to ten years or longer sparked outrage and intrigue among Americans. This disclosure, issued during the fragile reset period of all times, underlined the ever-present distrust and skepticism inherent in Russian politicians. Nevertheless, it would be overly dramatic to contend that the presence of these spies tasked with Americanization proved irreversibly damaging to U.S.-Russian relations. In fact, it can be argued that President Obama reacted by moderately adjusting his expectations, putting on kid gloves so as not to provoke Russias sensitivities. Yet, the incident of 2010 would not be the last accusation of espionage to make headlines. In breaking news, the FBI is currently investigating whether a Russian cultural exchange official based in Washington was secretly recruiting young Americans as possible intelligence assets (Horwitz A7).

5 Meanwhile, European allies are furious over reports of U.S. spying. Among those world leaders offended over U.S. phone tapping include German Chancellor Angela Merkel one of Americas closest allies, at least prior to the disclosure of top-secret American surveillance operations. The damaging documents regarding U.S. intelligence originate from a stack of documents leaked by ex-NSA contractor Edward Snowden. When it appeared as if this flurry of spy cases could not get any more intense, Russias starring role in the drama proved it can always get wackier. Despite a series of private and public appeals by U.S. officials to return Snowden to the United States, the Russian government rejected all pleas by granting him protection in Russia for one year. For someone who fancies himself a modern-day Daniel Ellsberg and relies on free speech as his lifeline, Russia seems a curious place to seek refuge.

The harboring of Edward Snowden, as well as a series of other recent events has obliged President Obama to remove his polite gloves. As Mankoff reiterates time and again in his chapter on Russia and the United States, countless challenges surface as a result of the two countries divergent interests and values (123). The domestic politics of Vladimir Putins Kremlin oppose many of the values professed by the U.S., such as fair and multiparty elections, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent media, and protection for minorities, to name a few. Moscow not only fears such forces, but vehemently works against them in order to stem what it considers the United States attempt to impose its will and values on the whole world.

In the spirit of countering dangerous Western values, Russia instituted a crackdown on nongovernmental organizations. A new law requires organizations that receive funds

6 from abroad and engage in political activity to register as foreign agents. The government initially focused its energies on securing ownership over major media and industries, and is now shifting its attention to exerting control over research to remove the taint of Western influence. Advocacy groups under attack for violations of the law include the nonprofit election monitor Golos, as well as the Kostroma Center for the Support of Public Initiatives (Lally A11). Critics of the law in Russia claim that it is a tool of the Kremlin to wage war against an active Russian civil society. To categorize research organizations as agents of foreign influence chokes off the possibility of independent, nonpartisan research. The law, which went into effect in March of 2013, comes at a time when Russian political leaders have been accusing NGOs of promoting Western interests and interfering with internal politics. The intention of the law is to expand state control of foreign funding entering Russia. The suspicion is that whatever is not monitored by state agencies runs the risk of being manipulated for purposes which are harmful to Russian society, or at least to the interests of the Russian state. Moscow has taken action against what it views as Americas attempt to undermine the Kremlin. In late 2012, Russia ousted the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) from the country after more than two decades of work on projects from agriculture to governance. A recurring assumption of the Russian authorities overseeing the expulsion of the aid organization is that the work of USAID, and other western-linked NGOs, is truly intended to influence the political process by fomenting the prospects for democratization.

7 Such heightened persecution of NGOs is in large part a response to an upsurge of prodemocracy movements both around and within the Motherland. The color revolutions in countries such as neighboring Georgia, for example, put Russia on high alert. The leader of the 2003 Rose Revolutionwestern-educated Mikhail Saakashvilirevoked the right of the Russian state to call the shots. To claim that Russia was threatened by Georgias consolidation of statehood would be an understatement. According to Russia, Western NGOs and governments played a pivotal part in inflaming these dangerous new ideas, including the desire to join NATO (Finan 285). The insulting idea that former Soviet satellites such as Georgia would now prefer American hegemony to Soviet hegemony is sufficiently damaging. However, the betrayal of the Russian people in the aftermath of recent elections proved too much for the Kremlin to bear. Rather than address the issue of alleged election irregularities head-on, Putin instead focused the brunt of his disdain for protests on blaming the United States. In the face of domestic street protests, Putin found the culprit in former Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. The Department of State, NGOs, and all other entities seeking to extend the intrusive reach of Western influence were at fault for the demonstrations sweeping across Russian in 2011 and 2012. The longer the Kremlin continues to misunderstand and patronize the Russian people, the more traction opposition movements will gain.

Developments over the past few years, and even months, indicate that one country or the other has attempted to undermine the reset of U.S.-Russian relations. As of late, the two countries have not seen eye-to-eye, particularly with regard to human rights. From the American Magnitsky list to refuse officials visas, to a Russian law that limits public expression of support for nontraditional relationships, it is evident that retaliation has

8 been a persistent theme characterizing bilateral relations as of late. Nevertheless, this environment marked by enmity is readily cast aside by Moscow when it recognizes a guaranteed successful partnership with the U.S. This is especially alluring when it appears that the U.S. needs Russia. These very conditions were met in regard to cooperation over Syrias chemical weapons. The international stalemate over the crisis in Syria resulted in U.S.-Russian cooperation. While the Obama administration was able to avoid military intervention, Russia managed to bask in the credit of proposing the plan to destroy Syrias chemical weapons. Also of great importance is the fact that Russia was consulted as an equal as it sought to serve its interests. While the two countries have differing views on the fate of Bashar al-Assad, both the United States and Russia agree that post-civil war Syria must be governed in the absence of extremists.

Once again, cooperation between the United States and Russia came to fruition at a time when the two powers confronted a common threat. The diplomacy of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov transpired during the most critical moment of the Syrian crisis. There is a tremendously long and arduous journey ahead in the U.S.-Russia partnership on Syrian weapons. However, if and when this partnership succeeds, will the U.S. and Russia renew their confrontational relationship over human rights, with a tit-for-tat retaliatory game? Or worse yet, will the United States resume its policy of deafening neglect toward Russia, further alienating an already distant partner? Scholars of Russia in the United States have an obvious advantage: Vladimir Putin appears to be fixed in his seat of power for the foreseeable future. Russia scholars have had ample time to analyze the leaders past and present behavior, and assess that what Putin needs is to be neededby both the Russian people and the international

9 community. Until Russia and the U.S. focus on long-term ways to improve both mutual respect and bilateral trade, the two countries will remain bound by their Cold War-style stereotypes and apprehension.

10 Works Cited Finan, William J, Jr.. Stuck with Putin. Oct 2012. Web accessed 25 Oct 2013. < https://mymasonportal.gmu.edu/bbcswebdav/pid-3537608-dt-content-rid23351468_1/courses/73339.201370/GOVT%20731%20Russia/Finan%20CH%20 Oct%202012.pdf>. Garamone, Jim. Bush Announces ABM Treaty Withdrawal. U.S. Department of Defense. 13 Dec 2001. Web accessed 24 Oct 2013. <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=44365>. Horwitz, Sari. Director of Russian Center in Washington Accused of Spy-Recruitment Effort. The Washington Post. 24 Oct 2013. Politics & The Nation: A7. Lally, Kathy. Russias Crackdown on NGOs Stirs Soviet Comparisons. The Washington Post. 28 Apr 2013, The World: A11. Mankoff, Jeffrey. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham: Council on Foreign Relations/Rowman & Littlefield, 2012.