RAFAEL GELOS

-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS
Promulgated: May 8, 1992
G.R. No. 86186
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162 SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as
in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary
to law, are even more important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER RELATIONSHIP,
DISTINGUISHED
1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural
laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof;
2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee
of agricultural land;
3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a salary
or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and
4. the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.

The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247).

YOLANDA CABALLES
-versus-
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.
Promulgated: December 5, 1988
G.R. No. 78214
CONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that
permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food,
clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the
land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income.
The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square
meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and corn cannot by
any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting
camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.

TENANCY
The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not
unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native
way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the
tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square
meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that.
Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for
the primary purpose of agricultural production.
Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged tenant
does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided there are
complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; All requisites must concur
The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not
unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants
certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a
native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically
make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500
square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone
at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its
possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Not shown by sharing of harvest
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationships.
Certainly it is not unusual for landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specifically when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500, sq. meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
1. the parties are the landholder and tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.




HILARIO
-versus-
IAC
148 SCRA 573

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites
Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration. It is also understood that
5. there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that
6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the
harvests.

Fact that respondent was giving the landowners 20 cavans of palay every harvest not sufficient
basis for formation of landlord tenant relationship where the landowners never intended to
devote part of their metropolitan property to agriculture.
The land in question was purchased at a foreclosure proceeding as "residential" and tax
assessments show that it is "residential", not agricultural.
A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession of the
subject property.
Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land.


SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009
Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the subject
property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for PASUDECO's laborers and
employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per square meter. This
was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued
Board Resolution authorizing the purchase of the subject property at P4.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition seeking approval of the voluntary
surrender of the subject property with payment of disturbance compensation. The voluntary
surrender was approved and the tenancy relation was extinguished on the date they entered
into the agreement. A Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and
PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential
purposes were prepared. TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered. However,
due to financial distress, PASUDECO did not complete the construction. For the meantime,
though, it did not authorize any person to occupy the landholding.
Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario his
overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, C. Almario remitted
the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that petitioners were the actual
tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with
the LBP.
The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the
property into a housing project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. In May 1990,
petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the PARAD to
restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings.
Petitioners together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed some of their crops.
Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses the fact that PASUDECO
was the owner of the subject property.
1. TENANCY ESTABLISHMENT
Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481-482:
Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural
leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or
(2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied.
By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system
and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other method
is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing.
2. IMPLIED TENANCY
Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without
opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a
leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso
facto make one a de jure tenant,because the principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists is intent.
3. ELEMENT OF TENANCY CONSENT
Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51,
63 and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA
234, citing Lastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]).
Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
property, and not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the
property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion among the
unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. cCaSHA
4. ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION NOT DETERMINATIVE OF TENANCY
Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon, G.R. No.
176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008:
Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de
jure tenant, because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship
exists is intent.
5. QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666,
690-691:
Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a
mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove
the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible
evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate.
6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS NOT BINDING UPON
JUDICIARY
Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571-572:
The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient.
In a given locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an
authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC, concerning the presence or the
absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is considered merely
preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.


SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL.
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI
Promulgated: October 23, 1992
G.R. No. 88113
AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Requires consent
It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of
the true and lawful owner is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an
untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or
permission to work on the farm land.

This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals where this court further held
that the agricultural lessee's rights are enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
successor-in-interest.
Whatever was the true nature of his designation, Benigno, was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the
property and the law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute
an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed.

VICTOR G. VALENCIA
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: April 29, 2003
G.R. No. 122363
Facts:
Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at Barangay
Linothangan, Canlaon City, Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and
covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397 hectares under Homestead
Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease agreement with
a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a five-year civil law lease agreement with Fr.
Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or
encumbering and against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent.
Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated
fourteen others together with the Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve
became recipients of CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia
demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to
gain possession of his landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to be his
overseer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the property was placed under
the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the
respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail.
However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profit
sharing agreement. No other respondent entered into any kind of agreement with the
petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of the protest, an administrative
investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to 1983, it was only
Bautista who received the shares in the produce. Respondents only stopped paying when
Bautista refused to issue a receipt for such. Valencia did not receive a single cavan for the
said years. to aggravate matters, some of the respondents have even subleased their
properties despite the pending protest of Valencia. While all this was transpiring, Valencia
and Catalino Mantac entered into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279
hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137.
Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maintained in the landholding,
prompting Valencia to appeal to the Office of the President. However, the Order was
affirmed with the modification that the Homestead be excluded from the coverage of P.D.
No. 27.
Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or
Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without
express authority to do so under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is
expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case?
Held:
A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the
land subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the
statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the
minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA
119).
When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the
person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is
already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lessee already
works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural
Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land;
not until then.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot
automatically institute tenants on the property under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct
view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee, although a legal
possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the
lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the occupants of
the property are merely civil law sublessees whose rights terminate upon the expiration of
the civil law lease agreement.

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition
Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to
employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically
authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as
may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a
landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation
would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and
taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil
law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the
property than the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain security of tenure, and
eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and
unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to
realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of
a tenant by the civil law lessee.

RETENTION; Homestead Grantees
With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct descendants,"
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands have been covered
by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them provided the original
homestead grantees who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act
No. 6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the homestead. [50]
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain
to the landowner, as a general rule. [51] However, the factual determination of whether Valencia
and his "direct descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be
addressed by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct
descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit provided by Pres. Decree No. 27
requires the technical expertise of the administrative agency concerned.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP
In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving
statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. [43]
The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of
a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be
concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v.
Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other
evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. [46]
In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson, and
subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later Fr. Flores
were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding of fact, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract between Valencia and
Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms the stipulation prohibiting the
subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without the written consent of Valencia. [47]
The Secretary even went as far as stating for the record that such stipulation barring the
subletting of the property was violated by Fr. Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of
land to private respondents.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites
The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: [36]
(a) the parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is
consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation
that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian
dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The
elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure.
[38]
A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation.
Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between
petitioner and private respondents.
The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not
a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also
a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed,
and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important.

TANPINGCO VS IAC
SYLLABUS
Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-in-interest or
against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be reversed therein. Section 2,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of
the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought
against the real-party-interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be
rendered therein (Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and Pacific
Commercial Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-interest is one who
stands to be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800 [1989] citing Samahan ng mga
Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA
598 [1988]). If the suit is not brought against the real-party-interest, a motion to dismiss may
be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (ESPIRIDION
TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports as the party defendant. We agree with the contentions of the private
respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court
of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 [1991], a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in
an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a
donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property
donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL.,
207 SCRA 652).
Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other
limitations than those established by law. Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the
owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by
law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from
donating his naked title to the land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not
extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. As
elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of
tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of
livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the
leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is
extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However,
the donation itself is valid (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high
school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance
with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. Considering that the tenant in the
case at bar is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his
right to cultivate the landholding in question, the real issue is who should pay the
compensation. We rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner
cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon
until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36
(1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial court
correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the
private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. In view of the foregoing, we are of the
opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of
disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest.
And having arrived at this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other
errors assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of
Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could
not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding
to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance
compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to
for it (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207
SCRA 652).


POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: August 12, 1998
G.R. No. 126425
GRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing
Agricultural Leasehold
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing
agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed,
much less determined by mere implication.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees
and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No.
3844.
TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites
Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. the subject is agricultural land;
3. the purpose is agricultural production; and
4. there is consideration. It is also understood that
5. there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that
6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the
harvests.
AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing
Agricultural Leasehold
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing
agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed,
much less determined by mere implication.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees
and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No.
3844.


ANICETO M. QUIO
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Promulgated: June 26, 1998
G.R. No. 118599
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Full Amount of the Redemption Price
It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in
court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption
without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the
repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by
speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic
uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all
controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time. Against such rationale,
petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of
the requirement of the law and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against him.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Redemption Price
An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with
consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price
within the prescribed period. It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not
sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase; this
statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment
which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment
must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held
ineffectual. As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by
the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to
be such reasonable price and consideration.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Purpose of Written Notice
The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its
terms and its validity, and to quite any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does
not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying he
redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars
thereof, the period for redemption will start running. The letter received by petitioner, being bare,
was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the
sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of
the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption
from receipt of the authentic document on 02 March 1987. the amended complaint filed on 27
July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days.


Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997
278 SCRA 820
The policy of social justice, we reiterate, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing
simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as we
said in Galay et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. "is an imperative of every humane society but
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege."
It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained,
effect should be given to it by the judiciary.
Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious
meaning, according to its express terms.
A mere member of a tenant's immediate farm household is not entitled to a home lot.

RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO
-versus-
ATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE
Promulgated: February 2, 2000
Adm. Case No. 3808

LEGAL ETHICS; Remission of duty as a lawyer
Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law
and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had
been existing between the parties before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAB), thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciated of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears
to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long
been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet respondents
dares raised the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title.
Any lawyer would know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the fact of
Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land.


Facts:
Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct.
Respondent was one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels of land
situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the squatters, the
latter refused and instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants therein.
Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land
titles. This time, claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land. They traced their
alleged ownership to an old Spanish title.
Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a
case against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of
forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter.
Held:
After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the
former are as follows:
". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total
inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the
respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent
can, in good faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next.
Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the
law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior
dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus deceiving the
court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts.
Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as
appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's
duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have
no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of
land."
The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by
evidence on record.
Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility
against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less
than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability,
he knew not to be his.
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its
commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for
suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his
lawyer's oath that the court will not tolerate.

BAYANI BAUTISTA
-versus-
PATRICIA ARANETA
Promulgated: February 22, 2000
G.R. No. 135829
CERTIFICATIONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the
DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of
petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not
necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not
supported by substantial evidence.
The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and
the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of
the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship and the
absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as
distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Facts:
In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare
parcel of land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed
security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of
Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject
landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments against his person,
for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for
the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land.
Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the
property belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation
Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and
ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the
Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall under CARL because it
has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the presence
of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to
leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at
conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
was filed by the plaintiff.
The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant.
On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal.
Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio
Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly
delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner,
likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding
Held:
The Appeal lacks merit.
"His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove
that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only
show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and
why he became a tenant."
In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold
agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we
ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land'
(sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has
no right to the land subject of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way
for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful
landholder."
Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual
finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications
issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In
Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or
officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the
courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere
conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.