Table of Contents

***China CP*** .............................................................................................................................. 2

China CP 1NC ............................................................................................................................. 3
Solvency: Venezuela ............................................................................................................... 4
Solvency: Oil Advantage ......................................................................................................... 7
2NC Venezuela Says Yes ........................................................................................................ 8
Chinese Soft Power Good: Warming ...................................................................................... 9
2NC Perm Do Both ............................................................................................................... 11
A2: Not Zero Sum ................................................................................................................. 12
A2: Increasing Engagement Not Key .................................................................................... 13
A2: Chinese Involvement Bad ............................................................................................... 15
**Aff Answers** ...................................................................................................................... 16
2AC: General Answers .......................................................................................................... 17
2AC: Perm Do Both .............................................................................................................. 19
2AC A2: Net Benefit ............................................................................................................. 20
***Case Answers*** .................................................................................................................... 22
A2: Solvency ............................................................................................................................. 23
A2: Oil Advantage ..................................................................................................................... 25
Oil Advantage Answers: General .......................................................................................... 26
A2: Oil Shocks ...................................................................................................................... 29
A2: China Advantage ................................................................................................................ 31
China Advantage Answers: General...................................................................................... 32
A2: Democracy Impact .......................................................................................................... 34
A2: Credibility Advantage ........................................................................................................ 35
A2: Relations Advantage ........................................................................................................... 37

***China CP***
China CP 1NC
Text: The Peoples Republic of China should substantially increase economic
engagement with Venezuela by increasing oil investment contracts and refinery
rent subsidies.
China supports interacting with Venezuela on energy issues
Amineh 2012 *Mehdi Parvizi Amineh; Yang Guang, Secure oil and alternative energy : the
geopolitics of energy paths of China and the European Union Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2012.+
The international financial crisis was a turning point for both sides to accelerate their comprehensive cooperation. The
promotion of mutual China-Venezuelan benefits and common prosperity not only helps the
long-term development of ties, but also helps the two states to withstand the global financial
crisis. In February 2009, on a visit to Caracas, Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping announced that: China
and Venezuela should boost cooperation in energy and finance. Energy cooperation is a priority and
constitutes an important part of bilateral cooperation. The two sides would make a joint effort to push
forward an all-round energy partnership. The two countries should explore more fields and channels for
cooperation. Apart from energy cooperation, we should better tap the cooperation potential in agriculture,
infrastructure and high tech, as well as promote projects in the housing, railway, telecommunication and electric power
sectors. Sino-Venezuelan energy cooperation began as early as November 1985, when the two
countries signed the protocol on scientific and technological cooperation in oil survey and
exploration. This was a trial period and process for both countries, and a chance to weigh up the possibilities and potential of
collaboration. That said, the signing of the agreement was a clear indication that both countries were aware that hydrocarbon
cooperation could not be ignored. In November 1996, during Chinese Premier LI Pengs visit to
Venezuela, the two governments signed a further agreement on joint oil exploitation. Since
then, cooperation between the two countries has not only continued, but has been deepened.
Chinese engagement with Venezuela solves the aff and sustains Chinese soft
power in Latin America
Nye 4/29 [Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F.
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, What China and Russia Dont Get About
Soft Power, Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_
soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)

In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spent billions of dollars
on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and Latin America are not
limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style
emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its investment. Polls show that
opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but predominantly
negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Solvency: Venezuela
Venezuela values engagement from China
Xinhuanet 5/10 [Future China-Venezuelan cooperation looks optimistic, May 10, 2013,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-05/12/c_132376693.htm]
Officials from Venezuela and China have voiced confidence in bilateral relations since President
Nicolas Maduro took office in April, saying the two countries' cooperation prospects look great. China and Venezuela
established diplomatic relations in 1974. In recent years, the two countries have expanded their cooperation in
energy, finance, infrastructure, technology and production. During his 14-year mandate, the late Venezuelan
President Hugo Chavez visited China six times and boosted bilateral relations. After Maduro was sworn in last month, he said
his government will continue to attach great importance to its strategic partnership with
China and will further deepen and promote their cooperative relations in various fields. "The best
way to pay tribute to Chavez is to continue to deepen Venezuela and China's strategic relationship," he said. The China-Venezuela
High Level Joint Commission was established in 2001 as a high-level decision-making center of the cooperation between the two
countries. A joint development fund between the two nations was created in 2007. Han Deping, regional chief of China Development
Bank's American division, told Xinhua that the joint development fund and the long-term financing loans
are cornerstones of cooperation between the two countries. They not only help undertaking the financial
risks for the Chinese enterprises, but also solve the budget restriction for the Venezuelan government, Han said. Wang Yong, China's
economic and commercial counselor to Venezuela, said trade volume between China and Venezuela amounted to over
23 billion dollars in 2012. Venezuela has become China's fourth largest trading partner in Latin America. China has
provided more than 30 billion dollars to Venezuela in financing nearly 300 bilateral cooperation projects in energy, agriculture,
industry, technology and infrastructure, he added.
China provides loan assistance and financial investments to Venezuela now
Simon Romero, April 18th, 2010, Brazil and South American Bureau Chief for The New York
Times, The New York Times, "Chvez Says China to Lend Venezuela $20 Billion,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/world/americas/19venez.html?_r=0
CARACAS, Venezuela President Hugo Chvez said over the weekend that China had agreed to
extend $20 billion in loans to Venezuela, pointing to deepening ties between the two
countries as China seeks to secure oil supplies here. The announcement of the loans follows
other financing agreements with China that have softened a sharp economic downturn in
Venezuela, including a $12 billion bilateral investment fund. Chinas ties with Venezuela have
grown increasingly warm in recent years, marked by rising Venezuelan oil exports to China, the
Chinese launching of a satellite for Venezuela and the sale of Chinese military aircraft to
Venezuela. If the loans materialize, they could give Mr. Chvez a much-needed cash infusion.
Some financial analysts, including the American investment bank Morgan Stanley, have said that
Venezuela could soon face a cash crunch as it grapples with low oil revenues and a dearth of
foreign investment. All the oil that China needs for its growth and consolidation as a power
is here, Mr. Chvez said at a ceremony on Saturday announcing the loans. Details about the
new financing deal were sparse. Xinhua, the Chinese governments news agency, said it involved
soft loans channeled through the China Development Bank. The linchpin of the loans appears
to be Chinas thirst for oil, with the China National Petroleum Corporation, or C.N.P.C., agreeing
to form a venture with Venezuelas national oil company to explore for oil in southern
Venezuela. Eventually the companies could produce 400,000 barrels a day in the area.
Venezuelas energy minister, Rafael Ramrez, said C.N.P.C. would need to pay $1 billion to move
the venture forward. Venezuela, faced with a slump in oil production, has recently been
seeking to reach similar deals with energy companies from Russia, India and Spain, as well as the
Chevron Corporation from the United States. Mr. Ramrez also made a rare trip to Washington
this month where he spoke about oil projects. While the United States remains the top buyer
of Venezuelas oil, China is emerging as a new market. But the precise nature of energy relations
between Venezuela and China remains something of a mystery. Venezuela claims it is exporting
460,000 barrels a day of oil to China, while Chinese government data show the country
importing around 132,000 barrels a day. Moreover, Venezuelas government has announced
dozens of oil-exploration and refining ventures with companies from an array of countries
including Iran, Uruguay and China itself. But almost none have been completed during Mr.
Chvezs 11 years in power; the refurbishment of an oil refinery in Cuba is a rare exception to
this record.
Chinas relationship with Venezuela was a direct response to lack of interest in
a relationship with the U.S.
Aljazeera, 13 [Chris Arsenault, Phil Lind Fellow (University of British Columbia) and Wolfson
Press Fellow (Cambridge),
Venezuela looks to China for economic boost, March 12,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/03/201331271053389351.html]
China is the Future for Venezuela President of OrOctrading, a consulting firm, Sanchez - sporting thick cufflinks with the red Chinese
flag and a dark blazer - has been teaching Venezuelan companies about doing business with the worlds second-largest economy.
Usually, manufactured goods from China are coming into Latin America and raw materials are
going out, Sanchez told Al Jazeera. Venezuela has posted a positive trade balance with China,
because of oil exports, but without those we would have a major deficit. Trade between Venezuela, holder of the
worlds largest oil reserves, and China grew to $18bn in 2011, a 24-fold increase from 2003, reported China Daily, a
government-backed newspaper. Venezuela exports more than 500,000 barrels of oil to the Asian giant
daily, according to government figures, and plans to increase that to one million by 2015. The two countries had
signed 300 bilateral agreements, including 80 major projects, according to a University of Miami study in 2010. Looking
east As relations between Venezuela and the US soured in recent years, Venezuela looked away
from its traditional trading partner towards the east. China could soon surpass the US as Venezuelas
largest trading partner. Venezuela's interim President Nicolas Maduro, who took the job following the death of President
Hugo Chavez on March 5, held talks with Chinese officials over the weekend. "The best tribute that we could give to our comandante
Chavez is to deepen our strategic relationship with our beloved China," said Maduro, who once served as Venezuelas foreign
minister. In a televised meeting with Maduro, Zhang Ping, chairman of Chinas National Development and Reform Commission, said
deepening relations between China and Venezuela are the only way to comfort the soul of President Hugo Chavez. If elected
president on April 14, Maduro has said his first trip abroad will be to China. Henrique Capriles, leader of
Venezuelas opposition, criticises most government policies but generally supports expanding trade with China. The countries have
launched two satellites together in recent years, and China is negotiating a free trade deal with Mercosur, a
South American trading zone.

No offense china already gave massive amounts of aid to Venezuela for
petroleum and coal extraction
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external
actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores and more than 20 articles in
this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=606)

It can be argued that Venezuela is currently Chinas principal strategic partner in Latin America, both
in terms of the volume of investment, as well as in the nature of the relationship between the
two countries.29 China currently has over $1.5 billion invested in Venezuelaprior to the recently announced
$100 million in investment commitments, the largest investment position of any country in the region.30 Bilateral trade between
China and Venezuela increased from $150 million in 2003 to $1.2 billion in 2004,31 and is anticipated to reach $3 billion in 2005,
based on agreements signed during the state visit of Venezuelas populist president Hugo Chvez Frias to China during the 2004
Christmas holiday,32 as well as a series of 19 cooperation accords signed between Venezuela and China in January 2005.33 These
gures reect growth in both imports and exports. Venezuelan imports from China grew by 120 percent over 2004 to reach $560
million, while similarly growing oil exports have allowed Venezuela to maintain a net trade surplus.34 The Chinese relationship with
Venezuela reects not only Chinese interest in Venezuelan resources, but also the receptivity of President Chvez. His interest in
developing alternative markets for Venezuelan petroleum, and developing a hedge against U.S. inuence in the region, make him a
strong potential Chinese ally.35 In his highprole state visit to China, Chvez signed a number of accords in which he committed
Venezuela to put its petroleum production at the disposition of the great Chinese fatherland.36 On the other hand, he is also a
potential threat to Chinese interests, insofar as his Bolivarian revolution and support for indigenous populism and antiglobalist
causes could foment instability in Chinas trading partners in Latin America, and undermine Chinese access to the resources of the
region. Chinas principal interest in Venezuela, based on trade and investment patterns, is petroleum
products. Exports of Venezuelan petroleum products to China registered a 75 percent increase in 2003,37 and a 25 percent
increase in 2004, reaching a level of $640 million.38 Although the volume of petroleum shipments from Venezuela to China is limited
and there are restrictions on the size of tankers and cargo ships which can be sent through the Panama Canal, infrastructure projects
are under consideration which could sidestep these constraints by using pipelines to carry the oil overland to Pacic portseither
across Colombia or Panama. As part of a series of accords signed during the state visit of Chvez to China in December 2004, and
leveraging the close working relationship with the Chinese developed over recent years,39 Venezuela will give China access to 15
mature oil elds, with proven reserves of up to a billion barrels of oil, for Chinese rms to develop and exploit.40 As part of the
accord, China will invest $350 million toward bringing these elds on line,41 and in exchange will be allowed to build reneries on
Venezuelan territory to process the oil.42 The agreement will help the Venezuelan government to overcome the shortfalls in
technical management that it created when it red half of all workers in its state oil rm, Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), following
the December 2002-March 2003 national strike. By allowing the Chinese to directly develop these elds,
Venezuela will be able to almost double its production despite a lack of internal technical
capacity to do so, selling signicant quantities of oil to China while still serving its traditional
markets. As a compliment to its assistance to Venezuela in extracting its oil, China is also investing $60 million in a number of
projects to help Venezuela extract its natural gas. 43 During a scheduled state visit at the end of January 2005, Chinese Vice-
President Zeng Quinghong and senior directors of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) will analyze the viability of even
greater Chinese investment in the development of Venezuelan natural gas reserves.44 A third signicant element of
Chinese engagement with Venezuela in the petroleum sector involves the Chinese purchase of
Venezuelan ormulsin, and conversion of Chinese facilities to use it for the generation of
electricity. Ormulsin is a low-grade, high-pollution content fuel oil traditionally given little or
no value because of the lack of a global market for its use. In December 2001, CNPC and PdVSA established
the joint venture Orifuels Sinoven, S.A (Sinovensa) and invested $330 million to develop a capability to produce 6.5 million metric
tons of ormulsin per year by the end of 2004. In conjunction with this effort, in November 2003 CNPC began constructing a special
new type of power plant capable of burning ormulsin in the Guangdong province of China.45 Through a deal nalized in 2004,
Chinas commercial agent, Petrochina, a subsidiary of CNPC, is currently purchasing 1.5 millions of tons of orimulsin annually from
Venezuela.46 By building the new power plant, China is able to make use of the Venezuelan ormulsin, which it is able to 8 purchase
at relatively low cost because of the lack of a global market. Moreover, Venezuela is Chinas natural partner for the
ormulsin deal, in that the Latin American country currently possesses the worlds largest
proven ormulsin reservesalmost double those of Saudi Arabia, the next largest source.
China is also helping Venezuela to extract its coal. At the end of 2004, China announced that it will invest in the
development of mines in the Orinoco River Basin area in the south of the country.47 China Minmetal and the Venezuelan rm,
Corpozulia, are slated to sign an agreement during the scheduled state visit of Chinese Vice President Zeng Quinghong at the end of
January 2005 that would use Chinese investment to increase Venezuelan carbon production.48 Beyond the domain of extractive
industries, the ChineseVenezuelan partnership has extended to the agricultural sector, where Venezuelan interests in improving
agricultural productivity coincide with Chinese interests in developing reliable, friendly suppliers of foodstuffs. As part of the accords
reached between the two nations during the Christmas 2004 visit of Chvez to China, the Asian giant has agreed to provide
Venezuela with agricultural machinery and credits for the nation to increase its food production.49 In keeping with the vertically
integrated strategy that China has pursued in other Latin American countries to secure access to sources of supply for strategic
materials, China announced in December 2005 that it will invest in the construction of a national railway line, helping Venezuela to
transport raw materials and foodstuffs to market.50 Finally, China is also helping Venezuela to develop its telecommunications
industry, including assistance to Venezuela in access to space. As part of the series of accords reached during the Christmas 2004
visit of Hugo Chvez to China, the two nations announced that China will launch a telecommunications satellite for Venezuela,
helping the nation become less dependent on U.S. telecommunications networks.51 The initiative built on broader discussions of
how China could help Venezuela to develop and modernize its telecommunications infrastructure more broadly, including a
December 2004 visit to Venezuela by Vice minister of the Chinese information ministry Lou Kinjian to discuss possible collaboration
on telecommunication projects with the Venezuelan telecommunications rm, CVG Telecom.52

Solvency: Oil Advantage
Venezuela is more responsive to oil trade with China
Jianhai 2005 *Bi Jianhai and David Zweig, Foreign Affairs, China's Global Hunt for Energy Sep-
Oct 2005 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031703]
Washington remains wary, especially as Beijing seeks cooperation from other governments on the United States' shortlist of rogue
states. China is undermining U.S. efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions by resisting the imposition of sanctions against the
Islamic Republic in the event it resumes its efforts to enrich uranium. And Beijing is strengthening ties with the
temperamental Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, who likes to poke the Americans in the
eye. "We have been producing and exporting oil for more than loo years," Chavez told a group of Chinese
business executives last December. "But these have been loo years of domination by the United States. Now we are
free, and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland." Souring relations
between Caracas and Washington have already prompted the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to mandate contingency plans in case Venezuelan oil stops flowing to the United
States. Chinese officials, meanwhile, deny that China's oil hunger is increasing friction with the United States. According to Han
Wenke, deputy director general of the energy institute affiliated with China's National Development and Reform Commission,
"Although oil trade plays an important role in every field, it has a limited influence in Sino-American relations."

2NC Venezuela Says Yes
Venezuela says yes to Chinese infrastructure cooperation empirically proven
Amineh 2012 *Mehdi Parvizi Amineh; Yang Guang, Secure oil and alternative energy : the
geopolitics of energy paths of China and the European Union Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2012.+
In the infrastructure sector, China and Venezuela have cooperated on a number of high profile
projects, including the National Rail Network, hydraulic works for the Bolivarian Aqueduct and
the National Plan for Residential Construction. In addition, Venezuela and China formed a joint
venture worth $7.5 billion to build a railway that will link farm and oil regions in the south of
Venezuela. The china Railways Engineering Corporation (CREC) hold a 40 per cent stake and the
Venezuelan state owns the rest. Venezuela suffers from severe electricity shortages, caused by
a lack of adequate investment; consequently, in a long-term $20 billion financing deal, China is
providing assistance to Venezuela to build three electricity generating plants.
Theyll say yes to China: resent U.S. involvement
Kurlantzick 7 (4/9, Joshua, visiting scholar at the China Program of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Beijing's Big Push, Newsweek, p. lexis)
Putin's bear hug was no anomaly, and though done for good strategic reasons, also reflects Russian public opinion. Even as relations
between Moscow and Washington continue to sour, China is growing more popular than ever; a major public-opinion poll last year
found that most ordinary Russians now think China has "a positive impact on the world" and that the United States has a negative
one. And Russians are far from alone in these sentiments. Over the last five years, while anti-Americanism has
surged around the globe, Beijing has worked hard to ingratiate itself in Asia, Latin America and
Africa. The name of this game is soft power: making China and its culture as attractive as possible to foreign publics,
not just their leaders. For years, Washington has dominated the field. But Beijing's new outreach--through foreign
aid, investment, deft diplomacy, tourism and education--is starting to best American efforts. Ordinary people across
the planet now view China more warmly than they do the United States. Polls taken by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes and the BBC show that majorities of people in most countries
today consider China to be a more positive influence and less of a threat to international
peace than the United States is. Such sentiments are particularly strong in the developing
world; China is rated far more favorably than the United States is in places ranging from Saudi Arabia (54 percent to 38 percent)
to Turkey (27 percent to 15 percent) to Indonesia (60 percent to 40 percent) to Brazil (53 percent to 42 percent). Even in Australia,
one of Washington's closest allies, polls by the Lowy Institute now show that average citizens feel as good about China as they do
about the United States.

Chinese Soft Power Good: Warming
Chinese soft power is key to solve global climate change its key to getting
other nations on board
CSIS 9 (March, Jesse Kaplan and Julianne Smith, Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the
United States: competition and cooperation in the developing world
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090305_mcgiffert_chinesesoftpower_web.pdf)

When it comes to China and combating climate change, everyone, from Al Gore to T. Boone Pickens, recites a common yet troubling narrative: with global temperatures rising,
the need for a peak in global greenhouse gas emissions is incompatible with continued Chinese economic growth. The Peoples Republic of China, which recently became the
world leader in carbon emissions, has completely ignored environmental considerations. Kinder critics explain that renewable energy is hopelessly expensive for developing
countries. Conspiracy theorists grumble that China is determined to destroy the Pax Americana with emissions, if not with military and economic might. All, or at least most,
agree that Chinese obstructionism is a primary obstacle to global efforts to combat climate change.
If only the Chinese would do something, the thinking goes, perhaps the United States would have an
incentive to act as well. This narrative is familiar. It is also almost entirely wrong. To be sure, the climate picture is alarming.
Experts agree that to limit global warming to a moderately safe level of two degrees Celsius above the preindustrial norm, global carbon emissions will need to peak in the next
decade and then be more than halved by 2050. Practically, this means that developed countries must have zero-carbon economies by mid-century and developing countries
must followe suit a few decades later. In quantifiable terms, the avoidable costs of climate change inaction range between 5 and 20 percent of global gross domestic product
(GDP) approximately the cost of both world wars and the Great Depression combined. The environmental, human development, and quality-of-life costs are far greater. Even
before it passed the United States as the worlds largest emitter of carbon dioxide, China figured prominently in climate change discussions. The International Energy Agency has
projected that if China were to do nothing to curb emissions, it would emit more carbon dioxide
during the next 25 years than the worlds 26 richest counties combined. Almost every week a coal-fired and highly
polluting power plant large enough to service all of San Diego or Dallas opens somewhere in China, and the Chinese build enough such plants annually to light the entire United
Kingdom. The Chinese coal sector alone produces upward of 16 percent of global carbon emissions. These numbers are sobering. In contrast with the common narrative,
however, they are not sobering only to Western eyes. The Chinese widely recognize that the threat of climate change is
real, and they have taken significant steps in recent years to counter that threat. To start, China
has a National Climate Change Plan, something about which U.S. environmentalists can only dream, and China has mustered a
wide array of legislative, economic, and governmental instruments to foster shifts to more
sustainable industrial activity. China has invested heavily in renewable energy and has more stringent efficiency standards for its automobiles than
does the United States. In his annual address in 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao made 48 references to environment, pollution or environmental protection, and party
leadership has pursued efforts at structural reform to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. However, significant gaps between
well-intentioned rhetoric and concrete action remain. In addition, Chinese efforts to stem emissions are sometimes contradictory
and not always effective. The country is nevertheless of the correct path, and its recalcitrance about addressing climate change is, if not a complete myth, not an obstacle to
engagement either. Villainizing China, while convenient, distorts reality and distracts from U.S. inaction.
Extinction
Deibel 7 [Terry L. Professor of IR at National War College, 2007 Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic
for American Statecraft, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today+
Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature,
which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the
stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been
observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has
passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on
climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that
anthropogenic warming is occurring. In legitimate scientific circles, writes Elizabeth Kolbert, it is
virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fun damentals of global
warming. Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of
newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the
next century; climate change could literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread
of cholera and malaria; glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, andworldwide, plants
are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago; rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global
increase in the most destructive hurricanes; NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005
was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second;Earths warming climate is estimated to contribute
to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year as disease spreads; widespread
bleaching from Texas to Trinidadkilled broad swaths of corals due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. The world is
slowly disintegrating, concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. They call it climate
changebut we just call it breaking up. From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the
industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At
present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels.
Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to
reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the
only debate is how much and how serous the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show,
we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease,
mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying
countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and
West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would
cover North Carolinas outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich
Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline
circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would
otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of
warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening
scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of
water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures.
Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even
though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can
conclude is that humankinds continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to
playing Russian roulette with the earths climate and humanitys life support system. At worst,
says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, were just going to burn everything up; were
going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were
crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse. During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan
popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would
not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War eras
equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over
the long run it puts dangers form terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not
only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this
planet.
2NC Perm Do Both
China will perceive U.S. influence as interfering with their interests
Johnson 5 (Stephen, Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin
America, 10/24/05, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-
growing-influence-in-latin-america)
China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing
Tai-wan's reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was
isolated, but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation,
it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds
observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S.
influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and
new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly,
"[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not
friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the
Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket reforms and Washington's
unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm. National Defense University professor
Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant
corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the
world's superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]
Maduro does not want U.S. involvement
Fillingham 13 (Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African Studies in
London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect Chinese policy,
GeopoliticalMonitor.com, Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw? http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-
chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)
Current polls indicate that Maduro would triumph in the coming election, a scenario that does not bode well for a
thaw in US-Venezuelan relations. Maduro has dropped several indications that he plans to
carry on his predecessors anti-American tone, notably by suggesting that the U.S. might be
behind Chavezs illness and by kicking out two U.S. military attaches under the accusation of
trying to destabilize Venezuelan politics.


A2: Not Zero Sum
Chinese engagement trades off
WorldCrunch 5/6 (2013, Wang xiaoxia, staffwriter, economic observer, In Americas Backyard: Chinas Rising Influence in
Latin America http://worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-
policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)
China is busy in America's backyard. Over the past five years, Chinese businesses have been expanding their
footprint in Latin America in a number of ways, beginning with enhanced trade to ensure a steady supply of
bulk commodities such as oil, copper and soybeans. At this year's Boao Forum for Asia, for the first time a Latin American sub-forum
was created that included the participation of several heads of state from the region. Since 2011, China has overtaken the
Netherlands to become Latin Americas second biggest investor behind the United States. China has
signed a series of large cooperation agreements with Latin American countries in such fields as finance, resources
and energy. According to the latest statistics of the General Administration of Customs of China, Sino-Latin American
trade grew in 2012 to a total of $261.2 billion, a year-on-year increase of 8.18%. This trend risks undermining
the position of the United States as Latin Americas single dominant trading partner. In 2011, the
U.S.-Latin American trade volume was $351 billion.
Power is zero sum even a peaceful china rise erodes US power
Ellis 11 (NDU Press, 1
st
Quarter 2011, Issue 60, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and
simulation with the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin
Americas relationships with external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of China in Latin America: The Whats and
Wherefores and more than 20 articles in this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A
Case Study http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)
The reemergence of China as a dominant global actor highlights longstanding ambiguities in U.S. thinking regarding what constitutes
national security. Peoples Republic of China (PRC) policymakers have emphasized the peaceful nature of
Chinas rise and have generally avoided military or political actions that could be seen by the United States as threatening.
Nonetheless, the economic, institutional, and cultural battles through which the PRC has advanced its position have both
leveraged and contributed to an erosion of the U.S. strategic position globally. The advance of China
and the multidimensional strategic challenge that it poses are most effectively characterized by one of the most loosely defined and
misunderstood buzzwords in the modern parlance: soft power.

A2: Increasing Engagement Not Key
Chinas involvement with Latin America is growing
Jianhai 2005 *Bi Jianhai and David Zweig, Foreign Affairs, China's Global Hunt for Energy Sep-
Oct 2005 http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031703]
Beijing has also been active in Latin America. Brazil's development minister visited Beijing nine times in 2003 and
2004. Dozens of business leaders accompanied President Hu on his four-stop trip to the region in November 2004, during which he
announced $20 billion in new investments for oil and gas exploration and other projects. During his visit to Latin
America and the Caribbean last January, Vice President Zeng Qnghong signed various trade
and oil-supply agreements with Venezuela. According to the Financial Times, trade between
China and Latin America has quintupled since 1999, reaching almost $40 billion by the end
of last year. A recent report by the Spanish bank BBVA indicates that Latin America has continued to benefit
greatly from China's economic growth, in terms of both investment and trade. Last year,
China invested $1.4 billion in the region; it is now the main impetus for export growth for
many Latin American states.
China is engaging Latin American countries now sustained outreach critical for
expanding trade
Bethel, 2013 *Erik, How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China? Dialogue's daily
Latin America Advisor, January 18, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210]
China's ambassador to Chile, Yang Wanming, told newspaper China Daily that the Asian nation should look to Latin America to
make up for declining demand from developed markets. Chinese exports to the region grew 12 to 15 percent last year, and it "is
now a strategically important market," he said. How significant is Latin America as an export destination for China?
Are business and government leaders actively looking to the region to expand trade? Where is the Chinese economy headed next
year and in the mid-term, and how will that affect Latin America? A: Erik Bethel, managing partner of SinoLatin Capital: "Latin
America's 19 countries, 575 million people and $6.8 trillion GDP offer a tantalizing opportunity for Chinese
exports. China is already a major exporter in Latin America, but there is a lot of room for further growth. In order
for this to happen, Chinese firms need to view the market not on a regional basis, but rather country-by-
country. There is no question that Sino-Latin relations have been strengthening at a rapid pace, as
demonstrated by China's direct investment in the region ($175 billion in cumulative FDI as of September), membership in the Inter-
American Development Bank and the many bilateral visits that have taken place. However, Chinese firms need to approach the
region with the understanding that Latin American countries have uneven levels of development, varying political models, alliances
and outlooks. All of this requires deft political engagement in developing the relationships, trust and
public support in order to open markets further. There is no question that while China's appreciation for Latin
America and its opportunities has significantly increased in the last decade, there is still work to be done in
deepening its understanding of the region's differing customs, histories, nuances and subtleties. Achieving this
heightened awareness and understanding will be critical. Conversely, Latin Americans need to better understand China and define a
fair and constructive relationship. It is clear that while Latin American consumers could greatly benefit from China's wide range of
inexpensive imports, concerns remain over the effects of increased Chinese competition on domestic Latin American industries.
Herein lays Latin America's conundrum. Latin America greatly benefits by selling raw materials to China and by purchasing
inexpensive Chinese electronic goods, textiles, furniture and other goods. But the concern is that the region will remain trapped as a
low value-added raw material supplier with a struggling manufacturing sector and limited employment opportunities. Without a
doubt, a great foundation for expanded trade is in place. However, seeing it grow over the coming years
will require a sustained educational and outreach effort on both sides."
Chinese economic engagement key for increasing trade relations
Hungbo, 2013 *Sun, How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China? Dialogue's daily
Latin America Advisor, January 18,
http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)
"China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for
safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent
of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America
has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of
China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more
sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both
in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient
way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China
continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13
percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America.
Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese
business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend
on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for
sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will
necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin
America."


Chinese influence depends on U.S. desertion- plan reverses that
Johnson 5
[Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Stud-ies, at The Heritage Foundation.Balancing China's Growing Influence in Latin
America, 10/24/05, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/balancing-chinas-
growing-influence-in-latin-america]

China's main rival for global preeminence is the United States. China sees the United States as preventing
Tai-wan's reunification with the mainland and thwarting Beijing's rise as a power. Previously, China was
isolated, but now plays key roles in Asian geopolitics and aspires to do so elsewhere. Besides status as a nuclear nation,
it is a member of the U.N. Security Council, the World Trade Organization, the Group of 77 developing nations, and the Asia Pacific Economic Coopera-tion group. It also holds
observer status in the Organization of American States. While China has become the second-largest U.S. trade partner after Canada, it challenges U.S.
influence wherever it can. In fact, it will soon have more attack submarines than the United States, with the addition of four Russian Kilo-class subs and
new diesel-electric vessels equipped with technology that will allow them to run quieter than nuclear submarines.[1] According to former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing James Lilly,
"[T]he facts are that [the Chinese] run massive intelligence operations against us, they make open statements against us, their high-level documents show that they are not
friendly to us." Chinese military white papers promote power pro-jection and describe U.S. policies as "hegemonism and power politics."[2] In the Western Hemisphere, the
Chinese are taking advantage of failures of half-hearted mar-ket reforms and Washington's
unwillingness to pursue neighborhood relations with much enthu-siasm. National Defense University professor
Cyn-thia A. Watson notes, "[T]he 1990s turned into a period of severe disappointment as free markets led to rampant
corruption and unfulfilled expec-tations in Latin America while Washington became the
world's superpower rather than a part-ner for the region."[3]


A2: Chinese Involvement Bad
China provides a good model for Latin American economic development
Adrian H. Hearn and Jos Luis Len-Manrquez (social policy professor at the University of
Sydney) July 31st, 2011 http://www.eurospanbookstore.com/media/pdf/extracts/9781588267672.pdf
In search of effective strategies for engaging China, analysts have suggested that Latin American
countries would do well to learn from Chinas development trajectory and consider the
benefits of a more proactive state.3 Present conditions favor this tactic. The global financial
crisis has generated an environment in which governments in Latin America and beyond have taken
unusually bold steps to get their economies back on track through stimulus packages, tighter regulatory
controls, and, in some cases, more active industrial policies. Together these actions could leverage
sustainable benefits from Chinas long-term demand for resources if state intervention is
carefully directed toward human capital advancement, economic diversification, and
coordination with Chinese enterprises, whose overseas investments often dovetail with the
infrastructure and development agendas of foreign governments

**Aff Answers**
2AC: General Answers
China doesnt solve Venezuela crisis
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African
Studies in London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect
Chinese policy, GeopoliticalMonitor.com, Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)

Just to recap: what we are likely to see is a Maduro win, followed by a politico-economic crisis that ushers in either a return to credible multi-party
democracy or a descent into conspicuous authoritarianism. But how will this impact US-Venezuelan relations? Given its precarious economic situation,
Venezuela will need outside assistance in the near future. And while some would say that China is best
suited to step up and bail out Caracas, there are a few reasons to question whether this will actually come to
pass. First of all, The Chinese Development Bank has already provided a huge amount of money to
the Chavez government, about $40 billion between 2008 and 2012 alone. Thus, if Venezuela were to be faced with a
default, it would be Chinese investors with their money on the line. Any debt renegotiations would
surely include provisions that didnt sit well with the Venezuelan public. After all, there have already been agreements
reached between Venezuela and the Chinese state-owned company Citic Group that have raised populist alarm bells regarding the signing of mineral
rights over to foreign companies. In this context, a limited rapprochement makes sense from a Venezuelan point of view, as it would balance against a
preponderance of Chinese economic influence. Now that the Bolivarian Revolution is all but discredited, and
countries like Brazil have proven that its possible to alleviate poverty through trade and keep
US influence at arms length, a US-Venezuelan thaw is theoretically possible. However, authorities in
Washington will likely have to endure another round of vitriol and wait until the dust settles in Venezuelan domestic politics before their window of
opportunity presents itself.
The US is best for aid to Venezuela
Fillingham 3/10 (2013, Zachary, BA in IR from York University, MA in Chinese Studies from School of Oriental and African
Studies in London, analytical area of expertise in Chinese foreign policy, particularly in regards to how nationalist issues affect
Chinese policy, GeopoliticalMonitor.com, Post-Chavez US-Venezuelan Relations: Headed for a Thaw?
http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/post-chavez-us-venezuelan-relations-headed-for-a-thaw-4790/)

And by all indications, Venezuelas finances arent going to hold out for very long. The country is currently running a
deficit of over 20 percent, and its national inflation rate fluctuates between 20 and 30 percent. Though it presides over one of the worlds largest oil
reserves and is a card-carrying member of OPEC, Venezuelas oil yields have been dropping throughout the Chavez era due to
a lack of foreign investment. The same is true of Venezuelas food industry. A lack of foreign investment, inefficiency, and costly subsidies
have stunted overall output, resulting in food shortages that are now showing themselves in the huge lineups spilling out of government food depots
nationwide. A reoccurring theme of Chavezs economic policy was a willful ignorance regarding the creation of infrastructure and social capital that could drive economic
growth beyond the era of direct government handouts. Given the structural challenges that the Venezuelan economy now faces, challenges that will
preclude the governments ability to continue Chavez-era patronage ad infinitum, a Maduro government will inevitably be faced
with an economic reckoning of sorts. In the aftermath of this economic reckoning, there will be an opportunity
for both domestic opposition forces within Venezuela, and American foreign policy to make inroads.
Chinas presence results in destabilizing US security interests
Ellis 5 (June 2005, R. Evan Ellis, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University, with a research focus on Latin Americas relationships with external
actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. Author of China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores and more than 20 articles in
this research area. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America
Executive Summary http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/summary.cfm?q=606)

In this monograph, the author argues that China?s pursuit of longterm strategic objectives is leading the country to increase its presence in
Latin America, with serious national security implications for the United States. Sustained Chinese economic
growth requires ever greater quantities of basic commodities such as petroleum products, coal, iron and steel, and strategic minerals. As the new
generation of Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao has moved away from the more cautious approach of his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, China has begun
to aggressively court Latin America as its principal source of supply outside Asia. Figures from the Chinese National Statistics Office show that, for
example, 77 percent of all Chinese foreign investment outside Asia in 2003 went to Latin America. The pattern of Chinese investment in countries such
as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile suggests that the Asian giant is seeking to assure access to critical commodities by constructing vertically integrated
supply networks over which it has leverage. China is purchasing interest in key Latin American suppliers such as the Canadian minerals firm Noranda, or
the Argentine oil subsidiary PlusPetrol Norte. It is also building cooperative relationships with supplier governments such as the joint oil exploration and
refinery construction deals signed with Venezuela and Brazil in 2004. Where necessary, China is also investing in the infrastructure of Latin American
countries to help them more effectively bring their products to market. In addition to documenting China?s aggressive new posture in specific Latin
American countries, this monograph argues that the expanded Chinese trade and investment presence in the region ultimately will give China a stake in
the politics of the region and may tempt it to become involved in the region?s security affairs. Expanded Chinese trade and i nvestment in Latin
America, for example, will expand greatly the community of Chinese nationals in the region. The broadened community of Chinese nationals multiplies
opportunities for incidents involving those nationals, while also expanding the community in China with an interest in the region. At the same time,
significant Chinese investments in Latin American extractive industries and increasing
dependence on its production will cause the Chinese government to seek to deflect political
movements in Latin American countries that could expropriate these investments or disrupt
these resource flows. Ultimately, this monograph argues that Chinese engagement with Latin America will
make the nation both a powerful competitor and a potential partner for the United States in the region.
On one hand, China, with major investments in Latin America and dependence on its material flows, is likely to be a nation interested in reducing
political instability, armed groups, and criminal activity in the region, rather than fueling radical populism and insurgency. On the other hand, the
United States needs to consider to what degree it is willing to accept a China that has
increasing leverage in Latin America through its investment and trade presence?and a growing
interest in the political course of the region. Now, rather than later, is the time for the United States to begin seriously
considering how to most constructively engage the Chinese in the Western Hemisphere.
Chinese Presence in Venezuela is ineffective
Evan Ellis ( professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an
analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues) The Manzella Report, May
10
th
, 2013 Critical Problems for New Chinese Presence in Latin America
Finally, the new Chinese presence on the ground in Latin America makes it vulnerable to the
actions of the governments where it operates. This is a critical problem, since the new Chinese
projects are disproportionately concentrated in the countries in the region with the worst
track records of respecting investors, such as Venezuela and Argentina. Chinese construction of
a new petrochemical complex in Tierra Del Fuego has been blocked by the Argentine
governments restrictions on importing supplies. In Venezuela, Chinese frustration in dealing
with PdVSA has paralyzed progress in negotiating the development of the new Junin-1 and
Junin-8 oilfields in the Orinoco. Similar frustration with delays in China-financed construction
projects led the PRC to deny Venezuela a new $4 billion line of credit in February 2013.


2AC: Perm Do Both
Perm do both the US and China arent competing in Latin America both
countries can maintain a relationship with Venezuela
Global Times 5/31 (2013, China, US not competing over Latin America: expert
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Uaqh_kCkqUI)
Chinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit
aiming at promoting China's cooperation with the region.
Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico follows his first foreign trip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania,
South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking office in March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is
concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling
visits" by Chinese and US leaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in
Latin America is on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can
"carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao
Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a
coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US
influence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of
influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum
game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin America out of their
respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperate with other countries, and visits of such high-level
are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said. China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-
decade leadership transition with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several
high-level visitors to Beijing. After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to
8 in California.

2AC A2: Net Benefit
CP doesnt solve Chinese soft power limited abilities and strategic flaws
Nye 4/29 (2013, Joseph S. Nye is an American political scientist and former Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University. What China and Russia Dont Get About Soft Power
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?wp_login_redirect=0)
Power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, and that can be accomplished in three main ways -- by coercion,
payment, or attraction. If you can add the soft power of attraction to your toolkit, you can economize on carrots and sticks. For a
rising power like China whose growing economic and military might frightens its neighbors into counter-balancing coalitions, a
smart strategy includes soft power to make China look less frightening and the balancing
coalitions less effective. For a declining power like Russia (or Britain before it), a residual soft power helps to cushion the
fall. The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political
values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral
authority). But combining these resources is not always easy. Establishing, say, a Confucius Institute in Manila to teach Chinese
culture might help produce soft power, but it is less likely to do so in a context where China has just bullied the Philippines over
possession of Scarborough Reef. Similarly, Putin has told his diplomats that "the priority has been shifting to the literate use of soft
power, strengthening positions of the Russian language," but as Russian scholar Sergei Karaganov noted in the aftermath of the
dispute with Georgia, Russia has to use "hard power, including military force, because it lives in a much more dangerous world ...
and because it has little soft power -- that is, social, cultural, political and economic attractiveness." Much of America's soft power is
produced by civil society -- everything from universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture -- not from the government.
Sometimes the United States is able to preserve a degree of soft power because of its critical and uncensored civil society even
when government actions -- like the invasion of Iraq -- are otherwise undermining it. But in a smart power strategy, hard and soft
reinforce each other. In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China
has spent billions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power. Chinese aid programs to Africa and
Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese style
emphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited return on its
investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but
predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea.
Even China's soft-power triumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long
after the last international athletes had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft power
gains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo
and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft power boost
from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message. China and Russia
make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power. In today's
world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government
propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China
Central Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As the
Economist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the
private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom
it thinks might have global appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way . As Pang Zhongying of
Renmin University put it, it highlights "a poverty of thought" among Chinese leaders. The development of soft power
need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to
succeed, they will need to match words and deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies.
Unfortunately, that is not about to happen soon.
No Chinese soft power no cultural draw
The Atlantic 4/11 (2013, China File, Can China Do Softpower http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/04/can-
china-do-soft-power/274916/)
Jeremy Goldkorn: Chairman Mao Zedong said that power comes out of the barrel of a gun, and he knew a thing or two about power,
both hard and soft. If you have enough guns, you have respect. Money is the same: if you have enough cash, you can buy guns, and
respect. Israel and Saudi Arabia are examples of the limits of such respect. Both countries are rich and in some ways very powerful,
but people in other countries with no cultural connections don't look at Israel, or Saudi Arabia and think: "Gee, I want to live like that
and watch their movies!" But we, the rest of us, everyone who is not American, we all want to watch American
movies. I am from South Africa, and I'll confidently represent the entire Third World and the rest of the First World assure you
that it's true. We don't want to watch Israeli or Saudi or Chinese movies, nor buy Chinese sneakers. Nor, with
the exception of a few eccentrics such as myself, do we want to live in Chinese cities. The Saudis and Israelis do not
seem to care about this, but China does, hence the endless hand-wringing about soft power. The
essence of Joseph Nye's articulation of of soft power is the power to attract, to co-opt and to seduce. China now has enough cash to
open Confucius Institutes, fund movies, TV stations, and schools, open art zones, buy aircraft carriers and islands, but China has
not made itself an attractive place to live or work or dream. Until Chinese political leaders
would rather their daughters went to Peking University over Harvard, until Chinese people would rather
buy Mengniu infant milk formula over the equivalent brand from New Zealand, until Beijing and Shanghai become as pleasant to live
in as New York and L.A., China will find its soft power ambitions thwarted. As the ancient American saying has it,
you can put lipstick on a pig, but it's still a pig --doesn't matter how much you spend on the lipstick.

***Case Answers***
A2: Solvency

Venezuelan Government Has Empirically Reacted Adversely to US Involvement
Jones, '84 [Randall J., Jr., Professor of Political Science at Central Oklahoma University,
Empirical Models of Political Risks in U. S. Oil Production Operations in Venezuela, Journal of
International Business Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring - Summer, pp. 81-95]
In 9 of the years between 1961 and 1978, Venezuelan regimes took actions adverse to the
profitability of U.S. oil companies' local production operations. In this study 2 time-series
discriminant models were developed for classifying each of the 18 years according to the
occurrence of such action. In the first model, adverse government action was found more likely
to occur following years of economic decline and periods when U.S. companies earned high
profits from petroleum investments in Venezuela. In the second model, government action
tended to occur after periods of relative deprivation experienced by Venezuelans. To illustrate
the use of discriminant models in forecasting political risks, hypothetical scenarios were
formulated from which projections were made through 1985 of the likelihood of government
action against those U.S. oil companies' operations remaining since the nationalization of
petroleum.

Venezuela only willing to cooperate if U.S. stays out of their affairs.
MercoPress [South Atlantic News Agency, Venezuela wants best of relations with the
US based on mutual absolute respect, January 18, 2013, MercoPress,
http://en.mercopress.com/2013/01/18/venezuela-wants-best-of-relations-with-the-us-
based-on-mutual-absolute-respect]
In the framework of this new reality, the Venezuelan government will always be
willing to have the best possible relations with the governments of the US, at any
moment. But, insisted Maduro on the basis of absolute respect and non
intervention in the internal affairs of our country. Last 4 January Maduro revealed
that at the end of November there had been three contacts between Venezuela and the
US in which the establishment of improved relations in the understanding of mutual
absolute respect was considered. Maduro who considered the contacts as normal said
they involved the Venezuelan ambassador before OAS, Roy Chaderton and were
specifically authorized by Chavez who remains convalescent in Cuba. Although the US
remains as the main trade partner of Venezuela, bilateral relations have gone through
bad moments, currently probably the lowest since the end of 2010 when ambassadors
were withdrawn. Venezuela denied consent to the new US ambassador following
statements before the US Congress and Washington left the Venezuelan ambassador in
the US with no visa.
Venezuela wont accept foreign oil investment
Coggin 11 [John, Senior Editor for International Policy Digest, Venezuelas Oil Sword, May
26, http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/05/26/venezuelas-oil-sword/]
Its the uncertain quantity and quality of Venezuelas oil reserves that keep U.S. foreign
policy analysts and energy forecasters up at night. Like Saudi Arabias national oil company, PDVSA
operates behind a cloak of secrecy. The Venezuelan constitution strictly forbids foreign
investment in upstream oil activities. U.S. oil companies ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips
exited Venezuela in 2007 due to nationalization reforms.


A2: Oil Advantage
Oil Advantage Answers: General
Venezuelan oil industry declining
The Economist, 12 *Venezuelas oil industry up in smoke, August 27, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/ blogs/americasview/2012/08/venezuelas-oil-industry]
On August 25th a gas leak at the Amuay oil refinery in western Venezuela set off a giant explosion. The force of the blast destroyed
scores of homes and businesses in the surrounding area and has killed at least 41 people, many of them soldiers from a National
Guard unit stationed nearby. Days after the fireball erupted, the plants fuel storage tanks were still ablaze, and pools of oil from
seeping underground pipes filled the neighbouring streets. The government has suggested that the disaster was a freak accident.
Its critics counter that the charred wreck of the refinery is an apt symbol for the overall state of Venezuelas oil industry
since Hugo Chvez became president in 1999. The sectors decline began in 2003, following a strike by the
employees and managers of Petrleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the state oil company, in protest
against Mr Chvezs leftist policies. When the conflict ended, the president had almost 20,000 workers sacked. Since
then, PDVSAs chairman, Rafael Ramrez, has steadily replaced them with loyal chavistas: he has made it an
explicit company policy to employ only supporters of the president. He has also allowed Mr
Chvez to use the company as a piggy bank for his socialist revolution: last year, PDVSA
spent twice as much on off- budget government programmes as it did on taxes, royalties and
dividends. With so little attention paid to the actual business of extracting oil, it is little
wonder that PDVSAs production has fallen from 3m barrels a day in 1999 to 2.4m today, according to OPEC. In
the same period, its foreign debt has risen fivefold. Moreover, oil union leaders say PDVSAs
industrial-safety procedures have deteriorated sharply. The petroleum and mining ministrys annual report
shows that maintenance work is frequently postponed for lack of cash. Residents of the Amuay area have told reporters that the gas
leak was apparent hours before the blast, though the government denies this.
Oil Shocks no longer have impacts- 2003 Proves
William Nordhaus (Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University) Whos Afraid of a Big Bad
Oil Shock? Brookings 2007
Whos Afraid of a Big Bad Oil Shock? When the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, many
economists feared that the war would lead to a sharp decline in Iraqi oil production, a spike in
oil prices, and a woeful U.S. economy that would follow the scripts of the oil shocks of 1973,
1978, and 1990. Real oil prices did increase, indeed more than tripled, from $20 in 2001:Q4 to
$62 in 2006:Q3 (in 2007 dollars). But the ailments associated with earlier oil-price increases did
not appear. Instead output grew rapidly, inflation was moderate, unemployment fell, and
consumers remained reasonably happy.
Venezuelas over reliance on oil hurts the economy
Agnani 2011 [Universidad de Granada, May 2011/ article
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1514032611600056]
Venezuela's growth experience over the 56-year period from 1950 to 2006 was characterized by
a high economic growth rate from 1950 to 1974 and a low economic growth rate from 1974 to
2006. We show that the country has been immersed in a great depression since the mid-
seventies. We also show that although Venezuela is an oil abundant economy, this growth
experience is largely due to the evolution of its non-oil GDP. We perform a growth accounting
exercise to quantify the extent to which the growth experience in the non-oil sector is a result
of physical capital accumulation, finding that non-oil sector behavior can largely be explained
by the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP). Finally, we calculate the correlations
between oil rents and physical capital accumulation and TFP in the non-oil sector, finding a
high positive correlation during the good performance period, but a negative correlation in the
implosion period.

US already cutting demand for foreign oil
IISS 2013 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, U.S. Need for Foreign Oil Falls
Dramatically, March 6, 2013, Real Clear World,
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/06/us_need_for_foreign_oil_falls_dra
matically_100597.html)
Over the last seven years, the United States has dramatically reduced its dependence
on oil imports. From their peak in 2006, imports have fallen 40% as a result of
declining demand and strong growth in domestic production of liquid fuels, leading to
predictions that the US could reach oil self-sufficiency within 15-20 years.
The United States isnt going to make any progress with Venezuelan oil
Landers 13 (Jim Landers of Dallas News Business, Crumbling Venezuelan oil sector
expected to remain hostile to U.S. investment, March 7, 2013, Dallas News,
http://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/20130306-crumbling-venezuelan-oil-sector-
expected-to-remain-hostile-to-u.s.-investment.ece
Venezuela has more oil reserves than any other country thanks to massive deposits of
asphalt-like crude in whats called the Orinoco oil belt. Development of these deposits is
both technology- and capital-intensive. Chvezs push for more national control
over the oil sector in 2007 led Exxon Mobil Corp. and ConocoPhillips Co. to
abandon big Orinoco projects. Other international companies stayed,
including firms from Russia, China and Vietnam, and the Orinoco now
accounts for about 20 percent of Venezuelas oil production. Mark McNabb,
director of the Emerging Markets Research Center at UTDs Naveen Jindal
School of Management, said in a phone interview that he expects U.S. firms
will remain on the outside looking in. Were kind of frozen out for the next
three to five years, he said.
Multiple checks to oil shocks
The Economist 11 [March 3, 2011, The 2011 oil shock,
http://www.economist.com/node/18281774]
So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny. Libyas turmoil has reduced global oil output by
a mere 1%. In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Todays oil market also has plenty of
buffers. Governments have stockpiles, which they didnt in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more
ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008. Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically has
enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers. And
the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump.
Venezuela Currently Investing in Oil Infrastructure
Cesar J. Alvarez, and Stephanie Hanson (Writers for Council on Foreign Relations) February 9,
2012 Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy
PDVSA (Petrleos de Venezuela, S.A.), Venezuelas state-owned petroleum company, oversees the
exploration, production, refinement, and export of oil as well as the exploration and
production of natural gas. It is the world's third-largest oil company, behind Saudi Aramco and
ExxonMobil. According to Tinker-Salas, after the nationalization of Venezualas oil in 1976, PDVSA was very much like a state
within a state. It insulated itself from the government and functioned largely as its own entity with control of the nations wealth.
In 1980, PDVSA acquired CITGO, a U.S.-based refinery, and it is now one of the world's largest
refiners. Under Chavez, however, the company's mandate has drastically expanded. In 2002,
Chavez redefined PDVSAs role to include the governments social priorities. PDVSA must now spend at least 10 percent of its annual
investment budget on social programs. This money is funneled through the National Development Fund, or Fonden, an investment
fund set up in 2005 that is not included in the government's budget. Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a
Washington-based center for policy analysis, says that Chavezs gradual takeover of PDVSA has given him an enormous bankroll to
pursue his political and economic ambitions. Yet Chavez has also moved to expand PDVSAs role in Venezuelas oil ventures. In
the 1990s, Venezuela opened its oil industry to limited private investment and allowed foreign
companies to manage specific oil fields. Such strategic associations made up roughly 23 percent of total oil
production as of 2006. In April 2006, Chavez announced the government would take a majority stake in such projects, increasing its
share from 40 percent to 60 percent. Though this partial nationalization is expected to burden PDVSA with investment costs in the
billions, in 2007 the president created seven new subsidiaries of PDVSA, including services, agriculture, shipbuilding, construction
and industry. The head of PDVSA, Rafael Ramirez, told the New Yorker in June 2008 that Chavez plans to use the oil company to
transform Venezuela from an "oil sultanate to a productive society within a socialist framework." The financial crisis and oil price
drop has had some impact on the oil company. In particular, PDVSA lost a $5 billion line of credit in October 2008. In early
2009, Chavez signaled the government would be open to more foreign investment in its oil
resources, but analysts say there is little trust (Bloomberg) contracts would be honored over the long term. "Chvez is
celebrating the demise of capitalism as this international crisis unfolds," Pedro Mario Burelli, a former board member of PDVSA, told
the International Herald Tribune. "But the irony is that capitalism actually fed his system in times of plenty." Spending the Oil
Money It is difficult to determine how Venezuela has been spending its oil windfall, given the lack of government transparency (the
country ranks 162 out of 179 countries ranked on Transparency International's corruption index). However, from the few official
figures the government has released and its stated pledges of aid to foreign countries, it is possible to glean a picture of billions of
dollars dispersed on activities not directly related to PDVSA's core business. Analysts express frustration that these reports lack
detail, and efforts by news organization to obtain further information from government agencies have been rebuffed (NYT). PDVSA
has transferred billions of dollars to Fonden, the off-budget investment fund many experts say is financing Chavez's social projects.
According to International Oil Daily, an energy trade publication, PDVSA spent $14.4 billion on social programs in 2007 (as compared
to $6.9 billion in 2005). These programs include projects such as medical clinics providing free health care, discounted food and
household goods centers in poor neighborhoods, indigenous land-titling, job creation programs outside of the oil business, and
university and education programs. Increased oil revenues have also given Chavez the ability to extend assistance programs
outside Venezuelas borders. For example, he provides oil at a preferential price to many countries in the Caribbean through the
Petrocaribe initiative. In 2009, a Venezuela-backed home heating program to low-income households in the United States was
briefly halted, a sign that low oil prices may be forcing Chavez to reconsider (TIME) some of his social programs. In August 2007, the
Associated Press calculated that Chavez had promised $8.8 billion in aid, financing, and energy funding to Latin America and the
Caribbean between January and August 2007, a figure far higher than the $1.6 billion of U.S. assistance for the entire year. Though it
is impossible to determine how much of that funding was actually dispersed, the difference in aid is striking. Chavez is also
suspected of funneling money to the FARC, a Colombian guerrilla group, as well as providing funds to Argentine President Cristina
Kirchners election campaign in 2007though he denies both charges. Military expenditures are also funded by the government's
flush coffers. Between 2004 and 2006, Venezuela spent roughly $4.3 billion on weapons, according to a January 2007 Defense
Intelligence Agency report. As part of deals signed with Russia in 2006, Venezuela purchased 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, twenty-four
Sukhoi-30 fighter planes, and fifty-three Russian helicopters. In March 2008, it hired Belarus to build an air defense system. Critics
of Chavez think he should be pouring money into infrastructure to ensure a sustainable oil industry rather than allocating so much
for social and foreign policy initiatives. According to the Wall Street Journal, PDVSA spent just $60 million on exploration in 2004,
compared with $174 million in 2001. But Vicente Frepes-Cibils, the lead economist for Venezuela at the World
Bank, says investment is increasing and Venezuela has an accumulation of reserves
including outside funds ranging from $10 billion to $15 billion that it is planning to use for oil
infrastructure.
A2: Oil Shocks
Energy producers are interested in wealth maximization and behave
rationallytakes out risk of supply shocks
Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, The Energy Security Obsession, LIMES:
THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-
security.pdf
When foreign policy elites encounter these arguments in public forums, they tend to dismiss them as overly
theorized economics that assume perfectly informed rational actors and, moreover, are divorced from
geopolitical reality. Energy producers, we are told, are not first and foremost wealth maximizers. They pursue
foreign policy ends and demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice money to secure those ends. Ideological regimes,
moreover, have not always acted rationally in the past and cannot be counted upon to do so in the future. The
possibility that producer states might become economic suicide bombers immolating their own economies in
order to inflict great economic pain on the West cannot be lightly dismissed. The facts, however, indicate
that the above narrative is fundamentally at odds with observable reality. Energy
producers have thus far demonstrated a keen interest in near-term wealth maximization
cover stories to the contrary notwithstanding. International actors rarely if ever act
irrationally as an economist would define the term (e.g., they do not act in a manner that would frustrate their
self interest as they perceive it). Fears of economic suicide bombing by anti-Western
producer states are greatly exaggerated by an overly pessimistic view of the harm said
bombing could do to Western economies. And worry over embargoes demonstrates a
fundamental ignorance of how international oil markets work. There are plenty of
things for foreign policy elites to worry about. Energy security, however, is not one of
them.
Even a massive supply shock would only have mild economic effects, followed
by efficiency gains and a crash in oil prices
Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, The Energy Security Obsession, LIMES:
THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-
security.pdf,
Regardless, the departure of Saudi Arabia from world crude oil market would probably
have about the same effect on domestic oil prices as the departure of Iran from world
crude oil markets in 1978. The Iranian revolution reduced oil production by 8.9 percent,
whereas Saudi Arabia accounts for about 13 percent of global oil production today.13 Oil prices increased
dramatically after the 1978 revolution, but those higher prices set in motion market supply and
demand responses that undermined the supply reduction and collapsed world prices
eight years later. The short term macroeconomic impacts of such a supply disruption
would actually be less today than they were then given the absence of price controls
on the U.S. economy and our reduced reliance on oil as an input for each unit of GDP.14
Suppliers know they cannot strong-arm usmeans there is no real embargo
risk because of interdependence
Sebastian Mallaby, journalist, What Energy Security Really Means, WASHINGTON POST,
7-3-06, p. A21.
What about U.S. relations with energy suppliers ; surely here the model of nationalistic competition is relevant?
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated the danger of a conflict between suppliers and consumers, and
Russia's withholding of natural gas from Ukraine last winter shows that embargoes remain possible. But
suppliers know that strong-arm tactics are the surest way to accelerate the search for
alternative fuels, which is why Russia plays politics with energy more by giving out
subsidized supplies than by refusing to sell any. The threat of an embargo by oil states
is therefore smaller than the threat of violence by non-states -- rebel attacks in Nigeria's oil delta, an al-
Qaeda strike in Saudi Arabia. In this sense the energy security of producers is not in
competition with that of consumers. They are interdependent. If the G-8 summit can spread
the word about this interdependence, it will do some good. But the nationalistic conception of energy security is
worse than useless. By encouraging a competitive scramble for resources that could spiral into conflict, this sort
of security talk only creates insecurity.
No supply shocksproducers are more dependent on the oil trade than are
consumers
Jerry Taylor and Peter Van Doren, Cato Institute, The Energy Security Obsession, LIMES:
THE ITALIAN JOURNAL OF GEOPOLITICS, 11-23-07, www.cato.org/pubs/articles/energy-
security.pdf
So while it is possible that a radical oil-producing regime might play a game of chicken with consuming
countries, producing countries are very dependent on oil revenue and have fewer degrees of freedom to
maneuver than consuming countries. Catastrophic supply disruptions would harm producers
more than consumers, which is why they are extremely unlikely. The best insurance
against such a low-probability event is to maintain a relatively free economy where
wages and prices are left unregulated by government. That would do more to protect the West
against an extreme production disruption than anything else in governments policy arsenal.

A2: China Advantage
China Advantage Answers: General
Oil investment upsets China
Levi and Clayton 12 [Michael Levi is the Michael A. Levi is the David M. Rubenstein Senior
Fellow for Energy and the Environment and Director of the Program on Energy Security and
Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Blake Clayton is a Fellow for Energy
and National Security at the CFR, The Surprising Sources of Oils Influence, Survival, Vol. 54,
No. 6, online]
What about fights over investment? There is no question that cross-border investment in oil
production is often politically charged. In many ways, though, this does not make oil special. China, for example,
discriminates between domestic and foreign firms, and among foreign companies too, in determining when to allow investment in a
host of industrial sectors, from telecommunications to banking. That said, in some cases, oil investment is particularly touchy. In
Latin America, for example, oil is typically seen as a countrys patrimony, and selling it to
foreigners is something that triggers deep emotional reactions.6 Oil investment decisions can
thus take on a special cast. 3 It is important, though, not to push this too far. In some cases where one would expect
international politics to play a major role in shaping oil investment, it does not. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, for example, all
appear to select foreign firms for inward oil investment more on the basis of contract terms and technological potential than on the
bilateral relationship with those firms home countries.7 Chinese oil companies, meanwhile, appear to select their
targets for outward investment primarily based on assessments of commercial
attractiveness, with foreign policy objectives taking a decisive back seat. But that does not
mean that politics has not have not affected where these companies have deployed their
capital. Chinese national oil companies have opportunistically taken advantage of
investment opportunities in places like Sudan and Burma, where Western sanctions have kept
Western oil majors at bay.
US and China compete through oil investments U.S. engagement with
Venezuela upsets Chinas market access
Tania 12 [Maxime, Master of Science (M.Sc.), International Relations and Affairs from the
University of Amsterdam, masters thesis on Chinas energy security in Venezuelan politics,
Chinas energy security strategy towards Venezuela, July 1,
http://epa.iias.asia/files/Maxime%20Tania%20-
%20Chinas%20energy%20security%20strategy%20towards%20Venezuela%20-
%20Transnationalization%20and%20the%20geopolitical%20impact%20of%20the%20Sino-
Venezuelan%20relationship.pdf]
In furtherance to what is discussed above, it is interesting to illustrate whether the constraints to expanding the Sino-Venezuelan
relations stems from the fact that, both for China and Venezuela, the U.S. is a more attractive option. With regard to the U.S.-
Venezuelan relations, the advantages of geographical proximity and processing Venezuelan oil in the U.S. has previously been
discussed and concludes that, despite Venezuelas political friction, doing oil business is quite lucrative. But why is China likely to
benefit more from a benign U.S. than a strategic partnership with Venezuela? The Sino-U.S. relations are the final
factor requiring discussion in order to assess the geopolitical impact that the relationship between China and Venezuela have on
the world. Some would assess Chinas oil diplomacy and its quest for overseas energy resources as a negative component to its
relations with various countries. As China is strengthening its relations with oil-producing and exporting countries, constituting a
great competitor for other countries that rely on oil imports, China is likely to undermine their oil security and contravene their
policies towards oil-producing countries (Hongyi, 2007: 530). In scrambling for energy resources, both China
and the U.S. as the worlds major powers want to project their influence on the worlds
geopolitical regions. Although Latin America may be the backyard of the U.S., for both
China and the U.S. Latin America is turning into another geopolitical region. Chinas
relations with Latin American countries in general and Venezuela in particular, have
primarily emphasized on their economic relations in terms of trade and investments. Along
these lines, China could be reducing U.S. opportunity to have trade relations and make investments in the region instead. The fact
that Chinas military relations with countries would affect the U.S., could be construed as an upcoming threat to U.S. national
security. Although Chinas power projection on the world can generally be characterized as soft power, China is also growing
security relations with its international partners. China claims that its militarization in these countries is a natural
consequence of the need it has to protect its interests from potential rivals. It is hard to tell whether or not the
U.S. should be keeping a close eye on this, still, minor threat to preserve its national security. Also, the consolidation of
Chinas political relations with U.S. opposing parties, fuels tensions between the U.S. and
China whether this is justified or not.
A2: Democracy Impact
Democracy wont spill over New democracies are too weak
Larry Diamond, March/April 08, The Democratic Rollback, Foreign Affairs, Democracy expert (duh)
Before democracy can spread further, it must take deeper root where it has already sprouted. It is
a basic principle of any military or geopolitical campaign that at some point an advancing force must consolidate its
gains before it conquers more territory. Emerging democracies must demonstrate that they can
solve their governance problems and meet their citizens' expectations for freedom, justice, a better life, and a fairer
society. If democracies do not more effectively contain crime and corruption, generate economic growth, relieve economic inequality, and secure
freedom and the rule of law, people will eventually lose faith and turn to authoritarian alternatives. Struggling democracies must be
consolidated so that all levels of society become enduringly committed to democracy as the best form of government and to their country's
constitutional norms and constraints. Western policymakers can assist in this process by demanding more than superficial electoral democracy. By
holding governments accountable and making foreign aid contingent on good governance, donors can help reverse the democratic recession.
Leaders would hold elections to appease the world but not implement true
democracy
Fareed Zakaria, November 1997, The rise of illiberal democracy Foreign Affairs, Editor of FA
A PROPER appreciation of constitutional liberalism has a variety of implications for American foreign policy. First, it suggests a certain humility.
While it is easy to impose elections on a country, it is more difficult to push constitutional liberalism on
a society. The process of genuine liberalization and democratization is gradual and long-term, in
which an election is only one step. Without appropriate preparation, it might even be a false step.
Recognizing this, governments and nongovernmental organizations are increasingly promoting a wide array of measures designed to bolster
constitutional liberalism in developing countries. The National Endowment for Democracy promotes free markets, independent labor movements,
and political parties. The U.S. Agency for International Development funds independent judiciaries. In the end, however, elections
trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great
deal from the resulting government, as they have with Yeltsin, Akayev, and Menem. In an age of images and
symbols, elections are easy to capture on film. (How do you televise the rule of law?) But there is life after
elections, especially for the people who live there.

A2: Credibility Advantage
Chavezs Death Wont Change US Relationship with Venezuela Much
Jay Nelson Small (Writer for Time) March 7, 2013
http://swampland.time.com/2013/03/07/u-s-hopes-chavezs-passing-could-smooth-relations-
with-venezuela/#ixzz2XRpr3Pj2
U.S. officials are cautiously optimistic that the death of Venezuelas Hugo Chvez could
improve relations between the two countries, but they arent holding their breath. One of the
things that happens over 14 years in a government like Venezuela is it really did revolve around one man. So while Im hesitant to
say that the change in an individual, or the passing of an individual, completely changes a relationship, a State Department official
told reporters Wednesday, he played an outsized role in that government and therefore his absence can have outsized
implications. That said, Venezuela is now facing elections, as mandated by its constitution. And all of us know electoral
campaigns are not times to break new ground on foreign policy, the official said. (PHOTOS: Rise of Chvez: The Late Venezuelan
Presidents Path to Power) Not to mention that hours before Chvezs death was announced, Venezuelan
Vice President Nicols Maduro, Chvezs anointed successor, accused the U.S. of working to
destabilize Venezuela and of causing Chvezs illness in a rambling 90-minute press conference. Two U.S. State
Department officials were expelled from Venezuela following the allegations. Chvez died Tuesday of cancer. The U.S. reserves the
right to reciprocity under the Geneva Convention to expel Venezuelas diplomats, though no such move has been made, the official
said. The State Department made an attempt at mending U.S.-Venezuela relations after Chvez stepped away from office to focus
on his health last year. Chvez had often campaigned on anti-U.S. rhetoric, and relations between the two countries have been
strained almost since he took office 14 years ago. A senior State Department official spoke with Maduro by phone in November and
a couple of follow-up meetings were held. To be honest, we didnt get much of a response, the official said. We really
hadnt gotten very far and were not sure whether the government of Venezuela wanted to go down that road. (MORE:
After Chvezs Death, Venezuelans Mourn and Look to an Uncertain Future) The official said that State will wait until after the
elections to reach out again, though the White House does plan to send an official delegation to the funeral. The *coming
presidential+ campaign itself may raise issues, may be a difficult campaign for many, the official said. We will probably
continue to hear many difficult things about the U.S. that will not improve this relationship.
Its very hard for us to tell right now if the current government or the next government will
either continue or stop the momentum to a better relationship.
Credibility bad
Stephan M. Walt, Professor at Kennedy's School of Government, Foreign Policy, September 11,
2012, "Why are U.S. leaders so obsessed with credibility?"
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/11/the_credibility_fetish
What's the biggest mistake the United States has made since the end of the Cold War? Invading
Iraq? Helping screw up the Israel-Palestine peace process? Missing the warning signs for 9/11, and then overreacting to the actual
level of danger that Al Qaeda really posed? Not recognizing we had a bubble economy and a corrupt financial industry until after the
2007 meltdown? Those are all worthy candidates, and I'm sure readers can think of others. But today I want to propose another
persistent error, which lies at the heart of many of the missed opportunities or sins of commission that we made since the Berlin
Wall came down. It is in essence a conceptual mistake: a failure to realize just how much the world
changed when the Soviet Union collapsed, and a concomitant failure to adjust our basic
approach to foreign policy appropriately. I call this error the "credibility fetish." U.S. leaders have
continued to believe that our security depends on convincing both allies and adversaries that
we are steadfast, loyal, reliable, etc., and that our security guarantees are iron-clad. It is a
formula that reinforces diplomatic rigidity, because it requires us to keep doing things to keep
allies happy and issuing threats (or in some cases, taking actions) to convince foes that we are
serious. And while it might have made some degree of sense during the Cold War, it is
increasingly counterproductive today. One could argue that credibility did matter during the Cold War. The United
States did face a serious peer competitor in those days, and the Soviet Union did have impressive military capabilities. Although a
direct Soviet attack on vital U.S. interests was always unlikely, one could at least imagine certain events that might have shifted the
global balance of power dramatically. For example, had the Soviet Union been able to conquer Western Europe or the Persian Gulf
and incorporate these assets into its larger empire, it would have had serious consequences for the United States. Accordingly, U.S.
leaders worked hard to make sure that the U.S. commitment to NATO was credible, and we did similar things to bolster U.S.
credibility in Asia and the Gulf. Of course, we probably overstated the importance of "credibility" even then. Sloppy analogies like
the infamous "domino theory" helped convince Americans that we had to fight in places that didn't matter (e.g., Vietnam) in order
to convince everyone that we'd also be willing to fight in places that did. We also managed to convince ourselves that credible
nuclear deterrence depended on having a mythical ability to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear exchange, even though winning would
have had little meaning once a few dozen missiles had been fired. Nonetheless, in the rigid, bipolar context of the Cold War, it
made sense for the United States to pay some attention to its credibility as an alliance leader and security provider. But today,
the United States faces no peer competitor, and it is hard to think of any single event that
would provoke a rapid and decisive shift in the global balance of power. Instead of a clear
geopolitical rival, we face a group of medium powers: some of them friendly (Germany, the UK,
Japan, etc.) and some of them partly antagonistic (Russia, China). Yet Russia is economically linked to our NATO
allies, and China is a major U.S. trading partner and has been a major financier of U.S. debt. This not your parents' Cold War. There
are also influential regional powers such as Turkey, India, or Brazil, with whom the U.S. relationship is mixed: We agree on some
issues and are at odds on others. And then there are clients who depend on U.S. protection (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan,
Taiwan, etc.) but whose behavior often creates serious headaches for whoever is in the White House. As distinguished diplomat
Chas Freeman recently commented, "the complexity and dynamism of the new order place a premium on diplomatic agility. Stolid
constancy and loyalty to pre-existing alliance relationship are not the self-evident virtues they once were. We should not be
surprised that erstwhile allies put their own interest ahead of ours and act accordingly. Where it is to our long-term advantage, we
should do the same." What might this mean in practice? As I've noted repeatedly, it means beginning by recognizing that the
United States is both very powerful and very secure, and that there's hardly anything that could happen in the international system
that would alter the global balance of power overnight. The balance is shifting, to be sure, but these adjustments will take place over
the course of decades. Weaker states who would like U.S. protection need it a lot more than we need them, which means our
"credibility" is more their problem than ours. Which in turn means that if other states want our help, they should be willing to do a
lot to convince us to provide it. Instead of obsessing about our own "credibility," in short, and bending over backwards to convince
the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Afghans, Israelis, Saudis, and others that we will do whatever it takes to protect them,
we ought to be asking them what they are going to do for themselves, and also for us. And instead of spending all our time trying to
scare the bejeezus out of countries like Iran (which merely reinforces their interest in getting some sort of deterrent), we ought to
be reminding them over and over that we have a lot to offer and are open to better relations, even if the clerical regime remains in
power and maybe even if -- horrors! -- it retains possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle (under IAEA safeguards). If nothing else,
adopting a less confrontational posture is bound to complicate their own calculations. This is not an argument for Bush-style
unilateralism, or for a retreat to Fortress America. Rather, it is a call for greater imagination and flexibility in how we deal with
friends and foes alike. I'm not saying that we should strive for zero credibility, of course; I'm merely
saying that we'd be better off if other states understood that our credibility was more
conditional. In other words, allies need to be reminded that our help is conditional on their compliance with our interests (at
least to some degree) and adversaries should also be reminded that our opposition is equally conditional on what they do. In both
cases we also need to recognize that we are rarely going to get other states to do everything we want. Above all, it is a call to
recognize that our geopolitical position, military power, and underlying economic strength give us the luxury of being agile in
precisely the way that Freeman depicts. Of course, some present U.S. allies would be alarmed by the course I'm suggesting,
because it would affect the sweetheart deals they've been enjoying for years. They'll tell us they are losing confidence in our
leadership, and they'll threaten to go neutral, or maybe even align with our adversaries. Where possible, they will enlist Americans
who are sympathetic to their plight to pressure on U.S. politicians to offer new assurances. In most cases, however, such threats
don't need to be taken seriously. And we just have to patiently explain to them that we're not necessarily abandoning them, we are
merely 1) making our support more conditional on their cooperation with us on things we care about, and 2) remaining open to
improving relations with other countries, including some countries that some of our current allies might have doubts about. I know:
It's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world
define it for us. The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely
because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do. And even when allies are of considerable value to us, we still
have the most leverage in nearly every case. As soon as we start obsessing about our credibility, however,
we hand that leverage back to our weaker partners and we constrain our ability to pursue
meaningful diplomatic solutions to existing conflicts. Fetishizing credibility, in short, is one of
the reasons American diplomacy has achieved relatively little since the end of the Cold War.

A2: Relations Advantage
Venezuela-US Relations will improve
Neuman and Archibold 2013 *Kerry Meets With Official of Venezuela to Set Talks,
William Neuman and Randal C. Archibold, June 5, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/06/world/americas/venezuela-frees-tim-tracy-jailed-us-
filmmaker-and-expels-him.html?_r=0]
After months of tensions between the United States and Venezuela, Secretary of State John Kerry
met on Wednesday with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Elas Jaua, in Antigua, Guatemala, and
announced the start of talks aimed at improving relations between the two countries. The
overture came after another hopeful sign, Venezuelas release from jail and subsequent
expulsion of an American documentary filmmaker who had been accused of seeking to undermine
the government. The filmmaker, Tim Tracy, was put on a commercial flight to Miami on Wednesday
morning. We agreed today, both of us, Venezuela and the United States, that we would like
to see our countries find a new way forward, establish a more constructive and positive
relationship, Mr. Kerry said after meeting with Mr. Jaua on the sideline of a session of the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States. American officials said Venezuela had requested the
meeting. Appearing separately, Mr. Jaua said, We have faith and confidence that this meeting
marks the start of a relationship of respect. The two men were photographed shaking hands in
what a senior Obama administration official said appeared to be the first public meeting of top officials
from the two countries since President Obama and the Venezuelan president at the time, Hugo Chvez,
shook hands in a brief encounter at a regional summit meeting in 2009. Mr. Kerry said the countries
had agreed that there will be an ongoing and continuing dialogue at a high level between
the State Department and the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry. He expressed hope that the
countries could quickly move to the appointment of ambassadors. Mr. Chvez expelled the
American ambassador in 2008, accusing the United States of backing a group of military officers plotting a
coup against him. In response, the United States expelled the Venezuelan ambassador. The two
countries quietly began similar talks aimed at improving relations late last year, but they ground to a halt
a few weeks after Mr. Chvez, a socialist who often made the United States out to be a villain, flew to
Cuba in early December for cancer surgery. Mr. Chvez died in March. In April, his handpicked successor,
Nicols Maduro, narrowly won an election to replace him. In the previous round of talks, the two
countries agreed to focus on topics of potential cooperation, including the fight against drug trafficking,
and to have the regional head of the Drug Enforcement Administration meet Venezuelan counterparts in
Caracas a meeting that never occurred. Mr. Maduro, who is struggling with economic problems and
faces great pressures from within Mr. Chvezs movement and from a re-energized opposition, has
repeatedly used the United States as a political punching bag and accused it of ties to purported plots to
undermine or overthrow his government. Last month, Mr. Maduro called Mr. Obama the big boss of
the devils and said Mr. Obama planned to provoke violence in Venezuela to have an excuse to
intervene. On the day Mr. Chvez died, Mr. Maduro expelled two military attaches at the American
Embassy, saying they were trying to destabilize the country. He has speculated that the United States may
have found a way to cause Mr. Chvezs cancer. In April, the Maduro government arrested Mr. Tracy,
the filmmaker, accusing him of being a spy seeking to set off a civil war in Venezuela by funneling money
to student protesters. It never made public any evidence to support the charges against Mr. Tracy, who
said he had come to Venezuela to make a documentary about the countrys political divide. In a
television interview last month, Mr. Obama called the accusations ridiculous. Mr. Kerry on
Wednesday called Mr. Tracys release a very positive development. The Venezuelan interior
minister, Miguel Rodrguez Torres, said Mr. Maduro had ordered Mr. Tracys expulsion.