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Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land. In 1999, petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative.
Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land. In 1999, petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative.
Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land. In 1999, petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative.
Facts: Petitioner caused the inspection investigation and survey of lands located in Sombrero Island in Palawan for the purpose of its re-classification from forest to agricultural land and, thereafter for him to apply for a homestead patent. In 1965, the Director of Lands favourably declared the land as agricultural land. "Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3, 1977 5 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island. In 1999, Petitioner filed an action seeking to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999. A MR was filed but was denied , for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order. The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription invoking its residual prerogative. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition?
Held: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin 11 we explained thus:
"x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x." 12 (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. 13 In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 14 of the same rules. To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the Complaint motu proprio "on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction" 15 and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
(Note: the action was more of an action for reversion and not annulment of title nor reconveyance; dismissal was proper because, the action being one for reversion, it is only the Sol Gen who can bring said action, thus, the complaint states cause of action)
Pecson vs. Comelec 575 SCRA
Facts: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga. Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate, garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecson's 12,531, or a margin of 61 votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest. The RTC rendered a Decision in Pecson's favor. Cunanan filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC issued an Order noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials 2 (Rules) allows this remedy. The RTC granted Pecson's motion for execution pending appeal via a Special Order. Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting the records of the case. Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day TRO but eventually denied Cunanans petition. It ruled that the resolution of the motion for execution pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending incidents. On Cunanan's motion, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution reversing the ruling of the Second Division insofar as it affirmed the RTC's findings of good reasons to execute the decision pending appeal. It affirmed the authority of the RTC to order execution pending appeal; it however nullified the March 11, 2008 writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals of both Cunanan and Pecson (to be accurate, the lapse of Pecson's period to appeal). The case was elevated to the SC via petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc correctly nullified the writ of execution on the ground that the RTC could no longer issue the writ because it had lost jurisdiction over the case after transmittal of the records and the perfection of the appeals?
Held: No. Another legal reality is that the COMELEC is wrong in its ruling that the RTC could no longer actually issue the writ on March 11, 2008 because it no longer had jurisdiction to do so after the appeal period lapsed and after the records were transmitted to the ECAD-COMELEC. That the RTC is still in possession of the records and that the period to appeal (of both contending parties) must have not lapsed are important for jurisdictional purposes if the issue is the authority of the RTC to grant a Special Order allowing execution pending appeal; they are requisite elements for the exercise by the RTC of its residual jurisdiction to validly order an execution pending appeal, not for the issuance of the writ itself. This is clearly evident from the cited provision of the Rules which does not require the issuance of the implementing writ within the above limited jurisdictional period. The RTC cannot legally issue the implementing writ within this limited period for two reasons: (1) the cited twenty-day waiting period under Section 11(b); and (2) the mandatory immediate transmittal of the records to the ECAD of the COMELEC under Section 10 of the Rules. Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and after full- blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. 11 This is especially true when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the term of the contested elective office, of the case. In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in nullifying the RTC's Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in nullifying the Special Order.