B U D D H A D A SA A ND D O C T R I N A L M O D E R N I S A T I O N IN C O N T E M P O R A R Y T HA I B U DDHI S M:

A Social and Philosophical A naly sis.

>
By
Peter A nthony J ackson.
A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the A ustr alian National University.
J anuar y 1986
II
DE C L A R A T I ON
Ex cept where otherwise indicated
this thesis is my own work.
P- CX
P e t e r A nt ho ny J a c k s o n .
J a n u a r y 19 86
E R R A T A .
Page Line. Error. Correction.
Page 63, line 27 oposition opposition
page 79, line 18 negelcted neglected
page 129, line 20 defintion definition
page 141, line 2 respecitvely respectively
page 151, line 16 unwholseome unwholesome
page 155, line 24 defintion definition
page 186, line 7 attinment attainment
page 242, line 5 harmonioulsy har moniously
page 263, line 20 acknolwedge acknowledge
Ill
A CK NOWL EDGEMENT S.
I wish to thank t he following people for their co- operation and assistance
dur ing the research and production of this thesis, both in A ustr alia and in T hailand.
In Australia: Ms Nerida Cook, Dr Tony Diller, Mr William Ginnane, Mr
Preecha J untanamalag a, Dr Barend J an Terwiel, Dr Gehan Wijeyewardene.
In T hailand: Acharn Bany at Ruangsi, Acharn Bamr ung T orut, Acharn Sa-
ngiam T orut, Associate Professor Sunthor n Na- Rangsi, Phr a Buddhadasa Bhikkhu,
Phr a Rajav ar amuni.
IV
A B S T RA CT .
Phr a Buddhadasa Bhikkhu is without doubt the most controversial and the
most innovative interpreter of Buddhist doctrine and teachings in contemporary
T hailand. Buddhadasa has devoted his life to a systematic and thorough re
inter pretation of the entire body of T heravada Buddhist teachings, with the ex plicit
goal of revealing the relevance of the Buddhas message to men and women living
in the modern world. However, a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of his total
re- interpretative system requires more than simply a philosophical study of Buddhist
doctrines and theoretical teachings. Because of the social and political role of
ins titutional Buddhism in T hailand, and because of the importance of his work to
educated and progressive T hai laypeople, the sources, motivations and aims of
Buddhadasas ideas can only be fully detailed when their extra- religious social and
political influences are also considered.
T hat is, Buddhadasas systematic re- interpretation of Buddhist teachings should
firstly be understood in terms of its relation to the history of doctrinal
inter pretation and Buddhist studies in T hailand. But this theoretical analysis
should at the same time be complemented by an appreciation of the social contex t
of Buddhadasas reforms, and the critical as well as supportive responses to his
work from the various sections of T hai society. Only when Buddhadasas doctrinal
ref ormation of T heravada Buddhism is appreciated as being both a theoretical and a
sociological phenomenon can its significance in contemporary T hailand be fully
appreciated.
V
T A B L E OF CONT ENT S
Declaration ii
Acknowledgements. iii
A bstr act. iv
PREFA CE. 1
1 P r e se nt a t i on of T hai and P a l i Ma t e r i a l s . 1
1.1 Sy s tems of T r a ns l i t e r a t i on. 1
2 F o o t not i ng and B i bl i og r a phi c a l S y s t e m. 6
INT RODUCT ION. 8
1 T he Goal s of T his S t udy . 8
2 Me t hodol og i c a l A ppr oache s I: A Social and P hi l os ophi c a l 11
A na l y s i s .
3 Me t hodol og i c a l A ppr oache s I I : S y mpa t he t i c E ng ag e me nt . 15
3.1 S y mpa t he t i c E ng ag e me nt - S umma r y . 21
1. T HE SOCIA L A ND T HEORET ICA L CONT EX T S OF B UDDHA DA S A S 23
WORK .
1.1 T he Hi s t or i ca l Cons e r v a t i s m of T hai B uddhi s m. 24
1.2 Or t hopr a x y - Or t hodox y . 25
1.3 T he S econdar y Pl ace of Re as on in B uddhi s t T houg ht . 28
1.4 B uddhi s m as S t at e Ideol og y in T ha i l a nd. 32
2. T HE SOURCES OF B UDDHA DA S A S T HEORET ICA L 41
INNOV A T IV ENESS.
2.1 Pr ecedent s f or B uddha da s a s Do c t r i na l Re - int e r pr et at ions . 44
2. 1.1 T he Hi s t or y of B uddhi s t Re f or m Mov e me nt s . 44
2. 1.2 T he Inf l ue nce of K i ng Mo ng k ut s Ref or ms on 46
B uddl i a da s a .
2.2 We s t e r n Inf l uences on t he S t udy of B uddhi s m. 48
2.3 T he Inf l uence of S inhal es e B uddhi s t Na t i ona l i s m on 55
B uddha da s a s T houg ht .
2.4 T he Inf l uence of Socio- Economic Chang e in T ha i l a nd on 56
B uddha da s a s T houg ht .
2.4.1 Conf l ict in Mode r n T hai S ociety . 56
2.4.2 B uddha da s a s B a c k g r ound a nd Re l a t i on to t he T hai Ne w 62
B our g eois .
2.4.3 Rel ig ious a nd Ide ol og i cal Di l e mma s F a ci ng Pr og r es s iv e 67
L ay T hai B uddhi s t s .
2.5 T he T r a di t i ona l Bases of Re l i g i ous A ut ho r i t y i n T he r av ada 74
B uddhi s m.
2.5.1 B uddha da s a s Re l i g i ous A ut ho r i t y . 76
3. PIIA SA - KHON - PHASA- T HAM: B UDDHA DA S A S MET HOD OF 79
S CRIPT URA L INT ERPRET A T ION.
3.1 T he T heor y of Phas a- k l ion - P ha s a - t ha m. 82
3.2 H is t or ical Pr ecedents of t he Phas a- k l ion - Pha s a - t ha m T heor y . 84
3.3 T he Not i ons of S pi r i t ua l De pt h a nd Cont e mpor a r y Rel ev ance 87
i n B uddha da s a s w or k .
VI
3.4 F ur t he r Hi s t or i c a l Pr ecedents of t he Phas a- k hon - Phas a- t ham 89
T heor y .
3.5 Dif f i cul t ie s W i t h t he T heor y of Phas a- k hon - Phas a- t ham. 94
3.6 Dif f i cul t ie s i n A ppl y i ng t he Int e r pr e t a t i v e T heor y of 97
Pha s a - t ha m.
3.7 Cr i t i c i s ms of t he Pha s a - t ha m T heor y . 100
3.8 Doc t r i na l Re - int e r pr e t at ions B as ed on P ha s a - t ha m Re ading s of 104
t he B uddhi s t S cr ipt ur es .
3.9 Concl us i on. ' 111
4. B UDDHA ^A S A S CRIT ICISMS OF T HE A B HIDHA MMA P IT A K A A ND 112
V IS UDDHIMA G G A.
4.1 T he A bhidhammapitaka. 112
4.2 B uddha da s a s Cr i t i ci s ms of t he A bhidhamma i n T ha i l a nd. 114
4.3 Cr i t i c i s ms of B uddha da s a s Re j e ct i on of T he A bhidhammapitaka. 119
4.4 B uddha da s a s Cr i t i ci s ms of the V isuddhimag g a and t he 123
T r a di t i ona l Int e r pr e t a t i o n of t he Paticcasamuppada.
4.5 Cr i t i c i s ms of B uddha da s a s Re- int e r pr e t at ions of "B i r t h". 132
4.6 P hr a R a j a v a r a muni on Paticcasamuppada a nd R e bi r t h. 135
4.7 P o l i t i c a l Oppos i t i on to B uddha da s a s V ie w s . 137
5. CIT -WA NG A ND B UDDHA DA S A S T HEORET ICA L A BOL IT ION OF 142
T HE MONK- LA Y DIST INCT ION.
5.1 C i t -w a ng a nd Suhhata - B uddha da s a s Int e r pr e t a t i o n of A natta. 144
5.2 C i t -w a ng as t he F unda me nt a l C ondi t i o n of Mi n d . 149
5.3 Nibbana as a Uni v e r s a l l y A cces s ible S pi r i t ua l G oa l . 152
5.4 B uddha da s a s T heor et ical A bo l i t i o n of t he Monk - L ay 157
Di s t i nc t i o n.
5.5 De ba t e on t he Lokiy adhamma - L okuttar adhamma Di s t i nc t i on. 161
5.6 Concl us i on. 166
6. T HE PRA CT ICE OF CIT -WA NG. 169
6.1 T r a di t i ona l B uddhi s t Mo r a l a nd Me di t a t i v e P r a ct i ce . 170
6.2 B uddha da s a s E mpha s i s on V ipassana Me di t a t i o n. 172
6.3 C i t -w a ng - A Lay - accessible P a t h to Nibbana. 176
6.4 De ba t e on the C o mpa t i bi l i t y of C i t -w a ng w i t h Social A ct i on. 178
6.5 B uddha da s a on K amma and S uf f er ing . 182
6.6 C i t -w a ng a nd W or k . 183
7. CIT -WA NG A ND ZEN. 188
7.1 T he T eaching s of Zen B uddhi s m. 189
7.2 B uddha da s a s J us t i f i c a t i o n f or B or r ow i ng Zen Not i ons . 191
7.3 Zen Inf l uences on the Not i on of C i t -w a ng . 193
7.4 Conf us ions in B uddha da s a s Use of Zen Not i ons . 195
7.5 Dif f er ences B et w een t he T he r av ada Nibbana and the Zen 200
Sat or i.
7.6 B uddha da s a s Ma na g e me nt of Zen S cr i pt ur e s . 201
7.7 S a l v a t i on Her e a nd Now - T he Zen Inf l ue nce on B uddha da s a . 203
7.8 Zen a nd S ocial A c t i on - T he Inf l uence on B uddha da s a . 207
8. B UDDHA DA S A ON MODERNIS A T ION A ND DEV EL OPMENT . 210
8.1 B uddha da s a s Qua l i f i e d S uppor t F or Socio- Economic 210
De v e l opme nt .
8.2 B uddha da s a s Int e g r a t e d T heor y of A c t i on. 214
8.3 Nibbana A s B ot h a Social a nd a Rel ig ious G oa l . 216
vii
8.4 S oci al Il l s a nd t he F a i l ur e of Cont e mpor a r y Re l i g i on. 218
8.5 E duc a t i o n a nd the S ol ut i on of Social P r obl e ms . 221
8.6 Cont r a di c t i ons in B uddha da s a s S ocial T houg ht . 223
8.7 T heor et ical Dif f i cul t ie s W i t h T he r av ada E t hi cs . 225
8.7.1 B uddha da s a s De- emphas is on K amma. 230
8.7.2 Dif f i cul t ie s W i t h B uddha da s a s V ie w on K amma. 232
8.8 Ma ha y ana Inf l uences on B uddha da s a . 234
8.9 Concl us ions . 235
9. B UDDHA DA S A S P OL IT ICA L WRIT INGS . 238
9.1 B uddha da s a on C a pi t a l i s m a nd C ommuni s m. 239
9.2 B uddha da s a s Cr i t i ci s ms of P ol i t i c s . 241
9.3 B uddha da s a s P o l i t i c a l Cons e r v a t i s m. 244
9.4 De mocr acy a nd the B uddhi s t T r a di t i on. 247
9.5 Cont r a di c t i ons betw een B uddha da s a s Doc t r i na l Re f or ms and 249
P o l i t i c a l Cons e r v at i s m.
9.6 Re l i g i on - B uddha da s a s S ol ut i on f or S ocial Il l s . 253
CONCL USION. 260
A PP ENDIX I. 273
1 B uddhi s m: Hi s t or i c a l B a c k g r ound. 273
2 Ce nt r a l T enets of B uddhi s t Doc t r i ne . 275
3 B uddhi s t P r act i ce . 277
4 T he r av ada B uddhi s m in T ha i l a nd. 279
A P P ENDIX II. 283
1 B i og r a phi c a l Inf o r ma t i o n on B uddha da s a . 283
GL OS S A RY OF T HA I A ND PA L I T ERMS. 291
B IB L IOGRA P HY OF ENGLISH L A NGUA GE BOOK S. 299
1 Classical Buddhist Texts and Reference Books. 299
2 Other Texts. 299
B IB L IOGRA P HY OF T HA I L A NGUA GE MA T ERIA L S. 306
1 Classical Buddhist Texts and Dictionaries. 306
2 Other Texts. 306
INDEX . 321
1
P R E F A C E .
1 P r e s e nt a t i on of T ha i a nd P a l i Ma t e r i a l s .
A considerable amount of the material studied and detailed in the following
chapters has been taken from T hai language sources, and the majority of the terms
and concepts relating to T heravada Buddhism are derived from the Pali language.
In addition there are occasional references to the Sanskrit terminology of the
Mahay ana branch of Buddhism, and some English language authors quoted have
used the Sanskrit forms of Pali terms when discussing T heravada teachings. The
systems used for tr ansliter ating T hai, Pali and Sanskrit terms, respectively, into
Roman script are given in the following tables. I have followed the usual convention
of tr ansliterating T hai terms phonetically with no attempt to mimic the actual Thai
script spelling. In contr ast each character of Pali and Sanskrit terms, as written in
devanagari script, is given a Roman script equivalent.
1.1 S y s tems of T r a ns l i t e r a t i on.
A. P a l i .
The Pali Text Society system for rendering Pali terms into Roman script is
followed. The following characters are used:
i.Vowels: a, a, z, t, u, u, e, o.
ii.Guttur als: k, kh, g, gh, h.
iii.Palatals: c, c/i, j , j h, h.
iv.Cerebrals: (, th, d, dh, n.
v.Dentals: t, th, d, dh, n.
vi.Labials: p, ph, 6, bh, m.
vii.Semi- vowels: y, r, /, /, v.
viii.Sibilant: s.
ix .Aspirate: h.
2
x .Nig g ahita(Nasa\): m.
B. S a ns k r i t .
The charact ers used to transliterate Sanskrit terms are the same as for Pali,
with the addition of palatal and cerebral sibilants: s , s; the vowels and diphthings:
r, a i , au, and visarga: h.
C. T hai
The following system is used for phonetically rendering Thai into Roman
script.
i. Tone marks are not indicated.
ii. When the repeat symbol is used the syllable is written
twice.
iii. The symbol is written la.
iv. Thai consonants are sometimes purely consonantal and sometimes
followed by an inherent vowel, which is written o, a or or
depending og the pr onounciation, e.g. Pili - khon.
khanom, Pi - kor.
v. Silent consonants ^with their accompanying vowels, if any, are not
written, e.g. ' lli-
vi. When the pr onunciation requires one consonant to serve a double
f unction, at the end of one syllable and at the beginning of the
nex t, it is written twice according to its pronunciation, e.g.
- thatsana.
vii. In four common words ^ occurs preceding another consonant
to mark ta tone, and is then not written, i.e. QU^I _ lA i
vak, ay - u - y ang, flU - y u.
v
viii. When W precedes another consonant to mark a tone it is not
written, e.g. VUHH - may .
Using these principles the T hai alphabet is represented by the following
characters:
i . Cons onant s .
Initial and Medial. Final.
n
- k k
*a, pi,
- kh k
>3 -
ng ng
1
_
c t
3
' ch 1
B " s 1
Q1 - y n
- d t
f l , a t t
f l , VI, 71, s , th 1
VIX - S t
tU, U - n n
5J - b p
li - P P
CJ ,N, ft ph p
CJ, T^i - f p
j j - m m
u - y
X - r n
9 , W - 1 n
- w
f1, y , ft - s t
W, Q - h
ii. V owel s a nd Di pht hong s .
^ - ry, r i, roe. qo - ry.
Q'l - iia. - uay.
flt) - or. Bfitl - oy.
X\ t - a. ft - a.
ftSJ-J - ay. - iia.
- ua. )'} - a.
ay - " aw-
4
b o
bo
IB
IBO
IBB
- am.
- 1W.
- y.
- u .
u.
- e.
ew.
- oe.
BU
LB
I BU
I BO
I BBS
- i .
- i .
- uy.
- e.
oey.
- ew.
oe.
IBS
I B 0 S
I BU
I BU 0
I B B S
LIB
UBr
1b s
1 B
e.
- or.
la.
- l aw .
ya.
- ae.
- o.
- ai.
IBO
IB
IBUr
IBB
IBBU
11BO
1 b
1b
1 BU
- oe.
- l a.
- ya.
- yay.
- aew.
- o.
- ai.
- ai.
Except where there is an established convention, such as where T hai authors
have already decided on the spelling of their names in English, T hai terms are
presented as such and not in the Pali and Sanskritised forms sometimes used.
Where in quotations from English language sources other authors have followed
diff erent transliteration systems their slight variations are retained. What differences
do result are few and minor and easily traceable. In keeping with their tr aditional
canonical and literary languages T heravada and Mahay ana Buddhist technical terms
are written in this text in their Pali and Sanskrit forms respectively. For ex ample,
5
the Pali term nibbana here always refers to the T heravada notion of salvation while
the related Sanskrit term nir v ana is always used to refer to ultimate salvation as
conceived within Mahay ana Buddhism. These linguistic differences are retained
because such cognate terms often have different nuances in the two tr aditions, the
most notable ex ample in this work being the differences between the notion of
"voidness" in T heravada Buddhism (Pali: s uhhata) and in Mahay ana Buddhism
(Sanskrit: s iiny ata) discussed in Chapter Seven. I do not follow the custom of
many authors who give T heravada technical terms in artif icial Sanskrit forms, but
where in quotations and references other authors have used Sanskrit forms for
T heravada terms those forms are kept for accuracys sake1.
Below is a short list of some of the most common Pali terms used in this
work and their cognate Sanskrit forms sometimes used as alternatives.
PA L I. SA NSKRIT .
atta atr nan
cakkavattin cakr avar tin
dhar nma dhar ma
j hana dhy ana
kamrna kar ma
nibbana nir v ana
sutta siitra
tipitaka tnpit ak a
To avoid conf usion T hai words transliterated into Roman script are underlined
while Pali and Sanskrit words are italicised. Proper names of persons, organisations,
religious sects or places given in either Pali or T hai are capitalised but not
underlined or italicised.
In keeping with the analy tical focus on T hai Buddhism in this work references
to and quotations from the T ipitaka, the canonical T heravada scriptures, are
wherever possible taken from the T hai version of the canon. T hroughout this work
all references to the T ipitaka are to the forty five volume Phr a Traipi4ok Phasa
T hai Chabap Luang ( m S\ n V l t miJ IM'H The f f icial
T hai Language Edit ion of the T ipitaka) published by the T hai Department of
Religious Aff airs or Krom Kansasana ( f) f J J m i FIT $ 1 4 ) in B.E. 2525
^Pa l i is a l ang uag e cl oscl y r el at e d t o Sans k r i t , pr o ba bl y be i ng a v e r nacul a r i n Nor t he r n Indi a s oon af t er
t he t i me of t he hi s t or i cal B uddha . W h i le P a l i is t he c las s i cal l ang uag e of t he T he r a v a da s cr i pt ur es s ome
aut hor s t end t o gi v e T he r a v a da t er ms in t hei r equi v a l e nt Sans k r i t f or ms . T hi s cus t om is ar t i f i ci al and has
no t he or et i cal j us t i f i c a t i on ot he r t ha n i ndi cat i ng an as s umed g r eat er s t at ur e of Sans k r i t , the cl assi cal
l ang uag e of Hi ndui s m and of Ma ha y a na B uddhi s m in Indi a.
6
(A .D. 1982)2. In referring to this T hai edition of the T ipitaka I follow the Thai
system of citing sections of the scriptures or suttas by: volume/verse/page3. In a
very few places where it was deemed appropriate the Pali Text Societys English
translations of the T ipitaka have been referred to instead of the Thai version.
2 F oot not i ng and B i bl i o g r a phi cal Sy s tem.
In the tex t I follow the custom of using the first names of T hai nationals as
the f ormal form of address, although in most cases both given and family names are
used for clar ity s sake. For non- Thais I follow the Western custom of using
surnames as the formal form of address. For ex ample the T hai author Sulak
Sivaraksa is referred to as Sulak while the English author Trevor Ling is referred to
as Ling.
Because of the diversity and varied nature of the Thai and English language
sources referred to in this work and because of the different bibliographical
conventions used for describing works in the two languages I have had to use
special f ootnoting and bibliographical systems capable of fully documenting my
source materials. Two separate bibliographies are listed at the end of this book, the
first for English language materials referred to in the tex t and the second for Thai
materials. References in the body of the tex t to T hai language materials as well as
quotations which I have translated from T hai sources are marked with a bracketed
capital T, i.e. (T ), indicating that the relevant bibliographical details are found in
the T hai language bibliography. All T hai language bibliographical details, both in
the bibliography and in footnotes, are given in T hai script as well as being
transliterated into Roman script. The translated titles of T hai works are also given
in brackets. Following the T hai custom, materials in the T hai language bibliography
are arranged in T hai alphabetical order according to the author s first name, not
according to the author s surname.
Some T hai authors cited below have written books both in English and in
T hai. Such T hai language works are listed alphabetically in T hai according to the
author s first name, while the same author s English language works are
alphabetically listed in the English language bibliography according to his or her
surname. To help avoid confusion the name under which bibliographical inf ormation
is listed is always printed in bold type in footnotes.
2
T ha i l a nd uses t he B uddhi s t cal endar , da t i ng f r om t he B ud d h a ' s de at h in 543 B . C. T he y ear A . D. 1986
is in t he B uddhi s t Er a ( B .E. ) t he y ear 2529.
l e m/k ho r /na I f l J J / f l t l / V l i n
3
7
e.g.
Sulak S iv ar ak s a - English language bibliography.
Sul ak Siwarak - T hai language bibliography .
Many T hai authors and personalities prefer to spell their names in English
according to the Thai spelling rather than according to the actual pr onunciation.
Because T hai names often include silent letters when written in Thai script such
English versions often vary significantly from the actual pr onunciation. For ex ample,
the monk referred to in this work as Buddhadasa, which is that monks own
preferred spelling of his name in English, is in T hai referred to as Phutthathat, and
the monk Rajavararnuni is referred to in T hai as Ratchawor amuni. Where a person
has already decided on the English spelling of his or her name I respect that non-
phonetic convention in the body of the tex t and in f ootnoting and bibliographical
details for his or her English language works. However, to retain such non- phonetic
conventions when detailing T hai language materials would introduce severe
contradictions and breach the Thai alphabetical ordering of the Thai language
bibliography . Consequently, in the bibliographical details given for the Thai
language works of such authors in the T hai language bibliogrpahy and in footnotes
all names are spelt according to the phonetic tr ansliteration system detailed above.
Some of the most common differences in the spelling of Thai names found in this
tex t are listed below:
ENGL ISH CONV ENT ION. PHONET IC T HA I SPEL L ING.
B u d d h ad asa P hu t th at h at
Bodhiraksa Phothir ak
K hukr it Pr amot Khy kr it Pr amot
Rajavarar nuni Ratchwor amuni
Sulak Sivaraksa Sulak Siwarak
8
I
IN T R O D U C T I O N .
1 T he Goal s of T his S tudy .
Since the early 1970s the thoug ht of the aging Buddhist monk Buddhadasa1
has become a primary focus of theoretical and doctrinal discussions of T heravada
Buddhism in T hailand. Buddhadasa began a systematic re- appraisal and re
inter pretation of T heravada Buddhist doctrine in 1932 and some of his sermons and
articles were published in local Buddhist jour nals in the 1930s and 1940s. However,
it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, in par ticular during the brief,
tur bulent period of civilian government from 1973 until 1976, that Buddhadasas
ideas found a broader national audience in T hailand. This is because it has only
been during the last couple of decades in response to the rapid socio- economic
development of the country that considerable numbers of fellow Thais have come to
share the modernist and reformist views on Buddhism that Buddhadasa has been
pr opounding for over fifty years. Bv his supporters and followers Buddhadasa has
been hailed as a progressive reformer and even a genius. His critics, however, have
labelled him a dangerous heretic whose work subverts both the teachings of the
Buddha and the national institution of Buddhism in T hailand.
But whatever the status of such conf licting claims and accusations it is
nevert heless still the case that no detailed study of the interpretation of Buddhist
doctrine in T hailand today can omit a consideration of Buddhadasas views without
being left deficient and inadequate. This is true whether ones interest lies in the
area of Buddhist doctrine and contemporary accounts of the notions of salvation and
spir itual practice, or whether ones concern is with more pr agmatic issues such as
debates on the proper role of Buddhist monks and laypeople in modern T hai
society, for Buddhadasas re- interpretative work covers all areas of Buddhist doctrine
and practice. Indeed Buddhadasas life work can be seen as an attempt to develop
an ordered and thorough modernist re- interpretation of the entire body of T heravada
1 B uddha da s a is t he Pal i s pel l i ng of t he name. In T hai B uddha d as a is cal l ed P hut t ha t ha t
( WVl l ] V Hf i j ) or *n P hr a P hut t ha t ha t P hi k k hu. B ot h of t he T ha i t er ms phr a ( ^ J ) ai >d
phi k k hu ( f in*? ! P a l i: bhik k hu) denot e a B uddhi s t monk a nd ar e v ar i ous l y us ed as honor i f i cs in
1
c ombi na t i on wi t h a mo nk ' s ac t ua l na me.
doctrine, including both the soteriological and the social aspects of Buddhist
teachings. Not since the V isuddhimagga and other related commentaries written by
Buddhaghosa in Ceylon in the fif th century of the Christian era has there been such
a comprehensive attempt to systematically re- interpret the entirety of T heravada
doctrine in the light of contemporary views and ex pectations.
I believe that both the theoretical and social implications of Buddhadasas
work are of equal importance, and that it is necessary to consider both aspects in
any attempt at analysing or interpreting the complex and multif aceted phenomenon
of his half century of scholarly activity . Consequently I take the starting point of
this analysis to be the total phenomenon of Buddhadasa and his re- interpretative
work, a phenomenon which at one and the same time has theoretical and doctrinal
as well as social and political significance in contemporary T hailand. It is my goal
in the following chapters to develop a subtle and complex analysis adequate to the
task of both describing and evaluating this complex phenomenon. More specifically
the goal of this work is, f irstly, to delineate and systematically describe the details
of Buddhadasas doctrinal re- interpretations and, secondly, to evaluate the impor t
and significance of his views and theories for T heravada Buddhist thought.
It is necessary to devote a significant part of this work to the straightforward
presentation of Buddhadasas views, because no systematic overview or account of
the details of his various theories and doctrinal re- interpretations has yet been
published in either T hai or any European language. In order to evaluate
Buddhadasas theoretical and socio- political importance it has first been necessary to
construct from his voluminous writings - including pamphlets, theoretical tracts as
well as reports of his many talks and sermons - an overview of his arguments and
the theoretical emphases and foci of his work. Buddhadasa himself has not
presented a summary or guide to the total system of his views which has rather
developed organically over the decades. The various theoretical foci respectively
chosen as the bases of the following chapters are my own interpretation of what
Buddhadasa has said and argued, and while I consider them to be the core of his
views other readers and critics could no doubt have chosen other concepts or
theoretical points about which to articulate an alternative account of his system of
doctrinal re- interpretation.
The theoretical foci of Buddhadasas work which I have chosen as the bases of
my account and critical analysis of his views are:
(1) Buddhadasas theory of scriptural inter pretation, called phasakhon
- phasatham (Chapter Three),
(2) his cr it icisms of tr aditionally accepted canonical scriptures and
commentaries, especially the A bhidhammapitaka and the
V isuddhimag g a (Chapter Four),
(3) his re- interpreted theory of salvation based on the notion of
cit- wang, "voided mind" or "freed mind" (Chapter Five),
(4) the system of practices presented as leading to the attainment of
salvation or nibbana by the development of cit-wang (Chapter
Six ),
(5) the influence of Zen and Mahay ana Buddhist notions on his re-
interpretations of T heravada doctrine (Chapter Seven),
(6) the social doctrine that emerges from Buddhadasas system of
thoug ht (Chapter Eight) and,
(7) Buddhadasas specific comments on and criticisms of political
activity and political involvement (Chapter Nine).
In re- interpreting the tot ality of T heravada doctrine Buddhadasa is
f undamentally concerned to shift the focus of T hai Buddhism from the transcendent
to this world and to incorporat e the hopes and aspirations of T hai laymen and
laywornen into Buddhism by conferring religious value on action in the social world.
But to do this Buddhadasa must move the entire theoretical structure of Buddhism,
or to use another structural metaphor, he must rebuild Buddhist doctrine upon the
new theoretical foundations that he lays. In this work I wish to consider the
entirety of this theoretical reconstruction of Buddhism, to follow and evaluate the
overall contours of the new vision of Buddhism revealed in Buddhadasas work, and
also to reveal the major structural weaknesses of this new edifice.
A t numerous points in the following chapters t he analytical movement of
tracing the general development of Buddhadasas total system work could easily
have stopped in order to concentrate on any one of the many specific issues raised
by his doctrinal re- interpretations. By taking up each of these various issues in
detail each of the chapters that follow could easily have been ex panded to a size
equivalent to that of this complete study. However, this temptation to stop the
general analytical movement of the study in order to concentrate on details has had
to be systematically resisted in many places, and in this study I have only detailed
Buddhadasas work to an ex tent that I regard as suf ficient to demonstrate the
impor t of the specific points and issues treated and to show their place in his work.
Because of the broad scope of this study the reader may sometimes feel f rustrated
that a certain idea or suggestion is not developed further. However, a high degree of
descriptive and analy tical economy has had to be maintained thr oughout in order to
keep the focus of this study on the whole "f orest" of Buddhadasas work rather
than diverting to observe individual conceptual "trees" in too great detail.
2 Me t hodol og i ca l A ppr oache s I: A S ocial a nd P hi l os ophi c a l A na l y sis.
While it is impor tant to isolate the conceptual and theoretical pivots upon
which Buddhadasa constructs his system (these pivots forming the bases for the
following chapters as briefly delineated above) a simple study of the ex plicit details
of Buddhadasas thoug ht would not reveal its f ull significance. It is equally
impor tant that from any account of the ex plicit details of Buddhadasas system the
underlying and often implicit themes which provide the structuring and consistency-
giving framework to his broad and diverse body of thought are also clearly revealed.
The many details of Buddhadasas re- interpretations, the relations between concepts
and the significance of par ticular notions and ideas are not all self- evident. I suggest
that the significance of his theories and ideas is often only able to be clearly
comprehended when their relation to general underlying themes whose provenance
lies outside of Buddhism - in the contemporary changes in society, economy,
education and cultural ex pectations which are tr ansforming T hailand - is made
manif est.
Underlying all of Buddhadasas detailed theoretical re- interpretations are two
broad and often implicit themes. The first is Buddhadasas desire for Eiuddhist
teachings to conform to what he regards as modern rational and scientific standards
of argumentation and analysis. This desire is demonstrated most forcefully in his
systematic demyt hologisation of Buddhist doctrine and in his reduction of all
supernatural conditions and non- empirical entities described in the Buddhist
scriptures to psychological states. Buddhadasa re- interprets the entire tr aditional
cosmology and soteriology of T heravada Buddhism, which involves successive rebirths
over eons in an elaborately structured cosmos of heavens and hells, as occurring
within the mental scope of human beings alive on earth here and now. The second
and related theme inf orming Buddhadasas work is his wish for Buddhism to
maintain its social relevance in contemporary T hailand in the face of rapid socio
economic development and cultural change. Buddhadasa believes Buddhism should
demonstrate its ongoing relevance to human life and aspirations by f unctioning as a
moral and ideological basis for action in the social world which simultaneously
integrates and promotes both progressive social development and the individual
attainment of spiritual salvation.
Each of these themes, the desire for discursive modernism or rationalism and
for contemporary social relevance, represents a radical departure from tr aditional
T heravada teachings and in order to develop and justif y his radical views and
analyses within the conservative T hai Buddhist contex t Buddhadasa has been forced
to take an equally radical approach to the interpretation of doctrine. In order to
12
demonstrate the full significance of Buddhadasas thoug ht the details of his doctrinal
re- interpretations, in addition to being analysed in terms of their ex plicit conceptual
relations, are in each chapter also related to these two general themes which
f undamentally inf orm and determine the character of his work.
The sources of Buddhadasas theoretical concern with discursive modernism and
with the social relevance of religion lie outside of Buddhist doctrine as such in the
realm of contemporary social relations and social change. As will be argued in
Chapter Two Buddhadasas work owes much to the impact of Western notions of
science and rationality . His ideas can also be seen as a response to the cultural and
religious challenges presented by socio- economic development and modernisation in
T hailand. Consequently, it is impossible to limit this study to a purely theoretical
or philosophical analysis. While necessarily reliant upon the norms, assumptions and
precedents of the tr adition of doctrinal interpretation in T hailand, Buddhadasas
views go far beyond the historically defined bounds of that theoretical and doctrinal
tr adition. As already suggested the ex tra- religious influences on Buddhadasas
thoug ht, as expressed in the general underlying themes outlined above, are an
essential element of his re- interpretation of Buddhism. In presenting and evaluating
his work it is therefore as impor tant to appreciate the character of the ex tra
religious or social influences on Buddhadasa as it is to understand the details of the
historical tr adition of Buddhist doctrinal interpretation which is the immediate
source of the specific concepts and notions that he details. T hat is, the
methodology of any study of Buddhadasas work must match the actual character of
that work by integrating both social and philosophical analytical approaches.
A combined social and philosophical study of Buddhadasas work, or for that
matter the work of any Thai Buddhist thinker, is also necessary because of the
concrete character of T hai Buddhism. Buddhist doctrine is part of the living
tr adition of Thai Buddhism, which in turn is arguably the most impor tant cultural
ins titution in Thai society. The teachings of Buddhism and the formal institution of
the monkhood or sahgha remain the basis not only of everyday social relations in
T hailand but also of the Thai political structure and the related religio- political
ins titution of the T hai monarchy. In developing a comprehensive analysis of any
aspect of Buddhism in T hailand, not only of Buddhadasas specific re- interpretations,
it is necessary to recognise ex plicitly that T hai Buddhism exists in a dy namic
relation with Thai society, and has political, cultural and ideological as well as
purely religious importance.
A purely theoretical study of Buddhadasas work which focussed solely on his
ideas would artificially abstr act those ideas from the social contex t which has to a
large ex tent inf ormed them and in which they have become an object of public
debate, f inding both adherents and critics. On the other hand, a study which
focussed solely on the social sources and impact of Buddhadasas work would not
give suffi cient weight to the fact that it is his ideas, presented as a continuation of
a long- standing religious tr adition, and not his actions in either the political or
social spheres which are the object of public debate in T hailand. A combined
theoretical and a social analysis of Buddhadasas work is therefore required in order
to delineate fully its features and significance. This study, then, is an attempt to
develop a socially informed evaluation of the totality of Buddhadasas re-
interpretations of Buddhist doctrine; it is an analysis of doctrine which considers:
(1) the social contex t of Buddhadasas theoretical work,
(2) the relation of Buddhadasas doctrinal re- interpretations to the history of
the theoretical tr adition of T heravada Buddhism, and
(3) the views and reactions of Buddhadasas audience and readership, in other
words, the social impact of, and response to, his ideas.
A second, related goal of this study, in addition to that of providing a
combined social- theoretical account of both the ex plicit details and general themes of
Buddhadasas views, is to evaluate those views and the arguments Buddhadasa uses
to support them. Because of the combined social- philosophical analytical approach
taken here I consider any evaluation of his work which focusses solely on the strict
logical consistency of his arguments or on the validity of his views in terms of
canonical or tr aditional presentations of T heravada doctrine to be inadequate. On
the other hand I also regard as inadequate any evaluation from a social or
pr agmatic perspective which judges Buddhadasa solely in in terms of say the
popular ity of his ideas or their "efficacy'' in initiating or leading to concrete social
or political results. A t the same time I regard both these theoretical and practical
criteria as impor tant and needing to be incorporated into any serious evaluation of
Buddhadasas work. As a theoretical system which has social importance, an
evaluation of Buddhadasas total system of doctrinal re- interpretation must combine
specific judgements on the systems theoretical validity and logical consistency
together with judgements of its social impact. To damn Buddhadasas total system
because of certain theoretical inconsistencies despite its having a major social
impact, or, conversely, to dismiss it because it lacks practical efficacy even though
it may be a thorough and consistent interpretation of T heravada doctrine, are, in
my opinion, both unacceptable positions. Because Buddhadasas re- interpretations of
T heravada doctrine constitute a complex social and theoretical phenomenon any
13
evaluation of that work as a whole must mirror that complex ity and avoid
simplistic or monovalent judgements.
By recognising the actual complex ity of T hai Buddhism and of Buddhadasas
work as simultaneously being sociological and theoretical phenomena it is my wish
in this study to approach the study of doctrinal modernisation in T hailand in a
more realistic way. I do not intend to artif icially divide up my object of study
according to the theoretical and methodological lines of the institutionalised
academic disciplines of Western universities. Rather I wish to treat Buddhadasas re-
interpretative work as the given, and my theoretical approach to that body of work
as the variable to be modified in accordance with the actual complex character of
that object. I want to avoid a common and unf or tunate consequence of uncritically
accepting the divisions between academic disciplines, namely the taking of a
methodological approach peculiar to a certain discipline as the determinant of ones
study , a manner of research which often oversimplifies and fails to appreciate the
theoretical and social complex ity of cultural phenomena.
The theoretical study of Buddhism by Westerners has historically suffered from
attempts to make it fit within the disciplinary boundaries of European philosophy.
The "Buddhism" sections of university libraries are replete with theoretical studies
such as, "Remarks on Early Buddhist Proto- f ormalism"2, "The A natta Doctrine and
Personal Identity "3, "The Buddhist Doctrine of Two T r uths "4, and so on. But
while Buddhism is indeed a theoretical system and a philosophy, it is also much
more. Unlike Western philosophy, which is by and large an academic activity , the
issues of Buddhist thought are part of the cultural contex t of Buddhist societies. To
study Buddhism as if it were jus t a system of thoug ht, along with say Platonism,
Ex istentialism, Structuralism or Behaviourism is to ignore the fact that unlike these
intellectual schools Buddhism provides the f oundation of the political structure,
social ethics and world view of Buddhist societies. Only in this century have
Buddhist societies begun to experience the segregation of activities into the religious
and the secular which has characterised Western societies for several centuries.
Philosophy , as understood and practised in the West today, is an intellectual
pr oduct of a society in which there is a strong compartmentalisation of religious,
2
Do ug l as D u nmor e Da y e , "Re ma r k s on Ea r l y B uddhi s t Pr ot o- f or mal i s m ( L og i c ) and Mr T a c hi k a w a 's
T r a ns l a t i on of t he Ny ay apr av e s ' a~ , J o ur na l o f I n d i a n P hil os ophy , V ol . 3, 1975, pp. 383- 398.
3
Ri c ha r d T a y l o r , "T he A na t t a Doct r i ne a nd Per s onal I de nt i t y ", Phil os ophy E a s t and West, V o l . X I X
No . 4, Oc t obe r 1969, pp. 359- 366.
4
Fr eder i ck J . S t r o n g , "T he B uddhi s t Doc t r i ne of T wo T r ut hs as Rel i g i ous Phi l os ophy ", J o ur na l o f
I n d i a n P hil os ophy , V ol . l , 1970- 72, pp. 262- 271.
political and secular intellectual activities. In T hailand, these divisions are much
weaker and less clearly defined. For this reason attempts to analyse T hai Buddhist
philosophy, T hai politics or T hai society in isolation introduces the intellectual and
social divisions of our own society into a situation in which they do not apply. It is
possible to study Buddhist philosophy, but only if it is analysed in the contex t of
Buddhist societies and the polities of those societies.
3 Me t hodol og i c a l A ppr oache s I I : S y mpa t he t i c E ng a g e me nt .
In evaluating Buddhadasas work it is necessary to recognise that his doctrinal
re- interpretations are part of a non- Western intellectual tr adition. Buddhism is a
religious tr adition with a distinct theoretical history in which notions of
arg umentation, methods of reasoning and even the place of reason in human
knowledge differ markedly from the situation in the Western tr adition. For these
reasons it is not possible to criticise or evaluate T heravada Buddhism using precisely
the same intellectual tools used to critically assess Western theoretical and
philosophical tracts. To uncritically apply Western analytical criteria to Buddhism
may lead to the f undamental differences in the character of Buddhist thought being
perceived as theoretical weaknesses and logical deficiencies, a result which may in
fact unnecessarily and unjus tif iably undervalue or even devalue that system of
thoug ht. What are in fact differences in the respective theoretical character of
Buddhist doctrine and Western philosophical writings may be perceived as
"inadequacies" by those trained in one system or the other if the existence of
f undamental discursive differences is not acknowledged.
In this regard it is not only the case that Western theoreticians using
theoretical criteria specific to their own tr adition may perceive Buddhis ms
theoretical differences as inadequacies. Buddhists may also see what Westerners take
as f undamental aspects of their intellectual tr adition as inadequacies or theoretical
deficiencies when judged by Buddhist criteria. For ex ample, Buddhadasa himself
criticises the Western valuation of free enquiry and the operation of reason and
rational analysis free of religio- moral constraints. In Buddhist intellectual culture
reason is always subordinate to the religious quest for nibbana or salvation from
suffering, rational enquiry not directly dealing with issues concering salvation not
being sanctioned. Buddhadasa criticises the West as being a culture which
emphasises intellectualising arid philosophy rather than encouraging the practical
cultiv ation of wisdom, which in Buddhism is regarded as the f oundation of attaining
salvation from the miseries of human existence. In his words the West, "is dr unk
16
and addicted to philosophy [i.e. free rational enquiry] like a spiritual her oin."(T )5
To insist on applying a strict Western critical analysis to all theoretical
systems, even those developed in non- Western societies, fails to recognise that
significantly different discursive systems do in fact operate upon different theoretical,
logical and epistemological principles. This point is developed f urther when discussing
the place of reason in Buddhist thoug ht, already briefly alluded to above, in
Chapter Two. What from a Western perspective may be perceived as deficiencies in
Buddhist theorising may, in terms of the principles of Buddhist doctrine, itself be a
wholly adequate argument or interpretation. A strictly logical (Western) analysis of
Buddhadasas thought would lead to an unwarranted concentr ation on the details
and specific intellectual failings of his work. But such a strict logical analysis
would utterly fail to recognise that when viewed in the contex t of the principles and
intellectual history of T heravada Buddhist thoug ht Buddhadasas system cannot but
be seen as an impor tant theoretical development with prof ound implications.
But just as an unqualified Western- styled critique of Buddhadasas thoug ht is
unacceptable (because it would fail to appreciate the distinct character of Buddhist
intellectual activity and the socio- historical contex t of Buddhadasas work) so too
would a solely contex tual or internal study which completely abandoned or held in
abeyance criteria of discursive criticism be an inadequate theoretical approach. To
define Buddhism as a system to which one cannot apply Western notions of logical
argumentation would be to deny the possibility of a Western student developing an
evaluation or judgement of Buddhist thoug ht which has theoretical significance
within the contex t of Western discourse and intellectual history.
This poses the question of whether Buddhist thought can in any theoretically
signif icant sense be an object of Western philosophical analysis. In Western
intellectual history Buddhist doctrine and thought have tr aditionally been the
theoretical objects of the disciplines of religious studies, anthropology and
comparative studies in the history of ideas. All of these disciplines can be described
as following an "observational" methodology in which the aim is to describe,
ex plicate and account for the characteristics of the object of study whilst declining
to engage or intervene in that object. The observational or "objective" method
** j P h u t t h a t h a t ( VI VIS 1/1*1 ), My a T ha m K hr or ng L ok
( " l U ' a u i J j j p i T Qv j I a n " - When D h a m m a Gov er ns the Wor l d), T ha mma t han Mul a n i t hi
( U J J J-J Y l ^n i U ^U I J ), Cha i y a T ha i l a nd , 2522 (19 79 ), pp. l 3 9 f f . N. b. In t hi s s ame book B uddha da s a
al so cr i t i ci ses f l ie We s t er n emphas i s on i ndi v i dua l i s m i n i nt e l l e ct ual , ar t i s t i c a nd c ul t ur al act i v i t i es , s ay i ng
t hi s r es ul ts is conf us i on and s oci al decay . l i e al so cr it ici ses w ha t he sees as a Wes t er n over - concer n f or
i ndi v i dua l pol i t i cal r i g ht s and de mocr at i c f r eedoms whi ch is dev oi d of a concept of t he mor al r es pons i bi l i t y
needed bef or e s uch f r eedoms can be pr oper l y ut i l i s ed, i.e. di r ect ed t owar ds t he a t t a i nme nt of ni bbana.
1 7
which has been the historically dominant method in anthropology and religious
studies involves an attempt on the part of the student to avoid commitment to the
beliefs and values of the foreign culture being studied and so to avoid judg ing that
cultur al system. The dominance of these observational disciplines in Buddhist studies
since the second half of the last century can perhaps be ex plained in historical
terms. Western academics reluctance to judge or evaluate Buddhist doctrine may be
an attempt to avoid the self- righteous, judgemental and morally unpalatable
criticisms early missionaries and other European travellers made of what they saw
as the "barbaric" beliefs and practices of the "pagans", while still allowing some
scope for an insatiable Western intellectual curiosity.
I support the methodological approach of the observational disciplines to the
ex tent that it recognises the existence of structural differences between the
theoretical systems of different cultures. The simple observational method, however,
has severe limitations when viewed from the perspective of the discipline of
philosophy. Unlike the practitioners of the observational disciplines those engaged in
the intellectual activity of philosophy rarely have any qualms about engaging their
objects of concern. A philosophy which sought to avoid evaluating or theoretically
engaging its object would have lost an impor tant aspect if not the most impor tant
aspect of what has historically characterised Western philosophical activity .
Philosophy is not a discipline which merely observes its objects dispasssionately but
as it has developed in Western intellectual history is an inherently interventionist
discourse which seeks active par ticipation in the issues, debates and arguments
presented, assumed or implied in theoretical systems.
To approach Buddhism with such a Western philosophical method might, in
terms of the criticism of one- sided Western analyses of Buddhism mentioned above,
be regarded as a form of theoretical imperialism, arrogantly breaching the autonomy
of a non- Western system of thoug ht by assuming that that system should be
amenable to a Western mode of analysis. In recent years the promotion of the
notion of epistemological relativism by critics such as Paul Feyerabend6, a
development of earlier notions of linguistic and cultural relativism, can be seen as
an attempt to define epistemological limits to such universalising tendencies in
Western philosophy and other critical Western discourses. Relativists have argued
^T he t er m "epi s t emol og i cal r e l a t i v i s m is not one Fe y e r abend hi ms el f uses i n his mai n t ex t on r el at i v i s m,
A g a i ns t Me t hod - O ut l i ne o f a n A na r c hi s t i c T heor y o f K now l edg e (V er s o, L o nd on, 1978 ), wher e he i ns t ead
uses t he t er m "i ncomme ns ur a bi l i t y " ( A g a i ns t Me t hod, p. 223f f . ). By i nc omme ns ur a b i l ity Fey er abend means
t ha t not i ons or t heor i es in s i g ni f icant l y di f f er ent epi s t e mol og i cal sy s tems ar e s t r i ct l y i ncompar a bl e becaus e
t he i r r es pect i ve concept s and t heor et i cal as s umpt i ons ar e dr a w n f r om t he i nt e r na l cont ex t of r el at i ons wi t h
ot he r not i ons and theor i es w i t hi n t he i r or i g i nat i ng or s our ce epi s t e mol og i cal s y s t em. A ccor di ng t o t hi s
t heor y not i ons and t heor i es ca nnot be appr e ci at e d in t hei r or i g i na l sense and i mpor t out s i de of t hei r
de f i ni ng e pi s t e mol og ical cont e x t .
against a philosophical or interventionist approach claiming, among other things,
that when one theoretically intervenes in a foreign intellectual system one may end
up not so much studying that foreign system of thoug ht as the patter n of ones
own theoretical interference in it.
Relativists have often incorporated a strong ethical component into their
epistemological hypotheses. They have argued, whether ex plicitly or implicitly , that
Western theoreticians should refrain from engaging foreign discourses as if they were
simply variants of Western discourses in order to avoid imposing alien Western
conceptions upon T hird Wor ld or non- Western systems. Relativism has represented
an epistemological expression of a much broader anti- colonialist and anti- imperialist
polemic which has argued against Western political, economic and cultural
domination of the T hird Wor ld. In arguing for the epistemological autonomy and
independence of non- Western theoretical systems (and of marginalised or suppressed
systems of thoug ht within the Western cultural tr adition) by proposing that such
systems can only be evaluated in terms of their own assumptions and within their
own epistemological contex t relativism has not only attempted to define limits to
Western intellectual activity but has also suggested that Westerners should
voluntar ily curb their theoretical and evaluative ex cursions into non- Western
discourses. Relativism has thus functioned as an ethical epistemology arguing for a
sense of responsibility in avoiding par ticipating in acts of theoretical or cultural
imperialism.
While the approach of epistemological relativism has laudable political and
ethical bases, avoiding charges of par ticipation in Western cultural and intellectual
imperialism it would, if followed strictly, tend to lead to the definition of Buddhism
and Western thought as two distinct, self- contained systems which cannot seriously
or legitimately engage each others views. In its ex treme form this approach would
deny Westerners the intellectual right to evaluate or comment on Buddhist notions,
and v ice v er s a. However, while supportive of the ethical and political goals of
relativism and of maintaining the autonomy of non- Western theoretical systems I
cannot accept the above ex treme relativist position as realistic in the contemporary
world. For to adopt an ex treme relativist position would imply that I, a non- Thai
and a non- Buddhist, cannot seriously engage or evaluate Buddhist thought. In
observational disciplines such as ant hropology this dilemma is in theory avoided by
creating an evaluative or theoretical distance between the Western observer and the
foreign "object" in an attempt to acknowledge and respect the foreign social or
theoretical system.
But what the observational discourses (and I include the philosophical
approach of epistemological relativism here) do not acknowledge is the paradox that
this respect is also inherently imbued with an implicit condescension which in its
own way continues to devalue the foreign cultural and theoretical system. This is
because the ethical component of relativist theories is based on the assumption that
critical Western systems of thoug ht are in fact dominating systems, whether
inherently so or because they are par t of the dominant material and political culture
in the modern world. Relativist theories also make the corresponding assumption
that foreign theoretical systems are weak, less powerful and susceptible to
domination if not annihilation. In maintaining that one should not engage or judge
a foreign theoretical system by using criteria derived from ones own cultural and
intellectual contex t, because to do so would be epistemologically invalid and
ethically unacceptable, one also imputes powerlessness to the foreign theoretical
object and power to oneself by making the assumption that engagement would in
fact be an act of theoretical imperialism, and an expression of a dominant
intellectual power. However, the holding back from judgement which relativism and
the observational approaches entail results in the isolation of foreign theoretical
systems from our own and avoids the issue of how concrete interaction and
engagement can or should occur. There is no true interaction with the object in
the observational disciplines, as occurs between two independent and mutually
respecting individuals. Rather the observational disciplines follow a zoological
approach which categorises and isolates cultures and their associated theoretical
systems, and is an approach which perpetuates the implied power inequality between
Western and foreign cultur al and theoretical systems.
In the case of Buddhism I regard it as necessary to question the assumption of
the powerlessness of the foreign theoretical object and of the imperialising
powerfulness of the W'estern observer or would- be- commentator. Is it not the case
that the intellectual significance of Buddhist thought is demeaned by not seriously
engaging it but instead approaching it with intellectual kid gloves? I maintain that
the study of the emerging societies and economies of contemporary Asia requires a
quite different intellectual approach from the tr aditional observational or
anthropological methodology. I also suggest that in contrast to the earlier
observational methods used in studying Asian societies there is a growing need for
Western scholars to engage Asian theoretical systems, which in Western academic
terms can be described as a philosophical rather than an anthropological approach.
It is for this reason that I regard the critical and analytical methods of philosophy,
when applied judiciously and with a sympathetic appreciation of the differences of
foreign cultural systems, to be more appropriate to contemporary inter- cultural
studies than in the past when the avoidance of the intellectual trappings of
colonialism dominated the methodologies of Western studies of Asia. To not engage
Buddhism is in my opinion to patr onisingly imply that that tr adition is incapable of
responding to Western evaluations or criticisms, an assumption I think is less valid
if not invalid in the closing decades of the twentieth century.
There is an additional reason for a more interactive and less observational
approach to the evaluation of Buddhadasas work which lies in the very character of
his doctrinal reforms. As will be detailed in the following chapters, Buddhadasas re-
interpretative work is not a "pure" Buddhist product, having been signif icantly
inf luenced by Western theoretical and philosophical notions. For ex ample,
Buddhadasa is ex plicitly interested in making Buddhist doctrine more scientific or at
least not in contradiction with modern scientific theories. But in addition, underlying
all his re- interpretations and demythologisations of tr aditional Buddhist teachings is
an implicit rationalism and anti- metaphysical orientation which draws heavily on
Western empiricist sources. While Buddhadasas work is in form continuous with the
long history of T heravada Buddhism, in character it represents a distinct break from
that tr adition, incorporating distinctly Western notions and emphases. To evaluate
this Western- influenced but Theravada- derived interpretation of Buddhism requires a
clear appreciation of the relation of Buddhadasas system to its various sources and
influences. Similarly , evaluating Buddhadasas work necessitates judging it according
to both Western and Buddhist criteria, that is, according to secular and religious
criteria. Buddhadasas Buddhism is in no sense tr aditional and any attempt to
treat it as if it were the product of an isolated and completely foreign cultural
contex t would fail to appreciate the signif icant Western inf luence and the ex tent of
overlap with Western notions and concepts.
What is required in analysing Buddhadasas work is a critical approach to
Buddhism which at the same time appreciates the significance of Buddhism in its
own historical and theoretical contex t. This involves maintaining a balance between
a critical analysis or theoretical engagement and a sympathetic understanding and
appreciation of Buddhism in its own terms. A sympathetic engagement with
Buddhism would seek neither to devalue that theoretical system because of its
cultur ally determined differences nor to demean it by patronisingly holding criticism
in abeyance and avoiding evaluative comment. A sympathetic understanding or
engagement of Buddhism implies neither agreement with its theoretical assumptions
nor the development of an apologetic for Buddhist doctrines. Instead sympathetic
engagement represents a recognition of differences and, if necessary, an
acknowledgement of the need to agree to disagree over f undamental values, but not
to either disparage Buddhism or refrain from further engagement because of these
differences. Such an approach neither assumes that Buddhist doctrine is a perfectly
consistent development of the religions principles, nor does it refrain f rom making
inter nal inconsistencies apparent where they in fact exist.
3.1 S y mpa thet ic E ng a g e me nt - S umma r y .
The approach of sympathetic engagement followed in this study is a* two
pronged analysis. Engagement denotes analysing and criticising the details of
arguments, the assumptions underpinning notions, the particulars of logic and
reasoning. On the other hand, a sympathetic or contex tual understanding denotes
looking more at generalities, at the contex t of history and general theoretical
principles which inf orm and pattern the par ticular details of doctrine and teaching.
However, these two moments are not separate but occur in tandem, critical
engagement being tempered by sympathetic or contex tual awareness and similarly a
cutting or critical edge to sympathetic understanding being maintained by critical
engagement.
More specifically, the sympathetic engagement of Buddhadasas work means
that it is criticised and evaluated both in terms of strictly Western criteria and in
terms of its own internal Buddhist- derived principles. However, neither of these
approaches dominates the other, the results of an ex ternal criticism always being
weighed against a contex tual appreciation of the issues at hand, and v ice v er s a.
No simple theoretical f or mula can be given for whether the ex ternal Western or
inter nal Buddhist evaluation of Buddhadasas doctrinal re- interpretations should
predominate or be the ultimate basis for making some single final judgement on the
overall value and importance of his work. The reasons for this have already been
given - any simple judgement is likely to represent the dominance of one discursive
systems principles over the other, resulting in a loss of perspective. The method of
sympathetic engagement does not and, as argued, in fact cannot define any precise
theoretical relation between Buddhism and Western thought. Rather it is an ethical
and political approach to the intellectual study of contemporary T hai Buddhism
which aims towards a balance in theoretical evaluation. Sympathetic engagement can
be likened to a methodology of diplomacy. Sympathetic engagement acknowledges
that there are irreduceable theoretical differences and so tensions between Buddhism
and Western thought, but neither retreats into a pure, non- judgemental
observationalism because of these irresolveable theoretical tensions nor attempts the
impossible task of resolving the theoretical tensions by appealling to some abstract
or metaphysical unify ing principle between cultures. Rather , like diplomats skilled
21
in the political arts of inter national relations, this method seeks to engage the
foreign party and arrive at a balanced judgement which gives value and weight to
both Western and Buddhist analyses of Buddhadasas work.
The methodological approach of this study is then complex in two senses.
Fir stly , it involves appreciating Buddhadasas work both as a theoretical system and
as a social phenomenon. And secondly, this social- philosophical analysis is
undertaken in a way that sympathetically engages Buddhadasas work, evaluating it
both in terms of the Buddhist tr adition from which it is drawn and the Western
intellectual tr adition which has signif icantly influenced it.
However, before beginning the detailed description and criticism of
Buddhadasas re- intepretations in Chapter Three and subsequent chapters the first
two chapters of this study will outline the historical and theoretical background of
Buddhist discourse and the social, institutional placement of Buddhism in T hai
society. These introductory chapters will provide the details necessary to arrive at
balanced theoretical and socio- political appraisals of Buddhadasas work in later
sections and chapters.
T hroughout this study it is assumed that the reader will already be acquainted
with the history and basic principles and doctrines of Buddhism. For those
unf amiliar with the terminology and concepts of Buddhist thought a brief overview
is presented in Appendix I at the end of this book.
22
23
C HA P T E R 1
T HE S OC IA L A ND T HE O R E T IC A L C ONT E X T S OF
B U D D H A D A S A S W O R K .
As stated in the Intr oduction it is not the goal of this work to study
Buddhadasas re- interpretations of T heravada doctrine in abstraction or to present a
purely theoretical or internal analysis of his work. Rather , I intend to study and
evaluate Buddhadasas writings in terms of both the theoretical tr adition of
T her avada Buddhist doctrine and in terms of the impact of his work within
ins titutional Buddhism in T hailand. In this chapter and the nex t I will present and
detail the theoretical and social contex ts of Buddhadasas work, providing the
background and f oundation for the detailed analyses and criticisms of his doctrinal
re- interpretations which begin in Chapter Three.
Because Buddhadasas work is a complex social, political and theoretical
phenomenon, in analysing his thoug ht it is necessary to draw on the theoretical
insights and analyses of several academic disciplines. In detailing the contex t of
Buddhadasas work here and in Chapter Two I will refer to the work of political
scientists, historians, sociologists as well as to the research of historians of ideas and
students of Buddhist thoug ht and religious studies. The specific accounts and
analyses of Buddhism and of T hai social arid political life presented in these first
two chapters are not in themselves the results of original research. However, in
relating these diverse f indings and focussing them on the theoretical object of the
work of Buddhadasa I hope that a more comprehensive and integrated picture of
the man and of his doctrinal re- interpretations is developed than has previously been
presented by more narrowly defined academic studies of T hai Buddhism.
The theoretical tr adition of Buddhist studies in T hailand and the other
T her avada countries differs signif icantly from the Western intellectual tr adition. For
ex ample, there is in T heravada Buddhism a relatively greater emphasis on correct
practice or orthoprax y as the basis of author itative presentations of doctrine rather
than on the notion of correct belief or orthodox y, such as has tr aditionally
underpinned the interpretation of religious doctrine in Western countries. This
emphasis on correct practice as opposed to correct belief has to an ex tent led to a
relatively free and unrestricted approach to doctrinal interpretation, and in contrast
with the intellectual history of Chr istianity the concern with heresy, for ex ample,
has been unimpor tant in Buddhist countries. However, t his relative freedom in the
realm of doctrine (always associated with strict conservatism in religious practice)
has not as mig ht perhaps be expected led to the development of a dy namic
intellectual culture in T heravada countries such as T hailand. On the contrary, the
history of Buddhist intellectual culture in T hailand until this century can only be
described as conservative and even as stagnant. A t least two impor tant factors lie
behind the relative historical stagnation of Buddhist scholarship in T hailand. Firstly,
the unrestricted operation of reason, or free rational enquiry into Buddhist doctrine
or other topics, has not been regarded as being a "pr of itable" or appropriate
intellectual activity . Secondly, T heravada Buddhis ms historical f unction as the
national ideology of the strongly centralised T hai state has been associated with the
imposition of political controls on the religion, which have in turn restricted and
inhibited doctrinal and theoretical innovation. In this chapter I detail these points,
i.e. the emphasis on practice in T heravada Buddhism, the devaluation of reason, and
the imposition of political controls on T hai Buddhism, which together constitute the
most impor tant features of Buddhadasas intellectual and socio- cultural contex t.
1.1 T he Hi s t or i c a l Cons e r v a t i s m of T ha i B uddhi s m.
While Buddhadasas reworking of tr aditional Buddhist teachings is in itself a
theoretically complex and detailed phenomenon I do not regard the most
outstanding feature of his work to lie in any specific theory or re- interpretation of
doctrine, but rather in the fact that he has attempted such a radical and systematic
review of T heravada Buddhism at all. Those accustomed to the critical and
analy tical emphasis of Western intellectual culture tend to take intellectual
innovation and theoretical speculation for granted. However, theoretical novelty or
innovativeness in doctrinal interpretation has not historically been a feature of T hai
intellectual life. The interpretation of Buddhist teachings has in particular been a
static area, the primary concern of Buddhist scholars (who up until this century
were always monks) being with the conservation and f aithf ul reproduction of holy
tex ts and established cornmentarial interpretations from one generation to the next.
This conservatism in the study of Buddhist teachings in T hailand is perhaps in
par t the result of historical factors. By the time the Thais formally adopted
T her avada Buddhism, sometime around the twelfth or thirteenth century of the
Chr is tian era, the religion was already eighteen hundred years old. The scriptures
had been determined and recorded, first in Ceylon, commentaries had been written
and patterns of religious practice and organisation had long since been systematised.
In a sense all that was required of the relatively newly converted T hai Buddhists
was to maintain and f aithf ully reproduce the given forms of practice and teaching,
and preservation of the already fixed doctrines became the pr edominant concern of
the official Buddhist hierarchy of monks in T hailand.
But this simple historical ex planation is inadequate to account for the
intellectual conservatism of tr aditional T hai T heravada culture. The fact that a
religious or theoretical tr adition has a significant history does not in itself mean
that that tr adition is incapable of f urther development or innovation. Indeed
Buddhism as a whole can in no sense be called an inherently static intellectual
system for around the same time the Thais were adopting T heravada Buddhism in
Southeast Asia the schools of Chan and Zen were foci of religious and intellectual
innovation in Buddhist China and J apan. And at an earlier period there had been
intellectual ferment in T ibet as local beliefs and practices interacted and fused with
Nor th Indian Buddhism to produce the distinctly T ibetan Buddhist tr adition called
V ajr ay ana. There is therefore nothing self- evident in T hai Buddhis ms long history
of doctrinal conservatism. The very fact that Buddhism elsewhere and in other
periods has been characterised by innovation and reform, and that Buddhadasas
work represents so radical an outbreak of re- interpretative activity within the long
stag nant T hai tr adition, indicate that T hai Buddhis ms historical conservatism is in
need of furl her ex planation.
In this chapter the ex plication of the social and intellectual contex t of
Buddhadasas work will at the same time incorporate an account of the
conservatism of T hai Buddhism against which his work, even with its flaws,
contrasts so strongly as an innovative and original contr ibution to Buddhist
thoug ht. In Chapter Two I will outline the sources of Buddhadasas innovativeness
and the reasons for the recent ir r uption of a critical and reformist approach to
doctrinal interpretation within the tr adition of T hai Buddhism. As already suggested
above the static character of tr aditional T hai Buddhist approaches to doctrine has
multiple roots which lie both in the intellectual tr adition of T heravada Buddhism
and in the history of Buddhis ms institutional role in the T hai socio- political order.
1.2 Or t hopr a x y - Or t hodox y .
While an oversimplif ication, one can when analysing a religious tr adition
separate out the doctrines and teachings from the practices. This simple conceptual
segregation is useful in accounting for the relative historical lack of concern for
matters of doctrine and for the doctrinal conservatism of T heravada Buddhism in
T hailand. When one compares Buddhism with say the Christian tr adition it is clear
that the relative significance placed upon doctrine and upon practice in the two
systems is markedly dif ferent. In the Chr istian tr adition questions of orthodox y or
correct view and correct belief have always been highly impor tant points of dispute
and conf lict. But as Kirsch observes, when the history of T heravada Buddhism is
reviewed one finds that,
disputes within the T heravada Buddhist tr adition have rarely focussed on
doctrinal questions. More commonly, disputes have taken place within the
sahgha [ monkhood] and have centred on questions of monastic discipline.1
Kirsch provides a T hai ex ample, noting that the main differences between the
two nikay ( Tin'll! ) or sects of Buddhism in T hailand, the tr aditional Mahanikay
( UMTUfl'lfJ ) Sect and the T hammay ut ( liJ T J J tJ fl ) s ect established by King
Mong kut or Rama IV (1850- 1868) are based not on conf licting interpretations of
doctrine or teaching but on divergent interpretations of correct clerical practice.
The differences between the two nikay concern matters such as the proper format of
initiation into the s ahg ha, the manner of accepting almsfood, methods of physically
dealing with money and the manner of wearing the monks robes. The significance
of issues of religious discipline and practice in T hai religious and political history
can be gauged from Kir schs observation that King Rama III (1830- 1851) did not
sponsor Mong kut, his half brother, to be king after him because he felt Mongkut
itv\ | 0c>sc
would cause religious dissension. Rama III was afr aid that Mong kut would^his
T hammay ut Sects practice of wearing the monks robes so as to cover both
shoulders on the Mahanikay monks, w'ho had tr aditionally worn their robes so as to
cover only one shoulder.
In the contex t of an analysis of Hinduism Staal has called a religious emphasis
on correct practice "or thopr ax y "2, as opposed to correct belief or orthodox y. Staal
argues that the orthopractic emphasis of Hinduism is related to the stress placed on
the r itualistic aspect of the doctrine of kar ma or the belief that, "only the correct
performance of k ar man, r itual activ ity , will lead to the desired result (e.g. wealth,
off spring, heaven, immor t al it y )."3 T heravada Buddhism in T hailand also has a
distinct emphasis on orthoprax y as opposed to orthodox y and, like Hinduism, has
^T homa s A . K i r s c h, "Mode r ni s i ng Impl i cat i ons of Ni net e e nt h Ce nt ur y Ref or ms of t he T ha i S a ng ha ", in
B ar dwe l l L. S mi t h (ed), R e l i g i o n a nd L e g i t i ma t i o n o f Power i n T ha i l a nd, L aos a nd B ur ma , A ni ma Book s ,
C h a mber s bur g Pe nn. , 1978, p. 53.
2
Fr i t s S t a a l , E x pl or i ng My s t i c i s m, P e ng ui n Books , L ondon, 1975, p. 72.
3i bi d. pp. 163- 164.
also historically emphasised the theory of kamma. This has as in Hinduism led to a
corresponding religious concern with "r ight action" in order to guarantee "r ight
results". For ex ample, Sunthorn Na- Rangsi says,
It is to the credit of Buddhism that the law of k amma has been worked
out in great detail until a specific kamma can be r ationally related to a
specific result.4
Sources of the orthopractic concern with kamma and right action in T hai
Buddhis m in fact lie in the Buddhist scriptures. Sunthorn cites the
Culakammav ibhahg a Sutta in the A hg uttar a Nikay a as isolating the following
specific actions and their precise kammic results,
The killing of living beings leads to a short life ... the persecution of
living beings leads to a sickly life ... Irascibility , anger or hatred leads to
an ugly figure or a bad complex ion ... Envy leads to powerlessness. Non
envy leads to powerfulness. Miserliness or selfishness leads to poverty or
pennilessness.5
A second source of T heravada Buddhis ms concern with correct practice or
orthoprax y lies in the central place of the immense canonical literature on correct
clerical practice, the eight volumes of the V inay apitaka, which reflect either the
B uddhas or the early Buddhist sahgha'>s concern with the details of spiritual
practice. In the V inay apitaka ascetic practices are laid down in minute detail, to the
ex tent that in Buddhism the notion of conf ormity to the scriptures implies not only
correct belief or understanding of the recorded doctrine, as is the case in
Chr is tianity , but also the correct practice of the path to salvation whose description
occupies such a substantial par t of the T heravada canon.
Practice also has an impor tant place in the religion because according to
Buddhis t doctrine nibbana or salvation depends on insight which can only be
developed through moral and meditative practice. Unlike the Christian notion of
salvation which is based upon f aith or belief, Buddhist salvation or nibbana can
only be attained as the result of an ex tra- ordinary insight into reality whose
achievement depends not upon simply believing in the reality of that salvation but
upon sustained mental practice or meditation. Only a mind focused by moral and
meditativ e practice can penetrate to and attain nibbana. In Buddhism spiritual
attainment or holiness is not simply manifested in acts of piety but is regarded as
being generated and produced by those strictly specified acts. This general equation
4
S unt ho r n Na - R a n g s i , T he B uddhi s t Concept o f K a r i n a a nd Re bi r t h, Ma ha r na k ut Ra j a v i dy a l a y Pr ess,
B a ng k o k , 1976, p. 83.
il)id. pp.82-83.
of clerical piety with strict abidance by the monkly code of conduct often blends in
the popular animistically influenced religion with magical beliefs in the supernatural
efficacy of religious practice per se. Terwiel makes the following observations of
Centr al T hai farmers beliefs,
Many laymen believe that the monks who behave strictly according to
the precepts [i.e. the vinaya] are generating more and stronger beneficial
power than less strict bhikkhus [ monks] and such monks should be
supported in preference to those who do not make these efforts.6
Even though Buddhism possesses a considerable body of canonical and
commentar ial literature disputes over matters of doctrinal interpretation have not in
fact been a historical characteristic of T hai Buddhism or of T heravada Buddhism in
general. Instead, given that salvation depends ultimately upon religious practice
rather than belief, and that moral and immor al actions are regarded as having
precise and specific consequences, the historical focus of concern has been on correct
clerical practice. While not directly hindering the development of an analytical or
innovative and questioning approach to matters of doctrine the key teachings of
k amma and nibbana have led to a relative focus on practice in Theravada Buddhist
history rather than on doctrine or theory. However, the actual interpretation of the
goal and character of Buddhist practice by the Buddha himself, as recorded in the
S ut tapitak a, can also be seen as having devalued the place of free rational enquiry
in the Buddhist tr adition and as having inhibited the development of a speculative
intellectual tr adition.
1.3 T h e S econdar y P l ace of Reas on i n B u d dhis t T houg ht .
Philosophical activity in the Western intellectual tr adition has historically been
characterised by the acceptance of the author ity of reason (however that reason may
be defined) in intellectual and theoretical disputes. There has also been, at least in
theory, a general preparedness to accept the conclusions of logical reasoning and
ar g umentation however personally repugnant or unpleasant those conclusions may at
times be. Since the Scientific Revolution this reliance upon reason has even come to
be characteristic of many schools of religious thoug ht in Chr istianity in addition to
being a f undamental principle of the secular pursuit of knowledge. Buddhism,
however, recognises supra- rational forms of knowledge as ultimately being superior to
mere reason and as a consequence does not regard r ational enquiry as being of
ultimate significance. The intellectual activities of conceptual thought or reasoning
2 8
^B a r e nd J a n T e r w i e l , Re l i g i on i n R ur a l C e nt r a l T ha i l a n d , P h. D. t hes is , A us t r a l i a n Nat i ona l Uni v e r s i t y ,
C a n ber r a, s ubmi t t e d 1971, p . 164.
2 9
are encompassed within the notions of v itakka, "thoug ht conception", and v icar a,
"discursive thinking ". Spiritual insight, on the other hand, is developed through
meditation, whose various levels are called j hanas or "absorptions". The r ational
and discursive thought processes of vitakka and vicara are tr aditionally described as
characterising only the lower meditative states, and are wholly transcended in the
higher states where they give way to supra- rational wisdom or pahha which leads to
the attainment of nibbana. This pahha or insight into the f undamental conditions of
reality (i.e. change or anicca and non- self or anat t a), which liberates one from
suffering, dukkha, is not of a rational character and cannot be arrived at be means
of any type of logical analysis. Because it alone cannot lead to pahha or saving
insight Buddhism does not give reason the pride of place it has tr aditionally
occupied in Western thoug ht, and neither is intellectual speculation valued as highly
as in Western philosophy.
Unrestrained rational enquiry is ex plicitly criticised by the Buddha as being
without spiritual "benefit" in the effort to attain salvation from suffering. The
f ollowing statement by the Buddha against giving consideration to certain
philosophical questions posed by some of his followers, here taken from the Cinta
Sutta in the Papata Vagga of the Samy utta Nikay a, is an often repeated f or mula
found in several places in the Suttapitaka,
You should not think of matters such as whether the world is eternal or
not eternal, whether the world has an end or does not have an end ...
Whether beings after having died yet live again or do not live again ...
Why should consideration not be given to such matters? Because such
thinking is not beneficial. It is not the beginning [of the practice] of
brahm.acariya7 which is undertaken for the sake of attaining tiredness [of
world involvement] , for the easing of lust, for ex tinction, peace, wisdom,
enlightenment, for nibbana.(T )8
However, in contrast to this tr aditional devaluation of uninhibited rational
enquiry some Buddhists have in recent decades argued that, unlike the Semitic
religions emphasis on f aith, their religion is f undamentally rational and so not in
conf lict with the methods of modern science or logical thought. For ex ample, one
Sri Lankan monk, Bhikkhu A nanda, has claimed that,
Buddhism does not impose any dogmatic belief upon its adherents. The
Buddhist is asked to believe that which he himself has proved to be tr ue.9
7
Dr a hma c a r i y a , "t h e pur e or hol y l i f e", a t er m de not i ng t he r e nunci at e lif e of t he monk .
8
C i n t a S ut t a , P a pa t a Vagga, S a my ut t a Nik a y a , V ol . 1 9 /v e r s cs l 7 26 - 7 /pp. 4 4 1- 2.
9 -
( B hi k k hu ) A n a n d a , T her av ada and Zen, G unas ena & Co. , Col ombo Cey l on, 1962, p. 30.
3 0
Such enthusiastic attempts to associate Buddhism with the assumed intellectual
superiority of empiricism or the scientific method are commonly based upon
interpretations of the K al ama S ut ta10, which has been taken by some modernist
Buddhists as a Buddhist charter for free enquiry. Bhikkhu A nanda says,
In the K al ama Sutta we are asked not to believe in any thing even
merely because the Buddha happened to preach it ... The true Buddhist is
a free thinker, a seeker of the tr uth, who seeks to disarm the one enemy -
Ignorance. He is self- dependent ... In his quest for supreme wisdom, the
Buddhist will be guided by reason and knowledge rather than sentiment
and emotion.11
Claims such as these are made because in the K al ama Sutta the Buddha
advises the Kalama people that the assumed authority of report, tr adition, hearsay
or of a renowned teacher or tex t should not be accepted uncritically when
considering the claims of competing or dubious doctrines. But despite criticising
unthinking f aith in tr aditional views and those who put themselves up as authorities
the Buddha in this sutta is also critical of unrestrained rational investigations of
diff erent religious doctrines. He criticises r ational activity which does not arrive at
the most beneficial or t he most ethical result but instead accepts conclusions arrived
at by purely logical analysis. In the K al ama Sutta the Buddha also admonishes the
K alama people to,
not be led by mere logic ... by inference ... by considering appearances ...
by the agreement with a considered and approved theory ... by seeming
possibilities.(T )12
Rather , the Buddha says that the deciding criterion when weighing up
competing views or theories should be whether a certain doctrine is dosa (morally
corrupt) or adosa (free of moral corruption). T hat is, far from being what some
Buddhists, selectively reading the K al ama S ut ta, have said is a Buddhist scriptural
licence for free intellectual enquiry this sutta in fact presents a highly pragmatic
approach to rational activity which gives ethical considerations primacy over logical
or rational debate. A theory regarded as "v alid" by whatever logical criteria would,
if not considered to be adosa or to promote virtue and moral attainment, and
thereby the attainment of nibbana, have to be rejected by the principle presented in
the K al ama Sutta. It is true that the Buddha says the people of Kalama should in
^T h e K a l a m a S ut t a is al so c a l led t he K e s a put t a S ut t a a nd is f ound in t he T i k a ni pa t a of t he A ng ut t a r a
N i k a y a , V ol . 20/v er s e 5 0 5 /pp. 179- 184.
^( B h i k k h u ) A n a n d a , pp. 30- 31.
12 - -
K a l a m a S ut t a , see not e ( 10) abov e.
their religious enquiries make judgements by the power of their own ethical reason
and not depend upon or have uncritical f aith in others, in tex ts or in certain
theories. But this is a freedom to realise the g iv en tr uth of Buddhism by ones own
ability and not to let a pure reason free to consider whatever might come within its
analy tical ambit. Buddhists have always been protective of what are presented as
their religions central tr uths, never opening them up to the same scrutiny which is
often directed at competing views. Faith in the central tr uths of Buddhism,
especially f aith in anat t a, is never given up or suspended. For without the doctrine
of anatta or non- self it would be dif f icult to distinguish Buddhism from jus t another
of the many Hindu sects and philosophies (which almost without ex ception
emphasise the notion of atman or essential self) which Buddhists have for millenia
sought to distance themselves from. As Slater notes, in Buddhism,
Intellectual activity is never regarded as a means sufficient in itself ... it
is always a means to an end, to that Ariy an intuition which is
indispensable to nibbanic f ulf ilment.13
Buddhis ms emphasis on practice over doctrine and its ranking of reason below
transcendent forms of wisdom or insight do not, however, mean that the religion is
inherently anti- speculative or incapable of producing a living, ongoing tr adition of
intellectual enquiry and debate. The early centuries of Buddhism saw multiple
schisms over issues of doctrine and the production of a large body of interpretative
literature which often included novel views and presentations of the original
teachings and scriptures. It also does not mean that Buddhist doctrine is devoid of
general philosophical interest or of issues about which there is or can be genuine
theoretical debate. Indeed the major part of this study will be taken up with a
philosophical consideration of the issues raised by Buddhadasas re- interpretations,
both within the body of his work itself and in the tr aditionally accepted teachings
of Buddhism. Rather , it is the case that Buddhism as a theoretical system has
historically been based on a quite different understanding of the place of reason and
of doctrinal debate than has been characteristic of Western scholarship. And in turn
this different appreciation of the place of reason and reasoning in human knowledge
appears to have limited, or at least not to have promoted the development, of an
intellectual environment in which rational enquiry is not subject to ex plicit extra-
r ational constraints.
The general constraints on reason and doctrinal debate outlined above have,
Robe r t L aws on S l a t e r , P a r a dox a nd Ni bba na , Uni v er s i t y of Chi c ag o Pr ess, Chi cag o, 1951, p. 60.
13
however, been present in Buddhism since its inception and yet as already noted
there have still been periods of signif icant intellectual activity and theoretical
innovation in the history of the religion. The high degree of intellectual stagnation
tr aditionally characteristic of T hai Buddhism cannot therefore be attr ibuted solely
any presumed inherent anti- intellectual tendency of the religion, although the
constr aints described above have undoubtedly been impor tant factors discouraging
the development of a critical approach to doctrine in T hailand and other Theravada
countries. It is necessary to turn to a more concrete consideration of the place of
Buddhism in T hai society to understand the long uninnovative centuries of religious
and doctrinal conservatism in T hailand. For as an integral part of the T hai social
order Buddhism is subject to extra- religious influences which have historically
restricted intellectual speculation on matters of doctrine. This consideration will at
the same time detail the politico- religious backdrop against which Buddhadasa has
worked and to which he in general opposes himself.
1.4 B uddhi s m a s S t at e Ideol og y in T ha i l a nd.
In addition to its spiritual message of salvation T heravada Buddhism has since
its official adoption by the T hai kings over seven hundred years ago had a
distinctly this- worldly influence. Buddhist principles and ideas inf orm T hai notions of
government, politics and social interaction, and the religions ostensibly spiritual
teachings have long been used as justif ications for various courses of action in
political matters. The social and political implementation of Buddhist teachings and
the governance of society by a Buddhist monarch are positively sanctioned by the
canonical literature. The A g ahha S ut t a]4 recounts that because of greed and
conf usion amongst themselves the first humans gathered together and argued for the
need to select the best among them to, "be wrathf ul when indignation is right ...
censure that which should be censured and banish he who deserves to be
banis hed."10 T ambiah describes this sxdta as presenting an elective and contr actual
theory of kingship whereby a king is elected by a people and remunerated by the
pay ment of a rice tax 16.
The concept of a Buddhist monarch is further developed and reinforced by the
notion of the cakkav attin, a morally inspired keeper of the social order who in the
^^A g a hr ia S ut t a , Di g ha Nik a y a , V o l . 11 /v er s es 5 1- 7 2 /pp. 61- 75.
15
Ci t e d by S. J . T a m b i a h , Wor l d Conque r or a nd Wor l d Re nuunce r , Ca mbr i dg e Uni v er s i t y Pr ess,
C a m b r i dg e, 1976, p . 13.
32
3 3
Mahapar inibbana Sutta is included in a list of four types of people described as
thiipar aha17, or as worthy of having a pilgrimage monument or stupa erected over
their ashes. The other three types of thupar aha or "stupa- deserving" individuals all
have a spiritual rather than a worldly character, i.e. ( l ) a tathag ata, (2) a follower
of a tathag ata, and (3) a paccekabuddha18. Further, in the Cakkav atti S ut ta19 the
Buddha instructs the emperor Dalhanemi in the cakkav attivatta, the vow of the
universal monarch or cakkav attin, to depend on and honour the dhamma, to
protect the dhamma in himself and his people, to provide property and subsistence
to those in need and to follow the counsel of those knowledgeable in the dhamma.
But while sections of the canonical T heravada Buddhist scriptures ex plicitly
detail principles of moral governance it was not until almost two hundred years
after the Buddhas death that the Buddhist sahgha fi rst became f ormally associated
with a temporal regime. It was under A soka, ruler of an extensive North Indian
empire from 272 to 232 B.C., that the sahgha and Buddhism first acquired the role
of an institutional religion, both gaining the protection and support of a temporal
monarch and becoming dependent upon and subordinate to that monarch. Somboon
Suksamran isolates several reasons for the sponsorship of Buddhism by various Asian
monarchs as a state religion. In addition to specific teachings in the A g ahha and
Mahapar inibbana Suttas and in other sections of the canon, such as the J at ak as ,
about the necessity of obedience to a righteous king, the general outlook of
Buddhism also provided a basis for moral and legal- political order, being,
a perspective within which each human existence could be seen as the
consequential outworking of moral gain and loss in previous ex istences.2
Somboon also points out that in the Buddhist ethical system equanimity ,
peaceableness and generosity are rated high while anger, conf lict, violence and self-
centred desire for gain are strongly disapproved of. T hat is, Buddhist ethics does
not in general sanction activities which undermine social order and stability . And
f inally , the Buddhist ethico- religious system was maintained by an organisation of
strictly non- political voluntary teachers effectively supported by the alms and
donations of the f aithf ul. In other words, while providing a religious justif ication for
Ma ha pa r i ni bba na S ut t a , Di g ha Ni k a y a , V o l . l 0 /v e r s e l 3 5 /p. l 16.
18
P acce k abuddha - a per son who a t t ai ns e nl i g ht e nme nt but who unl i k e t he B uddha or s a mma s a mbuddha
does not t each a message of s al v at i on to t he wor l d.
C a k k a v a t t i S ut t a , Di g ha Ni k a y a , V ol . 1 l /v e r s e s 3 3 - 5 0 /pp. 43- 60.
S omboon S u k s a m r a n , P o l i t i c a l B uddhi s m i n S out he as t A s i a , C. Hur s t & Co. , L ondon, 1977, p. x i .
20
the ins titution of kingship and pr omoting values conducive to law and order, and
thereby pr omoting the stability of the ins titution of the monarchy, the sahgha
required little direct support from the royal treasury and provided no direct political
thr eat.
It was A soka who established the precedent whereby a Buddhist monarch was
also charged with the author ity to ensure that monks obeyed the vinay a or clerical
code of conduct. The Buddhist king had no authority regarding doctrine or
dha mma , only over the sahg ha-1s "pur ity ", a term which tr aditionally connotes strict
abidance by the vinaya. This def inition of the monar chs authority in matters of
clerical practice but not of doctrine again reveals the strongly orthopractic character
of T heravada Buddhism, for the prime concern of both Buddhist monarchs and laity
has historically been with the sahg has strict purity in matters of monkly practice.
The purity or strictness of practice maintained by members of the sahgha is the
most commonly used measure of the overall "health" or status of the sasana or
religion. And seeing as the propagation of the doctrine of salvation or the dhamma
was the sole responsibility of the s ahg ha, and that the monkhoods spiritual status
and author ity were regarded as depending on strict obedience to the vinay a, the
monar chs control over clerical practice came to be considered crucial to the
maintenance of the dhamma itself, as a doctrine of liberation founded on the living
practice of righteousness among the monks.
Following A soka later Buddhist monarchs also acquired an institutionally
sanctioned religious power that depended upon their control of temporal power, for
only a strong temporal monarch could hope to muster sufficient sway to enforce
strict purity in the sahgha thr oughout his kingdom. Strong temporal power
centralised in a monarch has tr aditionally been regarded as essential to the well
being of the sasana. This Asokan model provided the pattern for church- state
relations in the first T hai kingdom of Sukhothai, and the association of the
Buddhis t sahgha with the T hai state has been signif icant since that time. As
Mulder notes,
T hroughout history T hai governments have been aware of the impor tant
integrative function of institutionalised Buddhism and repeated efforts have
been made to control the monks and their practices, and to bring their
organisation under the supervision of the state.21
Somboon Suksamran concurs, stating that Buddhism,
has long served as one of the most impor tant sources of political
Ni el s M u l d e r , Ev er y day L i f e i n T ha i l a nd, Dua ng K a mo l Publ i s her s , B a ng k ok , 1979, p . 140.
21
legitimation for the political rulers; one of the main socialising,
acculturating and unif ying forces in T hai society.22
A t the same time the order of monks has been rendered politically impotent
because its integration into the political structure was effected in such a way that it
had no means to exercise political influence. As Morell and Samudavanija observe,
The Buddhist hierarchy, by virtue of their numbers and the respect
accorded them by the rest of society, represent a potentially powerful
political force. But because the T hai branch of T heravada Buddhism is
more pacif ist, contemplative and apolitical than the Mahay ana branch found
in V ietnam - or even other T heravada branches - monks did not intervene
in politics.23
The drawing of a sharply defined distinction between a mundane religious path
for the world- involved laity , l ok iy adhamma, and a supramundane path for
renunciates, lokuttar adhamma, and the consequent radical separation of the role of
the layperson from that of the monk have provided a religious justif ication for
proscribing clerical involvement in politics. For w'hen world- involvement is equated
with spiritual pollution no monk can become directly involved in politics without
irreparably damaging his clerical author ity . In contr ast to this tr aditional segregation
of the lay or mundane from the clerical or supr amundane Buddhadasa has been
concerned to abolish the distinction between the lokiya and lokuttar a realms. This
doctrinal stance amounts to a denial of the tr aditionally accepted apolitical
character of the role of the Buddhist clergy and has drawn severe criticism from
religious and political conservatives in T hailand.
T hai Buddhis ms institutional isolation from ex plicit political involvement has
not only resulted from the theoretical influence of a par ticular doctrine but has long
been enforced by direct control and supervision of clerical affairs by the Thai state.
The recent history of church- state relations in T hailand amounts to a series of
actions by the monarchy, and since the 1932 revolution the military dominated
state, to utilise the sahgha^s authority to promote the policies and security of the
government of the day while at the same time depriving the monkhood of any
ability to interfere in the running of the state. One of the first acts of King Rama
I (1782- 1801), founder of the present Chakr i dynasty of Bangkok after the
devastation of the earlier T hai kingdom of A y ut thia by Burmese forces, was to re
organise and re- vivify Buddhism. Political acumen as well as Buddhist piety can be
22
Sor nboon S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m and P ol i t i c s i n T ha i l a nd, I ns t i t ut e of S out heast A s i an S t ud ies,
Si ng apor e , 1982, p. 40.
23
"Da v i d Mo r e l l & Chai - anan S a m u d a v a n i j a , P o l i t i c a l C o nf l i c t i n T ha i l a nd, Oel g es chlager , G unn &
I l a i n P u b l isher s, Ca mbr i dg e Mass . , 1981, p. 57.
35
read into the following account by a T hai prince of the activities of Rama I in
tr y ing to rebuild social order after the strife and chaos following the downf all of
A y ut thia in 1767,
It is natur al that the K ing s systematic mind would have promoted first
a code of morality by which a standardisation of the conduct of the clergy
could be established. He then set out with energy to see that his lay
subjects as well as members of monastic orders behaved as good Buddhists.
His effort in this direction is evidenced by the innumerable decrees
governing the conduct of monks and lait y .24
The twentieth century has seen two major shifts in the character of the T hai
states use of the Buddhist sahgha as an ideological basis of its temporal authority .
The first shift was effected in the early decades of this century by the absolute
monarch King Wachir awut or Rama V I (1910- 1921) who emphasised that Buddhism
not only underpinned the monarchy but also the prosperity of the entire nation. By
stressing the importance of Buddhism to the nation, not jus t to the monarchy,
Rama V I laid the groundwork for the religion to become the ideological f oundation
of the democratic T hai state which came into being with the abolition of the
absolute monarchy in 1932. T hat is, when effective power shifted from the monarch
to politicians, and subsequently to the militar y , the ideological role of Buddhism
also shifted, or rather ex panded. Ins titutional Buddhism then became the ideological
bulwark of the modern T hai state jus t as it had previously been, and in fact
continues to be, the bulwark of the institution of the monarchy. T hai political
leaders since 1932 have placed just as much importance on maintaining and
controlling the Buddhist sahgha as did earlier absolute monarchs. There is
therefore a signif icant degree of continuity between the tr aditional T hai monarchy
and the modern militar y state in terms of the use of Buddhist symbolism in the
public leg itimation of power. Rama V i s royalist- cum- nationalist slogan of Chat -
Sasana - Phrarnahakasat ( WT t "Nation-
Religion- Monar ch"), a derivative of the old jingoistic British max im of "God, King
and Countr y ", has been touted as much by recent militar y rulers as it was by
former absolute monarchs in their efforts to promote national unity and shore up
their own regimes.
Since the 1932 revolution the sahgha has been under the direct control of the
government, through the Depar tment of Religious Aff airs, rather than under the
contr ol of the now mostly symbolic monarch. T ambiah aptly summarises the present
politically dependent status of the sahgha relative to the T hai state,
24( H. H. Pr i nc e ) D h a n i Ni v at K r o ma mun B i dy a l a bh, A Hi s t o r y o f B uddhi s m i n S i a m, Si am Soci et y ,
B a ng k ok , 1965, p. 23.
3 7
The Depar tment of Religious Af f airs25 spends more money on the
stipends of ecclesiastical functionaries, on their fans26, and on the staging of
religious festivals than it spends on monks education. The ministers and
generals and colonels engage in highly visible merit- making activ it ies; in
tur n, high ranking ecclesiastics solicit their presence and patronage when
they initiate activities for the material benefit of their own monasteries.27
Of importance here is the financial and practical emphasis on the visibility of
the states patronage of the s ahg ha, which indicates that more than the Thai power
elites piety is being demonstrated in publicly supported Buddhist activities. State
supported Buddhist rituals are also an attempt to legitimise the states political
power by pr omoting association with the tr aditional institutional symbols of
legitimacy.
A second shift in the character of sahg ha- state relations has occurred since
Wor ld War II, in particular since the regime of Field Marshal Sarit T hanar at
(1957- 1964), when the pr edominating concern of government became the promotion
of national development. In political terms the concern with development firstly
translated into an emphasis on national unity and the integration of peripheral or
marginal groups (e.g. Hill Tribes) into the main body of T hai society, and secondly
into a concerted campaign to counter communism which was interpreted as causing
social divisions and so obstructing the goal of national development. The following
comment by Wit aptly summarises the nexus of concerns which has dominated
recent Thai political history,
Cont emporary T hailands ability to avoid the tragedy of V ietnam [i.e.
communist dominations is largely dependent upon its governments degree of
success in resolving vital national problems and promoting national
development.28
In 1962 Sarit passed a new Sahgha Act which effectively centralised power in
the hands of those monks associated with or supported by his regime. Somboon
Suksamran catches the political tenor of the changes when he notes the major
directives to the restructured sahgha adminis tr ation were,
25
T he De pa r t me nt of Rel i g i ous A f f ai r s , w i t hi n t he T ha i Mi ni s t r y of Educ a t i on, is t he l at t e r day
e qui v a l e nt of t he A s ' okan- s t y l ed monar c h ent r us t e d wi t h t he r es pons i bi l i t y of ens ur i ng t he "pur i t y " of t he
s a ng ha . T hi s de pa r t me nt i mpl e me nt s pol i t i c a l deci s i ons af f ect i ng t he s ang ha and among ot her t hi ng s
di s bur s es cl er i cal s t i pends , s uper vi ses t he r unni ng of t he s y s t emat i s ed cl er i cal e x ami nat i ons and t he a l l ot t i ng
of cl er i cal t i t l es a nd honour s .
^Ce r e moni a l f ans ar e used to i ndi cat e t he r el at i v e s t a t us of monk s in t he s ang ha hi er ar chy .
27
T a i n b i a h , Wor l d Conque r or Wor l d Re nounc e r , p. 397.
28
Da ni e l W i t , T ha i l a nd - A not he r V i e t na m?, C ha r l es Scr i b ne r 's Sons , New Y or k, 1968, p. 20.
First, to follow the policies of the government; second, to oversee and
prevent the communist inf iltr ation of the sahgha and monasteries; thir d, to
prevent any attempt to use the monasteries for the propagation of
29
communism.
In the contex t of the Cold War and the civil wars in neighbouring V ietnam,
Laos and Kampuchea, and in order to mobilise popular sentiment, successive Thai
militar y regimes and militar y leaders have maintained that communism seeks the
destruction of all religion, including Buddhism. And because Buddhism has since the
f oundation of the first T hai kingdom been argued to be the f oundation of both the
nation and the monarchy communism has consequently been attacked as a threat to
the f oundations of T hailands national integrity and to its most hallowed
institutions. Buddhism has been officially defined in T hailand as anti- communist and
communism as anti- Buddhist. As the intellectual Puey Ungphakorn observed in 1969,
According to a government slogan, broadcast on the radio, a person
without religion must be a communist or a terrorist. Some school teachers
also repeat this theory to their pupils.30
The continuing ideological significance of institutional Buddhism to T hailands
political and militar y leaders is demonstrated by the fact that each major change in
government policy this century has been accompanied by efforts to reform and re
organise the monkhood and to redefine its f unction in Thai society. Somboon
Suksamran observes that thr oughout all the changes, "The T hai sahgha has been
loyal and subservient to the political authority in return for protection and
patronage. "31
In this contex t where Buddhism fulf ils an impor tant politico- ideological role the
T hai state exerts considerable control over both the organisation and education of
sahg ha members. The maintenance of certain tr aditional interpretations of doctrine
is seen by most of those in positions of influence and political authority in T hailand
as par t and parcel of preserving Buddhism as the ideological f oundation of the
nation and, as a consequence, the intellectual atmosphere within the sahgha is
highly restricted and not conducive to free intellectual enquiry or debate. While the
strong emphasis on practice rather than doctrine and the relative devaluation of free
intellectual enquiry in the Buddhist tr adition have historically contributed to the
29
S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m and P ol i t i c s i n T ha i l a nd, p. 40 .
30
P ue y U n g p h a k o r n , "T he Rol e of Et hi cs and R e l i gi on in Na t i ona l De v e l opme nt ", in V is ak ha P uj a ,
B uddhi s t A s s oci at i on of T ha i l a nd, B a ng k ok , 2517 (1 9 74), p. 116.
31
S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m a nd P ol i t i c s i n T ha i l a nd, p. 13.
intellectual conservatism and stagnation of T hai Buddhism the most concrete
deter minant of this situation has undoubtedly been the power and control of the
T hai state over sahgha affairs. In recent centuries, and especially in this century,
ins titutional Buddhism in T hailand has had no independent existence apart from the
T hai state, which both supports and controls it. Maintenance of the tr aditional
religious symbols and legitimation of the ex isting temporal order rather than
doctrinal innovation or investigative scholarship have therefore been the
pr edominating concerns of most monks.
The control exerted by the state over the sahg ha, both directly in ant i
communist laws and indirectly through the conf erring of honours on favoured monks,
and the community of interests between senior sahgha officials and the T hai
monarchy and political elite, together result in strong pressures to maintain a
tr aditional view of the religion and its teachings and of the role of the sahgha in
society. This is because the tr aditional character of Buddhist teachings, especially on
social matters, provide justif ications for the ex isting social order in which the senior
clergy and political leaders share in a symbiosis of power.
But despite this politically controlled atmosphere within the sahg ha, which is
consequently resistant to and unsupportive of innovation or reform in most aspects
of the religion, it is still the case that, because of the overriding orthopractic
concern of the sahgha hierarchy to maintain strict, centralised control over correct
clerical practice, there is in fact no centrally enforced control on interpretations of
doctrine. There is, for ex ample, no central censorial body in the sahgha which vets
Buddhist publications in T hailand. Any monk or layperson is free to publish
whatever interpretation of the scriptures and doctrines he or she wishes without first
needing to obtain any ecclesiastical impr imatur . Because faithfulness to Buddhist
tr adition is in the main defined in terms of strict abidance to tr aditional practices
rather than in terms of adherence to a given orthodox y no specific institutional
constraints exist on Buddhist writings or discussion. The only enforced intellectual
or theoretical control in T hailand is the general censorship of what the political
authorities regard as politically inf lammator y , communist, libellous or immor al
literature. While Buddhadasas re- interpretations of doctrine have been severely
criticised by many religiously and politically conservative individuals, both monks
and laypeople, he has never been criticised by the formal institution of the sahgha
hierarchy. This is because, given that his work is neither illegal nor subject to
secular censorship or restrictions and that he abides by the clerical practices guarded
and enforced by the sahgha hierarchy, there are no institutional means or processes
that can be used to criticise Buddhadasa.
There are no formal or institutional barriers to doctrinal reform or theoretical
innovation in T hai Buddhism. However, the combined power of the Thai state and
senior sahgha hierarchy, whose interests co- incide in seeking to maintain the
dominance of doctrinally conservative views and who together control both clerical
education and lay religious education in T hailand, has resulted in the actual
historical conservatism of T hai Buddhism.
Buddhadasasa doctrinal innovativeness thus breaks with the long conservative
tr adition in T hai Buddhism which even today remains the dominating influence on
the contemporary practice and understanding of the religion. In seeking to appreciate
the significance and impor t of Buddhadasas re- interpretations in the contex t of the
historical and present character of Buddhism in T hailand it is therefore necessary to
consider how and why he has made this theoretical break. When by far the
major ity of monks in T hailand continue to either support or acquiesce in the
conservative religious and political s t a t us quo what has motivated Buddhadasa to
set himself at odds with the generally accepted order of things? This issue is the
focus of the discussion and analysis in the next chapter, in wrhich some impor tant
theoretical and social aspects of Buddhadasas work are also outlined and previewed.
41
C HA P T E R 2
T HE S OURCE S OF B U D D H A D A S A S
T HE O R E T IC A L INNO V A T IV E NE S S .
Until recent decades the T hai Buddhist tr adition has been distinctly non-
analy tical, being almost devoid of debates on doctrinal and theoretical issues and so
lacking "theologians" in the Western sense of the term. In contrast to this
conservative history where the pr edominating concern has been to re- affirm and
f aithf ully reproduce the teachings and practices of previous generations Buddhadasas
work represents the development of a distinctly analytical and philosophical trend.
For ex ample, Buddhadasa has taken the all but unprecedented step of criticising the
tr aditionally accepted interpretation of such central Buddhist teachings as the theory
of causation or paticcasamuppada and he has questioned the reality of such
generally assumed facts as rebirth. Underpinning these re- interpretations is a novel
method of approaching the T heravada scriptures, a method whose objective is the
demythologisation of Buddhist doctrine. Buddhadasas work is characterised by the
systematic reduction of metaphysical aspects of Buddhist teaching, such as notions
of rebirth in heaven or hell, to psychological conditions.
This systematic demythologisation of Buddhist doctrine is paralleled by
Buddhadasas pervasive concern to give religious value to action in the material
world. His re- interpretations of the religion's teachings are characterised by a
marked shift of the theoretical focus of Buddhist doctrine from the transcendent to
this world here and now. Buddhadasa effects this shift by redefining notions of
Buddhist salvation as being conditions of life in this world, and then using these
redefinitions to develop a more ex plicitly social thr ust to Buddhist doctrine. He
reverses the relation between desire and the material world which has tr aditionally
characterised most Buddhist teachings. T raditionally Buddhism has taught that in
the face of the transience of the things of the world, anicca, human beings should
cultivate detachment and strive for the transcendent salvation of nibbana. However,
Buddhadasa proposes that suffering is not always solely attributeable to an
indiv iduals kamr nic inheritance, caused by his or her ignorant cravings for passing
things, but on the contrary is often caused by ex tra- individual factors in the
ex ternal world. Whereas Buddhism has tr aditionally taug ht that an indiv iduals
dukkha or suffering is a wholly self- caused condition which is relieved through
individual spiritual practice Buddhadasa maintains that the suffering caused by
socio- economic ex ploitation and political oppression has an ex ternal source and can
be ended only by spiritually guided action in the social world. T hat is, for
Buddhadasa liberation from suffering involves not only overcoming ones own
ignorance and craving through spiritual insight, the tr aditional Buddhist notion of
salvation, but also overcoming oppressive or dukkha- causing conditions in the
ex ternal world. The focus of action to attain the religious goal of ending suffering is
therefore ex panded to include not only the self- directed moral and meditative
practices of the individual who suffers but also welfare- directed activity in the social
and material contex t in which he or she suffers. In brief, for Buddhadasa the
mater ial world has become an integral component of the proper religious goal of
human aspirations.
Buddhadasas systematic reworking of T heravada teachings is inf ormed by an
awareness, for the most part implicit but nonetheless generally characteristic of his
work, that Buddhist salvation can no longer be defined in terms of a retreat from
the social w'orld. The inclusion of the social world and social action within
Buddhadasas interpretation of the notion of salvation or nibbana can be seen as his
recognition of the potential benefits afforded humanity by modern technology and
contemporary scientific knowledge. Buddhadasa accepts the results of science and
tries to bring scientific knowledge within the scope of his re- interpreted version of
Buddhism. He does this firstly by claiming that his view of Buddhism is in -
accord with the findings of science, and secondly by criticising the animist and
Brahmanical aspects of T hai Buddhism as being inconsistent with his scientific and
rationalist interpretation of the scriptures.
In the tr aditional structure of Buddhist teaching and practice in which there is
a sharp distinction between the mundane and supr amundane realms w'orld-
involvement has been associated with the lay form of the religion, which has
incorporated animist and Brahmanical features. Buddhadasa, however, wishes to
integrate a positive valuation of action in the material w'orld with strict doctrinal
Buddhism, i.e. with what has tr aditionally been regarded as the lokuttar a or
supr amundane world- detached form of the religion appr opriate only for monks. He
rejects the tr aditional lay or lokiya form of Buddhism not only because of the
inconsistencies of its animist and Br ahmanical features with his r ational, scientific
outlook but also because he transfers the tr aditional world- involved or lokiya role to
the doctrinal or lokuttar a level. Buddhadasa wishes to integrate the lokuttar a
concern with salvation with the lokiya emphasis on world- involvement.
4 2
4 3
Buddhadasa is a strong supporter of the modernist intellectual environment in
T hailand and he finds his most receptive audience among the Westernised and
Western- educated T hai intellectual elite. Buddhadasas intellectual modernism, a
result of the influence of Western scientific and r ationalist forms of knowledge on
his thoug ht, is further demonstrated by his greater emphasis on the authority of
reason and rational argument in the interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures over
the author ity tr aditionally accorded to specific texts and reverred commentators.
Buddhadasas rationalism takes the form of a systematic doctrinalism, where he
takes f undamental principles of the religion, such as anatta and nibbana, and
proceeds to develop re- interpretations of doctrine by logically developing relations
between such concepts rather than by slavishly mouthing the conclusions of some
commentary or tr aditionally accepted author ity .
Because of the importance of the social world to his interpretation of Buddhist
doctrine Buddhadasa has also broken the tr aditional silence of T hai monks on
political matters to express ex plicit opinions on politics and social change in his
country. But while his work has political significance Buddhadasa cannot be
categorised as being aligned with any ex isting political group or faction whether of
the "r ig ht" or the "lef t". While offering Buddhist- based arguments providing
qualif ied support for socio- economic development and criticising capitalist ex ploitation
and oppression of the poor he is at the same time critical of Marx ism and all
mater ialist philosophies, including what he regards as the sensualism of unfettered
consumerism. He is thus critical of both the political East and West.
However, Buddhadasas radical re- interpretative efforts are not without their
dif ficulties. His arguments are often vague and the sources of certain interpretations
are left uncited and at times are even hidden. But over and above these academic
details impor tant aspects of his thoug ht, especially his social philosophy, are flawed
by f undamental contradictions. These theoretical contradictions are in fact forced on
Buddhadasa as a result of some of the practical contradictions of his decision to
attempt to radically reform Buddhist teachings and practice while yet officially
r emaining within the conservative and orthopractic T hai sahgha. But even given
these dif ficulties Buddhadasas work remains impor tant, as the starting point and
catalyst of a growing critical modernist movement within T hai Buddhism which
marks a real efflorescence of Buddhist intellectual activity .
But given the unquestioning acceptance of doctrine which has historically
characterised T hai Buddhism, in analysing the total phenomenon of Buddhadasas
work it is necessary to understand the sources of his theoretical and philosophical
innovativeness. In the previous chapter some ex planations were offered for Thai
Buddhis ms long conservative history. In this chapter in addition to further detailing
the theoretical and social contex t of Buddhadasas work I will also investigate the
origins of his innovativeness. I will seek to detail what it is that has changed in the
tr aditional mix of Buddhis ms internal theoretical constr aints and ex ternal political
limitations which has permitted Buddhadasa to develop his radical views. The
theoretical changes represented by Buddhadasas work, his theoretical this- worldliness
and attitudes to discursive authority in Buddhism, touched on above, are analysed
in detail in the following chapters. Here the changes in the cultur al, social and
political contex t which have impinged on the religion in the last century will be
discussed, for Buddhadasas work is far f rom being an undetermined or random
ir r uption of reason and criticism in an otherwise stagnant tr adition. His work has
developed within and been influenced by signif icant ex ternal changes in Thai society
and by Buddhists perceptions of themselves and their place in the world. Firstly,
the precedents for Buddhadasas review of doctrine will be considered by reviewing
the character of historical reform movements in Buddhism. Secondly, the influence
on Buddhadasa of King Mong kuts nineteenth century royal- sponsored reform of the
T hai sahgha will be discussed. T hirdly , and most impor tantly , the impact of
Western forms of knowledge and scholarship and of socio- economic development on
the theoretical and social contex t of T hai Buddhism will be analysed and their
inf luence on Buddhadasas own views presented.
2.1 Pr ece de nt s f or B uddha da s a s Do c t r i na l Re - int e r pr e t at ions .
2.1.1 T he Hi s t or y of B uddhi s t Re f or m Mov e me nt s .
Historical precedents exist in T heravada Buddhism for Buddhadasas doctrinal
re- interpretations, which he regards not as total innovations but as being reforms
based on f undamental religious principles. Buddhadasa has seen his goal as being
to, "revive the practice of dhamma so that it is correct, as at the beginning [of
Buddhism] or directly according to what is t r ue .'^T )1 Religious reform in many
tr aditions , not only Buddhism, is often characterised by innovation and change
f ounded upon continuity with the past. Such a patter n of innovation based upon
stated conservatism or faithf ulness to the past is necessary for any reformer working
within a tr adition w'here authority is invested in certain source teachings, scriptures
or recorded insights. Ref orm is then couched in terms of a return to the purity of
2 # - - ^ ^ _ _ _
Ci t e d by C h i t P hi ba nt ha e n ( ^ LI V lli C hi w i t L ae Ng a n K hor ng P hut t ha t ha t
Phikk.hu. ( " . m m i a s ' j n i i w m r e v n f l 11 T he L i f e a nd Wor k o f B uddha da s a B hi k k hu),
S i l a pa ba na k a n ( f l f l l h U J j u n m J ), Ba ng k ok , 2520 (1 9 77), p. 42.
4 5
the tr aditions original sources, which Buddhadasa takes to be the teaching of
salvation as passed down in the Buddhas own recorded words in the T heravada
canon. In Buddhadasas work both the moments of conservatism and continuity
and of radicalism and change are equally pronounced and for each innovative
adjustment he makes in re- interpreting Buddhism he takes an equally pronounced
step back to what he regards as the pure and original form of the religion.
It is possible to interpret Buddhadasas enterprise as another instance of
Buddhis ms long history of f undamentalist tendencies and movements which have
aimed to re- attain what is assumed to be the original pur ity of Buddhist teaching
and practice. Rahula notes that in ancient Ceylon the A sokan accord between
sahg ha and state was seen by many monks as having deleterious effects on the
sasana and was viewed,
with great anx iety and concern, as a mark of deterioration ... they felt
that inspite of their earnest and repeated attempts to "pur if y " the sasana
they were helpless against the overwhelming tide of change and
development. Disappointed in the contemporary state of affairs, therefore,
they looked back for their guidance and consolation upon the past which
they regarded as perfect and ideal.2
Even in the time of the Buddha and immediately after his death there was a
tendency to refer to the then recent past as representing a time of goodness and
pur ity in comparison to what w'as seen as contemporary corruption and moral
decay. Rahula notes the following discussion in the Suttapitaka between the Buddha
arid one of his closest disciples, Mahakassapa,
Mahakassapa asked the Buddha why formerly there w'ere less precepts
and more ar ahants , and why now there were more precepts and fewer
ar ahants .
"It is so Kassapa", said the Buddha, "when people become degenerate
and the good teaching disappears, there are more precepts and fewer
bhikkhus attain ar ahant s hip."3
The notion of moral decay and corruption of teachings has thus been
associated with Buddhist reform movements from the earliest times.
2
Wa l po l a R a h u l a , Hi s t or y o f B uddhi s m i n Ce y l on, G una s ena & Co. L t d, Col ombo C ey l on, 1966, p. 199.
3i bi d. pp.202- 203.
46
2.1.2 T he Inf l ue nce of K i ng M o n g k ut s Re f or ms on B uddha da s a .
Buddhadasas doctrinal innovations also have a more recent historical precedent
in the reforms instituted in the last century by King Mong kut, Rama IV. Mongkut
sought to uproot inconsistencies between monastic practices and the clerical code of
conduct or v inay a, and between a strictly doctrinal view of Buddhism and popular
views, which he and subsequent reformers of T hai Buddhism have regarded as
Br ahmanical or animistic accretions to the pure religion. When Rama I restructured
and reformed the T hai sahgha in the first years of the present Chakr i dynasty he
referred to the established tr aditions of the earlier T hai kingdom of A y utthia as his
model. Mong kut, however, went back even further into history to find a pristine
source for his reforms in the actual Pali scriptures, and as Butt notes,
Because the ideas he derived from these sources sometimes clashed with
practices and beliefs which over the years had come to be accepted as
orthodox by most T hai, Mong kut was frequently accused of supporting
radically innovative changes in Buddhist f aith and lif e.4
As already discussed popular T hai religion is a combination of many influences,
animistic and Brahmanical beliefs blending with more strictly Buddhist doctrines.
However, the existence of non- Buddhist spirit worship, magical rites and the
honouring of Hindu deities has not tr aditionally been seen as conf licting with the
canonical message of the religion. Rather , such features have been regarded as part
of the overall heritage of T hai Buddhism. But Mong kut rejected many of these
animist and Brahmanical "accretions" to the canonical or doctrinal message of
Buddhism, arguing that animism and the worship of various gods are incons i st e nt
with the doctrines expressed in the Buddhist scriptures and urging a closer
observance and understanding of those scriptures. Mong kuts studies of the Pali
canon dur ing the thir ty odd years he spent as a monk before he disrobed and
ascended the T hai throne led him to see discrepancies between the scriptures and
the actual practices of T hai monks. As Kirsch notes,
He was so anguished about this discrepancy he vowed that he would
disrobe if he did not receive some sign that the monastic line of succession
back to the Buddha had not been broken in T hailand.5
Mong kut subsequently met a Mon monk whom he came to regard as being of
a tr adition which continued the original T heravada tr adition and proceeded to
4
J o hn W. B u t t , "T ha i K i ng s hi p a nd R e l i g i ous Re f or m", i n B a r dw e l l L. S mi t h (ed), Re l i g i on and
L e g i t i v i a t i o n o f Power i n T ha i l a nd, L aos a nd B u r m a , A ni ma Book s , Cha mbe r s b ur g Pe nn. , 1978, p. 47.
5
K i r s c h, "Mode r ni s i ng I mp l i cat i ons of Ni ne t e e nt h Ce nt ur y Ref or ms in t he T ha i S a ng ha ", p. 58.
4 7
establish at Wat Boworniwet in Bangkok a new, stricter sect of monks, the
T hammay ut, - "those adhering to the doctrine or dhamma" - in accord with the
more scriptural aspects of the Mon Burmese tr adition. The T hammay ut Sect
remains today as the second institutionally recognised sect of the T hai sahg ha, the
other being the Mahanikay Sect (literally , "the great sect"), which Mong kut
characterised as "those adhering to long- standing habit" and to which the
overwhelming majority of T hai monks, including Buddhadasa, still remain attached.
But as Wells observes, despite ins titutional recognition the reformist efforts
under pinning Mong kuts establishment of the T hammay ut Sect ran,
counter to popular religious concepts and observances, but he [ King
Mongkut] saved Buddhism for the well- educated and humanistic among the
T hai who wanted a religion free from superstition and in accord with
ethical and scientific thoug ht generally prevailing at that time. King
Mong kuts approach to Buddhism was both rationalistic and pur itanical.6
Buddhadasas re- interpretations closely parallel aspects of King Mong kuts
reforms. Mong kut had an intimate knowledge of then current Western ideas and
scientific views, obtained from discussions with Christian missionaries dating from
his early days as a monk in the 1830s, and Kirsch comments that Mong kuts
emphasis on re- instituting monkly conduct in strict accordance with the vinay a went
hand in hand with certain ideological commitments,
For one thing, Mong kut rejected a great many tr aditional beliefs and
practices as superstitious interpolations into Buddhism. He rejected the
cosmogony and cosmology represented in the T r aiphum7, arguing that
cosmology had to accord with the scientific views that he had learned in
his contact with Westerners... Mong k uts monastic reform involved then,
not only an effort to upgrade monastic practice and to make it more
orthodox , but also included an attempt, in Western terms, to demythologise
the wor ld.8
As will be discussed further in subsequent chapters, in his re- interpretations
Buddhadasa also follows the principle instituted by Mong kut of following the Pali
scriptures as closely as possible while attempting to avoid any interpretations of
doctrine that contradict contemporary scientific knowledge or rationalistic views.
^K e nne t h E. W e l l s , T hai B ud d hi s m , It s Ri t e s a nd A c t i v i t i e s , S ur i y a bun Publ i s her s , B a ng k ok , 1975, p . 13.
7 - - -
T he T r a i bhumi k a t ha or i n T ha i t he T r ai - phum P hr a R ua ng was compos ed in t he f our t ee nt h ce nt ur y by
L y - T hai (al s o cal l ed P hr a Y a l i T ha i ) , a k i ng of t he ear l y T ha i k i ng dom of S uk hot ha i . T he T r ai- phum has
been one of t he mos t i mpor t a nt B uddhi s t t ex t s in T ha i hi s t or y , its el abor at e cos mol og i cal des cr i pt i ons
be i ng t ak en as t he of f i ci al ac count of t he v ar i ous l evel s of B uddhi s t hel l s a nd heav ens at t a i ne d t o as a
r es ul t of i ndi v i dua l s ' di f f er ent qua l i t a t i v e and qua nt i t a t i v e a c c umul at i ons of me r i t and demer i t . T he
T r a i bhumi k a t ha was t he cent r al B uddhi s t cor nme nt ar i al t ex t in ol d Si am becaus e it was r eg ar ded as
r e l a t i ng t he e mpi r i ca l char act er of T ha i s oci et y to ul t i ma t e B uddhi s t r eal i t y .
8
K i r s c h , "Mode r ni s i ng Impl i c a t i ons of Ni net e e nt h Ce nt ur y Ref or ms in t he T ha i S a ng ha ", p. 59.
4 8
There are therefore precedents for B uddhadas as work both in the ancient and
recent histor y of Buddhis t ref or m mov ements . However, the ex istence of precedents
does not by itself ex plain the char acter or ex tent of Buddhadas as own innov ations ,
serving more to pr ovide j us tif ications for his novel views once they are presented
r ather than being the actual provenance of those views. Giv en the contr as t between
the nov elty of Buddhadas as views and the long history of ins titutionalis ed
cons er v atism of the t r adit ion within which he wor ks it would appear necessary for
there to have been deter mining or at least tr ig g er ing influences upon Buddhadas as
t houg ht f r om outside of T her av ada B uddhis m itself. T hat is, I suggest t hat the
sources of Buddhadas as innovativeness as well as of his specif ic doctr inal
innov ations are more likely to be f ound outside of Buddhis m than w ithin it.
Specif ically I suggest t hat the origins of the Buddhadas as re- appraisal of Buddhis m
can be traced to the impact of Wester n cult ur al , economic and intellectual inf luence
in A sia.
2.2 We s t e r n Inf l ue nc e s on t he S t udy of B uddhi s m.
T he earliest W7estern intellectual engagements with Buddhis m w'ere the cr itical
denunciations of the early Chr is tian missionar ies. However, the denig r ation of
B uddhis m and of A sian civ ilis ation as a whole by Eur opeans in the period of
colonial is m was much more than a purely religiously instig ated phenomenon. In the
face of the political, economic and assumed cultur al super ior ity of European
civ ilis ation all cultur al and intellectual achiev ements tended to be judg ed ag ainst the
nor m of Eur ope and Nor th A mer ica, in compar ison with which A sian cultur es were
almos t w it hout ex ception f ound to be severely lacking . T his imputed backwardness
of A s ia was not only the view of Eur opeans but was also implicitly accepted by
many of those A sians educated under Eur opean education systems. However, this
resigned acceptance of A s ias intellectual and cultur al inf er ior ity began increasingly
to be questioned by the nationalis t and anti- colonialis t movements which were
established in the f ir st decades of this centur y . For the members of these A sian
nat ional is t mov ements a renewed emphasis and appr eciation of indigenous lang uag e,
r elig ion and cultur e went hand in hand with political attacks on the colonial
powers. T he twentieth centur y has consequently seen a resurgent inter est among
A s ian Buddhis ts in the teachings and pr actice of Buddhis m. Even thoug h T hailand
was never colonised by any Eur opean power T hai cultur e, education and national
dev elopment have nevertheless been heavily inf luenced by Eur ope, and more recently
by A mer ica and J apan. As a result there are many parallels between the s ituation
in T hail and and the actually colonised countr ies of Southeast Asia. As among
4 9
Buddhis ts in Ceylon and Bur ma there has been a resurgent interest in Buddhis m
among those T hai Buddhis ts who are concerned to pr omote the value and
signif icance of Buddhis t thoug ht and Buddhis t cultur e in opposition to the implicit
and ex plicit denig r ation suf fered in earlier periods.
Ir onically , however, this resurgent national inter est in Buddhis m has in many
ways been spurred by the scholar ly activ ities and intellectual ideals of the colonising
Eur opeans whom T hai, Burmese and Ceylonese Buddhis ts have otherwise wished to
distance themselves f r om and oppose themselves to. Unt il Eur opeans began s tudy ing
Buddhis m seriously in the middle of the nineteenth centur y doctr inal or scholarly
Buddhis m, t hat is the s tudy of the core scriptures of the Buddhis t canon, had f allen
into decline in all the T her av ada countries, not only in T hail and. Eugene B ur nouf
was perhaps the f irst Eur opean to appr eciate the signif icance of the hither to
overlooked Pal i scriptures. Because of the established Br itis h colonial dominat ion of
Cey lon t hat country pr ovided the most accessible source of these canonical scriptures
and it was Ceylonese monks who f irst offered impor t ant source inf or mation on the
Pali T ipit ak a to Eur opeans. Indeed w'ith the Pali researches under taken by T homas
Wil l iams Rhy s Dav ids and Her man Oldenbur g , and with the es tablishment of the
Pali T ex t Society in the late nineteenth centur y , Cey lon became the focus for the
r evivif ied scholarly study of T her av ada Buddhis t doctr ine. T he patter ns and
char acter of t hat study have subsequently had a pr of ound inf luence on Pal i studies
in all the T her av ada countries, including T hail and.
T he early Eur opean study of T her av ada Buddhis m had a pronounced doctr inal
emphasis, pr oducing inter pr etations which attempted to be in str ict logical accord
with the pr inciples of the religion. T his in tur n led to a rejection of popular folk
Buddhis m in Ceylon as an ir r ational demonolog ical accretion. As Heinz Bechert
notes,
T o be sure, the Indologists could not overlook the f act t hat monastic
pr actice did not correspond to the precepts of the v inay a, t hat is of canon
law, and t hat the cult of the gods and the ex orcism of demons had an
impor t ant place in the religion of the Sinhalese ... A nd yet representatives
of this approach tr ied r ather pr ecipitously to ex plain away such
obser vations or simply ignored them. Whatev er could not be derived f r om
Buddhis t tr adition w'as an "adul t er at ion" of the r eligion, a Hindu inf luence
or s imply popular s uper s tition.9
It was this sanitised doctr inal inter pr etation of Buddhis m which was then
taken up by the English educated Sinhalese elite as a sy mbol of their cultur al and
9 Hei nz B e c h e r t , ' Cont r a di c t i ons i n Si nhal es e B uddhi s m", in B ar dwe l l L. S mi t h (ed), Co nt r i but i o ns to
A s i a n S t udie s Vol. 4 : T r a di t i on and Chang e i n T he r av ada B ud d hi s m , E. J . Br i l l , L ei den T he Ne t he r l ands ,
1973, p.8.
nat ional independence f r om Europe. For the educated Sinhalese elite, hav ing
accepted the notion t hat a religion s hould in its entir ety be consistent with its
stated pr inciples, proceeded to reject the popular or folk f or m of their own religion
for precisely the same reasons given by the colonialist scholars. A nd when T hai
Buddhis ts subsequently looked to the ex ample of Sinhalese Buddhis t national is m as
a model for moder nist Buddhis t mov ements in their own countr y it was this same
essentially Eur opean constr ucted, or des tr ucted, f or m of Buddhis m (a doctr inal
r elig ion which denied its seemingly incons is tent popular f orms) which was likewise
ir onically held up as quintessentially s y mbolis ing "T hainess" and' T hai independence
f r om the West. Contempor ar y doctr inal B uddhis m in the T her av ada countr ies of
Southeas t A sia has thus in effect been reconstr ucted and re- interpreted ar ound the
r ationalis t ass umptions of the f irst Eur opean Indologists and Buddholog is ts, and
s tr ictly speaking is more a symbol of cult ur al f usion and inter nationalis m between
Eas t and West than of any inherent "A s iannes s ".
In re- asserting Buddhis m's intellectual signif icance some moder nis t and
nat ional is t interpreters of Buddhis m in T hail and, such as Buddhadas a, have assumed
the very principles of r ationality , logical consistency and scientif ic methodolog y
which were previously used to denigr ate Buddhis m. There has been a tr emendous
intellectual effort on the part of Buddhis ts to disprove the earlier cr itical claims of
Western scholars, t hat Buddhis m was a s uper stitious and inconsistent r elig ion, by
at t e mpt ing to demonstr ate that their r eligion is in fact r ational, logical and
scientif ic.
T he desire to demonstr ate the intellectual s ignif i cance of Buddhis m by
compar ing it with Western notions is shown mos t clearly in the attempts to prove
the scientif ic char acter of the r eligion. As previously noted science also has
impor tance for Buddhadas a's doctr inal re- inter pr etations in pr ov iding a basis for
all ev iat ing or ending suf f ering, the B uddhis t religious goal, at the mater ial level.
Demons t r ating a har mony between B uddhis m and science is therefore not only
s ig nif icant in terms of imputing intellectual s tatur e to Buddhis m, by associating it
with the theor etical respect accorded to science, but is also impor tant in ensur ing
t hat there are no contr adictions or barriers to integ r ating the mater ial benef its of
moder n science and technology into a revised inter pr etation of Buddhis t s alv ation.
B uddhadas a has said t hat Buddhis m and science,
are alike in that scientif ic pr inciples can s tand pr oof - one may pr ov ide
the pr oof himself for others to see, or be willing to let any one scrutinise,
test, and cross- question as he wishes, and it bears up unt il no f ur ther
tes ting can be done and he mus t believe.10
T he ar g ument t hat the s pir itual t r uths of Buddhis m are open to ex periential
v er if ication in a way t hat is assumed to be s imilar to the method of v alidating
s cientif ic results is a claim commonly made by Buddhis ts . For ex ample, the Sri
L ank an Buddhis t thinker J ay atilleke says,
I f ind t hat early Buddhis m [ i.e. T heravada] emphasises the impor tance of
the scientif ic outlook in dealing with the pr oblems of mor ality and religion.
Its specific "dog mas ' are said to be capable of ver if ication and its general
account of the natur e of man and the universe is one t hat accords with the
f inding s of science r ather than being at v ariance with t he m.11
A nd Spencer, an Eng lish conver t to Buddhis m, adds,
T here can be no question t hat Buddhis m is the one system, ex cepting
per haps science itself, which achieves an objective and detached view
towar ds the natur e and destiny of ma n. 12
While there is clearly an enthus ias m for science and the scientif ic method
among some contempor ar y Buddhis t thinker s this does not mean t hat there is a
clear appr eciation or even an inter est in epistemological issues and debates
concer ning scientif ic method. While both Buddhadas a and J ay atilleke above claim
t ha t there is a congruence between the Buddhis t appr oach to g aining s pir itual
ins ig ht and the v er if icationis t methodolog y of science no mention is made of the
competing f alsif icationist view on the wor kings of science and neither is there any
at t e mpt to demons tr ate a close r elations hip between Buddhis t thoug ht and
f als if icationis m. In these tr acts science is instead regarded as a s tatic, abstr act ideal
of epis temolog ical perf ection r ather than as the somewhat more fuzzy- edged activ ity
recent studies have claimed it to be. T his idealised view of science f ound in many
B uddhis t works suggests t hat the actual r elation between science and Buddhis m is
not the real issue being discussed but t hat what is being attempted is a j us tif ication
of or an apolog etic for Buddhis t teachings in which science appears only for the
sake of g r ant ing what is assumed to be its impr imator ial seal of appr ov al.
T hat Buddhis ts are not prepared to f ully accept scientif ic r ationalis m is shown
by the f act t ha t claims for B uddhis ms scientif ic char acter are most often based on
1 ^B u d d h a d a s a , B uddhi s m i n 15 A t i nut e s , t r ai l s. H. G . Gr e t l i cr , S ur i y a ba n Publ i s her s , B a ng k ok , no
p u b l i cat i on dat e g i v en, p. 18.
^K . N . .l a y a t i l l e k e , "B uddhi s m and t he Sci ent i f i c Re v o l ut i o n in B uddhi s m a nd Science, no edi t or
g i v en, B uddhi s t P ubl i c a t i on Soci et y , K a ndy Sr i L a nk a , 1980, pp. 2- 3.
12
Robe r t F. S pe n c e r , "T he Re l a t i on of B uddhi s m to Mode r n Sci ence", i n B uddhi s m and Science, no
e di t or g i v en, B uddhi s t P ubl i c a t i on Soci et y , K a ndy Sr i L a nk a, 1980, p . 12.
5 2
references to the K a l a ma S utta. In Chapter One I traced such claims about the
pur por ted r ationality of Buddhis m to a par ticular ly liberal and one- sided reading of
the B uddha s s tatements in the K a l a ma S ut t a , which some apologists have taken as
presenting a sort of "scientif ic method" of s pir itual enquir y . Buddhadas a, for
ex ample, reads the K a l a ma S ut t a as war ning not to blindly believe in either the
T ipi t a k a , a teacher, what is reported or r umour ed, what has been reasoned out or
what has been arrived at by logic. He says,
A lt houg h w'e may have read, listened and hear d, we should not simply
accept what is offered in these ways unless we have f irst thoug ht it over,
considered it caref ully , f athomed it out, ex amined it, and seen clearly that
it really is s o.13
However, the crucial dis ting uis hing point between any scientif ic or r ationalis tic
method of inv es tig ation and the B uddhas pr onouncements in the K a l a ma S utta is
t hat according to the l atter one is to be as wary of the results of reason and logic
as of r umour and report. Buddhadas a acknowledges this when he says t hat "seeing
clear ly " means to appr ehend tr uth or r eality , "w ithout needing to use reason,
w it hout needing to speculate, w ithout needing to make as s umptions ."14 T hat is,
despite claims of the r ationalit y or scientif ic char acter of Buddhis t doctr ine the
K a l a ma S utta is in f act a call for dev eloping direct s pir itual insig ht into r eality,
not for f ollowing a scientif ic method of enquir y . A nd while upon close scr utiny it
can be seen that the K a l a ma S utta does not contain a call for the implementation
of the scientif ic method in Buddhis m it is nonetheless the case t hat Buddhadas a and
others do consider the author ity accorded science to r ub of f onto a Buddhis m
pur por tedly demons tr ated to be "s cientif ic". Buddhadas a claims,
T hus is there not a clear indication of how Buddhis m goes by natur e
with science, which the modern wor ld everywhere honours? A nd the most
impor t ant point is: when Buddhis m alone is one with the wor lds science
then which religion is f it to be the religion of the w'orld besides
B uddhis m? 15
T hus while the r elations hip between Buddhis m and science is undoubtedly
impor t ant for Buddhadas a, given his concern to incor por ate the mater ial allev iation
of suf f ering within the religious scope of Buddhis m, it cannot be said t hat the issues
inv olv ed have either been adequately appr eciated or presented, or resolved.
13
B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha - dha mma For S t ude nt s , t r ans . A r i y ar i anda B hi k k hu, S ubl i me Li f e Mi s s i on,
B a ng k ok , 1982, p . 16.
1 4 i bi d. p. 15.
i d. , B ud dhi s m i n 1 5 Mi nut e s , p . 19.
15
But while claims concer ning the "s cientif ic" char acter of Buddhis m are str ictly
speaking inv alid, or at least poorly presented, it is nevertheless the case t hat there
is a f undamental congruence between the doctr inal, demy tholog ised Buddhis m t hat
Buddhadas a presents and Wester n r ationalis m. As noted above Buddhadas a
emphasises the doctr inal aspect of Buddhis m and rejects the t r adit ional popular or
lay aspects of the religion in an att empt to integ r ate a positive v aluation of action
in the social wor ld with core Buddhis t doctrines. Popular Buddhis m in T hail and is
of ten associated with beliefs in the power of s uper natur al entities which can be
placated, cajoled or enraged and which it is believed have the abil it y to intervene in
human life, whether for good or for bad. It is also popular ly believed t hat the
perf ormance of certain def ined r ituals can war d of f har mf ul inter v entions by demons
and conversely can pr omote benef icial inter v entions by benevolent spirits. Str ict
doctr inal Buddhis m, however, has always been dominated by notions of immut abl e
imper sonal law, the law of kar nma and the over ar ching cosmic- moral order of
righteousness or dha mma , to which all are inescapably subject. It is the ex istence of
such universal laws which gives sense to the T her av ada Buddhis t teaching t hat
s alv ation lies in the hands of the indiv idual. In Buddhis m the cosmos is a
consistently and thor oug hly ordered system where both suf f ering and s alv ation result
f r om the sy stematic oper ation of such principles as kar nma and dhamma. Salv ation
or nibbana in T her av ada is the result of s y s tematically apply ing and utilis ing these
univer sal pr inciples. In pos iting the ex istence of immuteabl e universal laws the
doctr inal Buddhis m which Buddhadas a gives weig ht to, like Western r ationalis m,
also emphasises the consistent application of general principles.
Popul ar Buddhis t beliefs are of ten s tr ictly speaking in contr adiction with
doctr ine. For ex ample, such beliefs as the tr ans f er ability of religious mer it or good
k a mma between indiv iduals , t hat there is personal continuity af ter death, and t hat
nibbana can be attained as a result of an enor mous accumulation of mer it rather
than thr oug h liber ative ins ig ht, cannot be j us tif ied by Buddhis t doctrine but are
nonetheless widely adhered to. Such popular Buddhis t beliefs represent attempts to
cir cumv ent or evade the consequences of the universal cosmic laws proposed by the
doctr inal core of the religion. These contr adictions of popular belief with doctr ine
have long been recognised and have been accepted as the unav oidable cor r uption of
the B uddha s teachings by the wor ld- involved minds of lay people who are unable to
gr asp the subtleties of the true tr anscendent doctr ine. T he divison between str ict
doctr inal Buddhis m based 011 notions of immut eabl e universal law and the popular
belief in the ability of s pir its and s uper natur al inf luences to intervene in and in
effect cir cumv ent these laws is based upon the t r adit ional pr actical dis tinction of a
lay pat h or l ok iy adhamma f r om the l ok ut t ar adhamma or s upr amundane s pir itual
path of the r enunciate monk. T he generally pr ev ailing view among monks
knowledgeable in the doctr ine has been t hat the popular views are all t hat laypeople
are capable of under s tanding . It is generally held t hat it is better t hat laypeople
gr asp thing s in their own inadequate way and so then act mor ally than t hat they
be lef t out of Buddhis m entir ely because of their s pir itual tur pitude.
Such inconsistencies between the lay and clerical f orms of Buddhis m have in
general been accepted and have not been subject to attempts at r esolution because
of the secondary place given to reason and logical analy sis in the T her av ada
t r adit ion. Because theor etical knowledge has tr aditional ly been judg ed in r elation to
its s pir itual "benef it", r ather than ag ainst any str ict notion of r ationality or logical
consistency , inconsistent views may be accepted if they are regarded as being
mor ally benef icial for those who hold them. Buddhadas a, however, rejects the
mundane- s upr amundane dis tinction upon which tr aditional T hai Buddhis m is based
and in contr ast maint ains t hat Buddhis m should be doctr inally and logically
consistent thr oug hout. T his doctr inalis m, which seeks to consistently apply universal
pr inciples of Buddhis t teaching t hr oug hout all aspects of the religion, can be seen as
a r ational potentiality which has been latent in doctr inal Buddhis m since its
inception. However, this r ational potential has not been f ully developed because of
the mit ig at ing inf luence of the two- tiered mundane- supr amundane str uctur e of
B uddhis t practice and teaching , and because str ict logical consistency has
t r adit ional l y been regarded as hav ing only secondary impor tance behind the moral
benef it of par ticular views. T he r ationalis t implications of str ict doctr inal Buddhis m
are only being f ully realised now because of Buddhadas as rejection of the historical
dis t inct ion between an imper f ect lay and a str ict, doctr inal clerical f or m of
B uddhis m and because of his implicit acceptance of Wester n notions of r ationalis m
and scientif ic reasoning.
T here is also a f ur ther reason for Buddhadas as str ict doctr inalis m or
r ational is m, which will be described in detail in the f ollowing chapters. Because his
inter pr etations of Buddhis m are so innov ativ e and because his views are often
w it hout direct precedents in either the canonical scriptures or in commentar ies
B uddhadas a mus t consequently a r g ue for his views and provide jus tif ications for his
inter pr etations . Because his r e- inter pretations therefore depend upon logical
ar g ument at ion and demons tr ation Buddhadas a places much more emphasis upon
reason t han do more t r adit ional interpr eters of Buddhis t doctr ine, who can rely
upon given and accepted sources.
Histor ically the contempor ar y concern among moder nis t Buddhis ts to make
5 4
Buddhis m r ational and scientif ic by rejecting the t r adit ional popular animis t and
Br ahmanical aspects of the religion has its origins in the r ationalis t approaches of
the f irst scholarly Eur opean studies of Buddhis m. However, while European- derived
r ationalis m has had a tr ig g er ing effect the rejection of animis t and other logically
contr adictor y beliefs has in f act revealed and br oug ht to the fore in Buddhadas as
work a latent r ationalis m which has lain in the very core of doctr inal Buddhis m.
Contempor ar y Buddhis t r ationalis m is therefore a compound phenomenon, combining
elements of both borrowed Eur opean and indig enous Buddhis t r ationalis t
methodolog ies. However, while s tr uctur ally s imilar in emphasising the consistent
appl icat ion of general pr inciples Wester n and Buddhis t r ationalis m are nevertheless
not identical. As already discussed in Chapter One reason takes second place to
s pir itual ins ig ht in Buddhis m and it is the f ailur e to acknowledge this basic
epistemolog ical diff erence t hat accounts for much of the conf usion concer ning the
"s cientif ic" char acter of Buddhis m outlined above. V er if ication of hypotheses or
r eligious doctr ines by personally developed s pir itual ins ig ht into t r ut h is not at all
the same thing as the empir ical methodolog y of science.
2.3 T he Inf l ue nce of S inhal es e B uddhi s t N a t i o n a l i sm on B uddl i a da s a s
T houg ht .
For many T hais incl uding Buddhadas a national is m has become an integr al
component of the r eclamation and review of Buddhis m and in this contex t he
appear s to have been par ticular ly inf luenced by the work of the A nag ar ika
Dhammapal a. Bor n Donald Dav id Hevavit ar ana, this Ceylonese Buddhis t later
assumed the title of a na g a r i k a , denoting a wander ing ascetic, and took the Pali
name of Dhammapal a (lit. "pr otector of the dha mma ") . Wit h the assistance of the
T heosophical Mov ement the A nag ar ik a established the Mahabodhi Society in
Col ombo in the f inal decades of the last century with the goal of pr opag ating
B uddhis m both in Cey lon and other countries. However, his emphasis was as much
social as religious and he became a sy mbol of a resurgent Sinhalese Buddhis t
nat ional is m and of a way to r eclaim t r adit ional cultur al values oppressed by
colonialis m while yet s uppor ting socio- economic moder nis ation.
Gokhale describes Dhammapal a as combat ting ,
the notion t hat B uddhis m was a mere other- worldly philosophy calling
upon man to tur n his back on the wor ld and all its aff airs. He maintained
t hat Buddhis m was meant as much for the monk as the lay man (upas ak a)
andl in the contex t of the moder n age the dhar ma of the upas aka needs re-
assertion and re- inter pr etation as much as the r evival of monastic learning.
Buddhis m of the lay man addresses itself to both mater ial prosperity and
5 5
5 6
s pir itual g r ow th.16
T he A nag ar ik a aimed for a f usion of moder n technology and economic methods
w ith Buddhis t values and cited with considerable admir at ion the achievements of
J apan, which he saw as ex emplif y ing the benef icial results of such a f usion. The
s imilar ities between the A nag ar ik as and B uddhadas as own views are str iking , each
of the above points - inter est in a this- worldly r elig ion, concern for lay people, a
desire for the integ r ation of scientif ic and r eligious appr oaches, and admir ation of
J apan - being par alleled in B uddhadas as own wor k. Per haps the commonality of the
social contex ts in which Buddhadas a and the A nag ar ik a have worked ex plains the
closeness of their respective views. However, the f act t hat Buddhadas a was in
contact with the Mahabodhi Society and its publications in the 1930s thr oug h his
br other Dhammadas a also strongly suggests t hat his views have received at least
some inf luence and dir ection f r om the early Buddhis t ref orm and nationalis t
mov ements in Cey lon.
2.4 T he Inf l ue nce of Socio- Economic Cha ng e in T ha i l a nd on B uddha da s a s
T houg ht .
2.4.1 Conf l ic t in Mo de r n T ha i Society .
In addit ion to the br oad cultur al and intellectual impact of the West on A sia
social changes specif ic to T hailand have also been impor t ant influences on
B uddhadas as work. T he penetr ation of new ideas and technologies via novel means
of communication and t r ans por tation has under pinned a broad general
tr ans f or mation in values and ex pectations among the T hai populace. The r elation
between social and economic change and B uddhadas as re- inter pr etations of Buddhis t
doctr ine is complex , inv olv ing conf licts between and chang ing aspir ations among the
diverse g r ouping s of the T hai cultur al and political elites. In par ticular Buddhadas as
views can be seen as responses to the religious and mor al dilemmas f acing the
moder nis t, intellectual section of the T hai elite, who make up Buddhadas as main
audience in T hailand and of which Buddhadas a is himself a member . To detail these
social and intellectual r elations, however, it is f ir st necessary to describe the
dy namic socio- economic s ituation in modern T hail and.
While moder nis ation is af f ecting the lives of all T hais it is nevertheless only a
r elatively small T hai ur ban elite of militar y and g ov er nment bur eaucr ats, inf luential
16B a l k r i s hna G ov i nd C o k l i al e , "A na g a r i k a Dl i ani r na pal a: T owar d Mo de r ni t y T hr oug h T r a di t i on in
Ce y l on", in Ba r dwe l l L. S mi t h (ed), C o nt r i but i o ns to A s i a n S t udie s Vol. 4 : T r a di t i on and Chang e i n
T he r av ada B ud d hi s m , E. J . B r i l l , L ei den T he Net her l ands , 1973, p. 39.
5 7
businessmen, teachers, lecturers, s tudents, writers and ar tis ts who have any
sig nif icant decision- making power in the process of moder nis ation. As a teacher of a
moder nist inter pr etation of Buddhis m B uddhadas as main audience and supporters
are f ound among st Buddhis ts who are ex plicitly concerned with the issues of
T hail ands moder nis ation and of the count r y s socio- economic dev elopment. Nearly
all Buddhadas as supporter s are member s of the numer ically s mall urban- based T hai
elite who dominate the countr y politically , economically and cultur ally . Fur ther mor e,
B uddhadas as supporters are dr awn f r om only specif i c sections of the elite and it is
impor t ant to note t hat while small in absolute ter ms the g r oup contr olling and
manag ing T hail ands political, economic, educational and cultur al life is s till highly
heterogeneous, being ver tically split into a hierarchy based on relative power and
later ally s plit at each level of t hat hierarchy by conf licting ideological allegiances
and political perceptions. Wilson has div ided the T hai elite into three hier archical
tier s 17 which make up a py r amid of power and inf luence. He locates a s mall group
of ten to f if teen people - mil itar y commander s, civ ilian political leaders and some
ar istocr atic figures - at the top of this py r amid. These are the people who are
potentially capable of dominat ing the elite and thereby the rest of the countr y
because of their access to and abil ity to manipulat e key political forces. T he second
tier of the T hai elite isolated by Wils on is made up of about one thousand senior
f igures - high r anking ar med forces officers, special grade civil servants, some
par liamentar y leaders and a few powerf ul businessmen. T he thir d level, at the base
of the py r amid, are, in the words of Daniel Wi t ,
T he educated, interested and r easonably ar ticulate thousands of persons
resident in Bang kok and a few pr ov incial towns who, whether within or
w ithout the public bur eaucr acy , are the T hai equiv alent of the middle
classes ... composed of high school and univer s ity gr aduates and their
equiv alent, most are middle- level bur eaucr ats with lesser number s of
prof essional and white collar personnel, writers and j our nalis ts and
businessmen. They are attuned to the political cur r ents and are even willing
to be cr itical, but few are anx ious for r ev olutionar y chang es.18
A par t f rom divisions arising f rom personal allegiances to one or other powerful
mil it ar y , bur eaucr atic or political patr on (a s ig nif icant f eature of all T hai political
and bur eaucr atic life) there are def inite ideological and political divisions within the
elite between t r adit ional is t and progressive groups. For both the tr adit ional is t and
progressive sections of the elite the same complex of issues f ocussing on national
17
Da v i d W i l s on, P ol it i c s i n T ha i l a nd, Cor nel l Uni v er s i t y Pr es s, I t ha c a N . Y . , 1962, pp. 60- 67.
1 8 W i t , p. 10 3.
dev elopment, nationalis m, Buddhis m and appr opr iate national political f orms
dominate intellectual debate, but both sections s y s tematically disagree on each of
these issues. In br ief the tr adit ional is t sections of the T hai elite s uppor t strong links
with Western countries and reliance upon Wester n models of dev elopment based
upon s ig nif icant foreign inv es tment together with an opening of the economy to high
levels of f oreign business penetr ation. T he progressives, while not necessarily in
disag r eement with the basic capitalis t model of socio- economic dev elopment, are
more openly cr itical of the deleterious cultur al and economic effects of unrestr icted
reliance upon the West. In contr ast they tend to s uppor t the idea of a Thai- based
model of dev elopment which refers to Buddhis t r ather than to capitalis t par adig ms .
T his emphasis on a Buddhist- based economic f r amewor k for development is reflected
*
in such books as Setthasat Choeng Phut ( " I ViVlS11 Buddhis t
Economics ){ T ) 19 a tr ans lation and commentar y upon E.F. Schumacher s S mal l is
B e aut i f ul , and in articles such as Wis it Wang w iny us "T han P hut t hat K ap
<
S etthas at Chaw P hut " ( " VHUIJVrS VlTdnll I PIT Ujtf nf if lT f lnr r j V f f i"
"B uddhadas a and Buddhis t Economics ")(T )20
T he t r adit ional is t s economic and technological reliance upon the West is
associated w:it h a vehement oppos ition to communis m; the f ir ing of a strong T hai
nat ional is m among the populace to resist communis t ideological inf iltr ation;
maint aining political and militar y links with the W7est, par ticular ly A mer ica; and a
preference for a str ong, centralised militar y - backed if not military - led g overnment in
Bang kok. T he progressives on the other hand seek to develop and strengthen T hai
national identity as a cultur al barr ier to Wester n and J apanese as well as
communis t incur sions into T hai socio- cultural tr aditions . T he progressives seek an
5 8
19
C h a w A s ok ( i m f l l f i n ) (t r ans ) , S e t t ha s a t Choeng P hut
B uddhi s t E c o no mi c s ), in K hui a m L om- lew K hor ng S e t t ha s a t
-* 1 */ * '
S a ma y M a i P hr or Ma i S oncai S e t t has at Choe ng P hut
\
T he Col l aps e o f Mode r n E c onomi c s Becaus e o f the L ack o f Inte r e s t i n
B uddhi s t E c o no mi c s ), M ul a ni t hi T l i a mma s a n t* O l f i U f i T i J T l i m i f l ), B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 98 2): bei ng
v
a par t i al t r ans l at i on of and c omme nt ar y upon E. F . S c huma c he r 's S ma l l is B e a ut i f ul .
20 W i s i t Wa ng w i ny u ( "T ha n P hut t ha t ha t K a p S e t t ha s a t Chaw P h u t '
( 11 Yil ViT) VlH U I f i ? H 5) fl*") Fl J *2 *) 0 ifii VT5 ** "B uddha da s a a nd B uddhi s t Ec onomi c s ") ,
in K ha na k a mma k a n Sas a na P hy a K a n- pha t a na ( P M S f l J T Uf i I T f t t f i i i n I V i f t f l 1 J Y f i S l i n )
(ed) (no i ndi v i dua l edi t or g i v e n) , P hut t ha t ha t K a p K ho n R un M a i
B uddha da s a a nd the New G e ne r a t i on), Mul a ni t hi K omol
1 " ^ 4
K hl mt ho r ng ( U f l l i f i I H l i f l P l UV I B 'l ), B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 9 82), p. 24f f .
Jl
independent r ather than a der ivative T hai cultur al identity and s uppor t inter nal
political democracy as a vehicle for social j us tice w ithin the countr y . The
progressives among the T hai elite are thus by and large liber als and democrats,
with a strong commit ment to establishing T hail ands political, economic and cultur al
independence w'ithin the moder n global order. These progressives can in many ways
be identif ied as the T hai intellig ents ia, consisting mainly of univer sity and college
teachers, s tudents, writers, ar tis ts, some labour leaders, some outspoken monks such
as Buddhadas a, and lower r anking but educated g over nment of f icials committed to
national development.
A large pr opor tion of the progressive section of the T hai elite are members of
w hat Ben A nder son calls the "new bourgeois s t r at a", which has grown r apidly in
size as a result of s ubs tantial post Wor ld War II A mer ican and J apanese inv estment
in T hailand. A nder son says t hat this "new bour g eois" is,
r ather small and f rail to be sure, but in s ig nif icant respects [it is] outside
of and par tial ly antag onis tic to the old f eudal- bur eaucr atic class.21
The new bourgeois consists of adminis tr ativ e, ex ecutive and manag er ial
workers, prof essionals and technicians, and service and recreation workers, most of
whom have received some level of ter tiar y education. While str ictly speaking neither
r adical nor lef tist this new bourgeois stands in some degree of opposition to the
t r adit ional mil it ar y , bur eaucr atic and ar istocr atic T hai elite whose established
interests are of ten seen as hinder ing the new bour geois social mobility and
adv ancement.
A par t f rom a couple of brief interludes, such as the 1973- 1976 period of
civ ilian g over nment, it has been the tr aditional is ts who have dominated the T hai
political scene since the 1932 r ev olution. More of ten than not the progressive
member s of the T hai elite have been in a def ensive r ather t han offensive position. In
ter ms of Wil s ons conception of the T hai elites three tiered py r amidal structur e the
top rung and most of the positions of the middle r ung are dominated by
t r aditional is ts and their suppor ter s. Mos t progressives are isolated f rom any real
exercise of power, being in the thir d and lowest r ung of the elite hier archy , only a
very few manag ing to establish themselves in inf luential middle level manag ement or
decision- making positions.
T he Buddhis t hierarchy of monks or s ahg ha has inev itably but often
unwilling ly become involved in the theor etical and political tension and conf licts
2 1 .
Ben A n d e r s o n , "Wi t hdr a w a l S y mpt oms : Soci al and Cul t ur a l A s pect s of t he Oct ober 6 C o up , in
B ul l e t i n o f Concer ned A s i a n S c hol a r s , V ol . 9 No. 3 J u l y - Sept . 1977, p . 13.
6 0
between the tr adit ional is t and progressive sections of the T hai elite. As already
outlined ins t it utional Buddhis m in T hail and is alig ned with and has been moulded
by successive conservative regimes as a religious leg itimation of those regimes
political policies. T he progressive elements of the T hai elite are as a consequence as
dissatisf ied with the conservative s ahg ha hierarchy as they are with the var ious
regimes which have manipulated the of f icial clerical r epresentatives of Buddhis m.
Because of the association of the s ahg ha with the dominant conservative, mil it ar is t
and monar chis t sections of the elite any sig nif icant r e- inter pr etation or ref or m of
Buddhis t doctr ine or pr actice which broke or weakened this politico- religious r elation
could not but have political implications . A nd indeed the various cr iticisms of
B uddhadas as re- inter pretations of doctr ine discussed in succeeding chapters have as
much basis in political disputes between the t r adit ional is t and progressive sections of
the T hai elite as in disputes over s tr ictly doctr inal matter s.
Indeed, a s ig nif icant deter minant of the hig h degree of s uppor t for
B uddhadas as r e- interpretative work f r om progressive sections of the elite derives
f r om his dissociation f r om the conser vatively aligned s ahg ha hierarchy . Progressive
T hai Buddhis ts also s uppor t Buddhadas a because of his commit ment to a Buddhist-
based notion of dev elopment which is f ounded upon a cr itique of the t r adit ional
inter pr etations of the religion sponsored by both the of f icial s ahg ha hierarchy and
the maj or ity of the tr adit ional is t sections of the elite. Seri Phong phit , an academic
philosopher , notes Buddhadas as popular ity among progressive intellectuals as f ollows,
His [ Buddhadas as] line of thoug ht has an inf luence on a large number of
T hai intellectuals , thinker s and waiters and he seems to be accepted and
admir ed by intellectuals more than by other groups, especially since 14th
October 197322 when his t houg ht - as presented by himself and by others -
has become increasingly clearly concerned with social and political
af f air s .(T )23
For progressive T hais Buddhadas as reforms have great socio- cultural
22
O n 14t h Oct obe r 1973 t he r eg i me of T ha noni K i t t i k a chor n was t oppl e d af t er s ev er al day s of s t udent -
l ed r i ot i ng in B a ng k ok . T he per i od f r om Oct obe r 1973 un t i l Oct obe r 1976 saw a br ief , t ur bul e nt
l i be r al i s at i on of T ha i soci et y unde r a series of popul a r l y el ect ed g ov e r nme nt s . Mi l i t a r y r ul e was re
es t abl i s he d by a v i ol ent coup in Oct obe r 1976.
2 3 . ^
S e r i P hong phi t ( I $ J Vt>3 1*1VJPi "T ha mma K a p K an- my a ng : T ha n P hut t ha t ha t K a p
S a ng k hom T ha i " ( Mf J J J j - f UJ f) 0 J I - V mUV Il /l U V n f i m j f f t Pi I I I VlU "Dha mma
a nd Pol i t i cs : B uddha da s a and T ha i S ocei t y "), in K ha na k a mma k a n S a s a na P hy a K a n- pha t a na
T ha n P hut t ha t ha t N a i T ha t s ana K hor ng
Na k w i c ha k a n ( " v i ' w t m v i n $ 1 m v f m i r m u n w i n n i B uddha da s a i n the
View o f A ca de mi cs ), B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 9 8 2) p. 33.
61
signif icance f or he is regarded as aiding efforts to def ine "T hai- ness" and national
identity in ter ms other than the j ing ois tic ideal pr opounded by the T hai mil itar y
and monar chy . T he progressives desire a new T hai Buddhis t identity which both
def ines their cultur al uniqueness and their place in the wor ld. T his desire is
ex pressed by Phr a Pr acha Pas annat hammo, a f ollower of Buddhadas a, who in a
paper entitled "T han P hut t hat ha t K ap P at iw at Wa t t ha nat ha m"
( w ? Un ) or "B uddhadas a and Cul t ur al
Re v ol ut i on"(T )24 gives one chapter section the heading , "Ek alak s ana K hor ng T hai
Lae Sakon- niy om Baep P hut " ^ S'j't VlilU^Z$ ''Ifift'UtJllUlJlJIAj 11 j
or "T hai Identity and Buddhis t Int e r nat ional is m"(T )2. Phr a Pr acha ex plains the
cultur al impor tance attached to B uddhadas as work when he says,
He [ Buddhadasa] enjoins us to see the value of a "T hai- ness" which is
not s imply a r etur n to the former nat ional or self - inf atuation t hat we are,
or are of, a nation which is more ex cellent than and superior to other
nations. A nd it is dif f erent f r om the superf icial national is m of Rama V I
[ King Wachir awut] and the mad nat ional is m cur rent in the time of Field
Mar shal Phibul Song k hr am26. A nd it is also dif f erent f r om the
contempor ar y of f icial pr opag anda [ about T hai national identity] which is
only the refuse of "T hai- ness" and which does not lead to an under s tanding
of the core [of being Thai] itself.
T he f act t hat contempor ar y T hais have been separated f rom their
"T haines s ", t hat they feel alienated and have lost a sense of pride in their
own countr y , is because the social leaders of the past one hundr ed years
have not used their intellect to seriously question the tr ue char acter of our
identity . Because they have been blindly f ollowing the tails of the f arang
[ Westerners] Indian- f ile ... Buddhadas a is an impor tant person who points
out what is the tr ue core of being T hai t hat we s hould pr otect, that we
should be pr oud of and should s uppor t and nur tur e. A t the same time he
does not ref rain f r om cr iticising our weak points ... but what is even more
impor t ant is t hat he is a person who can progress f r om "T haines s" thr oug h
Buddhis m to also be a univer salist. I regard this as f inding the most
appr opr iate ty pe of ide nt it y . (T )27
Phr a Pr acha thus sees Buddhadas a as pr ov iding a T hai- Buddhist base for an
inter national identity .
24 ( P hr a ) P r a c h a P a s a nna t ha mmo ( ( yj J ~ ) j j J l l t l l i l i 2 J J 1 U )> T ha n P hut t ha t ha t K a p
f '
P a t i w a t W a t t ha n a t ha m B uddha da s a and t he
Cul t ur a l Re v ol ut i o n") , bei ng a cha pt e r in Si Nak - k hit R ua m S a ma y ( ^l i P l Pl f ) T ^U t l 34LI
F our Cont e mpor a r y T hi nk e r s ), by t he s ame aut hor , S a mna k - phi m T hi a nw a n, B a ng k ok , 2526 (1 98 3), pp. 1- 61.
2 ^ i b i d. p. 50.
26P hi bun S ong k hr a m was a mi l i t ar y r ul er of T ha i l a nd in t he 1950s.
2 7 i bi d. pp. 50- 51.
T hai B uddhis ms ins t it utional role in leg itimating the tr adit ional is t military -
monar chis t elite has created disenchantment with of f icial Buddhis m among the rising
middle and intellectual classes, who are outside of the old system of
sang/m- monar chy - military - bur eaucr acy alliances. T he rising classes are seeking an
alter nativ e def inition and appr oach to Buddhis m which can be used both to oppose
the t r adit ional religio- social order which l imits their chances for adv ancement and to
s imultaneous ly pr omote their own interests and view of the wor ld. In this s ituation
of conf lict Buddhadas as moder nist doctr inal ref orms have been taken up as an
impor t ant component of the alter nativ e Buddhis t ideology soug ht by the T hai
middle classes or new bourgeois.
2.4.2 B uddha da s a s B a c k g r ound and R e l a t i o n t o t he T ha i Ne w B our g eois .
It is s ig nif icant t hat Buddhadas as f amily backg r ound and educational
ex perience reveal him to be a member of the section of T hai society which today
cons titutes his largest audience, the lower r ung of the educated elite. Buddhadas a
w'as born in 190628 into a commer cial f amily whose members appear to have hig hly
v alued education and social adv ancement thr oug h the tr aditional ly recognised
channels of the monkhood and the gov er nment service. For ex ample, Buddhadas as
y ounger br other , Dhammadas a, was educated at Chulalong kor n University in
Bang kok, the most pr estigious ter tiar y ins t it ut ion in the countr y which was
established in the f irst decades of this centur y for the purpose of pr ov iding T hais
with the t r aining necessary to occupy posts in the ex panding gover nment
bur eaucr acy of the newly moder nising countr y .
Dhammadas a appears to have had a major inf luence on Buddhadas a and to
have taken as keen if not keener an interest in Buddhis m as his older br other .
Dhammadas a was par ticular ly impressed by the pr opag ation of Buddhis m in the
West by J apanese and Ceylonese Buddhis ts . In letters wr itten to Buddhadas a while
he was a s tudent at Chulalong kor n Univ er sity Dhammadas a appears somew'hat
amazed by these Buddhis t missionar y efforts,
Our Buddhis m mus t cer tainly have s omething good, enough to be able to
boast to the f arangs about i t . ( T ) 29
Foreigners who used to hold to other r eligions have become interested in
Buddhis m, and devote their time and energy to pr opag ating it and making
it widespread. Why then dont we T hai, who are true Buddhis ts , think to
28
For f ur t her bi og r a phi cal de t a i l s on B uddha da s a see A ppe ndi x II
29 . . .
"Ci t e d by C h i t P hi ba nt ha e n, p . 103.
6 3
do as the f or eig ner s? (T )30
When he r etur ned to manag e the f amily business in Phumr iang near Chaiy a in
1929 Dhammadas a continued his interest in Buddhis m by s etting up a small lending
l ibr ar y on Buddhis m at the f amily store. He also s tar ted a Buddhis t discussion
g r oup which he called the K hana S ont hanat ham ( pitUi $14 VFli'VB T111 )>
"T he Dhamma Discussion Gr oup", and which in later years developed into the
T hammat han Mul anit hi ( UJ the Dhammadana Foundation.
B ut in addition to his br other B uddhadas as intellectual dir ection was also
inf luenced by events dur ing his stay in Bang kok at the beg inning of the 1930s,
when he attempted to obtain an ecclesiastical degree. A t the time Buddhadas a was
in Bang kok one Nar in Phas it ar ranged for his daug hter s to become s amaner i or
novice nuns. It was Nar ins wish to pr omote the dha mma , which he regarded as
hav ing decayed because the s ahg ha no longer had the f ull complement of both
monks and nuns as in the B uddhas time; the of f icial order of T her av ada nuns
hav ing f allen into decay before the T hais became Buddhis t over seven hundr ed years
ago. Nar in also established a temple called Wat Nar iwong for nuns in his att empt
to revive the t r adit ion of female or dination. Nar in contacted the K hana
S ont hanat ham seeking s uppor t for his moves, because under Dhammadas as
leadership and f requent letter wr iting to newspapers and jour nals his discussion
g r oup had become widely known as being interested in ref or ming Buddhis m.
Dhammadas a at f irst suppor ted Nar in and inf or med him of Buddhadas as own
r ef or mist interests. However, Buddhadas a disagreed with Nar in, appar ently not so
much because of doctr inal differences as because he felt the way Narin had gone
about his project of re- establishing the T her av ada order of nuns amounted to an
attack on the s anctity of the sahg ha.
Nar in and his ideas were generally criticised and his project was f inally
abandoned because of the vehemence of opos ition both f r om within and outside the
s ahg ha. Y et despite his opposition to the project Buddhadas a seems to have been
deeply aff ected by the Nar in episode. He became concerned t hat people like Nar in
could so easily criticise the s ahg ha and was led to consider what lackings there
mus t be in the T hai monkhood t hat lef t it so open to attack. T he pr oblem of the
deg ener ation fo the s ahg ha occupied Buddhadas a more and more and he began a
deeper personal study of the scriptures in an att empt to glean the B uddhas actual
intentions and teachings, and to j udg e the moder n s aiig ha ag ains t them.
While cur r ent issues such as moder nis ation and socio- economic development no
30., . , .
i bi d. p . 114
6 4
doubt occupied Buddhadas as mind at this time, and became more pronounced in
his wr iting s with the passage of the years, in and of themselves these were not the
or ig inal mot iv at ing force behind his ref or mist efforts. Rather , f r om his position
inside the s ahg ha he appears to have been more concerned with pr eventing the
attacks of such moder nist laypersons as Nar in. In coming to regard Nar ins and
other s criticisms of the T hai sahg ha as f lowing f r om a decay or degener ation of the
monkhood Buddhadas a also accepted the moder nis t values which under lay those
criticisms. However, like any true conser vative he saw the s olution to the
degener ation of T hai Buddhis m as not ly ing in a one- sided accommodation of the
s ahg ha to moder nis t views. Instead Buddhadas a soug ht to pur if y Buddhis m by
r etur ning to the or ig inal teachings and ins tr uctions of the Buddha. He thoug ht t hat
because the s ahg ha had so degenerated as to become the object of attacks f r om the
lay populace the or ig inal teachings mus t have been lost or at least suffered
mis inter pr etation. In Buddhadas as view cr iticis ms t hat the s ahg ha was out of line
with contempor ar y society, and even a r etar ding and negative social influence, were
not to be met by simply modernising the monkhood. Wit h f aith in the univ er sality
of the B uddhas message of s alv ation Buddhadas a t houg ht t hat once the or ig inal
f or m of Buddhis m was ref ound and expressed anew the r elig ions univer sal and thus
cur r ent relevance would once ag ain become tr ans par ently clear.
However, over and above these events it is also impor tant to note t hat
Buddhadas a received encouragement f rom his f amily when it became clear t hat he
wished to utilise his obvious intellectual talents in the religious domain. Because of
his f amily backg r ound Buddhadas a would have had a keen personal awareness of the
as pir ations of upwar dly mobile but non- aristocr atic educated T hais, the new
bourgeois. T his is shown by his strong identif ication with the bureaucrats and
j unior ar my officers who together overthrew the absolute T hai monar chy in 1932 in
order to establish a popular g over nment under a r econstituted cons titutional
monar chy . Buddhadas a saw a close r elation between the political r ev olution of 1932
and his own mission to ref orm Buddhis t teaching s and practice, which began in the
same year,
In the countr y there was a r ev olution, a ref or m concerning the governing
of the land; for we temple- dwellers, we religious, there was the intention to
r evolutionise or ref orm activ ities r elating to religion. We wanted the
r ev ival, pr omotion, study and practice of r eligion, to impr ov e it to the
ex tent t hat it could be called a r ef or m.(T )31
31 P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha l a e ng k a n S ua n Mok 50 P i ( n f| ^ Uf l 'f l 5 0 l l M C o mmuni que
on the F i f t i e t h A nni v e r s a r y o f S ua n Mo k ) , S a mnak - phi m Suk l i a phap- cai , B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 98 2), p. 2.
Kirsch has observed t hat the rising T hai commer cial and adminis tr ativ e classes
have been the strongest suppor ter s of religious moder nis ation and ref orm since the
last century . He says t hat the religious ref orms of K ing Mong k ut (Rama IV ) -
ref orms which I argued above f or m a basis for Buddhadas as own re- inter pretations -
received their strongest s uppor t f rom,
among the gr oup of local leaders, schoolteachers, store keepers, and a
nascent g r oup of local tr ader s who are also oriented to national concerns
and are the innov ator s and modernisers of village society. T his s ituation
suggests t hat there is a social and psy chological "f it " between a
moder nising and national outlook among local leaders and the [ particular]
Buddhis t or ientation fostered by Mong k ut s moder nising r ef or ms.32
T hat is, it is those T hais who, thr oug h higher education or ex perience of
socio- economic dev elopment, have come to perceive their place and the place of their
countr y in a broader, more inter national or g lobal perspective who are the most
dissatisf ied with the t r adit ional inter pr etation and practice of Buddhis m and who are
the strongest supporters of moder nising religious reforms.
T he str ong s uppor t for Buddhadas as views f rom members of the new T hai
bourgeois is due to the ref lection in his work of the social, political and religious
issues which preoccupy the educated T hai middle class. In his various reforms of
doctr ine and teaching Buddhadas a has not only addressed what he sees as the need
to ref or m T hai Buddhis m but also at the same time the new bourgeois perceived
need for religious ref or m. In par ticular Buddhadas as work directly addresses some
dif f icult religious and ideological dilemmas f acing the lay T hai Buddhis t
intellig ents ia.
Since K ing Mong k ut s religious reforms in the middle of the last centur y an
emphasis on doctr inal consistency in Buddhis m has also been appar ent among
progressive sections of the tr adit ional T hai elite. A nd while the over whelming
maj or ity of Buddhadas as suppor ter s are members of the intellig ents ia or the new
bourgeois there are also member s of the t r adit ional elite who adhere strongly to his
views. For ex ample, a f ormer high r anking ar my of ficer, one Major Gener al Dej
32
K i r s c h, "Mo der ni s i ng Impl i c a t i ons of Ni net ee nt h Ce nt ury Ref or ms in t he T ha i S a ng ha ", p. 62.
T ul aw ant hana33 has wr itten a series of books pr omoting Buddhadas as re-
inter pr etations of Buddhis m. Major General Dej f elt t hat the T hai tex ts of
Buddhis m t hat he had read contr adicted the doctr ine of anat t a and the principles of
science, making Buddhis m seem bor ing , conf used, behind the times and,
"inappr opr iate for the new generation of intellectuals who have free knowledge and
free t houg ht ."(T )34 Maj or Gener al Dej says he has wr itten the series of books, all of
which liber ally cite Buddhadas a,
In order to help redeem Buddhis m (so t hat f utur e generations of T hais
will s till f ind Buddhis m in ex istence as their inher itance) before it
disappear s f rom T hail and because of an abandonment of a na t t a . (T )35
Str ictly speaking it is necessary to dis ting uis h two groups within T hai society
who s uppor t Buddhadas as doctr inal r e- inter pretations. T he f irst group consists of
progressive intellectuals or members of the new bourgeois or new g eneration of
y oung er , Western- educated T hais. These people see in Buddhadas as work not only a
scientif ic or r ational presentation of Buddhis m but also the f oundations of an
alter nativ e T hai Buddhis t identity and an alter nativ e T hai society which embodies
notions of democracy and justice. T he second, much smaller gr oup, ex emplif ied by
Maj or Gener al Dej, is well- entrenched in the t r adit ional T hai elite and sees in
B uddhadas as work not the basis of an alter nativ e T hailand but rather simply a
r ational, non- superstitious Buddhis m. T his second g r oup are moder nist to the ex tent
of dis par ag ing "s uper s titious ", animis t and Br ahmanical aspects of T hai religion but
in general are not interested in r ef or ming the contempor ar y social order in any
s ig nif icant way . In contr ast the new generation of Buddhis ts see their religion as a
social f aith capable of re- establishing pride in T hai identity and of assisting in the
progressive moder nis ation of T hai society. In this study the analy tical focus is on
33
Ma j o r Gener a] Dej T ul a w a nt ha na 's ( i m f i e m T m i r ) b ooks pr ov i de t he f ol l owi ng
bi og r a phi cal i nf or mat i on. He w'as bor n in 1915 (2458) and was e ducat e d in T hai l and. A f t e r g r a dua t i ng
f r om mi l i t a r y s chool in 1933 (2476) t ook up a c omma nd as a s econd l i e ut e nant ( ) i n t he
ar t i l l er y . He s ubs equent l y ma de obs er v at i on t our s over s eas and has had per s onal i nter es t s i n pol i t i cs ,
mi l i t a r y s t udi es , economi cs and s oci al ps y chol og y , whi ch he has f ol l owed up i n sever al Eur ope a n count r i es
at his own ex pens e. He has al so been a me mbe r of ma ny ci v i l i a n commi t t ee s and or g ani s at i ons , mos t
not a bl y t he T ha i Nat i onal Or g ani s a t i on f or t he P r omot i on of Spor t .
^ 4 - . *1 . . . .
( P ho l . T r i ) Det T ul a w a nt ha na I P l ^ Z\ T l i I )> R i a n P hut t ha s a s a na Y ang
P a ny a c hon - L e m i ( I ? [ } UYJ Yf fi ^ l f t i t m U ~ I f i U 1 11 - S t udy B uddhi s m L ik e a n
1 - *
Int e l l e c t ua l - B ook i ), Bor i s at T ha i I. E. , B ang k ok , 2526 (1 9 83), I nt r oduc t i on.
6 7
B uddhadas as supporter s among the new bourgeois r ather than in the T hai
establishment. T his is because it is the members of the intellig ents ia and new
bourgeois who are the most vocal supporters of Buddhadas as work and who have
done the most to pr omote his ideas and inter pr etations of doctr ine. While there are
isolated members of the mil itar y and other t r adit ional ly priv ileged and powerf ul
sections of T hai society who sponsor Buddhadas as moder nist appr oach, unlike the
new bourgeois they do not f or m a unif ied g r ouping and in general de- emphasise the
ideological component of his wor k.
2.4.3 Re l i g i ous a nd Ide ol og i cal Di l e mma s F a c i ng Pr og r es s iv e L ay T hai
B uddhi s t s .
T he life of the moder n T hai ur ban dweller, pervasively inf luenced by the
"r ev olution of rising ex pectations ", the ethic of progress and the spoils of moder nity ,
is r adically dif f er ent f r om the tr adit ional ways of liv ing for which Buddhis m, the
religion of over ninety five percent of T hais, has tr aditional ly provided the
integ r ativ e value system. As a consequence there is a gr owing questioning of the
relevance of Buddhis m to the new T hai society now in the process of developing.
More and more T hais, especially among the progressive educated urban dwellers, are
questioning the apr opr iateness of Buddhis t practices and doctrines which developed
f r om and were directed towar ds an altogether dif f erent social order. Siddhi Butr - Indr
echoes the feelings of many think ing T hai Buddhis ts when he says,
Unless the s pir itual principles of religion can be tr ans lated in terms of
social ideals, values and interests or can inf luence wor ldly aff airs, they will
not sur vive as far as society as a whole is concer ned.3
Social moder nis ation has raised two br oad sets of issues for t r adit ional
Buddhis m. A t the social or ins t it utional level the question is whether a religion
which has t r adit ional ly legitimised the largely s tatic socio- economic and political
str uctur es of T hai society can be re- interpreted and utilised to provide ideological
s uppor t for and leg itimation of f undamental social change. A nd secondly, at the
level of personal ethics Buddhis ts suppor tiv e of moder nis ation mus t deal with the
f act t hat Buddhis t teachings have tr aditional ly def ined mater ial values as ul timatel y
being in oppos ition with the religious ideal of tr anscendent enlig htenment or
nibbana. As Rupp observes, for a religious system to r emain viable in a moder nising
twentieth centur y society it cannot avoid the issue of the religious signif icance of,
"ma ns increasing capacity to shape his personal and cor por ate life within the sphere
36S i ddhi B u t r - I n d r , T he S ocial Phil os ophy o f B uddhi s m, Ma ha ma k u t B uddhi s t Uni v er s i t y Pr ess,
B a ng k ok , 1979, p. 8.
of phenomena] ex istence."37 T his ethical pr oblem can be summar ised as whether, in
at t ai ning s alv ation f r om suf f ering, the emphasis of religion should be on adjus ting
ones desires to the reality of a hostile wor ld - or whether it should be on chang ing
the wor ld to f it in with ones desires. Under ly ing the doctr inal ref orms of
B uddhadas a can be seen a desire to establish the pur s uit of mater ial well- being as a
r eligious value in its own r ig ht while yet not deny ing or dev aluing the tr aditional
s pir it ual verities. Buddhadas a thus tackles the contempor ar y religious dilemma of the
need to resolve the conf lict between upholding the tr aditional approaches to
B uddhis t teaching and practice, and risk seeing Buddhis m become increasingly
socially ir r elevant, and accepting the benef its of moder nis ation and risking the
mater ialis ation of the religion and the consequent loss of its s pir itual values.
T he wish of many intellectual Buddhis ts is for Buddhis m to act as the
ideological f oundation of a r eligious and mor al appr oach to socio- economic
dev elopment, as a unique T hai alter nativ e to both capitalis m and communis m. As
a key focus of T hai nat ional and cultur al identity Buddhis m is regarded as having
the potential of pr ov iding a cultur al and ins t it ut ional link between T hail ands rich
cultur al past and the general hope for a more prosperous but still independent
f utur e. In this contex t the twin demands being placed upon Buddhis m by
progressive intellectuals are f irstly t hat it pr omote or at least s uppor t economic
dev elopment and moder nis ation and secondly t hat it direct a pr imar y emphasis to
the concerns of this wor ld, here and now.
But while these br oad issues of the relevance and place of Buddhis m in
moder n T hailand underlie the pervasive concern of t hink ing Buddhis ts for the f utur e
of their religion most contempor ar y religious analy ses and debates on these points
are couched in much more specific ter ms, in ter ms of the perceived f ailur e of
ins t it ut ional Buddhis m or the T hai s ahg ha to meet the needs of T hai men and
women in the twentieth centur y . It is the s ahg ha, the t r adit ional monastic
or g anis ation of Buddhis m in T hail and, which is the focus of criticisms which arise
f r om the dis illus ionment of the progressive sections of the T hai educated elite with
the intellectual, political and r itualis tic conser v atism of of f icially sponsored
i ns t it ut ional Buddhis m. As Swearer notes,
T he generally low educational level of the average monk and monas tic
pre- occupation with r itual and ceremony has led to widespread alienation of
37
Geor g e R u p p , "T he Re l a t i ons hi p Bet ween Ni r v a na and S a r ns ar a ', in P hil os ophy E a s t and West,
V o l . 21, 1971, p. 67.
the intellig ents ia f r om ins titutional Buddhis m.38
Pun Cong pr as oet, the late f ounder of a lay Buddhis t r evivalist mov ement, T he
Sublime Life Mis s ion39 and long time suppor ter of Buddhadas a concurs with
Swearer s view,
These days the major ity of those who have been or dained are devoid of
knowledge about either the wor ld or dhamma. T his is because they are too
lazy to study and seek out knowledge, and because their only aim is
looking for money . Consequently they are incapable of correctly answering
questions about the dhamma. What those who have been ordained
pr opag ate has in the main become mere ig nor ant nons ens e.(T )40
T he s ahg ha is the focus for cr iticis m because in T her av ada Buddhis m religious
aut hor it y in matter s of doctr inal inter pr etation has t r adit ional ly been centralised in
the hierarchy of monks. Histor ically the Buddhis t lay person has not been regarded
as hav ing sig nif icant religious s tanding , and as a result lay f r ustr ations der iving
f r om the perceived ir relevance of the religion in the face of modern ex pectations
tend to be directed towar ds the t r adit ional holders of s pir itual author ity , the monks.
However, there is an additional counter v ailing f actor in T hai Buddhis m which
would seem to make the development of these lay f r ustr ations and criticisms
unnecessary. T his is the f act t hat Buddhis m has t r adit ional ly had two distinct levels
of ethics and religious ex pectations - one for the wor ld- involved layperson and one
for the r enunciate aspir ing to s pir itual perf ection. Buddhis t lay ethics and practices,
l ok i y a dha mma , have alway s been more wor ldly , encompassing economic, political
and other materia] concerns which would seem well- suited, perhaps with some
r elativ ely minor adj us tments , for g uiding activ ities related to moder nis ation and
socio- economic dev elopment. Siddhi Butr - Indr summar ises the attr ibutes of the ideal
Buddhis t lay person, w'hich are presented in the s ut t as , as being one who,
38
Do n a ld K . S w e a r e r , B hi k k hu B uddha da s a and the B uddhi s t R e f o r ma t i o n i n T ha il a nd, pa mphl e t
publ i s he d by t he Ec ume ni c a l I ns t i t ut e f or S t udy and Di a l og ue, Col ombo Sr i L a nk a, 1982(7), p. 5.
39 . . . . .
T hi s is how P un chose t o t r ans l at e t he na me of his g r oup, t he "K ha na Phoe y phr a e Wi t hi
K an- dar nnoe n Chi w i t A n Pr as oet
I
( m z l u m t M i s n n r F n i i n m f l B U i J j r ), nteraiiy
"S oci e t y f or P r opa g a t i ng t he Me t hod f or L e adi ng One 's Lif e Pe r f ec t l y ".
I
P u n Cong pr as oe t ( l J u ^> 3 i J t r ) (ed), W i ui a t ha Ra w a ng T ha n P hut t ha t ha t P hi k k hu
1 1 ,
K a p M . R . W . K hy k r i t P r a mot Na i Ry a ng Cit- uiang ( U . J . 1
n T j i r a w v m v n a i W l u i
' A Debate Between A4.R. K huk r i t P r a mot a nd T he Rev er end B uddha da s a B hi k k hu on
- - - . . r J '
the A4a tter o f Ci t - w a ng ), Ong k an Py n- f u Ph r a P hut t ha s a s a na ( ^ *4 Pi f ) 1 T ^1
II 1
S a mut pr a k a n T ha i la nd, 2518 (1 9 75 ), p. 24.
69
seeks wealth by lawf ul and non- violent means, in so doing gets ease and
enjoy ment for himself , shares it with others and does mer itor ious deeds,
utilises it w ithout greed and craving, and is guiltless of offence, heedf ul of
danger and alive to his highest v alue.41
Giv en t hat the roles of monk and lay person are ins t it utional l y
compar tmentalis ed and t hat l ok iy adhamma has t r adit ional ly s anctioned active world-
inv olv ement the reasons for some lay T hai intellectuals dis enchantment with
Buddhis m and their cr iticisms of the s ahg ha are not immediately appar ent. T he
source of the dissatisf action in f act lies in the changes which have occurred in many
of the more hig hly educated and socially concerned T hais view of the wor ld and of
their religious aspir ations , changes which have been tak ing place apace with
moder nis ation. T he relatively s mall s tr atum of educated T hais - the teachers,
univ er sity lecturers, g ov er nment of f i cials, writers, ar tis ts and students who have
either studied abr oad or under the Western- modelled T hai ter tiar y education system
and who identif y with the goal of j us t and equitable national development - is the
social group whose values and outlook have come to dif f er most r adically f r om the
t r adit ional T hai conceptions of life and religion. Contempor ar y univer sity educated
and cr itical, t hink ing T hais consider themselves par t of the inter national intellectual
community and as has alr eady been noted accept the Western- derived cr iter ia of
theor etical cr iticis m and ar g umentation and the methodolog ical principles of science
which under pin the technology and know- how being used for moder nis ation. A nd
more impor tantl y , like the Br itish- educated Sinhalese elite in Cey lon, they also judg e
t r adit ional and popular lay Buddhis m by these same Western- derived r ationalis t and
scientif ic s tandar ds, of ten r ejecting or cr iticising it as being super stitious and
uns ubs tantiated by the scriptures. For ex ample, Pun Cong pr as oet often spoke of
moder nis t religious ref orms as being like, "oper ating to remove the cancer of
s uper stition f r om B uddhi s m"(T )42 a cancer he def ined as including among other
thing s , belief in mag ic, s pir it houses, mag ical bracelets and amulets, trances and
s pir it possession and conversing with celestial beings.
T he divergence between popular Buddhis m and the doctr inal religion ascribed
to by many educated T hai Buddhis ts has been appr ar ent for some time. In 1947
4 1 B ut g r - I nd r , p. 39.
42 P u n Cong pr as oe t (ed), T amr a Du Phik s u ( ** ^ I ""IP) Ilf) A Textbook For Observing Monk s ),
Sar nnak - nang s y T ha mma buc ha )U T T 1'IIJ i n ), B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 9 8 2), p. l .
71
one A r ay a Nik or nt hai43 made the f ollowing obser vations in a newspaper article
entitled, "Phut t has as ana Campen Samr ap K hon T hai Ry "
( m v o pnmn y n l l l l i ' " I s Buddhis m Necessary for T hais ? "), a plea
for moder nis ation in T hai Buddhis m,
If we had persisted in f ollowing the ways of our ancestors how could we
have got the cons tit ut ion? 44 T he diff erences between the religious beliefs of
our ancestors and of people today are thus so gr eat t hat we can say there
is a Buddhis m for the people of the past and a Buddhis m for contempor ar y
people.(T )45
V an Esterik notes t hat in desiring to ref or m Buddhis m in accordance with
their moder nis t views progressive T hai intellectuals cut across all the t r adit ional
ins t it ut ional div isions of T hai Buddhis m, appr opr iat ing to themselves not only such
f or mer ly clerical aspects as meditation but even the monar chs t r adit ional role as
upholder of the r eligion,
T he r ef or mation of Buddhis m by laity is a moder n mov ement. Educated
and elite laity have taken up the role nor mally bestowed upon the king, to
pur if y the r eligion and, at the same time to make it relevant to present
day society , as they perceive it. Instead of r estor ing the monkhood, which
many of them denig r ate, they seek "s al v at ion" in a religious inv olv ement
t hat will pur if y each and every indiv idual in the s tate.46
Being lay yet adher ing to a t r adit ional ly clerical, monastic f orm of Buddhis m
means t hat progressive T hai intellectuals face more mor al and ideological tensions
than either the monks, the general populace or the power elite of the aristocracy,
mil it ar y and large business interests. These tensions are manif ested in their
43A r a y a Ni k or nt ha i
T ha i popul a c e ". T bi s as s umed
ar t i cl e ar e hel d by al l "ci v i l i s ed'
44 . . . . - .
T hi s is a r ef er ence t o t he 1932 r ev ol ut i on whi ch abol i s hed t he abs ol ut e monar c hy of K i ng P r a c ha t hi pok
( R a ma V I I ) and es t abl i s hed t he t hen Si am as a c ons t i t ut i ona l monar c hy .
4 ^ A r a y a Ni k or nt ha i ( f m u r u n r l v i L i ), "P hut t ha s a s a na Ca mpe n S a mr a p K hon T ha i Ry "
V UJ V UQ" "Is B uddhi s m Neces s ar y f or T ha i s ? ") , ci t ed i n A r u n
We t c ha s uw a n ( Q n u n w n t u ) i n S ua n Mo k - My a ng Cha t y a L ae P hut t ha t ha t P hi k k hu
S ua n Mok , C ha i y a and
B uddha da s a B h i k k h u), 3 r d pr i nt i ng , S a mnak - phi m P hr a e P hi t ha y a f i JJVll LITAI J Vll 1/1LI ^ ) t B a ng k ok ,
2524 (1 98 1 ), p. 294.
N. b. T he f act t ha t t hi s quot e by A r a y a Ni k or nt ha i is c ont a i ne d in a bi og r a phy of B uddha da s a s ug g est s
t ha t t he a ut ho r was ei t her a s uppor t e r of B uddha da s a or s omeone who hol ds s i mi l ar vi ews. It is unl i k el y
t ha t B uddha da s a hi ms el f was t he a ut hor as he us ual l y s igns his na me t o his own wor ks .
46
J o hn L aur i e r V a n E s t e r i k , C ul t ur a l Int e r pr e t a t i o n o f C a no n i c a l Par adox - L a y Me di t a t i o n i n a
C e nt r a l T ha i V il l ag e, P h. D. t hes is , Uni v er s i t y of I l l i nois at Ur ba na - Cha mpa i g n, Uni v er s i t y Mi c r of i l m
I nt e r na t i o na l , A nn A r bor Mi c hi g a n, 1977, p. 172.
vj
T i nT l V1L1 ) j s a nom- de- pl ume whi ch l it er al l y means "t he ci vi l i sed
na me was obv i ous l y i nt e nde d to i mpl y t ha t t he vi ews cont a i ne d in t he
(r ead "mode r ni s t i c ") T hai s .
dis enchantment with the t r adit ional religion. In contr ast to the religious
conser v atism of most other sections of T hai society those T hais who br ing the
cr itical insights of their Western- sty led education to bear on the problems of
contempor ar y T hai society and r eligion mus t deal with the f ull force of the
ideolog ical conf lict generated by placing moder nis t mater ial demands and
ex pectations for social dev elopment on a system of religious doctr ine which grew
f r om a pre- modern social order and which s oug ht an altog ether other- worldly goal.
For ex ample, there is a pr onounced tension between the ul timat e religious goal of
mbbana, now appr opr iated by many lay Buddhis t intellectuals as their pr iv ate
r eligious ideal, and the t r adit ional T her av ada inter pr etation of nibbana as a pur if ied
mental state obtainable only by years if not lif etimes of intense mor al and
meditativ e eff ort under taken in seclusion away f r om everyday social inter action. T his
is only one of a number of f undamental tensions which result f r om educated
l ay mens and lay womens rejection of the t r adit ional ly def ined lay system of
Buddhis t belief and pr actice and their consequent attempts to hold to the clerical
system of religious practice and doctr ine, which has been ex clusively monas tic for
over two millenia.
However, the tr adit ional s epar ation of lay Buddhis m f rom the clerical f or m of
the religion means t hat educated lay Buddhis ts face a pr actical dilemma in addition
to the theoretical pr oblem of developing a doctr inally pure religion by r emoving
what are seen as non- Buddhist accretions. Under ly ing this pr actical dilemma is the
his tor ical restriction of dha mma or religious studies to the leisured scholar monks.
B ut more f undamental is the pr oblem that accor ding to the clerical tr adition now
inclined towar ds by the educated laity a wor ld- involved layperson is regarded as
lacking the religious a ut ho r i t y necessary to develop acceptable re- inter pretations of
B uddhis m. While desiring to ref or m or purif y Buddhis m the cr itical lay Buddhis t
lacks the religious s tatus needed to author ise any s ig nif icant re- inter pretations. Only
the clergy possess such author ity but as already noted the s ahg ha is by and large
conser vative with few monks f eeling any r esponsibility to adj us t either the
inter pr etation of the dha mma or their own practice of the v inay a to suit the
moder nis t pr edilections of a cr itical intellectual minor ity .
T he continuing acceptance of this t r adit ional centr alisation of religious
aut hor it y in the hands of member s of the s ahg ha is reflected in the f act t hat not
even the most radical lay T hai Buddhis ts have suggested t hat they appr opr iate f ull
r eligious author ity to themselves. A mong all the calls for doctr inal pur if ication and
ref orms of the s ahg ha there are no calls for a Pr otestant- like r ef or mation of T hai
Buddhis m. T his reticence of the laity to seek to obtain ex plicit religious author ity
f or themselves is a consequence of the long- standing political suppor t for the
s tr ong ly or thopr actic char acter of Buddhis m, where the greatest religious status is
ascribed to those who mos t str ictly f ollow the ascetic codes of the v inay a, i.e. the
r enunciate monks. T his of f icially recognised and sanctioned t r adit ion of or thopr ax y ,
which denies f ull religious author ity to the laity , is not challenged by even the most
r adical of Buddhis ts because for the laity to appr opr iate the f ull religious author ity
of the clergy would be to under mine the t r adit ional role of the monk and thus the
i ns t it ut ion of the s ahg ha. A nd such action is seen, even by the most cr itical
lay per son, as a thr eat to T hai Buddhis m itself. T his reluctance to do any thing
which mig ht be seen as under mining the s ahg ha, such as an ex plicit lay ass umption
of religious author ity , f ollows f r om the s ahg ha being included as an inalienable par t
of one of the most centr al of all Buddhis t articles of belief. T his is the B uddhas
pr onouncement t hat all those who seek s alv ation f r om suf f ering should maint ain
f ait h, s addha, in the three unimpeachable jewels, t i r a t a na , of: the Buddha, the
dha mma and the s ahg ha47. It is out of the question for a doctr inally str ict lay
Buddhis t to breach such a centr al canonically recorded doctr ine by ar r og ating to
him or herself the s pir itual author ity invested in the s ahg ha and vouchsaf ed by the
B uddha s own recorded words.
What the cr itical Buddhis t lay per son, caug ht at the crossroads of a clerical
ideology and wor ldly inv olv ement, would therefore seem to require is a monk,
pref er ably with a r eputation for both scholar ship and pr actical insig ht, to develop a
new outlook upon Buddhis m on their behalf . For as outlined above educated lay
Buddhis ts face doctr inal and pr actical dilemmas which they as laypersons cannot
resolve. I suggest t hat a key to under s tanding the signif icance of many of
B uddhadas as doctr inal re- inter pretations lies in realising t hat both his teachings and
his per sonal his tor y , as a r enunciate monk, meet the pressing social and religious
needs of t hat g r oup of educated T hai Buddhis ts who desire a Buddhis m which is
consistent with their moder nis t view of the wor ld and with their roles as agents of
their count r y s socio- economic dev elopment. In ex plicating Buddhadas as wor k I will
of ten r etur n to this ar g ument, t hat the centr al aspects of his re- inter pretations of
B uddhis m, whatever their doctr inal author ity or s pir itual v alidit y , can also be seen
as f ulf il ling the needs of moder nis t T hais looking for a Buddhis m consonant with
their social aspir ations for a moder nised, developed T hail and.
It is tr ue t hat as a monk Buddhadas a is not dir ectly affected by the pr actical
dilemmas of cr itical lay Buddhis ts who are denied f ull religious author ity , and so
73
AI , , #
T hi s pr onouncement occur s i n t he D h a m m a d i n n a S ut t a , S a my ut t a N i k a y a ,
V ol . 19 / ver ses 1625 - 16 2 6 /pp. 4 04 - 405.
the innovativeness of his doctr inal r e- interpretations cannot be regarded as hav ing
been directly deter mined by these tensions. However, as noted Buddhadas a is by
bir t h and rearing a member of the social g r oup who now cons titute his largest
audience. While sections of Buddhadas as work can be seen as str aig htf or war d
att empt s to demy thologise or r ationalise Buddhis t teachings other sections of his
wor k are ex plicitly concerned with the social and political role of Buddhis m in
moder n T hail and. T his social aspect of Buddhadas as work clearly shows t hat he
shares the concerns of his lay audience and t hat he does feel responsible to develop
a moder nis t inter pr etation of the religion which is r elevant and directed to resolving
the dilemmas faced by lay Buddhis ts . Buddhadas a thus sy mpathises with his lay
suppor ter s and is ex plicitly concerned to deal with their dif f iculties in his work.
Consequently it mus t be acknowledged t hat Buddhadas as work is a response not
only to intellectual moder nist or r ationalis t trends but also to the religious and
ideological dilemmas faced by the rising new bourgeois s tr atum of T hai society, of
which Buddhadas a is himself a member.
2.5 T he T r a di t i ona l Bases of Re l i g i ous A ut ho r i t y in T he r av ada B uddhi s m.
However, it is not only Buddhadas as ideas which are impor tant to his lay
audience. B uddhadas as w ay of lif e is also impor tant in author is ing and g iv ing
leg itimacy to his r adical views in the face of a generally antag onis tic and
conservative religious es tablishment. Buddhadas as str ict ascetic life gives author ity
to his views, s omething of v ital impor tance to the insecure new bourgeois which is
seeking to f ind a leg itimate and recognised place for itself and its views in moder n
T hail and.
In order to appr eciate why the manner of Buddhadas as life and teaching as
well as the theor etical content of his doctr inal re- interpretations are so impor tant to
moder nis t lay Buddhis ts it is f irst necessary to digress briefly to consider the
t r adit ional ly accepted bases of religious author ity in T her av ada Buddhis m. Religious
author ity in T her av ada Buddhis m is more than an ins titutional l y recognised r ig ht to
speak on and inter pr et matter s of doctr ine, althoug h it does include t hat r ig ht.
Because of the or thopr actic emphasis of the religion and the absence of centralised
censorial contr ols on inter pr etations of the B uddhas teachings, whether by laypeople
or by monks, there is in effect a univer sal r ig ht to speak on matter s of doctrine
w it hin cer tain legally and tr aditional ly def ined bounds. Rather , religious author ity
w ithin T hai Buddhis m denotes the r ig ht to be listened to and to be regarded as a
person whose utter ances or wr iting s s hould be tr eated with due g r avity and respect.
Ess entially religious author ity in T hail and is equiv alent to the ins titutionally
recognised s tanding of a pe r s on, r ather than of his or her s tatements or ar g uments,
w ithin the of ficial hierarchy of the Buddhis t s ahg ha.
However, the def inition of religious author ity on doctr inal matter s has been
ambig uous in T her av ada Buddhis t histor y. T his ambig uit y arises f rom a conf lict
between, on the one hand, the pr edominant or thopr actic concern with correct mor al
and meditativ e practice as the recognised basis of at t aining the tr anscendent insig ht
required for salv ation and, on the other hand, the f act t hat ex pertise in doctr inal
matter s requires intellectual or theor etical ex pertise, a r ational skill which is not of
itself recognised as being capable of leading to the at t ainment of nibbana. In
T her av ada history there has been a long- standing dispute over whether scholarly
knowledge of the scriptures, i.e. dha mma , or s tr ict obedience to the codes of
monas tic practice, i.e. v inay a, should be accepted as the pr imar y deter minant of
ins t it utional l y recognised religious author ity . Rahul a notes t hat the debate over
whether lear ning or practice is more impor tant dates back to ancient Cey lon. In the
f irst century B.C. a dispute arose between Buddhis t ascetics called pa ms uk iil ik as ,
"wearers of rags f r om a dust heap", and those monks who specialised as teachers of
the doctr ine, dhammak at hik as . T he dispute concerned whether the basis of the
s as ana, the religion, lay in the str ict asceticism of the pams uk iil ik as or in the
scholar ship of the dhammak at hik as . Rahul a observes t hat ,
Ultimately it was decided that learning was the basis of the s as ana, and
not practice. T he pams uk iil ik as were silenced and the dhammak at hik as
were v ictor ious .48
Nevertheless the issue remained ambig uous , for as Rahul a goes on to say this
decision in fact ran contr ar y to,
the or iginal idea as f ound in the Dha mma pa da 49 t hat a person of
r ealisation even thoug h he has only a l ittle lear ning is superior to one who
has great lear ning but no r ealis ation.00
"Real is ation" here denotes tr anscendent insig ht gained thr oug h mor al and
meditativ e practice. T he ins t it utional decision in f av our of the scholars and the
teachers of the dha mma did not in f act abolish the groups of forest- dwelling and
other ascetic monks, who continued their str ict practices as before. Rather , it
mar ked the or ig ination of two dis tinct monkly v ocations, between what is called the
48
R a h u l a , A His t or y o f B uddhi s m i n Cey l on, p. 159.
49 -
T he Dha mma pa da is a popul a r s ect ion of t he S ut t a pi t a k a , f ound in t he K hudda k a Nik a y a .
>0R a h u l a , i bi d.
7 6
"v ocation of books", g ant hadhur a, or the study and teaching of the dha mma , and
the "v ocation of medit at ion", v ipas s anadhur a, or the single- minded ref lection upon
the t r uths of suf f ering, imper manence and non- essentiality. T his v ocational
dis tinction is still preserved in T hail and today . While the major ity of monks are
ur ban or temple dwelling specialists on the teachings a hig hly respected minor ity
called dhut ahg a monks (T hai: t hudong ) lead the life of wander ing ascetics much like
the early pams uk ul ik as in ancient Cey lon. Speaking of the s ituation in T hailand
T ambiah notes t hat ,
T he r ecommended ideal is for monks to be g r amav as i (residing in towns
and villages and engaging themselves in educational and religious activ ities)
r ather than v anav as i (residing in the forest and engaged in meditation with
no oblig ation to the l ai t y ). 51
B ut T ambiah also comments t hat r egar ding f orest- dwelling monks, "the laity
are apt to consider them [ forest monks] holy and to pursue them with g if t s ."52 T his
indicates a sig nif icant degree of respect for and acknowledgement of the author ity of
these Buddhis t anchorites. T hus in pr actice both scholar ship, or r ational skills, and
str ict ascetic practice, which it is assumed leads to the dev elopment of s pir itual
ins ig ht, continue to be recognised bases of religious author ity . However, the strict
r elations hip between these two cr iter ia remains vague and not ex plicitly def ined.
2.5.1 B ud d h a d a s a s R e l i g i o us A ut h o r i t y .
Unlike most monks, whose s tanding or author ity usually rests on a personal
specialisation as either a temple- dwelling teacher or a wander ing ascetic, Buddhadas a
in f act f ulf ils both of the t r adit ional author ity - conf er r ing cr iter ia. Buddhadas as
double- sourced religious author ity lies, f ir stly , in his being a renowned and capable
scholar who is well- versed in the Buddhis t scriptures and, secondly, in his ex tremely
conservative and ascetic appr oach to Buddhis t practice. In 1932 at the age of 26 he
pr oclaimed t hat the only way to reach the t r uth of Buddhis m was to liter ally f ollow
the B uddha s own path of r enouncing the world for the forest. Buddhadas a decided
to r epenetr ate to the heart of the B uddha s r ealisation by discar ding the diversions
of the s ahg ha hierarchy and its associated r itual is m and r etur ning to the ascetic
roots of the religion. For several years he lived as a solitar y recluse in an
abandoned temple in the j ung le of Souther n T hail and, a f act t hat for many T hai
Buddhis ts endows him with a greater religious author ity than purely scholarly
51
S . J . T a r n b i a h , B uddhi s m and S pi r i t C ul t s i n Nor t he as t T ha i l a n d , Ca mbr i dg e at t he Uni v er s i t y Pr ess,
Ca mbr i dg e , 1970, p.67.
5 2 .. . ,
i bi d.
7 7
monks, who are not regarded as hav ing so strong a pr actical insig ht into the tr uths
of Buddhis m. A f ter this solitar y phase, dur ing which Buddhadas a began to f or mulate
his re- interpretations of doctrine, he also began to pr omote and publish his views
and today is recognised as a learned teacher of Buddhis t doctr ine. However, he s till
r etains his or ig inal wish to ref ind and re- express the f undamental tr uths of the
religion by r etur ning to its or ig inal source in ascetic practice,
T he Lord B uddha himself did not have an umbr ella, shoes, mos quito nets
and lots of addit ional kinds of thing s ... We call this [ ascetic practice] the
system of r eviving or pr omoting the practice of dha mma .{ T )53
As a monk Buddhadas a is therefore in a str ong ly author itativ e position and he
has used this to develop a wide- ranging re- inter pr etation of Buddhis t doctrine which
par allels the ideological concerns and needs demands of the progressive lay
Buddhis ts .
B uddhadas as popular ity among s t moder nist lay T hai Buddhis ts can thus be
seen as r esulting f r om his r esolution of cer tain intellectual and pr actical religious
pr oblems f acing t hat g r oup, both in the author ity of his person, which is f ounded
upon both practice and scholar ship, and in the innov ativ e ref or mist character of his
teachings. However, it is his ref or mist views r ather than the details of his ascetic
pr actice t hat dr aw the most praise and which are the object of this study . In the
wor ds of one lay suppor ter ,
Buddhadas a has been called a ref ormer ... a ref ormer is someone astute
in r etur ning to the ancient teachers and in r etur ning to the original
teachings. Such a person is an opponent of teachings which have been so
embellished as to lose the way , inter pr eting the or ig inal teachings so that
they are in line with the chang ing society and with the new generation. A
ref ormer communicates the cultur e and basic ins titutions of old by
steadf astly keeping to their core and to s accadhar nma54, inter pr eting
appr opr iately for the s ituations which actually arise in the new s ociety .(T )5d
T he sources of Buddhadas as ref ormist work and of his break with the
53 . . .
P h u t t h a t l i a ^, ^ T ha l a c ng k a n S ua n Mok 50 P i
( 50 5 " ^ pp 67-
54
S a c c a dha r nma denot es "t he t r ut h of t he doct r i ne of d ha mma " or "t he t r ue t e achi ng s ".
55 - - - - -
^F r ont i s pi e ce t o T ha n P hut t ha t ha t N a i T ha t s a na K ho r ng Nak - w ichak an
r vi nuvj M vnalu wiu r a tu iTn rmm 7 " Buddhadas a i n the Vi ew o f
1
A c a de mi c s ) , publ i s he d b^ K h a n a k a i n i n a k a n S a s a n a P h y a K a n p h a t a n a
( PlUl S f l J J U n l l A I B m J V I f a i i n ), no a ut hor g i v en, B a ng k ok ,
2525 ( 1982).
doctr inal conservatism which has histor ically characterised T hai Buddhis m are
complex . Ex ter nal political, economic and cultur al influences f r om the West have
pr ovided a trigger which has activ ated the use of models pr ovided by ex isting
f undamental is t and ref or mist precedents within Buddhis t histor y . These historical
precedents have acted as bases for re- interpreting doctrines and views, an activ ity
which Buddhadas a has jus tif ied and authorised by a declared retur n to the original
wis dom and ins ig ht of the Buddha. Western- derived cr iticisms of popular animis t
beliefs have also freed a lat ent r ationalis m ly ing within doctr inal Buddhis m itself,
whose dev elopment and appl ication has acted as an indig enous source of innov ation
and ref orm. Fur ther mor e, social conf licts and changes in the class str uctur e of T hai
society as a result of moder nis ation have given immediate sociological and political
relevance to what super f icially may simply be taken as abs tr act and theor etical
issues of religious doctrine. T he nascent T hai middle classes, like the entrenched
conser vative establishment, regard Buddhis m as a v ital ins t it utional source of social
and religious leg itimacy . However, given t hat the interests and adv ancement of the
new bourgeois are dependent upon socio- economic development and change, r ather
t han upon maintenance of the s t a t us quo, they wish to see a new inter pr etation of
Buddhis t doctr ine and pr actice which suppor ts their interests rather than shoring up
the position of the establishment. T he "new Buddhis m" they desire is precisely the
r ationalis t, doctr inal and wor ld- involved doctr ine of Buddhadas a. Buddhadas as
w'ork thus ex ists at a j unctur e of trends, of Buddhis t f undamentalis m, of the
r ationalis ation of the religion due to the impact of Western notions, and of the need
of Buddhadas as own social s tr atum of the educated Buddhis t elite for an
alter nativ e Buddhis t ideology to pr omote their interests within the T hai social order.
A l l three forces are manif est in and often over determine Buddhadas as wor k, the
specif ic details of his re- inter pretations hav ing sources in both theoretical and social
inf luences. A nd in developing a complete under s tanding of Buddhadas as work it is
consequently necessary to consider all of these f actors.
7 9
C HA P T E R 3
P HA S A - K HON - P HA S A - T HA M:
B U D D H A D A S A S ME T HOD OF S C R IP T U R A L INT E R P R E T A T IO N.
T he piv ot of Buddhadas as r e- inter pr etation of T her av ada doctr ine is the
notion of cit-wang , "v oided- mind" or "f r eed- mind", which is analy sed in detail in
Chapter s Five and Six . Ci t -wang denotes a mind which is free f r om the
distur bances of moral impur ities , and which is consequently in a state of peace and
equanimity , the f oundation of nibbana or s alv ation. For Buddhadas a cit-wang is
the key to under s tanding the religious goal of Buddhis m and is the basis of the
pr actice to att ain t hat goal both in indiv idual life and in social life. But while
B uddhadas as inter pr etation of cit-wang is based upon notions f ound in the canonical
liter atur e, in par ticular the notion of s uhhat a or "v oidness", it has not historically
received much attention in T her av ada Buddhis m. S uhhat a or cit-wang has in
general been a secondary concept used to ex plicate more central notions such as
a na t t a , non- self, and anicca, imper manence. Because of the peripheral char acter of
the notions of s uhhat a and cit-wang in the t r adit ional readings of the T ipit ak a in
T hail and Buddhadas a cannot j us tif y his emphasis on them by referring to either the
T hai t r adit ion of scr iptur al inter pr etation or to the later commentar y liter atur e used
to s uppor t t hat inter pr etativ e tr adition. In placing cit-wang at the centre of his
pr es entation of T her av ada doctr ine Buddhadas a has in f act dr awn heavily on
Mahay ana and Zen Buddhis t teachings, which have tr aditionally been negelcted by
T ha i l a nds T her av ada monks. Indeed, in order to suppor t his inter pr etation of
T her av ada Buddhis t doctr ine Buddhadas a has had to break r adically with the
doctr inal analyses and readings of the scriptures histor ically taug ht by the T hai
s ahg ha. T his break with the T hai inter pr etativ e tr adition has three
main components.
Fir s tly , Buddhadas a has developed an alter nativ e her meneutic or inter pr etativ e
appr oach to the canonical scriptures, which has allowed him to argue t hat
s ig nif icantly more sections of the T ipit ak a pr ovide suppor t for his views than
uninf or med readings appear to provide. He calls this inter pr etativ e theory
phas a-khon - phasa-t ha m, "or dinar y lang uag e - dha mma lang uag e", and it is this
8 0
theory of phas a-khon - phasa-t ham which is the analy tical focus of this chapter.
Secondly, Buddhadas a reads the T her av ada scriptures selectively, rejecting as
ir r elevant to his re- interpretative enterprise the entire f inal section of the T ipit ak a,
the A bhidhammapit ak a. In br ief he rejects of the A bhidhammapit ak a because it is
not wr itten in the B uddhas words. Buddhadas a accor ds the B uddha s recorded
discourses in the S ut t apitak a the greatest author itativ e s tanding because he regards
those sermons and conversations as embody ing the B uddhas or ig inal insights.
Buddhadas as rejection of the A bhidhammapit ak a is detailed in Chapter Four.
Buddhadas a also rejects the exegesis of the scriptures contained in Buddhag hos as
V is uddhimag g a, which has been the most impor t ant commentar y on the Pal i canon
in T her av ada countries since the f if th century of the Chr is tian era. In cr iticising
Buddhag hos as system of exegesis Buddhadas a opens the way for his altog ether
dif f erent inter pr etation of the scriptures based on the her meneutic theory of
phas a-khon - phas a-t ha m. In addition Buddhadas a reads selectively those sections of
the canonical liter atur e t hat he does retain. For ex ample, in reading the
S ut t apit ak a he concentrates on the D'ig ha, M a j j hi m a , A hg ut t ar a, and Sar ny utta
Nik ay as , which contain the greatest number of direct quotes f r om the Buddha. On
the other hand Buddhadas a all but ignores the K huddak a Nik ay a of the
S ut t apit a k a , a section of the scriptures which contains a larger pr opor tion of the
popular , "s uper stitious" Buddhis t teachings t hat he rejects.
But in addition to his theory of s cr iptur al inter pr etation and his cr itique of
the canonical scriptures and commentar ies there is a thir d impor tant component to
Buddhadas as re- interpretative enterprise, namely , his reliance upon the author ity of
reason and r ational ar g umentation. T hat is, instead of seeking to j us tif y his views
solely in terms of s cr iptur al precedents, a methodolog ical appr oach he nevertheless
follows in places, Buddhadas a also argues for his central theory of cit -wang f r om
f irst principles. T his is because, as noted above, in seeking to present what has been
a relativ ely peripheral notion in the histor y of T her av ada Buddhis m as t he doctr inal
core of the religion, a position t hat is without precedents, he mus t argue for his
inter pr etation. Buddhadas as views mus t s tand on the str eng th of ar g uments
presented to s uppor t them because he is unable to rely on t r adit ional sources of
aut hor it y such as the commentar ies, which present an inter pr etation of Buddhis m
t hat he rejects.
As indicated in the previous chapter Buddhadas as greater reliance upon reason
has a precedent in the r ationalis t char acter of doctr inal Buddhis m. Indeed
Buddhadas as r ationalis m could j us t as well be described as a s tr ict theor etical
doctr inalis m. His r ationalis m is char acterised by a systematic effort to inter pr et the
entir ety of Buddhis t doctr ine as the logical dev elopment of a number of key notions
such as anat t a and anicca, and he rejects as inv alid any views which are
inconsistent w ith the strict application of these f undamental notions. For ex ample,
while most T hai Buddhis ts are prepared to accept the ex istence of spir its and
s uper natur al entities Buddhadas a rejects these beliefs as being inconsistent with the
doctr ine of ana t t a or non- self, according to which there is no personal continuity
af ter death. T his doctr inalis m, while based on the core of Buddhis t teachings, also
f its conv eniently with the scientif ic r ationalis m which Buddhadas a espouses. Both
doctr inal Buddhis m and science are based upon the notion of univer sal law, nat ur al
law in the case of science and dha mma or ethico- natur al law in Buddhis m.
In addition str ict doctr inal Buddhis m, while maint aining the reality of non-
empir ical conditions such as nibbana, is not s uper natur al, deny ing t hat s uper human
entities are capable of interf er ing in the oper ation of the universal laws of the
cosmos. In doctr inal Buddhis m s alv ation is attained by recognising and
sy s tematically utilis ing universal laws to alleviate and eventually ex tinguish human
suf f ering. Giv en the assumptions of Buddhis m, nibbana or salv ation is a logical
r esult of f ollowing s pir itual practices or rules. It is not the result of prayer or
seeking the inter v ention of super natur al powers in ones life. There is therefore a
s tr uctur al par allelis m between doctr inal Buddhis m and scientif ic r ationality which
r esults f rom a common emphasis on law guided processes and logical consistency.
But even thoug h the radical natur e of his views forces Buddhadas a to rely
more heavily upon r ational analy sis in presenting his views he is still severely
cons tr ained by ins t it utional f actors. He mus t at all times be seen to be maint aining
r eligious tr adit ion and must av oid being regarded as in any sense har ming the social
or of f icial role of Buddhis m in T hail and. Buddhadas a thus cannot aff ord to be seen
as r adical or innov ativ e but mus t present all his views as being f ounded upon
g enuine Buddhis t principles. But this very need to de mo ns t r a t e his f aithf ulness to
B uddhis t pr inciples, as opposed to conf or ming to established inter pr etations of the
doctr ine, introduces a far greater emphasis on r ational ar g ument into Buddhadas as
wor k than has t r aditionally characterised doctr inal studies of Buddhis m in T hail and.
T he f act t hat Buddhadas a ul timatel y does break f r om t r adit ional notions and
inter pr etations of doctrine is shown by his preparedness to accept non- T her avada
notions t hat he regards as hav ing religious value into T her av ada Buddhis m.
Because he argues for his views in ter ms of what he sees as the principles of
B uddhis m and because he places his pr imar y allegiance in those principles r ather
t han in any specific tex t, commentar y or t r adit ional ly accepted view, Buddhadas a is
free to dr aw on ideas which he regards as being theor etically compatible with his
inter pr etation of what constitutes the f undamentals of Buddhis t doctr ine.
8 2
3.1 T he T he or y o f P h a sa- k hon - P ha s a - t ha m.
Buddhadas a disting uishes two hermeneutic levels of the B uddhas words in the
S ut t apit a k a , calling these two levels, phasa-khon ( ) or
ever yday lang uag e and phasa-t ham ( m i n i ? J J J J ) or dhamma
l ang uag e1. He gives the f ollowing def initions ,
Every day lang uag e is wor ldly lang uag e, the lang uag e of people who do
not know dhamma. Dha mma lang uag e is the lang uag e spoken by people
who have gained a deep insig ht into the t r ut h, dha mma . 2
Buddhadas a says t hat phasa-khon or everyday lang uag e,
has as its f oundation a meaning dependent upon matter (it does not
f undamentally rest upon dhamma) and consequently speaks only about
mater ial t hing s .(T )3
On the other hand phasa-t ham or dhamma lang uag e, "has to do with the
mental wor ld, with the intang ible non- physical w or l d."4
While Buddhadas a speaks of two kinds of lang uag e in f act the dis ting uishing
point between phas a-khon and phasa-t ham is t hat they represent two dif f erent types
of knowledge which under lay the or ig inal composition of the scriptures and which
inf or m the r eading of those scriptures today . A ccor ding to Buddhadas a the
B uddha s recorded statements in the scriptures f all into two general categories,
depending upon whether the Buddha himself was speaking in a mundane or literal
way about everyday thing s, i.e. phas a-k hon, or whether his words were in fact
ex pressing transcendent insig hts and so were f ounded on s upr amundane or s pir itual
knowledge, in which case they are phas a-t ham or dha mma language. The
phas a-khon - phasa-t ham theory is then concerned with the r ecognition of which
sections of the scriptures are ex pressions of everyday lang uag e and which express
s pir itual insights in dha mma language. T o be able to recognise this dis tinction,
Buddhadas a maint ains , requires a degree of s pir itual ins ig ht on the par t of the
reader, lacking which all the B uddhas statements will mistakenly be read with a
l i t e r a l l y pha s a -k hon means "t he l ang uag e of peopl e" or "huma n l a ng uag e ", t ha t is, t he ev er y day s peech
of huma n bei ngs . "D ha m m a l ang uag e " is t he di r ect t r ans l at i on of t he t er m pha s a - t ham.
2
B u d d h a d a s a , T wo K i nds o f L ang ua g e , t r ans . A r i y a na nda B hi k k hu, no publ i s he r g i v en, B a ng k ok , 1974 ,
p. l .
I t / | 1/
3id., M a i K ha uc a t S a s a na P hr or M a i R u P ha s a - t ha m ( "1 m a n l **rt na n w n r l u i r n im t j u M
u
Not Unde r s t a ndi ng Re l i g i on Becaus e o f Not K no w i ng P ha s a - t ha m), O ng k a n Fy n- f u P hr a P hut t ha s a s a na
(f Mnnni i J ur l v n ZYYVIU ), S a mut pr a k a n T ha i l a nd, no publ i ca t i on dat e g i v en, p. l .
11 1
4
i d. , Two K i nds o f L ang uag e, p . 3.
8 3
mundane awareness simply as phasa-k hon. T his is because language itself, being a
f eatur e of the r ational or discursive f unctioning of the mind, is incapable of
adequately ex pressing tr anscendent knowledge. Such knowledge is only sy mbolically
or metaphor ically alluded to in language and is incapable of being ex plicated within
the r ational domain. But if the reader does not recognise t hat in such cases
lang uag e is being used to allude to t hat which cannot in f act be ling uis tically
ex pressed he or she will mis takenly concentr ate on the liter al or phasa-khon sense of
the ter ms, and misr ead the aut hor s or ig inal intent.
Buddhadas a claims t hat it is possible to read some s uttas or sections of the
scriptures in two ways with two dif f er ent meaning s, depending on the mode of
knowing which inf or ms the r eaders act of inter pr eting . Should the readers
awareness be f ounded solely on sense- based ex perience of tang ible thing s then the
s ut t a will be read as ex pressing the meaning s of phas a-khon or everyday language.
T hat is, the reader will take the referents of the s utta to be mater ial objects or
empir ically knowable conditions. B ut if the reader is s pir itually aware and
knowledgeable of the intang ible r ealm then the same s ut t a, if it was in f act
composed as an ex pression of transcendent knowledge, may be read as ex pressing
the meaning s of phas a-t ha m, dha mma lang uag e. T he same ling uis tic ex pression may
thus be taken as ref erring to abstr act s upr amundane thing s or processes. T hus the
two types of lang uag e in Buddhadas as theory do not refer to any objectively
discernible quality of the g r ammar , syntax or v ocabular y of the scriptures. Rather
the theory is concerned with detailing the types of inter pr etativ e f rameworks a
reader may apply to religious tex ts, with the intention of per mitting the or ig inal
s pir itual or mundane char acter of s uttas to be recognised.
A phasa-khon inter pr etation of a ter m is then s imply its conventional or liter al
meaning while the same ter ms phas a-t ham render ing is its s pir itual or sy mbolic
sense. Buddhadas a uses this dis tinction to argue t hat many of the t r adit ional
readings and inter pr etations of the Buddhis t scriptur es in T hailand r emain at the
liter al or phasa-khon level. He also argues t hat these tr aditional inter pr etations are
wr ong , or at least inaccur ate, insof ar as they do not take into account the
tr ans cendent phas a-t ham sense of ter ms or passages. In general, Buddhadas a is
opposed to liter al or phasa-khon inter pr etations of the scriptures, ar g uing t hat the
tr ue impor t of the B uddhas words is only f ound when their s pir itual or
metaphor ical, i.e. phas a-t ha m, signif icance is appr eciated. He does not claim t hat
every ex pression in the scriptures has both a phas a-khon and a phasa-t ham reading.
It is not the case t hat the entir e body of the recorded words of the Buddha can be
read as a consistent system solely at the liter al level of phasa-khon or at the
8 4
metaphor ical level of phasa-t ha m. There is only an overlap, and thus possible
conf usion over inter pr etation, at certain points. T hat is, in some places Buddhadas a
takes the B uddhas words as s tr aig htf or war dly and unsy mbolically referring only to
the everyday or commonplace thing s, s ituations and feelings they seem to denote.
He maintains t hat both her meneutic levels need to be considered in order to
accurately under s tand the B uddha s teachings, "not j us t either one of them al one."5
In his work Buddhadas a places more emphasis on the notion of phasa-t ha m,
and those sections of the S ut t apit ak a t hat he regards as being expressed in dhamma
lang uag e, than on phasa-khon and those sections of the scriptures which can be read
liter ally . T his is because it is his re- inter pretations of doctr ine in ter ms of
phas a-t ham which diff er f r om the t r aditional views of Buddhis t teachings and which
therefore need to be discussed and j us tif ied. T he par ts of the scriptures which he
regards as being wr itten in phas a-khon are not of great interest to Buddhadas a
because they are the sections where, by and large, he agrees with the t r aditional
literal reading of the tex ts.
3.2 Hi s t or i c a l P r e ce de nt s of t he P has a- khon - P l i a s a - t ham T heor y .
Buddhadas as theory of phasa-khon - phasa-tham has a precedent in well-
established pr inciples laid down for inter pr eting the T her av ada scriptures. Bond has
analysed the post- canonical methodolog ical tex t, the Netti- Pak ar ana6 as pur por ting
t hat "r ig ht cons tr uing " of the B uddhas words is arrived at by the f ollowing
procedure,
These terms and phr as ing [in question] mus t be placed beside the s utta
compared with the v inay a and patter ned af ter the essential natur e of the
dha mma . 7
Here the terms s ut t a, v inay a, and dha mma have specific senses. Bond
proposes t hat in the Netti- Pakar ana s utta refers to the doctr inal core of Buddhis m,
the f our noble tr uths or ar iy as acca; v inay a denotes the mor al practice of
over coming lust, hate and delusion while dha mma refers to the theor etical
elabor ation of Buddhis t doctr ine represented by the theory of causation or
5 i bi d. p. 3.
^T he Ne t t i - P a k a r a na is a t t r i but e d t o Ma ha k a c c a na , an i mme di a t e dis ci pl e of t he B uddha . It is not
r eg ar ded as c a noni c a l by t he Si nhal es e and is not par t of t he T ha i T ipi t a k a but is i ncl ude d i n t he
B ur me s e canon.
7
Geor g e D. B o n d , "T he Ne t t i - P a k a r a na : A T he r a v a da Me t hod of Int e r pr e t a t i on", in S oma r a t na
B a l as oor i y a (ed), B uddhi s t S t udie s i n Hono ur o f Wal pol a R a hul a , Gor don F r aser , L ondon, 1980, p. 20.
8 5
pat iccas amuppada. Buddhadas a has ex plicitly referred to this pr inciple of
j us t if ication cited in the Net t i- Pak ar ana, "T he Buddha laid down a pr inciple for
testing : ex amine and measure ag ains t the s uttas and compare with the v i na y a ."8
T his general inter pr etativ e pr inciple is based on advice given by the Buddha
on his deathbed on how to deal with s tatements on the doctr ine which are dubious
or disputed. In the Mahapar inibbana S ut t a the Buddha says,
T hen you should study well those [ disputed] par ag r aphs and words, and
inv es tig ate whether they occur in the s ut t a , and compare them with the
v inay a. If hav ing investig ated the s ut t a and compar ed with the v inay a they
can neither [be found] in the s ut t a nor [ found to be] compar able with the
[ teachings in the] v inay a then you s hould reach agreement on these points
t hat they are cer tainly not the words of the Bhag av a9, and t hat the
bhik k hu in question [ who made the disputed statement] has incorrectly
remember ed [ the B uddhas teaching] . Y ou should discard those statements
completely . (T ) 10
T he pr inciple of inter pr etation laid down here is t hat disputed or dubious
s tatements on the doctr ine should be compared with the recorded words of the
B uddha, the s ut t a, and with the ethical principles recorded in the v inay a, to gauge
whether they are strictly accur ate or, if not a str ict r estatement of the B uddhas
wor ds, at least in accord with Buddhis t ethical principles. Bond says, however, t hat
an addit ional inter pr etativ e pr inciple is put f orward in the Netti- Pak ar ana, namely ,
t hat inter pr etations of the doctr ine s hould "be patter ned after the essential natur e
of the dha mma ". T his is a more general pr inciple, that a view or opinion should
be theor etically consistent with the doctr inal basics of the religion, r ather than a
liter al r estatement of the B uddhas words as requir ed in the above passage f r om the
Mahapar inibbana Sutta.
It should be noted t hat the B uddha gave the above strict and liter alis t
inter pr etativ e method at a time when Buddhis m was an oral t r adition. Before the
B uddhis t canon was wr itten down several centuries after the B uddhas death a
pr imar y concern of monks was with f aithf ul ly remember ing the T at hag at as precise
words. T he B uddhas s tatement in the Mahapar inibbana S ut t a is thus meant as an
inj unct ion to monks to adhere closely to the actual teachings of the B uddha which
they had commited to memory . T he Net t i- Pak ar ana, which is def initely a post-
canonical composition, represents a dev elopment of this pr inciple into a f or m more
8
B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha - dha mma For S t ude nt s , p . 24.
9
B ha g a v a - "t he bl essed, aus pi ci ous one ", i.e. t he B uddha .
^M a h a p a r i n i b b a n a S ut t a , Di g ha Ni k a y a , V ol . 1 0 /v . l 1 3/p. 102.
appr opr iate to a liter ate tr adit ion in which the demands of simple memor isation
have been lif ted and true scholar ship or tex tual analy sis can be under taken. The
Net t i- Pak ar anas addition of the pr inciple t hat s cr iptur al inter pr etations should be
patter ned after the dha mma amounts to a recog nition t hat in a liter ate tr adition
f aithf ulness to the B uddhas teachings no longer necessitates a strictly liter al
adherence to his actual words but may also be based upon views which f ollow the
s pi r i t of the B uddhas teachings. T his more liber al pr inciple of inter pr etation is
very close to Buddhadas as method of inter pr eting the scriptures.
Fur ther mor e, Bond proposes t hat the central inter pr etativ e method put f orward
in the Netti- Pak ar ana,
not only requires the inter pr eter to elicit f r om a tex t the semantic
essence of the dha mma (phr as ing ), but also to indicate how a tex t points
to the goal of the dha mma [i.e. nibbana] .11
T hat is, accor ding to Bond the Netti- Pakar ana proposes t hat the scriptures
can be inter pr eted at two levels, at the level of under s tanding the semantics of
statements and ter ms themselves, and at the level of under s tanding how those terms
and statements point towar ds or are sugestive of nibbana. These two levels closely
par allel Buddhadas as dis tinction between phasa-khon as the liter al sense of a term
or s tatement and phasa-t ham as the transcendent ins ig ht alluded to by what
otherwise mig ht be read as a quite or dinar y ex pression. A nd j us t as Buddhadas a
proposes t hat it is possible for those lacking in s pir itual insig ht to read the
scriptures in terms of phas a-khon while missing their higher or phas a-t ham impor t
so too, Bond says,
the Netti implies t hat every authentic tex t implicitl y points to the at.tha
[ sense or meaning] of the B uddhas teachings, but unless an inter pr eter is
aware of the guidelines this indication of the goal could be overlooked or
mis under s tood.12
T he most impor tant s imilar ity between the method put f orward in the
Netti- Pakar ana and B uddhadas as inter pr etativ e theory then is, as Bond puts it, the
pr opos ition t hat,
the inter pr eter mus t not only under s tand the wor ds of the B uddhas
teaching but mus t also grasp how they point to the aim of the dha mma . 13
^ B o n d , p. 19.
1 2 i bi d. p. 22.
8 7
Buddhadas a aims to present the doctrines of Buddhis m in a way t hat clearly
r eveals their relevance to contempor ar y life. In att empt ing to f ulf il this aim by
utilis ing the inter pr etativ e licence conf erred by his notion of phasa-t ham or dha mma
lang uag e, Buddhadas a is in f act ex pressing the inter pr etativ e pr inciple which the
author of the Netti- Pakar ana implor ed all inter preter s of the B uddhas words to
adhere to. Namely , to go beyond the immediate sense or pr esentation of a ter m to
appr eciate its under ly ing s pir itual impor t.
3.3 T he Not i ons of S pi r i t ua l De pt h a nd Cont e mpor a r y Rel ev ance in
B uddha da s a s w or k .
Buddhadas as notion of dha mma lang uag e as an ins ig htf ul appr eciation of the
under ly ing s pir itual sense of a ter m or s tatement is closely related to his concern to
inject new relevance into Buddhis m. He himself has said t hat he hopes his re-
inter pr etations will enable T hai Buddhis m to, "ef fect results t hat will satisf y t oday s
s t ude nt s . "(T )14 By "s tudents " Buddhadas a here means educated T hais with a
moder nis t and progressive outlook. Buddhadas a regards his phasa-t ham
inter pr etations as not only revealing the hidden t r ut h of Buddhis t teachings but as
s imultaneous ly demons tr ating the contempor ar y relevance of those teachings to
"t oda y s s tudents ". T hat is, he regards r etur ning to the or ig inal t r uth of the religion
as equiv alent to establishing the impor tance of the saving message of Buddhis m in
the moder n wor ld. T his equation of tr uth or s pir itual depth with contempor ar y
relevance is seen by some of Buddhadas as critics as oppor tunis tic, as seeking to
j us t if y a moder n Buddhis t social ideology by what is presented as a retur n to the
or ig inal tr uth of the religion. Such claims are not w ithout substance given the
appar ent preparedness of some of B uddhadas as lay f ollowers to s uppor t his
moder nis t inter pr etations for pr ag matic political reasons r ather than because his
views are perceived as necessarily manif esting s pir itual t r uth. For ex ample, a
biog r apher of Buddhadas a gives the f ollowing quote as indicativ e of the views of
those who s uppor t Buddhadas as wor k,
If the religious of f icialdom does not effect a r ev olutionar y renewal in
Buddhis m so t hat it becomes appr opr iate and r elevant to the ex pectations
of T hais of t oday s civ ilis ation the dis integ r ation of Buddhis m will become
more clearly manif est every day ... As for the state of mind of T hais with
str ong national is t feelings, at this time they have alr eady begun to be
widely aler t in religious matter s. T hat is, they would be glad to accept
every kind of religion or ideology so long as t hat religion or ideology helps
pr omote the development of co- operation ... for suppressing the power of
*
14Ci t e d by C h i t P hi ba nt ha e n, p . 102.
other lands in our economic and political af f air s .(T )15
However, Buddhadas a himself has never ex pressed so pr ag matic a preparedness
to propose a par ticular view of Buddhis m simply because of its social relevance
r ather than because of its f idelity to religious tr uth.
B ut whether Buddhadas as views on Buddhis t doctr ine are regarded as in f act
repr esenting the or ig inal teaching of the Buddha or as simply being a conveniently
adj us ted inter pr etation presented under the guise of conf or ming to B uddhis ms
or ig inal insights depends on what is regarded as the true core of the religion.
B uddhadas as conservative cr itics take the his tor ically and ins t it utional l y sanctioned
inter pr etations of doctrine as the most reliable guidelines to the B uddhas actual
message. As a consequence the f act t hat B uddhadas as views are in general at odds
w it h the t r adit ional pr esentations of the doctr ine is regarded by these author s as
discr editing his work.
However, Buddhadas a hims elf believes t hat religious tr uth lies in f aithf ulness to
doctr inal principles r ather than to histor ical tr adit ion as embodied in the ins t it ution
of the s ahg ha, which he regards as of ten maint aning erroneous and inconsistent
inter pr etations of Buddhis t teachings. Buddhadas a assumes Buddhis m to be a
univ er sal religion in the sense t hat its message of s alvation f rom suf f ering is
univ er s ally true and relevant to all people in all times and in all places. He then
regards the cr iticisms of moder nis t, educated T hais t hat ins t it utional Buddhis m in
T hail and is no longer relevant to contempor ar y life as indicating t hat the true
meaning of the B uddhas message has been obscured. Buddhadas a claims t hat the
source of the obf uscation of the B uddhas univer sally relevant message of s alv ation
lies in the inf luence of Br ahmanical and animis t beliefs, which have become
associated with ins t it utional Buddhis m and which have distor ted the or ig inal pr istine
char acter of the religion. It is these same Br ahmanical and animis t beliefs t hat
Western- educated and Western- inf luenced Buddhis ts have rejected as ir r ational and
unscientif ic. Buddhadas a believes t hat when these accretions are removed and the
doctr ine is once ag ain revealed in its or ig inal pur ity the contempor ar y relevance of
t ha t univer sal message will become clear and the pr oblem identif ied by intellectual
cr itics will have been resolved. A t the same time Buddhis m will have been cleansed
of the ir r ational and s uper natur alis t elements which many educated T hais f ind
unacceptable. Buddhadas as r ationalis t appr oach to inter pr eting Buddhis t doctr ine,
j us t if ied by his inter pr etativ e theory of phas a-t ha m, s imultaneously brings Buddhis m
into conf or mity with a par ticular view of modern scientif ic r ationality and with a
15X r a y a Ni k or nt ha i , pp. 295- 296.
doctr inalis t view of the religion t hat seeks to make the teachings of Buddhis m
wholly consistent with its basic theor etical pr inciples.
B uddhadas as r etur n to religious f ir st pr inciples can be seen as a genuinely
motiv ated at t empt to "pur if y " Buddhis m and to once ag ain reveal its univer sal
message of s alv ation. B ut at the same time his related inter est in establishing
Buddhis m as a scientif ic and r ational religion, if considered in is olation, can also be
regarded as a pr ag matic att empt to ins til relevance into the r eligion by r esponding
to chang ing public opinions and social trends. But given the complex set of cultur al,
theor etical, social and political influences under ly ing Buddhadas as re- inter pretations
it is not possible to present any single j udg ement on the s tatus of his wor k.
B uddhadas as wor k is not a "pur e" phenomenon, whether purely a response to
Buddhis t pr inciples or purely a pr ag matic or political development. His work is a
compound phenomenon which can only be ex pected to manif est its diverse sources.
Consequently neither Buddhadas as own claims t hat he is in f act r etur ning to the
t r ut h of Buddhis m nor the counter claims of his critics t hat his theory of phasa-t ham
is merely a cover for pr ag matic adj us tments of doctr ine to meet contempor ar y
ex pectations can be ignored. Elements and sections of Buddhadas as work can be
isolated and used to suppor t both sets of claims.
3.4 F ur t he r Hi s t or i c a l Pr ecedent s of t he Pl ias a- k hon - P has a- t ham
T heor y .
B ut quite apar t f r om the question of how Buddhadas a utilises his
inter pr etativ e theory it mus t be acknowledged t hat there are a number of clear
precedents in the T her av ada tr adit ion for the theory of phas a-t ham itself. In
addit ion to the methodolog y of the Netti- Pak ar ana there is an even older precedent
for the phas a-khon - phas a-tham dis tinction in the t r adit ion t hat in g iv ing
discourses the Buddha varied the level of his ins tr uction accor ding to the abil ity of
his audience to under stand the s pir itual t r uths revealed. T his tr adition provides
j us t if ication for Buddhadas as claim t hat dif f er ent sections of the s uttas were given
by the Buddha in dif f erent ways, whether as phas a-khon or as phasa-t ha m. T his
t r adit ional view is ex pressed in verse f orm in the V is uddhimag g a,
By methods terse and long as need may be He t aug ht the law, so t hat
f r om being s hearts, if they have wit to learn, the dark depar ts, melting in
the good dhamma^s br ill iancy .16
T he view t hat there are two levels to the B uddhas discourses is related to the
V i s uddhi ma g g a , X V , 33.
90
t r adit ional ly recognised div ision between the two paths to s alv ation t hat the Buddha
pur por tedly t aug ht. T hat is, between the lokiy a or mundane path for the lay person,
which pr omotes well- being but does not end the process of r ebir th, and the
l ok ut t ar a or s upr amundane path for the r enunciate, which leads directly to the
cessation of r ebir th and to liber ation f r om suf f ering. T he view t hat the Buddha
spoke in dif f erent ways depending on the level of s pir itual development of his
audience is also related to the B uddhas pr ag matic appr oach to knowledge discussed
in Chapter T wo, where it was noted t hat he regarded t hat which is benef icial as
hav ing pr ior ity over t hat which is str ictly tr ue. Weer ar atne comments t hat the
impor t ant ter m s a mma , "cor rect" or "tr ue" (as in the B uddhas injunctions to
"r ig ht v iew", s a mma di t t hi , and "r ig ht act ion", s a mma k a mma nt a ) , has a dif f erent
impor t depending on whether it is being used in r elation to the lokiy a or the
l ok ut t ar a path. He proposes t hat at the lokiy a level of practice,
Rig ht [ samma] does not necessarily mean true ... Rig ht here seems to
have a pr ag matic meaning such as "us ef ul", "benef icial" and "conducive to
well- being and happiness" ... T his is very clearly hinted at in the
A pannak a S ut t a 17 and in the A pannak a J a t a k a 18 where it is said t hat
when there are two views [ concerning the inter pr etation of the B uddhas
teaching] , one opposed to the other , r egarding which one cannot come to a
conclusion as to which of them is true and which is false, one should
tentativ ely accept the view t hat w'ould inspire action, r esulting in ones
well- being and happines s.19
T aking this view some passages in the scriptures have been inter pr eted as
ref erring to the lokiy a path w'here say "r ig ht v iew", s a mma di t t hi , does not mean
actual insig ht into religious t r ut h but an outlook with s pir itually benef icial results
which mig ht ul timatel y be conducive to at t aining enlig htenment. On the other hand
other passages in the scriptures have been taken as ref erring more directly to the
l ok ut t ar a path. Buddhadas a expresses a view s imilar to this in the f ollowing
passage,
A t the basic level r ig ht view [ s ammaditthi] is under s tanding which is
correct in the respect t hat it effects benef icial dev elopment of this wor ld in
every way the wor ldling s w ant 20. Rig ht view of the middle level is
A pa nna k a S ut t a , M a j j hi r n a Ni k a y a , V ol . 1 3/v er s e s l ( )3 - 1 2 4/pp. 80- 103.
18A pa nna k a J a t a k a , K hudda k a Ni k a y a , V o l . 2 7 /v e r s e l /p. l .
1 9 W . G . W e e r a r a t n e , Indi v i dua l a nd Socicty i n B uddhi s m, Me t r o Pr i nt e r s L t d, Col ombo Sr i L ank a,
1977, p . 12.
9 0
"Wo r l di ng " or p ut t huj a n a denot es a per s on who is c a ug ht up i n desir es f or obj ect s and t hi ng s in t he
ma t e r i a l wor l d.
91
under s tanding which is correct insof ar as it effects benef icial dev elopment in
wor lds higher than those wor ldling s wish for, and which are called the
"other w or ld", the wor ld beyond or the nex t wor ld21 and which are better
than or dif f erent f r om this wor ld. As for the high level of r ig ht view, t hat
denotes under s tanding which is correct in the respect t hat it effects crossing
over or transcendence of each and every wor ld in all ways, which is called
the at t ainment of nibbana or l ok ut t ar a and which is inter pr eted as being
bey ond the w or l d.(T )22
In addit ion to the t r adit ion of the two levels of the B uddhas discourses the
phas a-khon - phas a-tham dis tinction has a f ur ther , more sy stematically ex pressed
theor etical precedent in the Buddhis t theor y of two tr uths . T here is in Buddhis t
theor y a recognised dis tinction between a conv entional or everyday level of knowing ,
s ammat is acca, and a f orm of knowing based more dir ectly on under ly ing t r ut h or
r eality , par amatthas acca. S ammat is acca or conv entional t r ut h is also called
v ohar as acca, t r ut h according to speech or conv entional wisdom. Par amatt has acca
on the other hand is, as noted by Phr a Raj av ar amuni, an eminent scholar monk,
"to recognise thing s according to w hat they [ really] are and for the sake of the
dev elopment of the highest benef it [ i.e nibbana] ." {T ) 23 To know things "as they
really ar e" here denotes perceiving the objects in the wor ld according to the
f undament al pr inciples of r eality identif ied by the Buddha, i.e. as imper manent,
amcca, and w ithout essence, anatt a.
In the A bhidhammapit ak a these two modes of knowing are respectively related
to two modes of ex pounding the dha mma . S ammat is acca or conventional t r ut h is
r elated to pug g al adhit t hana or ex position of the doctr ine in ter ms of persons or by
per s onif ication, and par amat t has acca or absolute t r ut h is related to
dha mma dhi t t ha na or ex position in ter ms of elements or concepts. To ex pound
B uddhis t doctr ine in terms of elements, dha mma dhi t t ha na , is to consistently present
the teachings in ter ms of the doctr ine of a na t t a , i.e. t hat there is no essential self^
and t hat ev er y thing is composed of natur all y occur ring elements or aggregates,
k ha ndhas , combining and f unctioning in accord with natur al laws or dhamma. T o
be consistent with the doctr ine of anat t a one must completely eschew speaking of
indiv iduals (Pali: pug gal a ) or persons. Ins tead one mus t speak only of k handhas
21
For B uddha da s a w o r l d in pha s a - t ham denot es a me nt a l s t at e and not a pl ane of ex istence.
22 - - - . . .
P h u t t h a t h a t , N i ppha n ( " HV J V j ni i *1 Ni bba na ), Sat nnak - nang s y T ha mma buc ha
( a n i l n V i l l V d ' c m S - l J i m ). B a ng k ok , 2524 (1 9 81 ), p p . 136- 137.
u
2 3 ( P hr a ) R a t c h a w o r a r n u m ( ^ yj J j ) J ^ j j J )> P hut t ha t ha m
B ud d ha dha m m a ) , T ha mma s a t ha n Chul a l ong k or n Uni v er s i t y , B a ng k ok ,
1
2525 (1 9 8 2), p . 55.
acting in accord with given laws, such as the law of k amma or the general natur al
law called dhamma. What is of ten called the A bhidhamma Method in T her av ada is
an at t empt to express the entire body of Buddhis t t houg ht by f aithf ully f ollowing
the doctr ine of anat t a or non- essentiality. T he A bhidhamma Method is an at t empt
to ex pound Buddhis t doctrine by ref erring only to aggregates of elements r ather
than to substances or thing s.
A consistent account eschewing references to people who suffer or at t ain
l iber ation, tal k ing only of aggregates of f or m, consciousness, v olition, etc. is called
dha mma dhi t t ha na , where dhamma has the specif ic sense of an element or
cons titutiv e aggr egate, khandha. As previously noted the ter m dhamma also denotes
the doctr ine or teaching of the Buddha which is in accord with the realised tr uths
of the cosmic order, this cosmic order also being called dhamma. In this more
general sense of the ter m dha mma , dha mma dhi t t ha na denotes a true or f aithf ul
ex position of the doctr ine based upon s pir itual ins ig ht into dhamma. T hus like
phas a-t ham dha mma dhi t t ha na is a s pir itually inf or med ex position of Buddhis t
doctr ine, because it is based upon insig ht into the t r uth of anat t a and is in accord
writh absolute t r ut h, par amatthas acca.
On the other hand pug g al adhit thana is regarded as an inferior and inadequate
ex position of the doctr ine because it continues to refer to people and indiv iduals as
if they in f act have an essential self. Pug g al adhit t hana accounts of Buddhis t
teaching are, like phasa-khon, based on everyday awareness or conv entional
knowledge, s ammat is acca, which is devoid of s pir itual insig ht. While such
pug g al adhit t hana ex positions may have value in encour aging mor al practice among
those who lack the s pir itual insig ht to appr eciate the core doctrines, and even
thoug h as rioted above the Buddha himself recognised the need to vary the level of
pr esenting the teachings according to the s pir itual abilities of the audience, such
ex positions in ter ms of conv entional conceptions and ter ms are str ictly speaking
false. A nd while in the instr uctional tex ts of the S ut t apit ak a such false but mor ally
and s pir itually benef icial accounts of the doctr ine are sanctioned, it was the
intention of the the author s of the A bhidhammapit a k a to present the doctr ine in a
way w'holly consistent with the pr inciple of anatt a. T hat is they attempted to
wr ite the A bhidhammapit ak a solely in ter ms of dha mma dhi t t ha na.
In elabor ating his theory of phas a-khon - phas a-t ham Buddhadas a also
maint ains t hat there are two levels at which the pr inciples of religion can be
under s tood, the ex oteric and the esoteric, which he in tur n relates to his notions of
phas a-khon and phasa-tham and to pug g al adhit t hana and dha mma dhi t t ha na
r espectively. Buddhadas a defines "esoteric" in T hai as chaphor -khon
( if tY nzf tU )? "person- specif ic" or "per taining to an indiv idual s
under s t anding ."(T )24 He also equates the T hai wor d for person, khon (f ound in the
ter ms phas a-khon /'ev er y day lang uag e", and chaphor -k hon, "ex oter ic") with the Pali
loan wor d bukkhon ( , Pali: pug g ala) denoting "indiv i dual ", which is
f ound in the ter m pug g al adhit t hana. Giv en this equation it appears t hat
Buddhadas a regards his ter m phasa-khon as a T hai version of the much older Pali
ter m pug g aladhit thana.
Buddhadas a also has the f ollowing to say r egar ding the tr anscendent or
l ok ut t ar a awareness of absolute t r ut h, par amat t has acca, which under pins his
phas a-t ham inter pr etations of the scriptures,
T his [par amat t has acca] is held to be tr uly speaking in the way of
dha mma dhi t t ha na , and to reach to the end point of those matter s [of
doctrine] which or dinar y people s till cannot see.(T )25
Giv en t hat the T hai word t ham (as f ound in phas a-t ha m) is the T hai
equiv alent of the Pali ter m dha mma , and also given t hat he equates the terms
phas a-khon and pug g al adhit t hana, it appears t hat Buddhadas a similar ly regards his
ter m phas a-tham as a contempor ar y T hai r endering of the Pal i term
dha mma dhi t t ha na . A nd Buddhadas a acknowledges t hat the concepts of
pug g al adhit t hana and dha mma dhi t t ha na f ound in the A bhidhamma liter atur e are a
source of his notions of phas a-khon and phas a-t ham when he says of phas a-khon,
"T his is called speaking in the way of pug g al adhit t hana [i.e. s ammat is acca], for
those who cannot work out deep thing s. "( T ) 26
However, while Buddhadas a presents phasa-khon and phasa-t ham as being
l ing uis tically and conceptually related to pug g al adhit t hana and dha mma dhi t t ha na
there is in f act an impor t ant difference between the two sets of terms. T r aditional ly
the S ut t apit ak a as a whole has been called v ohar ades ana, "the teaching (presented
in ter ms ) of conv entional speech", because it is composed pr edominantly of
conver sations or v ohar a expressed in conv entional speech. T hat is, the entir e
S ut t apit ak a has tr aditionally been categorised as pug g al adhit thana. On the other
hand the A bhidhammapit ak a has been called par amat t hade s ana, "the teaching
24 - / -
P h u t t h a t h a t , T ek it cak am ( n [ f] J J J J " T e k i c c a k a mma ), T ha mma t ha n M u l a ni t hi
( U J J U il ) ( Cha i y a T ha i l a nd, 2519 (1 9 76), p. 297.
i bi d. p. 290.
26i d. , Os ar eta.ppha.t ham ( " j ) ^ 'I I J VilU J 7 U ^ s ar et abb a dha mma ) , T ha mma t ha n M u l ani t hi
( f l T T U V n U U a i n ? )- Cha i y a T ha i l and, 2525 (1 9 82), p. 55.
(presented in ter ms) of ul timate t r ut h", because its doctr inal tr acts are in the main
ex pressed in ter ms of the cons titutiv e elements of ex istence. T hat is, the
A bhidhammapit ak a is an ex position in ter ms of dha mma dhi t t ha na. T he theory of
phas a-khon - phas a-t ha m, however, breaks with this convention. Buddhadas a
maint ains t hat many of the B uddhas s tatements in the S ut t apit ak a , in accord with
the conv ention t hat the Buddha addressed dif f erent audiences in qualitativ ely
dif f er ent ways, should be read as par amat t hade s ana, i.e. as phas a-t ha m. He says
t hat to regard all the discourses recorded in the S ut t apit ak a s imply as conv entional
speech or v ohar ades ana and to inter pr et them as all being pug g al adhit t hana or
phas a-k hon, as has tr aditional ly been the case, is to miss their real s pir itual
s ig nif i cance. T hat is, Buddhadas a transf ers the domain of appl icability of the notion
of dha mma dhi t t ha na f r om its t r adit ional referent of the philos ophical analyses of
the A bhidhammapit ak a to the discourses and discussions of the S ut t apit ak a, which
have histor ically been regarded as being presented solely in terms of
pug g al adhit t hana. T hus while being der ived f rom the notion of dha mma dhi t t ha na ,
B uddhadas as notion of phasa-t ham has both a dif f er ent emphasis and a dif f erent
ref erent f r om its par ental notion. S imilar ly , w'hile the notion of phasa-khon is
derived f r om t hat of pug g al adhit t hana Buddhadas as ter m also has a dif f erent
emphasis and a dif f erent referent. Instead of being a generic ter m for the dir ect
speech recorded in the S ut t api t a k a, pug g al adhit t hana is used to denote an
inadequate and uninf or med r eading of t hat direct speech.
3.5 Dif f i c ul t ie s W i t h t he T heor y of Phas a- k hon - P has a- t ham.
T here is a dif f iculty , however, in the der iv ation of the notions of phasa-khon
and phas a-t ha m. For while Buddhadas a wishes to use these notions to develop his
r e- inter pretation of the doctr ine contained in the S ut t apit ak a the two ter ms
respective par ental notions of s ammat is acca and par amat t has acca and of
pug g al adhit t hana and dha mma dhi t t ha na are not f ound in the S ut t apit ak a but f ir st
appear in the later A bhi dhammapi t a k a 27, whose author ity Buddhadas a by and large
rejects. In f act the dis tinction between abs olute and relative t r uth def ined above is
only ex plicitly developed in the later commentar ies, which Buddhadas a considers
even less author itat iv e than the A bhidhammapit a k a itself. B uddhadas as views on
the canonicity and author ity of the T her av ada scriptures and commentar ies are
27 -
T he t er m s a mma t i s a c c a f ir st occur s in t he K a t ha v a t hu of t he A bhi dha mma pi t a k a ,
V ol . 3 7 /v e r s e l 0 6 2 /p. 3 3 8 . T he f ir st occur r ence of t he t er m p a r a ma t t ha is i n t he s ame pl ace,
V ol . 3 7 /v e r s e s l - 19 0 /pp. 1- 83. T he t er ms pug g a l a dhi t t ha na des ana ( de s a na : t eachi ng , i ns t r uct i on, ex pos i t i on)
a nd dha m m a d hi t t ha n a des ana ar e not f ound in t he T ipi t a k a , f ir st occur r i ng in a c omme nt ar y on t he
A bhi dha mma pi t a k a , t he P a t i s a mbhi dha ma g g a A t t ha k a t ha .
discussed in detail in Chapter Four . However, it is impor tant to note here t hat
Buddhadas a rejects the author ity of the liter atur e which he himself has stated is the
source of the crucial her meneutic theory of phas a-khon - phas a-t ha m. His mot iv at ion
in rejecting the A bhidhamma liter atur e is to cleanse Buddhis m of the super stitious
and non- scientif ic cosmological mater ial associated with it in T hailand and to avoid
what he regards as the A bhidhammapitaka'* s excessive analy tical detail. The
mot iv at ion behind setting up the phas a-khon - phas a-t ham theory is s imilar ly to
develop a method of inter pr eting the key scriptures of the S ut t apitak a in a way
t hat is scientif ic and non- superstitious. However, these two prongs of Buddhadas as
r e- inter pretation of T her av ada doctr ine, the rejection of the A bhidhamma and the
pos iting of the theory of phas a-t ha m, are in f act in conf lict, with the rejection of
the A bhidhamma under mining the s cr iptur al basis of his her meneutic theory.
However, as discussed above the notions of pug g al adhit thana and
dha mma dhi t t ha na f ound in the A bhidhamma liter atur e are not the only sources of
the theory of phasa-khon - phasa-t ha m. Both the inter pr etativ e method put f orward
in the Netti- Pakar ana and the generally recognised tr adit ion t hat the Buddha varied
his discourses to suit the level of under s tanding of his audience also provide a f ir m
basis for Buddhadas as theory within the T her av ada t r adit ion. Nevertheless, it is
still the case t hat Buddhadas a ex plicitly cites pug g al adhit t hana and
dha mma dhi t t ha na as the respective sources of his notions of phasa-khon and
phas a- t ha m, and it is also the case t hat he rejects the author ity of the
A bhi dha mma , liter atur e which is the canonical source of those notions. While
Buddhadas a does not discuss his j us tif ications of the phasa-khon - phas a-tham
theory and his rejection of the A bhidhamma in the same tex ts this does not lessen
the logical contr adiction, a contr adiction which he neither acknowledges nor deals
with.
However, another T hai scholar monk also interested in developing moder nist
and relev ant inter pr etations of Buddhis t theor y , Phr a Raj av ar amuni, has pr ovided a
possible r esolution of the above contr adiction in his reference work on T her av ada
doctr ine, "P hut t ha t ha m" ( " WVrffi] J 714" ) ( T ) 28. While Phr a Raj av ar amuni is not
ex plicitly concerned with Buddhadas as work or with the theory of phasa-khon -
phas a-t ha m29 large sections of his book P hut t hat ha m are dir ected to an analysis and
j us t if ication of inter pr etations of the scriptures which correspond closely to
28 7
See f oot not e 23 abov e. i n T ha i Phr a R a j a v a r a muni 's na me is pr onounce d P hr a Ra t c ha w or a muni , and
t he b i bl i og r a phi c al det ai l s of his wor ks ar e l i sted unde r t hi s na me i n t he T hai l ang uag e bi bl i og r aphy .
29 -. t . j
In a pr i v at e cor r es pondence P hr a Ra j a v a r a muni has i ndi cat e d t o t he a ut hor t ha t he has r ead l i t t le of
B uddha da s a 's wor k . Ne v e r t he l ess he has al so i ndi cat e d t ha t he does s har e ma ny of B uddha da s a 's views.
96
B uddhadas as own views. Even thoug h Buddhadas a and Raj av ar amuni have worked
independently they share common views about the need to rid T hai Buddhis m of
animis t and Br ahmanical influences and of the need to re- interpret and re- present
T her av ada teachings in a way t hat demonstr ates their relevance to moder n life.
These common views have in several places independently led the two scholar monks
to s imilar inter pr etativ e positions. Like Buddhadas a Raj av ar amuni places the
gr eatest emphasis on the B uddhas own recorded words in the S ut t apit ak a as the
source of doctr inal author ity . Wher ever possible he attempts to trace the origins of
his inter pr etations of doctr ine back to precise statements in the S ut t apit ak a rather
t han j us tif y ing his views by ref erring to one or other later commentar y on the
scr iptur es. Because of the s imilar ity of Raj av ar amunis ideas to Buddhadas as views
and because of the detailed and scholar ly natur e of his research I will refer to his
work several times in the f ollowing chapters where it is of use in clar if y ing
dif f iculties and ambig uities in B uddhadas as work.
In P hut t hat ham Raj av ar amuni provides a detailed discussion on the origins of
the s ammat is acca - par amatthasacca. dis t inct ion(T )30, which as noted above is one
precedent of the phasa-khon - phasa-t ham theor y . Raj av ar amuni observes t hat the
immediate source of this dis tinction is a comment made by a nun or bhikkhun'i
named V aj ir a31 in the V aj ir a S ut t a, who is quoted as condemning the conv entional
appr oach to under s tanding reality which is ig nor ant of the tur th of anat t a or non
self,
T his is Mar a [ delusion] ! How can you have this clinging- inf ormed thoug ht
t hat it [a human being] is an entity ? Inas much as it is only a pile of
s ank har a ( c ompounded t hi ng ] ) no entity at all can be f ound. J us t as when
the necessary components are assembled together it is said t hat there is a
"car t ", so when all the k handha are present it is [ conventionally] assumed
t hat there is an e nt it y .(T )32
Raj av ar amuni adds t hat the s ammat i - par amat t ha dis tinction developed in
the A bhidhammapit ak a is in fact f ounded on the B uddhas advice to,
recognise the use of language as a medium of meaning w ithout being
30 - T
P h r a R a t c h a w o r a r n u m , P hut t ha t ha m ( 11 Y'j VIU1) J J U* * )> P- 55.
1
31
T he di s t i nc t i on bet ween s a mma t i s a c c a a nd pa r a ma t t ha s a c c a made in t he K a t ha v a t t hu of t he
A b hi dha mma pi t a k a (see f oot not e 27 abov e) is bas ed on an a n a l ysis of t he comme nt s made by t he nun
V a j i r a .
32 - -
V a j i r a S ut t a , S a my ut t a N i k a y a , V ol . 15 /v er s e 5 5 4 /p. 167.
attached to the [ conventional] assumptions as a slave of l ang uag e.(T )33
He suppor ts this view by citing passages such as the f ollowing f r om the
Potthapada S ut t a , where the Buddha says,
These are wor ldly appellations , wor ldly ex pressions, wor ldly usages and
wor ldly designations t hat the T at hag at a uses in speaking but is not
attached t o.(T )34
Here Raj av ar ar nuni is say ing t hat the conceptual dis tinction of s ammat is acca
and par amat t has acca, which under pins both Buddhadas as phas a-khon - phas a-t ham
theory and the inter pr etativ e dis tinction of pug g al adhit t hana and dha mma dhi t t ha na ,
has its actual source in the B uddhas own recorded words f ound in the S ut t apitak a.
T hat is, Raj av ar amunis account cir cumv ents the dif f iculty caused by Buddhadas as
denial of the A bhidhammapit ak a and related commentar ies by tr acing the sources of
the dis tinction back to the S ut t apit ak a whose author ity Buddhadas a does recognise.
However, Buddhadas a himself does not detail this source of his notions in the
S ut t apit ak a and so it still r emains the case t hat within the body of his own
wr iting s there r emains a contr adiction between his assertion of the theory of
phas a-khon - phas a-t ham and the denial of the author ity of t hat theor y s immediate
s cr iptur al source in the A bhidhammapit ak a.
3.6 Dif f i c ul t ie s in A ppl y i ng t he Int e r pr e t a t i v e T heor y of Phas a- t ham.
In addition to the theor etical dif f iculties associated with the scr iptur al sources
of the phasa-t ham theory there are also practical dif f iculties in apply ing
B uddhadas as theory of s cr iptur al inter pr etation. Fir s tly , Buddhadas a provides no
ex plicit pr inciple to indicate which par ts of the S ut t apitak a should be read in terms
of either phas a-khon or phas a-t ha m. His theory is consequently par ticular ly
susceptible to attack, for w ithout a clearly expressed criterion of how the two types
of inter pr etation should be applied disputes over the respective phasa-khon or
phas a-t ham char acter of par ticular s ut l as cannot easily be resolved. A nd secondly,
Buddhadas a does not provide a theor etical cr iter ion for j udg ing the accuracy of any
par t icul ar inter pr etation of a s utta which he claims is the true phasa-tham r endering
of t hat s utta. T his means t hat it is dif f icult for Buddhadas a to prove t hat in re
inter pr eting the Pali scriptures he is not s imply f ollowing his own whim or twis ting
the or ig inal tex t to suit his own purposes, as has been claimed by some of his
3 3 ( P hr a ) R a t c h a w o r a m u n i , P hut t ha t ha m ( "Y J V Uj f l ? J U M ), p. 56.
34P o t t ha pa da S ut t a , Di g ha Ni k a y a , V ol . 9 /v e r s e 3 1 2 /p. 2 8 1.
9 8
cr itics35. T his is not to say t hat B uddhadas as inter pr etations are in f act wrong or
twisted but t hat he provides no cr iter ion which mig ht allow others to independently
decide the accuracy or inaccur acy of his renderings of the scriptures. T hat is, he
does not pr ovide a theor etical criterion which would allow an independent observer
to deter mine f r om an analy sis of the tex t or scriptures in question whether t hat
tex t s hould be read as phas a-t ham and, if it is to be read as phasa-t ha m, whether
the dha mma lang uag e inter pr etation he gives to t hat tex t is in f act correct.
B ut while Buddhadas a does not present any ex plicit cr iter ia for the application
of his inter pr etativ e theory a close r eading of his works does reveal the oper ation of
some implicit cr iter ia. One of these cr iter ia is sociological, in t hat Buddhadas a bases
j udg ements of the inaccur acy of t r adit ional readings of the scriptures and of the
accuracy of his phasa-t ham readings on the social and religious effects of those
respective inter pr etations . T his cr iter ion is related to Buddhadas as ecumenical
interests for, as will be discussed in Chapter Nine, har mony between religions is a
major plank of Buddhadas as proposal for a better wor ld, seeing as he traces social
pr oblems to weaknesses in or conf licts between religions. He thereby regards ending
social pr oblems which hinder impr ov ements in human well- being as f undamentally a
r eligious matter , say ing t hat ,
T he true objective of the f ounders of all religions with regard to the
completion or perf ection of what is most useful and needful for humanity is
not being achieved, because the f ollowers of the respective religions inter pr et
the language of dhamma wrongly , hav ing preserved wrong inter pr etations
and preached wr ongly to such an ex tent t hat the wor ld has been f acing
tur moils and pr oblems created by the conf licts among r eligions.36
T hus for Buddhadas a the key to religious har mony is t hat each r elig ions
doctr ines should be inter pr eted correctly accor ding to phasa-t ha m, and because of
w hat he sees as histor ical accretions to and mis inter pr etations of or ig inal religious
teaching s he warns t hat , "We should be ex tremely careful with [ religious]
inter pr etations of a r ig idly t r adit ional nat ur e ."37 T o pr omote mut ual under s tanding
and agreement concer ning the correct rendering of each r elig ions doctrines
Buddhadas a calls for "enlig htened f lex ibility as r egar ding inter pr eting ."38 Concretely
this "enlig htened f lex ibility " means t hat ,
35 See Cha pt e r Ni ne
'^B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y a nd B uddhi s m, no t r a ns l at or g i v en, 2nd edn, S ub l i me Li f e Mi s s i on,
B a ng k ok , 1977, p. 8.
37
i bi d. p . 15.
*
We s hould maint ain t hat if an inter pr etation of any wor d in any religion
leads to dis har mony and does not positively f ur ther the welfare of the
many , then such an inter pr etation is to be regarded as wrong; t hat is,
ag ains t the will of God, or as the wor king of Satan or Mar a39.40
Here Buddhadas a is restating the epistemolog ical cr iter ion of "mor al benef it "
put f or war d by the Buddha which was discussed in Chapter One. T hat is, he
proposes t hat the criter ion for j udg ing the accuracy of a phas a-tham inter pr etation
is ethical. A ter m or s utta should be subjected to a phas a-t ham re- inter pretation if
its cur r ent or t r adit ional inter pr etation does not produce social and religious
har mony . A nd a phas a-t ham rendering is correct if it then per mits or pr omotes
univ er sal welf are and inter- religious har mony .
T his sociological cr iterion for the appl ication of phas a-tham inter pr etations
demons tr ates t hat Buddhadas as theory is not based solely in T her av ada doctr ine
al t houg h, as has already been discussed, it is closely related to the t r adit ion of
T her av ada thoug ht. Rather , Buddhadas a's her meneutic theory incorporates his
per ception of the social role and impor tance of Buddhis m in T hailand, for the
sociological cr iter ion for apply ing phas a-t ham inter pr etations of the scriptures is
based upon j udg ements concerning the proper social impact of par ticular
inter pr etations of religious tex ts and doctrines. T his sociological criterion for the
appl icat ion of phasa-t ham inter pr etations does not deal with the character of the
tex ts in dis pute but is based on ex tr a- tex tual j udg ements of the benef icial or
deleter ious impact of s cr iptur al inter pr etations . For Buddhadas a phas a-tham
inter pr etations are valid and true if and because they pr omote mor al and religious
well- being and ul timatel y assist in the at t ai nme nt of nibbana or s alv ation f rom
suf f er ing. As alr eady noted this criterion is in accord with the practical or ethical
epis temolog ical emphasis of T her av ada Buddhis m, where a point or theory is j udg ed
as "t r ue" if it has pr actical benef it in assisting the at t ainment of s alv ation, not
because t hat point or theory is true pe r se.
T his pr actical and ethical epistemolog ical cr iter ion is, however, f ounded upon
impl icit theor etical principles. It is based f ir stly on the ass umption t hat nibbana is
an act ual and true condition. Fur ther mor e, the ethical cr iter ion of t r uth assumes
t hat any activ ity which promotes the at t ai nme nt of nibbana mus t of necessity be
g uided by knowledge which either reflects t hat ul timat e t r uth or par ticipates in it
to such an ex tent t hat it is capable of ul timat el y ef f ecting its r ealisation. T hat is,
39
Ma r a is r eg ar ded as a de mon who pr of er r ed t he las t g r eat t e mpt a t i on to t he Buddha- t o- be bef or e he
a t t a i ne d e nl i g ht e nme nt . T hi s was t he t e mpt a t i on to r ul e t he wor l d r a t he r t ha n r ule t he pas si ons a nd at t ai n
ni bba na .
40
B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y a nd B ud dhi s m, p . 15.
only action based upon pr inciples which are in f act in accord with the ul timate
t r ut h of nibbana are in practice capable of leading to the under s tanding of t hat
t r uth. Because the ethical goal of Buddhis t s pir itual practice is a state of wisdom or
absolute knowledge epistemology and practice are thereby inter- related. For this
reason Buddhadas as pr actical or sociological cr iter ion for the application of his
phas a-t ham theory mus t be regarded as in f act being based upon sound Buddhis t
epistemological criter ia. However, he hims elf has not ex plicitly detailed these
matter s and has, as a consequence, left his inter pr etativ e theory somewhat in a
state of theoretical conf usion.
3.7 Cr i t i c i s ms of t he P ha s a - t ha m T heor y .
T he conf usions associated with Buddhadas as pr esentation of the theory of
phas a-khon - phasa-t ham make it par ticular ly susceptible to attack, and indeed there
are vehement critics of B uddhadas as two lang uag e theory . However, the attacks of
these critics in general reveal either a mis under s tanding of what the theory actually
proposes or the cr iticism is more political than theor etical, which perhaps is to be
ex pected given the pr actical and social emphasis of the phas a-t ham theory. In
genera] it is the political and social implications of Buddhadas as views on the
lang uag e of the Buddhis t scriptures which are cr iticised, not the views themselves
nor the means by which he arrives at them. T he polemical char acter and general
theor etical inadequacy of many of the cr iticisms raised ag ainst the phasa-khon -
phasa-t ham dis tinction in f act demonstr ates t hat in f undamentally ref or ming
Buddhis t teachings in T hailand Buddhadas a provides not j us t an intellectual but an
ideological challenge to tr adit ional is t and conser vative T hai Buddhis ts , who respond
with political and ideological rather than s tr ictly theoretical attacks on his work.
For ex ample, f ormer Pr ime Minis ter K huk r it Pr amot 41 criticises not only the
phas a-khon - phasa-t ham dis tinction but also says t hat the overall style of
B uddhadas as language in his works and sermons is conf using for the average T hai.
In one public debate with K huk r it Buddhadas a remarked t hat, "T he more one
41 K huk r i t P r a mot is pr oba bl y tl ie mos t f a mous cont e mpor ar y T ha i pol i t i ci an, bei ng t he l eader of t he
Soci al A c t i on Pa r t y , one of t he maj or co- al it i on par t ner s in r ecent T ha i Gov e r nme nt s under Pr i me Mi ni s t e r
P r e m T i ns ul a non. K huk r i t was hi ms el f Pr i me Mi ni s t e r in 1973 a nd ag a i n in 1975. He is al so a wel l - k nown
nov el i s t a nd owner of a maj or B a ng k ok dai l y news paper . Hi s i nt e l l e c t ua l as oppos ed t o pol i ti cal s t at ur e can
be g aug e d by t he f act t ha t he has publ i cl y de bat e d B uddha da s a on T V and r adi o on issues of B uddhi s t
doct r i ne a nd pr act i ce.
101
studies Buddhis m the less one under s tands i t . "( T ) 42 Buddhadas a has a f ondness for
par adox and irony , being much inf luenced by the Zen school of Buddhis m. A nd as
in Zen Buddhadas a of ten likes using lang uag e pr ov ocatively with the object of
s t imul at ing his audience to reconsider their customar y views. In the above quote
Buddhadas a is emphasising t hat purely theor etical studies of Buddhis m not only do
not lead to correct s pir itual under s tanding but the conv olutions of an intellect
caug ht at the level of phasa-khon may actually pr event ins ig ht into Buddhis t tr uths .
However, in reply to B uddhadas as above s tatement K huk r it quipped, "Y ou should
go and teach the J apanese, you speak like a Zen Buddhis t. "( T ) 43 As a politician
K huk r it appears to have in mind the accessibility of Buddhis m to the T hai masses
when he criticises the pur por ted dif f iculty of B uddhadas as style.
However, there have been some more specific theor etical cr iticisms of
B uddhadas as inter pr etativ e theor y , such as the f ollowing by Winay Siwakun, an
economist and political scientist wor king in the Depar tment of the Budg et44. Winay
argues t hat ,
In regard to ex plaining the dha mma under s tandably , how will we speak
unless we use phasa-khon for t alking and ex plaining so as obtain knowledge
and under s tanding of dha mma ! {T )45
Here Winay has in mind the t r adit ional notion of r eligious lang uag e in
T hail and, which he mistakenly thinks is what Buddhadas a means by phas a-t ha m.
42 . . _ _ _
Ci t e d in P u n Cong pr as oet (ed), W i w a t ha R a w i n g M. R . W . K hy k r i t P r a mot K a p T ha n P hut t ha t ha t
P hi k k hu N a i t Ry ang Cit- w ang
* r
( " r n v i r i z m n j j . j . t . S n q v r a i J n l i r a m j v n u w v f f i v n a n n ^ " ), P .29.
43. , . ,
i bi d.
44 ^ ^
Wi na y S i w ak un ( 'i HL ! ) s a t r ai ned economi s t w or k i ng in t he
De pa r t me nt of t he Budg e t . He t eaches A bhid.ham.ma at t he A bhi dha mi na F o unda t i on ( A phi t ha m Mul a ni t hi
- v m j t u u m i s ) at W a t Pho in B a ng k ok . In par t i cul a r he t eaches
3J
a bo ut t he r el at i on bet ween t he B r a hma ni c a l as pect s of T ha i B uddhi s m a nd A bhi dha mi na . He is al so head
of t he Ong k a n P hi t ha k P hr a P hut t ha s a s a na
( 'Q'J h f l J Tfll Vlf l liYJ VlU ^ ) or T he Soci et y f or t he Pr ot e ct i on
of B uddhi s m, a cons er v at i v e, t r adi t i onal i s t or g ani s at i on.
4 ^ W i n a y Si wa k un ( ^VILI )i "P ha s a P hut t ha t ha t "
B uddha da s a 's L a ng ua g e ") i n A na n S e na k han (ed), K ha ms o r n
y . r
, *=1
D i a r a t h i ( ** Pi Q l l I 3^t l U 11 He r e t i ca l T eaching s ), Ong k a n P hi t ha k P hut t ha s a s a na A phi t ha m
r *
Mul a n i t hi ( ), B a ng k ok , 2522 (1979), p. 104.
1 51
i
Histor ically the lang uag e of Buddhis m in T hail and has not been the ver nacular but
the ancient language of Pal i, which is unintellig ible to the uneducated. Winay asks
how can Buddhis m be understood if Buddhadas a intends using such a remote and
unintellig ible language. B ut Winay has not only misunder stood what Buddhadas a
means by phas a-t ha m, namely , a s pir itually insig htf ul reading of the scriptures and
not a special scholarly religious lang uag e, he also f ails to under s tand what is meant
by phas a-k hon. He takes phas a-khon as meaning liter ally , "human speech", with the
implicat ion of speaking in an under s tandable and reasonable way . While in common
usage phasa-khon has the positive impor t of being clear, down to ear th and sensible,
for Buddhadas a it has the negative impor t of being an inadequate and limited
appr eciation of the B uddhas teaching. T his inver sion of the t er ms usual impor t in
T hai is a deliber ate ling uis tic ploy by Buddhadas a to emphasise t hat what most
people take to be a sound and reasonable inter pr etation of the scriptures is, f r om a
s pir itual perspective, quite unsound. Winay asks how deep thing s can be understood
w it hout using the clear language of phas a-k hon. It is Buddhadas as point, however,
t hat what Winay pur por ts to be clear and reasonable lang uag e is based upon a
mater ial r ather than s pir itual mode of knowing . Consequently a phasa-khon analysis
is incapable of appr eciating the actual impor t of the dhamma simply because it has
not penetr ated to the epistemological r ealm of dha mma , r emaining in the
"sensibleness" of mundane awareness.
B uddhadas as point is t hat w ithout s pir itual insig ht into dha mma no amount
of ex plaining , no matter how clear and reasonable, will ever succeed in ins tilling in
the listener an actual appr eciation of the B uddhas teaching. In Buddhadas as view
phas a-k hon, or language taken liter ally as ex pressing the conv entionally accepted
wis dom of the average person, no matter how astute or perspicuous, forever f ails to
g rasp the tr uths of the dhamma.
Nevertheless, in his criticisms of Buddhadas as theory Winay invokes a
power f ul ally in his emphasis on ease of under s tanding in accounts of Buddhis m,
namely the present T hai king , Phumiphon A duny adet or Rama IX (1947 - ). In a
1965 address to the K hanak ammak an Sun K honkhwa T hane Phutthas as ana
r V V
( ), or the Committee
v si i
of the Centr e for Buddhis t Research, at Wa t Saket Bang kok, K ing Phumiphon
emphasised t hat despite the progress of science Buddhis m retained its t r adit ional
impor tance, as indicated by the number of Eur opeans and A mer icans interested in
it. T he K ing then suggested t hat f oreigners interest in Buddhis m should be
f acilitated and t hat,
103
Buddhism should be taught so that it can be easily understood, by
means of language everyone can listen to without having to spend a long
t i me. ( T) 46
This speech is referred to by another critic of Buddhadasa s, the former monk,
Phra Chayanantho Phikkhu, or Anan Senakhan47 in a book called " Khamsorn
Di arathi " ( t t f l l l T t l L I " ) ' Heretical Teachings), a text
which is directed solely at condemning Buddhadasa and his ideas. The clear
implication of this book is that Buddhadasa s teachings, by not fitting with the
Ki ng s expressed wish for Buddhism to be expounded simply and straightforwardly,
not only show disobedience to the monarch but also subvert the propagation of
Buddhism to foreigners, which the King and many other Thai Buddhists regard as
an important cultural activity.
However, these criticisms by Winay and Anan are not directed at the actual
theory of phasa- tham, but rather criticise the political implications of Buddhadasa s
work and not his theoretical work itself. This failure to deal with theoretical issues
and the corresponding concentration on politics is a systematic characteristic of
many of the criticisms directed against Buddhadasa s interpretations. This indicates
that the crucial point of disagreement between Buddhadasa and his critics is not in
fact strictly theoretical or doctrinal but is more a question of fundamentally
differing appreciations of the nature of Buddhism in modern Thailand. The response
of Anan Senakhan, Winay Siwakun and similar conservative critics of Buddhadasa
to socio-economic modernisation and development has been to resist change in what
they perceive as key elements of Thai culture and identity, symbolised in the
traditional teaching and practice of Buddhism. For the conservatives change is
regarded negatively as a threat, but for liberal Buddhists like Buddhadasa the
changes brought about by modernisation are seen as challenges, to be met by
j udicious adjustment of existing ideas and outlooks to the new circumstances. As
will be discussed in a later chapters these two polarised responses to change are also
associated with polarised political stances in contemporary Thai secular life.
Ci t ed by A n a n Senakhan ( ' Q' UHf l I 114"VijTilJ ) *n Khams orn Dirathi
( ** f]*' ' ! $ l U I f l U T Tl U n Heretical Teachings), On g kan Phi t hak P h u t t hasasana Aph i t h am
Mul ani t hi ( f i n T TWVf f l kTNMl I T JJJJf i f f i ? ) Ba ngkok, 2522 ( 1979) p . 23.
1 II
47An a n Senakhan ( cl eri cal name Phr a Ch a y a nt ho Phi kkhu) was f or mer l y a pol i c e man in t he Di vi si on of
Cr i me Suppr es si on and was ac t i ve in an ant i - c o r r upt i on c ampai g n wi t hi n t he pol i ce f orce. Howe ver , his
c r i t i ci sms o f hi gh- r anki ng of f i cers and pol i t i ci ans f orced hi m t o be c o me a mo nk f or reasons o f personal
s af et y in 1975 af ter a nu mbe r of t hreat s were made agai nst hi m. Whi l e a mo nk he be c ame a s t r ong
s u ppo r t e r o f t he Ab h i d h a mma Fo un dat i o n at Wa t Ph o or Wa t Phr ac h e t uph o n, and mai nt ai ned hi s cri t i cal
pe nc h ant by at t ac ki ng progressi ve mo nks li ke Budd ha das a wh o m he r egar ded as under mi ni ng Buddhi st
t r adi t i ons . He di sr obed in earl y 1983 in o rder t o par t i c i pat e in t he c ampai g n f or t he ge ner al e lect i on but
was arrest ed in Ap r i l t hat year on t he c har ge of lese maj est e af t er a c ont r over s i al publ i c address on t he
mo na r c h y . He has been c onv i c t e d o f t hat c har ge and is no w ser vi ng t wo t hree year pri son t erms.
104
3.8 Doctrinal Re-interpretations Based on Phasa-tham Readings of the
Buddhist Scriptures.
While it is important to appreciate the problems underlying Buddhadasa s
phasa- khon - phasa- tham theory and the criticisms that it has received it is equally
i mportant to consider its place in his overall system of thought, as the basis for a
re-interpretation of the entire body of Theravada teachings and scriptures. I will
now turn to consider an example of how Buddhadasa in fact uses his hermeneutic
theory.
In the Pali scriptures the Buddha and his disciples often refer to celestial
beings and to demons and the various levels of heavens and hells inhabited by such
beings. Traditionally other worlds and super-human and sub-human beings have been
regarded as real in Buddhism, respectively representing the heights and depths a
human may either rise or sink to in subsequent lives as a result of the outworking
of their good or bad deeds. Celestial beings or devata, heavens and hells are all
taken as having real existences by Buddhaghosa in his interpretative text, the
Visuddhimagga. Speaking of the supernatural powers attained by concentration
meditation and the attainment of j hanas or trance states Buddhaghosa says that
with the supernormal power of clairaudience one may hear, "right up to the
Brahma worl d. 48, that is, the heavenly domain inhabited by the god Brahma and
his retinue. Elsewhere he says that because of a strong desire for heavenly bliss one
may, by the effect of the kamma created by such a desire, be reborn in the
Brahma world49. Buddhaghosa supports his interpretation with quotes from the
Buddha s own scriptural pronouncements on the benefits of attaining j hanas,
Where do they [meditators] re-appear after developing the first j hana
limitedly? They re-appear in the company of the deities of Brahma s
retinue.50
However, Buddhadasa does not interpret such references to the "deities of
Brahma s retinue" as being actual celestial beings. He says such a view is a limited
phasa- khon reading and instead defines devata, (Thai: thewada) in phasa- tham as,
48Vi suddhi magga, XIII, 6.
49 i bi d. VI I, 7.
Vibhanga Sutta, ci t ed at V i s u d d h i m a g g a , XI , 123.
50

105
" A person free of suffering, who is beautiful, lives in ease and is glorious. " ( T ) 51 He
adds,
If in this human world there are some people who need not work, be
anxious or bear heavy burdens but who can continually relax, play and be
at ease then according to the above definition they can be called thewada.
Moreover, if they obtain this status of ease for a few hours then they are
thewada for those hours. Outside that period they are humans, or may
even fall lower than that to become hellish beings. That is, for a few hours
they may burn with worries and unease like beings in hell. When they
work at tiring duties they are human. But in the hours they are sensually
satisfied they are t hewada. ( T) 2
As for the nature of the abodes of these thewada and hellish beings
Buddhadasa says that,
Heaven is in one s breast, hell is in one s mind, nibbana exists in the
human mind. Hence what is meant by the term "world" exists in the
human mi nd. ( T) 53
Talking specifically of the various grades of hell described in the Pali canon
Buddhadasa maintains that their interpretation as "woeful states" of mind, apaya,
"co-incides in meaning and purpose with what the Buddha taught. "54, w'hile the
belief that they represent actual realms of being, "should be recognised as
superstition. " 55
There is a common pattern across all Buddhadasa s phasa- tham re-
interpretations of concepts which reveals a further implicit criterion underlying the
application of the theory. Notions which in the Visuddhimagga and in popular
interpretations of scriptures refer to actually existing supramundane or submundane
realms and beings are reduced to psychological states or conditions. That is, in
Buddhadasa s phasa- tham readings the traditional Buddhist cosmology is collapsed
and brought within the range of the life and mind of the individual. Heaven or
sugati in phasa- tham is not a realm of happy rebirth but the state of mind of a
^Phutthathat, Baramat ham Para.madha.Tnma), Samnak- phi m Sukhaphap- cai
, Bang ko k, 2525 ( 19 82) , p. 4.
52ibid. pp.4-5.
53Phut t hat hat , K harawat Tham The Layperson' s Dhamma) ,
Sani nak- nang s y Th a mr n a b uc h a ( ^f"") I l f ) M i l 1 )> Bang ko k , 2525 ( 1982) , p. 111.
U
54 -
B u d d hadasa, Buddha- dhamma For Students, p. 61.
106
happy person. Similarly a thewada is anyone who is "in heaven", in the popular
sense of someone alive here on earth who is overjoyed or pleasantly satisfied.
Taken as a whole Buddhadasa s phasa- tham re-interpretations represent a
systematic demythologisation of the Buddhist scriptures - whereby cosmological
realms become psychological states and deities and demons are interpreted as
individuals experiencing those respective states. Whenever a concept or term is
traditionally interpreted in a way which is at odds with what can be called a
modernist or rational scientific world view (i.e. that phenomena should be
interpreted and explained empirically) then that term or concept is demythologised
and is subjected to a phasa- tham re-interpretation. While neither traditional
Buddhist doctrine nor Buddhadasa s work can be called scientific, Buddhadasa does
follow the spirit if not the letter of science. He eschews metaphysical interpretations
of the doctrine and attempts to bring all the significant notions of Buddhist thought
within the experiential ambit of the human mind.
This demythologisation, however, does appear to be at odds with sections of
the scriptures which unequivocably refer to supernatural states and beings. The
commonness of the Buddha s unqualified scriptural references to heavens, hells,
deities and demons does give the strong impression that he himself believed in the
metaphysical rather than simply psychological reality of such realms and beings. For
example, it is difficult to interpret the following passages from the Puggala and
Cittanayi Suttas as referring to anything other than an actual hell and an actual
heaven.
If at this time the person [who has a mind turbid with kilesa] should die
they would go to naraka [hell] because of their turbid mind ... All beings
inevitably go to dugati [hell] because of that mental t urbi di t y. ( T) j6
If at this time this person [who has a mind bright and clear of kilesa]
should die they would go to sugati [heaven] because of their clear mind ...
All beings inevitably go to sugati because of that mental cl ari t y. ( T) 57
However, Buddhadasa s demythologisation of the Theravada scriptures does
obtain some support from the fact that the authority of the traditional system of
scriptural exegesis taken from the Visuddhimagga, in which heaven and hell are
regarded as real, is in fact based solely on tradition. There is 110 literature
supporting the interpretative position taken in the Visuddhimagga because
historically it has never been questioned in Thailand. Because heaven and hell have
^^Puggala Sutta, Khuddaka Nikaya, Vo l . 25/ v e r s e 198/ p . 1 71.
57Ci t t anayi Sutta, Khuddaka Nikaya, V o l . 2 5 / v e r s e l 9 9 / p . l 7 2 .
107
traditionally been regarded as referring to actual supernatural conditions there has
been no need to justify the literal reading of these and similar terms in the
scriptures. This means that the interpretative system represented by the
Visuddhimagga and related commentaries is only as strong as the regard and
reverence in which that text and its interpretative tradition has customarily been
held. Should the regard for that interpretative tradition falter then, in the absence
of any explicitly argued justification for reading the scriptures literally, the basis of
views and interpretations hallowed by that tradition would be substantially
weakened. And by desiring that Buddhist doctrine be consistent with a rational
scientific standard which has no place for the supernatural Buddhadasa does indeed
strongly question this traditional interpretative system.
The theoretical weakness and superficiality of the criticisms of the theory of
phasa- tham made by Buddhadasa s opponents demonstrates the lack of a theoretical
basis for the traditionally accepted exegetical system. Those criticisms which are
not directed at the political implications of Buddhadasa s theory amount to simply
statements of faith and ad homi nems. In countering Buddhadasa Anan Senakhan
says,
There really is a hell. It denotes every kind of being which must be born
in the realm of suffering called hell ... beings having wholesome kamma are
born in heaven. ( T) 58
And he accuses Buddhadasa of, "explaining [the doctrine] like a mentally
backward person. " ( T ) a9
In the absence of reasoned arguments for accepting the traditional Theravada
exegetical system any competing system of interpretation need not have so strong a
theoretical foundation as might be expected. This point is brought out clearly by a
follower of Buddhadasa in a book on interpreting religious symbolism, i .e.
phasa- tham,
Since there exists no simple set of rules for the deciphering of religious
allegories, each individual is more or less at liberty to propose whichever
interpretation strikes him as the most reasonable. Whether he then manages
to convince others that his view is correct depends on how well he can put
his case and defend it against the attacks of critics.60
co _ . . . #
A n a n Senakhan, K h a msor n Di ar at hi ( " p] Lf l U J D U P - 4 3 .
59 vA
ibid.
6 ( Bh i k k h u ) A r i y a n a n d a , P sychol ogy and Rel i gi ous S ymbol i sm, Subl i me Li f e Mi ssi on, Bangkok, no
p u b li cat i on dat e gi ven, p . 1 0.
108
Yet it must also be noted that Buddhadasa does not in fact completely deny
the cosmological reality of heaven and hell. He says,
True enough, the heaven and hell of everyday language are realms
outside - though don t ask me where - and they are attained after death.
But the heaven and hell of dhamma language are to be found in the mind
and may be attained anytime depending on one s mental makeup. ( T) 61
To be precise Buddhadasa does not deny the traditional supernatural
interpretations of doctrine but rather renders them irrelevant for the purpose which
he takes to be the goal of Buddhism. That is, they are irrelevant to the attainment
of nibbana in this life. For as Buddhadasa so often insists, ''nibbana must be
something we can have in this l i f e . " ( T) 62 He maintains that,
Buddhism exists in order to allow everyone to live in the world
victoriously, we needn t flee the wor l d. ( T) 63
As for that which is called dhamma or sasana [religion], it exists in
order to be the refuge of the people of the world. 1 don t want good people
to discard the world but I want people to live in the world beneficially and
without sufferi ng. (T)64
Buddhadasa defines Buddhism as a religious system which is concerned only
with this life and while not denying the existence of an after-life in heaven or hell
he places them outside the focus of concern of the religion. This means that from
a phasa- tham standpoint all the references to an after-life in the Buddhist scriptures
mu s t be interpreted as symbols of some condition or process in this life here on
earth now. Buddhadasa proposes, "The dhamma of the Lord Buddha does not talk
about the period after death in the coffin as something i mpor t ant . " ( T) 65, justifying
Phut t hat hat , " Upas ak Hae ng Ka n p hoey phr ae T h a m
f I
( " J J P UUW n i C J UUV n U ? n j Obs t ac l es t o Pr o pa g at i ng Dh a mma " ) , in Pun
Co n g p r a s o e t ( ed) , Arai Th.uk Arai Phit ( tt Q ~ 1 j n n i i r I t c j V i " What is Correct and What is
' v
Wrong) , Ong kan Fy n - f u Phr a Phut t has as ana ( p)f] J VjllVJ VJJ I Vli VIS PlH Al l *1 )> Bangkok, 2525 ( 1982) ,
V 1
p. 61.
6 2 i bi d. p . 56.
6 3 i d. , Kharawat Tham ( " ^ J "1 ^ 1 f i l l T J U " ), p . 138.
1/
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Khams o r n Phu-buat ( ' ' f n a m i u i r a " Teachings f or the Ordained),
Sai nnak- nangsy Thammabucha ( f i f at l OWl N ? T ), Bangkok, 2524 ( 1981) , p. 18.
I
(>5id. , " Upasak Haeng Kanphoeyphrae Tham" ( 11QlJfii J J f t M M H '"I T I tj U ILV4 T5 J T JJH ),
P . 56. 1
109
this disinterest in the after-life by saying that, "If we rectify and correct this life
then without doubt the next life will be rectified accor di ngl y. " ( T) 66
From a purely theoretical perspective the denial of the significance yet non
denial of the reality of supernatural phenomena might seem an unnecessary
complication. If after all phasa- tham interpretations do not deny the metaphysical
reality of phasa- khon or literalist views on heaven, deities and so forth but rather
amount to a shift of emphasis one is left wondering what need there was to
propound an altogether new hermeneutic of the scriptures. However, we should look
to the ideological significance of phasa- tham when seeking to understand the
emphasis Buddhadasa places on it. Ideologically one of the functions of
Buddhadasa s re-interpreted system of Buddhism is to endow the material world and
human activities in this world with religiously sanctioned value. This sanctification
of the mundane is effected by an integration of mundane activities and aspirations
into the effort to attain spiritual salvation. As will be discussed in Chapter Six the
notion of work, defined as integrating spiritual and material effort, is of central
importance to Buddhadasa s overall system. This shift, to view the material world
as a positive domain of human activity and aspirations, is radically opposed to the
traditional clerical view of the w'orld as a retarding and almost inherently evil
influence. The traditional scriptural view of life in the world, as a householder, is
made clear in the following quote from the Digha Nikay a,
Full of hindrances is the household life, a path for the dust of passion.
Free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things.
How difficult it is for the man who lives at home to live the holy life
[brahmacariyaj in all its fullness, in all its purity, in all its bright
perfection.67
The attitude among many monks in Thailand today is little different. The
biographer of the famous monk Acan Mun recounts that at an early point in his
life the sage,
came to realise that the life of the householder is the conglomeration of
all kinds of suffering, being like an immense thicketed forest where lurk all
kinds of dangers, whereas the chaste life [brahmacariya], supported by the
efforts of renunciation, would serve to carry him through that dangerous
land.68
66i d. , Kharawat Tham ( j j u m ), p . 138.
6 7 Pal i Te x t So ci et y , Digha Nikaya, II, 41.
68
( Ve ne r abl e Pb r a Ac b ar n Mal i a) D o o w a Ny a nas amp ann o , The Venerable Phra Acharn Mun Bhurxdatta
Thera - Medi t at i on M as t e r , trail s. Siri Buddhas uk, Wat Pa Bar n Tar d, Udo r n Tha ni Thai l and, 1982, p. 4.
*,
110
The denial and opposition implicit in the theory of phasa- tham is not directed
solely at supernatural and other "unscientific" views but also against the world-
negating outlook inherent in the traditional lokuttara standpoint. The proposition
that there are two levels at which the Buddhist scriptures can be understood is thus
fundamental to Buddhadasa s attempt to make activity in the material world a
positive part of the soteriological effort to end suffering, and contributes to the
ideological significance of Buddhadasa s thought and to his popularity among
progressive Buddhists.
In fact phasa- tham interpretations are not in fundamental opposition to all
unscientific and supernaturalist views, but rather to a view of the soteriological
activity of Buddhism which denigrates the social world. This indicates that the
deeper function of Buddhadasa s theory, over and above the demythologisation of
the Buddhist scriptures, is the establishment of the material or social world as a
domain with religious importance. It is because science values the material world, as
the source and object of human knowledge and as the domain for the finding of
human well-being, that Buddhadasa so values it and uses phasa- tham as a method
to effect a rationalist demythologisation of Buddhism. But where supernatural beliefs
do not devalue the material world Buddhadasa does not appear to be concerned to
either criticise or demythologise them. Buddhadasa tends to criticise only those
supernatural views which place more value on activities with a more other-worldly
than this-worldly orientation. Some other magico-superstitious parts of Thai
Buddhism are left untouched by him. For example, Buddhadasa s view of money in
the following passage, implying the transfer of merit via a material object, is
distinctly magical and "unscientific" yet he provides no apology. Money is after all
an essentially mundane phenomenon hardly in need of being reified or brought
down from heaven,
But what is certain is that according to the laws of nature money which
has been obtained from good actions is "good money", and if money has
been obtained from evil actions it is "bad money". "Good money" makes
its owner an even better person. If "good money" is used to buy food to
nourish the body one s body will benefit, if used to support one s wife she
will be a good wife ... If the money is used to perform merit one will
receive in return merit which is pure. Even after death one will still be
sorely missed by everyone. Directly the opposite is the case for money
which has been received from evil actions. That is, it makes its owner an
even worse person. If used to buy food to nourish the body one s mind and
body will both deteriorate. And if used to support one s children they will
follow one in evil and vileness ... After death people will revile all one s
.
I l l
family l i ne. ( T) 69
3.9 Conclusion.
The phasa- khon - phasa- tham theory of interpreting the Buddhist scriptures is
not without theoretical difficulties, most notably caused by Buddhadasa s denial of
the validity of the very scriptures w'hich provide some of the theoretical foundations
for his interpretations and by his failure to provide an explicit criterion for the
application of the theory. However, the theory of phasa- tham does follow the spirit
of Theravada Buddhist teachings and does have significant precedents both in the
canonical scriptures and in the commentary literature. Leaving aside the question of
the precise historical and scriptural precedents for Buddhadasa s theory of
phasa- tham it is also the case that his interpretative theory is a consistent
development of basic doctrinal principles. That is, given the assumption that
Buddhism contains a universally true and relevant message, and the recognition that
the religion is no longer seen in this way an interpretative effort which again
demonstrates the vitality of the original message of salvation must have in fact
penetrated to and incorporated that basic insight.
But in judging Buddhadasa s work it is also important to note that
independently of the theoretical status of the theory phasa- tham has a broader
social and ideological significance in Thailand. This is due to its use in the
demythologisation of Buddhist doctrine and the related conferring of religious value
on activity in the social world. Despite its limitations and failings the theory of
phasa- tham - phasa- khon must be recognised as a positive attempt to develop a new
system for interpreting the Ti pitaka, and in this chapter I have concentrated on
how Buddhadasa has set up his theory by detailing its connections with doctrinal
precedents and by revealing the implicit ideological role of the theory. However,
Buddhadasa does not only champion his new hermeneutic by buttressing it with
supporting arguments. He also undermines the doctrinal credibility of his critics,
which does not amount to a specific defence of the phasa- tham theory but is rather
an attempt to discredit those who attack it. This subversive approach is manifested
in Buddhadasa s denial that the scriptures emphasised by his major opponents, the
Abiiidharnmapitaka and its commentaries, are authoritative sources of Buddhist
doctrine, and it is these critical claims which are considered in the next chapter.
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Tham^na Prap Phi Nai Tua K haratchakan Lae Nak- kan- myang
( " s y j j j z i J j n u u l ' U R v n n ' i j r n j u e u u n m i i J j f t v j " Dhamma Eradicates Ghosts
i n Public Servants and Pol i t i ci ans ) , Ong kan Fyn- f u Phr a Phut t hasas ana
r 1/
( ' D' Ji si n / n 3 u Y t f V i T S W M f 8n e l i n ) , Samut pr akan Thai l and, no publ i c at i on dat e gi ven, p p . 16- 17.
SJ 1

112
CHAPTER 4
BUDDHADASA S CRITICISMS OF THE
ABHIDHAMMAPITAKA a n d VISUDDHIMAGGA.
Buddhadasa s re-interpretations of Buddhist doctrine are based not only on his
novel hermeneutic approach to the canonical literature, i.e. the theory of
phasa- khon - phasa- tham, but also include a highly selective and critical reading of
the Buddhist canon, the Tipitaka, and of the commentary literature. He rejects as
either unnecessary or inaccurate large sections of both the Abhidhammapitaka and
Buddhaghosa s authoritative commentary work, the Visuddhimagga. Buddhadasa
undertakes this radical critique of the Theravada scriptures and commentary
literature as part of his general attempt to eradicate supernaturalist beliefs from
Thai Buddhism and to refocus the religion on the immediacy of human life here and
now. In addition to detailing his critical approaches to the Theravada scriptures in
this chapter I also detail Buddhadasa s criticisms of the traditional Buddhist belief
in rebirth. For Buddhadasa regards the traditional Buddhist concern with kamma
and rebirth, which he sees as being most strongly supported by^Visuddhimagga and
traditional interpretations of the Abhidhammapitaka,^promoting supernaturalism and
disinterest in life here and now.
4. 1 T h e Abhidhammapitaka.
The Abhi dhammapitaka, the third major division of the Theravada canon after
the Vinayapitaka and the Suttapitaka, is a set of seven complex theoretical texts
which systematically present the teachings outlined in the Suttapitaka in accordance
with the basic truths of impermanence, ani cca, and non-self, anatta. The intention
of the authors of the Abhidhammapitaka was to represent the entirety of Buddhist
teachings, as detailed in the recorded words of the Buddha in the Suttapitaka, as a
consistent theoretical development of the doctrines of anicca and anatta. The
Abhi dhamma literature consequently eschews describing the objects of perceptual and
cogniti ve experience as entities or atta, that is, as individuals. Instead, in accord
with the doctrine that there are no individuals or essential selves, the
Abhi dhammapitaka refers to the objects of experience only in terms of elements and
shifting relational states of compounding between those elements.
113
The Abhidhammapitaka is a radical development of the non-self doctrine,
which is interpreted as meaning that there is no essential unity to perceived or
cognised objects and that there is no essential continuity between what is perceived
or cognised at subsequent moments in time. While relations of contiguity and
association are regarded as existing between the objects of experience at successive
moments in time, the transformations in such objects are explained solely in terms
of varying relations between diverse naturally existing elements and not as the
variable expressions of any underlying entity, soul, spirit or essence. The
Abhidhammapitaka thus develops a radical critique of everyday assumptions about
the nature of the self and the world. And given that it was written over two
thousand years ago in the context of a predominating belief in a soul or atta
(Sanskrit: at man) in Hindu dominated ancient India the Abhidhammapitaka must
be regarded as one of the most astounding intellectual creations of the ancient
world.
However, the analyses of the Abhidhamma were not developed solely as an
intellectual exercise. As Nanamoli Bhikkhu, an Abhidhamma scholar, observes, the
purpose behind its composition was,
to furnish additional techniques for getting rid of unjustified assumptions
that favour clinging and so obstruct the attainment of the extinction of
clinging.1
In particular, as noted by Mrs Rhys Davids,
The object of the profound analysis known as Abhi dhamma, is to show
generally that such a state of consciousness [of selfhood] is no simple
modification of a mind-stuff, and, above all, that there is no soul or ego
which is apart from the states of consciousness; but that each seemingly
simple state is in reality a highly complex compound; constantly changing
and giving rise to new combi nati ons. 2
That is, the analyses of the Abhidhammapitaka were developed as spiritual
aids for the purposes of overcoming delusion and developing the liberative insight
into reality which is necessary for the attainment of salvation. By analysing the
minutiae of experience solely as transitory relations of elements the authors of the
Abhidhammapitaka hoped to assist the Buddhist aspirant give up his or her
delusional belief in the substantial nature of the objects of experience. The ending of
the deluded belief in a self and the development of insight are regarded as leading
N a n a m o l i Bhi kk h u, I nt r oduc t i o n t o hi s Engl i sh t r ans lat i on o f t he Visuddhimagga by Buddhagho s a, 4th
e dn, Buddhi s t P u b li cat i on Soc i et y, Ka nd y Sri Lanka, 1979, p. xxvi i .
2 ( Mr s ) R li y s - D a v i d s ( ed) , Compendi um o f Phil osophy - Transl at i on o f the Abhi dhammattha- Sangaha,
Pal i Te x t Soc i et y, Lo nd o n , 1972, p. 8.
to a cessation of emotional craving and attachment to the objects of experience.
This is because craving is regarded as resulting from the deluded belief that there is
an "obj ect " which can be possessed and a "self" which can possess.
4.2 Buddhadasa s Critici sms of t he Abhi dhamma in Thailand.
Despite the unquestionable canonicity of the Abhidhammapitaka Buddhadasa is
highly critical of the emphasis placed on this final section of the Buddhist canon in
Thailand, and he claims that Thai Buddhism would in fact be better off without its
compl ex theoretical details. Buddhadasa regards the theoretical complexity of the
Abhidhammapitaka as being unnecessary and even potentially misleading. He
translates the prefix abhi as meaning "extreme" ( ying - U'J ) or "excessive"
( keen - ), calling the Abhidhammapitaka an "excessive part" or "superfluous
part" (suan- koen - ^VlllVU ) ( T ) 3 of the scriptures and arguing that, "It is part
of the dhamma [i.e. scriptures on the doctrine] which is not directly or
immediately related to the extinction of suf f eri ng. "( T) 4 By this Buddhadasa means
that the Abhidhammapitaka represents an intellectual or theoretical system which
exists apart from or only as an adjunct to the meditative practice which is the only
true source of liberative insight. He regards the Abhidhammapitaka as unnecessary
for the purpose of attaining Buddhist salvation,
On some occasions the Lord Buddha mentioned [in the Suttapitaka] the
words abhidhamma and abhivinaya. These denote the parts of the dhamma
which are excessive or the parts which provide too deep an explanation,
beyond what is necessary for a person to know or to have in order to
attain nibbana.( T ) 5
But Buddhadasa s interpretation of the term abhidhamma here is problematic.
The term abhidhamma itself is rare in the Suttapitaka, the part of the canon
containing the Buddha s discourses and the section of the scriptures w'hich
Buddhadasa accepts as the true source of authoritative interpretations of Buddhist
doctrine. Where the term abhidhamma does occur in the Suttapitaka it has a
special sense, and does not specifically denote either the Abhidhammapitaka or the
"Abhi dhamma met hod", because the final section of the Theravada canon was the
last to be compiled, postdating the compilation of the discursive sections of the
Suttapitaka by at least a couple of centuries. Suchip Punyanuphap, compiler of The
_____________________ i i
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , " Upas ak Haeng Kanphoe ypl t r ae Tha i n " ( B i J f l j n - u i i w n i J i c j u u v u 's j t j j P. 82.
4 i b id.
114
^i bi d. p p . 82- 83.
115
Tipitaka f or the Common Man ( Phra-Traipidok Samrap Prachachon
observes that when the term abhidhamma
occurs in the Ki nt i Sutta7 of the Suttapitaka it denotes, "the highly distinguished
dhamm a" ( T ) 8. In particular it denotes the bodhipakkhiyadhamma or the thirty
seven qualities regarded as contributing to enlightenment9. In the Mahaparinibbana
Sutta these thirty seven qualities are also collectively called the
abhi hhadesit adhamma10, a term which denotes a higher practice of dhamma beyond
the basics of Buddhist ethics. The difficulty in interpreting the nuances of these
terms abhidhamma and abhi hhadesitadhamma, which both denote a "higher" or
"distinguished" dhamma, is that in Pali the notion "distinguished", vi sesi t a, can, as
in English, denote both "excellent" or "superior" as well as simply "having many
distinctions" or "having many parts". Noting this ambiguity, Buddhadasa maintains
that the prefix abhi in the term abhidhamma may mean either "great" or
"excessive", depending on the context. He also acknowledges that depending on
who uses it and how the Abhidhammapitaka is approached it may either be of
"great" use or be "excessive" and a hindrance to spiritual practice. Buddhadasa
admits that when used by the right person in the right way the Abhidhammapitaka
may be of benefit in spiritual practice, saying that it may,
be either beneficial or non-beneficial, it can cause confusion or not cause
confusion because it contains both that which is real or true and that
which is excessive and unnecessary. (T)11
He concedes that the study of the Abhidhammapitaka is appropriate for those
with penetrating understanding who wish to undertake an intellectual study of
Buddhist principles. But he also claims that for the ordinary person the
^ S u c h i p Pu n y a n u p h a p ( l j [L QH U f l Y / j ). Phra- t raipidok Samrap Prachachon
1 1c 4 1
( " T m l n y f l j Q n t f o w n i i J j The Tipit aka f o r the Co mmo n Man) , Mah ar n akut
Rat c h awi t h ay a l a y ( u r n u n f j y i ^ n v i t n f H j , Bang ko k, 2525 ( 1982).
7
Ki nt i Sut t a, M aj j hi ma Ni kaya, Vo l . 14/ v e r s e s 42 - 5 0 / p p . 31- 36.
8
S u c h i p Pu n y a n u p h a p , p. 461n.
9 - -
' Th e t hi rt y seven bodhipakkhiyadhamma are: t he 4 sat i patt hana, t he 4 sammappat hana, the 4 itthipada,
t he 5 indriya, t he 5 bala, t he 7 bojjhanga, and t he 8 magga.
10Ma h a p a r i n i b ba n a Sut t a, Di g ha Ni kaya, V o l. 1 0 / v e r s e l 0 7 / p . 9 9 .
11 ^ 1
P h u t t h a t h a t , Aphi t ham Khy Arai ( n f)^J J J JJPl 'Q'Q i I y What is Abhi dhamma?), Samnak-nangsy
*
T h a mma b u c h a ( Q' 1 Uf l V i l N B U J T JJU^J "1 ), Ban g ko k, 2517 ( 1974) , p. 9.
i
116
Abhi dhamma is both excessive and a spiritual hindrance. Buddhadasa defines what
he calls the true Abhidhamma or "great dhamma" as suhhata or voidness, which
he calls, "the Abhidhamma [i.e. "great dhamma"] which does not go by the name
o f Abhi dhamma. " ( T ) 12. This notion of suhhata, in particular as interpreted in the
Thai notion of cit- wang, is central to Buddhadasa s interpretation of Buddhist
practice and is discussed in detail in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
Buddhadasa further defines what he means by abhidhamma by first drawing a
distinction between what he terms philosophy and science,
Buddhism as such cannot be a philosophy, it is a science. It is of a kind
with material science but it is a mental science or a science of
namadhamma [ mental ity]. (T)13
Here Buddhadasa takes "phil osophy" as denoting theoretical or intellectual
speculation while "science" is described as knowledge that is both definite and
i mmediate. Utilising his interpretative theory of phasa- khon - phasa- tham
Buddhadasa says that for those who "do not know [spiritual truth]", i.e. who
interpret the scriptures at the level of phasa- khon or everyday language, the term
abhidhamma simply denotes a speculative system of thought such as is found in the
Abhidhammapitaka. But for those who "know" or who read the canon at the level
of phasa- tham the term abhidhamma, denotes "scientific knowledge" of absolute
truth or paramasacca, which he defines as anatta or suhhata, or in Thai
t
khwarn- wang ( jsi/) ' i xn' ' N ) - "voidness". That is, for Buddhadasa abhidhamma
does not denote a certain text or theoretical doctrine but rather the existential
condition of knowledge of anatta or the "voidness of self" attained through
meditative insight.
Nevertheless, Buddhadasa concludes that in the final analysis the
Abhi dhammapitaka should be regarded as "superfluous" or "excessive" rather than
as "great". This is because in his opinion it is not necessary either to know or to
utilise the Abhidhammapitaka in order to become an ariyapuggala, an enlightened
or liberated personality14, citing the Yodhajiva Vagga in the Tikanipata of the
Ahgutiara Ni kaya10 as supporting his claim. Buddhadasa in fact proposes that
Theravada Buddhism would be better off without the Abhidhammapitaka altogether,
1 2 i bi d. p . 1 1 0 .
1 3 i d. , T ek i t cak am ( " i n f m n n u " T ek i ccak amma) , p . 294.
14, - - - - -
Fo ur t ypes o f ar i yapuggal a are t r adi t i onal l y rec ogni sed: sota panna, saki dagami , anagami , and ar ahant.
1 5 - . .
Bu d d h a d as a gi ves as hi s ref erence Vo l . 2 0 / v e r s e 5 8 0 / p . 3 7 0 in t he Pal i edi t i on of t he Ti pi taka publ i shed
by Mahar nakut Buddhi s t Uni versi t y Press. Thi s c o r r e s po nds t o t he Assa Sutta No . l in the Thai language
edi t i o n, f o und at Vo l . 2 0/ v e r s e 5 80/ p. 2 78 .
i
117
Should we toss the Abhidhammapitaka away completely ... nothing would
be lost because we would still retain the Suttanta [Suttapitaka], which is
the practical aspect of the scriptures for attaining nibbana quickly ... But
what! Now we have just the opposite [in Thailand]: attempts to throw out
the Suttantapitaka completely and leave only the Abhidhammapitaka.
Buddhism is going to the dogs! ... If all the Suttantapitaka is thrown out
leaving only the Abhidhammapitaka humanity will go to the dogs! We
could not correctly follow the Noble Eightfold Path [ariyamagga] that leads
to nibbana. But if we were to get rid of every last bit of the
Abhidhammapitaka ... we could still follow the path to nibbana, and easily
at that, because we would not have the path obscured or our minds
confused by that Abhi dhammapitaka. ( T ) 16
These criticisms of the Abhidhammapitaka s "excesiveness" are not purely
theoretical but appear to be related to Buddhadasa s concern to make Buddhist
meditative and soteriological practices accessible to the layperson. Mastery of the
compl ex analyses of the Abhidhammapitaka, an attainment requiring sustained
intellectual application for some years, has historically been associated with one type
of clerical meditative practice. However, the use of the Abhidhammapitaka as a
guide to meditation is not the only Buddhist meditative system and Buddhadasa s
criticisms are perhaps meant to indicate that laypeople do not need to devote
years to an academic study of the Abhidhammapitaka before they can undertake
meditative practices.
Buddhadasa s criticisms also appear to be related to the general fundamentalist
character of his re-interpretative enterprise. Despite the novelty of some of his views
on specific points of doctrine Buddhadasa authorises his re-interpretations by
claiming that they are consistent with the original teachings of the Buddha as
recorded in the Suttapitaka. The Suttapitaka is consequently the most important
section of the Buddhist canon for him, in particular those sections containing the
reputed actual words of the Buddha. Buddhadasa follows this fundamentalist course
in order to cut through what he regards as the misinterpretations of later
commentaries and so penetrate to the original, pure core of Buddhism. Thus when
Buddhadasa correctly states that, "The Abhidhammapitaka does not exist in the
f orm of the Buddha s wo r d s . " ( T) 17, he is also saying that in his opinion the
Abhidhammapitaka lacks the religious authority of the Suttapitaka and so should
Cited by B u j mn N^etliangkun , in To Than Phutt hat hat Ryang Ci t - wang - Lem 1
{' l a u 1 W Cri t i ci sms o f Buddhadasa on the Mat t er o f Cit-wang -
Book 1 ), Ong kan Phi t hak Phut t has as ana Ap h i t h a m Mul ani t hi
( af rmux jf tii? ) Ra"gkok>25- 2 (19)> pp-33-34.
1 ^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Aphi t ham Khy Arai ( 11 J I v ' l J 11 ), p.4.
V
not be given equal standing with or priority over the simpler but authentic
discourses recorded in the Suttapitaka.
Buddhadasa expands his attack on the authenticity and religious authority of
the Abhidhammapitaka to include a criticism of the way it has historically been
studied in Thailand, and the purposes to which it has been put. He not only claims
that the Abhidhammapitaka itself cannot be regarded as being on par with the
Suttapitaka but that those monks who study Abhidhamma teachings in Thailand
content themselves with even less authoritative commentaries on the
Abhi dhammapitaka, avoiding study of the more difficult original text. Buddhadasa
notes that around the twelfth Buddhist century (sixth to seventh centuries of the
Christian era) Ceylonese commentators summarised the voluminous and complex
Abhidhammapitaka into a much more compact text called the
Abhi dhammatthasahgaha18. Over the centuries many further commentaries were
based on this radically abridged version of the original canon. Mrs Rhys Davids
observes that,
The Abhidhammatthasahgaha, whether on account of its completer
survey of what is known as Abhidhamma., or because of its excessively
condensed treatment, or because of its excellence as a handbook, stimulated
a larger growth of ancillary works than any of the foregoing [list of Pali
commentaries].19
Buddhadasa asserts that the commentaries based on the
Abhidhammatthasahgaha came more and more to emphasise the supernatural and
the miraculous in the stead of the original analytical emphasis of the
Abhidhammapitaka itself. He claims that this trend to supernaturalist readings of
the Abhi dhamma has developed so far in Thailand that the Abhidhamma studied
and taught there today should be called "rat s nest Abhi dhamma" (aphitham
rang- nu - y j i j f tj yi l i ) 2 because it is full of odds and ends. That is,
Buddhadasa claims that the Abhidhammapitaka has become associated with the
popular supernatural religion, in contradistinction with the original intentions of the
text s authors. One of the supernatural associations of the Abhidhammapitaka is
18
In t he I nt r oduc t i o n t o her edi t ed ver si on of t he Abhi dhammat thasangaha Mr s Rhy s - Dav i ds dat es t he
t e x t ' s c o mp o s i t i on by its r eput ed aut hor , Ani r uddha, t o bet we e n t he ei ght h and t wel f t h cent uri es A. D.
1Q
( Mr s ) R h y s D a v i d s , p. 8.
20 -
The s e det ai l s are t aken f r om a ci t at i on of Bu d d h a d a s a ' s bo ok Aphi t ham Khy Arai
vj
u r j ml Me t h ay g kun , To Than Phutt hat hat Ryang Cit-wang - Lem l
( - i a u 1 )t p . n .
i
demonstrated in Thai funeral practices, sections of the Abhidhammapitaka
traditionally being chanted at funeral services because of a mythical association with
communicating with the dead. Wells comments,
The Abhidhamma is used at funerals both because it is considered to
contain the essence of the teaching of the Buddha and because it was used
by the Buddha when he preached to his mother after her death and
ascension to the t avatimsa heaven.21
It is not because of the specific relevance of its teachings that sections of the
Abhidhammapitaka are recited at Thai funerals. In fact the content of the
Abhidhammapitaka is largely irrelevant in this context, the mere recitation being
more important because of the belief that the spirit of the deceased may benefit
from the teachings. In this context Buddhadasa is not so much critical of the
Abhidhammapitaka per se, which he has nevertheless criticised for other reasons as
discussed above. Rather, he is critical of the supernaturalist interpretation of
Buddhism which is often justified in Thailand by reference either to some tradition
or legend concerning the Abhidhamma or to specific supernatuarlist interpretations
of the Abhidhammapitaka itself. However, the distinction between criticisms of the
historical use and interpretation of the Abhidhammapitaka and criticisms of the
texts themselves is not always clear, and Buddhadasa tends to use arguments
against supernaturalist readings of the Abhidhamma as arguments against the
Abhidhammapitaka itself.
4. 3 C r i t i c i s m s o f B u d d h a d a s a s R e j e c t i o n o f Th e Abhidhammapitaka.
Those Thai Buddhists who base their interpretation and practice of the
religion upon the Abhidhammapitaka are some of Buddhadasa s most vocal critics,
for he attacks the very foundation of the form of Buddhism they teach and
practice. For example, in opposition to Buddhadasa s claim that the
Abhi dhammapitaka is "not in the form of the Buddha s w' ords" Winay Siwakun
retorts that,
the science for the transcendence of the suffering of life which is found in
the Abhidhammapitaka is a result of the realisation of the Lord
Buddha. ( T) 22
That is, Winay claims that although the Abhidhammapitaka is not composed
21 We l l s , p . 225.
99 ^
W i n a y Si wakun ( " Jl i U
A p h i t ham Mul ani t hi ( QFl i) T T
u
r t
), Ci t - c ai K h y Ar a i (M" V f i l ^ ft'Q'Q t ' l J What is t he M i n d 7. ) ,
), Bang ko k, 2525 ( 1982) , p .3.
from the Buddha s actual discourses it is nevertheless consistent with the spiritual
insights revealed in the Suttapitaka.
As discussed above one of Buddhadasa s principle goals in attempting to
undermine the authority of the Abhidhammapitaka is to discredit the spirit cults
and supernatural beliefs which have become associated with the commentaries on the
Abhidhamma. Buddhadasa has vehemently criticised the association of popular spirit
cults with Buddhism, saying that, " We should not let our most perfect Buddhism
be changed into an animistic faith like that of the unci vi l i sed. "( T) 23 Buddhadasa is
also concerned to present rationalist interpretations of apparently supernatural
phenomena. For example, he describes belief in ghosts and spirits as possibly
resulting from a collective psychological or hypnotic effect,
The influence of the collective mental flow of many ignorant people can
have enough power to possess the minds of foolish individuals ... and
accordingly develop in them the feeling that such things are true and so
cause them to believe in ghostly and magical things ... the thing called
avij j a [ignorance] builds up such erroneous bel i efs. ( T) 24
That the primary focus of Buddhadasa s criticisms of the Abhidhammapitaka
is in fact on attacking animist and supernatural beliefs is further indicated by the
fact that the proponents of the Abhidhamma in Thailand, in defending their views
against Buddhadasa s attacks, are most concerned to defend the reality and the
existence of the spirits and supernatural beings that Buddhadasa denies. For
example, in his defence of the Abhidhammapitaka in the face of Buddhadasa s
criticisms Anan Senakhan notes the four yoni or modes of generation mentioned in
the Suttapitaka,, where all beings are classed as either womb-born, egg-born,
moisture-born or opapatika. This last category denotes creatures having
"spontaneous" births, that is, without the instrumentality of parents. Anan regards
this mode of generation as referring to the process by which actual superhuman and
subhuman beings are "born" or come into existence in heaven and hell. In contrast
Buddhadasa interprets the notion of "birth" in phasa- tham as referring to the
deluded idea of individuality - that there is an essential self or atta,
The word "birth" refers to the arising of the mistaken idea of "I",
"mysel f". It does not refer to physical birth, as generally supposed. The
mistaken assumption that this word "birth" refers to physical birth is a
_____________________ i
P h u t t h a t h a t , Phi Afi Cing Ry Alai ( CJ U V T W J ' 0 I Are Ghost s Re a l l ), Ongkan Fyn- f u Phr a
Phu t t h a s as a na (B>1 Plfl 'UvJllTjhH J ZtjVIE Pi fl S a mut prakan Thai l and, 2522 ( 1979) , p . 10.
24 i bi d. pp. 4- 5.
p i
major obstacle to comprehending the Buddha s teaching.25
It was noted in the previous chapter that Buddhadasa regards heaven and hell
as states of mind and demons and thewada as humans who are respectively
experiencing states of suffering and enjoyment. In phasa- tham Buddhadasa then
interprets the notion of opapatika, or beings spontaneously born in heaven and hell,
as metaphorically referring to the processes by which the notions of "I am a
suffering individual" and "I am a happy individual" come into being.
Anan rejects this reduction of the supernatural to psychological states, saying,
Opapatika are beings which have both concrete \rupa] and abstract
[nama] existence. They have both bodies and minds but their bodies are
composed of translucent atomic particles26. One could say they have divine
bodies but the truth is that they have fine material bodies. Opapatika are
p e o p l e who we cannot see with our unaided eyes. ( T) 27
Buddhist philosophy analyses the aggregates or khandha constituting human
existence into two main categories, rupa or materiality and nama or mental factors.
In modern Thai these two terms also respectively denote the paired notions of
"concrete" or rupatham ( ) and "abstract" or namatharn (ll'lJJ'B J IU ), in
v
the sense that matter is concrete while thought is abstract. In his phasa- tham
interpretations Buddhadasa gives the wad a and demons only an abstract or
namatharn existence. Demons and thewada are according to Buddhadasa no more
than mental states and have no concrete or material existence. By emphasising the
material albeit fine atomic nature of thewada and spirits Anan is attempting to
w'ard off the possibility of reducing them to purely abstract psychological states. By
asserting their material character Anan ensures that in his interpretation of
Buddhism spirits remain actually existing non-human beings. The purported
materiality of spirits is thus the lynchpin of Anan s position, for without it there is
25
B u d d h a d a s a , Anot her Ki nd o f Bi r t h, trans. R. B. ( no o t her det ai l s gi ven) , no publ i sher gi ven,
Ban g ko k, 1974, p. 3.
26l n a rel at ed di sc ussi on Bu nml Me t h ang kun ci t es an Abhi dhamma c o mme n t a r y as pr ov i di ng the
f ol l o wi ng el ement al anal ysi s o f mat t er : One bean seed or dhahhamasa is e qui val ent t o seven l i ce or uka,
one uka is equal t o seven l ouse eggs or li kkha, one likkha is equal t o t hi r t y si x bi ts of c har i ot dust or
rat harenu, one rat harenu is equal t o t hi rt y six t aj j a n ( ?) , o ne t aj j ari is equal t o t hi rt y six at o ms or anu
and o ne anu is r egar ded as bei ng made up of t hi rt y si x ul t i mat e at o ms or paramanu. One paramanu is
t hus e qu i v a lent t o 1/ 82, 301, 184 o f a bean seed. Buni rn t hen says t hat opapati ka are made up o f a
t rans l uc ent f or m o f paramanu. Ci t ed at J | u n m i Me t ha ng kun , To Than Phutt hat hat Ryang Auiicf^a Lae
Phi- sang-theuiada - Lem a. ( " 1 PI V n U TJ Vffi I 0 7 ^ 1 1 8 S U H I V H f H
Cr i t i c i s ms o f Buddhadasa on the Mat t e r o f Spi ri ts and Celestial Bei ngs - Book Two) , Aphi t ham Mul ani t hi
Bang ko k, 2523 ( 1980) , p . 27.
*1 *
2^ A n a n Senakhan, Khams orn Diarathx ( " p n a f w i m j j f l t j " ), P. e i .
122
no easy way to deny Buddhadasa s interpretation that spirits are in fact simply
mental states.
of his views. However, his reply, in the form of counter criticisms, is not explicitly
directed at Anan Senakhan or Winay Sivakun and is presented in the context of a
discussion of the doctrine of paticcasamuppada or dependent origination, a notion
mistaken views that there is a self and that there is entitative continuity between
one life and the next have been implicitly accepted within Theravada Buddhism
since the Third Buddhist Council, which was held only three hundred years after
the Buddha s death. He acknowledges that this scriptural misinterpretation may
have arisen unintentionally and because of ignorance and intellectual slackness in
interpreting the subtleties of Buddhist doctrine. However, he also suggests that its
acceptance may have been the result of a conspiracy to destroy Buddhism,
There might have been rebellious traitors acting as destructive agents
inside Buddhism who [deliberately] and maliciously explained
paticcasamuppada, the foundation of Buddhism, incorrectly. That is, so
that it would become the eternalist doctrine [sassataditthi] found in
Hinduism, or [in other words] change into Brahmanism ... If there were
such harmful intentions it would mean that someone must have feigned an
explanation [of paticcasamuppada] so as to create a channel for the atta
doctrine to come into Buddhism. And then Brahmanism would swallow
Buddhism ... this is a surmise from the standpoint that there could have
been harmful [influences within Buddhi sm] . ( T) 28
With uncharacteristic sectarianism Buddhadasa adds that the motivation
behind such a treacherous plot could be that, "Brahmanism is an enemy of
Buddhism, it wants to sw'allow Buddhi sm. " ( T) 29 These criticisms, however, do not
have a simply historical import. The clear implication of Buddhadasa s statements is
that if Brahmanical ideas of an eternal self or soul were dangerous over two
thousand years ago then they, and those purported Buddhists who today teach that
human beings are in fact reborn as spirits and demons are equally harmful today.
28 -
P h u t t h a t h a t , Pat i t casamupapat Cak Phra Ot nf l YJJ** I ^ ^ Paticcasamuppada
Buddhadasa has not remained completely silent in the face of these criticisms
which is discussed in detail immediately below. Buddhadasa considers Buddhist
teachings about the doctrine of paticcasamuppada and specifically about birth and
rebirth to have long been misinterpreted because of the implicit acceptance of the
notion of atta (i.e. that there is an individual self or soul). He maintains that the
in the Buddha's Words), Th a mma t h a n M u lani t hi ( 3 J X JJ
V
), Chai y a Thai l and, 2524
( 1981) , p . 77.
29
i bi d. p . 78.
i
Buddhadasa thus accuses those who claim he is destroying Buddhism of precisely
the same crime.
4.4 Buddhadasa s Criticisms of the Visuddhimagga and the Traditional
Interpretation of the Paticcasamuppada.
As already noted it is not only the authority of the Abhidhammapitaka that
Buddhadasa attempts to undermine in order to establish his phasa- tham or
demythologised interpretation of Buddhist doctrine. The Visuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa also comes in for criticism. Written in the fifth century as a
summary of Buddhist teachings the Visuddhimagga has become the most reverred of
all Theravada commentaries. Sunthorn Na-Rangsi says of the Visuddhimagga that it
is, "regarded by the Theravadins as an authentic source of Buddhist teachings
second only to the Pali Tipitaka itself. "30 Perhaps because of the respect
traditionally accorded the Visuddhimagga Buddhadasa s criticisms of Buddhaghosa s
view's are somewhat guarded,
I don t respect or believe in Buddhaghosacariya one hundred per cent
because there are parts [of the Visuddhimagga] I have quite some
disagreement with. I can respect up to ninety or ninety five per cent of
Buddhaghosa s teachi ngs. (T) 31
Buddhadasa s main point of disagreement with Buddhaghosa concerns the
interpretation of the paticcasamuppada, the doctrine of dependent originat ion.
Through a series of causally linked stages the paticcasamuppada demonstrates how
ignorance, avi j j a, leads to attachment, upadana, and how attachment in turn leads
to suffering. The paticcasamuppada is a systematic explication of the Buddhist
doctrine that ignorance of reality is the root cause of human suffering. Conversely,
the paticcasamuppada is also taken as detailing how attaining wisdom and
overcomi ng ignorance leads to the cessation of suffering and so to nibbana. The
twelve causally linked stages of the pati ccasamuppada, also called bhavacakka or the
cycle of becoming, are in order as follows:
(1) avi j j a - ignorance,
(2) sahkhara - mental "formati ons" associated with volitional or
kamma-creating actions,
(3) vihhana - consciousness,
(4) namarupa - the five aggregates or khandhas constitutive of individual
human existence,
30
Na- Rangsi , p.86.
r
3 ^ P h u t t h a t l i a t , Pat it casamupapat Calc Phra Ot ( l l r p ' v f l i J i j i n v r ? ' l n ' w J r I ' o u v ), p.95.
(5) salayatana
(6) phassa
(7) vedana
(8) tanha
(9) upadana
(10) bhava
(11) j at i
(12) j aramarana - old age and death.
Jaramarana denotes suffering which results from birth, j at i 33, which has itself
been conditioned by all the preceeding ten factors beginning with ignorance. The
suffering of jaramarana is in turn regarded as being a condition for the arising of
ignorance, and is consequently the starting point for another cycle of the
paticcasamuppada or cycle of becoming. The paticcasamuppada is in every sense a
vicious circle, with each stage feeding on the former and contributing to the next.
The paticcasamuppada has also traditionally been regarded as providing the
theoretical basis of the account of the process of rebirth. Buddhaghosa interpreted
the twelve spokes of the bhavacakka as in fact spanning three separate lives and in
the Visuddhimagga he wrote,
The past, the present and the future are its [i.e. the paticcasamuppada s]
three times. Of these it should be understood that, according to what is
given in the texts, the two factors ignorance and formations [,sahkhara]
belong to the past time, the eight beginning with consciousness belong to
the present time, and the two, birth and aging-and-death, belong to the
future time.1"4
In this interpretation rebirth is accounted for by the postulation of a special
relation between consciousness, vi hhana, and formations, sahkhara. As Na-Rangsi
comments, in the pat iccasamuppada,
the function of consciousness is twofold; to cognise the object presented
and to constitute the subterranean stream of consciousness [bhavahga] which
is the basis of individuality.35
Traditionally it is consciousness in a "subterranean" or bhavahga mode which
is regarded as forming the basis of individual identity. In its bhavahga mode
124
32
Budd hi s m lists six senses: si ght , heari ng, t ast e, smel l , t ouc h and mi nd. As Sunt hor n Na- Rang s i not es,
" Bu d d h i s m regards t he mi nd or c onsc i ous nes s as t he si xt h sense whi c h has ment al st at es or ment al
p he n o me n a as its obj e c t s of c o n t a c t . " ( N a - R a n g s i , p. 61. )
33
' ' T h e Pal i t erm j ati ( Thai : c h a t ) l i t erally deno t es " bi r t h" , but is general l y used in the sense of
" r e bi r t h" . Jati can a lso be render ed i nt o E n g lish as " l i f e" in t he sense o f " pas t li f e" , " f ut ur e li f e", et c.
34
Visuddhimagga, X V I I , 287.
Na- Rangsi , p.191.
- the six bases of sense impressions32,
- sense contact, the six types of sense impressions,
- feelings resulting from sense impressions,
- craving for the six types of sensorily cognisable objects,
- attachment or clinging to sensed objects,
- coming into being, becoming,
- birth conditioned by bhava,
t
consciousness functions as a matrix in which character and personality-determining
kammi c residues inhere. In order to remain consistent with the doctrine of anatta
and avoid the implication that the rebirth doctrine denotes that there is an entity
or soul which re-incarnates in successive lives this subterranean mode of
consciousness is explicitly presented as not being a self-existing entity or self.
Rather, it is described as being a process with a definite origination and end. It is
maintained that the bhavahga consciousness underlying each successive life is in fact
distinct and discrete, beginning at conception and ending at death. The actual link
between successive births (i.e. between the cessation of one bhavahga condition at
death and the origination of the next bhavahga at conception) is called the
patisandhivihhana. It is this patisandhi consciousness which transfers the kammic
impressions or sahkhara determining the character or fate from one existence to the
next. That is, Theravada Buddhism proposes that kammi c residues are transfered
from one life condition to another (via the discrete transferral process called
pat i sandhi vi hhana) but that successive existences are in fact distinct and discrete.
This is because the identity-giving bhavahga consciousness underlying each existence
is posited as being a finite phenomenon specific to each individual existence.
Buddhadasa, however, denies that the causal linkages of the paticcasamuppada
provide an account of literal rebirth. He instead maintains that the cycle of
dependent origination should be taken as explaining the arising of suffering at any
moment during a given life. Buddhadasa denies that rebirth is central to Buddhist
doctrine. As noted above he says that the notion of "birth" should be interpreted in
phasa- tham as the psychological arising of the deluded sense of individuality or
selfhood, not as denoting literal birth or rebirth. Buddhadasa s denial of the
i mportance of the notion of "rebirth" to Buddhist teachings is one of his most
radical claims, which not only stands in opposition to the Theravada interpretative
tradition as represented by the Visuddhimagga but also counters the explicit
references to rebirth in the core canonical scriptures of the Suttapitaka. Sunthorn
Na-Rangsi says,
In the Pali scriptures there are many stories telling about some of the
Buddha s disciples who passed away and assumed new births in some realm
o f existence or other. All such stories stand as scriptural proofs of rebirth.36
Recollections of past lives, such as indicated in the following passage from the
Potaliya Sutta, are commonly reported in the Suttapitaka,
Behold householder, this ariyasdvaka [follower of the Buddha], abiding in
36. , ,
ibid. , p. xi.
126
upekkha [equanimity] as the cause of a pure mind without any greater
dhamma, can recall many past lives, can recall one life, two lives ... ten
lives ... a hundred lives, a thousand lives, a hundred thousand lives through
many eons of world development and many eons of world dissoluti on. (T) 37
While in this passage it is possible to interpret term "life" or "birth" (j at i ) in
phasa- tham as the arising of the sense of self, and the term "world" as denoting a
psychological condition, there are other passages in the suttas where the reference to
literal rebirth is less easily interpreted metaphorically. For example, in the
Sihgalaka Sutta the Buddha admonishes the layman Siiigalaka, saying that one who
follows the vinaya or discipline of the Buddha,
Naturally practises for victory over both worlds ... both this world and
the next. In the future after having died because of the body s break down
that ariyasavaka [follower of the Buddha] will naturally attain to the
sugati heavenly wor l d. ( T) 38
Buddhaghosa clearly indicates in the Visuddhimagga that he does not intend
j ati or birth, the eleventh spoke of the paticcasamuppada, to be interpreted
metaphorically when he says that birth,
should be regarded as the aggregates [khandhas] that occur from the
time of rebirth-linking [patisandhivihhana] up to the exit from the
mother s womb. 39
Buddhadasa s opposition to this ancient teaching is consequently no light
matter. However, it should also be noted that belief in rebirth is nowhere included
among the central articles of belief or among the key doctrines of Buddhism. In
denying rebirth Buddhadasa thus flaunts both tradition and sections of the
scriptures but he does not contradict any fundamental doctrine such as anatta,
ani c ca, dukkha or nibbana.
Buddhadasa s preparedness to contradict even sections of the Suttapitaka in
addition to denying the authority of the Abhidhammapitaka and of commentaries
reveals that his methodological approach to re-interpreting Buddhism is doctrinal
rather than scriptural. That is, Buddhadasa is above all concerned to present a
systematic interpretation of Theravada teachings which is completely consistent with
doctrinal principles. For Buddhadasa logical consistency with the doctrinal
fundamentals of Buddhism is the most important determinant of authoritative
37 . . . -
Pot al i ya Sut t a, Maj j hi ma Ni kaya, Vol . 13 / v e r s e 5 4 / p p . 39- 40.
38
Singalaka Sutta, Digha Ni kaya, Vol . 11/ v e r s e l 7 4/ p . 139.
3 9 Vt suddhimagga, XVI , 33.
t
127
interpretations of the teachings. The Buddhist scriptures, while providing guidelines
and insights, are not taken as the ultimate source of doctrinal authority and are
discarded by Buddhadasa wherever they contradict his strictly doctrinal and
modernist views.
Buddhadasa argues for his metaphorical interpretation of the notion of "birth"
by claiming that the belief in rebirth, as presented in the Visuddhimagga and as
generally understood in Thailand, contradicts the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of
anatta - i.e. that there is no essential self to either human or non-human existence.
He claims that belief in rebirth may easily become the false doctrine of
sassatadi tt hi , that there is in fact an eternal self. Buddhadasa warns,
Be careful in this matter of the "next life". One small error will make it
the sassataditthi [eternalist doctrine] of the Brahmins. That is, believing
that when some person has died that he himself will be born agai n. ( T) 40
He argues that according to the traditional interpretation of "birth" in
Buddhism,
A person's kilesa in a previous life effect kammi c results in this life ...
those kammi c results in this life then cause kilesa to arise anew in this
life, which then effects kammi c results in a subsequent life. When
paticcasamuppada is taught like this it becomes a teaching about atta
[essential self]. It becomes a teaching that there are atta, selves, beings and
individuals. ( T ) 41
In contradistinction with the interpretation presented in the Visuddhimagga
Buddhadasa denies that vi hhana, the third element in the paticcasamuppada series,
can be regarded as meaning "rebirth-linking consciousness'' or pati sandhi vi hhana42.
Instead he maintains that vihhana straightforwardly refers to the six modes of
sensory consciousness recognised in Buddhist teachings. Buddhadasa makes this
claim despite the clear association of the notion of patisandhi with rebirth in the
sut t as, as in the following passage from the Jhanakatha in the Khuddaka Ni kaya,
In a previous kammi cly- determined existence delusion was avi j j a, the
aggregate of karnma was sahkhara, satisfaction [in sensuality] was tanha,
immersion [in sensuality] wras upadana, and consideration [of being] was
bhava. These five dhammas in the previous kamma- cxistence were the
determining factors of patisandhi in this life, patisandhi was consciousness
and its development was into namarupa and nerves, which became the
---------- ------------
P h u t t h a t h a t , " Upas ak Haeng Kan - p h o o y - p hr a a T h a m" ( f t i j f j J J f } UVN fl "IT It JU UV\I 5" 1] I T JJ )
p . 57. 1
41 i d. , Pat rt casamupapat Cak Phra Ot ( iJfl'V'V Ul J U 1 VI ' Vfl l AI T t I 014 *? )i P-74.
y *4
4 2 i b i d . p. 66.
twelve sense spheres [ayatana]. [T ) 43
Buddhadasa does not acknowledge that his denial of rebirth contradicts such
explicit references in the canonical scriptures. However, the fact that Buddhadasa is
prepared to oppose even sections of the scriptures that he himself regards as being
the most authentic and authoritative, i.e. the Suttapitaka, further indicates that the
guiding principle of his re-interpretations is consistency with what he regards as the
basic doctrines of Buddhism, not faithful abidance to any specific text.
Buddhadasa s critique of the notion of literal rebirth in fact raises again an
ancient theoretical difficulty of Buddhist doctrine, namely, how to reconcile the
doctrine of anatta with belief in rebirth. If there is rebirth, what is it that is
reborn if, as the Buddha taught, there is no self or soul which re-incarnates? The
interpretation of consciousness in the paticcasamuppada series as having subliminal
(.bhavahga) and rebirth-linking (pati sandhi ) aspects, as described above, has
traditionally been regarded as having resolved this problem. In this interpretation
consciousness or vihhana is defined as a dependent characteristic of each individual
existence, having no independent existence and not continuing beyond death.
However, in its subliminal or bhavahga mode consciousness is regarded as having the
capacity to transfer karnrnic momenta to another subsequent existence, passing some
of its own characteristics on to the bhavahga consciousness associated with that
subsequent existence.
However, Buddhadasa approaches the problem of resolving the conflict between
the doctrines of anatta and rebirth from an altogether different perspective, by
redefining what is meant by "birth". Buddhadasa develops his interpretation of the
notion of "birth" or j at i by focussing on the teaching that, "True happiness consists
in eliminating the false idea of I ( asmi nanassa vinaya etam ve paramam
sukham. " ) 44 He defines "the false idea of I " or at.ta as denoting the subjective
sense of self together with the self-centred or selfish attitudes associated with it.
According to this definition anatta denotes not just the ontological doctrine of "non
self" or "non-esentiality" but also the ethical notion of "non-self-centredness" or
"unselfishness". That true happiness results from the ending of suffering by the
elimination of the false idea of "I" is interpreted by Buddhadasa as meaning the
ending of self-centredness. In this context he notes a related Buddhist maxim which
128
4 3 Jhanakat ha, Khuddaka Ni kaya, V o l. 3l / v e r s e 98 / p . 3 9 .
44
Buddhadasa, Ano t he r Ki n d o f B i r t h , p.l .
t
states that, "Birth is perpetual suffering ( dukkha j at i punapunnam) . " 45 Here,
Buddhadasa maintains that the "birth" which engenders suffering is not actual
physical birth but rather the arising of the false idea of "I" and of self-centredness.
He asks,
Just what is this rebirth? What is it that is reborn? The birth referred
to is a mental event, something taking place in the mind, the non-physical
side of our make-up. This is birth in dhamma language.46
In Buddhadasa s system one is "reborn" when one s notion of selfhood or
psychological identity undergoes a shift,
The word "birth" only means a single change of thought about "I" and
"mi ne". It is one birth if we think like a thief and are born a thief and it
is another birth the moment we have returned to thinking like a normal
person and so have changed to be born as a person. ( T) 47
That is, in phasa- tham to be "born" a thief is to psychologically identify with
being a thief, and to be born a "person" is to regard oneself as a "person".
Buddhadasa also re-interprets the notion of "death" in Buddhism, saying that, "To
die means that I and mine die compl et el y. " ( T) 48 That is, death in phasa- tham is
not the physical end of life but the ending of the deluded notion of individuality,
and since to end the delusion of selfhood is to be free of the "rebirth" that causes
suffering it is also to be freed of suffering, which is the defintion of nibbana. As
Buddhadasa notes,
In the words of an old saying, "nibbana is to die before dying" ... That
is, the kilesa - the causes of the feeling that there is an "I" or a "mine" -
it is they that di e. ( T) 49
In Buddhadasa s system all notions traditionally associated with rebirth, such
as sar'nsara or the cycle of rebirth and suffering, are systematically re-interpreted in
terms of phasa- tham. For example, he says that if,
46 i bi d. p p . 4- 5.
I
P h u t t h a t h a t , " Upas ak Haeng Ka n- p h o e y - p hr a e T h a m" ( J J ft UVlv] 0 1 J I CJL! UYJ J 1) J ? U
P . 60. 1
v I
48 i d. , Khwam Suk Thi Thae Mi Yu Tae Nai Ngan ( 11 f ) Q ''J Vl l l Vl UBLI l l f l 1 Il' J True Happi ness
L
Ex i s t s Onl y in Work) , Samnak- nang s y Tb a r n ma bu c h a ( a n u n m f t a f t s u j j i m ) Bangkok, 2521
u
(1978), p.157.
t
130
at any time when there exists the idea " I " - " mi ne" , at that time there
exists birth, suffering a n d the cycle of samsara. . The "I" is born, endures
for a moment, then ceases; is born again, endures for a moment and again
ceases - which is why the process is refered to as the cycle of
sa7hsara. ( T ) 50
Because "birth" has traditionally been interpreted literally its place in the
paticcasamuppada series, where it is a causal precursor to suffering or dukkha, has
meant that in Theravada Buddhism physical existence has been regarded as being
inherently and inextricably associated with suffering. That is, in traditional
Theravada teachings the suffering from which liberation is sought is regarded as
being as much physical as mental. This is made clear from the inclusion of the
physical processes of aging and death and of pain in the traditional explication of
dukkha or suffering in the Visuddhimagga,
with birth as condition there is aging and death, and sorrow,
l amentation, pain, grief and despair; thus there is the arising of this whole
mass of suffering.51
However, for Buddhadasa dukkha or suffering, in the sense of the condition
from which Buddhism seeks release, only follows from the birth of self-centredness,
not from literal physical birt h. He consequently defines dukkha solely as mental
suffering,
A person has a physical birth only once, and finally dies just once, but
they can have mental birth and extinction many times. Even in a single
day there can be many cycles of birth and extinction ... and each time it
[that mental birth] is suffering. For this reason the dhammic doctrines
which mention suffering denote mental suff eri ng. ( T) 52
That is, for Buddhadasa the only religiously significant suffering is mental pain
or mental dis-ease. Physical suffering is not denied by Buddhadasa but he does not
regard it as religiously significant. That is, because the cause of physical suffering
lies in the material world he regards its alleviation as being a matter of applying
material rather than religious or spiritual remedies. Thus in Buddhadasa s system
suffering, in the religious sense of ignorance-caused dukkha, is no longer regarded as
being inescapably inherent in phyiscal birth. For Buddhadasa existence in the
material world is not necessarily a state of imperfection and inadequacy. The
50., . , -
ibid. p. 7.
51Vi suddhi magga, XVII, 2.
I
<
52 P h u t t h a t h a t , Duang Ta Thi H en T ham ( ^ ^ VII Wil t) J 3" y/ie E ye T hat Sees Dh a mma ) ,
. ^ ^ 4
Sarnnak-nangsy Thammabucha IVUl'J T T ^ ) ( Bangkok, 2511 (1968), p.9.
elimination of the negative spiritual connotations associated with physical existence
in the material world is one of the most important aspects of Buddhadasa s re-
interpretative system. For, as will be discussed in later chapters, he wishes to
abolish the traditional role division between a world-involved layperson and a
renunciate monk, by giving the layperson access to traditionally clerical practices
and by according spiritual value to the activities of the layperson in the social
world. Buddhadasa wishes to interpret this world and this life as the domain of
Buddhi sm s concern and as the locale of salvation, not some transcendent or post-
death state.
Traditionally the notion of "worl d", loka, in Buddhist doctrine, as in English,
fundamentally connotes materiality, the earth and all that constitutes and populates
it. The term "world" is also used in the sense of heavenly and hellish "worlds".
However, in Buddhist thought the term loka has an additional negative association
with impermanence, ani cca, and with suffering. On this point Nanamoli cites a
comment in the Pararnatthamahjusa, a commentary on the Visuddhimagga,
The round fof birth, i .e. samsdra\ ... (including fine material and
immaterial heavens) is called the world [loka] because of its crumbling
[lujjana] and disintegration [pal uj j ana].53
However, Buddhadasa s phasa- tham interpretation of the term "world" should
be noted here,
In dhamma language [phasa- tham] the word "world" refers to the worldly
[lokiya} mental state, the worldly stage in the scale of mental development
the condition which is impermanent, changing, unsatisfactory [i.e.
dukkha] ... Hence it is said that the world is the unsatisfactory conditional
[dukkha]; the unsatisfactory condition is the world. 04
The traditional negative valuation of existence and activity in the material
world asociated with Theravada teachings is completely absent from Buddhadasa s
work. He systematically reduces the field of Buddhist spiritual action from a cosmic
to a psychological level, which implies that not only may this material life be freed
of dukkha (i.e. mental suffering) but also that is is only within the psychological
dimension of this material life that liberation can be sought. In other w'ords
Buddhadasa s re-interpretation of Theravada Buddhism implies that the material
world, here and now, is the only field of Buddhist spiritual activity and the only
53
Pararnat t hamahj usa 91, ci t ed by N a n a m ol i Bhi kkl i u, in his t ransl at i on of t he Visuddhimagga, at
Visuddhimagga, i l l , 5n. , ( p. 85n) .
131
j 4 B n d d l iadasa, Two Ki n d s o f Lang uage , p. 15.
i
132
domain on which its benefits, i.e. enlightenment and nibbana, are enjoyed. In his
reformulation of the doctrine of paticcasamuppada, his denial of rebirth and his
emphasis on the here and now Buddhadasa thus lays the groundwork for a more
"worldl y" or socially involved interpretation of Buddhism. There is in fact a
fundamental continuity between Buddhadasa s theoretical re-interpretations of
doctrine and spiritual theory and his social theory which is analysed and studied in
Chapters Eight and Nine.
4.5 Criticisms of Buddhadasa s Re-int erpretations of "Birth".
The supporters of the Abhidhamma in Thailand vehemently disagree with
Buddhadasa s phasa- tham interpretation of birth and rebirth. Anan Senakhan affirms
that, " Birth denotes the birth of all sentient beings, according to their respective
categories in the thirty one realms of exi st ence. " ( T) 55 That is he affirms the
traditional Buddhist cosmology of rebirth in various heavens or hells according to
one s merit or demerit. An associate of Anan s and senior member of the
Abhi dhamma Foundation, Bunmi Methangkun, maintains that, "If the cycle of birth
and death i.e. samsara] as a being in various worlds should not be, Buddhism will
fall into d e c a y . " ( T) 56 By this Bunmi means two things. Firstly, he means that if
the cycle of samsara does not in fact exist and, "If we are only born for a single
life and there is no rebirth then there is no need to have the Buddha, and his
teachings are meaningl ess. "(T) 57 And, secondly, Bunmi implies that if the
metaphysical phenomenon of samsara does exist but people like Buddhadasa deny
its reality then that misguided view can only mean that spiritual liberation from the
cycle of rebirth will not even be sought for, let alone be attained. Buddhism would
consequently utterly fail to provide salvation and would amount to a meaningless
religion.
However, there is a sense in which Anan s and Bunmi s criticisms of
Buddhadasa are misdirected. Buddhadasa does not in fact completely deny the
actuality of literal rebirth. What he does deny is the spiritual relevance of actual
rebirth to the soteriological enterprise of Buddhism. Buddhadasa says,
c;c: . . . l *
A n a n Senakhan, Khams orn Di arat hi ( " p n f i B i u m j T f l t i 11 ), P. 4o.
">6 i i m l Me t ha ng kun , t To Than Phutt hat hat Ryang Cit-uiang - Lem 1
< " l ? i r n r W B v n f i i j f N ' v p m * - i t u j 1 " ^ p -57 -
u
d7 B u n m i Me t ha ng kun , " Phi ks u Phu Tharnl ay Phut t has as a na" ( Hn i l litJ TUTA VIU " The
111 1
Mo n k Wh o is Des t r oyi ng Bud d hi s m" ) , in A n a n Senakhan ( ed) , Khamsorn Di arat hi
* * '
IflLl ? ClU ), Ong kan Phi t hak Phut t has as ana ( )'] flfl ^1T'A' VlFl VIS ), 2522 ( 1979) ,
p . 92. 1
i
133
If we can master this kind of birth [of "I"] here and now we will also be
able to master the birth that comes after physical death. So let s not
concern ourselves with the birth that follows physical death. Instead let us
concern ourselves seriously with the birth that happens before physical
death.58
Buddhadasa thus does not deny that kamma accumulated from actions
performed now can influence the quality of existence in some future incarnation.
However, he refocusses Buddhist doctrine and changes its emphasis, defining
Buddhist doctrines as referring solely to this life here and now. By saying that a
life led well now will augur well for any future birth Buuddhadasa implicitly retains
the traditional belief in literal rebirth. The contradiction between Buddhadasa s
above statement on the reality of rebirth and a previously quoted passage where he
explicitly says, "A person has a physical birth only once", is only apparent. If as
proposed in the doctrine of anatta there is in fact no soul then even if actions in
this life do cause rebirth, by whatever mechanism, it is not the precise same person
who is reborn. Strictly speaking each person, as a unique individual whose character
is determined by the specific factors or khandhas constituting his or her conditional
existence, is born only once. As a conditional phenomenon individuality or "self
ness" does not transcend any specific concrete existence.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Buddhadasa walks a theoretical
tightrope between denying and accepting literal rebirth. He does deny Buddhaghosa s
use of the paticcasamuppada to provide an account of rebirth and he also says that
references to "birth" and "death" and to the "cycle of birth and death" in the
Buddhist scriptures should be interpreted metaphorically. However, he does not
explicitly deny the reality of rebirth. Although it is the case that in denying
Buddhaghosa s interpretation of the paticcasamuppada B uddhadasa is left without
any theoretical explanation of the mechanism of rebirth and without any resolution
of the fundamental contradiction between simultaneously maintaining the doctrine of
non-self and the reality of rebirth. However, Buddhadasa is not concerned by this
theoretical gap) and contradiction because he maintains that Buddhism is solely
concerned with life here and now. As a Buddhist he is consequently under no
obligation to resolve difficulties he has defined as being outside the field of his
domain of concern.
Despite his explicit concern to define Buddhism as a teaching of salvation
relevant specifically to life here and now Buddhadasa is unable to completely deny
the reality of rebirth, and so complete his radical redefinition of Buddhism, because
58Buddhadasa, Ano t he r K i n d o f Bi r t h, p. 19.
of insurmountable theoretical tensions. It is the case that some passages in the
Suttapi taka, when taken in isolation suggest that the Buddha himself did not in
fact sanction belief in rebirth or an emphasis on the after life. For example, in the
Potthapada Sutta the Buddha says,
Behold Potthapada, these points we cannot determine, whether beings
after death either continue to exist or do not continue to exi st . ( T) 59
When pushed on why this could not be determined the Buddha replied,
Behold Potthapada, because that is not meaningful, is unrelated to the
dhamma, is not the start of brahmacariya, does not proceed for the sake
of tiredness [of worldliness], for extinction, for peace, for higher knowledge,
for realisation, for nibbana. Thus for these reasons we cannot determine
[this matter] . ( T) 60
In its pragmatic approach to what a Buddhist should regard as worthy of
investigation and consideration this sutta provides scriptural support for
Buddhadasa s demythologised, this-worldly emphasis on that which is of immediate
practical benefit to the ending of suffering. This sutta also provides support for
Buddhadasa s lack of interest in providing an alternative account of the rebirth
process after his debunking of the traditional explanation put forward by
Buddhaghosa. Like the Buddha Buddhadasa regards such an intellectual exercise as
having no direct relevance to the practical goal of ending suffering and consequently
as being outside the purview of Buddhist concern.
However, the above comments must be balanced against the plethora of
references to literal rebirth and to the next world in the main body of the
Suttapitaka. For example, in suttas such as the Payasirajahha Sutta61 disbelief in
the unreality of kamma, rebirth and the next world are respectively presented as
false views which hinder acceptance of the Buddha s teaching of salvation.
It should also be noted that there is in fact a structural necessity for
Buddhism to maintain the reality of rebirth. For if the accumulations of kamma
and sahkhara are acknowledged as real, and if not all kammi c reactions or vipaka
are experienced in this life, then rebirth is essential for the future exhaustion or
outworking of kamma acquired in this life plus that remaining from previous lives.
Wi thout rebirth Buddhism is left without an account of moral justice. Without
Pott hapada Sut t a, Digha Nikaya, Vo l . 9/ v e r s e 2 92/ p. 2 70.
60. . . .
i bi d.
^ Pa y a s i r a j a h h a Sutta, Digha Nikaya, Vol . 10 / v e r s e s 3 0 1 - 3 3 0 / p p . 234- 260 .
t
rebirth Buddhism cannot explain why the good suffer or why the evil prosper, for
by the law of kamma good actions reap good results and evil actions must bear the
fruit of evil consequences. Because there is no immediately apparent relation between
the moral quality of one s actions and the actual quality of a person s life here on
earth Buddhism must postulate the existence of a future life in which the good, bad
or neutral consequences of present intentional actions are experienced. Rebirth is
necessary in order to make sense of the entire Buddhist moral and spiritual
enterprise. Because of the relation between the notions of kam?na and of rebirth it
is then no accident that, given his emphasis on this life here and now, the notion
of kamma and of suffering originating from past kamma is significantly downplayed
in Buddhadasa s system. Buddhadasa s views on kamma are discussed in detail in
Chapter Eight.
Because of the conceptual structure of Buddhist teachings, and because of the
prevalence of references to actual rebirth in the scriptures Buddhadasa cannot
completely deny either rebirth, kamma or the reality of future existences. In
attempting to make Theravada Buddhism a religion of the here and now the most
he can do is de-ernphasise these aspects of the Buddha s teaching and
correspondingly emphasise the more immediate, this-worldly aspects. Nevertheless,
as noted above Buddhadasa does in places come within a hair s breadth of actually
denying both the doctrine of rebirth, and certain related scriptural passages
concerning patisandhi vihhana. This tightrope walking quality of Buddhadasa s
discourse appears wherever traditional Buddhist teachings have to be severely
stretched to match up wit h his modernist views.
4 . 6 P h r a R a j a v a r a m u n l on Paticcasamuppada a nd R e b i r t h .
As noted in the previous chapter the work of Phra Rajavaramunl often
presents a more detailed analysis of doctrinal and scriptural issues on which
Buddhadasa is satisfied to simply present broad and general views. This is also the
case with the issue of interpreting the paticcasamuppada and the reality of rebirth.
Like Buddhadasa Rajavaramunl criticises the interpretation that paticcasamuppada
occurs across more than one life, saying that when it is set out in great detail it
tends to be adhered to rigidly as if its "excessive and confusing det ai l " ( T) 62 is the
final word on the issue. He also cites a passage from the Suttapitaka where the
Buddha refuses to explain the paticcasamuppada in terms of past or future lives
because such things are not immediately demonstrable and their consideration is not
spiritually profitable,
62(Phra) rtatcliaworainuni, Phutthatham ( W i m n j j ), P.86.
136
Thus, reverred householder, were I to show to you the arising and
passing away of suffering [i.e. the paticcasamuppada] by referring to the
past, such as, "In the past this came to pass", then you would have doubt
and suspicion on this matter. And if I were to show to you the arising and
the passing away of suffering by referring to the future, such as, "In the
future this will come to pass", then you could also have doubt and
suspicion on this matter. So reverred householder, as we sit here I will
show to you who also sits here in this place the arising and the passing
away of suffering. (T)63
The point of the above passage is that the arising and passing away of
suffering, i.e. the paticcasamuppada, is regarded as taking place in the immediate
present. Rajavararnuni mentions that in a commentary on the Vibhahga of the
Abhidhammapitaka contained in Buddhaghosa s Sammohavinodani ( T ) 64, a text
Buddhaghosa wrote after the Visuddhimagga, the paticcasamuppada is described as
occurring in a single thought moment - an interpretation which is omitted from the
much more oft-quoted and oft-read Visuddhimagga. In fact there is clear evidence
that the historical e mp h a s i s on the interpretation that the paticcasamuppada
occurs across more than one life is post-canonical. The section of the Vibhahga in
the Abhidhammapitaka which deals specifically with the paticcasamuppada is called
the Paccayakdravibhahga65, which is itself divided into two parts, the
Suttantabhajaniyab6 and the Abhidhammabhajaniya67. The first of these two
sections deals with the paticcasamuppada interpreted as occurring across more than
one life and is four pages long, while the second section deals with the
interpretation that the paticcasamuppada occurs in one thought moment and covers
thirty one pages. But in Buddhaghosa s commentary, the Sammohavi nodani , the
amount of space devoted to these two sections is inverted. The view that the
paticcasamuppada occurs across more than one life is dealt with in a nintey two
page commentary while the view that paticcasamuppada occurs in one thought
moment receives only a nineteen page commentary. Buddhadasa s interpretation
therefore has support from the earlier scriptures of the actual canon, even though
this view has been decreasingly emphasised with the passage of the centuries.
^3Sahha Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya, Vol . 1 8/ v e r s e 6 2 7 / p . 2 5 1.
^4 Sammohavi nodani , p p . 260- 278, ci t ed by ( Phr a) R a t c h a w o r a m u n i , Phutt hat ham ( ** Yll VUJll T J U *1 )i
pp. 140- 142. 1
65 - -
Paccayakaravibhanga, Abhi dhammapi t aka, Vo l . 35.
^ Sutt antabhaj ani ya, Abhi dhammapi t aka, Vo l . 3 5 / ver ses2 5 5 - 2 7 3 / p p / 131- 135.
^7Abhi dhammabhaj ani ya, Abhi dhammapi t aka, Vo 1. 35/ v e r s e s 2 9 1 - 3 5 7 / p p . 146- 177.
i
137
Nevertheless, Buddhadasa s this-worldliness is itself only a one-sided view of
the actual teachings contained in the Theravada scriptures. Rajavaramuni aims to
correct this imbalance when he says that he does not think the psychological view
of paticcasamuppada as occurring in a single thought moment means that belief in
literal rebirth should be denied. Instead he retains both views (i.e. that the
paticcasamuppada represents an account of the arising of suffering at any given
moment in a present life and in some future life) as being tenable and as being
equally founded in the canonical scriptures.
4.7 Political Opposition to Buddhadasa s Views.
There is no denying that Buddhadasa s particularly one-sided emphasis in his
interpretation of the Theravada scriptures and the vehemence with which he attacks
long-held views and beliefs is an important source of the criticisms directed against
him. As Mulder notes, for most Thais Buddhadasa s criticism of the traditional view
of Buddhism is "shocking",
All these people have always thought themselves to be good Buddhists,
and now they have to hear they are not. Necessarily they feel threatened.68
This sense of threat goes some way to explaining the opposition to
Buddhadasa which has arisen, but it should be noted that his threat is not purely
intellectual or religious. Buddhadasa s views challenge the traditional institutional
character of Thai Buddhism and its ideological role in the structure of power and
culture in contemporary Thailand. Because the religious heritage he and other
reformers seek to re-interpret is such an essential factor in the traditional structure
o f Thai society and political power then even seemingly theoretical debates on
matters of doctrine may have political implications. This explains why, in Mul der s
words, religious reformers in Thailand are so, "easily branded as heretics, a danger
to the stability of society and thus are often called communists . " 69
Bunmi Methangkun, head of the Abhi dhamma Foundation Committee, criticises
Buddhadasa s demythologising of Buddhist doctrine and his emphasis on the religion
as a this-worldly doctrine in the following way,
He is one who has opened the door wide to accept those who like
politics and do not hold to our religion ... in order to destroy
M u l d e r , Everyday Li f e in Thailand, p. 146.
68
i
That is, Bunmi regards Buddhadasa as accommodati ng Buddhism to non-
Buddhists (read communists) whom he and other political and religious conservatives
are opposed to and whose influence such organisations as the Abhidhamma
Foundation and its supporters seek to nullify by propagating their own traditional
form of Buddhism. The above criticism of destroying Buddhism, both doctrinally
and by allowing non-Buddhists to infiltrate and subvert the religion, is not purely
religious for it is part of conservative Thai Buddhists ideological campaign against
communism to promote the notion that Buddhism is the foundation of both the
monarchy and of national security. Bunmi notes,
Buddhism is still the collective nucleus of the sympathies of the Thai
people, in this they are solidly united. When Buddhism gradually
degenerates what will happen? How could the nation and king
cont i nue?( T) 71
Opposing communism, maintaining traditions and in particular supporting the
monarchy, which is viewed as a symbol of Thai tradition and independence, are
three recurring themes in the writings of Buddhist conservatives. Anan Senakhan s
criticisms of another reformist monk, Phra Phothirak (Pali: Bodhiraks a), provide a
clear example of the meshing of traditional symbols and values with politics and
religious belief. Phothirak is a monk who, because of disagreement with the
authorities of both the Thammayut and Mahanikay orders, decided in 1975 to
establish his own independent monastic order. Anan legalistically notes that under
the 1962 Sangha Act promulgated by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat all Thai monks
must be associated with and subordinate to one of either the Thammayut,
Mahanikay, Chinese or V ietnamese Buddhist orders which are officially recognised in
Thailand. Anan maintains that Phothirak s break with the official sahgha hierarchies
is strictly speaking illegal. But in addition Anan accuses that Phothirak s actions
are, "Equivalent to being in rebellion to the l a nd . " ( T) 72 Anan makes this claim
because Phothirak rejects the authority of the Supreme Patriarch of the Thai
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - V
7^ Bu n mI Methangkun, "Phiksu Phu Thamlay Phu ttbasasana
p.94. ' 11 '
71. - - -
id., To Than Phu t t ha t ha t Ry a ng Ci t - wa ng - L e m 1 .
Vi l i t
i ) * p-48-
7 r) . . .
A n a n Senakhan, Pho t hi r a k - Sat s ada M a h a p h a y (** IYl5 3"fl 14 ^)14W ^flLI11 Do dhi r aks ' a -
~ r *4
The Hi g h l y Da n g e r o u s Pr o p he t ) , Niwat Sisathaphorn ( 14 *50114 ), Bangkok, 2525 (1982),
Buddhism. ( T ) 70
p. l 18 .
t
139
sahgha, whose status and position are conferred by the King in his role as
sasanupathamphek ( ) or upholder of the faith. Thus in rejecting
the authority of the King, who is also the secular head of the nation, Anan
maintains that Phothirak is strictly speaking in rebellion to the highest symbol of
political authority in the land. Accusations of this type are taken seriously and have
considerable force in some conservative circles.
However, the criticisms of reformist monks such as Buddhadasa and Phothirak,
who are regarded as, "Abandoning traditions which are good and which have existed
from ancient t i me s . " ( T) 73, also transcends politics p e r se. The conflict is also over
the character of Buddhism. For Buddhist conservatives Buddhism is the key social
institution of Thailand, the basis of Thai society and social order. For Buddhadasa,
on the other hand, Buddhism is first and foremost a doctrine of personal salvation.
That is, the conflict between traditionalist and reformist Buddhists is at one level a
conflict between an individualistic and a social or institutional view of the religion.
If as Anan proposes the institutional character of Buddhism is of primary
importance then it follows that all the things that maintain the solidarity of that
institution in society are also of paramount importance. Conformity to defined
goals and traditional sources of unity, such as the power of the state and the
symbol of the monarchy, will rank above innovation and reform, which may well
threaten solidarity and unity. But if Buddhism is, as Buddhadasa views it, a
doctrine of personal salvation then the pressure to conform to traditional beliefs and
practices may well be in contradiction with the individual s spiritual quest for
enlightenment.
This debate is strictly speaking outside of religion because it is unable to be
resolved by a purely religious debate or by reference to the Buddhist scriptures. As
has already been seen the Theravada scriptures are ambiguous and contain
conflicting elements and tendencies which, when taken alone, can be used to justify
either Buddhadasa s individualistic and doctrinal interpretation or the more popular,
institutional perspective of Anan and other conservatives. As already noted, sections
of the Buddhist scriptures appear to unequivocably treat heaven, hell, spirits and
other supernatural phenomena as real states and real beings while other sections
appear to reject such supernatural beliefs. Ling observes that historically Buddhism
has exhibited a spirit of tolerance towards belief, "in the many supernatural beings
who are respected, venerated, propitiated or worshipped by the mass of the common
7 3 i b i d . p . 96.
t
pe o pl e . " ' 4 Thus from a purely historical perspective Buddhadasa s critique of such
beliefs which underpin Buddhism as a popular, cultural institution is
uncharacteristically puritanical. Nevertheless, in contrast to this general tolerance
towards lay beliefs Ling also notes that the Buddha specifically forbids monks to be
involved in supernatural activities. Citing a Vinaya text Ling notes the following
injunction of the Buddha,
You are not, O bhikkhus, to learn or teach the low arts [lit. "brutish
wi sdom": of divination, spells, omens, astrology, sacrifices to gods,
witchcraft and quackery. 70
Theravada Buddhist doctrine is open to widely varying readings and can be
manipulated to support widely divergent spiritual and social positions. For this
reason it is difficult to evaluate Buddhadasa s reformed interpretation of Theravada
doctrine simply in terms of his faithfulness to Buddhist teachings or to the
canonical texts. When viewed theoretically or doctrinally one can validly conclude
that despite his numerous inconsistencies of detail Buddhadasa has by and large
succeeded in creating an important and innovative reading of the Pali canon which
is broadly consistent both with the texts he accepts as authoritative and with
modernist intellectual expectations. But when viewed politically or sociologically one
can just as easily conclude that Buddhadasa is an idealist who, in rejecting popular
beliefs, fails to appreciate the importance of institutional Buddhism to the Thai
populace, whether farmers, labourers, administrators or generals. The criticisms of
conservative Buddhists like Anan Senakhan and Bunmi Methangkun can be taken as
an indicator of Buddhadasa s failure to develop a popularly acceptable reform of
Theravada Buddhism.
At the same time, however, Buddhadasa s work is regarded as having great
social and religious significance by the small section of modernist Thai Buddhists in
the new bourgeois. For example, in a statistical survey of the religious beliefs of 284
Thai academics at five state universities David Gosling found that only 25%
believed in the reality of rebirth and most expressed no opinion on the reality or
unreality of other Buddhist doctrines such as nibbana and kamma. However, the
majori ty regarded the principle of impermanence, ani cca, to be in substantial
agreement with science and regarded it as being compatible with a doctrinalist
interpretation of Buddhism. Significantly, Gosling reports that,
140
74
Tr e v o r Li n g , The Buddha - Buddhist Ci vi l i sat i on in India and Ceylon, Te mpl e Smi t h, Londo n, 1973,
p . 74.
7 i b i d . p . 70
between 30% and 70% of the questionnaire respondents at Chulalongkorn,
Mahidol and Chiengmai Univerisities and Payap College [respecitvelyj
mentioned Putatat [i.e. Buddhadasa] on the questionnaire.76
Gosling notes that the correspondents usually mentioned Buddhadasa
approvingly on their questionnaire sheets, especially in the context of supporting his
interpretation of rebirth as a psychological phenomenon occurring in this life rather
than as denoting literal rebirth. Gosling s conclusions show that the Thai scientists
he interviewed do indeed hold very similar views on Buddhism and Buddhist
doctrine to Buddhadasa,
Very few respondents had any desire to reject Buddhism, and as has
already been pointed out, the rejection of rebirth as a literal statement of
what happens at and beyond death often went hand in hand with a
dynamic this-worldly interpretation of the cardinal Buddhist doctrines.77
There are therefore multiple levels at which Buddhadasa s re-interpretations of
Theravada doctrine can be criticised. Firstly, his denial of the authority of the
Abhi dhamma and of the reality of spirits and rebirth is a direct threat to those
whose interpretation of Buddhism, and whose books, classes and investments in
teaching Buddhism, are founded on precisely those scriptures and teachings.
Secondly, the contradiction between Buddhadasa s desire to interpret Buddhism as a
religion of the here and now and the scriptural and doctrinal emphasis on the
reality and importance of rebirth creates distinct theoretical tensions in his work.
Buddhadasa s novel views and doctrinalism and his emphasis on individual salvation
as opposed to the traditional institutional role of Buddhism in Thai society also
cuts across and opposes what most Thais regard their religion to be. But despite
these theoretical and socio-political difficulties in Buddhadasa s work it is
nevertheless still the case that among progressive Thai Buddhists he is one of the
most popular and respected academic monks in modern Thailand. This is not simply
because of his demythologisation of Buddhism. Buddhadasa also commands the
respect of intellectual Buddhists because the view of Buddhist practice that he
develops upon the base of his phasa- tham method provides access for laypeople to
the spiritual core of the religion, from which they have historically been isolated. In
Chapters Five and Six Buddhadasa s re-interpreted Buddhist soteriology, based on
his notion of cit- wang or "freed-mind", is detailed and his attempted abolition of
the theoretical distinction between the monk and the layperson is analysed.
76 Dav i d G o s li ng , " The Sci ent i f i c and Rel i gi ous Bel i ef s of Thai Sci ent i st s and Thei r I nt er - r el at i onshi p" , in
Sout heast Asi an Journal o f Social Sci ence, Vo l . 4 No . l , 1975, p . 10.
77
i bi d. p . 11.
t
142
CHAPTER 5
CIT- WANG AND BUDDHADASA S THEORETICAL
ABOLITION OF THE MONK-LAY DISTINCTION.
While each is doctrinally and theoretically significant in itself, the
interpretative theory of phasa- khon - phasa- tham, the demythologisation of Buddhist
metaphysics and supernaturalism, and the rejection of traditionally respected
scriptures are in fact jointly the foundations of Buddhadasa s total re-interpretative
system. Together these doctrinal innovations and criticisms provide the tools
Buddhadasa requires to reform both the doctrine and the practice of Theravada
Buddhism in Thailand in order to give contemporary relevance to the religion. The
various details of his reviews of doctrine and the criticisms of traditional accounts of
Buddhist teachings are all elements of his general programme of reform, which has
as its goal the abolition of the historical distinction between the Buddhism of the
monk, l okuttaradhamma, and the Buddhism of the laity, lokiyadhamma.
As noted in Chapter Three Buddhadasa is highly critical of what he regards
as the superstitious and supernaturalist character of popular Thai Buddhism, arguing
for a return to doctrinal basics as interpreted in terms of their relevance to the
immediate experience of life on earth here and now. However, those features of
Buddhism which Buddhadasa rejects as superstitious have traditionally been the
dominant and often the most import,ant aspects of the religion of the Buddhist
layperson. Concern with Buddhist doctrine p e r se has in general characterised only
the clerical religion of the monks. Therefore if the Buddhist laity are not to be
excluded from Buddhadasa s system he must incorporate them within his doctrinal
view of Buddhism. But given that laypeople cannot be expected to relinquish their
involvement in social affairs and, furthermore, that Buddhadasa rejects the
traditional world-oriented lay or lokiyci path, the only way he can in fact
incorporate the layperson within his doctrinally purified system of Buddhism is by
making the traditional clerical, transcendent and doctrinal view of salvation
compatibl e with the mundane life and commitments of the laity. Indeed, the
integration of the active, socially involved role of the layperson with a rationalist
and strictly doctrinal interpretation of Buddhist teachings is in fact a major focus of
143
Buddhadasa s work. The theory of phasa- tham and the rejection of the
supernaturalism and otherworldly focus of the Abhidhamma and the Visuddhimagga
are simply the methodological and critical levers which he uses to effect a
fundamental restructuring of the entire edifice of Theravada Buddhist thought and
practice.
The various issues Buddhadasa directs his attention to can all be seen as
either laying a new foundation for approaches to Theravada doctrine or as being
aspects of the systematic reconstruction of Theravada teaching upon that new
foundation. Buddhadasa s effort to theoretically reconstruct Theravada Buddhism
itself can also be divided into two aspects. Firstly, in integrating the world-
involved lay role with doctrinal Buddhism Buddhadasa is concerned with
undermining the validity of popular, supernatural Buddhism, and with preventing
any regression or retreat to the shelter of traditional religious beliefs. This critical
moment of Buddhadasa s w'ork has been the focus of t he previous two chapters.
Secondly, he is concerned to give authentic religious value to the lay role, to world
involvement and to the social and material world itself. This systematic
sanctification of the social and material world, or loka, which in doctrinal Buddhism
has traditionally been regarded as the very antithesis of spirituality, will be
systematically and thoroughly discussed in the remaining chapters.
Discussion in this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the theoretical pivot
upon which Buddhadasa attempt,s his monumental reconstructive effort of integrating
the w'orld, l oka, with the core of Buddhist soteriological teachings concerning
nibbana. This pivot is a special interpretation of the notion of anatta or "non-self",
which Buddhadasa calls in Thai cit- wang or "voided mi nd". Buddhadasa defines
"voided mind" as being the base or foundation of nibbana, salvation. However,
unlike traditional interpretations of nibbana, which define Buddhist salvation as an
inherently transcendent condition attained by radically breaking from the snares of
world involvement, Buddhadasa maintains that cit-wang is rooted in the everyday
experience of mental calm and peace available to all, whether monk or layperson.
He maintains that there is a fundamental continuity between ordinary mental peace
or ci t-wang and the absolute importable peace of nibbana. This notion of cit-wang is
the most important positive concept in Buddhadasa s system.
t
144
5. 1 C i t - w a n g a nd Suhhata - B u d d h a d a s a s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Anatta.
The term cit-wang is Buddhadasa s rendering into Thai of the Pali term
suhhata (Sanskrit: s' iinyata)1, literally "voidness" or "emptiness", and the Thai
term can be literally translated as "voi d-mi nd". However, caution needs to be
exercised in interpreting the term cit-wang because there are two quite different but
related aspects to the notion of " voi d" or suhha2 in Theravada thought. Firstly,
suhhata is used in reference to the doctrine of anatta to denote the non-substantial,
phenomenal character of reality; the fundamental void underlying being. Suhhata
also has a second ethical import of being, "devoid of lusts, evil dispositions and
karma. " 3
The following passage from the Visuddhimagga exemplifies the first sense of
suhhata noted above, showing the relationship between the notion of "voi d" or
suhha and the doctrine of the absence of any self, anatta, in either the subjects or
objects of consciousness.
In the ultimate sense all the truths ii.e. ari yasaccaj should be understood
as void because of the absence of (i) any experiencer, (ii) any doer, (iii)
anyone who is extinguished, and (iv) any goer. Hence it is said:
"For there is sufferi ng but none who suffers;
Doing exi sts al though there is no doer;
Ex ti ngui shed is but no exti ngui shed person;
Al though there is o path there is no goer.""*
In the Theravada tradition the term suhhata has most commonly been used to
denote the notion of anatta as applied to the external world, that is, to denote the
notion of the non-substantiality of the objects in the external world. This
attribution of non-substantiality or the absence of an essence to the objects in the
world is commonl y called the voidness or emptiness of the world, as in the following
^In t he Thai lang u ag e ver si on of t he Suttapit aka (Phra Trai pi dok Phasa Thai Chabap Luang) suhhata is
s y s t e ma t i c a lly t r ans l at ed as wang, or mor e c o mmo n ly as t he abs t r ac t noun k hwa m- wang, " v o i dne s s " . Th e
speci f i c t erm ci t - war i g has been c o i ne d by Bud dha das a and is uni que t o his wri t i ngs and t he wri t i ngs o f hi s
f ol l owers. Whi l e used t ec hni c al l y t o de no t e " v o i d " t he Thai t er m wan g al so has t he sense of " t o be de v o i d
of " or " t o be f ree o f " , i t is al so used t o de no t e " be i ng f ree" in t he sense o f not bei ng busy, t he t er m
wel a- w' ang meani ng l i teral l y "f ree t i me" . Th e t erm c i t - wang t hus l i teral l y means " v o i d - mi n d " , but bec aus e
of t he par t i c ul ar t hr ust of Bu d d h a d a s a ' s use o f t he t erm thi s l i teral t ransl at i on is mi sl eadi ng. I pref er t he
t erms " v o i d e d - mi n d " or " f r e e d- mi nd" , whi c h mo re ac c ur at e l y c at c h t he sense o f Bu d d h a d a s a ' s t erm,
de no t i ng a mi nd whi c h is voi ded o f or f reed f r om moral i mpuri t i es. Ci t -wang most def i ni t el y does not
me an an " e mp t y mi n d " in t he sense o f a ment al v a c u um or voi d.
2 ................................ .
Suhha, " v o i d " is t he adj ec t i val f or m whi l e t he t erm suhhata is an abs t r ac t noun, i.e. " vo i dnes s " . The
Sanskri t equi val ent s are s'unya and s'unyata.
3
P a l i T e x t S o c i e t y , Pali Engl i sh Di ct i onary, T . W. Rhy s Dav i ds & Wi l l i am St ede ( eds) , Luzac & Co.
Lt d, Lo nd o n , 1976, p . 717.
4Vi suddhi magga, XVI, 90.
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145
passage from the Khuddaka Ni kaya, "Because of being void of self or of things due
to a self it is consequently said that the world is v o i d . " ( T ) 5 The term anatta on
the other hand, w'hile denoting the general notion of non-substantiality applicable
both to the subject of consciousness and to the objects of consciousness, is also used
in the more specific sense of the absence of any permanent subject, soul or spirit
(i.e. "non-self").
The second sense of suhhata is, as noted, to be devoid of moral impurities,
which in Buddhist thought is regarded as being in a state of mental equilibrium or
equipoise, upekkha, wherein one is neither attracted to nor repelled by anyone or
anything. While the traditional emphasis in Theravada Buddhism has been on the
first sense of suhhata described above, as denoting anatta or "non-self" in the
objects of the world, it is the second sense (i.e. to be devoid of "lusts") which is
most emphasised by Buddhadasa in his notion of cit-wang. Buddhadasa s primary
emphasis in his interpretation of the notion of anatta is not upon the absence of an
entitative self or soul, "non-self", but upon the mental attitude of non-self-
centredness or selflessness. The former interpretation of anatta is not absent from
Buddhadasa s writings but it is significantly underplayed. His justification for this
ethical emphasis in the interpretation of anatta and cit- wang is pragmatic,
The interpretation of anatta and atta has never been fully beneficial.
They must be re-interpreted to be fully beneficial and useful for everyone in
restraining suffering. (T)6
That is, Buddhadasa maintains that the traditional emphasis of interpretations
of anatta as denoting the absence of an ontological essence or self to phenomena
has not realised the full benefits or utility of the notion in practical efforts to
attain the Buddhist goal of ending suffering. His re-interpretative approach here is
once again revealed as doctrinalist rather than strictly scriptural, because he
measures the value of interpretations of the notion of anatta against a general
principle of doctrine, the ending of suffering, rather than against any specific
scriptural reference to anatta as such. Buddhadasa regards his interpretation of atta
as denoting "self-centredness" and anatta as denoting "non-self-centredness" as being
more beneficial to the soteriological goal of ending human suffering.
However, Rajavaramuni indicates that there is in fact an integral relation
between the ontological interpretation of anatta as "non-self" and the ethical notion
5 - - -
Mogharaj a Manavakapanhani ddesa, Khuddaka Ni kaya, V o l. 30 / v e r s e 5 05 / p. 197.
f
Ph u t tl iat hat, Duang Ta Thi H en Tham, ( H VI IViVl' B J J ), p. 14.
t
of non-self-centredness which is emphasised by Buddhadasa. He describes
suhhata- vi mokkha, which denotes a process of attaining liberation through
concentration on anatta, which effects salvation by, "seeing anatta and then being
able to withdraw attachment and cl i ngi ng. " ( T) 7 That is, when it is realised that
there is no self in either oneself or in the objects of desire there also arises the
awareness that there is nothing which can be clung to or desired, and an attitude
of non-attachment and non-self-centredness is developed.
Buddhadasa renders the term att a, " sel f or "selfhood" into Thai by the
compound term tua-ku - khorng- ku ( ^ f | ) T" - " mi ne" 8 and says that
u u
realising the truth of anatta is equivalent to ending the self-centred view' that there
is an "I" and that there are tilings which are "mi ne", " Don t identify as I or
mine ; act with clear awareness and there will be no suffering."9 For Buddhadasa it
is the false view that there is an \" w'hich is able to have and to possess objects
of desire as being "mi ne" which is at the root of emotional attachment. According
to the doctrine of anicca the desiring of impermanent things in the long run can
only lead to the 1" or desirer suffering the loss of those things. Thus, in accord
with Buddhist teaching, ending identification as an "I" or self is essential for
liberation from suffering. When there is no longer any sense of "I" there is
correspondingly no posessive sense of "mi ne", and so both clinging and its
concomitant suffering are ended.
For Buddhadasa cit-wang denotes having a mind, cit ( ), which is free,
wang ), from the possessive and deluded atttitude of " I " - " mi ne" . That is,
7 - T - *"
(Phra) Ra t c haw or aru u ill, P h o t c a n a n u k r o m Phu t t ha s a t ( " ^ l i n ? U'MVll] Pi 5" M ^
* 1
D i c t i o n a r y o f B u d d h i s m ) , Krom Kan- sasana Krasuang Syksathikan
( n J U f n r f t t m n n ? ), Bangkok, 2520 ( 1 97 7 ), p. 133.
g
Thai possesses an elaborate pronoun system iri which the choice of first, second and third person
pronouns varies depending on the relative statuses of the speakers or persons spoken about. The first
person pronoun ku ( ^ ) is used either derogatorily, as when expressing anger or disgust, or as an
intimate form among c lose friends or relatives. Here Buddhadasa is using ku in its first, derogatory sense,
to emphasise the delusory and false nature of the belief in the existence of a self. Had he wished to
emphasise the associations of intimacy attached to the term ktj Buddhadasa would have chose a much less
ambiguously intimate first person pronoun such as chan (<tni ) The English translation of tua-ku -
khorng- ku as ' I - " mi n e ' , while being the closest possible rendering, fails to catch the emphatic sense of
disapproval associated with Buddhadasa' s vernacular Thai rendering of the Pali term atta.
9
B u d d hadasa, An o t h e r K i n d o f Bi r t h, p. 15.
ci t- wang denotes a mind in ethical equilibrium which is free of disturbing moral
stains or hindrances to salvation. Cit- wang, "freed-mind", is therefore as much an
ethical as a psychological notion, denoting the state of mind which should be
established if one is to attain nibbana. The following passage, called "Eating the
Food of Freedness5", is a description of living in the condition of cit-wang, devoid
of "I" and "mine",
Both the thing that eats and thing that is eaten are ?freed-ness"
[khwam-wang f t' } ' 1)!]'} *)>! ], are "ffeed-things" [kherng-wang 21'EM^W ]. He
who eats thus is "freed" [wang ] because he is neither a being nor an
individual. The thing wrhich is eaten is a "freed-thing", or simply the
natural el ements. (T) 10
This "freed-ness" or suhhata, i.e. the state of being wang or "voi ded" of
moral impurities and delusions of self-hood, is in no sense an ontological void. What
is "voi ded" is simply the self-centred attitude of " I" - " mi ne" . In the above-quoted
passage Buddhadasa indicates that the cit- wang attitude to eating should not be
that " I am eating this f ood", but rather that, "The elements w'hich are this
individual are eating the elements which are this f o o d . " ( T ) n He makes the
psychological and ethical character of cit- wang clear in the following statement,
M ental emptiness [sic]12 is the state in which all the objects of the
physical world are present [and being perceived] as usual, but none of them
is being grasped or clung to as " mi ne" . 13
Thus cit- wang is not a vacuous mental state. It is not,
"voi d" of content. All objects are there as usual and the thinking
processes are going on as usual, but they are not going the way of
grasping and clinging with the idea of "I" and "mi ne".
Buddhadasa defines cit- wang as a condition in which, "one does not cling to
anything, is not anything, does not feel that one gets anything or that one gets to
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - v f i
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Khwam Suk Thae Mi Yu Tae Nai Ngan f 1 {*) ^ *"11^*2 LLVlJJBLl LLf l l l i ' J M )i
p p . 134- 135. 1 31
^1 i bi d. p . 138.
12
As no t ed pr evi ousl y I di sagr ee wi t h t he t ransl at i on o f wang as " e mp t y or " empt i nes s " be caus e it
mi s le adi ngl y i mp lies t hat c i t - wang is a st at e of ment al vac ui t y . Ho we v er , wher e ot her s have used t he t erm
" e mp t y " in t ransl at i ng Bu d d h a d a s a ' s wo r k, as here, I ret ai n t he t erm f or t he sake of f ai t hf ul ness t o the
c i t ed t ext .
13Buddhadasa, An o t h e r K i n d o f Bi r t h, p.6.
14ibid. pp.6-7.
be anyt hi ng. " ( T) 15 When the mind is freed it is, "free from suffering, free from
dogmatic clinging and at t ac hment . " ( T) 16
Because the Buddhist notion of "worl d", l oka, in conformity with the doctrine
of anat t a, is often described in the scriptures as being "voidness" or suhhat a, the
notion of suhhata (Thai: wang) has often been misinterpreted as denoting a literal
void or vacuum. Buddhadasa continues the tradition of describing not only the mind
but also the world as being wang, but it should be kept in mind that by this he
means that the world is "freed" or "voi ded" of moral defilements, not that it is a
literal "emptiness",
The Lord Buddha said, " suhhato evekhassu mogharaja sada sat o -
"One should be a person w'ith mindfulness, always seeing the world in the
condition of being a freed thing ( khwam-wang) . " ... Whoever sees the
world in the condition of being a freed-thing will not have suffering because
they will see it [the w'orld] as something completely without birth and
extinction, and so there cannot be suff eri ng. ( T) 1'
In interpreting the expression, "the world is suhhat a", one must be careful to
remember that in Buddhist thought the notion of "worl d", loka, does not denote an
obj ecti ve thing totally independent of consciousness, although Buddhism does not
deny that there is in fact an external world. Rather, in Buddhism the "worl d" is
always conceived in terms of its relation to human experience and desires. There
may well be an external world independent of and beyond human ken but insofar as
it is external to human experience such a w'orld is, according to Buddhist teachings,
irelevant to any human concerns or interests. The Buddhist "worl d", loka, is that
part of the external cosmos which can be perceived and which can therefore become
an obj ect of human sense-based desire. Sunthorn Xa-Rangsi says,
The existence of the w'orld according to Buddhism is nothing apart from
the existence of sentient beings and vice versa ... When a man is no more
in the wrorld, the world is no more for him. 18
Therefore when Buddhadasa calls the w'orld a "freed-thing" he does not mean
i
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , XVithi Fyk Samathi-i uipatsana - Lem 1 ( *^ J UH dU^5 0 lJfj^14^ j The
Me t ho d o f Practising Samadhi -Vipassana - Book l ) , Samnak- phi m Phut t has an
( s n u n m i w w v i s p n m i )> Bang ko k, no publ i c at i on dat e gi ven, p. 78.
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Cut - may Khorng Kan- syksa (** ^ "IlI 3 ' B' J f ) ^1J Pifl The Goal s o f Educat i on) ,
Sar nnak- nang s y Tha ni ma bu c h a ( ^Vi Fl "W*L1 nJ ABU T I ^ Ban g ko k, 2522 ( 1979) , p. 83.
1 7 i d. , Thalaengkan Suan Mok 50 FH 3"H I ^ U P l^] ^ 0 d**) , p. 29.
1^Na- Raugsi , p.68.
t
149
that it is a literal void but that it is a realm of experience freed of clinging and so
of suffering. A "freed-world" is one no longer clung to or craved for. Buddhadasa
makes this clear when he says,
The suhhata of the Buddha means the absence of anything that we
might have a right to grasp at and cling to as an abiding entity or self ...
The world is described as empty because there is nothing whatever that we
might have a right to grasp at. We must cope with an empty world, with
a mind that does not cling. 19
Thus Buddhadasa s description of the world as a "freed-thing" is in no sense a
comment on the actual character of the external world but rather is an injunction
regarding the non-attached state of mind which should be brought to bear in all
relations with the world in order to attain salvation from suffering.
5.2 Cit- wang as the Fundament al Condition of Mind.
Following on from his wrish to interpret anatta "beneficially", that is, to make
doctrinal Buddhism accessible to and of benefit to the layperson as well as to the
monk, Buddhadasa avoids defining cit-wang as a condition attained only as the
culmination of a rigorous system of spiritual practices undertaken in isolation from
the w'orld, as Buddhist salvation has traditionally been interpreted. Rather he
considers ci t-wang to be the fundamental condition of mind as such,
I consider a mind freed from kilesa to be fundamental ... Normally the
mind is fundamentally free from kilesa: hence our only [spiritual] duty is to
wait and block their way with mindful wisdom. Don t give them [kilesa]
the chance to arise. Let there continually be the freedness of the
fundamental, original freed-rnind. (T)20
Here Buddhadasa states that the mental impurities or kil esa21 which bar the
w'ay to salvation have no essential existence but like all other things exist
dependently. The condition which permits kilesa to arise and pollute the mind is
the absence of mindfulness or sati. Sati denotes self-watchfulness, which is
essentially to distance or detach oneself from one s thoughts and actions and so
attain mental and moral equilibrium. Sati or mindfulness is the basic Theravada
meditative practice, usually developed by the practice of observing and concentrating
on the breath. On this Buddhadasa advises,
19
B u d d h a d a s a , Buddha-dhamma For Students, p. 64.
v t
P h u t t h a t h a t , Khwam- suk Thae Afi Yu Tae Nai Ngan (r m_i r* ) P- ^7.
1 M
21
Tr a d i t i o n a ll y ten ki lesa or def i l ement s are enume r at e d: ( l ) lobha - greed, ( 2) dosa - hat red, ( 3) moha -
de l us i on, ( 4) mana - c onc ei t , ( 5) ditthi - f al se vi ews, ( 6 ) vi ci kiccha - s cept i ci sm and d o u b t , ( 7) thina
me nt al t o r por , ( 8 ) uddhacca - ment al rest l essness, ( 9) ahirika - shamel essness, ( 10) anottappa - l ack o f a
c o n s c i e nc e or mor al dread.
t
Having mindfulness is to wait and be cautious with every inward and
outward breath. Don t get lost in attached clinging, to having, taking and
bei ng. ( T) 22
When one lacks mindfulness one ignorantly identifies with one s thoughts and
actions, which in turn is regarded as giving rise to mentally disturbing kilesa. But
kilesa do not have to be dug out or extricated from the mind because according to
Buddhadasa they have no essential character. Thus to try to get rid of kilesa by
actively suppressing them is to mistakenly regard them as having some positive or
essential character. In Buddhadasa s system kilesa are not to be removed but,
rather, prevented from developing by remaining mindful and so not allowing their
necessary preconditons to arise. This interpretation of cit- wang is important to
Buddhadasa s re-interpretative effort because it means that the human mind is
fundamentally pure, not impure or defiled. Thus given that he defines cit- wang as
the basis of attaining nibbana it means that all that is required to begin working
for nibbana is to remain "mindful" and prevent the mi nd s original purity from
being defiled. This is a much more accessible practice for attaining nibbana than the
traditional complex system of Buddhist meditation. In other words, Buddhadasa s
interpretation of cit- wang as denoting both the fundamental condition of mind and
the foundation of nibbana radically simplifies traditional Buddhist soteriological
practices, making them much more accessible to the layperson.
However, this interpretation of cit- wang has attracted considerable criticism.
Bunrni Methangkun, for example, has theoretical objections to Buddhadasa s
contention that cit-wang, a pure mind completely free of any moral stains or
impurities, is the fundamental condition of mind. Bunmi observes that,
There are anusayakil esa, that is, a fine kind of kilesa which hide,
completely obscured inside the mind, and which no-one anywhere can
comprehend. " ( T ) 23
In Buddhist doctrine anusaya are regarded as latent or subconscious morally
unwholesome (akusala) proclivities or dispositions which underlie the cognisable
expressions of kil esa24. The following passages from the Visuddhimagga reveal the
non-conscious nature of anusaya and their fundamental role in perpetuating the
clinging which creates kamma and which leads to rebirth,
_____________________
22P h u t t h a t h a t , Wi t hi Fyk S a m a t h i - wi p a t s a n a - L e m 1 (** c l n f i i n i n i l a m n , l ^ o j i 5* P.85.
23 T
B u n m l Methangkun, To Than P h u t t h a t h a t Ry ang Ci t - wa n g - L e m 1
VI |
( " I n v n u v n v f f i v n a i i f m p m ' j - i a u 1 M pC8'
" ^Traditionally se ven a nus ay a or anus a y a ki l e s a are listed: ( l ) kama- r aga - sensuous greed, (2) pat i gha -
grudge, (3) di t t hi - false views, (4) vi c i ki c c ha - skepticism and doubt, (5) m a n a - conceit, (6) bhava- raga -
craving for continued existence, ( 7 ) a vi j j a - ignorance.
i
The defilements [anusayakil esa] that are the roots of the round [of
rebirth] are inherent in one s own aggregates [khandhas] not fully
understood by insight from the instant those aggregates arise.25
Elsewhere in the Visuddhimagga it is said,
These things are called proclivities \anusaya] since, in consequence of
their pertinacity, they ever and again tend to become the conditions for the
arising of ever new sensuous greed [kama-raga], etc. 26
These passages suggest, in contradistinction with Buddhadasa s contention that
the mind is fundamentally pure, that moral impurities are in some sense inherent in
the factors or khandhas from which mind is constituted. Bunmi claims that
ci t- wang cannot be the basis of nibbana because even when the mind is free of
explicit kilesa (i.e. Buddhadasa s definition of cit-wang) the implicit or unexpressed
anusaya or anusayakilesa yet remain, potentially capable of becoming manifest and
of destroying the mental peace of cit-wang. Buddhadasa does not deny that anusaya
exist, for he claims that cit-wang is the fundamental conditon of the c o n s c i o u s
mind. He does not deny that morally unwholseome kammi c residues may remain
subconscious or latent. He invokes the notion of latent anusaya when explaining
why the sakidagarni, the enlightened Buddhist saint who is "reborn" only once more
before attaining salvation, must yet still lake one more "birth",
Sakidagarni translates as, "a person who will return once more", meaning
that the sakidagarni already traverses the correct path [towards nibbana]
but because of the germs of some kinds of original kilesa [i.e. anusaya]
which remain he still reverts once more to recollecting and missing the
condition of living like an average per s on. ( T) ' '
The debate here over whether the mind is fundamentally pure or defiled, and
over whether cit- wang should, as Buddhadasa maintains, denote only the conscious
mind or, as Bunmi holds, include the non-conscious mind, is at root a disagreement
over the definition of nibbana. Specifically it is a debate over the degree of mental
purity which must be developed before it can said nibbana has in fact been
2 V i s u d d h i m a g g a , XXI I , 83.
26i bi d. , XXI I , 60.
27 P h u t t h a t h a t , Nipphan Phon Sainay Pai Lacw Ry l j j { j I lJ 0 Vi ^3 ^T^^ana
Old Fashi oned?) , Ong kan Fyn- f u Pbr a Phut t ba s as ana (g^ ^ JT4VJVJ T t WVl' B "V Samut pr akan
3J ^
Thai l and, 2508 ( 1965) , p. 7.
N. b. Bu ddhadas a makes it cl ear in thi s passage t hat he does not t ake t he t erm sakidagarni t o denot e a
per s on who is l i teral l y reborn onc e mor e bef ore at t ai ni ng ni bbana. Rat he r he t akes t he t erm as me ani ng an
e n li ght ened person whos e r emai ni ng kamma f orces t hem t o ret urn t o t he del uded ment al c o ndi t i on of an
o rdi nary person.
i
152
attained. If, as Bunmi maintains, nibbana is defined as the absence of all
disturbances or kil esa, even including potential anusaya, then such a state of
mental purity could only be attained after considerable spiritual effort. However, if,
as Buddhadasa holds, nibbana is simply the absence of impurities from the
conscious mind, i.e. cit-wang, then Buddhist salvation is not only readily
accessible to either the layperson or the monk but it is a mental state that each
person experiences whenever they are not particularly angry, hateful or desirous.
5.3 Nibbana as a Universally Accessible Spiritual Goal.
The most important result of Buddhadasa s defintion of cit-wang as being the
basis of Buddhist salvation is that nibbana is not a transcendent condition
attainable only after years, or perhaps lives, spent purging the mind of impurities,
but like cit-wang is the original condition of the mind. In other words, in
Buddhadasa s system nibbana is the mi nd s characteristic state. Nibbana is the
mi nd s basic condition, an original state of mental equilibrium to be retained or re
attained by remaining mindful and by not allowing the delusions and ignorance of
" I " - " mi ne" to arise.
Buddhadasa recognises three levels of ?iibbana. The first level of nibbana is
called tadahganibbana and is defined as,
A state that comes about momentarily when external conditions happen,
fortuitously, to be such that no idea of "I" or "mine" arises.28
That is, tadahganibbana denotes the attainment of mental calm because of the
influence of a peaceful environment. The second level of nibbana recognised by
Buddhadasa is called vikharnbhajianibbana, which denotes mental calm attained
because of the mental control exercised in sarnadhi meditation, in which intense
concentration arrests or paralyses the arising of kilesa. But neither of these two
forms of nibbana are regarded as permanent. In the case of tadahganibbana any
disturbance in the environment would in turn re-effect the disturbing influence of
kilesa upon the mind. And in the case of vikhambhananibbana kilesa are not in
fact abolished but only paralysed from acting by the force of meditative
concentration. In contrast to these preliminary forms of nibbana Buddhadasa calls
the highest form of nibbana samucchedanibbana or parinibbana, which is when
mental peace results from the actual ending rather than the simple repression of
mind-disturbing kilesa. Significantly Buddhadasa regards tadaiiganibbdna and
28
Buddhadasa, An o t he r Ki n d o f Bi r t h , p.8.
153
vikharnbhananibbana as actual modes of nibbana while his traditionalist opponents
regard only parinibbana as true nibbana. That is, Buddhadasa accepts conscious
states of mental peace which may still be underlain by anusaya as actual if basic
forms of salvation or nibbana. For Buddhadasa the supreme parinibbana is
foreshadowed by the less profound and impermanent but, for him, nevertheless
actual nibbanic states of tadahganibbana and vikharnbhananibbana. However, Anan
Senakhan recognises only a mind totally freed of anusaya as potentially having
access to nibbana and he is highly critical of Buddhadasa s broader interpretation,
Buddhadasa tries to twist the explanation that the term nibbana, which
is the extremely difficult and profound dhamma, denotes something that is
easy [to attain]. It is as if he holds in contempt the realisation of the Lord
Buddha. ( T) 29
In fact, however, Buddhadasa does not present nibbana as being something
easily attained or as part of the mundane world of craving, attachment and
ignorance. He acknowledges that nibbana itself is an ineffable condition not able to
be adequately described in words or rational concepts,
This is the difficulty or depth of its [nibbana's] meaning, for the world
[of human learning] still lacks any linguistic term to denote a condition
which is far, far beyond the world - a condition that is attained by
following neither goodness nor evil, neither happiness nor suffering - but
which we must yet request to call, in the manner of a supposition, the
blessed nibbana.{ T ) 30
However, for Buddhadasa nibbana is not beyond description because it is in
fact a condition that is beyond the material world, but rather because, while being
based in everyday experience, it still transcends the usual mental world of human
beings which is disturbed and clouded by ignorance.
This debate over the definition of nibbana reflects Anan s and Buddhadasa s
widely varying views on the nature of Buddhism as a religion. Anan Senakhan
supports the preservation of the traditional distinction between the lay and clerical
forms of Buddhism and denounces as shallow Buddhadasa s popularist interpretation
of salvation. Buddhadasa, however, wishes to make the core soteriological aspects of
Buddhism relevant and accessible to all Buddhists, whether world-involved laity or
renunciate monk. His definition of the lower forms of nibbana as actual conditions
of salvation, while to an extent a matter of semantics, reflects his concern to
29A n a n Senakhan, K h a m s o r n Di a r a t hi ( " p n a Q i i i f m m " ), p.4 i.
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Ni pphan ( ** T4TfMV\l " " l l i ), p.46.
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154
emphasise the accessibility of Buddhist practice and salvation to all. He maintains
that the layperson who experiences the occasional peaceful bliss of tadahgambbana
has tasted t rue salvation, even if only momentarily.
Buddhadasa also acknowledges the two traditionally recognised types of
parimbbana, sa-upadisesanibbdna, and anupadisesanibbana, defining the former as
follows,
When the five khandhas which have been freed of avij j a [ignorance] have
yet to disperse, and there is still the enjoyment of the taste of nibbana,
such a state is called sa-upadisesanibbana. [T ) 31
Sa-upadisesanibbana, also called kilesapari nibbana or the full extinction of
defilements, denotes, "nibbana with the groups of existence [i.e. khandhasj still
remaining. "32 That is, sa-upadisesanibbana is a condition of salvation traditionally
regarded as being attained while alive, when the khandhas or constitutive factors of
human existence remain to sustain life. Anupadisesanibbana, on the other hand,
denotes, "nibbana without the groups [khandhas] remaining. "33 Anupadisesanibbana
is also called khandhaparinibbana or the full extinction of the khandhas which
sustain life, and is traditionally regarded as a post-death condition of salvation.
Chinda Chandrkaew expresses the traditional Theravada view of salvation when he
says of sa-upadisesanibbana and anupadisesanibbana,
These are not two different kinds of nibbana; they, in fact, refer to the
one and the same nibbana which is given as two according as it is
experienced before or after death.34
However, Buddhadasa denies that supreme or parinibbana is only attained
upon death, citing the fact of the Buddha s life mission undertaken after his
enlightenment,
The Buddha and all the other arahants were completely free of desires,
yet succeeded in doing many things far more useful than any of us are
capable of ... If the defilements responsible for the desire to be and get
things had been completely eliminated what was the force that motivated
the Buddha and all the arahants to do all this? They were motivated by
i bi d. , p . 28.
32
N y a n a t i l o k a , Buddhist Di ct i onary Manual o f Buddhist Terms and Doc t ri ne s , 4t h edn, Ny anapo ni ka
( r e v) , Buddhi s t Publ i c at i o n Soc i et y, Ka ndy Sri Lanka, 1980, p p . 128- 129.
'J i bi d. p . 129.
34Chi n da C h a n d r k a e w , Nibbana - The Ultimate Truth o f Buddhi sm, Mahac h ul al o ng ko r n Buddhi st
Uni ver si t y, Bang ko k, 1 9 8 2 , ' p . 70.
t
155
discrimination coupled with goodwill [metta].35
In Buddhadasa s interpretation there is no express relation between parinibbana
as a mental state and death, a relation which is implied in the traditional view of
anupadisesanibbana. On the contrary, for Buddhadasa an arahant who is
anupadisesa is not dead but in a state of unperturbable balance beyond the
influence of any mentally or morally disturbing influences. This interpretation is
supported by the following passage from the Dhatu Sutta. In this sutta the two
types of nibbana are not distinguished in terms of respectively denoting pre-death
and post-death conditions of salvation. Rather, sa-upadisesanibbdna is described as a
condition in which remaining mental impurities, i.e. anusayakil esa, may yet cause
mental confusion and so attachment and suffering, while anupadisesanibbana is
described as a completely unperturbable condition,
When a bhikkhu partakes of mental objects that are both liked and
disliked, when he yet partakes of pleasure and pain because the five
naturally arising sense organs have not yet decayed and the five senses still
remain, behold O bhi kkhus, the ending of rdga [passion], the ending of
dosa [angeri, the ending of rnoha idelusion] of such a bhikkhu is what is
called sa-upadisesanibbdna factor ... When all feelings in the selfhood of a
bhikkhu, that is, factors born of kil esa, or tanha and so on, cannot cause
him to be engrossed [in sense objects] and are extinguished and cooled,
behold O bhikkhus, this we call anupadisesanibbana f ac t or. ( T) j6
Two issues are at stake in Buddhadasa s disagreement with the traditional
view that anupadisesanibbana is a post-death condi t ion. The first issue has already
been raised above and is a matter of defintion related to the question of the
accessibility of nibbana to the layperson. Anan Senakhan and other Buddhist
traditionalists define true nibbana as the supreme condition of salvation or
parinibbana, whether sa-upadisesanibbdna or anupadisesanibbana. Buddhadasa on
the other hand takes a broader view, including the tadahga and vikhambhana states
of nibbana as conditions of true salvation. However, there is also a second
theoretical issue involved in this disagreement. Buddhadasa s and Anan s conflicting
interpretations of nibbana also represent alternative views of the actual character of
nibbana. In Buddhadasa s interpretation nibbana is founded upon the everyday
exerience of mental calm and, rather than being qualitatively distinct, the higher
state of parinibbana is described as being the acme of a single continuum of ever
more exalted states of salvation which progressively approach the final condition of
35
Buddhadasa, Handbook For Manki nd, t rans. Bud dha ni g ama, Subl i me Li f e Mi ssi on, Bangkok, 1980,
p. 77. .
^ Dhat u Sutta, Khuddaka Nikaya, Vo l . 2 5 / v e r s e 2 2 2 / p . l 9 2 .
i
1 5 6
imperturbable mental equipoise. For Anan, on t he other hand, nibbana is
intrinsically transcendent and outside of everyday life, being qualitatively distinct
from everyday experience.
In Buddhadasa s system ci t - wang is defined as the immediat e precursor of
nibbana and he defines both conditons in the same terms, as the absence of
" I " - " mi ne" or self-centredness,
Nibbana translates as "extinction without remainder", but one may well
ask extinction without remainder of what? It is simply the extinction
without remainder of " I " - " mi ne" , which is simply the feeling of attached
clinging ... That is, the state in which there is nothing to be taken or to
b e . ( T ) 37
That is, Buddhadasa regards nibbana, like cit- wang, as being a condition in
which there is neither identification, or "being someone", nor possessive attachment,
or "taking something". And like ci t- wang Buddhadasa defines nibbana as the
fundamental or natural condition of the mind,
The blessed nibbana is the destination point of every person. There is
an attraction towards the condition of nibbana. or to put it another way
the inherent tendency of desire is always towards a naturally existing
freedness jkhwam-wang]. But this tendency suffers some kinds of interfering
influences, such as the fruits of kamma, which retard it and pull it off its
natural course. ( T) 38
Buddhadasa s interpretation of nibbana as being a "natural" goal of every
person, which is founded upon the everyday state of mental equilibrium that he
calls ci t- wang, is fundamental to his attempt to make Buddhist salvation a universal
goal, accessible to all, whatever their life circumstances,
This is a nibbana in which everyone should be interested. It is a natural
matter, something that everyone can understand and do. It is not beyond
their ability. Nibbana is a condition of many kinds and levels of calm and
we can attain it according to our own abi l i t y. ( T) 39
37P h u t t h a t h a t , W i t hi Fy k Sar nat hi - xvi pat s ana - L e m 1 ( II JJ ^ lJ^i ^ P-79.
3 8 id M p p h a n ( " t f w n U " ), p. 25.
39 - - _ . * -
id., Ni p p ha n No r k Kh a m p h i A p h i t h a m ( MtlVJ VnVl l i ' Qn PUJf) J oRl ] T Ni bbana Ou t s i de the
A b h i d h a m m a Sc r i pt ur e s ) , Origkan Fyn- fu Phra Phutthasasana p i n r i m t f n m n ),
a i
- t
Sa mut pr a ka n Thai l and, no publ i c at i on dat e gi ven, p . 14.
157
5.4 Buddhadasa s Theoretical Abolition of t he Monk-Lay Distinction.
Buddhadasa s view of the universal relevance of nibbana contrasts sharply with
the traditional Thai view that striving for the ultimate Buddhist salvation, because
of its assumed transcendent character, is an activity appropriate only for spiritually
advanced monks. Slater summarises this traditional view of nibbanas inaccessibility
to the ordinary person when he notes, "only the saint can experience nibbana, only
the saint can know. " 40 Buddhadasa does not deny that one must become a saint or
an arahant in order to attain salvation, but he does deny that it is first necessary
to be a monk in order to become a saint. Commenti ng on popular Thai views of
salvation anthropologist Jane Bunnag observes,
According to orthodox Theravada doctrine only a monk ... can have any
hope of achieving nirvana, the layman, or householder w7ho remains firmly
rooted in the material world can entertain no such aspirations.41
Bunnag also adds that in practice, "few, if any monks [in the Central Thai
countryside] consider nirvana to be a relevant goal for which to stri ve. "42 Most
monks instead, like laypeople, strive for a better rebirth through meritorious action,
nibbana only being regarded as a realistic goal for the most spiritually developed
personalities. In the context of criticising Buddhadasa' s view of the universal
relevance of nibbana Khukrit Pramot has re-affirmed his support for the traditional
Thai distinction between the lay and monastic lifestyles described by Bunnag,
Buddhism has two grades of dharnma which are established on different
kinds of truth or sacca, and which proceed towards different kinds of goals.
They are not the same at all. These two grades of dhamma are
l oki yadhamma [worldly dhamma] and lokuttara dhamma [supramundane
dhamma], which are different varieties of dhamma that could be called
different levels or different compartments. But they are in the same religion
and both are the instructions of the Lord Buddha. ( T) 43
Tambiah traces the origin of such views at least as far back as As oka s North
Indian empire in the third century B. C. , the first explicitly Buddhist state.
4 S I a t e r , p. 62.
41
Jane B u n n a g , " Th e Rol e of t he Bud d h i s t Mo nk in Cent ral Thai So c i e t y , in Visakha Puja, Buddhi s t
As s o c i at i o n o f Thai l and, Ban g ko k, 2513 ( 1970) , p. 48.
42. . . ,
i bi d.
4"? ** ^ . . . .
K h y k r i t Pr a mo t ( ). Khwar n- he n Ba n g To r n Kh o r ng M. R . W. Khykr i t
. . < - I * ? ,
P r a mo t ( u n . P i n q v m i i . " s orne Vi ews o f M. R. Khukr i t Pr a mo t " ) , in
Pu n Co ng p r as o e t Arai Thuk Arai Ph.it ( " a s l j t j n f l r l r a f t " What is Correct and What is Wrong) ,
On g k a n Fyn- f u Phr a Phut t has as ana ( f t ' JPl f l )> Bangkok, 2525 ( 1982) p p . 2- 3.
Si 1
i
T ambiah writes t hat in the As*okan church- state r elations hip, which became the
model for all subsequent Buddhis t polities, it was only within the br oader socio
political order t hat the specialised quest of the "r enouncer " or monk who soug ht
nibbana was placed,
In other words it is within the larger universe of the king and subjects
t hat we should place the bhikkhu^s regimen and s alvation quest as the
specially valued and ex clusive pur s uit of the religious elite - with the
l ay ma ns duty [ being] to s uppor t it but not imit ate its str ing ent lif e.44
A l t houg h Buddhadas a believes t hat at t ai ning the ul timat e f r uits of Buddhis t
pr actice is more dif f icult for the lay per son he is nevertheless s till specif ically
concerned to break dow'n the t r adit ional monk- lay dis tinction, ascr ibing the same
r eligious aspir ations and hopes to all. Buddhadas a says t hat , "an a r ahant [ an
enlig htened T her av ada saint] has tr anscended monkhood and laity al ik e."45 T hat is,
he denies t hat an enlightened person mus t of necessity be a monk, say ing t hat an
a r ahant is in a condition which is beyond such social distinctions. In f act
Buddhadas a claims t hat because the life of a layperson has more dis tur bing
pr oblems than the monk s sheltered monas tic ex istence the laity are in greater need
of nibbana's quenching of the fires of suf f ering than are monks (T )46. Reg ar ding the
pr actice of s at i or mindf ulness, the basis of maint aining cit-wang or the "freed-
mi nd" state necessary to att ain nibbana, he says t hat the ter m "pr acticer " (khon
pat ibat t ham - p i t i i l p n s n i j ) does not refer to,
those who practise alone in the forest. T he people who live at home, who
act and wor k with duties and the bur den of whatever responsibilities are all
called "pr acticer s". T hat is, they pr actise <f/ia mma . ( T ) 47
However, Buddhadas a does not seek to abolish the actual roles of monk and
lay per son but only to place both on an equal s pir itual f ooting , with equal access to
the f r uits of the path. For ex ample, he proposes t hat T hais should uphold the
ancient t r adit ion of lay men seeking or dination for at least one three month phans a
or r ainy season r etreat dur ing their life,
Or daining for three months , which even today many arrange to do, is
44
T a m b i a h , World Conqueror and World Renouricer, p. 60.
45
B u d d h a d a s a , Buddha-dhamma f or Students, p .39.
** ** *1 * ^
P h u t t h a t h a t , Nipphan Nork Khamphi Aphi t ham ( MTiVi V i ni i T i B f l P l J J f l T QfVI] T T U *5, P- 9.
1/ I
4 7 i d. , Khwam- s uk Thae Mi Yu Tae Nai Ngan ( ^ U V1J J QU l l f l l '111 ^ p 3
t
159
s omething which should be done and which should be encour ag ed.(T )48
Buddhadas a says t hat this practice should be retained to ensure t hat the
r eligion does not decline, and in order to allow lay men to obtain a better
under s tanding of the principles of Buddhis m. Whereas he criticises many other non-
canonical practices and beliefs Buddhadas a says t hat this par ticular non- canonical
custom of short- term or dination should be retained because of its benef i ts,
Even thoug h being or dained for three months is not s omething t hat
ex isted in the time of the Buddha if it is done with pure and good
intentions it is still something reasonable for collectively holding to and
per f or ming the practice [of dhamma] into the f ut ur e.(T )49
While opening up access to ul timat e s alv ation f r om suf f ering to the layperson
Buddhadas a does not equate the layperson with the monk on all counts. He still
maint ains t hat ,
It occurs in the Pali scriptures themselves t hat the holy life,
br ahmacar iy a, is not something t hat the layperson can practise flawlessly
well ... because the state of being a layperson has many [ worldly] concerns
and obstacles.(T )
Because of the limit at ions of being a layperson Buddhadas a says, "We still
cannot enter into the [ meaning ofi the r eligion itself until we have tr uly led the life
of a monk . "(T ) 51
He therefore does not propose abolis hing the ins t it ution or role of the
r enunciate. What he abolishes is the t r adit ional barrier to lay practice of meditation
and related salvation- oriented activities. Buddhadas a shif ts the focus of his cr itique
away f r om the question of social roles by def ining the ter ms "l ay " and "monk " in
phas a-t ham as mental states rather than as religious roles,
Dont take liv ing in a house or a temple as the criterion of being a
lay person or a monk. Y ou must consider what is the per sons state of mind
... These days those liv ing in a temple may have a mind like one liv ing at
home ... a householder may well have a mind like a monk or even an
4 g - - - ^ . . .
i d., B ua t S a m Dy a n ( ] J J J ^ 11 O r d a i n f or T hree Mo nt hs ) , S amnak - nang s y T ha mma buc ha
( f l ' n i l n V l l i V d a S n i J I l i n ) B a ng k ok , 2525 (1 9 8 2), P ,3.
31
49
i bi d. p. 2.
50., . , -
1Ol d. p. 5 .
i
By this def inition both a monk and a lay person may have the pr actical
ex perience of liv ing the dha mma in the wor ld which Buddhadas a says is v ital to
tr ue religious att ainment. In B uddhadasa s phas a-t ham inter pr etations the terms
l okiy a and l ok ut t ar a, and their respective t r adit ional associations with being a
layperson and a monk, no longer refer to either the ins t it ution of the s ahg ha or to
the wor ldly life. Instead they refer to states of mind which are independent of ones
lif estyle or social role, "T he l ok ut t ar a domain denotes a mind which is w ithout
self , t hat has neither I nor mine. "( T ) 53
While Buddhadas as doctr inal ref orms are of ten radical his pr actice, as already
noted in Chapter T wo, is hig hly conser vative. For given the impor tance of correct
practice in T her av ada Buddhis m Buddhadas a mus t r emain str ictly conservative in
practice in order to demonstr ate his b o na f ide position as a monk if he wishes his
views to have author ity and s tanding w ithin the ins t it ution of T hai Buddhis m. But
also, given t hat the str uctur e of the Buddhis t hierarchy in T hail and is f ounded upon
s tr ict abidance to practices r ather than upon any enforced or thodox y , Buddhadas as
r adical re- inter pretations of doctr ine do not in themselves cons titute a thr eat to
ins t it utional Buddhis m. T his is despite the f act t hat his endowing of the layperson
with most of the abilities and qualities f ormerly att r ibuted only to the monk may
at f ir st appear to under mine the s tr uctur e of the Buddhis t s ahg ha, given t hat T hai
Buddhis m has t r adit ional ly been based upon a qua l i t a t i v e dis tinction between the
monk and the layperson.
T he t r adit ional j us t if ication for lay sponsor ship and mater ial suppor t of the
s ahg ha in the popular r eligion has been the belief t hat g iv ing alms to monks and
donations to temples are mer itor ious acts which lead to the accumulation of good
k a mma and so to a f elicitous r ebir th. But if accor ding to Buddhadas a such
s uper natur alis t views of k a mma and r ebir th are to be rejected, and if laypeople
themselves possess all the s pir itual author ity and abil ity required for their own
s alv ation, then the t r adit ional bases of the s ahg ha's s uppor t would indeed appear to
be threatened. T his need not mean any t hing so disastr ous as the utter collapse of
the T hai s ahg ha but if Buddhadas as ref or mist ideas were widely accepted it would
mean t hat the s ahg ha which did continue would have to have its socio- religious role
r adically redef ined.
ascetic. (T )52
? _
i d. , K ha r a w a t T ha m ( ** 5| J t i l l J J J J n ) i P- 123.
5^i bi d. p. 49.
However, while a r adical r estr uctur ing of ins t it utional Buddhis m would seem a
necessary pr actical consequence of abolis hing the essential s pir itual dis tinctions
between laity and monks, Buddhadas a, concerned to uphold the t r adit ional practice
of Buddhis m which confers religious author ity to his re- interpretative wor k, f ails to
mention this result in any of his wr iting s. Instead, and in contr adiction with the
thr us t of his theor etical abolition of the monk- lay dis tinction, he re- affirms the
pr actical r etention of these two t r adit ional roles on unr elated, pr ag matic gr ounds. As
noted above, Buddhadas a says t ha t or daining as a monk ensures the cont inuat ion of
the religion by g iving lay men a f irst hand knowledge of the B uddha s own
r enunciate practices and goals. B ut while he does not recognise, or avoids
acknowledg ing , the potentially dis r uptiv e consequences of his ideas for the ins t it ution
of Buddhis m in T hail and Buddhadas as conservative critics have focussed their
attacks on precisely this point. Bunmi Methang k un and A nan Senakhan accuse
Buddhadas a of seeking to destroy Buddhis m, i .e. the s ahg ha. Bunmi criticises the
ending of the t r adit ional monk- lay dis tinction when he says Buddhadas a has put
f or war d his teachings in order to, "destroy Buddhis m and to have the monks go out
to t ill the fields. "( T ) 54 However, because his ideas have not until now led to any
action which has concretely aff ected the s tatus or role of the s ahg ha, Buddhadas as
doctr inal decler icalisation of salv ation has not yet met any practical opposition f rom
w ithin the s ahg ha hierar chy , althoug h indiv idual monks have severely attacked his
views.
5.5 De ba t e on t he L ok iy adhamma - L ok ut t ar adhamma D i s t i n c t i o n .
In a handbill attacking Buddhadas as notion of cit-wang Phr a K i t t i w ut t ho50
cites the tr adit ional canonical basis for the dis tincton between the wor ldly and the
s upr amundane paths in the Dha r nma di nna S ut t a 56. K it t iw ut t ho claims t hat
B uddhadas as rejection of the t r adit ional lokiy a- lokuttar a dis tinction contr adicts the
teaching s of the Buddha in the S ut t apit ak a. In the Dha r nma di nna S ut t a a lay man,
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 /
^ B u n m i Me t ha ng k un, "P hi k s u P hu T har nl ay P hut t ha s a t s a na " ( II 1/15 P ' ^-
1 51 t
ct; _ . . . . . .
( P hr a ) K i t t i w u t t h o ^h i k k h u,, "Ry a ng Ci t - wang Nor k P hr a T r ai pi dok Mi K hw a m S a mk ha n Nai
P a t c uba n Ma k " ( " I 1 ? ) 'I U U B f l V t f z\ ^ ^ U l f t m i J T i n "
"Conc e r ni ng Ci t - wang as Be i ng Out s i de [ the T eachi ng s Cont a i ne d in] t he T ipi t a k a Ha v i ng Gr e at
Cont e mpor a r y I mpor t a nc e ") , i n P un Cong pr as oe t (e d), A r a i T huk A r a i P hi t ( WQ " I J Q ' I 13
U
Cor r ect a nd What is Wr ong ), Ong k a n Fy n- f u P hr a P hut t ha s a s a na , B a ng k ok , 2525 (1982), p p. 126- 130.
D ha r n m a d i n n a S ut t a , S a my ut t a Ni k a y a , V o l . 1 9 /v e r s es l 6 2 5 - 1 6 2 6/pp. 404- 405.
i
Dhammadinna, asks the Buddha to describe the way to happiness and well- being.
T he Buddha replies t hat the best and most ex peditious path to well- being or
nibbana is to study and put into practice the "pr of ound teaching of the T athag ata
on the voidness (s uhha t a ) of l ok ut t ar a ", an inj uction which Buddhadas a equates
with abiding by cit-wang . However, Dhammadinna responds t hat it is too dif f icult
for a layperson to appr eciate and enter into the pr of undity of the B uddhas teaching
of s uhhat a and asks to be instr ucted in the dha mma in a way appr opr iate for a
layperson like himself who is alr eady established in Buddhis t mor al practice. T he
Buddha then provides an alter nativ e ins tr uction, the s otapattiy ahg a or f our "l imbs "
or aspects of s pir itual practice which lead one into the str eam, s ot apatt i, t hat flows
towar ds nibbana. These f our limbs are def ined as: (1) f aith in the Buddha, (2) the
dha mma and (3) the s ahg ha, as well as (4) abiding by the s'ilas or mor al practices
for the purpose of developing s amadhi. When Dhammadinna says t hat he and his
r etinue are alr eady established in these f our s otapattiy ahg as the Buddha replies t hat
they have then attained the f r uit of s ot apat t i, i.e. they have enterred the str eam
t hat flow's towar ds nibbana.
T he f our s otapattiy ahg as have tr adit ional ly been regarded as the bases of
lok iy adhamma or the lay per sons practice, whose goal is not nibbanic s alv ation but
a f elicitous r ebir th. T he above s utta has also tr adit ional ly been inter pr eted as
meaning t hat the practice of s uhhat a is too dif f icult for the layperson and t hat the
higher or more ex peditious path to s alv ation is open only to the monk. It is also
cor r espondingly taken to mean t hat f ollowing the most ex peditious path to s alv ation
requires complete r enunciation of lokiy a concerns in the socio- cultural wor ld, whose
influences are regarded as r etar ding or obs tr ucting the att ainment of nibbana.
However, in t alking of the same s utta Buddhadas a claims t hat in pr ov iding a
pr actically more accessible path for the layperson the Buddha has not thereby given
up the goal of nibbana as being appr opr iate for the laity . He claims the f our
s otapattiy ahg as given by the Buddha to Dhammadinna are not l ok iy adhamma in
the above sense but r ather are full- fledged aspects of the path t hat leads to
nibbana. T his is because he maint ains t hat the very ter m s otapatti or "enter r ing the
s tr eam" implies the beg inning of the pr actice of the Noble Eig htf old Pat h or
ar iy amag g a whose culmination is not wor ldly success but nibbana. In the actual
Dha mma di nna S ut t a the B uddha in f act says nothing about the s otapattiy ahg a
being a dif f erent lokiy a pat h, the ter m lokiy a is not even mentioned in this contex t,
and so the popular inter pr etation of this s utta referred to by K it t iw ut t ho in
cr iticising Buddhadas a in f act has no immediate s cr iptur al basis.
My own inter pr etation of this s utta is t hat when he initial ly advises
i
Dhammadinna to study and put into practice the teaching of the "voidness of
l ok ut t a r a ", the Buddha is ref erring to the higher j ha ni c meditations on nothingness
which are described elsewhere in the S ut t apit ak a as a means of penetr ating to an
enlig htening insig ht into r eality . S uhha t a , the voidness of ex istence or the absence
of a per manent centre to any of the imper manent objects of ex perience, is also one
object of Buddhis t s ama dhi meditat ion, whose pr actical goal is to decrease
at t achment by appr ehending all thing s in ter ms of their cons titutiv e elements r ather
than as entities. T his pr actice is described in detail by the Buddha in the
Cul a s uhha t a S ut t a^7. B ut when Dhammadinna rejects this elabor ate meditativ e
system and the Buddha proposes f ollowing the s otapattiy ahg a for the purpose of
dev eloping s a ma dhi , I suggest t hat the Buddha may in f act be ref erring to upacar a
s ama dhi or "access concentr ation", the ty pe of meditativ e reflectiveness requir ed for
ins ig ht or v ipas s ana meditat ion. These two types of meditation, s amadhi and
v ipas s ana are discussed f ur ther in the nex t chapter . However, it should be noted
here t hat both are t r adit ional ly considered capable of leading to nibbana.
If my inter pr etation is correct it would mean t hat the f our s otapattiy ahg a do
not represent a separate lokiy a path for the layperson, which pr omotes a happy
r ebir th but not the at t ainment of nibbana. Rather , they would represent a separate
point of entry into the same path or str eam towards nibbana which contemplativ e
monks at t ain by means of their more abstr act j ha ni c or s amadhi meditations .
A lt houg h Buddhadas a does not present this inter pr etation, it is consistent with his
view t hat the Dha mma di nna S utta does not pr ovide a j us tif ication for a separate
lok iy a path for the lay per son, and also with his stated preference for v ipas s ana
meditat ion techniques over the more elabor ate s amadhi systems. Buddhadas as views
on meditat ion are discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
Buddhadas a maintains t hat not only is the tr adit ional inter pr etation of the
Dha mma di nna Sutta wrong but t hat , "T he mis under standing s of some people who
try to separate lokiy a and l ok ut t ar a concerns will destroy the very t r ut h of
B uddhi s m. "(T ) 58 While acknowledg ing the dif f erent social roles or activ ities of the
monk and the layperson, Buddhadas a says t hat in f act the Buddha never spoke of
l ok i y a dha mma as something t otall y dif f erent f r om and opposed to l ok ut t ar adhamma.
Instead he says t hat the B uddha t aug ht,
L ok iy adhamma is the duty or business of the layperson who has to
57
C ul a s uh h a t a S ut t a , Ma j ] hi m a Ni k a y a , V ol . 1 4 /v e r s e 33 4 /pp. 180- 181.
I t
' ^ Phut t hat hat , "Upas ak Hae ng K an- phoe y - phr ae T ha m" ( " B i J e j j m i i u m j l u m u m T J u " ),
p. 49. '
t
practise dha mma in accordance with their common character. B ut at the
same time the Buddha also gave knowledge of l ok ut t ar adhamma for the
purpose of governing those lokiy a duties so they would be perf ormed
w ithout s uf f er ing .(T )59
T he debate over what practices the B uddha actually prescribed for the
lay per son is complicated both by some basic conf usions and by conf licting views
presented in dif f erent par ts of the scriptures. Fir s tly , there appears to be a common
conf usion on the par t of B uddhadas as critics between the two ter ms l ok adhamma
and l ok iy adhamma. In the Cat uk k a Nipat a of the A ng uttar a Nik ay a60 l ok adhamma
is def ined as the eight "wor ldly f actor s" or "wor ldly conditions " of: ( l ) labha -
acquis ition, (2) alabha - loss, (3) yaso - r enown, (4) ayaso - ig nominy , (5) ni nda -
blame, (6) pas ams a - praise, (7) s uk ham - well- being, and (8) duk k ham - suf f ering.
These are the conditions given as char acter istic of someone who is s till attached to
the objects of the wor ld. L ok i y adha mma, on the other hand, refers to the notion
of a separate path for the lay person which has a dif f erent goal and object f r om the
l ok ut t ar adhamma of the bhik k hu. It is true t hat in places in the scriptures, such as
in the L ok av ipat t i S ut t a61, the B uddha says t hat the put huj a na or "wor ldling " is
caug ht in l ok adhamma while the ar iy as av ak a or noble f ollower of the Buddha is
not. However, it is not the case t hat the Buddha associates l ok iy adhamma with
put huj a na , and it appears t hat the two ter ms l ok iy adhamma and l ok adhamma are
of ten wr ongly equated. In f act the Buddha himself does not use either of the terms
l ok iy adhamma or l ok ut t ar adhamma anywhere in the S ut t apit a k a , their f irst
canonical occurrence being in the Dha mma s a hg a m of the A bhidhammapit a k a 6
A nother commonly conf used point is t hat the ter ms put huj a na and
ar iy as av ak a are often mis takenly read as denoting "lay per son and monk
respectively. B ut in the actual canon it is not specified w'hether either an
ar iy as av ak a ("noble f ollower ") or a put huj a na ("w or l dl ing ") is either a layperson or
a monk. Buddhadas as position t hat the Buddha did not specify a lay path dis tinct
f r om the path of the monk is therefore v indicated by a strictly liter al r eading of the
S ut t apit ak a.
However, it is nevertheless under s tandable how the popular views and
5 9 i bi d. p. 46.
C a t uk k a N i p a t a , A ng ut t a r a Ni k a y a , V ol . 2 1/v er s e 19 2 /p. 180.
61 L o k a v i pa t t i S ut t a , A ng ut t a r a N i k a y a , V ol . 2 3 /v e r s e 9 6 /p. l 2 3 .
6 2 D ha m m a s a n g a n i , A bhi dha mma pi t a k a , V ol . 3<f /v er s e706/p. 248 , V ol . 3 4 /v e r s e 9 1 l /p. 3 1 5 .
i
conf usions arose. Fir s tly , scattered t hr oug hout the s uttas are numer ous statements
denig r ating the status of the layperson and ex tolling the r enunciate role, "[ To be] a
restr icted layperson is the way of dus t, [ to enter] the monkhood is the way free and
cl e ar ."(T )63 As Siddhi Butr - Indr notes the pat h to nibbana,
is open to monk and lay adher ent alike, yet due to the lesser
oppor tunities a lay adher ent has for a s pir itual life, he is mostly considered
to be second to the monk whose monas tic life offers greater possibilities of
s pir itual adv ancement.64
A nd the t r adit ional identif ications of the ter m put huj a na with lay per son, and
the ter m ar iy as av aka with monk, do appear to have the implicit s uppor t of the
Buddha. T his is because when he comments t hat put t huj a na are caug ht in
l ok adhamma the Buddha is almos t inv ar iably addressing an audience of bhik k hus ,
and encour aging them in their v ocation by showing the benef its of their life of
r enunciation when compar ed with the tr oubled life of the householder. There is,
theref ore, a tension between Buddhadas as str ictly literal r eading of the scriptures on
this issue and the more contex tual reading f avoured by Buddhis t tr aditionalis ts .
T he views of both sides are f ounded in the scriptures but both are also one- sided in
their respective appr oach to and analy sis of the tex ts.
Indeed, Buddhadas as own wr iting s ex hibit an unresolved tension resulting f rom
his tak ing a liter al inter pr etation of the scriptures in some places but using a more
contex tual or metaphor ical r eading in others. As ment ioned in Chapter Three a
maj or dif f iculty of B uddhadas as phasakhon - phas atham theory is his f ailur e to
pr ov ide any def inite cr iter ion for j udg ing whether a specif ic section of the scriptures
s hould be read liter ally , as phas a-k hon. or metaphor ically , as phasa-t ha m. Wit hout
such a cr iter ion B uddhadas as alter nation between liter alis t phas a-khon readings and
metaphor ical phasa-t ham inter pr etations of dif f erent par ts of the scriptures cannot
av oid the charge of being cloaks for his own bias. For ex ample, he seems to degrade
the s pir itual s tatus of the lay per son when he talks to monks on the issue of being
or dained for three months , but elsewhere he wants to raise the layperson to the
level of the monk. On this second point Buddhadas a goes much f ur ther than
f ollowing what the Buddha t aug ht when he says,
T he lay per sons dha mma is necessary for the person who would at t ain
nibbana ... If one cannot be a layperson well then one cannot at t ain
6 3P o t t ha pa da S ut t a , Di g ha N i k a y a , V ol . 9 /v e r s e 2 79 /p. 2 5 4.
6 4 B u t r - I n d r , p. 77.
i
In other words Buddhadas a is claiming t hat the f ruits of the s upr ar nundane
lok ut t ar a path are unrealisable w ithout being f ounded on the mundane level of
activ ity . T his hig hly unconv entional claim, the complete converse of the t r adit ional
view t hat nibbana is only att ainabl e by maint aining a r adical separ ation between
the lokiy a and l ok ut t ar a domains , f ollows f r om Buddhadas as opinion t hat , "Being a
lay person has the meaning of s tudy ing the dhamma it s el f ."(T )66, t hat is, in ones
actual life. In other words Buddhadas a regards f ollowing the dha mma in lay life as
g iv ing one a pr actical under s tanding of Buddhis m as opposed to the of ten
theor etical under s tanding of the monks. Fur ther mor e this pr actical under s tanding ,
born of adher ing to the dha mma thr oug hout all lif es vicissitudes, is regarded as
breeding a more eff ective appr oach to at t aining s alv ation.
5.6 Concl us i on.
A major deter minant of B uddhadas as denial of the t r adit ional monk- lay
dis tinction is the f act t hat it is the popular lay religion which contains the most
Br ahmanical and animis t f eatures, which conf lict with his r ationalis t and moder nist
outlook. In seeking to make Buddhis m consistent with both a moder nist or scientif ic
wor ld view, and with the f undament al pr inciples of the religion, Buddhadas a mus t
reject the customar y beliefs and practices of the lay populace which conf lict with
this r adically doctr inal inter pr etation of the religion. But if the lay Buddhis t
populace is to be left with any s ig nif icant religious f orm in B uddhadas as system
then this can only be accomplished by including them within the ambit of his
ref ormed or pur if ied doctr inal Buddhis m, an aspect of the religion which was
previously open only to monks. However, if we regard Buddhadas a as an ideologue
as much as a scholar, and therefore wr iting with his moder nis t lay Buddhis t
audience in mind, then the ex pectations of t hat audience should be considered as
possibly being as powerful an inf luence on his univ er salisation of Buddhis t
soteriological doctr ine as the abov ementioned theor etical r equirement of maint aining
consistency with r ationaliis t and doctr inal principles. T hat Buddhadas a does have his
audience in mind in his r edef inition of nibbana is made clear in the f ollowing
s tatement,
What benef it is there in the teaching t hat we will get nibbana af ter we
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , K ha r a w a t T ha in (** 0 ^1*5 I 3" JJ** ), p. 41.
n i b b a n a . ( T ) 65
66.. . ,
i bid. p. 4.
*
t
have died? It is as a result of this t hat moder n people are not interested
in nibbana. A nd in addition Buddhis m is made barren by such
t eaching s .(T )67
B uddhadas as use of the notion of "benef it" as a criterion for g aug ing the
correctness of doctr inal inter pr etations provides a channel for the intr oduction of the
contempor ar y social ex pectations of Buddhadas as lay audience into his re- interpreted
system. For , as is made clear in the above quote Buddhadas a regards a "benef icial"
inter pr etation of doctr ine to be one which is suf f iciently in tune with peoples
att it udes to make them "inter ested" in the doctr ine. His sy stematic ref orms can
thus be seen as not being motiv ated ex clusively by his own scholar ly desire for a
r ationalis t and doctr inally consistent Buddhis m. T hey are also motiv ated by a desire
to mould Buddhis t teachings in response to the ex pectations of his lay audience, in
an att empt to re- establish the relevance of Buddhis m to the lives and aspir ations of
t hat lay audience.
As discussed in Chapter T wo moder nist and progressive T hai Buddhis ts , like
Buddhadas a, also reject the popular animis t and s uper natur al f orms of Buddhis m as
ir r ational and unscientif ic. They have consequently tur ned their interest to the
t r adit ional ly clerical, doctr inal level of T her av ada Buddhis m. While Buddhadas as
concern to abolish the theoretical dis tinctions between monks and laypeople can be
regarded as f lowing f rom his own desire to make Buddhis t doctr ine consistent with
moder nis t and r ationalis t pr inciples the dominance of this concern in his work can
also be interpr eted as a response to the demands of his lay audience, to his att empt
to make Buddhis m socially relevant. B uddhadas as work should be read as a
conf luence of these two influences.
B ut because of his emphasis on ending the monk- lay dis tinction Buddhadas a
mus t also resolve tensions which arise f r om making the f ormerly clerical ideal of
nibbana both theor etically and pr actically consistent with the life of the layperson in
contempor ar y T hail and. For ex ample, it is no longer acceptable t hat nibbana be
def ined as a condition attainabl e only by years of intense meditativ e pr actice in
monas tic isolation. It is precisely t hat t r adit ional view of the goal of Buddhis m
which has both in theory and in practice barred the layperson f r om shar ing in its
f r uits and which has contr ibuted to what Buddhadas a recognises as the g r owing
irrelevance of Buddhis m in T hail and. Def ining cit-wang both as the natur ally
ex isting unper tur bed state of mind w'hich everyone experiences f r om time to time
and as the basis of nibbana provides a much more lay- accessible view of the
67i,1N i ppk i n N i r k K hamphi Aphi tkam { ^ V n U U B n f O l f ! /o f T l i J T ) j >' P'6'
r elig ions goal. Nevertheless, it is a measure of the unconv entional natur e of this
inter pr etation t hat Buddhadas a has f irst had to develop a new her meneutic appr oach
to the scriptures and also criticise the author ity of almos t a thir d of the T her av ada
canon plus the histor ically accepted system of s cr iptur al exegesis in order to present
his view's. Wit hout the phasa-t ham theory and without r ejecting the
A bhidhammapit ak a and par ts of the V is uddhimag g a Buddhadas a would have f ound
it much more dif f icult to deny the t r adit ional s uper natur alis t inter pr etations w'hich
he regards as being inconsis tent with the actual doctr ines of Buddhis m and with
moder n scientif ic knowledge.
Buddhadas as notion of cit- wang and his inter pr etation of nibbana provide a
religious goal which has its basis in everyday life - the higher s pir itual states
r equir ing only the dev elopment and deepening of the natur ally ex isting condition of
"f r e e d - m i n d B y this theor etical development Buddhadas a brings the Buddhis t
s pir itual goal out of the monaster y and into the stream of everyday life. However,
cit -wang is f ar f r om being j us t a theor etical notion. It is also the basis of
Buddhadas a's inter pr etation of Buddhis t s pir itual practice, and j us t as in his
doctr inal inter pr etations he defines the state of cit- wang as being integ r ally related
to everyday ex perience so too the practices Buddhadas a describes as developing this
condition are also related to the domain of everyday life. As will be detailed in the
nex t chapter cit-wang is the basis of B uddhadas as Buddhis t philosophy of action in
the social w'orld.
169
C H A P T E R 6
T HE P R A C T I C E OF CIT - WA NG .
In Chapter Five the impor tance of B uddhadas as inter pr etation of the notion
of cit- wang and his at t empt s to abolish the t r adit ional dis tinction between the lay
and clerical f orms of Buddhis m were discussed. T he notion of cit-w ang , def ined as
the base of Buddhis t s pir itual at t ainment f ounded in everyday life, is the central
plank of Buddhadas as att empt to resolve the theor etical dif f iculties created by his
advocacy of a moder nis t, scientif ic inter pr etation of T her av ada Buddhis m and his
rejection of the t r adit ional lay r eligion. Buddhadas a response has been to develop an
inter pr etation of doctr inal Buddhis m which he maintains is as accessible and
r elev ant to the world- involved lay person as it is to renunciat.es. However, in order
to f ully resolve the dif f iculties raised by his pr esentation of a r ationalis t
inter pr etation of Buddhis m which rejects the tr adit ional lay religion as super stitious
and inconsistent Buddhadas a mus t pr ov ide more than s imply a theoretical
ex planation of the relevance of doctr inal Buddhis m to the layperson.
In addition to ar g uing for lay access to the nibbanic f or m of Buddhis m
Buddhadas a mus t also demonstr ate t hat a lay per s ons adherence to the teachings
and practices of this tr aditional ly clerical aspect of Buddhis m is compatible with
mater ially - or iented activ ity in the social wor ld. He mus t demons tr ate the
compat ibil it y of s imultaneously wor king for both mater ial well- being in the social
wor ld and str iv ing for nibbana if he is indeed to pr ovide f ull and unqualif ied lay
access to doctr inal Buddhis m. Because of the hig h level of social awareness and
concern for social dev elopment among Buddhadas as main audience any
inter pr etation of Buddhis m which per petuated the tr aditional dev aluation of mater ial
and social activ ity relative to s pir itual pr actice would f ail to produce what he has
s tated is the goal of his wor k, namely , an inter pr etation of Buddhis m which is
perceived by educated T hais as being relevant to their lives and to their work.
Moder nis t T hai Buddhis ts desire not only t hat Buddhis m be compatible with
progressive social inv olv ement but t hat it also s uppor t and encourage dev elopment
in the mater ial sphere alongside with pr omoting s pir itual progress towar ds nibbana.
For Buddhadas a to meet these r equir ements he must demons tr ate, f ir stly , t hat
i
the practice, as well as the theory , of s alv ation in his inter pr etat ion of B uddhis m
is accessible to the layperson. Secondly, he mus t show t hat t his pr actice is
compatible with and suppor tiv e of progressive social activ ity . These two
r equir ements are discussed in this chapter in the contex t of an analy s is of
B uddhadas as teachings on the practice of cit-wang , f irstly in ter ms of the
r elations hip between cit-wang and Buddhis t meditat ion, and secondly in ter ms of the
r elation between meditation and action or "wor k" in the wor ld.
6.1 T r aditional Buddhis t Mor al and Meditativ e Pr actice.
T r aditional ly Buddhis t s pir itual pr actice has had a three tiered s tr uctur e, the
base of which is s'ila or v ir tuous conduct. S i I a or mor al practice, combined w it h an
under s tanding of Buddhis t teachings on the causes and methods of ending human
suf f ering, is regarded as the f oundation of s amadhi meditation, the second stage of
s pir itual practice. T he purpose of s amadhi or concentr ation meditation is to calm
the mind and develop one- pointedness or undiv ided mental attention. In the thir d
stage of Buddhis t practice, v ipas s ana or insig ht medi tat ion, the concentr ated power
of consciousness is focussed in a quest for ins ig ht into the tr uths of ex istence -
ar ncca, duk k ha and anat t a. Wit h the at t ai nme nt of such insig ht ignor ance is
dispelled and the root cause of suf f ering is er adicated, the ul timat e f r uit of insig ht
meditat ion being s alv ation or nibbana.
However, while this graded series of practices peaking at the at t ainment of
nibbana is theor etically acknowledged as the str uctur e of Buddhis t religious practice,
his tor ically , v ar y ing degrees of emphasis have in fact been placed on the dif f erent
stages. In par ticular , there has been an histor ical emphasis in T hailand on s amadhi
or concentr ation meditation, of ten to the ex clusion of insig ht meditation or
v ipas s ana. T he emphasis on s amadhi meditation in T hailand may be related to its
t r adit ional association with super nor mal pow'ers and s uper natur al ex periences, which
have been a focus of attention in popular , s uper natur alis t readings of the
A bhi dhammapi t a k a and related commentar ies . S ama dhi meditation induces trances
or states of intr ospective absor ption called j ha na s . T here are many levels of
incr easing ly deep "abs or ptions" or j ha na s which, Spir o observes, produce, "a cer tain
ty pe of concentr ation, which (it is believed) deter mines which of the Buddhis t
heavens one will ev entually ent er ."1 It is also believed t hat the s amadhi
pr actitioner , thr oug h the att ainment of cer tain trance states may also develop
s uper nor mal powers such as clair voy ance and clair audience. Super natur al powers or
1Me l f or d E. S pi r o , B uddhi s m and S ociety , Geor g e A l len & U nw i n L t d, L ondon, 1971, p. 50 .
t
171
iddhis are in par t icul ar associated with the second level of s amadhi concentr ation,
called upacar a or access concentr ation. Phr a Maha Boowa Ny anas ampanno, the
author of the biog r aphy of A char n Mun, a monk f amed for his psychic
achievements, describes this second or upacar a level of s amadhi concentr ation as
allowing telepathic communication with invisible s pir itual beings. Phr a Maha Boowa
also observes t hat the f ir st or k hanik a level of s a ma dhi ,
is not enough to pick up messages f rom outside or to communicate with
these kinds of invisible beings. T he thir d level of concentr ation is called
appana or f ull [ absorption] concentr ation and is too pr of ound for the
picking up of messages and communicating with invisible beings.2
Buddhadas a is cr itical of this tr adit ional emphasis on the development of
psy chic powers or iddhis thr oug h s amadhi meditat ion, and he is opposed to
pr actis ing Buddhis t meditation with the specific intention of developing i ddhi s ,
The Buddha did not deny mental i ddhi s , but he str ongly disapproved of
demons tr ating them because they are mere illusions ... We dont come
across it in the T ipit ak a t hat the Buddha demons tr ated iddhis . There do
ex ist accounts of the Buddha demons tr ating i ddhi s , but they occur only in
commentar ies and other works. Consequently the tr uth of these accounts is
dubious; and there really is no need for us to j udg e them true or f alse.3
A par t f rom their association with the dev elopment of super natur al powers
many doc.tr inally s tr ict Buddhis t teachers have also regarded the j hanas or
sarnadhi- \ nductd tr ance states as in f act being s pir itual hindrances to the
at t ai nme nt of liber ativ e insig ht into r eality . T his is because, in Spir os words, "T he
meditator may prefer to per petuate his j ha ni c pleasures rather than proceed to
nibba na ."4 A nd Buddhadas a agrees with this view, say ing t hat,
While the mind is concent r ated [in s amadhi] it is likely to be
ex periencing such a satisf y ing kind of bliss and well- being t hat the
meditator may become attached to it or imag ine it to be the f r uit of the
pat h [i.e. nibbana] .5
Nevertheless, as Spir o comments , for many monks and for the major ity of
Buddhis t lay people,
It is the s uper natur al pr oducts of meditation which they view as holy
2
(V ener abl e P hr a A c ha r n Ma ha ) B o o w a Ny a na s a mpa nno, p. 60n.
3
B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha - dha mma f or S t ude nt s , p. 47.
4S p i r o , p . 51.
5
' B u d d h a d a s a , Handbook f or M a n k i n d , p . 70.
i
172
and for which they venerate monastic meditator s who, allegedly , have
achieved these super nor mal states.6
6.2 B uddha da s a s E mpha s i s on V ipas s ana Me di t a t i o n.
T hus, in addit ion to its value as the base to insig ht meditation or v ipas s ana,
s amadhi is also impor tant to tr adit ional is t T hai Buddhis ts who adhere to the
Br ahmanical and animis t heritage of T her av ada Buddhis m because of its association
w ith s uper natur al powers and psychic communication with celestial beings. It is for
this same reason t hat Buddhadas a de- emphasises s amadhi and is cr itical of the
t r adit ional emphasis on concentr ation meditation in T hailand. In contr ast he
maint ains t hat it is v ipas s ana or insig ht meditation which is the most impor tant
aspect of Buddhis t s pir itual practice. He says s a ma dhi ,
may come about nat ur all y , on the one hand, and as a result of organised
practice on the other. T he end result is identical in both cases; the mind is
concentr ated and f it to be used for carr y ing out close intr ospection. One
thing mus t be noticed, however, the intensity of concentr ation [i.e.
s amadhi] t hat comes about natur ally is usually suf f icient and appr opr iate
for intr os pection, and ins ig ht , whereas the concentr ation r esulting f rom
organised t r aining is usually excessive, more than can be made use of .7
Buddhadas a goes f ur ther and actually denounces the practice of s amadhi wrhich
is centr al to the s uper natur alis t view of Buddhis m,
A deeply concentr ated mind cannot practice intr ospection at all. It is in
a state of unawareness and is of no use for insig ht [v ipas s ana]. Deep
concentr ation is a major obstacle to insig ht pr actice.8
In these wor ds Buddhadas a is in fact championing one of the several
canonically recognised meditativ e paths to nibbana, the v ipas s ana- based
s uk hav ipas s at ha or "dry - visioned" att ainment of nibbana, so called because its
pr actice does not result in the meditator ex periencing any of the super natur al
delig hts attained thr oug h j ha na or s amadhi meditation. T he "dry- visioned"
at t ai nme nt of nibbana results f rom a dir ect, unelabor ated insig ht into liber ative
t r ut h. S uk hav ipas s at ha is to att ain nibbana af ter a penetr ating insig ht into reality
att ained upon the f oundation of only the basic concentr ation level called upacdr a
s ama dhi or "access concentr ation". Buddhadas a is in accord with Buddhis t doctrine
^S p i r o , p . 51 n.
7
B u d d h a d a s a , Handbook f or M a n k i n d , p. 70.
8 i bi d. p . 73.
173
when he says t hat a mind in any s amadhi state higher than upacar a cannot
pr actice v ipas s ana meditation and t hat to develop liber ative insig ht v ia v ipas s ana
the mind mus t First come out of the higher trance states.
However, the Buddhis t scriptures also describe another much more elabor ate
meditativ e path to nibbana t han the more s tr aig htf or war d s uk hav ipas s at ha or
v ipas s ana method suppor ted by Buddhadas a. T his alter nativ e meditativ e path in
f act utilises the very j ha ni c trances or s amadhi concentr ations which or dinar ily
inhibit the development of the liber ative insig ht into reality obtained f r om
v ipass ana- ty pe meditations . T his path via s amadhi concentr ations has nine stages.
T he f ir st eight stages cons titute the f our r upa j j ha nas or meditativ e absor ptions of
the f ine materia] sphere and the f our higher absor ptions of the immater ial spheres,
which are called the f our ar upa j j ha na s or ar iipay at ana. These j ha ni c trances all
involv e intense concentr ation,
dur ing which there is a complete, thoug h tempor ar y , suspension of the
f ivef old sense activ ity ... T he state of consciousness, however, is one of full
alertness and l ucidit y .9
T he f our higher j ha na s are based on a process of "v oiding " or "empty ing "
consciousness of the sense of entitativ e ex istence or atta. Objects of consciousness
are s y stematically broken down into their components in order to develop insig ht
into the tr uth of the non- essential, non- self char acter of all phenomenal ex istence.
T he culmination of this process is meditativ e concentr ation on pure voidness or
s uhha t a itself. In the Cii l a s uhhat a Sutta the Buddha describes how to practise the
meditat ion of "v oiding " the mind of entitativ e awareness by s ubtr acting , one after
another , the perceived entitativ e or atta qualities of various objects, in this case a
house,
He it he meditating monk] knows clearly t hat this ideation is emptied of
the awareness t hat it is a house, t hat it is s omething human and he has
clear awareness only of t hat single thing which it is not emptied of ...
T hus he considers the voidness [s uhha t a ] of those thing s which do not fin
fact] ex ist in t hat ideation !of a house] and he knows clearly t hat which
does continue to ex ist and which still is. A nanda, such as this is the
bhik k hu's progress towar ds voidness [s uhha t a ] accor ding to t r ut h which is
pure and not in er r or .(T )10
A f ter hav ing s ubtr acted all the mater ial qualities and attr ibutes of the object
of meditation the meditator proceeds to concentr ate, in succession, on the
9
N y a n a t i l o k a , p. 83.
C ul s uhha t a S ut t a , M a j j h i m a Ni k a y a , V ol . 14 /v cr s e 3 3 4 /pp. 180- 181.
i
incr easingly abstr act and "v oided" states of (i) the r ealm of the inf inity of space,
ak as anahcay at ana; (ii) the r ealm of the inf inity of consciousness, v i hhana hca y at a na ;
(iii) consciousness of the r ealm of nothing ness, akihcahhay atana\ and f inally (iv)
consciousness of the r ealm of neither perception nor non- perception,
nev as ahhanas ahhay at ana. These f our higher meditations or a r upa j j ha na s involve a
process of g r adually ex tr icating the meditator f r om his or her sense of self hood as
well as of the entitativ e char acter of the objects of consciousness. T he meditations
are a method to assist the meditator at t ai n ins ig ht into r eality .
A state beyond all these stages of s amadhi is identif ied in the Pahcala S utta
where it is called s ahhav eday it anir odha11. T his nint h stage is described as the
cessation of consciousness and sensation in which all as av a or l atent mental
impur ities disappear because of the at t ainment of penetr ating wisdom, pahha. A f ter
this mental pur if ication thr oug h intense concentr ation nibbana can then be attained.
T he Cul as uhhat a S ut t a provides a more detailed account of
s ahhav eday it anir odha. In this s utta the ninth stage of s amadhi is described as a
concentr ation devoid of any signs or dis ting uis hing f eatures where s uhhat a or
abs olute void is the object of consciousness. But this meditativ e state nevertheless
s till has "combining f actor s" or s ahk har a, i.e. k ammic residues, capable of arising
and destr oy ing the concentr ation- induced condition of mental calm. For this reason
the nint h s amadhi stage is still an imper manent condition, seeing as it may still be
s ubject to distur bances or disr uptions . But when the meditator att ains the
r ealisation t hat even this ex alted state is subject to cessation and can pass away
then he or she is released f r om the dsavas of lust, desire for being and of
ignor ance, (i.e. k amas av a, bhav as av a, av ij j as av a) and the mind then att ains hana
or liber ating wisdom. A t this point,
It is the end of bir th. T he practice of the moral life has reached its end.
T he work t hat should be done is f inished and no other work for ex isting in
this [ liberated] way need be per f or med.(T )12
In other words nibbana can be attained by a transcendence of even the highest
s amadhi meditation on voidness, s ahhav eday it anir odha.
B ut Buddhadas a rejects this elabor ate, intr icate and dif f icult meditativ e system
for at t ai ning nibbana v ia s a ma dhi , which requires a life devoted solely to meditativ e
pr actice. Instead he maint ains t hat the most appr opr iate s pir itual practice is the
pr actice of cit- wang or s at i, mindf ulness of br eathing . Buddhadas a proposes t hat in
P a hc a l a S ut t a , A ng ut t a r a Ni k a y a , V ol . 1 4/v e r s e 246 /p.3 6 2 .
12 - - -
C ul a s uh h a t a S ut t a , M a j j h i m a Ni k a y a , V o l . 14/v er s e34 1/p. 183.
174
I
pr actis ing the commones t and most basic f or m of Buddhis t meditat ion, mindf ulness
of br eathing or a na pa na s a t i, suf f icient concentr ation or s amadhi is developed to
per mit liber ativ e insig ht into r eality . Spiro describes the general practice of
mindf ulnes s as, "where one attends to, and is self- consciously aware - in the
minutes t detail - of ones every act, thoug ht, sensation and e mot ion."13 In the
specific practice of the mindf ulness of br eathing ,
one not only attains total concentr ation, but also becomes awar e in ones
own body of one of the char acteristics of ex istence, i.e. imper manence.14
Buddhadas a rejects the intr icacies of the s amadhi system because he says the
B uddha has pr ov ided a short- cut system to enlig htenment. He maint ains t hat the
practices detailed in the Noble Eig htf old Pat h or ar iy amag g a, whose acme is
s amas amadhi or "r ig ht s a ma dhi ", is for,
people who will not take short- cuts. It is not the wrong path; it is the
r ig ht path. B ut it is on the or dinar y level, and takes a long t ime . 15
He says t hat the short- cut or s uk hav ipas s at ha method involves not cling ing to
sensed objects or to the notion of self. T hat is, he proposes t hat the dev elopment of
cit-wang is the key to Buddhis t soteriological pr actice and says t hat once cit-wang
or the at t it ude of non- self- centredness is developed the rest of B uddhis ms s pir itual
practices are developed automaticall y ,
Not to hold t hat there is self hood [atta.] in eye, ear, nose, tong ue, body
or mind, causes the ar ising of the entire Noble Eig htf old Pat h [ and thus of
s a ma dhi ] in a single moment.
Buddhadas a does not dispute the t r adit ional g r adation of Buddhis t practices
into s'ila - s ama dhi - v ipas s ana, but he proposes t hat the mindf ulness attained
t hr oug h the pr actice of cit-wang provides suf f icient concentr ation to operate as a
basis for ins ig ht practice, thus rendering the elabor ate j ha ni c concentr ations and
their s uper natur al pr oducts ir r elev ant,
If we set the mind r ig ht or prevent it f rom cr aving and cling ing then
t ha t is s a ma dhi , it is the very thing of s amadhi itself. T hen whether we
are acting , speaking, walking , eating or whatev er , we will r emain in t hat
1 3S p i r o , p . 51.
1 4i bi d. p . 52.
15
B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha- d.ha.mma f or S t ude nt s , p . 19.
16i bi d. p . 20.
t
176
s amadhi. T hat is, the mind is free f r om "I" and "mine". We will have
both the well- being and the penetr ating keenness to t hink, consider and
work with our hear t and mind in ever y thing . Hence I say t hat to have
s amadhi is easy, as easy as r olling a stone down a hi l l . ( T )17
6.3 C i t - w a ng - A L ay - acces s ibl e P a t h t o Nibbana.
S pir itual pr actice based on cit-wang is of centr al impor tance to Buddhadas as
total system of doctr inal re- inter pretation and ref or m. Ci t -wang is the basis of
Buddhis t s pir itual pr actice aiming at the at t ainment of nibbana which, while
preserving the t r adit ional g r aduated s'ila - s amadhi - v ipas s ana schema of Buddhis t
pr actice, also purges Buddhis t meditation of the Br ahmanical and s uper natur al
emphasis on s ama dhi meditation which is suppor ted by religious tr aditionalis ts .
Mindf ulnes s or s at i based on cit- wang also provides a meditativ e system which
bypasses the complex ities of the monastically - or iented s amadhi system and which is
accessible to the layperson who, when compar ed with the more leisured monks, has
litt l e free time av ailable for meditativ e practice. Buddhadas a emphasises the general
accessibility of the pr actice of cit-wang or non- self- centred mindf ulness, and thus the
accessibility of s alv ation, by maint aining t hat if it is practised correctly the
mindf ulnes s of cit-wang can itself lead to nibbana. Buddhis t doctrine details a series
of stages on the path to ending suf f ering and Buddhadas a claims that each of these
stages f ollow on f r om one another in a natur al succession, s tar ting f r om the
f undamental mindf ul practice of cit -wang or non- self- centredness. He claims t hat it
is,
j us t by making our own daily liv ing so pure and honest t hat there
develop in succession s pir itual joy (pit i, par noda), calm (pas s adhi), insig ht
into the tr ue natur e of thing s (y at l iabhut ahanadas s ana), disenchantment
(nibbida), withdr awal (v ir ag o), escape (v i mut t i ), pur if ication f rom
def ilements (v i s uddhi ), and then peace or nibbana. 18
Buddhadas a says t hat once the basic pr actice of cit-wang is established the
entire process of liber ation culminating in nibbana is set in motion,
Because the f r uit of the path arises automat icall y once the path is
established, the at t ainment of the path is regarded as the culmination of
the pr actice.19
1 ^ P h u t t h a t h a t , W i t hi Fy k S a ma t hi- w ipat s a na - L e m 1 ( ^ if f j J J ^ r]j ^ 'I 1 11 )
pp. 48- 49.
18
B u d d h a d a s a , Handbook f o r Ma n k i n d, p. 84.
19
i bi d. p . 87.
t
177
T hus j us t as there is no need for special concentr ation or s amadhi practices,
accor ding to Buddhadas a s pir itual insig ht and s alv ation also develop as a natur al
consequence of being established in the mindf ulness of cit-wang . He suppor ts his case
by citing s cr iptur al instances of people who are described as hav ing attained nibbana
nat ur all y , w ithout f ollowing any specific system such as j ha ni c or s amadhi
concentr ations,
These people did not go into the forest and sit, assiduously pr actising
concentr ation on cer tain objects, in the way described in the later
manual s .20
For Buddhadas a nibbana or s alv ation requires neither the special lear ning of
the scholastically tr ained monk nor the retr eatist monastic lifestyle,
T hr oug h the power of j us t this natur ally occur ring concentr ation, most of
us could actually at t ai n liber ation. We could att ain the f r uit of the path,
nibbana, a r a ha nt s hi p, j us t by means of natur al concentr ation.21
Buddhadas a does not deny the value of the more sy stematic s amadhi appr oach
to meditation, say ing t hat it may be of use to those who are still at a relatively
undeveloped s pir itual stage and, "who still cannot perceive the unsatisf actor iness of
wor ldly ex istence with their own eyes, nat ur al l y . "22 But the general impor t of his
system of practice, like his inter pr etation of the doctr ine, is to declericalise s alv ation
and to provide a path to nibbana for the or dinar y lay person, neg ating the spir itual
dis tinction between layperson and monk. Buddhadas a is not concerned with the
doctr inal details of enlig htenment or s alv ation, with the dif f erent types of saving
wisdom or pahha or with the various meditativ e states listed as pr oducing t hat
wisdom in the A bhidhamma and commentar y liter atur e. Rather , in accord with his
r ationalis t emphasis on general principles and the notion of universal law
under pinning Buddhis t doctr ine Buddhadas a believes t hat the at t ainment of nibbana
is guar anteed once the proper mor al and meditativ e basis is established. For
Buddhadas a nibbana is not a mir aculous or s uper natur al condition but is the
culmination of sy stematic s pir itual practices which operate in f ull accord with the
general laws of ex istence realised by the Buddha.
For Buddhadas a the f oundation of correct s pir itual pr actice is the most
i mpor t ant thing in at t aining s alv ation. For when the f oundation, i.e. cit-wang , is
20i bi d. pp. 70- 71.
21 i bi d. p. 77.
22 i bi d. p. 85.
_ r' L
178
laid correctly he maint ains t hat the str uctur e arises automatically thr oug h the
oper ation of the natur al laws which the Buddha utilis ed and sy stematically f ollowed.
Buddhadas a consequently sees his duty as a monk and s pir itual instr uctor as being
to demonstr ate and detail how the path to s alv ation may be begun, or how the
s tr eam to nibbana may be enterred, f r om the pos ition of being an indiv idual liv ing
in contempor ar y T hail and. There is no need for elabor ate descr iptions of
s uper natur al mental states or for detailed descr iptions of dif f erent conditions of
wisdom or insig ht in Buddhadas as system. For once the path is correctly f ollowed
all the rest, r ig ht up to s alv ation, f ollows as an inev itable and natur al consequence.
6.4 De ba t e on t he C o mpa t i bi l i t y of C i t -w a ng w i t h S ocial A c t i on.
However, Buddhadas as opening up of B uddhis ms soteriological practices is by
no means univer sally welcomed. For mer T hai Pr ime Minis ter , K huk r it Pr amot,
voices the f ollowing objection,
In olden times when a child asked its elders about v ipas s ana [ insight
meditation] ... no- one spoke. They said it was a secret. The instr uctor s
ordered not to let j us t any one be t aug ht, the s tudent had to be chosen. It
was not a widespread teaching. Hence up until now Buddhis m has not gone
ag ains t national dev elopment or the f oundation of g ov er nment.(T )23
K huk r it believes t hat the att ainment of higher s pir itual states is incompatible
with wor ldly inv olv ement and so he lauds the t r adit ional practice of r estr icting
access to the soteriological aspect of Buddhis m to the few, i.e. to monks. K huk r it
is consequently concerned by the popular is ation of Buddhis t meditation techniques
among the lay populace, maint aining t hat if people att ain cit-wang thr oug h
meditat ion they will be in no position to aid the dev elopment of the countr y ,
Because the person w'ho has no cr avings or attachments , the person
whose mind is freed [ i.e. cit-wang ], holds to nothing as himself or as his
own he is in no condition to he able to develop the countr y , develop the
land or to even develop himself . (T )24
K huk r it is here ex pressing the widely held view t hat the s pir itual path to
nibbana and the path of wor ldly inv olv ement cannot both be traversed at the same
time. A Sri Lankan monk, Somather a, makes a s imilar comment,
In those who seek immor talit y [ nibbana] , all kinds of endeavour and
ex er tion to acquir e wor ldly power and possessions become slack thr oug h he
per ception of death [ anicca] but they do t hat all t hat has to be done for
23
K l i y k r i t P r a mot , p . 7.
2 4iL>id. p. 2.
att aining the deathless s tate.25
In this same contex t Buddhadas a observes t hat his notion of cit-wang has been
criticised as a thr eat to T hail ands national security,
[ It has been accused that] if the T hai people have cit -wang completely
they will not love their countr y and they will not pr otect their
count r y .(T )26
But Buddhadas a claims t hat the emotional detachment and calm of cit-wang is
not at all the same as the social disinterestedness which K huk r it and others
maint ain f ollows f r om the cult iv at ion of "f reed- mind". Rather than hinder ing the
att ainment of social or mater ial goals Buddhadas a says t hat by r emoving the
conf usions caused by self- centredness such goals will in f act be attained more
ef f iciently and with less suf f ering,
I want the layperson to be able to work with less suf f ering and to have
completely successful results. By what means will we at t ain this? Wil l it
not be done with cit-wang , or would a conf used mind be bet t er ? (T )27
Buddhad asa appears to take his lead on this point f rom the Subha Sutta"'8
where the Buddha is asked about the relative statuses of the work of a lay person,
who has many concerns, and of a monk who has few dis tr actions , regarding their
r elative abilities to f ollow the path to nibbana. T he Buddha replied t hat work
under taken with great desire and great eff ort, if struck by disaster, will come to
naug ht while a work under taken with little desire and l ittle conf usion, if f or tuitous ,
can produce great results. In other words wor king in an unattached way , as in
cit -wang , does not of itself pr event "great r esults", of whatever kind, f rom being
pr oduced.
But K huk r it r emains skeptical of the pos sibility of work or wor ldly activ ity for
social dev elopment being pleasur able,
25
S o m a T her a, Wor ds L e a di ng to Di s e nc ha nt me nt , B uddhi s t P ubl i c a t i on Soci et y , K a ndy Sr i L a nk a, 1978,
p. 4.
2^ P h u t t h a t h a t , Cit- pr aphaA s or n - ^ Cit- doem- thae - C^t- Wang My a n- k a n Ry Y ang - r ai
( ** ^ ?llJ ? Z r i $ t i 3 Lf l j J l l /I I WU'DHnUV i ? 1DjLI i ? n P r a bha s s a r a - mi nd, Or ig i na l -
m i n d and Fr eed- mind - A r e T hey the S a me 1. ) , S amnak - nang s y T ha mr na buc ha
( t f T u n v m v i i i m n u i m ), B a ng k ok , 2517 (1974), p. 22.
2 7 . . -- - - -
Ci t ed in P u n Cong pr as oe t (ed), W i w a t ha R a w i n g M. R . W . K hy k r i t P r a mot K a p T han P hut t hat hat
P hi k k hu A(ai Ry a pg Cit- w ang ( V ) 1 VIS J ZV11 U . I . 1 . f l f l ^ V l ? l j j n l j j f l fUJ V l Ol l WV f f i V HS l
i i f p/l ui f t U'v V mN} ), p.52.
\
oo
S ubha S ut t a , M a j j h i m a Ni k a y a , V ol . 13/v er s e7 1 1/p . 492.
179
i
180
I think t hat if one wants to obtain successful results in the wor ld those
results mus t be boug ht with suf f ering ... [ If one wants] true wang w ithout
suf f ering, one mus t completely sacrif ice wor ldly success ... When one is a
layperson there mus t be some happiness and some suf f ering, it is not
wang . (T )29
Buddhadas a retor ts t hat the ex ample of the B uddhas various strenuous
pr opag ator y and teaching activ ities carried out af ter his enlig htenment show t hat
hav ing the mental peace of cit -wang , and of mbbana, in no way hinder s the
f ulf ilment, of demanding wor ldly tasks,
There has never been any evidence any where [for the suppos ition that]
those who are free of kiles a will not work. The Lord Buddha and the
ar ahant s worked more than us, sacrif iced more than us and became more
tired than us, and all their work was for helping other s.(T )'j0
But at this point K huk r it r emains f ast to his tr adit ional is t views, for unlike
Buddhadas a he does not regard the B uddhas life as a realistic model for the
average person. T alking of nibbana he says,
T he person who reaches a state such as this natur ally cannot live in the
w'orld like an or dinar y person. They cannot live as a householder in the
society of householders ... T hey mus t try to get away f r om society. T his is
the usual thing upon at t aining the f r uits of the pa t h. (T )"1
K huk r i t s cr iticisms of B uddhadas as abolition of the lokiy a - l ok ut iar a
dis tinction and of the pr opag ation of the notion of cit-wang may , however, be
motiv ated by political consider ations as much as by any simple religious
conservatism. K huk r it maintains , for ex ample, t hat monks should have no mundane
associations or direct social inv olv ement whatever,
It is a sin for a saint to establish a f oundation32, even if t hat f oundation
has the object of helping our f ellow man. Because, if established, a
f oundation will cause att achment and cr av ing to arise. When there is not
OQ . . _ _ _
Ci t e d in P u n Cong pr as oet , W i w a t ha Ra w a ng Af . R . W . K hy k r i t P r a mot K a p T ha n P hut t ha t hy t P hi k k hu
Na t Ry ang , Cit - w ang ( V n V l r J S V H ' V J U . T . T . R f l ^ l /l f l i I JJ*& f i U V Hl l W VTB
i W l i u i t u ' s m ' u " j, p.52.
*
J P h u t t h a t h a t , "Upas ak Ha e ng K an- phoey - phr ae T ha m" ( y m i v u m T i c j m i v i m j n h ),
p . 19. 1
^^K l i y k r i t P r a mot , p. 4.
OO _ - . . .
T hi s may be a r ef er ence t o B uddha da s a 's i nv ol v e me nt in t he T ha mma t ha n F ounda t i on es t abl i s hed in
Cha i y a , Sout he r n T ha i l a nd, by B uddha da s a t og et her wi t h his br ot he r Dha mma da s a f or t he pur pos e of
pr opa g a t i ng t hei r vi ews on B uddhi s m. K huk r i t may al so be ref er r ing- her e t he mor e open po l i t i cal
i nv ol v e me nt of t he monk K i t t i w ut t ho wi t h r i g ht - wi ng mov e me nt s in t he 1973- 1976 per i od.
enough money there is suf f ering, doing any t hing will lead to s uf f er ing .(T )33
Here K huk r it is ass uming t hat inv olv ement in the world is intr ins ically linked
with suf f ering and the moment a s aint (i.e. one who is free f r om suf f ering) enters
the mundane domain, even to help another , t hat wor ldly inv olv ement mus t have the
unwholesome or ak us al a mor al and s pir itual effect of causing the s aint to suffer or
f all f r om his state of s pir itual at t ainment . Buddhadas a, however, maint ains t hat it
is not wor ldly inv olv ement pe r se but the at t it ude of attachment when acting in
the mater ial wor ld which leads to suf f ering.
However, K huk r i t s assertion t hat a saint cannot enter the world without
s oiling his saintly s tatus - coming f r om a seasoned politician and f ormer Pr ime
Minis ter - may be as much a call for the complete separ ation of church and state
as an ex pression of religious belief. T here are several reasons why a politician mig ht
seek to keep the s ahg ha out of politics, not the least of which is to ward of f the
dev elopment of a potential alter nativ e source of power in the countr y . As a strongly
organised body the s ahg ha would indeed be a potent political force if its energies
were more dir ected into the mundane r ealm. As noted in Chapter One successive
T hai g over nments have maintained tig ht contr ol over the s ahg ha to str ip it of
eff ective power and to pr event the order of monks f rom possibly using its strong
or g anis ation and prestige in T hai society ag ains t those g ov er nment s. In addition to
the ex plicit legal and political contr ols on the s ahg has activ ities the doctr ine t hat
the wor ldly domain is the sinf ul antithes is of the s pir itual r ealm and t hat a monk s
enter r ing the social wor ld entails a s pir itual pol lution which automat icall y destroys
his s pir itual author ity also f unctions as an ideological barrier to the ex pansion of
the s ahg ha's activ ities into the socio- political realm. Buddhadas as views thr eaten
this t r adit ional is olation of the s ahg ha f rom politics and K huk r it s criticisms can be
read as an att empt to maint ain the ideological s t a t us quo. B ut despite the
cr iticis ms of tr aditional is ts Buddhadas a insists t hat his inter pr etations are in str ict
accor dance with the B uddha s teachings. In r eply ing to criticisms t hat the doctr inal
teaching s of anat t a or cit-wang are in f act too abs tr act and remote for the average
person he retorts,
B ut I have tried to do what is best, to follow j us t what the Lord
Buddha suggested, t hat the lay people should know about s uhhat a or
cit -wang as is appr opr iate for f he m. (T ) 4
3 3 K h y k r i t P r a mot , p. 5.
3 ^P h u t t h a t h a t , "K l i a r a w a t T ha m" ( IIipj j ^ ^ J **)> P- 55.
. L
182
The average person should know about the central doct rines of Buddhis m
because,
It is clearly wr itten in Pali, in the blessed scriptures, t he Lord B uddha
said s uhhat a is a matter hav ing eternal benef it in helping the l a i t y . (T )35
6 .5 B ud d ha da s a on K a mma a nd S uf f e r i ng .
In complete oppos ition to K huk r i t s views Buddhadas a denies t hat lay people
are f ated to suffer, "If one act s well and correctly as a lay person one may be able
to avoid s uf f er ing ." (T )36 Buddhadas a denies t hat suf f ering is something intr ins ic to
lay life and says t hat it need not be accepted passively as the unav oidable result of
past f ate or k amma. Commenting on the distr actions and conf usions of the
hous eholder s life he says,
Those thing s do not ex ist for the sake of g iv ing suf f ering or for either
directly or specif ically being suf f ering. T hey may have come into being as
lessons or as tests to advance the [ spiritual] level of human being s .(T )37
Buddhadas a does not specif ically deny the tr adit ional view t hat the suff erings
of a layperson are f ated because of their k a mma , but he does oppose the
inter pr etation t hat suf f ering is a s pir itual impediment,
If we look at it f rom the point of view of suf f ering then it is suf f ering,
but if we look at it f r om a better perspective then it is j us t . T hat is, it is
s omething t hat teaches and drives us f or war d quickly ... obstacles or
suf f ering are tools to help us subsequently become s pir itually
intel l ig ent.(T )38
For Buddhadas a suf f ering is j us t not s imply because it is r etr ibution for
misdeeds, which in Buddhis t doctr ine it is, but more impor tantl y because it leads to
the f utur e benef its of lear ning how to av oid suf f ering and how to progress s pir itually
quickly . Buddhadas a inver ts the notion of k a mma f r om the tr aditional inter pr et ation
of it being a s pir itual block or hindr ance. He regards the suf f ering human beings
are f ated to as a positive tool which r ather , than holding one back or bar r ing one
f r om s alv ation, is in f act capable of accelerating ones att ainment of nibbana if
correctly appr eciated and acted upon. He advises t hat if suf f ering arises because of
30 i bi d. pp. 61- 62.
36 i bi d. p . 119.
3 7 i bi d. p . 124.
3 8 i bi d. p p . 124- 125.
t
183
the concerns of being a layperson, "Dont accept it as suf f ering and tor tur e, take it
as a pr oblem which mus t be s ol v ed."(T )39 Buddhadas a maintains t hat suf f ering is
not s omething humans should passively endure as their f ated mor al due but is a
tool which should be used as a spur to the at t ai nme nt of greater thing s.
T he implications of this re- inter pr etation of k a mma and suf f ering are pr of ound
because it represents a f undamental shif t in the Buddhis t view of human ex istence
and activ ity in the wor ld. Buddhadas a does not regard mundane ex istence as a
punis hment for past sins but as the domain in which human beings actively contr ol
and impr ov e their lives in the quest to end the pr oblems and suf f erings of everyday
life. Suf f ering is no longer ended only in a tr ans cendent r ealm. For Buddhadas a
suf f ering is both created and destroyed at the mundane level and it can be ended
not only mentally or thr oug h s pir itual practice but also phy sically thr oug h mater ial
activ ity to better the social and mater ial wor ld. In other words in Buddhadas as
inter pr etation the Buddhis t goal of the cessation of suf f ering is placed within the
very social world or mundane realm, l ok iy a, which in tr aditional Buddhis m was the
complete and utter opposite of s alv ation. On this point T ambiah has commented
t hat ,
What Buddhadas as ideas f orcef ully ref ute and deny is the f atalis m, the
pos tponement of action, the unr eality of this wor ld and therefore apathy
towar ds it att r ibuted to Buddhis m by cer tain stereotype commentar ies. He
is in f act say ing t hat the wor ld here and now ... comprisefs] the stage for
ur gent and immediate action in the f orm of Buddhis t practice. Perhaps an
even more impor t ant ideological assertion on his par t is t hat the quest for
nir v ana does not mean a negation and r enunciation of action in the
wor ld.40
6.6 C i t -w ang a nd W or k .
Buddhadas as conception of human beings as active controllers of their own
mater ial and s pir itual progress is most clearly presented in his view of work as
integ r ating both mundane and s upr amundane or social and s pir itual activ ity . While
f undamental l y derived f rom the notion of k a mma or action Buddhadas as
inter pr etation of work has a much more this wor ldly impor t than the t r adit ional
Buddhis t notion of k amma. Whereas k amma - i.e. world- involved activ ity
inher ently infected w ith craving and cling ing - is t r adit ional ly regarded as s omething
to be avoided because it leads to f ur ther entang lement in the cyclical net of
i bi d. p . 128.
4 T a i n b i a h , Wor l d Conque r or and Wor l d Re nounce r , p. 414.
184
suf f er ing, Buddhadas a defines work as an inher ently liber ative activ ity because it is
r elated to the pr actice of dha mma and, he maintains , "the actual pr actice of
dha mma is the w or k ."41 The basis of Buddhadas as notion of work is cit-wang or,
more precisely, the non- self- centred activ ity which he inter prets as meaning to work
for the sake of dha mma r ather than for any self- interested motiv ation. His ideal is
to be able to, "work for the wor k, to wor k for the sake of dha mma . " { T ) 42
Buddhadas a ins tr ucts t hat we,
should do every kind of work with a "f r eed- mind". A ll the results of
wor k should be given up to "freed- ness". We should eat the food of "freed-
ness" the way a monk eats. We s hould die to ourselves completely f r om
the beg inning .(T )43
T o give up the results of wor king to "freed- ness" means not cr av ing or
cling ing to those results but, like an ideal monk, to eat or act with the awareness
t hat it is merely a congeries of essenceless (a na t t a ) elements which are being eaten
or acted upon. T he result of such wor king with "freed- ness" is to eat w ithout
"t as t ing " the f ood, or to act w ithout "t as t ing " the f r uits or results of the action.
T hat is, to act with cit-wang is to maint ain equanimity and not to be per tur bed by
either the good or bad results of acting , and so not to suffer f rom the vagaries of
imper manent ex istence. It is B uddhadas as intention to render all human activ ity ,
including mundane mater ial wor k, suffering- free, "If we have dhamma it will make
wor king or dev elopment free of s uf f er ing ."(T )44
Y et Buddhadas a promises more than a simple absence of suf f ering as the result
of wor king with cit-w'ang. He maint ains t hat work carried out with cit-wang will be
successful - because activ ity is no longer conf used by "I"- "mine" - and t hat wor king
will be a pleasureable r ather than j us t a neutr al or suffering- free ex perience,
We will consequently feel successful in our work. T hat is, the work will
go well and the person wrho does it will be happy and w'ant to work
because he or she enjoys wor king . If we act in this way it is Buddhis m or
going to the hear t of B uddhis m. (T )45
41 -
B u d d h a d a s a , T wo K i nds o f L ang uag e , p . 10.
42 U * *
P h u t t h a t h a t , K hw a m- s uk T hae M i Y u T ae Na i Ng a n ( n m/l J J QL ! L l f f l 11\ J '"l l i 1*
p. 40. 1 U
4 3 . , . , .
i bid. p.6.
I
44 . . . . . . .
i d. , "Upa s a k Haeng K an- pboey - phr ae T ha m" ( ft Q j J f j J f| 1 J I CJ U 11V U 5 J J P- 18
v i
4 5 i d. , K hw a m- s uk T hae M i Yu Tae N a i Ng a n ( p.40.
He maintains t hat s pir itual practices and pr inciples should guide and be
integ r ated with wor ldly activities, including activ ity associated with socio- economic
dev elopment,
Dev elopment which gets results mus t have the l ok ut t ar a ty pe of dhamma
integ r ally g over ning it. T hat dev elopment will as a consequence be correct
and will not proceed to create ong oing crises or to cause cor r upt ion.(T )46
Buddhadas a makes no dis tinction between work def ined as a s pir itual activ ity
to establish oneself in cit-wang or as the mundane activ ities of everyday life and
mak ing a liv ing . For him the two amount to the same thing , "Wor k ing is the same
t hing as pr actising dha mma , there are no ways of the world [ distinct from] the
ways of dha mma . "(T )47 T his is very much a philos ophy of action in the wor ld
r ather than of withdr awal f r om mundane activ ities and simultaneous ly brings
s alv ation into the wor ld of everyday life wrhile also imbuing mundane work and
activ ities with a r eligious or sanctif ied qualit y . Buddhadas a does not disting uish
between mundane and s pir itual activ ity but only between correct and incorrect
act iv it y , a dis tinction based not on the objective char acter of an action, such as its
location either within or outside the temple precincts, but rather on the
psy chological at t it ude which is br oug ht to bear on an action. A ll actions perf ormed
with cit- wang are regarded as hav ing the same s pir itual s tatus on the path to
nibbana. T hus in B uddhadas as system the "temple" or the site of spir itual
practice is no longer a geogr aphical location but a state of mind. T his integ r ation of
work with s pir itual activ ity is made manif est in the f ollowing def inition,
T he word "wor king " jkan-t ham-ngan f i IT YTN '111 J T hai. If it were
rendered into Pali it would be the wor d s a mmdk a mma nt o, which translates
as hav ing r ig ht wor k. When there is r ig ht work then it is one component
of the Noble P a t hs [ar iy amag g a set of practices for adv ancing towards the
blessed nibbana.(T )48
By def ining work in terms of whether it is carried out with the non- self-
centred at t it ude of cit -wang or with the self- centred att it ude of "I"- "mine", r ather
t han in ter ms of either its mundane or s upr amundane char acter , Buddhadas a
removes B uddhis ms negative sanctions ag ainst what has his tor ically been seen as
the non- spir itual and even anti- s pir itual char acter of mundane activ ity . T he above
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i
4 6 i d., "Upas ak Haeng K an- pboey - pbr ae T ha m" (' )l j f i l J J Pi UV M Pi 1 5 I ULI l l l 'V J 'u T J 3J M )> P- 55-
y
4 7 i d. , B a r a m a t h a m ( " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ", pp. 88- 89.
V i/
AQ ^
i d. , K a n- ng a n K hy T ua khuiam- k aw- na ( ** f ) H T 'J ' I l i P l B P ! ^ f l ^ '13J f l ^ U l i O 11 Wor k i ng is Pr og r es s
I t s e l f ), Sar nnak - nang s y T ha mma buc ha ( ^Ufl Wli'3 ti Bll 3" J JJU *0 *1 ), B a ng k ok , 2525 (1982), p. 3.
identif ication of work with the s pir it ual practice of "r ig ht act ion" or
s a mma k a mma nt o, the f our th of the eight injunctions of the Noble Eig htf old Pat h,
means t hat in B uddhadas as system mundane work now has the s t at us of a mor al
inj unct ion. Not only is wor ldly activ ity a possible par t of the path to nibbana, in
B uddhadas as system it is an integ r al and necessary par t. In other words, instead of
being the antithesis of the state of salv ation the mundane socio- cultural wor ld is
essential to what Buddhadas a means by the at t inment of s alv ation. Wor k ing , the
f undamental activ ity under ly ing the indus t r ial mode of pr oduction is, according to
Buddhadas a, not simply necessary for socio- economic development but also for
s pir itual s alv ation.
T he socialist notion t hat man realises himself thr oug h pr oductiv e labour
appear s to underlie the f ollowing pr oclamation by Buddhadas a,
Humans must act in order to be human ... Wor king is s omething
s ublime, holy , ex alted. As for being human, if t hat which is called work is
abandoned we will inev itably lose our correct humanit y . (T )49
Here "humanit y " denotes a state achieved thr oug h the s pir itual eff ort of
pr actis ing cit-wang . Being "human" or a "man" is not, accor ding to Buddhadas a,
s omething one is born with but is a state which is attained, "ma n ... refers to the
higher qualities implied in the word human. "50 Buddhadas a implies t hat we are
made human thr oug h our work in the wor ld, as pr act ised with cit-wang . Man as a
s pir itual being is thus equated with man as economic being because for Buddhadas a
economic activ ity and s pir itual activ ity cannot be separated without making life
pointless and meaningless,
T he wor ld is wor king and wor king is the wor ld, life is wor king and
wor king is life - they are one and the same thing . If wre were to live in the
wor ld or have a life devoid of wor king then such a life would be w ithout
meaning , it w'ould moreover, to alr eady be dead.(T )51
C i t -wang , when inter pr eted as being the basis of Buddhis t practice, provides
the link between Buddhadas as s pir itual philosophy and his tr eatment of social and
pol itical issues. Ci t -wrang incorpor ates all the diverse concerns of Buddhadas as re-
inter pr etativ e pr og r amme. T hat is, it is a focus of his criticisms of s uper natur alist
r eading s of Buddhis m and of the separ ation of lay and clerical f orms of the r eligion,
49 ^ r:
i bi d. p. 5.
50
B u d d h a d a s a , T wo K i nds o f L a ng ua g e , p . 19.
v I I
51 P h u t t h a t h a t , K hw a m- s uk T hae A f i Y u Tae Na i Ng an ( II ^ LI V I UQU l l f f l I M P - 4^
c ' ii

and for his concern to give mater ial and social activ ity s pir itual s tanding and to
g r ant the Buddhis t laity dir ect access to s alv ation. T heor etically Buddhadas a
describes cit-wang as being at the same time a development of the everyday
ex perience of mental calm and the dir ect precursor of nibbana. T hat is, cit-wang is
the link between the wor ld of the everyday mundane awareness of the lay person and
the s upr amundane condition of s pir itual s alv ation. A ccor ding to Buddhadas a
cit -wang provides the layperson with dir ect access to nibbana. Similar ly , the practice
of cit-wang , or the conscious dev elopment of mindf ulness or s a t i , is inter pr eted as
being integ r al to activ ity and work in the social wor ld. Indeed Buddhadas a regards
w'orking and cit-wang as being integ r ally related. Consequently , for Buddhadas a,
cit -wang is the key to the resolution of the theoretical dif f iculty of pr ov iding a lay-
accessible inter pr etation of both the theory and the practice of doctr inal Buddhis m.
It is for this reason t hat j us t as the theory of phas a-t ham is the basis of
B uddhadas as methodolog ical appr oach to the task of re- interpreting T her av ada
Buddhis m so is the notion of cit-wang the conceptual hub of t hat re- interpreted
system.
188
C HA P T E R 7
CIT - WA NG A ND ZEN.
In order to complete this study of B uddhadas as reconstr uction of T her av ada
doctr ine it is necessary to detail his ex plicitly social and political wr iting s. However,
bef ore under taking this f inal analy sis I wish f irst to pause in the task of delineating
B uddhadas as actual r e- inter pretations in order ref lect on some of the theor etical
sources of his innov ativ e appr oaches to Buddhis t doctr ine. In Chapter T wo I
proposed t hat Wester n r ationalis m, the g r owth of science and socio- economic
dev elopment and changes in the class s tr uctur e of T hai society have all inf luenced
B uddhadas as theoretical innov ations . In this chapter , however, I wish to analy se a
more specific theor etical inf luence on Buddhadas a, namely , the impact of Zen and
Mahay ana Buddhis t notions. In the process of detailing the sources of many of his
ideas in Zen and Mahay ana I will also criticise Buddhadas as approach to and use
of some of his theor etical and liter ar y sources. For while his ideas are undoubtedly
theor etically impor t ant and also socially sig nif icant to moder nist T hai Buddhis ts
there are nevertheless flaws in his work which arise f rom theoretical conf usion and,
occasionally , f r om appar ently deliber ate obf uscation.
B uddhadas as inter pr etation of T her av ada Buddhis m, in par ticular his emphasis
on cit -wang or "f reed- mind", has been sig nif icantly inf luenced by the teachings of
Zen Buddhis m, a school of Mahay ana Buddhis m tr aditional ly f ound in China, J apan
and V ietnam. T he Mahay ana t r adit ion of Buddhis m, however, is f ounded on several
f undament al l y dif f erent notions f r om those which under pin T her av ada Buddhis t
doctr ine. In ter ms of metaphy sics the most impor t ant difference between the two
t r adit ions is the Mahay ana claim t hat voidness or s 'uny ata (Pali: s uhha t a ) , as the
f undament al char acter of r eality , has a positive char acter and is not the ontolog ical
v oid or emptiness generally denoted by the par allel T her av ada notion of ana t t a
(Sanskr it: a na t ma n). T he Mahay ana pr oposition t hat the "v oid" is in f act not
empty but an or ig inating "f ullness" which f orms the undif f er entiated substrate of all
ex istence is presented in Zen teachings as an intellectual par adox whose t r ut h can
only be realised by a transcendence of mundane r ationality . Zen masters have
his tor ically emphasised the penetr ation of par adox ical statements, called k oan, as an
impor t ant meditativ e tool in str iv ing to att ain such tr anscendent s pir itual awareness.
T he T her av ada t r adit ion contains no ex plicit doctrines of the f undamentally
par adox ical natur e of r eality , instead presenting the basic teachings of Buddhis m,
including t hat of anat t a or non- self, as unambig uous descr iptions of the actual
char acter of ex istence. Soter iologically Mahay ana Buddhis m differs f r om T her av ada
in its acceptance of the ability of s pir itually advanced personalities to dir ectly assist
the s pir itual enlig htenment of others by acts of grace. On the other hand s alv ation
in T her av ada Buddhis m is a wholly indiv idually attained condition.
In utilis ing Zen and Mahay ana notions in his ref or m of T her av ada doctr ine
Buddhadas a mus t come to terms with the impor tant doctr inal differences mentioned
above in order to j us tif y his bor r owing of non- T heravada ideas. He does this in
several ways, such as by claiming t hat Zen is not in f act par t of the Mahay ana
tr adit ion but r ather represents a r etur n to the f undamental core of Buddhis m which
has relevance for all Buddhis ts of all tr aditions and backgr ounds. However,
Buddhadas as main j us tif ication for employ ing Zen- derived ideas is contained in his
att empt s to demons tr ate the ex istence of s imilar ities and even identities between the
Zen ideas t hat he borrows and undeniably T her av ada notions and teachings.
However, these ar g uments are often weak and in places rely upon mis inter pr etations
of Zen notions and upon managed readings of Zen tex ts which avoid detailing points
which show up the actual differences between T her av ada and Mahay ana doctr ine.
T he f ailings of Buddhadas as j us t if ications of his use of Zen ideas (presented in
order to avoid criticisms of heterodox y f rom within the T hai s ahg ha) do not,
however, ultimately detract f r om the signif icance of his Zen- influenced re-
inter pr etations of T her av ada doctr ine. Whether or not his ideas str ictly f ollow
T her av ada notions Buddhadas a still remains f aithf ul to what he inter pr ets as the
s pir it of Buddhis t doctrines. A nd it is this emphasis on the broader pr inciples of
Buddhis t teachings r ather than on s cr iptur al details which has allowed him to re-
inv ig or ate the theor etically s tag nant T her av ada tr adit ion by intr oducing views and
concepts f r om other Buddhis t tr aditions .
7.1 T he T e a c hi ng s o f Zen B u d dhi s m.
Blof eld describes the central tenets of Zen Buddhis m as follows: Zen,
s ubmits t hat , while all Buddhis t sects present the t r uth in var y ing
degrees, Zen alone preserves the very highest teaching of all - a teaching
based on a my ster ious transmission of Mind which took place between
Ga ut a ma Buddha and Mahakas y apa, the only one of his disciples capable
189
190
of receiving this tr ans mis s ion.1
Zen emphasises t hat the central teaching of Buddhis m cannot be caug ht w ithin
an intellectual web of words but is a my s tical, wordless doctr ine whose t r ut h is
realised dir ect ly and immediately r ather than appr oached g r adually thr oug h a
sy stematic g r adation of practices as in T her av ada Buddhis m. T his t r ut h bey ond
wor ds, in w'hich the intellectual polar ities of everyday consciousness and r ationalit y
dissolve, is variously called the "v oid", s >uny at a, "Mi nd" or "One Mi nd"2. T o the
intellect this t r ut h is impenetr able, and so a conceptual v oid, but Zen teachers
maint ain t hat it is yet the source of all being, a substr ate of Mind upon which all
phenomenal ex istence is gr ounded. T he Zen scholar Suzuki describes this Mind as
being t hat ,
f r om which this universe with all its mul tiplicities issues, but which is
itself s imple, undef iled and il l uminat ing as the sun behind the clouds.3
In Zen enlig htenment, or s ator i in J apanese, is an all or nothing ex perience -
one either int uit s Mind or One Mind i n t o t o in a single f lash of liber ativ e insig ht
or not at all. Nevert heless, Zen still teaches t hat one can only prepare the mind for
its sudden r ealisation of t r ut h thr oug h meditation and it is the f rom the practice of
dhy ana meditation (Chinese: chan, J apanese: Zen) t hat the sect in J apan takes its
name.
A ccor ding to t r adition the wordless doctr ine or direct s pir itual insig ht of the
Buddha f ir st passed to Mahak as y apa (Pali: Mahakas s apa) and f rom him to
A nanda, who became the second of twenty eig ht patr iar chs who received the
wordless doctr ine in an unbroken line of succession. T he last Indian patr iar ch,
B odhidhar ma, is tr adit ional ly regarded as hav ing gone to China in the six th centur y
of the Chr is tian era, becoming the f ir st of six Chinese patr iar chs , the last of whom
was Hui Neng (also called Wei L ang ). Subsequent divisions in the sect broke the
dir ect line of s pir itual succession.
^ o h n B l o f e l d (t r ans ) , The Zen T eaching s o f H ua ng Po - O n the T r a ns r ni s s ion o f M i n d , Gr ov e Pr ess,
New Y or k , 1958, p. 8.
2
T he Chi nes e t er m whi ch Bl of el d t r ans l at es as "One M i n d has al mos t as ma ny r ender i ng s i nt o Eng l i s h
as t her e hav e been t r ans l at or s of Zen t ex t s. Wa ng Mou- Iai n, t r ans l at or of The S ut r a o f Wei L a ng (or H ui
Neng ) ( We s t por t Conn. , 1973.) says t he or i g i nal Chi nes e t er m denot es "S e l f - nat ur e" but ne v e r t he l ess
chooses t o r ender it by "Es s ence of Mi nd". S uz uk i , on t he ot he r ha nd, dr a w i ng on t he J apanes e t r adi t i on,
v ar i ous l y uses t he t er ms "Mi nd" or "No- mi nd".
O
Dai s e t z T ei t ar o S uz uk i , The Ze n Doc t r ine o f No- Mi nd - T he S i g ni f i c a nc e o f the S ut r a o f Hui- Ne ng
(We i- L ang ), Ri de r & Co. , L ondon, 1949, p. 23.
*
191
7.2 B u ddha da s a s J us t i f i c a t ion f or B or r ow i ng Zen No t ions .
Buddhadas a in no way hides his indebtedness to Zen and by ex plicitly
s uppor ting Zen teachings opens himself to the cr iticism of being an apos tate to his
T her av ada roots. T he T her av ada s ahg ha has his tor ically regarded itself as the
bearer of the tr ue Buddhis t doctr ine and practice, on the ar g ument t hat its
tr adit ions and scriptures can be traced back f ur ther than those of any other ex isting
B uddhis t school. T he T her av adins have been hig hly protective of their "pur er "
tr adit ion and ex tremely wary of its pollution with Mahay ana doctrines.
B uddhadas as critics correctly regard the piv otal notion of cit-wang as a T hai
equiv alent of s 'uny ata or v oid, but mis takenly claim t hat this is solely a Mahay ana
and not a T her av ada concept. Phr a K i t t i w ut t ho says,
T his T her av ada section of Buddhis m does not talk about cit-w ang . In the
T ipit ak a ... nothing at all is indicated about the matter of cit-wang . T he
B uddha s words in Pal i show nothing like it ... cit-wang is a matter
outside of the blessed T ipitak a. It is not a pr inciple of this pure T her av ada
section of Buddhis m but is an opinion of the Mahay anis t s .(T )4
Buddhadas a def ends himself ag ainst such criticisms by claiming t hat cit-wang ,
"is the hear t of all Buddhis m, [ having ex isted since before the s epar ation into
T her av ada or Mahay ana. "( T ) 3 A nd in opposition to critics like K it t iw ut t ho
Buddhadas a claims t hat s uhhat a is not only a ter m used by the Buddha but t hat
in the Dha mma di nna S ut t a the Buddha calls it the basis or heart of Buddhis t
pr actice. Buddhadas a also cites other s uttas as pr ov iding suppor t for his emphasis
on s uhhat a and on cit- wang. He maint ains that in the Mahav ar a Vagga of the
S amy ut t a Nik ay a the Buddha says,
Emptines s [ suhhata] is what I teach. A teaching t hat does not tr eat of
emptiness is someone elses teaching , an unor thodox teaching composed by
some later disciple.6
A nd he quotes the B uddha as say ing in the Pahcak a Nipat a of the A ng ut t ar a
Nik ay a t hat ,
A discourse of any k ind, thoug h produced by a poet or a learned man,
versif ied, poetical, s plendid, melodious in sound and syllable is not in
4 ( P hr a ) K i t t i w u t t h o , p p . 128- 130.
'P h u t t h a t h a t , K hw a m- s uk T hae M i Y u T ac N a i Ng a n ( ^ U V1JJB U Llfll "111'' ) P ' 33
^B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha - dha mma f o r S t ude nt s , p. 68.
i
keeping with the teaching [ of the Buddha] if not connected with s uhha t a . 7
A f ter claiming t hat cit -wang is at the hear t of Buddhis m Buddhadas a also
att empt s to f ur ther weaken K i t t i w ut t hos attack by say ing, "T r ue Buddhis m is
neither T her av ada nor Mahay ana. "(T ) 8 A nd he opens the way for the f ur ther
incor por ation of Mahay ana ideas into T her av ada by say ing t hat , "We should not
regard Zen as being Mahay ana. "( T ) 9 T his l ast claim is in f act based on a r ather
nar r ow and religiously chauv inis tic def inition of Mahay ana Buddhis m as being
concerned more with the wor ship of Mahay ana saints or bodhisattv as than with
f ollowing the pr actical teachings of the Buddha. Buddhadas a attempts to show t hat
Zen does not f it this nar r ow def inition and so should not be called a par t of
Mahay ana Buddhis m. Despite the narr ow char acter of this def inition of Mahay ana
Buddhis m used by Buddhadas a in s uppor ting his case for bor r owing Zen notions it
mus t nevertheless be acknowledged t hat this is the same def inition used by his
cr itics when they raise the spectre of the pur por ted pur ity of T her av ada being
subver ted by the intr oduction of Mahay ana teachings. A nd so. inas much as
Buddhadas a is here conducting a polemical rather than a scholarly debate, his
demons tr ation of the supposedly non- Mahay ana char acter of Zen can be regarded as
politically ex peditious even if it is theor etically super f icial. In tr y ing to dissociate his
bor r owing of Zen notions f r om what most T hai Buddhis ts regard as being
Mahay ana Buddhadas a claims t hat ,
The Zen sect arose in order to ridicule those Mahay anis ts who wor ship
only [ the bodhis attv as , A mit abha and A v alokites 'v ar a with pleadings and
impl or ing s .(T )10
Here Buddhadas a is say ing t hat Zen criticises the same r itualis tic f aith w^hich
T her av adins f ault in popular Mahay ana practice. However, he does not acclaim Zen
as being any better or as hav ing any more insig hts than T her av ada,
Zen is not any better t han the type of Buddhis m we already have ... Zen
is inter esting. Whoev er studies it well mus t become more intellig ent than
7 i bi d.
1/ t t
P h u t t h a t h a t , K hiuam- s u k T hae M i Y u Tae Na i Ng an ( " f t ^ U l l f f l I N l l i 11 ) P '3 3 '
^ 5J
9 i d. (t r ans ) , K ha m- s or n K hor ng H ua ng Po ( 11 Pi H 'Q'J f i ^ I L I 1* The T eaching s o f Hua ng Po),
S a mna k - na ng s y T ha r nr nabuc ha ( f J ' I U n W I N f l Dl f ? T U l J ^ n ), B a ng k ok , 2520 (1977), p. l .
^ i d. , , Ci t - pr a pha t s or n - Cit- doem- thae - Cit- uiang - My an- k an Ry Y a ng - r ai l
w I
(M?mJjsnftfiT - i t \ iftjjuvi - iwilmimnufl." ), p13.
* ' i
It has been B uddhadas as own tr ans lations into T hai of various Zen wor ks12
which has led to the popular is ation of that sects ideas among a f ormerly
uninter ested T hai readership. A nd in the intr oduction to one of those tr ans lations,
The T eaching s o f Huang Po, he appeals to his audiences moder nis t aspir ations by
say ing t hat while the wor k is the acme of Zen Buddhis t thoug ht it is still largely
unknown in T hail and, and if they do not acquaint themselves with it, "T hai
Buddhis ts will be said to be behind the times. "( T ) 13
7.3 Zen Inf l uences on the No t i o n of C i t -w a ng .
It is not the specific ter m s uhhat a which Buddhadas a has borrowed f r om Zen,
for as already seen this ter m does occur in the Pali canon. Rather , it is the view
t hat cit-wang is the f undamental state of mind which has been taken f rom the Zen
school. Suzuki quotes the Zen master Hui Neng as say ing the f ollowing on this
point,
Mind as it is in itself is free f r om ills ... T he Mind as it is in itself is
free f rom distur bances ... T he Mind as it is in itself is free f rom f ollies.14
Blof eld, whose Eng lis h t r ans lation of Huang P os teachings was in tur n
tr ans lated into T hai by Buddhadas a, savs t hat Zen refutes the view,
t hat the mind is a mir r or to be cleansed of the def iling dust of
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * '
11 i d. , Cha w P hut T hi D i Y or m Pen K h n t T hi D i ( " f i ' n V J V l f W L I ' Q U I l l U f l J f j f l W 1 A Good
B uddhi s t is N a t ur a l l y a Good C h r i s t i a n ), Samna k - nang s y T ha mma buc ha (
B a ng k ok , 2523 (1 9 80 ), p . 13.
12
T he mos t i mpo r t a nt Zen t ex t s t r ans l at e d i nt o T ha i by B uddha da s a ar e:
(i.) T he Ze n T eaching s o f H ua ng Po - O n the T r a ns mi s s i o n o f M i n d , J ohn Bl of el d (t r ans ) , Gr ov e Pr ess,
New Y or k , 1958. T r a ns l at e d as K ha m- s or n K ho r ng Hua ng Po ( ** P) ^i DTi'21 d'J L) ^ ^ 1 l i ** T he T eaching s
o f H ua ng Po), Sa mna k - nang s y T ha mma buc ha ( 4'ltl^j J 3"3J U^5 0 ), B a ng k ok , 25 20 (1977).
(i i. ) T he S ut r a o f Wei L a ng [ or H ui Ne ng ), W a ng Mou- l am (t r ans ) , Chr i s t mas Humphr i e s t(ed), no
publ i s he r g i v en, We s t por t Conn. , 1973. T r a ns l at e d as S ut K hor ng Woey L a ng (** ?) T *2 ) >3 I *) **
. ^ 'H
T he S ut r a o f Wei L a ng ) , Samna k - nang s y T ha mma buc ha ( ^ /' l UP MU' J cl "DTl J J ^ ), B a ng k ok , 25 20
(1 9 77).
A s is c ommon in T ha i l a nd t oda y mos t t r ans l at i ons i nt o T ha i ar e f r om Eng l i s h or i g i nal s or Eng l i s h
v er s i ons of t ex t s.
1 3 P h u t t h a t h a t , K ha m- s or n K hor ng Hua ng Po
14
Da i s e l z T e i t ar o S u z u k i , Ze n a nd J a pa ne s e B uddhi s m, J a pa n T r av el Ce nt r e , T ok y o, 1958, p p. 19- 20.
bef or e.(T )11
phenomena, passion and other illusions, for this view leads to dualis m ...
the dust and the mir r or are one intang ible uni t y . 15
A nother Zen master , Hui Neng, t aug ht the par adox ical doctr ine t hat nir v ana
or s alv ation is the same as s ams ar a or the cycle of suf f ering and r ebir th f r om
which liber ation is soug ht. Hui Neng t aug ht t hat def ilements are the same as pure
Mind, and t hat to dis ting uis h between these polar ities is to be caug ht in the
delusory net of dichotomous think ing . Hui Neng then sought not to end def ilements
or the cycle of s ams ar a but r ather the polar ised way of t hink ing in which nir v ana
is disting uis hed f r om s ams ar a, and in which klesa (Pali: k il es a) or mental
def ilements are considered dis tinct f r om pure Mind. A ccor ding to Hui Neng mental
def ilements and the suf f ering of r ebir th are all essentially the same as Mind or One
Mind.
Buddhadas a adopts a view s imilar to Hui Neng s on the f undamental pur ity of
the mind when he criticses some A bhidhamma scholars as holding t hat,
people f undamentally have kiles a. T hat is t hat the mind is f undamentally
dis tur bed. T hey then, try to ex tract kilesa in order to abolish t he m. (T )16
It f ollows f r om the doctr ine of anat t a t hat even kilesa such as ignorance
(a v i j j a ) and cr av ing (t a nha ), despite their great power to obstr uct the att ainment
of nibbana, are non- essential and dependent phenomena. T he dependent natur e of
a v i j j a is detailed in the A v i j j a S ut t a ] 1 where it is stated t hat a v i j j a has the
pahcaniv ar ana or five hindrances of lus t, ill will, sloth, restlessness and anx iety as
its "f ood" or dependent sources of or ig ination. These five hindr ances are f ur ther
described as hav ing three kinds of ducar it a or bad conduct as their "f ood", while
lacking contr ol of the senses is in tur n given as the "f ood" of ducar it a. T he list of
dependent causes then proceeds thr oug h many successive stages18. T his means, as
Chinda Chandr kaew states, t hat,
Ins pite of the f act t hat in the causal f or mula of Dependent Or ig ination
[ paticcasamuppada] a v i j j a is f irst mentioned ... the at t empt to inter pr et
1 5 B l o f e l d , p. 78 n.
1/ I I
^P h u t t h a t l i a t , K hw a m- s uk T hae M i Y u T ae N a i Ng an
p. 36.
1 1)
17 -
A v i j j a S ut t a , A ng ut t a r a Nik a y a , V ol . 2 4 /v e r s e 6 l /p. l 0 3 .
18
T he "f ood" of l ack i ng cont r ol of t he senses is in t ur n l ack i ng t he mi ndf ul ness cal l ed s a t i s a mpa j a r i ha ,
whose "f ood" is g i v en as not bei ng me nt a l l y cl ev er or i ng eni ous . T he "f ood" or s our ce of a l ack of me nt a l
cl ev er nes s is l ack i ng f a i t h or s addha, whos e "f ood" is not l i s t eni ng to t he t r ue t eac hi ng or s acc adhar nma,
whose "f ood" is not me e t i ng wi t h a per s on es t abl i s hed in t r ut h, a s appur i s a .
195
a v i j j a as the f irst pr inciple or cause, out of which ever y thing comes, cannot
be s us tained.19
B ut despite the above scr iptur al descr iption of a v i j j a as being a compounded
or dependent phenomenon ignor ance is nevertheless still popular ly hy postatised as a
self- ex isting evil, personif ied by the demonic f igure of Mar a. Phr a A chan Maha
Boowa Ny anas ampanno, the biog r apher of A char n Mun, reflects this popular view of
a v i j j a when he says,
Ig nor ance is clever, not only in its defensive manouevres whereby it is
adr oitly evasive, but also in aggressive str ategy , whereby it can launch a
surprise attack on its opponent with dev as tating r esults.20
Like Hui Neng Buddhadas a opposes this hy pos tatis ation of ignor ance and
mental def ilements, say ing t hat the at t it ude of attacking a v i j j a and other kiles a is
to deludedly confer on them a s ubs tantial char acter which as imper manent,
dependent phenomena they do not possess. He instead proposes using mindf ulnes s or
s at i to pr event the necessary conditions for k il es a, such as a v i j j a , f rom ar ising , t hat
is, to r emain in the or ig inal state of cit-wang .
7.4 Conf us i ons in B uddha da s a s Use of Zen Not i ons .
But while agreeing with the Zen doctr ine t hat the mind is f undamentally pure
and t hat att ack ing def ilements is the wr ong way to att ain enlig htenment
B uddhadas as reasons for holding these views in f act dif f er f rom the Zen injunctions
to av oid t hink ing in ter ms of r ational polar ities. A nd indeed despite the superf icial
s imilar ities between Zen teachings and his own views Buddhadas a creates conf usions
in his work by not clearly acknowledg ing the differences between his outlook and
t ha t of Zen.
A f undamental conf usion arises f r om B uddhadas as identif ication of his notion
of cit -wang with the Zen idea of One Mind or Or ig inal Mind. For while
B uddhadas as entire inter pr etation of T her av ada doctr ine rests upon a r eduction of
pur por ted s uper natur al phenomena to psy chological states the Zen teaching of One
Mind, unlike the notion of cit -wang , has an ex plicitly ontolog ical component. T his
contr asts shar ply with both Buddhadas as and the t r adit ional T her av ada view of
ana t t a . Blof eld notes a Zen cr iticis m of the T her av ada view of a na t t a , a view which
B uddhadas a str ong ly suppor ts,
19
C h a n d r k a e w , p. 50.
( P hr a A c ha r n Ma ha ) B o o w a Ny a na s a mpa nno, p . 115.
20
196
If the T her av adins are r ig ht with their "no ego and no Self ", what is it
t hat re- incarnates and f inally enters ni r v a na ? ... For if the tempor ar ily
adher ing aggregates of personality are not held together by an ego- soul or
by a Universal Self or the One Mind, whatever enters nir v ana when those
aggregates have f inally dispersed can be of no interest to the man who
devotes successive lives to at t aining t hat g oal.21
Buddhadas a avoids this ontolog ical pr oblem posed by Blof eld (i.e. what is it
t ha t re- incarnates and ul timatel y att ains nibbana?) by def ining the scope of
Buddhis m as covering only the psy chological domain of this life on ear th. As it will
be recalled Buddhadas a re- interprets r ebir th as denoting the continual re- arising of
ego- centredness or "I"- "mine". In contr ast, Mahay anis ts ex plicitly maint ain t hat
there is a tr anscendent "Self ", the One Mind, pre- ex isting all thing s and which is
the pure, unsullied ontological f oundation of r eality . T his Mahay ana notion is totally
dif f er ent f r om the de- ontologised idea of cit-wang , which Buddhadas a maint ains is
the same as the Zen notion of One Mind. C i t -wang is a basic, undef iled mental
condition while the Zen One Mind is not only a f undamental mental state but is
also regarded as being the basic mental substr ate. Buddhadas a, on the other hand,
eschew's all discussion of substrates and of f undamental substances as soter iologically
ir r elevant.
In a pr evious chapter I noted t hat Buddhadas a does not deny t hat non-
conscious mental impur ities , anus ay ak il e s a, continue to ex ist even in some saintly
per sonalities who are established in cit-wang . Fr om this I concluded t hat cit-wang ,
which Buddhadas a defines as the f undamental mental condition, mus t denote the
basic state of the c ons c i ous mind. T his is because if cit-wang is not restricted to
being a descr iption of the conscious mind it would contr adict the pr oposition t hat
there are anus ay a or latent, non- conscious kilesa or mental def ilements. In contr ast,
however, the Zen One Mind, as the source of all being, is much more than a state
of consciousness. T hat is, cit-w ang , as a condition of the conscious mind, is not at
all the same thing as the all- encompassing char acter of the Zen One Mind, and
Buddhadas as att empt to identif y the two only creates conf usion as to the actual
char acter of cit-wang , and of One Mind.
B uddhadas as work is also conf used by his equation of the Zen notion of
s 'uny at a with the concept of wang or cit-w ang . As noted above cit -wang denotes a
mental state which is freed or emptied of def ilements. In contr as t, however, the Zen
and the Mahay ana notion of s'>uny ata is of an all- pervasive, under ly ing pr inciple of
r eality which, while being an abs olute void in which all dualities are abolished,
21 B l o f e l d , pp. 109- 11 On.
par adox ically also has a positive quality of being the "essence" of being. Neither
cit -wang nor the T her av ada notion of s uhhat a can be described as par adox ical.
Both denote a void or absence of psychological and mor al def ilements r ather than of
conceptual dualities . T he T her av ada concept of s uhhat a under pinning B uddhadas as
notion of cit-wang s tr aig htf or war dly describes phenomena as being characterised by
a na t t a or non- es sentialitity . T he Zen s iiny ata on the other hand is a much more
absolute philos ophical notion than either the T her av ada s uhhat a or the psy chological
condition of cit-w ang .
In att empt ing to identif y cit -wang with what Blof eld tr anslates as One Mind
Buddhadas a maintains t hat the or ig inal Chinese ex pression for the ter m Mind is in
f act ambig uous in t hat it could be rendered as either "or ig inal mind" or "tr ue
mi nd". He v decides to tr ans late it as "tr ue or ig inal mi nd", cit-doem-thae
( If ] IfU- JtlVI ), and admits t hat,
These words, "or ig inal mind" or "tr ue or ig inal mind" are f ound in the
Dhy ana Sect [i.e. Zenj. They dont occur in our T her av ada S ect.(T )22
However, Buddhadas a goes on to equate this Zen notion of "tr ue or ig inal
mind" with the T her av ada Pali ter m pabhas s ar a (Sanskr it: pr abhas v ar a, T hai:
pr aphats or n ), liter ally "to shine very br ig ht ly ", say ing t hat like "tr ue
or ig inal mind" this denotes the or iginal mental state which is free f r om
unwholesome def i lements,
T he mind is natur ally pabhas s ar a. T hat is, it is w ithout kilesa and is
not saddened or clouded because of kiles a. T hat or ig inal mind shines as
pabhas s ar a but when kilesa enter it changes into a [ morally] clouded
mind. (T )23
In an ar ticle compar ing Zen and T her av ada Walpola Rahul a refers to this
same ter m of pabhas s ar a as demons tr ating the ex istence of a link between the two
schools. Rahul a offers the f ollowing ex planation of the Zen s y mbolis m of a black ox
which thr oug h t aming and tr aining g r adually becomes white,
T he under ly ing idea is t hat the mind, which is natur ally pure, is polluted
by ex traneous impur ities and t hat it could and should be cleansed thr oug h
discipline and meditation.
There are in the A iig uttar a- nikay a [ Ahg. I (PT S), p. 10] two very
impor t ant and essential s uttas which serve as an index to the concept of
197
22 - . . . . . . . . .
P h u t t h a t h a t , Ci t - pr a pha t s or n - Cit- doem- thae - Cit- w ang - My a n- k a n Ry Y a ng - r a i l ,
V I
( " w i i J r s m m - ^ f i i f T u u v i - l u j j B u m i . 11). p- 12-
23 i d. , O s a r e t a ppha t ha m ( I 1 1 WV t V l f J J U ^ p.226.
i
the black ox g r adually becoming white. One s utta says: Pabhas s ar am
idam bhikkhav e a t t a m, t an ca kho dg antukehi upakkiles ehi upak k il i t t ham.
("Bhik k hus , this mind is luminous and it is def iled by adv entitious
def ilements.") T he other one says: Pabhas s ar am i dam bhikkhav e a t t a m, tan
ca kho dg antuk ehi upakkiles ehi v ippamut t am.{ "Bhikkhus , this mind is
luminous and it is freed f r om adv entitious def il ements .").24
T hat is, there is in f act a T her av ada s cr iptur al basis for Buddhadas as view
t hat the mind is or ig inally pure and only "adv entit ious ly ", t hat is incidentally , and
not f undamentally def iled. Rahul a goes on to note t hat the Pali ter m pabhas s ar a
is f ound in its Sans kr it f or m pr abhas v ar a in the impor t ant Zen tex t, the
L ahk av at ar a S ut r a , where mind is described as pr akr ti- pr abhas v ar a, "luminous by
nat ur e", a descr iption which is paired w'ith pr ak r ti- par is uddhi , "pur e by natur e".
T hus in addition to hav ing some basis in the T her av ada canon Buddhadas as view
t hat mind in or ig inally pur e also bears some r elation to the Zen view. B ut despite
these scr iptur al precedents for Buddhadas as inter pr etation of cit -wang as denoting
pabhas s ar a or the Zen "tr ue or ig inal mind", it is nevertheless still the case that
cit -wang is an incomplete r ender ing of the Zen notion of Mind. As Blof eld notes,
Zen adepts, like their fellow Mahay anis ts , take a na t ma n to imply , "no
entity to be ter med an ego", noug ht but the One Mind, which comprises
all thing s and gives them their r eality ."0
Buddhadas as inter pr etation of anatt a as cit-wang , or the absence of the self-
centredness of "I"- "mine", catches the Zen emphasis on the absence of ego as a
psy chological f unction but not the Zen view of the lack of an entity of the self.
Buddhadas a nowhere talks in ter ms of entities or of the mind or "Mind" as a basis
of r eality .
T he s pir itual goal of Zen is identif ication with the "v oid" or the One Mind, as
is ex pressed in the f ollowing ex cerpt f r om a V ietnamese Zen manual for which
Buddhadas a has sig nif icant regard,
People nor mally cut r eality into sections and divide it into compar tments,
and so are unable to see the interdependence of all phenomena. To see one
in all and all in one is to break thr oug h the great bar rier which Buddhis m
calls the attachment to the false view of self ... We are life and life
w ithout limits ... If our lives have no limits , the assembly of the five
aggregates [k handhas ] which makes up ourself also has no limits . T he
imper manent char acter of the universe, the success and f ailures of life can
no longer manipulat e us. Hav ing seen the reality of interdependence and
24Wa l po l a R a h u l a , "Zen and t he T a mi ng of t he B ul l ", in Wa l pol a Ra hul a (cd) , Zen and the T a ming o f
the B ul l - T owar ds the Re - de f i ni t i on o f B uddhi s t T houg ht , Gor don Fr as er , L ondon, 1978, p p. 16- 17.
25 B l o f e l d , p . l l O n .
penetr ated deeply into its r eality , nothing can oppress you any long er .26
T his emphasis on loss of self thr oug h identif ication with One Mind is absent
f r om T her av ada, and f rom Buddhadas as wr iting s. Buddhadas a defines anat t a quite
dif f er ently as the absence of the def iling or immor al quality of self- centredness, and
he mis takenly represents t hi s as being the centr al teaching of Zen,
T he Chinese Buddhis t Sect of Zen teaches us to live w ithout needing to
have a self ... to eat w it hout there needing to be an eater, to work
w it hout there needing to be a doer. T hat is, to have a mind suf fused with
wisdom. (T )27
In the intr oduction to his T hai tr ans lation of the work of the Zen master
Huang Po Buddhadas a does uncr itically mention the ontolog ical Zen view of One
Mind, "A ll beings are the same thing as t hat which is One Mind, or is the
B uddha . "( T ) 28 But He does not present this inter pr etation in any other of his
wr iting s and even in the same intr oduction f r om which the above s tatement is taken
he shif ts f rom Zens ontolog ical view to his own T heravada- based, psychological and
mor al inter pr etation of One Mind as being equiv alent to s uhha t a , and thus to
cit -w ang , "One Mind has a meaning equiv alent to being freed f rom all distr acting
thing s . "( T ) 29
When f ur ther ex plaining Huang Pos ideas Buddhadas a says t hat before bir th,
"One Mind alr eady ex ists: no- one knows how long it has been in ex istence. "(T )30
Huang Po means by this t hat One Mind is the pre- ex isting g r ound of all being,
while it mus t be recalled t hat for Buddhadas a "bir t h" means the ar ising of the self-
centr ed sense of "I"- "mine" or of ego- centredness, a psy chological rather than a
metaphy s ical phenomenon. T hus in phasa-t ham ter ms to say t hat One Mind ex ists
bef ore "bir t h" is, in contr adis tinction with the Zen view, simply to say t hat
cit -wang is the mental state which pre- exists the ar ising of self- centred def ilements.
26 T h i c h N h a t H a n h , T he Mi r a c l e o f B e i ng A wak e, t r ans . .Vlobi Q uy nh Hoa, ed. J i m For es t ,
S at hi r ak os e s - Nag apr a di pa F ounda t i on, B a ng k ok , 1976, p. 36.
i/ 1/
2*7 _ _ __ ^ ^ vj
P h u t t h a t h a t , N i ppha n P hon S a ma y P a i L aew Ry ( II WW L l l l l f i 51^ ? B *1 )> P- 10-
28i d ., K ham- s or n K hor ng Hua ng P'o ( " I l l " ), p .3 .
29 i bi d. p. 6.
3 0 i bi d. p.3.
2 0 0
7.5 Dif f er ences B et w een the T he r a v a da Nibbana a nd t he Zen S at or i.
T here is a f ur ther sig nif icant dif ference between T her av ada and Zen, in their
respective accounts of enlig htenment, nibbana and s ator i. Buddhadas a implies t hat
both T her av ada and Zen aim for the same goal. However, not all T her av ada
scholar s agree t hat the s pir itual goals of the two tr aditions are in f act identical.
A f ter a study of the respective scr iptur al descr iptions of s ator i and nibbana a Sri
L ank an scholar monk, Bhik k hu A nanda, concludes t hat,
t houg h the descr iption of one who has attained s ator i and nir v ana may
seem s imilar , yet, however, the a t t r i but es belong ing to one who has
attained nir v ana are never heard of nor mentioned of the person who has
attained s ator i in Zen.31
Dif f erences arise f r om the ways in which Zen and T her av ada adepts
respectively att ain their ideal states. Nibbana is s omething att ained thr oug h
indiv idual mor al and meditativ e pr actice while, ideally , the Zen enlig htenment or
s ator i is regarded as a special tr ans miss ion f r om the mind of the teacher to the
mind of the aspir ant. Unlike in T her av ada a teacher is therefore essential in Zen
not only for ins tr uction in meditativ e practices but also for the actual at t ai nme nt of
enlig htenment. T he Zen teaching t hat this mind- to- mind enlig htenment is sudden
also dif f ers f r om the T her av ada emphasis on meditation as leading one g r adually
closer and closer to nibbana. Suzuki says of Zen, "T hat the process of enlig htenment
is abr upt means t hat there is a leap, logical and psy chological, in the Buddhis t
ex per ience."32 T his is completely at odds with Buddhadas as inter pr etation of
cit -w ang , and nibbana, as being continuous with and developing out of everyday
ex periences of mental calm.
T hus while Buddhadas a of ten refers to Zen teachings, claiming Zen doctr ines
to be compatible with if not identical to T her av ada doctr ine, the view of Zen he
presents is heavily coloured by T her av ada notions. In fact B uddhadas as
mis inter pr etation of the Zen notion of One Mind shows t hat, contr ar y to
K i t t i w ut t ho s claims, he is not an apostate to T her av ada Buddhis m. Buddhadas a
mis inter pr ets Zen notions precisely because he keeps to T her av adas non- ontological
pr inciples. K i t t i w ut t hos cr iticism is misplaced for while Buddhadas as emphasis on
cit -wang and s uhhata has its source in Zen his actual inter pr etation of cit -wang in
f act r emains str ictly within the bounds of T her av ada or thodox y . Buddhadas a
nowhere intr oduces the ontolog ical impor t of the Zen notions of s iiny ata and One
Mind.
3 1 ( B bi k k hu) A n a n d a , p. 24.
32
S uz uk i , T he Ze n Doc t r ine o f No - Mi nd, p. 53.
V
2 0 1
Rather than actually intr oducing Zen ideas into T her av ada Buddhis m
Buddhadas a has instead used Zen terms and Zen- like ar g uments to jus tif y a shif t of
emphas is w i t hi n T her av ada doctr ine. While he tends to use lang uag e which has a
s tr ong Zen f lav our he does not in f act reject or replace any T her av ada position with
its opposed Zen view. Instead of intr oducing actual Mahay ana or Zen notions into
T her av ada Buddhis m Buddhadas a draws on Zen to create a new ter minolog y to
dif f er entiate his par ticular inter pr etativ e emphasis f r om the tr aditional ly accepted
versions of T her av ada in T hailand. T his bor r owing of Zen terms and idioms gives
B uddhadas as wor k a Zen- like appearance while also obscur ing the f act t hat his
inter pr etations of cit -wang , s uhhat a and nibbana are in f act continuous with
T her av ada t r adit ion rather than being an "her etical" acceptance of Mahay ana
teaching s.
7.6 B uddha da s a s Ma na g e me nt of Zen S cr i pt ur e s .
However, Buddhadas as "s anit is ation" of Zen in order to make it f it better
with his version of T her av ada ex tends bey ond s ubtly eliding the ontolog ical
implications of ter ms such as One Mind and s 'uny a t a , and av oiding discussing the
diff erences between s ator i and nibbana. In t r ans lating Blof elds book on Hui Neng
into T hai Buddhadas a also omits some sections which show Zen cr iticisms of
T her av ada doctr ines. For ex ample, while including mos t of Blof elds f ootnotes in his
own t r ans lation Buddhadas a leaves out the f ollowing note on the ter m s 'r av ak a,
f ound on page thir t y nine of the Eng lish tr ans lation,
Huang Po sometimes stretches this ter m to imply Hinay anis ts [i.e.
T heravadins] in general ... Huang Po implies t hat Hinay anis ts pay too
much att ent ion to the literal meaning of the scr iptur es, instead of seeking
intuit iv e knowledge thr oug h eliminating conceptual t houg ht .33
Buddhadas a also omits large sections of the second par t of Blof elds tr ans lation
called, "T he Wan Ling Record of the Zen Mas ter Huang Po (T uan Chi )". Section
t hir t y seven of the Wan Ling Record in Blof elds Eng lish version contains the
war ning , "If you accept the doctr ine of a na t ma n [ Pali: anatta] the concept
a n a i m a n may land you among the T her av adins ."34 T his is a Zen cr iticis m of
T her av adins pur por ted attachment to intellectualis ms and to the precise ling uis tic
meaning of the ter m "non- self ", r ather t han att empt ing to go beyond the
intellectual polar ities of whether there is or is not a self in order to penetr ate to
tr ans cendent t r ut h itself.
3 3 B l o f c l d , p. 39 n.
i bi d. Sect i on 37 of "W a n L i ng Recor d of t he Zen Ma s t e r Hua ng P o".
34
^4 '
2 0 2
It is not immediately clear why Buddhadas a should manage his sources in
order to ar tif icially create an appearance of compatibil ity between Zen and
T her av ada doctr ine. It is also unclear why he overlooks the ontolog ical ass umptions
under pinning the Zen and Mahay ana teachings on One Mind when he is in contrast
so cr itical of the ontolog ical beliefs in spir its, demons and heavens of his f ellow T hai
Buddhis ts . These inaccuracies, conf usions and the s tr aig htf or war d avoidance of
tr oublesome aspects of the Zen scr iptur es may , however, result f rom religio- political
cons tr aints . It is clear t hat Buddhadas a sees much in Zen t hat he feels is both of
v alue to T hai Buddhis m and compatible with T her av ada principles. However, in the
pur is t and intellectually x enophobic atmospher e of the T hai s ahg ha he per haps feels
it necessary to jus tif y his enthus ias m for Zen by maint aining t hat there is an
absolute identity between T her av ada and the J apanese school. Because his view of
Buddhis m is clearly unconv entional within the conservative T her av ada t r adit ion in
T hail and, which is in general intoler ant of r adical innov ation in either practice or
teaching , Buddhadas a seeks to av oid por tr ay ing himself as an innov ator and as a
doctr inal renegade by , cons tantly put t ing f orward precedents for his ideas.
Nevertheless, t hat the precedents Buddhadas a draw's on mus t in several cases be
taken f r om outside T her av ada (in the Zen and Mahay ana tr aditions ) indicates the
actual degree of the innovativeness and unconv entionality of his ideas. In the face of
the novelty of his views on T her av ada doctr ine and the of ten intr ans ig ent
conser v atism of his critics, and of the T hai s ahg ha hier ar chy , Buddhadas a takes the
ex treme pos ition of i de nt i f y i ng his centr al notion of cit-wang with Zen ideas of
One Mind and s iiny at a, even thoug h this requires a str etching and manag ement of
the Zen sources. A ny admission of inconsistencies or incompatibilities between Zen
and T her av ada mig ht be seen by Buddhadas a as pr ov iding his conser vative critics
w ith a theor etical stick with which to beat him. Buddhadas a may fear t hat any
self - admitted chink in the ar mour of his ar g uments mig ht be used to pull down the
entir e edif ice of his r ef or mist enterprise.
However, the sources of the inconsistencies in Buddhadas as use and tr eatment
of Zen mater ials and notions r emain speculative. B ut given the intellectual ar dour
and capability s y stematically expressed in B uddhadas as work I am r eluctant to
at t r ibut e the various inconsistencies noted above to either a simple intellectual slip
or to deliber ate duplicity . I am more inclined to the view that the inadequacies in
his tr eatment of Zen result f r om religio- political pressures to maint ain an appear ance
of absolute conf or mity to T her av ada principles and tr aditions .
203
7.7 S a l v a t ion Her e and Now - T he Zen Inf l ue nce on B uddha da s a .
While the version of Zen described by Buddhadas a as impor tant for moder nis t
T hais to know and appr eciate is a par ticular ly T her av ada inter pr etation there is no
deny ing the sig nif icant influence of various aspects of Zen doctr ine on his wor k. It is
not only ter minolog y and liter ar y styles t hat Buddhadas a has borrowed but also
aspects of the ethic or appr oach of Zen to the quest for enlig htenment.
Buddhadas a f inds a s oulmate in such Zen author s as Suzuki who writes, "Zen
disregards conv entionalis m, r itualis m, ins t it utional is m, in f act any thing t hat is
binding and r es tr icting ."30 He f inds in Zen a kind of Buddhis m with the common
goal of cutt ing thr oug h the accumbr ances of past inter pr etations of the scriptures by
r etur ning to the pr actical core of the religion.
There are also specific emphases of inter pr etation borrowed f rom Zen without
which Buddhadas a would not have been able to develop his r adical, moder nist
inter pr etation of T her av ada. For ex ample, the doctr ine t hat cit-wang is the
f undamental mental state (as alr eady seen an idea borrowed, with v ar iations, f rom
the Zen teaching of One Mind) has impor tant implications regarding whether human
ex istence on earth is seen as essentially inv olv ing suf f ering or as only conditionally
being inadequate, and so potentially subject to amelior ation and better ment.
T r adit ional T her av ada teachings equates mater ial ex istence with being caug ht in
s ams ar a , the cycle of rebir th and suf f ering, and maint ain t hat the mere association
of mind or nama with the phy sical or bodily f actors of ex istence, r upa, is the
compounded state of ex istence of s ahk har a , which the Buddha taug ht under lay all
suf f ering. It is a necessary conclusion of this inter pr et,ation t hat the mind can never
be totally free of def ilements or the causes of suf f ering so long as it is associated
with the mater ial f actors of the body . Mere association w it h the mater ial wor ld is
regarded as a def iling ex perience. In cr iticisng Buddhadas a A nan Senakhan
summar ises this tr adit ional inter pr etation as f ollows,
Insof ar as namar upa [ the compound of mind and body factors] yet
r emain there mus t be compounding [s ahk har a] and when there is
compounding it is v att as ams ar a ... When there is namar upa there mus t
be ar ising and passing away . When there is ar ising and passing away t hat
itself means there is v att as ams ar a. Wher e there is v attas ams ar a there
cannot be nibbana because nibbana is devoid of nama r upa , devoid of
compounding , it is as ahk hat adhar nma [ unconditioned] .(T )36
T he compounding of nama and r upa (i.e. of mental f actors and mater iality ) is
35
S u z u k i , Ze n a nd J a pa ne s e B uddhi s m, p. 33.
^ A n a n S e na k ha n, K ha r ns o r n D i a r a t hi
tr adit ional ly regarded as leading to the cycle of bir th and death, becoming and
unbecoming , which in tur n is regarded as leading to suf f ering. A nd so according to
this t r adit ional view any compounded state (i.e. any embodied state) cannot att ain
nibbana because embodiment necessarily entails the suf f ering which is the antithesis
of nibbana. Buddhadas a completely disagrees with this t r adit ional view. For him
s ahk har a or compounding is not essentially the r elation of body to mind but rather
is the purely psy chological att achment of v olition and consciousness to the objects of
desire. Buddhadas a conceives of compounding as the association of consciousness
with cravings which grow f r om delusion and ignorance. In phasa-t ham v attas ams ar a
is consequently inter pr eted as the psy chological cycle of suf f ering r esulting f r om the
ar ising or "bi r t h" of the deluded outlook of ego- centredness, "I"- "mine".
Buddhadas a maint ains t hat , "A t whatever moment the mind is not compounded
with I -mine there is no v att as ams ar a. "( T ) 3' In phas a-t ham v att as ams ar a is not
an ontolog ical condition, as it is for A nan, but a psychological state which is not
f undamentally char acter istic of human mental life but r ather only arises per iodically ,
when delusion and desire compound with consciousness,
Whenever the mind has compounding s ahk har a boiling and gushing up
it is v att as ams ar a. Whenever there is no compounding and the mind
remains in or ig inal peace it is nibbana.(T )38
Raj av ar amunl also considers this pr oblem of mater ial ex istence and suf fering,
and offers an inter pr etation s imilar to Buddhadas as. He notes that if the mind is
s till pervaded by kilesa then the process of per ception will be "t aint ed". Perceptual
consciousness or s ahha tainted with the def ilements of attachment and ignorance is
an obstacle to s alv ation f r om suf f ering because, being imbued with ignorance, it
cannot att ain the clear and objective perception of r eality as tr ans ient and non-
essential which is necessary for s alv ation. Raj av ar amunl calls this def ilement- tainted
consciousness papahcs ahhd or k il es as ahha, which is, "s ahha iperception] t hat arises
f r om kiles a or is combined with kilesa. "(T ) 9 Raj av ar amunl also observes t hat it is
this Arz/esa- infected knowledge or delusion, moha, which is the energy of
s ams ar av at t a , the cycle of suf f ering as detailed in the pat iccas amuppada. But he
maint ains the process of per ception, f ounded as it is in the mater iality of the senses,
3 ^ P h u t t h a t h a t , N a i W a t t a s o ng s a n M i Ni ppha n I n S a ms a r a T here is
- - ^
Ni bba na ) , Sa mna k - nang s y T ha mr na buc ba ( ^ tl 'D'B T ? )> B a ng k ok , 2524 (19 81 ), p . 1 0.
U
38. , . , _
i bi d. p. 7.
3 9 ( P hr a ) Ra t c ha w o r a mum, P hut t ha t ha m f Vi VIU1] T T J J W), p. 43.
does not intr ins ically produce deluded awareness or necessarily lead to suf f ering for,
"A r ahant s yet have s ahha but it is a s ahha t hat is devoid of asav a. T hat is, it
is free f r om k il es a.''(T )40 When kiles a are absent perception is called k us al as ahha
or "wholesome per ception", and this is said to lead to the process of v iv atta or the
opposite of s ams ar av at t a, i .e. the process of the ending of suf f ering. A nd
Raj av ar amuni describes v iv atta as taking place within the scope of the liber ated life
here on ear th, in opposition to the t r adit ional is t claim t hat life is equiv alent to
s ams ar a or suf f ering.
Boy d also presents an inter pr etation s imilar to Buddhadas as ar g uing ag ains t
the t r adit ional view as put f or war d by A nan. Boy d notes t hat the Buddha ex plicitly
denied the teaching t hat nibbana was annihil at ion. Consequently , if nibbana is the
end of s ams ar a, and so thus the end of suf f ering, but it is not phy sical annihil at ion
then the ending of s ams ar a cannot be equiv alent to annihil at ion or death, which is
implied in t r adit ional views t hat def ine life as inex tr icably per meated by suf f ering
and the web of s ar hsar a. Using this ar g ument Boyd then says, in ter ms very
s imilar to Buddhadas a, t hat notions such as r ebir t h, becoming, ag ing and dy ing , as
they occur in the pat iccas amapada,
can refer as much to the rise and fall of sensations- with- attachment
[s ams ar a] as they do to phy sical f ailur e or death.41
But while Buddhadas as view of the r elations between s ams ar a and nibbana
can be ar gued to be str ictly in accord with T her av ada principles he nevertheless
suppor ts it by ref erring to the Zen view on s ams ar a. Following the Zen idiom
Buddhadas a has claimed t hat nibbana or s alv ation ex ists in the condition of
s ams ar a , or the cycle of r ebir th and suf f er ing 42.
Blof eld notes t hat Zen scholars have criticised the t r aditional is t T her av adins as
being,
dualis tic in t hat they seek to overcome their s ams ar ic life in order to
at t ain nibbana; while Zen perceives t hat s ams ar a is none other than
nibbana.43
205
4 0 , . ,
i bid .
41 - - -
J a mes W. B o y d , "T he T be r a v a da V i ew of S a ms a r a , in S oma r a t na Dal as oor i y a (ed), B uddhi s t S t udie s
i n Hono ur o f W a l pol a R a h u l a , Gor don Fr as er , L ondon, 1980, p. 32.
42 - -
T he t i t l e of one of B uddha da s a 's pamphl e t s is I n V a t t a s a ms a r a T here is Nibban. See f oot not e No. 37
abov e
4^B l o f e l d , p.4 4 n.
206
Rupp notes t hat this charge of dualis m derives f r om the f act t hat ,
Whereas for the T her av adins the f undamental mot if in the inter pr etation
of the r elation between nir v ana and s ams ar a has been t hat of contr ast, the
Mahay anis t has ty pically expressed the conv iction t hat they are ultimately
identical.44
But despite dr awing on Zen notions of the identity of s ams ar a and nibbana
and using Zen- styled r hetoric Buddhadas a nevertheless s till retains the tr adit ional
T her av ada duality of s ams ar a and nibbana. He emphasises t hat both v att as ams ar a
and nibbana ex ist in this life here on earth but he does not claim, as does Zen,
t hat both are par adox ically s imultaneously present, i.e. t hat s ams ar a is nibbana.
While both s ams ar a and nibbana are psy chological states for Buddhadas a they do
not both par adox ically ex ist together . For Buddhadas a s ams ar a or the delusions of
"I"- "mine" still ex clude mbbana. He does not borrow the Zen notion of the my stical
union of opposites. When Buddhadas a says t hat nibbana ex ists in s ams ar a he in
f act means t hat what he takes as nibbana ex ists in what other T her av adins
mis takenly believe to be char acter is tically s ams ar a or suf f ering, i.e. human ex istence
here on ear th. T his is a f ur ther instance of Buddhadas as use of Zen- like language
to describe and j us tif y T her av ada or re- interpreted T her av ada notions.
Y et while Buddhadas a does not, like Zen teachers, par adox ically identif y
s ams ar a with nibbana he does maint ain that even in s ams ar a or the wor ldly state
of compounding and suf f ering the mind still remains f undamentally pure, or
cit -w ang . In contr adis tinction with the t r adit ional T her av ada view the notion of
cit -wang presents a pictur e of human beings as f undamentally good and as hav ing
in themselves all the qualities requir ed for at t aining their own liber ation in this life.
In the t r adit ional view or dinar y humans are f undamental l y f lawed by their kilesa
and so are mor ally inf erior to those greater s pir itual beings or T her av ada saints
who are regarded as hav ing pur if ied their minds of the def ilements which still
compound the mental states of the average person. By his ref orms Buddhadas a has
intr oduced into T her av ada what Rupp has described as the str ength of Mahay anis t
teaching s,
its [ Mahay ana B uddhis ms] insistence t hat nir v ana and s ams ar a are
ul timat el y one cons titutes an at least potentially positive v aluation of the
wrhole of being. Hence the concern of the Mahay ana Buddhis t is with all
of r eality . A ll beings par ticipate in the Buddha- natur e [ One Mind] ; all are
alr eady ing r edient in ni r v a na ,45
4 4
R u p p , p. 57.
4 i bi d. p. 63.
207
T hat is, Buddhadas a has imbued T her av ada Buddhis m with s omething of the
univer sal s pir it of Mahay ana while not actually intr oducing the notions of One
Mind, Buddha- natur e and other ontolog ical ex pressions of Mahay ana teaching . In
endowing each person with s pir itual per f ection, cit-w ang , as their basic char acter
Buddhadas a also endows each Buddhis t indiv idual with the potential author ity to
govern their own s pir itual lives and to strive for the ul timat e s alv ation of nibbana.
His eff ort to abolish the s pir itual dis tinction between monks and laity by opening
up nibbana to all thus has a dis tinctly Mahay ana char acter , par alleling the l at ter s
emphasis on the universal potential of all human beings to att ain s alv ation.
A t the same time Buddhadas a r etains what Rupp views as the s tr eng th of the
T her av ada view, which derives f r om the r etention of the dis tinction between nibbana
and s ams ar a. Rupp says t hat in T her av ada Buddhis m,
the religious task entails a s tr aig htf or war d conf r ontation with mor al
l imit at ions and a concerted effort to overcome them - an eff ort, t hat is, to
change the ex isting state of aff airs. T he result is a conception of nir v ana
which emphasises dif ferences and consequently the need for changes in the
pr ev ailing patter ns of phenomenal ex istence or s ams ar a. 46
In other words, at an ideological level B uddhadas as inter pr etation of
T her av ada provides a basis for action in the wor ld, for change and dev elopment and
for notions of universal r ig hts to the benef its of such actions and changes.
Buddhadas a overcomes some ba^ir ideological l imit at ions of both tr aditional
Mahay ana and T her av ada teachings, when viewed in the contempor ar y contex t. His
views counter Mahay ana B uddhis ms under mining of the need for action or change
because of the teaching t hat nir v ana is already present in every s ams ar ic or
wor ldly condition, no matter how much it is imbued with suf f ering. A nd he also
opposes T her av ada B uddhis ms elitist view of who is capable and deserving of
at t ai ning nibbana.
7.8 Zen a nd S ocial A c t i o n - T he Inf l ue nce on B uddha da s a .
T he ideas and emphases adopted f r om Zen are impor tant to B uddhadas as
sy stem of thoug ht because in the T her av ada and T hai contex ts they re- inforce and
s uppor t the ideological s hif t effected by the intr oduction of piv otal notions such as
cit -wang and the inter pr etativ e theory of phas a-khon - phas a-t ha m. It is s ig nif icant
t hat the inter pr etation of Zen which seems to have mos t inf luenced Buddhadas a is
contained in a V ietnamese book whose a ut hor s ex plicit intention was to develop a
208
Zen Buddhis t f oundation for social activ is m in what was then South V ietnam. T he
book, The Mir acl e o f Being Awake - A Ma nua l on Me dit at ion f or the Use o f
Y oung A ctiv is ts by T hich Nhat Hanh. was or ig inally wr itten in V ietnamese for the
aut hor s f riends in the South V ietnamese Schools of Y out h for Social Service. In a
descr iption of the time it is said these schools were composed mostly of,
y oung Buddhis ts who have left the more comf or table life in the cities to
share the dif f iculties of the peasants and refugees in the countr y s ide.47
T he goal of these y oung Buddhis ts was to impr ove the life and s ituation of
the South V ietnamese peasants by f ollowing an ideology which was neither
communis t nor capit alist but Buddhis t. For political reasons T hich Nhat Hanhs
book was not published in South V ietnam and in f act was f irst published in
t r ans lation, both in T hai arid Eng lis h48, and subsequently became very popular in
T hail and. T he signif icance of the book to Buddhadas a, and his association with its
T hai publisher s, can be gauged f rom the f ollowing quote f r om the preface to the
1976 English version, pr inted in T hail and,
On the 27th May , Ven. Buddhadas a Bhik k hu, the most learned monk in
Siam, will complete his 70th bir thday anniv er sar y . On the same day Mrs
Nilch awee Siv ar aksa49 will observe her 40th bir thday . As she has a great
regard for the Mahather a, she has ordered a number of copies of "T he
Mir acle of Being A wake", which has been very much admir ed by the
venerable bhik k hu, to be especially presented to him. 50
Buddhadas as emphasis on mindf ulness as the practice of cit-wang and on
cit -wang as under ly ing pr oductiv e and f r uitf ul work is closely par alleled in "T he
Mir acle of Being A wake". A f ter asking how can a worker practise mindf ulness all
day and yet do all, "T hat needs to be done to change and to build an alter nativ e
4 7 T h i ch N h a t H a n h , p . 17.
48
T he T ha i t r a ns l at or was a monk , Phr a Pr a c ha P a s a nna t ha i nmo [t j %, \
ijTrt?n iltiiiiii] illji the
'
T ha i t i t l e bei ng P a t i ha n Hacng K an- ty n- y u- s ar noe - K hu- my Fy k S a ma t hi S a r nr a p K hon- num- s a w T hi
I I f I
P a t i ba t k a n Na i S a ng k hom
vi n j pm w i ua v!iJp?rm t*1 u fft mi" T he Mi r a c l e o f P e r pe t ual Wa k e f ul ne s s - A
Ha ndbook f o r the Pr act ice o f S a ma dhi f o r Y outh Who ar e A ctiv e i n S ociet y .), Mul a ni t hi K omon
K hi mt ho r ng ( I Pi Vl3'3 )> B a ng k ok , f ir st pr i nt i ng 2518 (1975).
11
49 . . . .
Ni l chawee Si v ar ak s a is t he wi f e of a ut hor and B uddha da s a s uppor t e r , Sul ak Si v ar ak s a.
50
I nt r oduc t i on t o T hi c h N h a t H a n h , p . 10.
209
s ociety ? "51, the author answers himself by say ing t hat ,
T here is no reason why mindf ulness should be dif f erent f r om f ocussing all
ones attention on ones wor k, to be alert and to be using ones best
j udg ement .52
Buddhadas as integ r ation of both s amadhi and v ipas s ana techniques of
meditat ion and his dual account of cit-wang as both the or ig inal mental state and
as the practice to re- attain it can also be seen to be related to the f ollowing
descr iption of mindf ulness as being,
at the same time a means and an end, at the same time the seed and
the f r uit. When we practise mindf ulness in order to build up
concentr ation, mindf ulness is a seed. But mindf ulness is the life of
awareness ... and therefore mindf ulness is also the f r uit .53
While it is clear t hat Zen teachings have s ig nif icantly inf luenced B uddhadas as
views his whole system cannot be ex plained by ref erring only to this inf luence. T he
ideas Buddhadas a has borrowed f r om Zen all f it into the patter n of his r ef or mist
ideology , and they all buttr ess his attempts to develop a moder nist inter pr etation of
Buddhis m in line with the principles outlined in the Chapter T wo. T here is a
conv enient par allelism between Zen teachings and the sort of moder nis t, socially
r elevant r eading of T her av ada Buddhadas a aims for. However, it is alway s
T her av ada rather than Zen t hat stands par amount in Buddhadas as mind and this
is shown most clearly by the fact t hat when there are discrepancies between Zen
and T her av ada, as is inev itably the case, it is alway s Zen t hat gives way to
T her av ada teachings and not the converse.
51.
i bi d. p. 23.
52
i bi d.
5 3 i bi d. p. 24.
2 1 0
CHAPTER 8
BUDDHADASA ON MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT.
B uddhadas as impor tance in T hail and is not limited to his re- inter pr etation of
Buddhis t doctrines of s alv ation or to his hav ing laid the theoretical g r oundwor k for
a world- involved or socially- involved Buddhis m. For his supporters among moder nist
T hai Buddhis ts Buddhadas as ex plicit s tatements on socio- economic development and
on politics, which are developed f r om the theor etical f oundations of his doctr inal re-
inter pr etations, are equally impor tant. It is B uddhadas as ex plicit statements on
contempor ar y social and political issues which have given his work sociological as
well as doctr inal and religious signif icance in T hail and. B ut while his social
philosophy is socially s ig nif icant it is, nevertheless, flawed by f undamental theoretical
contr adictions . These contr adictions do not result f rom simple theor etical slips or
lapses but rather arise f rom the very way in which Buddhadas a has carried out his
moder nis ation and ref orm of T hai Buddhis t doctr ine. T he contr adictions arise f rom
his championing of a wor ld- involved and socially r elevant inter pr etation of Buddhis t
teachings while still maint aining str ict conser vatism in the area of clerical practice.
T hat is, there are strong inconsistencies between Buddhadas as str ict or thopr ax y ,
which as has been shown is a basis of the author is ation of his r e- inter pretations,
and his actual re- inter pretations of doctr ine. In this chapter Buddhadas as views on
socio- economic dev elopment are presented, and the under ly ing contr adictions in these
views are analy sed. Chapter Nine f ollows a s imilar appr oach, but instead
concentrates on Buddhadas a's views on political activ ity and political inv olv ement.
8.1 B uddha da s a s Q ua l if ied S uppor t F or S ocio- Economic De v e l opme nt .
Buddhadas a has contr ibuted to the debate on the role of Buddhis m in
T hail ands socio- economic dev elopment by pr esenting ar g uments in s uppor t of
mater ial dev elopment, pr ovided such development r emains tied to clearly specified
r eligious goals. Buddhadas a has based his suggestions for a Buddhis t appr oach to
nat ional dev elopment on general ar g uments like the f ollowing , where he links notions
of ev olution and progress with his inter pr etation of the Buddhis t wor ld view,
211
A ccor ding to the law of ev olution as put f orward by contempor ar y
sciences like biology and in par ticular Dar winis m; as ex pressed by
Buddhis m in the law of the twenty f our kinds of causal r elations 1 and the
pat iccas amuppada, and f inally as can easily and generally be observed this
wor ld g r adually advances towar ds higher and higher levels - if not
mater ially then of necessity mentally . Stag nation and decline are not f ound
A ll this shows t hat the inter nal instincts [ of liv ing things] together with
all the ex ter nal, s ur r ounding pr omoting f actors only pull thing s towar ds
increasing better ment, because such is the inher ent desire of all liv ing
t hing s .(T )2
However, when he tur ns to speak of progress is the social r ather than the
nat ur al sphere Buddhadas a maint ains t hat development is no longer inev itable but is
dependent upon a conscious integ r ation of both mater ial and s pir itual values in
human wor k. Buddhadas a acknowledges t hat single- minded mater ial and s pir itual
activ ity are respectively capable of eff ecting progress in their own spheres,
Whenever we are str ongly inclined towar ds the mater ial side of thing s we
reach the end point of mater ial dev elopment, an ex ample being the sudden
advances of contempor ar y science. A nd wrhenever the wor ld is collectively
inclined towards the mental side of thing s we will reach the end point of
mental dev elopment j us t as in the ancient period of the ar ahant s . { T )3
However, he maintains t hat whatever mater ial developments moder n science
may produce, wor king on only the mater ial or physical level of activ ity cannot of
itself lead to mental or s pir itual dev elopment. A nd Buddhadas a regards the political
conf licts and social tensions of the modern wor ld, ar ising accor ding to him f r om
mor al lax ity , as showing t hat, "Solv ing problems mater ially is inadequate, problems
mus t be solved mentally as w e l l . "(T )4
But Buddhadas a also claims t hat a purely mental or s pir itual appr oach to
social pr oblems and to the issue of dev elopment is equally inadequate, say ing t hat ,
"In f act it is impossible for us to live by either mind or matter alone.
^In t he P a t t ha n a of t he A bhi dha mma pi t a k a caus al i t y or t he condi t i onal de pende nce of al l phe nome na is
anal y s e d i nt o t we nt y f our di f f er ent t y pes of c ondi t i ona l i t y or paccay a.
2P h u t t h a t l i a t , N i ppha n ( ,f ** ), p . 19.
3 i bi d. p. 20.
4 - - -
i d. , Ha k K ho r muni t K h a u M a P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Yu D a i
V I V
( i n n f l ' a U i J U ^ B L l l v l f C o mmuni s m Come s B uddhi s m C a n S t i l l
S ur v i v e ), Ong k a n Fy n- f u P hr a P hut t ha s a s a na ( J I * W Vi'S Pi *") t i l l ^ S a mut pr a k a n T ha i l a nd,
V 1
2517 (1 9 7 4), p . 101.
Dev elopment has bot h. "(T ) 5 Nevertheless, he still regards s pir itual f actor s as hav ing
the greatest impor tance and as being the main deter minants of at t aining successful
or problem- f ree dev elopment,
It mus t be the correct and impor tant thing s t hat lead. For ex ample, the
mental, the intellectual, the s pir itual should lead the mater ial .(T )6
By way of ex ample of what he regards as a correct appr oach to development
Buddhadas a offers J apan, home of Zen, as evidence for the power of social activ ity
inf or med by the s pir itual condition of "f r eed- mind" or cit-wang to pr ov ide a basis
f or all r ound welf are,
J apan took the path of mental instead of mater ial development and now
J a pa ns mater ial development has progressed to the point t hat the
f oreigners [i.e. Eur opeans and Americans] are af r aid of the bir thplace of
t hat mental dev elopment. J apan has a hig h level of mental development ...
it is in everyday life, in the very cultur e, t hat is, the kind of Buddhis m we
call Zen.(T )7
Sig nif icantly Buddhadas a regards Zen- inf luenced mental development as
pr omoting qualities such as resoluteness, industriousness, vigour in wor k, f orbearance
as well as politeness and gentleness - which together could be considered a
manag er s checklist of the attr ibutes of an ef f icient wor ker. In other words,
Buddhadas a would like to see a Zen- styled mental cultur e develop in T hailand in
order to pr omote the kind of qualities which mig ht lead to T hai workers becoming
more ef f icient agents of mater ial development. T his reveals another side to
B uddhadas as interest in ending the dis tinction between the lay per sons and the
monk s religious paths. He regards the qualities acquir ed by laypersons thr oug h
meditat ion and str ict s pir itual practice as not only per mit t ing them to reach
nibbana but as also enabling them to work more ef f iciently at the mater ial level.
For Buddhadas a wor king with cit-wang or a "f r eed- mind" not only frees one f r om
suf f ering but also helps to achieve better mater ial results. T his allows him to say,
"Dev eloping the mind accor ding to dhamma or by f ollowing the correct wor ldly way
212
5 i d. , B a r a m a t h a m ( " l i n j s n u f, p . 7 4 .
i d. , T ha mma ^ K a p ^ L ok ^ Ca P a i Dua y k a n D a i Ry M a i l
( % n }j z ruj i a rrv zl iJ?n ij mil fiu ?al u" C a n D h a m m a a nd the Wor l d Get A l ong T og et her ! ),
Sa mnak - nang s y T ha mr na buc ha B a ng k ok , 2521 (1978), p . 12.
i d., B a r a m a t h a m , ( ), pp. 84- 85.
213
amount to the same t hi ng . "( T ) 8 T hat is, provided people act mor ally Buddhadas a
does not dis ting uis h between either mater ial or mental dev elopment, seeing both as
necessarily f ollowing f r om abiding by dha mma and developing cit-wang.
Because of the impor tance placed on s pir itual pr actice in his view of
dev elopment Buddhadas a is a str ong cr itic of the present dominant appr oach to
dev elopment in T hail and, which he regards as being too one- sidedly mater ialis t,
We have been born in a pr imitiv e, underdeveloped countr y , althoug h t hat
is in f act only tr ue of the minor ity . B ut we f ollow the backsides of
countries which are developed or run af ter mater ialis m. We take people
who are mad over matter as our teachers. Even if were bor n in a forest we
should be able to become paccekabuddhas , but we dont want to. We still
r un af ter the tail end of the progress of those who are mater ially
developed. W7hy do we wor ship the mater ial side of dev elopment? ... It is
more, more, more, because we dont know ... t hat it is dangerous to
humani t y . (T ) 9
By mater ialis m Buddhadas a means the psychological or s pir itual domination of
the mind by desires for mater ial objects and phy sical pleasures. Buddhis m teaches
detachment f r om the objects of the mater ial wor ld and def ines nibbana as a
condition which is unaf f ected by suf f ering because it is totally independent of the
imper manent thing s of the wor ld. T hus when he criticises dev elopment in T hailand
as being overly mater ialis t Buddhadas a means t hat it is being gone about with a
mental att it ude of att achment and in such a way t hat it promotes f ur ther
att achment to mater ial thing s , which in tur n leads to suf f ering among those who
par ticipate in such dev elopment. A ccor ding to Buddhadas a conf usion and social
disor der result f r om under taking development with an immor al at t it ude of cr av ing or
att achment to ma t erial results,
T he wor ld now aims only for mater ial dev elopment because of cowardice
and the fear of not keeping up with "T hem", of not hav ing the equipment
to f ig ht "T hem" or to live well ... Consequently the whole wor ld is in this
state of disor g anis ation and conf usion. T here are complicated pr oblems
w ithout end which have arisen in par ticular f r om moral deg ener ation.(T ) 10
Mor al degener ation here means att achment and the self- centredness of
"I"- "mine ", which Buddhadas a regards as the r oot causes of the conf usion and lack
of peace in the wor ld.
8i bi d. p. 82.
9
i d. , T ha mma K a p L ok Ca P a i Dua y k a n D a i Ry M a i l
v 1/ I
( ) p-9-
1 0i d. , B a r a m a t h a m ( " u n m j u y , pp. 75- 76.
214
T he notion of peace or s ant i is centr al to Buddhis t doctr ine because the
s pir itual goal of nibbana is conceived of as being the s tilling and ex tinction of
conf used att achment and its concomitant suf f ering. As Chinda Chandr kaew observes,
peace is the intr ins ic value about which all others move. Hence it is
stated t hat there is no bliss higher than peace (Dha mma pa da verse 202),
which itself here means the at t ainment of nibbana. n
Buddhadasa maint ains t ha t , "Natur e wants there to be peace. If there is nt
peace there will be destr uction and r ui n. (T ) 12 T he natur e spoken of here is the
cosmic- moral order of dha mma , and the des tr uction and r uin is consequent upon the
f actionalis m and conf lict which arise f r om self- centred att achment and greed.
"K eeping the peace" is a str ong value ir^ T hai cultur e where it is most commonly
ex pressed as an aversion to w un-way ( Gr conf usion and disorder which
are believed to lead to ins t abil ity and possibly even anar chy . Mor ell and
S amudav anij a comment t hat ,
The proper [ Thai] behav iour al mode is to be quiet, calm and submissive.
In contr ast wun-way and its conf usion upset peace and order in society, the
most un- T hai action of al l . 13
Buddhadas a thus appr oves of the mater ial benef its of socio- economic
dev elopment but not the cultur al and social costs of the associated loss of s pir itual
values.
8.2 B uddha da s a s Int e g r a t e d T heor y of A c t i on.
It was noted in Chapter T wo t hat many of B uddhadas as supporter s among
progressive, educated T hai Buddhis ts seek in Buddhis m an independent and
indig enous ideology of development; a set of intr ins ically T hai r ather than foreign
g uidelines for the overall progress of the countr y . Because Buddhadas a and his lay
audience desire Buddhis t doctr ine to be a theor etically consistent unity , if Buddhis m
is to f ulf il an ideological role s uppor tiv e of socio- economic dev elopment then the
r elig ions teachings mus t be inter pr eted in such a w'ay t hat mater ial activ ity in the
social wor ld is integ r ated with and seen to develop f r om the f undamental principles
of doctr ine. Because progressive Buddhis ts r epudiate the t r adit ional lay f orms of
B uddhis m as supcr s titious ly concerned with mer it and r ebir th it is not suf f icient
11 C h a n d r k a e w , p. 33.
1^P h u t t h a t h a t , Cut - May K ho r ng K a ns y k s a ( " ^f l U J J "'lU2 Q'3 H 0 J ^f ) n ), p . 13.
1
13
M o r e l l & . S a m u d a v a n i j a , p. 30.
215
t hat contempor ar y notions of moder nis ation or dev elopment be inter pr eted s imply in
ter ms of the historically- given lay aspect of the r eligion. Rather , mater ial social
activ ity mus t be integ r ated with the doctr inal core of the r eligion, i.e. with the
at t ai nme nt of ul timat e peace or nibbana. While not posing this pr oblem ex plicitly
Buddhadas a nevertheless provides the f oundation of an integ r ated Buddhis t
inter pr etation of action. For ex ample, he implies t hat socio- economic dev elopment
and social jus tice are essential for s pir itual at t ai nme nt and thus for s alv ation. In the
contex t of discussing the injustices in the contempor ar y capitalis t appr oach to socio
economic dev elopment in T hailand Buddhadas a says, "If the political system in the
wor ld is not good [in pr omoting justice and development, the people of] this wor ld
will not have the hope of at t aining pa r a ma dha mma [ ultimate nibbana] ." {T ) 14 He
equates the social injustices of capitalis m with immor al ity and mater ialis m,
If in any countr y there are still people ... in need it mus t mean t hat
there is not equality in t hat society. As a consequence dis or g anis ation of
many kinds and varieties will necessarily arise; as, for ex ample, conf licts in
the countr y , the br eaking up of social har mony , insur r ection, changes in the
order of g ov er nment, changes in the economic system to socialism or
communis m. Because w'hen the poor can bear their s ituation no more they
tend to look for a way to destroy the ex tremely selfish wealthy people with
no regard for any thing at all. A nd many other kinds of dis r uption then
f ollow, such as making war and killing each ot her .(T ) 15
T hus Buddhadas a thinks t hat in unj us t societies where the rich selfishly hoar d
social wealth the poor have no oppor tunity for s pir itual at t ainment because of the
unbear able natur e of their wor ldly ex istence. A nd the disorder and conf usion which
result f r om the poor rebelling ag ainst social injustice and inequality only makes the
s pir itual peace of nibbana an even more r emote and unat t ainabl e goal. Mor ally
g uided social activ ity for over coming w hat Buddhadas a regards as the related
pr oblems of poverty and social injustice is consequently a pre- requisite for making
s pir it ual at t ai nme nt or nibbana a univer sally accessible goal.
B uddhadas as emphasis on wor k, which he takes as meaning , "T hat which
human beings mus t do, both phy sically and s pir itually , for both phy sical and
s pir itual r es ul t s ,"(T ) 16 provides a f ur ther basis in his doctr inal re- inter pretations for
an integ r ated theory of action. He implies t hat work is essential to s pir itual
at t ai nme nt in such s tatements as, t hat in regard to lear ning about the pat h to
14P h u t t h a t h a t , B a r a ma t ha m *( U 5* 3-JU3 T U** , p. 102.
15 . _
i d. , I l a k t y ho r muni t K h a u { ^a t/
* 1 V
^i d . , B a r a m a t h a m (** 11 3" 3* 3 U **), p. 98.
P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Y u D a i
), pp. 29- 30.
216
nibbana, "wor k itself is the best teacher. "( T ) 17
However , there are theor etical dif f iculties in integ r ating the doctr ine of
tr ans cendent salv ation with any notion of mater ial activ ity and in making both
s pir itual and wor ldly activ ity par t of the same f undamental effort for s alv ation. Wi t
summar ises the dif f iculty when he says t hat the core of T her av ada doctr ine has
t r adit ional l y involved,
a belief in the v ir tue of non- inv olv ement in the struggles of society.
Ma ns phy sical labour or the appl ication of human intelligence to the
s olution of wor ldly pr oblems is not eulogised or even considered [by the
religious] to be the means to a better life ... Neither indiv idual nor
collective economic, social or political action is suggested as the appr opr iate
means or impr ov ing ma ns l ot . 18
8.3 Nibbana A s B ot h a S ocial a nd a Re l i g i ous Goal .
Buddhadas a deals with this dif f iculty by no longer conceiving of nibbana solely
as an indv idual s pir itual goal but also as a social goal whose r ealisation necessitates
social action as well as persona] s pir itual pr actice. In contr adis tinction with the
t r adit ional T her av ada view t hat nibbana is only accessible to wor ld- renouncing
monks Buddhadas a considers Buddhis t s alv ation to be open to all, lay and monk.
A t the level of indiv idual s alv ation Buddhadas a r etains the tr aditional teaching t hat
ni bbana, as a condition which is independent of all chang ing thing s, is att ainabl e no
matt er what ones mater ial circumstances. However, at the social level he maintains
t hat a s uppor tiv e social order is a necessary pre- requisite for every person to in f act
have the oppor tunit y to work for and att ain nibbana.
Buddhadas a denies the t r adit ional view of s pir itual practice in which aiming to
a t t ai n nibbana necessitates r etr eating f r om social inv olv ement to the monaster y or
f orest her mitag e. When, as in the t r adit ional Buddhis t view on s alv ation, the quest
for nibbana is limited to a small elite equating the att ainment of s alv ation with
detachment f r om social inv olv ement does not pose any great dif f iculty . B ut when
nibbana is regarded as a univer sally accessible ideal it is clearly impossible to equate
the quest for s alv ation with r etr eatis m. It is impossible for every member of society
to av oid or retreat f rom mundane dis tr actions w ithout social order collapsing , and
so for Buddhadas a nibbana mus t be def ined as a goal attainabl e w ithin the social
sphere. A nd given that the abil it y of a layperson to work for nibbana is dependent
upon a s uppor tiv e social order , such as hav ing suf f icient wealth and free time to be
17i bi d. p. 99.
18W i t , p . 57.
217
able to practice meditation or study Buddhis t teaching s, s alv ation in B uddhadas as
system consequently becomes conditional upon the state of the social wor ld. For
when retr eating f r om social inv olv ement is no longer an acceptable path to nibbana,
and when injustice and inequality inhibit some peoples ability to work for t hat
s pir itual goal then r emoving those inhibit ing social f actors is essential if nibbana is
in f act to be a univer sally relevant and accessible goal.
While the r ealisation of nibbana as a univ er sally accessible social goal is
dependent upon a r elatively prosperous and j us t social order Buddhadas a does not
r epudiate the t r adit ional teaching t hat any given indiv idual can alway s strive for
and att ain nibbana whatever his or her social circumstances. A n indiv idual whose
cir cumstances inhibit his or her abil ity to under take s pir itual practices and str ive for
nibbana always has the option of r enouncing social inv olv ement and becoming a
monk or recluse. Buddhadas a consequently does not contr adict the teaching t hat
nibbana, as a condition of personal s alv ation, is independent of all chang ing
phenomena. It is only as a social ideal r ather than as a personal ideal t hat the
at t ai nme nt of nibbana is dependent upon the r ealisation of a suppor tiv e social order.
Similar l y , it is only as a social ideal t hat the at t ainment of nibbana necessarily
implies action in the wor ld to better society; the personal att ainment of nibbana, as
in t r adit ional Buddhis m, necessitates no social inv olv ement whatsoever, and in
B uddhadas as system r emains a condition att ainabl e totally outside of society. T hat
is the path to nibbana, as an indiv idual state of s alv ation, r emains, in theory ,
essentially independent of ones mater ial circumstances. But nibbana, as the
univ er sally relevant social goal Buddhadas a defines it as, cannot be realised w ithout
a cer tain j us t and equitable social order.
Buddhadas as emphasis on the r elation between social order and justice and
the oppor tunity for s pir itual at t ainment has a well- established precedent in the
T her av ada notion of the cak k av at t in or r ighteous monar ch. T he t r adit ional T hai
view of the cak k av at t in is presented in the T r aibhiimik at ha and A nday a notes t hat
in t hat tex t,
T he legendary Buddhis t king , Dhar mas okar aj a, is cited as the ideal
ex ample of a cak r av ar t in who pr actised mer itor ious works and eased the lot
of his people so t hat they could devote more time to s pir itual matter s . 19
T hat is, there is a t r adit ional recog nition in the Buddhis t tr adit ion of the
impor tance of social order to the general populaces s pir itual welf are, and on this
point T ambiah makes the relevant obser vation t hat ,
19
B a r ba r a Wa t s on A n d a y a , "S t a t e c r a f t in t he Re ig n of L u T ha i of S uk ho da y a ", in B ar dw e l l L. S mi t h
(e d), R e l i g i o n and the L e g i t i ma t i o n o f Power i n T ha i l a nd, L aos a nd B u r m a , A ni ma Books , Chambe r s bur g
P e nn. , 1978, p. 4.
218
Fr om early times Buddhis m has been positively related to a conception of
an ideal politico- social order, whose cornerstone was a rig hteous monar ch
who would pr omote a prosperous society and religion. T his Buddhis t
conception of a mor al polity r eadily f its with a f or mulation t hat only a
mater ially prosperous society can be ready for the pur s uit of s pir itual
concerns; it also f its equally with a political ideology of benevolent
abs olutis m combined with welf are s ocialis m. 20
However, while the welfare of the populace has tr aditional ly been regarded in
ter ms of their f ollowing the lay or lokiy a pat h, Buddhadas a integr ates the social
welf are t r adit ion of Buddhis t political teachings with the f ormerly monas tic ideal of
at t aining nibbana. A ccor ding to Buddhadas a a social order should not only pr omote
the mor al welfare of the populace, the t r adit ional ly def ined r esponsibility of a
cak k av at t in, it should also meet the much more ex acting criter ion of contr ibuting to
the actual s pir itual s alv ation of the populace.
8.4 S ocial I lls a nd t he F a i l ur e of Cont e mpor a r y Re l i g i on.
For Buddhadas a the f undamental cause of social problems, and of the disorder
and conf usion which hinders the r ealisation of nibbana as a social goal, is
inadequate or impr oper mor ality , "A ll disor g anis ation [wun-way ] is the result of a
lack of mor a l i t y ."(T ) 21 Mor al f ailures, t hat is, not maint aining cit- wang or detached
mindf ulnes s leads to the self- centredness of "I"- "mine" which Buddhadas a regards as
the immediate cause of social pr oblems, "Self- centredness is the basic cause of
suf f er ing, both indiv idually and s ociall y ."(T ) 22 Wi t hout the mindf ulness and self-
r estr aint inv olved in mor al practice the t r uths of anat t a and anicca are lost sight
of. Mis g uidedly t hink ing that, there is a self which can possess and thing s t hat can
be possessed, people selfishly crave mater ial objects, and this selfish craving causes
social suf f ering when some consequently hoard wealth while others go in need. When
there is hoar ding by the "haves" there are attempts by the "have nots " to take the
stored wealth, and so social conf lict and conf usion arises. T hus for Buddhadas a the
causes of t ur moil or the lack of social peace are traced to the same moral lapses
and self- centredness which produce personal suf f ering and lack of mental peace.
20
T a r n b i a h , Wor l d Conque r or and Wor l d Re nounce r , p. 431.
21 - . - - - -
P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha mmi k S a ng k hor nniy om B aep P ha dc t k a n Ry S a ng k homni y om T am L a k Hae ng
S a s a na ( T huk S a s a na ( II r l UUU U LI U U I CJ PTV f l 1 7 V U f l i f t p l i m i J U
f] ^1 UW'J Pi 1^1 1 ^ VIH ^ Di c t a t o r i a l Sty le o f D ha m m i c S oc ia l i s m, or
1
S o c i a l i s m i n A ccor d w i t h the P r i nc i pl e s o f Ev er y Re l i g i o n) , S ainnak - nang s y T ha r nma buc ha
( a ' n U f n 3 l T > K l B l } U m j ,i n ), B a ng k ok , 2517 (1 9 74), p.3.
u
22i d. , K ha r a w a t T ha m ( " T J J J )%p.43.
219
Buddhadas a f ur ther traces the mor al f ailing s which cause social pr oblems to
the f ailur e of religions to eff ectively communicate their s pir itual message,
Because of wrong inter pr etations people f ail to apply themselves to
religious pr actice so t hat their so- called "r elig ion" ceases to be an effective
device for solving the pr oblems of everyday ex istence. Only when a religion
has f ailed to do its duty does mater ialis m come into ex istence in the wor ld
... if religious ins titutions inter pr et the tenets held by them correctly ,
especially the tenets expressed in the lang uag e of dhamma [ i.e. phas a-t ha m],
then religious practice itself will prove to be the "decided opponent" of
mater ialis m in all its f orms. 23
Buddhadas a regards his phas a-t ham inter pr etations of Buddhis m as not only
r evealing the correct way to personal s alv ation but also as cor r ecting doctr inal
mis inter pr etations which have led to people becoming disenchanted with r eligion. He
att empt s to re- interest his T hai audience in what he sees as the univer sally relevant
t r uths of Buddhis m, and implor es T hais to take a fresh look at their relig ion, as
inter pr eted in phasa-t ha m,
Dont get the impression t hat mor ality is reactionary . Childr en, adults
and people with political and economic power tend to look on religions or
mor ality as reactionary and as f ollowing the ways of our g r andpar ents ...
T he t r ut h is t hat it [ religion] has reached the point of being r eactionar y
because it has been going in the wr ong dir ection for so l ong .(T ) 24
A ccor ding to Buddhadas a not only has the histor y of doctr inal
mis inter pr etation made world- involved people dis enchanted with r eligion, it has also
led to dev out people abandoning impor tant areas of social activ ity . T he histor ical
div is ion between the mundane and the s upr amundane has led many to regard active
w'orld- involvement directed towar ds amelior ating social problems as ant it hetical to
their religious life, and Buddhadas a decries B uddhis ts avoidance of political
inv olv ement and the abandonment of political activ ity to the self- centred and self-
seeking,
In society people who have shar p and pure s pir itual intelligence usually
prefer to av oid g etting involved in politics , accor ding ly aiming only for the
pur e, in depth study of the humanities , liter atur e, ancient history or the
nat ur al sciences. In T hailand there are people who dont dare utter a wor d
about politics; who dont dare speak about the pr oblems of mor ality , who
are af r aid of being accused t hat they are inv olv ed in politics. Consequently
they dont dare mention the word "peace" or consider the thing called
peace. T hey detest and are af r aid of the wor d "politics ". They are af r aid
because they think t hat politics is s omething dir ty and deceitf ul ... When
L O *
B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y and B uddhi s m, p . 16.
24P h u t t l i a t h a t , Cut - may K hor ng K an- s y k s a
2 2 0
it happens t hat intellig ent people like this prefer not to get involved in
politics, it consequently seems t hat it will be lef t only to the s tupid or to
people with wor ldly [ materialist] mentality to get involved in political
af f air s. T he people with tr ue and pure intelligence have deserted it. T his is
called the degener ation of the wor ld because of the f ailur e to use
intelligence for the purposes of peace.(T ) 25
In a s imilar vein Buddhadas a has also said,
Here even among us Buddhis ts some may doubt, "Why should we play a
leading role in all the af f airs of the people in the whole wor ld? Let us only
be interested in our own inter nal Buddhis t af f airs ..." If there is any one
who thinks like this please let him recollect the wor ds of the Buddha who
says: "T he T athag ata is born in the wor ld for the happiness of all beings"
Mor eover , when the Buddha f ir st sent gr oups of monks out to spread
the teaching , He emphasised this as well say ing, "Go you f or th, Oh
bhik k hus ... to preach the div ine life for the benef it and happiness of the
wor ld ..." It is proper for us to sacrif ice ourselves to play a leading role in
the af f airs of the whole wor ld as the Buddha intended us to do. 26
In response to the tr adit ional is t claim t hat s pir itual ity or dha mma is the
antithes is of inv olv ement in the social wor ld Buddhadas a replies,
In one sense dhamma is indeed the opposite of the wor ld, but it is
opposite in t hat it helps get rid of problems. When the wor ld is pointed
towar ds evil dha mma will point it towar ds good ... Whenever there is
peace and happiness it can be said t hat dha mma and this wor ld have have
been able to show their amicable r elations .(T ) 27
For Buddhadas a the association of dha mma or mor ality with politics, t hat is,
the par t icipat ion of Buddhis ts in the political process, would prevent politics
becoming cor r upt and a source of conf lict. T his is his j us t if ication for say ing, "I am
of the opinion t hat dha mma is a political ideol og y ."(T ) 28 Buddhadas a thus views
social pr oblems as r esulting f rom an inadequate level of mor al under s tanding and
mor al pr actice in the lay society, a f ailing whose cause lies in the inadequacies of
the Buddhis t chur ch. He regards Buddhis m as hav ing failed because of its pr omotion
of erroneous inter pr etations of doctr ine which fail to show the relevance of r eligion
25i bi d. pp. 8- 9.
^ B u d d h a d a s a , "E x c ha ng i ng Dha mma Whi l e F i g ht i ng ", i n V is ak ha P uj a , B uddhi s t A s s oci at i on of
T ha i l a nd, B a ng k ok , 2513 (1970), p. 33.
27 - , - -
P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha mma K a p L ok Ca P a i Dua y k a n D a i Ry M a i l
i/ r
( TUrtMjlan^ rl ij'* ). pp-s-e.
28 i d. , T ha mma Na i T ha na L a t t hi K an- r ny ang ( ^ ^ ~ I I V l l j H 'I J I U'EN 11 D h a m m a A s a
r ^ ^
P o l i t i c a l Ideol og y ), Sa mna k - nang s y T ha mr na buc ha ( ^ Cif tl ] T J B a ng k ok , 2521 (1 9 78 ),
p. 2.
to moder n life and so tur n people away f r om the r eligion and render those who do
stay with the of f icial church socially and politically impotent.
B uddhadas as views on the need for mor al people to become politically
inv olv ed not only counter the t r adit ional Buddhis t view t hat s pir itual at t ainment is
opposed to wor ldly inv olv ement but also go ag ainst the t r adit ional T hai view of
pol it ical activ ity . As Morell and S amudav anij a note, "T he image of politics in
T hail and is of an activ ity t hat is dir ty , immor al , manipulativ e, cor r upt and
chaot ic. " 29 A corollary of this t r adit ional view is the belief t hat political
inv olv ement is s pir itually cor r upting and Somboon Suksamr an observes t hat while
there is in f act a f undamental s tr uctur al r elation between ins t it utional Buddhis m
and the T hai political establishment (see Chapter T wo) the view t hat only a "pur e"
or politically disinterested s ahg ha can ensure the mor al welfare of the nation leads
both the T hai rulers and the s ahg ha author ities to, "maintain t hat the s ahg ha is
divor ced f r om mundane af f air s. " 30 Buddhadas a thus goes ag ainst t r adit ion by
br ing ing the political impor t and signif icance of Buddhis m into the open, and this is
one of the main attr actions of his system of thoug ht to progressive T hai Buddhis ts .
A s one commentator and supporter states,
He [ Buddhadasa] has yet done thing s dif f erent f rom the customar y
activ ities of usual religionists and mor alists, especially in T hailand. T hat is,
he has criticised contempor ar y society and pol it ics .(T ) 31
8.5 E duc a t i o n a nd t he S ol ut i on of S ocial P r obl e ms .
Giv en t hat Buddhadas a isolates the roots of social problems and conf licts as
ly ing in inadequate and impr oper mor al knowledge, education has a piv otal role in
his bluepr int for solving social ills, "Education ... is the thing we take to be of the
mos t impor tance. It is the f oundation of ev er y t hing ."(T ) 32
B uddhadas as emphasis on the impor tance of education in his view of a better
T hai society has str ong histor ical precedents. Histor ically it was the monks who
were the educator s in T hailand and the temples were the only schools, a s ituation
29
M o r e l l &: S a m u d a v a n i j a , p. 25.
30
S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m a nd P ol it i cs i n T ha i l a nd, p . l .
31 _ _ _ _ _ _
K l i a n a k a m r n a k a n f S a s a pa P h y a K a n - p h a t a n a , P hut t ha t ha t K a p K ho n Run- ma i
( ** YJ YT3 Vl^l f i t ) D Pl U I l / l Mul a ni t hi K o r non K hi mt hor ng
), B a ng k ok , 2526, p p . 12- 13.
H
3 2 P l i u t t h a t l i a t , B a r a m a t ha m , p. 45.
which has only changed s ig nif icantly since Wor l d War II when the state education
system has been able to take over the role of the old temple school. B ut until quite
recently the state school system and the temple schools were often one and the
same. In 1898 when K ing Chulalong kor n (Rama V ) soug ht to establish gover nment
sponsored pr imar y education in the T hai provinces he did it thr oug h the temples,
by using the monks as teachers, because the then Siam lacked both the teachers
and the f inances to build an education system f r om scratch. Rey nolds observes t hat
this decision,
took adv antag e of the t r aditional pr actice of schooling y oung boys in the
monaster ies, and it kept secular and religious lear ning bound together as
they had alway s been. In V aj ir ananas wor ds [ the then Supreme Patr iar ch] ,
"Secular and religious lear ning flow in the same channel. Each will sustain
the bur dens of the other so t hat both may move f or ward and progress. " 33
However, Buddhadas a regards the increasing secular isation of education in
T hail and as a negative dev elopment and would like to r etur n to the old histor ical
nor m where religious and wor ldly education wfere integ r ated.
He criticises the trend towar ds purely v ocational education calling it education
for mere sur v iv al, rather than for s pir itual dev elopment. In par ticular Buddhadas a
condemns the T hai educator s and educational adminis tr ator s who base education in
T hail and on what he considers to be the mater ialis t, career- centred systems common
in Wester n count ries, instead of f ollowing s pir itual principles,
Because they [ Thai educat ors] believe the foreigners more than the Lord
Buddha, more than J esus Chr is t, more than the Pr ophet Mohammed, they
consequently arrange the educational system to f ollow the f or eigner s.(T ) 34
Buddhadas a contends t hat concern for the details of mater ial sur vival has
become so great t hat it has been f orgotten t hat w ithout a religious code of ethics
such thing s are devoid of meaning . T o counter t his tr end he says t hat the centr al
purpose of education should be to teach children s pir itual f undamentals . A nd the
r esult of the sort of education Buddhadas a proposes would be people r eaping the
s pir it ual and mater ial benef its of liv ing according to cit -wang .
33 -
Cr a i g J . R e y n o l d s (t r ans . ), A ut obiog r aphy : T he L i f e o f P r i nce - P at r ia r c h V a j i r a ha na o f S i a m
1860- 1 9 21 , Ohi o Uni v er s i t y Pr ess, A t he ns Ohi o, 1979, p. x x x v i i .
34P l i u t t h a t h a t , D a r a m t ha m f U T i m T J J ") , p. 4.
223
8.6 Cont r a di c t i ons i n B uddha da s a s S ocial T houg ht .
While it is Buddhadas as social and political thoug ht which has been a major
deter minant of his popular ity among moder nist T hai Buddhis ts ir onically it is this
aspect of his work which is the most f lawed and contr adictor y . For ex ample,
Buddhadas a has not acknowledged or considered the serious implications of his
doctr inal r e- interpretations for the T hai s ahg ha. If , as Buddhadas a teaches,
s pir itual and social activ ity are integ r ated and if the layperson thereby has access to
the tr aditional ly clerical aspects of Buddhis m it is not clear what role is lef t for the
monks or the s ahg ha in his proposed system of Buddhist- based socio- economic
dev elopment. Fur ther mor e, despite all his calls for the active inv olv ement of
Buddhis ts in socially or iented activ ities the contr adiction remains t hat Buddhadas a
hims elf is not concretely involved in social welf are activ ities , and in f act he
ex plicitly denies t hat this is the proper role of the monk,
Monks should not directly co- operate in social welf are activ ities or in any
of the peoples dev elopmental works ... They should be a g r oup t hat
provides the people with mental and s pir itual development, progress and
saf ety. (T ) 35
In the opening chapters it was noted t hat in accord with the signif icance
placed upon or thopr ax y in T her av ada Buddhis m B uddhadas as innov ativ e doctr inal
ref orms were f ounded on and author ised by his s tr ict adherence to t r aditional
clerical practices. However, the doctr inal ref orms Buddhadas a author ises by his
pr actical conservatism imply a radical r estr uctur ing of the tr aditional roles of the
Buddhis t monk and lay person. T hat is, his r e- inter pr etations of Buddhis t teaching
imply a r adical ref orm in the very practices whose t r adit ional f orms he clings to
and continues to s uppor t. How'ever, Buddhadas a does not acknowledge t hat he
hims elf under mines the t r adit ional his tor ically accepted bases for maint aining the
s tr ict monk- lay role div ision in T her av ada Buddhis m and neither does he
acknowledge t hat there is a f undamental contr adiction between his conservative
pr actice and his r adical re- interpretations of doctr ine which imply an utter
r ef or mation of Buddhis t practice.
T his contr adiction between, on the one hand, maint aining a t r adit ional role
div ision between monks and l aity , and on the other hand, s uppor ting moder nis t,
wor ld- involved inter pr etations of doctr ine in which t hat role div ision has no place is
an inconsistency t hat is not restricted only to B uddhadas as wr iting s . It is a
Fr om an i nt er v i ew w i t h B uddha das n* r epr oduced in S u l a k Si war ak , K ha nc ho r ng S or ng P hr a
I , "
HRe f l e c t ions o f the Monk hood), Sar nnak - phi m Lay- sy T ha i , B a ng k ok , 2522 (1979),
p. 255.
224
char acter istic of the work of many other moder nist Buddhis ts . For ex ample, there
is a gr owing trend in T hail and, with advocates across the political and social
s pectr um, to pr omote the t r aining of monks as community dev elopment workers.
Phr a Raj av ar amuni has offered the f ollowing r ationale for g iv ing monks secular as
well as religious tr aining and for ex panding their t r aditional role to include secular
activ ities ,
It is not t hat we are tr y ing to secularise the Buddhis t monk. Rather we
are at t empt ing to restore his t r adit ional place as religious leader and guide
of the people ... Besides their own peculiar duties towar ds the goal of self
enlig htenment, monks are bound with many social oblig ations to serve their
community and to render reasonable services for the benef it of the l ay mans
society . 36
However, such clerical inv olv ement in society in f act jeopardises the t r adit ional
s y mbolic value of the s ahg ha, eroding the religious and s pir itual s tanding of the
monk by his perf ormance of acts perceived as essentially secular. When it is argued
t hat the layperson should have complete access to the t r adit ional l ok ut t ar a or
clerical aspect of the r eligion, and conversely t hat the monk should become involved
in t r adit ional ly secular development and welf are projects, then the monk can no
longer claim any special religious s tatus or respect. T he monk s hands are tainted
by wor ldly inv olv ement j us t as the lay per sons role is sacralised. Despite the
g roundswell of suppor t for clerical inv olv ement in society as a means of r ef mding
and r ejus tif y ing the monkly role, the notion is nevertheless regarded with
considerable ambivalence by many senior members of the s ahg ha. As Mor g an opines,
It is not the par ticular s tandar d of liv ing [of the T hai people] t hat is in
ques tion, but the style, rate and effects of continual changes in s tandar ds.
T he restless generation of wants and desires has such great af f inities to the
bur ning thir s t or ins atiable cr aving which lies at the very core of Buddhis t
concer n, t hat the s ahg ha leader ship could scarcely escape ambivalence about
the whole process of economic dev elopment and g r owth, the process of
moder nis ation. 37
I agree with Mor g ans contention t hat those who s uppor t,
the ex pansion of the activ ities of the monks and the enhancement of the
aspir ations of the l aity , do not seem to perceive these notions as blur r ing
3 6 Ci t e d in Dona l d K. S w e a r e r , "Some Obs e r v at i ons on New Di r e ct i ons in T ha i B uddhi s m", in V is ak ha
P uj a , B uddhi s t A s s oci at i on of T ha i l and, B a ng k ok , 2513 (1 970), p. 56.
37
B r uce F. M o r g o n , "V ocat i on of Monk a nd L a y man: Si g ns of Chang e in T ha i B uddhi s t Et hi c s ", i n
B a r dw e ll L . S mi t h (ed), C o nt r i but i o ns to A s i a n S t udie s , Vol. 4, T r a di t i o n and Chang e i n T he r av ada
B ud d h i s m : Es s a y s on Cey l on and T ha i l a nd i n the 19 t h a nd 20t h Ce nt ur ie s , E. J . B r i l l, L ei den T he
Ne t he r l a nds , 1973, p. 72.
the dis tinction between monk and l ai t y . 38
Even thoug h he verbally suppor ts socio- economic dev elopment and an
ex pansion of the lay per sons role into the tr adit ional ly clerical domain Buddhadas a
is not in pr actice prepared to cor respondingly deconstr uct the barriers which
separate the monk f rom the social wor ld. Despite the contr adiction t hat it creates
in his ar g uments for active Buddhis t inv olv ement in society Buddhadas a is perhaps
unwil ling to deal with the implications of being seen as ex plicitly blur r ing the
t r adit ional demar cation between lay and monkly roles, a dev elopment which Mor g an
argues is almos t univer sally regarded as,
a thr eat to the inter nal s tability of the s ahg ha, to the prestige of the
s ahg ha in T hai society and to the health of T hai society so dependent
upon the f unctioning of the s ahg ha.39
Giv en these dif f iculties it would seem t hat if B uddhadas as re- interpreted
system of Buddhis m is to be saved his notion of Buddhis t social action mus t be
inter pr eted as a moder nis t, world- involved ideology which is applicable only, to the
lay person and not to the monk. Buddhis t teachings have never placed negative
sanctions on lay inv olv ement in the social wor ld, and Buddhadas a confers on the
laity all the s pir itual r ights to s alv ation t hat were tr adit ional ly reserved for the
clergy. However, he denies monks the r ig ht to par ticipate in the wor ldly activities
which he otherwise defines as central to his moder nist notion of Buddhis m. In
insisting t hat monks ref rain f r om becoming involved in secular or dev elopment
activ ities Buddhadas a s imultaneously denies the s ahg ha a place in his integ r ated
view of Buddhis t s pir itual and social action. Indeed, B uddhadas as own role as a
monk is under mined by this contr adiction between his r adical theory and
conservative practice. B ut while the contr adiction is g lar ing it is not acknowledged
by Buddhadas a, let alone resolved.
8.7 T heor e t ical D i f f icul ties W i t h T he r a v a da E t hi c s .
In addit ion to the contr adiction betw'een Buddhadas as theories and his
conser vative pr actice there is, however, a f ur ther theor etical dif f iculty associated with
his at t e mpt to integ r ate the mundane and s upr amundane aspects of Buddhis t
teachings. T his dif f iculty lies in the very char acter of T her av ada ethical doctrines.
As discussed above, for nibbana to be a univer sally accessible social goal would
38 i bi d. p . 70.
226
requir e co- operative effort to create a j us t and prosperous society. T hat is, co
oper ating and wor king with other people are centr al to the at t ainment of the social
goal of nibbana and of the social conditions under which all can work for nibbana.
B ut such co- operative activ ity is not at all esssential for indiv idual eff ort aimed at
at t aining nibbana, which on the contr ar y has tr aditional ly been def ined as the
activ ity of the social recluse and renunciate. T her av ada ethical teachings have
likewise tr aditional ly ex tolled the virtues of self- restraint and mental contr ol which
are essential for calming and f ocussing the mind and for f acilit ating the development
of meditativ e insig ht. T her av ada ethical wr iting s on the l ok ut t ar a or s upr amundane
pat h concentr ate ex clusively on the vir tues of indiv idual s pir itual practice r ather
than on collective or co- operative activ ity . T r aditional T her av ada ethical notions are
def ined more in ter ms of attitudes than actions, emphasising the indiv idual s state of
mind towards others more than any concrete ex pression of assistance to others.
Cons equently , it is not clear what s cr iptur al sources Buddhadas a can refer to in
j us t if y ing his notion of Buddhis t social inv olv ement. For ex ample, the impor tant
Buddhis t ethical goals of met t a, lovingkindness, and k a r una , compassion, are def ined
in the V is uddhimag g a as f ollows,
Lovingkindness is char acterised here as pr omoting the aspect of welf are.
Its f unction is to prefer welfare. It is manif ested as the removal of
annoy ance. Its pr ox imate cause is seeing loveableness in beings. It succeeds
when it makes ill- will subside, and fails when it produces [ selfish]
af f ection. 40
Compassion is characterised as pr omoting the aspect of allay ing suf f ering.
Its f unction resides in not bearing other s suf f ering. It is manif ested as non
cruelty. Its pr ox imate cause is to see helplessness in those overwhelmed by
suf f ering. It succeeds when it makes cruelty subside and it f ails when it
produces sor r ow. 41
Compassion and loving- kindness are thus manif ested by the removal of ones
own cruelty and of ones own annoy ance of others, not by any positive contr ibution
of assistance. A nd compassion is ex plicitly def ined as not meaning to bear other s
suf f ering. T he utter ly indiv idual r ather than co- operative char acter of T her av ada
ethics is shown by the f act t hat even the above a t t it udina l vir tues mus t be given
up at cer tain stages of s pir itual pr actice in order for the mind to be totally
concentr ated on at t aining s alv ation. A char n Muns biog r apher gives the f ollowing
account,
4 V i s u d d h i i n a g g a , I X , 93.
4 1 i bi d. , I X , 94.
227
T he mind t hat is still wor r y ing about other thing s or other people is like
a ship overloaded with cargo and soon doomed to a watery grave. For such
a mind no hope for the cessation of suf f ering can be ex pected. Whatev er
lovingkindness there is towar ds others mus t cease for the time being. When
the Final Goal is being att ained, loving kindness for others mus t die away,
for it will interf ere with the at t ai nme nt of the goal itself . 42
T he Buddhis t notion of welf are, f r om the s pir itual perspective of the follower
of the dha mma , does not necessarily incor por ate actually aiding other people in a
mater ial or concrete sense by chang ing the condition of the wor ld. Rather Buddhis t
ethics emphasise making people feel happy by helping them adj us t their desires to
the wor ld. As Wi t observes,
Cer tain indiv idual acts of char ity and benevolence are suggested, but
there is no philosophical or religious j us t if ication for human str uggle to
change the wor ld. 43
It is the above notion of s pir itual welf are which underlies the f ollowing passage
f r om the Loka S ut t a , which describes three types of people who "help the wor ld":
an enlightened t at hag at a, an ar ahant f ollower of a tat hag at a , and a tathag ata^s
f ollower who aspires for a r a ha nt s hi p,
Behold O bhik k hus these three types of people who, when they are born
into the wor ld, are necessarily bor n for helping many people, for the
happiness of many people, for the welf are, for the benef it, for aiding , for
the happiness of devata and of human being s .(T ) 44
A ll of the terms, "hel ping ", "welf ar e", "benef it", and "aiding " above denote
s pir itual and not mater ial welfare.
Rahul a notes t hat in ancient Cey lon, source of many of the tr aditions of
T her av ada Buddhis m, opinion was div ided as to whether monks should engage
themselves in humanitar ian activ ities . He says,
There were two classes of monks. One class of monks devoted themselves
only to meditat ion, with the sole purpose of saving themselves, w ithout
taking any interest in the welf are of the people. T he other class of monks
seems to have taken an interest in the welfare of the people - both
s pir itual and mater ial - in addit ion to their own s al v at ion. 45
However, Rahul a observes t hat the consensus which g r adually arose among the
monks , and which r emains the general opinion in T hail and today , was t hat monks,
42
(V ener abl e P hr a A c ha r n Ma ha ) B o o w a Ny a na s a i npa nno, p. 110.
43W i t , pp. 57- 58.
4 4 L ok a S ut t a , K hudda k a Nikayb.,- V ol . 2 5 /v e r s e 26 3/p. 2 66 .
R a l i u l a , Hi s t o r y o f B uddhi s m i n Ce y l on, p. 193.
45
could serve the people best by leading a holy life themselves. T heir way
of life was an ins pir ation and ex ample for the people to f ollow a righteous
lif e. 46
Siddhi Butr - Indr agrees t hat this moral- ex emplary role is the view of correct
monkly practice cur rent in T hail and, say ing,
T he f undamental duty of the monk towar ds the lay adher ent is to
conduct himself as the model, teacher, ins tr uctor , guide and pr omoter of
mor ality and other s pir itual values in society . 47
As discussed above Buddhadas a concurs with this t r adit ional isolation of the
monk f r om active social inv olv ement. B ut leav ing aside the pr actical dif f iculties
B uddhadas as position creates for the s ahg ha it is still the case t hat if his system is
to be saved, and to f unction as a lay r ather than clerical Buddhis t ideology of
socio- economic development, it is necessary to pr ovide for the layperson a clear link
between the personal s pir itual practice required for s alv ation and co- operative mor al
act iv it y in the social wor ld aimed. B ut given t hat , on the one hand, Buddhadas a
rejects popular lay f orms of Buddhis m which have been the t r aditional source of co
oper ativ e ethical notions in Buddhis m, and, on the other hand, t hat lok ut t ar a ethics
pr ov ide no clear basis for co- operative social welf are activ ity it is not clear how
personal practice and social inv olv ement can in f act be integ r ated in Buddhadas as
system.
Because of the indiv idualis tic char acter of eff orts at att aining s alv ation in
t r adit ional T her av ada doctr ine social r elations are not a necessary or integral par t
of the path to nibbana, but like all inter actions with the wor ld are something to be
tr eated war ily if they cannot be av oided. B ut once Buddhadas a universalises the
r elig ious goal and makes it the acme of both the clerical and the lay paths as well
as the ideal and goal of social act iv it y , then the precise r elation between social
inter action and inv olv ement with others and the personal att ainment of nibbana
mus t be made ex plicit. Buddhadas a himself emphasises t hat,
As for the matter of nibbana, which is the chief or head of peace, we
should ar range for it to be something manif est in the pages of general
publications as a matter of everyday s tudy for each person. T his is because
the mater of nibbana denotes s alv ation, which follows the wants and
inclinations of the instincts of every s entient being .(T ) 48
46i bi d. p . 194.
4 7 D n t r - I n d r , p . 118.
48P h u t t l i a t h a t , Ni ppha n ( 11TiTAI VJ^Ti ** ), p. 80.
229
In tr adit ional Buddhis t societies social r elations were not viewed as crucial to
personal s alv ation but as the oblig ation of laypeople to abide by the k ing s laws, to
pay the k ing s tax es and to serve in his army in ex change for the monar chs
maintenance of both the social and s pir itual orders. Being solely of the
s upr amundane r ealm nibbana was t otall y outside the j ur is diction of the king and so
the activ ities of those one- pointedly engaged in at t aining s alv ation, i.e. the monks,
also fell outside those social oblig ations . Nibbana was regarded as the antithesis of
the wor ld of social relations. B ut hav ing s pir itualised the social domain, making it
an integ r al par t of the path to personal s alv ation, this t r adit ional monar chical
ideology of the cak k av at t in which prov ided the doctr inal j us t if ication for social
r elations in t r adit ional Buddhis t societies is inadequate for B uddhadas as purposes.
For he mus t show t hat social r elations are not simply an oblig ation to an ex ternal
tempor al- cum- spir itual author ity but are integ r al to ones own s pir itual practice and
to the att ainment of ones personal s alv ation. Buddhadas a attempts to demonstr ate
the necessary r elation between social and s pir itual practice by proposing t hat n o t to
help or assist others who are in need is to suffer f r om the same self- centredness
which bars one f r om s pir itual at t ai nme nt ,
Relig ion doesnt only mean the actions of indiv iduals to pass beyond
suf f ering. We must still help others to pass beyond suf f ering also. T hat is,
we mus t have lovingkindness [k a r una ] towar ds our fellow man and towar ds
all sentient beings, because if we are completely w ithout loving kindness we
will be a self- centred person ... As is said in the Pali words of the Lord
Buddha in the Nipata S ut t a of the K huddak a Nik ay a ..., "A person who
only has wisdom in seeking out their own benef it is an impur e human
being ..." Hence a religious person mus t assist others as one ty pe of
necessary human duty , or else it will be to have a religion in words
onl y .(T ) 49
Unlike Buddhag hos a Buddhadas a regards lovingkindness as denoting ex plicitly
assisting others, and not s imply as the development of the intention of benevolence.
Buddhadas a also claims t hat every human being mus t be a member of the
wor ld society and that all have three unshir kable duties: to natur e, such as
nour is hing the body and maint aining a healthy phy sical ex istence; to dha mma , to
be upr ig ht and mor al and so maint ain a healthy mental life; and thir dly , to relate
tog ether in a peacef ul social life,
Whoever evades these duties as a matter of course forf eits their humanity
or their member ship of the wor ld society. Even thoug h they are s till alive
i d. , Ha k Q ho r muni t ' K h a u A^a ^ P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Y u D a i
( ), PP.26-27.
D 1 5J
230
it is as if they are alr eady dead.(T ) 00
Buddhadas a also says t hat serving others is a good oppor tunity to make mer it.
However, here he caref ully distinguishes his phas a-tham inter pr etation f r om the
popular view of mer it as being some metaphy sical quantit y which can be
accumulated thr oug h good deeds and whose amount determines the quality of ones
r ebir th, and ultimately ones s alv ation. In order to clearly dissociate hims elf f r om
such popular inter pr etations of mer it making Buddhadas a gives the war ning t hat ,
Of all tempting thing s there is nothing more tempting than mer it. So he
[ the Buddha] said t hat mer it is upadhi (t hat is, it is also a bait of k il es a)
... Because mer it inev itably leads to bir th in one realm or another , if not
in the condition of a human then as a devata. T hat is, it is an ins tr ument
t hat keeps us always s wimming in the cycle of mental bir th and
deat h.(T ) 51
Buddhadas a also dissociates himself f r om the popular view t hat mer it is best
acquir ed by g iv ing alms to monks, citing the Nav aka Nipat a of the A hg ut t ar a
Nik ay a and say ing t hat the Buddha taug ht t hat ,
Developing awareness of change [ aniccasahha] for j us t as long as it takes
to click the fingers has more effect, or more mer it value, than pr ov iding
meals for the whole s ahg ha along with the Buddha as leader. 02
For Buddhadas a mer it is not s omething stored up for t he sake of going to
heaven. Rather , to perf orm mer it (T hai: t ham bun) is to act selflessly for the
benef it of others in order to reduce the power of deluded self- centred thoug hts in
ones life and consequently to also reduce the suf f ering self- centredness produces.
8.7.1 B u d d h a d a s a s De - e mpha s i s on K a mma .
Buddhadas a also indir ectly shows the need for Buddhis ts to help others
progress and to be involved in social welfare activ ities by av oiding t alking of
suf f er ing and poverty in terms of kar nmic r etr ibution,
We should regard poverty and being in mater ial need as a per sons
greatest bad luck or as the most pitif ul kind of basic human bad luck. We
^ i b i d. p . 27.
* u s
^1 i d. , B a B un - B a S a w a n ( "m u n i - j pi " M a d Ov er Me r i t - Ma d Ov er He a v e n),
O ng k a n Fy n- f u P hr a P hut t ha s a s a na ( B'J Plfl S' *-VI 1/1*5Pi 14*1 S a mut pr a k a n T ha i l a nd, 2518
(1 9 7 5 ), p. 6.
52 -
B u d d h a d a s a , B uddha - dha mma f o r S t ude nt s , p. 44.
mus t not be indif f erent towar ds those who are yet in need.(T ) 53
When, as in t r adit ional T her av ada Buddhis m, physical or mater ial suf f ering is
seen as j us t and mor al r etr ibution for past misdeeds is regarded as s omething
inev itable and unav oidable then the theor etical basis for helping others overcome
mater ial dif f iculties is very weak. A nd it is in order to pr omote his r e- inter pr etation
of T her av ada doctr ine as a Buddhis t ideology of social welfare and socio- economic
dev elopment t hat Buddhadas a instead speaks of pover ty in a way t hat attempts to
overcome the t r adit ional acquiescence and mor al indif f erence by ar ousing s y mpathy
f or other s suf f ering.
The notion of k amma and of f ate is s ig nif icantly under play ed in Buddhadas as
system. In Buddhis t teachings the suf f ering of k amma or f ate is regarded as
mis f or tune which cannot be avoided. But because Buddhadas a regards some of the
major sources of physical suf f ering, such as hunger , disease and ignor ance, to now
be amenable to er adication or at least to amelior ation then such suf f ering is no
longer included within the category of inev itable and unav oidable suf f ering due to
kamr nic deter minants . By cont r ibuting to the elimination of mater ial suf f ering
moder n technology and education in cer tain cir cumstances have the potential of
relieving w'hat has tr adit ional ly been regarded as f ated and inev itable suf f ering. T hus
it is to be ex pected t hat f ate and the inev itabil ity of mater ial suf f ering will be de
emphasised by Buddhadas a, who wants Buddhis ts to take adv antag e of the benef its
of modern technological developments. When Buddhadas a does mention suf f ering he
talks more of mental unease and dis- ease, aspects of human life wrhich are as much
a par t of moder n mater ial cultur e as of any past society. Buddhadas a regards
Buddhis m as a s olution to mental ills and mental suf f ering, being happy to leave
the impr ov ement of mater ial well- being and the ending of mater ial suf f ering to
scientists and technocr ats.
As in other aspects of his re- inter pr etation of T her av ada doctr ine Buddhadas a
does not re- interpret the doctr ine of k a mma by deny ing t r adit ional inter pr etations
out of hand but by pr ov iding an alter nativ e emphasis and a new focus on the
notion. Buddhadas a nowhere denies t hat personal suf f ering of whatever char acter is
in f act a result of k ammic r eactions, deter mined by previous actions perf ormed with
ig nor ant attachment. However, he chooses not to talk of suf f ering in a way t hat
emphasises its inev itability and human inabil ity to change it. In line with the
pr opag ation of an ideology pr oclaiming t ha t human beings are responsible agents
53 - - -
P h u t t h a t h a t , I l a k K ho 'r muni t K ha v j M a P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Yu Da i
* ** *
(" vi nn pifcujjtffifi i -aiinw vmpnmnmft au .)p.33.
u n ii
231
232
capable of actively chang ing their cir cumstances for the better he chooses to focus
on those aspects of human suf f ering which are open to amelior ation and able to be
sof tened by the pr ovision of one or other f or m of mater ial assistance. T he pr imar y
focus in Buddhadas as system is on suf f ering which can be ended by another s
assistance.
8.7.2 Dif f i c ul t ie s W i t h B uddha da s a s V ie w on K a mma .
However, by de- emphasising k amma and the related notions of mer it and
demer it in an att empt to pr ov ide an ethical j us tif ication for inv olv ement in the
wor ld Buddhadas a s imultaneously under mines the tr aditional political leg it imating
role of T her av ada Buddhis m. T r adit ionally the Siamese king has been regarded as
the person with the greatest mer it in the king dom and to hold the highest secular
r ank by v ir tue of t hat merit. As Keyes observes,
Not only was the r ig ht of a man to occupy the thr one legitimised in the
popular mind by the idea t hat only a person with an ex ceptionally
mer itor ious component to his k ar mic legacy could occupy the thr one, but it
was also believed t hat the welf are of the king dom dur ing a mans reign was
dependent upon the degree to which he possessed a "mer it " which could be
shared with his subjects. 54
Histor ically the welfare of the king dom has been regarded as being tied up
with the indiv idual merit, possessed by the king . T his ideology of kingly mer it has
changed somewhat since the abol ition of the absolute monar chy in 1932 but despite
tr ans f or mation it does r emain, as indicated in popular r ituals where a holy merit-
tr ansf er r ing thr ead or say- sin ( ) is connected to both a pictur e of the
king and to a Buddha image. T his r itual symbolises the idea t hat the source of
mer it, in the sense of a "mer it " whose benef it s can be shared by all who par ticipate
in the r it ual , lies at the top of a s pir itual hierarchy where the s ahg ha and the
monar chy link. Keyes continues,
T he K ing is conceived of today , as in the past, as being the one with by
f ar the greatest legacy of mer it of any w ithin the r ealm. T his conception of
the K ing as "hav ing mer it " serves today , as in the past to leg itimise the
contempor ar y socio- political order. T he political leadership of the countr y
are known to receive f rom the K ing their [ symbolic] mandate to r ule. 55
T hus when Buddhadas a in effect denies the notion of par ticipator y mer it 56 and
54 i
Char l e s F. K e y e s , "T he Power of Me r i t ", in V is ak ha P uj a , B uddhi s t A s s oci at i on of T ha i l a nd, B a ng k ok ,
2516 (1 973), p. 98.
J J i bi d. p . 100
See A ppe ndi x 1 f or a dis cus s i on of par t i ci pa t or y mer i t .
56
even the s pir itual s ig nif i cance of k amma per se he s imultaneously under mines the
basis of B uddhis ms use as a means of popular political leg itimation. However, it is
not only Buddhadas as cr itical view of k amma which under mines B uddhis ms
t r adit ional political leg itimating role. His concern to demy thologise T her av ada
B uddhis m also leads him to discard what in T hai history has been the most
impor t ant Buddhis t tex t j us tif y ing the monarch- led social order, the T r aibhumik at ha
of Phr a Y al i T hai. T he elabor ate cosmological descr iptions of the T r aibhumik at ha
have t r adit ional ly been taken as descr ibing the var ious levels of heavens and hells
at t ained to as a result of dif f erent qualitativ e and quantit at iv e accumulations of
mer it and demer it. As a result of Buddhadas as denial of both par ticipator y mer it
and the tr aditional T hai view of society and the cosmos, based on the notions
which are contained in the T r aibhumik at ha, T her av ada B uddhis ms social and
pol it ical leg itimator y role is seriously jeopar dised. If Buddhis m is to be the
progressive social ideology which Buddhadas a and his supporters desire it to be
there is therefore a need for a new Buddhis t theory to provide leg itimacy for T hai
political f orms.
While not def ining the pr oblem so clearly it would seem t hat Buddhadas a
regards the f ollowing Buddhis t pr inciple as under pinning a contempor ar y social order
which takes its leg itimacy f r om Buddhis m, namely , the pr omotion of welf are in such
a w'ay as to enable the populace to strive for nibbana. Political leg itimacy then
would not flow f rom s y mbolic association with or par ticipation in the K ing s mer it
but r ather f rom the visible, indiv iduall y practised mor ality of political and social
leaders. T hat is, the new Buddhis t leg itimacy would lie in indiv idual mer it, in both
the Wester n and Buddhis t senses, not in mere association with the t r adit ional
s y mbols of author ity . T his notion of Buddhis t "mer itocr acy " is dealt with f ur ther in
the nex t chapter when discussing Buddhadas as idea of dhamr nocr acy .
However, Buddhadas a himself presents no ex plicit resolution of the dif f iculties
of needing to pr ovide, f ir stly , a doctr inal ethical j us t if ication for social action and,
secondly , a new inter pr etation of the ideological relation between Buddhis m and the
T hai state. A nd these omissions, both manif ested at points of j unctur e between his
re- interpreted theory and actual social pr actice, are f ur ther indications of the
inadequacies and contr adictions of B uddhadas as social thoug ht. While socially
impor t ant Buddhadas as social thoug ht has few of the insights and penetr ating
analy ses of his work on Buddhis t doctr ine and s pir itual philosophy . T his does not
mean t hat the issues dealt with in his social thoug ht are in any sense less
impor t ant than his work on s pir itual philos ophy . On the contr ar y , the f utur e of
T her av ada Buddhis m in T hailand will be deter mined by how the s ahg ha
adminis tr at ion and lay T hai Buddhis ts resolve the questions raised by social,
economic and political change. What the f laws in Buddhadas as social t houg ht do
reveal, however, are the tensions created in T her av ada Buddhis m between the
r elativ e f reedom in the domain of doctr inal inter pr etation and the enf orced
conser vatism of pr actice within the s ahg ha.
8.8 Ma ha y a na Inf l uences on B uddha da s a .
In the process of developing a T her av ada social doctr ine Buddhadas a maintains
t hat aspects of suf f ering may be softened if not ended thr oug h another s benevolent
assistance r ather than thr oug h ones own mor al effort and s pir itual insig ht. T his
seems to imply t hat at least par t of the way to s alv ation, i.e. the ending of
s uf f er ing, can be attained thr oug h no effort of ones own but r ather thr oug h a
g r acious ex ternal inter v ention. Such a view has similar ities with the doctrines of
some schools of Mahay ana Buddhis m which teach t hat salv ation can be attained
thr oug h f aith in the liber ative grace of either the Buddha or a Mahay ana s aint, a
bodhis attv a. T his tendency of Buddhadas as T her av ada social doctr ine to incor por ate
asepcts of Mahay ana Buddhis m f ur ther indicates t hat his interest in Zen and
Mahay ana, as detailed in Chapter Seven, is not accidental but is a direct result of
intr oducing a doctr ine of s pir itually oriented social action into a religious system
where s alv ation has heretofore been regarded as the result of indiv idual moral effort.
However, when action to end the social pr oblems which inhibit others at t aining
nibbana is also regarded as par t of ones own s pir itual work for at t aining personal
s al v at ion it f ollows t hat those welf are- minded activ ities also contr ibute towar ds other
peoples s pir itual salv ation. In other words s alv ation is no longer something attained
wholly by pr iv ate effort in isolation f r om others. Nibbanic salv ation now becomes a
mor e social phenomenon where one per sons benevolent assistance may positively
cont r ibute to another persons s pir itual enlig htenment.
As already noted in the previous chapter the Mahay ana- like char acter of
B uddhadas as thoug ht also derives f r om his univ er salising the doctr ine of salv ation
f r om suf f ering by ending the monk- lay dis tinction. As Rupp notes, Mahay ana has
alway s been,
a more comprehensive path. Fr om its inception lay men as well as monks
have been more integ r al to its pr og r am than in the ty pical T her av ada
pos ition. A nd the bodhisattv a ideal ar ticulates ex plicitly an active concern
with the destiny of all beings, a concern which only remains implicit when
the [ Theravada] ideal of the ar ahat is dominant . 57
57R u p p , p. 64.
235
T he Mahay ana- like tendencies inher ent in Buddhadas as notion of s pir itual
pr actice as incor por ating social welf are activ ities are f ur ther demons tr ated by his
s tated emphasis on the bodhis attv a r ather than the ar ahant as the Buddhis t
s pir itual ideal. The T her av ada s aint or ar ahant is honour ed for his or her personal
at t ai nme nt of s alv ation. On the other hand the Mahay ana s aint or bodhis attv a is
honour ed because of his or her compassionate vow not to enter ul t imat e nir v ana
unt il every sentient being has also reached t hat ex alted condition. In Mahay ana
teaching s a bodhis attv a, unlike an a r a ha nt , is regarded as hav ing the abil ity to
positiv ely assist others to at t ain nir v ana. Buddhadas a says,
We should consider the kind of indiv idual who is called the "blessed
bodhis at tv a". T hat is, a person who sacrifices the benef it or personal
happiness w'hich he should get himself , in order to help others to pass
beyond suf f ering ... In Mahay ana there is a tenet which holds t hat the
blessed bodhis attv a should accept a mor al pr inciple with the gist t hat , "We
will strive to help every last one of those who have f allen into suf f ering
before we will per mit ourselves to enter the blessed nir v ana ." T his is the
highest ideal of helping others or of aiding ones f ellow man who is in need
of both physical and mental sustenance, a s ituation which is a complicated
social problem at the present t ime .(T )')8
However, this should not be taken as meaning t hat Buddhadas a has completely
abandoned the ar ahant ideal for there is a sense in which the a r ahant and the
bodhis attv a are compatible notions. While in popular Mahay ana cults it is believed
t hat f aith in bodhis attv as is suf f icient to elicit their saving grace, as was seen in
Chapter Seven Buddhadas a ex plicitly rejects such notions. For Buddhadas a a
bodhis attv a is an ar ahant who teaches, guides and actively assists others along the
pat h to s alv ation but who, unlike popular Mahay ana saints, does not possess the
abil it y to walk along t hat path on his or her disciples behalf . Buddhadas as
bodhis attv a is therefore a dev elopment of r ather than a denial of the T her av ada
ideal of the ar ahant . Once ag ain the change represented by B uddhadas as re
inter pr etation is a matter of ref ocussing or of re- emphasising notions r ather than of
the out r ig ht rejection of tr adit ional T her av ada doctrines.
8.9 Concl us ions .
While mor al education is centr al to Buddhadas as s olution for social problems
it has its effect thr oug h people actually pr actis ing cit-wang and lessening the power
of self- centredness in their lives. T he selflessness of acting with cit-wang is regarded
P h u t t h a t h a t , ^H a k K ho r m un i t K hc^u ^ Ma P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Yu. D a i
i ' v n n f m i m i f i i f l ), P.3o.
' V 1 11 F
as solving social problems in two ways. Fir s tly , by reducing self- centredness thr oug h
the practice of cit-wang the divisiveness and greed behind so many pr oblems of
pover ty and oppression will be amelior ated. A nd secondly, the welf are- minded
pr actice of aiding those in need, while lessening personal self- centredness, also
concretely helps the v ictims of injus tice and poverty overcome the social barriers
which prevent them f rom f ollowing the path to end suf f ering. Ci t -wang or ending
self- centredness is therefore the piv ot both of Buddhadas as inter pr etation of the
T her av ada doctr ine of liber ation and of his social thoug ht.
Ci t -wang not only has subjective benef its in leading the pr actitioner towar ds
s alv ation but it also has objective social benef its in pr omoting the r ealisation of
nibbana as a social goal.
T he diss olution of the dis tinction between personal and social activ ities and of
the difference between subjective and objective results manif ests in the s tr uctur e of
B uddhadas as system of t houg ht his ov er r iding concern to make the mater ial wor ld
as much a domain of s pir itual activ ity as the inner recesses of the contempl ativ es
mind. In the f ollowing quote J ay awar dene09 summar ises well the t r aditional
T her av ada view of s alvation to which Buddhadas a is opposed,
Suf f ering (duk k ha) is ma ns own cr eation. It is not a quality of the
ex ter nal wor ld, nor is it the effect of the ex ternal wor ld upon ones self.
Man can therefore eliminate suf f ering by his own efforts ... suf f ering arises
when our desire is in conf lict with the phenomena t hat sur r ound us. We
can, however, change our desires, and the Buddha r ecommended t his w ay . 60
In contr ast, for Buddhadas a the suf f ering of oppression and social t ur moil born
of greed is a quality of the ex ternal wor ld. A nd what is more human beings can
change the phenomena t hat s ur r ound them in order to end or at least alleviate
suf f er ing by action inspired by dha mma and perf ormed with cit-wang . Instead of
ending suf f ering by adj us ting our desires to the world Buddhadas a maint ains t hat
suf f ering can at least in par t be ended by adj us ting the wor ld to our desires for
s pir it ual and mater ial well- being.
Were Buddhadas a, like mos t T hai monks, to retain the t r adit ional division
between clerical and lay Buddhis m r ather than att empt ing to create an integ r ated,
compr ehensive religion of indiv idual s alv ation he would have few dif f iculties in
br ing ing notions of economic dev elopment and moder nisation into Buddhis m. But he
236
J ul i us R. J a y a war de ne is now t he Pr e s i dent of Sr i L ank a. T he quot e her e is t ak en f r om a l ect ur e
g i v en when he was Fi nance Mi ni s t e r of t he t hen Ce y lon.
6 J ul i us R. J a y a w a r d e n e , B uddhi s m a nd M a r x i s m , P a mp h let of t he t ex t of T e nt h A nni v e r s ar y L ect ur e
t o t he Ce y l on Uni v er s i t y B r ot he r hood, Col ombo Ce y l on, 6t h Ma r c h 1950, p. 4.
eff ectively excises t hat tr aditional lay- social aspect of Buddhis m in at t empt ing to
inter pr et anew f r om f ir st pr inciples the Buddhis t doctr ine of s alv ation. Cons equently ,
w anting his inter pr etation to f unction as a g uide for pr oductiv e and benef icial social
action he mus t integ r ate a t r adit ional ly wor ld- r enouncing doctr ine of s alv ation with
active wor ld inv olv ement. A t a theor etical level he mus t show both t hat the wor ld
and nibbana are not in contr adiction and t ha t s ociality or inv olv ement with others
for the purposes of social dev elopment is necessarily related to and in har mony w'ith
personal s pir it ual it y . As seen above Buddhadas a argues for both of these positions.
However, his ar g uments are ul timat el y unconv incing , not because of any specif ic
theor etical lapse but rather because of the g lar ing contr adiction between his
pr omotion of a socially involved doctr ine of s alv ation and his own t r adit ional and
conservative segregation of the monk f rom wor ldly activ ity . A t the same time as
presenting a sy stematic r e- inter pretation of Buddhis t doctr ine which eff ectively
abolishes the dis tinction between religious and wor ld- involved activ ity he maint ains
t hat the s ahg ha, and here he includes himself , should not engage in social welfare
activ ities . T he ideal t hat emerges f r om B uddhadas as thoug ht is not that of a
r enunciate a r ahant monk but of a world- involved bodhis attv a- like layperson who
s imultaneous ly works for personal s alv ation and social welfare by f ollowing the
pr actice of cit-w ang . What role the monk play s in his reformed view of Buddhis m
is, however, unclear.
Buddhadas a propagates an alter nativ e T hai Buddhis t ideology, but it is an
ideology of a s pir itually independent and socially active layperson not of the
monas tic isolation he himself practices. The place of the monk and of the s ahg ha in
his ideology of s pir itual activ is m is ex tremely pr oblematic. A nan Senakhans and
B unmi Me t hang k uns criticisms t hat Buddhadas a seeks to destroy the s ahg ha by
sending monks out to till the f ields, while over stated, do have some substance.
B uddhadas as ideas have s ig nif icant implications for the inter pr etation of the
doctr ine as well as for the ins t it ution of Buddhis m in T hailand. However, in s tr iv ing
one- pointedly for both doctr inal consistency and contempor ar y relevance he f ails to
consider the pr actical issue of B uddhis ms ins t it ut ional role in T hai society. A nd in
the absence of a pr actical or ientation to the r ealities of ins t it utional B uddhis ms
place in T hail and the overall success of B uddhadas as at t empt to develop an
inter pr etation of the doctrine with direct contempor ar y relevance can only be
regarded as being seriously in doubt.
238
C H A P T E R 9
B U D D H A D A S A S P O L I T I C A L W R I T I N G S .
In addit ion to presenting a general social doctr ine of spiritually - based activ is m
Buddhadas a has also made a number of comments upon and criticisms of more
specif ically political issues. However, his views cannot be categorised as either
f ollowing the patter n of any ex isting political ideology or as s uppor ting the
pr og r ammes of any T hai political par ty or mov ement. B uddhadas as statements on
politics are alway s general and he av oids making remarks on specific political
debates and cur r ent controversies. He is mor e concerned with setting out what he
regards as correct Buddhis t principles for the oper ation of politics r ather than with
acting as a Buddhis t critic of political events.
Fundament al to Buddhadas as conception of politics is the pr inciple t hat all
political doctrines and political activ ity should be judg ed ag ainst a s pir itual
criter ion. For Buddhadas a any political f or m is good or benef icial if it enables or
encourages the populace to reach towar ds nibbana by upr ooting self- centredness and
establishing both social and indiv idual peace. What mig ht be considered the
t r adit ional goals of political activ ity , such as pr omoting the pr oduction of a society s
wealth or at t aining socio- economic equity and jus tice, are by no means unimpor t ant
in B uddhadas as view of politics but are not regarded as hav ing intr insic value in
themselves. Rather , for Buddhadas a the pr oduction of mater ial wealth and the
pr omotion of social equity only have value inas much as their att ainment per mits or
encourages the populace to f ur ther their s pir itual interests. In other words what are
commonly taken as ends in t r adit ional political thoug ht are regarded as means by
B uddhadas a, means tow- ards the at t ai nme nt of a f inal s pir itual end which he calls
dhar nmocr acy 1 or the rule of dha mma in the world. Buddhadas a consequently takes
a ut il it ar ian appr oach to the t r adit ional pol itical ideologies and systems, none of
which he regards as hav ing any inher ent value apar t f r om their capacity or
pot ent ialit y for pr omoting dha mma in the wor ld. T his political ut ilit ar ianis m is
^1 t r ans l at e t he T ha i t er m t ha mmr t t hi pa t a i ( B T 3 U *11] l J I ) as dhar nmocr acy . Howev er it s houl d be
not e d t ha t t he T ha i wor d is der i v ed f r om a muc h ol der Pa l i t er m, dha mma dhi pa t e y y a , whi ch l i t er al l y
de not es , "t he do mi na t i ng i nf l uence of d ha mma ".
239
shown most clearly when Buddhadas a says, "When there is dhammocr acy it could
be a dictator s hip, a democracy or whatever. "( T ) 2
9.1 B uddha da s a on C a pi t a l i s m a nd C o mmuni s m.
Buddhadas as lack of commit ment to any ex isting political ideology is f ur ther
shown by his equally vehement cr iticisms of the pr inciples and oper ation of both
capitalis m and communis m. As already noted in Chapter Eig ht Buddhadas a has
ex pressed par ticular concern about the pover ty , oppression and ex ploitation which
pr event people f r om f ollowing the pat h to nibbana,
When the countr y is made up of indiv iduals who are des titute and
desperately poor and the f armers are poor , s tar v ing and weak how can the
nation be secure? T hey , the pillar s of the nation, will be r otten and worn
away . (T ) 3
In stark contr ast to many politically conser vative T hais Buddhadas a maintains
t ha t communis m per se is not a thr eat to T hailand but r ather the ex ploitation and
oppression which lead impoverished people towar ds communis m and violent
r ev olution,
We are ex periencing the pr oblem t hat these evil- minded capitalis ts are
sucking the blood of humanity to such an ex tent that the poor mus t rise
up to f ig ht and destroy their enemy, f looding the wor ld with bl ood.(T ) 4
Buddhadas a regards the f undamental thr eat to T hail ands national security as
ly ing not in communis m but in ex ploitativ e capitalis m. However, he does not
regard capitalis t ex ploitation to itself be the ul t imat e source of political problems.
B uddhadas a maintains t hat ex ploitation has its roots in the ignorance, delusion and
at t achment which are the causes of all suf f ering. Because of the dominance of a
mater ialis t mentalit y , t hat is, of a deluded att achment to mater ial wealth,
Buddhadas a says t hat capitalis ts have used the potentially benef icial social and
technolog ical developments associated with indus tr ial is ation and mechanis ation to
greedily hoar d wealth. T he sy stematic greed of capitalis ts has as a consequence
created social conf licts between the impover ished workers and the wealthy capitalis t
employ er s. B ut Buddhadas a also considers the communis t ideal of workers and
2P l i u t t h a t h a t , B a r a m a t h a m ( " l n u i m u 1/, P . 53.
3i d., K ha r a w a t T ha m ( j t ), p- 6.
4 , _ .
i d. , T ha mma t / K a p v L o k i Ca P a i Dua y k a n D a i Ry M a i l
peasants ov er thr owing the capitalis ts as being inf or med by the same mater ialis t
greed which led to the or ig inal ex ploitation. In other wor ds he regards the workers
as being caug ht in the same tr aps of delusion and attachment as their capitalis t
employ ers.
B uddhadas as views on communis m are neither wholly s uppor tiv e nor wholly
cr itical. Because of its mater ialis t doctrines he does regard communis m as being
f undament al l y incompatible with Buddhis m,
Communis m cannot be the same as Buddhis m. T he main point which
s hould be noted is t hat the pr inciples of B uddhis m do not teach t hat we
s hould acquir e any t hing as being our s .(T ) 3
T hat is, he regards the communis t ideal of state owner ship or owner ship of
the social wealth by the collectiv ity of the wor king class as being j us t another more
general f or m of self- centred greed. But hav ing said this Buddhadas a s till remarks of
communis m, "Y et it is still good; it has benef it for the wor ld if it helps us to build
up peace for the wor ld. "(T ) Insof ar as communis m ends the greed- based
ex ploitation of the capitalis ts , which is at the r oot of the worker- capitalist conf lict,
it br ings peace into the wor ld and so f rom a Buddhis t perspective should be
regarded as good.
As alr eady seen Buddhadas a characterises peace as the main dis ting uis hing
f eature of nibbana. Me regards peace as the pr ime social goal. T he absence of peace,
t hat is, w un-way or conf usion and disorder, is seen as ar ising f rom delusion and
at t achment and f rom both cr av ing and r unning af ter mater ial thing s. Peace, on the
other hand, is described as the char acter istic of cit -wang or of a mind freed f r om
cr av ing and att achment and f rom the self- centred delusions of "l "- "mine".
T heref ore, accor ding to Buddhadas a, when self- centredness is ended peace arises,
both inter nally and ex ter nally , for he maint ains t hat social conf lict and disorder can
be traced to the same self- centredness and mater ial greed which pr oduce inner ,
mental conf usion. Buddhadas a consequently uses the presence or absence of peace,
def ined as the absence of conf usion or conf lict, as his main cr iter ion for deter mining
whether the char acter of a society is either dha mmi c , i.e. s pir itual , or mater ialis t.
T he pr actical question this then raises is how is social peace to be attained?
In ter ms of a t r adit ional is t inter pr etation of T her av ada doctr ine social peace is
realised if all indiv iduals are peacef ul in themselves. However, Buddhadas a provides
a more developed analy sis of the sources of peace and disorder. While cr iticis ing the
_____________________ t
^id., "Upa s a k Hae ng K an- phoey - phr ae T l i a m" ( **B l J t l TI P)II lr'1'3fl 7 I ULI Tj J TU11 ), p. 28
S I , !
. . . . .
i d. , C ha w P hut T hi D i Y or m Pen K hr i t T hi D i (* ^ VIIVHj Vif lLI BiLI I I J l i P l T Si? l Vlf l " )> P- 26.
240
workers and labour leaders who attack capitalis m for being as mater ialis t as their
capitalis t opponents he also acknowledges t hat the f ormer s mater ialis m is initially
conditioned by the self- centred greed of the capitalis ts, and t hat wor ker- capitalist
conf licts are pr imar ily caused by the l atter and not by the f ormer. For Buddhadas a
peace is attained not only thr oug h inner , mor al and meditativ e practice but also by
combining this with mor ally guided social action directed towar ds ending the power
of cer tain ex ploitativ e, greedy and self- centred sections of society. P eace is attained
by both inner and outer action, not by either alone. It is for this reason t hat , as
noted in the pr evious chapter , he criticises both those Buddhis ts who eschew politics
because it is "dir t y " (because they do not act in the wor ld) as well as the
communis ts (because they act only in the wor ld w ithout a mor al base). However,
Buddhadas a does not go beyond this analy sis to suggest a concrete political
pr og r amme to overcome social conf licts. Rather , as analy sed below, his s olution to
political conf lict is mor al and educational, to intr oduce Buddhis t mor al principles
into political act iv it y , r ather than to under take any specific ideologically aligned
inter v ention in politics as such.
9.2 B uddha da s a s Cr i t i c i s ms of P o l i t ics.
Buddhadas a uses his inter pr etativ e theory of phasa-khon - phasa-t ham to
dis ting uis h between what he considers to be ihe correct inter pr etations of social and
political concepts and their popular , but erroneous, def initions. He says t hat politics
w it hout mor ality becomes cor r upt and f actionalised as self- centredness dominates
minds and actions and causes conf usion and tur moil . In contr ast, in phas a-t ha m,
"Politics is def ined as] per f or ming duties so t hat this wor ld ex ists ha ppi l y . "(T ) 7
T hat is, politics is, "ar r ang ing or acting so t hat the many , many people who live
[ in this world] tr uly live together in peace and happiness. "( T ) 8 By "happines s"
B uddhadas a means more than simple mater ial pleasures. T he happiness politics
s hould pr omote is dhar nr mc,
dha mma which is politics will make the wor ld pass beyond k il es a,
har mf ulness , evil and the self- centredness of "I"- "mi ne ". (T ) 9
As a result of his pr oposition t hat political activ ity should be mor ally - inf ormed
7i d., T ha mmi k S a ng k homni y om B aep P ha dc t k a n (
8 - ^
i d. , T ha mma K a p K a n- my a ng ('^ J J JJ ~ft Uf) HJ IJJ'Q'O11 B uddhi s m a nd P ol it i c s ), T ha mma t ha n
M u l a ni t hi ( 0 J J J J V l T U U a l l f i ), Cha i y a T ha i la nd, 2522 (1979), p. 6.
U
9i d. , T ha mmi k S a ng k homni y om B acp P ha dc t k a n ( ^ P i J J UU U l l D U I U f \ l f l 1 T " ^ p 14
242
Buddhadas a maint ains t hat par ty politics and political f actionalis m char acter istic of
Wester n democracies are outside his def inition of politics, and are in f act a
manif es tation of immor al ity , "When there is no mor ality politics necessarily splits
into par ties and f act ions ."(T ) 10 For Buddhadas a politics is an activ ity which should
not only pr omote har mony but which s hould also proceed har moniouls y itself ,
otherwise it is "dir ty pol itics ", or not a tr uly benef icial f orm of politics. T his is
B uddhadas as cr iter ion for j udg ing the appr opr iateness or benef icial char acter of
political act iv it y , i.e. good political activ ity is peacef ul in itself and in its results.
B uddhadas as opposition to the conf lict inher ent in the par ty politics of tr adit ional
democr atic f or ms of g ov er nment is, however, as much a T hai dis dain of wun-way or
conf usion as it is a Buddhis t dislike of dis tur bing the peace. As Mor ell and
S amudav anij a note,
Par t icipant politics requires conf r ontation, open conf lict, discussion,
ar g ument; these have been disdained in T hai cultur e in preference for a
passive stance on pol it ical issues, a stance which is dig nif ied and basically
non- commital. 11
Buddhadas a is by no means convinced t hat libera] democracy based on the
two par ty system is necessarily the best political f or m,
Liber alistic democracy opens t he way for f ull freedom but doesnt clearly
def ine what f reedom is. T hen peoples kiles a snatch the oppor tunity to be
free accor ding to the power of those kilesa. (T ) 12
He suggests t hat an emphasis on political or social freedom without a
cor r esponding degree of mor al ins ig ht on the par t of the populace can only mean
f r eedom for kiles a to dominate social and political life. He emphasises this when he
says,
But it [ democracy] is ex tremely dangerous, because if the common person
is not yet good it will immediately tur n the w'hole of this wor ld into a
hel l . (T ) 13
Liber al democracy f ails in Buddhadas a's j udg ement because it does not lead to
social conditions which pr omote mor ality or the at t ainment of nibbana. In place of
^ i d. , Cut - ma y K hor ng K an- s y k s a ( ** p. 6.
' ^M o r e l l &: S a m u d a v a n i j a , p. 28.
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha mmi k S a ng k homni y om B aep P ha de t k a n (** ^ p i u w j u u i j u i t m n W p i s .
1 3i d. , T ha mma K a p L ok Ca P a i Dua y k a n D a i Ry M a i l ( 11 J T U S f l U l s i I P M
P- 17
243
liber al democr acy Buddhadas a proposes an alter nativ e f or m of g over nment which he
calls a "dictator ial style of dha mmic s ocialis m". Buddhadas a considers socialism to
be, "mor e mor al than other s y s tems "(T ) 14 because it restricts indiv iduals abil it y to
accumulate mater ial wealth, thus put t ing a check on the dangerous power of kiles a
and of mater ial attachment. He also values socialism because of its emphasis on co
oper ativ e r ather than competitiv e social activ ities . Buddhadas as proposed "dha mmi c
s ocialis m" denotes a political f or m which does not simply aim to pr ovide each
person with the necessities of s ur viv al. Rat her , it has as a higher goal the
pr ov ision of social cir cumstances which enable each person to strive for nibbana and,
accor ding to Buddhadas a, such a s pir itual f or m of socialism should proceed in a
centr alised, dictator ial manner .
T wo j us tif ications are pr ovided for a dict ator ial rather than liber al democr atic
f or m of dha mmi c socialism, the respective ex amples of the Buddha and of the f irst
Buddhis t emper or, A s oka. Buddhadas a maint ains t hat, "T he Buddha himself had
the pr inciple or ideal of socialism but his method of wor king was di ct a t or i a l . "(T ) 15
T hat is. the co- operative way of life of the s ahg ha or those s tr iv ing for nibbana
was the B uddhas "s ocialis m", but in lay ing down the details of the Noble Eig htf old
Pat h and the practices of the v inay a in elabor ate detail the Buddha was also acting
"diet at or i a l l y ", in say ing str ictly how nibbana was to be striven for. However,
B uddhadas as model Buddhis t polity is more specif ically based on the histor ical
t r adit ion dat ing f r om A s ok as Nor th Indian Maur y an Empir e some two hundr ed
years af ter the Buddha's death, for lie pr imar il y refers to the t r adit ional notion of
the Buddhis t monar ch. In ar g uing for a dict ator ial style of Buddhis t socialism
Buddhadas a refers to the da s a r a j a dha mma , the ten tr aditional qualities of a
B uddhis t k ing 16, say ing t hat they still have relevance in the moder n wor ld,
"da s a r a j a dha mma ... is the socialism which has the greatest benef it - a sovereign
abiding by the da s a r a j a dha mma . "(T ) 17 B ut r ather than hav ing a king Buddhadas a
implies t hat there should be a dictator with these attr ibutes , for he says t hat the
] 4i d. , T ha mmi k S a ng k homni y om B aep P ha de t k a n ( f l U U U J J l l U U p ?
1 5 i bi d. p. 39.
*6 T he da s a r a j a d ha m m a or t en qual i t i es of t he r oy al d ha m m a are: ( 1) dha na - al ms g i v i ng , ( 2) s il a - to
be mo r a l a nd not unde r t he i nf l uence of k i l e s a , (3) p a r i j j a g a - r e nounc i ng bad as pect s of one 's per s onal i t y ,
s uch as s el f - cent r edness , (4) a j j a v a - hones t y and i nt e g r i t y , (5) madda v a - g ent l enes s , (6) t apa - ex er cise of
s el f - cont r ol , (7) ak odha - not t o be ang er ed, (8) a v i hi ms a - not caus i ng di f f i cul ties or pr obl ems f or ot her s ,
(9) k ha nt i - pat i ence a nd f or bear ance, (10) a v ir odha - t o be f r ee f r om s us pi ci on by not v i ol a t i ng soci al
nor ms .
1"^P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha mmi k S a ng k homni y om B aep P ha de t k a n , p. 49.
244
best and quickest way to att ain s pir itually benef icial social development is by
hav ing a dictator contr olling a dha mmic socialist state,
T his [ dhammic socialism] is not a system which should be abandoned
and it is not the abs olute monar chy which is so hated. Per haps this system
will be able to remedy the wor lds pr oblems better than other s y s tems .(T ) 18
9.3 B u ddha da s a s P o l i t ical Cons e r v a t i s m.
While Buddhadas a calls for a centralised f or m of g ov er nment under a Buddhis t
dict ator it is clear t hat for him this is only a second best appr oach given t hat the
T hai monar ch no longer has legislative power. He in f act appears to have few
objections to the now' abolished ins t it ution of the absolute monar chy ,
If the King still f ulf illed his duties like t hat [ according to the
das ar aj adhamma] there would be no pr oblems, because the king did not
think , "T his [ national wealth] is mine." He t houg ht only t hat it was
society s, which is the people who give power to the k ing .(T ) 19
T he t r aditional char acter of B uddhadas as views can here be gauged by the
s tr iking s imilar ity between the above s tatement and an ins cr iption of the f our teenth
centur y K ing of Sukhothai, Ly- T hai, who praised himself say ing,
T his king rules by observing the ten king ly precepts [i.e.
das ar aj adhamma). He has pity on all his subjects. If he sees rice belonging
to others he does not covet it and if he sees the wealth of others he does
not become indig nant . 20
Buddhadas as conservative suppor t for the ins titution of the absolute monar chy
s hould be seen in the contex t of the impor t ant histor ical inf luence of K ing Mong kut
on Buddhadas a's ideas and pr actice, a matt er which has already been discussed in
Chapter T wo. As abs olute monar ch K ing Mong k ut not only ref ormed the str uctur e
of the T hai sarigha by establishing the T hammay ut Sect but also began the process
of national moder nis ation w'hich was so vigorously taken up by his son and heir,
K ing Chulalong kor n. It mus t be remember ed t hat senior members of the T hai
r oy alty had a sig nif icant progressive impact on the T hai s ahg ha until the f irst
decades of this centur y . For ex ample, Chulalong k or ns hal f br other , V aj ir anana
(T hai: Wachir ay an) was abbot of Wat Boworniw'et in Bang kok, the main
18i bi d. p . 53.
19
i bi d. p. 37.
20
Ci t e d in T r ev or L i ng , B uddhi s m, Impe r i a l i s m a nd War - B ur ma a nd T ha i l a nd i n Mode r n Hi s t o r y ,
Geor g e A l l en & Unw i n L t d, L ondon, 1979, p. 20.
245
T hammay ut temple, f r om 1892 and Supreme Patr iar ch of the T hai s ahg ha f rom
1910 to 1921, when he had a las ting impact on Buddhis t scholar ship and the ref orm
of the s ahg ha. T he abs olute T hai monar chy under Rama IV and Rama V thus in
many ways did have a progressive, moder nist impact on the countr y and there is no
doubt t hat it is this histor ical ideal which Buddhadas a has in mind when he calls
for a r etur n of the monar chy . It is by and large since 1932 t hat the monar chy has
become a sy mbol of conser vatism and entrenched interests, especially since the
dict ator Sar it T hanar at successfully r ehabilitated the monar chy and pr omoted it as a
s y mbol of T hai unity to bolster his own autocr atic, mil it ar is t regime in the 1960s.
Since t hat time the T hai monar chy has in effect been aligned with the mil itar is t
interests in the countr y . T he cutting edge of ref or m in T hailand thus no longer lies
with the monar chy but with the disg r untled rising middle class and with those
labour and peasant leaders who ar ticulate the woes of the lower classes. In not
recognising this his tor ical shif t Buddhadas a politically aligns himself with the
establis hment, tending to alienate himself f rom the "new g ener ation" of cr itical
Buddhis t thinker s in the new bourgeois.
Buddhadas as pr onouncements on what he calls the "dictator ial f or m of
B uddhis t s ocialis m" are his most specific comments on contempor ar y T hai politics.
These ideas were developed and f ir st published in the t ur bul ent period of 1973- 1976
when political polar is ation in the countr y was heightened and overf lowed into a
polar is ation of the s ahg ha between r ig htis t and left- aligned monks. T his
politicis ation of the s ahg ha was perceived by many , including Buddhadas a, as
thr eatening B uddhis ms role as a sy mbol of national unity . Somboon Suksamr an has
described the lef twing groups of monks as espousing causes which could only be
r ealised thr oug h poli tical action, "such as campaig ning for the under pr ivileged,
B uddhis m or nat ional is m. " 21 On the other hand the more conservative sections of
the politicised monks under took political action in response to what they perceived
as thr eats to their personal status , privilege and pos ition because of the popular ist
activ ities and demands of the lef tist monks. Politicis ation of the s ahg ha in the mid
1970s thus revealed w ithin the order the same tensions which had become appar ent
in the broader T hai society.
In this conf used and potentially dangerous s ituation Buddhadas a, hav ing no
specif ic alig nment with either the political r ig ht or the lef t, intervened by publis hing
his ideas on dictator ial Buddhis t socialism, which he appar ently hoped mig ht be
taken up as a mid- way position by the opposed political f actions in the s ahg ha as a
21
S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m a nd P ol it i c s i n T ha i l a nd, p . 7.
246
means of quelling the divisive disputes. Rather than directly face the political issues
inv olv ed Buddhadas as s olution relied upon a r etur n to the established tr adition of
maint aining str ict separ ation between the monkhood and social and political affairs.
Buddhadas a opposed the view t hat monks should be politically or socially active.
While this ex plicit conser vatism sits uneasily with his calls for the abolition of the
t r adit ional dis tinctions between the world- involved and r enunciate f orms of Buddhis m
it appears t hat the crisis within the s ahg ha was so great t hat Buddhadas a f elt it
could only be overcome by r etur ning to tr aditional practices. Rather than seeking a
r esolution by openly debating the issues, which would most likely have led to the
dev elopment of serious splits within the s ahg ha, Buddhadas as call for monks to
r ef r ain f rom becoming involved in social issues was an att empt to cut of f the means
f or the ex pression of dissent within the s ahg ha. T hat is, he viewed the conf lict
w it hin the s ahg ha as essentially irresolveable, because of the danger of the s ahg ha
suf f er ing perhaps per manent damag e f rom the ex pression of f actional interests. As a
consequence he sought to pr event the peace- disturbing ex pression of either r ig htis t or
lef tist views at the source. Somboon Suks amr an comments on Buddhadas as
inter v ention as f ollows,
between 1973 and 1976 when ideological conf lict was immensely
intensif ied Buddhadas a published his f or mulations of dhamma socialism
'dhammik a s ang k homniy om| , a very complex and closely knit set of
Buddhis t ideas. It was intended to provide a Buddhis t compr omise between
secular left- and right- wing ideologies. T houg h his ideas were ex ploited by
both left- and right- wing political monks to suit their goals, essentially he
had a conservative v iewpoint which emphasised the duties and
r esponsibilities of indiv iduals to their religion, g over nment, nation and their
f ellows. 22
Despite his progressive and moder nis t ref orms of doctr ine and his pr omotion of
a notion of Buddhis t social inv olv ement, as a result of the publication of his views
on dictator ial socialism Buddhadas a is by and large seen in T hailand today as a
pol it ical conservative. He offers ar g uments which suppor t strong, autocr atic political
contr ol of the countr y r ather than governments democr atically elected by the T hai
populace. Indeed, this ill- f itting political conservatism draws cr iticism f r om those
who otherwise s uppor t Buddhadas as general r ef or mist pr og r amme. Sulak Sivaraksa
comments ,
I think a weak point of his [ Buddhadasas] lies in this matter of
"dict at or ", because dictator s never possess dha mma , and i t s like this
everywhere because we abandon ourselves to hav ing dictator s. Even the
abbots at almos t every temple are dictator s , including Buddhadas a as
2 2 i bi d. , pp. 91- 92.
Like many of Buddhadas as supporter s among progressive T hai Buddhis ts Sulak
is a str ong pr oponent of the democr atic processes of g over nment who f inds it
dif f icult to accept Buddhadas as pr onouncements on the desir ability of a dictator ial
f or m of Buddhis t g over nment. Puey Ung phakor n, a pr ominent social scientist, echoes
the thoug hts and feelings of many progressive T hais when he says he sees the bases
of a "good moder n society" as being eff iciency, f reedom, justice and kindness24. T his
contr asts with Buddhadas as emphasis on responsibility over f reedom, which leads to
his r elatively poor regard for the notion of liberal democr atic g over nment in w'hich
he says mor al r esponsibility , the basis of Buddhis t practice (s'ila), is of ten thr own
ov er boar d in an unthink ing championing of indiv idualis tic f reedom.
9.4 De mocr acy and t he B uddhi s t T r a di t i on.
When considering Buddhadas as political conservatism and his criticisms of
liber al democracy it is necessary to keep i n mind t hat doctr inal Buddhis m provides
a weak basis for democratic principles. It is tr ue t hat in the B uddhas time there
were two competing types of g ov er nment in Nor th India, which can respectively be
categorised under the rubrics of r epublican and monar chical. One of the most
commonly mentioned "r epublics " in the Pali canon is the V ajj i region w'it.h its
capital at V esali, while Mag adha w'ith its capital at Raj ag r iha was a powerful
monar chy in the B uddhas time. However, it should be noted that the ter m
r epublic is r ather loosely applied to such states as V aj j i, which Ling says would be
better called ar istocr atic oligarchies, because the goverments of such states were
composed only of leading men of the tr ibe belonging to the k s 'atr iy a or war r ior
caste. However, as Ling notes, because of the ex pansion of the monar chies and
inter nal f euding among s t the var ious r epublics there was a general, "tr end towar ds
an increase in the size and power of the monarchies at the expense of the
r epublics . " 25 Indeed, as a result of these forces all the republics had collapsed within
a few years of the B uddhas demise.
Raj av ar amuni notes t hat the Buddha laid down pr inciples for g uiding the
gover nance of both the republics and monar chies of his day . T hat is, the Buddha
2 3 . - - - - - -
Q uo t ed in K h a n a k a m i r ^a k a n S a s a n a P l i y a K a n - p l i a t a n a , P hut t ha t ha t K a p K ho n Run- max ,
( w v r a i n f i r i i j m i T u l v i i J n ), P. 56.
24
U n g p h a k o r n , p. 116.
25
L i n g , T he B uddha - B uddhi s t C i v i l i s a t i o n i n I n d i a a nd Cey l on, p. 50.
w el l .(T )23
did not s uppor t one system of g over nment over the other , but r ather tried to ensure
t hat the mor al and religious welfare of the people was guar anteed whatever the
political system ( T )26. Buddhadas as comprehensive notion of dhamr r iocr acy and his
political pr ag matis m therefore have well- established precedents in the B uddhas own
tr eatment of the political divisions of his time. Nevertheless, Raj av ar ar nuni also
observes t hat the Buddha thoug ht the monar chical system of g ov er nment would
dominate in the long ter m. On this point Ling comments t hat ,
Social s tability appears to have been recognised by the B uddha as a
necessary condition for the success of social and mor al r econstr uction. In
the ex isting s ituation in Nor th India in the f if th century B.C. the surest
g uar antee of social s tability appeared to be in the dir ection of a str ong and
benevolent monar chy . 27
T hus Buddhis t teachings are by no means antithetical to democr atic f orms of
g ov er nment but by the same token neither are they str ongly suppor tive. A nd given
the considerably more ex tensive references to the cak k av at t in (univ ersal monar ch)
and to the royal qualities of the das ar a j adha mma in the T her avada canon, rather
than to democr atic ideals and virtues, Buddhadas as conser vatism and the unease of
democr ats such as Sulak Siv ar aksa are both under s tandable. Buddhadas as support
for a str ong, centr alised, even dictator ial f or m of g over nment appears to be based
on a concern for maint aining the peace and social order he regards as being the
f oundation of the collective mor al order of T hai society. Buddhadas as political
conser v atism, together with his conservatism in the realm of the practice of
dha mma , are the main sources of dissatisf action with his work and ideas among
progressive Buddhis ts , many of whom suppor t a much more mil it ant or at least
ex plicitly democr atic f or mulation of Buddhis m. B ut while at odds with many of his
moder nis t suppor ters B uddhadas as views are at this point unchar acter istically in
accord with those of the major ity of T hai citizens who acquiesce in or suppor t
s tr ong centralised regimes. Mor ell and S amudav anij a observe,
A lthoug h many intellectuals and some r oy alists would prefer otherwise,
the r emainder of society considers mil itar y rule or at least long- term
mil it ar y tutelag e, as both leg itimate and reasonable, and cer tainly
impor t ant for the s tability and order with which it is associated. 28
2<^ ( P hr a ) R a t c h a w o r a m u n i , P hut t ha s a s a na K a p S a ng k hom T ha i (it ^ pj "]^ ^ j s j [ y] jj II
- T
B uddhi s m and T hai S ociet y ), Mul a n i t h i Kor nor t K hi mt l i rr*g ( m m m u a m j v i B ' j )- Bang k ok ,
si
2526 (1983) pp. 22f f .
27
L i ng , T he B uddha - B uddhi s t C i v i l i s a t i o n i n In di a and Ce y l on, p. 140.
28
Mo r e l l &c S a m u d a v a n i j a , pp. 57- 58.
248
249
9.5 Cont r a di c t i ons betw een B uddha da s a s Do c t r i na l Re f or ms a nd P o l i t i c a l
Cons e r v a t i s m.
B ut while there are both s cr iptur al and cultur al- histor ical precedents for
Buddhadas as political conser vatism there is nevertheless a pr onounced dis continuity
between his work on politics and the r emainder of his otherwise r ef or mist teachings.
In developing his general re- inter pr etations of Buddhis t teachings, as elabor ated in
the preceding chapters, Buddhadas a has f ollowed the method of r etur ning to
doctr inal f undamentals as expressed in the f irst sections of the S ut t apit a k a , t hat is,
the Dig ha Ni k a y a , Ma j j hi ma Nik ay a, A hg utt ar a Nik ay a and S amy ut ta Nik ay a. His
r e- inter pretations have been based on a selective r eading of the Buddhis t scriptures,
concentr ating on doctr inal tex ts and effectively ig nor ing his tor ical, popular and non-
doctr inal sections of the S ut t apit ak a such as the J at ak a s and the Pet av at t hu, which
contain views more alig ned w'ith t r adit ional popular Buddhis m than w'ith
B uddhadas as clerical doctr inalis m. However, s ig nif icantly these otherwise neglected
tex ts, in par ticular the J at ak as or stories of the B uddhas previous incar nations ,
come to the fore in B uddhadas as political wr iting s. For ex ample, the
da s a r a j a dha mma or ten qualities of a r ighteous monar ch, which Buddhadas a cites in
s uppor t of his notion of an ideal political leader, are dr awn f rom the J a i a k a Tales
and not f r om the doctr inal core of the early sections of the S ut t apitak a. T hat is,
in his political wr iting s B uddhadas as use of the Buddhis t scriptures is inconsistent
with the methodolog ical appr oach taken in the r emainder of his ref or mist work,
cr eating a discursive dis continuity between his ex plicitly political and general
doctr inal wr iting s . T his str ongly suggests t hat these two areas of his work in f act
operate under quite dif f erent cons tr aints and accor ding to dif f erent assumptions. The
dissatis f action of many of Buddhadas as lay suppor ter s with his politically
conser vative anti- democr atic views is a consequence of this f undamental dissonance
between his political and non- political wr iting s .
T he reason for this dis continuity between Buddhadas as political and non
pol itical wor k lies in the already noted contr adiction between his conceptual
integ r ation of the s pir itual and mundane levels of human activ ity but the ongoing
pr actical s epar ation of these tw'o levels in his own life and in his tr eatment of the
pr actical role of the s ahg ha in moder n T hail and. Political activ ity is necessarily
and ir r edemably pr actical and world- involved and, given t hat Buddhadas a has in his
own life f ailed to resolve the dilemmas raised by clerical inv olv ement in the
mundane wor ld, his tr eatment of political activ ity r emains cut of f and distanced
f r om his other wr iting s , in the same way t hat he has distanced himself and the
s ahg ha f r om active wor ld- involvement. For ex ample, Buddhadas as opposition to the
par t icipant politics of liber al democr atic f orms of g ov er nment is consistent w it h his
own decision over f if ty years ago to r etreat f r om the conf usions and w un-way of the
political hierarchy of the s ahg ha in a personal search for ins ig ht and peace.
However, the tensions under ly ing contempor ar y political conf licts, both in lay
society and within the s ahg ha, also appear to have intr oduced an ex ternal source of
contr adiction into Buddhadas a's wor k. While the logic of his moder nist views
inev itably leads him towar ds the abol ition of t r adit ional dis tinctions in the teaching
and practice of T hai Buddhis m this abol ition also has the potential of under mining
the very str uctur e of ins t it ut ional Buddhis m in T hail and. He clearly does not want
the s ahg ha to collapse, and perhaps it was only the events of 1973- 1976 which
made it clear to him t hat ins t it ut ional Buddhis m in T hail and was in f act thr eatened
with being tor n apar t by the same tensions which he has been tr y ing to resolve in
his own work of ref orm and r e- inter pretation. However, Buddhadas a has never
acknowledged the potentially destr uctive implications of his wor k. Per haps he does
not see them, or perhaps he wishes to ignore them. Wher ever the tr uth lies it is
clear t hat his response to the political and religious crisis of the 1970s was an ad
hoc reaction designed to preserve the s ahg ha at all costs, even at the cost of
cr eating inconsistencies in his own work and in his r ef or mist pr og r amme.
T he pr ag matic char acter of Buddhadas as appr oach to politics is f urther
indicated by a sof tening of his cr iticisms of liberal democr acy in the years since
1976, when a retur n to r elative social and political s tability has per mitted a par tial
and g r adual liber alis ation in T hai society. B uddhadas as more recent political
comments in fact contr adict some of his s tatements made in the mid 1970s. A t a
talk given in 1982 to commemor ate the f if tieth anniver sar y of Suan Mok
Buddhadas a gave the f ollowing reasons for why it was f it t ing for him, a monk, to
talk about democracy , a political matter ,
1. Because democracy was bor n in T hail and together with
Suan Mok, they were both born in the same year [ 1932] ,
althoug h Suan Mok is one month older ...
2. Buddhis m has in it the s pir it of democracy . Buddhis t
pr inciples, especially in the governance of the s ahg ha have
in them the s pir it or conception of democr acy ...
3. We [as human beings] by natur e have the char acteristic
of democr acy in us ... T hat is, we are all "f riends" of
suf f ering, bir th, ag ing , illness and death. We all have
kiles a in us in the same way and suffer the same
pr oblems ... the idea of democracy ex ists in every person
by the principles of nat ur e.(T ) 29
_____________________ v
29 P h u t t h a t h a t , Fa- s ang T hang P r a.chat hipa.t ai De moc r at ic
. w- ~ f t
D a w n i n g ) , Sar nnak - nang s y T ha r nma buc ha ( ^ WVl 'J ti t i l l J 3* 3J11^5 ^ B a ng k ok , 2528 (1985), pp. 2- 3.
250
251
T he above seem the words of a t otall y dif f er ent Buddhadas a f r om the one who
eig ht years earlier in 1974 called for dictator ial Buddhis t socialism to remedy the
conf using state of T hai society. Indeed the very title of the book the above remarks
a r ^, taken f r om, Democr atic Da w ning (Fa- sang T hang Pr achat hi pat ai
"vl'igi'va v n ^i I y s T m ul ) stands in stark contr as t to the tenor of his work on
dictator s hip. B ut while in recent years Buddhadas a has increasingly shif ted towar ds
s uppor ting the liber al democr atic patter n he was earlier so cr itical of the change is
not in f act so dr amatic. He still maint ains str ong s uppor t for the notion of dictator
or dictator s hip (phadetkan - ) 5 but is now caref ul to redef ine what he
means by this,
T he word "dict at or " denotes acting resolutely ... If it has dhamma then
a dictator s hip is resolute and correct. Dictator s hip is only a tool, a method
t hat is resolute and decisive ... If it is used in a correct way it is good but
if it is used wr ongly it is bad.(T ) 30
T his r etur ns us to Buddhadas as politically pr ag matic notion of dhammocr acy ,
wherein all political systems are seen s imply as tools or methods for obtaining "the
rule of dha mma in the wor ld", and in themselves have no inher ent value.
Buddhadas a goes on to say t hat people have criticised his use of the notion of
dict ator ,
because they only know the ty r annical jthor ar at - VlTT'l'fl j destr uctive
dictator s and regards it, dictator s hip, as a system of political ideals. B ut I
say it is nt. T he word "dictator s hip" does not denote a political system but
a tool which can be used for any thing . (T )
Y et despite these recent qualif ications of his earlier cr iticis m of democracy and
s uppor t for dictator s hip insof ar as he maint ains an essentially supra- political stance
by calling all political systems tools, which are good or bad accor ding to the mor al
char acter of the par ticipants or leaders, Buddhadas a is s till, in strictly political
ter ms, a conservative. T his is because he is, as shown in 1974, prepared to abandon
democr atic principles if on his j udg ement the practice of democracy leads to too
g r eat a degree of social conf usion. T he democr atic idealists among many of his
progressive lay suppor ter s, however, cannot accept this supra- political dhammic
pr ag matis m and like Sulak par t ways with Buddhadas a at this point.
B ut while Buddhadas a can be cr iticised for the contr adictions intr oduced into
his views by his political and pr actical conser vatism it is necessary to remember
i bi d. p. 7.
31 i bi d. p . 36.
t hat he is a monk and t hat as a member of the T hai clergy there are def inite
l imit s to what it is possible to say and advocate given the alig nment of the s ahg ha
hier ar chy with the state, and the r esulting str ictly enf orced conser vatism of the T hai
monkhood. In addit ion, because of the str ongly or thopr actic char acter of T hai
Buddhis m, and in par ticular the s ig nif icant or thopr actic basis of s pir itual author ity ,
if Buddhadas a were to challenge the t r adit ional role and practices of the monk he
would also risk losing the repute and esteem needed to author ise his doctr inal
ref orms. T his is because in order to author ise doctr inal changes he mus t r emain
s tr ictly or thopr actic even if the new inter pr etations thereby developed imply a
ques tioning or cr iticis m of the or thopr act ic t r adit ion itself. Giv en the severly limited
scope for pr actical innov ation in the T hai s ahg ha Buddhadas a, as a monk, in f act
has no choice but to take a conservative s tand and oppose s ahg ha inv olv ement in
pol it ical aff airs if he wishes his doctr inal ref orms to be considered as leg itimate
inter pr etations of the dhamma. So long as he wishes his inter pr etations of
B uddhis m to be considered within the contex t of T hai T her av ada Buddhis m, and
not as the work of an isolated, unauthor is ed eccentric or maverick ex ternal to that
t r adit ion, he can do nothing but abide by or acquiesce in t he narrowly def ined, non
political and non- involved role laid down for monks.
T he contr adiction between Buddhadas as theoretical integ r ation of the worlds
of social action and dhamma and his own is olationist personal practice and
conservative political views, is therefore in effect forced upon him as a monk of the
of f icial T hai s ahg ha. A lthoug h in the face of real tur moil and conf lict Buddhadas a
does appear to have in f act suppor ted the tr aditional isolation of the monk f rom
activ e social inv olv ement he could not have decided otherwise, and remained a
recognised and respected inter preter of o f f i c i a l Buddhis m, even if he did have more
r adical personal views. T he contr adiction in Buddhadas as work is in f act inher ent
in the ins t it utional char acter of T hai Buddhis m and could only be overcome either
by an unprecedented ref or m in clerical practices or by a schismatic dissociation f r om
the author ity and contr ols of the of f icial church. Buddhadas a seems uninterested in
either of these r adical alter nativ es and so the contr adictions between his life and
wor k and between his political and non- political t houg ht, in the f inal analy sis,
r emain irresolveable.
Because he has in practice w ithdr aw n f rom active wor ld- involvement and
because he does not want to engage in conf r ontational politics Buddhadas as
suggestions for the r ealisation of his ideas of a Buddhis t polity and social order
av oid dir ectly f acing or thr eatening the power and author ity of either the s ahg ha
hier ar chy or the T hai state. As a consequence his suggestions r emain unr ealistic and
252
idealis t, even if mor ally laudable. Nevertheless, in order to appr eciate the total
system of B uddhadas as wor k it is necessary to consider his suggested means of
r ealising Buddhis t ideals in the social wor ld as he hims elf presents them. A nd by
way of completing this study of Buddhadas as thoug ht and work his views on the
power of religion to effect social tr ans f or mation are considered below in the f inal
section.
9 .6 Re l i g i on - B uddha da s a s S ol u t i on f or S ocial Il l s .
Buddhadas a considers the ul timat e s olution of social and political problems to
lie in the dev elopment and application of mor ally inf or med knowledge or wisdom.
For ex ample, he sees both his s pir itual and social thoug ht as pr ov iding an
alter nativ e appr oach to the social reforms suggested by communists, a s pir itual
B uddhis t way to at t ai n peace. He maintains t hat communis m only arises as a
popular ideology when religion has decayed, and so restr engthening religion mus t be
at the root of ending both the capitalist- caused social problems which communis m
addresses, as well as the perceived thr eat of communis m itself,
Communis m will only arise when religion loses its power ... Whenever
religion loses its power it no longer has inf luence over the minds of human
beings and then people will of necessity become so selfish t hat they
consider no other person. A nd those who endure this oppression and
ex ploitation then must rise up to f ig ht i t . (T ) 32
A nd Buddhadas a maintains t hat religion decays pr imar ily because of
mis inter pr etations of doctr ine which, in t ur n, lead to the gr owth and spread of
mater ialis m,
Whenever people think t hat mental matter s are less impor tant than
mater ial concerns communis m will arise. If r eligion s till has the correct
teachings people will necessarily feel t hat mental thing s are more impor tant
than the mat e r ial .(T ) 33
When religious doctrines are misinter pr eted in the moder n contex t religion
becomes ir r elevant to contempor ar y life and people are forced to look elsewhere, to
mater ialis t doctr ines, in order to f ind answers to their current problems.
B uddhadas as phasa-t ham inter pr etations are therefore as impor tant to his social
doctr ine as they are to his re- inter pretations of Buddhis t s pir itual philosophy . He
regards his phas a-t ham inter pr etations as revealing the tr ue relevance of Buddhis t
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - t i
32
i d. , "Upas ak Hae ng K an- phocy - phr ae T ha r a , ( n y y f ) 'I ? I CJ LI l l YJ 11 l T J U ) P '22'
1
3 3 i bi d . p. 23.
254
teachings to moder n life. He also considers these re- inter pretations to provide the
means to prevent people leaving Buddhis m for mater ialis m or communis m because of
dis enchantment with the r elig ions conser vatism and contempor ar y irrelevance. For
ex ample, Buddhadas a regards phas a-t ham inter pr etation of "bir t h" or "lif e", as the
ar ising of self- centredness, and his emphasis on s alv ation here and now as being
correct views which, if widely under s tood, would pr event people becoming interested
in communis m,
Our community of Buddhis ts is s till too f atuously concerned with the
nex t w'orld, af ter death. In f act Buddhis m doesnt f atuously place its hopes
in the nex t wor ld but is instead a system of correctly f ig hting kilesa here
and now; with being able to completely eradicate thoug hts and actions
dangerous to humanity here and now for us to see [ the results] in this
l if e.(T ) 34
Buddhadas a does not l imit his criticisms of the f ailings of contempor ar y
r eligion to Buddhis m and sees s imilar mis inter pr etations in other religions as also
pr omoting both the capitalis t mater ialis m which produces the social ills of poverty
and ex ploitation in contempor ar y society and the communis t reaction to these ills.
He regards all religions as shar ing a common phasa-tham essence, the er adication of
self- centredness and the r e- attainment of cit -wang , and sees all religions as having a
v ital role in solving the wor lds problems. He says,
T hat which is called nibbana is the result of holding to religion, to every
religion. A ccor ding to their preferences other religions do not call it nibbana
but the result of pr actis ing t hat religion in r eality is t hat which we call
nibbana. (T ) 35
Buddhadas a maintains t hat religions should realise their common natur e and
w'ork collectively and co- operatively in f ig hting their common enemies.
Rappr ochement between religious tr aditions is consequently a central element of his
pr og r amme to better the wor ld,
Looking on other r eligions as enemies is the heig ht of s tupidity ; it is the
greatest mis under standing and the greatest danger to humanity . There is
nothing in any religion t hat need make it an enemy of another religion.
T hat is, if we look at the hear t of the thing called religion we will feel
t hat every religion wants to er adicate the f eeling called "I"- "mine", or
str ong self- centredness. T ha t is the core of every r elig ion.(T ) 36
34
i bi d. pp. 26- 27.
35 i d. , O s a r e t a ppha t ha r n ( r* 1 ^1 I 5flVilVIB J IJ - J *} , p. 217.
f 1
36i d. , ' U pas ak Hae ng K an- phoey - phr ae T ba n i ' ( ^ J J f l U.1W H") T ICJ LI LIVJ J U I T J J ")- PP- 24- 25.
255
A t the s upr amundane level of phasa-t ham Buddhadas a says t hat there are no
dif ferences between religions and t hat we only , "separ ate out Buddhis t, Chr is tian,
Moslem because we have not attained to the t r ut h. "( T ) 37 By say ing t hat every
r eligion is at core the same Buddhadas a not only att empt s to build bridges between
religions but also presents a j us t if ication for the impor tat ion of ideas f rom other
r eligions into Buddhis m. T he ex tent of Mahay ana and Zen inf luence upon
B uddhadas as ideas has alr eady been analysed in Chapter Seven, but there has also
been an input f r om Chr is t ianit y . Per haps the mos t impor tant inf luence f rom
Chr is t ianit y is the notion of God. Buddhadas a says,
T he classif ication of religions into tw'o groups, atheis tic and theistic, is a
very shallow classif ication and does not touch the real essence or meaning
of r elig ion. 38
He attempts to breach the theistic- atheistic dis tinction by claiming that despite
popular opinion to the contr ar y Buddhis m does in f act have a God, ar r iv ing at this
conclusion via a very Buddhis tic r eduction of the Chr is tian notion of div inity to
dha mma , or the law of natur e. Buddhadas a gives dham? na a f ourf old theistic
inter pr etation as f ollows:
(1) Natur e, or the entire natur al system of the cosmos.
( 2) T he laws of nature.
(3) A ct iv it y in accordance with the laws of natur e, i.e. moral action.
(4) T he results attained f rom abiding by the laws of nat ur e. 39
T his def inition is then used to argue t hat all of natur e is what other religions
mean by "G ods body ", the laws of natur e are "G ods mind", abiding by the laws
of natur e is to follow' the desires or commands of God, and the result of such mor al
action is a gif t or of f ering f r om God40. But Buddhadas a does not only doctr inally
link Buddhis m and Chr is t ianit y via the concept of God, he makes the much broader
claim t hat Buddhis ts ,
can accept all the passages of Chr is t ianit y [ i.e. the Bible] , if they are
allowed to inter pr et the language of dha mma [phas a-t ha m] in the Bible in
3 7 . . - / i
i d. , M a i M i S a s a na ( " i u u v - n m n " T here is no R e l i g i o n), Sar nnak- nang s y T ha mma buc ha
( J U U i n )- B a ng k ok , 2517 (1974), p. 5.
11
3^B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y a nd B uddhi s m, p. 7.
C| ^
^ P h u t t h a t h a t , T ha mma N a i T ha na L a t t hi K a n- my a ng ( 11 ^ J J J J t I I I O l i S ^ Vl 'Kn T J I " ) j
pp. 3- 4.
40
i bi d. p.8f f .
256
their own ter ms . 41
These views, however, have not been well- received by some other Buddhists ,
par ticul ar l y in Sri Lanka. A n author identif ied only as "A . de S." says of
B uddhadas as book Chr i s t i a ni t y and B uddhi s m,
this book is an apology for Chr is t ianit y and a subtle att empt to convert
the Buddhis ts of T hailand ... T he Off ice of Chr is tian Education in
Bang kok, f r om which the book comes, has chosen its pr opag andis t and
pr opag anda unwisely and erroneously , for the venerable bhik k hus words
will be like seeds cast on stony g r ound. 42
One A mar as ir i Weer ar ame criticises the theory of phasa-t ham upon which
Buddhadas a bases his r appr ochement with Chr is tianity as, "so much bluf f . There is
no such thing as a common dha mma lang uag e serving as a common denominator to
all r elig ions. " 43 Weerar ame makes the realistic comment t hat ,
By tr y ing to inter pr et away Chr is tianity to f it into the thoug ht and
concepts of Buddhis m he does violence to both Buddhis m and
Chr is t ianit y . 44
Weer ar ame concludes t hat Buddhadas a, "is adv ocating a new br and of religion
which is neither Chr is tian nor Buddhis t. It cannot be accepted by either par t y . " 45
On this issue Buddhadas a also has critics in T hail and, Sulak Sivaraksa accuses that,
He always looks at thing s f r om a good perspective. In par ticular he sees
other religions and other cultur es thr oug h rose- coloured glasses.(T ) 46
T hat is, Sulak criticises the univer salist char acter of Buddhadas as views of
other religions which diminis h the specific "T haines s" or national char act er of
B uddhis m which many progressive Buddhis ts like Sulak see as a bulwar k against
neg ativ e f oreign cultur al inf luence in T hailand.
41
B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y and B uddhi s m, p. 7.
42A . de S. (no ot her name g i v en), "B uddhi s t Mo n k ' s A pol og y f or Chr i s t i a ni t y ", in Wor l d B uddhi s m
( Ce y l on) , Ma y 1969 (B . E. 2513), r e pr i nt ed i n ( B hi k k hu) Si v l i bodhi (ed), B uddha da s a : A ppear ance and
R e a l i t y , S ubl i me Li f e Mi s s i on, B a ng k ok , 1 9 7 1, p p . 1- 3.
43A ma r a s i r i W e e r a r a m e , "Mo n k ' s Int e r pr e t a t i on of Chr i s t i a ni t y ", in Wor l d B uddhi s m (Ce y l on),
S e pt e mbe r 1969 ( B . E. 2513), r epr i nt ed in ( B hi k k hu) Si v l i bodhi (ed), B uddha da s a : A ppear ance and Re a l it y ,
S ubl i me Li f e Mi s s i on, B a ng k ok , 1971, p. 33.
44
i bi d. pp. 35- 36.
40i bi d. p. 36.
4 6 . . . . .
Ci t e d in K l i a i i ^k a m i p a k a n S a s a n a P l i y a K a n - p h a t a n a , P hut t ha t ha t K a p K ho n Run- ma i
( "wv iijv iT amjmnulv iij" )t p57.
257
But at least some Chr istians view B uddhadas as theories positively . Swearer,
an academic and a Chr is tian, says,
A mong the T hai Buddhis ts with whom I have talked it is generally
agreed t hat Buddhadas a is the most impor t ant as well as the most
contr over sial spokesman for Buddhis m in T hail and today . He is praised for
his pr of undity in ex pounding the dha mma but at the same time is
criticised because his er udition exceeds the under s tanding of the or dinar y
man. Other s are unhappy with the or ig inality of his t houg ht asserting he
does not expose the scriptures, especially the A bhidhamma ... Buddhadas a
s tands alone as one of the most creative, pr of ound and s timul ating thinkers
I have discovered in the Buddhis t s ahg ha. 47
Sulak Siv ar aksa r etor ts, however, t hat when considered seriously,
There is no way t hat Chr is tians can accept Buddhadas as rendering of
the notion of "God". T hat T hai Chr is tians do accept it is because it is
benef icial for them to do so and because they are the minor ity in
T hailand. (T ) 48
T hat is, Sulak maint ains Buddhadas a is in effect pr ov iding a Buddhis t
leg itimation for a f oreign, non- T hai religious f orm.
However, contr ar y to the Sri L ankans claims Buddhadas a is not in f act
interested in opening the way for Buddhis ts to conver t to Chr is t ianit y . On the
contr ar y his emphasis on the common unity of all religions is meant to re- inforce
each per sons commit ment to their own religion,
It is because of ignorance of the language of dhamma t hat one abandons
ones own religion and embraces another . If one really under stands the
meaning of ones own religion in the lang uag e of dha mma , he will love his
own religion j us t as he loves his own lif e. 49
Indeed Buddhadas a regards his phasa-t ham inter pr etations as actively
pr ev enting T hai Buddhis ts becoming Chr is t ian, say ing t hat the super stitious
accretions to Buddhis m tend to make T hai Buddhis ts despise,
their own religion, consequently they embrace Chr is t ianit y which is
compar ativ ely new to them and has no such s uper stitious pr actices. 50
T hr oug h appr eciating his or her own religion in ter ms of phas a-t ham he wants
47
S w e a r er , B hi k k hu B uddha da s a a nd the B uddhi s t R e f o r ma t i o n i n T ha i l a nd, p. 6.
48 _
Ci t e d i n K l i a n a k a m r n a k a n S a s a n a P l i y a K a n - p l i a t a n a , P hut t ha t ha t K a p K ho n Run- r nai
( **vj v i t i T j 7 l A " , P.57.
49
B u d d h a d a s a , C hr i s t i a n i t y and B ud dhi s m , p. 6.
50i bi d. p . 22.
each person to know t hat which is the highest and most pr of ound teaching of t hat
r eligion. A nd it is thr oug h an in depth appr eciation of ones own religion t hat
Buddhadas a considers mater ialis m and communis m will be f oug ht and def eated,
Let each person have their own r elig ion, enter into their own religion and
then vigorously conf r ont communis m. Dont s tupidly think t hat the coming
of communis m would end Buddhis m. Buddhis m is not in such a poor state,
it is not so weak ... Buddhis m mus t be like a mountain. When
communis m collides with t hat mount ain it mus t die. We have and keep to
the dha mma which is the heart of religion. It mus t resist communis m.(T ) 51
T his at t it ude differs mar kedly f r om t hat which has been put f or war d by A nan
Senakhan, Phr a K it t iw ut t ho and other religious conservatives, namely t hat
communis m is a great thr eat to Buddhis m. Fig hting communis m has been argued as
v ital to nat ional security because, given the belief t hat Buddhis m under pins both
the nation and the monar chy , the anti- r eligious stance of communis m is regarded by
conservatives as thr eatening the whole f abr ic of T hai society. Morell and
S amudav anij a note t hat the t r adit ional accusation of various T hai g over nments
counter- insurgency pr opag anda was t hat ,
When the communists contr ol a village they will force all the monks to
leave the temple and thereby destroy the v illag es religious lif e. 5
Buddhadas a disagrees. Fir s tly , he sees the pr imar y social pr oblem in T hailand
as ex pl oitation - communis m is simply a response to the self- centred and greedy
hoar ding of wealth by capitalis ts . A nd secondly, he thinks that communis m is only
seen as a viable response to ex ploitation when the religious response is either
mis inter pr eted or dismissed as ir r elev ant because of mis inter pr etation. Buddhadas a
considers all f orms of mater ialis m to be thr eats to social well- being and to peace,
and does not regard either capitalis m or communis m as in the long run being a
better political f or m. A nd r ather than attack ing communis m directly Buddhadas a
proposes t hat the tr uth of r eligions s hould f irst be more widely revealed and t hat a
f or m of dha mmi c or religious s ocialism be built upon t hat universal s pir itual t r uth.
By this appr oach Buddhadas a maint ains t hat the mater ialis m of both capitalis m and
communis m are attacked s imultaneous ly , in a s pir itual and r adical rather than
merely s y mpt omat ic way.
Buddhadas a is conscious of pr esenting a social theory which is neither
capitalis t nor communis t and ex plicitly states t hat Buddhis m, "doesnt agree with
1P h u t t h a t h a t , Ma i Mi S a s a na ( ** I '* ), p. 27.
M o r e l l &: S a m ud a v a n ij a , p. 229.
capitalis m ... It is nt communis m ... Buddhis m is consequently neither strongly
r ig htis t nor s tr ong ly l e f t is t ."(T ) 53 He also says,
Buddhis m is neither mater ialis m nor idealism but a state of correctness
between both; or to put it another way it is both kinds in proper
pr opor tion. (T ) 54
A nd Buddhadas a would like to see Buddhis m r ather than capitalis m or
communis m as both the religious and social ideology of T hail and, "If the major ity
of T hais were tr ue Buddhis ts they would not prefer any ideology other than
B uddhi s m. "(T ) 55 A nd in these few wor ds Buddhadas a reveals the nex us of social
and religious mot iv at ions behind his wor k, and the reason for his qualif ied
popular ity among progressive T hai Buddhis ts . He desires a r etur n to the "T rue
B uddhis m" as a means of ensuring the r eligion not only r emains the most impor tant
T hai ins t it ution but also becomes a cataly s t for the progressive tr ans f or mation of
T hai society.
53 . . . . - - .
P h u t t h a t h a t , H a k K h o r m un i t K h a u Ma P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Y u D a i
11 n u n i N v i u " D L i I ), p-ioo.
i d. , T ha r nr ni k S a ng k ho mmy o m Dae p P ha de t k a n ( " t u u n f i N P i u i i L i u u u u . " )p- 11-
5 5 . - - - . - - - - .
i d. , H a k ^ K h o r m un i t K ha u t Aa P hut t ha s a s a na K o r Y ang Yu D a i
"vi nn piBumia fi i ninviiviii pnemnntfi aul n"
), p . 110.
260
C ONC L U S IO N.
While Buddhadas a is a theor etician and his contr ibution to T her av ada
B uddhis m lies in the r ealm of doctr inal and s cr iptur al inter pr etation a simply
philos ophical analy sis of his work would nevertheless f ail to captur e the f ull impor t
of his intellectual impact. As discussed in the Intr oduction, because of the key role
of ins t it ut ional Buddhis m in T hai political, social and cultur al life, the theor etical
and doctr inal aspects of the religion mus t also be viewed in terms of their ex tr a
relig ious signif icance in the secular domain. S imilar ly , when analy sing contempor ar y
teaching s on Buddhis m it is as impor tant to investigate the possible social sources
of ideas and inter pr etations as it is to seek out theoretical precedents within the
B uddhis t t r adit ion itself. In the Intr oduction I also argued t hat a social and
philos ophical analy sis of Buddhadas as thor oug h review of T her av ada teachings
should be under taken with an at t it ude of s y mpathetic engagement. T hat is,
B uddhadas as work should alway s be tr eated s y mpathetically by acknowledg ing the
specif ic intellectual and socio- cultural contex ts which he has worked within and
dr awn upon. A t the same time, however, a philosopher should not ref rain f rom
eng ag ing Buddhadas a and mak ing ex plicit the contr adictions and limit at ions of his
pr es entations of Buddhis m.
These above methodolog ical pr inciples are necessary components of any analy sis
of B uddhadas as work which does not ov er simplif y the actual complex ity of his
cont r ibut ion to Buddhis t scholar ship. A nd for this same reason, when at t empt ing to
present a conclusion or overall ev aluation of Buddhadas as contr ibution to Buddhis m
it is also necessary to av oid overly simplif ied judg ements . It simply is not possible
to s ummar is e the results of B uddhadas as f if ty years of intellectual work in one or
two pit hy , easily digested s tatements . Rather , to be tr ue to the man and to his
monument al opus one mus t make mul tiple ev aluations of the various themes which
char acter ise his wr iting s and which set his work apar t f rom tr adit ional and most
contempor ar y Buddhis t s cholar ship in T hail and.
However, before at t e mpt ing to give any detailed ev aluation of B uddhadas as
life work it is necessary to make some general observations in order to provide a
backdr op for the more specific cr iticisms and analy ses. T r aditionally Buddhis m has
t aug ht t hat s alv ation f r om suf f ering is attained by detachment f r om the world of
imper manence, which it was assumed was beyond the power of indiv idual human
beings to change or better . In the face of the vagaries of natur e and his f ellow man
the B uddha s oug ht a per manent tr ans cendent r eality which could pr ovide suf f ering
human beings with an unshakeable s pir itual refuge. In contr ast to this t r aditional
view of the wor ld the thoug ht of progressive, moder nis t T hai Buddhis ts is inf ormed
by the belief t hat the nat ur al and social wor lds can be tr ansf or med for the better
and t ha t human suf f ering can be amelior ated thr oug h the exercise of human will
coupled with technolog ical and political power. In his sy stematic re- interpretation of
T her av ada Buddhis m Buddhadas a has attempted to develp a comprehensive view of
human well- being in which neither tr ans cendent nibbana nor active world-
inv olv ement is either denied or given ex clusive emphasis. He has attempted to
s ubsume the polar opposites of "this wor ld" and the "nex t wor ld" into a unity
which, he hopes, will r etain all the t r ut h and saving power of the B uddhas s pir itual
message while also af f ir ming the mater ial saving power af f orded humanity thr oug h
scientif ic knowledge and technological skill. In ter ms of the tr aditional role divisions
of T her av ada Buddhis m Buddhadas a has attempted to integr ate the r enunciates
hope for s alv ation with the lay per sons hopes for well- being and f ulf ilment in this
wor ld here and now.
It cannot be over- emphasised t hat in at t empt ing this integ r ation of the
s pir it ual and mundane Buddhadas a has embar ked on a huge theoretical enterprise
which is w ithout precedent in the histor y of T her av ada Buddhis m in T hailand. His
goal has been to theor etically r econstruct the entir ety of T her av ada doctr ine in
accord with re- interpreted doctr inal pr inciples. In this eff ort he has display ed an
unpar allelled intellectual ruthlessness, being prepared to reject and denounce any
view's or inter pr etations which contr adict his own r adical pr esentation of doctr ine,
even if those view's are contained in time- hallowed commentar ies or the scriptures of
the T ipit ak a themselves. Before t ur ning to consider the details of Buddhadas as
review of Buddhis t doctr ine it mus t be acknowledged t hat the consistency and scale
of his wor k in themselves give his work intellectual signif icance and statur e. Not
content to ref or m only a few details of Buddhis t teaching Buddhadas a has instead
per sistently mounted a radical attack on t r adit ional is t inter pr etations of the
doctr inal f undamental s of the religion.
T o a philosopher and s tudent of r eligion B uddhadas as grand pr og r amme of
innov at iv e ref orm is at once ins pir ing and challeng ing . Not only has he set about
ins t il l ing v it al it y into the long- stagnant intellectual env ir onment of T her av ada
B uddhis m in T hail and but he has under taken this task sy stematically and
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262
thor oug hly . Buddhadas a inspir es intellectual respect because his work incorporates
both a g r and vision of the total ref orm of an intellectual t r adit ion and a scholarly
concern for the detailed r ealisation of t hat vision. Neither a scholastic pedant nor a
r emote and abs tr act theor etician Buddhadas a manif ests in his work a rare
integ r ation of intellectual abilities .
Fur ther mor e, the vision which has motiv ated Buddhadas a thr oug hout his life is
one which is of univer sal concern in the moder n wor ld. Namely , the integ r ation of
the society- and wor ld- tr ans f or ming power of contempor ar y science and technology
w it h t r adit ional notions of humanit y and with ethical and religious values.
Buddhadas a inspires respect not only because of the compelling intellectual power of
his complete r estr uctur ing of T her av ada doctr ine but also because of his keen
awareness of contempor ar y religious and social issues. While his concern is with the
place of T hai Buddhis m in the moder n wor ld the issues he deals with are not
unique to T hailand or to Buddhis m. Despite the differences in theoretical and
ter minolog ical details any Wester n thinker likewise concerned about human and
r eligious values in the age of science cannot but feel s y mpathy for the ideal to
which Buddhadas a has devoted his life.
More specif ically Buddhadas a has made three major contr ibutions to T her avada
B uddhis m, at three dif f erent levels. A t the level of the ex plicit presentation of
Buddhis t theory and doctr ine he has presented a consistent demy thologised view of
the r elig ions teachings. By incor por ating notions of scientif ic r ationalis m and by re
emphas ising the implicit r ationalis m of doctr inal Buddhis m Buddhadas a has
presented a radically s implif ied view of Buddhis t teachings which systematically
av oids metaphy sical accounts of phenomena, whether physical or mental. A t a more
impl icit level his r ationalis t account of Buddhis m has changed the emphasis of the
r elig ion, f ocussing not on the tr ans cendent or the metaphy sical "other wor ld" but on
the immediacy of life here and now. Wi t hout dev aluing the piv otal place and
signif icance of nibbana in B uddhis t t houg ht Buddhadas a has related t hat condition
of ul t imat e s alv ation to activ ity in the social wor ld. P r ovided it is inf ormed by
mor al pr inciples and practised with cit-wang , mater ial activ ity oriented towards the
progressive dev elopment of the social, economic and political orders is thereby given
r elig ious value, being viewed as par t and parcel of the human quest for s alv ation
f r om suf f ering.
Buddhadas as thir d major cont r ibution to T her av ada Buddhis m has been at
the level of practice. Wit h mor al activ ity in the social wor ld beign def ined as par t
of the Buddhis t r eligious quest Buddhadas a has prov ided a j us t if ication for pr ov iding
the layperson with access to the core of Buddhis t teachings and practices which are
263
concerned with the att ainment of nibbana. No longer ex cluded f r om the inner
s anctum of Buddhis t teaching or practice, in Buddhadas as system the layperson is
given s pir itual r ights and potentials equal to those of the monk.
B ut while g iv ing due weig ht to the intellectual signif icance of Buddhadas as
work one cannot overlook the f act t hat his system is not theor etically perf ect or
f lawless. T here are numer ous theor etical contr adictions and tensions in his work.
For ex ample, the piv otal inter pr etativ e theory of phasa-khon - phas a-t ham is poorly
ar g ued for and its application is described in a vague and hig hly ambig uous manner .
In addit ion, Buddhadas a denies the author ity of the A bhi dhammapi t a k a , which
pr ovides the most def initiv e canonical source of the conceptual distinctions which
under pin his own two lang uag e theory. T here are also numer ous places in
B uddhadas as books, such as in discussions of r ebir th, heaven and hell where the
inter pr etations developed with the phasa-t ham - phasa-khon theory come precariously
close to an outr ig ht denial of the B uddhas own s tatements recorded in the core
scr iptur es of the S ut t apitak a. Because of his strong r ationalis t appr oach
Buddhadas a is prepared to reject sections of the scriptures which contr adict or
conflict, with his str ictly doctr inal inter pr etations . However, he also ex plicitly values
the B uddha s recorded words in the S ut t apit ak a as a singular ly author itativ e source
of inter pr etations of the dha mma . Despite this emphasis on the B uddhas own
s tatements Buddhadas a nevertheless does not acknolwedge or resolve the
contr adictions which arise when the Buddha himself is reported as saying something
which is contr ar y to his own doctr inal r e- inter pretations. For ex ample, the Buddha
does in places ex plicitly describe rebir th and post- death states of being, which
Buddhadas a denies as being ir r elev ant to Buddhis t s pir itual practice. There are also
lapses, omissions and inaccuracies in Buddhadas as use of other tex tual mater ials.
His mis inter pr etations of Zen notions and the managed use of Zen tex ts to s uppor t
his own ref ormed T her av ada views are one of the clearest ex amples of the
inaccur acies in the details of Buddhadas as work.
B ut while his re- inter pr etations are f lawed in many places by weak or
uns uppor ted ar g uments, by unacknowledged omissions f r om cited sources and by the
f ailur e to detail the contr adictions involved in his views I do not regard these
pr oblems of detail to themselves inv alidate or under mine Buddhadas as entire
enter pr ise. Many of the logical or theoretical dif f iculties result f rom an inadequate
elabor ation of notions and ar g uments or f r om insuf f iciently detailed analy ses. In
several places, such as in the discussion of the sources of the phas a-khon -
phas a-t ham theory and in the inter pr etation of the pat iccas amuppada, I have shown
t ha t B uddhadas as position can of ten be v indicated by a clearer and more detailed
264
pr es entation of the ar g uments. T he work of the Buddhis t scholar Phr a
Raj av ar amuni has been referred to on several occasions to indicate t hat many of the
f laws in B uddhadas as work are not insuper able but can of ten be corrected by a
mor e subtle and caref ul appr eciation of the issues.
In re- inter preting Buddhis t doctrine Buddhadas a has always had the intention
of ef f ecting a pr actical ref or m in T hai Buddhis m. However, it does not appear likely
t hat his views will obtain the degree of general s uppor t necessary to effect
s ig nif icant religious ref or m in the immediate f utur e. Of greatest impor tance to
B uddhadas as long- term success in this regard is his r ecognition and acceptance
outside of the small g r oup of the T hai middle class and educated elite who
cons titute his main audience. However, it mus t be noted t hat while his work is of
indis puteable theor etical impor tance B uddhadas as view's are not popular among s t
the br oad mass of the T hai populace. A clerical f ollower of Buddhadas a, Phr a
Pr acha Pas annat hammo, gives the f ollowing lament,
B ut the leaders of society, whether of the wor ldly or religious spheres,
have barely been inf luenced by these intellectual waves [of Buddhadas as
work] in all these f if ty years t hat have passed [ since Buddhadas as mission
began] . Even thoug h each day people get to know more and more about
both Suan Mok and Buddhadas a, when we take stock of the actual
s ituation we cannot say t hat B uddhadas as thoug ht has any serious
inf luence on T hai s ociety .(T ) 1
It is of ten argued t hat the erudite and complex natur e of his thoug ht and the
nov elty of his prose style make him all but inaccessible to the average T hai
Buddhis t. Somboon Suks amr an says,
He [ Buddhadasa] has a considerable body of published work, but his level
of t houg ht is such as to l imit its cir culation to intellectuals. T houg h
widely respected in T hailand as a s aintly man who has divorced himself
f r om the mundane concerns of s ahg ha adminis tr ator s , he is not essentially
a political f igure and does not command a political f ollowing . 2
However, it is not only his lang uag e and style which cut him of f f r om the
maj or it y of T hais. T he very char acter of B uddhadas as views, which are highly
cr itical of many t r adit ional and still widely- accepted aspects of T hai Buddhis m,
pr ev ent those views becoming widely popular ised. Mulder describes Buddhadas a and
s imilar ref ormers as,
pr opag ating the Buddhis t path as a solution for all wor ldly problems, the
_____________________ t i
1 ( P hr a ) P r a c h a P a s a nna t ha mmo , Si Nak - k hit Rua. m Sa.Tnay ( ** d l l f l T 0 UL) M ), pp. 3- 4.
2
S u k s a m r a n , B uddhi s m a nd P ol it i c s i n T ha i l a nd, p.9 1 n.
265
idea being t hat , if the T hai say they are Buddhis ts , they had better be
tr ue Buddhis ts and organise their personal lives and society accordingly.
T his perspective is of course hig hly utopian and very much in contr adiction
with the meaning f ul s tr uctur e of domesticated T hai ex istence. 3
Relig ious ref ormers such as Buddhadas a are by and large a tiny minor ity
regarded as ir r it ating r ather than enlig htening by the vast maj or ity of T hais who
also call themselves Buddhis t.
In a sense Buddhadas a is an ideologue w ithout an eff ective social mouthpiece.
He is not popular among peasants or workers or in the halls of power but only
among a small gr oup of like- minded intellectuals who, by and large, are
disenf r anchised f r om the actual decision- making processes of T hai politics and who
s tand in uneasy r elation to the rest of T hai society. Moder n j our nalis ts , scientists,
s tudents , author s, intellectuals and social critics do not yet appear to have f ound a
place of general acceptance or acknowledged relevance in the chang ing T hai social
sy stem, and Sulak Siv ar aksa realistically observes t hat ,
So long as those who govern the countr y still possess the power of
car r y ing out coups detat, such as began in 1932, and so long as they still
govern the land solely by mil itar y force they will not consider it impor tant
to listen to intel lectuals .(T ) 4
T he general rejection of Buddhadas as ideas even by many sy mpathetic
Buddhis ts , and par ticular ly by those highly placed in T hai society, is ex emplif ied by
the outcome of Buddhadas as debate with K huk r it Pr amot , discussed in Chapter
Fiv e, over the compatibil ity of cit-wang and social dev elopment. Commenting on
this debate Mulder concludes t hat ,
Buddhadas a maintained t hat s antos a and s uny ata are noble and
cons tr uctiv e attitudes t hat are f ully compatible with the r equir ements of
moder n life, but was never able to convince the pr ag matis t M .R. K huk r it,
and for all pr actical purposes it would appear t hat T hai policy makers and
adminis tr ator s will decide about the acceptable contents of Buddhis m in
T hail and. 5
T he disenf r anchisement of Buddhadas as main audience among cr itical,
3
M u l d e r , Ev e r y day L i f e i n T ha i l a nd , p. 54.
4 -
S u l a k f S i w a r a k ^ P hut t ha - t hat s a r ^a P hy a K an- s ang - s an S a ng k hom M a i
A B uddhi s t V is ion f o r Re ne w i ng Society ), Samnak -
phi r n T hi a nw a n ( I V l M m i W , B a ng k ok , 2526 (1983), p. 3.
5
' M u l de r , "B uddhi s m, Na t i o na l I de nt i t y and Mode r ni t y i n Cont e mpor a r y T ha i l a n d , in J o ur na l o f S ocial
S ciences - C hi a n g m a i Univ e r s it y , V ol . 2 No. 2, S e pt e mbe r 1978, p. 40.
moder nist B uddhists f r om the exercise of real power in T hai society, is indicated by
their , and Buddhadas as, over whelming emphasis on a lay r ather than a clerical or
ins t it ut ional f or m of Buddhis m. To ref orm or modernise ins t it utional Buddhis m
would be to conf r ont and oppose its alig nment with the state, and neither
Buddhadas a nor his suppor ter s at present have either the power or the united will
to ov er tur n t hat r elation. As such, reli gious and politico- cultur al f r ustr ations are
released in mar g inal or per ipheral developments, like the increasing emphasis on lay
Buddhis m and Buddhadas as own wor k, which do not affect the entrenched political
or r eligious hierarchies.
Because of the entr enched conser vatism of the T hai s ahg ha s ignif icant changes
in B uddhis t practice and teaching are only possible outside the of f icial religious
hier ar chy . As a consequence the most dy namic areas of T hai Buddhis m are likely to
be those least subject to the control of centr al s ahg ha author ities , whether among s t
the l ait y , in new' heterodox or g anis ations of the s ahg ha (e.g. Phot hir ak s
es tablis hment of a de f a c t o thir d nikay or sect in T hail and), or in isolation f r om
the Bang kok s ahg ha author ities , as in the forests of Souther n T hailand. In aiming
to ref orm T hai Buddhis m Buddhadas a f irst disengaged himself f r om the immediate
aut hor it y and inf luence of the s ahg ha hierarchy by r etr eating into solitary
contempl ation in the forest. But nevertheless, he neither disrobed nor split with the
of f icial Buddhis t chur ch, r emaining , at least in name, within t hat church. T his
diseng ag ement f rom the conservative author ities amounted to an admission t hat , in
Mul de r s w- ords, any r ef or mist activ ities he mig ht have attempted in Bangkok would,
never s tand a chance to clean up the cobwebs of complacency and
t r adit ional is m t hat pr evail in the higher levels of the [s ahg ha] hier ar chy . 6
B uddhadas as r etur n to his remote hometown of Chaiy a in 1932 w'as in effect
a tr ade off, a withdr awal f r om attempts at chang ing the s ahg ha f rom within in
ex change for the f reedom to innov ate in areas outside the immediate jur is diction of
t ha t hier ar chy . In pr actice this has meant an emphasis in his work on Buddhis m for
lay people, for the lay practice of Buddhis m of fered, and still offers, the greatest
scope for change and adj us t ment to contempor ar y conditions of any section of T hai
B uddhis m. While r emov ing himself f rom dir ect inv olv ement with and opposition to
the of f icial hierarchy has gr anted Buddhadas a a hig h degree of intellectual f reedom
it has not been w ithout the cost of l imit ing the ex tent of pr actical reforms his ideas
are capable of eff ecting. By hav ing chosen an ex tr a- ins titutional role for himself
Buddhadas a is thereby l imited to an ex tr a- ins titutional impact. In terms of the
6 i bi d. p. 37.
267
ins t it ut ional al ig nment s of clerical and political author ity in the T hai s ahg ha and
g ov er nment B uddhadas as r etr eat f r om f or mal clerical associations to establish his
own dis tinct f ollowing and centre of study in the remote south of the countr y has
in f act f unctioned to siphon religious discontent away f rom the conservatively
intr ans ig ent of f icial clerical hier archy . B uddhadas as f ailur e to consider or directly
deal with the entrenched power of the conservative s ahg ha constrains him to act
w ithin the l imit s def ined by t hat hier archy and intr oduces into his teachings the
f undamental pr actical contr adictions discussed in Chapter s Eig ht and Nine.
Of f icial Buddhis m may more and more become a shell, a residue of magic,
s uper s tition and animis m for some, a sy mbol of political and religious power for
others. A nd cor r esponding ly , the religious meaning of the B uddhas message of
s alv ation may incr easingly be f ound outside r ather than inside the s ahg ha - among
lay men and lay women r ather than among monks. B ut unless and until the shell of
ins t it ut ional pr actice and r itual is in f act changed moder nising and ref or ming
B uddhis t trends such as initiated by Buddhadas a will have l ittle or no impact on
r eligious or social policy , or on state decision making . As such Buddhadas as relative
f ame and restricted popular ity but ul timat e impotence r emain as a symbol of the
div isions and unresolved tensions in T hai society caused by recent economic and
socio- cultural change. For Buddhadas a to seriously assist in resolving those tensions
and to f ulf il the promise of his early desire to concretely reform and modernise
Buddhis m would require him to move out of the r ealm of theory and step f ully into
the r ealm of action which he espouses but ref rains f r om enterring.
However, it is unj us t to j udg e the potential pr actical or social impor tance of
B uddhadas as wor k by its short ter m f ailur e to effect s ig nif icant religious ref orm.
B uddhadas as r e- inter pr etation of Buddhis m is built upon a moder nis t view of
human ex istence which has yet to penetr ate thr oug hout T hai society. Mor e than
seventy percent of the T hai population are s till rice f ar mer s, most receiving no more
t han pr imar y education and continuing to live in tr adit ional village- based
communities . If the process of moder nis ation continues in T hailand, if education
levels increase and scientif ic methods of ag r icultur e and indus tr ial pr oduction become
more and more the nor m and, per haps more impor t ant l y , if the population shif t to
the cities and towns does not slacken, then in the coming decades social conditions
may be created in T hailand w'hich f av our a more general acceptance of
B uddhadas as social and religious v ision. A f ter all, as argued in Chapter T wo
B uddhadas as views were themselves inf luenced by the very beginnings of social
moder nis ation in T hail and in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. If it is in
f act the case t hat the widespread acceptance of moder nist religious views is
268
dependent upon social and cul tural moderni sati on then Buddhadasa s teachi ngs could
onl y be expected to grow in popul ari ty i f the proporti on of Thai s parti ci pati ng in
the non-tradi ti onal sectors of Thai soci ety conti nues to grow.
However, by this I am not predi cti ng a necessarily bri ght future for
Buddhadasa s vi ews in the comi ng decades, al though his work may wel l attai n
general popul ari ty by the begi nni ng of the t went y first century. There are counter-
i ndi cati ons to the assumpti on that social moderni sm leads to religious moderni sm
and rati onal i sm. Whi l e the response of a mi nori ty of Thai s, like Buddhadasa and
his supporters, to social change has been to seek a fi rm, unchangi ng basis for life by
re-af f i rmi ng the veri ti es of the doctri nal core of Buddhi sm others have turned to
popul ar ani mi sti c rel i gi ous f orms for support and solace. As Mul der observes,
Ani mi st i c expressi ons of rel i gi on are very much on the increase, wi th
more and more magi cal l y gi f ted monks, amul ets and hol y water, the
venerati on of potent i mages and shrines, and the practi ce of pure
esoteri ci sm and magi c to ensure good luck and supernatural bl essings.7
In this cont ext monks are not so much regarded as representati ves or
expounders of the dhamma as mani pul ators and medi ators of a sacred magi c whi ch
is regarded as ensuri ng protecti on and wel l -bei ng. Even among many secular Thai s
there is a tendency to f ol l ow the ritual i sti c practi ce of religion rather than to be
al i gned wi th the moderni sm expressed by Buddhadasa. Thi s is because even though
t hey may be uni nterested in f i ndi ng meani ng in rel i gi on' these secular Thai s take the
publ i c practi ce of ritual as si mpl y the way thi ngs are done and see more benefi t in
conf ormi ng to such of fi ci al l y sancti oned ri tual i sm than in causing antagoni sm or ill-
f eel i ng by expl i ci tl y denyi ng it like Buddhadasa.
But what ever the future social condi ti ons in Thai l and there are, nevertheless,
i nternal contradi cti ons in Buddhadasa s re-i nterpreted system whi ch may have the
capaci t y to l i mi t the expanded i mpact of his vi ews. These contradi cti ons are not
rel at ed to the errors, omi ssi ons and other theoreti cal fl aws al ready menti oned above.
Rat her, they occur at a deeper structural level of his work, arising at the poi nts
where his ideas i mpi nge on the social and practi cal domai ns. Most apparent here is
the contradi cti on between Buddhadasa s theoreti cal abol i ti on of the di sti ncti ons
bet ween monks and l aypeopl e but his personal hi ghl y conservati ve practi ce, whi ch is
based upon a retenti on of those t radi ti onal role divisions. There is also the further
cont radi ct i on between his promot i on of the noti on of the ri ght of all peopl e, whether
l ayperson or monk, to seek ul t i mat e sal vati on through their own efforts but his
7i bid. p. 44.
staunch bel i ef that i ndi vi dual pol i ti cal ri ghts should be forsaken in order to
guarant ee social harmony under a di ctator. . Furthermore, not onl y does his own life
provi de no model of actual l y l i vi ng the dhamma in the social worl d but his own
l ife practi ce serves to re-i nforce the tradi ti onal i dea that spiritual practi ce requires a
l i teral renunci ai ton of the worl d.
The contradi cti on between Buddhadasa s theoreti cal radi cal i sm but conservati ve
practi ce mani fests in many ways, all of whi ch raise doubts about the abi l i ty of his
syst em to successfully fulfil his stated i ntenti on of maki ng Buddhi sm rel evant to the
l i ves of cont emporary peopl e. The contradi cti ons between theory and practi ce tend
t o al i enate the very peopl e Buddhadasa has said he is most concerned to reach -
the progressi ve, moderni st and educated Thai l aypeopl e. For exampl e, Buddhadasa s
cri ti ci sms of l iberal democrat i c f orms of governemnt and his taci t support for the
pol i ti cal status quo in Thai l and are at odds wi th the democrati c i deals of most
progressi ve Thai s. Whi l e havi ng ef f ecti vel y isol ated hi msel f f rom the mundane
concerns of sahgha admi ni strators Buddhadasa is neverthel ess not percei ved as
st andi ng for a pol i ti cal l y i ndependent monkhood. His expl i ci t support for the
monarchy and authori tari an government tend to al i enate a si gni f i cant number of
those who otherwi se whol eheartedl y support his moderni si ng enterprise.
However, the structural contradi cti ons in Buddhadasa s work do not have onl y
a soci ol ogi cal si gni f icance. They also raise the questi on of whether Theravada
Buddhi st doctri ne is in pri nci pl e capabl e of bei ng consi stentl y re-i nterpreted in terms
of a moderni st worl d vi ew. But I do not bel i eve that Buddhadasa s personal
i nabi l i ty to eff ect the sweepi ng ref orms he f oreshadowed early in his career should
be taken as i ndi cati ng that Theravada Buddhi sm is an i nherentl y conservati ve
rel i gi ous form. It does not mean that Theravada is i ncapabl e of adj usti ng its role
and outl ook in order to become an ef f ecti ve moral and religious voi ce in modern
Thai soci ety. A t the level of doctri ne Buddhadasa has forceful l y demonst rat ed that
preci sel y the opposi te is the case. Rather than bei ng an other-worl dl y rel i gi on whi ch
def l ects human i nterests away f rom the realities of concrete social exi stence
Buddhadasa has shown that Ther avada is in fact a hi ghl y adapt abl e system, wi th
vast theoreti cal resources for ref orm and for devel opment in new di recti ons. By
abol i shi ng the rel i gi ous di sti ncti on between the monk and the l ayperson Buddhadasa
has also abol i shed the doctri nal basis for the tradi ti onal pyrami dal structure of
rel i gi o- moral authori ty in the Thai sahgha. Thi s structure of rel i gi ous authori ty is
f ounded upon the tradi ti onal noti on that onl y a spiritual el i te has access to the
t rut h of nibbana. In contrast Buddhadasa mai ntai ns that nibbana is uni versal l y
accessi bl e because it is si mpl y the deepeni ng and devel opment of the mi nd s natural
270
condi ti on or ci t-wang. The noti on of ci t-wang thus lays the f oundati on f or a
Buddhi st i deol ogy in whi ch all peopl e are regarded as equals, all possessing the
moral qual i ti es necessary to be autonomous, responsi bl e i ndi vi dual s. Buddhadasa s re
i nterpreted versi on of Theravada belies any stereotypi cal cl ai m that Theravada is an
i nherentl y worl d- negat i ng and elitist rel i gi on. One should not make the mi stake of
equati ng the scope and potenti al of such compl ex a religious and theoreti cal system
as Ther avada Buddhi sm wi th its i nterpretati on and practi ce in any parti cul ar peri od
or place.
The contradi cti ons of Buddhadasa s re-i nterpretati ons are not at root
t heoreti cal but result f rom the i mpact of the conservati ve pol i ti cal and rel i gi ous
cont ext in whi ch he has worked. Gi ven the conservati ve pol i ti cal si tuati on in
Thai l and and the strength of entrenched vi ews of the soci o-cul tural si gni fi cance of
t he sahgha, the structural contradi cti ons between Buddhadasa s radi cal theory and
conservati ve practi ce are all but unavoi dabl e. As al ready noted above the
cont radi ct i ons associ ated wi th Buddhadasa s conservati ve rel i gi ous practi ce and
support for the tradi ti onal asocial role of the monk deri ve f rom his havi ng avoi ded
ei ther di rect cri ti ci sm of or i nteracti on wi th the sahgha hi erarchy. To overcome
this contradi cti on woul d necessi tate a di rect conf rontati on wi th the sahgha
hi erarchy. But as also previ ousl y noted in earl i er chapters the sahgha is uni versal l y
regarded as a hol y i nsti tuti on and to attack or criticise it too vehementl y is
consi dered i nauspicious, sacrel i gi ous and hi ghl y dangerous, because of the potenti al i ty
of unl eashi ng an uncontrol l abl e amount of social di sorder and confusion or wun-wa y .
Because of the practi cal l i mi tati ons of the tradi ti on wi thi n whi ch he has
worked Buddhadasa s thought may in fact represent as radi cal a ref orm of
i nsti tuti onal Thai Buddhi sm as is presentl y possible. The contradi cti on between his
radi cal thought and conservati ve practi ce is af ter all forced upon hi m by the
ort hopraxy of Theravada Buddhi sm in whi ch i nterpretati ons of doctri ne are
authori sed more by the i nterpret er s strictness in practi ce than by his or her
i ntel l ectual acumen or theoreti cal arguments. For Thai Buddhi sm to be more fully
ref ormed and for the tension between theory and practi ce to be resol ved may wel l
requi re a second generati on f ol l ower of Buddhadasa to l i teral l y emerge f rom the
" f orest " i nto the social worl d. I f Buddhadasa s teachi ngs do gai n i ncreasi ng
acceptance in the f uture thei r rol e may be as a pl at f orm or base for further ref orm.
However , it does not seem possi bl e for Buddhadasa hi msel f to compl ete the ref orms
whi ch he has f oreshadowed and discussed.
There is in fact onl y one theoreti cal as opposed to practi cal stumbl i ng block
to the f urther moderni sati on and ref orm of Ther avada Buddhi sm, namel y, the
scri ptural l y sancti oned i mportance of the rol e of the renunci ate monk, and the
def i ni ti on of the monk s spi ri tual status as bei ng determi ned by his degree of
det achment f rom the social worl d. As al ready discussed at l ength in the concl udi ng
chapters, despi te his radi cal theoreti cal i nnovati ons in most other areas of
Ther avada teachi ng even Buddhadasa has not been abl e to slacken this theoreti cal
knot. The role of the l ay Buddhi st has been expanded to the poi nt where for some
of the more educated l aypeopl e monks are al most an i rrel evance. However, for
pol i ti cal reasons it is not possi bl e at the present t i me to expand the role of the
monk i nto the social real m. At t empt s are bei ng made in this di recti on but the
barri ers neverthel ess remai n. I suggest that the barri ers prevent i ng monks f rom more
ful l y part i ci pat i ng in social life are more pol i ti cal than rel i gi ous or scriptural. For as
Buddhadasa hi msel f has noted the Buddhi st vi rtues of metta and karuna, i.e.
l ovi ng-ki ndness and compassi on, can be i nterpreted as i mpl yi ng the need to acti vel y
assist others to end suffering. Theravada possesses the i ngredi ents necessary to
devi se a Buddhi st theory of clerical social i nvol vement and social acti on. However, it
appears that that doctri nal potenti al has not been realised because of the pressure
to mai ntai n the tradi ti onal l y consti tuted saiigha hi erarchy as the religious basis of
pol i ti cal power.
Because of the hi stori cal rel ati ons between the monarchy, the Thai state and
the sahgha, and because of the l ong hi story of pol i ti cal i nstabi l i ty since 1932, there
is a general reti cence to at t empt any radical ref orm whi ch mi ght upset the del i cate
rel i gi ous-i deol ogi cal -pol i ti cal bal ance in Thai l and. More concretel y, however, the
conservat i ve pol i ti cal forces in Thai l and have consi derabl e power and deal strongl y
wi t h those who at t empt to al ter the tri angul ar rel ati ons of sahgha-ki ng-state upon
whi ch thei r own posi ti ons and i nfl uence depend. Duri ng the 1973-1976 peri od of
ci vi l i an government, when many in the sahgha did begi n becomi ng i nvol ved in social
issues, those clerics who supported social ref orms such as l and ref orm, labour union
ri ghts, housi ng and so on, w' ere scapegoated and denounced as communi sts. Wi t h
the re-establ i shment of mi l i tary rule in 1976 there was a f orced return to the
tradi t i onal clerical role of non-i nvol vement .
Thus whi l e Buddhadasa s work is wi t hout doubt the most i mportant
progressi ve rel i gi o-theoreti cal devel opment in recent Thai hi story, its full i mpact and
i mpl i cati ons have yet to be realised. For Buddhadasa s rel i gi ous vision to be fulfilled
requi res t wo things. Fi rstl y, there is a need to devel op a cl ear analysis of the role
and pl ace of the monk in cont emporary Thai soci ety. But more i mportantl y, social
and pol i ti cal condi ti ons in Thai l and must also change. The realisation of
Buddhadasa s ideas in Thai social life woul d requi re the exi stence of an educated
audi ence whi ch has enough social and pol i ti cal power to restructure social rel ati ons
accordi ng to thei r moderni st Buddhi st ideals. But whether the proport i on of more
educated, progressi ve Thai s wi l l in fact i ncrease, and whether they wi l l succeed in
obt ai ni ng real social and pol i ti cal power cannot be predi cted at this poi nt. Credi t
must be gi ven to Buddhadasa for his monumental theoreti cal work in whi ch he has
pl anted the seeds of an al ternati ve f orm of Buddhi sm and a vision of an al ternati ve
Thai soci ety. Whet her the full potent i al i ty of those seeds is abl e to devel op wi l l
depend upon the future course of pol i ti cal and cul tural events in Thai l and.
273
APPENDIX I.
1 Buddhism: Historical Background.
The hi stori cal f ounder of Buddhi sm was Si ddhat tha Got ama1, a pri nce born
i nto the rul i ng Sakya ( Sanskri t: S akya) clan of a smal l ki ngdom in the Hi mal ayan
f oothi l l s some t wo and a hal f thousand years ago. By Buddhi sts Si ddhattha
Got ama is someti mes referred to as Sakyamuni , sage of the Sakyas, or as Got ama
Buddha. The t erm Buddha in fact denotes any person who has attai ned compl ete
spi ri tual enl i ghtenment and is not an epi thet restri cted to the Got ama Buddha,
al though as the hi stori cal f ounder of the rel i gi on he is most commonl y referred to
si mpl y as the Buddha or "t he enl i ghtened one" . In the Theravada Buddhi st
scri ptures, the Ti pi taka, he is most commonl y referred to as the Tat hagat a, the
"thus gone" , whi ch in Thai l and is usually taken to mean the one who has attai ned
the Buddhi st spiritual perf ecti on of nibbana. Accordi ng to tradi ti on at the age of
t went y nine several pi votal events deepl y di sturbed Si ddhat tha Gotama, l eadi ng hi m
to renounce his life of royal ease as wel l as his wi f e, and infant son in order to
search for spiritual l i berati on. He tried but rej ected as i nef f ecti ve the Brahmani cal
and Yogi c spiritual systems then exi sti ng in anci ent Indi a and after six years of
f ol l owi ng ascetic practi ces attai ned full enl i ghtenment near the present Indi an town
of Bodhgaya af ter an eff ort of supreme concentrati on. He soon devel oped a
f ol l owi ng of fel l ow renunci ates w' ho became the forerunners of the present Buddhi st
monkhood or sahgha, l i teral l y "t he communi t y" . Af t er his enl i ghtenment the Buddha
l i ved to teach his message of l i berati on f rom sufferi ng for al most fi fty years and it
is f rom the teachi ngs he then gave that the pri nci pl es and scriptures of Buddhi sm
are reputed to have come.
Af t er the Buddha s death (c. 543 B. C.)2 a counci l of his fol l owers met and
f ormal i sed his teachi ngs but for several centuri es Buddhi sm remai ned a purel y oral
^Si ddhat t ha Got ama is the Pal i spel l i ng of the Bud dha' s name. I n Sanskri t it is wri t t en Si ddhar t ha
G aut ama.
2
T ha i Buddhi st s dat e the Bud dha ' s deat h at 543 B. C. , t he year f r om whi ch the Thai c alendar is
reckoned. Ot her Buddhi st t radi t i ons and many cont empor ar y schol ars, however , pl ace his deat h as l ate as
480 B. C.
tradi ti on. The texts accepted as canoni cal by the Ther avada3 sect now predomi nant
in Thai l and were not wri tt en down until the first century B. C. when the Ceyl onese
Buddhi st ki ng Vat t agami ni had t hem inscribed on pal m l eaf manuscri pts. In
opposi ti on to the Sanskri t speaki ng Brahmi n priests of his ti me, whose religion and
teachi ngs he rej ected, the Tat hagat a used a Nort h Indi an vernacul ar rel ated to
Sanskri t as the medi um for propagat i ng his teachi ngs. Thi s l anguage is thought to
have been close to what is now called Pal i , whi ch became the classical l anguage of
the Theravada scriptures. The use of Pal i disti ngui shes the Ther avada or "Southern
School "4 of Buddhi sm f rom the Mahayana5 or " Nort hern School s"6 whose scriptures
are recorded in Sanskri t as wel l as several nati onal l anguages such as Ti betan,
Chi nese, Vi etnamese, Mongol i an, Korean and Japanese. Schisms based on poi nts of
doct ri ne had appeared in the Buddhi st cl ergy or sahgha wi thi n a coupl e of centuries
of the Buddha s death and it was at a Buddhi st council in Indi a around 250 B.C.
t hat the forerunners of the t wo maj or survi vi ng schools of Buddhi sm, Theravada
and Mahayana, f ormal l y split. Because Pal i is tradi ti onal l y consi dered to be the
l anguage of the Buddha t he f ol l owers of Theravada Buddhi sm in Sri Lanka, Burma,
Thai l and, Laos and Kampuchea regard themsel ves as the bearers of the ol der and
purer f orm of Buddhi sm.
Buddhi sm had al most compl etel y di sappeared f rom its Indi an motherl and by
the Mi ddl e Ages whence Ceyl on, whose Sinhalese Ki ng had become Buddhi st around
200 B. C. , became the centre of the l i vi ng Theravada tradi ti on. And so when the
Thai kings f ormal l y adopted Ther avada Buddhi sm in the Sukhothai peri od some
seven hundred years ago it was to Ceyl on that they turned for authori tati ve
i nstructi on and def i ni ti ve versi ons of the Pal i scriptures, whi ch are col l ecti vel y called
the Tipitaka. Tipitaka l i teral l y means "three baskets", denoti ng the three wi cker
contai ners ori gi nal l y used for stori ng the mai n di vi si ons of the pal m-l eaf
manuscri pts. The three pitaka or di vi si ons of the Pal i Buddhi st canon are:
1. Vinayapitaka - discourses and discussions attri buted to the Buddha
274
3
L i t eral l y Ther av ada means " doct r i ne of t he el ders" , where " e l der s ref ers to t he seni or members of the
Buddhi st monkhood or sangha.
4
T he count ri es where Ther av ada Buddhi sm has t r adi t i onal ly been domi nant are all l ocat ed in Sout h and
Sout heast Asi a, i.e. Sri Lanka, Burma, Thai l and, Laos and Kampuchea.
5 - -
Mahay ana l i teral l y means " t he great ve hi cle" ( f or t he transmi ssi on of t he Buddha' s t eachi ng) .
Mahayani st s cal l The r av ada Buddhi sm I l i nayana, " t he l esser vehi cl e" , a t erm Ther avadi ns regard as
de r og at or y.
6T h e count ri es where Ma hay ana Buddhi sm is domi nant are in the mai n l ocat ed in Nor t h and Nor t heast
Asi a.
275
emphasi si ng mat ters of practi ce and discipline whi ch are
col l ecti vel y called the vinaya.
2. Suttapitaka or Suttantapitaka
- discourses by the Buddha plus discussions about the
doctri ne, whi ch is in general called the dhamma.
3. Abhidhammapi taka - a phi l osophi cal devel opment of some of the key ideas of
the doctri ne or dhamma.
Tradi ti onal l y Theravada Buddhi sm has been organi sed as a nati onal church of
monks arranged under a monarch who as uphol der of the fai th was also ul ti mate
arbi t er of clerical disputes and ul ti mate enf orcer of clerical discipline. However,
because of the cul tural l y and pol i ti cal l y di srupti ve effects of European i mperi al i sm in
the other Ther avada countri es (Sri Lanka, Burma, Laos, Kampuchea) this tradi ti onal
structure is t oday retai ned onl y in Thai l and. The Buddhi st church i tsel f consists of
renunci ate monks and the lay persons whose al ms and donati ons support them.
However, Theravadi n monks are not in any sense priests i ntercedi ng wi th di vi ni ti es
on behal f of the l ai ty but are practi cers and teachers of the doctri ne who in theory
have deci ded to stri ve for sal vati on more i ntensel y by stri ctl y f ol l owi ng monasti c
disci pl i ne.
2 Central Tenets of Buddhist Doctrine.
At the level of doctri ne and teachi ng the most i mportant concept in
Theravada Buddhi sm is that of dhamma. Dhamma is an ext remel y broad noti on
whi ch whi l e denoti ng the noti on of doctri ne also i mpl i es correct practi ce ai med at
at tai ni ng sal vati on. The Thai Buddhi st schol ar Sunthorn Na-Rangsi gi ves the
f ol l owi ng four-fol d def i ni ti on of dhamma,
1. dharma as nature or natural phenomena, 2. dharma as condi ti on or
natural l aw, 3. dharma as doctri ne as t aught and f ormul ated and 4.
dhamma as the qual i ty of ri ght or ri ghteousness.7
Dhamma pri mari l y denotes the order of the cosmos, both natural and moral ,
whi ch patterns all of exi stence and whose f undament al truth the Buddha realised
upon his enl i ghtenment. The Buddha s i nsi ght and teachi ngs are regarded as bei ng
i nf ormed by this cosmi c-ethi cal order and so the doctri ne of sal vati on is also called
dhamma. The edi tors of the Pal i Engl i sh Di ct i onary provi de the f ol l owi ng as one
gl oss on the t erm dhamma,
That whi ch the Buddha preached, the dhamma ... was the order of l aw
7
Na - Ra ng s i , pp. v-vi.
of the universe, i mmanent , eternal , uncreated, not as i nterpreted by hi m
onl y, much less i nvented or decreed by hi m, but i ntel l i gi bl e to a mi nd of
his range.8
And i nsofar as one abi des by the Buddha s teachi ngs one also abides by
dhamma and so the noti on of righteousness is also i ntegral to that of dhamma.
At the level of soteri ol ogy Buddhi sm focuses on the truth grasped by the
Buddha that human exi stence is i nherentl y unsati sf actory, i ncompl ete and
i nadequate. Thi s is cal l ed the truth of suffering, dukkha, or the uni versal i ty of
sufferi ng. The Buddha s savi ng message was that not onl y is there a cause of
sufferi ng but there is also a way to end it, and sufferi ng can through moral and
medi t at i ve practi ce be t otal l y exti ngui shed. The cessation of suffering is called
nirodha whi l e its compl ete exti ncti on, even down to its causes, is called nibbana, a
t erm ori gi nal l y associ ated wi th exti ngui shi ng or put ti ng out a fl ame. In Buddhi st
doctri ne nibbana is metaphori cal l y i nterpreted as denoti ng the exti ncti on of the
f l ames of passion, lust and delusion regarded as pri me causes of suffering. Thi s
doctri nal core is usually expressed as the " Four Nobl e Trut hs" or ariyasacca:
( 1) There is sufferi ng - dukkha.
( 2) There is a cause of suffering - samudaya.
( 3) There is an end to suffering - nirodha.
( 4) There is a path to the endi ng of sufferi ng - rnagga.
Suf feri ng or dukkha is theoreti cal l y linked wi th the process of rebirth through
successive lives and the goal of Buddhi sm is to attai n f reedom f rom the turmoi l s of
repeated bi rths and deaths or samsara. The probl em of how to end dukkha is often
expressed in terms of endi ng the process of rebi rth whi ch is, so to speak, the mat ri x
wi t hi n whi ch suffering inheres. The cessation of sufferi ng thus has both a
psychol ogi cal and a cosmol ogi cal aspect, i nvol vi ng both the end of the mental state
of dukkha and of the process of rebirth.
The Buddha procl ai med that the ul t i mat e cause of sufferi ng is avi j j a or
i gnorance of real i ty. The real i ty of whi ch most peopl e remai n i gnorant is regarded
as havi ng three characteri sti cs or til akkhana, namel y, that all thi ngs are
i mpermanent, amcca, are wi t hout an essence, anatta, and are i nherentl y rel ated to
sufferi ng, dukkha. Accordi ng to the Buddha everyt hi ng is in flux and so nothi ng in
the worl d is permanent or capabl e of provi di ng ei ther a secure physi cal or mental
refuge. He t aught that in i gnorance of this real i ty peopl e del ude themsel ves that the
physi cal and mental obj ects of desire can provi de sati sfacti on. However, because
those obj ects are i mpermanent and so pass away such del uded desires or cravi ngs
276
8Pal i Engl i s h Di c t i o nar y, p. 336.
are left unsatisfied, causing suffering. That is, i gnorance leads to the delusion that
what is in fact i mpermanent and inessential can provi de l asti ng satisfaction. Thi s
del usi on then breeds desire or cravi ng for the i mpermanent thi ngs of the worl d
whose evanescence is then the i mmedi at e cause of suffering.
Ignorance is also regarded as causi ng rebi rth because it infects acti on wi th
del usi on so that it falls under the sway of the i mpersonal l aw of cause and effect
cal l ed the of l aw kamma. Speci fi cal l y kamma denotes an acti on perf ormed wi th
desi re or i ntenti onal i ty, that is, wi th the desi re to attai n a parti cul ar obj ect or goal .
As Sunthorn Na-Rangsi notes, for any acti on to be classed as kamma it,
must al ways be associ ated wi th the mental state of vol i ti on ( cetana).
Just an acti on wi thout vol i ti on is not cal l ed karma in the Buddhi st sense
of the word, since such an acti on is not l iable to yi el d any moral
consequence to the perf ormer. In the stri ct sense of the Buddhi st doctri ne
of karma, it is vol i ti on i tsel f whi ch is cal l ed karma.9
At the psychol ogi cal level the l aw of kamma states that every i ntenti onal
acti on bears an experi enti al frui t commensurate to the moral qual i ty of the
i ntenti on. Whi l e often si mpl i sti caHy expressed in Thai in the maxi m, tharri di dai
di, tl i am chna dai chua ( VhfTl ) or " Do good get good,
do bad get bad" , at the theoreti cal level this doctri ne denol.es the proposi ti on that
every i ntenti onal action perf ormed in i gnorance is a cause of future suffering.
Buddhi sm i sol at es the cause of rebi rth, and so suffering, as l yi ng in the necessary
reacti ve worki ng out of past i ntenti onal acti ons perf ormed in ignorance. Because not
every acti on has its reaction or vipaka eff ected wi thi n the scope of a single l i f eti me
Buddhi st doctri ne postul ates the real i ty of rebi rth, as permi t ti ng as yet " unri pened"
vipaka to be effected.
3 Buddhist Practice.
A t the level of moral practi ce Buddhi sm ai ms to reduce suffering through
exerti ng sel f -control and sel f -restrai nt on cravi ngs, whi ch are the i mmedi at e cause of
sufferi ng. Thi s system of sel f -restrai nt consti tutes the Buddhi st moral code, of whi ch
there are t wo general sets, a more basic set for the l ayperson and a much more
el aborate codi f i cati on of t wo hundred and t went y seven rules, the pati mokkha, for
the ordai ned monk. Tradi ti onal l y Buddhi st practi ce also di sti ngui shes between t wo
l evel s of spi ri tual endeavour, the lay or mundane path called lokiyadhamma and the
asceti c or supramundane path called l okuttaradhamma. The mundane path consists
essenti al l y of moral practi ces and whi l e regarded as reduci ng sufferi ng it still leads
9
N a - Ra n g s i , p.49.
to the producti on of the " substratum of rebi rt h" , pati sandhi -ci tta, and does not
l ead to compl ete sal vati on f rom sufferi ng or f rom rebi rth and does not result in the
at t ai nment of nibbana. The supramundane path on the other hand i ncorporates
medi t at i ve practi ces regarded as l eadi ng to the compl ete cessation of rebi rth and
thus of suffering.
Whi l e the practi ce of moral i t y reduces sufferi ng it does not end it, for so long
as there is i gnorance there wi l l be the del usi on whi ch is the basis of cravi ng.
I gnorance is dispelled by the att ai nment of i nsi ght i nto real i ty or enl i ghtenment
born of medi tati on. The final key to sal vati on f rom suffering is theref ore wi sdom,
pahha, or i nsi ght i nto the truths of i mpermanence and non-essenti al i ty. The Buddha
t aught that when it is seen that everyt hi ng one craves must necessarily pass away
and l eave one sufferi ng in loss such thi ngs wi l l no l onger be desired and in ceasing
to desi re the proxi mate cause of sufferi ng is also destroyed.
Medi tat i on is the pi nnacl e of Buddhi st practi ce, standi ng atop a system of
practi ces called the " Nobl e Ei ght f ol d Pat h" or ariyamagga. whose ei ght " l i mbs" are
al so rungs on the l adder l eadi ng to sal vati on. The ei ght l i mbs of the Nobl e Path
are:
1.sammadi tthi - ri ght vi ew.
2.sammasahkappa - ri ght i ntenti on.
3.sammavaca - ri ght speech.
A.sammakammanta - ri ght acti on.
S.samma-dfiva - ri ght l i vel i hood.
Q.sammavaydma - ri ght effort.
7. sammasati - ri ght mi ndful ness.
8.sammasamadhi - ri ght concentrati on or medi tati on.
Samadhi ( poi nt 8. above) is often taken as denoti ng medi tat i on in general,
whi ch in Theravada Buddhi sm is systemati sed i nto an el aborate range of practices.
However , there are t wo basic types of medi tati on. The first, concentrati on
medi t at i on or samadhi , ai ms to devel op cal mness and one-poi ntedness of mi nd whi l e
the second type, i nsi ght medi t at i on or vipassana, ai ms to use that mental power to
del ve i nto the mi nd and penetrate to a real i sati on of the true nature of all things
as ani cca, dukkha and anatta. One who has attai ned such savi ng i nsi ght is called
an arahant, a " wort hy one". Wi t h the endi ng of cravi ng no further kamma is
created but this does not necessarily mean that all acti on ceases, for Buddhi sm
recogni ses a f orm of l i berated act i vi t y, ki ri ya, freed of cravi ng and so also barren of
rebi rth-causi ng and suf feri ng-causi ng results.
Nibbana, sal vati on, is the compl et e f reedom f rom suffering whi ch comes f rom
i nsi ght i nto real i ty. T wo condi ti ons of nibbana are recogni sed. The first,
279
sa-upadisesa nibbana, is when as yet unreacted results of past acti ons conti nue to
sustain the aggregates of i ndi vi dual human exi stence and is a f orm of sal vati on
at tai nabl e whi l e al i ve. However, the second f orm, anupadisesa nibbana or
parinibbana is a post-death condi ti on. Nibbana has someti mes been i nterpreted as
equi val ent to anni hi l ati on and utter exti ncti on i nto nothi ngness, seeing as there is
no essence or soul to remai n af ter death. However, at least in Thai l and this is not
the case and nibbana is not regarded as total exti ncti on. Rat her it is seen as the
ext i nct i on of cravi ng and the other factors that lead to suffering. Nibbana is the
at t ai nment of a qual i t at i vel y di ff erent mode of exi sti ng in whi ch all delusions about
the self and about the obj ects of desire are exti ngui shed.
4 Theravada Buddhism in Thailand.
Because of a too scri ptural and too phi l osophi cal approach many Western
students of Buddhi sm have in the past port rayed the religion as otherworl dl y and
di sparagi ng of everyday mundane life. However, a fuller readi ng of the scriptures
and a closer, anthropol ogi cal vi ew of the way Theravada Buddhi sm is in fact
practi sed and understood by its Southeast Asi an adherents reveals it as havi ng had
an i ntegral rel ati on to social and pol i ti cal life f rom the earliest times. However,
whi l e it is i mportant to realise that Buddhi sm is and has al ways been a soci o
pol i ti cal force it is also necessary to appreci ate that hi stori cal l y there has been a
di spari ty between the nibbdnic doctri ne of sal vati on outl i ned in the previ ous pages
and the popul ar religion of most Thai Buddhi sts. Tradi ti onal l y it has onl y been the
monks and recluses, and of ten onl y some of them, who have ai med di rectl y for
nibbana. Ter wi el describes the common rel i gi ous outl ook in the Thai countrysi de as
f ol l ows,
No f armer aspires to reach nibbana. Thi s exal ted state is reserved for
the Buddha and the arahants. Whi l st nibbana certai nl y may be equated,
in the eyes of the f armers, w' ith a f eel i ng of eternal bliss, no normal person
can aspi re to reach such a state of perf ect i on.10
The rel i gi on of the l ayperson is i nstead ori ented towards the accumul ati on of
kammi c meri t through the perf ormance of good deeds and this meri t, or the
benef i ci al results of wel l -i ntenti oned acti ons, is regarded as f aci l i tati ng a happi er
rebi rth. T o quote Ter wi el agai n, " Thai f armers do not aspire to escape rebirth;
i nstead they wish to be born in better ci rcumstances."11
^ T e r w i e l , Rel i gi on i n Rural Cent ral Thai l and, p. 310.
Popul arl y kammi c meri t or in Thai bun ( ^ ) and its opposi te of demeri t
or bap ( l n i l ) are regarded as bei ng produced by previ ous moral or i mmoral
acti ons. Bun and bap cannot cancel each other out but each has its own
i ndependent consequences det ermi ni ng the physi cal , mental and social differences
bet ween indi vi dual s. T o be a man or a woman, whol e or def ormed, heal thy or ill,
l ord or peasant, weal t hy or poor have all tradi ti onal l y been regarded as results of
one s kammi c i nheri tance. Neverthel ess, meri t or bun is not solely an i ndi vi dual
t hi ng but can be shared by others in specific ri tual i sed meri t -maki ng or tham bun
( VniJHJ ) ceremoni es. For exampl e, a ritual pouri ng of wat er at the end of a
rel i gi ous ceremony in a t empl e is regarded as transf erri ng all or part of the meri t
generated by the ceremony to "al l sentient bei ngs" or to speci fi cal l y desi gnated
peopl e, often the recentl y dead. And when a man is ordai ned i nto the sahgha the
sponsors of the ordi nati on are also considered to parti ci pate in the meri t thereby
generated.
Spi ro proposes that at least t wo kinds of Theravada Buddhi sm should be
di sti ngui shed12, " nibbanic Buddhi sm" whi ch is concerned wi th ul ti mate sal vati on
through escapi ng f rom the cycl e of suffering regul ated by the law of kamma, and
"kammat i c Buddhi sm" whi ch seeks a better rebirth by using the law of kamma to
acqui re meri t. In many ways this di vi si on corresponds to the di sti ncti on found in
the comment ari es between ( he lokiya or mundane path and the lokuttara path
descri bed above, but many monks f ol l ow a kammati c rather than a nibbanic f orm
of Buddhi sm and some lay peopl e f ol l ow the nibbanic f orm of the religion. To
avoi d conf usi ng these rel i gi ous f orms wi th religious roles it is better to think of
nibbanic Buddhi sm as stri ct doctri nal Buddhi sm, as found in say the pri mers of
Buddhi st phi l osophy and among more l i terate and i ntel l ectual Buddhi sts, and to
regard kammati c Buddhi sm as the actual popul ar rel i gi on of most Thai s, whether
l ayperson or monk. It should be noted that there is an i mportant difference between
Spi ro s anthropol ogi cal concept of kammati c Buddhi sm and the doctri nal noti on of
l oki yadhamma ment i oned above. In the actual popul ar rel i gi on, i.e. kammatic
Buddhi sm, good kamma or meri t is commonl y regarded as i tsel f capabl e of l eadi ng
to nibbana. Nibbana is not seen as a l i berati on f rom the net of kamma but as
resul ti ng f rom the accumul ati on of vast amounts of meri t, and is regarded as a sort
of super-heaven. Thi s is qui te di f f erent f rom and actual l y doctri nal l y i nconsistent
wi t h the stri ct i nterpretati on of lokiyadhamma as promot i ng wel l -bei ng but not of
i tsel f l eadi ng to sal vati on. Stri ctl y speaki ng even good acti ons, i f perf ormed in
12Spi r o, pp.lOff.
281
i gnorance, lead to sufferi ng because of attachment to their beneficial results whi ch,
like all other thi ngs, are i mpermanent. In doctri nal or nibbanic Buddhi sm all
kammi c accumul ati ons, both meri tori ous and demeri tori ous, theref ore have to be
exti ngui shed bef ore compl ete nibbana can be attai ned.
The popul ar Thai rel i gi on is also characteri sed by the worshi p of Brahmani cal
or Hi ndu- deri ved deities such as I ndra and Vi shnu, as wel l as by bel i ef in magi c
and the power of both good and evi l spirits. The rites of Buddhi sm are often
regarded ani mi sti cal l y as bei ng capabl e of af f ordi ng protecti on f rom evi l influences
rather than as aspects of a path seeki ng sal vati on through wi sdom. Terwi el notes
this magi cal el ement of Thai Buddhi sm,
Monks who chant Pal i texts, who medi tat e or who preach emanate
prot ect i ve power ... the greater the store of beneficial kamma a monk
possesses, the stronger the power he generates. The monk who f ol l ows his
precepts and who perf orms meri tori ous acti vi ti es can be seen as a source of
prot ect i ve, beneficial power .13
Because of the compl exi t y of the actual phenomenon of religion in Thai l and
there has been consi derabl e academi c debate over whether the discerni bl e ani mi st,
Brahmani cal and Buddhi st el ements f orm one i ntegrated system or represent di sti nct
and di sti ngui shabl e strands. Ki rsch mai ntai ns that ani mi sm and Buddhi sm are
i ntegrat ed in nei ther theory nor practi ce. He sees ani mism standi ng, "in symbol i c
opposi ti on to that whi ch Buddhi sm val ues most hi ghl y: asceti ci sm, self-control and
predi ct abi l i t y. "14 At the level of rel i gi ous practi ce he says that,
In contrast to the respect accorded Buddhi st and folk Brahman features
[of Thai religion] ... consi derabl e ambi val ence is expressed about the entire
ani mi st domai n ... most ani mi st practi ti oners have l i ttl e respect among
thei r fel l ows. There are cl earl y deep-seated cl eavages between ani mi st
el ements and Buddhi sm and folk Brahmani sm.15
Whi l e 1 woul d agree wi t h Ki rsch i f by Buddhi sm he means nibbanic or stri ctl y
doctri nal Buddhi sm I do not agree that anthropol ogi cal l y speaki ng there are any
deep-seated cl eavages between what is t radi ti onal l y taken as Buddhi sm and ani mi st
bel i efs and practi ces. Ki rsch s vi ew of Buddhi sm above is parti cul arl y doctri nal and
abst ract and whi l e an observer knowl edgeabl e in doctri nal Buddhi sm can di stinguish
the ani mi st f rom the Buddhi st el ements of Thai rel i gi ous practi ce most accounts of
13
T e r w i e l , Re l i gi o n i n Rur al Cent r al Thai l and, pp. 165-166.
14Thomas A. Ki r s c h , " Compl exi t y in the Thai Rel i gi ous Sy s t e m , in Jo ur nal o f As i an St udi es,
V o l . X X X V I No . 2, Febr uar y 1977, p. 259.
the actual f orms of popul ar Buddhi sm show that many Buddhi st doctri nes are in
f act i gnored or mi si nterpreted. I agree wi th Spi ro when he says that whi l e
Ther avada Buddhi sm is the overarchi ng rel i gi ous system in Thai l and, Burma and Sri
Lanka, " many of its doctri nes are onl y rarel y i nternal i sed by the members of these
soci eti es because they are ei ther i gnored or rej ected by the f ai t hf ul ."16 Terwi el
concurs, sayi ng that,
Al t hough the sahgha and Buddhi sm pervade religious life in the villages,
this does not necessarily mean that the vi l l ager accepts the phi l osophi cal
tenets of Buddhi sm or adheres to its soteri ol ogy. The Buddhi st concepts are
of ten i nterpreted in such a way that they are in accordance wi t h rnagico-
ani mi st presupposi ti ons.17
An exampl e of how Buddhi st doctri ne is popul arl y re-i nterpreted has al ready
been descri bed in the above case of nibbana bei ng regarded as resul ti ng f rom good
kamma.
But what ever anthropol ogi cal expl anati on of Thai Buddhi sm one f avours a
cl ear appreci ati on of the expl i ci t doctri nal i nconsi stency but practi cal i ntegrati on of
the vari ous el ements consti tuti ng Thai rel i gi on is neverthel ess i mportant if the
ref ormi st teachi ngs of monks like Buddhadasa are to be correctl y understood. For
Buddhadasa " ref ormi ng Buddhi sm" means i nsti tuti ng a doctri nal l y consistent
rel i gi on, and as such Ki rscl f s comment s do descri be well the tension between the
popul ar rel i gi on arid Buddhadasa s ref ormed moderni st system. However, Spi ro s and
Ter wi el ' s concl usi ons of the overal l i ntegri ty of Thai religion at the popul ar level are
al so rel evant, especi al l y in anal ysi ng the character of the cri ti cal responses of
rel i gi ous tradi ti onal i sts to the f orm of Buddhi sm that Buddhadasa teaches.
16c . . n
S p i r o , p. 10.
Bar end Jan T e r w i e l , Mo n k s and Ma g i c , 2nd edn, Cur zon Press, London, 1979, p. 22.
17
283
APPENDIX II.
1 Biographical Information on Buddhadasa.
Buddhadasa was born on 27th May 1906 at P humri ang, a tambol or vi l l age in
what is t oday the amphee or di stri ct of Chai ya in Suratthani Provi nce, Southern
Thai l and . He was the first son of a Chi nese stqre owner, Si ang Phani t
( I HI N anc] hi s Thai wi f e, Khl yan ( and was gi ven the
t
name Ngyam ( ). Buddhadasa is a Pal i pen name whi ch he l ater assumed
and by whi ch he now prefers to be known. Buddhadasa s f ather was born in
Thai l and, his grandf ather comi ng f rom Hokki en in Chi na in the mi d-ni netpenth
century. Tl i c Chi nese f ami l y name was ori gi nal l y Sae Khwo ( Hokki en: 1*3^ ,
Taej i w: i r u ), Phani t bei ng an offi ci al l y conferred Thai surname gi ven in the
rei gn of Ki ng Rama VI . Buddhadasa s mother was of a Thai f ami l y f rom the
^T h e i nf or mat i on det ai led in thi s sect i on has been cul l ed f rom the f ol l owi ng books:
( 1) Cl i i t Phi bant haen ( )^ Chi wi t Lae Nga n Kh o r n g Phut t hat hat Phi kkhu
( 11*2 ^ ~ 'O Hl i fl D'O VI1) V) 0 m f l f ) ^the L i f e and Wo r k o f Buddhadasa Bhi kkhu) , Si nl apabanakan
( S a i h U J j n n m ? ) Bangkok, 2520 ( 1977) .
( 2) ( Phr a) P r a c h a Passanat hammo ( ( Vi J ) l l U i U ), L au- wai My a Wai Sont haya -
'
At ac hi wapr awat Kh o r n g Than Phut t hat hat
t v I I
( u I 1 I XI ' O' } LI ^14' BU ^ ^ l l ? t 1 91*0Q' J VnUVl i VIS VHSi " Re f l e c t i o n s f r o m t he Twi l i ght Years -
'0***1
Aut o bi ogr aphy o f Buddhadasa) , Mul ani t hi Koi non Khi mt hor ng ( 3-J^' UB I fl Ut 5)1*1UVI B' J ),
II
Bangkok, 2528 ( 1985) .
( 3) ( Phr a) R a t c h a n a n t j i a m u n i ( ( VJ J 2 ) 7 VI3J14 ), Phut t hat hat K h y Kh r a i , Than T ha m Ar ai
( " i m v n a m A p i T , v m i i v f n ' a r l r ,f Who i s Buddhadasal What Has He Do n e ! ), Rong- ri an
P h u t t hat ham Wa t Chonpr at hanr angsi t (*I T' J I J U U l i VIU 1] 5" J 3J ^^1 *2^ l i J > I 'J . ), Nont habur i
T h a i l and, 2525 ( 1982) .
( 4) A r u n We t c has uwan ( I 0 J J DI )
i. Suan Mo k Da e n Sangop Suan Mo k , The Peac ef ul Land) , Samnak-
phi rn Phr ae Phi t hay a ( ^f ^Vi f l VJJJV\i Il YYJ VJV1LI ^ )> Bangkok, 2524 ( 1981) .
ii. Suan Mo k, My a n g Chai ya Lae Phut t hat hat Phi kkhu
( " z m l u n ' a i J j s u l f l u n i i a s i r a v n a n m i " . Suan Mo k, Chai ya and Buddhadasa Bhi kkhu) ,
1 , 1
, ^ ^ >>
Samnak- phi r n Phr ae Phi t haya ( ' l U f l lAi UYV IL1AJJ VJ VlLI H ), Bangkok, 2524 ( 1981) .
vi l l age^ of Tha Chang. He has a brother, Yi key ( tJl fi l l ), and a sister, Ki msoy
( ).
The Phani t f ami l y was reasonabl y wel l off, Buddhadasa s father, Siang, havi ng
establ i shed a general store at Phumri ang whi ch in the earl y years of this century
f uncti oned as a local meet i ng pl ace and as the amphee pol i ce stati on before the
di stri ct centre w^as moved to Chai ya j ust bef ore the Second Worl d War.
Buddhadasa s educati on began when at the age of ei ght he became a t empl e boy at
Wa t Nork ( al so called Wat Ubon) in Phumri ang, where he l i ved for three years.
However, his f ormal school i ng started in 1914 when he began attendi ng
Phot hi phi t t hayakorn School at Wa t Phot haram (al so cal l ed Wat Nya) in
Phumri ang, where he studi ed for three years and compl eted the pri mary educati on
grade of Pr at hom 3. He then moved to Chai ya where his f ather worked and he
began studyi ng at the Chai ya Di stri ct School, Saraphi -uthi t School. Buddhadasa
compl et ed the high school grade of Mat hayom 3 but had to l eave school to run the
f ami l y business at Phumri ang w' hen his father died in 1922. He then took on the
responsi bi l i ty of supporti ng the educati on of his younger brother, Yi key, who was
studyi ng at the presti gi ous Suan Kul ap School in Bangkok. Yi key subsequently
began studyi ng medi ci ne at Chul al ongkorn Uni versi ty but did not compl ete his
course.
When ' Nike returned f rom studyi ng in Bangkok in 1926 he took over the
runni ng of the f ami l y business. Buddhadasa was then freed f rom his f ami l y
responsi bi l i ti es and was able to f ol l ow the Thai custom of bei ng ordai ned i nto the
monkhood at the appropri ate age of 21. He was ordai ned i nto the Mahani kay order
at Wat Nork ( Wa t Ubon) , Phumri ang, on 29th July 1926 by Phrakhru
Sophanacet asi karam ( Vi mal o) ( yj ? j l I ), who gave hi m the Pal i
ii
cl eri cal name of I ndapanno ( Thai : I nt hapanyo) . Phra Ngyam I ndapanno then spent
his first phansa or rai ny season retreat at Wat Mai ( al so cal l ed Wat Phumri ang) ,
Phumri ang, where he passed his Nakt ham- t ri ( I l I ) exam.2
Buddhadasa had been a bri ght and studious child and as a hi gh school student
in Chai ya he had been i nterested in readi ng about and discussing Buddhi sm.
However , there is no i ndi cati on that until his ordi nati on he felt any special
i ncl i nati on t owards becomi ng a monk. Ini ti al ly he had deci ded to remai n in the
monkhood onl y for the three or four months of the rai ny season monasti c retreat.
However , he qui ckl y devel oped a l i ki ng for the monk s life and soon showed promi se
2
T h e educat i on of monks in T h a i l and is systei nat i sed i nt o vari ous grades, each havi ng a nat i onal ly
super vi sed exami j j at i on. The r e are t hree basi c grades f or new ordi nees and novi ces st art i ng at Tham I I I or
Nak t ham I I I ( U n t l J J U ) and f i ni shi ng at Nakt ham I. The r e are t hen seven grades of Pal i studi es f or
f ul l y or dai ned monks st art i ng at Par t anl l l ( ,*=1 ) and f i ni shi ng at Part an I X.
------- lliJUOJ -------
I
4
285
both as a schol ar and as a teacher. Buddhadasa has never di srobed since he was
first ordai ned some si xty years ago. Perhaps the young man s i nterest in remai ni ng
a monk was sti mul ated by the exi stence at nearby Wat Phot haram, Chai ya, of a
templ e school for monks, whi ch had been establ i shed in 1925 by monks f rom Wat
Rat chat hi wat in Bangkok. In the 1920s educati onal facilities in provi nci al Thai l and
were extremel y poor and for an academi cal l y-mi nded youth templ e schools often
provi ded the onl y means for f urtheri ng i ntel l ectual interests.
Neverthel ess, Buddhadasa seems to have qui ckl y devel oped more than a purel y
academi c i nterest in Buddhi sm. In addi ti on to doi ng wel l in his monasti c
exami nat i ons ( passi ng his Naktham-th'o ( I I ) exam in 1927) he also gai ned a
reputati on as a good preacher of the dhamma, and as havi ng an engagi ng styl e of
presentati on whi ch w' as more than si mpl e reci tati on of the Pal i scriptures.
Buddhadasa also devel oped a preference for monasti c sol i tude and seeing as his
brother, Yi key ( who now uses the Pal i name Dhammadasa or in Thai Thammat hat )
was managi ng the f ami l y business Buddhadasa recei ved his mot her s blessing and
encouragement to remai n a monk.
At the i nsti gati on of an uncle Buddhadasa went to Bangkok in order to
f urther his studies in July 1928, stayi ng at Wat Pathumkhongkha. However, he did
not find the sort of spi ri tual educati on he had expected and met no-one whom he
regarded as an abl e teacher. Buddhadasa was also di ssatisfied wi th the clerical
educati on of the ti me and compl ai ned t hat , "I n studyi ng the pari yatti dhamma3 in
this peri od we don t trul y study the Ti pitaka itself, we study onl y the
commentari es. " ( T )4 Thi s, t ogether wi th his di sappoi nt ment wi t h l axi ti es in the
practi ce of the vinaya among Mahani kay monks in Bangkok made hi m di si nterested
in obt ai ni ng a theol ogi cal degree. Af t er onl y t wo months Buddhadasa found his
studi es oppressi ve and bori ng and returned to Chai ya.
In 1929 one of Buddhadasa s uncles, Nguan Setthaphakdi , of the nei ghbouri ng
t own of Ban Dorn, donated 5,000 Baht for the establ i shment of a school of
scri ptural studies at Wat Phrat hat in Chai ya, and Buddhadasa was i nvi ted to be
3
Par i yat t i d. ha. mma - t he doct ri nes and the scri ptures, t hat dhamma whi ch is to be l earnt as opposed to
bei ng pract i sed.
4 Ci t ed by D n s a d i Ang sume t hang kun ( ^ I JJll fi J " Than Phut t hat hat Kap
f T _ 1 U
Kan- pat i r up Sasana" ( II VIU V) H$ f i D Pi T l l f ] ? lJPi " I ** ' Buddhadas a and Rel i gi ous Re f or m" )
i n Khanakammakan Sasana Phy a Kan- phat ana (
P h u t t h a t h a t K a p K h o n R u n - m a i ( n ; m v n a n i l m j i / l ), Mul ani t hi Komon Khi mt hor ng
f l U f t f l UVl B' J ). Bangkok, 2526 (1983), p.247.
286
the i nstructor. Buddhadasa also wrote his first book in 1929, a cremati on vol ume
f or Phrakhru Sophanacetasi karam, enti tl ed, Kan- tham Than ( y VI^14n ) or
Gi vi ng Al ms. When his students passed thei r Nakt ham III and Nakt ham II exams
wel l Buddhadasa s f ami l y deci ded that he should not waste his obvi ous academi c
tal ents teachi ng novi ces and advi sed hi m to return to Bangkok and at tempt higher
study there once again.
1930 found Buddhadasa once more at Wat Pat humkhongkha in Bangkok,
al though this t i me he deci ded that he could study more ef f i ci entl y by doi ng a
si gni f i cant part of the work by himself. His i ndi vi dual i sti c approach, so characteri sti c
in the l ater styl e of his life and in the i nnovati veness of his ideas, pai d of f wel l and
he t opped his class in the pari an sam-pravok ( I I I ) Pal i exami nat i ons that year.
However, his i nterests ranged far outsi de the scriptures and Pal i and he f ol l owed
courses in science, phot ography and radi o as wel l as the tradi ti onal lectures on the
exegesi s of the Tipitaka.
The three years Buddhadasa spent in Bangkok in the earl y 1930s saw his
i deas about Buddhi sm and the di recti on of his life crystallise. It was a peri od when
a set of di verse influences prodded hi m to take a course of acti on he hi msel f later
descri bed as dari ng. Gradual l y the issues of religious ref orm became Buddhadasa s
predomi nat i ng concern and be began to negl ect his f ormal studies, whi ch he came to
see as i rrel evant to the crucial probl ems faci ng Buddhi sm. In 1931 he failed his
pari an prayok si ( I V) P ali exami nat i on, somethi ng he had expected. Af t er his
pri vat e readi ngs of the Ti pitaka Buddhadasa felt that there were si gni fi cant
di f f erences between the comment ari es upon whi ch his clerical exami nati ons were
based and the actual canoni cal scriptures. He realised that even if he gave the
answers to questi ons on doctri ne whi ch he regarded as bei ng correct he woul d fail
the Pal i exams, because his vi ews di ff ered radi cal l y f rom the orthodox
i nterpret at i ons t aught in Bangkok. As a consequence he regarded further f ormal
educati on to be pointless. A l etter wri t ten to his brother Dhammadasa towards the
end of his second stay in Bangkok shows how Buddhadasa s ref ormi st ideas had
crystal l i sed. He wrot e that he i ntended to di sconti nue his studies, l eave Bangkok
and that he had resol ved to,
l ook for a qui et pl ace free f rom i nternal and external vexati ons ... in
order to exami ne and research the dhammi c science whi ch I have been
studyi ng.
I have had a stroke of good luck ... in that I have found a friend who
has the same feelings about life ... we each have the same i ntenti on in the
future work. We have agreed that Bangkok certai nl y is not the pl ace to
fi nd puri ty; bl underi ng around studyi ng the scriptures in a way pol l uted by
concern for status. The benef i t of this is that we realise we have been
mi sdi rected. We have f ol l owed the worl d f rom the mi nute we were born
until the mi nute we gai ned this awareness. Af t er this we wi l l not f ol l ow
the worl d, and wi l l farewel l the worl d in order to search for what is pure
by f ol l owi ng the path of the ariyans [saints] who searched until they found
[nibbana]. ( T )5
In f ul f i l l ment of his desire to f ol l ow the actual path of the Buddha
Buddhadasa l eft Bangkok on 5th Apri l 1932 and returned t o Wat Mai at
Phumri ang. Other monks were to have accompani ed hi m but because of f ami l y
pressures they abandoned the idea, l eavi ng Buddhadasa to carry on alone. But
Dhammadasa and a small party of his associ ates strongl y supported Buddhadasa
and t oget her they deci ded that the spi ri tual retreat should be undertaken at a long-
abandoned and overgrown templ e, Wat Traphangci k or si mpl y Wat Phangci k, near
Phumri ang. Buddhadasa took up resi dence there on 12th May 1932 and renamed
the t empl e area Suan Mokkhaphal aram ( ^ 1 J^IJJ l i teral l y,
" T he garden to arouse the spirits to attai n l i berati on. " Today the t empl e is usually
si mpl y called Suan Mok, " The garden of l i berati on. "
It was in the f ol l owi ng month that the democrat i c revol uti on whi ch overt hrew
the absol ute monarchy occurred and Buddhadasa s comments on this event reflect
how7 he vi ewed his religious enterpri se,
We take this event [the revol uti on] as an omen of changi ng to a new
era, for recti f yi ng and i mprovi ng vari ous thi ngs as much as we c a n. ( T)6
The i ntensi ty of the t went y six year old monk s determi nati on can be gauged
f rom the f ol l owi ng vow, wri t ten in a notebook on 28th August 1932,
I commi t this life and body as a dedi cati on to the Lord Buddha. I am a
servant of the Buddha, the Buddha is my lord. For this reason I am
named " Buddhadasa" ( l i teral l y, "servant of the Buddha").7
For the f ol l owi ng t wo years Buddhadasa l i ved al one at Suan Mok, f ol l owi ng
the sol i tary life of a forest monk. In 1935 another monk, Phra Sasanapachoto
Phi kkhu, accompani ed hi m for the phansa rai ny season retreat and over the next
f ew years the number of monks and novi ces resi di ng at Suan Mok grew' to ten.
Because of l i mi ted space at the Wat Traphangci k site, in 1943 Suan Mok was
moved to its present l ocati on on al most a hundred acres of hilly land at Wat
Than- nam-l ai , several ki l ometres southeast of Chai ya.
5C h i t Phi bant hae n, pp. 39-40.
^i bi d. p . 48.
287
7i bi d. p . 11.
288
Dhammadasa was far f rom i nacti ve duri ng these f ormat i ve years and was in
constant contact wi th his brother. Toget her they devel oped a plan for propagat i ng
thei r ideas of the purer, ori gi nal Buddhi sm. They agreed that thei r work needed to
proceed gradual l y, starti ng wi th a f ew and onl y sl owl y bui l di ng up numbers. They
also fel t it had to be a trul y rel i gi ous work, avoi di ng f ame and honour. The first
stage was for Dhammadasa to establish a group of peopl e i nterested in publ i shi ng
books on the dhamma, and the second stage was for this group to acti vel y promot e
the dhamma. Dhammadasa established the Khana Thammat han
( ftttlZUS-1UVnU ), " The Soci ety of the Gi f t of Tr ut h" , and took the Pal i mot to,
sabbadanam dhammaddnam j i n a t i , " The gi f t of truth excels all other gi f ts".
Wi t h the obj ect of, " propagat i ng the correct pri nci pl es of the dhamma,"8
Dhammadasa in 1933 began publ i shi ng a magazi ne, Phutthasasana ( Buddhi sm) ,
ai mi ng at nati onal di stri buti on. And in the first heady years after the democrati c
revol ut i on his small group was infused wi th a strong sense of desti ny and of the
possi bi l i ty of ef f ecti ng real progress in the character of Buddhi sm. As Buddhadasa
noted at the ti me,
We have consequentl y reached the appropri ate t i me for promot i ng the
progress of the practi ce of dhamma to obtai n true fruits of the blessed
rel i gi on. And we should do this by tryi ng to find ways or means to help a
l arge number of i ndi vi dual s understand correctl y and more truly the
dhammi c pri nci pl es of the blessed prophet, son of the Sakyas. ( T)9
Just as the democrat i c revol uti on brought the promi se of devol vi ng pol i ti cal
power to the peopl e so too Buddhadasa saw his and the Khana Sonthanatham s
propagat ory work as reveal i ng the true core of Buddhi sm for all to know.
Since Wor l d War II other organi sti ons have been establ i shed wi th the specific
purpose of publ i shi ng and di stri buti ng Buddhadasa s wri ti ngs and sermons. In 1953
Dhammadasa f ormal l y i ncorporat ed the Khana Thammat han as a f oundati on, the
Thammat han Mul ani thi . In associ ati on wi th this Chai ya-based organi sati on, whi ch
has its own li brary and press, is the Bangkok-based Thammabucha ( g y j j j l l ' j n
v
" Honour i ng Dhamma" ) pri nt i ng house, whi ch in turn is operated by the Khana
Phoey- phrae Wi t hi Kan-damnoen Chi wi t An Prasoet
i
{mi tUIJ i nnnTfin l mi L l J r 1^13 " T h e Group for Promot i ng the Met hod
of Leadi ng One s Li fe Per f ect l y" ) . Another organi sati on dedi cated to the publ i cati on
of Buddhadasa s w' ork is the Ongkan Fyn-f i i Phra Phutthasasana
^i bi d. p.114
^i b i d. pp.103-104.
( IlN PimTvIllrtYiT rWVHJPi' lflU' l " The Organi sati on for the Revi val of
u 1
Buddhi sm" ) , whi ch was establ i shed by the l ate Pun Congprasoet at Samut Prakan
near Bangkok.
Gradual l y since 1932 Buddhadasa s ideas have become more and more wi del y
recogni sed. Whi l e not al ways bei ng in agreement wi th t hem Buddhadasa has enj oyed
the company of t wo generati ons of l i beral democrati c pol i ti ci ans, symbol i sed by his
meet i ngs wi t h Pri di Phanomyong and his someti mes st ormy i nteracti ons wi th
Khukri t Pr amot . Duri ng the Second Wor l d War a pol i ti ci an f rom Buddhadasa s
home provi nce of Suratthani , Wut i Suw' annarat, came to know of his ideas and gave
some of Buddhadasa s books to the democrat and f ormer Pri me Mi ni ster, Pri di
Phanomyong. Pri di i nvi ted Buddhadasa to Bangkok and when the t wo met they
spoke f rom 1pm till 10pm on three consecuti ve days. Whi l e the content of their
conversati ons is not recorded the mere l ength of ti me the cabi net mi ni ster took of f
f rom his duti es i ndi cates somet hi ng of the i mportance Pri di pl aced on the discussion.
Pri di was also inspired to consi der arrangi ng for a templ e like Suan Mok to be
bui l t in his home provi nce of Ayut t hi a, but his bei ng forced i nto exile after the
death of Ki ng Rama Yl l in 19 47 meant the plan was never realised.
A t this same t i me Buddhadasa was also i nvi ted to gi ve a series of addresses
t o the Phut t hasamakhom ( Buddhi st Soci ety of Thai l and) , the content of his talks
and responses setti ng a pattern for his rel ati ons wi th the sahgha hi erarchy whi ch
has by and large conti nued to the present day. He enti tl ed one of his addresses,
" The Mountai nous Methods of Buddhi st Dhamma - Thi ngs Whi ch Obstruct Peopl e
Fr om Obt ai ni ng Buddhi st Dhamma. "10 It was a cri ti ci sm of the practi ce of Thai
Buddhi sm whi ch in turn drew vehement cri ti ci sm both f rom lay and clerical
members of the audi ence. One Phra Thi ppr i nya accused Buddhadasa of debasi ng the
Ther avada tradi ti on by his view' s. Indeed, as Sulak Si varaksa notes, " The work of
Buddhadasa has never recei ved any encouragement f rom ecclesiastical circles. " ( T ) 11
However , whi l e drawi ng severe cri ti ci sm f rom some, even being l abel l ed
hereti cal , the sahgha has not been abl e to i gnore Buddhadasa, for as Sulak gl owi ng
reports,
A t the present ti me, his i mpact is nati on-wi de. It is l argel y due to
I n Thai the address was t i t l ed, " Phukhau Wi t hi Phut t hat ham Si ng Thi Khwang- kan Mai Hai Khon
Khau Pai Su Phut t hat ham"
i f 1/ v I
( n m r s v m ' B J n j 5 > i ) Cited by (phra)
Ra t cha na nt ha mum, p. 26.
11 - - *
S u l a k Si warak, Kh a n c h o r n g Sor ng P hr a ( ^ yy y n )> P-233-
290
Buddhadasa that the younger generati on in Si am now turn to Buddhi st
val ues and take Buddhi sm seriously. He has wri tt en more books on
Buddhi sm than any other scholar - past or present - and his thought
conti nues to become even more prof ound.12
Recent years have seen Buddhadasa recei ve increasi ng publ i c recogni ti on, bei ng
the first monk to be made an honorary member of the w' idely recogni sed research
body, the Si am Soci ety. Duri ng the 1973-76 peri od Buddhadasa recei ved nati on-wi de
coverage when he debated the senior Thai pol i ti ci an Khukri t Pr amot on tel evi si on
and radi o. In 1980 the Mahachul al ongkorn Buddhi st Uni versi t y13 conf erred on hi m
an Honorary Doct orat e of Buddhi sm, the first it had presented in its ni nety year
exi stence. Thi s degree w' as conf erred by none other than the Supreme Patri arch of
the Thai sahgha. Buddhadasa has also recentl y been awarded the honorary clerical
ti tl e of Phra Rat chawi sutt hi met hi
The t empl e site at Suan Mok has grown consi derabl y over the years and now
there are of ten up to ei ghty monks and perhaps some hundreds of l aymen and
l aywomen vi si ti ng or stayi ng at the centre at any one ti me. A branch templ e of
Suan M ok is l ocated at Wat Urriong near Chi angmai . Wat Chonprathanrangsi t at
Pak-kret in Nonthaburi also has close associ ati ons wi th Suan Mok, its abbot, Phra
Rat chananthamuni or Panyanant ha Phi kkhu, bei ng a f ormer student of
Buddhadasa s.
l 9
Sul ak Si varksa, I nt rod ucti on to S w e a r e r , Bhi kk hu Buddhadasa and t he Buddhi st Re f o r ma t i o n i n
T h a i l a n d , p. 2.
13Hahachul al onakor n i s t he uni ver si t y f or monks f r o# t he Hahani kay sect , f l ahamakut i s t he
cor r espondi nq i nst i t ut i on r un by t he Thammayut sect , admi t t i ng monks and novi ces from bot h sect s,
291
GLOSSARY OF THAI AND PALI TERMS.
Arranged in Engl i sh Al phabet i cal order.
Abhi dhammapi taka
acan or acharn ( Thai )
akasanahcayatana
a ki hcahha y at ana
akusala
a nag ami
anapanasati
anatta
ani cca
anupadisesa nibbana
anusaya
arahant
- The predomi nat l y phi l osophi cal and anal yti cal
fi nal section of the Tipitaka.
- Honori f ic t erm for a graduate or honoured
teacher or l ecturer. Used for both monks and
l aypeopl e.
The real m of boundless space, the first
absorpti on or j hdna of the i mmateri al sphere,
arupajjhana.
The real m of nothi ngness, the third
absorpti on or j hdna of the i mmateri al sphere,
arupaj jhana.
- Moral l y unwhol esome or unprof i tabl e.
- A "non-returner", an enl i ghtened person or
ariyapuggala who wi l l not be reborn as a
human being.
- Form of medi tat i on based on observati on of
the i nward and outw' ard breath.
- Non-sel f, non-essenti al i ty; one of the three
characteri sti cs of exi stence or <tilakkhana. See
also ani cca, dukkha.
- I mpermanence, one of the tilakkhana or
three characteri sti cs of existence. See also
anatta, dukkha.
- Nibbana wi t hout the f actors of existence
remai ni ng. The ul ti mate f orm of nibbana
t radi ti onal l y regarded as bei ng attai ned after
death.
- an inherent, l atent unwhol esome procl i vi ty;
the underl yi ng cause of expl i ci t kilesa.
- An enl i ghtened person w' ho has fully attai ned
nibbana, see ariyapuggala.
ari ya - A spi ri tual l y enl i ghtened person.
292
anyamagga
ariyapuggala
ariyasacca
ariyasavaka
ari i paj j hana
asava
atta
avi j j a
bhavacakka
bhavahga
bhikkhu
bhikkhuni
bodhipakkhiyadham m a
bodhisatta
bodhisattva ( Sanskri t)
- The " nobl e pat h" or " nobl e ei ghtf ol d pat h"
of Buddhi st practi ce, i .e. sammadi tthi ,
sarnmasahkappa, sammavaca,
sammakammanta, samma-aj i va, sammavayama,
sammasati , sammasamadhi.
- " Nobl e i ndi vi dual s", those who have attai ned
or are in the process of attai ni ng enl i ghtenment,
i.e. sotapanna, saki dagami , anagami , arahant.
- The "f our nobl e t ruths" realised by the
Buddha and f ormi ng the basis of Buddhi st
doctri ne, i.e. 1. there is suffering, 2. there is a
cause of sufferi ng, 3. There is an end to
sufferi ng, 4. there is a path to the at tai nment
of the endi ng of suffering.
- A "nobl e f ol l ower" , a disciple of the Buddha.
- The four medi t at i ve absorpti ons or jhanas of
the i mmateri al spheres, i.e. akasanahcdyatana,
vi h h a n a h c a y at ana, a kin can h ay at ana,
nevasahhanasahhayata na.
Deep-seated moral def i l ements. See also
kilesa.
Self, used to denote the noti on of a
permanent self or soul. A doctri ne whi ch is
deni ed by Buddhi st doctri ne.
- Ignorance.
- The "cycl e of becomi ng", an al ternati ve term
for paticcasamuppada.
- a subl i mi nal level of consciousness regarded
as i mportant in the process of rebirth.
- A Theravadi n monk, a member of the
Buddhi st sahgha.
- a Theravadi n nun.
The thi rty seven requisites or i tems
pertai ni ng to enl i ghtenment.
- The Ther avada noti on of a bei ng desti ned to
at tai n compl ete sal vati on or Buddhahood, c .f.
bodhisattva.
- A Mahayana Buddhi st saint who vows not
to enter i nto compl ete nirvana until all other
senti ent bei ngs have l i kewi se been saved, c.f.
bodhisatta.
293
brahrnacariya
cakkavattin
cakravarti n{ Sanskri t)
cetasika
ci t - wang( Thai )
dasarajadhamrna
devata
dhamma
d ham m a d h i ttha n a
dhatu
dukkha
f arang( Thai )
i ddhi
j at i
j hana
kamma
karma[ Sanskri t)
- The hol y life of a renunci ate, usually equated
wi th cel i bacy.
- Uni versal Monarch, the Buddhi st ideal of a
ki ng who rules in accord wi th the dhamma.
- see cakkavattin.
- A general term for the mental categori es
such as vedana, sahkhara and sahha whi ch are
characteri sti c of a mi nd suffused by cravi ng and
i gnorance.
- Li teral l y: " voi ded- mi nd" , " empt i ed-mi nd" or
" f reed- mi nd" . Used by Buddhadasa as the Thai
renderi ng of suhhata.
- The ten qual i ti es of a ri ghteous Buddhi st
monarch.
- A celestial being.
- The natural order of the cosmos, the doctri ne
of sal vati on realised by the Buddha and based
upon that natural order, and ri ghteous acti vi ti es
in accord wi th that doctri ne and the order of
the cosmos.
- Exposi ti on of Buddhi st doctri ne in terms of
el ements or factors, dhamma s. Di stinguished
f rom puggaladhitthana ( q .v. ) or exposi ti on of
the doctri ne in terms of i ndi vi dual s or persons
consti tuted by those el ements.
- a consti tut i ve el ement.
- Suf feri ng, one of the three characteristics of
exi stence or tilakkhana.
- A Westerner.
- psychi c power.
- Bi rth or rebirth.
a trance or " absorpt i on" induced by
concentrati on medi tat i on or samadhi.
- Intenti onal or vol i ti onal acti ons whi ch accrue
moral reacti ons or vipaka to the performer.
- see karmna.
khandha - one of the fi ve aggregat es or el ements which
consti tute human exi stence, i.e. 1: riipa
mat eri al i ty, 2: vedana - feeling, 3: sahha -
294
kilesa
kusala
l okadhamma
lokiya
loki yadhamma
lokuttara
l okutt a r ad h a m rn a
M a h a n i k a y ( T h a i )
M a h a y a n a
mo ha
nama
ndmari ipa
nevasahhanasahhayata
nibbana
ni kay ( Thai )
percepti on, 4: sahkhara - mental factors
associ ated wi t h desire, 5: vihhana
consciousness.
- A mental def i l ement or i mpuri t y whi ch leads
to suffering.
- Moral l y whol esome or prof i tabl e.
- The worl dl y condi ti ons of the ordi nary person
or putthujana.
- Mundane, worl dl y; associ ated wi th the real m
of attachment , cravi ng and suffering.
- The spi ri tual path of practi ces for the worl d-
i nvol ved l ayperson.
- Supramundane, transcendent; associated wi th
nibbana or the path l eadi ng to the attai nment
of nibbana.
Tradi t i onal l y the spi ri tual path of the
ren unci ate monk.
- Li t eral l y, " The Great Di vi si on ( Sect ) " , the
ol der and l arger of the t wo official sects of
Ther avada Buddhi sm in Thai l and.
- " The Great Vehi cl e" , a generi c term for the
" Nort hern School s of Buddhi sm found in
Chi na, Vi et nam, Japan, Korea, Ti bet and
Mongol i a.
- delusion.
Ment al i t y; a generi c term for the four
i mmateri al khandhas of vedand ( f eel i ng) , sahha
( percept i on) , sahkhara ( combi ni ng mental
f actors) and vihhana ( consciousness).
- Human i ndi vi dual i ty or i ndi vi dual exi stence
as i mpermanent and i nnessential and composed
of the f i ve khandhas, or of nama and riipa i.e.
ment al i ty and physi cal i ty.
na - The sphere of nei ther percepti on nor non
percepti on, the fourth absorpti on or j hana of
the i mmat eri al sphere, arupajjhana.
Sal vat i on, the compl ete and permanent
exti ncti on of suffering.
A sect of Theravada Buddhi sm, see
Mahanikay, Thammayut.
295
nikaya
ni rvana) Sanskri t)
opapatika
paccekabuddha
pahha
paramatthasacca
pan yatti dhamma
paticcasamuppada
pati mokha
pa tisand h i vi hhdn a
parinibbana
phansa( Thai )
phasakhon - phasat ham ( Thai )
phi kkhu ( Thai )
phr a( Thai )
pitaka
puggaladhitthana
- A subdi vi si on of the T h e r a v a d a canon, e.g.
Di gha- ni kaya, Maj j hi ma- ni kaya, etc.
- see nibbana.
- Spontaneousl y born beings.
- One who attai ns enl i ghtenment but does not
teach or procl ai m his real i sati on to the worl d,
c.f. sammasambuddha.
- Wi sdom; l i berati ng i nsi ght i nto real i ty.
- Absol ute truth, f ounded on transcendent
i nsi ght i nto eternal truth, sacca.
- The doctri nes and scriptures of Buddhi sm;
that dhamma whi ch is to be learnt as opposed
to bei ng practi sed.
The doctri ne of dependent ori gi nati on,
expl ai ni ng the causal rel ati ons between i gnorance
and cravi ng, and the arising of suffering and of
rebirth.
- The clerical code of conduct for Theravadi n
monks.
Rebi rt h l i nki ng consciousness, the link
between the end of one life and the begi nni ng
of the next.
- Absol ute sal vati on, f reedom f rom suffering.
- The annual three month rainy season retreat
duri ng whi ch monks remai n based at one
templ e, the " Buddhi st l ent".
Li t eral l y " human l anguage" - "dhamma
l anguage" , Buddhadasa s theory of scri ptural
i nterpretati on.
- The Thai t erm for bhikkhu ( q. v. ) .
- an honori f i c used bef ore the name of a monk,
a Thai t erm used to mean a Buddhi st monk.
- One of the three mai n di visions of the
T h e r a v a d a scriptures, i .e., Vinayapitaka,
Suttapitaka and Abhidhammapitaka.
- Exposi ti on of the Buddhi st doctri ne in terms
of persons or i ndi vi dual s, c.f.
dhammadhi tthana.
putthuj ana - A " wor l dl i ng" , an ordi nary person.
296
rupa
sacca
sakidagami
sahhavedayitanirodha
samadhi
sarnrna
sarn ma-dj i va
samrnaditthi
sarnmakammanta
sarnma samadhi
s a rri m a s a rn buddh a
sa rn m a s a h k a ppa
sammasati
sammavdcd
sa rn mdvayd m a
samsara
sammati sacca
sahgha
sahkhara
sd sana
- Mat eri al i t y; the khandha or aggregate of
human exi stence whi ch confers f orm and
substanti al i ty, c.f. nama.
- Trut h.
- An enl i ghtened person who wi l l be reborn as
a human bei ng j ust one more ti me.
- Exti nct i on of feel i ng and percepti on, the
t emporary suspension of all mental acti vi ty
f ol l owi ng i mmedi at el y upon the attai nment of
the ei ghth j hdna or nevasahhanasahhayata na.
- Concentrati on medi tati on.
- ri ght, correct; ri ghteous.
- Ri ght l i vel i hood.
- Ri ght belief.
- Ri ght bodi l y acti on.
- Ri ght concentrati on.
- A universal Buddha who not onl y at tai ns
enl i ght enment but also procl ai ms a message of
sal vati on to the worl d, c .f. paccekabuddha.
- Ri ght Thought .
- Ri ght mi ndful ness.
- Ri ght speech.
- Ri ght effort.
- The cycl e of rebi rth and sufferi ng caused by
i gnorance and cravi ng.
- Conventi onal truth; truth accordi ng to the
common conventi ons of l anguage use.
The Buddhi st monkhood, the order of
renunci ate Buddhi st monks.
- A ment al f ormat i on resul ti ng resul ti ng f rom
vol i ti onal or /camma-causi ng acti ons and which
is the i mmedi ate cause of rebi rth and of vipdka.
- The di spensati on of the Buddha; Buddhi st
teachi ng; a t erm used to denote Buddhi sm as a
rel i gi on.
297
sassataditthi
sa-upadisesa nibbana
si I a
sotapanna
sukhavipassatha
suhhata
s' ii nyat a. ( Sanskri t)
sutta
Suttapitaka
Suit, ant a, Suttantapitaka
Tathagata
tan ha
T h a m m a y u t ( Thai )
T h e r a v a d a
thuparaha
ti l akkhana
Ti pi t aka
Trai bhumi katha
- The heterodox doctri ne that there is an
eternal self or atta.
Nibbana wi t h the factors of exi stence
remai ni ng, tradi t i onal l y, regarded as nibbana
attai ned whi l e still al i ve, c.f.
anupadisesambbana.
- Ethi cs, good conduct.
- A " st ream ent errer" , one who is in the
process of at tai ni ng nibbana.
- The path to nibbana vi a the practi ce of
i nsi ght medi tat i on or vipassana.
- Voi d, empti ness, a state free f rom i gnorance,
cravi ng and suffering.
- The Sanskri t equi val ent of suhhata.
- A di vi si on of the Theravada scriptures, a
section of one of the pitakas.
- The second mai n di vi si on of the Theravada
scri ptures composed mai nl y of exposi tory
discourses by the Buddha and his close disciples.
- Anot her name for the Suttapitaka.
- an epi thet of the Buddha.
- Cravi ng.
- Li t eral l y, " Those adheri ng strongl y to the
dhamma" , one of the t wo official sects of
Theravada Buddhi sm in Thai l and.
- The "doct ri ne of the el ders", the "Southern
School " of Buddhi sm predomi nant in Thai l and.
- Li t eral l y, "st upa- deservi ng" , an honoured or
venerated person consi dered worthy of havi ng a
pi l gri mage stupa erected over thei r bodi l y
remai ns.
- The three characteri sti cs of exi stence, i .e.,
anicca ( i mpermanence) , dukkha ( sufferi ng) and
anatta ( non-sel f) .
The canoni cal Theravada scriptures,
i ncorporat i ng the Vinayapitaka, Suttapitaka and
the Abi dhammapitaka.
- A f ourteenth century Thai text on Buddhi st
cosmol ogy.
298
T r a i P h u m P h r a
upacara
upadana
upekkha
vattsamsara
vicara
vinaya
Vinayapitaka
vi hhana
vi hhdnahcayatana
vipaka
vi pas sand
R u a n g ( T h a i ) - see Trai bhumi katha.
"Access concent rat i on", a basic level of
samadhi regarded as suffi ci ent for the practi ce
of vi pas sand.
- At t achment , cl i ngi ng.
- Equani mi ty.
The cycl e of rebi rth and suffering, c.f.
samsara.
- Di scursi ve thi nki ng.
- The code of moasti c discipline, as laid down
in the Vinayapitaka.
Secti on of the canoni cal T h e r a v a d a
scri ptures deal i ng wi th the codes of monasti c
di sci pl i ne or vinaya.
- Consci ousness.
- The sphere of boundless consciousness, second
of the four absorpti ons of the i mmateri al sphere,
ari ipajjhana.
the reacti ve out -worki ng of accumul ated
kamma.
Insight medi tat i on, a f orm of medi tati on
ai mi ng for l i berati ng i nsi ght i nto reality.
vitakka - Thought concepti on, rati onal thought.
299
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE BOOKS.
1 Classical B uddhist Texts and Reference Books.
( 1) Pal i - Engl i sh Di cti onary.
T . W. Rhys-Davi ds & Wi l l i am Stede ( eds) . Pal i Te xt Soci ety.
Luzac &. Co. Ltd. London. 1966.
( 2) Visuddhimagga.
by Buddhaghosa. The versi on cited in the t ext is the Engl i sh
l anguage transl ati on by Bhi kkhu Nanamol i . The Path o f
Pur i f i cat i on - Visuddhimagga. 4th Edi ti on. Buddhi st Publ i cati on
Soci ety. Kandy Sri Lanka. 1979.
2 Other Texts.
(1) A. de S. ( no other name gi ven) .
" Buddhi st Monk' s Apol ogy for Chri sti ani ty" , in World Buddhism
( Ceyl on) . May 1969 ( B. E. 2513). repri nted in Bhi kkhu Si vl i bodhi
( ed) . Buddhadasa: Appearance and Real i ty, Bei ng a Review o f
" Chri st i ani t y and Buddhi sm' by Venerable Buddhadasa. Subl i me
Li fe Mi ssi on. Bangkok. 1971. pp. 1-3.
( 2) ( Bhi kkhu) Ananda.
Theravada and Zen. Gunasena Co. Col ombo Ceyl on. 1962.
( 3) Andaya, Barbara W7atson.
" St at ecraf t in the Rei gn of Lu Thai of Sukhodaya". in Bardwel l
L. Smi th ( ed) . Rel i gi on and the Legi ti mati on o f Power i n
Thai l and, Laos and Burma. Ani ma Books. Chambersburg Penn.
1972. pp. 2-19.
( 4) Anderson, Ben.
" Wi t hdr awal Sympt oms: Soci al and Cul tural Aspects of the
Oct ober 6 Coup" , in Bul l et i n o f Concerned Asi an Scholars. Vol . 9
No. 3 Jul y-Sept. 1977. pp. 13-30.
( 5) ( Bhi kkhu) Ariyananda.
Psychology and Reli gi ous Symbol ism - An Interpretati on i n Terms
o f Psychology o f Some Fami l i ar Allegories f r om Buddhi st, Hi ndu
and Judaic Scri ptures. Subl i me Li f e Mi ssi on. Bangkok, no
publ i cati on date gi ven.
( 6) Berchert, Hei nz.
" Cont radi ct i ons in Si nhal ese Buddhi sm" , in Bardwel l L. Smi th.
Contri buti ons to Asi an Studies, Vol.4, Tradi ti on and Change i n
Theravada Buddhi sm: Essays on Ceylon and Thail and i n the 19th
and '20th Centuries. E.J. Brill. Lei den The Netherl ands. 1973.
pp. 7-17.
300
( 7) Bl o f e l d , John ( trans) .
The Zen Teachings o f Huang Po - On the Transmi ssi on o f ALind,
Bei ng the Teaching o f the Zen Master Huang Po as Recorded by
the Scholar P e i Hsi u o f the Tang Dynasty. Grove Press. New
York. 1958.
( 8) ( Venerabl e Phra Acharn Maha) B o o w a Nyanasampanno.
The Venerable Phra Acharn Mun Bhuri datta Thera - Medi tati on
Master, trans. Siri Buddhasukh. Wa t Pa Barn Tard, Udorn Thani
Thai l and. 1982.
( 9) B o n d , George D .
" The Nett i -Pakarana: A Ther avada Met hod of I nt erpret at i on" , in
Somaratna Bal asoori ya ( ed) . Buddhist Studies i n Honour o f
Walpola Rahula. Gordon Fraser. L ondon. 1980. pp. 16-28.
( 10) B o y d , James W.
" The Theravada Vi ew of Samsara" . in Somaratna Bal asoori ya ( ed) .
Buddhist Studies i n Honour o f Walpola Rahula. Gordon Fraser.
London. 1980. pp. 29-43.
( 11) ( Bhi kkhu) Bu d d h a d a s a .
0)-
Another Ki nd o f Bi rth, trans. R .B. ( no further detai l s gi ven) , no
publ i sher gi ven. Bangkok. 1974.
( 1i )
Buddhi sm i n 15 Mi nute. trans. H.G. G ret, her. Suri yaban
Publ i shers. Bangkok, no publ i cati on date gi ven.
Buddha-dhamma f or Students. trans. Ari yananda Bhikkhu.
Subl i me Li f e Mi ssi on. Bangkok. 1982.
( i v) .
Chri st i ani t y and Buddhi sm - Si ncl ai r Thompson Memori al
Lecture, Fi f t h Series, no transl ator gi ven. 2nd edn. Subl i me Li fe
Mi ssi on. Bangkok. 1977.
( v )-
" Exchangi ng Dhamma Whi l e Fi ght i ng" , in Visakha Puj a. Buddhi st
Associ ati on of Thai l and. Bangkok. 2513 ( 1970) . pp. 33-47.
( vi ) .
Handbook f or Manki nd, trans. Buddhani gama. Subl i me Li fe
Mi ssi on. Bangkok. 1980.
( vi i ) .
Two Ki nds o f Language, trans. Ari yananda Bhi kkhu. no publisher
gi ven. Bangkok. 1974.
( 12) B u n n a g , Jane.
" The Rol e of the Buddhi st Monk in Central Thai Soci ety" . in
Visakha Puj a. Buddhi st Associ at i on of Thai l and. Bangkok. 2513
( 1970) . pp. 48-55.
>
301
( 13) B utr-Indr, Siddhi.
The Social Phi l osophy o f Buddhism. Mahamakut Buddhi st
Uni versi ty Press. Bangkok. 1979.
( 14) Butt, John W.
" Thai Ki ngshi p and Rel i gi ous Ref orm" , in Bardwel l L. Smi th ( ed) .
Rel i gi on and Legi t i mati on o f Power i n Thai l and, Laos and
Burma. Ani ma Books. Chambersburg Penn. 1978. pp. 34-51.
( 15) Chan drkaew, Chi nda.
Nibbana - The Ul ti mate Truth o f Buddhism. Mahachul al ongkorn
Buddhi st Uni veri st y Press. Bangkok. 1982.
( 16) ( H. H. Pri nce) Dhani Ni vat Kromamun Bi dyal abh.
A Hi story o f Buddhism i n Siam. Si am Soci ety. Bangkok. 1965.
( 17) Feyerabend, Paul .
Against Method - Outl i ne o f an Anarchi sti c Theory o f
Knowledge. V erso. London. 1978.
( 18) Gokhale, Bal kri shna Govi nd.
" Anagar i ka Dharmapal a: Towar d Moderni t y Through Tradi t i on in
Ceyl on" , in Bardwel l L. Smi th ( ed) . Contri buti ons to Asian
Studies Vol. 4, Tradi ti on and Change i n Theravada Buddhi sm:
Essays on Ceylon and Thailand i n the i gt h and 20th Centuries.
E .J. Bri l l , Lei den The Netherl ands, 1973, pp. 30-39.
( 19) Gosling, Davi d.
" The Sci enti f i c and Rel i gi ous Beliefs of Thai Scientists and Thei r
I nter-rel ati onshi ps", in Southeast Asian Journal o f Social Science.
Vol . 4 No . l 1975. pp. 1-18.
( 20) Jayatilleke, K. N.
" Buddhi sm and the Sci enti f i c Revol ut i on" . in Buddhism and
Science - Collected Essays ( no edi tor gi ven) . Buddhi st Publ i cati on
Soci ety. Kandy Sri Lanka. 1980. pp. 1- 11.
( 21) Jayawardene, Julius R .
Buddhism and Mar xi sm, pamphl et of the text of the Tent h
Anni versary Lecture to the Ceyl on Uni versi ty Buddhi st
Brot herhood. Col ombo Ceyl on. 6th March 1950.
( 22) Kirsch, A . Thomas.
(i)-
" Compl exi t y in the Thai Rel i gi ous System: An I nt erpret at i on" , in
Journal o f Asi an Studies. V o l . X X X V I No . 2 February 1977.
pp. 241-266.
( i i ) .
" Moderni si ng I mpl i cati ons of Ni neteenth Cent ury Ref orms in the
Thai Sangha". in Bardwel l L. Smi th ( ed) . Reli gi on and
Legi t i mat i on o f Power i n Thai l and, Laos and Burma. Ani ma
Books. Chambersburg Penn. 1978. pp. 52-65.
( 23) Keyes, Charl es F.
302
" The Power of Mer i t " , in Visakha Puj a. Buddhi st Soci ety of
Thai l and. Bangkok. 2516 ( 1973) . pp. 95-102.
( 24) L i n g , Trevor.
0).
The Buddha - Buddhist Ci vi l i sat i on i n Indi a and Ceylon. Templ e
Smi th. London. 1973.
( i i ) .
Buddhi sm, Imperi al i sm and War - Burma and Thail and i n
Modern History. George Al l en & Unwi n Ltd. London. 1979.
( 25) M o r e l l , Davi d & S a mu d a v a n i j a , Chai -anan.
Pol i ti cal Conf l i ct i n Thai l and - Re f or m, Re-action and
Revol uti on. Oel geschl ager Gunn & Hai n Publ i shers. Cambri dge
Mass. 1981.
( 26) M o r g a n , F. Bruce.
" Vocat i on of Monk and Layman: Signs of Change in Thai
Buddhi st Ethi cs", in Bardw' el l L. Smi th ( ed) . Contri buti ons to
Asian Studies Vol. 4, Tradi t i on and Change i n Theravada
Buddhism: Essays on Ceylon and Thail and i n the 19th and 20th
Centuries. E.J. Brill, Lei den The Netherl ands. 1973. pp. 68-77.
( 27) M u l d e r . Niels.
w -
" Buddhi sm, Nat i onal I dent i t y and Moderni t y in Cont emporary
Thai l and" , in Journal o f Social Sciences - Chi angmai University
( Thai l and) . Vol . 2 No. 2, Sept. 1978. pp. 34-47.
( i i ) .
Everyday Li fe i n Thai l and - An Interpretati on. Duang Kamol
Publ i shers. Bangkok. 1979.
( 28) N a n a m o l i Bhi kkhu ( trans) .
Visuddhimagga, 4th edn. Buddhi st Publ i cati on Soci ety. Kandy Sri
Lanka. 1979.
( 29) N a - R a n g s i , Sunthorn,
The Buddhist Concept o f Karma and Rebirth. Mahamakut
Raj avi dyal aya Press. Bangkok. 1976.
( 30) N y a n a t i l oka.
Buddhist Di ct i onary - Manual o f Buddhist Terms and Doctrines.
4th edn. Nyanaponi ka ( rev) . Buddhi st Publ i cati on Soci ety. Kandy
Sri Lanka. 1980.
( 31) R a h u l a , Wal pol a.
(0-
Hi story o f Buddhism i n Ceylon - The Anuradhapura Period.
Gunasena h Co. Ltd. Col ombo Ceyl on. 1966.
"Zen and the Tami ng of the Bul l ", in Wal pol a Rahula. Zen and
the Tami ng o f the Bul l - Towards the Redefi ni ti on o f Buddhist
Thought. Gordon Fraser. London. 1978. pp. 15-23.
(ii).
303
( 32) Reynolds, Crai g J. ( trans. ) .
Autobi ography: The L i f e o f Pri nce- Patri arch Vaj irahana o f Siam
1860- 1921. Ohi o Uni versi ty Press. At hens Ohi o. 1979.
(33) ( Mr s) Rhys-Davids.
Compendi um o f Phi l osophy - Transl ati on o f the
Abhi dhammatha- Sang aha. Pal i Te xt Soci ety. London. 1972.
( 34) Rupp, George.
" The Rel ati onshi p Between Ni r vana and Samsara: An Essay on the
Evol uti on of Buddhi st Ethi cs", in Phi l osophy East and West. Vol .
21. 1971. p p . 55-67.
( 35) Slater, Robert Lawson.
Paradox and Nibbana - A Study o f Religious Ul timates with
Special Reference to Burmese Buddhism. Uni versi ty of Chi cago
Press. Chi cago. 1951.
( 36) Soma ( Thera) .
Words Leading to Disenchantment. Buddhi st Publ i cati on Soci ety.
Kandy Sri Lanka. 1978.
( 37) Spencer, Robert F.
" The Rel ati on of Buddhi sm to Modern Sci ence". in Buddhism
and Science - Collected Essays ( no edi tor gi ven) . Buddhi st
Publ i cati on Soci ety. Kandy Sri Lanka. 1980. pp. 12-16.
( 38) Spiro, Mel f ord E.
Buddhism and Society - A Great Tradi ti on and its Burmese
Vicissitudes. George Al l en Unwi n Ltd. London. 1971.
( 39) Staal, Frits.
Expl ori ng Mysti ci sm. Pengui n Books. London. 1975.
( 40) Suksamran, Somboon.
(0-
Buddhi sm and Pol i ti cs i n Thail and - A Study o f Soci o-Pol i ti cal
Change and Pol i ti cal Act i vi sm i n the Thai Sangha. Insti tute of
South East Asi an Studies. Si ngapore. 1982.
( i i)-
Pol i t i cal Buddhism i n South East Asi a - The Role o f the Sangha
i n the Moderni sati on o f Thail and. C. Hurst & Co. London. 1977.
( 41) Suzuki, Dai setz Tei taro.
( i ) -
Zen and Japanese Buddhism. Japan Travel Bureau. Tokyo. 1958.
( )
The Zen Doctri ne o f No - Mi nd - The Si gni fi cance o f the Sutra o f
I Jui -Neng {Wei -Lang) . Ri der Co. London. 1949.
( 42) Swearer, Donal d K.
(0-
Bhi kkhu Buddhadasa and the Buddhi st Ref or mat i on i n Thai l and.
304
pamphl et publ i shed by the Ecumeni cal Insti tute for Study and
Di al ogue. Col ombo Sri Lanka, no publ i cati on date gi ven, (est.
pub. date 1982).
( )
" Some Observat i ons on New Di recti ons in Thai Buddhi sm" , in
Visakha Puj a. Buddhi st Associ ati on of Thai l and. Bangkok. 2513
(1970) . pp. 56-58.
( 43) Tambiah, S.J.
(!)
Buddhi sm and Spi ri t Cults i n North- East Thailand. Cambri dge at
the Uni versi ty Press. Cambri dge. 1970.
( i i ) .
World Conqueror and World Renouncer - A Study o f Buddhism
and Pol i ty i n Thai l and Against a Hi stori cal Background.
Cambri dge Uni versi t y Press. Cambri dge. 1976.
( 44) T e r w i e l . Barend Jan.
0).
Monks and Magi c - An Analysis o f Religious Ceremonies in
Central Thailand. 2nd Edi ti on. Curzon Press. London. 1979.
( i i ) .
Reli gi on i n Rural Central Thail and - An Analysis o f Some
Ri tual and Bel iefs. P h .D. Thesi s. Austral i an Nati onal Uni versi ty.
Canberra, submi tted 1971.
(-15) T h i c h N h a t Ha nh .
The Mi racl e o f Being Awake - A Manual on Medi tati on f or the
Use o f Young Aci tvi sts. trans. Mobi Quynh Hoa. ed. Ji m Forest.
Sat hi rakoses- Nagapradi pa Foundati on. Bangkok. 2517 ( 1974) .
( 46) Ungphakorn, Puey.
" The Rol e of Ethi cs and Rel i gi on in Nat i onal Devel opment " .
Si ncl ai re Thompson Memori al Lectures, Thai l and Theol ogi cal
Semi nary, Chi angmai 1969. in Visakha Puja. Buddhi st Associ ati on
of Thai l and. Bangkok. 2517 ( 1974) . pp. 115-124.
( 47) Van Esterik, John Lauri er.
Cul tural Interpretati on o f Canonical Paradox - Lay Medi t ati on i n
a Central Thai Village. Ph. D. Thesi s. Uni versi ty of Illinois at
Urbana- Champai gn. Uni versi ty Mi cr of i l m Internati on. Ann Arbor
Mi chi gan. 1977.
( 48) Wang Mou-lam ( trans. ) .
The Sutra o f Wei Lang ( or Hui Neng) . Chri stmas Humphri es
( ed) . West port Conn. 1973.
( 49) Weerarame, Amarasi ri .
" Mo nk s I nterpretati on of Chri sti ani ty" , in World Buddhism
( Ceyl on) . Sept ember 1969 ( B. E. 2513). repri nted in Bhi kkhu
Si vl i bodhi . ( ed) . Buddhadasa: Appearance and Real ity, Being a
Review o f " Chri st i ani t y and Buddhi sm" by Venerable Buddhadasa.
Subl i me Li f e Mi ssi on. Bangkok. 1971. pp. 31-37.
305
( 50) Weeraratne, W. G.
Indi vi dual and Society i n Buddhism. Met r o Pri nters Ltd. Col ombo
Sri Lanka. 1977.
( 51) Wells, Kennet h E .
Thai Buddhism, Its Ri tes and Acti vi ti es. Suri yabun Publ i shers.
Bangkok. 1975.
( 52) Wilson, Davi d.
Pol i t i cs i n Thailand. Cornel l Uni versi ty Press. Ithaca New York.
1962.
( 53) W i t , Dani el .
Thail and - Another Vi etnam?. Charl es Scri bner s Sons. New York.
1968.
306
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THAI LANGUAGE MATERIALS.
Arranged in Thai Al phabet i cal Order.
1 Classical Buddhist Texts and Dictionaries.
( l ) VJJ s l FI? { Jf j Of HLi Vl V I L l f t U U W f n Phra Trai pi dok Phasa Thai Chabap
Luang.
(The O f f i c i a l Thai Language Edi t i on o f the Ti pi taka) .
n j u m i m a m n J l V i n ^ f l H n S m j Kr om Kan-sasana, Krasi i ang
Syksathi kan ( Depart ment of Rel i gi ous Af f ai rs, Mi ni st ry of
Educat i on) . 45 vols. Bangkok. 2525 (1982) .
2 Other Texts.
(])OU,S) (fl fl ^) ( Phra) Ki tti wuttho ( Phi kkhu) . , v
" i?B'j?fm'3imnvtfslnji]jQn liar l jsuvjjswvffi m
a mil a n r\n t r j uunuu j j uvru u r v b i lJa u us n u1vsw"
" Ryang Ci t - wang Nork Phra Trai pi dok Mi Khwam- samkhan Nai
Pat cuban Mak Lae Ryang Phra-phuttha-cau Sorn Lokut tarat ham
Nay Thammat hi nna Khor Pl i an Thamma Mai " ( " Concerni ng
Ci t -wang as Bei ng Outsi de the ( Teachi ngs Contai ned in the]
Ti pitaka - Whi ch Has Great Cont emporary I mportance; and
Concerni ng the Buddha s Teachi ngs on Lokuttaradhamma and
Dhammadi nna s Request for That Dhamma to be Changed. " ) ,
t
f rom a handbi l l repri nted in ^ ^ iJj r I a ? ^ ^ un Congprasoet
( ed) . n ^ I j c j f l " Arai Thuk Arai Phi t ( What is Correct
and What is Wrong). PlH 1 JvlllVjVilJ 2TrtlV13 Ongkan Fyn-f u
Phra Phutthasasana. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) . pp. 126-130.
t
( 2) f t Wz n n j J n n T f i i mn i Wf l n n i WS i n ( n u n u l m j ) ( Ruap-ruam Doy: )
Khanakammakan Sasana Phya Kan-phatana.
( Compi l ed by The Rel i gi ous Commi t t ee f or Devel opment, no
i ndi vi dual edi tor gi ven) ,
t f i t
( i ) . n m Y n a m j m n t f l v m - y i u"
Phutthathat Kap Khon Run- mai - Mya Khon-num-saw Tham
Thyng Rak Khorng Khwam- pen-thai ( Buddhadasa and the New
Generati on - When Youth Ask About the Roots o f Thai - ness).
Ntni f i l ni JaPmVl f M Mul ani thi Komon Khi mt horng. Bangkok.
2526 ( 1983) .
i
( i i ). nv nuv j v i s v nf i l um u r ^ i l n ^ n n n j u
Th' an Phutthathat Nai
Thatsana Khorng Nak-wichakan (.Academi cs Views on
Buddhadasa). Publ i shed by Khanakammakan Sasana Phya
Kan-phatana. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .
( 3) ( U. ? . ' J. ) 3nt) VI? l l J' l l l J' f l ( M. R. ) K l i y k r i t Pramot .
JJ. T. T. SfiqYffi l J n l w " KhWam- hen Bang Torn
Khorng M. R. W. Khvkri t Pr amot " ( " Some Vi ews of M. R. Khukri t
i
Pr amot " ) . in ^ V'Oi l l p un Congprasoet ( ed) .
" f l z l Tt i nsr i TtjY)1' Arai Th'uk Arai Phi t ( What is Correct and
What is Wrong). Q>J ftn nj f l uvJmzYVVf f i Pt tmn Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra
aj 1
Phutthasasana. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) . pp. 1- 8.
(4)^J'1'5Q IfiD Chaw A s o k ( trans. ) .
( nom-de-pl ume, lit. " The Peopl e of Asok" , i.e. the residents of
Phra Phot hi rak s t empl e compl ex of Santi -asok in Bangkok, no
r
individual, transl ator gi ven) . P mUf l U I VI f Ofl'EN I f i ' J J f i j J J U LWU
i
Khwam- l om-l ew Khorng Setthasat Samay Mai Phror Alai Soncai
Setthasat Choeng Phut ( 77;e Collapse o f Modern Economics
Because o f the Lack o f Interest i n Buddhist Economi cs),
I l a i m j j u d u f l ( wv ma t n i i mi f l Bl r t n) M' ul ani t hi Thammasant i
( Phut thasathan Santi -asok) . ( Bei ng a parti al transl ati on of E.F.
Schumacher s Small is Beaut i f ul ) . Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .
( 5) <8f) ni nmi YI U Ch i t Phi banthaen.
" ? ua s ^ i m v a vj vra vn ann -a,f c k iwit Lae Ngan Kh'orng
t i
Phutthathat Phi kkhu (The Li f e and Work o f Buddhadasa
Bhi kkhu). 3Ui ' i mJ Si l apabanakan. Bangkok. 2520 ( 1977).
( 6) EN Du s a d l Angsumet hangkun.
:
' T} l an phut t hai hat Ka P
i *** a
Kan-pati rup Sasana" ( " Buddhadasa and Rel i gi ous Ref or m" ) , in
t
PltUtn ) JJJfi 'IT Pl'lfiiU'') IVIIElO'iy WaHi"! Khanakammak an Sasana
i t
Phya Kan- phat ana. " 1JM Vnf i f Ui mi Jl/1 ViU"
Phutthathat Kap
Khon Run- mai ( Buddhadasa and the New Generati on).
ani thi Korriol Khi mt horng.
Bangkok, 2526 ( 1983) , pp. 242-270.
( ) ( Wa f l T) IWK f l f HJ JUU*' ( I^hol - Tr i ) D e t Tul awant hana.
1 1 *
" l iau 1, wan 8 lJjrnnyluniySninifUMPttaTn
*lvit1>3linilllV)H Ri an Phutthasasana Yang Panyachon
Lem 1, Lak 8 Prakan Nai Kan-syksd Phutthasasana Hai Thyng
Kaen Thae ( Study Buddhism Like an I ntel l ectual , Book 1, Eight
Pri nci pl es i n Studying Buddhism so as to Reach the Core
[Teachi ngs] ). Bori sat Thai I.E. Bangkok. 2526 (1983) .
( 8) UCUU l i Jf i ' Uf U B u n m i Met hangkun.
( 0 -
V\ t i l
" I flVIUViiVl'fi VH3 I TEN 1?]') IflJJ 1 T ' o Than Phutthathat
1
Ryang Cit-wang - Lem i ( Cr i t i ci sms o f Buddhadasa on the
Mat t er o f Ci t - wang Book i ) .
*
Qgf tni JWVi ni f l NVf f i Pf ttf i n BflfiTJJJlJmifi Ongkan Phi thak
1 31
Phutt hasasana Aphi t ham Mul ani thi . Bangkok. 2522 ( 1979) .
V f t I
( i i ) . i v n m - i a) J 2"
To Than Phutthathat Ryang Avitcha Lae Phi-sang-thewada - Lem
2 ( Cri t i ci sms o f Buddhadasa on the Matt er o f Spiri ts and
Celestial Beings - Book 2). J J JJiJQliU Aphi tham
Mul ani thi . Bangkok. 2523 ( 1980) .
f i nHJVha' l UWVI5 H' l Ql l ")n " Phi ksu Phi l Thaml ay Phutthasasana"
"1ii y
( " T h e Monk Who is Dest royi ng Buddhi sm" ) . in
r r
ft Till PI Anan Senakhan ( ec0-
MKlSlBTJ Ul l l Jtl U Khamsorn D'iarathi ( Hereti cal Teachings).
r r
Nf tnni Wvi nHWVrapnf i l i n f t f bnJJJJf i ' K Ongk' an Phi thak
1 SJ
Phutt hasasana Aphi t ham Mul ani thi . Bangkok. 2522 (1979).
pp. 90-100.
( 9) ( 7\IT r ) l l J r ^ n i j ^ ui i uul u ( Phra) P r a c h a Pasannathammo.
, 1 ! I I t
( i ) . ( t rans) " i J . ^ ] v n ? mi v Nn i ? mi f t u 1aua - n y T . p j u * *
Pati han Haeng Kan-tyn-yu Samoe - Khu- my
Samrap Khon- num- saw Thi Patibatkan Nai Sangkhom ( The
Mi racl e o f Perpetual Wakefulness - A Handbook f or the Practice
o f Samadhi For Youth Who are Acti ve i n Society). ( Bei ng the
tranl sati on i nto Thai of Thi ch Nhat Il anh, The Mi racl e o f Being
Awake - A Manual on Medi tati on f or the Use o f Young
Act i vi st s, trans. Mobi Quynh Hoa, ed. Ji m Forest, Sathirakoses-
Nagapradi pa Foundati on, Bangkok, 2517 ( 1974) . ) . 6th printing.
Nf l Usl ni l f i Pi l JVl tU Mul ani t hi Komon Khi mt horng. Bangkok.
2526 ( 1983) .
310
(ii).
v I
;iii).
" l a nl ' J I JJB' f t mr f i t n Vinii-wm Vi na" Lau-wai Mya
Wai Sonthaya - Atach' iwaprawat Khorng Than Phutthathat
( Reflecti ons f r om the Twil ight Years - Autobiography o f
Buddhadasa). Mul ani t hi Komon
Khi mt horng. Bangkok. 2528 ( 1985) .
i t j
" ml n h p i n u f i i j i j - & Nak-khi t
Ruam-samay - Nai Khl yan Khwam- khi t An Sap-son ( Four
Contemporary Thi nkers - I n Waves o f Confused Thought) .
l ViuliQ T TCU Samnak-phi m Thi anwan. Bangkok. 2526
( 1983) .
( 10)1111 n \ l ? z p un Congprasoet.
' * 4 J
(i)(ed). "f nnf i nny - wvraYwuin* i t b >j muntnnl j i J j t ^r r a^n n ^ frjwvmijTav)
^ 1 1 I V t ' 1
pj o x x u a s i u u u v i j u l f l t w i ^ Taj n n t r t o j T.T^d l i r j v i ^b u ^
Tamra Du Pln'ksu - Phutthaphot Bang Ryang An K' iaw-kap
Praphryt Khorng Phi ksu Syng Phutthabori sat Khuan Rii Lae
Phoey-phrae Phya Song-soem Pati bat-tham Hat Sarnrit-phon ( A
Textbook f or Observing Monks - Comments o f the Buddha
Concerni ng the Behavi our o f Monks, Which Buddhists Should
Know and Propagate f or Promoti ng the Successful Practice o f the
. ^ M
Dhamma) . f l ^ n V \ U > J ? l l ) 5 J J U! Ui n Sarnnak-nangsy Thammabucha.
Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .
' ^
( 11) ( ed) . " r n v i r J z v n ' u n . j . t . p i n q v i ? i i y n I j j *h n i l v n t i v j w i v n a n n ' a 1 m ? N
Wiwatha Rawang M. R. W. Khykri t Pramot Kap
Than Phutthathat Phi kkhu Nai Ryang Cit-wang ( A Debate
Between M. R. Khukri t Pramot and the Reverend Buddhadasa
Bhi kkhu on the Matter o f Ci t-wang).
311
(i ii).(ed)
( 11) ( m r
P).
f l ^f t f nnJuvt on SWVi SPhf l i n Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
ii i
Samut Prakan Thai l and. 2518 ( 1975) .
' ' t l i l JCJfl Arai Thick Arai Phi t (What is Correct and
v
What is Wrong). Pin "1JTffllVlVI J Z VIVI'S f i l f l i n Ongkan Fyn-f u
ii n
Phra Phutthasasana. Bangkok, 2525 ( 1982) .
WVUJl/nfl ( nn-a) ( Phra) Phutthathat ( Phi kkhu) .
* * n u n K ' a n - n g a n
Khwam-kau-na ( Working is Progress I t sel f ) .
Thammabucha. Bangkok. 2521 ( 1978) .
Khi j Tua
Samnak-nangsy
: )
( i i i ) . ( t rans)
V I
" h ' ) U V U J QU L l f l I UnJ^Ti" Khw' am- suk Tfiae M i Yu The Nai
I 51
Ngan ( True Happiness Exi sts Onl y i n Work).
f f l l l n f t l ' t j ' B J T ^ Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2521 (1978) .
Hft*Tlll<3EI'0f l ' w l l l Khamsorn Khorng Huang Po ( The
Teachings o f Huang Po). ( Bei ng the transl ati on i nto Thai of John
Bl of el d, The Zen Teachings o f Huang Po - On the Transmi ssi on
o f Mi n d , Grove Press, New York, 1958.).
ff^linWlKl 'cf'Q'BJ J UD1H Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2520 ( 1977) .
(i v).
( Teachings
MPnf l BUCJU^ f l Th 1H Khams' orn Phu Buat - Phak i
f or the Ordained - Part l ) .
Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok.
u
2524 ( 1981) .
t f ni i nvi i Kaf re j r uu^n
n
312
n?JJ m Tfill) J JU" Kharawat-tham [The Layperson' s Dhamma) .
f l ni i nVl l SSBI j yyj JU^n Samnak-nangs' y Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2525 ( 1982) .
( -\ V \ I
( v 1) ** I ** >> s ** 4 '1
v "^mJisnaay - *^ni ?iul ivi - l y ? M
Cit-praphats' orn - Cit-doem-thae - Cit-wang: Myan-kan Ry
Yang-rai ? ( Prabhassara-rnind - Ori gi nal - t rue- mi nd - Freed-mind:
Ar e They the Same?). tf tl l nVl l f t f i W I y U i m Samnak-nangsy
Thammabucha. Bangkok. 2517 ( 1974) .
( v) -
( vi i ) .
( vi i i ) .
(ix).
( x) .
" fl 1 J Cut - m' ay Khorng Kan-syksa ( The Goals
o f Educati on) . t hWHW SOI I JUl j B'1
Samnak-nangsy
Thammabucha. Bangkok. 2522 ( 1979) .
i
" SmWVf f i VlflUBU IUl i Pl I afl Mft" c h -aw p hut Th{ Dl Ybrm Pen
Khr i t Thi Di ( A Good Buddhist is Natural l y a Good Chri sti an) .
^Ti f l Wl Tj ^' Dl i y yUU' S' l Samnak- nangs' y Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2523 ( 1980) .
n fl'i' J PIT VI l MTi5 y yUn Dii ang Td Thi Hen Tham ( The Eye That Sees
Dhamma) . $ ' Win VIH'J Lift'S J J 'l Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha.
Bangkok. 2511 ( 1968) .
" I fin' V' vn J 5" JJ" Tekitcakam ( Tekiccakamma).
Ii y y UVmi Uat i U Thammat han Mul ani thi . Chai ya Thai l and. 2519
u J
( 1976) .
313
" iititNrnyiiumlun'a 50 5 narnQiTfiJ'wvi-euri^vi1*
( xi i ) .
( xi i i ) .
( xi v) .
( X V . )
Thalaengkan Suan Mok 50 Pi Lae Kot-bat Phutthabonsat
( Communi que on the Fi f t i et h Anniversary o f Suan Mok and
Buddhist Charter). ffo\inVUJYilj<II mv/1 1 Samnak-phi m
Sukkhaphap-cai . Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .
" 1i J yUSfilJfl tH' D' 311 Thamma Kap Kan-myang ( Dhamma and
Pol i t i cs). UT JUVnUiJftUl] Thammat han Mul ani thi . Chai ya
3J
Thai l and, 2522 ( 1979) .
1/ ' V i
" f l y ^ S f U j i a n ^ r l l J f 11Uf ni l f l W? t l l i J?n Thamma Kap Lok Ca Pai
Diiaykan Dai Ry Map. ( Can Dhamma and the World Get Along
Together7. ) . J Samnak-nangsy
Thammabi i cha. Bangkok. 2521 ( 1978) ,
11U T J US i l i ^ miztfWBITl 0 T I iJ'Qv] " Thamma Nai Thana Latthi
Kan- myang ( Dhamma as a Pol i ti cal Ideology).
"d'DU J JUU5]} n Samnak-nangsy Thammabi i cha. Bangkok.
2521 ( 1978) .
"f yyuiJynuu Iu?n^nyTurny u azunnny lum"
Thamma Prap Phi Nai Tua Kharatchakan Lae Nak-kan-myang
( Dhamma Eradicates Ghosts i n Public Servants and Pol i ti ci ans) .
'B-OPl fl l yvfl i Yl wy SYVVrD Ongk' an Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
v 1
Samut Prakan. no year of publ i cati on gi ven.
(xvi).
314
"fjjjjn^ipijjuuuiiuu lufrjm? nib fiajuLi^innuvidniiv\N3vin
Thammi k Sangkhomni yom Baep Phadetkan Ry Sangkhomni yom
Tam Lak Haeng Sasana Thuk Sasana ( A Di ct arori al Style o f
Dhammi c Soci al i sm, or Soci al i sm i n Accord with the Pri nci pl es
o f Every Rel i gi on). fifa'UnWli'J T S' JJLI6!} 1 Samnak-nangsy
( xvi i ) .
( x v i i f
( x i x;
(xxi).
Thammabucha. Bangkok. 2517 ( 1974) .
"UVyVn' U Ni pphan [Nibbana) .
Blf J TUU^n Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok,
u
2524 r 1981).
u J TJ4M Ni pph' an N'ork Khamph' i Aphi tham
( Nibbana Outside o f the Abhidhamrna Scri ptures) .
'B'J 'Plfl 1 JTflinWT SYJViU Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
ii i j
Samut Prakan. no publ i cati on date gi ven.
V V
" i l w r a v m f i j S A l kunvi f a " N i PPh 'an Phon Samay Pai Ry ( I s
Nibbana Ol d Fashioned?). Plfl' lST/iitlTAlVIT SlAj MB Ongkan
Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana, Samut Prakan. 2508 ( 1965) .
* 1 tlH IS' UVn^' Ill1 AVit Wattasongsan Al i Ni pphan ( I n
Vattsamsara There is Nibbana).
V5iTn3ABU XJ IJU'S 'I Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok.
u
2524 ( 1981) .
H1JJU5 5 JJJ" Bararnatham ( Paramadhamma) .
^UTl Wl JY^' f l f nWl ' V Samnak- phi m Sukhaphap-cai . Bangkok. 2525
n
(1982).
315
( xxi i ) .
( xxi i i ) .
( xxi v) .
xxv) .
( xxvi ) .
( xxvi i ) .
( x xv i i i ) .
Lfl Bl i 11 Buat Sam Dyan ( Ordai n For Three Months) .
fTnilnVSlI^ 5" J JJU*0^ Samnak-nangs' y Thammabucha. Bangkok.
11
2525 ( 1982) .
v u '
" l ni l f l l U' l?!' ) J JPl M Bun - Ba Sawan ( Mad Over Mer i t -
, J f v
Mad Over Heaven). * * H01 1 ^ * 1 tYSVIf f n m n
Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra
Phutthasasana. Samut Prakan. 2518 ( 1975) .
" l l f p^f i Ul l UnWnnVJ T S I Bi H " Pati tcasamupap' at Cak Phra Ot
( Paticcasamuppada i n the Buddha's Words).
Thammat han Mul ani thi . Chai ya. 2524 ( 1981) .
n
" T 4 W5" Q 1 Phi Mi Ci ng Ry Mai ( Are Ghosts Real?).
a>j fin nTY?uvtoT sTi vrcpnmn Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
n t
Samut Prakan. 2522 ( 1979) .
v
11 TAl Yfl T } VH ^ lJ 5" S'ff'lTilJ i f l U" Fa-s' ang Thang Prachathipatai
(.Democrati c Dawni ng) . ^' ' l l i nVi l N ^' QST J JJIJ'S ^ Samnak-nangsy
Thammabucha. Bangkok. 2528 ( 1985) .
*
lUQH T JUflT'Q' J L^l V Mya Tham Khrorng Lok ( When Dhamma
Governs the World). ^ ^ T UVnilJJflTili Thammat han Mul ani thi .
Chai ya. 2522 ( 1979).
t V t v
" l u I a nl ^ n i v m s l j j i m i m I JU" Mal Khaucai Sasana
XXI X
( xxx) .
( xxxi ) . ( t rans/
( xxxi i ) .
Phror Mai Ri i Phasa-tham ( Not Understanding Rel i gi on Because
o f not Understanding Phasa-tham).
'EMPlfl 'ITTf'UYllViy YJV)!I Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
Samut Prakan. no publ i cati on date gi ven.

" 13J3Jf i rt Mai M i Sasana ( There is no Rel i gi on) .

Jl i l l U' l Samnak-nangsy Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2517 ( 1974) .
i
" ^ n CJn^Uni ! l^JJ 1" Wi t h' i Fyk Samath' i-wipats ana -
Lem i ( The Method o f Practi si ng Samadhi -Vi pass ana - Book i ) .
YJUYii WVI1ifi/1fn4 Samnak- phi m Phutthasan. Bangkok. no
publ i cati on date gi ven.
316
t
11f j f l ? u'D'O I' iUVlA' I' J 11 Silt Khorng Wey Lang ( The Sutra o f
d
Wei - l ang) . ( Bei ng the transl ati on i nto Thai of Wang Mou- l am
( trans. ) . The Sutra o f Wei Lang ( or Hui Neng), Chri stmas
Humphri es ( ed) , no publ i sher gi ven, West port Conn. , 1973.).
Samnak- nangs' y Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2520 ( 1977) .
f V I V
" vnnpi f l uui l an i -j ' QliI n" i Pak Khor muni t
51 1 U
Kh.au Md Phutthasasana Kor Yang Yu Dai ( I f Communi sm
Coynes Buddhism Can Sti l l Survi ve) ,
m i r fifuvhn Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra Phutthasasana.
ij n o j
Samut Prakan. 2517 ( 1974) .
( xxxi i i ) .
f I
" BlJfl? Jftl l VNn "IT lULUlYUJ'B T J 11" "Upasak Haeng Kan-phoey-phrae
Tha m" ( " Obst acl es to Propagat i ng Dhamma" ) . in

lJT4 Pun Congprasoet ( ec0-

I S'Fifi'DS" JCJfln Arai Th.uk Arai Phi t ( What is Correct and
, -
What is Wrong). EN f lfi SAWE Ongkan Fyn-f u Phra
Phutthasasana. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) . pp. 8-71.
( xxxi v) .
HiTE J JJJPl'Q'Elt I T " Aphi t ham Khy Arai ( What is Abhi dhamma?) .
Samnak-nangs' y Thammabucha. Bangkok.
2517 (1974) .
( xxxv) .
I J PlViWl] T 5" U Osaretapphatham [Osaretabbadhamma).
5 I J Thammat han Mul ani thi . Chai ya Thai l and. 2525
( 1982) .
( 12) ( ) ? ^VIUYIJJU ( Phra) R a t c h a n a n t h a mu n l .
i *
"YYVffiVnflfliBlplT - Phutthath' at Khy Khr ai -
Than Tham Arai [ Who is Buddhadasa? What l i as l i e Done?).
I n I Tt mVj VnmJU i h R' ong- r' i an Phut t hat ham
Wat Chonprathanrangsi t. Nonthaburi Thai l and. 2525 ( 1982) .
( 13) o u r ) j w j t j j u ( p} i ra) R a t c h a w o r a mu n i ,
( 0-
r
JJJVIWD FlTcJflJ Photcananukrom Phutthasat ( A Di cti onary
o f Buddhism).
n j x i n n T f t n r k rom Kan-sasana
Krasuang Syksathi kan ( Depart ment of Rel i gi ous Af f ai rs, Mi ni st ry of
Educati on) . Bangkok. 2519 ( 1976) .
Oi).
;iii).
"wimnu - jSfioiuijyuiViPiui / ^uonil/pJvn wjb
1 i
l u u n r j n t f ' w u r c n f l "
*
Phutthatham Matchenathammathesana/ Matchimapatipatha. Ry
Kot Thammachat Lae Khun-kha Samrap Ch'iwit ( Buddhadhamma
Maj j henadhammadesanaj Maj j hi mapati pada Or The Laws o f
Nature and Thei r Value f or Li f e. ) .
r
U S ' n T Ui UM' H I / I U^ U Thammasat han Chul al ongkorn
Uni versi t y. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .
318
uYi VI1] fti/l VIII" Phutthas' asana Kap Sangkhom Thai
( Buddhism and Thai Society), JJtnil] Mul ani thi
Komon Khi mt hor ng. Bangkok. 2526 (1983).
' 14) 'Tolll W i n a y Si vakun,
ii .
Ci t - cai Khy Arai ( What is the Mi nd?).
QJTS 3" JJJUtil' S Aphi t ham Mul ani thi . Bangkok. 2525 (1982).
ft rnifHVIVill VI' ltl" " Phasa Phut t hat hat " ( " Buddhadasa s Language" ) .
1
r * <4 *
in Qll'Ufl I $t l /1rl l S Anan Senakhan. " PHu' Dll IflU 5*^lLIn Khamsbrn
D' iarathi ( Hereti cal Teachings).
r ^ * s ^ ^
Q^JPimJVJVinPlWVIfPinflin Ongkan Phi thak
Phutt hasasana Aphi t ham Mul ani t hi . Bangkok. 2522 (1979).
p p . 1 0 1 - 1 2 2 .
( 15) W i s i t Wangwi nyu.
* f
Vi ni l VJV12Vi n^mj l f i Tl ^H/l f l J <i jn0VJm' " T h a n Phutt hathat Kap
Setthasat Chaw Phut " ( " Buddhadasa and Buddhi st Economi cs" ) , in
i
PlPiS n 3 J Un Fin 'citn LYJftfl n JVi iU'1 Khanakammak an Sasana
t
Phya Kan-phatana. VIVl'ffV'IJjnUPlll Jl AwU" Phutthathat Kap
Khon Run- mai ( Buddhadasa and the New Generati on) .
Ln UflflUVl'Q'l Mul ani thi Komon Khi mt horng. Bangkok.
u
2526 (1983). pp.28-53.
- *
( 16) m m h f n u Sul ak Si warak.
(0-

MMiTVD'J ViT I Khan-chdrng Sorng Phra ( Refl ecti ons on the

Monkhood) . ff'yufiVUJVll V)U Samnak-phi m Lay-sy Thai .
Bangkok. 2522 ( 1979).
"wvravifius i^-Qnn vs^iM
i
Phuttha-thatsana Phya Kan-sang-san Sangkhom Mai ( A Buddhist
Vision f or Renewing Society). Jl'UlVIUYil LVlUli^ S' TtU Samnak-phi m
Thi an-wan. Bangkok. 2526 (1983) .
( 17) M i Jrcnpuj nvi s u c h i p Panyanuphap.
,lYUsl f l l 3pf l f f ' Wi nJl JT Phratrai pidok Samrap Prachachon
[The Ti pitaka For the Common Man) . 6th pri nti ng.
fl TUfl VOM T ^)ti n Vti n^U Samnak-phi m Mahamakut
Rat chawi t hayal ay. Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) .

(18)ia? VNfWPI Ser i Pho ngphi t. "iTJ UfUiniJ - muwvif vnatuijft nut ViU"
" Thamma Kap Kan- myang: Than Phut thathat Kap Sangkhom
Thai " ( " Dha mma and Pol i ti cs: Buddhadasa and Thai Soci et y" ) , in
Pl WsnJTUnni PSI Sl l i ni VI Bnnni Ji i l i n Khanakammak' an Sasana
Phya Kan- phatana. " V m i p v n a l u v i f i u r w W 1 n i - Thhn
Phutthathat ATai Thatsana Khorng Nak-wicliakan ( Buddhadasa in
the View o f Academi cs) . Bangkok. 2525 ( 1982) . pp. 33-88.
c
( 19) BMl f l I t f l i W I f i A n a n Senakhan.
(OH)-
LflLlTtlll11 Khamsorn Diarath' i ( Heretical Teachings).
Ongk an Phi thak
Phutthasasana Aphi t ham Mul ani thi . Bangkok. 2522 (1979).
320
1 D
( n) .
Phothi rak - Satsada Mahaphay
(.Bodhiraks'a - The Hi ghl y Dangerous Prophet).
tH'SiTi fi5 f}ft'"lYliS" Ni wat Si sathaphorn. Bangkok. 2525 (1982) .
( 20) ^ ^ A r u n Wet chasuwan.
(*)
11 JJn<3l l f m^' 3Uu Suan Mok Daen Sarigop ( Suan Mo k,
The Peaceful Land) . 11 T nl VilH Samnak-phi m Phrae
Phi t haya. Bangkok. 2524 ( 1981) .
(i i ) .
" f i bl l l j j n' f l - l ^i ni t a r mr SVnf i f l f Vi ]'1 S' uan Mok - Myang
Chaiya Lae Phutthathat Phikk.hu ( Suan Mok, Chaiya and
Buddhadasa Bl ukkhu) . 3rd pri nti ng.
fhUflViUVJ l i wi wvi un Samnak-phi m Phrae Phi thaya. Bangkok.
2524 (1981) .
( 21) t m u r Snj l v i U A r a y a Ni kornthai .
" f l Yl t f f nf i i nVn l l W n w n j P l u l VHJUJB" Phutt has asan a Campen
i
Samrap Khon Thai R y '' ( " I s Buddhi sm Necessary for Thai s?" ) ,
f rom the newspaper 111)1-0fl' Dfl J ' l i n i l " Bangkork Raywan ( Bangkok
Dai l y) , ^ 14VI 15 2/+90 15th January 1947. repri nted in
ETUI Arun Wet chasuwan.
y \
" Eh 111JOT - IIJBnJ l ^ J L I m i a S ' W V i ' S Suan Mok - Myang
Chaiya Lae Phutthathat Phi kkhu ( Suan Mok, Chaiya and
Buddhadasa Bhi kkhu) . 3rd pri nti ng.

fiTUflYJ 14711 IIVI3"711VIU1 Samnak- phi m Phrae Phi thaya. Bangkok.

2524 (1981) . pp. 291-296.