SEC. 22.

EX POST FACTO LAW

I.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. HON. ANTONIO M. EUGENIO, JR.
[G.R. 174629. February 14, 2008.]

FACTS:
After the ruling in the Agan v. PIATCO case, a series of
investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to
Philippine International Air Terminals Company Inc. (PIATCO) were
undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation
Staff (CIS) of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC).
The Office of the Solicitor General requested the AMLCs
assistance in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the
financial trail of corruption surrounding the NAIA 3 project. An
intelligence database search on certain individuals involved in the
award including Pantaleon Alvarez, the Chairman of the Pre-
Qualification Bids and Awards Technical Committee was conducted by
the CIS wherein by the time they found out that Alvarez was already
charged by the Ombudsman of violation of Section 3(j) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that Alvarez
maintained 8 bank accounts in 6 different banks.
The Anti-Money Laundering Committee issued a resolution which
authorizes its Executive Director to sign and verify an application to
inquire into the bank deposits or investments of Alvarez and the other
members of the award Technical Committee. The resolution was
founded on the findings of CIS that amounts were transferred from
Hongkong bank account to bank account in the Philippines maintained
by the respondents. The Makati RTC rendered an Order which granted
the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank
accounts of Alvarez.
In response to the letter of a Special Prosecutor, AMLC again
issued a resolution authorizing its Executive Director to do an inquiry
and examine the accounts of Alvarez as well the PIATCO and other
entities involved in the nullified contract. AMLC then filed an
application before Manila RTC to inquire into the accounts alleged as
having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project. The ex
parte application was granted and Manila RTC issued a bank inquiry
order. Alvarez after having knowledge of the order issued by Manila
RTC argued that there is no provision in the AMLC which authorizes
AMLC to seek authority to inquire in bank accounts ex parte.
After several motions, manifestations, orders and resolution, the
matter went up the Supreme Court with Alvarezs et. al position that
AMLA, being a substantive penal statute has no retroactive effect and
bank inquiry order could not apply to deposits or investments made
prior to the effectivity of AMLA on October 17, 2001. The subject bank
accounts were opened in 1989 to 1990 could not be the subject of a bank
inquiry order without violating Section 22 of the Bill of Right on ex post
facto laws.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies
to Section 11 of the Anti- Money Laundering Act (a provision which
does not provide penal sanction but which merely authorizes the
inspection of suspect accounts and deposits.)

RULING:
Yes. This is because no person may be prosecuted under the penal
provisions of the AMLA for the acts committed prior to the enactment of
the law (October 17, 2001). Regarding the authority to inspect, it
should be noted that in this jurisdiction the Supreme Court defined an
ex post facto as one that deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction of acquittal, or proclamation or
amnesty.


II.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

FACTS:




ISSUE:



RULING:

No.



III.

Mejia vs. Pamaran
GRs L-56741-42, 15 April 1988

(see Bernie guerrero PDF)

IV.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974


Facts
Respondent appealed from the judgment of the MTC Batangas finding him guilty of the crime of Illegal
Possession of Firearm and Ammunition he contested the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive
application of the ruling in People v. Mapa.

Respondent was appointed as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Respondent alleged that at the time of his appointments the prevailing doctrines are Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine.

In Macarandang it was held that"peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms.
While Lucero doctrine provides that the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a
necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion commander and must be deemed incident to or
necessarily included in the duty and power of said military commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.

Respondent and OSG alleged that the decision held in Mapa Case is of no applicability in this case

Issue



Ruling
The SC held that the decision in People v. Mapa reversing the Macarandang and Lucero doctrines came only in
1967, it has no proper application in this case.

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system in
the Philippines.

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the
land, at the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he was arraigned by
the trial court.

It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Petitioner incurred no criminal liability at the time of the commission of the crime since the prevailing doctrine
then were the doctrines of Macarandang and Lucero

V.

BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984]


Facts:
Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100
counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the
Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement
as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to
the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from
the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teachers camp
in Baguio Cityfor the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA
checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teachers camp resulting
in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were
filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo
Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together
with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed
against them.

On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA
3019.

Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional
guarantee against an ex post facto law.

Held:
The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as
amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime
of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes
subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from
public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates
the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto
law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office
during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty
because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the
official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And
does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is
currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is
charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under
a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon
the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The
use of the word office applies to any office which the officer charged
may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was
charged.
VI.
People vs. Sandiganbayan
GR 101724, 3 July 1992

FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:

(Bernie guerror pdf file)