der Gesollschaftssplele, TRODUCTI + The present reper 1s concerned vith the following question wroblem 1s vell known, and there 19 handily a situal daily 0 which this problem does not enter. Yet, the meaning s question is not unambiguous. For, as as n> isa gene of strategy in the proper sense), the fate of each player depends not only on his ovn actions but also on those of the others, ar 2 Pa eeratestlcatel| ty: the! aus’ sel¢iali dniano feleatetiontc firet playe that th Hence we must first endeav ind a clear formlat Peer neat veckaiy® aoe a a Pe things cone under this heading, anything dette to chess, fror ait he 1. he are acting of their ovn free will) - may be regarded as a game of strategy 1 | ne looks at the effect it has on the participants.° What ent do all these things have in commont ' A shortened version of this paper has been presented to Yathemat le: jociety on Decenber 7, This 1s the principal probleg of classical economies: ho lutely selfish "homo econonicus act under given ex cumstances?e2u other ("earlier") eventa at the tine vhen he makes his decision. By ys after the outcome of js hor tse ring this somevha ‘tative explanation into a ecise form. ‘The definition of ye of strategy would then be the ae ee re AC ai etl na oe nt the game Sura @ or "arav ending on chance, vidual players must be te c » 2p seep 8+) We the results, for short, y be: ' : ‘or each "draw whe probabilitiesA : Ph See f events must be 5} ; : he numbers b results, "draws and steps! 1fted of whose outcone the » th } eae aetna fakealiris aseta ts concerning mese s A11 othe: all "e au non pat this whole scheae be consistent and per- a enporal-causal interpretation, there 0 ver ch of them depend: Mables which nat > he fre i J Gea ee z an be seen that in spite of this what lengthy de © dealing 1 ite eimpl or jetually, in several respects ou tion might hh