Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Case Digest
1.
In Re Summary Settlement of the Estate of Melodia Ferraris Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965 ....................................................... 3
2.
Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987 ...... 4
3.
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD, respondent G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008 ................................ 5
4.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, Cesar ALVARADO,
petitioner vs. Hon. Ramon GAVIOLA G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993 ............................................................................... 6
5.
Ruben AUSTRIA et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Andres REYES, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970 ... 7
6.
In the Matter of the summary settlement of the Estate of the decease Anacleta Abellana Lucio BALONAN, petitionerappellee vs. Eusebia ABELLANA, et al., oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960 ..................................... 8
7.
Maria Gervacio BLAS, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Rosalina SANTOS, in her capacity as Special Administratix of the
Estate of the deceased Maxima Santos, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961........................... 9
8.
Wencesla CACHO, petitioner-appellee vs. John G. UDAN and Rustico G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L19996, April 30, 1965 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 10
9.
Tedoro CANEDA, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and William CABRERA, as Special Administrator of
the Estate of Mateo Caballero, respondents. G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993 ......................................................................... 11
10. Pascual COSO, vs. Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al., G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921 .............................................. 13
11. Agapita N. CRUZ, petitioner vs. Hon. Judge Guillermo P. VILLASOR and Manuel LUGAY, respondents. G.R. No. L32213, November 26, 1973 ............................................................................................................................................................... 14
12. Paula DE LA CERNA, et al., petitioners, vs. Manuela REBACA-POTOT, et al., and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964 ............................................................................................... 15
13. Gertrudes De Los SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Maximo De La CRUZ, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-29192,
February 22, 1971............................................................................................................................................................................... 16
14. Francisca Tioco DE PAPA, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Dalisay Tongko CAMACHO, et al., defendants-appellants. G.R.
No. L-28032; September 24, 1986 ................................................................................................................................................... 17
15. Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. Aurea S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos del
Prado, defendant appellee. G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966 .......................................................................................... 18
16. In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado, Heirs of Luis DELGADO,
petitioners vs. Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA, respondents. G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006 ............................................... 19
17. Marcelina EDROSO, petitioner-appellant, vs. Pablo and Basilio SABLAN, opponent-appellees. G.R. No. 6878, September
13, 1913 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
18. Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, Francisco GAGO, petitioner, vs. Cornelio MAMUYAC, et al., opponents. G.R. No. L-26317,
January 29, 1927 ................................................................................................................................................................................ 22
19. Pedro D. H. GALLANOSA, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Ubaldo Y. ARCANGEL, et al., respondents G.R. No. L-29300; June
21, 1978 ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 23
20. Testate Estate of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap deceased Fausto E. GAN, petitioner-appellant, vs. Ildefonso YAP,
oppositor-appellee. G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858............................................................................................................... 24
21. In the Matter of the Will of Antero Mercado, deceased, Rosario GARCIA, petitioner, vs. Juliana LACUESTA, et al.,
respondents. G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951...................................................................................................................... 25
22. Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia, petitioner, vs. Hon. Conrado M. VASQUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. L-26808, March 28, 1969
............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
23. Rizalina Gabriel GONZALES, petitioner, vs. Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and Lutgarda SANTIAGO, respondents. G.R.
No. L-37453, May 25, 1979 ............................................................................................................................................................... 27
24. Beatriz L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, et al., respondents. G.R. No. L-34395,
May 19, 1981 ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 28
45. Lauro G. VIZCONDE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 120, Caloocan City and
Ramon G. NICOLAS, respondents. G.R. No. 118449, February 11, 1998 ................................................................................. 49
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the legally adopted daughter. Under
Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of
the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the adopted child
and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other
testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and whether or not such deed is valid.
If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots in question to Zenaido Aluad.
RULING:
The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioners mother) one of mortis causa, it having the following
characteristics:
1.
2.
3.
It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to
the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
That before the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad
nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
That the transfer should be void of the transferor should survive the transferee.
The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of
no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners
mother during the formers lifetime. Further the statement, anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of
them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein
donated, means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the
right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The
phrase, anyone of them who should survive is out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take
effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as
it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. It is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it
was not probated, no right to the two lots was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to Zenaido by
her last will and testament, subject to the qualification that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed
lot, the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind within the meaning of Article 808 at the time his Huling
Habilin and codicil were executed.
If so, whether or not the requirement of double-reading in said Article was complied with such that
whether or not, they were validly executed.
RULING:
Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are incapable of
reading their wills. Since the deceased was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his poor, defective, or blurred vision, there can be no other course but to
conclude that he comes within the scope of the term blind as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him,
he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instruction. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential to ascertain whether
or not Art. 808 had been complied with.
There is no evidence and Cesar does not allege that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently
made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the Huling Habilin, the day of the
execution was not the first time that the testator had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft.
Moreover, with four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that
the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents. This is especially true considering the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to
the testator.
The spirit behind that law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with
the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure authenticity of the will, the formal imperfection should be
brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account may only defeat the testators
will. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of will are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery
but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must concur:
1.
2.
3.
The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
The cause must be shown to be false; and
It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had
known the falsity of the cause.
The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in
his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of
the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The
words used in her will to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that
she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate which
largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we
could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.
The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators name must be written
by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. In this case, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta
Abellana does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Bello. There is therefore, a
failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name
be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the deceased
Anacleta Abellana must not be admitted to probate.
Whether or not the heirs of Simeon Blas and wife Marta Cruz can make any claim for the unliquidated
conjugal properties acquired during their marriage.
Whether or not Exhibit A is a valid and enforceable contract.
RULING:
The heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated conjugal
properties acquired during said first marriage because the same were already included in the mass properties
constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications made by virtue of his will.
Exhibit A appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force at the time of
the execution of such document, which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or retaining something
avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already provocation been instituted.
The agreement or promise that Maxima Santos made in Exhibit A is to hold one-half of her share in the conjugal
assets in trust for the heirs and legatees of her husband in his will, with the obligation of conveying the same to such
of his heirs or legatees as she may choose in her last will and testament. This kind of agreement pr promise is not
void.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of
descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sister can concur with the widow or
widower, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate.
Further, the death of Francisco does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former
are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his
mother, pursuant to Article 992.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit the same manner from the illegitimate child.
However, the hearing on the probate must still proceed to ascertain the rights of Cacho as testamentary heir.
Whether or not the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero is fatally defective such that
whether or not it affects the validity of the will.
Whether or not the attestation clause complies with the substantial compliance pursuant to Article 809
of the Civil Code.
RULING:
An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify that the
instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives
rd
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been observed. Under the 3
paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of which would result in the invalidity of the will,
should state:
1.
2.
3.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest and subscribe to the will in the
presence of the testator and of one another. Attestation and subscription differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause herein assailed is that while it recites that the
testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the
number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses
subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. What is then
clearly lacking, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
Whether or not an error of law affects the conclusive effect of its decision.
Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe.
RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and
testament despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of
the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). A final judgment rendered on a
petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
The probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could
not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose
interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not
then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's
lifetime. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her
death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.
Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not
exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the
only heir intestate of said Gervasia.
In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of
whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
The plaintiffs are the grandaunt and granduncles of the defendant, Dalisay. They have as a common ancestor
the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister named Romana Tioco), father of the plaintiffs and great grandfather of
Dalisay. During the lifetime of Romana, she gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco
(legitimate sister of plaintiffs). The latter died intestate survived by her husband Estacio Dizon and their two (2)
legitimate children, Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the said four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of the children in equal pro-indiviso shares. Subsequently, Balbino died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children and bu his wife (among the plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren, Faustino and Trinidad. In the
partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of Toribia but as she had
predeceased her father, the said three (3) parcesl of land devolved upon her two legitimate children, Faustino and
Trinidad in equal pro-inidiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, singled and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir, who reserved the
said property subject to a reserva troncal. When Trinidad died intestate, her rights and interests in the land were
inherited by her only child, Dalisay and not long after, Eustacio died intestate survived also by his only legitimate
child, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from Trinidad.
Dalisay also claims the other half of the said parcels of land by virtue of reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the
death of Faustino but the plaintiffs opposed such claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half proindiviso interst in said parcel of land, which was inherited by Eustacio from Faustino, or three-eights (3/8) of the said
parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino. The lower court declared that the
parties are entitled to one-half (1/2) of the seven (7) parcels of land in dispute, as reservatarios, in equal proportions.
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed.
ISSUES:
1.
2.
Whether or not all the relatives of the propositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.
Whether or not the rights of the plaintiffs are subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate
succession.
RULING:
Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be
returned, but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules of
ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the
circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on instestate succession, the plaintiffs must be
held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino (the propositus), they are
excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant, although they are related to him within the same degree as
the latter. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the propositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs would
have been excluded by the defendant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different
result should obtain simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva,
i.e., the property took a detour through an ascendant thereby govong rise to the reservation before its transmission
to the reservatario.
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs.
RULING:
1.
It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to
Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural
children.
The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her halfbrother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in
favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to
partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her
death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear
2.
Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights
only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition.
Together with Guillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceased spouses and therefore not
entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful
heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, nieces and nephews.
Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado.
The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the
children of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of
her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.
RULING:
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration (gratuitous
tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles are within the third degree of
blood relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a
valuable consideration from another descendant, or form a brother or sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and
belong to the line where the property proceeded.
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him the two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquire them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded. The trial courts ruling
that they partake of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the
rights to use and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent.
Clearly he has under an express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of
is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion,
even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of
the property, first because it is no way, either actually or constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it.
RULING:
The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties
which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her
estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees
survived the reservor. The said properties, by operation of article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six children as
reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
The reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate
nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.
Whether or not in a settlement procceding (testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle
questions of ownership.
Whether or not the petitioners present action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the five
(5) parcels of land is barred by res judicata
RULING:
Petitioners present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a general
rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. The patent reason is the probate courts
limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the
probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate proceedings as in the case at bar.
Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the causes of actions. The other action was for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Lino and Genoveca while the other one was an action for the recovery of
possession and ownership of the five (5) parcles of land. Moreover, while the CFI had jurisdiction, the same was
merely limited jurisdiction. Any pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and could still be attacked in
a separate proceeding.
Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable. Res judicata has been shown to be unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches pleaded
by private respondents are seriously disputed.
By implication of law; or
2.
3.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet
that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and
under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adrianas maid was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will
of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana
and was not done in her presence.
Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed
be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz.
The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and
declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs.
Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled to
receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so
instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.
ISSUE:
May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free
portion of the will?
RULING:
No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament;
tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture
that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be
considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must
be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present.
Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also
requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will.
Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of its execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and
the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on the
holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be
allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
RULING:
A holographic will, as provided under Article 819 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
to be witnessed.
Secundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the
formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Sefundo himself. An
intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make
an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in
itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
The document entitled, Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding
his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited
by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefore shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance
that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be
considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for
the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated, it is
settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent to take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose.
Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45 Infantry of the US Army (Philippine Scouts) married Marcelina Salvador but
they were childless. However, they reared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considred
them as parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. When Mauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans
widow, became a pensioner of the Federal Government. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and
afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier. However, he was disabled and his wife was appointed as his guardian
when he was declared an incompetent. In connection to this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a
girlfriend of Agapito) wanted also to be his guardian however the court confirmed Nenitas appointment as guardian of
Agapito.
The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named Marilyn Sy, who was delivered to Marcelina
Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used the
surname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.
Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks. She executed a notarial will which is
in English and was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to
Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will) filed a
petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. As there was no opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as
administratix and subsequently, issued two order directing the two banks to allow Marina to withdraw from the
savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring the custodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina.
Upon motion of Marina, Judge Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of the
testatrix house among whom was Nenita and to place Marina in possession thereof. Nenita was then alerted to the
existence of the testamentary proceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order
ejecting them, alleging that the decedents son Agapito was the sole heir of the deceased; that he has a daughter
named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapitos guardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedents
granddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate courts jurisdiction to issue the ejectment order. In spite of such
fact, Judge Honrado issued on order probating Marcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress.
Nenita filed in the testate case an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit opposition with counter petition
for administration and preliminary injunction reiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not
duly executed and attested; and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procured by fraud or trick. Further, that the
institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as
executrix. Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of the will and a counter-petition
which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was
also dismissed. Hence, this complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for having admitted a will, which
on its face is void.
RULING:
Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case
which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress
in the void will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance
and carelessness. A judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed in the performance of his duties that diligence,
prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.
In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of identification. The signatures of the instrumental
witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the
testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions,
especially so when the will was properly identified by the subscribing witnesses. There was no question of fraud or
substitution behind the questioned order.
Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the division of the
inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass the property which they received from him, so that the
division may be made according to law and the will of the testator. Collation is only required of compulsory heirs
succeeding with other compulsory heirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during
the lifetime of the decedent.
The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation: 1) The probate court erred in ordering the inclusion of
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding. Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of the latters compulsory
heirs; 2) As a rule, the probate court may pass upon and determine the title or ownership of a property which may or
may not be included in the estate proceedings. Such determination is provisional in character and is subject to final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. In the case at bench, however, we note that the probate court went
Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can
take cognizance of the petition for probate of Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the
testators state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws
of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas
will and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R.
CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, represented by Rogelio
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M. Lasam and Atty. Edward P. Llonillo, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80032. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan and dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint for unlawful detainer
file by the said heirs against respondent Vicenta Umengan.
The RTC decision affirmed that of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of the same city, Branch III, which had
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and directed the ejectment of respondent Vicenta
Umengan from the lot subject of litigation.
The present petition likewise seeks the reversal of the CA Resolution dated May 17, 2005 denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam.
As culled from the records, the backdrop of the present case is as follows
The lot subject of the unlawful detainer case is situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. It is the eastern half portion of
Lot No. 5427 and Lot No. 990. The first lot, Lot No. 5427 containing an area of 1,037 square meters, is covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 196. The second lot, Lot No. 990 containing an area of 118 sq m, is covered by
OCT No. 1032. These lots are registered in the names of the original owners, spouses Pedro Cuntapay and Leona
Bunagan.
In an instrument denominated as Deed of Confirmation and acknowledged before a notary public on June 14, 1979,
the heirs of the said spouses conveyed the ownership of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 in favor of their two children, Irene
Cuntapay and Isabel Cuntapay. In another instrument entitled Partition Agreement and acknowledged before a notary
public on December 28, 1979, it was agreed that the eastern half portion (subject lot) of Lots Nos. 990 and 5427 shall
belong to the heirs of Isabel Cuntapay. On the other hand, the remaining portion thereof (the west portion) shall
belong to the heirs of Irene Cuntapay. The subject lot (eastern half portion) has an area of 554 sq m.
Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan, namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo
and Maria. When Domingo Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other
children by him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
Sometime in January 2001, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second husband) filed with
the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot.
Vicenta Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband).
In their complaint, the heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of the subject lot, having inherited it
from their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through Isabel
Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta Umengan to occupy the subject
lot sometime in 1955. The latter and her husband allegedly promised that they would vacate the subject lot upon
demand. However, despite written notice and demand by the heirs of Rosendo Lasam, Vicenta Umengan allegedly
unlawfully refused to vacate the subject lot and continued to possess the same. Accordingly, the heirs of Rosendo
Lasam were constrained to institute the action for ejectment.
x x x my share 1/5 (one-fifth) of the Cuntapay heirs, bordered on the North by Sr. Elia Canapi; to the South,
by Calle Aguinaldo; to the East, by Calle P. Burgos and the West, by the late Don Luis Alonso; on the
th
property which is my share stands a house of light materials where I presently reside; this 1/5 (one-fifth)
share of my inheritance from the Cuntapays I leave to my son Rosendo Lasam and also the aforementioned
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house of light material x x x
The MTCC reasoned that the heirs of Rosendo Lasam anchored their claim over the subject lot on the last will and
testament of Isabel Cuntapay while Vicenta Umengan hinged hers on intestate succession and legal conveyances.
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4
Citing jurisprudence and Article 1080 of the Civil Code, the MTCC opined that testacy was favored and that
intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should prevail. It observed that the last will and testament
of Isabel Cuntapay was not yet probated as required by law; nonetheless, the institution of a probate proceeding was
not barred by prescription.
With the finding that the subject lot was already bequeathed by Isabel Cuntapay to Rosendo Lasam, the MTCC held
that the siblings Abdon, Sado, Rufo and Maria Turingan no longer had any share therein. Consequently, they could
not convey to Vicenta Umengan what they did not own. On the issue then of who was entitled to possession of the
subject lot, the MTCC ruled in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam as it found that Vicenta Umengans possession
thereof was by mere tolerance. The dispositive portion of the MTCC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolve[d] to order the EJECTMENT
of VICENTA T. UMENGAN and in her place INSTITUTE THE HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM.
It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the Heirs of Rosendo Lasam the sum of P500.00 pesos
representing the monthly rental of the land from August 2000 to the time this case shall have been
terminated.
Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 attorneys fees plus cost of this
litigation.
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So Ordered.
SO ORDERED.
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam sought the reconsideration thereof but their motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated May 17, 2005.
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam (petitioners) now come to the Court alleging that the CA committed reversible error in
setting aside the decision of the RTC, which had affirmed that of the MTCC, and dismissing their complaint for
unlawful detainer against respondent Vicenta Umengan.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a] will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the
testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right
can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
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proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that "[b]efore any will can have force or validity it must
be probated. To probate a will means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that
purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by law, and
13
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceeding to establish the validity of the will." Moreover,
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the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore, erroneously ruled that petitioners have a better right to
possess the subject lot on the basis of the purported last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has
not been probated. Stated in another manner, Isabel Cuntapays last will and testament, which has not been
probated, has no effect whatever and petitioners cannot claim any right thereunder.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners claim, respondent has shown a better right of possession
over the subject lot as evidenced by the deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners, the dismissal of respondents action for partition in Civil Case No. 4917 before the
RTC (Branch 3) of Tuguegarao City does not constitute res judicata on the matter of the validity of the said
conveyances or even as to the issue of the ownership of the subject lot. The order dismissing respondents action for
partition in Civil Case No. 4917 stated thus:
For resolution is a motion to dismiss based on defendants [referring to the petitioners herein] affirmative
defenses consisting inter alia in the discovery of a last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay, the original
owner of the land in dispute.
xxx
SO ORDERED.
For there to be res judicata, the following elements must be present: (1) finality of the former judgment; (2) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
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(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action. The
third requisite, i.e., that the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits, is not present between the action for
partition and the complaint a quo for unlawful detainer. As aptly observed by the CA:
Our reading of the Orders (dated June 16, 1997 and October 13, 1997) in Civil Case No. 4917 reveals that
the RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, dismissed the complaint for partition because of the discovery of
the alleged last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay. The court did not declare respondents [referring to
the petitioners herein] the owners of the disputed property. It simply ordered them to petition the court for the
allowance of the will to determine the proper legitimes of the heirs prior to any partition. Instead of filing the
appropriate petition for the probate of Isabel Cuntapays will, the respondents filed the present complaint for
unlawful detainer. Viewed from this perspective, we have no doubt that the courts Orders cited by the
respondents are not "judgments on the merits" that would result in the application of the principle of res
judicata. Where the trial court merely refrained from proceeding with the case and granted the motion to
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dismiss with some clarification without conducting a trial on the merits, there is no res judicata.
Further, it is not quite correct for petitioners to contend that the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage could
not have conveyed portions of the subject lot to respondent, as she had claimed, because until the present, it is still
covered by OCT Nos. 196 and 1032 under the names of Pedro and Leona Cuntapay. To recall, it was already agreed
by the heirs of the said spouses in a Partition Agreement dated December 28, 1979 that the subject lot would belong
to Isabel Cuntapay. The latter died leaving her six children by both marriages as heirs. Considering that her purported
last will and testament has, as yet, no force and effect for not having been probated, her six children are deemed to
be co-owners of the subject lot having their respective pro indivisoshares. The conveyances made by the children of
Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage of their respective pro indiviso shares in the subject lot to respondent are valid
because the law recognizes the substantive right of heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/coownership among the heirs. The Court had expounded the principle in this wise:
This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or
participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which comes under the
jurisdiction of the probate court.
The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the same is under administration, is based
on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions of co-ownership, further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that
each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be