Can the BangsaMoro Basic Law (BBL) succeed

where the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM) failed?
An Essay submitted by Bertrand J. Lesaca (UP-NCPAG)
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for PA 331 (Seminar on the Administration of Economic
Development) under the guidance and instruction of Prof. R. E. Miral, Jr.

The decades old conflict in Mindanao has its foundations on the differences
between how the Muslim (aka Moro) minority see their struggle as one for
independence while the catholic majority sees such struggle as a secessionist act
against an internationally recognized legitimate state (Buendia. 2006) and is therefore
duty bound to enforce and protect its national patrimony.
Indeed, even way back in 1910 when the development of the Mindanao islands
was mainly aimed at benefitting the few large and well-connected plantation owners, the
bangsamoro has shown opposition to most actions by the central government. This is
mainly due to the fact that such developments deprived the bangsamoro people (Tan.
2010) of their resources and livelihood. Land grabbing was practiced by the wealthy and
politically powerful, leaving the bangsamoro destitute in their own land.
Through the years, this social inequity has grown and a resurgence of the
BangsaMoro independence movement took shape in the early 70s. Said to be triggered
by the Jabbidah massacre in the late 60s, hostilities against the State by the
BangsaMoro started (Buendia. 2006). With the formation of the MNLF, an armed
organization that purportedly represented the desires of the bangsamoro, the violence
increased and became widespread in the region.
Despite attempts by both sides to find a solution to this conflict, peace has been
temporal and fleeting, if not totally elusive. Even with the creation of the ARMM as a
result of the Tripoli Agreement during the Marcos regime, up to the current peace
process being undertaken by the Aquino III regime, peace and prosperity in the region
remains a pipe dream to the bangsamoro.
But such pipe dream now appears to take shape and form with the formal
submission of the draft BangsaMoro Basic Law (BBL) to the Philippine congress by the
government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). What makes the BBL
different is the fact that it was a product of discussion and collaborative efforts by
recognized representatives from both sides of the conflict.

Reasons for Failure

The ARMM failed to arrive at a lasting solution to the conflict in Mindanao mainly
due to the neglect by both the central government and the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) leadership. Both actors failed to realize that Independence was at the
forefront of any Muslim movement and that as a result of the failure of the ARMM,
anything arising from the Tripoli Accord will be deemed as temporal and that the
success of any future peace initiative will necessarily call for closer relations with other
Islamic, and hopefully non-violent, States (Tan. 2010).
Additionally, the Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG)1 has outlined the
shortcomings of the ARMM as follows:

Unequal National and Regional Relationships

Weak Electoral System

Poor Access and Control of the Exploitation and Utilization of Resources

Weak Fiscal Autonomy

Low Agricultural and Industrial Yield

Land Ownership Issues

Poor Delivery and Access to Basic Public Services and Facilities

Unstable Peace and Order

Moreover, according to Dr. Samuel K. Tan2, the following are attributable to the
current state of affairs:
-

Inability of the State, through the government and its agencies, to address and meet the
basic needs of the Muslim Community.
Tendency of the Muslim Community to satisfy their aspirations from their own society
and from that of the Muslim world.
The exploitation of the Mindanao conflict by external interests for their own benefit.
Failure of the Christian sector to remove the anti-Muslim bias in both historical and state
consciousness.

1 IAG is an independent, non-partisan think tank founded in 2001. Its main goal is to promote the generation of ideas
on autonomy as an effective vehicle for peace, growth and development in the Southern Philippines. It is an
institutional partner of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in the Philippines and is located at the Alumni Center, Notre
Dame University, Cotabato City 9600.
2

Dr. SAMUEL K. TAN holds several port graduate degrees and through his works, have received numerous honors
and awards.

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The current conflict in Mindanao can be seen as a reflection of the macro and micro
socio-economic conflicts that besieges the marginalized and exploited versus the State
and its dominant sector (Tan. 2010).

Does the BBL offer a new promise?

For any intervention that would lead to lasting peace and stability in the region, the
following needs careful consideration3:
-

The current system of governance does not provide for the proper conditions that
will allow real BangsaMoro autonomy and self-rule. To the bangsamoro, it is
clear that their acceptance to any agreement will depend on how far such will be
to absolute independence where the central government or any dominant nonMuslim majority cannot have any form of influence or power over Muslim affairs
other than the symbolic requirements of sovereignty called for by law.

Since the nominal relationship of the BangsaMoro to the State lies in Foreign
Affairs, National Defense, and the Philippine Currency, there should be
appropriate BangsaMoro representation in the Philippine Senate, an
undersecretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs and in the Department of
National Defense, and a board member in the Central Bank.

To provide the BangsaMoro with real and substantial fiscal support while it
develops its local resources, important support systems and increase its
absorptive capacity for governance, the State should provide for a sustained and
graduated subsidy system.

There should be a clear definition of the status of identified Muslim communities

that are outside the BangsaMoro territory, to become extensions of the Muslim
State. As well, a proper action plan needs to be drawn up to enable these
settlements to become additional reinforcements to the States external security
system.

A perusal of the BBL reveals that this bill contains more substantive provisions to
enable real autonomy and self-rule to the BangsaMoro. The BBL, through a process of
decentralization and devolution, appears to offer more than previous attempts to a
practical and peaceful solution to the Mindanao conflict. For example, Article XII of the
draft BBL (Fiscal Autonomy) outlines all revenues from territorial resources that are to
be shared between the central government and the BangsaMoro. This was not
mentioned in previous efforts.
By learning from the mistakes of the past, such as the Tripoli Agreement and ARMM
experiment, the State as well as the BangsaMoro have moved closer toward a better
3

Tan, S. 2010. The Muslim South and Beyond. UP Press. Quezon City. Pages 59-67. DS688.M2959.97 2010
P05000031

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understanding of the situation and have realized that peace and stability can be attained
only if we all agree to come up with a realistic and acceptable accord.

Conclusion
Although the BBL is acceptable to the State and the BangsaMoro, there are still
many obstacles to hurdle before it can become Law.
There also remains a wildcard in this peace process the MNLF and other
factions that see this period as an opportunity to advance their own agendas. With other
breakaway factions, such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the BangsaMoro
Independent Freedom Fighters (BIFF), joining the bandwagon calling for an
independent State, it is very difficult to decide if such groups have a legitimate cause or
are merely jockeying for concessions that may be given by the central government just
to keep them from making trouble. Who is to say no other organized and armed Muslim
group will come out to represent the bangsamoro and profess a different agenda for the
region?
Coupled with this is the time needed by the BangsaMoro to learn and increase its
absorptive capacity for self-rule. This learning curve can be prolonged by Muslim as well
as Christian protagonists who see themselves displaced from all the action by the new
agreement. Using disruptive activities and economic positioning, these groups can
easily throw a monkey wrench to the peace efforts and may potentially create further
disunity in the region. This will make future efforts at peace difficult. The peace and
order situation might even worsen.
Peace is indeed hard to come by when generations upon generations of deceit
and oppression have been experienced and inculcated, through protraction, in the
minds of both our Muslim and Christian brothers. Distrust is difficult to overcome once it
takes root and we, as Filipinos, regardless of our religious convictions, need to get
together to settle and address our differences in order to unite and grow under one
Nation. By strengthening the bond of trust among ourselves and work together toward
Nation building, we can overcome the evil that the weakest societal link may offer. Then
we may witness lasting peace and stability capped by a truly inclusive and sustainable
economic growth for our country.

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REFERENCES

Draft BangsaMoro Basic Law. Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process.
Accessed from http://www.opapp.gov.ph/resources/draft-bangsamoro-basic-law
on November 6, 2014.
Buendia, R. 2006. The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or
Economic Conflict? In The Politics of Death: Political Violence in South East
Asia. Edited by Aurel Croissant, Sacha Kneip, and Beate Martin (Muenster and
Hamburg)
Buendia, R. (2005) 'The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines: Unresolved
national question or question of governance?' Asian Journal of Political Science,
13 (1). pp. 109-138.
Tan, S. 2010. The Muslim South and Beyond. UP Press. Quezon City. Pages 59-67.
DS688.M2959.97 2010 P05000031
Toledo. R. 2011. What Ails ARMM? A brief presented at the Asian Institute of
Management Conference Center and organized by the Institute for Autonomy and
Governance (IAG).

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