Implications for Disaster

Relief: A Study of Hurricane

Katrina
Jordan Parkhurst, Melanie Passajou-Dick, Zachary Shadomy,
Clark Streets, and Camille Tate

Abstract
Our proposal focuses on the ineffectiveness of disaster response, particularly in New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. We would like to research ways in which the response could be

improved to develop ideas and propose plans for future disaster relief. We will be focusing on
the issue from several different perspectives particularly political, environmental, and social.
Within these spheres, we will be exploring specific ideas more in depth zoning and building
laws, policies put in place after Hurricane Katrina, environmentally sustainable housing units,
and relief agency response. We hope to use these funds to create a better plan that can be
implemented in the event of a disaster and assure an improved recovery for the community.
Background/Personal Statements
Contributors
Jordan Parkhurst is a sophomore English major with a concentration in Film Studies at
Appalachian State University. She also is minoring in Judaic, Holocaust, and Peace Studies,
which helps to fuel her interest in the humane treatment of people, including victims of natural
disasters, like Hurricane Katrina. The events and questionable treatment of the victims during
and after this event are topics closely related to dehumanization and therefore caught her interest.
Zachary Shadomy is a sophomore at Appalachian State University. His area of study is
community and regional planning. His main focus on this project is the aspects of inclusionary
and free-market zoning. He hopes to analyze the effectiveness of practices in place and how
other alternative or additional measures can benefit communities in times of disaster. Zoning
regulation and roadblocks prevent action from taking place to provide refuge for those displaced
during natural disasters. He believes that manipulating zoning restrictions could help offset
homelessness and those forced to live in poor conditions.
Melanie Passajou-Dick is a first-semester sophomore studying Appropriate Technology
at Appalachian State University. The program focuses on the various social, political,
environmental, and economic impacts technology can have on society. Melanie is particularly
interested in sustainable building and the implementation of renewable energy technologies. She

hopes to examine the close relationship between human activity and the environment, especially
during times of natural disaster. The majority of disaster relief emergency housing is socially and
environmentally destructive. Melanie believes that utilizing shelters that are more sustainable
and ecologically friendly, like Michael Reynoldss Earthship designs (Custom Designs), would
provide a much safer, more hygienic and reliable haven for victims suffering from even the worst
natural disasters.
Clark Streets is a Political Science major who is also minoring in Spanish. He has been
interested in politics ever since he was a child because of his parents passion for the topic and
has decided to make it his career. He is interested in attending law school and found it
appropriate to look at the policy aspect of the FEMA housing situation after Hurricane Katrina.
He has spent a lot of time around discussions of policies and has seen first hand their
effectiveness and destructiveness, which allows him to confidently address these policies.
Camille Tate is a sophomore social work major. She is interested in the field at the macro
and micro level. So far, most of her community work has been with persons who are
impoverished and homeless in urban areas. She is interested in working with policy and
legislation in the future and hopes to improve conditions for those living in poverty.

Research Review
There are firsthand reports of the temporary living conditions during the storm that
describe the horrors of their conditions and even compare them to the situations experienced in
concentration camps (Agence). The disconnect between those in need of aid and those capable of
providing it was shockingly clear, and the quality of care was, as a result, quite low. Remedying
this through better planning would make a significant difference. Therefore, improving the

temporary housing for natural disaster victims should be of the highest importance to those
capable of helping.
Around the time of the disaster, 27.9% of New Orleans was in poverty. With many
properties having gone off the market due to damages, prices increased. In 2006 the Louisiana
state legislature decided to adopt a plan of inclusionary zoning to help increase the amount of
affordable housing. In 2007 the legislature introduced a model to be used as a template for
municipalities to use. Inclusionary zoning is often a requirement or a suggestion for property
developers to set aside a portion of units for low to moderate income households (Phillips). This
type of zoning only applies to new development, meaning that if there is no new development,
there is not an increase in affordable housing. Most of those who benefit from this zoning are
considered middle income with household incomes ranging from 80% to 100% of the median
national income (Ellickson). Those who displaced after the disaster who most need it are not
necessarily guaranteed a higher chance to receive this than someone who has a much higher
income level.
Because it is such a controversial subject, it is not surprising that a number of critics have
explored the various inadequacies of the traditional relief shelters used in times of disaster. An
article published in the 2008 issue of the Journal of Housing and the Built Environment titled
Emergency Housing in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina: An Assessment of the FEMA
Travel Trailer Program focuses specifically on the problems associated with such defective
housing plans, while a document put out by the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) goes as far to say that certain global relief programs often cause more harm than good to
the environment. Our current system is ineffective, and a new plan needs to be implemented. We
believe that if we replaced current building models with more sustainable, environmentally

friendly shelters based on the research and designs established by Earthship Biotecture (Freney
223; Simple Survival) and other pro-sustainability organizations, both the natural world and
the victims of the disaster would be better off.
When a natural disaster like Hurricane Katrina takes place FEMA or the Federal
Emergency Management Agency steps in to provide aid and support. With this said though,
there must be laws that are in place in order for them to operate. Without its ability to adapt, how
can one expect FEMA to be prepared for other situations in the future? In 1974, President Nixon
passed the Disaster Relief Act, which was supposed to solidify the presidents role and
declaration in a time of natural disaster. It was not until the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act, which was signed into law in 1988 that the Disaster Relief Act
of 1974 was amended. This new Act gave FEMA the responsibility and authority for
coordinating government-wide relief efforts (About).
FEMA spent billions of dollars creating these trailers that were supposed to provide a
suitable opportunity for people to live after having lost their homes but these trailers turned out
to be riddled with formaldehyde after an air quality test in 44 FEMA trailers (Brunker). The
worst part is that FEMA attempted to retrieve overpayments from those people benefiting the
most from the housing that was given to them. Fortunately, The Disaster Assistance Recoupment
Fairness Act (DARFA), allowed complete waivers of this debt without any consequences to be
obtained by people with an annual household income less than $90,000 as well as partial waivers
to people with higher incomes. These waivers could only be obtained if the overpayment was
FEMAs fault (which typically was the case) (Moore).
Hurricane Katrina exposed a number of issues in the emergency response coordination in
the area, beginning with the evacuation process. The Superdome, which eventually held about

20,000 residents, was designated as a refuge of last resort and did not have the supplies for the
number of people or the length of time that people stayed in the Superdome. Additionally,
federal search and rescue was not dispatched to the area until five days after the disaster had
occurred, which left many people trapped and ultimately led to more deaths (Elliot). Overall, the
social service response and coordination surrounding Hurricane Katrina was poor, costing close
to 2,000 lives and endangering many more (Hurricane Katrina). It is clear that there were great
flaws in the communication between federal agencies and local governments and attempting to
implement standardized response plans to specific regions with specific needs and backgrounds
has proven problematic (Weil). In an attempt to solve some of these issues, further research in
the relationships between local and federal agencies is required.
Statement of Need
When Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005, the city of New Orleans and the
surrounding area was filled with ill-prepared people, who were afraid of the uncertainty in their
future. The decision to place these thousands of individuals in temporary shelters, namely the
Superdome, was made in haste. Those who were relocated became numbers, figures for
government officials and responders to glance over. These people failed to recognize the others
as equally human. This is a phenomenon that is not unique to this situation, but has been
observed in many past historical events, such as the Holocaust, which was used as a measuring
stick for the conditions at the Superdome. There are descriptions from these individuals of
human waste up to their knees, riots, fires, and other inhumane conditions that indicate a lack of
concern from those in control. The horrors of events like these are very real, but also very
avoidable. For this reason, the importance of talking to those involved is imperative to form a
solution. By listening to personal experiences, we could better learn how to aid future victims.

As mentioned above, these struggles cannot be ignored. There must be acknowledgement

from the government that in order for these issues to be corrected policies must be changed.
Those willing to relay their personal experiences will be very effective in bringing to light the
issues that must be addressed. The only way to truly prevent failed recovery attempts in the
future is by changing the laws. Without policies directing FEMA there is no way to improve the
situation that was left by Katrina and improve recovery efforts in the future.
Zoning policies and regulations in these affected areas are quintessential to housing for
disaster relief and following the disaster. Without proper procedures and measures, it is difficult
to provide adequate housing for those in need. Many displaced by hurricane Katrina were forced
to leave where they live aside and were displaced across the country. Providing adequate
regulation or deregulation, depending on the effectiveness of policies in place, is important.
Additionally, it is important that government agencies interact with local agencies when
preparing for disaster and responding to aftermath. Often local agencies, such as Community
Centers, churches, and local nonprofits will have closer ties in the community that allow them to
be better able to dispense aid. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, very little communication between
these agencies was done and it left the community unprepared.
While the various social, political, and ecological issues that arise during natural
disasters may seem unrelated at first, upon further examination it is obvious that these spheres
closely intersect. Even so, one of the complications most often overlooked is the negative
impact humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, especially during the construction of
temporary housing for the victims, can have on the natural environment. Many relief plans are
usually so concerned with quickly commencing post-disaster reconstruction that they oftentimes
fail to realize that their efforts further harm an already severely damaged ecological system.

The following five areasthe safe removal of hazardous substances, appropriate

emergency waste management, sustainable water use, environmentally benign sanitation
facilities, and conservational energy consumptionare in desperate need of improvement,
because improper management of these fields adds additional stress to the environment
(Humanitarian Action and the Environment 6). If the environment is damaged further, it is
even more prone to natural disasters in the future. By visiting and interviewing both the victims
who have experienced living in FEMAs trailer units firsthand and the individuals who took part
in constructing the shelters, we will gain insight into what is truly wrong with so many disaster
relief plans, allowing us to make drastic improvements for future plans. Thoroughly examining
current inefficient building systems will help us to devise an innovative alternative housing
model that will be appropriate in any region and climate, will provide a comforting and secure
living space for its occupants, and, more importantly, will work in accordance withrather than
harmthe natural environment.

Project Description
The plan, or lack thereof, to take care of displaced individuals after Hurricane Katrina
failed. Rather than mingling directly with victims and ensuring safety and sanitation, the FEMA
agents charged with helping saw that the people were indoors and deemed that adequate. This
was not the case; there were water trucks promised that never arrived, food supplies that failed to
support the quantity of victims, and many sanitation issues. One report specifically calls attention
to the deaths that occurred in the Superdome, stating that the popular belief is that the deaths
were a result of violence, yet most were from neglect rather than overt violence (Carr). Though
incidents with violence were indeed issues as well, what with the reports of several rapes and
stabbings, it should be noted that the conditions were the real reasons for the deaths that

occurred. Even after these people died, the officials were not in touch enough to appropriately
respond; the bodies were sometimes placed in the hallways being used as bathrooms (Agence).
These issues could have been remedied easily, had a plan for this disaster been made and
executed well. Therefore, direct communication with people who have experienced the failed
disaster relief attempts and the subsequent ability to try new methods is imperative. To ensure a
better quality of life for future groups affected by disaster, there must be learning from past
survivors. By implementing a solid plan for potential disasters, as we propose to research, the
lives of millions in the future could be improved or saved. To do this, funding to travel and speak
to these people is one of the first objectives, and this goes beyond those that have been
specifically mentioned, though their insights could arguably be the most valuable. Anyone who
has been affected by a natural disaster and relied on a disaster plan that ultimately failed them
could be immeasurably useful to us. By talking to them, a better understanding of their
experiences could be obtained, and future plans could be improved.
By visiting these areas affected by hurricane Katrina, we can address the issues
concerning zoning more efficiently. By speaking with local officials and politicians in various
Gulf Coast towns, specifically, those in Louisiana due to the inclusionary zoning in place, we can
more effectively study zoning laws and layouts of various towns. Seeing first-hand how
inclusionary zoning has affected those displaced we can assess whether this policy is doing its
job, or if other actions need to be taken.
New development since the legislatures policy needs to be reviewed to see the profiles
of those living there. Statistical analyses need to be run to measure the effectiveness of the
development and the composition of the tenants, the length of the housing agreement, market
prices, along with other variables. By looking at the implications of the policy we can assess the

total effectiveness. After coming to conclusions this data will be compared to numerous studies
and analyses of the free-market zoning approach taken in Houston, Texas.
One of the worst parts about the entire situation in New Orleans was the fact that our
government seemed to be working in slow motion. We realize that in order to correct the
mistakes that were made during Hurricane Katrina we must first push to enact laws that will
combat them. This will take meeting with politicians that are willing to work in areas that we
cannot to push legislation that will better FEMA and make the agency more efficient. By
meeting with those affected and allowing them to speak out (as we already mentioned) we can
work to make the issues that FEMA worked so hard to cover up more open to the rest of the
nation. We will gather other people who understand the need to improve the policies that hurt so
many people, especially the housing situation and form rallies. FEMA got away with giving
those in need of shelter the cheapest possible living conditions and then afterwards worked to get
back as much money from the people they were supposedly helping as they could. Without
requirements for living these government agencies have total control over how much or how
little help they can give.
Temporary homes provided during disaster relief can be unreliable, with occupants
often lacking access to safe drinking water, proper sanitation facilities, and safe, secure shelters.
The trailer housing units implemented by the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina epitomize why relief shelters are so
unsuccessful, and sometimes even dangerous. According to an article published by Stephen
Verderber in the Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, the FEMA trailers were
unhygienic, too small, offered little to no privacy, failed to provide basic necessities, and were a

consistent source of chronic environmental stress (367). Such horrendous living conditions are
not only harmful to the people, but to the environment as well.
After a natural disaster, the environment is more susceptible to damage. Therefore, it is
imperative that disaster relief organizations implement shelters that do not cause further harm,
making natural disasters more prone in the future. The following are examples of humanitarian
action that can negatively impact the environment: improper management of waste, debris, and
chemicals; water contamination and over-pumping of aquifers; improper use of natural
resources, land degradation and loss of biodiversity; unsustainable building designs; and
improper land use (Humanitarian Action and the Environment 6). Unfortunately, despite the
resulting negative environmental impacts, the majority of disaster relief agencies still refuse to
change their practices.
It is crucial that emergency housing and shelters that meet the basic needs of the people
and are also environmentally friendly are developed. We want to design radically sustainable,
eco-friendly housing that utilizes renewable energy technologies can be effectively implemented
in disaster situations. However, in order to successfully develop models that are radically
sustainable, cost-effective, and relatively easy to make, we need money to extensively research
the topic. In order to gain accurate first-hand accounts of why the FEMA trailers used during
Hurricane Katrina were so ineffective in the first place, we will need to meet with those
individuals forced to live in the housing units, as well as members of disaster relief agencies who
took part in implementing the shelters. Speaking with these people while also visiting and
examining the FEMA trailers would provide us with the solid base of knowledge we would need
to develop models of our own. In addition, we will also need to interview a number of experts on
green building systems and renewable energy. Visiting both the Earthship Academy and various

Earthship communities would also be helpful. Talking to Michael Reynolds, an architect who is
credited with developing and building the first Earthship model and establishing the Earthship
Biotecture Institute would give us valuable insight into how we can implement sustainable
practices into disaster scenarios. We would also like to participate in a variety of workshops to
gain experience building various types of Earthships, especially the Simple Survival Earthship, a
model designed specifically for natural disaster relief. If given the ability to conduct this
research, we strongly believe we could develop temporary emergency housing units that are
cheap, easy to build, safe, and sustainable and that everyone will want to implement in the future.
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the city of New Orleans hurricane plan designated
three social service agencies to handle the crisis: the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and Second
Harvest. The Red Cross and the Salvation Army were to establish feeding sites across the city
while Second Harvest should provide leadership in acquiring and distributing food and water.
Unfortunately, this is not what happened in the days following the storm. The Red Cross staff
evacuated and was unable to reenter the city. This incident highlights the complications involved
in placing a few large, central agencies in charge of all recovery operations. After Hurricane
Katrina, the Red Cross was hindered by its relative lack of integration with local networks of
social welfare agencies and public and private funders. (Reckdahl) These connections with
local aid groups are essential to providing assistance in a timely manner following a disaster. Part
of this research project would include locating local agencies with deep ties to the community
and determining their ability to serve the community in the case of a disaster. Once these
agencies are located, the next step will be making connections with federal agencies. In times of
crisis, the federal agencies will be able to contact local agencies and work with them to provide
aid to the community.

Larger central agencies should make connections with smaller local agencies that may be
more capable of helping a certain population. For example, church leaders and organizations
quickly took action while residents waited on aid from the government. It was very common for
community nonprofits and faith-based organizations to step in where large federal agencies
failed. For example, in the weeks following the Hurricane, Vietnamese churches worked together
to repair homes and petition to reconnect utility services. (Weil) Larger agencies, like the Red
Cross, should establish connections with the local agencies and use them to help coordinate
responses in specific areas. Instead of one agency trying to provide aid for all areas, they would
be able to dispatch community organizations to cover specific areas.
Budget:
- Visit to New Orleans, Louisiana:
- Airfare for five- $5,000
- Accommodation for two months - $6,000
- Rental car(s) - $3,000
- Food- $2,500
- Money for organized events:
- Venues, advertising, and pamphlets - $7,200
- Visit to Earthship global headquarters in Taos, New Mexico:
- Roundtrip airfare from New Orleans, Louisiana to Albuquerque, New Mexico $2,000 for five
- Shuttle service from Albuquerque airport to Earthship Biotecture Institute in Taos,
New Mexico (roundtrip) - $100 for the five of us
- Tuition for Earthship Biotecture Academy Sessions (4 weeks of classes, labs, handson construction and tours of Earthship buildings) - $ 12,500 for all five of us
- Housing during our stay at the Earthship Academy - $2,250-$4,000 for all five of us
- Food expenses during our stay - $1,500
Total: $43,800
Conclusion-Statement of Outcomes
Through our research we intend to develop a plan for disaster response that will meet the
needs of all kinds of residents and pay attention to issues of sustainability, public policy, and
land use practices. In this proposal, we have outlined the ways in which we intend to go about

this. We would like to determine the effectiveness of our ideas through research and suggest
ideas that would save lives and property in the case of a future disaster.
The terrible housing situation is one that people will fight for. It is unethical and those
affected suffered too much from disease, violence and blatant neglect for FEMA to avoid the
policy changes that it is due for.
By researching the ineffectiveness of natural disaster relief shelters and also studying
current sustainable housing models (like Earthships), we hope to design new forms of emergency
housing that are relatively cheap, simple to build, safe, comfortable, and environmentally
friendly and that can be easily implemented during future natural disasters. Traveling and having
the opportunities to find and talk to people who experienced the horrors of Hurricane Katrina
firsthand would be invaluable. When trying to gain a better understanding of the specific aspects
that survivors found the most inadequate, their direct contributions would be more useful than
any assumptions we could make. These interviews would help us to know what to include in new
plans and how to better help people who need it.
By connecting governmental service agencies with local agencies we hope to create a
strong system of support that will address the specific political, social, and economic climate of
the region. It is our hope that this method of connecting organizations could be implemented in
other areas where disasters occur.
Municipalities poorly handled the response to want to build housing post Katrina. By
visiting areas in Louisiana to determine the effectiveness of inclusionary zoning put in place after
the disaster, we can decide if further measures need to be taken to provide adequate housing now
and in the future if disaster were to occur again.

It is through these methods of research that we intend to determine ways in which a

comprehensive plan can be developed and applied to communities where disasters have
occurred.

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