Ven AVICENNA’S COMMENTARY ON THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE A Critical Study with an Annotated Translation of the Text Lhvcegnne , fg0- 1037. BY ISMAIL M. DAHIYAT M.A., Ph.D. LEIDEN E. J. BRILL —__ 19744CHAPTER TWO (POETICS, I-II]] On the Universal Ends and Universal Imitation in Poetry » x. Now let us try to express that part of the First Teaching [ie., 1 Follewing Chapter I, which serves as a brief introduction, Avicenna ”” as he modestly states, what he could understand from a treatise that bases its tenets on Greek poetry with which he was not familiar. ‘This chapter of the Commentary covers the first three chapters of the Poetics (I-11), combining summary with interpretation as is the case with Avicenna’s general method throughout his Commentary. As its title indicates, this chapter is devoted to a consideration of imitation and of poetry as a species of imitation from a deductive and generic (“universal”) viewpoint. Avicenna’s grouping of the first three chapters of the Poetics into one chapter is certainly a valid interpretative judgement which is borne out by the fact that they do form a coherent sub-unit dealing essentially with “universal” principles about imitation in general and the poctic art as imitation, ‘The three aspects of imitation which serve as differentiae among the various “imitative activities” are its means or media, “‘objects,” and manner or mode of presentation. The first differentia, namely, the means of imitation, include three things which are common, separately or in combination, to poetry, music and dance. These are tone (Jan), speech (“when it is imaginative and imitative”) and measure (wazn). It is evident in the Commentary that each of these three terms has two levels of meaning: one general and the other particular to each art. For example, measure (wazn) means rhythm in general but with reference to poetry it is rhythm expressed metrically (ie., poetic meter). ‘The second differentia of imitation, as Avicenna interprets it, is the teleo- logical function of imitation. In general, imitation has an ultimate rhetorical bent, for every thing, noble or ignobie, is imitated either to be made better or worse. There are, however, three possible ends of imitation: amelioration (tafistn) which Avicenna equates “in general terms” with encomium (mads, lit. “praise”), depreciation (tagbih) which is generally satire (damm), and correspondence (mufabagah), i.e., the representation of action ‘merely as it s" and “neither for amelioration nor depreciation.” This latter “category” however, considered as potentially prepared towards either encomium or satire. There is a basic premiss which Avicenna stresses in his interpretation and which underlies many of his views: Greek poetry was not devoted to the imitation of persons (dhawat) but to the imitation of actions for an undeniably thetorical and ethical purpose: ‘'to induce or prevent action.” Avicenna concurs with Aristotle’s notion that the “objects” of imitation are either noble or base. He does, however, place a marked emphasis on the ethical and rhetorical aims of imitation: amelioration of noble deeds and virtues, and depreciation of ignoble ones. A discussion of the third differentia of imitation (the manner) is missing in70 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY, the Poetics] which we are able to understand, since it mostly includes discussions of poems and descriptions peculiar and known to them [ie the Greeks]. Their acquaintance with such matters makes explanation and exposition unnecessary. As we have said? they had a fixed number of poetic kinds with definite themes—each having its particular measure. For each kind, they had certain conventions peculiar to them, just as the Arabs have conventions, e.g., the description of deserted habitation, the erotic motif, the depiction of landscape, and the like.? This should be taken for granted. L 2. As [Aristotle] said, let us now speak of poetry, its kinds and the characteristic of each kind; the principle of excellence in making likenesses and poetic fictions, i.e., imaginative utterances; and the exposition of the parts of each kind—quantitatively and qualitative- ly! Avicenna’s Commentary. Instead of a discussion of the manner of imitation in terms of the mode of presentation there is a reference to “manner” in a totally different sense: in terms of similitude, substitution (ie., “metaphor”), or the combination of both. There is no doubt that Aristotle is speaking about the manner in which the poet presents his material and not about whether similitude or metaphor is more predominant, In fairness to Avicenna, it should be emphasized that there are indications in the text which show that it is not his intention to “interpret” Aristotle in this way, On the one hand, the “place” at which Avicenna makes his trope- oriented remarks is the very beginning of his Commentary proper, preceding the discussion of the “means” of imitation; Aristotle’s cryptic statement occurs at the beginning of Chapter IIT of the Poetics. On the other hand, and judging from Abu Bishr Matta’s translation, the remarks were utterly in- comprehensible in their translated form. Avicenna, therefore, may have replaced them, as he sometimes does, by his own version of the “manner” of imitation in non-dramatic, non-narrative poetry, Thus, at the very end of Chapter II, he states that ‘The manners of imitation are three: itude, metaphor and the combination [of both]; the ends are three: amelioration, depreciation and correspondence.” 1 The “First Teaching” refers to the Aristotelian Corpus; “that part” refers to the Poetics. ® See above, I. 16. 8 The traditional Arab poem (gasidah) is exemplified by the seven “odes” which were composed by some of the major pre-Islamic Arabic poets and hung in al-ka’bah, the sacred shrine in Mecca, The “conventions” that Avicenna is referring to were structural elements in the arrangement of such poems and conventional motifs that the poet used for his own purposes. See J. A. Arberry, The Seven Odes: The First Chapter in Avabic Literature. London, 1957. © At first glance this statement may seem to be intended as a summary ofPOETICS, I-III 7 3. We say: every likeness and fiction is either by way of similitude, or by taking the thing not as it is but by way of substitution, ie, metaphor—or, still, by the combination of both. Imitation, which is natural to man, is giving the likeness of a thing, not the thing itself, such as when the natural animal is imitated by means of a form that seems natural, In a like manner, some men imitate the emotions of others, and some imitate one another.? Some of that {ie., imitation] proceeds from art, some follow practice.* Also, some of that is by action,¢ some by speech. 4. Poetry is one of the [arts] which imitate by three things: (i) melodious tone, because it has an unquestionable effect on the soul, and, furthermore, every theme has its proper tone in accordance with its eloquence or “softness,” or intermediacy, and by means of that effect, the soul itself becomes imitative of sorrow, anger, or the like; (ii) speech itself, when it is imaginative and imitative; and (iii) measure, some meters being light, others grave. 5. These three may be combined or they may be used separately. Measure and imaginative specch may be used alone.® Similarly, a melody composed of harmonious tone and rhythm may be found in flutes and lyres; a single melody which has no rhythm in it may be found in woodwind instruments which, when properly set, are not fingered. Rhythm without tone may be found in dancing; dancing, the opening paragraph of the Poetics, but the trope-oriented Avicenna gives mythos (“plot”) an interpretation befitting his views on poetry (non-dramatic, non-narrative) as expressed in the First Chapter. Two terms are used in a complementary manner—lkeness and poetic fiction (mathal wa khurafah ski’riyyah). In the following paragraph he now explains what “every likeness and fiction” means to him, and how this relates to the generic concept of imitation. 1 Two Arabic words are used to explain what “substitution” (tabdil) is: isti'@vah (“comparison”) and maja ("transfer"). Both express the varieties of “metaphor” in Arabic as it differs from similitude—the explicit juxta- position of two things as in a simile. 2 Three “species” of imitation can be deduced from these cryptic remarks: a likeness may be (s) a poctic one (by the use of similitude, metaphor or both), (2) a visual one by giving the “form” or “picture” (si#rah) of something as in painting and sculpture, and (3) a dramatic one as when “some men imitate the emotions (ahwal) of others.”” 3 The word ‘dah ("*practice” also means “habit,” “custom,” 4 The Arabic word is fit: “action,” “deed,” or perhaps “acting ® Le., poetic language that combines ‘ measure (IT. 5-6). ® These are evidently the two basic means of poetry, which is not accom- panied by music. See next paragraph: “Indeed, poetry excels by combining both imaginative speech and measure ‘imaginative representation” and72 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY however, is better performed when accompanied by the proper tone—it makes [a stronger] effect on the soul. 6. [Verbal composition] ! may be imaginative utterances in prose, or it may be in verse, but non-imaginative, being plain and artless. However, poctry excels by combining both imaginative speech and measure. Thus, the versified writings of a number of philosophers, including Socrates, were connected either with the [ele]giac tri- meter ? which is made up of fourteen syllables, or with the meter that is made up of sixteen syllables, or others. And also those writings which resemble poetry but are not really poetic, such as the versified writings of Empedocles in natural science: these share nothing with poetry except the meter. Empedocles and Homer share nothing except meter: what Empedocles wrote in verse is natural science, and what Homer composed in verse is poetry. Thus, Empedocles’ writings are not poetry, nor is a discourse that does not have one measure but rather a different measure for each part— that is not poetry, either. 7. Some people recite [poetry], singing it with a rhythmical 1 The subject of this sentence is not clear; it consists in an implied “it,” which I have interpreted, on the basis of the context, as “verbal composition.” Avicenna insists that poetry be both “imaginative” and “‘in verse.” On the basis of this view, he interprets Aristotle as distinguishing three types of “verbal composition”: (rt) imaginative prose, (2) non-imaginative verse confused with poetry because it is metrical, but not truly poetic since it lacks one of the essentials of poetry, namely, being imaginative (emotive and mimetic), and (3) true poetry which ‘combines both imaginative speech and measure.” Cf. Seymour M. Pitcher, “ ‘Epic, as 1 Here Define It,” AJP, 55 (1044), 340-353- 2 Cf. Margoliouth (Analecta, p. 81): trimetrum elegiacum. * The general consensus of modern scholars of the Poetics is, of course, opposite to what Avicenna is here ascribing to Aristotle on the basis of his (Avicenna’s) own insistence on the importance of measure (meter) to poetry. ‘This is also consistent whit his earlier assumption that the Greeks had one particular meter for each kind of poem (I. 16 & IT. 1). To mix more than one meter in the same poem is tantamount to putting the principles of natural science in verse—to be a versifier not a poet. Avicenna was perhaps misled by Aristotle's statement about Empedocles and’ thought that it “equally” applied to a “discourse” that has “a different measure for each part.” Abu Bishr Matta’s translation states: “also if a man made the imitation (hikdyah wa iashbik) by mixing all the meters, as was the practice of Chaeremon— whose Centaur was like a thapsody in all meters—we may have to call him a poet” (p. 33). Avicenna is, however, not alone in assuming a rigid adherence to the uniform use of one meter in each poem nor in interpreting Aristotle in this way (see D. L. Clark, Rhetoric and Poeiry in the Renaissance, New York, 1963; a detailed discussion of this point is included in Else, pp. 54 ff.).POETICS, 1-It 73 tone! Such was the poetry they called Dithyrambic, which, I suppose, was a type of poetry in which the virtuous in general were lauded, not a particular person or group; [the line] consisted of twenty-four syllables. Such, too, was the poetry used by the law- givers to describe the terrible end of evil souls: it seems to have been called Didactic. 8. The same was also done in Tragedy, i.c., the praise meant for a living or dead person. They used to sing it in a momentous and excellent way, starting with the mention of noble deeds and commendable traits which were attributed to an individual. If he died, they would add to the length of the poem or to its tone certain notes portraying elegy and lamentation. g. Comedy (a type of poetry in which invective is mixed with tidicule ® and irony and which is directed at an individual) is, however, different from tragedy in that tragedy may properly combine all the means of imitation including tone and verse,* but in comedy melodious intonation is improper because melody and ridicule are incompatible. 1 After the apparent digression of paragraph 6, the discussion seems to return to the means of imitation that were stated in paragraph 5, and applied to a distinction among “the imitative activities.” Four types of poetic composition are listed as examples of the combined use of all the means of imitation, Aristotle's relatively brief statement (Poetics, I. to, 1449b 23-29) is, however, expanded by Avicenna’s attempt to “explain” what the four genres supposedly mean. He takes us back to Chapter I of his Commentary (L 16) for a brief “definition” of each genre. These “definitions” (7-9), which are evidently meant as footnotes, are ultimately derived from the spurious sources mentioned in the treatise by al-Farabi. Avicenna’s procedure here is aclear example of how Chapter I influences his interpretative attempts and of how he tries to bring into his Commentary whatever was available to him that seemed to bear on the Poetics. We will see later in the Commentary how his knowledge of Aristotle's other works is brought in for the purpose of interpretation with relatively more valid results, There are no such ‘‘defini- tions” in the Arabic translation of Abu Bishr Matta which reads: “And there are some tAo use all those which were mentioned; as for example, by tone (Jabn), sweet voice and meters: the poetic art of the dithyramb, of the nome (namis), of encomium (tragedy) and also of satire (comedy); they differ in that some use all (of these) with the whole, and some with the part” (p. 33) 2 The reference is perhaps to the komnos (Poetics, XII). An example of a tragedy with a substantial kommos (“lament”) would be Aeschylus’ Persians. * The word “ridicule” (faze) is understood by Avicenna as combining both spite and mockery (al-Khifibah, p. 231). 4 The Arabic word nazm ("“versc”) is distinct from shi’y (“poetry"’) in that it refers to metrical speech in general and which may or may not possess the primary poetic characteristic that Avicenna designates as “imaginative representation,”74 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY IL, 10. The aim of every imitation is either amelioration or deprecia~ tion,! for a thing is imitated either to be made better or worse. Greek poetry was generally intended for imitating actions and emotions, and nothing else. The Greeks did not primarily occupy themselves with the imitation of persons, as did the Arabs. 31. The Arabs used to compose poetry for two purposes: (i) to affect the soul by presenting a given matter that moves it in the direction of an action or emotion; and (ii) for pleasure alone—every- thing was imitated for the pleasure of its imitation. On the other hand, the Greeks intended, by means of speech, to induce or prevent action, Sometimes, they did this by means of oratory, sometimes by means of poetry. Thus, poetic imitation, as they practiced it, was confined to actions and emotions—and to persons in so far as they have those actions and emotions.? 1 The two terms “amelioration” (tapsin) and “depreciation (fagbili) are essentially rhetorical, stressing the ends of imitation more than the “agents’” represented. Accordingly, it is action itself or characters im action that constitute the “objects” (= the subject matter) of Greek poetry. This premiss is repeatedly emphasized and serves as the basis of the distinction between Arabic and Greek poetry that follows. Since every action is either noble or base some poets imitate noble action to make it even nobler (tahs7n), others imitate base action to make it even baser (éagb7h), and stili others are more concerned with the “pleasure of imitating itself” and thus imitate an.action “merely as it is” (mufabagah), ® Although this distinction is tinged with some vagueness and hesitation due to the fact that Avicenna knew at first hand only one side of the campari- son (i.¢,, Arabic poetry), it is certainly insightful and probably not far from the truth, The distinction, which brings to mind the broader one between the Classic and the Romantic or the objective and the subjective, coiisists in two main points—onc related to the purpose of poetry and the other to its subject-matter or content (of course both are integrally related to the “manner”’). According to this distinction, Arabic poetry is emotive and subjective and its end is basically pleasure and wonder; Greek poetry, on the other hand, is purposive and more objective since its end is ethical and “practical” (‘to induce or prevent action”). Accordingly, the “objects” of Arabic poetry are the “persons” (dhawat), i.e., it is concerned with the expression of the poet’s own emotion or impressions; Greek poetry is con cemed with actions and emotions, and with “persons” only in so far as they serve as agents for the representation of these (cf. Poetics, VI. 9, 14$0a 15-19). Such a differentiation, I believe, is valid in so far as it accentuates a general difference between the poctry of two cultures without ignoring exceptions and finer details, F. Gabrieli has a harsher judgement on Avicenna’s attempted distinction (and a rather distorted view of Arabic poetry): ‘In this distinction, which is Stated in a vague and imperfect manner tinged with confusion and mis- understanding, there is in nuce awareness or at least an outline of the greatPOETICS, I-I1t 75 x2. Every action is cither base or noble, Since they [the Greeks] practiced the imitation of actions, some proceeded to imitate them for pure similitude,! neither for amelioration nor depreciation. Every imitation and similitude, however, was implicitly prepared to- wards amelioration or depreciation, or, in general terms, towards encomium or invective.? Their practice was [similar to] that of the painters who painted the angel in a beautiful form and Satan in an ugly form. The same holds for those painters who tried to portray the emotions, too. For example, the Manicheans, when trying to portray the emotion of anger or mercy, give anger an ugly form and mercy, a beautiful form.* Some Greek poets aimed at the imitation of an action, portraying a mere correspondence, without ameliora- tion or depreciation. 13. It is then apparent that the categories of imitation are these three: deprecitation, amelioration and correspondence. The means [of imitation} are not plain tones and measures nor plain rhythm, but speech. Correspondence is a fixed category which may be deflected towards baseness or towards nobleness, and thus become an intended imitation. For example, if one likens the desire of an contrast between Greek poetry, especially if seen through Aristotle's eyes, and Arabic oriental poetry: the first is mythical, narrative, dramatic, excluding from its schemata the lyrical and the subjective, and the poet who speaks in the first person; the second, on the contrary, is devoid of the epic and the drama, and totally restricted to expressing feelings and images... In [Arabic poetry] the dhawat, the persons as such, occupy the primary place; not only that, but in most cases the poet is the only persona, speaking of himself. Consequently, it is not wrong to think that if one can judge according to the schemata and not according to the concrete reality of poetry which defies - every schema, the poor monochord of the Bedouin [sic] muse which can hardly express itself except through subjective lyricism will appear closer to the modern conception of art than the spiendid multiform of the Greek muse” (see his article, “Estetica e Poesia Araba, Nell’interpretazione della Poetica Aristotelica presso Avecena e Averroe,” RSO, 13 [1929-1930], 29-331, p. 302). 1 This is the third kind of imitation. In the following paragraph (13) Avicenna designates this kind as “correspondence” (mufabagah}, which is deflectable towards either amelioration (encominm) or depreciation (satire). 2 These two, encomium (mad) and satire (dkamm), are apparently the main categories and the most “primitive” divisions of poetic composition; this is also Aristotle’s view (Poetics, IV, 7, 1448b 24-27). 3 As a general practice Avicenna omits Aristotle's examples; only in this context (and in commenting on Aristotle’s famed distinction between “history” and poetry) does he introrluce his own examples. Avicenna perhaps could not have found a better example than the one he gives when referring to the Manicheans to explain his view of the dichotomy between invective and encomium; this applies to poetry as well as to painting.76 AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE COMMENTARY irascible soul to the lion’s leaping, then this would be a correspon- dence that can be deflected towards either of the two extremes. One could say “the leaping of the outrageous lion” or “the leaping of the daring lion’””—the first is intended for invective, the second for encomium. Correspondence may be transformed into either amelioration or depreciation by having something imparted to it—this is the method of’ Homer.? If left as it is it would be mere correspondence. LO 14. These three imitations are according to the three manners mentioned above—some Greek poets made mere likenesses; some, like Homer, mostly imitated noble deeds alone; and others imitated both, ie., noble and ignoble deeds, He [Aristotle] then mentioned some conventions they had. These are then the categories of imita- tion as such and what it is meant for. The manners of imitation are three: similitude, metaphor, and the combination [of both]; the ends are three: amelioration, depreciation, and correspondence. 2 A similar notion, which could be the source of paragraph 13 as a whole, veesed by Aristotle with reference to “‘the sources of encomia and invec- tive” and to how “‘counselling becomes encomium by a change of the phrase.” See Rhetoric, I. ix, 1367b 36. 3 To Avicenna, Homer is the encomiastic poet pay excellence, His references to Homer are not to be understood as based on more than Aristotle's venera- tion and repeated references to the poet. Not only did Homer “mostly imitate noble deed’ and praise them, but he also followed the “method” of encomiastic poetry as Avicenna rather inadequately expiains it in this paragraph (13). 3 The essential topic in the third chapter of Aristotle's Poetics is his brief discussion of the manner of imitation No comparable treatment of this matter is to be found in Avicenna’s statements, unless one can assume that Avicenna intended the three “manners” of figurative composition (similitude, substitution, and the combination of both) as an “interpretation” of Aristot- Je’s opening statement of Poetics, TU. In view of the fact that Avicenna attempts to be inclusive in his summiatizing and interpretative task, and in view of his trope-otiented and rhetorical approach to the treatise, it is entirely possible that he was not able to make out more than he does with Aristotle’s cryptic and controversial remarks, and that he did intend his version of the “manner” of imitation as an interpretation of Aristotle’s statement. * Cf, Margoliouth (Analecta, p. 84): ‘“Tmitationes tres sunt, Comparatio, ‘Translatio, Ambarum coniunctio; Fines tres, Ornatio, Elevatio, Congruentia.””