Best Practices: A Report on Strategies for Provision of Resources to Public Safety and Police Programs by Martin Edwin Andersen Consultant May 15, 1998IL. I. Vv. VL. ‘Table of Contents Introduction ‘Types of Police Organizations Implications of Categorization for Institutional Development U.S, Experience in Assisting Foreign Police Police Performance Attributes General Observations Applications (Law Enforcement Funding Matrix) Conclusions Bibliography1. Introduction Law enforcement agencies and governments share with their communities a frustration with the failure of traditional policing strategies to control crime. Chronically high levels of crime, widespread fear of violence and disorder, a heightened sense of personal risk, and decapitalization of the social capital of neighborhoods are balanced against budgetary constraints that preclude the possibility of addressing crime through substantial increases in the size of police forces. Moreover, the flight of citizens from cities and regions can significantly decrease the tax revenue base and thus an area's ability to address the public's concerns. (This was the experience of a number of major U.S. cities-the so-called "white flight" phenomenon-in the 1960s and 1970s, In Latin America, increasingly urban crime-especially physical threats to businessmen-is receiving greater attention from business newspapers and other trade publications and enterprises specializing in investment risk analysis.) ‘The erosion of the social and economic stability of a community adds to law enforcement's growing burden, as conditions are created in which crime can flourish. "Reactive" police forces--for example those who find an ever increasing share of its time is take up by telephone requests for service--find no time to address the underlying causes of crime, New, community based and problem oriented strategies are needed. In the best of circumstances, police reform initiatives are part of a developmental process that takes into account the overarching legal framework, identifies opportunities for organizational leadership, and creates or improves institution-wide policies. Each project should reflect critical requirements established through the creation of a baseline, (well defined goals and objectives), and include clear performance benchmarks spelled out for the design, planning and evaluation stages, Where applicable, a developmental approach focusing on institutions and practices--such as doctrine, institutionalized training curricula and standard operating procedures--is preferable to mere training programs, where numbers trained becomes the basis for measurement of success or failure, as training outside a framework of institutional development tends to have only short term, ephemeral impact on policing practices. A. developmental approach helps to increase discipline and accountability by ensuring that multiple police units are combined, and recruitment and training procedures as well as lines of authority are unified. ‘As the Bank begins to offer greater resources to programs designed to increase citizen safety and security, it can, through the development of lending criteria ("best practices") help to ensure that inappropriate models for change are not funded, resources are not wasted on institutions in and around which little or no consensus for reform exists, and abusive practices are not abetted. Strategies for change can be broken down into three basic areas of activity, each of which should be clearly delineated in funding proposals, and the first of which should form part of the documentation included in the loan request. In proposals that seek to address a system-wide change in the institution, the following describes the areas that should be addressed:Stage 1, Baseline assessment and short-term results. (Identifying and clearly defining key issues.) The first stage should include a thorough analysis of expectations and perceptions of police performance held by external and internal stakeholders (mapa politico), as well as an analysis of operational performance. By identifying and clearly defining the key issues through 1a baseline assessment, a sense of empowerment can be generated among key reform constituencies both inside the department and the community at large. Crime fighting programs/strategies might also be identified at this stage. Stage 2. New police model; initiating process of targeted initiatives of early success; operational blueprint and administrative restructuring. (The designing and detailing of how the new police department will operate.) The second stage involves creating a project design that offers a new model of policing and offers strategies for creating community support by means of programs which are quickly viewed as helping to reduce crime. ‘The new police model should address three strategies for crime fighting: specific police department programs, the community's role, and a system-wide approach, as well as define the operational and infrastructure capabilities required to sustain each of these. The new model can identify within the department unnecessary tasks and redundant and non-value-added areas that can be eliminated or reorganized to help raise expectations for change in the community, such as freeing up more officers to street patrolling (covering the "beat"). ‘The new police model should include an operational blueprint covering such issues as deployment, staffing, equipment and facilities and technology. A plan for administrative restructuring in areas such as procurement, training, recruiting, finance, planning and budgeting and maintenance can also be derived from the model. Creating the model, an operational blueprint and a plan for administrative restructuring, together with the identification of redundant and unnecessary functions and tasks carried out by the department, will provide the needed background for moving to Stage 3. Stage 3. Implementation. (Lasting results through institutional change.) The implementation phase of the project is comprised of three components: program management, pilot projects and the buy-in process by stakeholders. Program implementation is key as itis the place where theory meet practice, and where, in the last analysis, the community takes its cue about the seriousness with which police institutions are being changed to meet its needs. The Bank's sometimes uneven record in program implementation suggests that special attention be focused on this area of activity. Political changes in the region in the past decade have helped to focus this paper on the reform prospects of countries that seek to improve existing institutions, or to create new ones from existing structures (such as in the case of decentralization of authority to state and municipal governments. It is recognized, however, that some of the most important police reform efforts in the Hemisphere-in Panama, in El Salvador, and in Haiti-involved the creation of entirely new forces, separate and independent from past institutions and practices. These efforts, which are likely not to be undertaken in any of the countries in the Western Hemisphere with the exception of Cuba, came after invasion or civil insurrection, and included the drafting andpassage of laws mandating the creation of the new institutions, new curriculum, major physical infrastructure projects, vetting procedures, development of institutional policies and procedures, and the creation of specialized police units. This paper also posits the reduction and eventual disappearance of military involvement in public safety as antithetical to modern, democratic concepts of policing : IL. Types of Police Organizations Key to understanding the developmental needs of a police department is the need to correctly categorize the policing model currently in use. This facilitates the creation of an agenda for change, moving the institution from an unacceptable status quo to a more modern and efficient system of citizen protection and safety. Less modem departments are reactive in their approach to.their job, and are thus perceived as being out of touch with the community. The ‘more modern the police institution, the more likely itis for its members to view law enforcement--a mission that requires significant community participation to ensure success--as only one of their primary responsibilities. Other duties, including crime prevention and crime and fear reduction, require even greater amounts of community awareness and involvement. Placing a police force within a developmental category can itself involve hazards and imprecision. Police institutions may straddle classification systems, incorporating elements of ‘wo of more categories. And itis important to remember that police organizations are dynamic institutions, and the models for policing have changed dramatically over the past 60 years. The exercise of categorization, however, can give a more realistic view of the state of policing in a community or a country, offers an implicit roadmap upon which reform efforts can be guided, and suggests a framework for measuring the progress of those efforts (benchmarks). For the purposes of this study, five policing categories are offered: watchman, law enforcement, professional/911 response, community based and problem oriented. Watchman. At the bottom of the institutional pyramid are police forces that serve a ‘watchman function, a model whose emphasis is on maintaining order. In watchman institutions, ‘a security force mentality is pervasive and generally investigative capabilities are weak. At one level the watchman model puts the police officer in close contact with the community, as members of the force spend most of their time walking a beat and are pro-active in their duties. However, officers are unable to respond quickly to emergencies, and demands for the provision of motorized vehicles and other technological advances often create a consensus for change to a higher level of institutional development. Law enforcement. Criminal law, and the police officer's role in enforcing it, define the law enforcement model. Advocates point out that emphasis on law enforcement simplifies priorities, while critics point out that strict law enforcement is not always the most effective response in dealing with a problem, such as the strain on police resources resulting from a growing culture of drug use. ‘These also point out that traditional "911" (emergency) postures by the police result in the draining of crime-fighting resources, reduce sworn officers to reporttakers, and give them little contact with the community at large (the primary stakeholder). Dissatisfaction with this model often arises from community awareness that more is needed that simple law enforcement if public safety is to be assured. Professional model/911 Response. Operational expertise and accountability are hallmarks of this model. Control of police resources is centralized and tightly managed; with an emphasis on standard operating procedures (SOPs) and improvements in operating efficiency. Rapid police response to citizen calls for service is emphasized, and every call is answered as, quickly as possible. As in the case of the law enforcement model, the professional model is essentially a bureaucratic one based on order and procedures, and the role of the police centers around fact finding, case preparation, quick assessments/decisions, and incident driven responses. This model is considered an improvement from the law enforcement one given its improved administration and operating procedures and the public security that emanates from the understanding that "a cop is only as far away as one's telephone." Critics, however, say the model carries with it several negative tendencies, including the effective distancing of the force from the community, as officer contact with the beat is reduced; and use of control measures which, while effective, can stifle initiative and contribute to a negative working environment. In addition, a technological tool--the telephone--ends up determining how police resources are allocated and, as a result, a police culture is fostered that is reactive rather than proactive, responding to symptoms of public disorder rather than addressing underlying problems. ‘Community-based policing. One of two approaches currently considered to be best, practices in law enforcement, the model emphasizes crime prevention through a partnership between sworn officers and the community that identifies and solves problems. The 911 response is used with more discretion, with crimes against people given higher priority than crimes against property, and extra weight given to crimes having a "multiplier effect" (e.g. drugs, domestic violence). ‘The role of the police centers around community relations, rule and law enforcement, out-of-court solutions and a differential response to crime. In community based policing, the officer is viewed as a friend and his/her focus tends to be preventative in nature, rather than engendering suspicion and merely reacting to crimes already committed. Supporters of this approach point out that it fosters a pro-active police culture, engages the community by making it part of the decision making process, and is results-oriented Criticisms of the model center around the fact that its results are not immediately apparent--thus constituency-creation and expanding the consensus for reform can be in the short to medium term problematic. Community police often does not include systematic analysis of high- incidence problems Problem-oriented policing (POP). Considered the other best current practice, POP places more emphasis on crime analysis, which in turn reduces crime and alleviates call volume, while preserving community involvement, particularly the involvement of neighborhoods. In this results-oriented model, police officers analyze problems and focus on causes of erime, prioritize police efforts with the community, and involves the community as needed to address specific problems. Officers are also encouraged to be pro-active and are given significantdiscretion to use non-traditional methods of crime abatement, such as increasing out-of-court action. : Itis important to note that a police department does not have to "evolve" mechanistically by passing through each step. A "watchman" force can move to a community-based or problem- solving model, without necessarily first becoming "law enforcement" or "professional" institutions. Insistence on climbing the developmental chain step-by-step will mean sworn officers will adopt policies and practices that they will have to "unlearn" as their institution moves higher up the developmental scale. Implications of Categorization for Institutional Development Effosts to promote more enlightened police practices by moving from a lesser-developed ‘model to a more modern one has powerful implications for a department's organization, particularly in the areas of:recruiting and training, deployment,support, and measurement and management. Recruiting and training. In the law enforcement model, few resources are devoted to recruiting and standards for recruits are low. Training of recruits focuses on law enforcement, and little attention is given to alternative policing methods. Community-oriented policing uses well-defined recruiting procedures, with improving standards for admission into the force. There is also some training in crime analysis as well as commonly encountered substantive problems. POP emphasizes recruiting officers who can work within the system and use their own initiative ("self-starters"). Institutional standards reflect organizational goals, and training emphasizes problem analysis, brainstorming and community interaction. Key elements to improved recruitment and training include: ~ raised recruiting standards, including higher entry level requirements and more mature candidates (higher minimum age requirements) ~ increased training department-wide - beat officers who receive targeted training on problem-solving,analysis, and human rights/human dignity ~ competitive salaries. Deployment. The law enforcement model is characterized by non-rationalized deployment, in which officers spend little time on their assigned beats. In the community-oriented policing model, time/space determine deployments, with officers assigned, at least theoretically, to one beat on a long-term basis. The POP model also employs a rationalized deployment schedule, with officers working one beat long term, with additional advantage (compared to community- based policing) that call volume is reduced due to reductions in crime-the result of professional crime analysis and prevention strategies. Key elements to improved deployment include: -- much more focused deployment~ officers assigned to beats for significantly longer time - officers spend 50 to 60 percent of their total time working their beats Support. In the law enforcement model, available support falls short of what is needed. In community-oriented policing, support is perceived as adequate, but is not always a priority. As in the law enforcement model, remote, or rural, police forces, can be short-changed in the budget-formulation process. In POP, support is optimized and designed to assist a decentralized, independent police force. Key elements to improved support include: ~~ real time data access for officers in the field in-depth crime analysis coordination with other state and PVO service providers (housing, penal service, prosecutor's office, child welfare, battered women's shelters.) Measurement and Management. In the law enforcement model, performance reviews are rudimentary, focus on individual effort and are quantitative in nature (arrests, tickets, number of calls, etc.) Community based policing uses standardized performance reviews that are also based on individual effort but that include community responsibilities as an area of evaluation. POP uses standardized reviews based on teamwork. Key elements to improved measurement and management include: performance goals need to be made much clearer individual attainment and group goals need to be aligned with organizational goals. ILL. U.S. Experience in Assisting Foreign Police Careful attention to the U.S. experience in foreign police training and development can repay significant dividends, as the "lessons learned! through both its successes and its failures, can offer key insights into some of the most critical factors affecting institutional change and development in law enforcement. ‘There are two very different instances of U.S. involvement in police reform. In 1962, at the height of the Cold War, the Kennedy administration created the Office of Public Safety (OPS), a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The civilian foreign police training program worked both with civilian police and paramilitary forces and was designed to improve their capabilities through training, technical assistance and equipment. Using primarily U.S. civilian police as trainers, it focused on the separation of military and police functions, and called its work "institution building.” The OPS trained more than one million police from around the world in its 13-year existence, and provided some $325 million in equipment to foreign forces. However, it was shut down in 1974 after serious questions were raised about its linkages to human rights violations inclient countries. In fact, conditions of the Cold War had conspired to create a record in fact much different from OPS' civilian and professional rhetoric. In many countries in Latin America, for example, efforts to separate policing functions from those of the military were negated by relationships forged by other U.S. agencies with military-run governments, in which the armed forces continued to play a key role in internal security and police forees were often led by military officers. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency used the program to create a network of covert intelligence links in countries known for rights violations. A Cold War focus nn "internal enemies,” rather than criminal investigations designed to bring common criminals to justice, further deformed law enforcement institutions in nations whose political framewor! dictatorships or weak civilian regimes-often meant the forces of order were seen as the enemy. After OPS was shut down, and until the mid-1980s, U.S. overseas police training was primarily limited to anti-narcoties efforts. In the mid-1980s, the U.S. Congress created the Office of Professional Development and Training (ICITAP) of the U.S. Department of Justice. ICITAP, which was also funded by USAID, began with small programs designed to help Central American countries develop their criminal investigative capabilities~-particularly in the areas of career development, personnel evaluation and internal discipline~expanding in a few years to include general police management and police academy curriculum development. In the early years direct training in sensitive areas, such as firearms training, use of force doctrine and urban disorder management, was off limits, and such prohibitions were reinforced by close scrutiny from a wary USS. Congress~ However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the U.S. Congress confronted the challenges of creating civilian police forces in high profile situations such as Panama, El Salvador, and Haiti, by extending statutory authority on a country-by-country basis for all police functions. These decisions, however, were taken in a political context in which baseline criteria for determining whether countries were either "ready" for assistance or deserving of U.S. support were not established. At this writing, ICITAP headquarters in Washington is wracked by allegations of public corruption, ranging from fraud and abuse of power, and including specific charges of senior officials leaking classified information to uncleared personnel, "sweetheart" contracts to friends of the Attorney General and to partisan political interests, sexual harassment and sexual favoritism in hiring, and contract fraud. The 14-month investigation by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is continuing. Three people, all senior management, have had their security clearances taken away, and several have been reassigned to other duties. More severe penalties are expected after the OIG issues its final report, expected for some time in November 1998. Itis important to note, however, that the U.S. agency was able to avoid the type of charges leveled two decades earlier against OPS. Its reliance on personnel from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies (primarily the FBI and DEA) rather than local police forces gave it a cachet of professionalism and purpose. Congressional oversight, and ICITAP's openness to include community actors, including human rights organizations, in policy discussions, have also allowed it to anticipate and effectively deal with criticism. This openness, while significantly diminished after the OIG initiated its investigation, included participation by ICITAP senior staff in conferences sponsored by international human rights organizations; the willingness of seniorofficials to meet individually or in small groups with local and international rights leaders to exchange information and to listen to suggestions, and careful attention paid to'reports and other evaluative instruments published by the groups. Perhaps most importantly, although the distinction has become blurred in the past few years, ICITAP was careful to focus on non- operational development activities, thus protecting it from the kind of exposuresthan came with specific work on cases often of interest to U.S. law enforcement or the State Department. ICITAP’s involvement in high-profile "whole force" police reform both required and tended to ‘generate the measure of political support needed to create plausible prospects for change. In addition, in smaller country projects, developing criminal investigative and forensics capabilities has remained its primary activity. Over nearly 15 years, ICITAP programs yielded several important lessons for successful foreign support for law enforcement reform. Early on ICITAP moved away from mere training of police officers to more systemic developmental activities, in which well defined goals and objectives~and with them the creation of design, planning and evaluation criteria-- were key to achieving a greater level of efficacy. Piecemeal training came to be seen as a squandering of resources unless it formed part of long-term development and institutional strengthening. ICITAP’s shift away from the "body count" approach of training--where "nothing sticks" because those trained may well be assigned to very different jobs within a short period of time--could be seen in its efforts to bring several police departments into line with international law enforcement accreditation standards, Unified hierarchical control, merit-based promotions and rewards, and the extension to all police units of the authority of Inspector Generals' offices were also hallmarks of the ICITAP developmental methodology, which helped to fortify discipline while increasing accountability. Other ICITAP strengths included: ~ close attention to the overall context in which reform efforts were to take place, in order to ensure the level of political will necessary to make changes feasible, or even desirable; -- the early creation of internal oversight mechanisms, such as Offices of Inspector General or Offices of Professional Responsibility (OPR), within the new forces or those undergoing significant change with which it worke -- recognition that police reform should proceed at a pace reasonably commensurate with that of other justice related sectors, s0 as to not raise unrealistic expectations or overload other, antiquated, actors in the system; and -- deferral of special force development-SWAT teams, etc.--until the in-country force showed strong signs of institutional growth, and that it could handle the extra responsibility that such training and functions required. ICITAP programs have been less successful in other regards, however. Particularly in the earlier programs, formal guidelines did not exist for initiating and ending projects. Because it used primarily federal law enforcement officers, ICITAP never really developed a strong,community orientation in its policing efforts. Most federal agents had little or no experience walking a beat, controlling traffic, managing urban disorders or carrying out social communications strategies, and because of that the panoply of skills offered still meant that even the reformed police institutions were relegated to the top of the "law enforcement” and "professional" models. Exit strategies remained unclear and were frequently dictated by U.S. foreign policy considerations unconnected with law enforcement development needs, ICITAP ‘management, although at the headquarters level primarily civilian, also proved to be disconnected from realities on the ground, subject to internal rivalries, and sorely lacking in the ethical and humane practices that formed part of its external offering, ‘The very real possibility that ICITAP's continuing management crisis may soon mean its eventual dissolution suggests that Bank involvement in law enforcement reform may become a high salience topic for debate within a short period of time. VI. Police Performance Attributes By establishing a comprehensive set of police performance attributes a baseline may be established from which to judge current institutions and practices within a law enforcement agency. In making judgments about current performance and the need for reform, balancing the value/cost of achieving certain levels of performance will require a careful assessment of tradeoffs, It should be noted that not all police departments operate in the same way--in fact, their charters may prohibit certain activities--and some strategic plans brought to the Bank for consideration for funding may not seek to address all of the attributes listed below. Moreover, not all best practices may be desirable based on the specific needs and resources of a community. The attributes listed below therefore are primarily directional in nature, and provide a specific framework for analysis consistent with the five models of policing previously identified. a. Missions/roles ("What" the police department does.) In this section, the missions and roles of police institutions are discussed. ‘The functional attributes encompassed by these roles and missions include the enforcement of laws and codes, the preservation of peace, the prevention of crime, the protection of life and property, the detection of offenders and the apprehension of perpetrators. At the most basic level of police development, law enforcement is the primary focus of the institution. Crime prevention is limited to random patrols, and the role of citizens is limited to reporting incidents. In an institution in which best practices are the rule, the roles and missions of the department are significantly redefined. In community-based and POP models, officers target the causes of crime as their primary objective and play the role of community advocate representing. community concems. Citizen participation is maximized. Institutional change indicators (benchmarks):~~ Law enforcement is complemented by some prevention initiatives ~ Citizens are able to participate in public safety through specific programs b. Relationships with Community (Structural and ad hoc relationships between the police department and the community.) In this section, the relationships a modem police department should have with the community are analyzed. These include: joint policing, problem identification/proactive resolution, investment in the community, quality of life expectations, and resources to deal with problems. Joint policing means that officers interact with citizens in the districts they patrol, are well known to them, and are seen as a channel for information sharing. Problem identification/proactive resolution means that the entire police department engages the community and works to identify and solve prevalent problems. Investment in the community includes police sponsorship of community activities and community sponsorship of police activities, so that community needs are effectively balanced with those of law enforcement and the community and the police make informed decisions based on a thorough understanding of the value/cost trade off. Quality of life expectations encompass the community's attitudes about the police force's ability and willingness to improve its quality of life; expectations are higher when the community sees the force working to improve its programs and services in a cooperative effort. Resource questions focus on the priority given to community-related problems in the delivery of police services. Departments operating at the lower end of the organizational pyramid are characterized by very limited involvement in the community, under-utilization of community resources, little or no investment of police resources in community affairs, and little or no involvement of community resources in assisting the police, low community expectations about the ability of the police to improve their quality of life, and few resources are available for community-related problems (such as battered women and street children.) Jurisdictions where policing is rudimentary evidence a low level of community participation in fighting crime, a lack of crime prevention seminars and educational courses, and insufficient mechanisms to bring youth into contact with the police--no youth-focused education, Institutions using community-based or POP models are characterized by strong ties to the community. Officers interact with citizens on their beat~they are well known to the community and act as channels for information sharing (a critical law enforcement intelligence function). ‘The department is mobilized to respond to community concerns, identifying and solving prevalent problems. Community needs and those of their police are carefully balanced, and both make informed decisions based on a thorough understanding of the value/cost tradeoff. Strong police relations with the community are created by the institution's daily reaffirmation of its commitment to its jurisdiction's quality of life. The department gives community related problems priority standing and adequate resources for their amelioration and/or resolution. Potential community roles could include serving as the "eyes and ears" of the department, organizing and implementing community patrols, providing support and facilities for recreational programs (churches, schools, community centers), providing human resources services (youthcounseling, battered women’s shelters, rehabilitation, etc.), serving as court monitors, and being trained to conduct crime prevention seminars (training the trainers). In the United States, there have been a number of highly successful programs implemented designed to improve police/community relations. These include: Meetings and Communications. In New York, as part of "Operation Calling Card,” posters of local beat officers have been displayed in storefront windows, and officers pass out, business cards to increase name recognition and opportunities to interact with citizens. The web page of the Chicago police department includes detailed beat layouts and schedules for all community meetings (down to the beat level). In Houston, the group Ministers Against Crime have ridden along in patrol cars. They have also trained at the police academy in "shoovno shoot" decision making processes, and have been asked to intervene with the community in some police brutality cases. Crime Prevention Training, Houston's Ministers Against Crime have sponsored crime education classes in places of worship. In Oxnard, California, public access cable channels are used to broadcast crime prevention messages. Community Patrols. In a number of cities, community watch groups have been organized Citizen's Academy. In New York City and in Prince Georges Country, Maryland, citizens receive abbreviated recruit classroom training, with topics that include driver's training and firearms education, Youth Academy. In New York, a Youth Academy has been established that is similar to the adult Citizen's Academy, but excludes firearms training Institutional change indicators: ~- community patrols are organized and police look to community for information/solutions for problems, through mechanisms such as the establishment of Citizens’ Advisory Councils, monthly meetings with the community, the work of district or precinct community relations officers, ete. ~ a sub-unit of police officers is assigned to patrol specific communities ~ police sponsor community activities, and resources begin to be regularly assigned to community related problems, such as youth gangs, visible drug. distribution points, abandoned buildings, lack of nighttime illumination, loitering and trash removal, ~ community sponsors police activities, and provides resources for them ~ police sponsor crime-prevention seminars and crime awareness sessions in addition to their other activities ~ quality of life issues-enduring questions about crime, fear and are considered to be important both by the police and the community,and result in a highly-visible police presence focused on community needs and targeted on the most crime- ridden areas,c. Relationships with Criminal Justice and Other overnmental Agencies (Other structural relationships and resources that support the police department's perféirmance of its, mission.) In this section, the relationships a modern police department should have with the criminal justice and other governmental agencies are analyzed. These include physical boundaries and jurisdictions, legal authorities (who has authority over what crimes in a given jurisdiction), the physical hand-off of people and property, information sharing and systems linkages, processing linkages for "papering" cases (making sure that arrests hold up by use of proper procedures and employment of up-to-date technologies to assure efficiencies), resource dependencies (shared resources that are exploited to their greatest advantage), and joint planning. Low-performance police institutions are frequently plagued by jurisdictional boundaries that are poorly defined and understood, with authority not shared between jurisdictions and the overlap thatexists is either insufficient or unnecessary. Established procedures for handing off people/paper across jurisdictions is lacking. Information is not electronically shared with other jurisdictions, sister institutions, or with government agencies. Little or no cooperation exists in processing investigations. Information about all existing resources is not widely available, and there is little or no inter-agency joint planning Departments characterized by best practices enjoy well-defined and well-understood jurisdictional boundaries, with authority shared across jurisdictions in a well-planned, rationalized manner. Handoff procedures are standardized and create minimal procedural delays Information sharing is facilitated by information technology (IT) and is widely used. (Centralized regional incident reporting can support better trend, pattern and series analysis across boundaries and between local agencies.) Cross agency/jurisdiction investigations use processing linkages that are both optimal and well-established. Shared resources are well known to potential users and are exploited to their full advantage. Crime fighting operations are planned and executed taking advantage of the relative strengths each organization has to offer. Officers trained in proper procedures-such as arrest procedure, evidence collection, and the efficient, processing of detainees during major crime "busts"--prosecutors need to "make the case" in court. Institutional change indicators: ~- cooperation between jurisdictions improves, and jurisdictional authority partially overlaps, so that "hot pursuit" issues decrease operations enhance each force's crime-fighting ability, and formal relationships are clearly defined ~ districts are reconfigured in cooperation with all agencies to create integrated policing by geography and service, so that police coverage reflects neighborhood and geographic realities, allowing for better links to public/city agencies, commercial entities, and neighborhood groups, and that police jurisdictions complement and reinforce each other -- handoff procedures begin to be standardized across jurisdictions,and show ‘greater efficiency ~- amount of time officers spend in court decreases significantly, with fewer ‘multiple appearances for the same case, less indiscriminate subpoenas for nonarresting officers, and greater coordination for officer with multiple cases docketed . procedures for electronic information sharing are initiated ~ procedures emplaced for assisting cross-agency/jurisdiction investigations information about available resources is disseminated and sharing increases inter-agency joint planning becomes routine attention is paid that joint-use technologies have compatible objectives and interfaces Examples: Jurisdictions.) In the Washington, D.C. area, the District's MPD and the Takoma Park Police have combined in a crime analysis effort and started pairing up while on patrol. In addition, the elimination of legal jurisdictional problems associated with pursuing a suspect across the District's borders has also been facilitated. The law enforcement section of the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs has model agreements that allow for "fresh pursuit" of offenders across reservation boundaries, an innovation that respects Indian lands legal standing as "domestic dependent nations.” (Information technology.) In the United States, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS), a basic system most departments use which is operated by a private group, provides police department to police department electronic mail and allows check on out-of-state license plates and permits. It is a basic link among police departments in the United States. The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) is another basic link among police departments in the U.S., and provides national tracking of warrants, criminal history, stolen property, and vehicle information. It is maintained by the FBI for all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. A Regional Crime Analysis System, a database maintained and accessed across the Baltimore/Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, captures, maintains and shares detailed regional information across police departments. Social Service links, which includes homeless shelters, battered women's shelters, child services, drug programs, welfare services, and housing, allow for communication, searches, and requests between police departments and organizations. (inter-agency joint planning.) In New York City, major department heads meet to exchange information, which helps to make everyone accountable and responsible on an instantaneous basis. 4. Crime Analysis Capabilities (The department's approach to analyzing crime patterns and trends.) In this section, crime analysis capabilities are analyzed. These include pro-active responses such as crime analysis, identifying underlying drivers of crime, and intelligence planning and capture, as well as random or service driven (reactive) responses. Crime analysis, includes: trends (where, when, what and by whom crimes are being committed) patterns (common characteristics of eriminal activity) ~ series (recognizing identical criminal methods and related crimes.Because crime analysis tracks and identifies current patterns, trends and series of crime: allowing for predictions about the most probable criminal activities--it can provide insight on crime prevention/reduction strategies and tacts. In low performance police departments pin maps illustrating the local and type of all reported crimes are the only proactive measure that are used. The underlying drivers of crime are not addressed, and data that is readily available is entered into a database in a slipshod fashion. Responses by the institution to crime are incident driven, with litle attention given to quality of life conditions. Key elements of analysis are limited to crime reports, arrest reports, 911 data and current events. In modern police institutions a comprehensive criminal intelligence database is maintained and used. Mapping capabilities are linked to all information systems. Crime prevention is a top priority as evidenced by its priority in resource allocations, and problems are actively identified and thoroughly analyzed. Data gathering is rationalized and pre-planned, and the product~the database--is well maintained and utilized. Crime analysis data sources are expanded to include systemic/recurring, or medium term, sources (hot spots, demographic reports, school data and juvenile arrests, organized crime and gang information, and drug market intelligence) and strategic/environmental, or long term, sources, such as prosecutor's offices, housing and social welfare departments, and the school system. Resources are allocated based on patterns, trends and series of crimes and are optimized for the workload created by citizen calls, and put police to work when and where crime is most likely to occur. Institutional change indicators: -- standard crime analysis procedures are established that ensure maintenance of all information crime maps are computerized, based on a detailed database, and are capable of discerning trends and pattems a sub-unit of police is tasked with identifying the underlying drivers of crime — planning precedes data gathering and significantly reduces redundant or unnecessary efforts analysis used to define when and where the most frequent and most lents of crime occur, who commits the crime; who are the victims ~ norms, methods, trends, series and patterns of criminal activity are identified - near-term indicators that warn something is likely to happen are defined. €. Deployment/Operations (Which resources are used to fight crime and how are they deployed.) In this section issues concerning deployment and operations are analyzed. ‘These include configuration (types of units~"specialized” or patrol; is specialization both rational and consistent with community needs?); their availability to the department and within the department; use (percentage of sworn officers covering non-command administrative pos detailed to specialty units, or on patrol); beat coverage (actual and effective; are beats covered 100 percent of the time, with redundancies built into system to eliminate personnel shortfalls?);arrest procedures (is arres/booking done manually, with a large number of handofis of detainees, and a multiplicity of paperwork requirements, or is it centralized, computerized and standardized into one form), 911 operations (although a hallmark of police operations in more developed countries, itis increasingly being adopted throughout the Hemisphere), and deployment strategy. Less developed police institutions are characterized by a high percentage of sworn officers not being available for policing duties due to sick leave or long-term disability, while a low percentage actually carry out patrolling and beat duty. Manpower resources are badly used, with a high percentage of sworn officers tasked with non-command administrative duties, a high percentage assigned to specialty units such as Criminal Investigations (homicide, special investigations, mobile crime units, sex offenses) and Narcoties, and a low percentage of officers actually patrolling the streets which, when done, is usually carried out in scout cars. Frequently some beats are left uncovered at roll call, and officers spend little time on their assigned beats. The arrest and booking process is manual, with a large number of handoffs and a maddening multiplicity.of forms. Dispatchers and call takers often bottleneck the 911 response process and there is only elemental prioritization of calls for service. Deployment of resources does not match calls for service at any level, and speed of service is considered the most important quality factor. In practice, more backward institutions are characterized by numerous problems in mission execution. For example, inefficient processes that limit crime fighting ability are evidenced-by juvenile cell blocks requiring heavy demands on administration and resources, and by prosecutors’ frequent dismissal of cases due to improperly processed paperwork. A lack of equipment can mean that case integrity is diminished as no database connects all incidents and family relations to individual children. Trends to specialization of skills in sworn officers limits their deployment flexibility, even when working in specialized youth and community programs. Trade off issues remain unexamined or are not operationalized (property crimes are given equal value to crimes against people; no extra weight is given to crimes that have multiplier effects such as drugs and family disturbances.) Community-based and POP models emphasize rationalized levels of specialization, with Jess than 10 percent of the force enrolled in specialty units, and force configuration is coordinated and focused throughout the department. Missions are defined and articulated, and boundaries are clearly defined and coordinated to prevent duplication of effort. Beat designs are linked to current crime statistics or demographics and reflect neighborhood and natural boundaries. The availability of swom officers is closely tracked and managed, with a high percentage available for policing duties, particularly patrol/beats, which results in greater community presence and a higher probability of crime prevention and detection. A low percentage of sworn officers hold non-command administrative positions, or are detailed to specialty units. Clerical positions not requiring police powers or expertise, technical positions requiring complex skill levels or specialized knowledge, and security missions are civilianized or outsourced, A high percentage of the sworn force is engaged in patrolling, whose modalities include scout cars, foot beat, motorcycles, scooters, bicycles and horses. Beats are covered 100 percent of the time, with redundancies built into the system to eliminate shortfalls, and officers spend most of their duty time on their assigned beats, Improved availability and use of officer manpower is accompanied by greater understanding by beat patrol of appropriate interventionand "right" arrests (reflecting community priorities as well as proper criminal procedure), as well as improved case building abilities and effectiveness as a state witness. A centralized computer arrest/booking process is emplaced, and is standardized into one form. All sworn officers working beats become skilled at community and youth crime prevention. Response to 911 (emergency) calls is prioritized based on a thorough ethical and pragmatic model, and 911 information is used to support the entire deployment process. Metrics focus on the end to end process. A significant number of 911 calls are avoided by the presence of beat officers on the scene, who normally respond on foot or in a squad car as necessary. Focused deployment matches calls for service demand at all time and geographic levels, and can reduce and eliminate many of the underlying causes of the calls for service. Citizen expectations for response are managed, and deployment speed matches that anticipated by the community. Institutional change indicators: = policing districts reflect updated deployment strategies and responsibilities, as well as neighborhood integrity, taking into account the concentration of population, and types, patterns and concentration of erime ~ force configuration begins to reflect rational, focused specialization ~ officer availability is tracked and the percentage present for duty begins to climb ~ availability of officers for patrol is prioritized and begins to grow a long-range plan is initiated to move sworn personnel away from administrative positions ~ the size of specialty groups is rationalized ~ the percentage of officers on patrol is tracked, and patrol is widely differentiated ~ police institution initiates study of problem of covering beats need to patrol assigned beats made administrative priority within force calls prioritized for 911 (emergency) service enhanced 911 system emplaced with caller and location identification 911 system reflects and supports community policing model missions not requiring use of sworn officers are civilianized or outsourced f. Organization, Structure and Staffing (Department organizational structure and reporting roles and responsibilities.) In this section issues concerning organization, structure and staffing are analyzed, including the structure of headquarters and administrative offices, and district units; sworn versus civilian staffing, spans of control, and organization by neighborhood. In less developed police forces, administrative support is not well thought out, and ‘manual, redundant administrative processes are rife at the district level. Sworn officers are over- utilized in positions that might be filled by civilians. Control is characterized by multiple spans and layers, configured hierarchically. Policing districts do not reflect current natural or residential boundaries.In community-based and POP model districts, administrative support is clearly linked to the organization's requirements, and minimum but essential administrative support is available at the district level. There is pro-active management of civilian employees so that these are used wherever possible. Spans and layers of control are rationalized. No neighborhoods are served by multiple districts and staffing levels match to historical crime pattems. > Institutional change indicators: administrative support begins to reflect organizational requirements ~- administrative redundancies are rare police availability increased by reactivating/retiring inactive sworn personnel ~ policing districts are designed by neighborhood boundaries, and begin to be regularly updated — missions not requiring use of sworn officers are civilianized or outsourced. g._ Information Technology, Infrastructure, Equipment and Facilities (Configuration of support systems for the department.) In this section issues concerning the configuration of support systems such as IT, infrastructure, equipment and facilities are addressed. In tow performance police departments, information technology is old and outdated, and its organization is split into non-compatible modules. Infrastructure is composed of old and inadequate facilities and a non-rationalized fleet consisting only of scout cars, Equipment and supplies, including police specific materials such as guns and vests, as well as office equipment and miscellaneous law enforcement supplies are not available in the necessary quantity and there are no plans for future acquisitions. Modern departments characterized by use of best practices utilize their IT to facilitate the sharing of information and plan out their IT acquisitions carefully in order to meet needs as efficiently as possible. Modem facilities are rationalized in quantity and are located to best optimize resources. The motor park is rationalized (scout cars, motorcycles, etc.) and is closely tied to deployment operations. Equipment and supplies are adequate, and their acquisition is well managed and built into the budget process. Institutional change indicators: ~- a single IT department is established -- I/T is current and consistent, and users begin to receive adequate training — Internet is used to increase public access to department, as well as for improving professional knowledge within force the optimal number and location of facilities is researched the fleet is fully differentiated, and its deployment begins to match needs ~ procedures for effective procurement of equipment and supplies created.hh. Support Processes (Major processes, functions and activities.) In this section issues of planning and budgeting, procurement, recruiting and training, property and inventory management, evidence control, medical services and ballistics are addressed. : In less developed police institutions, all support processes are done in-house. Planning is short term, and little control/oversight is given to the budget process, Procurement is uncoordinated, requires too many signatures, and does not form part of a strategic plan. Few resources are dedicated to recruiting, and standards for admission to the institution are low. Training is focused primarily on law enforcement, with little attention given to alternative policing methods, such as problem analysis and community interaction, Inventory and property levels are not managed effectively. Evidence control is haphazard and frequently the object of questioning by prosecutors and judges. All medical services not requiring hospitalization are within the department, an patient-tracking systems do not exist. Ballistics work is primarily done manually. Community-based and POP models emphasize support processes that are selectively outsourced based on a clear cost/benefit analysis. Planning and budgeting are the result of a clear understanding of operational and support requirements. Procurement is centralized, streamlined and fully integrated with both planning and budgeting and inventory management, Recruiting is revamped to attract the kinds of officers who can work within the system and employ their own initiative. Training includes a spectrum of policing methods, and focuses on analysis, brainstorming solutions and community interaction. Inventory and property levels are proactively tracked and managed, so as to reduce associated costs. Access to evidence is controlled electronically, with a name and pin number required of every potential user and recorded on an electronic tag, All medical service functions are completely privatized, except for tracking of benefits and duty stations. ‘There is a single ballistics laboratory for multiple jurisdictions, and associated costs and expertise are pooled. Institutional change indicators: ~ support processes begin to be outsourced ~ planning and budgeting are fully integrated, with efforts made to reflect organization's goals ~ bottom up input into budgeting processes creates budget that reflects operational reality ~ procurement process is analyzed and redesign is implemented importance of recruiting and officer retention are recognized and new and improved recruiting process is implemented ~ recruitment process includes detailed background checks ~ training is initiated in analysis together with commonly-encountered substantive problems trainers screened for appropriate educational background, job performance history and character suitable to police training inventory and property levels are tracked, thus simplifying the reordering process-- support items, including uniforms and equipment critical to officer duties, are acquired, stored and managed effectively 2 evidence control is computerized and a security system emplaced medical services are privatized and tracking systems encompass entire department : -- ballistics work is fully automated, sophisticated and linked to other regional ballistics labs i, Performance Management (Processes and systems to measure and manage team and individual performance.) In this section issues of standards (recruiting {related to (h) above}, performance, rewards, advancement, physical condition, etc.), management and review (promotion system) and finances (expenditure, authorization and control mechanisms) are addressed. Low-performance police institutions have a few fragmented standards for measurement and recruitment and financial areas. There is no clearly articulated rewards system. Standard processes/practices for performance reviews do not exist. Promotions are primarily tenure based, and not specifically linked to organizational goals. There is little or no authorization for expenditures at the local level, and financial control mechanisms are not linked to the organization's goals. Modern departments characterized by use of best practices have clear performance management standards, including for performance and rewards, which are well-defined across all dimensions, and which are rigorously adhered to and enforced. Performance reviews are standardized, carried out and reflect organizational goals. Promotions are based on demonstrated competence and are tied to organizational strategic goals. Expenditures are authorized at the local level, and financial controls are streamlined and are fully consistent with the organization's goals. Institutional change indicators: — resources are aligned to mission — mission reflects community needs (in part determined by public opinion surveys) consistent, clearly documented standards are created and implemented performance reviews are standardized and always carried out disciplinary procedures (corrective and adverse actions) are established and disseminated, with opportunities for officers and staff to become familiarized with them ~~ promotions are mainly based on demonstrated competence ~- financial control mechanisms are mostly linked to organizational goalsY. General Observations By understanding the dynamics of police development, the components that comprise effective measures of the performance of a department, and the lessons learned from previous third party efforts to promote police reform, some general rules can be derived to orient Bank strategies for loans to this critical public sector, In the recent past, a time that is arguably much different from the present circumstances, foreign police training activities were controversial, as they were seen by many as contributing to human rights violations and fortifying authoritarian regimes. The end of the Cold War and the return of elected government to all but one of the countries of the Hemisphere have created a new context-in terms of challenges and opportunities--in which police development is being conducted. However, it is important to understand that such programs are in and of themselves sensitive. Where the reform of law enforcement is concerned, the medical dictum of "Do no harm" falls short of an acceptable standard of performance. The community (the primary stakeholder in sector loan efforts) expects more. What follows are recommendations that might be considered to create Bank partnerships that are not only successful over time, but are perceived by stakeholders that the efforts undertaken are worth the time, effort, and resources, 1. The Bank should set forth the parameters of its loan policies for police institutions by means of a set of published guidelines that detail not only the types of activities that can be funded but also set forth policy guidelines about how the programs should be carried out, perhaps in the form of a mission statement that includes preferred policies and practices. The mission statement should focus on the professional responsibilities of civilian police force, including involvement in the community, ethics, and respect for human rights. By articulating a clear organizational value structure~-derived from the five models of policing established earlier--the Bank can clearly signal its preference for modem, community-based and problem-oriented models. The Bank should issue a policy statement that explicitly endorses community-based and POP models as essential strategies for rebuilding social capital in violent neighborhoods. 2. Police reform should not greatly outpace other sectors of the criminal justice system. Police reform efforts should be accompanied by improvements in the administration of justice generally, and should not outpace reforms in the courts or the penal system so that newly-trained officers face unresponsive courts. Without accompanying judicial reform, public disenchantment can actually increase, as greater numbers of detainees clog courts and prisons unprepared to deal with them. The increased paperwork officers must contend with due to a greater number of cases becomes truly overwhelming when the court system remains antiquated and inadequate, and results in fewer agents being able to cover their beats. The problem is exacerbated as well do to the fact that, while the executive branch normally controls the police, judges and the judicial process are or should be independent, and are thus less permeable to rapid change.Initial professional assessments need to be undertaken before projects receive final approval. Proposals for police reform should be accompanied by an institution's own assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, along the lines of the performance attributes listed in (IV), as evidence of an initial buy-in by a key stakeholder. Requiring the institution seeking the loan to disclose current institutional performance-can be a useful exercise as it would help to articulate the problem that needs to be addressed, and give those evaluating the proposal a chance to offer alternative developmental solutions for areas of concern, The assessment should be required when loan proposals impact upon two or more areas (nine in total, performance attributes A-I), which means that significant reform of the department seeking assistance is being contemplated. The assessment should then be followed by an independent review that could be carried out either by funding a new position(s) with the Bank's Evaluation Unit, or by means of contracting outside experts. Discrepancies in findings owing to differences between the institution's self-image and that held by outside authorities can serve to promote further refinements in the loan proposal, and help test the borrowing country/police institution's political will for change. ‘The assessment should also include a review of judicial system capabilities, in order to ensure appropriate police development efforts. Support for state and local police development efforts should also be predicated on a review of the jurisdictional boundaries used by the institution to carry out its activities, in order to assure these reflect current realities. Policing districts should reflect current natural or residential boundaries. Neighborhoods should not be served by multiple districts and staffing levels should match historical crime patterns. Failure to address this issue can lead to wasted effort and squandered resources. ‘The Bank should consider the development of a public opinion survey instrument that would be required to be administered in the jurisdiction of the police institution by recognized experts in public opinion research before loans are approved. Bank approval for the loan might be tied to a commitment by the requesting institution to disseminate widely the results of the survey, so as to inform policymakers about community attitudes concerning the force, and to foster community understanding of the institution's commitment to improve policing services. The survey should focus on attitudes of those who have recently sought police assistance, as well as those of the community at large. Conducting and disseminating the results ean provide citizens information with which to evaluate progress as the Bank-sponsored programs are implemented. second public opinion survey might be commissioned at the mid-way point of the program implementation to measure community acceptance and approval of the reforms undertaken, and to provide the policing institution with necessary "in-flight correction" information that will allow it to modify or change its community outreach efforts. ‘The Bank should consider earmarking, on a discretional basis, 15 to 20 percent of all loans to police institutions to tangible benefits for members of the force, as a means of helping to make them partners (stakeholders) in the reform process. Police in forces in the process of modemization may become resistant to change as increased work pressureis placed on finite staff resources, many of whom may feel threatened by the requirements of greater professionalization, Disbursement of the money, which could be used for services such as educational vouchers, support for pension programs, and insurance programs (duty-related burial and survivor benefits, and medical). Disbursement of funds would be made afier successful completion of the other terms of the loan agreement, Loan requests that are primarily designed to improve the equipment needs of a police force, such as the purchase of automobiles, weapons and protective gear, need to be evaluated in the context of modernization of the quality of policing, and also for the possible unintended consequences that result from their acquisition. For example, money for scout cars should be accompanied by an institution being required to examine its deployment policies, with an eye to increasing beat coverage. Most police institutions report that scout car responses to reports of crime are the most expensive. Loan requesters might be asked to provide evidence that vehicle acquisition is cost effective, and will not result in significant resources being drained away--in maintenance and other costs--from other vital policing services. The provision of automobiles can help move a police institution from the "watchman" category to that the "law enforcement;" both the community-based and POP models, however, emphasize taking the officer out of the squad car, where possible, and putting him or her on a motoreycle, or a bicycle, or walking the beat. All Bank loans impacting on two or more of the performance attributes listed above should have a social communications component that emphasizes community awareness of the reforms taking place, such as orientations seminars for local political and community leaders about the process, as well as opportunities for the community to participate in it. Community involvement in policing can help to increase resources for law enforcement, as its participation in crime fighting adds value to police efforts and also helps to create a political consensus in support of police institutions who successfully serve and protect their communities. It also provides an instance of political accountability for the institution. Informing the community of what changes can been expected in their neighborhoods, allows it to hold the police institution and the political leaders who oversee it, to a new standard of performance. Sustained community involvement is also an important guarantee of continued support for Bank efforts in this area. ‘The provision of loan resources for acquisition of lethal or other controversial police equipment, if itis not explicitly ruled out by the Bank, should be made available only to law enforcement institutions with a commitment to moving to community-based or POP status, within the possibilities of their specific needs and resources. Officers how find themselves badly outgunned or who are issued only two or three rounds of ammunition are unlikely to successfully confront criminals whose sophistication has reached alarming. levels. However, the Bank should set down strict requirements on--at a minimum- recruitment, training, deployment and community relations standards before entertaining Joan requests for lethal equipment or that which can cause bodily injury. In addition, the institution's commitment to the well-being of its officers should also be taken into10. ul 12. 14. account. An institution that does not respect its members will likely be sending officers with "chips on their shoulders’ out into already mean and difficult streets. ‘Assistance to police forces under the command and control of a country's armed forces should be strictly prohibited. Civilian police forces help to foster the rule of law and respect for human rights, promote democratic civil-military relations and confront expanded and increasingly sophisticated domestic and international criminal and drug- trafficking networks. Careful examination of both news reports and academic literature suggests that police departments that institutionally depend on a country's military are less professional and often less likely to uphold the values underpinning efforts to reform citizen safety and security, as well as citizen participation in crime prevention. By their very nature, military-led institutions cannot progress beyond "watchman" or, perhaps, “law enforcement” models, neither of which offer communities "best practices” in policing; moreover, supporting military involvement in intemal security operations might put the Bank in a position of seeming to involve itself in the internal political affairs of a country. Furthermore, excessive use of former members of militarized or politicized security forces helps to undermine changes in organizational culture and efforts to change public perceptions. Where possible, the Bank should promote the regionalization of certain police services, such as forensics laboratories, to reduce costs and promote professionalism and efficiency. Consolidation of services can be conducted across municipal, state and even national jurisdictions. Bank-financed projects for state and municipal police should rely heavily on technical assistance from consultants with backgrounds in state and local law enforcement. Invariably, sworn officers taken from federal law enforcement have much less, if any, first hand experience in community policing, and local participation and accountability. To the extent outside police experts are involved in state and local projects, priority hiring should be given to those people of recognized professional achievement who have significant community-related experience. Bank program managers in the area of police reform should be civilians with significant experience in administration of justice development generally, and in policing specifically. Use of civilians (non-sworn personnel) as project managers can promote policies that reflect Bank objectives concerning accountability and community participation. Program managers should also have previously established records of successful program management. Coordination with other donor countries and multilateral organizations is essential. A coordinating mechanism should be created that tends to maximize external leverage for reform by, where possible, having the international community speak with one voice. All Bank loans and programs should include an "exit strategy" that takes into account hypothetical conditions in which a recipient country does not carry out the terms of the agreement. Consideration should be given to circumstances of non-performance orfailure to attain reasonable performance benchmarks, as well as those in which Bank involvement in the sector in a given country threatens to violate Bank standards and policies. Contingencies should be created for the early close down of all programs. 16, All Bank loans and programs should be designed in order to enable sustainable changes in the policing institution. Limitations on resources for police institutions make it imperative that all efforts at reform be measured against their future sustainability by the requesting country. 17. The Bank can help policing institutions set standards for performance that would allow it to justify increases in pay. Policing throughout most of the Hemisphere is a relatively low paying profession. Attracting and retaining motivated and well qualified staff requires significant changes in salaries and benefits. The Bank can help requesting institutions to devise strategies for increasing public outlays for the costs of law ‘enforcement based on stakeholder satisfaction. Potential performance standards that ‘would indicate a fair return on public investment include: ~ demonstrable results in the reduction of crime, fear and disorder ~ increased visibility of policing efforts ~ equitable redressing of citizen complaints of police misconduct ~ higher professional standards, such as random drug testing, educational ’ and physical fitness requirements, rectification of sworn officers, and bearing and deportment evaluation -- improved deployment flexibility ~ regularized background checks of swom personnel and civilian staffs ~ professional pre-employment testing Additional care must be taken in loans to countries in which national police forces are the beneficiary, as these normally fulfill foreign counter-intelligence and state security roles. These roles, while legitimate, suggest specitic areas of potential controversy, particularly with respect to relations with neighboring countries and possible penalties against individuals accused of inging on specific laws (such as the execution of "spies" and "traitors". The Bank should also seck to ensure that, as major reform efforts are underway, parallel police units are not created that undercut the institutional development and legitimacy of newly reforming forces. This problem, in which parallel units delegitimize the specialized divisions of the newly reformed police, occurred in both Haiti and El Salvador. Effective criminal investigations units are essential in order to successfully prosecute serious crimes and to break up organized crime, and therefore should receive funding on a priority basis The creation or professionalization of intemal oversight units, such as Offices of the Inspector General and Disciplinary Tribunals, are essential for limiting human rights abuses and public corruption, and are key to any reform effortVI. Applications 7 The funding of public safety and law enforcement programs should be based on previously established professional criteria, in order to establish benchmarks of quality for proposals received, as well as to help to ensure positive reaction to Bank efforts. The following matrix is offered as a step to delineating necessary requirements and possible difficulties in funding proposals. VII. Conclusion Growing concems over public safety throughout the Hemisphere will inexorably place greater demands on the Bank to become involved in the area of police reform. Previous foreign efforts to stand up or reform policing institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean have yielded important lessons. Two modem models of law enforcement--community based and problem oriented policing--offer a guide to more humane and effective policing through. measurable performance attributes and significant involvement by the community. Bank efforts in the sector should focus on moving institutions receiving loans and programmatic assistance to these levels, keeping in view their specific community needs and resources. Because of the sensitive nature of police reform, the Bank should expend extra effort to insure that its project implementation matches its program design in quality and follow through. Although there may be pressure for the Bank to finance programs that merely offer "quick hits or immediate and showy, if only temporary--measures against crime and violence, in the long term sustainable institutional development offers societies in crisis their only real measure of solace and support. Assistance to military-led security forces is unwise, antithetical to the best practices of law enforcement, and, in modern societies, impracticable. Programs that seek to ‘make law enforcement professionals primary stakcholders in the reform process will find no stronger allies in the quest to ig safety and security to communities.| Stuswanosdunyso8urey ssojtgj reuonnn: amsus diay ura) sauaunbas yarwasar uoudo agqng “Addo ou Op samyauns uLeLi99 ray angio yeuoneat {Jo saseo ur 10 ‘suonnyos ato ysa8ins Ayunustt0s Jo saomosai pur oak aysads ways Au0) palopisuos 2q prnoys | stondaoxg -ungjar | oy uauju09 peormod Jo Janay ouruuzarop 1 sopuo ur “Buqpeny 494 sisanbar ye 195 “fn | | annoaga| ‘ayyeUr OF pm [eorjod to snogj or suagel)_puv poseg-Arumt09, saagowid 1s9q urapour pian Surdooy, ‘uw jou sw AeKp wIs.ONLID 01 uado pesodoxd Sane] GOpeN IOd| 40 paseq-Syunumio9 | Jo routs sajouporssuu aysmbai se apou! {Od YUN MaIsIs109 sesodord swioiqosd Buyyepun ssauppe loue Anuoo1 01 sisfjeue, paroidus) | soiSayexis| vonuanaid| ‘uo jo onnoaxe pur’ uBiseg ‘¢ ssure,bo.d| ‘suonejas Ayunwiwe: uonnsexe, ue uBiseq Z| qwowoje3s vorssiu siorenadiod) youcisuoyaudde 9 “9x0 soougy rapuayo Jo uoNDaI9p “s aaqod yeuona fo Ausodoud yous ut saummos wo] pue ay] jo uonoai0ud “p sv am st wowoaxojuo| cuas9 Jo uomuaraid “¢ nm fwoot puw ates paved yo uoneaasaud -Z wg autoa 01 Sosy axe sopoo pu 2OURINSSE 19} SISANbay|) SMF] JO WNEMISAIOLLD “| “ugg wages so4j0 re suqyuy pur sodeys .S20p wwaunzedap sajor pasodoud pue ‘oaqod 41 THAN, (Layannisod S15, dope prnoys seg _woissusjo uoRAMIMTY —_—_smOWSHASIN “V = jcasa eee . 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