RICE University

POLI 357
Take Home Exam 2

Anastazija Ristovska
Rice Class of 2013
23 March 2011

Democracy, electoral fraud, social cleavages,

democratization in brazil and Iraq

1. When new democracies hold elections, political leaders may not always be
willing to subject themselves to competition over competing policy programs.
Based on your readings and class discussion, describe how politicians in electoral
democracies (where competitors are allowed and all citizens have voting rights)
can continue to suppress full electoral competition. Mention at least one example
in your readings or discussed in class.

In a perfect electoral democracy where there is participation through universal suffrage,

and competition, which is the ability of the opposition to compete for electorates votes over
public policy programs that serve the public good, politicians can attempt to suppress full
electoral competition through a variety of corrupt methods, such as, but not restricted to,
electoral fraud, vote buying, clientelism, and patrimonialism. Clientelism is the use of a chain
of personal bonds between political patrons and their individual supporters (clients). In this
type of a democracy there are excludable goods such as money and jobs which in a perfect
democracy are available to everyone based on merit; these are also known as private goods
since access to them can be regulated even after they are given to one person. The governing
establishment is able to prevent people from getting resources which are excludable, and
patrons furnish such excludable goods in return for clients support such as votes and rallies.
In a pure democracy there are formal institutions and official political roles, universal
applicability of laws and programs, and merit-based civil-service jobs, whereas in cases of
clientelism there is personality politics, personal loyalties, individual application of laws and
programs, and patronaging practices in delivering civil service. Patronaging practices are
attractive to poor and marginalized voters who find practical solution to immediate needs via
problem-solving networks instead of relying on formal political means that in such societies
are less effective and less immediate. Thailand is an example of a country that did not
succeed in democratization. In the 2001 elections a total of $460 million were given to voters,
and in the 1996 elections 30 percent of households said they were offered an average of $27
USD per household. Even in most developed democracies there is clientelism present, though
in a very different, milder form. In the United States politicians pass policies that benefit their
constituencies. Before the 1940s such clientelism was called machine politics and was
common in areas of high immigration, nevertheless such practices ceased after the US
experienced a growth of middle class and a big growth of formal infrastructure. Electoral
fraud is another means through which political leaders suppress full electoral competition via
clandestine and illegal efforts to shape election results, mostly characterized by ballot rigging,
but including an array of fraudulent schemes ranging from procedural violation of electoral
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law to use violent force against voters. In most elections ballot rigging is indecisive, but can
undermine political stability in close races. Competitiveness shaped by political institutions
determines the ballot-rigging schemes parties use, and the more equal a society the less
frequent the efforts to suppress electoral competition.

2. Many consolidating democracies continue to face the challenge that not all
groups in society fully accept the legitimacy of democratic outcomes based on
majority rule. Based on your readings and class discussion, how can democratic
constitutions be designed to reduce the potential for majority tyranny? How
do institutions affect the incentives of groups fearing majority power to accept
democracy? Consider both economic differences and ethnic divisions in your
answer.
Elections bring majority rule and potential dominance over and oppression of minorities,
therefore minorities want guarantees so that they can feel safe to fully accept the legitimacy
of democratic outcomes based on majority rule. Part of the role of constitutions is to provide
this guarantee to minorities via appropriate institutions building. Madisonian institutions are
intended to bring about power separation with multiple geographically distributed
independent institutions, whereas consociational institutions are intended to support power
sharing wherein the possibility a certain group will be left out of power is eliminated.
Consociational institutions have the purpose of integrating the society through institutions
and creating the certainty minority groups will always participate in decision and policy
making. In post conflict and divided societies power sharing may be used to stop or prevent
civil wars. Typical consociational elements of a system are consensus institutions with
proportional representation elections, and preferably parliamentarianism, in conjunction with
executive power sharing via constitutional mandate for broad executive power sharing across
relevant groups as opposed to only a coalition government. Ethnic federalism is also an
option with either territorial group autonomy or non-territorial autonomy. Ethnic federalism
is not only built on geographic units but also on concentration of ethnic groups. An example
of a non-territorial autonomy is the Netherlands between 1857 and 1867 where the four nonterritorial pillars, Calvinist, Catholic, socialist and liberal, were guaranteed schools,
universities, hospitals and newspapers. The theory of cross-cutting cleavages suggests that
countries with divided societies, that is, with subcultures divided from each other by
cleavages, are prone to instability and opposition to change. Consociational democracies are
countries which exhibit such characteristics of fragmentation but are still stable democracies,
wherein leaders of rival subcultures engage in mutual deliberate efforts to countercheck the
unstabilizing effects of cross-cutting cleavages instead of exasperating tensions and
instability. Such a government by elite cartel designed to make stable a democracy with
cultural fragmentations requires cooperation among the elites representing all segments of
society. Several factors conductive cooperation among elites are the existence of external
threats which requires internal unity, multiple balance of power among the subcultures via a
multi-party system in which no party is close to majority, a relatively low total load on the
decision-making apparatus. Consociationalism has its own disadvantages as well due to its
rigidity and inability to adopt to change, numerous weaknesses of elite accommodation,
group size issues, as well as problems related to the type of cooperation induced, that is,
whether it is pre-electoral or post-electoral cooperation.

From the aspect of the minority group majority rule has always represented a peril as in
the case of land holders versus peasantry, agrarian interests versus urban interests and, of
course, minority ethnic groups. A majoritarian democracy is one with minimal guarantees to
minority rights, whereas in a democracy with enough guarantees there are consociational
institutions or power sharing, and Madisonian institutions. In a majoritarian democracy the
majority of the voters elect the bureaucracy from which then policy is produced, and in the
simplified modern Westminster Model of democracy there are two institutionalized steps in
which the voting majority decides on the parliamentary majority which then produces the
cabinet and there is at least one checkpoint along the way. In a Madosonian Federalism the
voters directly and separately elect the President, Legislature, Governor, and State Assembly.
The main principles of Madisonian federalism are multiple majorities with overlapping
jurisdictions, no majority monopoly over all policy, numerous institutional checks for
minority interests, madisonian institutions that compensate for lack of national unity and
economic disparities, protection of elite property rights, and weakening the majority will
elements of democracy. Madison as well as the founding fathers wanted to protect private
property rights, especially the rights of the wealthy minority that could be threatened by the
non-wealthy majority. The founding fathers also doubted common people could handle
absolute democracy and wanted to reconcile economic inequality with political freedoms. In
order to limit majority control Madisonian institutions embraced presidentialism,
bicameralism and federalism; initially state legislatures elected senators with 6-year
incumbency and presidents nominated judges with lifetime terms of office. The judiciary is
unelected but rather is appointed by past presidents/senates and it represents minority
interests. The president is elected by majority of the electorate at elections based on
population weight. District electorates elect House representatives based on district
population weight, and state electorates to the Senate are weighted equally. The President,
House and Senate are agents of the overall populations, their districts and their states
respectively, whereas the judiciary is an agent of minority interests. The bureaucracy is agent
of the President, House and Senate. Separation of power is achieved with three branches of
government, the legislative, judicial and executive branch, and no single branch can control
the others. Checks and balances are created by requiring that power be balanced among these
governmental institutions. Federalism achieves the division of power between the federal and
state government. In summary, in order to ensure prevention of tyranny of the majority, it
was needed to place as much of the government as possible beyond the control of the
majority, separate the powers of different governmental institutions, and construct a system
of checks and balances.

3. What are the main arguments regarding the problems (or potential benefits) of
presidentialism in new and consolidating democracies? Read the description of
Brazils first elected president under its 1988 constitution. Does this case provide
evidence for any of these arguments?
In parliamentary regimes stable
presidential regimes the executive is
legislature. When parliamentary crisis
unpopular and minority government;
rigid terms, and gridlock.

majorities create and support the government. In

elected separately and survives independently of the
happen it can be easily solved by ousting an unstable,
however in presidentialism there is dual legitimacy,

A parliamentary regime is one in which the only democratically legitimate institution is

the parliament, and even though parliamentary systems may include presidents who are
elected by popular vote, the presidents power cannot compete with the prime ministers
power. In presidential systems an executive is directly elected by the people for a fixed term
and is independent of parliamentary votes of confidence. In presidential systems the
executive, most commonly referred to as president, exercises full control over his cabinet and
administration.
A major issue of contestation is the many instances when the legislative majority opposes
the policies of the president. Since both institutions are elected by the majority of the
electorate, and both are agents of the same constituencies, therefore in case of opposing
policies, who is it that represents the true will of the people, the president or the legislative
body? While presidential governing leads to personalization of power, its legal mechanisms
may allow for the rise of someone whom the ordinary electoral process would never have
been president in an ordinary electoral process, as in the case of Brazilian President Fernando
Collor de Mello. Most other countries in Latin America such as Aregntina, Chile, Columbia,
Mexico and Venezuela had a president elected from a large well-organized political party
with congressional majority. Such leadership in the office of the executive was conductive to
free-market policies of investment and cut-offs in government spending. Similar policies
were unsuccessful in Brazil chiefly because they were initiated at the executive level and
President Collor had little base congressional support to push through each of these reforms
because he was an outsider whose party controlled only 3 percent of the seats in Congress
and many considered his government a minority not only in Congress but also in Brazilian
society. Due to the failure of Collors economic policies Brazil has remained a caboose in
Latin American economic development, and the overall political paralysis has curtailed most
other reforms promised in Collors presidential campaign program. Due to failure in the
leadership of a single man out of all democratically elected officials the whole society
suffered, which exemplifies presidentialisms drawback of zero-sum elections.
Presidentialism is a winner-takes-it-all arrangement that makes democratic politics a zerosum game wherein winners and losers are crisply defined for an entire fixed term in or out of
office with no chance for alliances, coalitions, new elections in response to major events etc.
The losers have to stay for four to five years without access to any executive power. In
Brazils case the presidential system was adopted to ease Brazils transition from autocracy to
democracy by having a strong executive; however some of the most experienced and best
educated candidates with a long record and experience in politics lost the elections to a
nation-wide popular persuasive figure that exemplified true democracy by placing in power a
man close to the masses which eventually did not prove to be the most beneficial outcome for
the overall national well-being. A stronger Congress or an executive closer to most
congressional factions would have better substantiated democracy out of several reasons
among which is the fact that most executive policies were opposed by majority of Congress,
and Congress as well as the president embody electorates interests; Collor received 28.5
percent of votes in the first round of elections, and won the second round via populist appeals
to extremely high expectations of solving Brazils economic problems and insert Brazil in the
economic arena. Most of his overly ambitious plan did not actualize as a result of his lack of
popularity with the political elite Coller knew how to sway the masses but had no formal
expertise in running the country and being a skilled leader of the rest of the much more
experienced political smart set.

Among the benefits of presidentialism is the advantage of allowing the people to

choose their chief executive directly and openly instead of leaving this choice to
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be made behind closed doors by the political elite already in power. The
presidential system has a multitude of advantages over autocracy mostly due to
the limits and checks imposed on the executive by the legislative branch, allowing
for a safe separation of power especially in case when the executive and majority
of legislature come from rival parties.

4. Read the background information on Iraq (as of 2006). Based on your readings
and class discussion, how would you describe the constitutional institutions
adopted in Iraq? Considering the social and economic context facing the
country, and thinking about the issues raised in Question 2 and 3, what are the
potential benefits of these institutions for democratic stability (compared to
potential alternatives)? Discuss at least one potential problem with Iraqs 2005
constitution (from the perspective of your readings) and suggest how an
alternative set of institutions might function.
Iraqs 2005 constitution makes Iraq a unitary parliamentary democracy with a
ceremonial presidential executive branch, a parliament, council of ministers, and a prime
minister. The president is the chief of the armed forced and presides over foreign affairs
issues. The prime minister elects the council of ministers from among parliament
members. The ministers administer the general policies of the state, propose laws and
budgets, oversee national security agencies, and negotiate treaties. Iraqs ethnically and
religiously divided society of 75-80 percent Arab and 15-20 percent Kurdish, and
approximately 65% Shia and 35% Sunni requires Madisonian and consociational
institution building. Iraq is oil rich, and as in most other oil-rich countries the oil-wealth
accumulates in a small elite circle of society that becomes an unprotected minority in case
of an absolute rule by the not-so-wealthy population. This small wealthy minority needs
guarantees to its safety and protection in a democratic society. Similar protection is
needed by the Kurdish and minorities of religions other than Islam that constitute 5% of
Iraqi citizens. In order to guarantee the rights of these minorities Madisonian institutions
are needed that will distribute power equally across different ethnic, religious or
economic factions. One major internal threat is insurgent forces in Sunni-dominated Iraq
responsible for escalations in sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni militias. The
greatest problem with the current governing establishment is its perceived striking
similarity with the former government. Ministerial posts are divided among political
blocks reflecting parliamentary representative percentages. The most obvious difficulty
Iraq is facing is the transition from dictatorship to parliamentary democracy. The role of
the president should be strengthened in order to better resemble an autocratic system with
a potent head of state. A semi-presidential or presidential system as in the case of France
or Brazil respectively might ease the transition, especially since the structure of the
current government resembles the structure of Saddams government. After all, the main
problem in Iraqs society in its relations with the West stemmed from disputes with
Husseins government, and once that particular leadership had been removed from office
then most of the conflict was theoretically resolved. Iraqs society is way too burdened by
economic instability for such a diverse governing body not to be overly burdened. The
new governing establishment does not form a consociational democracy where different
factions are able to cooperate among each other in spite of major cross-cutting cleavages.
Iraqs society is not yet able to resemble Netherlands consociationalism with four nonterritorial pillars, Calvinist, Catholic, socialist and liberal, mostly because of the long
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history of conflict among Sunni, Shiite, Arabs and Kurds in Iraq and the rest of the
Middle East. Maybe the most important principle that should be adopted from
Netherlands democracy is federalism, which in the case of Iraq would grant federal
territorial autonomy to Kurdish factions, as well as federal non-territorial autonomy to
Sunni and Shiite subcultures. Such federal establishment would be optimally presided
over by a strong non-partisan executive elected solely on the basis of ability, eligibility,
political experience and impartiality, elected from among several candidates, all sharing
traits of impartiality and ability. The president would be the agent of the whole society
and not just a particular subculture, acting as a neutral executive in carrying out the will
of the people. In this case, similarly to Frances semi-presidential system, the president
would have great influence over the prime-minister, council of ministers and the
bicameral legislature, initiating most laws and pushing them through congress by having
the prime-minister and the council of ministers win the support of the legislature. The
upper body of the bicameral legislature would be based on proportional Sunni-Shiite
representation with two-thirds majority veto power over any laws put forward by the
president, government, and the lower legislative body. An independent judiciary would be
responsible for protecting elite rights and as a checkpoint for all laws passed. Any
contested laws may be consulted with international courts, and any irresolvable issues
may require the assistance of UN agents appointed from neighboring stable countries with
similar culture. The lower legislative body would be elected via first-past-the-post
population-weight district representation. In such a way every district within federal units
would have a representative in the parliament. Federal representatives would be able to
veto economic and social decisions affecting their own federal units; however they would
not have any veto power over laws but rather just the power to modify and refer back for
revision laws it deems need be changed. Despite such federalism on all other issues, the
military power would be centralized with the president as chief of the armed forces, the
prime minister and the minister of defense as his main collaborators. The potential
benefits of the 2005 constitution are all the pros of a Madisonian democracy of separation
of power; however a consociational democracy is very hard to achieve in Iraqs
frequently militant sub-cultural faction, and for this reason presidential non-territorial
federalism is the optimal structure to preserve national unity and minimal level of conflict
while at the same time keeping checks and balances on the governments effort to protect
both minority rights and the harmony between the two major religious sects.