Translation of Aruch HaShulchan

Choshen Mishpot

Siman 2 deals with:

Extra-Judiciary Powers
Introduction-Law and Order
Hashem gave civil and criminal law to Moshe Rabbeinu together with the Ten
Statements at Sinai not as a practical solution for maintaining social order, but as a
system of absolute truth designed to funnel Divine influence into the world and
supernatural protection to the Jewish people. The primary function of halochos
requiring, for example, payment of damages or debts, is not to compensate for a loss,
but to elicit Divine influence. In fact, since keeping order is only a secondary objective
of Torah Law, it is entirely possible that in certain instances human legislation may
seem more effective toward this end than the Torahs rulings. Hashem did, however,
provide a means to maintain civil order in situations when the objective law cannot be
carried out due to legal technicalities or when such a system seems otherwise
inadequate to maintain social order the Jewish king. The Jewish king was charged
with preventing the spread of lawlessness and the rule of armed bandits by issuing
rulings as necessary to preserve civil order without being strictly bound by the letter of
the Torahs statutes. His mandate was meant to complement any perceived practical
deficiencies of the judiciary, who were bound by the strict letter of Torah law. For
example, if a murderer escaped punishment in Beis Din through a legal loophole, the
king was empowered to execute him.1

Before the anointment of Shaul as melech (king) this power was held by Moshe Rabbeinu and the

subsequent leaders of the Jewish People (Yehoshua and the shoftim-Judges) who were all technically
Jewish monarchs.
1

When the Jewish monarchy ceased, this mandate fell to the Sanhedrin, which then
assumed responsibility for both arms of justice; adjudicating according to Divine law,
and directing practical extra-judiciary corrective measures. Nowadays, the Sanhedrin
has been reduced to Beis Din, whose power is substantially less. While Beis Din today
can act as a proxy for a halachically qualified Beis Din of authentically ordained
Dayonim for certain matters, it lacks general legislative power and broad jurisdiction
and cannot take measures to preserve civil order in all scenarios. It is, however, still
charged with equitably applying Divine law to many modern circumstances with a
view to promoting civil order and world peace. Moreover, Beis Din has retained some
of the monarchs power and extra-judicial mandate as detailed in Siman 2 of Shulchan
Aruch Choshen Mishpot. Broadly, this power enables Beis Din to legislate for the
community or sanction an individual when there is a dire spiritual need (see part 1.1
of Siman 2). All of the above objectives are indeed the Divine will, and when Beis Din
rules professionally and without prejudice, it can be an instrument for the Jewish
people to regain their rightful place in fulfilling the purpose of creation. This, in turn,
will restore Hashems special providence for His nation until the Jewish legal system
and Davidic monarchy is reinstated and the balance of justice fully restored.2

Extra-Judicial Powers of Beis Din

Four sections

1. Extra Powers Granted to Beis Din beyond Adjudication of Torah law

1.1. {From the Torahs perspective, Beis Din not only has authority and jurisdiction
regarding all civil, commercial and financial matters, but also over religious
violations, criminal activity and any matter that is required to ensure fulfillment

The ideas presented herein are based on Derashos HaRan (chapter 11) and are not found in the

Aruch Hashulchan. For a fuller understanding of the two arms of Jewish Justice, see the writings of
the Ran.
2

of the Torahs mitzvos. However, many of these powers have long been
curtailed.}3 In fact nowadays, the Jewish Court does not judge any case which
involves capital punishment, lashes, or fines.4 However, if Beis Din sees that
circumstances require it, such as when society degenerates and is unrestrained,
all of the above types of cases may be heard and appropriate decisions rendered
as may be needed for the sake of maintaining social order, communal safety or
furthering spiritual benefit to society. Such decisions should only be rendered
when Beis Din has legal jurisdiction.
1.2. Permission to rule on such matters is given not only when Beis Din takes note of
a communal laxity requiring attention and correction; should Beis Din observe an
individual who sins repeatedly and whose behavior may negatively influence

Sentences, phrases or words in brackets are added for background information and readability. The

rest is a non-literal translation of the Aruch Hashulchan which attempts to clearly and accurately
present the ideas contained therein.
4

The Aruch HaShulchan is referring to all Jewish Courts both in Israel and in the diaspora, since

there is no distinction nowadays (see SMA 1:1 and 1:9).

Historically, however, there was a brief time when the powers of the Jewish court were fully
reinstated. In the 1500s, during the Spanish Inquisition, many of the Jews who were expelled had
sinned under duress and were concerned they would not receive full atonement without being
lashed. In order to facilitate that, the Mahari BeiRav and other rabbis in Tzfat reestablished the
authentic semicha of Israel. Despite fierce opposition by rabbis in Jerusalem, particularly Mahariben-Chaviv, some rabbis did receive the semicha including Rav Yosef Karo, the Alshich and Rav
Pinto, but the endeavor did not last long. Centuries later, the Chazon Ish, aligning himself with the
reasoning of the Maharlbach, ruled that there is no halachic basis to reinstate semicha today. Since
the 1500s, there have been other attempts to launch a Sanhedrin, but they have been met with
skepticism and have not entered mainstream Judaism. The failure of such undertakings may be due,
in part, to legitimate concerns that such control to direct Jewish law, ethics and the religion itself,
may fall into irresponsible hands.
3

others to sin, the Dayonim may fine him as they see fit, provided their intentions
are virtuous.5
1.3. Permission to take action against such a person is granted even if there is no
halachically valid testimony.6 Circumstantial evidence together with an
incessant rumor (where there are no enemies who might generate such a rumor)
are sufficient to require Beis Din to prevent the perpetrator from continuing his
behavior. However, Beis Din should only take action if the Dayonim believe it is
reasonable that they will succeed. Were Jewish Courts to be required to rely

The Aruch Hashulchan, based on the SMA (ss.3) distinguishes between legislation in response to a

communal laxity versus corrective measures against an individual who is a negative spiritual
influence. When a community lapses, new, community-wide legislation may be enforced to constrain
the lapse. Anyone who violates the new legislation can then be punished, even if that person never
sinned in a way which prompted the new legislation. When an individual lapses, on the other hand,
only the perpetrator himself may be sanctioned as Beis Din sees fit.
6

The Rashbo in responsa (4:311) explicitly allows relatives, women, and children to be witnesses for

the purposes of this law when their testimony is supported by circumstantial evidence or can be
assessed for veracity, at least subjectively. In another source, the Rashbo allows for second-hand
testimony which is when one witness testifies to what another witness told him he saw ( ,
( ) '' '' '' ''See Rashbos responsa attributed to the Ramban no.379).
Based on the principles in this chapter, Panim Meiros (2:155) allows the Jewish court to rely on
circumstantial evidence (umdan daas) in any case in order to force an admission from a defendant. In
one case in which a safe was broken into and robbed under circumstances which suggested that
domestic help was responsible, Panim Meiros ruled that force could be used to squeeze a confession
from the defendant. Such speculation based on circumstantial evidence, however, is not sufficient
grounds to rule that a defendant must pay. (See note 22 which further delineates this application of
extra-judicial power).
The Chidushei Harim, in his commentary on Shulchan Aruch (2:3), goes one step further. He
maintains that the testimony of people who have been disqualified as witnesses due to their
susceptibility to lie in court (pesulei eidus) can also be used as the basis for punitive or corrective
measures at the discretion of the Dayonim.
4

only on the strict letter of the law, such as halachically valid witnesses and a
proper warning, the world would degenerate into chaos. In fact, [historically,]
Yerusholayim was destroyed because the Sages of the time insisted on following
the [letter of the] Torahs law (Bovo Metzia 30b Rashbo in responsa, part 3
s.393).7
1.4. [In such cases when the Beis Din determines that there is a religious need to
protect the spiritual character of the community], the judges have permission

The Rashbos interpretation of the gemoro in Baba Metzia (30b) seems novel. A simple reading of

the gemoro directs judges to influence litigants to act beyond the letter of the law. The Rashbo,
however, understood it to be saying that the Judges of Yerusholayim erred in not using their extrajudicial powers to forestall the citys degeneration. Accordingly, they ought to have used
circumstantial evidence, for example, to correct deviant behavior and enforce a higher ethic even
when it was not otherwise halachically warranted.
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both to mete out corporal punishment and confiscate a persons property8

according to what they estimate will constrain the breach [in behavior].9
1.5. If the individual [being tried happens to be] powerful [enough to escape Beis
Dins grasp, the] intervention may be carried out by enlisting the secular courts
to order the accused to listen to Beis Din.10
8

Throughout the generations, Jewish courts have been authorized to revoke and transfer ownership

of personal assets. The authority for such powers is drawn from verses in Yehoshua and Ezra (see
Yevamos 89b) and is relevant to extra-judicial measures as well. The Rashbo (attributed to the
Ramban 256) considers this authority to be Biblical, mandated directly from Hashem and apparent
to us from verses in the Prophets. Mishpot Sholom, in section 12 of Kuntras Tikun Olam, a
manuscript describing the parameters of communal authority found in Shulchan Aruch Choshen
Mishpot 231, concludes that every Jewish court, even those active today who, per force, do not have
authentic semicha (ordination) nevertheless has such Biblical authority. In section 9 he distinguishes
between the Jewish courts forced revocation of ownership of personal assets (hefker beis din hefker) in
order to safeguard a communitys spiritual deterioration and forced revocation of personal assets for
other societal benefits such as protecting the financial interests of immature heirs. The Torah itself
authorizes every Jewish court accepted by its community to forcibly disown property if the purpose
is to constrain a religious breach (lemigdar milsa); whereas if it is for other societal benefits, it is
rabbinically authorized.
9

In fact, the authority extends to torture (pulling out hair), imprisonment and beating in order to

deter the defendant from his reprehensible behavior. Halachic authorities remind the Jewish court to
be considerate of human dignity and act only with the purest of motives. Should the defendant be a
Torah scholar, they should act in secrecy, taking extra care not to cause a desecration of Hashems
name (SMA 2:8). The statement of Chazal lauding judges who bear full responsibility for judging
correctly (emes laamito) thereby ensuring the improvement of the world and G-ds presence among
Jewry applies to these extra-judicial corrective measures as well. (See SMA 8:14).
'' ' ''
. ,
10

Although a final decision from Beis Din is normally required before seeking the support of the

secular judiciary, in extra-judicial cases Beis Din may enlist the support of secular courts even before
issuing a final ruling (SMA 2:7). The Aruch HaShulchans choice words allude to this point when he
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1.6. [As a rule,] anyone who has the power to take measures to support the Torahs
values and searches for halachic ways to avoid taking strict measures against
people who trample Hashems vision for the world and Jewry will not live long
nor have survivors. Even their meritorious acts will not shield them from harsh
eternal judgment. (Beis Yosef in Bedek HaBayis in the name of the Recanti
Mishpotim citing Midrash Haneelam on Megillas Rus).11
1.7. Likewise, it is incumbent upon Beis Din to ensure that there not exist members
of the Jewish community who have rebellious sentiments against the Duke or
his ministers. Our Sages have already said that Hashem has caused Jewry to
swear that they not rebel against the governing empire (Kesubos 111a). It is also
written (Mishlei 24:21) Fear Hashem my child, and also the king.12 Here

writes that Beis Din may enlist the secular authorities to enforce compliance with Jewish values
instead of solely with the decision of the Jewish Court. The Tur, however, only allows the Jewish
court to request assistance from the gentile legal system after a decision has been issued by Beis Din,
effectively ensuring that the secular system is merely upholding a Jewish decision. According to the
Turs opinion, it is never permissible to enlist the local non-Jewish authorities to deal with a Jew who
is a menace to society. Although the Aruch Hashulchans allusion to the SMAs opinion mentioned
above is less than definitive, it may be relied upon in practice.
11

While the Aruch Hashulchan has not given specific guidelines for when to implement this

sweeping power other than writing that it be applied according to the needs of the time, an
important factor seems to be concern for the public. For example, if the accused is a sex offender,
has committed homicide, sells drugs, drives a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants, or
performs religious sins in such a way that may lead others astray with or without physical harm, a
Beis Din may be required to act. An example cited in the Beis Yosef is a Judge who ordered someone
killed for displaying affectionate behavior toward a married woman in public. Such a concern would
also include taking action against anyone who would undermine the local governing authority since
this threatens any Jewish community harboring such a seditionist.
12

The full verse in Mishlei is '

The Malbim, a contemporary of the Aruch Hashulchan, translated the verse as follows:
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Shlomo Hamelech exhorts all Jews to exhibit docility and disassociate from any
revolutionary movements, mirroring ones deference to the Almighty. {An
anarchist, therefore, or dissident among the Jews must be restrained by Beis Din
whenever possible.}13
2. Requirements to Hold such Authority
2.1. [The above mentioned] power [to judge and intervene with emergency
measures without being strictly bound by procedural law] is reserved for a
person great in Torah or the agreed upon municipal administrators.14 Halochoh
recognizes the authority of elected civil servants in matters entrusted to them by
Shlomo Hamelech is exhorting all Jews to fear Hashem in religious matters and to be obedient to the governing
authority in matters relating to the social structure. Do not associate with people who show an interest in revolting
against the government and establishing a new authority. Such subversive activity is an infraction of Hashems will in
that He requires reverence for the governing administration.
It is possible that the choice to cite this verse was influenced by the Malbims translation. The
Malbim died in Kiev in 1879 at the age of 70. While he was one of the great Jewish leaders of his
time in halochoh and communal matters, he dedicated his writings to his work on Tanach. Rav
Yechiel Michel Epstein, the author of the Aruch Hashulchan, lived in Novardok and printed this
volume in 1891.
13

While it is possible that the Aruch Hashulchan meant this seriously, since protecting such people

was, in fact, dangerous, it may be that he felt compelled to add it lest its omission provoke
unnecessary antagonism from the authorities. If so, he may never have meant it as normative
halochoh. Indeed, it seems quite odd to require having a Jewish investigative unit to make sure no
Jew even thinks of rebelling against the local anti-Semitic dictator.
14

Rav Shneur Zalman of Liadi, the first Lubavitcher Rebbi, in his commentary on Shulchan Aruch,

writes that the elected members of the community should not use their authority in this regard
without first seeking guidance from a reputable Jewish court. Deciding such matters without input
from Torah scholars would indicate an extremely low level of fear of the Almighty. (Shulchan Aruch
HoRav, Nizkei Guf 16). Unfortunately, some communities with noble intentions seek professional
help to deal with threats to the public (e.g., sexual offenders) but neglect to ensure competent
rabbinic supervision over all decisions.
8

the citys residents to be on par with the power of the Sanhedrin [over world
Jewry]. In our times, it is incumbent on the citys Rav and leaders to contain
breaches in the behavior of Jewry with all their ability. [To this end,] (after being
granted legal permission from the local government) any tax which they levy
upon the residents must be paid even if it is obviously inequitable in that one
party loses while another gains. [Such sweeping authority over community
assets and other restrictive legislative power is granted to the trusted communal
leaders] only when these measures are expected to have communal benefits or
curtail improper deviations from religious norms.
2.2. Anyone who resists or sabotages this [process] is considered an ally of [the evil]
Yerovam, son of Nevot.15 [Moreover,] one should not be swayed if one notices
some learned people supporting those who sabotage this process, for it can be
presumed that they lack fear of Heaven; check and you will find this to be true.16
3. Various Levels of Communal Authority
3.1. However, in situations when there is no clear municipal need or religious breach
requiring a corrective measure, the authority granted City Council for
15

Yerovam, a civil servant, was expected to collect a certain amount of tax from his tribe, Efraim.

When Shlomo HaMelech refused to lessen Yerovams tax burden, he rebelled. His rebellion
eventually created an undesirable, lasting split in the nation, with the Davidic dynasty ruling over the
tribe of Yehuda and Yerovam becoming the first king of an alternative monarchy ruling the rest of
Yisroel (see Kings I chapters 11, 12 and 14, Kings II chapter 17 and Chronicles II chapters 10 and
13). The Talmud (Sanhedrin 90a) teaches that Yerovams behavior earned him the infamous title of
being one of the few to be denied any pleasure in the world to come.
16

Rav Yaakov ben Shmuel of Zvizmir, also known as the Beis Yaakov, forbade advocating for

someone that Beis Din planned to punish as a deterrent to potential future offenders. He explained
that from the time the rumor of the defendants misdemeanors had circulated, and Beis Din had
commenced plans to apply punitive measures, any association with or support of the defendant
would be considered an alliance with a known rosho (evildoer) and was therefore forbidden; at that
point, despite a lack of proper evidence against him, the defendant must manage on his own. (Beis
Yaakov, Siman 107; printed in 1696, available on Hebrewbooks.org).
9

extraordinary measures is limited. Unless explicitly empowered, an appointed

City Council can only compel the residents to maintain the status quo.17 Only
municipal activities, interests and expenditures already in place may be
continued by the existing council. The citys representatives may only add items
to their agenda at their discretion if they have been given a specific mandate to
add to that agenda as they see fit or if the specific matter has been brought to a
vote by the entire community.18
3.2. In financial matters in general, Halochoh requires a kinyon, a legal act of
acquisition, to be performed to create a binding obligation or effect a transaction.
Commitments pledged by a community and other communal matters, however,
are exceptions to this rule. Since it is impractical to have an entire community
perform a kinyon, halochoh allows for communal obligations to be finalized
17

According to the Aruch HaShulchan then, there are two instances mentioned here in which the

City Council has authority even when there is no communal need or religious breach. The first is
when they are explicitly empowered and the second is when they act to maintain the status quo. The
first scenario is mentioned explicitly by the Ramo. The second scenario is referred to by the Ramo
more obliquely. The Ramo first mentions a rejected opinion stating that the City Council does not
possess jurisdiction to enact inequitable legislation even though there is a communal benefit. Then,
according to the Aruch HaShulchan, the Ramo later notes that even still, all agree that City Council
may enforce the status quo even when it is inequitable to individuals and even when there is no
communal benefit or expected constraint of a religious breach.
18

This halochoh is still applicable in all communal matters. Synagogue or condominium boards or

any other multi-partner group who have appointed representatives to deal with the ongoing
functioning of an institution or communal entity must follow these principles. When the partners
have enough trust in the representatives, it is often most efficient to give the council freer rein to do
as they see fit. For an appointed council to function expeditiously, it can be invested with the power
to operate without restrictions. Official forums usually have detailed charters describing the powers
conferred. These are halachically binding delineations of the representatives authority. In smaller
forums such as vaad habayit in which no clear guidelines have been given, the scope of their powers is
usually limited to such things as paying bills and collecting funds.
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orally. A simple affirmative statement or vote is sufficient to halachically bind

an entire community. Once the vote is in favor, City Council is authorized to
collect funds or compel all residents to abide by the agreed upon decisions. 19 In
the absence of any of the conditions mentioned, the City Council is powerless to
do anything which benefits some and causes loss to others. However, if previous
City Councils acted according to their discretion in all municipal matters
including those not previously addressed, this constitutes a minhag, an
established precedent, which allows each successive Council to continue to
legislate, enforce or deal with any matter as it deems appropriate.20
Alternatively, the community may vote to assign the City Council the power to
deal with any and all matters that may arise according to the council members
discretion. In both of these situations, they may enforce any measure they wish
even if it benefits some and causes loss to others. City representatives whose
hearts are directed heavenward [approaching communal service for altruistic
reasons with no personal agenda] will be helped by the Almighty to succeed. In
fact, whenever a person wishes to purify his heart and act with appropriate
motives instead of self-serving interests, the Almighty will assist him (Shabbos
104a).

19

A kinyon is a halachic act of acquisition, typically irreversible, designed to demonstrably affirm the

intent of a party or parties to undertake a transaction or obligation with full awareness of its
implications and complete seriousness. Since the function of a kinyon is to finalize ones
commitment to an obligation or transaction, technically, it can also be accomplished with an oral
statement. In fact, in exceptional circumstances, halochoh will rely on an oral statement to effect a
kinyon such as when it is necessary but impractical for an entire community to perform a kinyon.
20

In general, a known custom is akin to an unspoken contract which binds the relevant parties.

When both parties know or are expected to know of a given custom, it is considered to have been
discussed and agreed upon as a binding condition to any obligation, transaction or appointment
even when there was never any mention of it.
11

The Discretion of Beis Dins Extrajudicial Power

4. Historically, the later authorities ruled that someone who is liable for lashes must
pay forty gold pieces.21 [Since this was only a temporary ruling based on extra
judiciary power, however,] in this type of case [nowadays], Beis Din has permission
to do whatever the Dayonim deem fit. [They may collect money or] even exonerate
the defendant if they wish, as once happened in early times. The incident in early
times involved one who was liable to receive lashes. He was seated on the ground to
be lashed and the person appointed to give him the lashes did not show up. At that
point, our Rabbis excused him from being lashed since he had already been
degraded by [merely] preparing himself to receive the lashes (SMA ss.16). This was
in accordance with what our Sages said (Makkos 22b, 23a), Once he has been
degraded, he is exempt (Rambam ch.17 of Sanhedrin h.5).22

21

One gold coin per lash.

22

There are many other examples of Beis Din exercising their authority as allowed for in this Siman,

including the following cases:

1. In one instance, the Rosh endorsed the decision of a local rav to cut off a widows nose which
she had beautified in order to attract an Arab man. Rumor had it that the Arab had impregnated
her resulting in the denigration of Judaism and Jewish laws by the local gentiles. R Yehuda ben
Yitzchak, the local rav, was concerned about other women learning from this precedent but was
unable to find bona fide halachic witnesses to convict the widow. The Rosh endorsed the
corporal punishment and urged a swift response to prevent the widows further assimilation. He
also recommended fining her in accordance with her wealth. (Responsa 18:13).
2. R Yehuda ben Asher, the Roshs son, recommended amputating both hands of a defendant
who disfigured a Dayan as revenge for having found him liable to pay a tax. The Dayan testified
that the defendant ambushed him, beat him, cut his face from eye to chin and lacerated his lips,
permanently disfiguring him. Reputable witnesses could only testify about the defendants
threats, ambush and escape, but not the actual attack. Rav Yehuda wrote that any attack on any
person must be dealt with, especially against a representative of Beis Din involved in upholding
justice, and particularly against a Dayan himself. Killing the defendant was not recommended
12

since he was not technically liable for the death penalty. Moreover, it was thought that
amputating both his hands one for each wave of attack - and leaving him alive would be a
more effective deterrent while still preventing further aggression from the defendant. (Chidushei
Harim 2:3 ruled that it is forbidden to kill someone even as a deterrent without proper halachic
witnesses. This responsa seems to contradict that assertion). Rav Yehuda also urged the rabbinic
leaders to make certain they approach this type of justice with only the purest of intentions.
(Responsa no. 79)
3. Rav Yisrael Isserlin, also known as the Terumas Hadeshen, who lived from 1390 to 1460 and was
Chief Rabbi and Rosh Yeshiva of Vienna, ruled that someone who was alleged to have
purposely pushed another during hoshanos, causing him injury, be required to apologize publicly
and pay the victim a fine. The defendant claimed that he was unaware that he was the one who
pushed and if he was, it was done accidentally. There were no witnesses to testify otherwise. The
plaintiff claimed that they had been enemies for years, and a witness said that the defendant
notified him the night before that he would push the plaintiff. Also, upon leaving shul after the
incident, the same witness said that the defendant turned to him and asked sarcastically, Why
didnt you help the plaintiff when he was pushed? The witness understood this as an admission
that he had carried out his threat from the previous night. The Terumas Hadeshen explained that
none of this testimony is enough to exact judgment according to strict halochoh. The threat may
have been posturing, the admission was unacceptable since it wasnt made in a Jewish court,
and such circumstantial evidence was insufficient to exact punishment or charge for medical
care. However, in light of Siman 2 in Shulchan Aruch and out of concern that hoshanos become a
forum for revenge which might one day lead to their cessation, as well as the incidents
desecration of the shul, the mitzvah and the sefer Torah which was on the bimah, he required the
defendant to apologize in shul on a day of kerias haTorah in front of the shuls dignitaries and pay
the victim a fine which he could use for the mitzvah purpose of his choice. (Responsa, Terumas
Hadeshen, pesakim 210).
A Further Application of Beis Dins Extra-Judiciary Power
The Chofetz Chaim found another example when the Jewish court is entitled to use their discretion
to cause bodily harm to a person which is otherwise halachically unwarranted in a situation outside
the scope of the above Siman in Shulchan Aruch. In general, the Chofetz Chaim rules that if it is
13

obvious that negative information about a person is true then one may believe it but may still not
share the news with others; likewise one is not permitted to physically harm that person even to
recoup a missing possession. In order to reclaim such an item, a proper suit in a Jewish court is
required. Beis Din, however, is entitled, by virtue of its extra-judiciary powers, to use this
halachically unreliable information as the basis to coerce a confession or other information which
may incriminate the suspect. (See 7:12 and 7:13 of The Laws of Loshon Hora and Beer Mayim Chaim
7:31 and 7:32 based on the Rosh and Nemukei Yosef to Baba Metzia 24a).
The Panim Meiros (2:155) mentioned earlier (note 6) says essentially the same thing. These rulings
effectively expand the authority of the Jewish court to a case not addressed in the Shulchan Aruch.
In these cases, corporal punishment is permitted neither to punish an offender nor to help the
community but rather as an interrogation technique in a private civil matter.
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14