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    15 Ansichten7 Seiten

    Geschichlichkeit - Ereignis - Kehre

    Hochgeladen von

    Ahmed Rizk
    heidegger

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    CONTENTS AIATPIBAL/ ESSAYS Thomas Sheehan GESCHICHTLICHKEIT / EREIGNIS / KEHRE /241 Robert E. Wood ‘THE FUGAL LINES OF HEIDEGGER'S BBITRAGE /253 Wilhelm S. Wurzer CULTURE CLOWNS: ON A TOUR WITH NIETZSCHE AND HEIDEGGER /267 David Wyatt Aiken PRAXIS HERMENEUTIKA. A STUDY IN THE OBSCURING OF THE DIVINE: MISTS AND CLOUDS IN HOMER'S ILIAD J 277 G HEIDEGG) ‘THE SECOND STEP: THE AOTOE OF THE GOLDEN AGE 297 Robert Makus :DUCATION IN THE GRIP OF TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING: AN ANALOGICAL IERMENEUTIC OF HEIDEGGER'S «QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY» /315 Eric Sean Nelson HEIDEGGER AND THE HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY /323 Harrison Hall HEIDEGGER'S RELENTLESS PURSUIT OF BEING /335 Charles W. Harvey INTERSUBJECTIVITY, INTIMACY AND SELFHOOD: BEING-WITHIN-AND-ALONGSIDE-OTHERS 345 Kraysztof Ziarek ARS AS FORCEWORK /355, Don Ihde WAS HEIDEGGER PRESCIENT CONCERNING TECHNOSCIENCE? /373 “Hans Herbert Kdgler OBJECTIFICATION AND DIALOGUE: RORTY AND THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HUMAN AND NATURAL SCIENCES /387 Adrian Mirvish ‘SARTRE ON CONSTITUTION: GESTALT THEORY, INSTRUMENTALITY, "AND THE OVERCOMING OF DUALISM /407 ‘Thomas F. Dailey ‘THE METAPHORICAL WISDOM: A RICOEURIAN READING OF JOB'S [REPENTANCE /27 Bernhard Radioff HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF RHETORIC / 437 Jacob Golomb HEIDEGGER ON AUTHENTICITY AND DEATH /457 . ‘Nader El-Bizry «QUI ETES-VOUS, X@PA?»: RECEIVING PLATO'S TIMAEUS | 473 Wlodsimierz J. Korab-Karpowicz HEIDEGGER, THE PRESOCRATICS, AND THE HISTORY OF BEIN KPITIKH BIBAIQN / REVIEWS Lovins Benedek TUSTICE AND POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATION: JOHN RAWLS’ THEORY ‘WITH THE EYES OF 4 POST-COMMUNIST IDEOLOGUE / 503-520 NG /491 EXISTENTIA MEAETAI ZO@IAS AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY SEPARATUM Thomas Sheehan GESCHICHTLICHKEIT / EREIGNIS / KEHRE VOL. XI / 2001 / FASC. 3-4, SZEGED - BUDAPEST - MUNSTER a LULrrrrC~—~—~— AvriGera ue vi povodia, tpayovdoiee didxinpn Suda dvdpay kai ywaixdy. "EDG xhdi: vées zopebovy Kuehne tpayouddiveas Eva «lapbéveioy» ind rods Hyous athov. ‘Ayyeioypagia tod E' aliovox 2.X. (Péun, Movoeio Bidta Ttovhia). AIATPIBAI Thomas Sheehan GESCHICHTLICHKEIT / EREIGNIS / KEHRE ne debete in philosophy has alvays been over the a priri—at all evel, ‘of course, but here I Yocus on human being—both about whether there is fone and io, of what kind it might be. Granted shar there isan a priori dimension defining human being, the argument between Heidegger and "Husserl was principally about its kind: throwmness or presuppositionless- ness, Granted, not unproblematially, that this first question were resolved in favor of thrownness (for Heidegger, the archi-exstental), the next debate, between Hei ‘dogger and Aristotle was about is material conten: possibilty or actuality. ‘The overlapping of agreements and disagreements is complex. Husserl and Aris- totle agree on the material content ofthe a priori but not on its formal kind. They hold that setidentity, immanence, and ideality define full being and validity, and hence they privilege attuality qua Selpresence asthe ansloical norm determining the material content of the a priori of human nature, They diverge, however, on its formal structure, Aristotle opting for thrownness into finite actuality, Hussel for a presuppositionlessly actual transcendental consciousness, Heidegger and Aristotle, ‘urn, agree on the general form of the a priori—throwaness in both cases —but verge on its material content: thrownness into passbilty for Heidegger, thrownness into actuality for Aristotle. And finally Husser| and Heidegger disagree on both the form and the content of the a priori operative in human being, with Heidegger arguing for thrownness into—and the derivation of all actuality from possiblity. ‘This third divergence explains why, on the negative side, Heidegger’ fundamental critique (both early and late) of Husser’s work always concemed historicity: he argued famously that there was no historicity, and in principle could be none, in Hiusserfian phenomenology. On the positive side, Heidegger’s insistence, from begin- ning to end, on thrownness into posibily (later formulated as Es-gibt-Sein) tells us everything he had to say, both early and late, about: historicity, presupposition, and “turn”, that is, about Geschihiichke, Ereignis, and Kelre. Which means it tells us everything Heidegger had to say, period, One of the abiding and most troubling a dztop/ai in Heidegger-scholarship is Jodged at the heart of what he has to say about the a priori, specifically about what * Amo Béler is exactly correct: Heidegger etsetz in den er Jahren den Terminus Gewor- fenheit durch die Formulierung Esgibt" In: Das Gedichinis der Zulcunf: Ansitze 20 ener Fundamentalontologie der Frehet bei Martin Heidegger and Aurobindo Ghose, Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 1996, p. 100, EASTER T vol Lp 24-251, 200 {SS spe Ci Pa Hara, he called das Apriori der Faktizitat (GA21,414.6-7: February 26, 1926, Heidegger's last lecture, before beginning the final draft of SZ2). A brief but crucial text in SZ delineates this aprioriy of facticity: it claims thatthe openness constituting the practi cal semantic field (but by implication any semantic field) is intrinsically characterized by “ein apriorisches Perfekt,” which in turn Heidegger defines asthe prior (that is, the possibilty of) having any encounterable entity in its current significance. Das auf Bewandtnis hin freigebende Je-chon-haben-bewender-lassen ist ein aprio: risches Perfekt, das die Seinsart des Dassin selbst charaktersirt, Das ontologisch ‘erstandene Bewendenlasen ist vorgingige Freie des Seienden auf seine inner- ‘umwelliche Zuhandeneit. (GA2,1145-9) ‘his passage lies at the eore not only of SZ but of Heidegger's entire projet as wel aso a it defines what openness how i futons, and what makes i posable in shor, te anlogealy unified ncaning of being that enables all forms of being-significant.> Thus an dxopia about the meaning of this text would be an dxopia about Heidegger's work as a whole. ira later marisa note (GAZ 114.2636) Heidegger offers cues on how to read ans pasageatRough as experience shows, his gloss rune the rk of explaining [Debt po ignore sogess tat the aforementioned openness be understood Br terms of the a priori—vo mpétepov tH ouoei—or even more clearly (“noch deuti- Gher’) in terms of vo vi fy evan (“das was schon war ~ sein”). Since that second Jhrase—transformed into “wie es je chon war” (GA2,431.14, translating 16 mas Jp cluad)recurs weighty in Heidegger's delineation of Genesenhet asthe aprior- t ereerccaing sof Zelichkettand since what Hetdegger has t0 a) sb0Ut Guscchahkatis only a moe concrete eaboration of Zelichket eine konkreere ‘fecrbetnarg’GA2.508 2), we may ake Arittles second phrase as cue unde andi ts conection between temporal, Moric), and apron. Whe, then, Fa san aeca by ng oterence cot Ye evar? Answering that requires abriet detour ihreegh Antlios philosophical grammar, : ‘Most modem grammars, including Portuguese, German, and English, privilege @ view of the verb in terms oftense, the marker indicating temporal relations between 2 given action and various datum points on an imaginary chronological line. Ancient Greek, however, while not neglecting chronology and tense, gives at least as much ‘weight to signaling within the verb itself the completeness or incompleteness of the depicted action Modern English generally relies on adverbial and prepositional 21 reference the Gesamfausgube by volume number, page, and, after the period, by the line or lines, Sein und Zet is abbreviated “SZ” [GA2}. - 3(1) Re sopenness:" compare: epi yoxis { De Anima: ..dbersetzen wir «ber das Sein in der Welts“Binfuhrung in die phinomenologische Forschung" / ,Der Beginn dec nevzeit- lichen Philosophie (Descartes-Interpretaion)” Friday, November 2, 1923. (2) Re openness fas sementi fel, cf , Welt nut In der Weise des exserenden Daseins, das als In-der-Welt- Sein fakdseh it" (GA2,503.13-15); and: Welt constitutes eine ontlogische Bestimuntheit des Daseins" (GA2,5D4 5-6) ,Das Da.-meint die ichnung des Seyns selbst" GAG5 298.645 ,das Da als die Lichnung" GAGS-299.14 te. (3) As regards the usual translations of Dasein one should apply Gertrude Stein's dietum about Oakland: “There's no there there." TK L. McKay, Greek Grammar for Studens: A Concise Grammar of Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect inthe Verb, Canberra, Australis; Australian National Univesity, 1974, pp. 214-224; and Hardy HANSEN and Gerald M. Qu, Greek, An Intensive Cows: Preininary Edition, New York: Fordham University Pres; 1980, Unit 21, (0). 22 supplements to portray aspect (e.g, “He ate it up” vs. “He ate it”), whereas modern Greek can distinguish such 6yis within the very form ofthe verb: incomplete, continu ‘ous, oF repeated action, for example, as in the present imperative with impertective aspect: ypdipe, as contrasted with action that is completerin-thisrmoment,as in the aorist imperative wit perfective aspect yparye.® . Like all ancient speakers ofGreek (and like Heidegger after him), Aristotle gener- ally relies on the present perfect form ofthe verb to indicate completed-aspectin- the-current-moment. Thus wey.d@nxa (present perfect form of jrvOdve, “I learn actually designates not a tense of “to learn” so much as the perfective aspect ofthe schived state of knowing ("now know”: ct Metaphysics 6, 104824, neuOn>) uch an already-achieved-and-operative state of afairs is what later philosophical {grammarians would call éveotds ouveehueér, “standing in an essential relation to an achieved state ofbeing,” a condition which Heidegger, ina frst approximation, intends by Goren and which he terms, nts more ba form, de Genesee, uch an a priorfessential relation is emphatically not a matter of chronological tm and hence snot expressed by tense nt SANT ofchronoogial ine (0) nites by the tense inating uniferentitd ps te, which th G Fa ates antigen pt ie ch he Gree gone by” (from napépyouat, “go by”) (2) Hor by the tense Indigo specifiy, continuing or extended past tne, 18 xapanasor (tow aporelo, arch Susans), wih andes eel gee by the tense marking the very receat pas, x3 napa “lying close by”) Ist ent a (uevov (the time , which English grammar calls the “present perfect tense.” Intro aru totes tay nop enone wea en tees eben HEI Chef Seatterurme let merece ni te re ene een on to aspect,” especially as found in Aristotle's texts on xpakts tehéua.® sent most obvious examples are at Metaphysics 06, where Aristotle writes such 84 ding wai Edpaxe, nal xedpdenee, xa voet nal vevéney. (10486, 23-24) eG kal eb Rycer Sua, eBdayovel nai eubeipdvncey 3525) ee dpaxe 88 nal 6pq duaeé ated, eal voeixai venéncey (3334) i Gk ae a ou aia aes tt Ot es Phincikt The Hague: Mosion, 196, 5: 515. The best workin Empsh on epee Robert Pies art ie era at a ae at SIE i pd toe t aa ea pe ae ceed en ee "id cece seins tes soem 10 plus the neuter adjective or participle. eee ‘~ ” 5. Teubner, 18H Hdesein: George Ole 965, 13 ep anon p38. Pe 243 ‘The usual translations of this passage (into English, French, and Italian, for exam- ple) are Entirely misleading. I indicate where the errors lie by using italics in the following (formally correct but materially inaccurate) English rendering: ‘Atthe same time one is seeing and has seen, is understanding and has understood, is intuiting and has intuited. (23-24) ‘At one and the same time one is living well and has lived well; one is happy and hhas been happy. (25-26) ‘That which has seen and that which, at the same time, sees, are one and the same. 3.34)? ‘And as with the translations, so t00 the interpretations ofthese passages are gener- ally skewed. On the relatively positive side ofthe ledger, Alexander Mourelatos does advance the issue beyond both Zeno Vendler’s and Anthony Kenny's discussions of verbal action by at least recognizing (although not developing) aspect in these texts!” and Jean ‘ricot’s commentary is formally correct in saying that in a perfect pais “Vacte est complet et achevé & chacun de ses moments (La Metaphysique, 502 n,); but his continued use ofthe present perfect without indication of aspect {s misleading.” On the negative side of the ledger, however, Gilbert Ryle entirely trivalizes the issue in lines 23-24 above when he write, “Aristotle points out, quite correctly (Met. IX, vi.7-10) that I can say ‘I have seen it’ as soon as I can’say ‘I see it" (Ryle tips his hand by his reference to “vi7-10"—viz. not the Greek text but the utterly inadequate English translation ofthe Loeb edition.) Likewise, Hip- pocrates G, Apostle wrongly reduces Aristotelian perfective aspect to chronological Succession when he glosses ©6,1048°33-34 above with: “That is, one can truly say this, allinte Ty siuce thete is an earlier (1), during which he has seen." Moreover, to anticipate for a moment, Heideggerians by and large continue to derail the issue ofapriority in Zeilichkeit Geschichilichkeit by missing the connec- tion between (1) the perfective aspect (not the present perfect tense!) ofthe verbs emphasized above—édpaxe, neppdvnxe, vevdnxzy, Xyxey—and (2) that which Hei- ogger designates as die Gewesenheit_ and which he interprets a8 das onvologisches Perfekt (GA2, 114.35-6). The latter phrase indicates not some “what-has-been” or the chronological state of “having-been”™* with its representation in the present perfect tense, but rather das Aprion! der Faktzitit, the ontological condition of éveovas * Compare: “Par exemple, en méme temps, on voit et ona vu, on congo et on a cong on pense et on a pensé... Main on peut &la fois bien vivre et avoir bien wécu, godter le bonheur et bvoirgodter le bonheur. .on @ vet on voit en méme temps, c'est une meme chose, et on pense et ona pensé.” La Métaphysique, ts JTicot, Paris: Vein, 1953, 11, $03. Alexander P. D, MOURELATOS, “Events, Proceses, and States,” in: Linguistics andPhiloso- ly, 2 (1978), pp. 415-34, responding to Zeno VeNDLER, “Verbs and Times,” PhilosophicalRe- Siew, 66 (1957), pp. 143-160 (reprinted with minor changes in his Linguistics in Philosophy, Ithaca: Comell UP ., 1967, as chapter 4) and Anthony KENw, Action, Emotion, Wil, London: ‘Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, pp. 172ff "WAS is well know, Thomas AQUINAS’ In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria provides ‘no commentary on the lines corresponding to Bekker 10481835 since the Latin version of “Asisttle that he used omits that section. "Gilbert RYLE, Dilemmas: The Tonner Lectures, 1953, Cambridge: Cambridge U.0., 1954, p.102. » Aristotle's Metaphysics, tH. Apostle, Bloomington: Indiana U.P, 1966, p.357 n. 13. Compare “Of Having-Been”, in: David Farrell KREtL, Of Memory ‘Reminiscence, and Witing?On the Verge, Bloomington: Indiana Univesity Press, 1990, chapter sx, pp. 240-276, 244 problem bedviling Heideggsrans as mch odo with thcinsstons om rntace Tagan unbapy ues on seegers pr ea hough ers see aspect as contrasted with tense (f. GA2,462.6; GA15,296.25-30), nonetheless he tmlorosteyymimiied Aros senploymen ofc pesen print ie ‘ntlopal pete” (eg th brgrheen OAL WEIS) ae etka Icmmings nig ot cstv low Nr tad omic Me eae ‘tatn nul be ocean tng the preset pnt ce saa in tows hangbeot) sed ne eee ee Wine Aro sdb is putes ede as neching to dosti a coon hats cuenty elles tae eh ae ead eth tot eon with conon whos fre secmulted Bose ear ad eee presen ins word ith aeing todo wih ts cet eke ne ee Koes rathen constr cmpcte aha eee whos or ino scarate pode! alsed tye ete atone ena the very doing itself (Exe(vn ¥| évoncipyer v6 téhov: 1048'22-23), in the mere exercise (xpfion) of the apposite faculty. Such acts need not cease when the téhos is attained, Seztse te wr ated and utsach somene ohne dee Usk pies “tracts” inca harvey perenne eae eet manent) sch tat here isan eqn, coened ite a ake txts above etwecn ing th act and engine ro Tee ooo Then inthe Gerhapo poo Atachen) eoe Mess se ini 88 thy xpaxukady otx Fou Go ovlty tor nap? ainiy uly xpatw, ofov apa x6 iOapiterv ode tow dito whos ovbts, di ad towvo won fodpyeia kai xpd (1198.9) ” ba ae But as regards matters xpd (in contrast to all kinds ofproduction the apa isl here sno other ven, For example, [when it comes plying the cithara] there is no other téios besides playing the cithara; rather, the very evépyeia—that isto say, the pais—is this thos itself . These ies of verbal aspect andi specienlon inthe “Arisotean aspect” proprio cna do pu ese ei aon nn a Conte of ie etre spe Sane a a ee as of Heeger’ problema ees of he peace ome re caning A vm beapaipaicnn te See ne eye deni heen of esinen at hana tobevee ean sae soe cen tt esa en Anges cntrn shout peeeie ae alte fom aps fspibe (to esac of periomablecescusans) 5°91 te te a eee human being), he confronts the grammatical dilemma of a verb (elvat) that has no © Ao ldots commertayon Mepis 6 14873, pu et oat absent gu Mears 1062S el rosa 048 ocune ane, Pay am Main: Klosterman, 1977, 3429-33. ee Ti hee ee tanta he Gre afer ne ont a es he Geol note Oe oie Ur ine tol nee Ponca nme yoymey mer nee) het King forthe tne beng” (Henoborvs Hora 0) af see eo oa he etic nr a 20 ara 245 fect form, His solution is to invent the paraphrasis v3 vi ay [+ possible dative ap am 4 ei nh rp (yout ae completeness at any given moment. The debate over the meaning of v8 ty eva, (Mrendelenbarg, Schwegler, Bonitz, Zeller, Ross, Arpe, Bassenge, Owens, and even Liddell and Scot), while long-standing, has been resolved, 1 belive, in favor of ‘Schwegler’s reading (basically repeated by Owens). That is, the Hy is understood to function not as any form of reference to past time but rather es designating the formal, intelligible perfection of a thing, the being qua “formal cause” as beyond generation (ot8 Eo aizou [= t6eldor] yévean, ovdt w vy elvau, Metaphysics, 177,1033°-8) Thus, absent a perfect form of tivas to. express perfective aspect, ‘Aristotle's paraphrastic fy points not at allt what is xpdrepov 7 xpdnp (hence, not to “whal-isas-having-been") but only to hatis mpécepav eats. All of which brings us back tothe text at SZ, GAZ,114.5-9 and Heidegger’s gloss of it. ‘This supposed “detour” through Aristotle's philosophical grammar has actually led us straight to what Heidegger takes to be philosophy’s one and only issue, the aprior- ity inscribed inthe openness that constitutes the “meaning” of being,significant at all. ‘This openness is not some vague, undifferentiated spatiality but an entirely concrete semantic field, at once differentially structured and self-interestedly oriented. What is more, ths diferential-openness-as-semanti-feld is as far as Heidegger (February 7, 1919—May 26, 1976) ever got philosophically.” Heidegger delineates the essentially differential structure of any semantic field as “das Aus des Auseinander des Unterschieds (das Da)” (GA9,326.33-34), which we might render as “the did of the diapopd: die Lichtung.” This clearing-by-distin- guishing—the performance of which Aristotle attributed to 6 vows 1 nave moueiv (De Anima, T3, 430°13) and Heidegger alluded to by his reference to the lumen naturale (GA2, 177.3 }—is die Sache selbst, and Heidegger variously names it the: Sinn, Wahrheit, Enowurfsbereich, Sein selbst, Seyn, Welt, Sein, Als, Zeit, Temporalitit, Offenes | Offenheit, Lichung,lichtende Verbergung (disesa, ¢vos®), Unteschied Unuerscheidung (®xaopd), Ortschaft (cénos), Eeignis (sivas), Sammlung (Ayo), Sein-lassen (xoino1s), Brauch (ypx)), ete—each term usually accompanied by at least cone and sometimes two understood gentives: subjective (des Sens selbst; des Wesens, etc.) and objective (von Sein; von Anwesen; der Seiendheit des Seienden, etc.). Even as an ontological datum, this differential openness is necessarily a perfor- STasone among it ahve linet wae “NB Albert Scrnveoten, De Mapai des Ansiotles. Gnd, Cberseizung und Com aay spate, Presta m Mate Mine, 19601, #345, “Dan hye” 30°97, “Eneuts LTB xiv dy eas und der Gebravch des Dative tn der Formel 0&9 eva bel ‘Aristotces™ and Joseph Own The Dorin of Being nthe Arstotlen“Metapyicss A Study inthe Grok Background of Mdiaciel Though second ein, Tooat: Ponca Iatte of Mediaeval Stoies, 1963, pp. 160 The fint dae mari the opening lecture in his course “Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschasungsproblem.” when {in Theodore Kisies words) “Heidegger became Her degen” ; Frio in sich schon diseua, well xpSxxeodou git,” GA2, 28234, 3 Pasi, inching GAS 177.26; GAO,20117-18-36931, 35: ier Seminar 7225, 7312-16, 822, and 101.28. CE Schelings Abhandlng Uber das Wesen der menschlchen Pree (183), ‘ibiogen: Niemeyer 197, 216289. Aso Er Sache des Denke, Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1969, 3421 Die «Unterscheidunge als Charaier des Sens sels es west ls untersceidend che dood ciigenes [property understood: als obrbcos/iaipeas>|= 246 ‘mance that has the existential (not existentiel) structure of “retrieval” / Wiederholung. Even “before” it is something to be taken over existentielly in resolution, differential openness is a “becoming,” (Zukommen, GA2,430:317), which, like alll movement, consists in wresting actuality from, and maintaining it in terms of, possiblity. This says not only that the structure of differential openness is ontological movement (GA22,173.7), but also that, as such, it is the possibility of disclosing something as something, All disclosure isa movement, and all movement a disclosure, insofar as both enact their transitory present from out of their rélos. Aristotle draws movement and disclosure together in Metaphysics A3, 1069°36-10702, and Heidegger offers a loss: nav yep werabdider tt kal ind twos kal eit, ..ei8 B9¢,16 elbos 2 All wexaBok is of something, by something into something, ..But that into which itchanges is that as which itappears. Heidegger's gloss interprets all forms of movement as forms of wetapols| (Um sehlag; GA65,193.14-15), and reads the latter terms of dlsjdeuc: Jede Bewestheit ist Umschlag von etwas (tx twos) zu etwas (eK 1). .. Den Wesenskern der griechisch gedachten wevaBod| treffen wir allerdings erst dann wenn wir beachten, daB im Umschlag etwas bisher Verborgenes und Abwesendes zum Vorschein konumt... (GA9,249.21-22, 26.29) ‘Therefore, to say that the a priori of human being is relegation to differential openness (“thrownness into world”) isto say that the easonse of human being is disclosure (disfdeua) understood as the aprion-operative rerieval of any possible sig. nificance. But this is exactly the definition ofthe Zeitichket to which the human being is essentially relegated: the a priori (gewesend) retrieval of finite present significance [segerndrigende} from out of one's ultimate possibility (Zukunfij—that is, one’s 4 priori presence-bestowing becoming: ‘gewesend-gegenwtiigende Zukunft” (GA2, 4323), IC is this existentia-structural retrieval that makes possible existenticl self retrieval. . ‘What does Geschichilichket add to this? Even when Heidegger speaks of Sein zum Anfang and die Erstreckung zwischen Geburt und Tod (GA2493.17-19), the Entre. kung has nothing essential to do with a supposed reaching forward to one's future death and/or backward to one’s birth, but always and only means living into the 1d of 6uagopd and thus retrieving present significance from possibility, At SZ §72 Heidegger terms this differentility Geschehen and names its existential structure Geschichtichkeit (GA2,495.33-4, 496.3), but neither of these is directly, about the possibility of somehow returning back over one's past. Both, rather, are about disclo. Sure.gsthe retrieval of possible significanco—here called the “liberation” of poss ties with the added nuance that Zeitihkeit is the retrieval of one’s archi-possibil- ity, whereas Geschichtichkeit enables the retrieval of possibilities found “short” of 2 The hyphen, which spears inthe fist edition, SZ 325.27 and later editions, i omited in ‘he Gesamiausgabe edition, Calo *Sebsverdang® GAGS 311. *® Compare oa yep nimos fe xvor alt Plytes 1 2201-2. x Der Mensch ist dem Dascin dbrantworte,betelgnet” GA 179.3436. + On iberlcfern as befrien see Was ist das—die Philosophie? Tubingen: Neske, 4th ed, 1966, 8415 and21.20-21 247 that ir vorgelagert, GA2, 350-23, 3514), including those that have come down t one tsa inheritance om the past GA2-907 16,38), Here te present pte teeth marker of what isashaving-been” ins is legkimacy forthe fist time in $Z; Dut itis entirely circumscribed and empowered by the qualitatively distinct apriorty of facticiy. Heidegger brings oth of these together atthe extentil levels authentic historical ving means (1) Hberating this or that present-perfect posit inthe light of (2 the sltiberating acceptance of ones ontological perfect trownness ‘The Kehre, the so-called “reversal” during the 1930s whereby “the focal point of Heidegger's reflection passes subtly from {Dasein] to Being itself,” is supposed to have changed all this. The moving force in this reversal is said to be Heidegger's discovery thatthe very structure of das Sein selbst includes an unsurpassable negativ- ity or hiddenness; and this hiddenness even hides its own hiddenness, a state of affairs that Heidegger terms das Geheimnis, the “mystery of being.”™ ‘But this position is beset by significant problems. It would seem that the Kehre is not a shift in Heidegger's thinking or his focus but rather inheres in and is the very Sachverhalt that Heidegger spent his life investigating.” “The Kehre is at work within the matter itself,” Heidegger writes its “at work in Erejgns.”™ And ifthere is indeed a “shift” or change (Wandel, Wendung) in Heidegger's thinking, it is not identical with the Kehre but rather duc to an effort to think though and correspond to the Kehre that is at work in Ereignis." Moreover, Heidegger makes it clear that from the from very onset ofthe question of SZ “being” is understood within the framework of the Kehre.™ : “To grasp what the Kehve is, therefore, we must frst understand Ereignis, and one way to do that is to unpack the paradigm of movement that informs Heidegger's thinking. ® sDamit bezeichuen wir das in der eigentlichen Entschlossenhitliegende ursprongliche Gestheben des Dasens, in dem es sich fei for den Tod ihm selbst in einer ererbten, aber aleichwobl gewahlten Moplichkelt ere” GA2,S0731-35. * Wiliam J. RICHARDSON, Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Though, The Hegue: Ni hot 36k. 238; compar “ite sit of fo om Bei o Benga soon as ame cleat that the primacy in the Being-process belongs to Being itself” p. 624, This perspective ‘continues in Richardson, “Heidegger, Martin,” in “Supplement” volume of The Eneyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Donsid M. Borchert, New York: Simon and Schuster Macmilan, 1996, 283-240: “Aletheia is experienced as more than the horizon within which beings ae encountered nd reveal themscives as true. Rather, it sexperienced aan active fore, a process that assumes naive ofits own by revealing self to Dasein—but concealing itself aswel." p. 234. the concealing self remains concealed. We may speak, then ofa concealing of eonce ment. This concealing ofthe concealed Heidegger calls ‘the mystery’ (das Geheimni). Ibid, 21. CL "The concealing takes a double form: (1) concealing ts own concealment so that itsseif-concealment is forgotten (mystery: das Gehetmns); (2) compounding the Torgttennest by seducing Dass into wandering abou in ever deeper frgeuloess ofthe mystery Cevrancy’ dre)? “Heidegger, Mati,” p. BAA. ° Tis Keire tine Line ct ein Vorging im geen Denker de geht a den,” Sachverhalt selbst,” Heidegger’ letter to Richardson, , Vorwort," i, p. xX. 3 Die Kehre spelt im Sachverhalt selbst.” iid, p. xX. (Cr, sho “Das “Geschehen’ der Xehe, wonach Sei fragen, st’ das Seyn als solches," itd, p. x.) “die (im Ereignis wesende) 3 That is, tis das Denken der Kehre,* or eine Wendung... die seinen Gang der Kebre centsprechen laBt," ibid, p_>vi ava The second paragraph of Richardson, pix, is the key text in this regard, 248, ‘Taken in the broad philosophical sense, movement is defined not as mere change of place and the like, but as the very being of entities that are undergoing the process of change. But movement is always for the sake of something absent and not pos- sessed—to broaden Aristotle's phrase into a principle: Gere yap tvexa tou eivmow (De Anima, T9, 432°15-16"): the very being of a moving entity is its anticipation of something absent. The absent is, by nature, hidden; but when anticipated or tended, the intrinsically hidden, while still remaining absent, becomes quasi-present insofar as it functions as the of ¥vexa that determines the present being of the anticipating entity, That is, if anticipation is the being of moved entities, and if anticipation is determined from the absent-but-anticipated goal, then even while remaining intrinsically concealed, the absent-as-anticipated “gives being” (Es gibr Sein) to the anticipating entity by disclosing that entity as what it presently is, ‘The pattern operative in movement is one of absence-dispensing-presence, where the of Evexa remains both intrinsically (if relatively) absent / concealed and indi. rectly present /revealed. Moreover, this pattern preeminently characterizes the entity ‘whose being is differential openness. What enables differential openness—the onto logical movement that discloses something as something—is intrinsic (if relative) concealment, and this Heidegger calls das Geheimnis des Seins. However, this “mm tery” is not,'as some Heideggerians would have it, (1) the redoubled concealing of (2) the intrinsic selfconcealment (3) that characterizes some “Being” distinct from differential openness. Such hypostasizing of “Being” and such doubling of its concealment are neither necessary nor possible on Heidegger's terms. Rather, Hei- eager speaks simply of “the intrinsic absence constitutive of differential openness” (das... Geheimnis des Daseins,” GA9,195.23) and, if there is any doubling of conceal- ‘ment here, it consists in the overlooking of the intrinsic absence: “das vergessen Gohcimnis des Dascins”).™ Hicideyger argued currectly that the intrinsic absence J hiddenness contributes to the overlooking, and he believed that Heraclitus had intimated as much in his fragment no.123, @van kpnreodat gui: “Differential ‘openness loves to hide.” ‘The paradigm of movement qua absence-dispensing-presence also sheds light on Heidegger's key term Ereignis. In ordinary German Ereignis means “event,” but in Heidegger's retrieval ofthe unsaid in Aristotle, itbecomes a name for the structure of the ontological movement that enables all being-significant. Playing on the adjective igen (“one’s own”), Heidegger comes up with the neologism Ereignung-”* ontologt cal movernent as the process of being drawn into what is “one's own’ by the apposite ob tvexa, Formally this structure applies to any “natural” entity: the being of any = The exception, of course, is the entirely immanent évépyeia dewnocas that Aristotle attributes at leat to God: Nicomachean Buhics H 14, 1154727. This point becomes @ commonplace in traditional philosophy. See Thomas Aquinas, n A Physicorur, lectio 2 (Parma XVIII, 2950): *..quod iam in aeta existens habet ordinem in Uulteriorem actum; quia si tolleretur ordo ad ulietiorem actum, ipse actus, quantumcumque Imperfectus eset terminus motus et non motus..";n VIM Physicorum, ecto 10 (Parma XVII}, 5004); “..movetursliguid, quod cum sit in potenti, tent in actu"; and 5.7. F-I, 30, 2, 2 “Est autem alia ratio vitutis motivaeipsius fins vel bon, secundum quod estrealiter pracsens, ¢t secundum quod est absens: nam secundum quod est pracsens, fait in seipso quiescere, secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum mover" Both citations are taken from AQUINAS’ Opera Omnia, Parma edition, reprinted, New York: Musurgi, 1948-1949, Ct, ,Der Entzug aber ist des Da-seins,* GA6S, 2939; and yDas Dasein as die Wesung dor Lichtung des Sichverbergens gehort zu diesem Sichverbergea selbst, da als das Er-eignis west” GAGS, 297.25-27 GAGS, 3114, ete, 249 ‘aes dy that is moved xa0" até consists in its being-pulled by, and thereby its anticipation of, its télos, However, for Heidegger it functions preeminently as the kinetic structure of differential openness. The ultimate possibility of such openness is the possibility that ends all possibilities, such that openness is “claimed” by the uunsurpassable téhos that is ever-enacted in its being and “pulled forth” by it into finite, mortal becoming-” This being-

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