133 Indian Dialecties appearance should be regarded as valid until the absolute is realised. Sarikardcarya distinguishes the empirical world, which is-taken for granted in logic, from dreams and illusions. They do not satisfy, the logical test of the fulfilment of conditions of place, time, cause and non-contradiction 2° According to Saikara and his followers that alone is truz or real which is not co.itradicted in all the three times (trikalabadhita ). Thus, the non-dual Brahman which is pure consciousness and which is not an object of knowledge is the only reality. _ The Vedantins can, on the whole, be said to admit the Coherence theory of truth. Truth is a systematic coherence. This |S More than: just logical consistency. A proposition is true in so far as itisa hecessary constituent of a systematically coherent whole. In the Vedantic view, truth in its fulness is only one systematic coherent whole, which is the absolute. It attaches to propositions as we know them and to wholes as we know them only to a degree. A proposition has a degree re apartionate to the completeness of the systematic according ey a ssstomtat entities to which it belongs. Thus, wateraes tit Amanuja, when of the three elsments—fire, the latter ig aq mticular element predominates in an object, elements are Renesas by its character, though the other being ey pe ean The element of fire or light (rejas) and thus aa seesaeS the qualities of rejas ic. silver illusion, owing to z ae in some sense. In’ the case of perception ae i ect in the : sense-organs and the | like, in the shell item y the qualities of silver (tejas) existing the prthvt or ern abalives of the other clements in it (eg. silver, The eons ‘ ment), and the shell is perceived as real object, the ‘l g2 of silver is thus true as it refers toa dilpenagteresee lement of silver in the shell. In this view differently, it can fens as having a teal object. Viewing it : nor. wt be said that every cogition is strictly speaking neg a8 It cognises only the predominant element in a thing but not the others.29 According to the Vallabhaites, the inner organ (antahkarana) generates prama when it is tguinbelProblem of Truth 639 with sattva-guna, otherwise there is aprama. The knowledge which is primarily predominant in sattva is the knowledge that one universal essence is piesent everywhere; this knowledge alone is absolutely valid Our empirical knowledge is associated with rajas and is not absolutely valid. This rajasa jiiana is ordinarily regarded as valid, though it is not absolutely so, and it is with rajasa jiina that logic is mainly concerned. Knowledge asscciated with ramas is completely false.6° Thus a knowledge can be judged as valid or not in relation to the system of which it is an essential pact. Jar, cup, saucer, ete. are unreal when considered by themselves; they are real inasmuch as they are modifications of clay or earth. Similarly, earth, etc, are unreal by themselves and are real only when viewed in relation to the Ultimate Principle This is true of their cognitions also. All knowledge is to be viewed within the framework of the knowledge of the Absolute. According to the Kevaladvaitins also, the ephemeral or illusory (pratibhasika), the empirical (vyavah@rika) and the highest (paramarthika) are real or true in view of the Absolute Brahman which is the substratum of all appearance. Whatever reality there is derives from the Absolute Principle. It may be noted that for the Vedantins truth and validity are identical; only the Vallabhaites do not regard memory, though it be true, as valid. Definite uncontradicted knowledge whose causes are not vitiated is tegarded as valid. Yatharthya ( correspondence or agreement with the object), avisamvada ( coherence or lack of inconsistency) and arthakriya— Karitva ( efficiency or being capable of leading to successful action) are regarded as the criteria of true and valid knowledge, Novelty is regarded as another requisite of valid knowledge especially by the Mimarsakas and the Buddhists. The Naiyayikas and the Prabhakaras regard anubhititva (presentative- ness) as an essential characteristic of valid knowledge; knowledge in order to be valid must be presentative and not reproductive in character. Smyti though true cognition is not prama (valid Bowl ecee) For almost all the the other schools, truth and640 Indian Dialectics validity are one, and all true knowledge is regarded as valid knowledge. The Indian logicians have lent much thought to the theory of knowledge. They have distinguished between knowledge, true and untrue, valid and invalid, as also defined valid knowledge and formulated theories of truth. The moot problem with them is whether pramanya ( validity) or apramanya (invalidity ) of knowledge is intrinsic (sva‘oh ) or extrinsic (paratah), generated by the same factors as produce knowledge oe by other causes, whether it can be known directly along with knowledge and whether it can proceed independently in its task of rightly or wrongly ascertaining the object. That is to say, “Is pramanya independent of other factors in respect of its origination (utpatti\, apprehension (jiapri) and its effect or the function of ascertaining things as they actually are (vathavyavasthittirthapariccheda-laksane karye)?” The two main exponents of the theory of the validity of knowledge are the Mimarnsakas and the Naiyayikas. The Mimarhsakas hold that Pramanya or validity is not dependent on other factors inall Rerine whereas, apramanya is dependent on other bath adler Naiydyikas, on the other hand, are of the view that that ieee y and invalidity are dependent on conditions other Vediianting Ribas for the origination, ete. of knowledge. The The Sania peneraly accepted the theory of the Mimarnsakas. nines a oga, in agreement with their theory of every: believe Pi mee existent whether latently or patently, are aad aa that validity and invalidity are both intrinsic seven aig ara Be The Jaina logicians hold that validity and aid faticton poeheadent on other factors for their genesis Biiccendarse Ege a of their apprehension they may Seka: » according as the object cognised is Se one or not a familiar one. The Buddhist logicians © same view as the Jaina logicians though they are generally believed to be of the view that validity is extrinsic and: invalidity intrinsic. In familiar cases both pramanya and apramanya can be known intrinsically. A person with someProblem of Truth : 641 eye-disease ( that he is aware of ) knows as soon as he sees anything that his cognition is not true. Similarly, in normal cases pramanya is ascertained along with the cognition.3+ Praminya and apramanya seem, according to the Buddhists, in their ulpatti: to be paratah, as being due to excellence or defect in the causal apparatus. The controversy on this problem is mainly and Primarily between the Mimarnsakas and the Naiyayikas. Following in their wake, other schools formulated their own theories regarding pramanya and apramanya as seen above We shall discuss at some length the views of the Mimarhsakas and the Naiyayikas with regard to validity being intrinsic (svatalt) or extrinsic (paratah). The former were concerned most with proving the validity or authoritativeness of Sruti or the Vedic word. They accepted it on the strength of their tradition, but they had to prove this in their controversies and discussions with others. It is obvious that they could not confine their discussions to the intrinsic validity. of the Veda alone which they regarded as apauruseya (authorless, not owing its existence to any person, not even God). Consequently, they formulated a theory of validity in general.82 We may now consider the arguments in favour of svatah-— pramanya (intiinsic validity) as given by Kumarila in his Stokavarttika (1.1.2, 33 ff) and supplement this discussion where necessary by additional arguments advanced by others, With regard to all cognitions you must consider the follow- ing questions ; Is the validity or authoritativeness (pramGnatva) and invalidity or unauthoritativeness (apramanatva) of a cogni- tion due to itself or to something else 28% Since those that are themselves non-existent cannot by any means be established, some people attribute both validity (pramanya) and invalidity (apramianya) to the cognition itself whereas others attribute them to the proved excellences or defects of its cause, But both can- not be due to the cognition itself, since the two are mutually contradictory and cannot subsist in one entity. Nor can both be due to something else, because there would be no definiteness“642 indian Dialectics in the cognition and it-would have no character of its own. That is to say, if both are held to be due to proved excellences ‘or defects in the cause, then a cognition having arisen, SO long as such excellences or defects have not been proved, the cognition cannot be accepted as valid or invalid, and so would be without any character—which is an absurdity. How could it again be possible that any one thing, independently of all extraneous agency should have contradictory characters ? And when devoid of both these characters, what nature could the cognition have ? It may be urged that though one and the same cognition cannot be both valid and invalid, yet the duality of character can be explained as referring to different cognitions and thus there would be ro contradiction. This isnot tenable, because even then if no extraneous determining factor is accepted, how can it be ascertained which cognition is valid and which not, and also where it is one or the other, Therefore, for those who hold apramanya of cognitions to be intrinsic or natural (svabhavika), pramanya must depend Hoon something else. In this connection the following rule is a eee Apramanya being a negative factor can never be due Sate ae of the cause, whereas pramarya being a positive brought about by theexcellences of the cause Be ea forth all possible alternatives regarding ae raseeer Uaguaa nye being intrinsic or extrinsic. Showing rice of both being intrinsic or extrinsic, he Erne aaeuens in favour of the view that apramanya ine pramanya extrinsic. If cognitions as a role patent aan the negation of pramanya be not determined foots ae CEs then no one could prevent dream cognitions & pramanya. Their apramanya cannot be said to be due to defects, because as said above, being a negative entity dt canpot but be causeless. In the view that apramanya is per ast and praminya extrinsic, however, there can be no pramanya in the absence of a particular cause, and consequently there is not the contingency of a negative factor (viz. apramittya) having a cause (in the form of defects. of theProblem of Truth 643 cause). The excellences of the sense-organs, etc. alone can be said to be the cause of pramanya, but the authority of these is denied for two reasons—(i) the occasional disorders of the organs of perception, and (ii) the occasional absence (e.g. during dreams) either of the organs themselves or of their capabilitics It is on account of this fact that you have the ‘mistaken notion that the illusory cognition is due to defects in the cause. As a matter of fact, the invariable concomitance of defects leads to the knowledge of the absence of excellences and this absence establishes the apramanya of the cognition; that is to say, apramanya is not brought about by defects in the cause, but is due to the absence of the excellerces which would have brought about pramanyain the cognition Apramanya is the rule and pramanya an exception in respect of cognitions. Therefore the purity of the cause ( karana-Suddhatva ) must be admitted to be the cause of the pramanya of a cognition; while apramanya being natural is due only to the absence of such purity (in the cause). There is no invariable concomitance, either positive or negative, between apramanya and defects, so apramanya cannot be said to result from a defect in the cause. No defect, for instance, is found to exist in the case of ajnana (non-cognition) that is due to the absence of the cause of cognition. [It may be noted here that apramanya is of three kinds—doubt (samsaya), erroneous knowledge ( viparyaya) and non-knowledge (ajf@na) ]. Therefore inasmuch as there is no human agency—or even if there be any, because of the impossibility of-any purity belonging to it~, there is no cause for the pramanya of the Vedic injunction (codana) and so pramatya cannot rightly be said to belong to it.5® Kumiérila then answers these arguments and establishes the view of the Mimarhsakas that pramanya belongs intrin- sically to cognition, and it is apramanya that is extrinsic or due to external factors: We must understand that pramanya ( validity) is inherent in all pramanas for a potency by itself non-existent cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency; since it is only for the sake of its originationos Indian Dialectics that a positive entity requires a cause, and when it has once acquired existence, gives rise to its effect or proceeds to do its work naturally.8¢ If even on the rise of a cognition, the object is not comprehended until the purity of its cause has been ascertained by. means of another valid cognition then in all cases we should have to wait for the rise of another cognition from another cause, for until the purity of the cause of a cognition has been ascertained, it is as good as a non- entity. And this second Cognition could be regarded as valid only on the ascertainment of the purity of its cause and so on. ad infinitum, On the other hand, if pramanya is accepted as due to the Cognition itself, nothing else is required, because in the absence of the cognition of defects, falsity (ice. apraminya) becomes precluded automatically. Therefore, the authoritative character which cognition comes to have through the mere fact of its having the character of ‘cognition’ gan, be set aside only by the awareness of the contrary nature of MS object or by the recognition of defects in its cause. ( For tnstance, in the typical case of mistaking the rope for 4 serpent, when it is found on examination that it is a rope, the validity of the Previous cognition. of the serpent is set aside, Similarly, One suffering from jaundice, perceives the white conch-shell as, yellow, but ac soon as he recognises ioe disorder in his eye, he attributes the cognition of yellowness to the disorder and accepts the conch-shell as white, thus setling aside the Validity of his previous cognition ), _ Apramianya is three-fold according as it is due to falsity (mithyiitva), non-cognition (ajnaina) and doubt (samsaya). From anong these, two, yiz falsity and doubt, being positive entities are brought about by discrepancies in the cause. In the case of non-cognition, however, we do not admit the operation of such defects, because all non-cognition is due to the absence of the cause of cognition. ‘The fact of apramanya being duc to defects does not involve the svarah pramanyavadins (those who hold that pramanya is intrinsic) in any vicious infinite series (anavasthii) as is found to be the case with the theory of excellences (asProblem of Truth 645, being the cause of pramanya ). [They explain apramanya as due to defects in the cause and the contrary character of the objects of cognition which are known by pramanas which are authoriiative; thus the latter cognition comes to be intrinsically valid and here the matter rests and they are saved the necessity of assuming one cognition after another ad infinitum, It is only when one thing (authoritative or otherwise ) is made to depend upon another of the same kind that the contingency arises].5" Apramanya (falsity) is got at directly through the cognition of the same object as having a contrary character, for so long as the former cognition is not set aside, the subsequent cognition (of its contrary) cannot arise. As to the other method, though the cognition of the defect of the cause is known to refer to a different object (than the object of the original cognition), yet we have co-objectivity (of the two cognitions) as being implied thereby and hence there is the preclusion of the former as in the case of the milking pot. (There is a general rule for performing a certain rite by means of a certain vessel: but in a particular case there is a special rule, whereby the rite is performed by means of another vessel, and here both the rules are accepted as being co-extensive in their scope as having the common purpose of laying down a vessel for the same rite, Similarly in the case of the cognition of yellowness with reference to conch-shell, though the preceding cognition of such yellowness has for its object the yellowness of the conch-shell and the subsequent cognition, the yellowness of the bile in the eye, the cause of perception being the defect of being jaundiced; yet in this latter case also we must admit a co-extensiveness of the scope of the two cognitions as implied by their meaning. The cognition of yellowness leads to the cognition of the bile, and the. bile being the cause of the perception of yellowness in white, is found to exist in the eye and thereby leads to the conclusion that its effect—the perception of yellowness—is wrong and this conclusion of the cognition of yellowness being a mistaken one contradicts the former646 Indian Dialecties cognition of yellowness in the conch-shell, and hence this latter is set aside. The implied meaning of the subsequent cognition is that there is bilein the cyes and the presence of the bile has given rise to the mistaken cognition of yellowness in respect of the conch-shell.) But this rule. (regarding the pramanya of the previous cognition being set aside by a succeeding cognition) applies only to those cases in which with regard to the latter there is neither cognition of any defect in the cause nor any contradictory cognition. In those cases, however, in which we have either of these two, the succeeding cognition becoming false, the preceding one comes to be authoritative.?® But in that case too, the pramanya is intrinsic (in the absence of any cognition of defects), It may be urged that just as the first cognition is set aside by the second, so the second may be set aside by the third and so on and on we may have to Proceed and find every cognition set aside by the one following it The answer to this is that where there is no such cognition Pecoounsre is no reasonable ground for doubt. It is only eter of defects in the cause that sets aside the Ra Sica ae when we do not come across any such defect, (hosbptiee ie ‘asonably doubt the validity of the cognition 0 cay T4 Pr meron na’ Sanka nispramanika.—Slv, 1.1.2, iavibealee aur the svatahpramanyavadin does ‘not stand iierornia er ae more than three or four cognitions and pramaine at he adheres to the doctrine of svatah- Speaking of Sabda Kumirila says : a ( word, verbal testimony ) in particular, mS - Sa rule the possibility or rise of defects Ae. peas depends on the speaker; and in faults eerie 1a sence of defects is due to its having a ahs cause the defects removed by his good qualities cannot attach to his word, or in the absence of any speaker (as is the case with the Veda), there would be no defects as ies Would have no substratum to inhere in. In the case of (truthful) human speech, we find two factors—absence 7Problem of Truth 647 of defects and presence of excellences, and it has already been explained that praminya cannot be due to excellences. Therefore, excellences must be held to help only in the removal of defects, and from the absence cf these latter proceeds the absence of the two kinds of apramanya (viz erroneous knowledge and doubtful cognition, non-cognition being out of the question in a case of cognition), And thus the fact of pramanya being inherent in cognition—here verbal knowledge (Sabda)—remains unaffected. It may be urged that if the absence of defects is held to result from excellences, there is the same anavastha (vicious infinite series) as was urged against the rival thinkers. The answer to this is that it is not-so, tecause at the time of the cognition of the absence of defects, we do not admit of any active functioning of excellences, though they continue to be recognised because in the cognition of the absence of defects, they help by their presence. If the cognition of excellence be the cause of the ascertainment of pramanya, then even this cognition would stand in need of another for its confirmation and so on ad infinitum; but as a matter of fact, excellences help the ascertainment of the absence of defects only by means of their presence, which serves to suppress the defects and these are not able to weaken the confirmed pramanya of the cognition. Then too in the case of the Veda, the assertion of freedom from reproach is very easy to put forward, because there is no speaker in this case, and for this reason, the apramanya of the Veda cannot even be imagined. Thus, then, the pramanya of the Veda being independent of a speaker or author, taking resort in its Author is entirely out of place, for this could be possible only if the Veda be assumed to be devoid of pramanya. (Only if the Naiyayika holds the theory of the unauthoritativeness of the Veda itself would he require a shelter in its infallible Author whom he assu’ es. But then, this infallible author would depend on the Veda for the proof of His existence, and the infallibility of the Veda resting upon the infallibility of such an Author, the reasoning would become acase of mutual dependence). Hence the mere fact of the Veda I-82ia Indian Dialectics not having been composed by a respectable or reliable (@pla) author ceases to be a defect. It is only human speech that depends for its authority upon another means of valid knowledge, and hence in the absence of the latter, the former becomes faulty, but the other (ie. Vedic statement) can never be so on that ground. [The commentators clarify even here that the other pramfna serves merely to set aside (suspicion of) a fault and not to establish pramianya }.*° Kumarila goes on to give a detailed exposition of the validity of the vedic word, into the details of which it is MOL necessary to enter here. Kuméarila has not explicitly referred to the three problems involved in the discussion of prim@nya—though these are implied in the exposition. Is Pramanya intrinsic in respect of its origination (utpatti), its own effect or function (karya ) and its own cognition (jaapti) Or is it dependent on factors other than those on which Reowledae depends 2? Most of the logicians discuss the problem pramanya from the point of utpatti (origination) and jrapti genition, awareness).42 But some like Jayanta, the author thee Mb@va-manjari and Abhayadeva ( tenth century ),** Dideee of the well-known commentary of Siddhasena nes a Sanmati Tarka have discussed it from a third thing? gee also, viz. its karya (effect, or function of making Sane wh as they are) (see Nydyamanjart,,1, pp. 146 ff; ukG, pp. 2 ff). cae Rees noted that with regard to the cognition of eet ie woe) there are three views among the Mimamsakas. itself ae Mat Prabhakaras it is known from the knowledge 7% ich is self-luminous. According to Murari Misra it is kno ledge of a thing (¢.g. I know the jar), and according to Kuméarila and his followers it is known by inference from the hetu, viz, jattara (cognisedness) produced in a thing by the anuvyavasaya, Nevertheless all hold that pramarya is ascertained intrinsically, that is to say, by the very factors that are necessary for the apprehension of knowledge (see Tattva-cint&amani, wn from the anuyavasaya which arises after the know: .Problem of Truth 649 Pratyaksa-Khanda, Pramanyavada, pp. 54ff ; also Vardhamana’s commentary on the Nyaiya Kusum@njali, 2, p. 9).48 The Naiydyikas on the other hand hold that pramaaya and apramanya are extrinsic ( paratah ). This problem was initially discussed from the point of view of the determination of the pramanya or apramanya of knowledge. The validity of a cognition must ‘be established ultimately by an appeal to facts, The process is that on the perceptual’ judgment ‘This is water’, there arises the further mental judgment ‘I see water’ and its validity is proved by actually drinking the water. The validity of cognition is determined by its pravytti-samarthya (efficiency) though we may not verify cach case of cognition of, for example, water.t* The difficulty is anticipated in the Nyaya-vartika and later works that there wou!d be thus ifaretaraSraya (mutual dependence ). A person will not act till he knows that his knowledge is true and the truth or validity of his knowledge cannot be determined till he acts (see NV, pp. 3-4; NVTT, pp. 11 ff). The Naiyayika’s solution is that the validity of knowledge can be determined only by its pravytti-simarthya, A person proceeds to act on there being the cognition of a thing, but not on there being the certain true cognition of a thing, because intelligent persons (scientists, discoverers, etc.) are seen to act even when there is doubtful cognition about a thing. And even when people act with the confidence that the knowledge of a thing is certain, they might be doubtful about the future result, whether they would be able to reach and handle the object or not, These, functioning even when doubtful of the result, determine the truth of the cognition from the success the activity meets with, and later determining the validity of similar cognitions pertaining to familiar things and circumstances on the ground that they are similar and so efficient, they act on such cognitions. The validity of each cognition would be already determined by inference on the strength of similarity with a previous successful cognition and so on. If the cognition of the result attained by acting on a particular cognition is doubted by650, . Indian Dialectics reason of comparison with enjoyment in a dream and the like, then we can say that such a cognition is not a familiar one, so its validity would have to be determined by pravrtti- samatthya, as explained above (NVTT, p. 12). Thus determining the validity of mantras and Medicine whose results hav2 been actually seen by reason of their pravrtti-samarthya, the validity of the Veda which has no visible fruit but which is similar to the former can be determined even without resorting to Pravrtli-samarthya, by reason of its being the utterance of an Gpta (viz, God). The allegation of mutual dependence (itarerara- Sraya) can be answered by the consideration that one’s mundane life (samsara) is beginningless, soeven when a baby starts Sucking the breast it does so on the strength of its sear of the validity cf the cognition of the breast by Be paren to similar experiences in past lives, so the fault een ree is not there as also in the case of seed eee etnias ie pp. 13-14). It may be observed here that atentnec: yikas admit that the pramanya of anumana irom ane eee (analogy) as also of anuvyavasiiya casnition parte. svatale _This is so because the inferential with the siap oat of a liga which is invariably concomitant istalways eae So is resolute in its genesis Anuvyavastiya ingtranieas tigen the case of the cognition of the shell meas silver’ ( ra © anuvyavastiya is ‘I know the thing before notjrequits ie rertinat, rajatatvena janami). This does vane testimony t verification. But sensuous cognition and though Bani pegecily _Tequire further verification as they are not proce: a existent object and caused by it, nor are the other eau ‘9 be invariably connected with the objeci; ith ae icc aE ea epeoreens: ete invariably connected with the thing ns aS Word is not necessarily connected propauiden aa i makes us understand the meaning of the convention regen n the strength of the knowledge of the ing the meaning of words (NVTT, pp. 17-13). Udayana has discussed the problem of the validity of cognition more systematically in the second stabaka of hisa Problem of Truth él Nyaya-kusumiiijali and this is ably supplemented by Vardhamana in his commentary Nyaya-kusum@iijali-prakaga. Vardhamana has incorporated in bis commentary arguments advanced by his father Gangega in his Tattva-cintamani (Pratyaksa-khanda— Pramianyavada}, We shail consider here Udayana’s arguments, supp'emented by those of Gangesa or Vardhamana only where necessary. The argument establishing the paratastva of validity in respect of ufpatti (genesis) is: “Prama (valid cognition) is dependent on causes over and above those that are the causes of cognition, because beingan effect it is a particular type of it, like apram@ (invalid cognition)? (pramia jianahetvatirikta- hetvadhina karyatve sati tad-visesatvat, aprama@yat). Vardhamana examines a number of likely objections against the wording of this definition, but the simple argument is quite under- standable as it is. What is meantis : whatever causes, including the special ones (sense-organs, etc. in the case of perceptual cognitions, etc.) are required for Producing the respective cognitions, cannot bring about the validity also of the cognition for which additional causes such as excellence of the sense- organs and the like are necessary. If prama (valid cognition) were dependent on only as many causes as are required for the origination of cognition, then even apram@ would be prama; the cause of cognition is also a cause of aprama since otherwise aprama would not be cognition. And, as Garigesa and Vardhamana add, even aprami (invalid Cognition) should thus be intrinsic (svatah), not extrinsic (paratah), because if it, like prama (valid cognition), were produced by the peculiar causes giving rise to cognition, dosa could not Possibly be its cause. If the causal apparatus being there, dosa is regarded as the cause of apram@,on account of positive and negative concomitance of dosa (eg noa-perception of particular features) and aprami, then on account of positive and negative concomitance of such guia (excellence) as Perception of parti- cular features and the like and prama, guna should similarly be regarded as a cause of prama (TC, Primanya-vada, Pp. 167; Nyayakusumanjali-prakisa 2, +p, 3).652 Indian Dialectics Udayana continues: It may be urged that even while being cognition, it is aprama owing to the presence of defects in addition in the causal apparatus. The answer to this is that similarly owing to the presence of the absence of defects in addition to the causes of cognition, cognition arises as pramii (valid cognition) as it necessarily depends on that. It may be further urged that absence of dosa (defect) may be an additional factor, all the same it is not a positive one and so prama can be said to depend only on those factors that are the causes of cognition. The answer (o this is that this would be tenable if dosas were necessarily positive in character. But it is not so. Even absence, e.g. absence of cognition of the particular features of a thing, can be a defect; otherwise how could doubtful and erroneous cognitions arise due to it? And then absence of dosa would be positive in character. Why should one not take it like this ? (Nyaya-kusumanjali, pp 1-2). Vardhamana explains this as follows :- It may be urged : “In the case of the cognition ‘yellow conch-shell’, erroneous cognition arises though there is the perception of particular features ; hence non-perception of particular features cannot be the cause of erroneous cognition; or where perception of Particular features also is erroneous there the knowledge Produced "by it would also be erroneous, so perception of Pees features cannot be said to bring about pramiatva.” ane Pee The absence of that perception of particular Sh cmen oes ceased to erroneous cognition is the cause A Lea p he case of perceptual error, direct perception ee ar features is opposed to it because this is found © true with respect to erroneous perception of directions and the error ‘I am fair’ (-body and soul are identified); and that is not there due to a defect. Perception of particular features which is of the nature of valid cognition is an excellence (gutta) and so its negation or absence is a defect (dosa). It may be argued here : “Non-perception of particular fea- tures is not a defect, but bile, etc. which obstruct the perceptionProblem of Truth 653 of particular features are defects, because they are indispensable in the generation of invalid cognition. It may be urged on the ground of parsimony or simplicity (la@ghava) that since these are many, it would be better to regard non-perception of particular features as the cause of apram@ in view of its persistence (—i.e. its being common to all cases—) as an obstructive factor of perception of particular features. But there is persistence in the sense that there is some defect or the other in all cases, otherwise aprama@ would not arise even from bile, etc. as these do not persist in all cases of invalid cognition; and because there is a greater degree or intensity of illusion corresponding to the greater degree or intexsity of bile, etc. It bile etc. are not defects how is it that there is not the valid cognition of particular features? If it is said that this is because the particular features of these particular features are not pereived, then this would lead to a vicious infinite series. Moreover, perception of particular features is not the cause of all valid cognitions whatsoever, nor of valid perceptual cognition, because this is not always found to be the case, and because if it were the cause of the valid cognition of particular features there would be a vicious infinite series.” This reasoning is.not tenable. Though it may not be a cause of all valid cognition, yet it is a cause of the valid cognition which arises after doubtful and erroneous cognitions. Non-perception of particular features being a defect here, it is a defect in other cases also. The greater intensity of bile, etc. is not directly connected as a cause of a greater intensity of aprama inasmuch as it mostly obstructs the perception of particular features. Thus excellence (guya) is a cause of prama and dosa (positive or negative in character) that of aprama (NKuP, pp- 4-5; also TC, Praminyavaida, pp. 174-184) The Mimamsaka may perhaps concede that validity is brcught atout in ferceptual cognition and the like by excellence but yet contend that in the case of the Veda, the four-fold negation of error, etc. is the cause of prama; in654 Indian Dialectics praciice only when there is absence or error, etc., is there the rise of prami, and being possessed of the true knowledge " of the rreaning of the utterance of a speaker or the like is not an excellence. Thus, as Udayana puts it, the Mimamsaka may argue that in the case of $abda (verbal or scriptural testimoay) the defects are comprised by positive tors like the intention to deceive, so in their absence the validity of verbal cognition is intrinsic. But this is not tenable, The Najyayika’s contention is that in the case of inference, etc. though the fallacies (lit. perversities) of liiga and the like which are positive are present as defects, prami does not arise simply due to their absence. P It may be urged : “Whatever may be the position elsewhere, in the case of Sabda there being the absence of the intention to deceive and the like, the excellences of the speaker are not required for the rise of valid cognition.” This is not true. It can as well be said then cortrarily that there being the ean oe excellence its invalidity does not depend for its ia ey on the defects of the speaker. If it is argued ae ae are concomitant both positively and negatively fener Preset vs and So they are its causes, this is not and negatively se is likewise concomitant both positively ith gunas (excellences) and so they are its causes. ion toe pees further ; “This may be the position with © ora. Rpetaak (pauruseya— owing its rise to a person ) cane htaaT eae » but in the case of the Vedic word which esi eee Person (i.e. is apauruseya, authorless), nontendtia Gee due to the absence of dosa.” This is » OCcause even apramanya is possible due to absence of guna. If it is contended that absence of guna is never found to be efficient with regard to apramanya, we ask : “Where has absence of dosa been found to be efficient with regard to pramanya 2” If it is said that this is found to be the case with the utterances of worldly people, we say that absence of guia is similarly found to give rise to apramanya. Tt may be said: Dosas alone are the cause of apramanya,Problem of Truth q 655, the absence of gunas being there because it cannot be avoided, The answer is: This is true of guras with regard to pramanya. If it is held that the presence of gumas is there due to the removal of dosas, then we can similarly urge that the presence of dosas is due to the removal of gunas. It may be argued that in that case the apauruseya Veda would become nihsvabhava (characterless) inasmuch as it would be associated with neither guna (the cause of pramanya) nor dosa (the cause of apramanya) and so would be neither valid nor invalid. The rejoinder to this is: “You have to blame yourself for this.” Therefore, as even though there is invariable connection with the absence of dvesa (hatred, dislike) and absence of raga (love, liking), still as it necessarily follows in the wake of r@gaand dyesa, effort of the nature of proceeding towards (pravrtti) or desisting from (nivrtti) a thing, is said to have raga or dvesa as the cause, and it is not proper to differentiate between them by saying that nivriti is due to dvesa, whereas pravytti is due to absence of dvesa though it follows in the wake of raga -so here also pram@ and aprama@ are both due to guna and dosa respectively, and prama@ cannot be said to be due to dosabhiva (absence of dosa ). 7 The Mimamsaka may rejoin : “Still the Veda being esta- lished to be apauruseya, it will come to have validity even because it is free from the doses of the speaker, and pramanya being thus established it follows that itis there even in the absence of gutas; so dosabhava is the cause of pramanya and not guias (excellences ).” This can be counter—balanced by the argument that the Veda being devoid of the guras of the speaker is not-valid and apramanya being thus proved, absence of gura is the cause of apramanya and -dosas are not the cause of it. It may be urged : “Pramanya is determined intrinsically, and the attempt at determination only removes doubt about i!; being based on dosas, the doubt isabsent. Hence it is not possible to put forth a counter-balancing rejoinder here.” This is not true; there can easily be doubt or suspicion I-83656 Indian Dialectics based on the absence of gunas. If it is urged that absence of guna alone cannot be a cause of apramanya (—it can be a cause only when accompanied by dosa—) so there cannot be a doubt due to it, the rejoinder is that absence of dosa alone cannot be a cause of pramanya ) (—It can be a cause only when accompanied by guna). So the doubt cannot cease due to absence of dosa (NKu. pp. 5-6). J Then Udayana takes up the question of the apprehension (fiapti) or determination of primanya by extraneous means and Not intrinsically. The argument is: “Similarly, pramanya ie known from another source, because in unfamiliar cases it a8 doubtful, like apramanya (pramanyam parato jiiyate, anabhyiisa-dasaytin samSayikatvat, apraminyavat-NKu, 2, p. 7). Udayana observes that if knowledge carried with it the Sppviction of its validity, there would never be any doubt eo is validity (yadi tw svato jaiyeta, kadaieid api prismiinya- eet ar syat—NKu, P. 7), as there is never any doubt a rea ease and there is no scope for doubtin ee ce pened things. Doubt does not arise from the enantio aie common attributes and the like alone, leaving (negatory) eae of sadhaka (corroboratory proof) and badhaka orate ae for ifit were so there would be the contingency ieee cas pamiipeearc>_ there would never be any doubt). Praniina so even ‘i at is meant is that as in the case of owing to the A mest of apramina there arises doubt apprehension penebe oye of the cognition and the non- there is the ap eee features, then we ask ; Even when (validity) oe aS aes of valid knowledge, is its pramanya aaprchesnelys parse sed or is the valid knowledge itself not eee 6 In the former case, how can there be the c 10n of pramanya intrinsically, because it (pramanya) a nee rpbrenengee even when the knowledge is apprehended ? In the latter case, how could there be doubt when the thing itself is not apprehended? The argument that the validity of knowledge must be intrinsically known as otherwise immediate successful activity on a vast scale would not be possible — isProblem of Truth 687 not tenable. This can be otherwise explained. Immediate effort not being possible without the immediate aggregate of causal factors implies its existence; profuse or intense effort implies profuseness or intensity ( pracurya ) of its causes; and desire is the cause of effort, and its cause again is the knowledge of the means of achieving what is desired and that arises from the apprehension of the probans ‘tajjasiyatva’ ( being of the same class), and that also arises from contact with sense-organs and the like. But cognition of pramanya is nowhere found useful, and even if it were useful how could it be said :to’ be intrinsic? Then profuseness of successful activity also results from profuseness of pramanya or profuseness of its cognition, but where is its svatastva (intrinsicness) useful ? And because those who want water, immediately, forcefully and successfully act with reference to water, therefore it does not follow that its potency to allay thirst is perceptible (NKu, pp. 7-8 ): That is to say, on there being cognition of water people proceed in its direction if they are thirsty not after ascertain- ing the validity of this cognition or the potency of water to allay thirst, but only on the basis of past experience or similarity to previous cognitions of water and the behaviour based on it. Tt may be urged : “ All this (immediate activity etc.) is justifiable on there being the cognition of pramanya; but if it were not intrinsic it would not be there at all, because the view that it is extrinsic suffers from the fault of anavastha (vicious infinite series).” As Vardhamana explains, if cognition whose validity isnot grasped is accepted as determining the validity of another cognition, then let even definite knowledge whose validity is not cognised determine the object. What is the need to cognise its validity ? And if on account of there being suspicion of its invalidity there is not the determination of the object from that alone, then due to doubt or suspicion as to the invalidity of the inference pertaining to validity there is not the determination of validity from it. If the validity of this also requires to be ascertained there would be658 Indian Dialeet’es anavastha. Similarly owing to the validity of the cognitions of the liga ( probans ), vy@pri ( invariable concomitance ) etc. not being determined, the hetu (reason), ete. would be asiddha (unproven), and if they were to be ascertained there would be anavastha. It is not true that there is not doubt as to the validity of the cognition of liga, as this would contradict practical experience. Therefore it has to be accepted that pramanya is cognised intrinsically. Udayana’s rejoinder is : Even if it (pramirya) is not cognised, everything (immediate action, etc) is possible even from the doubtful cognition of the thing. And there is not involved Gnavasth@ (vicious infinite series) because it is not accepted that pramanya must be necessarily known, otherwise the fault would, be there in the case of the theory of the intrinsic cognition of pramanya also. Vardhamana argues that there IDOL the determination of the object only due to the deter- mination of the validity of the knowledge, but where in Tespect of _knowledge of palm of the hand and the like (ie. ee oe) there is not the suspicion of invalidity, there eee nation of the object only on there being definite a ee pee. confident activity is possible only due to it omnes Bes the pursuit of the validity of the cognitions validity, acy cond the like of the inferential cognition of 4 ity, and so there is no anavasthi (NKu. 2, pp. 12-13 and rakaga, p, 14), help Toran. contintics : It may be urged that the Jitga can Cie ame aly if it is itself determined, so another infinitum. The i. Fequired for its cognition and so on ad Eee Beh F divayika rejoins : Does the thing, which is Sere or, imply the existence of what can account dr peprieieuCtsel Ubeineldeldentinediisocthat’ there’ should ot be anavastha? It may be urged here that it is definitely known by means of perception and it by its very presence is a determining factor, so this difficulty is not there. This is not tenable. In my case also, the /itiga is definitely known by means of perception and it serves as a determining factorProblem of Truth es) by its very presence; so the difficulty is similarly not present here. It may be asked : When validity of the knowledge of probans is not determined, how could there be its definite knowledge? We can rejoin : When there is not the definite know- ledge of the validity of the knowledge of the thing which is not accounted for, how could there be its definite knowledge? The argument is similar. If it is contended that as said above, perception does not help to determine its object by definite knowledge or by definite knowledge of its pramanya, but by its very presence, a similar argument can be advanced against it. It may be objected : “ What would happen if the probans accepted to establish primanya turns out to be a fallacious one?” We can similarly ask : “ What would happen if the thing that is one not accounted for also prevzs to be a simulation ? It may be argued: “It also implies pramanya, so the general rule is maintined. It is only set aside at times by a contradicting factor.” The rejoinder is that this would be true in the case of the probans also, It may be further urged that thus doubt will remain all the same with regard to the inference of validity, so the attempt to prove validity is meaningless. The answer to this is: “It will be the same in your case also. If it is urged that the thing, which is not accounted for, is such that it could not be a simulation even in a dream, and so there would be no suspicion, we answer that the same can be said of the Jinga also. What again is this thing which is not a simulation even a dream, on the non-apprehension of which there would be scope for erroneous cognition and on the appre- hension of which there is the demonstration of ils contradiction or absence (badhavyavastha,? Otherwise, if the contradicting factor is itself subject to deviation (vyabhicGra), badha-vyavastha also would not be there”. If the opponent urges, * What harm if it isnot there?” The rejoinder is that this is not tenable as the classification of reality (or truth) and unreality (or falsity) has to be there, otherwise there would be contradiction of worldly behaviour. How can there be the superimposition of the opposite even when there is the apprehension of allseo Indian Dialecties particular features which are the decisive factors ? Or if this were to happen how could there be a contradicting factor, when there is the non-apprehension of the particular features other than these? And in its absence how could that which is not contradicted be illusory? (NKu. 2, pp. 13-14). Vardha- mana explaining this says: If there be superimposition of the opposite even when there is the apprehension of all particular features that are deciding factors, then its character of being a superimposition could not be determined without a contra- dicting or sublating factor (badhaka) because otherwise there would be the contingency of everything being a superimposition. Tf it is determined by the badhaka, then on that which is regarded as the badhaka being contradicted, there would be the contingency of its being a non-hadhaka; and in the event of its being uncontradicted there could not be the possibility of superimposition, when there is the apprehension of the particular features, And if pramiya is thus inferrable, Knowledge whose priminya is cognised would not be the stimulator in respect of a thing which can be achieved after great effort, because the inferential cognition of its validity would have already perished; but the stimulation can come only from another cognition having the same object as that Knowledge and in respect of which there is no suspicion of apramanya (invalidity). And thus inferential cognition of praménya is not fruitless as without is there would be suspicion of invalidity in respect of knowledge having the same object. ; That is to say, the pramanya of knowledge in unfamiliar circumstances has to be ascertained by inference. The similar cognition that arises after this serves as the stimulator of activity In familiar cases, it is not necessary to ascertain the validity of cognitions, but this is so only because we have an Inner conviction of their validity on the ground of similarity with previous cognitions in the same circumstances which had been ascertained to be valid. This is the substance of Udayana’s contention.Problem of Truth 661 Summing up, one may say that the sceptic’s and the absolutist’s challenging the absolute truth of knowledge put the thinkers and logicians of the other schools on the alert and they carefully formulated their own theories of truth and — error, validity and invalidity. Even here they held different views and discussed their own theories and confuted rival ones at length in actual debates and controversies and in works on logic and philosophy. An enormous mass of dialectical thought grew around this subject. The attack on the authority of the the Veda and the sceptical attitude with regard to all knowledge in general gave the fillip to establish theories pertaining to validity and invalidity of knowledge in general. The Mimamsakas, mainly concerned with the defence of the intrinsic authority of the Veda, contributed much that is really important to the problem of knowledge. According to the Mimamsaka, truth is inherent in knowledge as the very aim and purpose of knowledge is truth and the very drive of it is towards it. According to the Naiyayikas, on the other hand, cognition is neutral to truth and falsity which are due to and apprehended by extraneous conditions, Even the Naiyayikas had almost to recognise the intrinsic validity of anuvyavasaya, upamiana, etc.; their contention that validity is extrinsic mostly pertained to perceptual cognition and verbal testimony. The Mimamsakas of al) the different sub-schools gave convincing rejoinders to the arguments advanced by the Naiyayikas. Thus an important epistemological problem came to light and received due attention from the different schools of philosophy as a result of dialectics, The Mimarsakas and the Vedantins who assert that validity is intrinsic to knowledge and invalidity extrinsic seem to have hit upon a very important truth. Knowledge does carry with it the conviction of its own truth in the case of every normal person. Even the ever-doubting sceptic’s drive in the cognitive process is towards truth though he never feels sure of it and so goes on doubting and questioning. The agnostic, though he does not believe in the possibility of the discovering of the ultimate truth about fundamentals,662 Indian Dialectics yet has faith in, and works with, empirical truths. But there cannot be an unbridgeable gulf between the ultimate truth and tbe empirical one, though one may not be able to bridge it In our human condition with its limitations one has to proceed with the conviction that the qualily of truth is inherent in every knowledge as it arises and that further contradictory experience removes the element of error from it and thus progressively leads to a clearer and a still clearer vision of Reality. This was the stand of the Mimarnsakas, which became more comprehensive in the case of the Uttara-Mimarsakas or the Vedantins who attempted to grasp Reality as a whole NOTES See ‘The Great Epic of India’ pp. 90 {f—Hopkins. Prameyasiddhih pramanaddhi—Samkhya-karika, 4 3. Sal-laksananibandhanarh manavyavasthanam, mananibandhana ca meya- sthitih, tad-abhave tayoh sadvyavah@ra-visayatvarh katharh ( svayam eva)...—TPS, p. 1; Laksanadhing taval laksyavyavasthitih, laksan@ni ca anupapannani, jnatadhikaranadi-leksananiropanadvarena cakraka- dySpatteh—KhKh, pp. 141-142; see also ViV, 31. pe 4 Indriyadosat sarhskaradosae ca avidya; tad dustajfianam, adustarh vidya.—VS 9.2.10-12. 5 Indriyarthasannikarsotpannari jfignarh avyapadesyam avyabhicari vyava- sayatmakath pratyaksam.—NS. 1.1.4; yad atasmirhs tad iti tad vyabhi- cri yat tu tasmiths tad iti tad avyabhicari pratyaksam itii—NB. 1.1.4. © See Saptapadarihi, 59-61; 211 fi; Nyaya-kusumanjali, 4.1ff; Tarkasaigraha, 34-36; 64-65; Bhasa-pariccheda, 51, 126-130. 7 ees anaropitath rapam, tasya jaanam anubhayah.—Suptapadarthi, “1 8 Pramanato’rthapratipattau pravrttissamarthyad arthavat pramanam. Pramanam antarena narthapratipattih narthapratipattim antarena Pravrttisamarthyam, pramanena khalu ayath jfiata’rtham upalabhya tam artham abhipsati jihasati. va tasyepsajihasa-prayuktasya samiha pravrttir ity ucyate. samarthyam punar asyal) phalena’bhisambandhalh. sampham@nas tam artham abhjpsan jihasan va tam artham apnoti jahati va.—NB Introductory. 1.1.1, See also NM. 1, pp. 158-159,Problem of Truth 663 9 10, ik. 12. 13, 14, A3. 16. 17. TC, Pramiina-laksana-siddhanta, Pratyaksa-khanda, p. 217 (Darbhanga, 1957). Gangesa does not regard the following definitions as tenable- yatharthagrhita-grahitvan lokasiddha-pramatvam, —yatharthanubhavatvam Pramatvain, guna janyanubhavatyarn dosabhava janyanubhavatvara va pramatvam, abadhitanubhavatvam — pramatvan, — samvadyanubhavatvam pramatvamh, samarthapravrtti janakanubhavatvaz pramatvain, tattvanubhavatvam prama- tvam. The refutation is almost the same as in KhKh, though not so elaborate. Other definitions refuted have the ring of Navya Nyaya about them; for instance, ‘Visesyanisthat yantabhavapratiyogidharma- prakarakanubhavacvam’ ( prama is anubhava of which the chief qualifier (prakara) is that (e.g. ghafatva) which is not the counter-positive of the absolute negation (e.g. patabhava) which subsists in the qualificand (e.g. ghata);; this definition is not acceptable as it is so narrow that it cannot apply to the valid knowledge of e.g. sayoga (conjunction) which is co-subsistent with its negation in the substrate. See pramalak sanapiurvapaksa in the Pratyaksa Khanda of the Tattvacintamani. See also ‘Etac ca visesanatrayam upadadanena Satrakarena karanadosa- badhakajiana-rahitam agrhitageahijiinarh pramanam iti pramana- laksanarh sntritam—SD. 1.1, p. 45 PP, Ch. 6, 2-4, p. 127; also PP, p, 42. The following stanza is ascribed to Kumarila : Tatra’pirvartha-vijianarh nigcitara badhavarjitam, adustakaranarabdharh pramanath loka-sammatam. Tad-adhikyac ca siddham uttaresar; pramanyam.-§D. 11, p. 46. PP, pp. 43-44. SD, p. 46 Tasmad bodhatmakatvena prapta buddhel pramanata:, arthanyathatvahetattha-dosajnanad apodyate. —Slv. 1. 12., v. 53; tasmat svatah-pramanyayy, praptam anyathatva— k@ranadosajnanabhyam apodyate ity avagyam angikartavyam.-SD, p. 22, Bhrantarh hy anumanam, svapratibhase’narthe’dhyavasayena Ppravrtta- tvat—NyBT, p. 9, yath® ca pratyaksarh pratibhasanvanarh niyatam arthath dargayati, anumanarh ca lingasambaddharh niyatam arthath daréayati; ata ete niyatasya’ rthasya pradargake; tena te Pram@ne na’nyad vijnanam.—NyBT, p. 4. 1-84664 18. 19. 20. ~ 21. 22, 23. 24, 25. Indian Dialectics Yenaiva prapitag ca’rthah. tatraivarthe kim anyena tato’dhigatavisayam apramanam.—NyBT, p. 4. fignena prathamam adhigato’ rthas tenaiva p' yartitaly purusah nenadhikath karyam, Tad- yadi —pratiksanarh —-ksamavivekadarsino’dhikriyocyate —tada bhinnopayogitaya prtha antah. atha sarvapadarthesu ckatva'dhyavasayinah sdrivyavaharikan purugan abhipretyocyate ta sakalam’ eva pila-santanam ckam artharh sthirarupatn tat-sadbyadi ca’rthakriyam ekatmikam adhyavasyantiti pramayam apy uttaressm anistam eveti kuto’nekantalh,—Hetubindutika, pp. 37-38 (GOS). Vide Pramapavarttika, 1.3 ff NyBT, pp. 4-5. Nocyate yasminneva kale paricchidyate tasminneva kale prapayitavyam iti. anyo hi darganakalo'nyag ca praptikalab. kinh tu yatkalarh pariechinnari tad eva prapaniyam. abhedadhyavasayae ca santdnagatam ekatvarh drastavyam iti.-NyBT, p. 5. Tan nadhyavasitakarapratirupa na_vidyate, tatra’py arthakriyavyaptir anyatha'tiprasajyate.-TvS, 1325. tk@ranam. samyagjfane hi sati smaranath, smaranad abhilzsah. abhilagit pravyttih. pravettes £@ praptih. tato na saksaddhetuh.—NyBT, p. 5; tatha hi na j th jana- Yad arthar prapayati, api (u arthe purusarh pravartayat prapay aty artham. Pravartakatvam api pravritivisaya-pradargakatvam eva, na hi purusarh hathat pravartayiturh gaknoti vijninam, ata eva ca’rthadbigatir eva ee adhigate ca’rthe pravartitah purusah prapitas carthah. 6@ Ssaty arthadhigamat samaptah pramaga-vyaparah. ata eva'nadhi- Satavisayath pramanam,—NyBT, pp. 3-4. Tac ca parvamatrars, na tu sak Purvadrs Pramanari, sva-parabhasi jnanath badbavivarjitam.—NyA, 1. See also 4-6: Tattvarthavyavasayatma jr narh manam itiyata, laksanena gatarthatvad vyartham anyad vigesanam.—TSlv. 1.10.77; Svaparavyavasayi jignarh pramanam.—PNTL 1.1.2; Samyag arthanirnayah pramanam.—PM 1.1.2. aa tartan va svarthar yadi vyavasyati, © na gastresu vijahati pramanatam.—TSlv. 1.10.78 Jn@nasya prameya’vyabhicaritvam pramanyam, tad itarat tv apramanyam. —PNTL 1. 18-19,Problem of Truth 665 26. See Nyayavatarasitra-varttika-vrtti, p. 17; Tatsamarthy: svarthavyavas: Ihinatvat —_ pramanatvasthiteh. avisativadasyapi itmakatvat.—Astasahasri, p. 279: see Ibid, pp. 276-280. Tatra smpytivyavrttarh pramatvam — anadhigata’badhitartha-visayaka- jnfnatva smytistdharanari tu abadhitartha-visayakajnanatvam. —Vedantaparibha: Ch. 1, p. 5; tatha hi smrtyanubhava-sidharanarh sarivadi-pravpttyanuknlarh tadvati tatprakair Ibid, Ch. 6. pp. 148-149. janatvarh pramanyarh.— 28. Kiri punas tatra kartsnyam abhipretar, desa-kalanimitta-sampattir abadhas ca —Br. Si. Sankarabhasya, 3.2. 29, See Sribhasya, 1.1.1, pp. 96-97 (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series); also NP. p. 39: Yatindramatadipika, pp 4 30. Prasthanaratnakara, pp. S{f (of Purusottama) (CSS). 31, Ahosvid apramanyarh svato’ vagamyate pramanyam tu karanagunajaanat sarnvadajnanad arthakriyajianad ya avadharyate——S§D 1.1.2, p. 20; tasmad apramanyarh svatah pramanyarh tu sarhvadajnanadibhir ity etad eva yuktam.—SD 1.1.2, p. 21. The author of the Yuktisncha prapiirani- siddhanta-candrika refers to this as the Buddhist view; Abhyasikarh yatha jnanarh pramanarh gamyate svatah, anarh tatha kijcid apramanarh svatah sthitam, —TvS, 3100; also Panjika, p. 811. mithy: sika view sez Bhasa-pariccheda, 131, 136: For the Nyaya-Vais Nyaya-kusumanjali, 2.1. p. 1 ff; Nyayamanjari, pp. 157-160, Parvamimarsi view—S Iv, 1.1.2. 33ff; $D 1.1, p. 20ff; PP, pp. 33ff Jaina view—PMS 1.1.3; PNTL 1.20; PM 1.18, ete. Vedantic view-Vedanta paribhasa, Ch. 6,149 ff; Bhaskara’s commentary on the Brahmasitra, 1.4.21; NP, pp. 31-34; TT. Vol. 4, pp. 4ff. Purusottama thinks that in some cases where knowledge is due to. the accessory influence of memory, its validity is not spontaneous or intrinsic, but is derived through corroborative sources; whereas there may be other cases where knowledge is intrinsically valid (PR; p. 155). I have dealt with Indian epistemology at length, with special refer- ence to the problem of error, in my book Avidya-A Problem of Truth and Reality (Published by the Gujarat University). 32. Vide Slv, 1.1.2 27-32. 1 am highly indebted to Ga translation.666 AON, 34, ae 36. 37. 38, 39, 40. Indian Dialecties Sarvavijiana-visayam idarh tavat pariksyatam, pramanatva’ pramanatve svatah k Tasmac svabhavikarh tesam apran pramanyam ca parapeksam atra nyayo’bhidhiyate. apramanyam avastutvan na syat karanadosatah, vastutvat tu gunas tesim_ pra anyam upajanyate. —$lv. 1.1.2. 38-39. Anvaya-vyatirekabhyam apramanyath na dosataly, na’jnane dysyate hy ctat karanabhavahetuke. tatag ca purusabhavat sati va guddhyasambhavac, nirmglatvat pramanatvath codananarh na yujyate. —Slv. 1.1.2. 45-46. Svatah sarva-pramananarh pramanyam iti grhyatarh, na hi svato'sat; gaktih kartum anyena gakyate. atmalabhe hi bhavanarh karanapeksita bhavet, labdhatmanarh svakaryesu pravyttih svayam eva tu. Bees Shy 151.2, 4748) Dogatag ca’ pramanatve svatah-pramanyavadinam, suMajnang’navasthavan na dosesu prasajyate.——Slv. 1.1.2. 56 He dosantarajyanari badhadhir va para na cet, udbhatau dvigyasya mithyatvad adyam@nata. Sly. 1.1.2. 59. Evarh tri-catura: Jn@najanmano na’dhika matih, Prarthyate ta: i . vad evaikarh svatah pramanyam_asnute. —Slv. 1.1.2. 61, Tatrapavadanirmuky hen tir vaktrabhaval laghiyas). Pere Rar na’gaykam api gacchati. eae inatvat pramanye tadupasanam, ee See amtave kalpye tat-prarthana bhavet, payee Pranitatvath na dosayatra jayate, wh tu saivesath vaksyamah pratisadhanam. Pauruseye tu vacane pramanantaramalata, tadabhave hi tad dusyed itaran na kadacana, Sly. 1.1.2. 68-71 thasdrathi Misra has given a summary of Kumarila’s arguments astradipika, pp, 20-23, —_Problem of Truth 7 41. 42. 43. 44, 667 See Nyaya-Kusuman jali, Pramanfevada. P. If; Tattva-cintamani, Pratyaksakkanda, See Appendix 2. Tenaiva primanyagraha iti Prabhakarah. jnanasya'tindriyataya tadanu- mity@ (adgraha iti Bhaecth. manasaiva jaanasvarupavat tat-pramanya- graha iti MurBrimigrah, tritaya-sidharanarhca svatasvari niruktam eva. —Vardhamana’s commentary on the Nyaya-kusuni jali, 2, p. 9. See NB, NV-1.1.1(Introductory).Part HlCHAPTER 15 GROWTH OF DIALECTICAL CRITICISM AS NOTICED IN PH: LOSOPHICAL WORKS Vedic Literature : We shall, in this chapter, study the evolution of dialectical’ criticism in philosophical writings. Certain hymns of the Vedas pertain to philosophical subjects; there is an attempt in them to explain the creation of the world and describe the ultimate principle, and different thinkers have tried to express their views in a language which is gradually becoming clearer and clearer with the passage of time and the growing maturity of thought. The monotheistic tendency is evident in them though its expression is not always consistent The Purusa Sakta jis an illustration in point. The Nasadiya Sakta is a bold philosophical sally. The thinker with a monistic bent of mind is thinking of the origin of the world. The sage finds it difficult to give expression to a principle which is beyond sat (being) and asat (non-being), which breathes without breath. He tries to show the process of origination. Then a thought comes to him—who could have information about the origina- tion of the world? Perhaps the gods might know or even they could not for they were produced later. Was the world ever produced or was it not? The hymn ends with a query which smacks of Agnosticism, We can be sare that in the age of the later Vedic hymns, philosophical speculations of all sorts were rampant, some of which have found a place in the Vedic Samhitas. The form in which these specutations are given does not admit of much reasoning or argument and therefore we do not get any clear idea of the processes of thought by which the thinkers arrived at their own conclusions which are stated in the hymns, or of the discussions and controversies L-85i Indian Dialectics that were there among the thinkers of that age in respect of philosophical problems. The Brahmanas, on the other hand, are exegetic works, @ kind of commentary on the Vedic hymns and sacrificial rites. There is an attempt in them to explain everything—even the number of syllables in a particular metre, and the etymology of terms.’ There is a myth to explain every sacrifice and there ate tales in exhortation of the performance of particular sacrifices, and also tales to recommend particular rites or in condemnation of the trangression of moral rules and the Proper mode of performing different sacrificial rites. For Instance, we are told that Kalyana Angiras told a lie and he lost his former State, he became a leper. As y points out in his commentary there is implied here a relationship Detween telling a lie and losing the former state and becoming a leper? Similarly, in the story of Sisu Angirasa, who addressed his elders as ‘putrakah’ (‘Dear Boys’), the gods oF menuce the judgment that he who is a mantrakrt (maker é fae ie a pitr (father)—yah mantrakrt sa pitt.8 There te aeapae” behind this however childish it may seem Gaye ae Bey ceded in convincing the people of those and seniority feat pace can convince even today (e.g. eae Satapatha Bran More on inner worth than on age). The husband, 50 the 22% 5:21:10 tells us—A_ wife is half the insufficient) © husband is only half Ge. imperfect and become aici long as he is without a wife. He does not a ole Hill he marries and begets a son (lit. ull he is sted bas, This explains why the presence of the wife is ue by the side of the husband in religious ceremonies. hat is more interesting for our purpose is that we find recorded in the Brakmanas, differences of opinion among the cifferent schools as regards the interpretation of sacrificial rites and their performance. In the Satapatha Brahmana 4.2.9, there is no‘ed a difference of opinion as to the number of metres fo be used for reciting verses for SUrya and the order in which the verses addressed to Sfirya are to be recited, AnGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 673 objection is similarly referred to and attempted to be answered in the same Brahmana (3.4.13 ff). In the Agnistoma, the begirming and the end are so alike that it is not possible to distinguish between them as in the case of the §akala serpent One cannot say which is the fore-part and which the hind part. But some object to this saying, “ They make the beginning of the stotras of the Soma day with the srivet (three-fold) stoma and conclude with the ekavimsa (twentyone-fold) stoma (at the evening libation), so how could they be alike?” To this one should answer, “They are like in so far as the eka- vin$a stoma is also a trivrt stoma for both contain triplets of verses.” Similarly a question is raised that on the hand we are told that the Agnistoma is like the sun because bothare connected with the day, and on the other hand it is said that the rites must not be performed hurriedly so that mistakes could be avoided. Now if the rites of the evening libation (trtiyasavana) are performed slowly, there being very little time at the disposal of the sacrificer, the sun might set even before the ceremony has been performed. The answer to this is that the sun neither rises nor sets. When people think that the sun is setting it itself produces two opposite effects, making night to what is on this side and day to what is on the other side. When they belicve that it rises, having reached the end of the night it makes itself produce two opposite effects, making day to what is on this side and night to what is on the other side. In fact, the sun never rises or sets. Rising and setting are both relative, the sun retains his high position in the sky.5 Perhaps what.the thinker means to say is that sunrise and sunset do not signify the origination and the destruction of the sun, and so from this point ef view, the sun neither rises nor sets for neither is it born nor does it perish. Sdyana seems to suggest this interpretation (astamayah svariipanisah, udayah stiryotpattih), That rise should be equated with origination and disappearance with destruction might appear childish to advanced science, but we find here the seeds of philosophy wherein appearance does signify origination074 Indian Dialeeties and disappearance destruction At least, the inquiry ofa searching mind is quite evident here. The Aitareya Brahmana 7.2.10 refers to a question asked by some, “In what does an Agnihotrin who has no wife bring his oblations with speech (i.e. by repeating the mantras required with his voice) ? In what way does he offer his daily burnt offering when his wife dies after he has already entered on the state of an Agnihotrin, his wife having by her d-ath destroyed the qualification for the performance of the daily burnt offering. The Agnibotrin who has no wife says to his children, etc. “ I have ascended the heaven by means of what was no heaven (i.e. by the sacrifice performed in this world).” He who does not wish to have a second wife keeps up, by speaking thus, his connec- tion with the other world. His children, grand-children and relation establish new fires for him who has lost his wife. How does he who has no wife bring his oblations with his mind ? Faith is his wife and Truth the sacrificer. The marriage of Faith and Truth is a most happy one, for by faith and Truth joined they conquer the celestiai world. Another controversial point discussed in the Aitareya Brahmana7.4.26 is whether the ksatriya should or should not eat the sacrificial food which is to be eaten by the sacrificer. They say if he eats then he commitsa ¢reat sin by cating sacrificial food althougb he is an ahutad (one not permitted to eat ). If he does not eat, then he cuts himself off from the Sacrifice, for the portion to be eaten by the sacrificer is the sacrifice. Thus he is on the horns of a dilemma (This it & case of ubhayatah spasa rajju, which is then shown to be an Gbhisa, simulation). _ One view is that it to be made over to the brahmana priest, for the brahmana priest of the ksatriya is in the place of his purohita. The Purohita is one-half of the ksatriya; only through ‘he intervention of another (--the brahmana priest) the Portion appears to be caten by him though he does not eat it with his own mouth, for the sacrifice is there where the brahmana priest is, The entire sacrifice is placed in the brahmana and the sacrificer is the sacrifice. They oeGrowth of Di: 35 throw the sacrifice in the shape of the portion which is to be eaten by the sacrificer, into the saci ice which has the form of the brahmana priest, just as they throw water into water, fire into fire without making it over-flow; this does not cause any injury to the sacrifice. Therefore, the portion to be eaten by a sacrificer is, if he be a ksatriya, to be given to the brahmana priest. Some sacrificial priests, however, sacrifice this portion to the fire saying, “I place thee in Prajapati’s world which is called Vibhan (shining everywhere); be joined to the sacrificer, sv@h@!" But the sacrificial priest should not proceed thus for the portion to be eaten by the sacrificer is the sacrificer himself, and therefore the Priest who acts thus burns the sacrificer in the fire. In this last Passage we find different views held in respect of the same point and also that there is some justification given for a particular view and also condemnation of a different one, This is thus a very good instance of dialectical criticism. Further the dilemma is posed that if the ksatriya partakes of the sacrificial food he becomes a sinner and if he does not eat the sacrificial food, he cuts himself off from the sacrifice, and a solution is found so that either difficulty is averted.¢ The examples of dialectical criticism given above are by no means exhaustive, and we do not here concern ourselves with the contents of the discussions in the Brahmanas, yet we discern the logical skeleton underlying them, It is quite likely that during the long sacrificial sessions, the people participating got plenty of time to indulge in all sorts of discussions and riddles ‘and the like. As a consequence of this, modes of dialectical criticism and elements of logic emerged. Some scholars are of the opinion that the early Mimarnsakas were the original pioneers in the field of logic and that piirvavat, Sesavat, and samanyato drsia types of inference were originally formulated by the early Mimamsakas who perhaps formulated also the syllogism of ten members (avayava) referred to by Vatsyayana.” In the Aranyakas the sacrificial rites are given a symbolic interpretation and this is676 Indian Dialectics attempted to be explained, though there are not many reasoned out statements. In the Upanisads we find recorded a number of philoso- phical debates and discussions as to the nature and identity of the soul and the Ultimate Reality, each thinker having a more and more. subtle interpretation of his own to offer thereof.® But very few arguments are found advanced by way of refutation. Still we do find at times a rival view referred to and refuted briefly, Uddalaka Aruni explains to his son that in the beginning this was Being (sar) alone, one without a second. Some people say that in the beginning this was Non-being (asat) alone, one only without a second; from that Non-being, Being was produced. But how, objects Aruni, could it be thus ? How could Being be produced from Non-being ? Hence it follows that in the beginning there was Being alone, one only without a second ( Chandogya Up. 6.2.1-2). Similarly we find philosophical problems posed in the Sverasvatara Up. 1.1—These who discourse on Brahman say: ‘What is the cause? Is it Brahman? Whence are *“e born? By what do we live? And in what are we established? O ye who know Brahman, tell us presided over by whom do we live our different conditons in pleasure and pain?” A number of views are mentioned as they were suggested in the history of the philosophical thought of that period— “ Time, inherent nature, necessity, chance, the elements, the womb or the person should they be considered as the cause? It cannot be a combination of these because of the existence of the soul. Even the soul is powerless in respect of the cause of pleasure and pain. Those who were devoted to meditation and con templation saw the power of ihe Divine hidden in its own qualities. He is the one who rules over all these causes from Time to the soul.” ($ver. Up, 1.2.3; sce also 6.1). In the Katha Up. (1.1.20), Naciketas asks Yama regarding the state of man after the destruction of the body as some hold that he is and some that he is not. Thus different views on the same pointGrowth of Dialectical Criticism. 677 are at times mentioned in the Upanisads though we hardly ever find any reasoned out statement in support or in refutation of any view. In the Brhadaranyakopanisad 3.8,9-11, Yaja valkya adduces inferential evidence from the orderliness of the world, The maintenance of the respective positions of heaven and earth and the like is not possible without the existence and guidance of an intelligent transcendent ruler Yajiavalkya explains that this Ultimate Reality is inexplicable, indescribable, beyond speech and mind and undifferentiated. We have a number of such negative explanations of the Ultimate Reality wherein all opposites are negated of it, these being confessions of the fact that logical reasoning or other empirical proof or verbal expression ‘confined to empirical concepts cannot give us an idea of the Absolute Reality. This shows the limitations of Dialectics with regard to metaphysical ultimates. The avyakrta (indeterminable) problems. of Buddha may be compared in this respect. Any answer to such questions is invariably relative and therefore invalid from the absolute point of view.® From the fore-going account it is clear that philosophical discussions and controversies were very common and popular in the Upanigadic period among the enlightened people especially learned Brabmanas and Ksatriyas. The philosophers must have reasoned and discussed at length before they arrived at or proved their conclusions, though these arguments are not preserved, as the Upanisads seem to be brief accounts of the philosophical speculations of the period, perhaps by way of brief notes and points helpful to the memory. The philosophers gradually developed the niceties of Philosophical thought and expression. As the Nasadiya sikta Says that there was neither being nor non-being in the beginning, so in the Subala Up. 1., Brahma says to Subala, «It was not existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent (na san na@san na sadasad iti). For a very long time, Vedanta con- fined its description of the Absolute Prin le to the negationa Indian Dialectics of existence, non-existence and both Safjaya Belatthaputta, the Madhyamikas and the sceptics add one more alternative and deny that also--‘ not neither ’ (7a asadasal), and come to theit conclusion that the Ultimate Reality cannot be described in terms of empirical concepts or that it is not possible to have definite knowledge of anything or that all definitions of Reality are self-contradictory. The seeds of such fine specula- tions can be traced to the Upanisadic period, if not earlier. Buddhist Canonical Literature—The carly Buddhist Pali literature (collected roughly in and after the fourth century B.C.) is packed with accounts of discussions and controversies between Buddha and his disciples and between Buddha and rival thinkers. We have also references to disputes and controversies in the Sarigha itself and with thinkers of rival schools. These discussions also contributed to the growth and method of dialectical criticism. Buddha puts himself as far as possible in the mental position of the questioner. He accepts as the starting point of his exposition the position of the opponent (e.g. desirability of the union with God as in the Tevijja Sutta of the Digha Nikaya, of sacrifice as in the Kafadanta Sutfa, of social rank as in the Ambattha Sutta, of seeing heavenly sights as in the Mahdli Sutfa, or of the soul theory as in the Poithapada Sutta)) and even adopts the very phraseology of the questioner. And then partly by putting a new and (from his own point of view) a higher meaning into the words and partly by an appeal to such conceptions as are common, ground between them, he gradually leads his opponent to his conclusion. In later Philosophical works we find a similar mode adopted; to satisfy the opponent his position is accepted and the ano- malies and contradictions are pointed out; the opponent’s pesos is also refuted even independently and: the contrary position established. Buddha also asks questions in answering which the opponent is gradually led to accept his view.?° In the Assalayana Sutta (Majjhima Nikaya), Buddha’s questions while repudiating yarna-vyavastha (--classification of varnas ie, classes hardened into castes-—) are very convincing, ¢.g.Growth of Dialectical Criticism... 679 “Is fire lit by a Brahmana brighter and more useful than that lit by others? ” This is another way of embarrassing the opponent on the basis of experience. which cannot be contradicted. Similarly, in the Vasettha Sutta, Buddha explains to Vasettha and Bharadvaja that there is a liga (characteristic mark ) peculiar to different classes of living beings but there is no such mark distinguishing the jaris or castes of human beings from one another. There is no difference in their bodies. They are only conventionally addressed differently. Here there is an attempt to show that no conclusion can be accepted if there is no mark to prove it. We have seen that inference, especially of the Sesavat or the sa@mianyato-drsta type is very frequently found in the Buddhist Canonical literature. Buddha very often discusses as to who is a true Brahmana, and how one isa Brahmana whether by his birth or by his character.t! It may be noted here that Buddha avoided answering certain metaphysical questions which he regarded as avya@kata (avyakrta, indeterminable). They are—-(1) The loka is eternal, (2) the loka is non-eternal, (3) the Joka has an end, (4) the loka is endless, (5) soul and bodyare one, (6) soul and body are different, (7) the Tathagata exists after death, (8) the Tathagata does not exist after death, (9) the Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death, (10) the Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death (see M@luikya Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya). One view with regard to this is that Buddha was a practical philosopher and so did not discuss such topics, as these in no way help to ease the pain man’s life is full of. Buddha himself says that such questioning is of no avail. Another view is that Buddha was an agnostic; he was of the opinion that one could not have certain knowledge of these metaphysical entities and problems; we must restrict our activities in such a manner as to concentrate all our energy on the leading of a life guided by right conduct and on the removal of pain. The last four of the questions mentioned above betray Sanjaya Belatthaputta’s influence that I-86680 Indian Dialectics one cannot affirm existence, non-existence, both or neither in respect of anything. We shall come to this point later. Any such proposition betrays a conflict of Reason and so could not be valid. Thus no knowledge is valid. This line of thought leads to utter scepticism in respect of everything. Buddha might not have gone to this length but he probably detected the conflict of reason in all empirical statements. It is here that we have the beginning of dialectics having to confront the conflict of Reason at every step of one’s argument. The Madhyamikas admitted this and came to the conclusion that everything is Sanya (void) as it is relative and dependent on another and only what is independent can be real. All the same they recognised the claims of Pure Knowledge or Highest Intuition. Prof. Murti seems to be of the view that this was the position of Buddha himself also and that is why he refused to answer questions of a purely metaphysical interest.12 Jaina Canonical Literature— Mahavira, we are told was not the founder of a new school of thought but was a reformer of the older one of Parsva so he must have had to vigorously combat the opinions of his opponents and defend those he had accepted or refined. During this process, dialectical criticism must have experienced a notable growth though we may not notice this in all its significance in the accounts of controversies in the Jaina Agamas. Before coming to the extant canonical works we may note that besides the azigas there existed other and probably older works called Parvas of which there were originally fourteen. The knowledge of these Parvas was gradually lost, but according to the Svetambara tradition, the Parvas were incorporated in the twelfth Aviga, the Drstivada which also was lost (before 1000 A.V. ie. 474 A.D ). But a detailed table of contents of the Drstivada and consequently of the Parvas has survived in the Samavayanga and in the Nandi Sitra, From this we know that they dealt chiefly with the drstis or philosophical opinions of the Jainas and other schools. It may be inferred that the Pirvas contained much dialectical criticism, though it mightGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 68h have been of a preliminary character. The title pravada which is added to the name of each parva confirms this. At times criticism proceeds on the basis of one’s own interpretation of the teachings or writings of other philosophers. The Sthanaiga Sitra, 587 mentions seven pravacana-nihnavas, that is to say, those who conceal the true teaching of Mahavira and put a new interpretation on it. Some recognise the Digambaras as the eighth Nihnava. These creators of schism even’ while remaining within the Jaina fold rejected the traditional interpretations of certain Agamic texts and gave them a meaning contradictory to the traditional one but favourable to their own position on account of some bias or obsession of theirs. Some interesting episode of personal experience is connected with most of these nihnavas which conditions their thinking. It may be noted in passing here that if two parties enter into a discussion as regards the interpretation of a particular text without bias or obsession, neither isconsidered to be Nihnava. For instance, there was difference of opinion between Jinabhadra and Siddhasena whether kevala—jnana (perfect determinate or particular knowledge), and kevala-darsana (perfect indeterminate or general knowledge)occur at different times or are simultaneous and whether they are different or one. They are not called Nihnavas because the sincere desire to know the truth was behind this difference of opinion of theirs. On the other hand Jamalt, Tisyagupta and such others are regarded as Nihnavas because they deliberately tried to misrepresent or trangress some of the teachings of Mahavira and created schisms even while remaining generally in the same school of thought. In later philosophical works we find attempts to misconstrue or misinterpret the views or arguments of the opponent before refuting them. In the Satrakrtanga i.1.4., a number of views including those of the Carvakas, Buddhists, Sarnkhyas, Vedantins, Ajfianikas (agnostics) are referred to and refuted briefly by pointing out some striking drawback. For example, in the refutation of the Vedantins recognising one sentient principle6 Indian D iaiecties z . appearing under various forms as the universe, it is argued that in that case one could not be sure that the man engaged in undertakings who committed a sin would himself suffer severe pain (1.1.1.9-10). The views that are refuted pertain to all kinds of philosophical problems such as number and nature of the souls, perfection, karma, good and evil, creation of the world and the like. The Satrakrtiiiga 26. gives an account of the discussions which Arya Adda (Ardraka) had with a number of thinkers-Gosala, a Buddhist, a Vedic.priest, a Vedantin, a Hastitapasa (belonging to a sect members of which Kill one big elephant and live upon it in order to spare the lives of other animals). Go¥ala finds inconsistencies in Mahavira’s earlier solitary life and his present life when he sits in the midst of a crowd, surrounded by monks teaching his doctrines for the benefit of many people.** Adda explains that this is no sin, Gosala Tejoins that in that case an ascetic who lives alone and single commits no sin if he uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him and has intercourse with women. This is an instance of pratibandi. Thus the dis cussion proceeds, Similarly, in Siitrakrtiinga 2.7, there is a discussion between Gautama and Udaka, a follower of Pargva. Udaka raises a question whether at some future timeall movable things in the world might not die outbeing born as immovable things and none but immovable things exist and vice versa. In the latter case, a Jayman who abstains from killing animals Practically causes no injury whatsoever; in the former case, he cannot be said to transgress: the Law even if he would do injury (2.7.12), Gautama combats this at length with the result that Udaka is Converted from the creed which enjoins four vows to that which enjoins five great vows and the pratikramana (expiation of sin). Safijaya Belatthaputta and Ajfianavadins—This is sufficient to show that dialectical criticism gradually developed as a result of discussions between tival schools of which quite a number are mentioned in the Buddhist and Jaina Agamas,1* Of the Annaniya (Ajaanikah), it is said in the SttrakrtarigaGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 683 | 1.12.2 that though they pretend to be clever, they reason incoherently and do not get beyond the confusion of their ideas. In the Brahmajaila-sutta, lokayata (sophistry) is enume- rated among the low arts. Lokayatikas are said to enter into controverses on fabulous or absurd points. The Brahma- Jalasutta-ayhakatha states that the term lokakkhayika is applied to such conversation as : ‘Who made the world ? The world was made by so and so. Crows are white because their bones are white; cranes are red because their blood is red.’ Lok@yara or vitand& comprises such controversies. In relation to dialectics we are interested in Ajii@nava-da (Agnosticism referred to in Jaina works) or in the theory of Saijaya Belatthaputta as stated in Buddhist works, The latter is reviled as amara- vikkhepa (amaraviksepa, celwriggling), behaviour like that of the amara fish which is slipplery and wriggles through the hand. The applicability of this term to the teachings of Safijaya Belatthaputta can be seen from the following passage from his reply to Ajatasatru: “If you ask me whether there is another world—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I do not say so. And I do not think it is thus or thus. And I do not think it is otherwise and { do not deny it. And I do not say there neither is nor is not another world.” And if you ask him about the being produced by chance, or whether there is any fruit, any result of goodor bad actions, or whether one who has known the truth continues or not after death— to each or any of these questions he gives the same reply,16 Thus the Eel-wriggler equivocates about each of such proposi- tions as the following : (a) (i) There is another world, (ii) There is not another world, (iii) There both is and is not another world, (iv) There neither is nor is not another world; (b) (i) There are chance beings (sprung into existence without the intervention of parents, (ii) There are no such beings,684 Indian Dialectics (iii) There both are and are not such beings, (iv) There neither are nor not such beings; (c) (i) There is fruit, result of good and bad actions, (ii) There is not, (iii) There both is and is not, (iv) There neither is nor is not; (4) () The Tathagata continues to exist after death, (ii) He does not, (iii) He both does and does not, (iv) He neither does nor does not.*? It is evident that the Eel-wrigglers, as they weie called, did not commit themselves to the assertion or denial or both or neither of anything. The Buddhists and the Jainas condemned them as ignorant, stupid. But perhaps they were too critical to accept the validity or truth of any proposition. Their theory can be called proto-agnosticism or even proto-scepticism. They found that there could be no absolutely true knowledge for the conflict of reason faces us at every step, though there may be pragmatic truth which conducts and guides our worldly affairs. Safijaya Belatthaputta examined all modes of expression of the existence or non existence of a thing, and rejected them. The Buddhists and the Jainas as also the thinkers of the Vedic school could not but be influenced by this agnostical or sceptical trend of thought, especially with respect to transcendental matters. We find in the Vedic works descriptions of the ultimate Reality in negative terms—not sat (being), nor asat (non-being), nor both, (nor neither), this last being introduced very gradually and in avery cases. We also find a clear-cut distinction between the empirical reality or truth and the ultimate reality or truth in Vedantic thought, though nowhere so marked as in the philosophy of Gaudapada and Sankara, who were definitely inheritors of a past tradition going centuries back. The influence of Saiijaya BellatthaputtaGrowth of Diaiectical Criticism... 685 on Buddhist and Jaina thought is obvious. In the Maluikya Sutta (Majjhima Nikaya) Buddha sets aside questions such as whether the Tathagata exists after death, does not exist, both exists and does not, and neither exists nor does not exist—as avyakrta, indefinable, indeterminable,18 As Jacobi says, if the public of Buddha’s time had not been accustomed to be told that some things, and those of the Sreatest interest, were beyond the ken of the human mind, and had not acquiesced in such answers, it certainly would not have lent a willing ear to a religious reformer who declined to speak out on what in Brahmanical philosophy is considered the,erd and goal of all speculations. ** Agnosticism or scepticism seems to have prepared the way for the Buddhist doctrine of Nirviina. Buddha could afford to maintain his reticence on the nature of Nirvana in the intellectual or philosophical atmosphere of his days. But as the different schools of thought kept on criticising and tefating one another, each school of thaxstie gven while refuting the position of others aad demonstrating one’s own was bound to develop and be transformed internally, The followers of Buddha also having to hold their own against such heir-splitting dialecticans as the Brahmanical philosophers, were almost driven to enunciate more explicit ideas about the important problem of Nirvana which Buddha had left unsolved, This is true to some extent of the concept of soul or the intelligent principle also, and this and such factors led to the division of the community into a number of sub-schools after the life-time of Buddha. This brief digression is meant to show the important part played by dialectical criticism in the development of philosophical views. In support of the assumption that Buddha was influenced by contemporary agnosticism or scepticism, we may note that as stated in the Mahavagga 1.23.24, Sariputta and Moggalana two of his most distinguished disciples had previously to their conversion been adherents of Saijaya and had brought over to Buddha two hundred and fifty disciples of their former teacher. This happened not long after Gautama’s686, Indian Dialecti:s reaching Bodhi (enlightenment), that is at the very beginning of the new school when its founder must have been willing— on account of his enthusiasm to have an open mind and a rational attitude, or in order to wir pupils (-perhaps on account of the former reason )—to treat prevalent opinions with due consideration. It is quite likely that Mahavira established his Syadvada under the influence of Agnosticism or scepticism or in opposition to it as Hermann Jacobi suggests 20 As the Ajftanavida (Agnosticism) declares that of a thing beyond our experience and thinking existence or non-existence or both or neither can neither be affirmed nor denied, so in a_ similar way but leading to contrary results, the Syadvada states that we can affirm the existence of a thing from one point view (syad asti) deny it from anoiher (sy@d n&isti) and affirm both existence and non-existence with reference to it at different times or from different points of view (sydd asti nasti). If we should ,thi.t:+of affirming existence and non-existence at the sime time from the same point of view, we must say that the thing cannot be spoken of (sya@d avaktavyah). Similarly, under certain circumstances the affirmation of existence is not possible (syad asti avaktavyah), of non-existence (syad nasti avaktavyah) and also of both (syad asti nasti avaktayyah).?* There are similarly the fameus nayas of the Jainas which justify different points of view and suggest that a proposition may be correct from some point of view, though it does not give the whole truth. Perhaps the Jainas were motivated to enunciaie such nayas to silence the opponents and to lessen difference of opinion. The Ajz@navadins must have puzzled and even misled many of the contemporaries, and the Syadvada must have scemed to them a happy way out of the maze of Ajnanavada.?? Thus Safjaya Belatthaputta and other sceptics and agnostics, ‘though brushed aside cursorily as stupid and ignorant, and as having confused ideas, influenced considerably contemporary speculation and the development of dialectical criticism and of philosophical views in generalGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 687 The Epics—In the period of the epics (2nd cent. B-C.— 2nd cent. A.D.) systems of philosophy were fully ripe for formu- lation even if they were not actually formulated. This accounts for the number of expositions connected with different schools of thought, especially the Sarmkhya with a theistic tinge and without it, in the epics, particularly the Mahabharata. There are teferences to the views of the Vedantin, Sarmkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Saiva, Paficaratra, Bauddha, Jaina, Lokayata.23 We may only say here that there occurred discussions and disputes between adherents. of different schools which we find reflected in the Mahabharata. People of the Vedic faith were confronted with materialists and other heretigs.2+ Rationalisation (hetuvada) was prevalent and was a favourite practice among the Panditas and that is why too much of it is condemned. There are numerous references to people indulging in too much of reason- ing and devoid of any faith in the scriptures. Thus in Santiparva 19. 23-24 are mentioned rationalists (hetumantak), hard to convince, wboare by nature confused and stubborn and deny the existence of the soul. These fools are despisers of immortality and talkers in assemblies of people; they wander over the whole earth, being fond of speaking and learned.2> The Bhagavad Gua 4, 40 refers to the unbelieving man who keeps on doubting, according to whom neither this world nor the other exists. (See MBH, 12. 131. 13). He negates or repudiates all scriptures, duties and even the soul. Thus we find the Lokayatas referred to as extreme rationalists who question everything. It can be said that it was the dialectical criticism of the Lokayatas that gave the chief incentive to other philosophers to formulate their theories of the pramanas and their metaphysical views precisely and in a well reasoned out manner. Rationalisation carried to an extreme was looked upon as dangerous and unhealthy as far as practical life was concerned. Nevertheless, the study of logic (Nyaya) was wide spread and the Maha- bharata is, as seen before, full of references to Nyaya. Vyasa admits that he was able to arrange and classify the Upanisads with the help of Anviksiki; that is to say, the Upanisads ought to be interpreted rationally.2¢ 1-878 Indian Dialectics Philosophical discussions are necessarily only a few in the Mahabharata and the Ramiiyana (-especially rare in the latter-), but these works abound in very interesting and appealing dialogues and controversies full of arguments by means of which the parties decide the future course of action. An interesting feature of these is that the parties make out a point very clearly and have something to say in defence of their own position even after the other party has pointed out drawbacks in it. These discussions—personal or political—are not of the formal type, yet the element of supporting or defending one’s own position is evident in them. On the other hand we hardly ever find this in the philosophical and religious discussions and disputes recorded in the Upanisads and the Buddhist and Jaina canonical works, in which a disputing party is shown to be immediately convinced, once the inconsistency in its position is pointed out and the other party has presented its position convincingly. In the Sitras, as: we shall see, we find finer points being raised in favour of one’s own position and looseness or fallacy detected in the opponent’s argument even after the opponent has had his say. The dialogues of the epics and the dialectical parts of the Sitras can be said to be the predecessors of all later dialectical literature. The Satras—The composition and the chronology of the Satras are such as not to permit a clear chronological order amongst the different darsanika Sitras. However, it may be said that the Satras with which we are dealing are not later than the second or third century A.D. Leaving aside the question of chronological order we may here arrange them from the point of view of the dialectical matter contained in them. Looking to the form of the sitras we cannnot expect much dialectic or argumentation expressed in them. Nevertheless, if one studies the sitras consecutively, one does not fail to per- ceive that there is a certain mode of argumentation running through them and that they imply the puarvapaksa (prima-facie view) and the uttarapaksa (final view) and their intermediary forms,Growth of Dialectical Criticism... » 68) Yoga.Siitra—The Yoga-siitra of Patafijali gives a very systematic account in four chapters of the Philosophy and the technique of Yoga. But there is not much of dialectical criticism in it. An objection is anticipated, as the commentator Vyasa explains, in Ch. 4, siitra 12 that if there is no existence for that which exists not, and no destruction for what exists, how could residuary impressions (v@san@) which exist as entities be destroyed. Patafijali answers this by saying that the past and the future exist in reality, there being difference of the attributes in respect of the paths of being (4.12). He proves the reality of the object by means of the unity of modification; a single modification of more than one is observed. Wick, oil and fire change into a lamp, as illustrated by Vacaspati. Similarly, though the attributes are more than One, a single modification does take place. Thus things have a real unity (4-14). There is then the refutation of the Vijfidnavada in this chapter in connection with this. 4.16—‘Na caika-cittatantram ced vastu tatpramanakan tadai kim syat’—states that if an object is dependent on the one mind, then if the mind is restrained or attending to some other object, the object will not be cognised by it, nor will it come into objective relationship with any other mind; it will not be cognised by it. Will it then cease to exist at the time? (Vyasa gives further arguments condemning Vijaanaviida). Patafijali goes on to say that the mind is not self-illuminating, since it is a knowable and since both (one’s own nature and the nature of the object) cannot be ascertained at the same time (4, 19-20), If this is said to be cognised by another mind, by what will the cognition of cognition be apprehended ? If by another this will mean ati- prasatiga (extreme absurdity) in view of the vicious infinite series, and there will be confusion of memories. As many will be the cognitions of various buddhis so many will be the memories, Thus the opponent can be said to bave confused everything by denying the existence of the sentient Principle or purusa who is a witness of the buddhi.2" In short, there is hardly any dialectial criticism in the690 Indian Dialecties Yoga-sitra. Only in the last chapter, there is refutation of the Buddhists who regard the citta as self-illuminating and who deny the existence of asoul, as also of external objects This is intended to prove the reality of things which, according to the Samkhya~Yoga, are never destroyed though they may undergo modifications. This became relevant especially when the problem of destruction of vasant (residual impressions) came up for discussion. The distinction between the knowable mind and the knower purusa is also shown here, Argument based on anavastha (vicious infinite series) and sasikara (confusion) is found employed here. Vaisesika Sitra—Vaisesika-sittra 2.1.8{f shows how the existence of vayu (air) can be inferred from sparga (touch) since it is the substrate of this quality. Vayu is also proved to be a substance (dravya), eternal (as atoms) and many. Au objection is anticipated that no one has perceived vayu, so the inference from sparga can only be of the type of sa@m@anyato- drsta and so only based on verbal testimony (tasmiad agamikam— 2.1.17), The answer to this is that people having supernormal powers must have perceived this substance for names are given only to things one knows directly. Thus that it has a name is itself a mark of inference (lifiga) to prove the exis- tence of vayu (2.1.18-19). Then it is shown that gabda (sound) can be the distinguishing feature of @k@éa alone and so can serve as a mark or liriga of Gkasa which is supersensuous. Kanada refutes the view that the existence of akisa can be inferred from the fact that a manenters or goes out through the door and not through the wall. Exit through the wall is obstructed because of the conjunction of body, the substrate of action, with a substance, viz. wall having touch (and not because GkaSa is absent there, since akasa is present every- where ) ( 2.1.20-28) 4.1. gives an argument proving certain things to be eternal and explains how the existence of such non-sensuous eternal things can be inferred. An existent thing devoid of a cause is eternal (sad akaranavat tan nityam~4.1.1.), €.g. atom. Supersensuous things can be inferred from theirGrowth of Dialectical Criticism, oot effects. Non-eternality of supersensuous things cannot be Perceived, so it cannot be affirmed of such things; they are real (4.1.2-5). The Vaisesika-siitra, it can be seen, attempts throughout to justify the existence and nature of its padarthas (categories), An interesting topic discussed ai some length is: “Is Sabda (word) connected with artha (the thing denoted, neaning) ?” Sabda is an attribute (guna) of Gkasa, so it could not be connected with artha (thing); moreover, a guna is motionless, so Sabda being a guna cannot teach the artha. If Sabda were to come into contact with the artha, the expression ‘aasti’ (is not) could not be employed with reference to what is non-existent for there can be no conjunction with the non-existent. There- fore Sabda and artha are not connected. It may be urged that we can have knowledge of the Samyogin (substance, viz. man with a staff) from the staff, and of the Satavayin (substance, horned animal) from the horns. Now the staff and the man and the horns and the animal are connected: similarly, since we have the knowledge of artha from Sabda, the two must be connected. The answer to this is that the two cases are not parallel. Man with a staff and horned animal are Perceptible, whereas here the relation of Sabda and artha is imperceptible, so the knowledge of artha from Sabda cannot be a reason (hetu) proving their connection. The Siddhantin treats the Pirvapaksin’s argument as a jati (sophistical rejoinder), Mcreover, if Sabda_ were connected with artha, a person could know the artha simply on hearing the sabda (word) even when ‘he is not aware of the convention in respect of its meaning. If it is argued that @ka@Sa is connected with Sabda and artha js connected with @k@Sa, so Sabda and artha are connected, the answer to this is that this would cause confusion, Al} things are connected with @k@$Sa, which is all pervading, so which particular thing would the word denote? Hence Sabda and artha are yo connected. The knowledge of artha can be obtained from $abda due to convention (samaya) and not due to any relation between602 Indian Dialectics them (7.2.15-24).* The relation of Sabdaand artha must have been a controversial and important topic of the times. Jaimini takes great pain in his Parva Muntist sitras to prove that the relation ef Sabda and artha is eternal, and Kanada has almost gone out of his way to devote a number of safras to this topic to show that Sabda and artha are not related. The arguments employed here afe quite nice and subtle. The sa/ras 9.2.3-5 explain that verbal testimony is inference. It can be seen that the VaiSesika-satra examines in its own ‘way the categories of the Vaisesika system by showing their similarities and dissimilarities. It also tries to account for the number and size, perceptibility or otherwise and the like of things. At times an argument is anticipated and refuted. It has given a fairly good exposition of the problem whether Sabda and artha ate connected or not and comes to the conclusion that they are not. It puts forth reasons to prove that Sabda or verbal testimony can be included in inference, that it is in fact inferential in characer. Kanada shows acquaiatance with the jai type of arguments though he has not branded them with the name ‘jazi’. Piirva Mimirasa Siitra-We shall here examine very briefly the method adopted by the Piarva-Mimamsa—sntra in presenting in a systematic manner the contents of the Brahmanas and the procedure of sacrificial rites. We shall also note the dialec- tical modes implicit or explicit in the composition of the sitras. 1.1. is called the Tarka-pada (Argumentative Quarter). 1.1.1. shows that Dharmaascan be known by means of verbal (i.€- scriptural) injunctions; the relation of word and its meaning is an intrinsic one and is therefore eternal; Instruction (wpadeSa) is the means of knowing Dharma; it is infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid source of knowledge since it is independent, according to Badarayana (1.1.5.). Then, the Pirvapaksa that Sabda is a product and is non-eternal is * According to the G.O.S. Edition of Vaisesika Sitra with the commentary of Candrananda, there are a few additional siitras here. —Growth of Dialectical Criticism... & 693 Tefuted and it is Proved that gabda is eternal (1.1.6-23). This topic is very interesting and is very carefully discussed as it is the very Pivot of the Parva Mimamsa system. Jaimini Stresses that both accept that Sahbda is freshly perceived; now, a thing can be perceived if it is brought about by the causal apparatus, and even when it being unmanifest is manifested by certain factors; so it cannot necessarily be said that sabda is produced and so is non-eternal. The Naiyayika’s argument that Sabda is non-eternal because itis a product—is a wrong one (-See The Chapter on Jatis). Siitras 24-26 establish the expressiveness of the Vedic sentences; 27-32 prove that the Veda is apauruseya—not the work of any person, as against the view that it hasan author. This is again a very important topic of the Prva Mimamsa system and the arguments on both the sides are very apt and interesting. 1,2.1-18 establish the authority of arthavada (valedictory) Passages in general. The Parvapaksa is that the purpose of the Veda lying in the enjoining of actions, those parts of the Veda which do not serve that purpose are useless, and in respect of these there- fore the Veda is declared to be non-eternal; moreover, herein we find the scriptures and the directly perceived facts contra- dicted, and so on and so forth. The Siddhantin’s contention is that being construed along with injunctions they woald serve the purpose of commending those injunctions. He refutes at length the other arguments of the Parvapaksin, 1.2.19-25 prove that such arthavada Passages as resemble injunctions inasmuch as they say something not already known, are nevertheless not injunctions as the Piirvapaksin would have us believe; if they be takenas injunctions, there would be a syntacti- cal split (vakyabheda). 1.2.31-53 refute the prima—facie view that mantras have no meaning, and prove that they certainly have a meaning. This topic is again very interesting and an important one for the Mimamsaka. * 1.3.1-7 discuss the authority of the Smpti texts in general, that Sruti is more authoritative than the Smyti and that no Compare the Kautsa commentary in Yaska's Nirukta, 1.oA Indian Dialecties authority attaches to Smytis prompted by worldly motives, 13.8-9 show that a word in Vedic and Smrri texts should always be understood in the sense assigned to it in the scriptures. Si. 1.3.10 says that the usage of words current among Mlecchas is also authoritative, and 1.3 11-14 show that the authority of the Kalpa-siitras is not a self-sufficient one. In all these cases, the Parvapaksais either implicit or is expicitly stated. 1.3 24-29 discuss the authoritativeness of grammatical Simytis. ‘Gauh’ is grammaticaily correct, whereas ‘g@vi’, ‘gomi, etc. are incorrect or vernacular forms of it. Are the latter forms rightly expressive of ‘cow’ or not? The Piirvapaksa is that they are expressive as there is actual cognition even with the help of them. The Siddhantin’s view is that the utterance and use of incorrect words is only due to the slips on the part of the speaker, hence they cannot be believed to have an unbroken tradition behind them. Yet they can express the meaning only by reminding us of the correct word due to a part of the word being the same as that of the correct word. 1.3.30-35 establish that words denote class (@krti, lit. configuration ) and through it the individual, Here the Parvapaksa that words cannot denote class is stated at length and then refuted. 1 4, discusses whether the names udbhid, citre, Syena, etc. signify accessories of a sacrifice or are names of particular sacrifices, the latter being the Siddhtnta (conclusion), and that doubts regarding the meaning of words and sentences are set aside by subsequent Passages and consideration of the capacity of things. The second Adhyaya deals with the differentiation among actions, and matters subsidiary to it e.g. apairva, mantra etc, At the outset, verbs and nouns are defined and differentiated in order to give a rejoinder to the opponent’s objection that all words denote activity. 2.1.30-31 show that mantras are not injunctiveas against the Parvapaksa that they also are injunctive. 2.1.46 gives the principle of ‘syntactical unit’-one sentence. So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words which on being separated are found to be incapable of effecting that purpose, they form one sentence (vakya). But when theGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 395 sentences are equally independent of one another they should be treated as syntactically distinct or as distinct sentences (vik yabheda) (2.1 47). Incomplete sentences should be completed by elliptical extension (anusariga) as the passage that is supplied belongs equally to all. But there can be no such elliptical extension whire there is intervention of words which are not consistent with the Passage to be supplied, and so cannot also be connected with it (2.1.48-49).28 After this the Pairva-Munansa- stra gives in I. 2 the grounds of differentiation among acts, the difference in the apirva of subsidiary acts, and other details pertaining to sacrificial ceremonies and their perform- ance. We need not pursue this further as this is sufficient to illustrate the method of the Parva-Mimtinsa-siitras. They have not explicitly referred to or refuted any school of philosophical thougbt as their main concern is the sacrifice. But whenever a controversial problem or a topic in which an alternative is possible is to be discussed, the author gives a full statement of the other view or views and then establishes his own after refuting them. Each topic thus becomes the subject of a controversy or debate. Jaimini has, moreover, set forth the method of interpreting Vedic texts. For instance, in 5.1; he states the factors that determine the order of sequence (of rites) and in 2.1.46-49 the principles of syntactical unit O@kya), syntactical split (v@kyabheda) and elliptical extension (anusanga). The examples for illustrating the laws of interpretation (uyaya) are all from texts pertaining to sacrificial rituals, As the sacrificial ritual has almost disappeared from the life of the people, these rules are not properly appreciated or sufficiently used. Even so, it continues to be recognised that the rules that Jaimini or his predecessors evolved are still found useful in the interpretation of law-texts and they have been so widely used that there is no important legal digest which does not draw upon the nyayas of Jaimini. The enunciation of these laws must have been the result of many discussions aad controversies about the interpretation of Vedic texts, or proposi- 1-88636 Indian Dialectics tions in general and texts quoted in their support. After they were made clear, they must have been used in interpreting texts, particularly so in courts of justice. Brahma Satra—After indécating the subject of study and showing that Brahman is the Ultimate Reality from which the origination, etc. of the world proceed, the Brahma-sitra shows the harmony of Vedic texts. All scriptural passages have Brahman as their purport, and their differences are only apparent. Satras 1.1.5-11 establish by various arguments that the cause of the world is a sentient ultimate principle which cannot be identified with the insentient Prakyti or Matter as the Sarnkhya holds. They refute the Sarmkhya interpretation Put-on certain Vedic passages cited in support of their own theory by the upholders of the Sarnkhya system of philosophy. For instance, the Vedantin arcues that if the meaning of the word ‘seeing’ (‘thinking’) is accepted as secondary or figurative, this is not true on account of the word ‘man’ (self) (gaunas cen natmasabdat-1.1,6). It may be urged that the word ‘seeing’ is used in a secondary or figurative sense in some passages,— ‘That fire thought, that water thought’ (at feja aiksata, ta apa aiksanta~Chaindogya Up. 6.2.3-4), and it may be so treated here. But this is not tenable, as the word ‘self? is actually employed. It is the self that sees or thinks and it is not Necessary to look upon ‘seeing’ as figurative. In the passages, ‘fire thought’ or ‘water thought’, what thinks is the Self acting through them. From this section onwards (ie. from 1.1.12ff) we find a discussion whether certain _terms used in the Upanisads refer to the Supreme Self, the individual soul or unintelligent matter—such terms being @nanda, Gkisa, prana, Jyotis, etc. All possible interpretations of these words are stated, which make the passage a controversial one. The Purvapaksin is supposed to plead for one or more of these, and then the Siddh@ntin refutes this and gives his own interpretation. Thus each adhikarana assumes the form of a controversy. 1.4.1-3 give a Vedantic interpretation of such terms as mahat, avyakta, etc. which apparently seem to be technical terms ofGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 67 the Samkhya, the Saimkhya view being refuted at each step. 1.4.14ff show that there is no conflict in passages pertaining to Brahman’s causality and that it is Brahman that is the material and efficient cause of the world. Incidentally the nature of the Highest Self, as also the relation of the individual soul and the Highest Seif, is discussed and views of ASmarathya, Audulomi and others are quoted. The last satra of Adhyaya | states, ‘Hereby all the doctrines (opposed to the Vedanta view) are explained”. The Samkhya is the pradhinamalla (principal wrestler in the game of intellectual wrestling), and by refuting his doctrines, all doctrines can be looked upon as refcted. Argument from anupapatti, not being able to account for something or inappropriateness, isa favourite one with the author of the Brahma-si'ra. All other alternative explanations are rejected and one is accepted because there is some anupapatti involved in the former (See 1.1.16; 1.2.13) Asambhava (impossi- bility) or sambhava(possibility) is a similar basis of argument (1.2.17;1.3.18; 1.3.26). Absence of conflict with the pratijna (thesis or position) and drsfanta (example) or non-contradiction is regarded as an essential charactetistic of a conclusion (—See prakrti§ ca pratijna-drstantanuparodhat-I 4.23). 2.1.1-3 repudiate the Smrti opposed to Sruti, especially when the Smyti supports the Sarmkhya—Yoga view. The opponent should not argue that thus certain Smyti texts though authori- tative will have no scope at all, because the Smrti texts being of a conflicting character, if these be accepted others would have no scope. This is anexample of a pratibandi, the urging of a fault same as that urged by the opponent. 2.1.4-11 refute the view that the sentient Brahman cannot be the cause of the insentient world on account of disparity in the natures of the cause and the effect. A number of problems whether insentient things can arise out of, and be merged in, a sentient cause and the like are discussed. The author of the Brahmasitra argues here that the faults and objections urged by the Samkhya against the Vedanta view are present in his view also ( svapaksadosac698 Indian Dialectics ca- 2.1.10). And it is a rule that common faults should not be urged against each other. Of course to ascertain and prove one’s position, each party should try to answer these objections Urging of prasaiiga (co..tingency) is a favourite device of dialec- ticians, For instance, Badarayana argues here that if it it urged that quite a different conclusion from that of the Vedantin can be arrived at by means of reasoning, the answer to this is that if reasoning be solely relied on there would be the contin- gency of non-release (2.1.11) (—see also 2 1.21, 26). Here again the Samkhya is the principal opponent and by refuting the Samkhya theory, the author of the Brahma-sitra claims to have refuted other theories which are less reasonable (2,1.12). He also tries to account for the distinction between Brahman, the enjoying soul and the objects of enjoyment (13), and establishes the non-difference of the effect from the cause (14-20) He further answers the objection that if the individual soul be non-different from Brahman, imperfections and faults like not doing what is beneficial to oneself would attach to Brahman (21-23). He discusses other questions such as Brahman’s independence of material and instruments of action (24-25), Brahman’s integrity being unaffected by the world (26-29), the manifold powers of Brahman, the world being His //@ (sport), the problem of suffering and evil and inequality in 1espect of the souls and their experiences (30-36), and shows that Brahman has all the qualities necessary for being the creator of the world.37 Brahma-siitra 2.2. is called the Tarka -pada. Here the author refutes the important philosophical views with regard to the cause of the world, which are opposed to the Vedantic positon —Samkhya (1-10), Vaisesika (11-17), Sarvastivada (18-27), Vijhdnavada (28-32), Stinyavada (32, according to RAmanuja), Jainism (33-36), Saivism (37-41), Bhagavata view or Vaisnavism (42-45). The statement here is‘mainly based on argumentation— perhaps chiefly for the conviction of those who would not recognise the authority of the Vedas, or even the validity of verbal testimony and would demand a rational stand. TheGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 699 Siiirakara has not stated here the view of the opponent; but Presupposing acquaintance with it on the part of the reader, he straightaway starts refuting it by. advancing arguments showing inconsistencies in the opponent's position. For instance, he says that since the orderliness of the world is not possible on the Simkhya hypothesis, Pradhana inferred by the Samkhya cannot be the cause of the world ( racantinupapattes ca nanumanam—2.2.1 ). Argument from anupapatti, as said above, is very common with the dialecticians (—see also 2.2:8); further a conclusion is dis- carded if it involves contradiction (vipratisedhiac c@ samaijasam —2.2.10). Rejection of an argument or theory because it involves vicious infinite series is found illustrated in the refutation of kas. If the relation of inherence (samavaya) be admitted between two things, then the samayaya which is different from them must be inherent in them by means of another samavaya and so on ad infinitum (samavityabhyupa gamie ca simyad anavasthiteh—2.2.13). In the refutation of the Jaina view, it can be seen that the doctrine of Syadvada is brushed aside cursorily by saying that it cannot be accepted on account of the impossibility of contradictory attributes in one thing (vaikasminnasambhayat-2.2.33). The Jainas also would noi acept this in this form; when they affirm such contra- dictory attributes of one thing they always qualify their expression by svarhpera (from the point of view of one’s character) or pararfpena(from the point of view of another's character), which the Stitrakara has conveniently ignored, This is an instance showing that sometimes in the enthusiasm for refutation the dialecticians misrepresented — or imperfectly. represented the opponent’s view. This would be an example of Jalpa in practical life, the sole aim being victory. It may be noted here that Badarayama starts here with the refutation of the Samkhya and then refutes the doctrine of the Vaisesika, the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Saiva and the Bhagavata schools. The Samkhya stands nearest the Vedanta doctrine; it admits the non-difference of cause and effect;700 Indian Dialeciies and is acceptable in one form or other to Sirti texts. So Badarayana repudiates it fi This was one way of refuting rival philosophies. The pradh@na-malla is defeated first and then it is easy to repudiate the others. In later philosophical literature we find a different method adopted. The most alien or distant philosophical theory or doctrine is stated and another school is made to refute it, the corresponding doctrine of this school being refuted by another, and so on till one comes to a theory which is very near one’s own, which being refuted, one’s own theory is established. This method we find adopted in Abhayadeva’s commentary on the Sanmati-tarka, and in the SarvadarSanasangraha and such other works. The author of the Brahma-sitra has considered other attempts at the interpretation of the Upanisads and summa- rised their resul.s The ancient teachers cited seem to have entertained different views on important points of doctrine such as the relation of the individual soul and Brahman and the like. Some of these are stated and Badarayana’s view is defended ?® Thus the Brahma-sitra indulges in the refutation of rival systems of philosophy and the criticism of other traditions of Vedantic thought. Each adhikarana is in the form of a controversy; or the Parvapaksin’s a1gument is anticipated (-iti cet) and refuted. Nyaya Stra : The first chapter of the Nytya-sitra is concerned, as Vatsyayana says, with the enumeration and definition of the Nyaya categories. The fifth chapier also gives the varieties of jai (futile rejoirder) and nigrehasikanas (grounds of censure). In 1,2.15-17, an objection is anticipated that upactira chata (figurative quibble) is not different from vak chala(verbal quibble) and answered by saying that they are different: if some similarity be sufficient reason to regard them as one, then on account of some similarity, however slight, all the chalas could be brought under one variety only This is a criticism of a view which accepted only two varieties of chala (-see chala in Caraka Samhita and Upaiyahrdaya).Growth of Dialectical Cri 701 From the second chapter onwards the author of the Nyaya-siiira examines these categeries by putting forth the likely arguments that could be advanced by the parvapaksin and refuting them. He starts with the examination of the concept of sanSaya (doubt) (2.'.1-7). As against the definition of doubt given earlier (1.123), the Parrapaksin urges that no doubt can arise either from the definite cognition of properties common to several objects or from the definite cognition of characters belonging to only one of the objects, or from the cognition of diversity of opinions or from that of uncertainty. On the contrary, where there is diversity of Opinions there is certainty of conviction. Further, since uncertainty itself is quite certain in its uncertain character, no doubt can arise from it. ( Vatsyayana adds that if uncertainty is not quite certain in its own character, it would mean that it is not a real uncertainty at all, and in this case also no doubt should arise.) Lastly, says the Parvapaksin, doubt would never cease, as the property whose cognition gives rise to doubt continues to exist. The Sitrakara’s rejoinder to these arguments is that when doubt is held to arise only from such a cognition as has been described (in 1.1.23) as not apprehending the specific character of any one object, there is no possibility of either there being no doubt at all, or of there arising a doubt that would be unceasing. The arguments-in the Plirvapaksa_ here seem to be those of some sceptical philosopher and speak highly of the development of dialectical thought of the time. We find a few such rare glimpses of advanced dialectical criticism as early as the S@fras, and especially in the Maha- bhasya of Patafjali (2nd cent. B.C.). In 2.1.8-20 there is a dialectical examination of the pramanas in general. The Piirvapaksa (prima-facie view) is that perception and the rest cannot be regarded as sources of cognition (pramaina) on accoupt of the impossibility of connecting them with any of the three points of time. If the pramana exists already before the object, then perception cannot be produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object. If the pramana comes702 Indian Dialectics into existence afer the object then by whose instrumentality could the thing be cognised and thereby become the prameya (object of knowledge)? If the two come into existence simultaneously, then inasmuch as each cognition is restricted to its own object, there can be no sequence among cognitions (2.1.8-11). The answer to this is that the denial itself is the cause or instrument of the cognition of the impossibility of pramanas and so there can be no denial as it is impossible to connect it with any of the three points of time; since all the pramanas have been denied, the denial itself cannot be established. If the character of pramana is admitted in the case of reasoning, the denial becomes restricted to only a few from among the pramanas,—which is not proper. There should be no denial of prameyas with regard to all the three points of time as their existence as cause and effect is proved in the same manner as that of the musical instrument is proved by its sound. Pramina itself can be a prameya as the names are applied according to circumstances. The weighing balance, for instance, which is a pramana (the means of ascertaining the weight of things) isa prameya also as regards its own accuracy (2.1.12-16)- Here the Piirvapaksin raises a point: If the pramanas are cognised by means of praminas, then this involves the possi- bility of other pramanas and so on infinitely (that is to sayy there is the fault of anavastha, vicious infinite series). If another Pramana is not operative in respect of a pramaa, then just as the cognition of the pramana would be accomplished without the operation of a pramina, so could the cognition of the prameya (object of cognition) also (2.1.17-18). The answer to this is that it is not so, as the apprehension of the pramanas is similar to that of lamp-light.° There is no absolute rule, as in the case of certain things we find that other instruments are inoperative, while in others it is found that they are not inoperative (2.1,19).31 Sarras 20-29 examine and defend the definition of perception especially in view of the charge of the Piirvapaksin that al! the causes of perceptual cognition are not mentioned, 30-32 state and refute the view of theGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... 703 Parvapaksin that perception is only inference because only a part cf a thing is perceived and the cognition of the composite whole (avayavin) proceeds from it. 33-36 examine the nature of the avayavin and refute the Parvapaksa that there is no real thing corresponding to the conception of the whole. The Parva- paksin says that we have the conception of ‘one’ in respect of a number of constituents of a forest or army because owing to distance, their distinctness cannot be perceived; similar is the case with other things because the distinctness of the atoms is not cognised. The Siddha@ntin’s answer is that the two cases are not parallel. The trees and the constituents of the army can be individually perceived, whereas the atoms are super- seasuous. Therefore the avayavin is perceived as also the parts. In 37-38, the Parvapaksin gives examples of inferences which are not true, thereby showing that inference has no validity or does not yield true knowledge; and the Siddhantin refutes the Parvapaksin’s arguments saying that if a particular inference is fallacious, it is due to the fault of the person putting it forth and not because inference has no validity. 39-43 examine the nature of Time especially in view of the contention of the Parvapaksin that there is no present time, for when an object falls, the only possible points of time are—that which has been fallen through, and that which has to be fallen through. In 2,1.4/-48 the Parvapaksa is that upamana (analogy) can be included in inference; there can be no analogy on the basis of either perfect or partial resemblance. In 2.1.49-56 the Parvapaksa that Sabda (word, verbal testimony) is anumana (inference) is examined at length and it is proved that there can be no relation between word and its meaning ( as the Mimdrsaka believes) as the meaning of a word is based on convention. 57-68 deal with Sabda in its particularity i.e. the Vedic word. The Parvapaksin’s contention is that $abda can- not be regarded as a pramana because of such defects as falsity, contradiction and tautology. The Siddhantin's rejoinder is that it is not so, as the failure is due to deficiencies in the 1-89704 Indian Dialectics action, the agent and the means, the contradiction is only apparent and repetitions have a Purpose; and so on, 2.2.1-12 examine and refute the claim of Aitihya (tradition), Arthapatti (implication \, Sambhava (inclusion) and Abhiiva (negation or non-apprehension) to be pramanas. Siitras 2.2 13-19 give an exposition and proof of the non-eternity of Sabda. In the course of the discussion, arguments and objections of the Parva- Paksin who holds that Sabda is eternal are anticipated and refuted, The Parvapaksin employs chala (quibble) at one Place : “When a thing is ‘different’, it is ‘different’ from something that is ‘different’ from it, and what is ‘different’ from the ‘different’ must be ‘non-different’, so that there is nothing that can be Tegarded as ‘different’ (anyad anyasmad ananyatvad ananyad ity anyatabhavah—2,2.3}). The Siddhtintin’s rejoinder to this is that if there is no conception of the ‘difference’, ‘there can be none of ‘non-difference’ as the two conceptions are mutually relative’ tadabhave nastyananyaté tayor itaretaraipeksasiddheh.— 22.32). In continuation of this discussion, satras 10-56 examine and refute what is meant by the modification of letter-sounds (varna); Tris sstablished that there is no modification ‘in letter- Sounds as would justify the continuity of their existence. Here too the Pitrvapaksin employs chala—“ As there is constancy in nON-cOnstancy, itis not right to say that there is no constancy” (aniyame niyaman na’ niyamah—2.2. 54%. 57-68 give the definition of Word and discuss what a word means, There are differences of Pinion that a word means the individual (vyakti}, con- Sguration @kp1i) or the universal (samanya). The Nyaya view is that al} three constitute the denotation of a word; it is established by refuting the other views. It can be seen that the whole of the second chapter is devoied to the examination of Pramanas, their definition, validity, number and the like problems Pertaining to them, which all the schools Of philosophy discussed, Sitras 3, 1-3 show that the soul is distinct from: the Sense-organs, and 4-6 refute the view that it is identical with the body ( refutation of the Lokavata view or the Tajjwa-a Growth of Dialectical Criticism... taccharwavada). 7-15 refute the view that the visual organ is one only (caksuradvaita); being two it could not be the soul which is one. 16-18 refute the view that the mind is the soul, 19-27 show that the soul is eternaland it does not originate, 28-32 examine the exact nature of the body—that it is composed of earth—and refute other views, S&tras 33-53 are highly dialectical in character. They refute the view that the senses are not made up of elemental substances, and while proving that they have a material character, objections are repeatedly anticipated (iti cet, if it be urged—) and answered, 54-63 refute the view that there is only one sense-organs and the objection that their objects being many, the sense-organ, also-should be many and not only five; and prove that there ate five sense— organs of the same nature as the five -elemental substances, 64-75 examine the objects of.the respective sense-organs and the qualities that the elemental substances have; here also the Parvapaksa that each one of the substances has only one quality is stated and refuted, 3.2,1-9 discuss whether buddhi (cognition) is eternal or non- eternal. At many places the Nya@ya-sitra states what the ground of such a controversy is, For instance, here it is said that the doubt whether buddhi is eternal or non-eternal arises due to its similarity to action and Gkasa (3.2.1, See also 3.1.54, 4.2.44). In problems pertaining to the sense-organs, buddhi, eternality or non-eternality etc. the Parvapaksin is mostly the Sarnkhya. In connection with the question of the eternality or non-eternality of buddhi, 10-17 state and refute the theory that things of the world are in Perpetual flux and perish un a moment (ksantabhaiga-refutation of the Buddhist _vie vOf perpetual flux), 18-41 prove that buddhi (cognition) isymonial qualily of the sense-organs, or the object or the mind, but is a quality of Gian (soul). Arguments based on the probans being itself one that requires to be proved, or the Do of the opponent being liable to the same objection ao ng like are found advanced here. Objections on the part ee B Pharvapaksin and on the part of other schools of thought are706 Indian Dialecti anticipated and answered with the result that the problem is treated in a highly dialectical fashion. 42-45 discuss the point : ‘Granting that buddhi (cognition) is non-eternal, does it perish as soon-as it is produced, or does it endure for some time 7” The objection that if cognition were evanescent, the perception of things would be always indistinct, like the indistinct per- ception of colour during lightning-flash —is answered by saying that the very reason put forward (viz. cognition is evanescent) implies the admission of what is sought to be denied; further even if it is evanescent, the perception of things can be distinct like the distinct Perception of the continuous series of lamp- flames, ¢6-55 establish that consciousness is not a quality of the body even though it is believed to be found when the body is present and absent when the body is absent, ubjections and analogies Put forth by the opponent being refuted. 56-59 say that there is only one mind in one body and that it is atomic as against the view that there must be a plurality of minds as we Perceive a number of actions (— cognitions—) appearing simultaneously, 609-72 show that the body is formed under the influence of the persistence of the effect of previous actions and rot independently of karman as the Nastikas would have us believe. Here a number of absurdities are shown to be involved in the opponent's position (prasatigiipatti). 413-9 give a classification of dosas (defects) into. three sroups—raga (desire), dvesa (hatred) and moha (ignorance) by anticipating objections (—e.g. since between moha and the other two there is the relation of cause and effect, it follows that moha is Something different from the dosas—) and refuting them. 10-13 treat dialectically the problem of rebirth. Sarras 14ff. state the views of different dialecticians ( Pravadukas as Vatsyayana calls them) and refute them; even in between the argument an Objection on the part of the Opponent is anticipated and tefuted, so that a fair chance is given to the opponent to justify bis own position and only after that it is taken to be refuted, This is the usual Practice of the Ny@ya-sitra, The views stated and refuted here are—(i) Things———————— Growth of Dialectical Criticism... nt are produced out of negation (14-18), (ii) God is the cause Of the universe (19-21),84 (iii) the world is a result of chance (22-24), (iv) all things are non-eternal (25-28), (v) all things are eternal (29-33), (vi) everything is unique, there is no unity (34-36); (vii) all is mere void (37-40), (viii) Samkhyaikanta, dogmatic assertion with Tegard to the exact number of things (41-43). Sitras 4 1.44-54 discuss fruition of action and prove that it comes after rebirth, and that it does not appear immediately, 55-58 examine the nature of pain and refute the belief of some that there can be no pleasure whatsoever, 59-68 treat final release (apavarga) by refuting the position that there can be no final release, since there is the concate- nation of debts, afflicticns (kleSa) and activity. 4.2.4-17 deal with components (avayava) and composite whole (avayavin) and at length State and repudiate the Buddhist’s denial of avayavin, 18-25 say that according to the Anupalambhika (Negationist) all things are non-existent, and accordingly he denies the atom also, but this is not true. 26-35 repudiate the denial of the external world ‘and 36-37 the denial of all, including buddhi (consciousness), From the above survey, it is evident that the Nyaya-sitra conducts a sort of Pariksa (examination) by pointing out why a doubt is likely to arise, Postulating a Parvapaksa and answering it by the Ustara—paksa. The different topics are treated as if they were subjects of controversy, especially in the part dealing with ‘examination’ (Chapters 2-4). The Pirvapaksa is given full scope in respect of presentation, and then it is refuted; even after this, fine objections or clarification on the part of the Parvapak sin or a third party are anticipated and refuted. We find in the Nyaya-sitra, a more logical criticism of the opponent’s view on the basis of specific Principles of dialectical criticism (such as sa@dhyasama, ete.) than we find in the other Sftras. Moteover, in connection with the Nyaya-sitra, Vatsyayana clearly enunciates the procedure of dialectical examination; first the categories are enumerated, then they are defined and then this definition and the particular category as408 Indian Dialectics such are examined.*# The Nya@ya-siitra itself does not mention this procedure, but if we examine the order of the treatment we find that it is implicit though it cannot be said to be wholly lacking in, as for example, the Vaisesika-siitra. Conclud.ng we might say of the different darSanika Siitras that the Yoga-satra and the Vaisesika stra, (especially the former) very rarely attempt any dialectical examination of their Gwn tenets or categories, though this is not entirely missing in the Vaisesika-sitra The Yoga-satra, in Chapter-4, while asserting and establishing the reality of things, has in view, as seen before, the Buddhist as the Parvapaksin. Similarly, the Vaisesika stitra when it shows that there is no connection between gabda and artha is, as a matter of fact, tefuting the contention of the Mimarmsakas that their relation is eternal. The Parva-Mimamsa sitra and the Brahma-siitra have each a Tarka-pada, The Parva~-Mimansai—sittra postulates a pirvapaksa in the discussion of each topic, especially so in the Tarka-pada and the exposition of cach topic assumes a dialectical form, This is true of the Brahma-siitra also with this in addition that the important systems of philosophical thought are refuted in the Tarka-pida. In fact the whole of the Tarka-pada is dialectical in character. Though not attaching, in so many words, any importance to ¢arka in respect of the higher problems of philosophy, the composition of the Brahma~ Stitra is dialectical in character: In the course of refutation, arguments on the part of the Parvapaksin or a third party are anticipated (iti cer) ‘and ‘repudiated. The exposition of the Nytya-sitra also is highly dialectical in character. After enumerating and defining the categories, it examines them critically, and presupposes powerful arguments against them as accepted by the Nydya school. Arguments against the validity of the pramanas also are stated and answered. Samkhya Kariki—A contemporary sitra of the Sarmkhya system is not extant, but we may consider here the S@mkhya- Karika (second. cent.-fourth cent. AD.) of [Svara Krsna, the earliest extant Samkhya work..The very first k@rika@ comprisesGrowth of Dialectical Criti ism... i) @ question or objection and its answer ; « There being in this world an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain (duhkhay, there arises a desire for enquiring into the means of alleviating them. And if it is urged that the enquiry is superfluous on account of there being known cures for the same, we answer that it is. not So, because. these latter are neither certain nor firal,°34 The revealed (Vedic) is like the Perceived. It .is associated with impurity, destruction and inequality. Other than that is better—proceeding as it does from the right cognition of the manifest (mahat, etc), the unmanifest (Pradhiina) and the knower (purusa) (1 2). Here the author is trying to justify the Samkhya position by pointing out its indispensability if pain is to be absolutely eliminated. We have here clearly a Proper type of dialectical argument. First the problem of Samkhya Philosophy is Stated, then a rejoinder is formulated as the purvapaksa and this in its turn is denied by proper arguments and then the final position is stated, This becomes the justification of the whole system. The Vedic rites are here criticised as impure and involving destruction and inequality, We find an important principle of. critical investigation laid down in the Samkhyu-karika, viz, a Knowable is established by means of a source of valid knowledge (prameyasiddhiht pra- mianiddhi-SK, 4), All dialecticians are Unanimous in recognising this as the fundamental principle of discussion. Byen the sceptical thinkers repudiate all the categories of thought by postulating this as the accepted standard of dialzctica| criticism and showing the inconsistercies involved in the different conceptions of the pram@Gnas and consequently of the Prameyas or knowables, The formulation of this principle was thus an important land— mark in the history of dialectical thought. Karika 7 states the factors due to which evenan existent thing may not be perceived. This signifies that it is wrong to argue that an entity is not existent because it is not perceived Prakrti is one such entity Which though existent is. not perceived on account of its subtlety, but -can be ascertained from jts effects—mahat, ete.710 Indian Dialecties (SK. 8. This implies the refutation of the position that what cannot be perceived is non-existent. K@rika@ 9 gives reasons to establish that the effect is existent in the cause. It may be stated here that argumentation (aha) is mentioned first among the eight siddhis (accomplishments), along with oral instruction, study, the three-fold suppression of pain, intercourse of friends and gifts--ignorance (viparyaya), incapacity (aSakti) and contentment (sus/i) being the three-fold curb on siddhis.5> This shows the importance the Sarakhyas, or rather all thinkers, attach to reasoning or the spirit of critical inquiry. The Sarkhya Karik@, it is noteworthy, establishes the Sa:mnkhya categories on the basis of reasoning. . The early Commentaries on the Sfirras—We may now briefly examine the Bhasyas (commentaries) on the Satras of the different systems of philosophy to enable us to form an idea how dialectical discussions entered the texture of the Philosophy of the different systems of thougbt. Vatsyayana (fourth century AD.) who has written a Bhasya on the Nydya-sitra, adopts the style of a teacher expounding philosophical problems to his disciple. The question ‘kasmae’ (‘why so 7’) is repeatedly asked and answered. As a matter of fact, the Indian bh@gsyakara always has in view an audience, [n his introductory remarks on Nya@ya-sitra 1.1.1, Vatsyayana has explained the effectiveness of the pramanas and has show> that the real nature of things is dependent (for its being ace:pted or rejected or treated with indifference) on the Pramitr (cogniser), pramina (source of valid cognition ), Prameya (cognised object, knowable) and pramiti (valid cog- nition). He further explains what the ‘real nature’ of things signifies. It is nothing else but ‘being’ or ‘existence’ in the case of that which ‘is’, and ‘non-being’ or ‘non-existence’ in the case of that which ‘is not’. That is to say, when something that ‘is’ is apprehended as being or existent, so that it is apprehended as what it really is and not as something of a contrary nature (i.e. as non-existent), and when a non-entity is apprehended as such, i.e. as what it really is and not as : aGrowth of Dialectical Criticism... m1 something of a contrary nature, then that which is thus apprehended constitutes the true nature of the thing. Raising the question how a non-entity can be cognised by means of a pramiana, he answers it. In explaining stra 1.1.1, Vatsyayana explains the purpose and connection of the treatise and anticipating an objection why doubt, etc. are mentioned when they can be included in either the pramanas or the prameyas, answers it. He shows that doubt and the other topics form integral factors of the science of reasoning, and also explains what motive (prayojana ) could be present in the three kinds of debate—vada, jalpa, vitand& mentioned among the topics, especially the last, because the true vaitandika does not accept anything, [t is a practice with Indian commentators to expound at the very outset the four anubandhas (bonds of connection, moving considerations ) which should also be referred to implicitly in the mavigala stanza if any. The four anubandhas are (i) adhikarin, person qualified, or adhikara, what qualifi- cations are required for the study, (ii) visaya, subject-matter, (iii) sambandha, what connection there is between the subject- matter and the book itself ( pratipadya—pratipadakabhiwa), and (iv) prayojana, purpose to be served by the study.°° The commentator also tries to justify the order in which the different topics are mentioned and discussed. The method of treatment has been clearly analysed by Vatsyayana when he says i: Trividha ca’sya Sastrasya Pravrttih—uddeso laksanarm pariksa ceti ( —NB, 1.1.3 )— The procedure of this Sastra is three-fold—enumeration of topics, definition and examination, This last involves criticism of definitions on the basis of the criteria of the definition being narrow (avpapti), too wide (ativy@pti), etc. and the faults of vicious infinite series (anava- sth@), self-dependence (@tmaSraya), itaretaragraya (mutual dependence), etc. These comprehend the main elements of a dialectical discussion. Commenting on Ny@ya-siitra 1.1.3 which enumerates the pramanas recognised by the Nyaya system, Vatsyayana raises 1-90nn 712 A Indian Dialectics an important question: Do the pramanas have common objects, that is to say, can the different pramatas operate with respect io one cbject ( pramana-samplava), or is the scope of the praminas restricted within mutually exclusive limits (—pramana-viplava)? This is in view of the Buddhists who are pram&na-viplavavadins, or in whose view the pramanas have their own exclusive objects—svalaksana, unique particular being the object of perception, and samanya, universal that of inference. While siving an exposition of the definition of Perception (1.1.4), Vatsyayana explains the significance of every term and justifies why other factors (e.g. mind) contri- buting to the rise of perceptual cognition are not mentioned. Commenting on the term ‘ avyapadesya’ ‘not expressible, ’ ‘devoid of verbal expression,’ he says that it is meant to refute the view of those who hold that no perception is free from verbal representation and examines it at length. In his commen- tary on the Nydya-sutra 1.1.22 which defines final release as absolute freedom from pain, etc. he refutes at length the Vedantin’s view that in the state of emancipation there is manifested the eternal happiness of the soul just like its ubiquity, and when that happiness is manifested the soul is absolutely free and becomes happy. He repeatedly anticipates arguments in support of the Vedantin’s view, as also the Vedantin’s objections to the Nyaya position and repudiates these by showing the anomalies involved, The discussion is highly dialectical in character. Commenting on Nyiya-sitra 1.1.32 which enumerates the members (avayava) of a syllogism, Vatsyayana refers to some logicians who recognise ten members—desire to know (jij asi), doubt (samSaya), capacity to accomplish what is desired (Sakya-pripti), purpose (prayojana) and dispelling of doubt ‘samSaya—vyudisa) in addition to the five mentioned in the Sitra—and explains that the author of the Nydya-siitra has Not recognised the former five members as they are not Cognitive in character and so cannot prove anything directly. It may be noted that the nature of these also is dialectical inGrowth of Dialectical Criticisni... i m3 character, the ten members jointly giving rise to a picture of a debate inasmuch as they show how the question arises, what is the cause of doubt, and the like, They were eliminated to prune the syllogism of its Practical associations and make it more theoretical and logical. Even so it retains a dialectical cbaracter, the different avayavas being like answers to questions. Vatsyayana similarly refutes a Suggested interpretation of the Ny&yastitra 12.9 defining the fallacious probans kalatua (belated), in view of the Buddhist view with regard to kalatita, reversal of the order of the avayavas of the syllogism. In his Bhasya on Nyaya-sitra 2.1.19 he has anticipated a number of objections on the part of the opponent and answered them especially because this pertains to an important point, whether pramana (cognition) is selfluminous or not, and the Nya@ya— shtra apparently seems to favour the view that pram@na is self—luminous—-which goes against the Nyaya view. Vatsyayana establishes at length the reality of the avayavin (composite whole) as distinct from the avayavas (components) in his commen- tary on Ny@ya-siitra 2.1.35 as this was again one of the points of controversy with the Buddhists who do not recognise the reality of the avayavin. Discussing the authoritativeness of the Veda, Vatsyayana refutes the Mimarsa view that word (Sabda) is eternal (2.1.68), In the fourth chapter of the Nyaya-satra there is, as stated above, the refutation of rival views, In the commentary on this chapter Vatsyayana’s dialectical skill is revealed. He has criticised the opponent’s view by exposing all the anomalies involved in his line of argument; here he has employed many of the principles of dialectical criticism laid down in the Nyaya-sitra, fallacies, anavasth@ and the like tarkas and so. on, To take one instaace, Ny@ya-siitra 4,1,37 states the Siinya- vadin’s view before refuting it. All things must be non-entities, because all things are known to be mere negations of one another (.sarvam abhiivo bhavesy itaretarabhiva-siddneh). The author of the Nya@ya-satra himself refutes this in 4.1.38, but before that Vatsyayana offers his own answer to the Sinya-Tia Indian Dialectics vAdin's contention and this answer is expressed in a typically dialectical fashion: The assertion put forward cannot be right because there is contradiction (a) between the two terms of the proposition, viz. ‘all things’ and ‘non-entities’ (—if they be things they cannot be non-enities), and (b) between the proposition and the statement of the probans (-If all things are non-entities, i! is not possible for things to be the negation of one another and if things arenegation of one another, then ‘all things’ cannot be ‘non-entities’).27 Here vyaghita (contra- diction) in the opponent’s assertion is exposed. At can be seen that though Vatsyayana is quite early among the Commentators whose works are extant (fourth century A.D), he has refuted the theories of rival views very often. The Nyaya-sitra is itself dialectical ir character, so Vatsyayana rarely got a chance to introduce discussions and refutations of his own. But he critically and dialectically examined the categories of the Nyaya system and repudiated rival views whenever he got an opportunity. His dialectical skill is fully Tevealed in such passages. The Bhasya of Vatsyayana provided Difinaga (perhaps his contemporary) the ground and the material for attacks on realism. Uddyotakara (635 A.D.., author of the Nyaya-varttika defended Vatsyayana against the attacks of Dii-aga and vehemently warded off and demolished the Criticisms of Difindga, Uddyotakara has very carefully examined the categories of the Nyaya system and tried to fortify it against all possible attacks at weak points by refining and rendering precise the presentation of different problems. He is very tenacious, though not always just in his dialectical criticisms which often take the shape of a jalpa (see his criticism of the Buddhist definition of Pratyoksa—NV. 1.1 4, pp. ff). Vacaspati (841 A.D.) devotes a major portion of his Nyaya—virttika-tatparya wki to the exposition and repudiation of Buddhist theories. He is well known for his exemplary impartiality, open-mindedness and true philosophic spirit. To take but one instance he was, along with others who are mostly forgotten, mainly responsible for the introduction of —Growth of Dialectical Criticism... ns the concept of nirvikalpa pratyaksa (indeterminate perception) into the classical Nyaya system, though it had earlier entered the Brahmanical field through the formulation of the theory of perception by Prasastapada and KumArila, probably due to the influence of the Buddhist view of perception. PraSastapada and Prabhakara and Kumarila also were influenced by Buddhist views through they were original thinkers and though they tried to dialectically examine and repudiate Buddhist theories. We can say that the period between the fourth or fifth century A.D. and the tenth century and beyond was the age of controversies and polemical writings of a high order, in which the different systems criticised one another and even while defending themselves against rival attacks benefited and were inspired to develop their philosophical views on account of the influence of other philosophical systems and in view of some just criticism levelled at one another. Udayana (tenth century A.D.) among other Naiyayikas is well known for his dialectical skill as evinced by his Nyayakusumazjali and Atmatattva-viveka. He has, further, enhanced the scope of different dialectical categories, as we have seen before, by accommodating the different dialectical devices and principles of dialectical criticism, employed in actual debates and in polemical works, within the scheme or framework of the Nyaya-sitra, PraSastapada (fifth century A.D.) gives in his Bhasya a systematic account of the Vaisesika system by way of a running commentary. He hardly ever indulges in the ctiticism of rival views, though when he gives at length the arguments to prove the existence of a soul he must have had in view the tenets of some who did not accept a soul, or did not accept that it could be established by inference. At times he Pre-supposes and states possible objections on the part of the opponent and answers them (e.g while treating visesa particularity, and samavaya, inherence). In his ontological views, PraSastapada remained thoroughly realistic, bui his logic was very strongly influenced by Buddhist views as can be seen from his Bhasya,