DOCUMENT , Dtente with the Soviet Union

I believe that the tone of our public and private discourse about and with the Soviet Union should
be calm, courteous and non-polemical. This will not prevent us from stating our views clearly
and, if need be, firmly; nor will it preclude us from candidly affirming our attitudenegatively if
warrantedtoward the policies and actions of the Soviet Union. But what I said in my Inaugural
address concerning the tone and character of our domestic debates should also govern the tone
and character of our statements in the international arena, most especially in respect of the Soviet
Union.
I believe that the basis for a viable settlement is a mutual recognition of our vital interests. We
must recognize that the Soviet Union has interests; in the present circumstances we cannot but
take account of them in defining our own. We should leave the Soviet leadership in no doubt that
we expect them to adopt a similar approach toward us. This applies also to the concerns and
interests of our allies and indeed of all nations. They, too, are entitled to the safeguarding of their
legitimate interests. In the past we have often attempted to settle things in a fit of enthusiasm,
relying on personal diplomacy. But the spirit that permeated various meetings lacked a solid
basis of mutual interest and, therefore, every summit meeting was followed by a crisis in less
than a year.
I am convinced that the great issues are fundamentally interrelated. I do not mean by this to
establish artificial linkages between specific elements of one or another issue or between tactical
steps that we may elect to take. But I do believe that crisis or confrontation in one place and real
cooperation in another cannot long be sustained simultaneously. I recognize that the previous
Administration took the view that when we perceive a mutual interest on an issue with the
USSR, we should pursue agreement and attempt to insulate it as much as possible from the ups
and downs of conflicts elsewhere. This may well be sound on numerous bilateral and practical
matters such as cultural or scientific exchanges. But, on the crucial issues of our day, I believe
we must week to advance on a front at least broad enough to make clear that we see some
relationship between political and military issues. I believe that the Soviet leaders should be
brought to understand that they cannot expect to reap the benefits of cooperation in one area
while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation elsewhere. Such a course involves
the danger that the Soviets will use talks on arms as a safety valve on intransigence elsewhere. I
note, for example, that the invasion of Hungary was followed by abortive disarmament talks
within nine months. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was preceded by the explorations of a
summit conference (in fact, when Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin [of the Soviet Union]
informed President Johnson of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he received the appointment so
quickly because the President thought his purpose was to fix the date of a summit meeting).
Negotiation and the search for agreement carry their own burdens; the Sovietsno less than we
must be ready to bear them.
I recognize the problem of giving practical substance to the propositions set forth in the previous
paragraph. Without attempting to lay down inflexible prescriptions about how various matters at
issue between ourselves and the USSR should be connected, I would like to illustrate what I have
in mind in one case of immediate and widespread interestthe proposed talks on strategic
weapons. I believe our decision on when and how to proceed does not depend exclusively on our
review of the purely military and technical issues, although these are of key importance. This
decision should also be taken in the light of the prevailing political context and, in particular, in

light of progress toward stabilizing the explosive Middle East situation, and in light of the Paris
talks [on Vietnam]. I believe I should retain the freedom to ensure, to the extent that we have
control over it, that the timing of talks with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons is optimal.
This may, in fact, mean delay beyond that required for our review of the technical issues. Indeed,
it means that we shouldat least in our public positionkeep open the option that there may be
no talks at all.