History of Events

and Happenings
Ibrahim Razi

Muhammad bin Qasim's

Invasion of Sind (712)
Muhammad bin Qasim was born around 695 AD.
He belonged to the Saqqafi tribe; that had
originated from Taif in Arabia. He grew up in the
care of his mother; he soon became a great asset
to his uncle Muhammad Ibn Yusuf, the governor of
Yemen. His judgment, potential and skills left many
other officers and forced the ruler to appoint him in
the state department.
There are both long and short term causes for the
conquest of India. Arabs had trade with India and
Eastern Asia. The trade was carried through sea
route; the route was unsafe due to the plunder of
the Pirates of Sindh. The Arab rebels also get
refuge in Sindh.

Continued
Muhammad Bin Qasim attacked Sindh. He led 6,000 Syrian cavalry and at
the borders of Sindh he was joined by an advance guard and six thousand
camel riders and with five catapults (Manjaniks).
Muhammad Bin Qasim first captured Debal, from where the Arab army
marched along the Indus.
At Rohri he was met by Dahirs forces. Dahir died in the battle, his forces
were defeated and Muhammad bin Qasim took control of Sind.
Mohammad Bin Qasimentered Daibul in 712 AD. As a result of his efforts,
he succeeded in capturing Daibul. He continued his Victorious Progressin
succession, Nirun, fortress (called Sikka), Brahmanabad, Alor, Multan and
Gujrat. After the conquest of Multan, he carried his arms to the borders of
Kigdom of Kashmir, but his dismissal stopped the further advance.
Now Muslims were the masters of whole Sindh and a part of Punjab up to
the borders of Kashmir in the north.
After the conquest, he adopted a policy, asking for acceptance of Muslim
rule by the natives in return for non-interference in their religious and
cultural practices.
He also established peace with a strong taxation system. In return he
provided the guaranty of security of life and property for the natives.

Continued
The conquest of Sindh brought Islamic civilization
face to face with the ancient Vedic civilization of
the Indo-Gangetic Plains.
In later centuries, there was much that Muslim
scholarship would learn from Indiamathematics,
astronomy, iron smelting-to name but a few
subjects.
Muslim scholarship has focused more on the
interaction between Islam and the West and has
neglected the interaction between Islamic
civilization and the East.
This is a surprise considering that until the 18th
century, there was little that the West had to offer
the more advanced Islamic civilization. The flow of
knowledge was almost always from Islam to the

First Battle of Panipat

(1526)
The first battle of Panipat (21 April 1526) was a major
victory for Babur over Sultan Ibrahim Lodi of Delhi, who
won during his fifth and final expedition into Hindustan, and
that helped establish the Mughal Empire.
Babur's fifth expedition began late in 1525, at a time when
his control of the Punjab was under threat.
His former ally, Alam Khan, the uncle of Ibrahim, had
returned to Lahore from Kabul earlier in the year, and had
promptly allied himself with Babur's enemy Daulat Khan,
the former governor of Lahore for Ibrahim, and also briefly
an ally of Babur. At about the same time that Babur left
Kabul the new allies attacked Delhi, where they suffered a
crushing defeat.
Daulat Khan was forced to submit to Babur after promising
to resist him, while Alam Khan returned to Babur's side
during the march on Delhi.

Continued
Ibrahim had not been idle. His victory at Delhi in 1525 had
been won with quite a small force, but he had now raised a
much larger army.
According to Babur he was told that Ibrahim's army
contained 100,000 men and 1,000 elephants. Other
sources give lower figures, (as low as 40,000 in some)
which may reflect the number of effective fighting men.
Having raised this army Ibrahim advanced from Agra, to
Delhi and then slowly moved north from the city, towards
Panipat.
Babur's own army had been 12,000 strong when it crossed
the Indus. Since them some men would have been lost,
while Babur had also joined up with his garrison in the
Punjab and with some local supporters, so his army may
actually have grown by the time he reached Panipat, but
he was still very badly outnumbered.

Continued
Babur came up with a plan that successfully negated Ibrahim's
numerical advantage.
In the last stage of the march Babur ordered his men to gather
up as many carts as they could find. These seven hundred
carts were lashed together, using ropes to connect the carts.
Enough space was left between each pair of carts to place five
or six mantlets, and Babur's matchlock men were posted
behind the mantlets.
A number of gaps were left in the line, separated by an arrow's
flight, and each wide enough to let 100-200 horsemen use
them. One flank of Babur's line was protected by the town of
Panipat, the other flank by a barrier of brush and ditches. He
split his army into the normal left, right, center, but also
created a reserve, and more importantly posted outflanking
parties at the extreme right and left of the line. His plan was to
wait for Ibrahim to attack the fortified line, and then have the
flanking parties attack the rear of the enemy army.

Continued...
The biggest problem Babur faced was getting Ibrahim to
actually attack.
The two armies faced each other for a week before the
battle. Every day Babur's men rode out towards the enemy
camp, firing arrows into their massed ranks and attempting
to provoke a confrontation, but without success. Eventually
Babur decided to launch a night attack on Ibrahim's camp,
hoping that this would provoke a battle.
A force of 4,000-5,000 men was selected to make this
attack, but the night march went badly wrong, and at dawn
Babur's men were in a dangerously exposed position close
to Ibrahim's lines. Babur reacted by sending his son
Humayun and an advanced guard towards the isolated
men, and then followed up with the entire army, but
although Ibrahim formed up as if he was about to pursuit
Babur's men, no pursuit followed.

Continued
That night Babur's camp was disrupted by a false alarm, and on the
morning of 21 April Ibrahim finally left his camp and moved to attack
Babur's lines. Babur's plan worked perfectly. His flanking parties attacked
the rear of Ibrahim's force, and the left and right wings attacked its sides.
Ibrahim was unable to force his way through the barriers in Babur's center,
and his army became increasingly compressed. His left and right wings
were soon unable to either attack or retreat, leaving only his center still
really active.
Although Babur's victory at Panipat is normally credited to his use of
artillery, his own account of the battle suggests that it was his archers who
played the biggest part in the battle, firing into the compacted Lodi army
from left, right and rear.
The hardest part of the battle lasted from early in the morning until about
noon. Ibrahim himself was killed during the fighting, although his body was
not discovered until later in the afternoon. Babur dispatched a force towards
Agra to try and catch the fleeing Sultan, before sending Humayun with a
larger force to occupy the city and seize Ibrahim's treasury. According to
Babur's memoirs his men estimated that they had killed 15-16,000 of the
enemy, although the inhabitants of Agra estimated the losses at 40-50,000.
This victory established Babur as the new power in this time (Hindustan).

Second Battle of Panipat

(1556)
The Second Battle of Panipat took place on 5th
November, 1556, between the Mughal Forces of
Akbar and the army of Hemu. The war was
ultimately won by Mughal Forces.
Bairam Khan with Akbar advanced through
Thaneswar to the plain of Panipat, where thirty
years earlier, Akbars grandfather, Babur had
routed and slain Ibrahim Lodi. Himu lost his park
of artillery in a preliminary engagement yet he
faced his adversary with 15,000 war-elephants
and a vast number of troops far superior in
number to those of Akbar.

Continued
The second battle was fought on November 5, 1556, and at the
initial stage Himu successfully attacked the enemy on both wings.
Bairam Khan commanded the ten thousand strong army from the
rear, placed Ali Quli Khan, later appointed Khan Zaman, in charge of
the centre, Sikandar Khan Uzbeg in charge of the right wing and
Abdullah Khan Uzbeg in charge of the left wing. Akbar was kept at a
safe distance in the rear by his guardian Bairam Khan.
After a successful attack on the two wings, Himu launched an attack
on the centre of the Mughal army, Himu appeared to be on the point
of winning victory.
But the defeated Mughal troops on two wings collected themselves
and made a counter offensive on Himus flanks.
Ali Quli Khan made a cavalry charge on the centre of Himus army.
While fighting was raging with all fury between the two sides, Himu
was struck by an arrow in his eye and he fell fainted. Himus
elephant driver took him out of the battlefield but was pursued by
the Mughal army and brought before Akbar. Thus, The Mughal army
of Akbar emerged as winners in the Second Battle of panipat.

Significance of the second

battle of Panipat(Nov. 5,
1556)
The second battle of Panipat marked the real beginning of the
Mughal empire in India and the history of its expansion began.
The political significance of this battle was all the more farreaching, for it shattered the military power of Himu on the one
hand and put an end to the Afghan pretensions to sovereignty in
Hindustan forever.
The victors occupied Delhi on the day of victory. Agra was also
captured soon after.
Himus aged father was taken prisoner and put to death on his
refusal to embrace Islam. Attempt to capture Himus widow,
however, failed.
Sikandar Sur Afghan, pretender to the Delhi throne, was
compelled to surrender in May, 1557, and was assigned a jagir in
Bihar only to be expelled there from soon after. Muhammad Adil,
another Afghan pretender, was killed in 1557. The third pretender
Ibrahim had to flee and take refuge in Orissa.
Within two years of the second battle of Panipat there remained
no other claimant to the throne of Delhi and Akbars sovereignty
over Delhi was confirmed.

Battle of Plassey (1757)

Though it was more of a skirmish than a battle,
the British victory under Robert Clive at Plassey in
Bengal was a crucial event in the history of India.
The young Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ad-daula, had
taken Calcutta from the East India Company with
a huge army in June 1756, when the notorious
Black Hole episode occurred.
It was not until August that the news reached the
Company in Madras and not until October that
Clive, now thirty-two years-old, left for Calcutta at
the head of a mixed European-Indian force of
some 2,500 men. He drove Sirajs army out early
in January 1757.

Continued
Clive decided that the best way to secure the Companys interests in
Bengal was to replace Siraj with a new and more accommodating nawab.
He found a candidate in a discontented elderly general named Mir Jafar.
After complicated conspiratorial discussions and the promise of enormous
bribes to all concerned, a secret agreement was smuggled into the
womens quarters of Mir Jafars house, which was being watched by Sirajs
spies, and Mir Jafar signed it.
Siraj knew or suspected there was a conspiracy against him, despite
Clives earnest protestations to the contrary, and moved south to Plassey .
On June 13th, Clive moved north with some 2,000 Indian sepoys and 600
British infantry of the Thirty-Ninth of Foot plus close to 200 artillerymen
with ten field pieces and two small howitzers.
Ambiguous messages were coming in from Mir Jafar and Clive was moving
into a dangerous situation against heavy odds.
He seems to have had a crisis of confidence and summoned his officers to
a council of war on June 21st.
The majority, including Clive, voted against action. At that point, according
to his friend Robert Orme, Clive retired into a grove of trees where he
stayed for an hour in meditation.
On his return he gave orders for the army to move on to Plassey.

Continued
The confrontation came on a cloudy morning north of the village
of Plassey on the bank of the Hughli river.
Clives army was drawn up in three divisions, as was the Nawabs
army of perhaps 40,000 men with its war-elephants and more
than 50 cannon. One division was commanded by Mir Jafar.
The British artillerymen quickly covered their cannon and
ammunition due to the heavy rain that was taking place, but the
enemy failed to do the same and their artillery was put out of
action, so that when the Nawabs army moved forward, assuming
that Clives cannon were also out of action, it was met with a
storm of fire. The enemy withdrew and Siraj, who distrusted his
generals and had already been warned of impending defeat by his
astrologer (who had possibly been bribed), lost his nerve when
Mir Jafar advised retreat.
When Clives army attacked again, Siraj fled on a fast camel. His
demoralized army followed suit and when the British entered the
enemy camp at about 5pm, they found it abandoned.

Continued
According to Clive, he lost eighteen men killed,
while he estimated the nawabs dead as around
500. Siraj-ad-daula was killed by his own people
and Mir Jafar replaced him. Clive, who was now
effectively master of Bengal, skillfully bolstered
Mir Jafars apparent authority while keeping him
on leading strings.
The skirmish at Plassey was critical to the East
India Companys triumph over its French rivals
and, in the longer term, to the establishment of
British rule in India.

Third Battle of Panipat

(1761)
The Third Battle of Panipat fought on January 14, 1761
between the Marathas and forces of the Afghan ruler Ahmad
Shah Abdali and his allies and was one of the biggest and
most significant battles of the 18th century in India.
After Aurangzebs death in 1707 the great Mughal empire
had entered a phase of terminal decline and the Maratha
power was on the ascendancy.
When Persian ruler Nadir Shah easily invaded India in 1739
any remaining illusion of the continued domination of
Mughal power was shattered, and India entered a period of
great instability. Some states that were formerly part of the
Mughal empire declared their independence.
Among those rebelling against the empire the Marathas,
who had even challenged Mughal emperor Aurangzebs
authority, captured a large strip of territory in central and
north India.

Continued
Meanwhile the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali was making frequent trips
into Punjab. In 1758 the Marathas pushed forward, taking control of Lahore
and Peshawar and forcing Timur Shah Durrani, the son of Abdali, out of Punjab
and Kashmir.
The Maratha rule was now at its zenith.
Abdali decided to strike back and check Maratha power. In 1759 Abdali and
his allies reached Lahore and Delhi. Seeing the Afghan advance, the Maratha
chief Sadashivrao Bhau headed north towards Delhi with a large army of
100,000 men that was strengthened by other Maratha forces on the way.
Bhau hoped to put his nephew on the Mughal throne. But the Maratha plans
suffered a setback when their potential allies, the Jats, withdrew from the
battle. In one of the initial battles Abdalis forces defeated and killed the
Maratha warrior Dattaji Shinde.
The Marathas retaliated at other places such as Kunjpura on the banks of a
flooded Yamuna, where they easily defeated the Afghan forces. Abdali who
was stuck on the other side of the river crossed it after finding a safer route.
There were several tactical maneuvers from both sides but eventually the
Marathas were encircled and their supply lines disrupted. The Maratha
generals hoped they could confront the enemy with some of their new Frenchbuilt artillery.
Smaller battles continued through the months and forces from both sides
amassed for the final assault. But the food was running out for the Marathas.

Continued
The battle started in the wee hours on January 14, 1761. Towards
the start of the battle the Marathas pushed back the Rohillas
(warriors), who were on the Afghan side. But the tide of the battle
soon turned against the Marathas and by the end of the day they
were killed, taken prisoner or fled.
There were several reasons for this. The Afghan forces and their
allies were larger in number and better trained than the Marathas.
Despite the Marathas possession of good guns, the Afghans
artillery was more effective. However, more than military and
tactical reasons, it was the perhaps the inability of the Marathas
to get the Rajputs, Sikhs and Jats on their side that proved to be
their undoing. The Marathas also spent time and resources in
protecting Hindu pilgrims and other non-combatants who were
caught in the siege.
The Third Battle of Panipat altered the power equations in India
but not necessarily in a predictable manner. The victorious
Afghans could hardly make any further inroads into India and were
even pushed out of Punjab by the Sikhs.

The year 1857 brought decline to

the Muslim rule in India, why and
how?

In the 19th century, Muslims like Syed Ahmad Brailvi and Shah Ismail
carried out Jihad against the Sikhs, as did Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan in
Deccan against the British. However, they failed in their efforts to stop the
downfall of the Muslim rule. The final crunch came after the war of 1857
when the Mughal rule officially came to an end and India came under the
direct rule of the British crown.
The Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent in the time of Aurangzeb
Alamgir, but it collapsed with dramatic suddenness within a few decades
after his death.
The Mughal Empire owes its decline and ultimate downfall to a combination
of factors; firstly Aurangzebs religious policy is regarded as a cause for the
decline of the Mughal Empire as it led to disunity among the people.
Although the policy did lead to weakening of the empire but the major
cause of decline was the lack of worthy and competent successors after
him.
The character of Mughal kings had deteriorated over a period of time. The
successive rulers after Aurangzeb were weak and lacked the character,
motivation and commitment to rule the empire strongly.
They had become ease loving and cowardly. They totally disregarded their
state duties and were unable to detain the declining empire from its fall.

Continued
The absence of any definite law of accession was another
important factor. The war of successions not only led to
bitterness, bloodshed, and loss of money and prestige of the
empire over a period of time, but to its eventual fall.
The degeneration of the rulers had also led to the moral
degeneration of the nobility. Under the early Mughals, the
nobles performed useful functions and distinguished
themselves both in war and peace. But the elite under the
later Mughals was more interested in worldly pursuit and
self-enhancement.
The nobles who had once been talented men with integrity,
honesty, and loyalty, turned selfish and deceitful. Growth of
hostile and rival clique in the court also undermined the
strength of the government.
Widespread corruption in the administration started and
taking bribes became common.

Continued
One of the most potent causes of the fall of the Mughal Empire
was the deterioration and demoralization of the army. The
military had not only become inefficient but also lacked in
training, discipline and cohesion. The army was outdated in
regard to equipment. It consisted of contingents maintained by
various nobles, which was the main source of Armys
weakness. As the weakening of the nobles occurred, so did the
army.
This was because of the soldiers, instead of identifying and
uniting as Mughal Indians, identified themselves with different
ethnic groups like Persian, Afghans and Central Asians.
The Mughals had no navy and only maintained small ships that
were no match for the well-equipped ships of the foreign
traders.
It was this weakness that the French and the British used to
their advantage, and were eventually able to establish their
control over India.

Continued
Another factor contributing to the decline was the financial position
of the Mughals.
The war of successions, rebellions and luxurious style of living had
depleted the once enormous treasury and had led to financial
bankruptcy.
During the time of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire had expanded to
reach its maximum size. This vast area had become impossible for
one ruler to control and govern from one center.
It was during the later Mughals that Deccan, Bengal, Bihar and
Orrisa declared their independence. The raids by Nadir Shah, and
repeated invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali, resulted in further
weakening of the empire.
The already weakened empire faced further encroachment by the
British and the French, which proved to be the last nail in the already
drowning empires coffin.
The British and French, who had initially come as traders, took full
advantage of the weakening empire and soon became masters of
the whole of India.

Pakistan India 1 War

(1947-48)
st

Continued
The first Indo-Pakistani war started after armed
tribesmen from Pakistan's north-west frontier
province invaded Kashmir in October 1947.
Besieged both by a revolt in his state and by the
invasion, the Maharaja requested armed
assistance from the government of India. In return
he acceded to India, handing over powers of
defense, communication and foreign affairs.
Both India and Pakistan agreed that the accession
would be confirmed by a referendum once
hostilities had ceased.
Historians continue to debate the precise timing
when the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed
the instrument of accession and the Indian army
moved into the state, arguing that the Maharaja

Continued
In May 1948, the regular Pakistani army was called upon to
protect Pakistan's borders. Fighting continued throughout
the year between Pakistani irregular troops and the Indian
army.
The war ended on 1 January 1949 when a ceasefire was
arranged by the United Nations, which recommended that
both India and Pakistan should adhere to their commitment
to hold a referendum in the state. A ceasefire line was
established where the two sides stopped fighting and a UN
peacekeeping force established. The referendum, however,
has never been held.
In 1954 Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was
ratified by the state's constituent assembly. In 1957, it
approved its own constitution, modeled along the Indian
constitution. Since that time India has regarded that part of
the state which it controls as an integral part of the Indian
union.

Continued
To the west of the ceasefire line, Pakistan controls
roughly one third of the state. A small region,
which the Pakistanis call Azad (Free) Jammu and
Kashmir, and the Indians call Pakistani-occupied
Kashmir, is semi-autonomous. The larger area,
which includes the former kingdoms of Hunza and
Nagar, called the northern areas, is directly
administered by Pakistan.

Pakistan India 2 War

(1965)
nd

The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was the

second conflict between the two countries over
the status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The
clash did not resolve this dispute, but it did
engage the United States and the Soviet Union in
ways that would have important implications for
subsequent superpower involvement in the
region.

Continued
The dispute over this region originated in the process of
decolonization in South Asia. When the British colony of
India gained its independence in 1947, it was partitioned
into two separate entities: the secular nation of India and
the predominantly Muslim nation of Pakistan.
Pakistan was composed of two regions, East Pakistan and
West Pakistan, separated by Indian territory.
The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a
predominantly Muslim population but a Hindu leader,
shared borders with both India and West Pakistan. The
argument over which nation would incorporate the state
led to the first India-Pakistan War in 194748 and ended
with UN mediation.
Jammu and Kashmir, also known as Indian Kashmir or
just Kashmir, joined the Republic of India, but the
Pakistani Government continued to believe that the
majority Muslim state rightfully belonged to Pakistan.

Continued
Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces
clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two
nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army
attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was
unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.
After Pakistani troops invaded Kashmir, India moved quickly to
internationalize the regional dispute.
It asked the United Nations to repeat its role in the First India-Pakistan
War and end the current conflict.
The Security Council passed Resolution 211 on September 20 calling for
an end to the fighting and negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir
problem, and the United States and the United Kingdom supported the
UN decision by cutting off arms supplies to both belligerents.
This ban affected both belligerents, but Pakistan felt the effects more
keenly since it had a much weaker military in comparison to India. The
UN resolution and the halting of arms sales had an immediate impact.
India accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on
September 22.

Continued
The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of
Kashmir, and both sides accepted the Soviet
Union as a third-party mediator. Negotiations in
Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with both
sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing
their armies from the disputed territory.
Nevertheless, although the Tashkent agreement
achieved its short-term aims, conflict in South
Asia would reignite a few years later.

Pakistan India 3 War

(1971)
rd

The third war between India and Pakistan took place

between November 22 (when the Indian's began
providing active artillery support to the separatists) and
Dec 17, 1971.
The origins of the third Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971)
were different from the previous conflicts.
The Pakistani failure to accommodate demands for
independence in East Pakistan in 1970 led to
secessionist demands in 1971.
In March 1971, Pakistan's armed forces launched a
fierce campaign to suppress the resistance movement
that had emerged but encountered unexpected mass
defections among East Pakistani soldiers and police.
The Pakistani forces regrouped and reasserted their
authority over most of East Pakistan by May.

Continued
As a result of these military actions, thousands of East Pakistanis
died at the hands of the Pakistani army.
Resistance fighters and nearly 10 million refugees fled to
sanctuary in West Bengal, the adjacent Indian state.
By midsummer, the Indian leadership, in the absence of a political
solution to the East Pakistan crisis, had fashioned a strategy
designed to assist the establishment of the independent nation of
Bangladesh.
As part of this strategy, in August 1971, India signed a twenty-year
Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
One of the treaty's clauses implied that each nation was expected
to come to the assistance of the other in the event of a threat to
national security such as that occurring in the 1965 war with
Pakistan.
Simultaneously, India organized, trained, and provided sanctuary to
the Mukti Bahini (meaning Liberation Force in Bengali), the East
Pakistani armed resistance fighters.

Continued
Unable to deter India's activities in the eastern sector, on December 3,
1971, Pakistan launched an air attack in the western sector on a number of
Indian airfields, including Ambala in Haryana, Amritsar in Punjab, and
Udhampur in Jammu and Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in inflicting
substantial damage.
The Indian air force retaliated the next day and quickly achieved air
superiority. On the ground, the strategy in the eastern sector marked a
significant departure from previous Indian battle plans and tactics, which
had emphasized set-piece battles and slow advances.
The strategy adopted was a swift, three-pronged assault of nine infantry
divisions with attached armored units and close air support that rapidly
converged on Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan.
Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, who commanded the eighth, twenty-third,
and fifty-seventh divisions, led the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these
forces attacked Pakistani formations, the Indian air force rapidly destroyed
the small air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of
commission.
In the meantime, the Indian navy effectively blockaded East Pakistan.
Dhaka fell to combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces on December 16,
bringing a quick end to the war.

Continued
Action in the western sector was divided into four segments, from the cease-fire line in Jammu
and Kashmir to the marshes of the Rann of Kutch in northwestern Gujarat.
On the evening of December 3, the Pakistani army launched ground operations in Kashmir and
Punjab.
It also started an armored operation in Rajasthan. In Kashmir, the operations were
concentrated on two key points, Punch and Chhamb.
The Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle where the Pakistanis forced the
Indians to withdraw from their positions. In other parts of Kashmir, the Indians made some
small gains along the cease-fire line.
The major Indian counteroffensive came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area south and west of
Chhamb.
There, two Pakistani tank regiments, equipped with United States-made Patton tanks,
confronted the Indian First Armored Corps, which had British Centurion tanks. In what proved
to be the largest tank battle of the war, both sides suffered considerable casualties.
Within hours of outbreak of hostilities, the Indian Missile Boat Group was ordered to execute
operation Trident, the code name for the first attack on Karachi.
The task group consisting of three OSA class missile boats, escorted by two Kamorta class antisubmarine patrol vessels, regrouped off Okha and charged towards Karachi. At 2150 hrs on
December 4, the task group was 70 nautical miles south-west of Karachi. Soon thereafter, the
task group detected patrolling Pakistani naval ships on their sensors. The deadly missiles were
heading towards their targets which were soon hit. PNS Khyber, a destroyer and PNS Muhafiz,
a minesweeper were sunk.
Another Pakistani destroyer Shajehan was badly damaged. The fuel storage tanks at Karachi
harbour were set ablaze, causing heavy loss. Operation Trident was a thundering success with
no damage to any of the ships of the Indian Naval Task Group, which returned safely. Operation
Trident had introduced to the war, the first ever ship launched missiles in the region.

Continued
Enthused by the success of this attack, the Indian Navy planned another offensive
operation, code named Python. The continued presence of the Indian Navy's larger
ships is the area gave enough indication to the Pakistani naval authorities that more
offensive operations were in the offing.
The Pak aerial surveillance was stepped up and their ships attempted to outsmart the
Indian Navy by mingling with merchant shipping. Notwithstanding these measures by
the Pakistanis, operation Python was launched on the night on December 8 and 9,
1971.
Despite bad weather and rough seas, the task group consisting of missile boat Vinash
and two multipurpose frigates, executed the attack with razor sharp precision.
INS Vinash approached close to the Karachi coast and fired four missiles. The first
missile struck the fuel tanks at the Keamari Oil Farm.
The other three missiles hit the merchant tankers Harmattan, Gulf Star and the
Pakistani naval tanker Dacca. More than 50 percent of the total fuel requirement of
the Karachi zone was reported to have been blown up. Operation Python was another
great success.
Though the Indian conduct of the land war on the western front was somewhat timid,
the role of the Indian air force was both extensive and daring.
During the fourteen-day war, the air force's Western Command conducted some 4,000
sorties. There was little retaliation by Pakistan's air force, partly because of the
paucity of non-Bengali technical personnel.
Additionally, this lack of retaliation reflected the deliberate decision of the Pakistan Air
Force headquarters to conserve its forces because of heavy losses incurred in the
early days of the war.

Pakistan India War of

SIACHEN (1984)

Continued
In the 1970s and early 1980s Pakistan permitted several mountaineering expeditions
to climb high peaks on this glacier. This was to reinforce their claim on the area as
these expeditions arrived on the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of
Pakistan.
Once having become aware of this in about 1978, Colonel N. Kumar of the Indian Army
mounted an Army expedition to Teram Kangri peaks as a counter-exercise. The first
public mention of a possible conflict situation was an article by Joydeep Sircar in The
Telegraph newspaper of Calcutta in 1982, reprinted as Oropolitics in the Alpine
Journal, London,in 1984.
India launched Operation Meghdoot (named after the divine cloud messenger in a
Sanskrit play) on 13 April 1984 when the Kumaon Regiment of the Indian Army and the
Indian Air Force went into the Glacier. Pakistan, which had also gotten wind of it quickly
responded with troop deployments and what followed was literally a race to the top.
Within a few days, the Indians were in control over most of the glacier as Pakistan were
beaten by just a week. The two passes due to Indian military pre-emption Sia La and
Bilfond La were secured by India while the Gyong La pass remained under Pakistan
control.
Since then both sides have launched several attempts to displace each others forces,
but with little success.
The Siachen glacier is the highest battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan
have fought intermittently since April 13, 1984. Both countries maintain permanent
military presence in the region at a height of over 6,000 metres (20,000ft). More than
2000 people have died in this inhospitable terrain, mostly due to weather extremes
and the natural hazards of mountain warfare.

Pakistan India War of

KARGIL (1999)
The 1999 Kargil War took place between May 8, when Pakistani forces and
Kashmiri militants were detected atop the Kargil ridges and July 14 when both
sides had essentially ceased their military operations.
It is believed that the planning for the operation, by Pakistan, may have
occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998.
The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into
territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to repel the intrusion
left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded, according to December 1
statistics by Defense Minister George Fernandes.
Earlier Government figures stated that 696 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A
senior Pakistani police official estimated that approximately 40 civilians were
killed on the Pakistani side of the line of control.
By 30 June 1999 Indian forces were prepared for a major high-altitude
offensive against Pakistani posts along the border in the disputed Kashmir
region.
Over the previous six weeks India had moved five infantry divisions, five
independent brigades and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to Kashmir.
The total Indian troop strength in the region had reached 730,000. The buildup included the deployment of around 60 frontline aircraft.

Continued
The Pakistani effort to take Kargil occurred after the February 1999 Lahore
summit between then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian
Prime Minister Atal Bahari Vajpayee.
This conference was believed to have de-escalated the tensions that had existed
since May 1998. The major motive behind the operation was to help in
internationalizing the Kashmir issue, and for which global attention had been
flagging for some time.
The intrusion plan was by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez Musharraf
and Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff.
Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on exploitation
of the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sector both on Indian and Pak
side of the Line of Control (LoC).
The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from the main roads
towards the LoC.
During winters the area gets very heavy snowfall making movement almost
impossible.
The only mountain pass connecting the Kargil area to the Kashmir Valley, Zoji La,
normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June.
Thus, moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not have
been possible till then. Pakistan Army calculated that even if the intrusions were
discovered in early May, as they were, the Indian Army's reaction would be slow
and limited, thereby allowing him to consolidate the intrusions more effectively.

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