Important Events Research Essay

There are numerous events that took place in the history of

Pakistan and of the subcontinent. Though are eleven events and
questions that shaped Pakistans history and that of the
subcontinent. These being, Muhammad bin Qasim's Invasion of Sind
(712), the First Battle of Panipat (1526), the Second Battle of Panipat
(1556), the Battle of Plassey (1757), the Third Battle of Panipat
(1761), how The year 1857 brought decline to the Muslim rule in
India and why, Pakistan-Indias 1st War (1947-48), Pakistan-Indias
2nd War (1965), Pakistan-Indias 3rd War (1971), Pakistan-Indias War
of SIACHEN (1984) and Pakistan-Indias War of KARGIL (1999).
These events and questions will be explained in detail in the essay
presented below.
Muhammad bin Qasim was born around 695 AD. He belonged
to the Saqqafi tribe, which had originated from Taif in Arabia. He
grew up in the care of his mother; he soon became a great asset to
his uncle Muhammad Ibn Yusuf, the governor of Yemen. His
judgment, potential and skills left many other officers and forced the
ruler to appoint him in the state department. There are both long
and short term causes for the conquest of India. Firstly, Arabs had
trade with India and Eastern Asia. The trade was carried through a
sea route; the route was unsafe due to the plunder of the Pirates of
Sindh. Muhammad Bin Qasim attacked Sindh. He led a 6,000 Syrian
cavalry and at the borders of Sindh he was joined by an advance
guard and six thousand camel riders and with five catapults. He first
captured Debal, from where the Arab army marched along the
Indus. At an area called Rohri Dahirs forces met him. Dahir died in
the battle, his forces were defeated and Muhammad bin Qasim took
control of Sind. Mohammad Bin Qasim entered Daibul in 712 AD. As
a result of his efforts, he succeeded in capturing Daibul. He
continued his Victorious Progress in succession, Nirun, fortress
(called Sikka), Brahmanabad, Alor, Multan and Gujrat. After the
conquest of Multan, he carried his arms to the borders of Kashmir. At
this point in history, after the capturing of Sindh, Muslims were the
masters of whole Sindh and a part of Punjab up to the borders of
Kashmir in the north. After the conquest, he adopted a policy, asking
for acceptance of Muslim rule by the natives in return for noninterference in their religious and cultural practices. He also
established peace with a strong taxation system. In return he
provided the guaranty of security of life and property for the
natives. The conquest of Sindh brought Islamic civilization face to
face with the ancient Vedic civilization of the Indo-Gangetic Plains.
The first battle of Panipat (21st April 1526) was a major victory
for Babur over Sultan Ibrahim Lodi of Delhi, who won during his fifth
and final expedition into Hindustan, and that helped establish the
Mughal Empire. Babur's fifth expedition began late in 1525, at a

time when his control of the Punjab was under threat. His former
ally, Alam Khan, the uncle of Ibrahim, had returned to Lahore from
Kabul earlier in the year, and had promptly allied himself with
Babur's enemy Daulat Khan, the former governor of Lahore for
Ibrahim, and also briefly an ally of Babur. At about the same time
that Babur left Kabul the new allies attacked Delhi, where they
suffered a crushing defeat. Daulat Khan was forced to submit to
Babur after promising to resist him, while Alam Khan returned to
Babur's side during the march on Delhi. Ibrahim had not been idle
during all this, his victory at Delhi in 1525 had been won with quite
a small force, but he had now raised a much larger army. According
to Babur, he was told that Ibrahim's army contained 100,000 men
and 1,000 elephants. Having raised this army, Ibrahim advanced
from Agra, to Delhi and then slowly moved north from the city,
towards Panipat. Babur's own army had been 12,000 strong when it
crossed the Indus. Since them some men would have been lost,
while Babur had also joined up with his garrison in the Punjab and
with some local supporters, so his army may actually have grown by
the time he reached Panipat, but he was still very badly
outnumbered. Babur came up with a plan that successfully negated
Ibrahim's numerical advantage. In the last stage of the march,
Babur ordered his men to gather up as many carts as they could
find. These seven hundred carts were lashed together, using ropes
to connect the carts.
Enough space was left between each pair of carts to place five or six
mantlets, and Babur's matchlock men were posted behind the
mantlets. A number of gaps were left in the line, separated by an
arrow's flight, and each wide enough to let 100-200 horsemen use
them. One flank of Babur's line was protected by the town of
Panipat, the other flank by a barrier of brush and ditches. He split
his army into the normal formation of left, right and center, but also
created a reserve, and more importantly posted outflanking parties
at the extreme right and left of the line. His plan was to wait for
Ibrahim to attack the fortified line, and then have the flanking
parties attack the rear of the enemy army. However, the biggest
problem Babur faced was getting Ibrahim to actually attack. The two
armies faced each other for a week before the battle. Every day
Babur's men rode out towards the enemy camp, firing arrows into
their massed ranks and attempting to provoke a confrontation, but
without success. Eventually Babur decided to launch a night attack
on Ibrahim's camp, hoping that this would provoke a battle. A force
of 4,000-5,000 men was selected to make this attack, but the night
march went badly wrong, and at dawn Babur's men were in a
dangerously exposed position close to Ibrahim's lines. Babur reacted
by sending his son Humayun and an advanced guard towards the
isolated men, and then followed up with the entire army, but
although Ibrahim formed up as if he was about to pursuit Babur's
men, no pursuit followed. That night Babur's camp was disrupted by
a false alarm, and on the morning of 21st April Ibrahim finally left his

camp and moved to attack Babur's lines. Babur's plan worked

perfectly. His flanking parties attacked the rear of Ibrahim's force,
and the left and right wings attacked its sides. Ibrahim was unable
to force his way through the barriers in Babur's center, and his army
became increasingly compressed. His left and right wings were soon
unable to either attack or retreat, leaving only his center still really
active. Although Babur's victory at Panipat is normally credited to
his use of artillery, his own account of the battle suggests that it
was his archers who played the biggest part in the battle, firing into
the compacted Lodi army from left, right and rear. The hardest part
of the battle lasted from early in the morning until about noon.
Ibrahim himself was killed during the fighting, although his body was
not discovered until later in the afternoon. Babur dispatched a force
towards Agra to try and catch the fleeing Sultan, before sending
Humayun with a larger force to occupy the city and seize Ibrahim's
treasury. According to Babur's memoirs his men estimated that they
had killed 15-16,000 of the enemy, although the inhabitants of Agra
estimated the losses at 40-50,000. This victory established Babur as
the new power in this time (Hindustan).
The Second Battle of Panipat took place on 5th November,
1556, between the Mughal Forces of Akbar and the army of Himu.
Mughal Forces ultimately won the war. Bairam Khan with Akbar
advanced through Thaneswar to the plain of Panipat, where thirty
years earlier, Akbars grandfather, Babur had routed and slain
Ibrahim Lodi. Himu lost his park of artillery in a preliminary
engagement yet he faced his adversary with 15,000 war-elephants
and a vast number of troops far superior in number to those of
Akbar. The second battle was fought on November 5th, 1556, and at
the initial stage Himu successfully attacked the enemy on both
wings. Bairam Khan commanded the ten thousand strong army from
the rear, placed Ali Quli Khan, later appointed Khan Zaman, in
charge of the centre, Sikandar Khan Uzbeg in charge of the right
wing and Abdullah Khan Uzbeg in charge of the left wing. His
guardian Bairam Khan kept Akbar at a safe distance in the rear.
After a successful attack on the two wings, Himu launched an attack
on the center of the Mughal army; Himu appeared to be on the point
of winning victory. However, the defeated Mughal troops on two
wings collected themselves and made a counter offensive on Himus
flanks. Ali Quli Khan made a cavalry charge on the center of Himus
army. While fighting was raging with all fury between the two sides,
Himu was struck by an arrow in his eye and he fell and fainted.
Himus elephant driver took him out of the battlefield but was
pursued by the Mughal army and brought before Akbar. Thus, The
Mughal army of Akbar emerged as winners in the Second Battle of
Panipat. The second battle of Panipat marked the real beginning of
the Mughal Empire in India and the history of its expansion began.
The political significance of this battle was all the more far-reaching,
for it shattered the military power of Himu on the one hand and put

an end to the Afghan pretensions to sovereignty in Hindustan

forever.
The victors occupied Delhi on the day of victory. Agra was also
captured soon after. Himus father was taken prisoner and put to
death on his refusal to embrace Islam. Attempt to capture Himus
widow, however, failed. Sikandar Sur Afghan, pretender to the Delhi
throne, was compelled to surrender on May 1557, and was assigned
a jagir in Bihar only to be expelled there from soon after.
Muhammad Adil, another Afghan pretender, was killed in 1557. The
third pretender Ibrahim had to flee and take refuge in Orissa. Within
two years of the second battle of Panipat there remained no other
claimant to the throne of Delhi and Akbars sovereignty over Delhi
was confirmed.
Though it was more of a skirmish than a battle, the British
victory under Robert Clive at Plassey in Bengal was a crucial event
in the history of India. The young Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ad-daula,
had taken Calcutta from the East India Company with a huge army
in June 1756, when the notorious Black Hole episode occurred. It
was not until August that the news reached the Company in Madras
and not until October that Clive, now thirty-two years-old, left for
Calcutta at the head of a mixed European-Indian force of some
2,500 men. He drove Sirajs army out early in January 1757. Clive
decided that the best way to secure the Companys interests in
Bengal was to replace Siraj with a new and more accommodating
Nawab. He found a candidate in a discontented elderly general
named Mir Jafar. After complicated conspiratorial discussions and
the promise of enormous bribes to all concerned, a secret
agreement was smuggled into the womens quarters of Mir Jafars
house, which was being watched by Sirajs spies, and Mir Jafar
signed it. Siraj knew or suspected there was a conspiracy against
him, despite Clives earnest protestations to the contrary, and
moved south to Plassey. On June 13th, Clive moved north with some
2,000 Indian sepoys and 600 British infantry of the Thirty-Ninth of
Foot plus close to 200 artillerymen with ten field pieces and two
small howitzers. Ambiguous messages were coming in from Mir Jafar
and Clive was moving into a dangerous situation against heavy
odds. He seemed to have had a crisis of confidence and summoned
his officers to a council of war on June 21st. The majority, including
Clive, voted against action. At that point, according to his friend
Robert Orme, Clive retired into a grove of trees where he stayed for
an hour in meditation, though on his return he gave orders for the
army to move on to Plassey. The confrontation came on a cloudy
morning north of the village of Plassey on the bank of the Hughli
River. Clives army was drawn up in three divisions, as was the
Nawabs army of perhaps 40,000 men with its war-elephants and
more than 50 cannon. Mir Jafar commanded one division. The British
artillerymen quickly covered their cannon and ammunition due to
the heavy rain that was taking place, but the enemy failed to do the

same and their artillery was put out of action, so that when the
Nawabs army moved forward, assuming that Clives cannon were
also out of action, it was met with a storm of fire. The enemy
withdrew and Siraj, who distrusted his generals and had already
been warned of impending defeat by his astrologer (who had
possibly been bribed), lost his nerve when Mir Jafar advised retreat.
When Clives army attacked again, Siraj fled on a fast camel. His
demoralized army followed suit and when the British entered the
enemy camp at about 5pm, they found it abandoned. According to
Clive, he lost eighteen men killed, while he estimated the Nawabs
dead as around 500. His own people killed Siraj-ad-daula and Mir
Jafar replaced him. Clive, who was now effectively master of Bengal,
skillfully bolstered Mir Jafars apparent authority while keeping him
on leading strings. The skirmish at Plassey was critical to the East
India Companys triumph over its French rivals and, in the longer
term, to the establishment of British rule in India.
The Third Battle of Panipat fought on January 14, 1761
between the Marathas and forces of the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah
Abdali and his allies and was one of the biggest and most significant
battles of the 18th century in India.
After Aurangzebs death in 1707 the great Mughal Empire had
entered a phase of terminal decline and the Maratha power was on
the ascendancy.
When Persian ruler Nadir Shah easily invaded India in 1739 any
remaining illusion of the continued domination of Mughal power was
shattered, and India entered a period of great instability. Some
states that were formerly part of the Mughal Empire declared their
independence. Among those rebelling against the empire the
Marathas, who had even challenged Mughal emperor Aurangzebs
authority, captured a large strip of territory in central and north
India.
Meanwhile the Afghan ruler Ahmad Shah Abdali was making
frequent trips into Punjab. In 1758 the Marathas pushed forward,
taking control of Lahore and Peshawar and forcing Timur Shah
Durrani, the son of Abdali, out of Punjab and Kashmir. The Maratha
rule was now at its zenith. Abdali decided to strike back and check
Maratha power. In 1759 Abdali and his allies reached Lahore and
Delhi. Seeing the Afghan advance, the Maratha chief Sadashivrao
Bhau headed north towards Delhi with a large army of 100,000 men
that was strengthened by other Maratha forces on the way. Bhau
hoped to put his nephew on the Mughal throne. But the Maratha
plans suffered a setback when their potential allies, the Jats,
withdrew from the battle. In one of the initial battles Abdalis forces
defeated and killed the Maratha warrior Dattaji Shinde. The
Marathas retaliated at other places such as Kunjpura on the banks of
a flooded Yamuna, where they easily defeated the Afghan forces.
Abdali who was stuck on the other side of the river crossed it after
finding a safer route. There were several tactical maneuvers from

both sides but eventually the Marathas were encircled and their
supply lines disrupted. The Maratha generals hoped they could
confront the enemy with some of their new French-built artillery.
Smaller battles continued through the months and forces from both
sides amassed for the final assault. But the food was running out for
the Marathas. The battle started in the wee hours on January 14,
1761. Towards the start of the battle the Marathas pushed back the
Rohillas (warriors), who were on the Afghan side. But the tide of the
battle soon turned against the Marathas and by the end of the day
they were killed, taken prisoner or fled. There were several reasons
for this. These being: the Afghan forces and their allies were larger
in number and better trained than the Marathas. Despite the
Marathas possession of good guns, the Afghans artillery was more
effective. However, more than military and tactical reasons, it was
the perhaps the inability of the Marathas to get the Rajputs, Sikhs
and Jats on their side that proved to be their undoing. The Marathas
also spent time and resources in protecting Hindu pilgrims and other
non-combatants who were caught in the siege.The Third Battle of
Panipat altered the power equations in India but not necessarily in a
predictable manner. The victorious Afghans could hardly make any
further inroads into India and were even pushed out of Punjab by
the Sikhs.
In the 19th century, Muslims like Syed Ahmad Brailvi and Shah
Ismail carried out Jihad against the Sikhs, as did Haider Ali and Tipu
Sultan in Deccan against the British. However, they failed in their
efforts to stop the downfall of the Muslim rule. The final crunch
came after the war of 1857 when the Mughal rule officially came to
an end and India came under the direct rule of the British crown.
The Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent in the time of
Aurangzeb Alamgir, but it collapsed with dramatic suddenness
within a few decades after his death. The Mughal Empire owes its
decline and ultimate downfall to a combination of factors; firstly
Aurangzebs religious policy is regarded as a cause for the decline of
the Mughal Empire as it led to disunity among the people.
Although the policy did lead to weakening of the empire but the
major cause of decline was the lack of worthy and competent
successors after him. The character of Mughal kings had
deteriorated over a period of time. The successive rulers after
Aurangzeb were weak and lacked the character, motivation and
commitment to rule the empire strongly. They had become ease
loving and cowardly. They totally disregarded their state duties and
were unable to detain the declining empire from its fall. The absence
of any definite law of accession was another important factor. The
war of successions not only led to bitterness, bloodshed, and loss of
money and prestige of the empire over a period of time, but to its
eventual fall.
The degeneration of the rulers had also led to the moral
degeneration of the nobility. Under the early Mughals, the nobles

performed useful functions and distinguished themselves both in

war and peace. But the elite under the later Mughals was more
interested in worldly pursuit and self-enhancement. The nobles who
had once been talented men with integrity, honesty, and loyalty,
turned selfish and deceitful. Growth of hostile and rival clique in the
court also undermined the strength of the government. Widespread
corruption in the administration started and taking bribes became
common. One of the most potent causes of the fall of the Mughal
Empire was the deterioration and demoralization of the army. The
military had not only become inefficient but also lacked in training,
discipline and cohesion. The army was outdated in regard to
equipment. It consisted of contingents maintained by various
nobles, which was the main source of Armys weakness. As the
weakening of the nobles occurred, so did the army. This was
because of the soldiers, instead of identifying and uniting as Mughal
Indians, identified themselves with different ethnic groups like
Persian, Afghans and Central Asians. The Mughals had no navy and
only maintained small ships that were no match for the wellequipped ships of the foreign traders. It was this weakness that the
French and the British used to their advantage, and were eventually
able to establish their control over India.
Another factor contributing to the decline was the financial position
of the Mughals. The war of successions, rebellions and luxurious
style of living had depleted the once enormous treasury and had led
to financial bankruptcy.
During the time of Aurangzeb, the Mughal Empire had expanded to
reach its maximum size. This vast area had become impossible for
one ruler to control and govern from one center. It was during the
later Mughals that Deccan, Bengal, Bihar and Orrisa declared their
independence. The raids by Nadir Shah, and repeated invasions of
Ahmad Shah Abdali, resulted in further weakening of the empire.
The already weakened empire faced further encroachment by the
British and the French, which proved to be the last nail in the
already drowning empires coffin. The British and French, who had
initially come as traders, took full advantage of the weakening
empire and soon became masters of the whole of India.
The first Indo-Pakistani war started after armed tribesmen
from Pakistan's north-west frontier province invaded Kashmir in
October 1947.
Besieged both by a revolt in his state and by the invasion, the
Maharaja requested armed assistance from the government of India.
In return he acceded to India, handing over powers of defense,
communication and foreign affairs.
Both India and Pakistan agreed that the accession would be
confirmed by a referendum once hostilities had ceased. Historians
continue to debate the precise timing when the Maharaja of Jammu
and Kashmir signed the instrument of accession and the Indian
army moved into the state, arguing that the Maharaja acceded to

India under duress. On May 1948, the regular Pakistani army was
called upon to protect Pakistan's borders. Fighting continued
throughout the year between Pakistani irregular troops and the
Indian army. The war ended on 1st January 1949 when a ceasefire
was arranged by the United Nations, which recommended that both
India and Pakistan should adhere to their commitment to hold a
referendum in the state. A ceasefire line was established where the
two sides stopped fighting and a UN peacekeeping force
established. The referendum, however, has never been held. In
1954 Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India was ratified by the
state's constituent assembly. In 1957, it approved its own
constitution, modeled along the Indian constitution. Since that time
India has regarded that part of the state, which it controls as an
integral part of the Indian union. To the west of the ceasefire line,
Pakistan controls roughly one third of the state. A small region,
which the Pakistanis call Azad (Free) Jammu and Kashmir, and the
Indians call Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, is semi-autonomous. The
larger area, which includes the former kingdoms of Hunza and
Nagar, called the northern areas, is directly administered by
Pakistan.
The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was the second
conflict between the two countries over the status of the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. The clash did not resolve this dispute, but it did
engage the United States and the Soviet Union in ways that would
have important implications for subsequent superpower
involvement in the region. The dispute over this region originated in
the process of decolonization in South Asia. When the British colony
of India gained its independence in 1947, it was partitioned into two
separate entities: the secular nation of India and the predominantly
Muslim nation of Pakistan.
Pakistan was composed of two regions, East Pakistan and West
Pakistan, separated by Indian Territory. The state of Jammu and
Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim population but a Hindu
leader, shared borders with both India and West Pakistan. The
argument over which nation would incorporate the state led to the
first India-Pakistan War in 194748 and ended with UN mediation.
Jammu and Kashmir, also known as Indian Kashmir or just
Kashmir, joined the Republic of India, but the Pakistani
Government continued to believe that the majority Muslim state
rightfully belonged to Pakistan. Conflict resumed again in early
1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed
territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities
intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take
Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful,
and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate. After
Pakistani troops invaded Kashmir, India moved quickly to
internationalize the regional dispute.

It asked the United Nations to repeat its role in the First IndiaPakistan War and end the current conflict. The Security Council
passed Resolution 211 on September 20 calling for an end to the
fighting and negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir problem,
and the United States and the United Kingdom supported the UN
decision by cutting off arms supplies to both belligerents. This ban
affected both belligerents, but Pakistan felt the effects more keenly
since it had a much weaker military in comparison to India. The UN
resolution and the halting of arms sales had an immediate impact.
India accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on
September 22. The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of
Kashmir, and both sides accepted the Soviet Union as a third-party
mediator. Negotiations in Tashkent concluded in January 1966, with
both sides giving up territorial claims, withdrawing their armies from
the disputed territory. Nevertheless, although the Tashkent
agreement achieved its short-term aims, conflict in South Asia
would reignite a few years later.
The third war between India and Pakistan took place between
November 22 (when the Indian's began providing active artillery
support to the separatists) and Dec 17, 1971. The origins of the
third Indo-Pakistani conflict (1971) were different from the previous
conflicts. The failure of Pakistan to accommodate demands for
independence in East Pakistan in 1970, led to secessionist demands
in 1971. In March 1971, Pakistan's armed forces launched a fierce
campaign to suppress the resistance movement that had emerged
but encountered unexpected mass defections among East Pakistani
soldiers and police.
The Pakistani forces regrouped and reasserted their authority over
most of East Pakistan by May. As a result of these military actions,
thousands of East Pakistanis died at the hands of the Pakistani army.
Resistance fighters and nearly 10 million refugees fled to sanctuary
in West Bengal, the adjacent Indian state.
By midsummer, the Indian leadership, in the absence of a political
solution to the East Pakistan crisis, had fashioned a strategy
designed to assist the establishment of the independent nation of
Bangladesh. As part of this strategy, in August 1971, India signed a
twenty-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union. One of the treaty's clauses implied that each nation
was expected to come to the assistance of the other in the event of
a threat to national security such as that occurring in the 1965 war
with Pakistan.
Simultaneously, India organized, trained, and provided sanctuary to
the Mukti Bahini (meaning Liberation Force in Bengali), the East
Pakistani armed resistance fighters. Unable to deter India's activities
in the eastern sector, on December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched an
air attack in the western sector on a number of Indian airfields,
including Ambala in Haryana, Amritsar in Punjab, and Udhampur in
Jammu and Kashmir. The attacks did not succeed in inflicting

substantial damage. The Indian air force retaliated the next day and
quickly achieved air superiority. On the ground, the strategy in the
eastern sector marked a significant departure from previous Indian
battle plans and tactics, which had emphasized set-piece battles
and slow advances. The strategy adopted was a swift, threepronged assault of nine infantry divisions with attached armored
units and close air support that rapidly converged on Dhaka, the
capital of East Pakistan. Lieutenant General Sagat Singh, who
commanded the eighth, twenty-third, and fifty-seventh divisions, led
the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. As these forces attacked
Pakistani formations, the Indian air force rapidly destroyed the small
air contingent in East Pakistan and put the Dhaka airfield out of
commission. In the meantime, the Indian navy effectively blockaded
East Pakistan. Dhaka fell to combined Indian and Mukti Bahini forces
on December 16, bringing a quick end to the war. Action in the
western sector was divided into four segments, from the cease-fire
line in Jammu and Kashmir to the marshes of the Rann of Kutch in
northwestern Gujarat. On the evening of December 3, the Pakistani
army launched ground operations in Kashmir and Punjab. It also
started an armored operation in Rajasthan. In Kashmir, the
operations were concentrated on two key points, Punch and
Chhamb. The Chhamb area witnessed a particularly intense battle
where the Pakistanis forced the Indians to withdraw from their
positions. In other parts of Kashmir, the Indians made some small
gains along the cease-fire line. The major Indian counteroffensive
came in the Sialkot-Shakargarh area south and west of Chhamb.
There, two Pakistani tank regiments, equipped with United Statesmade Patton tanks, confronted the Indian First Armored Corps,
which had British Centurion tanks. In what proved to be the largest
tank battle of the war, both sides suffered considerable casualties.
Within hours of outbreak of hostilities, the Indian Missile Boat Group
was ordered to execute operation Trident, the code name for the
first attack on Karachi. The deadly missiles were heading towards
their targets that were soon hit. PNS Khyber, a destroyer and PNS
Muhafiz, a minesweeper were sunk. Another Pakistani destroyer
Shajehan was badly damaged. The fuel storage tanks at Karachi
harbour were set ablaze, causing heavy loss. Operation Trident was
a thundering success with no damage to any of the ships of the
Indian Naval Task Group, which returned safely. Operation Trident
had introduced to the war, the first ever ship launched missiles in
the region. Motivated by the success of this attack, the Indian Navy
planned another offensive operation code named Python. The
continued presence of the Indian Navy's larger ships is the area
gave enough indication to the Pakistani naval authorities that more
offensive operations were in the offing. The Pak aerial surveillance
was stepped up and their ships attempted to outsmart the Indian
Navy by mingling with merchant shipping. Notwithstanding these
measures by the Pakistanis, operation Python was launched on the
night on December 8 and 9, 1971. Despite bad weather and rough

seas, the task group consisting of missile boat Vinash and two
multipurpose frigates, executed the attack with razor sharp
precision. Though the Indian conduct of the land war on the western
front was somewhat timid, the role of the Indian air force was both
extensive and daring.
During the fourteen-day war, the air force's Western Command
conducted some 4,000 sorties. There was little retaliation by
Pakistan's air force, partly because of the paucity of non-Bengali
technical personnel. Additionally, this lack of retaliation reflected the
deliberate decision of the Pakistan Air Force headquarters to
conserve its forces because of heavy losses incurred in the early
days of the war.
In the 1970s and early 1980s Pakistan permitted several
mountaineering expeditions to climb high peaks on this glacier. This
was to reinforce their claim on the area as these expeditions arrived
on the glacier with a permit obtained from the Government of
Pakistan. Once having become aware of this in about 1978, Colonel
N. Kumar of the Indian Army mounted an Army expedition to Teram
Kangri peaks as a counter-exercise. The first public mention of a
possible conflict situation was an article by Joydeep Sircar in The
Telegraph newspaper of Calcutta in 1982, reprinted as Oropolitics
in the Alpine Journal, London,in 1984. India launched Operation
Meghdoot (named after the divine cloud messenger in a Sanskrit
play) on 13 April 1984 when the Kumaon Regiment of the Indian
Army and the Indian Air Force went into the Glacier. Pakistan, which
had also gotten wind of it quickly responded with troop deployments
and what followed was literally a race to the top. Within a few days,
the Indians were in control over most of the glacier as Pakistan were
beaten by just a week. The two passes due to Indian military preemption Sia La and Bilfond La were secured by India while the
Gyong La pass remained under Pakistan control. Since then both
sides have launched several attempts to displace each others
forces, but with little success. The Siachen glacier is the highest
battleground on earth, where India and Pakistan have fought
intermittently since April 13, 1984. Both countries maintain
permanent military presence in the region at a height of over 6,000
metres (20,000 ft). More than 2000 people have died in this
inhospitable terrain, mostly due to weather extremes and the
natural hazards of mountain warfare.
The 1999 Kargil War took place between May 8, when
Pakistani forces and Kashmiri militants were detected atop the Kargil
ridges and July 14 when both sides had essentially ceased their
military operations. It is believed that the planning for the operation,
by Pakistan, may have occurred about as early as the autumn of
1998. The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed
forces into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around
Kargil in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military
campaign to repel the intrusion left 524 Indian soldiers dead and

1,363 wounded, according to December 1 statistics by Defense

Minister George Fernandes. Earlier Government figures stated that
696 Pakistani soldiers were killed. A senior Pakistani police official
estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the
Pakistani side of the line of control. By 30 June 1999 Indian forces
were prepared for a major high-altitude offensive against Pakistani
posts along the border in the disputed Kashmir region. Over the
previous six weeks India had moved five infantry divisions, five
independent brigades and 44 battalions of paramilitary troops to
Kashmir. The total Indian troop strength in the region had reached
730,000. The build-up included the deployment of around 60
frontline aircraft. The Pakistani effort to take Kargil occurred after
the February 1999 Lahore summit between then Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bahari
Vajpayee. This conference was believed to have de-escalated the
tensions that had existed since May 1998. The major motive behind
the operation was to help in internationalizing the Kashmir issue,
and for which global attention had been flagging for some time. The
intrusion plan was by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, Gen Pervez
Musharraf and Lt Gen Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff.
Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions was based on
exploitation of the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sector
both on Indian and Pak side of the Line of Control (LoC).
The terrain is extremely rugged with very few tracks leading from
the main roads towards the LoC. During winters the area gets very
heavy snowfall making movement almost impossible. The only
mountain pass connecting the Kargil area to the Kashmir Valley, Zoji
La, normally opens by the end of May or beginning of June. Thus,
moving of reinforcements by surface means from Srinagar would not
have been possible till then. Pakistan Army calculated that even if
the intrusions were discovered in early May, as they were, the Indian
Army's reaction would be slow and limited, thereby allowing him to
consolidate the intrusions more effectively.
Eleven events and questions that shaped Pakistans history
and that of the subcontinent. These being, Muhammad bin Qasim's
Invasion of Sind (712), the First Battle of Panipat (1526), the Second
Battle of Panipat (1556), the Battle of Plassey (1757), the Third
Battle of Panipat (1761), how The year 1857 brought decline to the
Muslim rule in India and why, Pakistan-Indias 1st War (1947-48),
Pakistan-Indias 2nd War (1965), Pakistan-Indias 3rd War (1971),
Pakistan-Indias War of SIACHEN (1984) and Pakistan-Indias War
of KARGIL (1999). Each with its own significance shows how of an
event(s) can manipulate history.

Work Cited

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