Plato

Plato considers mathematical objects to be abstract objects independent from

ourselves. I hesitate to describe them as forms instead of objects; there is one
perfect form of the colour white, but there are many equally perfect circles. In this
way, mathematical objects are beneath forms in terms of abstractness. Indeed,
Plato gives us this in the analogy of the divided line. However, I also think that Plato
would agree that a wheel instantiates the idea or form of a circle.
Now, in order to elaborate on how we know about the relationships or
theorems between these objects, one must first tackle the topic of anamnesis. As
presented in the Meno, anamnesis is the theory that all mathematical relationships
are fixed and already existent: one recalls them from pre-incarnation experiences
with the objects themselves. Mathematical proof, that is, deductive reasoning, is
merely an aid to this recollection, and a means to convince us that we are
remembering correctly. Despite this, I think the modern position of mathematical
Platonism is that we know theorems by means of deductive reasoning about
objective qualities of these intelligible objects. That said, modern views do not
retroactively change what Plato himself put forward.
To answer Wigners question about why mathematics is unreasonably
effective at modeling the material world, one must consider in more detail the
theory of the forms. Consider that physical objects are imperfect reflections or
instantiations of the intelligible objects. In this way, it makes sense that
mathematical relationships model the physical world. In Platos view, it would
almost be more appropriate to say that the physical world is a model of the
mathematical world, and not vice-versa.
I would personally prefer it if the Platonist thesis were true; it wraps
everything up in a nice little bow. However, the glaring objection to Platonism is that
there is no objective evidence for the existence of forms. It is not a logical position
to take. Moreover, as a mathematician, not a philosopher or aesthete, beauty is in
parsimony. To presuppose the existence another world of intelligible objects, past
lives, trans-incarnation recollection, and some mechanism by which intelligible
objects are instantiated imperfectly is, to be gentle, an awful lot. Indeed, if there is
no means by which to come to know the forms objectively, then Platonism is more
of a religion then not.