The

Air Force Integrates - 1945-1964 - World War II, Freeman Field Mutiny,
MacDill Riot, Unbunching, Eisenhower, Little Rock, Kennedy Era and the Civil
Rights Act, Travis Riot, Blacks in USAF
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U.S. Government, U.S. Military, Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Air Force (USAF)
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CONTENTS
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The Air Force Integrates - 1945-1964
CHAPTER I - FLYING ON CLIPPED WINGS
CHAPTER II - MARKING TIME
CHAPTER III - UNBUNCHING
CHAPTER IV - BENIGN NEGLECT
CHAPTER V - THE KENNEDY ERA
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 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment
DIA Director Worldwide Threat Assessment
White House National Security Strategy February 2015
Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on the 2015 National Security
Strategy
Additional National Security Testimony and Intelligence Community Material (2015
and 2014)
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The Air Force Integrates - 1945-1964
Alan L. Gropman
OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1985
SPECIAL STUDIES
FOREWORD
This book describes the struggle to desegregate the post-World War II U.S. Army
Air Forces and its successor, the U.S. Air Force, and the remarkable advances made
during the next two decades to end racial segregation and move towards equality of
treatment of Negro airmen. The author, Lt. Col. Alan L. Gropman, a former Instructor of
History at the U.S. Air Force Academy, received his doctorate degree from Tufts
University. His dissertation served as the basis for this volume. In it, the author describes
the fight to end segregation within the Air Force following President Harry S. Trumans
issuance of an executive order directing the integration of the armed forces. Despite
resistance to this order, fueled by heated segregationist opposition, integration moved
ahead somewhat slowly under the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Progress increased during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, which saw
major advances toward achieving equality for Negro servicemen.
Colonel Gropmans study is a detailed, comprehensive, and, in many respects, a
documentary account. The crucial events it describes more than justify the unusually
extended treatment they receive. The volume thus provides a permanent record of this
turbulent period in race relations and constitutes a significant contribution to the history of
the Air Force.
JOHN W. HUSTON
Maj. Gen. USAF
Chief, Office of Air Force History
Washington, D.C.
 4 December 1977
* * * * * * * * * * * *
U.S. AIR FORCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (As of September 1975)
Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.
Duke University
Lt. Gen. James R. Allen
Superintendent, USAF Academy
Dr. Robert F. Byrnes
Indiana University
Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark
USAF (ret.)
Dr. Henry F. Graff
Columbia University
Dr. Forrest C. Pogue
Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research
Mr. Jack Stempler
General Counsel, USAF
Chief, Office of Air Force History
Maj. Gen. John W. Huston
Chief Historian
Stanley L. Falk
Deputy Chief Historian
Max Rosenberg
Chief, Histories Division
Carl Berger
Senior Editor
Lawrence J. Paszek
* * * * * * * * * * * *
PREFACE
In 1945 the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) was a racially segregated institution
whose personnel policies were dominated by prejudices inherited from earlier decades. By
1964, however, its successor, the United States Air Force (USAF) had officially ended all
forms of racial segregation and undertookas did its sister servicesto end all forms of
discrimination on-and-off-base. This narrative concentrates on the Air Forces
evolutionary development away from segregation and towards equal opportunity.
To establish a base from which post-World War II Air Force progress may be
measured, I analyzed two key elements. First, I examined the military writings of the
interwar period (1919-1939) which debated the best uses of Negro soldiers. Second, I
studied the USAAFs wartime treatment of a mutiny of Negro officers which took place in
April 1945 at Freeman Field, Ind. Having obtained the use of recently declassified
telephone transcriptions involving discussions between AAF military leaders in the spring
of 1945, as well as other documentation, I was able to focus on the racial biases of the
officer corps.
Once their views were clearly established, I traced the slow and uneven
development of the AAFs policy from an April 1945 Negro officer mutiny to the success
of the equal opportunity program which followed the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
Although there were signs of positive change in military racial attitudes at the end of
World War II, the desire for racial equity was not sufficiently deep-seated nor widely held
by senior military leaders to break the pattern of segregation. The Army Air Forces, when
confronted with one massive and several minor race incidents in 1946 and 1947,
persistently sought to blame Communist influences as the source of the unrest among
Negro servicemen, while overlooking other factors such as overcrowded living conditions
and the maintenance of racial segregation.
A handful of senior Air Force officers recognized the causal relationship between
segregation and the disturbances and, more significantly, they were aware that segregation
was an inefficient personnel policy. When desegregation finally came to the Air Force in
May 1949, it was a product of military pragmatism combined with the demands of U.S.
presidential politics. A few key farsighted individuals in the Air Force in early 1948 had
sought to disband the single all-Negro fighter group and integrate its members into
formerly all-white units. Talented blacks found in other Negro organizations also were to
be integrated. Action, however, could not be taken until other members of the air staff
were convinced of the wisdom of desegregation or until opposition to the decision had
been effectively silenced. President Harry S. Trumans order of July 1948 to integrate the
armed forces immeasurably helped to move the desegregation policy through the air staff.
An examination of President Trumans White House staff papers shows that his decision
to desegregate was based largely on his desire to garner the Negro vote in the 1948
election.
With Trumans help the Air Force desegregated rapidly and smoothly but then it
neglected to monitor the continuing problems of Negro airmen. Thus, their promotions to
supervisory ranks stagnated between 1949 and 1962. Statistical appendices that follow this
narrative show that there were more Negro master sergeants in 1948 by percentage of the
total force than there were 13 years later. Blacks, furthermore, endured conditions both on-
and especially off-base which depressed their morale. The standard Air Force response to
questions about off-base discrimination before 1964 was that the service was incapable or
unable to intervene in off-base matters.
Soon, however, the Air Force was forced to take an active role in improving the lot
of blacks off-base. Once again presidential politics in the early 1960s slowly, but
incompletely, awakened the Air Force to the hardships blacks had to tolerate on and off
military posts. Air Force interest in this subject peaked with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. A year earlier, the Air Force had created an office to implement extant
and proposed equal opportunity policies. This office, however, was subsequently reduced
in size and declined in importance beginning in late 1964. By the end of the decade, the
Air Force had not kept abreast of changes in the Negro community and its headquarters
remained largely ignorant of racial unrest in the service, having let its equal opportunity
monitoring and implementing agency atrophy. A new era of racial turbulence and violence
during the early 1970s caught the Air Force by surprise. Race riots at key Air Force bases
led to the creation of an equal opportunity program monitored by Headquarters USAF
with lines of communication to the field to insure equal opportunity for Negro servicemen.
The Air Force leadership was asked to expand its knowledge of the grievances of
the Negro airmen, although this was a subject which had not previously been considered a
part of its job. But after a black servicemens riot at Travis Air Force Base in 1971, the Air
Force took immediate steps to improve Air Force race relations.
During my study of the Air Forces move from segregation to equal opportunity
for Negro airmen, I was blessed with an unusual display of cooperation and
encouragement. Colleagues at the U.S. Air Force Academy showed remarkable interest.
My former commander, Col. Alfred F. Hurley, Permanent Professor and Head of the
Department of History, financed my first research trip, calling it seed money, and gave
me a semesters leave in 1973 from my teaching duties to pursue my research. He read the
first draft of chapter I and together with Majors David Maclsaac and John Guilmartin, who
read draft chapters I and II, urged me to press on. Mr. William Cunliffe of the Modern
Military Branch at the National Archives and his colleagues, Edward Reese and Virginia
Jezierski (Mrs. Jerri), saved me a great deal of time. Mr. Charles F. Cooney of the Library
of Congress was similarly helpful. Mr. Charles Ohrvall of the Truman Library and Joan
Howard of the Eisenhower Library saved me much effort. Sylvia Turner of the Kennedy
Library also was cooperative.
Without the staff assistance provided by the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research
Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala., this study could not have seen the light of day. Marguerite
Kennedy, Chief, Historical Reference Branch, opened all the doors and James N. Eastman,
Jr., Chief, Historical Research Branch, kept them open. Mr. Morris MacGregor, a historian
with the U.S. Armys Center for Military History, assisted me countless times. Two of the
Tuskegee Airmen, Louis Purnell and Spann Watson, deserve my eternal gratitude. I am
also indebted to James C. Evans, who provided me with invaluable background
information. Betty Fogler of the United States Air Force Academy Library, Interlibrary
Loan, obtained material for me from throughout the United States while I was overseas.
The help I received from the Tufts University history faculty cannot be overstated.
Professor Russell E. Miller supervised my dissertation and supported my studies from my
arrival at Tufts as a graduate student in 1959. No single individual has so influenced my
growth as a historian. Without his advice and the generosity of his time I might have never
completed the dissertation from which this book emanates. Professor Daniel Mulholland
was second reader on my Masters thesis and the dissertation. For more than six years, he
has remained firmly in my corner. Also Professors George Marcopoulis, Aubrey Parkman,
and Robert Taylor always took an interest in my projects.
The Air Force Office of History secured a grant of $1,000 from Air Staff funds for
my research and provided numerous necessary services. I can never hope to repay men
like Dr. Murray Green, Dr. Charles Hildreth, William Mattson, Lawrence Paszek, Max
Rosenberg, David Schoem, and Herman Wolk. After I had completed my dissertation, two
historians helped to turn my manuscript into a book. Mr. Carl Berger, Chief of the
Histories Division, read it and made many valuable recommendations to improve the
manuscript. Dr. Stanley L. Falk, Chief Historian, Office of Air Force History, also read the
dissertation and offered valuable criticism and was most responsible for turning my
project into a book. Readers will recognize that it took some intrepidity for the Air Forces
Chief Historian to publish a work as critical of the Air Force as this. His only criteria were
truth and objectivity.
I also owe much to my family. Over the years, many individuals seemed never to
tire of hearing how the Air Force integrated (although they must have), and urged me to
press on. My children put up with my distraction and my wife supplied me with the
motivation and love I needed to complete this work while engaged in many other
enterprises. That is why the book is dedicated to Jackie.
Alan L. Gropman
Lt. Col., USAF
Ramstein Air Base, Germany
5 November 1976
* * * * * * * * * * * *
CHAPTER I - FLYING ON CLIPPED WINGS
Interwar Negro Personnel Policy
World War II Personnel Policy
The Tuskegee Airmen
The 477th Bombardment Group (M) (Colored)
The Freeman Field Mutiny
The McCloy Committee Recommendations
CHAPTER II - MARKING TIME
The Army Studies the Postwar Role of Negro Troops
The First Air Force Report
The Gillem Board Recommendations
Race Violence
The MacDill Riot
Air Force Blacks in the Postwar Period
Ben Davis Air Force
CHAPTER III - UNBUNCHING
The Air Force Shifts Policy
Political Pressure and the Election of 1948
Air Force Integration
Changing Military Attitudes
CHAPTER IV - BENIGN NEGLECT
The Korean War
Eisenhower and Civil Rights
Little Rock Air Force Base
Air Force Off-Base Discrimination
The Problem in the North
CHAPTER V - THE KENNEDY ERA
The Gesell Committee
Reaction to the Gesell Report
Air Force Opposition
Air Force Equal Opportunity Efforts
Passage of the Civil Rights Act
The Air Force Marks Time
EPILOGUE
Positive Programs Between 1964 and 1971
The Travis Riot
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I
Statistics
Table 1 Blacks in the Air Force
Table 2 Negro Air Force Officers
Table 3 Negro Enlisted Men, July 1948
Table 4 Negro Enlisted Men, June 1949
Table 5 Negro Enlisted Men, June 1950
Table 6 Negro Enlisted Men, June 1954
Table 7 Negro Enlisted Men, 1962
Table 8 Negro Enlisted Men, 1966
 Table 9 Negro Enlisted Men, December 1970
Table 10 Negro Officers, July 1948
Table 11 Negro Officers, June 1949
Table 12 Negro Officers, December 1952
Table 13 Negro Officers, 1962
Table 14 Negro Officers, 1966
Table 15 Negro Officers, December 1970
Table 16 Negroes as Percentages of Enlisted Personnel in Occupational Groups
by Length of Service, 1962
Table 17 First Term Reenlistments by Race in Selected Occupational Groups,
1962
APPENDIX II
Documents
NOTES
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Chapter I
FLYING ON CLIPPED WINGS
In April 1945 more than 100 Negro officers forcefully protested segregated
facilities and discriminatory policies at Freeman Field, Ind. They were arrested by their
white commanders to deny them the opportunity to lead what their superiors termed a
mutiny. This significant but little known event*, which occurred in the closing year of
World War II, is important in the history of the Army Air Forces because no other event
better illustrates the attitude of its white military leadership towards blacks. To understand
the factors which precipitated the revolt, it is essential to review Army racial policies
formulated during the 1920s and 1930s. These policies, based upon racist premises,
affected black and white relations for decades that followed. It should be stressed,
however, that the military leadership between the two world wars was no more bigoted
than other segments of American society. But that knowledge brought little comfort to
those who had to endure the system. Without admitting that it had succumbed to racist
theories, the military leadership had in fact adopted the racist hyperbole popular in the
interwar years.
Interwar Negro Personnel Policy
When World War I began in August 1914, the U.S. Army had no plans to employ
the vast reservoir of Negro manpower should the nation become involved in the European
conflict. Following Americas entrance into the war in April 1917, the Army did undertake
to recruit Negro troops totaling more than 400,000. Most Negro soldiers served in the
Services of Supply while others were formed into two infantry divisions and saw action in
combat in France. Their effectiveness, however, was a controversial issue after the war.
The question of the future use of Negro personnel was subsequently studied by 10 Army
War College classes.2 Essentially, these students reaffirmed decisions made by Gen. John
J. Pershing, the Army Chief of Staff in 1922.
In that year Pershing implemented the recommendation of a staff study which
suggested that only the four historic Negro combat regiments, the 9th and 10th Cavalry
and the 24th and 25th Infantry, be manned in the regular Army and that segregated
National Guard units be maintained and used as Army Corps reserve commanders saw fit.
The authors of the staff study believed that blacks had to be employed in a combat role.
They stated that: To follow the policy of exempting the Negro population of this country
from combat service means that the white population on which the future of the country
depends, would suffer the brunt of the loss, the Negro none- The Negro, they continued,
was a citizen of the United States, entitled to all of the rights of citizenship and subject to
all the obligations of citizenship They believed, however, that no Negro officer should
command a white officer. 3 The 1922 plan was no improvement over prewar policies,
mainly because it did not call for the establishment of a cadre to train a larger number of
blacks. The Army War College, perhaps recognizing this shortcoming, time and again
searched for a better plan. What emerged on each occasion was a muddled program of
Negro quotas reflecting racist policies.
A typical study was the War Colleges Memorandum for the Chief of Staff of 30
October 1925 titled, The Use of Negro Manpower in War.4 Signed by Maj. Gen. H. E.
Ely, War College Commandant, this report was the product of several years study by the
faculty and student body of the Army War College. It concluded that Negro men believed
themselves inferior to white men, that they were by nature subservient, and that they
lacked initiative and resourcefulness. Blacks, furthermore were fair laborers, but were
considered inferior as technicians and fighters.5 According to this report, blacks were also
very low in the scale of human evolution. The cranial cavity of the Negro is smaller than
the white; his brain weighing 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the white. If any blacks
did score well on intelligence tests, the reason given was that they possessed a heavy
strain of white blood.6
Negro officers, the report claimed, not only lacked the mental capacity to
command but courage as well. Their interest was seen as not to fight for their country, but
solely to advance their racial interests. Worst of all, according to the report, the Negro
soldier utterly lacked confidence in his colored officer - The Negro officer was still a
Negro, with all the faults and weaknesses of character inherent in the Negro race,
exaggerated by the fact that he wore an officers uniform.7
The compilers of this study also believed that blacks had a profoundly
superstitious nature, and possessed abundant moral and character -weaknesses. The
writers declared: Petty thieving, lying, and promiscuity are much more common among
Negroes than among whites. Atrocities connected with white women have been the cause
of considerable trouble among Negroes. Most damning of all, according to the report,
blacks were deemed cowardly. In physical courage, it stated, it must be admitted that
the American Negro falls well back of the white man and possibly behind all other
races.8
The memorandum also argued that racial segregation was dictated by inherited
inferiority. The Negro supposedly possessed physical, mental, moral and other
psychological characteristics that made it impossible for him to associate socially with
any except the lowest class of whites. The sole exceptions to this were the Negro
concubines who have sometimes attracted men who, except for this association, were
considered high class. Typical of those army officials who came before and who would
come later, these white officers believed that Negro social inequality makes the close
association of whites and blacks in military organization inimicable to harmony and
efficiency.9
In endorsing the memorandum, General Ely concluded that the study was based on
the need for military efficiency and was eminently fair to both the Negro and the white
man.17 His views, however, must not be taken out of context. The 1920s were uneasy
years for American blacks as well as for other racial and ethnic minorities. After World
War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, fear gripped America, and the country turned inward,
rejecting anyone who looked, acted, or spoke differently. This was the decade that
produced restrictive immigration legislation and saw the Ku Klux Klan win sufficient
public and official acceptance to parade down Washingtons Pennsylvania Avenue.
Pragmatic career military men succumbed to the pervading atmosphere and the storm of
hate.11
It was against this background that the faculty and students casually denigrated the
fighting performance of blacks. In a section of the study dealing with Negro service in
previous wars, the writers only perfunctorily praised the courage and successes of Negro
servicemen. They ignored or deliberately overlooked the fact that more than 10 percent of
Union Army troops during the closing years of the Civil War were black. Indeed, Negro
soldiers won 38 Medals of Honor between 1863 and 1898during the Civil, Indian, and
Spanish-American wars. Such facts were not mentioned in the War College study.12
Confronted by such points of view, blacks found it difficult to enter the Army. By
1937 there were only 6,500 blacks in an Army of 360,000 men, constituting 1.8 percent of
the total. The attitude of the Army Air Corps was that it would not accept blacks in any
capacity.13 The Air Corps maintained this posture until the early 1940s, when political
pressures forced it to modify its stand. Blacks had not been permitted to join the American
Air Service during World War I, although a Negro American, Eugene Jacque Bullard, flew
in combat with the Lafayette Esca-drill.14 The belief that blacks were unsuitable for air
duty remained unchanged up to the early years of World War II.
World War II Personnel Policy
After the war began in September 1939, the Army undertook to reformulate its
Negro policy. At the time, the Army had only the four regular black regiments. With the
start of hostilities in Europe, the question arose whether to increase the number of Negro
units. The Negro community criticized the Army for not acting expeditiously. The
response was that the Army was not a free agent in these matters, that it was only
following the will of the majority. The Armys Chief of Personnel stated that the War
Department is not an agency which can solve national questions relating to the social or
economic position of the various racial groups composing our Nation. The War
Department administers the laws affecting the military establishment; it cannot act outside
the law, nor contrary to the will of the majority of the citizens of the nation.15 The
Armys view throughout the war was that its primary concern was only to maintain a
fighting machine and that it was not interested in changing social customs. It also reasoned
that segregation was not discriminatory. After all, the Supreme Court had ruled on
numerous occasions that segregation was not discrimination per se. The Army, in a phrase,
would maintain separate but equal facilities.16 Long into the war and well after it, the
Army contended: Segregation is required, discrimination is prohibited.17
In the fall of 1940, after Germany had conquered France and the Low Countries,
the Army further outlined a program for Negro military employment. Blacks would be
recruited for the expanded Army in a strength proportional to that of the national
population. Negro units were to be established in each major Army branch; Negro reserve
officers were to be assigned only to Negro units; and blacks would be able to attend
Officers Candidate School (OCS), a privilege previously denied them. Regarding
segregation, an official statement declared:
The policy of the War Department is not to intermingle colored and white
personnel in the same regimental organizations. This policy has proven satisfactory over a
long period of years and to make changes would produce situations destructive to morale
and detrimental to the preparation for national defense.
The policy statement also announced that blacks were being given aviation
training as pilots, mechanics and technical specialists. This training will be accelerated.
Negro aviation units will be formed as soon as the necessary personnel have been
trained.18
Negro efforts to enter aviation units became one of the most widespread and
widely publicized of all the prewar public pressure campaigns affecting the Negro and the
Army.19 Throughout the 1930s the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) and Negro newspapers had pressured the War Department
without success. Its answer in 1931 to a Negro request that blacks be used in at least
service units drew an Air Corps response that it required men of technical and
mechanical experience and ability. As a rule, the colored man has not been attracted to this
field in the same way or the same extent as the white man.20
In 1939 Congress attempted to force the hand of the Air Corps by calling for the
establishment of Negro civilian pilot training schools, a branch of a broader civilian
program. These schools were created to provide a cadre of flyers should the United States
become involved in the war. The Air Corps did sponsor several Negro flying schools, but
took none of the graduates. Beginning with the fall of that year, the Civilian Pilot Training
Program (CPTP) established several Negro flight schools and permitted some blacks to
train in integrated northern flying schools. During the first year, 91 blacks (out of a class
of 100) passed, achieving a record on par with that of the whites. The Air Corps remained
reluctant, however, to accept any of these graduates into its ranks, arguing that the
congressional legislation did not require it to employ them, but simply to establish the
schools.21 It pointed out that blacks and whites could not be mixed and, since no
provision had been made to create Negro Air Corps squadrons, they could not enlist
because there were no units to which they could be assigned.22 Yet, one should not
minimize the genuine concern some Air Corps leaders expressed about interracial
problems. For example, they foresaw a problem should a Negro pilot execute a forced
landing at a white base. Such an incident raised the question: Where then could he eat or
sleep? What would white enlisted men do if ordered by a Negro pilot to service his
aircraft? These were serious questions in 1940.
Throughout 1939 and 1940, the Air Corps refused to alter its stand. By early 1941,
however, feeling pressure from politicians eager to garner the Negro bloc vote and
threatened with lawsuits from enterprising blacks, the Air Corps decided to establish one
pursuit squadron with 47 Negro officers and 429 Negro enlisted men.23 Tuskegee was
selected as the most suitable location for segregated training. The Air Corps created a Jim
Crow Air Force at the headquarters of Negro accommodation. Negro leaders and the
Negro press were unimpressed with this meager concession. But they temporarily muzzled
their discontent because they believed that criticism might halt further opportunities for
Negro pilots. On 22 March 1941 the 99th Pursuit Squadron was activated, and the
following year saw the activation of the 100th Pursuit Squadron.24 The CPTP trained
most of the pilots of these two squadrons. During the course of World War II, more than
2,000 Negro pilots earned their wings through the CPTP and nearly all of the Negro
combat aviators began their careers with that program.25
The Tuskegee Airmen were created partly because President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who was running for a third term, needed to shore up his waning support
amongst Negro voters in the 1940 election.26 Certainly, the Air Corps did not want blacks
and neither did Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. He wrote in his diary that leadership
is not embedded in the Negro race and making blacks commissioned officers was to court
disaster. He also predicted that blacks would fail as aviators.27 Roosevelt as well was
no activist on civil rights matters, but the Republican candidate, Wendell L. Willkie,
pressed determinedly for the Negro vote. Roosevelt, seeking to counter Willkies appeal,
promised to create Negro flying units and promoted Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., to brigadier
general, the first black to hold that rank.28 The President also appointed William Hastie as
Stimsons Civilian Aide on Negro affairs. For these and other reasons, Roosevelt won a
majority of the Negro vote.29 Having gained these advantages, most blacks were eager to
agitate for the right to fight in combat so that they might make future demands based on
their military accomplishments. Most Negro Americans considered their quest as a
struggle on two fronts: first, to fight Americas enemies abroad, and second, to help
guarantee a victory against the Negros enemies at home.30
Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, believed
that creating Negro officers would introduce an impossible social problem, i.e., Negro
officers would command white enlisted men.31 To avoid the above situation, Arnold built
a tightly segregated black component of the Air Corps, labeled the Spookwaffe by some
of its Negro members. Segregation, however, and the policy for all components of the
Army to take a quota of blacks crippled intelligent personnel policies. The technically
oriented Air Corps had a need for better educated personnel but most blacks did not score
as well as most whites on aptitude tests. The average score on the Army General
Classification Test (AGCT) which only measured educational achievement and level
was 107 for whites, whereas blacks averaged 79. Only 15 percent of the whites were in
the lowest two categories, IV and V, compared to 80 percent of the blacks.

One solution the Air Corps implemented to correct the social and quota problems
was to set up an Aviation Squadron. Each base was allotted approximately 400 blacks who
were assigned to these catch-all laboring units. There were more than 250 such squadrons
in 1944. Blacks were also assigned to segregated truck companies, medical and
quartermaster detachments, and air base defense units. Although more than 16 percent of
the blacks scored in the highest three categories of the AGCT and had abilities far beyond
those called for in menial tasks, they also were assigned to laboring units without regard
for occupational specialties, educational backgrounds, tested aptitudes, or any other
classification method. Blacks were assigned according to the numbers received and space
availability.32 Such segregated units at once encountered serious difficulties. Segregation
implied that in a black unit of 200 men, almost one half of them would fall in the lowest
aptitude category, while another 70 would score in the next lowest. In comparable white
units, 16 generally were in the lowest aptitude level and less than 50 classified in the next
lowest. White units could spread out their less endowed soldiers, while the Negro units
concentrated them.33 Almost 50 percent of all servicemen in class V did not comprehend
such words as discipline, individual, outpost, maintain, and observation, and less than a
quarter of the men understood barrage, cadre, counter-clockwise, personnel, exterior and
ordnance. These were commonplace words appearing in announcements on bulletin
boards and in manuals.34

Negro units were often poorly trained and frequently led by officers who also were
of comparatively low quality. Although the Air Corps accepted its quota, no more than 6.1
percent of its force was black.35 The vast majority of these were enlisted men. Their
difficulties will be examined in chapter II.
The Tuskegee Airmen
In March 1941, the first blacks were accepted into the Air Corps for flight training.
It is probably safe to say that the military leadership considered this at best an experiment
and at worst an unwarranted political intrusion. Tuskegee Army Air Field was established
on 23 July 1941 and training began the following 1 November. There were six men in the
first class, one officer and five flying cadets. The officer was Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., a
West Point graduate, 35th of 276 in the class of 1936, who had been silenced during his
stay at the Military Academy, because he was black.36 During the war years, Tuskegee
trained 650 single engine pilots, 217 twin engine pilots, 60 auxiliary pilots, and also
graduated five pilots from Haiti.37
This training, accomplished in Jim Crow fashion, disturbed William Hastie,
Secretary Stimsons Civilian Aide on Negro affairs. Air Corps segregation policies and
insensitive discriminatory acts later forced Hastie to resign. Stimson and Assistant
Secretary of War John J. McCloy viewed him as a representative of the NAACP, and they
actually kept Hastie ignorant of matters on blacks. The final blow came with the creation
of a committee on Special Troop Policies, headed by McCloy. It was formed without
Hasties knowledge and, more significantly, excluded him from its membership.38
Hastie and the Negro press regularly criticized the Tuskegee airfield program with
its white command element. The best Hastie could say about Tuskegee was that it was
uneconomical; and he was unhappy with the institute for accepting and monopolizing
Negro pilot training and with the Air Corps for lodging Negro flying training in Alabama.
He believed Tuskegee and the Air Corps were involved in an unholy alliance to keep
blacks segregated.39 Hastie admitted that the Air Corps gave blacks the best of facilities
and instructors, but the Pittsburgh Courier denied even that.
In a 5-part series of articles in 1944, the Courier, the leading Negro newspaper in
the country, with the largest circulation, attacked Tuskegee Army Air Field as a citadel to
the theory that there can be segregation without discrimination. The newspaper held that
whites were there chiefly to advance themselves without regard to the damage done to
the general morale of Negro Army personnel. The Courier complained that whites did
not associate with blacks and that no officer, including Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Noel
Parrish, who assumed command of Tuskegee AAF in December 1942 and remained in
command throughout the war, belonged to the Officers Club. There was even a hint that
airplane accidents might have been caused through the deliberate sabotage of aircraft.40
Tuskegees safety record belied sabotage and Colonel Parrish had membership in
the club. In fact, Parrish socialized in an open and relaxed manner with blacks and when
he was promoted from Chief of Training to Commander, Truman K. Gibson, Hasties
assistant and his successor, reported that morale at Tuskegee improved.4i After the war,
Parrish was probably the first white of any stature to advocate integration. He argued that
unless some deliberate break in the expensive and inefficient shell of segregation is made
now, the next emergency will find the Air Force embarrassingly unprepared for the large
scale employment of Negro manpower. As operations and logistics advance into the
atomic age, the personnel policies of the Civil War become increasingly burdensome.42
 Parrish understood much better than his white contemporaries that segregation was
the prime cause of low morale among blacks. He quoted Rayford W. Logan of Howard
University, Washington, D.C., who stated that however segregation may be rationalized,
it is essentially the denial of belonging. He knew that segregated units were no darker
on the top than other units, and that had to appear to the blacks as a trick. Negro units
were regarded as gift horses to be ridden by white men with Negroes doing the
shoveling.43 Morale problems, then, were unlikely to end when the pilots graduated from
Tuskegee.
Following graduation, the 99th Fighter Squadron (Separate) encountered
difficulties obtaining an overseas combat mission. Successive deployment dates passed,
and in the interim the 99th flew training missions to remain proficient. The Air Corps
could find no place for the unit because no one, apparently, wanted it. It remained
stateside for a year before being ordered to North Africa, and, as they departed, the black
airmen knew that upon their performance depended the future of Negroes in military
aviation.44 The 99th arrived in North Africa in April 1943 and flew its first combat
mission on 2 June over Pantelleria. A week later the unit made its first enemy contact. It
scored its first kill in July, but no more enemy aircraft were destroyed until January 1944.
General Arnold was unhappy with this dry spell, as was Col. William W. Momyer.45
Momyer, commander of the 33d Fighter Group of which the 99th was a part,
reported in September 1943 that the 99th had unsatisfactory air discipline, and had not yet
acquired the ability to work and fight as a team. He claimed that its formations
disintegrated under fire and condemned its lack of aggressiveness. He wanted the unit
removed from combat.46
Momyers recommendation was endorsed favorably as it moved up through the
chain of command. One general officer remarked that the Negro type has not the proper
reflexes to make a first-class fighter pilot. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General,
Northwest African Air Forces, endorsed the report, telling Arnold that the 99th had been
given a fair test. Arnold then recommended that the 99th be removed from an active
combat role, that the 332d Fighter Group (upon attaining combat-ready status) also be sent
to a noncombat area, and that the proposed training program to create a Negro
bombardment group be abandoned. It was clear to the command element that the blacks
had failed their test.47
Arnold, however, was aware of the political implications of barring blacks from
combat and asked Gen. George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, to secure Roosevelts
approval before abandoning them. Marshall asked Army G-3 (Operations) to study the
role of blacks in combat, both in the air and on the ground, because he needed more
information. G-3 advised that the evidence was inconclusive and recommended that the
332d be sent to the Mediterranean for a true test. Truman Gibson argued that the negative
comments by Momyer and others were unfair since many white units also responded
poorly when first thrust into battle, and the 99th had no combat veterans to leaven the unit.
Its flight leaders were neophytes because of segregation. Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., 99th
Commander, on temporary duty to the United States, further refuted Momyers
allegations. Davis admitted that the 99th had adjustment difficulties, but only once had the
unit dispersed under fire and even then it had not fled, but continued to fight man-to-man,
though in a disorganized fashion. The more combat missions the 99th flew, Davis argued,
the more aggressive it became. Davis testimony plus the report of G-3 bought more time
for the squadron and by January 1944 the 99th had so improved its capabilities that the
original Momyer report was shelved and no action was taken. In January 1944, the 99th
(now attached to the 79th Fighter Group) scored well over Anzio. On the 27th of January,
15 of the Tuskegee airmen engaged more than 16 FW-190s, destroying six and damaging
four. Later in the day, the unit added three more kills.48

At the end of the month, the 332d Group began to arrive and Davis became its
commander. In July, the Group received the P-51 for long range escort duty and on the
18th they shot down 11 aircraft. On 24 March 1945, the 332d flew a 1,600-mile round trip
to Berlin on escort duty, bagging three German jet fighters. Their record on escort duty
remained unparalleled. They never lost an American bomber to enemy aircraft. During its
combat career, the 332d was awarded several unit combat decorations.49
Though the 99th and 332d had problems, they did win a measure of glory. Their
difficulties, however, were minimal when contrasted with the obstacles confronting the
newly activated 477th Bombardment Group (Medium). Arnold tried to abort this unit
before it was born and the group never entered into battle, although it had been in
existence sufficient time to have fought. Its history constitutes a significant chapter in U.S.
military race relations and, far more important, demonstrates vividly the racial attitudes of
the AAF leadership.
The 477th Bombardment Group (M) (Colored)
Because bomber squadrons required many more crew-members than fighter units,
the 477th was confronted with severe manning problems. By 1943 there were 199,637
blacks in the AAF,50 a number that was insufficient to man rapidly a 4-squadron B-25
group and continue to supply personnel replacements to the 332d. The Air Corps could not
locate qualified blacks in sufficient numbers with the same aptitudes as whites to man the
ground support or flying organizations. For pilot and navigator training, therefore, as well
as for ground technical training, the AAF was required to accept blacks with significantly
lower aptitude scores. Negro candidates for pilot, navigator, and bombardier training could
enter with an aptitude score of four or less on a 9-point scale, while whites were required a
score of seven.61 But lowering the aptitude requirements for Negro units ultimately
proved harmful. If aptitude testing had any validity, and the Air Corps had made a science
of testing,62 then one must assume that Negro flying units had to be below the proficiency
level of the white units. The 477th Bombardment Group was activated on 15 January 1944
without a backlog of trained personnel and was doomed from the outset. Up to this time,
the AAF had never had Negro navigators and bombardiers. Consequently, it became
necessary to establish either a completely separate navigator and bombardier facility like
Tuskegee or to maintain ad hoc segregation at an established navigator and bombardier
school. The latter solution was adopted.53 In the autumn of 1943 it was decided that
creation of such a bombardment group was feasible. Col. Robert R. Selway, Jr., a 1924
graduate of West Point, was designated its commander. He was selected to lead the 477th
Bombardment Group (M) (Colored).54
Selway began to form the unit in mid-January 1944 at Selfridge Field, Mich. White
supervisory personnel were drawn from the combat theaters as well as from stateside
units. Blacks came from Tuskegee and the combat theaters. By mid-February there were
200 men in the group, including the first contingent of Negro enlisted technicians. Its
personnel strength increased slowly because only Tuskegee could train Negro pilots and
the Alabama complex also furnished replacements for the 332d in Italy. By 5 May, 175
officers were assigned to 477th out of an authorized strength of 290. There remained,
however, an acute shortage of navigators and bombardiers.55
On the same day, the 477th - without advance notice - was ordered to board trains
and moved to Godman Field, Ky., adjoining Fort Knox. The official unit history states that
the move was made to take advantage of better atmospheric conditions for flying and
that the housing and maintenance facilities at Godman were adequate.56 A more
plausible explanation for the move appears to have been an attempt to disassociate the
men from racial agitators in Detroit. Selfridge had four times the hangar space as
Godman Field, seven times the acreage, more and longer runways, five times the gasoline
capacity, and better flying weather. Godman could not house the entire group because of
insufficient hangar or apron space and its runways had deteriorated and could not handle
bombers. Godman Field also lacked an air-to-ground gunnery range.57 The Negro press
objected to the move and was particularly vocal about sending the men into the South.58

Although the 477th was authorized 128 navigators and navigator-bombardiers, by

14 October9 months after the units creationonly 23 had arrived. By the same date,
only half of the authorized 176 pilots had been assigned. They flew repeated routine
proficiency missions but undertook no combat crew training. Theirs was an unusually safe
flying unit. The first aircraft accident, a landing mishap during a squall, came after the
14,000 flying hour mark. Twice Maj. Gen. Frank O.D. Hunter, First Air Force
Commander, commended the unit for its exceptionally low accident rate. 59
Between mid-October 1944 and mid-January 1945, 84 new bombardiers and 60
new pilots arrived, but not all bombardiers had received formal navigator training. This
had to be accomplished before they could perform as navigator-bombardiers. At the end of
1944, navigation training continued apace and the 477th had enough qualified specialists
to undertake combat crew training. But as the winter weather closed in, flyable hours at
Godman were reduced to 40 percent of normal, because of low ceilings, icing and
increased smoke. Yet, the flying performance of the group was impressive. In its first
year the 477th flew 17,875 hours with two minor accidents, neither of which was
attributable to crew error.60
The AAF attempted to solve the problem of Godmans inadequate facilities with
another move of the unit to Freeman Field, near the town of Seymour in southern Indiana
in March 1945.
This move disrupted training and precipitated severe morale problems. Fort Knox
was a better location because it had a sizable civilian Negro population nearby, but the
town of Seymour lacked this advantage and, according to the unit historian, most of its
residents would not accept or intermingle with the colored troops socially or in their
daily business. Some local grocery stores refused to sell their groceries to wives of
colored officers and restaurant owners also refused service.61
The Freeman Field Mutiny
More significant was the mutiny which occurred in April 1945. The official unit
history remains silent about the causes of the revolt. A sudden interruption of progress in
the training program occurred on the 24th of April when sudden orders to return to
Godman were received.62 Godman, which was notorious for its lack of space and
inadequate flying facilities, could not accommodate all of the groups aircraft and a
number of airplanes had to be left at Freeman. Only gradually did the 477th recover from
the latest move and between mid-April and mid-July 1945 the group experienced five
accidents with 11 fatalities. The unit lost all of its effectiveness, and did not become
combat ready before the wars end, because its combat training was subordinated to the
question of who could enter the base officers club. The Negro officers viewed the return
to Godman as proof that the AAF would sacrifice training to maintain segregation. The
Negro officers of the 477th claimed the right to enter any officers club. The white
hierarchy, however - particularly Colonel Selway and General Hunter - refused to permit
blacks to use club facilities reserved for white personnel.
Hunters views were clearly established and perhaps knowledge of his stand
helped to provoke the mutiny and other altercations. He wrote in December 1944:
Racial friction will exist in a marked degree if colored and white pilots are trained
together . It is considered more consistent with the war aims to procure maximum
efficiency in white combat crew training and handle the Negro problem to the best of our
ability, on as a few bases as it may be concentrated, [than] to lower the quality of combat
training on all bases in an effort to appease certain agitators. The doctrine of social
equality cannot be forced on a spirited young pilot preparing for combat.63
 Earlier in 1943, Hunter had created a storm over a segregated officers club, at
Selfridge AAF, Mich. He had ordered that the single officers club on the base be used
solely by whites and declared that blacks would have to wait until one was built for them.
Offended by this announcement, many Negro officers entered the club and were arrested.
Much to Hunters chagrin, the incident led to an official reprimand for Col. William Boyd,
the bases white commander. Hunter then called Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, Chief of Air
Staff, Headquarters, USAAF in Washington to ask that the reprimand be aimed at himself
for ordering the desegregation.64 When forced later to endorse the reprimand, Hunter
tried to mitigate its intent by stating that Boyd had simply carried out orders. But this
embarrassed the AAF headquarters, as Giles told Hunters chief of staff when he called to
tell him that the reprimand could contain no such mitigating comments. Giles also
apologized for the mess that Hunter and Boyd were in, stating that he had condoned
segregation and backed them 100% on this thing.65 A few days later, Giles informed
Hunter that I told Gen. Arnold how you felt about it, that you didnt want anybody in
your command taking the rap for something you condoned. He also told Hunter that
Arnold had been sympathetic: I told General Arnold that we wouldnt let them join the
club and he approved.66
The reprimand given to Boyd was sharply worded:
1. Investigation by the Office of the Inspector General has disclosed that racial
discrimination against colored officers was due to your conduct in denying to colored
officers the right to use the Officers Club . Such action is in violation of Army
Regulations and explicit War Department instructions on this subject.
2. As a commissioned officer of the Regular Army of many years standing you
must have had knowledge that your conduct in this respect was highly improper. Not only
does your conduct indicate a lack of good judgment, but it also tends to bring criticism
upon the military service
3. You are hereby formally reprimanded and admonished that any future action on
your part will result in your being subjected to the severe penalties prescribed by the
Articles of War .67
The reprimand of Boyd demonstrates that Hunter was not a free agent in dealing
with blacks in his command, but he persisted. The following May 1944, Hunter called
Brigadier General Harper at the Pentagon to find out if orders were going to be issued that
the colored and white will be on 100% equal footing socially? He was told not at all.
There will be no orders on it. Hunter replied: Well now, by golly, thats what theyre
raising all this hell about at Selfridge. But he was assured that the dispute at Selfridge
was over a lack of equal facilities, that segregation was not the issue. Hunter, however,
knew differently. He demanded issuance of explicit orders for the War Department
authorizing separate clubs, and the right to handle any disturbances without interference
from the Pentagon. He was told to make sure he provided equal facilities, for if he did
that, he would have complied with what the War Department had in mind.68
But the latter statement was in error because since December 1940 Army
Regulation 210-10 had outlawed segregated officers clubs. It stated:
no officer clubs, messes, or similar organization of officers will be permitted by
the post commander to occupy any part of any public building unless such club, mess,
or other organization extends to all officers on the post the right to full membership .69
The blacks cited the regulation as their justification for protesting segregation at
Selfridge and later at Freeman.
Hunter was aware that blacks hated segregation, but his prejudices were too fixed
to have that fact alter his attitude. Also, some officers in the Pentagon continued to labor
under the false impression that blacks favored segregation so long as Negro facilities were
equal. Here again War Department literature clearly disputed this thinking. War
Department Pamphlet 20-6, Command of Negro Troops, issued in February 1944,
maintained that the:
idea of racial segregation is disliked by almost all Negroes and downright hated
by most. White people and Negro fail to have a common understanding of the meaning
of segregation . The protesting Negro knows from experience that separate facilities
are rarely equal, and that too often racial segregation rests on a belief in racial
inferiority.70
The issue of segregated officers clubs, however, was only one cause of the 1945
mutiny. Negro airmen also had other grievances which ignited their anger. For example,
they found themselves caught up in a white promotion mill. Thus no black could outrank a
white. When a white was promoted out of a job, another took his place. This notion
prevailed that no black, no matter how competent, could perform assigned duties better
than any white man no matter how incompetent.71 Added to the endless and frustrating
manning problems, inadequate flight facilities, disruptive unit moves, and the
discouraging promotion policy was a segregated officers club structure. The combination
finally produced an explosive situation.
Godman officials sought to avoid the problem by having whites join the all-white
officers club at Fort Knox, leaving the Godman club all black. Since Fort Knox could
extend membership to whomever it wished, and since no Negro officers were assigned to
Fort Knox it was suggested that there were no grounds for Negro complaints.72 Colonel
Selway notified the blacks before the move to Freeman Field that there would be two
separate (but equal) officers clubs. Race was supposedly not involved: one club was for
supervisors and the other for trainees.73 But all supervisors were white and all trainees
black.
As blacks arrived at Freeman, they protested the violation of Army Regulation
210-10. On 10 March 1945, Selway called Hunter and told him he was going to close the
club at Freeman until he was assured that his orders were legal. Hunter asked What
club? Selway said, the one that belongs to the white officers. Hunter disagreed: Oh
no, I wouldnt do that. As far as Im concerned if youve gotten out orders assigning one
club to the OTU [Officers Training Unit] Group and one club to the permanent party
personnel, and dont say anything about color, race, or creed youve complied with my
orders. Id be delighted for them to commit enough actions that way so I can court-
martial some of them. The issue was clear to Colonel Selway: the blacks were demanding
social equality and he was not going to grant it. He concluded the conversation by
informing Hunter that spies within the Negro units were keeping him informed.74
Following this and similar discussions, General Hunters intelligence section sent a
white agent to Freeman to evaluate the situation. His 31 March report was alarming:
The primary location of discontent and most likely location of any possible
uprising is at the Freeman Air Base. The colored officers and colored enlisted men located
there are in the majority thus giving them the psychological feeling of superiority over the
white personnel, and the white personnel resent said attitude.
Some whites made disgruntled remarks in the presence of blacks, but all those
put in the report had been made at the white officers club. They included, for example,
the following remarks:
c. If one of them makes a crack at my wife, laughs or whistles at her, like I saw
them do to some white girls downtown, so help me, Ill kill him.
d. I killed two of them in my home town, and it wouldnt bother me to do it
again.
e. I went to the show on this base my first and last time because Im afraid Ill get
into trouble some night when they start making remarks about the white actors and
actresses: besides that, the smell in the show is terrible.
h. Their club is better than ours. Why dont they stay in their place.
i. That isnt just what they are looking for. What they want to do is stand at the
same bar with you, and be able to talk with your wife. They are insisting on equality.
75
The Negro press was also alert to the crisis. The Indianapolis Recorder reported on
17 March 1945 that the men were incensed at segregation at Freeman and the
officers were staging an organized protest by boycotting Jim Crow facilities .76 A
Pittsburgh Courier headline read: Bombardiers disgusted at Freeman Field Bias. The
newspaper reported that the blacks had been threatened with severe penalties if they did
not obey segregation rulings. It cited paragraph 19 of Army Regulation 210-10 as the basis
for the Negro complaint.77
 On 5 April the first major events of the mutiny occurred. On that day 100 officers
arrived at Freeman Field from Godman to begin their combat crew training. Selway was
told that these new officers were planning to descend in groups upon the white officers
club, and he ordered the Provost Marshal to exclude any trainee personnel under penalty
of arrest. At 9:15 p.m. four Negro officers tried to enter. On being told they could not,
they left without incident. A half hour later 19 Negro officers attempted to enter the club
and were blocked by the Provost Marshal, standing with outstretched arms. Two officers
forcibly pushed the Provost Marshal through the doorway. One was heard to remark:
Well, let me go in and get arrested. All 19 entered, had their names taken, were arrested,
and confined to quarters. Less than a half hour later three more blacks tried to enter and
were sent away. Then minutes later, another group of 14 gained entry and were arrested.
The incidents continued until the club was closed for the night.78 Three blacks of the 61
arrested actually used force to enter. Only they were tried some months later.79
When Hunter learned of these actions, he called the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff,
Brig. Gen. Ray L. Owens, in Washington. He reported that out at Freeman Field a
bunch of these colored officers forced their way into the white officers club. Selway
has got them in arrest. Hunter told Owens that he had received permission from the Air
Staff to establish separate clubs. Owens replied: They cant claim discrimination on that,
one officers club is student and the other is permanent.80 But most of the phone
conversation between the two officers, however, referred to the club as white. Their failure
to use the word supervisors was more than a question of semantics.81
The following 2 days Negro officers again entered the club and were also arrested.
On 7 April the Judge Advocate advised Selway to release all of the arrested officers, with
the exception of the three who had forced their way into the club. Selway complied but
closed the club to prevent further disorders. On 9 April Selway issued a new regulation
designating particular facilities for each group, without citing race. All officers in the
477th were listed as trainees, except those who were specifically designated as Command
or Supervisory or Instructor personnel. The regulation also stated that all members of the
two housekeeping squadronsE and C specificallywere also trainees. There were
few officers in these units and only two other Negro officers on the post: a doctor and
chaplain. Had nontrainee Negro officers been allowed membership in the club, such an
action might have taken the wind out of the mutinous sail. The First Air Force Inspector
General reported that there is a group of approximately 20 Negro officers at Freeman
Field who are not assigned either to the 477th Bombardment Group or the CCTS [Combat
Crew Training Squadron] and hence are not trainees per se. This is important
because of the allocation of club facilities as between trainees and base personnel. The
inspector noted that the blacks labeled Selways justification for segregation a
subterfuge.82
Appended to the main body of Selways 9 April regulation was a statement that
read: I certify that I have read and fully understand the above order. On that and the
following day, at Hunters insistence, this regulation was read and explained to all base
personnel. All whites and most blacks signed, but practically all officers of the CCTS
refused. Selway commanded them to sign, but more than 100 refused to do so. A day
later, they were read the 64th Article of War, the willful disobedience article, and were
given another opportunity to sign. But 101 Negro officers still refused, and were arrested.
On 13 April, they were sent to Godman under arrest. Selway again opened the white club
only to learn from informants that approximately 100% of the Negro officer personnel
were about to present themselves en masse at the club . He immediately closed the
club. Throughout the night roving patrols of Negro officers passed by the club to see if it
was open. Selway came upon groups of up to 50 blacks as he toured the base and, while
he found them entirely orderly in their conduct, they were also surly and
uncommunicative.83
Throughout these days, Hunter was in daily contact with Pentagon officials. Maj.
Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, expressed sympathy for Hunters
situation and suggested that the First Air Force commander apply his supervisor/trainee
separation to his entire First Air Force. This Hunter refused to do. Still, Kuter found
Hunters separation legal and completely supportable.84

General Hunters unwillingness to apply his regulation to all bases under his
command made clear his desire to segregate by race rather than by function. Yet Inspector
General correspondence to the Secretary of War showed that functional separation was
stubbornly maintained as Hunters only goal. The inspector claimed that Hunter and
Selway had deemed it desirable to provide separate club facilities for officers belonging
to units of the permanent garrison and officers of units undergoing training at the
station.85 This same inspector agreed with Hunter when he labeled Negro intransigence a
conspiracy to revolt.86
The blacks, however, were not alone in this affair. By 11 April, Truman Gibson
and the McCloy Committee sought information on the Freeman problem.8? Also on the
same day, the NAACP sent a telegram to President Roosevelt to complain that the
Freeman Field situation was having a negative effect upon civilian and soldier morale
among Negro Americans. They were especially critical of the wholesale arrests.88
It was against this background that Hunter called upon the Army Air Forces Judge
Advocate, Brig. Gen. L. H. Hedrick, for advice. General Hunter now based his defense on
War Department Pamphlet 20-6, which seemed to authorize commanders to segregate.
This pamphlet stated that racial segregation was favored by a majority of white soldiers
and that this mass sentiment cannot be ignored. It also held that local commanders had
the option to determine if there need be some separation in the use of camp facilities
with the assumption that local conditions [would] be taken into account. Hedrick assured
Hunter that the defense of the arrested blacks, based upon Army Regulation 210-10, was
not a good defense. Hunter replied that he had orders from a three star general in the
Army Air Forces to segregate, but that he now desired a legal ruling to substantiate his
actions. Hedrick then responded: So far as my opinion goes, youve got it right now,
man, I think youre absolutely correct, and I think you were told it was correct. Hunter
reminded the chief lawyer of the AAF that he had been assured similarly the previous
year, and the end result had been a reprimand for his people.89 Hedrick thereupon sent
Hunter a written opinion which stated that:
Paragraph 19, AR 210-10, 20 December 1940, is not interpreted as a requirement
that all officers on a base be permitted the use of all clubs. It is the view of this officer that
this regulation was designed to insure every officer the right to membership in an officers
club; but does not prohibit a reasonable division of club facilities where circumstances
make such division necessary or desirable from a practical, disciplinary, or morale
standpoint. It should also be noted that this paragraph imposes a restriction upon post
commanders restricting the use of public buildings but does not extend a right to the
individual officers BY COMMAND OF GENERAL ARNOLD 90
On 17 April, the Chicago Urban League requested Congressman William A.
Rowan (Dem. 111.) to investigate the problems at Freeman Field. The League called his
attention to the unit promotion policy which denied all blacks command responsibility,
while insuring in some cases that noncombat veteran whites were promoted to command
positions over combat veteran blacks.91 Two days later, Walter White, Executive
Secretary of the NAACP, sent a lengthy detailed letter to Stimson, summarizing the
history of the 477th and calling the Secretarys attention to the fact that Selway had even
designated a Negro doctor as a trainee.92
Pressure upon Congress and from organizations such as the NAACP must have
had an effect. On 20 April, General Owens called Hunter to tell him that General Marshall
had approved a plan to release the Freeman officers and to drop all charges against them.
Hunter, however, cut Owens off in mid-sentence: Are those orders to me? They cant
issue orders like that, they havent the authority. Owens agreed: I know they cant He
also told Hunter that the officers in question were to receive no more penalty than an
administrative reprimand instead of a trial. Hunter replied: They cant do that. I
cannot command under those circumstances . I have court-martial jurisdiction, and they
cannot tell me whom I can try and whom I cant . Theyre backing water. Owens
agreed to that too.93 Not only had Marshall ordered the release of the nonsigners, but he
had decided to try only the three officers who had been arrested for using force to enter the
club.94
General Owens, in a later conversation with Hunters Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen.
Edward E. Glenn, expressed his view of air staff support for Hunter. He said that General
Arnold told him to report to Hunter that we are perfectly pleased and happy and satisfied
with his actions. He continued: [The] Chief here feels that his action in the past was
perfectly alright [sic] legitimate, satisfied with it, and if another event were to come up, he
hopes he will handle it in the same manner. Glenn, however, could not accept all of these
statements. If Arnold was pleased with Hunter and satisfied with his actions, why had
Hunter lost court-martial authority? Owens told Glenn that until the McCloy Committee
completed its investigation, Arnolds hands were tied. Glenn asked if McCloy was black
and Owens answered that McCloy was not, but he has one on his staff.95

The McCloy Committee Recommendations

As noted earlier, the McCloy Committee on Special Troop Policies was set up in
August 1942 to serve as a clearing house for staff ideas on the employment of Negro
troops, and partly as a consultation board for civilian ideas on Negro troops. Assistant
Secretary of War McCloy was chairman, and Brig. Gen. B. 0. Davis, Sr., was a committee
member. William Hasties successor, Truman Gibson, was also a member of the group.96
There were, therefore, two blacks on this committee. Also on the committee was Brig.
Gen. Idwal Edwards, who later helped integrate the Air Force in the late 1940s.
The McCloy Committee became deeply involved in the Freeman mutiny. On 5
May 1945, it received a summary sheet that outlined the position of the Air Corps
regarding the situation there. This summary abandoned the pretense of separate facilities
for trainees and supervisors and linked Hunters defense to War Department Pamphlet 20-
6, which, the summary alleged, permitted commanders to racially segregate facilities:
Negro officers at Freeman Field have questioned the right of a post commander
to establish separate officers clubs or mess facilities which operate to deny them the full
use of such facilities. Freeman Field had separate and essentially equal club and mess
facilities and the Commander issued orders which in effect restricted Negro officers from
using the facilities assigned to white officers.97
The summary noted that the blacks argued that segregation was in violation of
Army Regulation 210-10, but it pointed out that War Department Pamphlet 20-6 seemed
to establish other guidelines, and the Inspector General recommends that the
provisions of paragraph 19, AR 210-10 be modified to incorporate the instructions in
War Department Pamphlet 206. The summary quoted other major element commanders,
all of whom supported racial segregation.98
Truman Gibson condemned the summary as well as the report of the Inspector
General. He declared that Hunters and Selways policies were clearly racial and he
ridiculed other practical considerations, such as size of clubs, status of personnel, and the
desire to maintain separate social facilities particularly when the sexes were concerned.
Gibson used the inspectors own lengthy testimony to label the summary report and the
actions at Freeman a fabric of deception and subterfuge. He was especially disturbed
with the inspector.99 The committees reaction was in line with Gibsons findings.
On 18 May, the committee published its report. Selway, it held, had acted within
his administrative police powers in arresting the blacks, but his other actions were in
conflict with Army regulations. McCloys staff recommended a change in War
Department Pamphlet 20-6 to remove any ambiguities concerning segregation, adding to it
the specific ban on segregated clubs in Army Regulation 210-10.100 Later that month,
McCloy sent a memorandum to Stimson, disputing all claims of the inspector, Selway, and
Hunter, and declaring that Selways actions were not in accord with existing Army
regulations. McCloy also recommended that the inspectors report be returned with the
request that the non-concurrence with Army regulations and War department policies be
brought to the attention of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for appropriate
action.101
The Air Corps disliked these decisions. General Owens, in a letter to McCloy,
argued that segregated officers clubs should be maintained. It is believed that the Army
should follow the usages and customs of the country it has not been the custom for
whites and Negros [sic] to intermingle socially in homes or clubs .102 General Giles
wrote a similar letter, recommending separate and similar, but not reciprocal club
facilities, be made available to white and Negro officers . He added:
It is believed that the greatest over-all harmony between the white and Negro races
will be maintained within the Army if the Army follows as closely as practicable the
usages and social customs which prevail in this country with respect to recreational
facilities . Civilian social clubs of a similar nature are not customarily operated on the
basis of social intercourse between whites and Negroes.103
No longer was there an argument for maintaining separate clubs for trainees and
supervisors; now Hunters defense was simply the need to segregate socially the races,
which had been the case all along. But McCloy was unimpressed with these arguments.
Separate but equal officers clubs would be a step back from the position taken by the War
Department in the Selfridge Field case, McCloy argued, and a reversal of this position
would make the position taken in the Selfridge case untenable. He could not believe that
the Army Air Forces should return to a policy of separate but equal facilities for white
and Negro personnel.104 Following the McCloy decisions, only the trial of the Freeman
Field three awaited resolution.
The defendants were represented by Theodore M. Berry, President of the
Cincinnati Branch of the NAACP.105 All were tried for violation of Article of War 64,
which carried a maximum penalty of death.106 Although the original intent of the Air
Corps was to try all blacks who had attempted to enter the club and who had refused to
sign the club regulation, only Lts. Roger C. Terry, Marsden A. Thompson, and Shirley R.
Clinton were brought to trial.107 The governments case collapsed quickly, because
Selway would not admit that his order contained any provision which barred blacks from
the club. Two defense witnesses testified that the club officer, Major White, said that
colored officers were not allowed to enter the club whether they were base personnel or
not. Terry testified that he was not a trainee, but an officer in the 18th Air Base Unit and
entitled to use the club.108
In the end, Thompson and Clinton were found innocent, primarily because they
also were base officers. The court found that Selways orders had violated Army
Regulation 210-10, which had been introduced as evidence over the objections of the
prosecution.109 Terry, however, was found guilty of shoving a provost marshal and was
fined $150. His was the only conviction. Hunter had to endorse the punishment. He wrote
that the sentence, although grossly inadequate, is approved and will be duly
executed.110 And this final statement closed the file on the Freeman mutiny.
In late May 1945 General Arnold replaced all white officers in the 477th with
blacks, commanded by Col. Benjamin Davis, Jr.111 The change in command was
headlined and covered in depth by major Negro newspapers.112 Plans, furthermore, were
drawn up in May to send the 477th to the Pacific.113 Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCAFPAC), was willing to accept
the blacks but his air force commander, Gen. George C. Kenney, was not. In spite of
Kenneys objection, Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker continued to prepare the 477th for combat. He
had great faith in Colonel Davis ability to raise the group to combat status.114 Kenney
objected, stating his belief that it would be a serious mistake to send Negro air combat
units to this theater. In the end we would be subject to much criticism by having them
operate under necessary restrictions than to have them remain in the U.S.115 He had
intended to segregate the 477th and he therefore anticipated criticism.
To hasten the 477th preparation for combat, two of its four bomb squadrons were
disbanded to improve the trained manpower pool. In addition two experienced fighter
squadrons were attached to the group, thus creating the 477th Composite Group.i16 A
First Air Force inspection team reported that morale was very high and the unit would be
ready to go overseas on schedule.117 Termination of war in August 1945, however,
prevented the 477th from engaging the Japanese in combat. At wars end, the Air Corps
decided to leave the 477th at Godman Field.
Discrimination did not diminish with the arrival of Colonel Davis nor with the
coming of peace. Davis requested housing quarters at Fort Knox for some of his officer
personnel because of crowding at Godman. He knew that Selway had previously been
granted the same courtesy for his white officers. But the post commander at Fort Knox
called First Air Force headquarters to complain:
I dont know whether you are familiar with Fort Knox or not, but this is an old
cavalry post, we have four General Officers living here by God, they just dont want a
bunch of coons moving in next door to them.
He also said that he had a frank, confidential talk with General Eaker, who could
not understand why the Army Air Forces were entitled to any quarters at your post.118
Thus, Negro airmen would continue to encounter racial problems into the postwar years.
 Chapter II
MARKING TIME
Air Force blacks benefited little from official policies between 1945 and 1949. The
477th served first at Godman Field and later at Lockbourne AFB near Columbus, Ohio,
but it was chronically undermanned and therefore not too efficient. Political realities
required the Air Force to retain the Group and would not permit its dissolution despite its
condition. Whatever else might be said about the 477th, however, it did provide a measure
of prestige and security to several hundred officers and a large number of enlisted men.
Some of these men, especially the officers, had to think twice before leaving the shelter of
an all-Negro unit.
Although the 477th and 332d had not participated in a race riot in the postwar era
(their lot was a comparatively happy one), other Negro units became mutinous.
Continuing a trend that began during World War II, several Negro AAF organizations
resorted to violence and captured the attention of the AAF leadership. The largest of these
riots occurred at MacDill Army Air Field near Tampa, Fla., in late 1946. In damage done
and numbers participating, it was probably the largest riot the Air Force ever experienced,
except for a riot at Travis AFB, Calif., a quarter of a century later. The MacDill riot led to
little more than palliatives being offered the men to correct the immediate situation. These
included efforts to improve their facilities, ease crowded conditions on base, and limited
punishment of the trouble makers.
The Travis riot, on the other hand, led to a complete restructuring of the Air Force
race relations program, the difference being the temper of the times. In 1946, AAF
officials blamed Communist agitation for the unrest and made only cosmetic changes at
MacDill, leaving most of the real grievances untouched. In 1971, however, the Air Force
was more open to meaningful change. Most of its officials had been educated to the
rhythm and consequences of Negro protest.
There was a brief flowering of social awareness in the immediate postwar era
when a board of four generals, chaired by Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, recommended limited
racial integration immediately and a conscious longer range program aimed at making full
use of Americas blacks. The boards recommendations, however, were ignored.
Nevertheless, the very fact that the board recommended steps to integrate the service
demonstrates that not all of the military leaders were racially insensitive.
The Army Studies the Postwar Role of Negro Troops
In fact, there had been social growth in the Army. Recalling the 1925 War College
study which lamented the limited usefulness of the Negro American with his smaller
cranium, lighter brain, cowardly and immoral character, one might find refreshing a 1945
study of the subject, titled: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military
Establishment.1 This investigation was truly monumental compared to the earlier efforts.
It was the first massive attempt to answer the question of how to employ blacks properly
in the Army. Unlike previous studies of the subject, the Army compiled empirical data and
sought facts, not opinion. Of course, it discovered biased opinions, but it also gained clear
insights. This flawed Army attempt to measure qualitatively the value of blacks in the
military reflected the impact of social environmentalists upon the American mind.
 That is to say, Negro potential was seen as handicapped by the deprived Negro
past.
The study had its genesis with the McCloy Committee, as did many efforts that
affected Army blacks. In September 1944 McCloy sent a memorandum to the other
members of his Advisory Committee on Special Troop Policies. He wrote that the War
Department together with other government agencies has begun the study and preparation
of plans for the post-war period. Experience gained during the current war showed that
the Army was unprepared to deal with the large number of Negroes who entered the
service, despite the study of the problem during the interwar period by the General Staff,
Army War College and other military agencies. Whatever policy had been developed had
led to racial irritation. Racial problems, McCloy said, were caused by inadequate
preparation . This war has seen a greater proportionate participation of minority racial
groups in the Army than at any time in our history. This participation can be expected to
continue in the future . He directed the committee to work out a definite, workable
policy, before the final plans for the postwar military establishment had become
crystallized. He called upon the War Department General Staff to review its Negro
policies and to make recommendations based upon a study which will include all our
experiences during the present war, both in this country and abroad. The study should
begin immediately, so that the War Department would be in a position to effect any
necessary changes in policy which may result from a study either through the proposal of
proper legislation or other means. McCloy probably anticipated major changes as is
evidenced by his reference to legislation.2
Eight months later, the Army began to collect data on this subject. All-Negro units
and organizations with blacks in them were asked to compile a historic report on actual
experiences in training with particular reference to degree of proficiency attained and
length of training time required. Above all, an account of Negro performance was
desired. The War Department needed information on typical irritations or disorders
arising from racial conflicts. The statement was to cover irritations and disorders within
the Army itself and between Negro elements or individuals and civilians . This report
should include a careful appraisal of cause and effect. The War Department also desired
specific recommendations on future training and employment. The statement was to be
completed by 1 October 1945 and reporters were asked to be objective.
It should be borne in mind by all concerned in conducting the studies that the
objective sought is the factual determination of the most effective utilization of Negro
troops in the post-war military establishment. A positive approach is required for the
accomplishment of this objective. It is desired that studies requested herein be conducted
in such a manner as not to disturb existing arrangements for the training and utilization of
Negro personnel. All communications on the subject will be classified secret.3
Most of the studies found blacks useful as laborers and left little doubt that they
were to continue as laborers in the postwar period. In particular, Negro cooking skills were
frequently praised: They are best qualified as mess personnel. This statement is
confirmed by the fact that the colored mess is the best on this fieldboth from the
standpoint of the preparation of food and sanitationand is probably, at least equal to any
in the command. Blacks, however, were seen not as useful in occupational areas
requiring greater skills because of their low educational level. This was in addition to
the fact that as civilians they were rarely employed in occupations which required
initiative or a sense of responsibility. Because they had been denied opportunities both as
civilians and as military men, it was concluded that blacks did not possess a disciplined,
alert mind. Time and again, however, those interviewed in the I Troop Carrier Command
found that blacks did as well as whites in jobs for which they were qualified, i.e., for
which they had the aptitude and training.4
A Second Air Force report stated that white and Negro duty soldiers, truck drivers,
bakers and cooks were equally proficient, but that blacks did not perform as well in
administrative jobs.5 An attachment to the report noted that the educational and civilian
background of the average Negro soldier is inferior to the white soldier, and complained
that Negro difficulties were caused by environmental factors in their civilian background.6
Another attachment pointed out that if Negro personnel are compared with white
personnel who have the same education and AGCT test score, there is no noticeable
difference within the occupational specality.7
Third Air Force found that there were no jobs for which it can categorically be
stated that the race is not qualified. It is felt that with Negro personnel of equal
intelligence as white personnel in the army. Negro individuals and units could be
equally proficient as their white counterparts. It also found, on the other hand, that the
majority of blacks had very low aptitudes which lowered the overall proficiency of Negro
units. Racial irritations further undermined Negro unit morale, resulting in even lower
individual performance. Blacks suffered from poor off-base living conditions,
recreational facilities and transportation, all of which had an adverse effect upon the
efficiency of the more intelligent Negro personnel.8
Many unit historians, in preparing these studies, cited prejudice as a main cause for
low morale and therefore poor performance. Historians at Smoky Hill AAF, Kan.,
believed that Negro proficiency within any given specialty was equal and in a good many
cases higher than whites, and that no jobs were out of reach if blacks were given an
opportunity. They again reported that race prejudice caused blacks to lose initiative.9
Concern for Negro morale prompted a historian at Camp Pine-dale, Calif., to suggest that
blacks should never be a small minority on any base and that they would be most
efficient if stationed near Negro communities.10
Despite the recognition of environment as a factor in racial questions and a healthy
concern for minority morale, a new millenium had not dawned. The willingness of most
reporters to acknowledge environment as a factor in explaining poor Negro performance
was firmly positive, but few commentators, if any, deleted modifiers when describing
inferior black performance. The fact that blacks did not perform as a group as well as
whites was indisputable. The causes might have been significant to sociologists, but the
Army did not seek to reform society, only to use effectively societys product. Second Air
Force reported that of the 6,987 blacks in the command, 86.6 percent were in AGCT
classes IV and V, in contrast to only 30 percent of the whites. Blacks had qualified for 83
different job classifications; however, 91 percent of them were assigned to 12 job
categories and more than 75 percent of that group to only 5. 11
All of the above tasks were labeled unskilled or semi-skilled specialties. Blacks
additionally required more time to train than whites and had to be more closely
supervised. Blacks were largely unsuccessful as clerks, airplane and engine mechanics,
radio mechanics and in other skilled jobs. (Yet, all of these skilled specialties had been
performed by blacks at Tuskegee, Godman, and at the oversea bases housing the 332d
Wing.) Even if the authors admitted that environment made blacks less useful and
acknowledged that race prejudice was holding the blacks back, what then could the Army
do with people who were qualified mainly as laborers and lacked initiative and
judgment? The same authors who noted that environmental factors retarded blacks also
stressed that blacks lacked the necessary intelligence to absorb technical training.12
Higher headquarters might indeed be in a quandary over the garbled signals it was
receiving.
Another report open to subjective analysis was issued by the I Troop Carrier
Command. The compiler blamed the inadequate educational background possessed by
blacks for their lack of military progress, but he also cited their low intelligence level. He
reported that of 1,782 blacks in that command, 740 were duty soldiers (laborers), 180
cooks, and 531 drivers. Further, 1,651 of the 1,782 were categorized in unskilled or
semiskilled specialties, i.e., 41.5 percent of the blacks were duty soldiers in contrast to
only 5 percent of the whites, and 30.19 percent of the blacks were drivers while less than 2
percent of the whites were so employed. Five unskilled and semiskilled specialties
employed 85.4 percent of the blacks and only 14.7 percent of the whites.13
Not only were there ambiguities in the report, such as confusion over the meaning
of aptitude and intelligence, there were also contradictions between the field unit reports
and the summary statements, which further distorted the message. For example, the I
Troop Carrier Report condemned blacks for their lack of initiative in failing to achieve a
superior performance on the airplane washrack at Bergstrom AAF, Tex. Blacks had been
given an opportunity, but they displayed an incapacity to learn the job and many accidents
occurred. The base historian commented negatively about their low intelligence, ascribing
to it part of their failure.14 The report from Bergstrom AAF to I Troop Carrier Command,
however, revealed other causes for the apparent lack of success. The lieutenant who
supervised the washcrews knew that the blacks were characterized as lacking
responsibility and displaying a total indifference to the job. He also knew washing
airplanes was the dirtiest and meanest job on the base. Cleaning solvents irritated the
skin, particularly the ears, eyes, and feet. The men have wet feet from the time they start
work until they finish. Attempts were made through proper channels to secure rubber
boots for the men, but these attempts were unsuccessful.15 What was then interpreted by
headquarters as malingering was altogether explicable in the field.
Very rarely were blacks introduced to specialties that adhered more closely to the
Army Air Forces mission; yet, when blacks had a real mission, they met the challenge.
For example, Negro airmen were trained in the Air Cargo and Resupply field. At first,
enough blacks of sufficiently high aptitude could not be found to fill the ranks and entry
standards were lowered. Resupply managers, however, found the results encouraging.
They reported: Considering the relatively low level of AGCT scores and educational
achievements of the Negro personnel, minor miracles have been achieved in both training
and actual operations in the combat zone. Their morale was recorded as high, and the
accident rate was surprisingly low. The historian found blacks could absorb technical
training, and that, while whites might learn the material faster than blacks, they also did
not stand up as well as the latter under duress . The Negro has been capable of
absorbing complex technical training . Standards were the same for both races and
graduation requirements were not eased to accommodate the blacks. Considered as a
group, divorced from all social and economic considerations, Negro personnel do as well
on the whole as comparable white groups.16
Most of the AAF leadership, however, ignored such evidence. They looked instead
at the gross figures, at the low aptitude which they consistently confused with intelligence,
at the longer training time required, and at the fact that most of the Negroes were assigned
to unskilled specialties. Thus, the leadership concluded that blacks were not worth the
employment effort despite the sociological factors. Maj. Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Chief
of Staff, Continental Air Forces, summarized the theme of the reports cited above and
advised Gen. Arnold:
It is comparatively uneconomical to train colored units and individuals for combat
assignments requiring a very high degree of specialization. The length of time required for
training the 332d Fighter Group and the 477th Bombardment Group (M)and the
problems that attended that trainingclearly illustrate this basic fact. Accordingly, with
the anticipated increasing complexity of modern aircraft, and the adjuncts thereto, the
training of colored fighting units is not justified.
If it is anticipated that large numbers of Negroes will be called upon in another
time of war emergency for non-combat military duties, there should be available a
carefully selected, well-trained cadre of Negro soldiers upon which to build a rapid
expansion of Negro personnel .
Negro personnel, qualified for military occupational specialties which require a
high degree of skill or technical training should be selected by means of a rigorous
screening process and given thorough schooling in those specialties .
Negro personnel to be utilized in the intermediate groups of relatively skilled
assignments should be carefully selected and sent to special schools to remedy
inadequacies in their civilian background, as well as to train them in their military
occupational specialties.
Under existing conditions the great bulk of Negro personnel should be utilized in
relatively unskilled assignments for which they should receive thorough training, either in
the job or in schools.17
The First Air Force Report
Beyond the ambivalences, ambiguities, contradictions, and a cold-eyed manner of
interpreting data, some straightforward prejudice emerged. The most biased statement was
issued by First Air Force, the parent organization of the mutinous 477th. The report was
endorsed by General Hunter. He commented that the study had been carefully prepared
by those who have actually had the most intimate connection with the training of Negro
air organizations and it is believed that it is an honest and trustworthy document.18
The men Hunter assigned to study the Negro problem were Colonel Selway and his
staff.19 In his letter to Selway, Hunter blamed some of the racial problems on
organizations for the advancement of the colored race and the Negro press. These
groups, he said, agitated in an attempt to gain social positions in the Army which blacks
did not have in civilian life and which is contrary to the customs and social usages of the
country as a whole. Hunter complained that War Department policies made it
impossible to maintain the same discipline expected and demanded of white troops.
Hunter saw reverse discrimination. He declared that the morale of colored personnel has
received considerable consideration but the morale of white personnel has received little,
if any . He wrote that the morale of the great bulk of the personnel must receive
serious consideration even at the expense of a minority group. Segregation, he believed,
furthermore, had to be maintained to prevent forced intermingling of whites and colored
on a basis of social equality. 20
The First Air Force report is an interesting document. Nowhere within the report,
unlike most others in this series, were the authors identified by name or position.
Reviewers throughout the chain of command were not informed that these men had lost
command of the group because they had helped to provoke a mutiny. Selway began his
account by describing the blacks in the unit as the cream of their race. Hence a lack of
intelligence or education cannot be considered as a factor responsible for lack of
qualification or failure in performance. Blacks were as intelligent and as well-educated as
men in comparable white units, he alleged and, therefore, they should have completed
training within the same period of time as white units undergoing the same training. But
according to Selway, such was not the case. He wrote that in reality, with highly selected
white officers and enlisted men for Command, Supervision, Instruction and Inspection, it
will normally take from two to three times as long to train Negro enlisted men and officers
to do a passable job, as it would take for white enlisted men and officers with an
equivalent educational background. This argument was specious. The fact was that the
477th, the unit with which Selway had the most command experience, had spent its first
year awaiting the assignment of navigators. Despite this fact, Selway condemned the unit
for not becoming combat-ready in the 3 months it normally took a B-25 group to achieve
combat status. The reasons Selway gave for the delay were that blacks lacked initiative,
had looked to the white race for generations for guidance, and could not do even routine
tasks without supervision.21
Selway believed that blacks lacked desire to go to combat. As evidence, he cited
a May 1945 survey of the group which revealed that over 90 percent of all enlisted men
indicated a desire to be relieved from the Army without delay. Approximately 79 percent
of all colored officers in this organization indicated the same desire. This situation was
not surprising, considering the fact that Selway was still in command, with many Negro
officers under arrest and morale low. Selway complained about the low morale, lack of
discipline, and high venereal disease rate among the blacks, as well as about the large
numbers of Negro airmen absent without leave. All these factors, Selway believed,
indicated an inherent and instinctive lack of pride or a sense of duty among them.22
Time and again Selway criticized his troops. He charged:
A great number of Negro soldiers are either willful malingerers or chronic
neurotics . Negro personnel lack the intellectual curiosity which is the driving force
necessary to obtain mastery of a problem . Negroes as a class are not ready to assume
positions of responsibility and leadership .23
He therefore recommended:
That there be no Negro flying units in the Post War Army Air Forces, because
a. Proficiency attained is barely satisfactory.
b. Training time is three times as long as for a white unit.
c. Performance within the United States is satisfactory only under white command
and supervision due to the lack of leadership and reliability of Negro personnel.24
Selway suggested other uses for blacks in the new era. He thought there should be
a small detachment of Negro enlisted men on stations (where required), to perform base
duties normal to the individuals civilian occupation. These detachments, he believed,
[should] be commanded and staffed by white officers only.25 Selways
recommendation, however, ignored the outstanding safety record of the 477th as well as
their practice bombing skill. He also ignored the manning problems that had plagued the
unit. Indeed, it was piecemeal manning, not Negro incapacity, that in fact ruined the
477th.26
 Summary Report for General Arnold
The task of evaluating and digesting Selways report was assigned to Lt. Col.
Louis Nippert, a Headquarters AAF staff officer assigned to the Postwar Planning Branch.
On 17 September 1945, after reading Selways report, along with other studies previously
mentioned and data received from oversea units, he prepared a summary of the ambiguous
and contradictory data for General Arnold. Nippert wrote that enlisted blacks had been
generally accepted for specialist training on the same basis as white troops except that
Negro aviation cadets were accepted with a lower stanine (aptitude) score in order to
secure sufficient candidates to meet Negro pilot requirements. He noted that training time
was the same for blacks as for white pilots, and the proficiency attained compared to
whites, but that the elimination rate and accident rate was higher for Negroes than for
whites.27 Admitting comparable proficiency levels between Tuskegee graduates and
others, Nippert drew comparisons between Negro flying units and similar white
organizations. He reported that the training time for Negro units was considerably longer
than for white units.28 He said that Negro airmen performed creditably , that blacks
in technical schools with AGCT scores similar to those of whites in the same schools had
the same training time, and that their proficiency was equal.29
In a lengthy discussion of the data, Nippert judged that aptitude scores had been
lowered beyond what was justifiable in order to obtain any number of Negro pilot
trainees. In some instances it was necessary to accept candidates with stanine (aptitude)
scores as low as 2 in order to meet the pilot requirements. Even though the AAF had
accepted blacks in this low category, the service still fell short of the desired number.
Nippert concluded that as an individual, compared with white pilots of the same stanine,
the Negro attained the same degree of proficiency within the training time . Given
proper selection of personnel and training, there is no evidence that the Negro cannot do a
satisfactory specialized job whether administrative or technical. Nippert found when
comparing training time for whites and blacks plotted against AGCT scoresthat
blacks did as well as whites at the same AGCT level.30
Nippert, however, probably because of the contradictory and largely negative data,
could not avoid generalizations. He wrote that Negro officers were below average in
common sense, practical imagination, resourcefulness, aggressiveness, sense of
responsibility, and in their ability to make decisions. They are prone to accept lower
standards and to make allowances for misbehavior . Enlisted men were not as
satisfactory as whites They were not dependable; they were careless about equipment;
they were below average and not industrious; they were race conscious and considered
discrimination as the reason for routine orders and assignment of duties. The feeling of
being discriminated against is considered the great shortcoming of Negro soldiers.31
This last point received much attention in Nipperts report. Northern blacks, he
noted, were unwilling to accept restraints imposed upon them by southern civilian
communities. Blacks reacted negatively to the social segregation which such restraints
implied. The majority of the complaints concerning segregation came from northern
Negroes or were inspired by Negroes from northern cities. Friction occurred because
blacks insisted on a strict interpretation of paragraph 19 of AR 210-10 relating to the
common use of officers clubs by both white and Negro officers. Problems arose as well
because blacks believed that the exercise of command function is not an exclusive
prerogative of the white officer and that equal opportunity for both command and
promotion should be vested in the Negro officer of demonstrated qualifications.32
Nippert, however, was not entirely sympathetic to the Negro plight. He believed
that many complaints had proven to be of an inconspicuous nature, submitted either
through ignorance or pique, and in many cases doubtlessly fomented by professional
agitators either within the military ranks or members of some civilian organizations
dedicated to keeping alive the racial issue. This is attested by the fact that many of these
complaints are supported by newspaper clippings and by the similarity which complaints
from widely separated sources sometimes bear to each other.
Negro complaints were usually submitted in complete disregard of prescribed
military correspondence channels. These were often inspired by outside sources. The
greatest single source of complaints from both Negro enlisted and Negro officer
personnel has to do with alleged segregation usually related to War Department
theaters, post exchanges, service clubs, officers messes and officers clubs. Nippert
acknowledged that the War Department no longer designated such facilities and activities
on a racial basis, but the department did permit such facilities to be designated for specific
units. This had led to sharp clashes either through the failure of Negro personnel to
understand the differentiation between unit designation and racial designation, or by a
willful desire to ignore the designation on the pretext that it merely serves the purpose of
racial discrimination.33 Nippert, however, was mistaken about this. The actual language
of the Army letter of 8 July 1944 which desegregated facilities clearly stated that no
exchange will be designated for the exclusive use of any particular race. Where branch
exchanges are established, personnel will not be restricted to the use of their area or unit
exchanges, but will be permitted to use any other exchange on the post or station. The
same applied to recreational facilities.34 Nippert showed little sympathy for blacks who
desired to test their newly won rights.
He concluded his report with further recommendations culled from the massive
data he had accumulated. He accurately recorded the majority sentiment:
1. Negro personnel be trained on the same basis and standards as whites.
2. Qualified Negro personnel be obtained for pilot training and for technical
specialties by careful screening and selection.
3. Negroes be utilized in positions consistent with their qualifications in the
following manner:
a. In separate combat flying units not to exceed the size of a group.
b. In separate service units not to exceed the size of a group in support of the flying
units.
c. In other separate established units, not to exceed the size of a battalion, in
which Negroes performed most satisfactorily in World War II and in such other units as
their capabilities warrant.
d. In base units in jobs requiring the maximum of their capabilities.
 e. In command of Negro units to be the maximum extent possible.
f. In overseas assignments on equal basis with whites.
g. In ZI [Zone of the Interior] assignments in locations favorable to their welfare.
h. In disciplinary matters there should be no favoritism or discrimination.
i. Officer and NCOs assigned to Negro units should be carefully selected and
trained.
4. Segregation.
a. Negroes should be segregated into administrative units.
b. Segregation for recreation, messing and social activities be established in
accordance with the customs prevailing within the surrounding civilian communities.
5. Number.
The Army Air Forces should receive only the proportionate share of Negroes in the
Army as a whole based on the relative size of the three major forces and the number of
Negroes in the Army Air Forces should not exceed 10 percent of the total personnel
assigned to the Army Air Forces.35
Nipperts recommendation that the AAF maintain segregation was in accord with
the prevalent opinion contained in the reports. Segregation was clearly favored by all who
submitted reports on the use of blacks in the postwar military, except for Colonel Parrish,
the Tuskegee AAF commander.36 In his report, Parrish stressed that Tuskegee graduates
met AAF standards and that all airfield mechanical work was performed by Negro
mechanics with no assistance or supervision from white mechanics. All administrative
work, Parrish said, was performed by Negro enlisted men because there were no white
enlisted men at Tuskegee. Colonel Parrish further stated:
It is a discouraging fact that Officers of the Army Air Forces whose scientific
achievements are unsurpassed, and whose scientific skill is unquestioned in mechanical
matters and in many personnel matters, should generally approach the problem of races
and minorities with the most unscientific, dogmatic and arbitrary attitudes . Whether we
like or dislike Negroes and whether they like or dislike us, under the Constitution of the
United States, which we are all sworn to uphold, they are citizens of the United States
having the same rights and privileges of other citizens and entitled to the same
applications and protection of the laws.37
Parrish despised the practice of segregation and considered the existence of
Tuskegee a punitive measure. He further believed that segregation was self-defeating and
that the Army could never convince blacks, while they were being shunted off into a
corner, that the standards applied were the same for them as for whites. Parrish wrote:
Incompetent Negroes are pleased by mass treatment and assignment since they do
not then have to compete and are not blamed for individual failure but only for being a
helpless part of a mediocre group.
He argued that inept whites were also aided by segregation and commented:
An incompetent white commander or supervisor, while of course protesting against
the assignment, can always try to cover up any deficiencies in leadership or ability by
unscientific theorizing about Negro characteristics ad infinitum. Unfortunately he can
also easily point out the multitude of special problems in everything from administration
to public relations that are daily dumped upon him and actually justify almost any failure.

Parrish recommended the employment and treatment of Negroes as individuals

which the war requires and which military efficiency demands. He plainly disputed the
idea that permitting blacks into officers clubs would result in disorder and riot. He
concluded with a plea for racial integration:
Either the constitution and the law must be changed or we must make some open
concession, some positive step toward adjustment rather than defensive, bewildered
evasion, at least where the officers are concerned. Negro officers should either be assigned
according to qualifications or dismissed. They cannot forever be isolated so that they will
always be non-existent at meal time or at night. This has nothing to do with social
problems or marriage, but only with a place to eat and sleep, and occasionally relax. The
more rapidly officers in the air corps learn to accept these practical matters, as many of us
have learned already, the better the position of everyone concerned. The answer is wider
distribution, rather than greater concentration of Negro units, officers, and trainees.38
Parrishs report may not have influenced Nipperts summary, but the former did
have an opportunity to express personally his views before the Gillem Board, which
convened in the summer of 1945. Nipperts report was also submitted to the board and he
himself appeared before it. This board of four generals* was asked by the Secretary of
War to prepare a policy for the use of the authorized Negro manpower potential during
the postwar period including the complete development of the means required to derive
the maximum efficiency from the full authorized manpower of the nation in the event of
war.39
* General Gillem, Maj. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, Brig. Gen. Allan D. Warnock, and
Brig. Gen. Winslow C. Morse.
The Gillem Board Recommendations
The Gillem Board examined much material and interviewed an impressive number
of people, all of whom had extensive dealings with blacks and many of whom were Negro
leaders determined to achieve integration within their lifetime. Considering the conflicting
evidence the board studied and the fact that the uniformed witnesses and military data
were overwhelmingly against even limited integration, one can only conclude that the
Gillem Board probably set out to modify drastically the Armys racial policy. The Boards
evidence may or may not have supported their conclusions, but their recommendations
were far in advance of the national or military temper of the times and ultimately their
program was never adopted. Their counsel stood in sharp contrast to the conclusions of
earlier panels. The Negro press applauded their position,40 but the Army did not get in
step. Segregation of Negro airmen continued until President Truman ordered integration of
the armed services in 1948.
It is not difficult to understand why the Negro press favorably received the report.
The Gillem Memorandum to the Chief of Staff called for peacetime utilization of blacks in
proportion to their representation in Americas population, an approach not accepted in the
interwar period. Gillem also recommended using blacks on a broader professional scale
than has obtained heretofore . Combat and service units were to be organized from
the Negro manpower available in the post-war Army to meet the requirements of training
and expansion and in addition qualified individuals [were to] be utilized in appropriate
special and overhead units . The board also suggested that all officers be accorded the
same rights, privileges and opportunities for advancement.41 It recommended that
experimental groupings of Negro units with white units be continued in the post war
Army.42 The board further suggested that blacks be stationed in areas where community
attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute an undue burden to
the local civilian population . It also proposed that at mixed posts War Department
policies regarding use of recreational facilities and membership in officer clubs, messes
or similar social organizations be continued and made applicable to the post war Army.43
Recognizing that their suggestions heralded a change, the board called for the
indoctrination of all ranks throughout the Service as to the necessity for an unreserved
acceptance of the policy ,44
The Gillem Board advised the Chief of Staff that it was time for a reworking of
Negro policy. The principle of economy of forces indicates it said, that every effort
must be expended to utilize efficiently every qualified available individual in a position in
the military structure for which he is best suited . We must strive for improvement in the
quality of the whole. Blacks were termed no small part of the manpower reservoir .
The black, it said, was ready and eager to accept full responsibility as a citizen and
should be given every opportunity and aid to prepare himself for effective service in
company with every other citizen who is called.45
Perhaps more important than Negro eagerness to serve was the change observed by
the Gillem Board in white attitudes toward blacks: During the last few years, many of the
concepts pertaining to the Negro have shown changing trends. They are pointing toward a
more complete acceptance of the Negro in all the diversified fields of endeavor. Their
acceptability was important from a military viewpoint . Many Negroes who, before the
war, were laborers, are now craftsmen, capable in many instances of competing with the
white man on an equal basis. Gillem cited the recent increase in educational opportunities
for blacks, especially in the North and West where colleges and universities admitted them
solely on the basis of individual merit and ability . The board provided the Chief of
Staff with charts and statistics which showed a vast improvement in Negro education
between the wars.
It recommended that the change be introduced rapidly, stating: the considered
opinion of this Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the Negro
manpower be formulated and implemented now . The Nation should not fail to use the
assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of the war.
The panel called clearly for a program that must eliminate, at the earliest practicable
moment, any special consideration based on race.46 It said further:
Courageous leadership in implementing the program is imperative. All ranks must
be imbued with the necessity for a straightforward, unequivocating attitude towards the
maintenance and [preservation] of a forward thinking policy.
 Vacillation or weak implementation of a strong policy will adversely affect the
Army. The policy which is advocated is consistent with the democratic ideals upon which
the nation and its representative Army are based. 47
The Gillem Board also recognized that more than courage was required to
implement this change. It recommended setting up a War Department General Staff
Group who can devote their entire time to problems involving minority racial elements
in the military establishment . Creation for the same purpose of a similar group in the
staff of each major command is necessary.48 Had the armed services accepted these
proposals in 1945, much grief might have been avoided in the postwar period. It was not
until the mid-1960s, long after the work of the Gillem Board had been forgotten, that such
staff organizations were established at the headquarters level and these did not become
effective in smaller units until the 1970s.
In making these recommendations, the Gillem Board had before it the combat
record and failure of the 92d Division in Italy, a large unit with approximately 20,000
men. Their poor showing did not particularly concern the board; the latter simply ascribed
its collapse to poor leadership. It stated that: The failures of Negro units have in almost
every case been attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of junior officers and non-
commissioned officers. 49 Of crucial importance to the board was the comparative
success of a handful of blacks who fought side by side with whites in the last months of
World War II.50 The white commander of the 92d Division testified that blacks could not
be made into good infantry soldiers or even satisfactory ones.51 Yet, the Gillem Board
demonstrated a positive inclination to favor examples of Negro courage and effectiveness.
The experimental grouping of blacks and whites in late World War II in Europe was
probably a pivotal factor in their considerations.
In December 1944 Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower faced a severe shortage of riflemen
in Europe during the Battle of the Bulge. Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee proposed to give men
trained in service specialties the opportunity to fight, blacks included. Men above the rank
of Private First Class had to take reductions to that rank to enter combat. By February
1945, some 4,562 blacks had volunteered and many of these accepted reductions in rank.
Approximately one-half of them fought alongside whites in the closing days of the war.
Although the Negro volunteers had higher AGCT scores than the mass of blacks, their
scores were lower than those of the white volunteers and other whites in the units. The
Negro volunteers had fewer disciplinary problems than their white colleagues while
training for combat. They subsequently were formed into segregated platoons within white
companies, but they took their meals and whatever battlefield comfort they could find
with white soldiers. The first Negro platoon was combat-ready on 1 March 1945, and,
according to all accounts, fought well. The men were eager to engage the enemy, paid
strict attention to duty, were aggressive, and won the admiration of whites about them.
When other Negro platoons suffered combat casualties, blacks then fought as squads
within white platoons, and eventually as individuals. There were no reported racial
incidents, turmoil, or animosities.52
Also important to the Gillem Board in its evaluation of Negro performance was a
report titled: Opinions about Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies in 7
Divisions, compiled by the Information and Education Division.53 It revealed that whites
who fought alongside blacks were much less eager to maintain segregation than those who
did not have integrated experiences. Only 250 responded to the survey, yet the report
carried enormous weight with the board. Most of the respondents (64 percent) said they
had been relatively unfavorable toward blacks joining their company prior to serving with
them in combat. None said they had become less favorable after the experience, and 77
percent said they were more favorable to the idea of blacks serving with them. The
remainder indicated no change in their attitude. All whites were asked how well blacks
performed in combat; more than 80 percent responded that blacks performed very well,
and none complained that blacks performed poorly. When asked how blacks compared to
whites as fighters, only 5 percent of the officers and 4 percent of the enlisted men
answered not as well, and 69 percent of the officers and 83 percent of the enlisted men
said they fought just as well. The remainder thought blacks fought better than whites or
offered no opinion. Most of the interviewees believed that in the future blacks and whites
could serve together in the same company, but that they should be placed in separate
platoons.54
Similar questions were addressed to white combat veterans in the European
Theater who had not experienced platoon integration. These men were told that some
Army divisions in their theater contained Negro and white platoons and asked them how
they would react if their unit were set up something like that. More than 60 percent
stated that they would dislike it very much. The researchers found that the geographical
origin of a white soldiers home had a negligible effect upon his response. Northern whites
were almost as much opposed to platoon integration as southern whites.55
The implications of the survey were clear. White opposition to integration
decreased once men had been integrated. The solution to manpower problems might be
simple: white opposition will disappear once mixing is a fact, and this is what the Gillem
Board attempted to accomplish. The Army, however, was apparently unimpressed with the
experiment conducted in the European Theater and never adopted the boards program. It
should be stressed that the board appeared to know what it wished to prove and selectively
highlighted the evidence to do this. The choice of people to be interviewed also seems to
support this conclusion.
Not everyone interviewed by the Gillem Board was friendly to the Negro cause,
but most were; and it would have been difficult to select 52 officials at random within or
outside of the ranks of the Army and to find as many in favor of integration. Some whites
were hostile, but many were not. Indeed, one black opposed integration, but he probably
did this more out of fear of a white reaction than from a genuine opposition to integration.
William H. Hastie also testified before the board. The former civilian aide and Truman
Gibsons predecessor, Hastie had, as noted above, resigned his position in protest over
segregation and condemned its inefficiency. He told the board that the armed forces
created artificial units simply to absorb Negro inductees. He said there had been a
tendency to magnify the difficulties which integration might raise, and advised the
board not to be concerned with civilian attitudes because these need not prevail over
Army policy. Army integration, he said, would be less difficult than in the civilian
community because of military training and discipline. Hastie also called for integration
at the higher unit levels of individuals without regard to race, and urged the mixing take
place immediately. 56 His successor, however, took a different course. Gibson held that
complete integration would not work, but recommended that selected Negro individuals
should be treated as individuals rather than Negroes. He advocated a flexible policy
calling for the maintenance of separate Negro platoons, companies, and battalions within
larger white organizations. He suggested that white officers should be assigned to Negro
units to gain experience in command of blacks. He called for the peacetime training of
sufficient numbers of Negro officers and enlisted men to provide cadres in an emergency.
Finally, he sought the establishment of special training units to raise the educational level
of Negro soliders.57
More militant was Brig. Gen. B. O. Davis, Sr., who twice testified before the
board. He argued that blacks had been misassigned because of segregation, and pointed to
their success in integrated companies in the European Theater as proof of the success of
integration. He openly criticized the policy that was more concerned about mixed eating
and billeting than military effectiveness. He warned the board of the dichotomy between
American ideals and practices and how negatively this must impress foreign people such
as the French, Russians and Brazilians. He called for integration and suggested that
whites might be prepared to accept it through an education program.58
His son, commander of the 477th Composite Group, also advocated integration,
but called for a gradual approach out of fear of white reaction. For the younger Davis, it
was a question of leadership. If unit commanders were carefully chosen, and if they were
convinced that the War Department truly sought to end discriminatory practices, prejudice
would end. He recalled for the board the silent treatment he had experienced at West
Point after an upperclassman ordered his classmates not to speak to him. The war had not
eliminated this bias, he said, since the attitude that there is no place for the Negro officer
still exists in the Army.59
In addition to Negro military men and representatives from the War Department,
distinguished civilian Negro leaders testified. Frederick Patterson, President of Tuskegee,
called for Negro employment based solely on ability. Charles Houston of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund informed the board of the increasingly important role blacks were
playing in American Society. And Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP,
demanded the end of segregation because it was inefficient and provoked racial friction.60
White civilian and military witnesses partial to the Negro cause also appeared
before the board. Colonel Parrish stated that Army policy had created resentment and
precipitated the formation of groups of agitators. He asked the board to avoid the use of
the controversial term integration, and try simply to speak of assignment by
qualification. Blacks wanted only equality of opportunity and individual treatment, and
Parrish favored that too.61 Lt. Col. Charles Dollard of the Army Information and
Education Division also testified. Formerly a social scientist with the Carnegie
Foundation, he had participated in the Gunnar Myrdal study on American blacks, which
produced the landmark volume, American Dilemma. Dollard, then a member of the
American Council for Race Relations, called for integration starting from the bottom. The
Army, he claimed, lagged behind the civilian population in race relations and he called for
the individual integration of the American black.62 Two professional historians, both
working with the Army, were called upon to testify. Walter L. Wright testified that the
service was not abiding by the principles of democracy. Blacks wanted integration, he
argued, yet it seemed impossible. Integration of squads and platoons seemed more likely
to work at that time. He suggested integration in active units, in which the men would not
have too much time to sit around and quarrel.63 Bell I. Wiley was less positive. He
opposed the creation of Negro infantry officers, but did recommend the assignment of
Negro officers to other Army branches, such as the artillery, engineers, and service
elements. He also recommended the retention of separate officers clubs.64
 The other white witnesses ranged from those who wished to maintain the status
quo to those who were openly hostile. The former tried to balance evidence at hand.
Basing their conclusions on the overall record, they called for a most gradual change in
racial policy. Gen. Carl Spaatz, who succeeded General Arnold as AAF commander,
argued that the most carefully selected Negro crewmen and pilots could not form an outfit
of better than average efficiency. He expressed doubts that the individual black could
stand the pace if integrated into white crews. He acknowledged that some blacks had
command ability, but he did not want them in command of white officers. He suggested
they might be employed as technical specialists on white installations, so long as there
were enough of them to permit their own mess and barracks. If the AAF was to be
integrated, he suggested it should start in service units and at carefully selected
installations. He favored segregated training installations for pilots, but integrated ones
might even be tried at this level, providing the greatest care was taken in selecting the
training site. He was not worried about integration in the advanced service schools
because of the careful selection of the studentswhite and black.65
Less positive was the testimony of General Eaker, Deputy Commanding General
and Chief of Air Staff. Individual integration of blacks would be unwise, he said, because
blacks and whites do not do their best work when so integrated. Eaker suggested that if
the Army were racially integrated it might have difficulties in recruiting white volunteers.
The War Department, he warned, should not conduct social experiments. Although he
doubted that any Negro officer would be commissioned on merit if competing with white
candidates, he did find Col. Benjamin Davis, Jr., to be outstanding. In fact, he credited
Davis for the success of the Negro flying units. It was Eakers view that while blacks
could be promoted to any rank required by the size of Negro units, and the best might be
placed in staff jobs, they should not be placed in command of white troops. He said that
blacks should not attend white flying schools because they required more training time
than whites and would not graduate in a school run by white standards.66
Brig. Gen. Dean C. Strother was more negative. He claimed that the 332d was
never decorated because it was not good enough and that it was inferior to all white
groups in the theater. Nearly all credit for the units limited success he credited to Davis.
Whenever Colonel Davis was absent, the unit deteriorated. Except for Davis, the officers
lacked leadership, initiative, aggressiveness, and dependability.67 Brig. Gen. Edwin W.
Chamberlain stated that some of the Army Air Forces units were worthless. Blacks, he
advised, lacked the intelligence to do well. In his view, integration should not even be
attempted until 5 or 10 years after it was proved that company integration had worked. In
any case, the Army was ahead of the public in racial matters.68 George L. Weber, a
regimental commander in the 92d Division, said that the poorest white officer was more
dependable than any Negro officer. He favored southern white officers for Negro units
because they had no tendency to be lenient or fraternize with the troops. He warned
against formation of division-size black units.69
 The expert testimony of white combat commanders was entirely negative. Yet it
was balanced and, in the view of the board, outweighed by the testimony of noncombat
commanders, social scientists, and professional Negro advocates. Military men who would
consider the evidence of Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, and William
Hastie more significant than that of Generals Carl Spaatz, Ira Eaker, and Edwin Almond,
were rare.
Although Gillems military contemporaries and superiors balked at integrating on a
limited or on any other basis, the idea was recommended. Contained in the Gillem Board
papers collection is the original of a letter from a high ranking general, with the salutation
and complimentary close removed. The document is dated 25 June 1945. The sender asks
if his correspondent had been requested to provide information to the study, Participation
of Negro Troops in the Post War Military Establishment. The letter further reads:
It is an elaborate questionnaire on the performance of Negro troops in the war. To
my horror, my own section without my knowledge, set up a board of senior colonels to get
the answers. So the questionnaire, which is stupid, and the method of getting it
accomplished here, which is more so, will get for the War Department the greatest mass of
opinion, superstition, and legend it will receive on any subject.
Having thus expressed myself, there is fortunately a brighter side. General
Almond, commanding the 92d Division, has meticulously preserved every scrap of paper
in the Division which he will turn in to the AG when he is relieved or the Division is
inactivated. Dwight tells me that there are some good unit histories of Negro service units,
thanks to a good historian in our Base Section. The Inspector Generals report of the near
break thru of the 92ds position on Christmas day was delivered directly to General Joseph
T. McNarney .
In general, opinion all over the theater is that Negro troops are no good whether air
(the colored fighter squadrons are famous primarily for strafing our own troops), ground
(the 92d always had another full division spotted in reserve behind it), or service (you can
have all my Negro units without replacing them). Ive talked to several small unit
commanders who are extremely bitter about their experience and convinced that Negro
troops are simply not worth the effort. I thought the commanders good men and am
convinced they tried hard .70
One can conclude that the board knew the origin of the letter and that it was
authentic because it was preserved. The names probably were removed to protect the
sender and recipient from any possible future embarrassment. Against such deep-seated
feelings, the board recommended an evolutionary program to bring about racial
integration.
Once the boards findings were complete, their recommendations were circulated,
and ranking military men as well as civilian officials in the War Department were asked to
comment. Army Lt. Gen. J. E. Hull suggested that all Negro enlisted men be assigned to
all-Negro units, and no Negro officer be given command of white troops.71 Air Force
Maj. Gen. Idwal Edwards agreed in general with the boards recommendations, but
warned of the ineptitude and limited capacity of the Negro soldier.72 Army Maj. Gen.
Daniel Noce was most critical of the non-segregation features of the board report. He
wrote:
For the present and the foreseeable future, social intermingling of Negroes and
whites is not feasible. It is forbidden by law in some parts of the country and is not
practiced by the great majority of the people in the remainder of the country. To require
citizens, while in the Army, to conform to a pattern of social behavior different from that
they would otherwise follow would be detrimental to the morale of white soldiers and
would tend to defeat the effort to increase the opportunities and effectiveness of Negro
soldiers. It would be a mistake for the Army to attempt to lead the nation in such a reform
as social intermingling of the races.73
General Eaker, responding for General Spaatz, also criticized the report:
We should not organize certain types of units for the sole purpose of advancing the
prestige of one race, especially when it is necessary to utilize these units up to strength. As
the report points out, the formation of Negro combat groups was the result of political
pressure from a highly organized minority. In order to fill quotas for Negro pilot training,
students were accepted with stanine ratings as low as two (2), whereas the requirements
for white students was seven (7) .
Eaker also criticized the concept of experimental white and Negro groupings, as in
Europe during the closing days of the war, because the AF units were not suited for that
type of experiment. He stated further that:
The Board recommends that Negro units be stationed initially in localities where
community attitudes are most favorable. The AAF agrees that this is the best policy, but
we find it is extremely difficult to put into effect. We have endeavored for more than two
years to find some suitable base for the permanent assignment of our one Negro tactical
group. Whenever a base was tentatively selected for the unit, the civic officials
vehemently protested even though a large proportion of the population was Negro,
Syracuse, N.Y.; Columbus, Ohio; and Windsor Locks, Connecticut being cases in point.
Some communities even threatened local voluntary bans against selling merchandise to
personnel of the unit in case we overrode their objections .
The Army Air Forces believes that the difficulties of the colored problem will be
with us as long as any extensive race prejudice exists in the United States. The real
solution to the problem lies in the overall education on this subject and will undoubtedly
take generations to accomplish. In the meantime, it is believed that the War Department
should use great care to march in the van of popular opinion, but that it should never be
ahead of popular opinion on this subject; otherwise it will put itself in a position of
stimulating racial disorders rather than overcoming them. 74
The civilian component in the War Department was not as negative. Gibson wrote
to Secretary of War Patterson that the board had acted in a responsible manner to make the
best use of the nations manpower potential. Gibson recognized that the ultimate aim of
the board was a completely integrated Army . He favored the gradual approach the
board had recommended, and urged that the report of the Gillem Board be accepted. He
called, furthermore, for an explicit statement that the present policies requiring
segregation are no longer binding, and asked for a clearcut pronouncement that the
eventual goal is the elimination of segregation.75 Gibson feared that the Gillem report
language was too ambiguous. His supervisor, John J. McCloy, who had no particular
objections, described the report as a fine achievement.76 As in testimony before the board,
uniformed participants were negative and civilian witnesses positive. In 1946 the Gillem
Report was published almost without any modifications and was identified as War
Department Circular 124, 1946 (see Appendix 2). The circular would have established a
new, forward-looking racial policy, if it had been enforced.
Army officials, however, believed the recommendations too advanced and the
proposed changes too rapid, and therefore ignored the reports major suggestions. In fact,
the recommendations were premature. American society remained segregated and the
majority still had to be convinced that integration was the best way. The Gillem Board
understood this and urged adoption of an intensive education program to convince Army
personnel, from top to bottom, of the wisdom of its limited integration policy. The result
was Army Talk 170, a pamphlet on Negro soldiers. War Department Circular 76, 1947,
required that Commanders of all echelons insure indoctrination of all personnel,
including officers, under their command by establishing a course of instruction based on
WD Circular 124, 1946 and Army Talk 170. The circular established that instruction
would be completed within 7 training days and in not less than a 3 1/2 hour period.77
The pamphlet contained three sections. Part one discussed Negro manpower in the
Army; part two described the successful integration of blacks in combat units in Europe;
and part three called for harmonious race relations because the military mission demanded
it. Each section contained detailed notes for discussion leaders. Instructors were advised
that the mention of race was likely to touch off sparks from individuals who have deep
seated beliefs, convictions, or prejudices . Leaders were told to advertise the Gillem
Boards overall objective: increasing effectiveness of the Army.
 The purpose of the first part of the discussion was to describe how the Army
proposed to resolve its special manpower problem. It stressed that the general run of
Negro soldiers had less education, civilian training, and experience in highly mechanical
fields than whites, and that blacks scored lower on the AGCT. But it also noted that there
were blacks with very high scores and others who were well educated. Also, segregation
had not resulted in the most effective use of Negro manpower and had been accepted by
the Army merely to prevent friction. Discussion leaders were to tell participants that the
Gillem Board recommended the abolition of large all-Negro units and the employment of
blacks with special skills as individuals in overhead and other special units.* The
pamphlet cautioned that the Army was not an agent of social reform; therefore, it would
do nothing to alter the existing racial community pattern around posts. Such matters were
the concern of the civilian community. Within its own ranks, however, the official position
of the Army was that basic equality of opportunity to all soldiers, irrespective of race, is
essential to highest military effectiveness. Racial discrimination was termed fatal to
military efficiency. Army Talk 170 further stated that recreation facilities, while they
might be designated for specific units, must not be closed to members of any race. In the
interest of the maximum use of authorized manpower, the pamphlet stated, the Armys
ultimate aim is to be able to use and assign all personnel in the event of another major war,
without regard to race.79 Thus the Army went on record as striving for eventual
integration.
The second section Negro Platoons in Composite Rifle CompaniesWorld War
II Style, recounted the experimental integration in Europe at the end of the war.
Discussion leaders were told that the success of this type of integrated organization was a
major factor in the War Departments decision to increase, broaden, and to some extent
integrate the peacetime use of Negro manpower . In the process of praising Negro
performance, the authors of this section gave attention to the polls which revealed that
men who had served with blacks were much more receptive toward integration than those
who had not.80
* Overhead units included Headquarters support personnel engaged in
housekeeping activities, accounting and finance, etc.
Part three of Army Talk 170 examined racial problems on the world stage. Whites
were a worldwide minority and many of the non-white people in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America are looking to America as the leading democracy, for a picture of how democracy
works or can be made to work, and they are paying close attention to the way in which our
minority problems are solved. The pamphlet stressed that playing on minority
differences was a device used by Hitler and Mussolini, and we do not wish to use the Axis
method on ourselves. This segment of the pamphlet spoke also of the psychology and
sociology of prejudice and asked the discussion leaders to discuss prejudice with their
groups. The pamphlet ended with the Gillem Boards emphasis upon military efficiency:
the Army does not propose to change your prejudices. What you think or do is a concern
of the Army only so far as it affects Army effectiveness. Think whatever you want
personally, hut dont throw a monkey-wrench into the machine.81
Despite a well-thought out program of indoctrination and the obvious sincerity of
the Gillem Board, its policy was aborted. A classified report prepared in 1949 by President
Trumans Fahy Committee noted that none of the major or minor recommendations was
carried out. The committee accused the Army and the Air Force of obstructionism. Well-
qualified blacks were to be integrated into overhead units, but the Army attempted to
evade this provision. Some commands had no blacks in overhead units, and others
assigned blacks to their overhead units only as cooks, duty soldiers, and truck drivers. In
the overhead of the third Army there were 29 finance clerks, and no Negroes, 37
white motion picture projectionists and no Negroes, 478 white writers and no Negroes.
Throughout all commands the use of Negroes in overhead in signal, ordnance,
transportation, medical and finance military occupational specialties (MOS) was
minimal. Some commands, the Fahy committee charged, flatly refused to use blacks in
overhead positions, notwithstanding the directive nature of WD Circular 124. More than
half of the Army schools, furthermore, were officially closed to blacks, on the grounds
that there were no positions open to them to employ techniques learned in these schools.
According to the committee: The files of the historical records section reveal no
consistent enthusiasm for, and very often active opposition to, any positive measures for
implementing the policies of the Gillem Board. The committee blamed the failure to
implement the recommendations on the Armys refusal to establish a special staff group
within the Army Staff to monitor this program.82
To observers of the 1970s, it would appear that the Gillem recommendations were
timid, and their nonimplementation inconsequential. In the context of the 1940s, however,
the Gillem Board understood its suggestions to be anything but timid and must have been
disappointed when the Army failed to carry out its program. A special concern of the
board was the role segregation played in creating racial friction. In nearly every instance,
it held that problems arose because of the Negros real or fancied feeling that he is being
discriminated against and must take positive action, which in some cases results in riots.
The board placed the blame for race riots squarely upon commanders. It stated that:
if transportation to and from the post is inadequate, he must try to foresee all
friction and bad feeling due to overcrowding or lack of transportation by conferring with
officials of transportation lines or arranging for Army transportation. If restaurants and
stores in adjacent communities do not accommodate Negro trade, a talk with the secretary
of the Chamber of Commerce is indicated . They must demonstrate a real desire to
understand and care for the troops under their command regardless of race or color. They
must, by their attitude and actions, gain the confidence of the men under them .
Commanding officers who fail to carry out promptly the letter and spirit of approved
policies should be relieved.83
Race Violence
The boards regard for proper command actions to prevent riots was historically
valid. There had been race riots, some resulting in death, in the armed services during and
after World War II. The board understood the relationship between discrimination and riot,
and it appears that this may have been a factor in promulgating their new policy.
Historian Ulysses Lee in his book, The Employment of Negro Troops, describes
the World War II riots the Army suffered through. Racial friction, he wrote was a
continuous cause for concern within the War Department and in the Armys higher
commands. The summer of 1943 was the high point of violence although riots had
occurred in all of the war years. Serious disordersthose resulting in death or serious
injuryoccurred in 1943 at Camp Van Dorn, Miss.; Camp Stewart, Ga.; Fort Bliss, Tex.;
Camp Philips, Kans.; Camp Breckinridge, Ky.; Camp Shenago, Pa.; and elsewhere.84
Very early in the war counterintelligence officials worried that the Japanese were
propagandizing blacks to sabotage the U.S. war effort. For example, agents were
concerned about the Ethiopian Pacific Movement, which was said to have counseled
blacks to start a whispering campaign; when they tell you to remember Pearl Harbor, you
reply Remember Africa. The movement supposedly advised blacks to evade the draft
and help organize front organizations for propagandizing blacks. The Ethiopian Pacific
Movement, as well as two other groups - Emanuel Gospel Mission and the Afro-Asiatic
League - were alleged to have circulated pamphlets printed by the Japanese
government.85
There was an official proclivity to view Negro agitation as proof of enemy
propaganda or even sedition. Six consecutive editions of the AAF magazine, Intelligencer,
in 1944 warned of increasing Negro militancy. Blacks were demonstrably happy over the
War Department decisions in 1944 to desegregate recreational facilities, but the white
press in the South was virulent in its opposition to relaxation of segregation. The
Intelligencer remarked that the Daily Worker joined the Negroes in recounting
successes. The magazine noted that the use of nigger was becoming more
objectionable to blacks and the term was reportedly provoking racial incidents. The
Intelligencer also cited 68 racial outbursts within the Fourth Service Command over the
question of local transportation. Increasingly, the magazine reported, blacks were violating
Jim Crow seating laws. According to the Intelligencer, at Camp Sutton, N.C.:
Negro troops have a plan to take over the camp and the nearby town of Monroe.
Weapons have been stolen from the Ordnance warehouse. Numerous incidents have been
caused by Negro soldiers from the camp, such as: insubordination to white officers and
MPs, stoning vehicles occupied by white personnel, overturning of white taxicabs, and
storming a post theater.
The magazine reported a riot at Fort Francis E. Warren in Wyoming which
involved mob action on the part of 8,000 colored soldiers . It also identified a secret
Racial Club organized in Greenville, S.C., with about 150 members, and expressed the
belief that the club was part of a national organization connected with the NAACP.
Object of the club is to secure equal rights and protect members from discrimination.
The magazine cited another incident in which 16 Negro pilots en route from Walterboro
AAF stopped in a white only cafe in Fairfax, S.C. When refused service, they told the
white proprietress to go to hell and drew their revolvers. They left the cafe with shouts
of Heil Hitler and went to the railroad station. A Negro WAC who was refused service
in Evansville, Ind., had to be dragged away by the police. Over a period of months the
Intelligencer recorded similar incidents.86
In addition to the altercations at Selfridge AAF and Freeman Field, both previously
discussed, there were numerous other incidents at air bases in the United States and
abroad. Some of these involved the stealing of weapons and race violence. At Herbert
Smart Airport in Macon, Ga., an entire aviation squadron on 11 November 1944 simply
refused to obey orders to proceed with the days training. The blacks were called into the
base theater for a meeting, but the base commander lost control of the situation. Blacks
also protested vigorously at Amarillo Army Air Field, Tex., in late 1944 when they were
not allowed to use the facilities of the service club. The AAF alleged that club employees,
who refused to wait on Negro personnel, stated that their presence would prevent the
local white girls from entering the club.87
The MacDill Riot
Despite the Gillem Board admonition to remove racial irritants, the military post
pattern remained the same following the war, provoking a major riot at MacDill Army Air
Field in Florida in October 1946. The blacks apparently were unhappy many months
before the riot and had written about the situation at MacDill in a letter to the Chicago
Defender in April 1946. They complained that Negro servicemen awaiting their discharge
were assigned menial duties at a civilian airfield while whites awaiting discharge were not
so detailed. Whites apparently were allowed to leave the area for home once discharged,
but blacks continued to work as laborers for the civilian airfield until the day their
enlistment ended. There were, in addition, many complaints about segregation on the post,
and the fact that the blacks did not get a fair division of recreation funds for dances.88
Tension became acute and a riot erupted on 27 October 1946 at the Negro NCO
club. It began with a fist fight during a dance and someone called the Officer of the Day
(OD) to quell the disturbance. A half hour later, the OD received a second report that a
disturbance of greater intensity was occurring at the club. Numerous Negro privates
trying to crash the NCO dance apparently provoked the trouble. These angry men worked
themselves up to mob violence and began throwing beer bottles and rocks through the
NCO Club windows. When the OD again arrived at the club, the disturbance [had]
reached riot proportion. A mob of approximately 150 colored soldiers began yelling,
brandishing clubs, and throwing beer bottles. The situation became more tense with the
arrival of the Military Police (MP) who attempted to disperse the crowd of blacks. The
mob threatened to charge the MPs who then fired a volley of shots, forcing them to retreat
into the NCO club. During the shooting one military policeman was lacerated on the
temple, and a colored soldier sustained a bullet wound. Soon the mob dissipated at the
NCO club and another gathered at nearby Dispensary B where Pfc. James Treadwell
, spokesman, expressed his displeasure in no uncertain terms to Lt. Col. Russel G. May,
Commandant of Colored Troops, of the shooting fray at the NCO Club, and threatened
him bodily if the matter was not adjusted.:89
While May discussed the riot with Treadwell, two other men, Joseph and Richard
Plesent, went to a barracks with the expressed purpose of inciting its occupants to arm
themselves with clubs and fall out. Soon a mob converged on MacDill Avenue Gate
where it overcame and disarmed an MP, smashed windows, tossed furniture into the
street, dismantled the telephone and barricaded the gate entrance . The two mobs,
approximately 300 colored soldiers, many of whom were armed with rocks, bottles, clubs
and bed posts formed one mob gathering at MacDill Gate where they kept yelling and
shouting profanely, absolutely refusing to disperse upon orders from their commanding
officer.90
The rioters then attempted to invade the civilian housing project near the MacDill
Gate. This was a white only government project called Gadsden Homes. Some whites
reported that they had overheard blacks shouting that they were going to get some of that
white stuff and 15 or 20 of the blacks left the gate. They were met by an armed white
sergeant, who singled out one of the rioters and threatened to shoot if the soldiers did not
back off. The soldiers returned to the gate and began to agitate for guns. The county
deputy sheriff arrived shortly thereafter with nine carloads of heavily armed men, which
further excited the blacks. It was not until 2:30 a.m. the next morning that the crowd
dispersed.91
Earlier, Colonel May, surrounded near the barracks, had vainly tried to get the men
to calm down. There were rumors that men and women at the club had been shot, and
shouts of no more Jim Crow laws punctuated Mays pleas. When he tried to get the men
into their barracks, Treadwell shouted: No, dont go back, dont listen to that white son of
a bitch. May then tried to get the men into a mess hall for coffee, and Treadwell shouted:
Dont go to the mess hall. Hell surround it with MPs and shoot us down like dogs.
Treadwell told May, I hate the United States from East to West and North to South and
every bastard in it.92
The outburst led to an investigation into its causes. But examination of the racial
situation provided the Chief of Staff of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with much
more information than merely the causes for the MacDill riot. In the previous 90 days
there had been 22 mass disturbances in the military, all attributed to Communist
propaganda with the definite objective of infiltrating the armed forces, which has
manifested itself by inciting the Negro soldier to demand preference rather than equality.
Some military men believed that the Communists were also exploiting to the fullest an
exaggerated idea of the Negro contribution to the successful completion of the war.93
Presumably to uncover Communist agitation, a counterintelligence special agent
was assigned to the Negro unit. The agent, a Mr. Walter L. Harris (colored), was in the
unit between 2 and 22 November and reported in writing upon completion of his
investigation. He discovered that the riot was spontaneous and found no evidence of
Communist agitation.
He cited, rather, decided bitterness toward MacDill because of a lack of proper
on-duty and off-duty activities. There were few or no technical jobs available to the
colored soldiers and very little encouragement given them to attend technical schools.
They believed there was no future for them at MacDill Field or in the Army. Because
they were not assigned responsible jobs, they lost interest and began to drift, to
engage in goldbricking, and to try for a discharge as mental incompetents. Harris, who
believed he had been completely successful in winning the acceptance of the blacks, said
that these problemswhen coupled with the question of unsuitable recreational facilities
weighed heavily on the men and led to their demoralization breeding dissension and
[the] subsequent display of emotions.94
Despite the report of the counterintelligence agent, the MacDill file continued to
blame the unrest on Communist agitation. An undated and unsigned intelligence estimate
labeled, Communist Party Programs as Related to its Activities Against the Armed
Forces, stated that Communist dominated papers are efficiently carrying out propaganda
aims of the Communist Party . In preparation for the final clash with capitalism,
according to this report, the party and its organs would attempt to undermine the Army by
agitating blacks over segregation. This particular estimate cited the Pittsburgh Courier as a
leading offender.95
Whatever the causes for the riot, the facts of the destruction were there and trials
were held. The riot leaders, having in the meantime confessed, were brought to trial at
MacDill. The press was admitted to the open proceedings, and some Negro officers were
appointed members of the court. Of the 11 men tried, 9 were convicted. Of these some
received heavy sentences. Treadwell was sentenced to 1 to 20 years at hard labor,
forfeiture of pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. Others were given from 1
to 25 years at hard labor. The Amsterdam News complained that the men were tried in the
utmost secrecy and were being railroaded to prison. The Negro press further claimed
that southerners on the court were determined to punish the blacks and that the two Negro
officers on the court were frightened. But the trial was public; the men had confessed; and
there were numerous witnesses to the events.96
The riot led to an inspector generals visit to the airfield. The SAC inspector
discounted Communist influence, but also he made no recommendation for improvement
of the living conditions of the blacks. His main concern was to prevent future riots and he
criticized the fact that MacDill had no riot plan. He noted that blacks believed they had
won a moral victory and also that they could have taken over the whole base if they had
not been discouraged from doing so. He wrote: force properly used, such as tear gas and
fire hoses, backed up by arms may prevent the loss of a number of lives, because
colored men respect armed might and guns. He advocated strict discipline, because at
MacDill it had not been severe enough. He wrote that southern customs created
problems and that northern blacks with low mentality resent the customs of the South.
All of his recommendations called for better riot control and the rapid discharge of Negro
dissenters. He made no recommendation to increase recreational facilities for blacks or to
delve into the deeper causes of the riot, only that the situation should not be permitted to
get out of hand again.97
MacDill was not the only air base to experience a riot. In January 1947 officials at
Fort Worth Army Air Field, Tex., encountered similar difficulties with Negro enlisted
men. Here, blacks challenged white prejudice more directly. The Pittsburgh Courier had
reported 2 months earlier that Fort Worth AAF blacks resented white prejudice.
Approximately 1,000 mistreated and segregated Negro soldiers signed an open letter in
which they declared that their life was unbearable, un-American, prejudiced,
discriminative, and segregative (sic). They stated further that it was believed by large
numbers of us that after we had served our country during the past emergency, faithfully
and loyally, both here in the states and on foreign soil that the infectious diseases of
hate, segregation and discrimination would vanish. In the Army, inseeded with these
evils, the tension is growing worse .
It is our opinion that approximately 98 percent of colored soldiers on this station
are used as nothing less than common labor which does not involve training of any nature.
For example, a man does not have to be trained to be a kitchen police, a janitor, or
a street or area cleaner .
Yes, join the regular Army, travel, education, good pay, benefits under the GI Bill
or Rights and many other so-called advantages . This is what the Army launched as a
campaign to enlist men in the Army, but whats on paper is not practiced here. We have
joined the Army Air Forces and what can we say weve received: Unjustified treatment as
soldiers and as men, rotten food and not enough of that, unsanitary quarters and mess
halls, the uncongenial attitude of white civilians both on the base and in the town of Fort
Worth, Tex., together with the unsoldierly treatment by certain officers in this squadron
.
The letter also complained of an inadequate day room, service club, post exchange,
as well as a one-chair barber shop installed for 1,000 blacks. The final complaint was that
a medical officer had used the term nigger in a medical lecture.98
In essence, the complaints were much like those identified by the undercover agent
at MacDill and similar, but less violent, results were attained. On 6 January 1947, a Negro
private, who entered the service club and bought cigarettes, was accosted on his way out
by a white corporal. The corporal shoved him against the wall and called him a black-
son-of-a-bitch, whereupon the black invited the white outside. The white corporal, noting
that some blacks were waiting for the private, called for help. Soon 10 to 12 blacks
gathered, and the whites who had left the club rushed back in and locked the door. Then
approximately 50 to 60 blacks arrived and threw stones at the club. General fighting
erupted, which was stopped upon the arrival of the military police.
In a pretrial investigation, the white corporal admitted that he had told the Negro
private that he had no right to use the service club (the corporal later admitted that he
knew the statement was incorrect). The other whites who came to the corporals aid also
knew that blacks were entitled to use the club, but pitched in to see that colored were
kept out of the club. Two men, one black and one white, were court-martialed.99
A counterintelligence agent also was sent to Fort Worth. He found no evidence of
Communist agitation, but Col. J. K. Fogle of SAC headquarters commented on this point.
He wrote that the agent found that:
no direct Communist agitation is taking place. Therefore the recent uprisings can
be attributed to the general breakdown of military discipline that occurred upon the
cessation of hostilities in 1945. The Negro soldier has been slower to react to the return to
normal discipline than the white soldier and requires unusually fair but firm and interested
direction. It is known that the breakdown of military discipline in 1945 was planned and
agitated by the Communist Partyand, of course, the Negro was a most receptive
prospect.100
The MacDill file contains other reports of racial trouble. Violence broke out in a
Negro mess hall at Roswell Army Air Field, N.M., in early December 1946; and again a
counterintelligence agent was called to investigate. Also in the same month, on a bus en
route from Fort Worth to the air field, a white soldier asked a black to move to the rear of
the bus and demanded his seat. The black refused and the white tried to use force. At this
point the blacks in the back of the bus started opening knives, whereupon the white
soldier forgot the issue. The report concluded with the comment that Joe Green, white
CP organizer, is believed to be in Fort Worth area on a temporary visit. Information is
fairly reliable.101
 Not all assumed that unrest in Negro units was a product of Communist influence.
Some introspective individuals attempted to find a solution. For example, SACs Fifteenth
Air Force studied the problems of Negro troops following the MacDill riot. The unit
historian acknowledged that War Department Circular 124 (based on the Gillem Board
recommendations) called for greater utilization of blacks, but stated that the practical
application of this policy was fraught with vexing problems. The historian cited
resistance from commanders who frustrated implementation. In response to a question on
upgrading colored personnel, one base commander replied: Upgrading! Ill upgrade
them! Whereupon, during the next 30 minutes the commander denounced the blacks,
denigrated their worth and intelligence, and recommended their repression.102
Most of the responses the historian received were similarly unfavorable. As a
solution to the problem, he recommended a colorblind attitude. Moreover, he found that
the Gillem board recommendations were not detailed enough to offer guidance or to
counter the long standing customs of discrimination. SAC officials thought enough of the
problem to place the question of the utilization of Negro personnel on its February 1947
Commanders Conference agenda. Such matters as distribution, utilization, enlistment, and
reenlistment were discussed. Although 18 percent of SAC was black, most of the men
were stationed at only two locations: MacDill (Fla.) and Salina (Kan.). More than a third
of the personnel at MacDill were black (1,966 men) and overcrowding had still not been
alleviated there. The commanders found that utilization of blacks was not what it should
be. They suggested that it would improve only after intensive education of white
personnel and better use of race relations and democratic principles.103
In April 1947, Army Talk 170 was distributed to SAC bases, but the Fifteenth Air
Force historian found the results questionable. He wrote: What value, if any, resulted
from the foregoing studies or talks on the policies for utilization of Negro personnel in the
Fifteenth Air Force cannot be determined . He noted that blacks continued to be
assigned to base units (housekeeping organizations), engineer aviation battalions (ditch
digging units), and aviation squadrons (which were also housekeeping units). All these
units were segregated. However, Fifteenth Air Force headquarters asserted that assigning
blacks lowly tasks was not discrimination, because whites also performed these jobs.104
When SAC proposed that the Fifteenth Air Force accept the assignment of
additional blacks, it declined on the ground that adverse local conditions in the
immediate vicinity of its bases coupled with political influence negated such a move. The
SAC historian lamented: It can be said that at years end, 1947, the utilization of Negro
personnel still posed difficult problems and a successful formula for their utilization was
still being sought.105
Air Force Blacks in the Postwar Period
Indeed, a solution to the problem of Negro utilization was not found until the
advent of integration. Meanwhile, blacks continued to suffer the abuses of a system that
denied them opportunity. The Army Air Forces also suffered from a policy that caused
low morale, underutilization of a significant percentage of the force, and created social
ferment. The military was not totally insensitive to the needs of blacks; but military
sensitivity was too shallow to overcome long-held biases.
 After Germany surrendered, the Army decided to assign homecoming blacks to
areas of the country where they might be welcome. The Assistant Chief of Staff attached a
map to a letter of instruction designating zones of assignment. The deep South was
identified as an area where conditions were not likely to be suitable. A band across the
border states through West Texas was designated a favorable zone. The North was divided
into two zones, favorable or may be improved. The letter advised those responsible
for relocating Negro units that the assignment of black troops was of importance in the
interests of avoiding racial situations. If at all possible, measures were to be instituted in
conformity with the military exigencies to select stations in zones in which the racial
climate was favorable.106 The overcrowded MacDill Field, however, was listed in the
suitable zone.
Ambivalence best describes the official attitude toward blacks in the immediate
postwar period. America did not suffer a postwar economic recession; war torn Europe
had to be rebuilt, and well-paying jobs in industry became plentiful for whites. In the
meantime, the Army (including its Air Forces) found itself short of personnel.*
Headquarters, Army Air Forces decided to permit blacks to exceed the World War II and
Gillem quota of 10 percent. It maintained: Due to the present critical need for manpower
in the Army, it is necessary that voluntary enlistment of Negroes be continued and that this
personnel be effectively utilized. By 1 July 1946, it was anticipated that the Army would
be approximately 15 percent black, and nothing should be done to limit them to the 10
percent quota.107
The AAF announced a policy that there would be equal training and assignment
opportunity for all military personnel. Assignments were to be based on the skills and
abilities, mental and physical, of individuals to meet, or to be trained to meet, these
requirements. The Army Air Forces insisted that commanders take affirmative action to
insure that equity in training and assignment opportunity is provided all personnel. 108
* Between December 1945 and December 1946, AAF strength declined from
2,282,259 military personnel to 455,515.
Implementation of this policy, however, was not based on ability, mental and
physical, but on race. Personnel regulations listing assignment specialties available to
enlistees and reenlistees continued to identify jobs by race to the substantial advantage of
the whites. Blacks, furthermore, were not assigned to certain geographical locations.109
These restrictions, while not new, continued to antagonize blacks and their civilian
spokesmen. In denouncing this policy, the Pittsburgh Courier declared that: Proof that the
U.S. Army is the same biased arm of pre-World War II days was in indisputable
evidence. Its readers were told that colored soldiers, without exception, were still being
relegated to labor units in the European-Mediterranean theaters where the fine
assignments and opportunities, with ratings, were listed for white men only . The
newspaper cited assignments in the regulations that were limited to white enlisted
men.110
Yet, when the War Department was queried by President Trumans Committee on
Civil Rights about the status of blacks in the Army, the Secretary of War answered that
blacks were no longer restricted as they had been in the past and he added:
 War Department policy has been and continues to be to train all individuals and
units to such a degree of efficiency that they can effectively perform their mission, in war
and in peace. Training policies do not differentiate between races or troops; opportunities,
requirements, and standards are the same for all.111
The fact remained that blacks posed a major problem. The Army Air Forces,
following the massive demobilization, found a need for blacks because white men were
not enlisting in sufficient numbers to perform the defense mission. Generally myopic
about how policies affected blacks, the service did not agree that the solution to the
problem was integration. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) complained that it had too
many colored personnel, yet the Army Air Forces accepted all blacks it could because of
its manpower needs. By limiting blacks to a few specialties and by not permitting them to
be used in aviation specialties at sites apart from Lockbourne AAF, home of the 477th
Composite Group, TAC indeed had a problem. By the end of 1946, approximately 5,000
of the 18,000 enlisted men in the command were blacks. TAC recognized that blacks were
joining en masse because the military offered a refuge from social and economic
pressures, but the command had more blacks than it could employ. Even though the
Army Air Forces suspended Negro enlistment in mid-1946because of the extraordinary
rise in enlistmentsTAC still had more than it could absorb. The command
acknowledged its inability to use elsewhere excess specialists assigned to Lockbourne,
because segregation precluded their relocation. Like the Army Air Forces at large, TAC
was in a difficult situation. All units needed skilled men, but trained blacks could not be
employed to the extent of their abilities nor wherever needed.112 Segregation, therefore,
proved burdensome for all.
The Tactical Air Command could not resolve its Negro problem because the Air
Force was unable to solve its racial dilemma. In 1948, TAC complained of excessive
assignment of blacks, citing a higher percentage than other commands in the Air Force.
Repeatedly, the command tried to reduce the number to 10 percent, but without
success.113 Although TAC was troubled by the question, integration was never proposed
as a solution. Lockbourne had a chronic shortage of both rated and non-rated Negro
officers, an overage of submarginal enlisted men, and [frequently suffered] losses of
skilled airmen to overseas shipment. At Lockbourne, Negro personnel could be
employed as individuals in any unit [in] which their Military Occupational Specialties
could be utilized, while on other bases blacks could be used only on a unit basis .
Consistent with this policy, wing commanders, with few exceptions, chose to assign their
Negro troops to one squadronthe General Service Squadron (Squadron F)and such
personnel as were assigned over and above that squadrons authorized strength were
considered surplus to the needs of the station, as well as surplus to the needs of the
Command. In many instances, highly trained and skilled technicians performed duties of
firemen and janitors without regard to their capabilities or potentialities, which was an
unjustifiable waste of training and skill.114 Recognizing this, the command might have
condemned segregation, but did not. TAC continued to complain about policy limitations
without suggesting remedies other than to recommend a reduction of the number of
blacks.
In March 1948 TAC issued a staff study titled The Utilization of Negro
Manpower, in which it called for a change in the Air Force recruitment policy to prevent
reenlistment of submarginal individuals. To absorb excess blacks, it suggested creating an
additional squadron designated for blacks, a Squadron E (transportation). It further
recommended better selection criteria for choosing white officers to command Negro
units. The study also suggested that skilled Negro personnel be either reassigned as
individuals to Lockbourne Air Force Base or declared surplus to the Command. It also
wanted all Squadron F units within the Wing Organization to be designated an all-Negro
unit throughout the Tactical Air Command.115 All of these proposals involved
segregation, none suggested ending it, and none was carried out.116
Lockbourne suffered because 35 percent of its men were in AGCT categories IV
and V. These men were untrainable for some of the critical specialties required by the unit.
Yet, the air base had a sufficient number of skilled airmen in certain specialties, who could
be drawn upon and reassigned to overseas bases. To keep Lockbourne manned and
operational, however, TAC had to raid other bases within the command for skilled blacks.
Officer manning in particular became critical. The TAC historian wrote, Certain color
differences made it impossible to assign officers to the Group except those who were
recruited and trained for that Group. This meant that whites could not be assigned
because the 332nd was commanded by a black. There were also too few blacks attending
pilot training to meet the projected needs of the group. Since Negro aviators could only fly
with that unit, they could not achieve a rank commensurate with their experience and skill,
and everyone remained frozen in his grade. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada, the TAC
Commander, wanted to replace Colonel Davis and his staff with whites because Davis was
well overdue for senior schooling, but the Pentagon refused to sanction the move.11 The
Strategic Air Command also agonized over the employment of Negroes and tried to assign
Negro personnel to all of its bases, but local community prejudice and pressures hindered
ease of movement. Housing and demographic statistics indicated that Spokane AFB,
Wash, and Castle AFB, California might accept blacks. But before taking direct action,
SAC surveyed the local communities for housing available, Negro population in the city
and nearby area, and feelings expressed by local authorities. Both Castle and Spokane
had close at hand a small Negro population, but public sentiment in the adjacent
communities was clearly against assignment of Negro troops. SAC headquarters,
therefore, recommended that blacks not be assigned to either base.118
SAC also looked at Selfridge AFB, Mich., north of Detroit. But the city attorney
for the nearest town, Mount Clemens, reported:
The housing situation is very bad, as there has been little building since the War,
and our population has increased. From a quick survey, it would appear that there is no
housing available for the families of colored troops as the colored people in Mount
Clemens are already crowded in to the few areas open to them.119
Blacks in SAC, furthermore, were not well utilized. The SAC history notes that:
Most personnel used were with Aviation Engineer troops on temporary duty at
installations for construction purposes, and there was little hope in such units for
promotion. The historian suggested that blacks could be better used if they could be
moved to bases that had none assigned. But there was reluctance within the civilian
communities and by prospective base commanders to accept them. 120
Only at Godman Field and later at Lockbourne AFB were blacks fully utilized.
Positions in flying, maintenance, and the inner administrative workings of the group and
wing were all manned solely by blacks. Colonel Davis was highly regarded and TAC was
reluctant to replace him with anyone but a white. Blacks were also employed at Tuskegee
Field until it ceased operations in the spring of 1946. After the cessation of hostilities it
was not a truly active base. Still, Tuskegee ended its career under a white commander and
with whites holding nearly all leadership positions, although towards the end some blacks
had worked their way into leadership and management positions.
The white citizens of Alabama remained ambivalent toward Tuskegee. The base
historian recorded that the local white people are willing, and the writer emphasizes
willing, that the station remain in its present location provided it is always under the
command of a white officer and had white officers in positions of control. He wrote that
if the white leadership were withdrawn, the local white citizens would like to have the
station closed immediately. There are white merchants in Tuskegee, however, who realize
that the field is a great source of revenue, but even these would prefer that the colored
personnel send their money to town and not come with it. 121
Naturally, after the war the school slowly wound down, producing fewer pilots
each quarter, and the staff dropped commensurately. In September 1945, 20 pilots earned
wings, and a month later only 9 graduated. After Japan surrendered in August, students
were allowed to resign from the program and the Air Corps in practically any phase of
training.122 As the faculty diminished in size, the number of blacks on the faculty and
staff increased slightly, but it never reached a significant fraction of the total.123 When
Class 46A graduated from Tuskegee in March 1946, it was the only group of students to
graduate from an Army Air Forces flying school that month.124 The following 15 April,
Tuskegee was transferred to TAC from the Flying Training Command, thus terminating its
existence as a flying school. After the last blacks won their wings at Tuskegee, Negro
aviators began to train without fanfare and nearly without comment at Randolph Field,
Tex. Because there were so few of them, or in spite of that fact, segregation was not
practiced at Randolph.125 The issue which had prompted William Hastie to resign was
quietly resolved.
But Tuskegee did not end its existence without controversy. The President of
Tuskegee, Frederick D. Patterson, tried to keep the airfield open as a permanent base for
all Negroes flying in the post-war era. He wanted to retain the flying school and the
tactical units in the Alabama community. Soon after recommending this to General
Marshall, Patterson withdrew the suggestion, probably because of pressure from within
the Negro community. The Negro press was bitter in its criticism. The Pittsburgh Courier
viewed with apprehension Pattersons urgings to the Chief of Staff. Most of the
newspapers condemned him for his desire to promote segregation at a profit to his
institution. The Norfolk Journal and Guide scolded the Tuskegee president for not first
consulting the pilots themselves, who, the newspaper knew, objected to such a move.126
The Negro leadership, as expressed in its leading newspapers and its organizations, fought
for integration and nothing less because segregation remained intolerable to most blacks.
Ben Davis Air Force
The 477th, however, remained a segregated unit. At Godman Field the group
consisting of one bomber squadron and one single engine fighter squadroncontinued to
exist, if not to prosper. Their first designated mission was not flying, but rather to
discharge personnel who no longer desired to remain in the service. The group trained
men and flew in air shows to maintain proficiency, but it steadily lost personnel through
separation and airplanes through age and accidents. By mid-February 1946, the unit was
reduced to 16 B-25s and 12 P-47s, and 256 officers and 390 airmen. Four months earlier,
they had had 243 officers and 949 enlisted men. From the aftermath of the Freeman Field
mutiny to the dissolution of the Negro wing at Lockbourne, Colonel Davis was the
commander.127
On 13 March 1946, the 477th moved to Lockbourne Army Air Field, Ohio. The
unit for some time had wanted to move from Godman to a better location, and the men
and government searched for a new site. But as General Eaker noted, in a letter to the
Gillem Board, the unit was not welcome anywhere. Even in Ohio the editor of the
Columbus Citizen opposed the units move to Lockbourne Field, just south of the city.
Objecting to American servants doing the fighting for America, he labeled the 477th a
bunch of trouble makers, and wrote that he could prevent the move if I really wanted
to. He maintained that this is still a white mans country. The relocation, however, was
made despite his objections. Davis subsequently noticed a definite rise in morale of all
personnel as well as an increase in effort. Godman was an old and dilapidated air field,
while Lockbourne was in much better condition.128 The Negro flying unit remained at the
latter until the Air Force was integrated.
Once there, the 477ths mission did not change. TAC described it as the
demobilization and recruitment of military personnel, and active training to maintain
combat readiness.129 Accordingly, the unit participated in war games and flew
proficiency and tactical missions. The airmen practiced bombing and rocket firings on
ranges and performed maintenance chores to keep the unit flying. During 1946, their
flying safety record was either comparable to TACs or even slightly better. Throughout
that year the group organized a public relations effort entertaining the citizens of Ohio
with air shows, field days, fire power demonstrations, static displays, and other activities
to better inform the people about their flying mission. The 477th also participated in air
shows and other aerial demonstrations elsewhere in the United States.130
When Tuskegee closed in mid-1946, pilots who desired to remain in the AAF were
reassigned to Lockbourne. This put great pressure upon the squadrons aircraft. The large
number of pilots could not get in the minimal flying hours necessary to maintain their
proficiency without the addition of more aircraft or a reduction in the number of pilots. At
this time they also faced chronic shortages of maintenance personnel. The pilot flying
crunch eased after airmen began to separate at a faster rate than was desired. By the fall of
1946 the fighter squadron had only 22 of its authorized 78 pilots. The unit suffered even
greater losses in some of its important enlisted specialties.131
The Negro press monitored the activities of this unique organization and, in fact,
much of its total military coverage was devoted to Davis group. When the bombers and
fighters flew to Blyth AAF, Calif., to participate in an amphibious operation, the
Pittsburgh Courier reported their flying activities and commented that General Quesada
had high praise for the squadrons performance.132 In spite of these achievements, a
lower percentage of Negro officers won regular Army commissions than white. The
Pittsburgh Courier front-paged the complaints of Negro flyers about this situation and
concluded that No one is on their side. Thus, of the 9,800 officers in the Army selected
for augmentation, only 31 were blacks.133 It should be noted that regular officers have
much greater tenure than reservists and a regular commission was highly prized.
When either of the Davises made public pronouncements, the Negro press gave
their statements extensive coverage. The elder Davis spoke at a church meeting in
Columbus in the summer of 1946 and the Pittsburgh Courier captioned the article: Armed
Service Bias is Shame of the Nation. On this occasion, Davis said that segregation was
destructive of morale and that there was no such animal as separate but equal. He called
for integration at once.134 His son, in a later speech, compared the Navys racial program
to the Army Air Forces and found the latter wanting. He had observed Navy integration on
a cruise and found morale among blacks was higher in the Navy than in the AAF.
Integration, he said, had not resulted in racial friction even within the confined quarters of
ships.135 Both father and son had been on record favoring integration and neither feared
issuing public statements to the Negro press about sensitive matters. The black press also
sounded an alarm at any hint that the 477th or its successor, the 332d, would be
dissolved.136 If the unit was to be disbanded, the men would have to be integrated into
other units and no other approach was acceptable.
The 477th ceased to exist in mid-1947, but was immediately replaced by the 332d
Group (later the 332d Fighter Wing). On 10 July, the B-25s were deactivated after taking
part in combat exercises in central Georgia. Their mission was to drop bombs and strafe
simulated enemy targets. After these operations, they were praised by Maj. Gen. Paul L.
Williams, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force. Williams later commented that
the record of the parent units composing the 477th is well known to every student of
World War II history. He expressed pleasure with their accomplishments in their first
year at Lockbourne.137
The 332d Group was formally activated on 1 July 1947 and comprised of three
fighter squadrons: the historic 99th, 100th, and 301st. The groups mission was the
continuous training of officers and enlisted personnel by an actual on-the-job training
program that will broaden military experience and permit training in administrative and
technical duties which will qualify personnel for their peacetime responsibilities and also
train component units and crews in accordance with proficiency standards prescribed by
higher echelons. The B-25 pilots were retrained to fly fighters, but 25 officer crew
members were removed from flying status on 1 July as a result. These were mainly
navigator-bombardiers, who could not be absorbed into white units, even though there
might exist a need for them.138
In the next 6 months, during their check-out period, parts of the group took part in
war games and maneuvers at Myrtle Beach, S. C, Turner Field, Ga., and Fort Knox, Ky.
For all intents and purposes, this unit flew missions similar to any other TAC fighter
group. In August, the group was redesignated a wing, though it was still chronically
undermanned.
When the Air Force became an independent service on 18 September 1947, the
group retained its status and the occasion is hardly mentioned in its history. The 332d had
been segregated in the Army and remained segregated. Of the 15,473 Negro airmen in the
Air Force, more than 10 percent were stationed at Lockbourne, and of the 257 Negro
officers more than 75 percent were based there.139 The remainder of the officers were
scattered over the world, many as commanders of all-Negro aviation squadrons.
Although there were 55 groups in the Air Force at the end of 1947, not all blacks
were pleased with the miniscule size of the Negro component. Air Force plans to expand
to 70 groups did not include creation of additional Negro flying units. The Baltimore
Afro-American warned its readership: Wake Up, People! Realize what is happening
before it is too late. Congress authorized the Air Force to expand to 70 groups and this
has not done us a particle of good. Having only one group was objectionable because it
was segregated, and represented less than 2% of the Air Force strength although we are
supposed to have 10% and did not cover all types of planes and services. The
newspaper further lamented that there were only eight colored flying cadets in training
for pilots. Blacks were moving backwards, the paper complained, because fighter planes
did not require crews and teamwork. The Air Force was accused of holding our boys
down to fighter planes . They never have a chance to check out in multi-engine
planes . Because of the nature of fighter aircraft, there was no possibility to employ the
few colored bombardiers and navigators that were trained in the last war . The article
commented upon the lack of promotion potential for blacks and concluded: If this is
democracy, democracy stinks!140
The 332d, however, continued to fly. Throughout 1948, the unit was plagued by
manpower shortages and an inability to employ the men in specialties for which they were
trained. As of 1 January 1948, 49 of 80 officers and 102 of 338 enlisted men were
utilized out of their Military Occupation Specialty. Six months later, the unit was short 3
medical officers, 1 electronics officer, 28 fighter pilots, and an undisclosed number of
enlisted men.141 The group-sized unit could ill afford to be short of so many fighter
pilots.
In addition to manpower problems, the familiar social problems plagued these men
in the postwar era. Men of the 332d were socially segregated while on maneuvers in the
southern states as well as in other places. During war games, they were generally messed
and billeted separately and also attended separate clubs.142 Most of these events escaped
the Negro press. In mid-1948, however, the Pittsburgh Courier protested the exclusion of
the 332ds officers from the Camp Campbell, Ky., officers club. When the post
commander offered to open a separate club, blacks participating in the exercise objected.
Although the newspaper reported that Secretary of Defense James Forrestal was studying
the issue and that such segregation practices were against regulations, nothing came of the
protest.143
During its last year the 332d was undermanned, segregated, and largely neglected.
From June 1948 to June 1949, however, it suffered several fatal accidents, but participated
in Operation Combine III (one of the largest war games in the immediate postwar era),
successfully passed an Operational Readiness Inspection, won an Air Force Gunnery meet
in May 1949, and celebrated Sgt. Mai Whitfields victory in the 800-meter run in the 1948
Olympics. On 1 June 1949, the wing had 242 of its authorized 260 officers assigned, but
only 1,381 of its 1,931 authorized airmen. On 30 June 1949, the 332d concluded its
history as a black wing.144
 Why were there chronic manpower problems? An October 1945 memorandum
written by Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, to General Arnold
may provide an answer. Vandenbergs recommendations appear to have been generally
followed after the war. More important, in 1948 Vandenberg succeeded General Spaatz as
Chief of Staff of the newly created independent Air Force, and he brought the Air Force
into the integration era. His personal papers lack references to blacks and few of his
associates, subordinates, and superiors have been able to comment about his attitude
toward blacks in the Air Force. Perhaps the only time Vandenberg is on the record on this
subject may be found in an October 1945 memorandum written to General Arnold:
Comparing Negro to white applicants, approximately 17 times more colored
applicants must be screened than white to obtain the desired number . Due to the lower
average intelligence of the Negro, the elimination rate in the Negro pilot training program
from pre-flight throughout advanced was much higher than the white . On a
comparative scale, the colored will be grouped in the lower or minimum qualifying scores
whereas the white applicant will be spread evenly throughout the range . Minimum
qualifying scores had to be lowered for the colored program; that is, where the minimum
qualifying stanine score* for a white pilot was normally 7, Negro qualifying score was
lowered to 4 generally, and for short periods had to be disregarded entirely for those
individuals who were [physically?] qualified for aircrew training. A considerably higher
percentage of colored applicants than white volunteered for elimination because of fear of
flying. Upon graduation the average colored graduate was generally about equal to what
would be considered a weak average for the white; and in many instances to maintain the
colored units, it was necessary to pass borderline cases that would have been eliminated
had the applicants been white . The outstanding deficiency in the Negro officer was lack
of leadership it was necessary to fill key positions with white personnel. Similarly,
upon activation of the one medium bomb group, it was necessary to return Colonel Davis
from the Mediterranean theater to assume command. No other Negro officer had
developed sufficiently to assume this position.145
Vandenberg cited what he considered to be the poor combat record of blacks,
noting that the 332d during the war in one 11-month period had 91 air victories compared
with 1,024 to the remaining three groups of the Wing; or an average of 8.3 victories per
month for the 332d as compared with 24.2 per month for each of the other groups . He
further stated:
Notwithstanding the claims that all people are created equal, the vast majority of
whites insist on racial segregation. To avoid incidents and to provide for harmony in [the]
services, both for whites and colored, segregation is essential if Negroes are to be selected
for training
*A separate rating or score for each of certain Air Force specialties, indicating the
predictive aptitude of a person.
Due to lower average intelligence, the demonstrated lack of leadership, general
poor health, and extremely high elimination rate in training, it is far more expensive to
train Negro officer personnel than white. Also statistics indicate that the end product
obtained in Negro training is much less efficient than that obtained in white. Particularly
in the commissioned bracket, the training of Negro personnel is not economically sound.
 Due to the excessive cost of training Negro aircrew and commissioned personnel,
as well as the generally poor results obtained from the graduates, further training of Negro
personnel cannot be economically justified. Further, no compromise in procurement or
training standards should be made in peacetime in order to obtain Negro applicants. If
training of colored applicants is to continue, they should be required to meet the same
rigid standards in selection and training as whites.146
It would be unfair to assume that Vandenberg did not alter his views in the 3Y2
years between the appearance of this memorandum and the successful integration of the
Air Force. The memorandum is important, nevertheless. Blacks were commissioned and
permitted to fly after the war, but there is no record that they were accepted at lower
standards than whites. If the 332d could not be maintained by any other device during the
war, how else could it have been manned after the war? It would seem that Vandenbergs
recommendation had influence.
When the Air Force integrated in 1949, blacks made-up about 0.6 percent of the
officer corps, a lower percentage than during the war years. Whatever Vandenbergs views
on segregation in 1949, when he stated them in 1945, they were not different from any
high uniformed official with the exception of Colonel Parrish. The record will show,
however, that once Vandenberg was ordered to integrate, a plan already had been prepared
and the Air Force integrated with grace, speed, honesty, and success. Air Force integration
was aided enormously by presidential politics and by the man Vandenberg selected to be
his Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel, Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards.
 Chapter III
UNBUNCHING
Segregation had proved to be a decidedly inadequate personnel policy. Segregated
units could not rise above the low performance of their members, forcing the military to
under-employ those blacks who had the perseverance and intelligence to rise above a
deprived past. Although some Air Force leaders might doubt that blacks could do work
equal to whites, virtually all were in agreement that segregation was inefficient.
Arguments arose over what to do about the situation. The Air Force wanted to employ
blacks more efficiently, but it did not believe that it could break out of the circle of
prejudice it was helping to maintain. The logical answer was desegregation, but the Air
Force and American society were not ready for it.
Desegregation and integration came anyway. Many causes precipitated this result.
The Air Force integrated because its chief of personnel wanted to end manpower waste
and its service secretary independently supported the move. Equally important was
President Trumans Executive Order 9981 of 26 July 1948 to the armed services to foster
equal opportunity. While the Army did not take action on Trumans directive until forced
to do so during the Korean War, the Presidents order was the vital catalyst to the Air
Force, without which there would not have been a movement toward Air Force
unbundling.1 The Air Force decision to integrate had been announced prior to the
issuance of Trumans executive order, yet integration actually followed the Presidents
action by 10 months.
The Air Force Shifts Policy
Although it was not fully recognizable at the time, there had been a fundamental
shift in American attitudes which made it possible for Truman to issue his order. That the
military services were the first elements in American society to integrate and become for
all intents and purposes the most completely integrated element in society, is attributable
to hardheaded military pragmatism and the effects of the normal American political
processes. Legitimate pressures were placed upon President Truman to demonstrate his
willingness to humanize U.S. race relations.
Even before Truman issued his executive order, the Air Force had studied the
impact of segregation upon its own effectiveness. Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Air Force
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, had initiated the inquiry. As a member of the McCloy
Committee during the war he had long maintained that segregation was a waste of
manpower. In the spring of 1948, and perhaps even earlier, Lt. Col. Jack Marr, a staff
officer in the office of Air Force Personnel, was put to work investigating segregation.2
Edwards did not believe the Negro flying units of World War II had been effective.
Although he recognized individual flying ability, he found the aggregate constituted a poor
combat unit.3 It seemed to him that talent and well-maintained equal standards were the
answers. He recognized deficiencies in Air Force Negro personnel policy and decided that
corrective action was clearly indicated. Edwards saw waste and inefficiency in
employing only blacks within the limited structure of Negro units and Negro vacancies.
He noted that there were some specialties in which there were more qualified Negroes
than there were vacancies; in other specialties there were more vacancies than there were
qualified individuals to fill the vacancies. The obvious problem was that the Negro
surplus could not be employed elsewhere because of segregation. Edwards also found that
the 10 percent quota further aggravated the problem. The quota system and segregation in
particular combined to undermine the 332d. Edwards pointed out that the unit was
incapable of duplication or expansion, and, therefore, provided no mobilization
potential. More seriously, if the unit were committed to combat, it was virtually certain
that qualified replacements could not be provided to maintain it.4 He obviously referred
here to the wartime problems of finding qualified cadets for the 332d and 477th and of the
necessity to lower entrance standards to obtain adequate numbers.
 Marrs study and Edwards attitude influenced General Spaatz, the first Air Force
Chief of Staff, to issue an encouraging statement on integration. In an April 1948 letter to
Lemuel E. Graves of the Pittsburgh Courier, Spaatz promised that Air Force blacks would
soon be used on a broader professional scale than has obtained heretofore. The chief
also told Graves that blacks would soon comprise 10 percent of the Air Force and would
continue to serve in combat units. He stated that all airmen would be guaranteed equal
opportunity regardless of race. His summary paragraph is most significant. He wrote:
It is the feeling of this Headquarters that the ultimate Air Force objective must be
to eliminate segregation among its personnel by the unrestricted use of Negro personnel in
free competition for any duty within the Air Force for which they may qualify. The limit
of attaining this end will, naturally, depend on the degree to which that attainment affects
the effective operation of the Air Force.5
The wording in the above paragraph was repeated exactly by Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert when he testified in April 1948 before the National
Defense Conference on Negro affairs, a group of distinguished blacks. Zuckert told them
that the Air Force accepts no doctrine of racial superiority or inferiority. Edwards was
present when Zuckert read the statement.6 This Air Force position was in sharp contrast to
that of Army Secretary Kenneth Royall. He told the conference that he would maintain
segregation because it worked better than integration, but that he would continue to work
to improve the lot of blacks within a segregated environment.7 Amongst the blacks
presentJames C. Evans, Charles Houston, Mary McCleod Bethune, Sadie T. M.
Alexander, Truman Gibson, Mordecai Johnson, Walter White, and Roy Wilkins, and
othersthere was unanimous belief that segregation was inconsistent with improving the
racial situation. Because of Royalls position, the conference broke up. On the other hand,
General Edwards, who testified after Royall, endorsed desegregation.8
Royall was probably disturbed about the Air Force statement. A few days later he
wrote to Secretary of Defense Forrestal complaining that the Air Force did not make it
clear that they followed and planned to follow the same course as does the Army . The
demonstrated tendency of one of the services unjustly throwing the burden on the other is
not conducive to the correct spirit of unification and adds to the already unfortunate
situations that have recently arisen.9 It would appear that Royalls objections to the Air
Force taking the initiative in race relations was a major obstacle to the latter promulgating
the new policy. Richard Dalfiume identified him as the individual who caused the Air
Force to delay, because the Army was unwilling to be alone in maintaining segregation.
Lee Nichols gave the same explanation for the Air Force delay.10
There must, however, be more to the story. Secretary Forrestal was a well-known
advocate of integration and had begun the process when he had been Secretary of the
Navy.11 His successor, Louis Johnson, also was in favor of integration. In addition, it is
known that Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington wanted to desegregate.
Symington, who is given credit for participating in the formulation of President Trumans
Executive Order 9981, was characterized as a man who refused to recognize racial
distinctions and who used high-powered business methods to bring racial equality to the
Air Force .12 As early as 1947, Symington was on record that blacks should be able to
enter the Air Force whenever they could on their merits. Lee Nichols, furthermore, credits
Symington for inspiring the Marr report that challenged seg-regation.13 Dalfiume is no
less charitable towards Symington.14 How then does one explain the long delay in
bringing about integration if the Defense Secretary and the Air Force Secretary were in
agreement over integration and if the Navy had already ended compulsory segregation?
Ascribing the Air Force delay to Royall is inadequate and an oversimplified explanation,
although he probably played a major part.15 Another cause must be found among Air
Force leaders who opposed such a radical policy.
Trying to identify the opponents to integration more than 25 years after the event
poses problems. Air Force integration was one of the great success stories of the civil
rights movement. Almost instantly the 332d was dissolved and the units pilots,
mechanics, and technicians were dispersed throughout the Air Force, performing their
mission without rancor or disruption. In rapid order also, the Negro service units
disappeared, until there were none 3 years after the new policy had been initiated. The Air
Force almost completed integration before the Army began. Unlike the Navy, it was not a
token action (there were no Air Force Negro steward corps personnel waiting tables 10
years after the inception of integration). Therefore, it is difficult to identify those Air Force
leaders who opposed integration, but it is inconceivable to imagine that Royalls objection
deterred the Air Force from doing what it really wanted to do for more than a year.
According to Lee Nichols, there was stubborn resistance from many Air Force
officers to the preliminary integration proposals. After the Truman orders were issued
there were alarmed reactions from Air Force generals who predicted serious disturbances.
According to Nichols, General Edwards told Symington that he had found solid
opposition among [Air Force] officers to integrating Negroes and whites in the same
units.16 Dalfiume wrote that Edwards faced bitter opposition to a policy of integration
from Air Force officers when he first broached the new program.17 Nichols added that
many Air Force officers, particularly southerners, were certain the radical departure from
past practices would start a chain reaction of riot, disruption and desertion.18 Whatever
role Secretary Royall played, he had support among highly placed officers in the Air
Force. A selling job of some magnitude had to be done.19
Many retired generals interviewed stated that there was no real opposition. But
when my tape recorder was turned off, they did admit that various high ranking officers
had indeed opposed integration. Some of these generalshighly placed in Air Force
Personnel and elsewherewere strongly against integration.20 Eugene Zuckert,
Symingtons project officer for integration, maintained that the delay in implementation
was caused by the selling that had to be done in the organization. He recalled the names
of several generals who opposed integration, including the influential Gen. George C.
Kenney who flew to Washington to convince Zuckert that integration, the living
integration, barracks integration, dining hall integration was not good for Negroes. It
seemed evident to Zuckert that Kenneys objections stemmed from his own prejudices.
Zuckert added that there was a lot of that around.21 General Parrish noted that one of
the key generals in the Air Force Office of Personnel always referred to blacks
negatively.22
Gen. Dean C. Strother, Chief of Air Force Military Personnel and formerly
commander of the numbered Air Force controlling the 332d during the war, also opposed
integration. He was unimpressed with the wartime record of the 332d. It was, he said, very
deficient when Colonel Davis was not there to lead the group. Even in the 1970s, he
continued to believe that integration was a mistake. He recalled his previous experience
with the unit. He related in 1974: I thought we were rushing into it. That was my view at
the time and still is. I think they rushed into it too fast; theyve almost ruined the services.
General Strother maintained that most of the Air Staff also thought that the Air Force was
rushing into integration. He was certain that the greater bulk of the people on the Air
Staff shared his view. After the President issued his directive, however, there were no
overt objections. Once ordered, Strother said, we all did it as best we could. He
commented that Edwards and Zuckert carried out integration almost by themselves.
Zuckert had explained to Strother that integration was a political thing . Its going to
happen sooner or later, so lets do it now. The key to accomplishing it, of course, was the
Truman order. Strother admitted that it would not have been done so fast without the
order, and he concluded: Truman put out a damned flat order and the Air Force ran with
it. Being good soldiers we did the best we could with what we had.23
Strother remained at Air Force Personnel until integration was completed and he is
probably representative of the opposition that had to be overcome. Nichols said that
Symington had to override these objectors and had to tell the generals to stop their double
talk and act.24 Symington stated that he told the Air Force generals that he expected no
one to frustrate integration. If you dont agree with the policy, Symington said, then
you ought to resign now. And, we dont want to do it halfway .25 The record shows
that Air Force integration was carried out with grace and speedily and that Trumans order
did in fact electrify the atmosphere.26 General Edwards noted that Trumans order was
instrumental in accomplishing his mission.27 Symington said that integration was the
right thing to do morally , the right thing to do legally , the right to do militarily
. He also cited another imperative: The Commander-in-Chief said that this should be
done and so we did it.28
When Edwards briefed Air Force commanders in April 1949 on the new policy, he
cited Trumans order. He told them that the President had ordered integration and had also
created a bodythe Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services. Its job was to monitor integration progress within the armed forces. This
committee was authorized and directed to examine the rules, procedures, and practices of
the services to determine in what respect such rules, procedures, and practices may be
altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of the Bresi-dent.29 Edwards
emphasized the above words from the executive order to make it clear that the Air Force
was being monitored to ensure that it fully implemented the order of its Commander-in-
Chief.
Edwards told the senior commanders that the Air Force [had] adopted a policy of
integration under which Negro officers and airmen may be assigned to any duty in any Air
Force unit or activity in accordance with the qualifications of the individual and the needs
of the service. This was done out of a need for efficiency, economy, and effective air
power. He said the new policy did not mean the immediate end of all Negro units in the
Air Force. It definitely will mean that Negro personnel will not be restricted to Negro
units and will be procured, trained and assigned on the basis of individual merit and ability
rather than on basis of Negro quotas to man Negro units. Edwards informed the
commanders that the policy had been under review for some time and that the Chief of
Staff was on record against quotas and special consideration based on race. General
Vandenberg, he said, was opposed to forcing or retarding a mans military development on
the basis of race and that such was debilitating and detrimental to the organization as a
whole.30
Edwards explained that two initial actions were planned. First, the 332d Wing
should be deactivated on or before 30 June 1949. A screening board would be established
to check on the qualifications of the men and to reassign them. The objective, he said,
is to reassign throughout the Air Force, worldwide, the skilled and qualified individuals
from Lockbourne. Such personnel would be assigned to white units, just like any other
officer or airmen of similar skills and qualifications. Edwards told his audience that the
numbers involved were not large, estimating that only 200 officers and 1,500 airmen
would be sufficiently qualified and proficient for assignment to white units. He told
them that such men could be absorbed without difficulty, if spread out thinly and
evenly.31
The screening board led to anxiety among some blacks and angered others. It was
obvious that more would be accomplished than just facilitating relocation. There were
more than 200 officers and 1,500 airmen at Lockbourne, and apparently Edwards did not
anticipate that all of them would pass the screening. Blacks had the same specialty codes
as whites, but the former had also to pass a special muster. Edwards said that Colonel
Davis knew of the screening board and fully understands the implications of this policy.
He intends to recommend Negroes for assignment to white units only in those cases
where the individual is, first, of such temperament, judgment, and common sense that he
can get along smoothly as an individual in a white unit, and secondly, that his ability is
such as to warrant respect of the personnel of the unit to which he is transferred. The
order of priorities is interesting, for it placed the personality factor above specialty
qualification. Apparently Edwards did not want blacks who were identified as
troublemakers or who were overtly resentful. He said that unqualified or unusable
blacks would be discharged under current regulations. Those who were usable would be
recommended for assignment to Negro service units.32
One could interpret Edwards policy, at least initially, as one of evolutionary
gradualism. The approach adopted then was to dissolve the 332d, see how it goes, and
gradually follow it with the breakup of the Negro service units. All other commands
would also conduct screening boards and reassign skilled and qualified individuals to
white units. Edwards told the Commanders Conference that the screening boards
represented only the initial implementation of the policy. The matter must be watched
closely to assure continued implementation of the policy. He announced the end of the
black enlistment quotas and told his audience that Negroes would not be subject to quotas
for admission to schools. They would, he said, have to meet the same standards as
anyone else, and will be classified, assigned, promoted or eliminated in accordance with
standards which will apply equally to all per-sonnel.33
Why did General Edwards decide to maintain the all-Negro service units
indefinitely? Perhaps he did not expect that many blacks would be assigned to white units.
He stated that the number of Negroes who will be assigned to white units will probably
be about 1 percent of the white strength. This figure is supported by experience in
numerous civilian enterprises and by the experience of the Navy in implementation of a
very similar policy. Blacks in 1948 constituted about 6 percent of the Air Force, and if all
were integrated, they should have made up the same percentage in the previously white
units, unless many were eliminated through screening and others were relegated to service
units. Edwards recognized that some Negroes were not suited for assignment to white
units for various reasons, and that the retention of this type of Negro in a Negro unit is
authorized.34 This probably indicates that at least in the spring of 1949 Edwards
expected to go no further than the Navy.35
In his several references to the Navy, he admitted that the principal point of
discussion within Air Staff involved housing blacks and whites in the same barracks. But
he found some solace in the Navys experience. He stated that in the Navy, and I have
checked this by personal observation, implementation of this policy has relieved rather
than emphasized the situation. He said blacks were assigned to compartments aboard ship
with whites doing the same job and that since the number of Negroes is small, 1 percent,
and the Negro individuals are well qualified for their jobs, they are accepted by their
associates on the basis of merit and ability.36 The only way the Navy could have limited
integration was to assign most of the blacks to the stewards corps, which is what they did.
Finally, Edwards advised the commanders that they had an escape valve, if a
problem arose. Squadron commanders, he said, were not prohibited from assigning
separate sleeping accommodations within the unit. We do not believe this will be
necessary but it may aid in the smooth implementation of the Air Force policy. It was, he
said, purely a matter for local determination. (This particular clause, however, was deleted
from the final draft of the integrating directives.) Edwards ended his presentation by
reiterating to the commanders that desegregation had been approved at the highest levels
and that it would work because it had proven itself in the Navy. The Navy has had this
system for years and has found it wholly practicable. It is in effect at such southern naval
stations as Corpus Christi, Texas; Norfolk, Virginia; Memphis, Tennessee; New Orleans,
Louisiana; and the Navy reports No trouble. He urged commanders to give the new
policy their personal attention and to exercise positive command and control to minimize
frictions and incidents. He added that unless younger Air Force commanders were guided
and counselled by the senior commanders in unbiased implementation, we may encounter
serious trouble which the Navy has ably avoided. This policy, he concluded, must have
your personal attention and personal control.37 It seems obvious that the planned policy
was not as revolutionary as what would take place and that there was no immediate
expectation on Edwards part of complete integration.38
The policy that Edwards outlined was elaborated in two Air Force letters, No. 35-
3, dated 11 May 1949 which described Air Force Personnel Policies, and a separate
classified letter addressed to Commanding Generals, Major Commands, which required
implementation of the first letter (see Appendixes 2-2 and 2-3). Both letters were rewritten
a number of times, but except for deleting a statement of the right of local commanders to
segregate blacks in all Negro units or living quarters, changes made were minor. The first
letter, echoing in tone the Presidents Executive Order, stated:
It is the policy of the United States Air Force that there shall be equality of
treatment and opportunity in the Air Force without regard to race, color, religion, or
national origin.
To insure uniform application of this policy the following supplemental policies
are announced.
a. There will be no strength quotas of minority groups in the Air Force troop basis.
b. Some units will continue to be manned with Negro personnel; however, all
Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Negro units. Qualified Negro personnel may
be assigned to fill any position vacancy in any Air Force organization without regard to
race . Commanding officers are hereby directly charged with the responsibility for
implementation of the above policy.39
The last sentence is of particular significance, for it is quite explicit. It determined
who had to shoulder the responsibility for the success or failure of integration.
Commanders were also informed that they had to insure that all personnel in their
command are indoctrinated thoroughly with the necessity for the unreserved acceptance of
the provisions of this policy.40
In the first draft of the letter, dated 31 December 1948, the following paragraph
appeared:
Where personnel of various races are assigned to the same unit, commanding
officers are authorized to take whatever reasonable measures they consider in keeping
harmony among the personnel to include the provisions of separate sleeping
accommodations within the unit, if considered necessary; however, there will be no racial
distinctions made in the utilization of government facilities under the jurisdiction of the
Air Force.41
This paragraph remained in all versions, generally undated, until the final draft. In
view of General Edwards comments of 12 April 1948, the contents of the above
paragraph must also have been the policy at that point.
The classified implementing letter spelled out what was expected of the major
commanders:
Negro personnel may be assigned to any position for which qualified, and may be
permitted to attend appropriate service schools which will enhance their qualifications and
value to the Air Force based upon the merit and ability of the individuals concerned and
without reference to Negro quotas or Negro vacancies .
The implementation of AF Letter 35-3 can best be accomplished through the
careful selection and assignment of skilled and qualified Negro personnel to appropriate
duties in Air Force units. It has been proven that well-qualified individuals can be
absorbed into white organizations without insurmountable social or morale problems
arising as a result of such assignment.
The letter then described the plan to break up the wing at Lockbourne and reassign
the men to other units according to their specialties. This precluded unit commanders from
employing Negro airplane mechanics as janitors. Men at bases other than Lockbourne who
already worked with white units were to be permanently transferred to those units and live
with the assigned personnel. Others employed in all-Negro units, but possessing abilities
to work in white units, also were to be transferred. Negro airmen with qualifying aptitudes
were to be sent to school. The one concession to segregation was that blacks who desired
to remain in all-Negro organizations could do so voluntarily. No time limits were placed
upon the life of these units. Trumans Executive Order 9981 was appended to this letter
and commanders were instructed to put these policies into effect without delay, but doing
so gradually, smoothly, and without friction or incident. Prompt and appropriate
disciplinary action was to be taken where necessary to prevent friction or incidents.42
In the early drafts of this letter, Colonel Marr added a paragraph (later deleted)
explaining how well integration had worked in the Navy and how perhaps problems could
be avoided in the Air Force. He urged:
Care should be taken to insure that a reasonably small number of Negro personnel
is assigned to any individual white organization; in no case will the Negro enlisted
strength of the organization exceed 10 percent of the total enlisted strength of the
organization without approval of this headquarters. This limitation will not apply to
student populations, processing stations or similar activities, and of course does not
pertain to organizations manned entirely by Negro personnel . Negro individuals who
are considered by the appropriate commander as being best suited for assignment to a
Negro unit will remain in their present assignment unless eligible for separation from the
service under current directives.43
It is easy to see that the last sentence as well as the entire paragraph could well
vitiate the policy if left in the hands of unsympathetic unit commanders. These two
provisions coupled with barracks segregation might have undermined integration and it
was important that they be deleted. The Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment,
the Fahy Committee, deleted much of the paragraph and the provision allowing
commanders to designate blacks for all-Negro units.44 The committee did not, however,
delete the statement regarding barracks segregation, but Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force Eugene Zuckert did. I wouldnt want to give the commanders that kind of
sweeping power, he said. I would be afraid of how it might be exercised.45
Clearly, political pressure played almost no part in Edwards decision or in the
form of implementation. Army historian Morris MacGregor, who extensively investigated
the question of armed forces integration, concluded it was not forced and that integration
came after each service proved conclusively to itself that segregation was an inefficient
way for the armed forces to use its manpower. Although he considered the civil rights
movement a factor, MacGregor believes pragmatism was the key.46
The military was aware of the activities of Negro pressure groups and read Negro
newspapers in order to understand their views of military affairs. A 15 April 1948
memorandum to the Air Force Director of Military Personnel indicates that his office was
aware it was being monitored by Negro pressure groups. The Air Force did not plan to use
surplus Negro navigator/bombardiers after the war, yet these men continued to draw flight
pay although they did not fly. According to the memorandum, five officers at Lockbourne
were not assigned to bomber or transport crews because all these units were white. The
dilemma was clear: to continue these Negro officers on flying status and risk criticism
which alleges unjustifiable use of pay, or to remove these Negro officers from flying
status and risk criticism which alleges racial discrimination. The authors recommended
that the five officers remain on flying status, rather than risk criticism of the Air Force
from Negro organizations. They feared that charges would follow and be more damaging
to the Air Force than criticism arising from a liberal interpretation of the justification of
retaining these officers on flying status.47
Although notions of efficiency mainly motivated Air Force officials, this is not to
say that political pressures had no influence. Politics played a significant role in President
Trumans decision to issue Executive Order 9981 and to move the recalcitrant members of
the Air Force hierarchy. As noted above, this enabled Edwards and Symington to carry out
the Presidents wishes. When Mr. Truman decided to run for a second term in his own
right in 1948, he needed all the voter support he could find, including the black vote. One
way to do it was to integrate the armed forces and to take a strong civil rights stance.
Political Pressure and the Election of 1948
Trumans order had a long period of gestation, going back to the publication of To
Secure These Rights* in the fall of 1947 by the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights.
Established the previous January, this group strongly recommended armed forces
integration. In his earlier campaigns for public office, Truman had actively sought Negro
votes from his Missouri constituency. Later, as a Senator from a border state, he compiled
a good record on civil rights, although he was no zealot on the subject.48 As President,
Truman inherited the unresolved civil rights conflict of the Roosevelt administration,
but not the good will and affection most blacks had for his predecessor. Roosevelt, who
rarely supported or endorsed civil rights legislation, had been unwilling to attack the many
forms of discrimination existing in the United States. In particular, he had not wanted to
antagonize southern Democrats, whose votes he needed to implement his economic
programs. Nevertheless, blacks still considered Roosevelt a friend.49
The question of Trumans motivation has sparked a debate among historians.
Professor William C. Berman holds that Truman responded to the issue of civil rights in a
way that maximized political benefits for him and his party. Throughout, writes Berman,
Truman was politically wary and canny and always ambivalent because he opposed social
equality. Berman acknowledged Trumans rhetoric, but he said this was not synonymous
with active support for legislative action. Berman agrees that Executive Order 9981 was
Trumans greatest civil rights achievement and a racial breakthrough, but attributed its
adoption to pressure from A. Philip Randolph, Walter White, and others, and to the
overwhelming desire to win Negro votes in 1948. According to Berman: Negro votes
not simple humanitarianism though there may have been some of thatproduced
whatever token gains Negroes were to make in the years Truman inhabited the White
House.50
Similarly, Professor Barton J. Bernstein maintained that Trumans civil rights
legacy was ambiguous. He claimed that the President was surely not sympathetic to
demands for bold social reform; he was not deeply troubled by the plight of American
Negroes, and he did not oppose racial segregation. Only slowly and falteringly did
Truman move beyond the racial prejudice of his section. Bernstein found that Trumans
rhetoric was important, if not decisive, and that as he recognized the need for Negro votes,
he became more active. He found Truman a reluctant liberal in civil rights, even when
judged by the standards of the 1940s.51
Whether Truman responded to political realities and necessities or was motivated
by love of blacks or hatred of injustice is not a major issue. In fact, if Truman had no
sympathy for the problems of blacksalthough it can be demonstrated that he had some
the results of military integration might have even greater significance. If this action,
the most stunning achievement of the Truman era in the field of civil rights, was not the
result of his sensitivities, it must have been the product of ballot box pressure, and that
may say more for the legitimacy of American democracy than the Presidents motivations.
Military integration proved that the system could be changed through nonviolent political
means.
Prior to the 1948 election, Truman issued several statements about human rights
that deeply antagonized the South52 but more important he created the Presidents
Committee on Civil Rights. Even Berman and Bernstein admit that Truman had been
struck by the violence that confronted blacks returning from World War II. He responded
to the blandishments of his civil rights adviser, David Niles, by appointing a committee to
inquire into the problem and recommend a program of corrective action.53 Truman was
particularly upset over the blinding of Isaac Woodyard in South Carolina by a local police
chief.54 He appointed the Civil Rights committee on 5 December 1946 and instructed it to
inquire into and determine whether and in what respect current law enforcement
measures and the authority and means possessed by Federal, State, and local governments
may be strengthened and improved to safeguard the civil rights of the people.55

The committee, composed of distinguished and successful Americans, was

interracial in composition and represented men and women of the three major religious
faiths. It decided to focus attention on the bad side of the recordon what might be
called the civil rights frontier. The committee did not comment on what the United States
had accomplished, only on how far this country had to travel to live up to the promise of
its own Constitution.56
Although the committee studied all forms of discrimination and made
recommendations designed to guarantee voting rights and other civil liberties, the longest
single subchapter in their report, To Secure These Rights, was devoted to discrimination in
the military. Prejudice in any area, the committee wrote, is an ugly, undemocratic
phenomenon; in the armed services, where all men run the risk of death, it is particularly
repugnant.57 The committee praised the progress the military had made since the war,
noting, however, that there is great need for further remedial action. It specifically
criticized the small size of the Negro component in the Navy and Coast Guard, the fact
that the Marines limited blacks to stewards duties, the Army quota and tiny cadre of Negro
officers, and the minuscule ratio of Negro officers to enlisted men when compared to the
white ratio. It also criticized the concentration of blacks in the lower enlisted ranks and
complained that entrance requirements to the military academies were undoubtedly based
on race, because too few young Negro men were enrolled at the academies. Finally, it
commented about the poor treatment Negro soldiers received from civilian
communities.58 The committee praised the limited combat integration that had occurred
late in the European war, noting that it served to prove that segregation was not the sine
qua non of military efficiency, and that integration could work. It cited a poll taken by the
Research Branch which showed that whites in an integrated environment did not remain
adamant segregationists.59 The committee, therefore, recommended military integration.
In doing this the members were probably influenced by a staff memorandum that
looked beyond simple military efficiency as a rationale for integration. The staff
memorandum states:
The importance of the armed forces in the struggle of minority groups for full
achievement of their civil rights is too obvious to require labored discussion. The armed
forces are one of our major status symbols; the fact that members of minority groups
successfully bear arms in defense of our country, alongside other citizens, serves as a
major basis for their claim to equality elsewhere. For the minority groups themselves
discrimination in the armed forces seems more immoral and painful than elsewhere. The
notion that not even in the defense of their country (which discriminates against them in
many ways) can they fight, be wounded, or even killed on an equal basis with others is
infuriating. Perhaps most important of all is the role of the armed forces as an educator.
Military service is the one place in the society where the mind of the adult citizen is
completely at the disposal of his government. The use of armies to change public attitude
is an ancient and well-established tradition. In the recent war Great Britain and the Soviet
Union, as well as the Axis powers successfully used the time during which their men were
in service to educate them on a broad range of social and political problems..Finally,
the armed forces can provide an opportunity for Americans to learn to respect one another
as the result of cooperative effort in the face of serious danger.
The document treated the subject of discrimination and segregation historically
and included statistics to prove that blacks were the subject of discrimination in the
military.60
Among the committees recommendations on voting rights, employment
opportunities, schooling, and segregation in general, were several suggestions on the
military. The committee called for congressional legislation, followed by appropriate
administrative action, to end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on
race, color, creed, or national origin in the organization and activities of all branches of the
Armed Services.61 It believed that segregation was an injustice and weakened national
defense.62 The committee was quite specific in its requirements for a law, trying to avoid
the difficulties that had arisen in the past when language had been vague. It recommended:
Legislation and regulations should expressly ban discrimination and segregation in
the recruitment, assignment, and training of all personnel in all types of military duty.
Mess halls, quarters, recreational facilities and post exchanges should be nonsegregated.
Commissions and promotions should be awarded on considerations of merit only.
Selection of students for the Military, Naval and Coast Guard academies and all other
service schools should be governed by standards from which considerations of race, color,
creed or national origin are conspicuously absent .63
The committees second recommendation was more radical. It suggested using the
military to change the customs and mores of the country, especially in those geographic
areas where segregation was a legal practice. It proposed:
The enactment by Congress of legislation providing that no member of the armed
forces shall be subject to discrimination of any kind by any public authority or places of
public accommodation, recreation, transportation, or other service or business . The
government has an obligation to protect the dignity of the uniform of its armed services.
The esteem of the government itself is impaired when affronts to its armed forces are
tolerated. The government also has a responsibility for the well-being of those who
surrender some of the privileges of citizenship to serve in the defense establishment.64
If the federal government also moved to force hotels, restaurants, theaters, and bus
stations to desegregate for servicemen and women, presumably it would be a short step to
total desegregation. This tactic was in the minds of some committee members. Their first
goal, then, was to protect servicemen from indignities, and their second was to use the
military to change customs with which the committee greatly disagreed.65
On 29 October 1947, Truman met with the committee and received its report. He
told the group that he hoped it would be as broad a statement as the Declaration of
Independence and provide an American charter of human freedom in our time.66 One
member reported that the President thanked the committee with sincerity, warmth, and a
genuine sense of gratitude.67
Several months after release of the report, the President on 2 February 1948 sent a
special message to Congress dealing with the subject. He declared that there was a
serious gap between our ideals and some of our practices, which must be closed. He
urged Congress to enact legislation establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights,
a Joint Congressional Committee on Civil Rights, and a civil rights division in the
Department of Justice. The President also requested the passage of new laws to strengthen
existing civil rights statutes, provide Federal protection against lynching, and protect the
right to vote. He informed Congress that he was instructing the Secretary of Defense to
eliminate the remaining instances of discrimination in the armed services as rapidly as
possible.68
Meanwhile, Negro leaders became more vocal in their demands for Presidential
action. In October 1947 Grant Reynolds and A. Philip Randolph organized a new
Committee against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training. This organization
lobbied against continuing segregation in the military, with the goal of ending
discrimination via an amendment to military draft legislation then before Congress, which
would require integration of the armed forces. A number of Congressmen in 1947 and
1948 had been unsuccessful in amending the draft bill. In April 1948 Randolph met with
Truman to solicit his support for the draft amendment. Randolph later reported his meeting
to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, informing the senators of the
subject of his discussion with Truman. He said he told the President that blacks were in
no mood to shoulder a gun while denied democracy in the United States. If Congress
passed a bill without assurance of equality, Randolph said he was prepared to call on
blacks to resort to mass civil disobedience and to refuse to register for the draft. Sen.
Wayne Morse (Rep., Oregon), upset by these statements, termed them potentially
misguided and treasonable.69
The Negro press, monitoring the draft controversy, urged adoption of a new draft
bill designed to break down bias,70 but was less militant than Reynolds and Randolph.
The Pittsburgh Courier reported a lack of unanimity among blacks regarding Randolphs
statements. Truman Gibson and Reynolds engaged in a heated discussion before the
Senate Armed Services Committee. Reynolds accused Gibson of being a Negro Judas
Iscariot who had gained financial advantage at the expense of his people.
Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., told the Senate Committee that he and the vast
majority of the fifteen million Negroes in America supported Randolph and Reynolds.
Negroes, he exclaimed, are sick and tired of the hypocritical pretense at democracy
now being evidenced by Congress. He declared that Gibson did not even represent the
minority opinion among blacks and called him a rubber stamp Uncle Tom. He also
called segregationists traitors and concluded that there were not enough jails to hold
the Negro people who will refuse to bear arms in a Jim-crow Army.71
While the Pittsburgh Courier inflamed opinion on page one, it sought to cool
things down on the editorial page. The newspaper described Randolph and Reynolds as
extremists. It said that blacks were unquestionably bitter about the useless and
unnecessary Jim-crow policy which the armed services persist in perpetuating but there
is little indication at this time that there is any appreciable support for a policy of civil
disobedience in order to defeat it. The newspaper told its readers that alone among the
various elements constituting the American Nation the Negro has never produced any
traitors and we do not believe he ever will. It stated, furthermore, that it would be a
catastrophe if the nations white population ever thought that blacks would hamper
national defense in any way.
The Courier emphasized that it had always opposed military segregation, but that
if the majority of the American people are not at this time prepared to drop the color bar
in the armed services, Negroes must and should bow to the popular will as they would
expect any other minority of the population to bow to the will in any other case. It
reasoned that in a democracy it is necessary to take the bitter with the sweet. We should
battle this issue to the point of decision, and then, if defeated, gracefully accept the
decision and cooperate in its implementation. BUT WE SHOULD NEVER ABANDON
OUR FIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.72 A hasty poll conducted by Newsweek
magazine indicated that only 14 percent of the blacks polled would refuse to register were
segregation to continue, while 71 percent were inclined to favor Randolphs proposal.
Newsweek found no unanimity of opinion among Negro organizations about Randolphs
program.73 The draft bill was signed on 24 June 1948 without a provision ending
segregation, and a month later Truman ended this practice without the consent of
Congress. This accomplished, Randolph and Reynolds dissolved their organization.
The Randolph-Reynolds pressure may have been instrumental in Trumans
decision to issue his executive order. Other political advisers, however, may have had a
more significant role. In a 43-page confidential memorandum written in late 1947, Clark
Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, outlined a strategy to win the election in 1948.
Three pages in this report dealt with the necessity of winning the Negro vote. Clifford
argued that ever since 1932, the majority of blacks had voted Democratic, and in 1948 the
Negro vote could be pivotal. He noted that Trumans Republican opponent, Thomas E.
Dewey, was assiduously cultivating the Negro vote, because he considered it a foundation
for his victory. He warned the President that blacks might swing back to the Republicans
if something positive were not done to retain them. He noted that blacksunder the
tutelage of Walter White and other intelligent, educated, and sophisticated leadershad
become cynical, hard-boiled traders. Blacks believed that the rising dominance of the
southern conservatives in the Democratic councils of the Congress and of the party made
it only too clear that [they could go] no further by supporting the present
administration. Clifford suggested that Truman emphasize the great improvement in the
economic lot of blacks during 16 years of Democratic hegemony. However, he advised
that such demonstrations were wearing a bit thin. Clifford warned that without new and
real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures ), the blacks might vote
Republican. He noted that blacks held the balance of power in Illinois, New York, and
Ohio, and he feared their defection.74
The Presidents counsellor followed his gloomy predictions with several
recommendations. Republicans, Clifford wrote, would spare no effort wooing black votes.
He forecast that in the next session of Congress the Republicans would offer a Fair
Employment Practices Committee bill, an anti-poll tax law, and an anti-lynching proposal,
accompanied by a nourish of oratory on civil rights. The President, Clifford noted, would
make a grave error if he permitted the Republicans to get away with this. He urged
Truman to go as far as he possibly could go in recommending measures to protect the
rights of minority groups. This course of action, Clifford advised, was sound strategy, and
might cause difficulty with our southern friends but that is the lesser of two evils.75
 A direct recommendation to integrate the services to avoid the loss of Negro votes
came from William L. Batt, a Democratic Party researcher. He had agonized over the
potential loss of Negro votes in New York and elsewhere because of the third party
candidacy of Henry A. Wallace, a former Vice-President under President Roosevelt.
Trumans advisers feared that from 20 to 30 percent of the blacks might vote for Wallace,
and some leaders in New York said that 75 percent of the blacks in their districts would do
so. Batt claimed that the Negro vote was within Trumans power to salvage. He cited steps
suggested to him in discussions with Phileo Nash and young Negro leaders. He
recommended the President issue two executive orders, one to create a Fair Employment
Practices Committee for the executive branch of government, and one to end
discrimination in the Armed Services. Batt did not disregard a southern revolt and
suggested this possibility be examined.76
The Republican platform increased pressure on Truman to do something more than
talk about civil rights. The platform was forward looking, and expressed opposition to
continued segregation in the armed forces. Truman, wary of losing southern support,
wanted the Democrats to repeat the innocuously vague civil rights proposition adopted in
the 1944 platform. This plank, he believed, would not antagonize southerners. It proved,
however, much too weak for Hubert Humphrey and other liberals as well as blacks.
Humphrey and his supporters urged Truman to accept the recommendations contained in
To Secure These Rights. The President was able to control the platform committee
sufficiently to retain the weak statement, but Humphrey and other Democrats forced the
issue to the floor of the convention and won acceptance for the minoritymore liberal
plank, thus precipitating the Dixie revolt and walkout.77 Whereupon, the segregationists
organized a States Rights ticket headed by Gov. J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina.
Whatever chance Truman might have had of holding the support of southern
segregationists was lost on 26 July when he issued the integration Executive Orders (9980
and 9981) following the Democratic convention.78
Trumans Executive Order 9980 dealt with equality of treatment in the civil service
and Executive Order 9981 dealt with equal treatment within the armed services. The latter
was an innocuously worded instrument for one so revolutionary. It stated:
It is essential that there be maintained in the Armed Services of the United States
the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all
those who serve. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall
be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without
regard to race . There shall be created in the national Military Establishment an advisory
committee to be known as the Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services the committee is authorized to examine into the
rules, procedures, and practices of the Armed Services to determine in what respect
such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying
out the policy of this order.
No reference was made to segregation; the order was similar to previous
statements on equality of opportunity, which had resulted in no positive gains. In fact, for
several years thereafter the Army maintained that it was in full compliance with Trumans
Executive Order. Truman soon clarified his intent when asked by a reporter to comment
on the order. The President was asked on 29 July if equality of treatment and
opportunity meant an eventual end to segregation. Truman answered, characteristically in
one word, Yes.79 On 3 August, Sen. J. Howard McGrath (Dem., R. I.), received from
Truman further clarification of the language in the order and stated that it was the
Presidents unquestionable intent to eliminate segregation in the services.80 Shortly
thereafter, on 17 August 1948, Clifford recommended that Truman speak out more fully
on civil rights. He urged the President to refer to his votes in the Senate in support of the
wartime Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), and his executive orders to end
discrimination in the government and in the military. Clifford stressed that the Presidents
record proves that he acts as well as talks Civil Rights.81
 Undoubtedly Trumans words and deeds had an effect, and the Negro vote became
indispensible to his victory over the other candidates. His posture also influenced the tone
of the editorial policy in the major Negro newspapers in 1948. As in 1944, the Negro press
- except for the Chicago Defender - endorsed Dewey. In 1948, however, anti-Truman
comment was less vociferous and more muted compared to the 1944 elections.
During the wartime election, the Negro press had urged blacks to vote for
Governor Dewey of New York. On 28 October 1944 the Afro-American headline in one of
its last issues prior to the election declared in red capitals: CITIZENSHIP FOR ALL. In
smaller but prominent black type, it reported: DEWEY PLEDGES FULL CITIZENSHIP
FOR ALL AND NATIONAL PROGRAM TO COMBAT BIAS. The paper cited Deweys
statements in which he promised that his administration will have but one prejudice: it
will be prejudiced against injustice. The editorial column exclaimed redundantly that
The AFRO is for Dewey.82 On the same date, the Pittsburgh Courier editorial cartoon
on page 1 showed a black voting for Roosevelt, the caption stating Every vote for Mr.
Roosevelt is a vote for Rankin-Connally-Cox-Bilbo-Eastland* and all that the southern
politicians represent, segregation-lynching-poll tax. The front page Courier editorial
listed the key positions held by southerners in the House and Senate.
* Rep. John E. Rankin, Miss.,; Sen. Thomas T. Connally, Tex.; Rep. Edward E.
Cox, Ga.; Sen. Theodore G. Bilbo, Miss.; and Sen. James C. Eastland, Miss., all
segregationists.
The editorial cartoon stated: We must make prejudice unprofitable and Dewey
pledges to correct conditions of inequality.83
In 1944, the Courier and other Negro papers had campaigned as much against
Roosevelts selection of Truman as against Roosevelt. One headline read: South has little
to fear from Truman of Missouri. The article, written by Morris Milgram, claimed
Truman did not believe the FEPC would pass the Congress and that he was against social
equality. The paper quoted him as saying: There will never be social equality! Milgram
asked Truman if blacks could be served in public accommodations in Independence, Mo.
According to Milgram, Truman replied: No, theyre not, and they never will be.
Truman also was quoted as saying that he had never entertained blacks in his home
and never would. Elsewhere, in the Pittsburgh Courier, the writer described Truman as a
friend of Filibuster tycoon Senator Connally, and charged that the Democrats had
sacrificed Henry Wallace to please prejudiced southern politicians, replacing Wallace with
Truman. Milgram stated further that Negroes who vote for the re-election of President
Roosevelt this fall, should also PRAY AS THEY VOTE PRAY THAT MR.
ROOSEVELT CONTINUES IN GOOD HEALTH.84
In the Couriers final edition before the election, the newspaper reprinted a
Baltimore Afro-American editorial which was also reprinted in at least four other major
Negro newspapers. This editorial was highly critical of Truman and claimed he was linked
to the Ku Klux Klan. The writer also criticized President Roosevelt for permitting
segregation in the military and assured readers that Governor Dewey will not tolerate
such a policy.85 On the front page of the 28 October 1944 edition preceding the election,
the Courier printed a story about Truman and the Klan under the headline: Eyewitnesses
Swear Truman was member of Ku Klux Klan. The paper told its readers that the Negro
press, with 71 percent of the Negro circulation, supported Dewey.86
In 1948 the ratio did not differ, but the Negro attitude towards Truman was
different. The Negro press had chronicled President Trumans speeches and statements on
civil rights and followed carefully the progress of the Presidents Committee on Civil
Rights and hailed its report when published. In the summer of 1947, furthermore, Truman
became the first President to address the convention of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. The Pittsburgh Courier quoted extensively from his
speech at the Lincoln Memorial, which was carried on a nationwide radio broadcast. Large
headlines informed readers that TRUMAN RAPS PREJUDICE.87 The Civil Rights
report was hailed by the Courier. The entire report with commentary was published in
several issues of the newspaper, which stated that it had blasted the Nations Civil
Liberties Hypocrisy . Photographs of the President were prominently displayed, with
the paper stressing that Truman had received the report favorably.88 Later, when the
President sent his civil rights message to Congress, the same paper praised him in an
editorial feature, The Courier Salutes. It applauded his courage and said that his
message might go down in history with the emancipation proclamation.89 He was
praised for resisting southern pressure after the message was delivered. A headline read:
Pres. Truman Defies South, Will not Retract Statement, and Ignores Threats of
Revolt in Dixie.90 These articles made it very difficult for the Pittsburgh Courier or any
other black newspaper to remain militant in support of Dewey in 1948.
Following publication of Executive Order 9981, the Courier carried a banner
headline on its front page which read: PRESIDENT TRUMAN TAKES STEPS TO
ABOLISH JIM CROW IN THE ARMED SERVICES. The newspaper did take note in
the next few issues that Trumans language was perhaps temperate, but there was no
disguising its pleasure over the start he had made.91 As the election drew near, the
Pittsburgh Courier and most of the Negro press again threw their support to Dewey, but
without the anti-Truman rancor evident in 1944. On 25 September, the Courier announced
for Dewey, but in an accompanying editorial the publisher noted that blacks were indeed,
fortunate in having all of the three major candidates for President favorably disposed to
the advancement and protection of their rights. The editorial supported Dewey, because
he was not shackled by the Bilbos of the South, but commented favorably on Trumans
record.92 Later, the paper maintained that Deweys deeds as Governor of New York were
more significant than Trumans words. It also predicted a runaway Republican victory.93
It appears that the anticipated Dewey victory might have been a factor in holding the
Courier in the ranks of the Republicans. Trumans words and immediate actions toward
blacks were the most favorable of any President since Lincoln, but the paper may have
been unwilling to lose favor with an anticipated Dewey presidency.
As became evident, most 1948 prognosticators including the Pittsburgh Courier bet
on the wrong horse. They were misled by the strength and choice of the Negro voter.
Clark Clifford and the Negro press knew that the Negro vote was the key to an election
victory, and Trumans speeches and actions apparently won it for him. The Pittsburgh
Courier had followed the population shift of blacks from the South to the North and had
predicted that the Negro vote would hold the whiphand in 1948. The newspaper
discovered that blacks were the balance of power in 12 northern states, constituting 228
electoral votes, while 11 southern states which denied blacks the right to vote controlled
only 127 electoral votes. The newspaper stated that if the Negro is going to gain his civil
rights in America, this is the year. Its now or never, for he can drive a hard bargain with
his strength in those fifteen states which can elect the next president without any help from
the rest of the Union. This is the Negros big chance.94 When Truman won, the
Pittsburgh Courier credited the Negro vote for the margin of victory.
The first edition following the election claimed that blacks in Illinois, California,
and Ohio put Truman in the win column. It also asserted that Negro votes in the South
for Truman outnumbered those cast by whites for the Dixiecrat candidates.95 Later in a
more detailed article, the paper stated that 69 percent of the blacks voted for the
incumbent. It reported that Mound Bayou, Miss., voted two to one for the President, the
first time a Democrat had ever carried that community. The Pittsburgh Courier also
showed that Truman carried Harlem, N.Y., by a wider margin in 1948 than had Roosevelt
in 1944, despite the Wallace candidacy and Deweys popularity in his own state. In fact,
Truman emerged more popular among blacks nationally than Roosevelt.96 In the key
states of Illinois, Ohio, and California, his plurality in Negro wards was so great as to
overcome large deficits in white wards. Dewey did not win a plurality of blacks in a single
state.97
The Pittsburgh Courier, in a rare move, published several letters to the editor
criticizing the papers editorial policy during the presidential campaign. One accused the
Courier of taking money from the Republicans: You were not very clever in concealing
what now appears to be a fact. Your tune changed too abruptly, and that was after the
Republican machinery was well organized, and money collected with which newspaper
support was bought. The heart of the authors indictment came at the end of his letter: In
my opinion, he said, Mr. Truman is the first president since Lincolns time to go to bat
to try to improve the general status of Negroes in this country . Other correspondents
claimed the newspaper had accepted bribes and others denounced its editorial support of
Dewey as a double-cross of Negro principle . One letter called the Pittsburgh Courier
less meaningful than a rotten apple. Not a single letter supported the newspaper in its
editorial advocacy of Dewey.98
Perhaps because of Trumans newly discovered constituency, or in spite of it, the
President set out after his election to implement Executive Order 9981. He had provided a
mechanism for implementation in his original order which created a Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, popularly known after its chairman, Charles Fahy,
as the Fahy Committee. Historians who have studied the success of military integration
have concluded that the existence of this committee was the primary reason for the
success of the new policy. Even the most cynical commentators believe that the
importance of the Fahy Committee cannot be overrated . The presence of the
committee institutionalized Presidential interest in improving the status of Negro
personnel within the Pentagon. Its presence served as a base for collecting quantitative
data on Negro service and finding and checking resistance to the Presidential order.99
Other historians, more sympathetic toward Truman, hold that integration could not have
been accomplished had not Truman appointed and unwaveringly supported his Fahy
Committee. 100
Although the committee was established in October 1948, it did not meet until the
following January. 101 On 12 January, Truman conferred with the four service secretaries
and the members of the Fahy Committee. He informed them that he was not interested in
better treatment or fair treatment, but in equal treatment in the Government Service for
everybody, regardless of his race or creed or color . He wanted the spirit as well as the
letter of his order carried out. Secretary of Defense Forrestal told Truman that the Air
Force had a very progressive plan. Secretary Symington added that the plan would
completely eliminate segregation in the Air Force. He stated that we have a fine group
of colored boys. Our plan is to take those boys, break up that fine group, and put them
with other units themselves and go right down the line all through those subdivisions one
hundred percent. Truman said: Thats all right. The President also stated emphatically
that what he had ordered was not a publicity stunt and that he wanted concrete results.102

About the time of the first committee meeting with the President, John H.
Sengstacke, publisher of the Chicago Defender and a member of the committee sent a
memorandum to his associates on the Fahy Committee, titled: An Outline Discussion of
the Presidents Executive Order 9981. He wrote that democracy implied that all people
participated in decision making and that all benefits were distributed to all people. It also
meant that men were ruled by law and not by other men. Sengstacke stressed that
Trumans order also meant a military colorblind to such factors as an individuals religion
or national origin. The Fahy Committee must do more, he wrote, than simply investigate
discrimination. It had a mandate to eliminate discrimination in the armed forces.
Sengstacke recommended positive action to eliminate discrimination and to discard
segregation. He admonished his colleagues to beware of those who would say that
equality of opportunity could be achieved within a framework of segregation. Such a
person was a foe to the full emancipation of the Negro people. The Presidents order, he
said, required the elimination of segregation, and the committee should design a major
program to carry out that mission.103
On 13 January the Air Force presented to the Fahy Committee its proposal as
outlined in the draft copies of Air Force Letter 35-3 and the implementing classified letter.
The committee was pleased with this action, but recommended deletion of a provision
whereby local commanders would determine which blacks were to be assigned to all-
Negro units and elimination of the 10 percent quota. Once the Air Force had removed
these provisions, the committee decided to stand back and let the Air Force conduct its
own program. The committee was not disappointed.104 Fahy advised the President that
implementation began on 11 May 1949 and that the committee awaited further results
before making additional recommendations to the Air Force. Fahy wrote:
Meanwhile it [the committee] is watching with interest: (1) the variety and success
of assignments for the flying personnel of Lockbourne; (2) the extent of reassignment of
Negroes in Air Force Commands to white units; (3) the number of Negro units which are
kept in being; (4) the extent of new enlistments of Negroes for flight positions; (5) the
extent of Negro enlistments for skilled ground positions in the Air Force.105
The Fahy Committee, in other words, was determined to ensure that the Air Force
was honest in its policy. Within 6 months, this service created 1,301 integrated units,
leaving only 59 predominantly Negro units. This is to be contrasted with the 106 all-Negro
units and 167 integrated units that existed on 1 June 1949.106 The Fahy Committee, after
its initial recommendations, made no other substantive proposals to the Air Force because
there was no need to do so.
In reality, the Fahy Committee had little direct effect on the Air Force other than to
demonstrate that the President meant what he said and to require that the service delete the
two provisions which in ungenerous hands might have rendered the program a token
gesture. In a sense, what the committee accomplished was vital, but its involvement with
the Air Force was minimal, when compared to its relations with the other two services.107
Suffice it to say, the Army tied the committee in semantic knots, claiming even after the
committee had disbanded that segregation and Trumans order were harmonious. The
Army did not attempt to integrate until more than a year after the Fahy Committee
terminated its advisory role. The Navy continued a policy of tokenism into the 1960s.108
One final point needs emphasis. Air Force integration placed pressure upon the
other services to do the same. Thomas Reid, Chairman of the Personnel Policy Board
(created by Forrestal to formulate a general policy for the three armed forces so they could
end segregation before the Fahy Committee dictated a policy), said that Symington and
Zuckert made his job easier because they accomplished integration. The Air Force then
became the model for workability for the other services. Reid told the Army and Navy that
if they copied the Air Force they would carry out the orders of the President and the
objectives of the Fahy Committee.109 In committee hearings, Air Force representatives
repeatedly testified that their service was against segregation, believing that their program
would be good for America as well as for the Air Force.110
Air Force Integration
Before the Air Force proceeded to integrate the service, it uncovered doubts among
Negro airmen. The Air Force Times and the Army Navy Journal reported that some blacks
were apprehensive about integration. The two military journals treated the subject
differently. The Air Force Times reported the concerns of Negro airmen in a generally
positive account,111 the Journal interpreted these fears as casting doubt about the entire
Truman scheme. The U.S. Army, the latter claimed, questioned the integration program,
arguing that it was unnecessary because blacks had equal opportunity. The Journal also
highlighted Gen. Omar Bradleys seemingly negative remarks about integration and
concluded that most officers and enlisted men believed that the abolition of separate
white and colored units would harm rather than help equal opportunity. It quoted a Negro
noncommissioned officer who claimed he had equality and doubted he would get it in a
white unit. The Journal advocated equality of treatment and opportunity but no mixing of
the races .112
It would appear paradoxical that on the eve of integration some blacks sought to
resist integration, but such was the case. In February 1949, two Negro officers from
Lockbourne visited the NAACP national headquarters to express their fears about pitfalls
and loopholes in the Air Force plan to integrate. They suggested that the Air Force plan
might in fact be a blind to eliminate the effective force of Negroes in the Air Force. They
did not want to be caught mesmerized, watching the holiday sized integration flag,
while racists eased them out of prestigious well-paid positions. The officers represented
other Negro airmen and proposed an alternative plan to counteract any idea the Air Force
may have for completely eliminating (or nearly so) the Negro from the active participation
in the United States Air Force. They attached to their plan a memorandum titled:
Does Integration and Negro Screening Board Mean Progressive Elimination of Air
Force Negro Personnel?113
In response, NAACP Special Counsel Robert L. Carter visited Lockbourne and,
after completing his investigation, advised his headquarters that the fears expressed were
those of a majority of the base personnel. He related that this visit was kept secret from
Colonel Davis at the insistence of the protestors.114 Carter said further that the framers of
the protest believed that the Air Force proposal was a plot to ultimately eliminate the
Negroes from the Air Force. They claimed that assigning blacks to all the major air
commands was a fraud. They argued they would have to be gullible to believe that officers
from their wing would be assigned positions of comparable responsibility in integrated
units and in fact sneered at such a prospect. They scoffed at the view that flyers might be
assigned as staff officers. They feared an individual officer would become third assistant
to another major to be buried to make sure he causes no trouble. They were also
concerned for those who with only fighter experience might be transferred to bomber
outfits. They predicted that at the end of five years, there will be only forty or fifty
Negro officers in the Air Force. They especially feared decisions of screening boards. For
example, the protestors wrote:
Now take an ordinary captain assigned to the 301st Fighter Squadron, 332d Fighter
Group, who must first get by a screening board which is some additional machinery he
must get by because he is a Negro officer, in spite of the fact that he was graduated from a
Flying School staffed and operated by Regular Air Force Personnel (White), sent to Italy
flew fifty missions, returned to the states and has been flying by Air Force
standards since, acquired 1500 to 2000 hours. This captain now must be rechecked after
five to six years in the Air Force, and to determine whether he is temperamentally
unsuited. Thats a rather indefinite term to say the least. Do you envision this captain
taking over leadership of a flight ? We have no allusions [sic] we Understand what
the results will be.115
The Air Force, they lamented, had deliberately held back their promotions,
resulting in a great loss of income, and now was preparing to take their jobs from them as
well. Even if they were permitted to hang on, experienced Negro officers and NCOs
would never be given positions of responsibility over whites. They recommended,
therefore, that the 332d and Lockbourne be retained; as vacancies arose, these should be
slowly filled by whites. They also advocated elimination of screening boards, fearing they
would turn into a machine which tends to hold cliques and gives way to eliminating
qualified officer and enlisted personnel not because of not being able to qualify, but
because of personality conflicts and party politics which has [sic] been the evil in the
organization.116
Various interpretations might be made of the memorandum sent to the NAACP, but
underlying the protest was the idea that the men preferred segregation at Lockbourne to
what they considered to be less than vague promises of equal opportunity in an integrated
Air Force. Their proposal would have crippled integration, for even if their ideas had been
feasible they could not apply to other all-Negro units; the men in the latter units were
vulnerable, perhaps even more so than the Lockbourne aviators and support personnel.
The NAACP did not share the fears of the Lockbourne group and took no stand against the
Air Force plan. The national organization carefully monitored the activities of the Air
Force.
In October 1949, Roy Wilkins sent an office memorandum to all NAACP branch
offices stating that the Air Force has a non-segregation policy and is working it out in
practice much faster than the Navyask any Negro in the Air Force.117
On 11 May 1949, Colonel Davis was called to the Pentagon for a full briefing on
the implementation of Air Force Letter 35-3, and 2 days later General Strother briefed
Davis key subordinates. On 14 and 15 May teams of evaluatorsscreenersarrived at
Lockbourne to review the qualifications of its personnel. Davis decided that he would be
the president of the Personnel Redistribution Board. On 17 May aptitude testing and
interviewing began.118 Officially, the screeners evaluated Negro personnel to determine
which officers and airmen were qualified for immediate and general reassignment in their
specialties; which men required or desired additional training; and which personnel were
to be retained in the duty they performed at the time of the screening.119
At the same time other factors came into play. General Edwards informed the Fahy
Committeein response to a question about screening boards by Lester Granger of the
National Urban Leaguethat members of either race who were so inflexible that they
could not accommodate themselves to this system in the services, were to be discharged
or separated. Granger also inquired about those blacks who were not ready for a free
association with whites, and asked if adaptability in an interracial situation would be the
qualifying factor? Edwards answered: This is our intent.120 In any case the screening
boards were not as deadly as some had feared.
All officers in the 332d were screened within a week by Davis and board members
representing the Continental Air Command, Air Training Command, and Headquarters,
United States Air Force. Of the black officers screened, 24 were recommended for
schools, 158 for reassignment in their specialties, and 10 for separation. Among the
enlisted men, 145 were recommended for schools, 811 were retained in their specialties, 3
were assigned instructor duty, and 40 were to be separated. One fifth of the officers and
enlisted men were sent to the Far East and very few to Europe; and the remainder were
scattered throughout the United States.121
The same policy was adopted by all Air Force commands. The Air Force Times
informed its readers about the screening at Chanute Air Force Base, 111., where 214
Negro airmen were tested and interviewed by a 5-man team from the Air Training
Command. The newspaper reported that the board, broad in scope, was empowered to
hear cases of Negro personnel and to make decisions concerning retention or discharge
from the service of those thought to have a lack of interest, lack of initiative, or lack of
ability to absorb further training or benefit to the Air Force.122
When Lockbourne completed its evaluation, it recommended that 23 percent of its
men be discharged, a percentage slightly higher than the Air Force average. A report
prepared on the first eight screened air installationsand the evaluations of approximately
2,000 of the nearly 26,000 blacks in the Air Forcedemonstrates that 1.35 percent were
programmed for instructor duty, 19.6 percent were sent to technical school, 59.20 percent
were retained in their current specialties, and 19.84 percent were scheduled for discharge.
The report also shows that there were 368 Negro officers in the Air Force, making up .6
percent of the officer force, and 25,523 enlisted blacks or 7.2 percent of the enlisted force.
By the end of 1949 there were still 7,402 blacks in all-Negro units, but 11,456 in
mixed units, and 7,033 in pipeline, i.e., to be assigned to integrated training units. Of the
1,356 officers in flight training (these were inputs from ROTC or the academies), only 11
(.8 percent) were black, and the figure of only 22 of 2,085 (slightly over 1 percent) for
aviation cadets was as depressingly low. Approximately 11.6 percent of those in basic
training were black, perhaps indicating an increased incentive to join an integrated force;
and 6 percent of those in technical school were black, participating in 61 percent of the
technical training courses offered by the Air Force at the end of 1949.123
The Negro press closely monitored the evaluations and reported weekly on
personnel actions at a number of bases, but especially those at Lockbourne. The Pittsburgh
Courier, skeptical about the integration of Lockbourne, did not give the story any
prominence. Written by Lem Graves, Jr., and captioned, Integration at Last?, it argued
that the Air Force had to reduce its number of groups and decided to economize by
liquidating the 332d. It wanted to know the meaning of some of the moves. What did it
mean when the Air Force said that some units will continue to be manned by Negro
personnel? Graves wrote that only about 4,000 of the Air Forces 20,000 Negroes are to
be integrated at present and this has given rise to some cynical comments. He also noted
that regulation did not require an end to Jim-crow recreational, mess, barracks, and other
facilities on posts. He did acknowledge that the Air Force had promised to integrate these
facilities quickly.124 In sharp contrast, an entire page in a later edition was devoted to the
graduation of the first Negro from the Naval Academy.125
As weeks passed however, the Pittsburgh Courier changed its opinion of the Air
Force, apparently realizing that blacks were getting a fair deal and that other air bases in
addition to Lockbourne were being integrated as well. The Courier listed the assignments
of the men and called the job complete on 22 October 1949 with decidedly premature
headlines: THE JOB IS DONE! and AIR FORCE COMPLETES
INTEGRATION.126
In an interesting sidelight on the closing of Lockbourne, Ohio reporters at a press
conference were overwhelmingly concerned with the economic impact of the breakup of
the 332d, and asked few questions about desegregation. It will be recalled that the 332d
had not been warmly received when it arrived in the state. Reporters from the Columbus
Citizen, Columbus Dispatch, and Cleveland Call Post were briefed by Davis on the
reasons for integration and the need of screening boards, and he asked for questions. Only
after many questions about the future of Lockbourne did the reporters focus on racial
integration.127 The fact of integration, perhaps, was little more than a routine story for
these men. It turned out to be a routine personnel action for the Air Force.
The implementation of integration proceeded well because General Edwards made
it clear in a speech of April 1949 and in subsequent implementing instructions that it was
the commanders responsibility to make integration work smoothly, and that failure to
implement would be interpreted as failure in command. Maj. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter,
commander of the Military Air Transport Service (MATS), told his field commanders:
Selected and qualified Negro officers and men will be assigned to duty throughout
the Air Force without regard to race. Direct attention to this changed condition is required
throughout the Command. Judgment, leadership, and ingenuity are demanded.
Commanders who cannot cope with the integration of Negroes into formerly white units
or activities will have no place in the Air Force structure.128
Edwards addressed personal and unofficial correspondence to all major air
commanders, asking for their cooperation and for private comments on the racial situation.
He had the utmost confidence that our major commanders will implement these policies
with a minimum of friction. He cautioned, however, that the whole country would be
watching and warned that the policy was directed by the President as well as the
Secretaries of Defense and Air Force. The latter, he said, was personally interested in its
smooth implementation. Edwards informed the commanders why he was doing this
unofficially:
I am reluctant to direct the submission of this information through normal official
correspondence for the obvious reason that it would only serve to highlight the problem,
and by implication, indicate that we anticipated trouble in the implementation of this
policy.129
He wanted reports in detail on any racial incidents or difficulties as well as actions
taken. He also wanted to know of troop and community reactions to the policy and which
parts of it failed, if any.
Only a few of the replies to Edwards have survived, because they were sent
through personal channels. A letter from Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the
Strategic Air Command, spoke of smooth progress. Referring to Edwards letter of 29
July, LeMay told him that he had contacted his unit commanders through personal
correspondence. LeMay said that they were making a serious effort to achieve its
success. In LeMays opinion, the policy was workable, but it required a maximum in
flexibility to carry it out. He admittedly worried about social integration in southern
communities and advised that there could be common use of recreational facilities, but
social events would have to be scheduled separately. He promised to keep Edwards
informed. 130
LeMay also briefed his commanders on the necessity of exercising personal
leadership. He told them that on certain stations barracks integration would be gradual,
extended initially to no more than 25 percent of those eligible. LeMay also informed his
unit commanders that there had been unrest at Davis Monthan AFB, Ariz., because nearby
Williams AFB had integrated socially, while Davis Monthan AFB had not. He further
reported that some whites stated they would not reenlist because they could not live with
blacks. Finally, he mentioned a group of blacks who were apprehensive because they were
about to be transferred from California to Louisiana.131
When SACs Eighth Air Force failed to act on barracks integration by October
1949, LeMay wrote its commander, Maj. Gen. Roger M. Ramey, to bring him in line. He
noted:
In your recent report on the success of integration of Negro troops in your
command you stated that your units are still housing Negro troops in the Base Service
Squadron rather than with the organization to which they have been assigned . The
requirement to billet and mess Negro troops with the white units which they are assigned
is a basic concept of Air Force Letter 35-3 and will be included in a regulation to be
published by this headquarters. The Air Force policy on integration of Negro troops is
explicit and is expected to reach general accomplishment by the end of the calendar year.
Therefore, if your commanders are to have the maximum time available to smoothly effect
this required integration, it would be advisable to move to the next stepthat of housing
and messing.132
Such command interest insured the rapid accomplishment of the mission and the
Fahy Committee was pleased at the manner as well as the celerity of Air Force integration.
In late 1949 and early 1950 the executive secretary of the committee, E. W. Kenworthy,
traveled with Jack Marr to inspect seven Air Force Bases: Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Keesler
AFB, Miss.; Lackland AFB, Tex.; Davis Monthan AFB, Ariz.; Williams AFB, Ariz.;
Boiling AFB, D.C.; and Scott AFB, 111. In their travels, they discovered only one all-
Negro service unit at Maxwell AFB. Kenworthy reported that statistically about two-thirds
of the Air Force blacks worked and lived in integrated conditions, with the remainder in
service units. Wherever I went, he wrote, I saw Negro mechanics servicing and
repairing planes in hangers and on the line. There were Negroes in radio repair. There
were Negro instructors in classes. I saw Negroes in personnel work and in Air Police.
There were Negro jet pilots. He admitted he did not see the entire range of Air Force
jobs, but he did see a fairly broad sample, and wherever he went he observed Negroes
working with whites. He noted that Air Force policy statements had been limited to
military utilization, leaving recreation and social life to the individual commanders. In the
latter case, he found no fixed pattern.133
Thus, at some bases he found swimming pools and clubs as well as dances were
completely integrated, while at others there was tacit, though incomplete and unenforced
segregation in service clubs and pools, and separate dances for white and Negro enlisted
personnel. Everywhere he saw integrated officer and NCO clubs, and colored officers
and NCOs made use of these clubs.134 He saw less social integration at swimming
pools. He wrote: Negroes are no longer prohibited from using any pool, though the local
custom varies. At bases which had two pools, apparently blacks preferred to use their
own even when not required to do so. At other bases there was completely free use by
both races. The same could be noted at club dances. Some were thoroughly mixed; others
were not as well integrated. But movies and athletic contests were everywhere
unsegregated, and blacks were active on most service teams. He did find some air base
commanders refusing to schedule southern teams that would not play mixed military
teams.135
Kenworthy spoke to many blacks and whites about integration and found many of
the former were nervous about their continued prospects, but were agreeably surprised at
[integrations] success. He found one Negro officer who believed that he would have had
more retainability had he remained in the segregated 332d, but Kenworthy regarded him
as an exception. He stated:
I had the feeling that the Negroes were extremely anxious lest some untoward
incidents should jeopardize the program, and they seemed determined this should not
happen. Consequently they appeared to be acting with great circumspection, and while
they were striving hard to take advantage of new opportunities in jobs and school, they
were letting social relationships develop casually and naturally.136
Kenworthy noted that the southern press was critical of Air Force policy, but that
the bases in the South did not permit this to affect their on-base programs. He illustrated
this by showing the complete working and school integration at Keesler AFB, Miss. He
also commented on some voluntary social segregation. The base commander went a step
further and forbade the scheduling of athletic events with local teams that would not play
against blacks. Kenworthy did note that off-base social facilities available for blacks were
deplorable. He visited taverns, pool rooms, restaurants, and whorehouses and found
them appallingly filthy and degraded. He knew that the higher venereal disease rate for
blacks had to be ascribed to these substandard conditions. He also knew that it was not his
responsibility to investigate this, but thought the Presidents Committee on Religious and
Moral Welfare in the Armed Forces might wish to do so.137 Most blacks remained on
base where treatment was equal and more wholesome, but Kenworthy remained distressed
at the fact that men who have superior abilities required to take advanced technical
training and are a credit to the armed services of their country should be forced to seek
recreation in such spots.138
At Lackland AFB, Tex., Kenworthy noted that Negro counselors advised both
blacks and whites and that basic training at this base was totally integrated. He found
blacks attending most schools at Lackland and noticed no social segregation among
officers, but some among NCOs.139 The situation at Maxwell AFB, however, was not as
satisfactory. Only a small number of Negroes were assigned to white units. Most Negro
airmen had duty assignments to the 3817th Base Service squadron. This squadron was
manned by 269 blacks and, although they worked with whites on a duty interspersal basis,
they were housed in separate barracks and fed in their own mess. Kenworthy found the
separate facilities pleasant and no different from the white facilities and considered the
food plentiful and well prepared. He reported that the men had voted to remain
separate, except for 14 who were immediately transferred to the barracks of the employing
units. The handful who had transferred said that they were well treated in the former white
units.
The 3817th had its own service clubs, swimming pool and movie theater.
Conditions, however, were not hopelessly rigid even at Maxwell. An incident was
reported in which three blacks attempted to attend base service club dance and the local
civilian chaperone demanded that they be sent away. An officer on the scene refused to
dismiss the blacks, but a local newspaper complained about the disturbance. A similar
conflict occurred at the base swimming pool, but there again the blacks were made
welcome. Within the 3817ths complement of men, only 58 were involved in actual base
service activities and 211 were assigned to 29 separate organizations, including the Air
University Library, Base Operations and Wing Headquarters.140
Despite his negative experience at Maxwell AFB, Kenworthy was very pleased
with the success of the new integration policy and credited two factors for its favorable
outcomecommand leadership and the willingness of the men to accept integration. He
found that the officers had been initially apprehensive about the new policy, but
discovered their fears to have been completely groundless. These men were amazed at
the ease with which the new policy had been effected and the absence of trouble. Even
southern officers who disliked racial integration and expressed a desire to return to
segregation had admitted the new policy worked well and without friction. Most officers
told Kenworthy that the new policy meant increased military efficiency and an end to
chronic charges of discrimination. These men found that placing blacks and whites
together in a competitive environment with rigid standards of equality improved race
relations.
Kenworthy concluded:
The new racial policy of the Air Force supplies its own moral and military
justification. Nevertheless, it is in my opinion after visiting seven bases, that the success of
this reform can be attributed in large measure to the quality and resolution of command.
The Air Force issued its policy and let it be known that ungrudging compliance
with the spirit as well as the letter was expected. Thereafter it left implementation to local
commanders.
Individual commanders used their own judgment in putting the policy into effect.
Some commanders carefully briefed their staff officers, who in turn briefed squadron
commanders, and so on . Other commanders treated the new policy as merely a routine
administrative procedure, and simply issued orders to their staff . [The] difference in
method had little effect on results, so long as there was determination to carry out the
order. To this resolution of command can be attributed, I think, the ease with which this
policy has been effected. Unquestionably, however, the almost total absence of opposition
that had been anticipated in the enlisted men is a contributing factor in the success of the
policy. The men apparently were more ready for equality of treatment and opportunity
than the officer corps had realized.141
Changing Military Attitudes
Anticipated hostility by white enlisted men had long been a reason for not
integrating. Throughout the years the military had actually polled whites to obtain their
attitude toward integration. The results of the polls generally indicated that whites opposed
it, although a poll taken after the limited integration of 1945 and another during the
Korean War showed that whites who had served with blacks had no great antipathy toward
integration.142 The Army, still attempting to stave off integration, polled its enlisted men
during May and June 1949 and found that 32 percent definitely opposed any kind of
limited or total integration, while only 39 percent was not definitely opposed to
integration. The service found also that more than 60 percent were definitely opposed to
complete integration. The expected majority (73 percent) of southerners expressed
negative views, but 50 percent of the northerners had similar attitudes. The results were
clear.143 There took place, however, subtle changes in attitudes within the Air Force, of
which the Pentagon was not always aware.
Only those familiar with studies that emanated from the senior and intermediate
Air Force and service schools during this post war period would have noted the change.
The studies indicated a reversal away from racism and the extreme prejudice evident a
decade earlier, and a willingness to experiment. The student recommendations were not
radical, but their attitude was fundamentally different. No longer did they stress black
congenital inferiority, but rather they blamed whites for retarding Negro development.
With such thinking, a change in policy was possible. The reports of the late 1940s were in
advance of Air Force practice and even official policy. Most historians believe the post-
World War II years to be a racial turning point and the Air War College, Air Command
and Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces studies bear out that
assumption. What they reveal is tentative, hesitant, ambivalent, and ambiguous, but for all
that, when measured against the reports of the previous decade, these postwar studies were
positive.
The clearest example, of course, and one that is hardly ambiguous is Noel Parrishs
thesis which he wrote while attending Air Command and Staff College in the spring of
1947. He was the first to discuss this subject after the war and clearly supported
integration. He found that segregation damaged international relations, that the Navy had
proven integration could work, that industry had demonstrated its success, and that
efficiency and justice demanded it. He wrote:
Compulsory segregation in the armed forces is an evasion of two simple facts. The
facts are: Thirteen million Americans are classified by custom as Negroes; law and
necessity confer upon these Negro Americans the rights and responsibilities of American
citizenship. Decency and justice may be ignored, as they often are, but the facts remain. .
There is no more obvious illustration of the rights and the responsibilities of
citizenship than service in the Armed Forces. Any limitation on a mans equal right in the
service of the nation tends to destroy the equality of his responsibilities .
Segregation is the refusal to apply the American system to Negro individuals.144
Parrishs statement was the clearest call, but not the only one. Lt. Col. Solomon
Cutcher in his Air Command and Staff College thesis declared that beliefs in racial
superiority were bigoted hypotheses maintained by those who had an interest in
perpetuating racism because they benefited from it. The armed forces of the United States,
he wrote, cannot afford to subscribe to any doctrine based upon a premise of permanent
racial superiority any more than they can afford to wage war with antiquated weapons.
Cutcher claimed that the limiting factors affecting blacks in 1948 were scientifically
proven to be products of environment and not characteristic of race.
He blamed racial friction within the service on whites who had entered the military
with racist beliefs. It was his view that it was the mission of the military to reeducate
bigots in order to create a more efficient force.145
In the interim between the issuance of Trumans executive order and the Air
Forces announcement of integration, there appeared cautious essays in support of
integration. Lt. Col. John B. Gaffney, an Air Command and Staff College student, called
for the gradual and eventual elimination of racial segregation, because such a policy
would lead to a more effective utilization of all personnel and because it would be
economical. He recommended indoctrination of all personnel to make such a program
work.146 Another officer at the school, Maj. Hugh D. Young, stated that the Air Force
was unprepared for large scale use of blacks and should prepare itself. He wrote:
Certainly as a nation we have expended valuable energies in perpetuating the wasteful
and sterile luxury of bi-racial [sic] institutions, we have actually wasted the human
resources of Negro Americans by submitting them to relentless system of frustration and
rejection . He noted that American whites were no less bigoted within the military than
without, and he warned against inflexible race mixing. Indiscriminate mixing might lower
morale, even of the blacks who might be stationed with prejudiced whites. Pressure
politics, he warned, must not force the Air Force to adopt a morale-lowering, inefficient
policy, and all changes should be made in the direction of a more efficient Air Force.147
In 1948 a major study, Training and Utilization of Manpower, was prepared at
the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) in Washington, D.C., for use in an
Economic Mobilization Course. It was written by a study committee consisting of 22
officers from the Air Force, Army, and Navy. The committees overall goal was to
examine critically the problems of wartime manpower utilization, to evaluate the
effectiveness of the methods and techniques used to meet these problems in World War
II, and to propose future procedures. Almost one-half of their final report was devoted to
an examination of The Negro.148
According to the study committee, there were no racial characteristics that
distinguished men, and such differences as were noted were cultural. The group
maintained that the feeling that the Negro is an inferior product of humanity and unfit to
associate with the white population is a prejudice born in the era of slavery. It was
stimulated in the South by the experiences of the Reconstruction Period and is nourished
even today.149 The committee pointed out the myriad of ways blacks had been
discriminated against in housing, schooling, and in employment, but did not suggest that
the services could cope with the problem of national prejudice and its byproducts. This
body advocated federal assistance to upgrade the educational level of the blacks and
insisted that the South make educational opportunities truly equal. The study noted the
wide financial differentials between white and Negro schools to be disheartening for the
latter.150 The committee discovered that blacks were less healthy than whites and
attributed this to discrimination in health care. In all, the study group argued that racism
denied to the United States healthy, educated, and cultured blacks; and thus the military
was deprived of the full benefit of the Negro segment of the population.151
The committee advocated a truly separate but equal distribution of facilities to
bring the blacks up to white levels and to make the former more acceptable in a socially
integrated society.152 The study group was aware of the manpower drain of the last war
and believed the United States could not fight another, which the study estimated would
require a labor force of 70 million men, with 10 percent of the population in prejudiced
deprivation.153 This argument led to a dilemma. The ICAF committee knew that deprived
blacks did not have the required skills. To train them, it was necessary for employers to
hire them and for white workers to be willing to work with them. The committee thought
that time could solve the problem in peacetime but that war might create tensions. The
writers were particularly fearful that men like A. Philip Randolph and other Negro leaders
might seize the initiative in another war to force changes that might adversely affect the
white population. They were appalled by Randolphs suggestions that blacks evade a
segregated draft. Clearly something had to be done, but the committee did not know what
could be done. Blacks needed greater economic opportunities, but the study maintained
management and labor should not be forced to accept them.154
The military, argued the group, was in similar straits. Only as society changed
could the military employ more blacks.155 The ICAF students agreed that a division into
white and Negro units was not the answer, and that placing blacks in service units was
unfair to the nation. For the students of this problem, the solution was to develop
leadership, provide extensive training, and to employ blacks with or near white troops in
order that their conception of standards may be raised and the white soldiers may be used
as pace-setters.156
In the end, the ICAF committee recommended nothing more than additional study
of the problem, but their hostility toward racism and their recognition of its damage to
blacks meant that they were on the brink of change. The group wrote:
Although without logical, anthropological or sociological foundation the
suspicions, distrusts, beliefs and attitudes that both Negro and white races have for each
other must be considered. While regulations, laws and orders can force the indiscriminate
mixing of the races in a military organization, it does not assure per se that such an
organization will be effective . Compliance will be with the letter of the law rather than
with the spirit behind it . Forced associations can result in discord, distrust, discontent,
and racial cliques which are weak foundations on which to build a combat
organization.157
The committee argued that the services were well ahead of society and simply
recommended another committee be formed. It proposed:
The Secretary of Defense [should] prepare a report for submission to the Chairman
of the National Security Resources Board outlining the need for raising the general health
and educational levels of the American Negro in order that his maximum utilization in
time of national emergency be realized.
The Armed Forces [must] not be influenced by the political pressure of Negro
leadership which has a goal secondary to, and which may be detrimental to national
security.
The present policies of each of the three services [should] be subject to such
modification as may be practicable based on the rising public acceptance of the Negro.158
Echoing the findings of the group, an Air Force colonel, Lester L. Kunish, also
recognized the wastefulness of the current system and worried about forced integration.
He advocated a more complete utilization within a segregated framework, but that, as
society integrated, so should the military. He wrote:
The Air Force must recognize that eventually the Negro will earn complete parity
with the white, and it should prepare him for his greater future role in the military by
continuously developing methods of employing him in a way that will not provoke or
aggravate racial friction but will integrate him completely and effectively.
Still, he saw the future in terms of segregation. Segregation, he said, must still
be maintained for the good of the Air Force, but gradual studied progress toward complete
integration should be made as rapidly as possible.159
Other students of the question became more vehement about the effects of racism,
but were unable to overcome the psychological barrier of recommending something the
services were not doing. Maj. John J. Pesch wrote in his Air Command and Staff College
thesis:
Racial antagonisms are not the result of inexorable nature nor of inherited instincts,
but of deliberate education and cultivation. The qualities which we most dislike in
Negroes are precisely those which have been so acquired and are therefore capable of
being modified by a different environment.
He added that treatment of the Negro is the greatest barrier to Americas
leadership. Since he found blacks educationally inferior to whites, however, he
disqualified race mixing. Once blacks had achieved equality of education, he argued,
integration could proceed. Although he admitted biological equality, he expected such a
solution as integration to consume decades of time.160
Prior to the Air Force decision to integrate, several studies appeared,
recommending abandonment of segregation. Maj. James D. Catington, an Air Command
and Staff College student, wrote that segregation and discrimination were erroneous in
nature and without foundation in fact. Segregation, furthermore, he stated, violated basic
human rights, and also violated both the spirit and letter of the Constitution.
He advocated an educational program that would make the new Air Force policy
well known and acceptable to all. He recommended the complete and active abolishment
of the policy of segregation of Negro troops. He suggested that an adequate and
thorough indoctrination of the rank and file of the Armed Forces be undertaken to apprise
members of the military establishment of the nature of the non-segregation policy in order
to secure an unreserved acceptance by both Negroes and whites alike. 161
Once the integrated policy was promulgated, various authors eagerly supported the
program. Lt. Col. Jack E. Cunningham wrote:
It is the firm conviction of the author that the non-segregation policy can work
successfully only if positive measures are taken to educate officers and airmen in order to
erase or at least minimize their prejudice. In terms of simple economy there is ample
justification for this . Eradication of a foolish prejudice and the granting of fair and
equal treatment to all, should keep morale high . Under these conditions, the Negro and
the white can work together in the non-segregated Air Force team.162
After the policy was implemented, the Pentagon learned of examples of how eager
whites were to have blacks on their Air Force team. A San Antonio air base reported
several attempts of white airmen trying with their new friends to end segregation in San
Antonio. In August 1949, service blacks and whites integrated Sommers drug stores,
resulting in a white protest. At first, three whites entered the store and ordered four
sundaes, explaining that their buddy would join them momentarily. Once the ice cream
had been served, the fourth, a black, joined them at the counter. This initially upset the
white manager, but all four were able to eat and leave in peace. During later incidents drug
store officials refused to be integrated or else served the airmen while other whites walked
out. The owner, Mr. Sommers, received threatening mail warning him that if his policy is
to serve niggers in your cafeteria as you did on Saturday night you cannot expect white
patronage. He also received a telephone call expressing the same view.163
During the drug store integration attempts, other establishments were also visited
by salt and pepper teams with varying results. A sit in took place at a Walgreens drug
store later in August. An intelligence summary describing these events states that
premeditation was indicated and the entire report was based upon information provided by
usually reliable sources and was therefore probably true.164
Jack Marr noted these events when he prepared a report summarizing the first year
of integration. He said that there were more attempts of this kindfor example, whites
trying to lessen the humiliation of segregationthan negative racial incidents. He did cite
other problems. For example, blacks attempted to test integration in base barber shops by
getting haircuts from white barbers. When bigoted whites tried to force blacks to stay in a
corner of the barracks, appropriate action was taken to eliminate friction. Some whites
stated that they would not reenlist if integration continued. Some parents requested
transfers for their sons, but on the whole parents appeared more concerned than the
men. The command structure was more effective in the speeding of integration than was
the geographic location. At the time Marrs report was compiled, there were 24
predominantly Negro units remaining in the Air Force, but the pace of change was
encouraging. Social integration progressed slowly and that too was becoming a reality.
The men who worked and lived together also partook in recreation together. Marr said that
all indications from confidential command reports and from outside observers show that
the program worked better than even the optimists had anticipated.165
Most major air commands during the first year of integration reported on the
implementation of Air Force Letter 35-3 in their command histories. Thereafter all
mention of blacks disappears until the 1960s. The Strategic Air Command demonstrated
how the 25 percent black-white merger helped integration progress very satisfactorily, but
the command noted that there were problems in social integration, especially in the NCO
clubs. The practice was introduced to establish branch clubs on the same base and it was
tacitly understood that one club was for whites and the other for blacks.166 Such
arrangements have persisted to the present time.
The Air Training Command (ATC) on its own instituted a 10 percent quota to
prevent bases from becoming overpopulated with blacks. The command also tried to
assure that the first blacks sent to previously white bases were of the highest caliber
possible to ease the shock of integration. ATCs history states: A nucleus of high type,
well trained and properly oriented Negro airmen would serve as a forerunner in
establishing the confidence necessary to facilitate increased assimilation of Negro
personnel. The command at the same time refused to reassign blacks in large numbers,
moving them in small groups to bases over a 30 to 60 day period to cushion the
impact.167
The Ninth Air Force history records the Lockbourne break-up. The commander of
the Ninth Air Force, Maj. Gen. Robert D. Old, discovered that blacks he knew were
generally disappointed because they were not socially accepted even though on-the-job
integration was completed. He remarked that the intelligent Negro appears to feel that he
would rather be in an all-Negro organization.168
The Ninth Air Force later played host to Dr. Mordecai Johnson, President of
Howard University, who visited Lang-ley AFB to evaluate the success of integration.
Behind closed doors, he interviewed 50 Negro airmen picked at random. Johnson had
been skeptical about integration, but was pleased with what he saw and heard. He did take
note of the fact that the NCO club was not fully open to blacks, but he was assured that the
situation was being corrected. He also was discouraged by the small complement of Air
Force Negro officers and the miniscule number of active pilots (30 in number).169
The Air Force record was good and a definite prod to the other services. The Fahy
Committee commented favorably upon the Air Forces ability to integrate a large number
of individuals (more than 20,000) and believed the Navy could do better than it had since
most blacks in that service were still messmen and segregated. The Air Force had
demonstrated to itself, to the Fahy Committee, and by inference to the other services that
blacks had a wider range of abilities than anybody had thought. It also discovered that
even with high enlistment standards, a large number of blacks were deemed qualified for
Air Force service.170
The Negro press, which followed with great interest the Air Forces achievement,
criticized the Army for lagging behind.171 When the Air Force apparently decided not to
bar Negro aviators from southern bases and placate southern congressmen and senators
who sat on appropriations committees, the Pittsburgh Courier applauded in a page one
headline: AIR FORCE WONT GIVE IN TO DIXIE.172 This journal and other leading
Negro newspapers followed every phase of integration during the first 6 months. In a
series of articles, a Courier reporter, Collins George, traveled throughout the United States
to observe the extent of compliance of the armed forces with Trumans directives. He was
not completely satisfied with the Air Force, but he found its policy well in advance of the
Army. His report was published on 28 July 1951 below a banner headline, which
proclaimed: 2 CALIF. BASES CONFIRM AIR FORCE LEAD IN INTEGRATION.
George visited Travis and Hamilton and declared that these bases confirmed the already
well known fact that the Air Force so far outdistances the other services in the manner of
racial integrationboth on the enlisted and officer levelthat comparison is impossible.
He observed:
When one sees the ease and efficiency with which the Air Force policy works, one
wonders why the other services will not go into the integration with the same
wholeheartedness, if only for the simple good of the services. It takes only a firm policy
enunciated by top authority with equal firmness in seeing that the policy is carried out.173
 At Williams AFB, Ariz., he noted that Negro pilots were fully accepted and
labeled the air base the most dramatic of the Air Force bases he had visited. He was
heartened by the fact that blacks and whites were being trained as jet pilots according to
the same standards.174 He found no segregation at Williams, but complained bitterly
about segregation in nearby Phoenix.
Maxwell AFB, Ala., on the other hand, received no praise. George visited
Headquarters Air University in April 1951 and wrote about what he saw. His story in the
Courier was headlined: MORALE IS EXTREMELY LOW IN SHANTY-TOWN and
SEGREGATED UNIT SORE SPOT AT MAXWELL FIELD AIR BASE. He blamed
part of the problem on the vicious effects of nearby Montgomery, Ala., the first Civil War
capital of the Confederacy. He reported that the base did proceed to integrate (probably
because the men were permitted to work alongside whites). But he found that the men
were miserable. He scoffed at statements that blacks described as pent-up [with]
discontent and dissatisfaction had voluntarily decided to segregate themselves. After
talking with the blacks, he learned that the Negro area lacked proper equipment and other
amenities. He attributed these unsatisfactory conditions to the base command element
which was dominated by southern officers, and he denounced them for their bias.175 This
unit, however, was fully integrated before the end of 1952.1
Unsympathetic whites at Brookley AFB near Mobile, Ala., created problems.
Concerned about having Negro civilians on the base, they protested the lowering of racial
barriers. Some whites on three occasions bludgeoned blacks for drinking water out of
fountains and were punished. The base commander subsequently warned all Brookley
personnel that he would not tolerate such intimidation or coercion. All supervisors were
required to sign statements that they were aware of Trumans executive order on equal
opportunity.177
The move to an integrated service created diplomatic problems for the Air Force.
Several foreign countriesDenmark, Canada, and Great Britainrefused to accept blacks
at air bases provided the United States in their various possessions. The Air Force
requested the State Department to work out this problem. Although many months of
diplomatic negotiations followed, the problem was eventually resolved and these countries
agreed to accept Negro airmen anywhere.178
Records in the National Archives and the Library of Congress contain little
evidence of rabid protest or critical problems following the initial era of integration. One
southern judge, opposed to Air Force integration, wrote to Secretary of Defense Johnson
to inform him that forcing white boys into armed services with blacks was crushing
their spirits. He condemned Truman for dismantling segregation to garner the Negro vote
and claimed the President was impairing the safety of the nation. He called him a moral
murderer and said he should be impeached. The judge concluded:
I would not blame any white man forced to train, eat, sleep and be mixed with
Negroes while sick to burn the cantonment buildings, shoot the insolent Negro officers
and non-commissioned officers as the occasion arose and I believe they will shoot them
when they are in battle. This country is going to lose any major war in which it depends
upon Negro troops to win. If you know anything, you know that the Negro soldier in
the first and second world wars were not worth a damn, notwithstanding the propaganda
and lies spread to the contrary by the administration in Washington, the Negro press and
Negro politicians.179
Gov. J. Strom Thurmond (Dem., S.C.) complained to Secretary of the Air Force
Symingtonthrough the states Sen. Burnet R. Maybankthat 35 Clemson University
ROTC cadets were housed with Negro ROTC cadets at Lowry AFB, Colo., during their
summer encampment. Thurmond predicted violence and demanded resegregation.
Secretary Symington, however, cited the Air Forces successes in integrating officer
training and its enlisted force.180 An Alabama congressman complained to Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert that a constituents son had protested sleeping
and eating in the same areas with blacks and demanded a transfer. Zuckert, in turn,
recommended a discharge for the unhappy white.181 The success of Air Force integration
in the year 1950 is attested by a Secretary of Defense file on Negro Problems. It
contained not a single paper on Air Force integration problems.182 Clearly, the Air Force
had succeeded in integrating with a minimum of friction, in a minimum amount of time.
The integration process advanced rapidly and smoothly. The Air Force Inspector
General did not mention integration in a lengthy report to the Vice Chief of Staff that
discussed major problems, although racial policy was reviewed. Apparently integration
was not a problem.183 Indeed, official Air Force unit histories written during the 1950s
scarcely took notice of integration other than to mention that it had gone well. By the end
of June 1952!during the Korean warthe last all-Negro unit disappeared without
notice.184
In the late 1940sa period without fierce racial tensions, guerrilla groups,
voluntary Negro resegregation, and snipersit was possible to become sentimental about
the achievements of integration. A review of Air Force integration from the perspective of
that decade indicates that acceptance was not generally expected. Even the most sanguine
of individuals had harbored fears, which made the trouble-free implementation of
desegregation more than welcome. Its success reflected the views of a handful of
pragmatists who were determined not to let racists stand in the way. Men like General
Edwards and Lt. Col. Jack Marr helped to open a new chapter in Air Force history.
Lee Nichols commented extensively about the change in Air Force thinking.
Having had access to Air Staff Personnel reports that reflected a remarkable social change,
he spread the good news. Whites who continued to oppose full rights for blacks were
quietly removed from their posts. Racial conflict seemed all but ended. At Lowry AFB,
Colo., an Air Training Command installation, the base commander (a general officer) told
Nichols he had no idea how many blacks were on this facility. This comment clearly
reflected the progress the Air Force had made. The general reported that blacks performed
as well as whites in various courses. He stated further that integration was the best policy
for the Air Force, and thats a southerner speaking.185
He did speculate momentarily that the military services might become a haven for
blacks, who recognized that it was the best possible situation for blacks, and he expressed
concern that the services might become predominantly Negro in the future. Another
commander at Keesler AFB, Miss., who told Nichols he was Virginia-born, stated that
integration had been no problem. He admitted that he had been skeptical about mixing the
races at first, but had seen clearly that the policy was a correct one.186
 Nichols also believed that the impact of integration would be as great or greater on
America than it was on the military. A native of Biloxi, Miss., commented that the men
leaving the service would be sure to retain at least some of their integration experiences
with positive benefits. He added: Our airmen who are discharged have different views in
civilian life than they had before. It happens more and more every day. They are learning
to live with Negroes. Mrs. Anna M. Rosenberg, an Assistant Secretary of Defense (1950-
1953), supported Nichols contention. In the long run, she noted, I dont think a man
can live and fight next to one of another race and share experiences where life is at stake,
and not have a strong feeling of understanding when he comes home. The Chief of Air
Force Chaplains told Nichols:
You cant turn a million guys into the military this year, and have them live and
work together without segregation, without some impression when they return to their
own communities. Integration is already having an impact, though not out in the open. It is
working like yeast, quietly.187
Nichols also believed the military was having an impact on the nearby civilian
communities. Some communities were altering their racial customs. Amarillo University
accepted Negro airmen along with whites in their extension course program. Previously,
the school had been segregated. George L. B. Weaver of the C.I.O.* Civil Rights
Committee credited military integration with improving industrial race relations, because
it firmly put the government on record as practicing what it said about equal
opportunity.188 Nichols praised the military for showing the country the way by
demonstrating that it could be done and by molding men who were less bigoted than they
were before entering the military service. He stated that from all available evidence the
great majority of men in integrated units took home a fresh slant on race free from the
basic concept of segregation that once dominated the American scene. This type of
experience was certain to influence not only the men themselves but also their families,
friends, and casual acquaintances.189
* Congress of Industrial Organizations.
Nichols watched with obvious pleasure the lowering of community racial barriers.
Near one northern location, a local bar owner was told by base officials to serve all
military personnel or his establishment would be declared off-limits. The owner
integrated.190 In this situation, however, Nichols was overly optimistic, for this became a
problem area in the 1960s. Nichols in 1953 looked for the bright side, found a positive
example, and who could fault him for broadcasting it? In February of that year, Col. James
F. Olive, commander of Harlingen AFB near Brownsville, Tex., received the following
letter from a white church in a tightly segregated community:
It is with pleasure that we inform you of the following motion that was
unanimously passed by our church . That the commanding officer of the Harlingen
Air Force Base be asked to invite all officers and airmen of the Base, regardless of race
or color, to attend any or all of our church services . We will appreciate any action you
may take that will make the officers and airmen under your command, regardless of race
or color, feel free to worship God with us in our church. We commend the actions of the
Air Force in your program of eliminating race discrimination, and hope that our action
may be at least a step forward in uniting our people as one under God.
 Nichols believed that before this letter was sent, probably no Negro had ever been
admitted to a white Protestant church in Brownsville . Racial integration in the military
was exercising a powerful influence on civilian habits, it was inevitable it should.191
Once the Air Force had completed integration, USAF officials took less note of
continuing problems, including prejudiced communities with which blacks were forced to
interact, individual bigots in uniform who overtly discriminated against or humiliated
blacks, and the changing racial climate in the United States. It was ironical that the Air
Force, which had been well ahead of the civilian sector in the 1950s, lagged behind
during the Negro civil rights revolution of the 1960s. It may be significant to note that the
original letter on equal opportunity (AFL 35-3), was revised in September 1950, and later
issued as an Air Force regulation (AFR 35-78), but with few changes. It remained in force
until 1955, when it was rewritten and its title changed to Air Force Personnel Policy
Regarding Minority Groups. The regulation admonished commanders to carry out the Air
Forces policy of equal treatment and opportunity. It did not tell them how to do this and
offered no guidance for eliminating the prejudiced or improving the lot of blacks in nearby
local communities.192 When the regulation was superseded in 1964 by a very specific
directive, it changed the whole face of Air Force race relations. But this came after the Air
Force had allowed indignities to be heaped upon Negro airmen.
 Chapter IV
BENIGN NEGLECT
By 1952 the Air Force had desegregated and concluded that integration had been
completed. Those officials responsible for desegregation were transferred to other posts.
In 1951 General Edwards was appointed Commandant, Air University, Maxwell AFB,
Ala., and Colonel Marr was reassigned to a European post. They were not replaced and
would have been the first to question the need for replacements. They believed the
problem had been resolvedsince all-Negro units had disappeared and blacks were
working, playing, and socializing with white airmen. There was no disputing the fact that
the Air Force was integrated in the early 1950s. The Negro press, a leader in the
integration campaign, seemed satisfied and the Air Force became the model for the other
services. When the Army and Navy desegregated, the problem seemed to be resolved.
Few spokesmen of prominence within the military or Negro community addressed at this
time the problems of racial discrimination which most Negroes faced within the civilian
communities.1 These problems were not addressed during the last years of the Truman
administration, which found itself involved in a hot war in Korea.2
The Korean War
The Korean War (1950-1953) underscored the fact of integration. The Negro press
covered the war and wrote numerous news stories about individual Air Force blacks in the
Far East and many favorable articles about Air Force integration. The disbandment of all-
Negro units, however, made it more difficult to report on Negro airmen achievements.
The Pittsburgh Courier headlined one edition: TAN FLIERS OVER KOREA.
The paper reported that six blacks were flying in combat. The following week the Courier
in a headline article reported that 25 Tan Fliers Battle Reds, but admitted that it was
difficult to state precisely the number of blacks engaged in combat since the Air Force did
not keep records by race.3 The Negro press focused on Capt. Daniel Chappie James,
who gained prominence as a pilot of an unarmed reconnaissance jet, flying dangerous
missions over North Korea. The articles usually stressed that a white airman operated a
camera in the back seat of his aircraft.4 Front page coverage also was given to 1st Lt.
Dayton Rag-land, the first black to shoot down a MIG aircraft.5 Ragland later was shot
down and became a prisoner-of-war for the duration of the conflict.
The theme of most news accounts, however, was not of individual heroism, but of
the fact of integration. The Baltimore Afro-American said that war correspondents
described integration in two words: Air Corps, and added no one here will challenge
their right to spell it that way.6 The Pittsburgh Courier called Yokota AB, Japan, a
perfect model of race harmony, and noted that whites and blacks forgot about race and
color and went about their work and sociabilities in absolute harmony.7 Yet the real
story in Korea was not Air Force integration, but Army desegregation, for that war
demolished forever a centuries-old tradition of separatism. For every Negro flyer the Air
Force graduated, the Army produced hundreds of black combat soldiers, and the Negro
press began to report their exploits in 1950 and 1951.8
One item of disagreeable Air Force marginalia survived to indicate that the upbeat
stories in the Negro press did not tell the full story. Lt. Gen. Earle E. Partridge,
Commander, Far East Air Forces (FEAF), decided to remove blacks from duty as forward
air controllers after several had twice misdirected fire on friendly troops. He wrote in his
diary:
I discovered on the third of January, strikes were made in the Uijonbu area by
Navy aircraft, operating under a Fifth Air Force controller. It developed that the controller
was a Negro pilot. This makes the second time that a Negro controller has placed strikes
on our own troops. I am forced to the unhappy conclusion that certain of these people are
not temperamentally suited for such important assignments. Accordingly I issued orders
 to quietly remove from Mosquito Squadrons all Negro pilots when the Negro pilots
with the TACPs finish the tour no more Negroes [will be] assigned to that type of duty.9
 The numbers affected by the directive could not have been many, but it is
significant to note that some military leaders continued to generalize about an entire race
because of the poor performance of a few. Before the Korean war ended in July 1953, a
new administration entered the White House and blacks thereafter received less moral
support from President Dwight D. Eisenhower than from his predecessor, Harry Truman.
Soon after the end of the Korean conflict, the last all-Negro units in the Army and
Navy disappeared. By 1952 military discrimination was a dead issue, although
Eisenhower tried to capitalize on his role in integrating the United States Army in Europe.
Neither political party in that year vigorously sought Negro votes. The Stevenson-
Sparkman* ticket could hardly afford to do so, and the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket probably
did not want to. The Negro press conducted muted campaigns for the candidates in
contrast to 1944 and 1948. Although the Negro press took stands, there was little fire in
the editorials. The Pittsburgh Courier endorsed Eisenhower in its edition on the eve of the
election, but its coverage until then had been almost neutral. The newspaper headlined,
Ike and the 99th, and claimed that Ike had kept them on Wings. In a breathless style
the paper advised, Now it can be told. A decision which saw General Dwight D.
Eisenhower going all out for the first Negro fliers ever to soar into the skies against an
enemy of this country. The article lacked names, dates, or other substantiating
evidence, but the fact that the newspaper had to reach far back in time to say something
nice about the Republican candidate is clear evidence of the poverty of the partys civil
rights platform. In addition, the paper carried numerous photographs of Eisenhower and
predicted his victory. Again, articles on the second page recounted how Eisenhower had
fought segregation in the Army.10
* Gov. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois and Sen. John J. Sparkman of Alabama.
The Baltimore Afro-American endorsed Stevenson, apparently because the
newspaper did not find Eisenhower strong on civil rights. The latter was attacked for his
negative statements on military integration and civil rights prior to 1948, and one issue
claimed Ike flunks initial tests on Civil Rights.11 The paper in an October 1952 edition
displayed a photograph of the home of his running mate, Senator Richard M. Nixon, with
a photostat of the restrictive covenant Nixon and his wife had signed promising not to sell
to any person or persons of Negro blood or extraction of the Semitic race, blood or
origin, which racial description shall be deemed to exclude Armenians, Jews, Hebrews,
Persians, and Syrians. All of the above could be welcomed into the neighborhood as
servants.12 On 11 October, the Baltimore Afro-American endorsed Stevenson, more it
would seem for distaste of the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket than for fondness of Stevenson
and his running mate, Sparkman.13
Eisenhower and Civil Rights
Eisenhower had no Negro constituency and did little for blacks. The 1954 Supreme
Court decision on school segregation was another matter. In his memoirs, the former
President did not claim any credit for this decision on segregation. He admitted that he
found the decision sound, emphasizing again that he had said nothing in its support
originally, but finally getting himself on record after almost a decade of silence.14 Civil
rights legislation during the Eisenhower years was not of a revolutionary nature and
received little presidential backing. When the Pittsburgh Courier endorsed Eisenhower in
1956, it supported him for his conservative views and not for his leadership on racial
matters.15 Even the Baltimore Afro-American gave qualified approval of the Republican
ticket, in the hope that a landslide might sweep away the Democratic senators opposed to
integration.16
This is not to say that Eisenhower did utterly nothing, but that he was passive
when the tide of expectations was rising steadily. A journalist, Robert J. Donovan, who
closely scrutinized the first Eisenhower administration, wrote: When the administration
took office no one gave much thought to the special problems of the Negro, and
practically nothing was done about this politically very sensitive matter. He concluded
that in the early months of 1953 the matter of civil rights was let slide. Unlike Truman,
Donovan wrote, Eisenhower had deliberately refrained from assigning anyone on his
staff to a more or less full-time job of attending to the problems of minority groups.17
But 2 years after taking office, Eisenhower issued an executive order establishing a
Presidents Committee on Government Employment Policy. This committee reaffirmed
and monitored the equal opportunity program within the civil service initiated by his
predecessor but it was not a dramatic gesture.18 In 1956, however, the President requested
civil rights legislation and won a victory the following year with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, the first such legislation in more than four score years.19 He also sent federal
troops into Little Rock to support the Supreme Courts 1954 desegregation decision.20
These presidential acts, however, did not retain the Negro vote for the Republican ticket in
1960.
An early Eisenhower executive action that did have impact on the armed services
was his decision to integrate dependents schools on military posts before the Supreme
Court ordered general school integration. In March 1953, Eisenhower sent a memorandum
to Defense Secretary Charles Wilson requesting data on segregated schools operating on
military installations. Wilson advised the President that there were 21 schools operating on
a segregated basis on military posts. He also informed Eisenhower that he wanted to end
school segregation quickly and requested firm instructions to do so. The Secretary of
Defense acknowledged that desegregating these schools would be difficult because they
were operated by local authorities and therefore came under local laws which maintained
racial segregation. He suggested that if the federal government dictated integration,
teachers might leave the schools, accreditation problems might arise, and the federal
government would probably have to provide more funds. Despite the anticipated
problems, Wilson wanted to integrate. I suggest, he wrote to the President, that this
problem would be expedited if you were to direct that the procedures for integration are to
be finalized so that the objectives can be accomplished not later than the school year
beginning in the fall of 1955.2i Even before Wilsons letter Eisenhower had ordered the
end of segregation at the Fort Benning elementary school beginning in September 1953.
The school, unlike others on federal posts, was wholly supported by the government and
did not depend on local funds for teachers salaries or for operating costs.22
Eisenhower moved cautiously on the question of other segregated schools. Within
his cabinet, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), Oveta Culp Hobby,
advised deliberation. In a memorandum to the President, she recommended he act slowly
and do nothing for the time being. She cited the problem areas noted by Wilson and
introduced new issues which did not appear in the 1970s to be too serious. There were,
she wrote, small numbers of local children now attending the on-base schools,
though they did not live on military posts. What was to become of these children? How
would children be affected if after leaving military supported integrated elementary
schools they were forced to attend segregated secondary schools? Finally, she advised
Eisenhower that the best reason for delaying a decision was that the Supreme Court was
then studying the entire question of segregated schools, and it would be helpful to have the
benefit of the Supreme Courts decision on the segregation issue before taking executive
action. She concluded by warning Eisenhower about the impact such a move would have
on southern Congressmen. She recommended that he wait until more information could be
gathered.23
It is difficult to evaluate Eisenhowers position during this internal debate. He does
not appear to have taken a firm stand. Records in the Eisenhower Library indicate that the
question was discussed. A draft letter from Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, to
Adam Clayton Powell contains a statement which would have committed the
administration to desegregating schools on federal installations, but someone later
removed the sentence from the final draft of the letter. It is impossible to establish with
certainty who ordered the material deleted but it does show indecision on this question.24
Eisenhowers conservative supporters recommended he shun the issue. Gov. Allan Shivers
of Texas urged the President to stay out of the entire school desegregation thicket and
leave such matters to the people at the local level.25
For all of the indecision, in late 1953more than 8 months prior to the Supreme
Court integration orderthe Defense Department announced its decision to desegregate
schools on military posts within 2 years at the latest. If local school boards would not
cooperate, the federal government would finance the schools. The 2-year lead time would
provide an opportunity to iron out all details.26 On 12 January 1954, Defense Secretary
Wilson directed the service secretaries to take appropriate steps to assure that the
operation of all schools on military posts was conducted on an integrated basis. Effective
that date, no new schools opened were to be segregated and all schools had to be
integrated by the opening of the 1955 school term. Wilson also outlined a policy for
operating the schools should the community fail to cooperate.27 The Defense
Departments decision to desegregate was hastened after the Supreme Court decision in
May 1954. The elementary school at Maxwell AFB was integrated in the fall of 1954
without the cooperation of Montgomery school officials. The local superintendent wrote to
Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott demanding the return of the school to city jurisdiction.
Talbott advised him that he would get back the school once the state government had
decided to desegregate the Maxwell school.28
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court decision influenced the Department of Defense to
act before September 1955, because the federal government had to appear to support the
decision if it expected compliance with federal law. Richard M. Dalfiume argued in his
important 1969 book, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts,
that military integration had been an important factor influencing the Supreme Court in a
positive manner. Dalfiume claimed that in 1954, before the epochal decision on school
desegregation, members of the Court read in manuscript form Lee Nichols 1954 book,
Breakthrough on the Color Front . Desegregation of the military was indeed an
important precedent for the Federal Governments new role in race relations.29 An
attempt to confirm Dalfiumes statement brought negative comments from the late Chief
Justice Earl Warren and Associate Justice Thomas Clark. Warren stated that he had no
recollection of Nichols book, nor had he ever asked anyone on the bench to read it.
Concerning Dalfiumes statement, Warren stated that the court was not thinking in terms
of the military at all. I have no recollection of it at all. I never heard of the book.30 Clark
also said in an interview that he had never heard of the book, and I know I never read it.
He was aware of armed forces integration, but it was not a factor . . , .Armed forces
integration had no weight. I dont recall it being discussed.3i Associate Justice Thurgood
Marshall also was asked the same question because he had argued the case before the
court. He wrote that he had not used the Nichols book in preparing his brief .32
One should not conclude that armed forces integration had no influence on the
courts decision. Had race riots accompanied military integration, the Supreme Court
might have proceeded more slowly. Had Truman never moved into the field of integration
in 1946 and climaxed his activities with military integration in 1948, the national climate
might not have supported a judicial school integration decision, although Justices Warren
and Clark would have been among the first to deny that their unanimous decision was
based on anything other than points of law. Thus, it seems that armed forces integration
despite Dalfiumes commentinfluenced the court only indirectly, if at all. One must look
elsewhere for an explanation.
The historic court decision did increase Negro militancy and after 1954 complaints
of Negro servicemen in the South increased. The files of James C. Evans, a civilian
assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reveal many complaints mainly from
married servicemen who objected to being stationed in the South where they were forced
to send their children to segregated schools.33 Representative Adam Clayton Powell,
trying to halt federal impact funds to systems that segregated in violation of the court
decision, introduced amendments to two public laws that permitted civilian communities
to tap federal funds if large government installations were nearby.34
Little Rock Air Force Base
The Air Force was drawn into the school controversy in 1958. The elementary
school adjacent to Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark., was built with federal funds
exclusively for Air Force dependents and financed with impact aid, but was open to whites
only.35 The base commander expressed the official Air Force position. He noted that the
school was situated on Pulaski County property and not on the base and that the Air Force
had to abide by the school boards decision not to integrate. It was Department of Defense
policy, the commander added, to conduct civil activities according to the customs and
decision of local agencies in the area of military installations . Although there is no
segregation within the Armed Forces all military services have traditionally followed local
civilian rules, regulations and customs with regard to segregation in their off-base
activities.36 The Eisenhower administration, however, reacted to this situation by buying
the school from the county.
This controversy required staff activity within the Air Force Secretarys office. The
President wanted the question resolved in favor of Negro parents who were offended by
federally supported segregation. Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles decidedafter
consulting with the Attorney Generalthat the United States Government should take
over the elementary school by right of eminent domain. The school would then be
operated as a federal school using HEW funds. The pain expressed by parents at having
their children bused through the gates of the base, past a school built by the government
for Air Force children, to another, older, and less well equipped school 11 miles away, was
too much for the President and his advisors.37 Service children were caught up elsewhere
in the ugly turmoil over school integration in the 1950s and in many cases became
innocent bystanders in campaigns like Virginias massive resistance fight. Service
personnel, who seldom vote in states where they are stationed, became unfortunate victims
of local politicians who preferred to shut down a school rather than integrate. In Congress,
there was some sentiment to provide federal funds to schools which accepted service
dependents if state officials closed the schools.38 No action was taken on such a measure,
however, until 1960.
In addition to the Little Rock situation, there were other scattered examples which
reflected the civil rights sentiments of the Eisenhower administration. The President
assigned a high level administrator, Maxwell Rabb, who served as Secretary to the
Cabinet and Associate Counsel to the President, to deal with civil rights. Rabb received a
complaint about segregated barber shops at Chanute AFB, 111. He solved the problem by
ordering a consolidation of base shops.39 Rabb received letters from various congressmen
among them, Representative Powellwho complained vigorously that blacks at West
Point in 1954 were rigidly Jim-crowed, segregated, and discriminated against by being
forced into categories of domestic servants.40 He also learned that a Negro airman at
Keesler AFB had requested a transfer because he had been ordered off a public beach near
the base. The airman was advised the Air Force could not interfere with the customs and
laws of a civilian community. He was told further that he could not be transferred simply
because of discrimination, since it was practiced in many communities throughout the
United States. To transfer personnel to bases where there was no discrimination would
limit the bases to which such personnel could be assigned. According to Rabb, reassigning
personnel on such a basis would make it impossible to man a unit properly and would be
contrary to the policy of equality of treatment.41
The administration did react to some integration issues. For example, it transferred
the 1957 Tulane-West Point football game from Louisiana to New York because Negro
cadets would have been required to sit in segregated sections.42 Such actions, however,
were rare. There was no major effort attempted by the Eisenhower administration to deal
with such questions, perhaps because there was no Negro constituency to respond to.
In 1957, James C. Evans, a Civilian Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, prepared a formal report for Rabb in which he summarized the racial gains made
in the services. Evans report was titled: Advances in the Utilization of Negro Manpower
Under Ten Years of Unification of the Armed Services. Almost all of Evans brief report
tracing the progress from segregation to desegregation was a condensation of various
statements issued by the Defense Secretaries from George Marshall to Charles Wilson.
Secretary Wilson noted that combat effectiveness is increased as individual capabilities
rather than racial designations determine assignments and promotions . Above all, our
National Security is improved by the more effective utilization of personnel regardless of
race.43 There was no hint from Evans that the job was less than fully done. Oddly, 2
years earlier he had prepared a progress report in pamphlet form for general distribution,
which liberally praised the advances made by Negro servicemen. In his 1955 report, Evans
also claimedwithout furnishing substantiating evidencethat the Defense Department
had made gains for minorities that were beyond the direct purview of the Department of
Defense.44
Air Force Off-Base Discrimination
There is, however, no evidence that the Department of Defense ever worked for
blacks off the post before the 1960s. Even if Negro airmen suffered no more than their
civilian contemporaries, those in the service did not have the freedom to relocate when
faced with poor facilities and open discrimination. Often they were required to live in
areas which they would have avoided if given an option. Blacks would have been least
likely to move to bases in the rural North, where many communities were every bit as
segregated and hostile as those in the South. And their situation was made worse by the
absence of legitimate recreational and social outlets because there were no nearby Negro
communities. Indeed, blacks in the rural North suffered as much or more than those in the
southern states.
In the South, the situation was less than idyllic for Negro airmen. Maxwell AFB,
whose racial problems were typical of southern bases, was located near Montgomery,
Ala., the first capital of the Confederacy during the Civil War. The base became a captive
of deep southern prejudices and a model for racial intolerance.45
It took base officials, it will be remembered, more than 2 years to carry out the
provisions of Air Force Letter 35-3 to integrate the installation. The problems Negro
airmen faced in Montgomery were no worse than those endured by Negro civilians, but
few airmen would have chosen to live there, given reasonable alternative. Capt. Emmet S.
Walden, Jr., an officer attending the Air Command and Staff College during the civil rights
era, researched and wrote his staff college thesis about Maxwell and its peculiar
institutions. The author, a southerner, began his research by adopting an unsympathetic
attitude towards the racial activism of the Kennedy administration. At first, he believed
that the military was being misused by Kennedy when the President tried to insure equal
rights to minority groups. After studying the issue, however, Walden changed his position.
He examined the real problems blacks faced while attending the Air Force professional
schools at Maxwell AFB, and then reached difficult conclusions. He discovered, for
example, that in order to invite a Negro classmate to his home, he had to go through a
procedure that was both elaborate and demeaning.46
To begin with, interracial socializing in private homes was officially discouraged
by both the base and school officials. Captain Walden was told:
There are no local laws which prevent voluntary off-base association between
white and Negro military personnel or their dependents. Local police officers have on
occasion warned persons about their safety where whites and Negroes were associating
but no charges were made. The local custom against social associating of whites and
Negroes is very strong. A white person associating socially with a Negro can expect
general community disapproval and ostracism. A Negro visiting a white residence for
social purposes would arouse the greatest local resentment.47
Students who still desired to entertain or study with Negro classmates were told to
inform their neighbors that a fellow student, a Negro, was coming to call, and were
advised to be sure that the whites knew just who he is and why he is coming. Blacks
visiting whites were counseled to wear their uniforms.48
From the 1940s into the 1960s, youth activities offered to dependents at Maxwell
AFB that were in any way involved with off-base groupssuch as the Little League and
Boy and Girl Scoutswere strictly segregated because the civilian community would not
tolerate integrated recreational and social activities. One Air University commander
explained that long standing customs, tradition, and laws made it a breach of the peace
to mix the races. He stated that all relationships with the civilian community must
conform or risk inciting riots and arrest of all participants . Air Force youth activities
cannot participate with their counterparts in the Montgomery area if any Negro
participants were included. He added: Likewise all the civilian community activities that
participate with like Air Force activities were strictly segregated. This meant that adult
groups such as the Toast-masters and Kiwanis also were segregated. Some organizations
used Maxwell facilitiesthe gymnasium, clubs, and athletic fieldsgiving the base the
appearance of sanctioning segregation. If there were no Negro organizations that
corresponded to a segregated activity, blacks were barred from all participation. While
membership or participation in any of these organizations had not been denied any
person because of race the local customs and ordinances for mixing the races are well
known by all, and blacks did not apply for membership.49
The practice of segregating recreational activities, which continued into 1962 and
1963, had been ratified by Maj. Gen. Truman Landon, Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel.
To do otherwise would have deprived the vast majority, i.e., the whites, of needed
recreational activity, and a demand for racial integration would seriously damage the
relationship Maxwell had painstakingly built with the town. Blacks did not join Maxwell
athletic teams until 1963 and when several blacks joined a basketball team, the local
YMCA immediately withdrew its permission for Maxwell to participate in its leagues.50
Other functions were also segregated at Maxwell. As late as the early 1960s, cab
service to and from the air base, the base-community council, housing lists, and mortuary
service was segregated.51 From time to time the base commander had considered it
necessary to instruct blacks to stay out of Montgomery except when on important
business, which in effect placed the city off-limits to blacks. He exercised his option
during periods of tension, which became increasingly more common in the early 1960s.
Congressman Charles Diggs (Dem., Mich.) sent an inquiry to the Air Force Inspector
General and was told that the base commander had indeed at times directed Negro
personnel to avoid Montgomery.52
The Inspector Generals letter to Diggs included a summary of recent incidents
involving Negro officers and airmen at Maxwell. For example, in March 1960 a Negro Air
Force major was arrested while accompanying two Ethiopian officers and an Air Force
captain to a downtown barber shop. The Air University students were stopped and
searched at gunpoint, and because the trunk of the car contained a carpenters hammer, the
police hinted that the major might be booked for possession of a dangerous weapon. He
was, instead, booked for reckless driving and fined $25, in addition to court costs. Such
hostility, the inspector general said, was reason enough for the base commander to caution
blacks.53
A more violent confrontation took place the same month. A Negro airman in
uniform was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to murder
and for carrying a concealed weapon, a straight razor. The police officer testified that the
airman became abusive while being questioned on a routine matter. According to the
officer, the airman struck him, knocking his revolver to the ground. The airman seized the
gun and allegedly fired at the officer at point blank range, but missed. But the airman told
a different account. He testified he was quietly waiting for a bus when the policeman
approached and made derogatory remarks about his race. He said the officer struck him
with his night stick whereupon the airman grabbed the gun and in the process fired it into
the ground. An eyewitness corroborated the airmans story.54
Maxwell military police officers interviewed the airman in the local jail that same
day, observing that he was uninjured except for a small bump on the head where he had
been struck by the night stick. The next day the airman showed signs of a physical
beating. He had suffered a laceration above the right eye requiring clamps, a swelling on
the right side of the face, and another lump on the head. The Alabama court assessed the
airman more than $600 in fines and court costs, but did not try him for attempted murder
as had been threatened.
The Inspector General informed Diggs that the Air Force was most interested in
the morale, health, welfare, and security of all its personnel and deeply believed in equal
opportunity, but that Air Force authority in this matter was restricted to the limits of Air
Force jurisdiction. Beyond these limits civilian jurisdiction prevails, as determined by civil
law and local custom. The letter further stated that:
there is little basis to expect that any member of the Air Force will receive more
favorable treatment from the civilian community than he would receive as a civilian under
the same circumstances. Nor does the Air Force have authority to use any measure of
force or coercion to change or influence local law or custom which does not agree with
official Air Force policy.55
The Air Force, in effect, had sent its Negro airmen into a segregated community
which Air Force officials surely knew would abuse and demean them whenever they
ventured off the base. The Air University, established in 1946 before integration, began a
$5,000,000 building program at Maxwell to house an Air War College and the Air
Command and Staff School in 1955, well after integration.56 At the time no one paid
attention to the situation that Negro airmen sent to Maxwell might face while attending the
schools there.
Their problems were manifold. For example, it was difficult if not impossible for
Negro airmen to find decent lodging, restrooms, restaurants, homes, and schools to
educate their children. Maj. Alfred E. McEwen, who attended the Air Command and Staff
College in 1965-1966, examined these issues in his thesis, Permanent Change of Station
A Continuing Problem for Negro Airmen. McEwen described automobile travel
through the South as a nightmare. Blacks generated white hostility, he wrote, for simply
owning a late model automobile.57 The blacks were forced to plan all journeys in the
South with care to avoid trouble from hostile whites on the road. Even after arriving at
Maxwell, they faced the danger of physical attacks if they tried to socialize with white
servicemen. Fear, McEwen wrote, is constantly a companion of the Negro airman. He
suffers from fear anytime he departs the confines of the base to which he is assigned in the
Deep South. . Frustrations followed blacks. On-base, they were treated as professionals,
off-base they were humiliated daily. Forced to live in the least desirable parts of the city of
Montgomery, they were unable to offer their families amenities enjoyed by their white
associates. This conflict drained their energies and led many to react defensively,
aggressively, and to display antisocial behavior.58
The danger of being stationed in the South is well illustrated by the case of Lt.
Titus A. Saunders, Jr. In the spring of 1955, Saunders was a passenger in an automobile
involved in a minor accident in Mississippi, where he was stationed. Although he was not
the driver of the car, he rolled it off the highway after the accident to prevent blocking of
traffic. He was promptly arrested and charged for driving while under the influence of
alcohol, was fined $500, and sentenced to serve 6 months on the states chain gang. He
appealed his sentence and, after he had served 1 day on the gang, the Air Force reassigned
him to Ohio. The Governor of Mississippi demanded Saunders extradition but Ohio
Governor Frank Lausche refused to return him, calling the conviction unjust. One of
Mississippis senators wrote a letter to Air Force Secretary Donald Quarles demanding
Saunders be discharged from the Air Force because he was a convicted felon and Air
Force regulations called for the discharge of those so convicted. Reacting to this political
pressure, Quarles gave Saunders the choice of resigning or receiving a less than honorable
discharge. The secretary said that it was not the responsibility of the Air Force to
determine the adequacy of the evidence. It was sufficient for the Air Force that
Lieutenant Saunders had been convicted and that the conviction had been upheld upon
review by the Mississippi Supreme Court.59
The Problem in the North
Blacks in North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, northern Michigan, Maine, and
elsewhere in the rural North suffered as many indignities or more than those in the South.
Blacks stationed in the rural North might not be able to document a case history as
dramatic as Titus Sauders, but they also were badly treated. Negro airmen stationed at
Ellsworth AFB, S. Dak., were rejected by the local communities, and base officials
seemed to be indifferent to their plight. Many business establishments were closed to
blacks, all taverns were segregated, and housing was extremely limited, substandard, and
exceptionally expensive.
In 1962 the NAACP complained to the Air Force Inspector General. It was told
that the Air Force was extremely limited in the extent to which it may exert its influence
in the local civilian community. The NAACP then wrote to the commander of the air
division at Ellsworth suggesting that the town could be opened to blacks if the commander
declared segregated facilities off-limits to all military personnel. This, said the NAACP,
would almost immediately bring the desired results.60 The Air Force replied that the
community of Rapid City had to solve its own problems and, in any case, its authority was
restricted to the limits of the base.61
Some senior Air Force officials were probably aware of the misery that
accompanied blacks in such assignments, but they were restricted to a policy of
nonintervention. Frequently in the 1950s and 1960s, Congressman Diggs complained
about the situation, only to be informed that living conditions, while deplorable, were not
an Air Force problem. Negro airmen complained they had been called niggers and
darkies by whites in the communities surrounding Finley Air Station, N. Dak., and that
they also were routinely barred from dances. Maj. Gen. Joe W. Kelly USAF, in responding
to Diggs request for information, told the Michigan lawmaker that a major difficulty lies
with community sentiment concerning Negro airmen. Most of the local citizens were
Norwegians who had never associated with blacks prior to the establishment of the air
station. This unfamiliarity coupled with the total absence of a Negro civilian populace
within a hundred miles presents a difficult problem for colored airmen and their families
as concerns social status, freedom of action, and entertainment facilities. Kelly informed
Diggs that the town of Mayville, N. Dak., about 30 miles from the base, was especially
hostile toward blacks. He added: Emphasis is made by the police department and
prominent citizens that Negro airmen are not wanted in the town, and neither are white
airmen who choose to associate with Negroes.62
 Blacks stationed in Montana were no better off. In December 1948 General Kuter
wrote to General Edwards about the off-base situation at Great Falls. Kuter wanted to
reduce the number of blacks to a maximum of 50 and to limit their tour on the post to 18
months.63 The situation, furthermore, did not improve following integration. A year later
James L. Flaherty, the director of the Larger Montana Chamber of Commerce, asked
General Vandenberg to bar blacks from Great Falls. Vandenberg refused.64 Edwards
shortly thereafter wrote to Kuter, informing him that the problem still continued and that
he could not consider a quota on blacks nor a shortened tour. General Edwards suggested
to Kuter that the economic benefit that accrued to Great Falls should make them grateful
for the air base and require them to accept the minor inconveniences inherent in the
situation.65 But the people of Great Falls were unyielding. Blacks found they could not
purchase hamburgers from local food concessions and had difficulty buying gasoline
restrictions not even found in the South. The only restaurant in town open to blacks was
also a house of prostitution.66 After repeated complaints from the Air Force, many town
establishments agreed to remove the offensive signs barring blacks, but some still refused
to serve them. One investigator summing up the situation wrote:
The lack of a Negro Community with normal outlets in restaurants, hotels,
recreation and religious services, and the utter and deplorable scarcity of housing for
Negro married personnel will always make Great Falls an undesirable place for the
assignment of Air Force personnel . Great Falls is probably above the standards of most
western communities of Air Force personnel except those on the Pacific Coast in its
acceptance of Negro personnel in uniform . The Great Falls situation is another example
of the impossibility of providing any substitute for a Negro community . The problems
of western and northwestern cities where some of the worst discrimination now exists are
mainly those of a lack of Negro citizens and services.67
In July 1953, Brig. Gen. John Ives, the Director of Military Personnel, wrote to an
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force that discrimination in Montana persisted. The
situation in Great Falls presented a dilemma. Air Force personnel policy could not bar
blacks from such stations, General Ives claimed, and closing the base would be too costly
and a poor policy. He recommended working with the more influential elements in Great
Falls to find a suitable place for blacks.68 Trying to gain cooperation from the town
fathers for better treatment of blacks was the best the Air Force could do.
Glasgow, Mont., was another difficult place for blacks. For years the NAACP had
complained about the problems in the community. In 1961, Sen. Philip Hart, (Dem.,
Mich.), wrote to Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert about discrimination in Glasgow. He
said that most serious consideration should be given to a policy whereby base
commanders could declare private establishments which refuse service to uniformed
members of the armed services because of race, to be off-limits. Hart told the secretary
that Glasgow profited from the base and by wielding economic power the Air Force could
end the continuing embarrassment and disgrace suffered by blacks in uniform. He
complained that towns like Glasgow had discriminated for years, but the Air Force had
done nothing to solve the problem. It was time, he said, for a change.69
Blacks stationed at an air base in upper Michigan fared no better than those at
Great Falls or Glasgow. The men were completely integrated on the job, but the towns in
the area were so hostile to blacks that Negro airmen felt they were imprisoned and lived in
fear because of local hostility. Barber shops refused to cut their hair and most restaurants
and taverns refused them service. There was a United Service Organization (USO) in one
of the towns, but it provided little comfort. Housing, furthermore, was nearly
unavailable.70
The Air Force, while aware of the situation, was short of solutions because of its
inability to challenge community customs, mores, and laws. A 2-year study of its
recreational problems suggested that the promise of equal opportunity expressed in Air
Force Regulation 35-78 was incomplete so long as the matter of off-base discrimination
remained a problem. The Air Force recognized, the investigator wrote, that it had no
power of right to insist on a change of local community practices with respect to racial
segregation . Where segregation is required by law in the community, the base has an
obligation to stimulate activities on behalf of its Negro personnel among the Negro
community, just as it does for its white personnel in the white community. The report
recommended the base sponsor more interracial activities with the town. It was hoped that
people would end their racial hostility once a common meeting ground was found in
recreation. The program skirted, however, the more basic problems, such as housing and
schools.71
Throughout these years James C. Evans, monitoring the affairs of blacks in the
military, did what he could to interest the Department of Defense in the plight of Negro
personnel. He was especially concerned about housing problems, schools, and off-base
social discrimination. He further analyzed promotion complaints, courts-martial, and cases
where blacks were separated with less than honorable discharges. Evans found that blacks
generally were pleased with their on-base treatment, but critical of civilian discrimination.
An example of the latter was the case of a Capt. Joseph B. Williams, USAF, a B-58
navigator, who made arrangements to move into a house in Kokomo, Ind., near Bunker
Hill AFB. When he suffered personal abuse and public hostility, the air base officials
attempted to persuade him not to move into the community because of the damage this
might do to the bases relationship with the town.72
Evans studied school complaints, including those from a staff sergeant at
Charleston AFB, S.C., who regularly reported his grievances. Fearing reprisals, he asked
Evans not to identify him in correspondence. At issue was the question of two schools
built with federal funds 50 and 250 yards outside the base perimeter fence to educate base
children. Holes had been cut into the fence to provide access to the schools which,
however, were attended solely by white dependents. The Negro airman complained that
the air base had eighteen Negro military children who were forced to attend segregated
schools because they were not permitted to attend schools which were constructed for the
sole purpose of educating military dependent children. He stated that the children were
bused between 11 and 22 miles to their segregated schools. The final correspondence on
this subject, dated September 1964, indicated the problem had not been solved by that
date.73
There is a paucity of material in the Evans files from individuals complaining
about military discrimination. This did not mean that the Air Force had miraculously
succeeded in eliminating individual bias and prejudice and that it had become a paradise
for blacks. But the Air Force did provide better career opportunities for blacks than most
civilian institutions and blacks responded with reenlistment rates that exceeded the white
rate by a large margin. The Air Force, furthermore, had a mechanism in the office of the
inspector general for acknowledging complaints that most civilian institutions lacked.
Blacks did not frequently turn to the inspector general, but, when they did, he proved to be
a powerful investigative force.
Evans and the inspector examined examples of military discrimination. For
example, Sgt. S. L. repeatedly found cases of discrimination since 1950 and the inspector
general regularly investigated these. As early as 1952 Evans had gone on record indicating
that S. L.s grievances had no substance, but that did not end the complaints. In 1957, S.
L. again complained to the NAACP that he had noticed overt acts of racial violence,
racial segregation, racial discrimination, and intimidation at Wright Patterson Air Force
Base. S. L. informed the NAACP that he had previously brought matters to the attention
of the Defense Department and his congressmen, but had not received satisfaction. He
claimed that he was being threatened with reprisals.74 Despite S. L.s record as a chronic
complainer, the Air Force conducted an investigation.
Because S. L. raised the question about cross-burnings and every other kind of
racial violence at the Ohio base, the Air Force moved quickly. When inconsistencies
appeared in his stories, the Air Force interviewed 10 blacks within his organization to see
if any of the complaints were justified. The investigator reported that S. L. had
consistently misrepresented facts, given erroneous information, and failed to cite
positive examples in support of his claims when requested to do so by investigative
personnel. When pressed about his claims of cross-burnings and racial violence, he stated
that he had not meant these things in a literal sense, but that there was great pressure,
adverse feelings, and negative attitudes. S. L. had been stationed in Louisiana, New Jersey,
Kansas, and Ohio. But wherever he served, he had complained of mistreatment and could
not support his allegations.
In 1957, he accused Air Force officials of segregating airmen in the barracks and
chapel. He claimed his phone was tapped and charged that he had not been promoted to
warrant officer because of discrimination. Despite this charge, he had a white roommate
and no other blacks supported his claim of segregation in the chapel. In fact, many blacks
were members of the interracial chapel choir.75 S. L. persisted in raising unsubstantiated
charges into the next decade. Perhaps he employed this method to guard against bias and,
if his rank was any indication, he was successful; S. L. was promoted to master sergeant in
his twelfth year, a promotion rate which any white would envy.
The Air Force did give complaining individuals a hearing. Even if the complaint
was outrageous, as in S. L.s case, it was not a bar to promotion. Investigators in the
Kennedy years further examined internal Air Force personnel problems, but they were
minor and few in comparison to off-post difficulties. When confronted with questions of
bias outside of its direct domain, the Air Force was in a quandary about how to respond.
For example, during the 1950s the Air Force sent personnel to technical training schools
under civilian contract. Some of these schools were in states which practiced segregation.
When blacks were assigned to such schools, the individual had the option to choose
whether he wanted to attend a segregated school or not go at all.6 This was not much of
a choice for the blacks, who could choose humiliation or refuse the opportunity for
advancement.
The off-base problems encountered at Great Falls, Glasgow, Montgomery, and
other stations affected Negro morale overseas as well. In France blacks complained that
white servicemen had poisoned the social atmosphere against them, making recreation and
housing scarce. Rep. Adam Clayton Powell investigated and found that white airmen used
economic pressure to force bars and dance halls to discriminate and landlords to refuse to
rent to blacks. Powell also discovered that when a club entertained blacks, it soon became
an all-black facility because the air police and others discouraged whites from entering
such entertainment centers. He also discovered that the French were not anti-black, but
hostile to American blacks whereas they were cordial to black Africans. Powell asked the
President to declare off-limits any establishment that discriminated.77 Elsewhere, the
Chicago Defender reported that whites and blacks brought their racial tensions with them
to Germany. Most bars in that country were established exclusively for one race or the
other.78
Rep. Charles Diggs, after traveling to U.S. bases in Asia, found the situation
similar to Europe. He argued that Executive Order 9981 had not been fully implemented
because of rigid segregation in communities outside military installations. He visited
Okinawa, Japan, and the Philippines and noted discrimination in each of those countries.
He also discovered that housing problems for blacks were as severe overseas as they were
in the United States, with much of the housing being controlled by the service to which it
was leased. He noted social segregation as well and argued for off-limits sanctions to end
this humiliation.79 The Chicago Defender reported a similar situation in Newfoundland,
finding that white Americans had infected the local populace with the disease of racial
prejudice.80
Blacks stationed near Misawa City, Japan, decided to employ sit-ins to end
discrimination in the bars and cabarets of that city. Of the 45 such businesses in the city,
42 refused service to blacks. Negro airmen then sought service at white bars, but were
repeatedly refused. The Misawa base commander advised Japanese bar owners that if
problems were to arise from this situation, he would be required to place the bars and
cabarets in Misawa City Off-Limits . The bar owners, in turn, threatened to import
thugs to eject the blacks. Local newspapers carried accounts about the sit-ins, but in the
end, the bar owners relented and extended their services to all.81
Off-base discrimination and subtle personal discrimination came to the attention of
Lee Nichols. In the early 1960s, he spoke of updating his study, Breakthrough on the
Color Front, and he traveled throughout the United States and overseas to perceive the
changes instituted since 1954. He found complete official acceptance of racial integration
at all command levels with no indications of any thought of reverting to the former
segregated system. He talked with many blacks who were fully satisfied with their rate
of advancement and apparently respected by their peers, their superiors, and their
subordinates. Nichols noted that no one objected to shared facilities on base such as
gyms, mess halls, theaters, and clubs.
He did discover, however, a lack of sensitivity on the part of most commanders to
some of the ramifications of segregation which are manifested in both off-post and to
some extent on-post circumstances. He was particularly distressed with overseas
discrimination and the unwillingness of the military to eradicate it. He reported that the
off-post bias he encountered in Germany, France, Korea, and Japan was caused primarily
by the pressures and actions of white GIs, not by the wishes of the local proprietors. He
concluded that American racial prejudice had circumscribed the overseas housing market
for blacks. Suggestions made by Nichols to local commanders to do something about off-
post discrimination brought only negative responses.82
The services obviously could not eliminate all forms of racial prejudice among its
diverse personnel. Consciously or unconsciously, for example, blacks were rated slightly
lower than whites, which led to lower promotion rates for the former. By the early 1960s,
after the Air Force had had blacks within its ranks for more than two decades and after
more than a dozen years of integration, blacks accounted for 9.2 percent of the enlisted
force, but only .8 percent of the highest enlisted grade, Chief Master Sergeant (E-9), was
black. Less than 2 percent of the next highest category, Senior Master Sergeant (E-8), was
black. The officer total was equally bleak.83 Even Kennedy administration investigators
were unable to grasp fully the indistinct tracing of such bias, and concentrated rather on
the more obvious form of discrimination, that is, the problems blacks faced in the civilian
communities.
Chapter V
THE KENNEDY ERA
In March 1960, in the twilight of the Eisenhower presidency, E. Frederic Morrow,
the Presidents black man in the White House, wrote a memorandum on the emerging
civil rights tide. The Greensboro incident* grows in importance, he noted of the first
Negro sit-ins, because of the accumulating evidence that Negroes throughout the South
saw in its example a means of release from discrimination and slights . The South is in a
time of change, the terms of which cannot be dictated by one race. Morrow concluded
that segregation could no longer be maintained except by continuous coercion. He saw a
new trend emerging, one of direct action, and predicted that if the South tried to
preserve segregation in the face of this movement, it would invariably encounter
violence.1
The civil rights revolution advanced through the twentieth century in an irregular
ascent to ever higher plateaus as if catching its breath after each exertion to climb to
another level. The high ground reached with the 1954 Supreme Court decision that school
segregation laws in the South were unconstitutional was not surpassed until massive
efforts, beginning in February 1960 with the Greensboro sit-ins, led to enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The Negro press paid little
attention to civil rights news between 1954 and 1960. Its coverage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1957** was thin at best. Much space was given to the crisis over President
Eisenhowers 1957 decision to send Federal troops to integrate the public schools of Little
Rock, Ark., in accordance with the Supreme Courts ruling. But during the next 2 years
the Negro press spent most of its time reporting sensational news, e.g., recording the tax
problems of wealthy blacks, lurid divorce cases, and marital strife among Negro
celebrities. It took the sit-ins of 1960 to awaken the Negro press from its slumber and to
reorient its focus of attention. After March 1960 the front pages were given over to civil
rights stories and to the revolution that found its footing with the courageous college
students in Greensboro.2
*The sit-in movement was launched at Greensboro, N.C., when black college
students insisted on being served at a local lunch counter. The students forced
desegregation of department stores, supermarkets, libraries, and movies. By September
1960 more than 70,000 students were participating; 3,600 were arrested.
**Enacted on 9 September 1957, it provided for protection of the constitutional
right of all citizens to vote regardless of race or color. It also provided for a program of
assistance in efforts to protect other constitutional rights of American citizens, and
established a bi-partisan Presidential commission to study and recommend further steps to
protect those constitutional rights.
The struggle for civil rights spilled over into the 1960 presidential election contest
between the major candidates, Sen. John F. Kennedy and Vice President Richard M.
Nixon. Senator Kennedy was not the first choice of the Negro leadership because some
believed he was not committed to civil rights. Once nominated, however, he did receive
support from most Negro papers and organizations.3 The Baltimore Afro-American and
Chicago Defender fell into line after he won the nomination. The Pittsburgh Courier, for
the first time in this century, failed to endorse either candidate.4
After the election, all three of the leading papers interpreted the campaign as a
replay of 1948, with blacks playing a decisive role in Kennedys victory. The Pittsburgh
Courier claimed that blacks had put the Bostonian into the White House and anticipated
full citizenship for blacks as a reward for their support. The paper further argued that the
margin of victory in the Negro wards of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh carried Pennsylvania,
the Negro wards of Detroit and Cook County carried Michigan and Illinois, respectively,
and that the voters of Watts, Calif., carried the state. The paper was in error about
California, which Nixon won. The Courier claimed Kennedy deserved to win the Negro
vote because he had solicited it, whereas Nixon had refused to do so.5 The Chicago
Defender reported that Kennedy had received huge pluralities in the ghettoes of
Philadelphia (80 percent), New York City (75 percent), Chicago (80 percent), and
Cleveland (75 percent), giving him the margin for victory in Pennsylvania, New York,
Illinois, and Ohio.6 The Baltimore Afro-American cited the same statistics and also
pointed out that Kennedy won only 7 of the 21 counties in Maryland, yet he won in the
Negro wards of Baltimore a huge plurality that carried the state for him.7
President Kennedy, like Truman, resorted to executive action in the area of civil
rights. He saw the military as probably the most fertile ground to plow.8 Less than 2
months after his inauguration, he issued Executive Order 10925 forbidding the armed
forces from encouraging segregation or other forms of discrimination. The military was
told that it was not to permit organizations that practiced race, religious, or other forms of
discrimination to use military facilities. The Air Force Inspector General, acting on this
order, declared that Air Force facilitiesincluding those financed through non-
appropriated fundscould not be made available to segregated organizations. The Air
Force required all commanders to certify in writing that they had read and understood the
Department of Defense memorandum implementing the Presidents executive order. The
inspector advised commanders that he intended to make compliance a special matter of
interest.9
Kennedys executive order was followed several months later by a memorandum
written by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, dated 19 June 1961. It dealt
with the subject of the availability of facilities to military personnel. It reaffirmed the
policy of equal treatment for all personnel and asked the services to assist minorities in
securing integrated quarters. Where unsegregated facilities were not readily available to
all members of the service, Gilpatric instructed the military to provide facilities on the
post. Local commanders, furthermore, were told to make every effort to obtain such
facilities off base for members of the Armed Forces through command community
relations committees. The memorandum also warned that military police should not be
used to enforce segregation or other forms of racial discrimination. Finally the
memorandum called on the services to provide legal assistance to insure that members of
the armed forces were afforded due process of law.10
 The Gesell Committee
On 24 June 1962 President Kennedy followed up by establishing a Committee on
Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, headed by Gerhard A. Gesell, of Washington,
D.C., and others.* The President asked the committee to look into the general problem of
equal opportunity for members of the armed forces and their dependents in the civilian
community, particularly with regard to housing, education, transportation, recreational
facilities, community events, and other activities.
* Members of the Gesell Committee were Joseph OMeara, South Bend,( Ind.;
Nathaniel Colley, Sacramento, Calif.; Abe Fortas, Washington, D.C.; Benjamin Muse,
Manassas, Va.; John Sengstacke, Chicago, Ill.; and Whitney Young, New York, N.Y.
Not surprisingly, a number of members of the House and Senate reacted to the
initial report of the Gesell Committee as a threat to the republic and denounced it on the
floors of Congress. Most of the committees recommendations, however, bore fruit,
although it took the unusual events of the late 1960s and early 1970s to finally
implement all of its suggestions. Adam Yarmolinsky, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Affairs under Secretary Robert S. McNamara, has stated that he
invented the Gesell Committee.11 His claim of authorship, however, can be challenged. In
February 1962 Congressman Diggs, long an advocate of military civil rights, wrote to the
Secretary of Defense McNamara, urging him to investigate the conditions of servicemen
at home and abroad. Diggs claimed he had received more than 250 complaints during the
previous 60 days. He called attention to an August 1961 letter he sent to McNamara,
reiterating his demand that a Citizens Committee be invited to investigate the current
status of integration in the Armed Forces . Diggs attached a summary of racial
incidents, the bulk of which dealt with off-base discrimination.12 Early Kennedy
administrative correspondence on what subsequently became the Gesell Committee,
referred to this body as the Civilian Committee or Citizens Committee.13
No matter who initiated formation of the committee, President Kennedy on 24
June 1962 reestablished the Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed
Forces and asked Gesell to make a thorough review of the current situation both within
the services and in the communities where military installations are located to determine
what further measures may be required to assure equality of treatment for all persons
serving in the Armed Forces. The committee was directed to study the fact that there was
considerable evidence in some civilian communities [that] discrimination on the basis
of race, color, creed or national origin is a serious source of hardship and embarrassment
for Armed Forces personnel and their dependents. The President asked for
recommendations that would improve the lots of servicemen and their families in the
civilian community, particularly with respect to housing, education, transportation,
recreational facilities, community events, programs, and activities.14
The services were upset by the findings of the Gesell Committee. As the
investigation process lengthened and direction of the study became clear, fears increased
among both uniformed and civilian defense leaders. The Air Force liaison to the
committee, Col. John Horne, of the Directorate of Military Personnel, wrote to his chief to
complain that the committees effortswhich he believed (falsely) were only to be a.
survey, had turned into an investigation. He stated that the committee was helping to
initiate racial problems with its studies and suggested the Air Force threaten to withdraw
its support of the study if it was not given an opportunity to review and comment on the
committees findings. Horne also complained that much of the data sought by the
committee was unavailable because the Air Force did not maintain records by race, since
it had been under strong pressure to keep racial designations off records. When some
committee members expressed displeasure over the timidity of southern base commanders
in seeking equal facilities for blacks, Horne defended the commanders:
It is not possible for these commanders to go to local community officials in
Alabama, Texas, and Georgia, regarding their off-base problems, with the same
aggressiveness as their northern and western brothers. If they did, good community
relations which have been maintained for years could be ruined in a matter of minutes.
Horne wished to persuade the committee to turn to the Commission on Civil
Rights* or to the Departments of Justice or Health, Education, and Welfare to gather
information about racial problems around southern bases rather than to force the services
to report such information.15
James Goode, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower Policy,
attended a Gesell committee session and later reported that answers provided by five Air
Force base commanders were inconsistent. Two from the deep South stated that it was not
their job to influence civil leaders on racial matters. When committee members suggested
they use off-limits sanctions as a solution for off-base discrimination, the five
commanders balked. Several stated that they did not have the power to take such actions,
while others said they would not place community facilities off-limits to benefit a few
while the white majority suffered. All five claimed to have good relations with the nearby
communities. This statement brought forth the ire of Whitney Young against those base
commanders who preferred good relations at the expense of the suffering blacks. The
Maxwell AFB commander told the committee it was Air Force policy not to assign blacks
to that base.16
 *The Commission on Civil Rights was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (71
Stat. 634).
In addition to interviewing personnel, the committee requested an enormous
amount of data from the services. The Air Force was asked to answer 30 questions, most
of them statistical in nature. The first question dealt with how the Air Force handled
discrimination complaints. Had there been a lessening of problems in segregated
communities because of Air Force efforts? Did the Air Force provide guidance to
commanders in such areas? Other questions dealt with schools, recruiting, housing,
commissioning programs, and promotion.17 The answers to these questions provided
much of the raw material for the committees initial report, published 13 June 1963.
Release of the Gesell committee report brought down a storm of protest and
perhaps for that reason it was never widely publicized. Yet it can be demonstrated that
nearly all of its major recommendations were implemented by the 1970s. Unlike those of
the Fahy Committee, Trumans Civil Rights Committee, or the Commission on Civil
Rights, the Gesell report was not published in a form accessible to the public. Nonetheless,
it was placed in the Congressional Record by a hostile congressman.18
Blacks, the report noted, served in the armed forces in slightly smaller numbers
than their proportion of the population, but they held only a small percentage of the higher
officer and enlisted ranks. In fact, the officer corps of each service was overwhelmingly
white. The Army reported that more than 3 percent of its officer corps was black and the
Navy less than 1 percent. Negro gains since 1949 were meager and much still remained to
be done to provide equal opportunity. Promotion selection, the report complained, was
made primarily by white officers . The committee recommended removal of all racial
data from promotion folders, including photographs, to prevent selection bias among
board members. The report also recommended adoption of a conscious policy of assigning
blacks to promotion boards and choosing whites whenever possible who have more
than casual experience serving with Negro officers and enlisted men. 19
The keynote of the report was sounded early. Blacks in the military and their
families were daily suffering humiliation and degradation in communities near bases at
which they are compelled to serve, and a vigorous, new program of action is needed to
relieve the situation.20 This was the reports theme throughout. It stated:
To all Negroes these community conditions are a constant affront and a constant
reminder that the society they are prepared to defend is a society that depreciates their
rights to full participation as citizens. This should not be . Homes are broken up by
these conditions as Negro families coming from parts of the country which are relatively
tolerant of color differences find themselves facing a situation which is both new and
frightening. For them, the clock has turned back more than a generation. To protect their
children and to maintain some degree of dignity they return home, and the husband is left
to work out his service obligation alone the indignities suffered in the community place
a load upon his service career affecting both his interest and performance.21
The Committee discovered that base commanders lacked specific directives to
guide them in helping blacks and that for the most part military leaders believed that
problems of segregation and racial discrimination in the local community were not their
legitimate concern. The committee, however, designated the base commander as the
individual primarily responsible for solving local problems.22
Finding litigation too slow, the committee opted for a more rapid solution. It
declared:
Segregation and other forms of discrimination in facilities in a given locality,
detrimental to the morale of Negro personnel must cease. The commander should
attempt by means available to himcommunity committees, persuasion, emphasis on the
bases importance to the local economyto eliminate such practices. In situations in
which these efforts are unsuccessful, the commander should develop a plan under which
military personnel of all races would be permitted to patronize only those facilities which
receive his express approval. One of the requirements for such approval should be the
guarantee from the proprietor that the establishment will be open to all servicemen and
their dependents without regard to race or color .23
As indicated above, private citizens and some members of Congress had earlier
suggested the use of sanctions. The Gesell report, however, represented the first attempt
by a high level committee to endorse the method. The committee went even further,
stating that:
should all other efforts fail, the Services must consider a curtailment or
termination of activities at certain military installations near communities where
discrimination is particularly prevalent . The objective here should be the preservation
of morale, not the punishment of local communities which have a tradition of
segregation.24
In the report the committee complained that the services had not given emphasis to
this factor when selecting base locations and recommended more attention be given to
such details in the future.25
The mechanism which blacks might employ to air their sentiments against
discriminatory practices was also open to committee criticism. No one was charged with
responsibility to listen to equal opportunity complaints. Given the absence of such an
apparatus, blacks often took their complaints out of channelsto Congressmen, to the
NAACP, and even to the President. The inspector general, the committee believed, was a
fruitless channel because he was not geared to handle such problems. Blacks,
furthermore, feared reprisals if they raised matters of this kind. The committee
recommended the appointment of an officer to receive such complaints. This officer
would have to have free access to the base commander for the purposes of
communicating and discussing complaints of discrimination. Every black was to be free
to contact this officer at any time, without the consent, knowledge or approval of any
person in the chain of command. The committee further recommended that such
complaints were to be privileged, and service regulations were to prohibit the disclosure
of such communications without the servicemans consent.26
With the aid of a specially appointed equal opportunity monitoring officer and
armed with off-limits sanctions, base commanders would be required to improve the racial
climate on and off the installation. The committee advocated a new policy and mission for
the chain of command from the service secretaries down to the base commander not only
to remove discrimination within the Armed Forces, but also to make every effort to
eliminate discriminatory practices as they affect members of the Armed Forces and their
dependents within the neighboring civilian communities. To insure active compliance on
the part of local commanders, the report suggested that base commanders be rated on their
performance in these areas. It declared:
It must be made clear to base commanders and others concerned with these
problems that they will be measured in terms of their performance. A regular system of
monitoring and reporting on progress should be instituted. It should be made clear that
officers showing initiative and achievement in this area will enhance their performance
ratings and career advancement. It is especially important that such officers be assured that
they will not run the risk of official disfavor for their efforts, and they will receive the
support of all echelons of command if their programs are attacked by local interests.27
To acquaint future base commanders with the problems confronting blacks, the
committee recommended that the history of Negro participation in the armed forces and
the problems which he confronts in the services must be emphasized and made a definite
part of the curriculum at all levels of officer and command training. It suggested that the
military must insure that men reaching the position of base commander are familiar with
the requirements of the Constitution and the history of the Negroes struggle to achieve
equality of treatment and opportunity.28
Another recommendation dealt with discrimination in NCO and Service Clubs.
The report noted that bases with branch clubs often had de facto segregation, and base
commanders had chosen to ignore this fact. Hostess recruiting for club dances also created
tensions because there were instances when too few or no Negro girls were brought to
base. The committee also provided evidence that civilian hostesses imported onto the
base from the civilian community [exhibited racial] attitudes which are inconsistent with
Department of Defense policy. More efforts had to be made to secure unbiased hostesses
and more Negro girls should be secured for dances. In any case, greater care should be
taken in the selection and training of hostesses and other civilian personnel operating
Service Clubs.29
There were other recommendations: base commanders were told to appoint
biracial citizens committee to assist in maintaining good town/base relationships;30
Defense Department funds should not be spent on schools that were segregated, nor
should such schools retain ROTC programs;31 segregated cabs and buses must not be
permitted on military posts;32 base commanders should not urge compliance with local
segregation requirements;33 nor should the military permit its name to be used in
sponsoring segregated athletic, social or other functions; the military police must not be
segregated in town patrol duties; and, above all, the military, from the Pentagon down to
the recruit, must set the example for the community and country. The report concluded:
The Committee is mindful that the Armed Forces are an ever present symbol of
our democracy. Both at home and abroad, they must be leaders rather than followers in
establishing equal opportunity. To the extent they practice and preach equality without
regard to race, creed, color or national origin, they provide a standard by which
communities at home may measure their own conduct and against which citizens of other
lands may judge our adherence to the principles we advocate.34
 Kennedy wrote to Gesell, thanking him and informing him that his
recommendations would have the immediate attention of Secretary McNamara who was
required to report to the president within 30 days.35 McNamara issued a directive which
summarized the main Gesell points. Department of Defense Directive 5120.36, dated 26
Jul 63, and titled, Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, called upon the uniformed
services to issue appropriate manuals and regulations to implement equal
opportunity. The directive also created a civil rights office within the secretariat. The heart
of the directive is contained in the final paragraph:
Every military commander has the responsibility to oppose discriminatory
practices affecting his men and their dependents and to foster equal opportunity for them,
not only in areas under his immediate control, but also in nearby communities. In
discharging that responsibility a commander shall not, except with the prior approval of
the Secretary of his military department, use the off-limits sanction in discrimination cases
arising with the United States.
Never had the use of off-limits sanctions in discrimination cases been considered
in an official directive and, even if the power to use such tactics was hedged, its possible
adoption was a significant new tool in the integrationists hands.36
A week earlier, McNamaras nominee for the civil rights office, Alfred Fitt,
prepared a long memorandum for the secretary outlining the services objections to the
Gesell report. Fitt commented on the military criticisms and offered his own
recommendations for action by McNamara and Kennedy. Fitt explained that most of the
service opposition was concerned with the Gesell off-base proposals. Although not all of
the recommendations for on-base improvements were well received, the services were
nervous about those suggestions that might destroy their relationships with the
surrounding community. There was in addition strong opposition to the appointment of an
equal opportunity officer. On this point, Fitt concluded that the real problem was in
communication; the committee perceived the military had to improve communications,
but if that were done, there would then be no need for the establishment of new
communication channels because several already existed. If communications then were
not encouraged, the newly assigned equal opportunity officer would prove ineffective in
the performance of his functions. Fitt, therefore, recommended a lesser course: that
establishment of equal opportunity officers be voluntary at the base level.37
While the services objected to the idea of rating commanders on their success in
achieving equal opportunity for service personnel, Fitt agreed with the need for their
comment. He believed that men were more industrious when they were graded. He did
not, however, agree with all of the reports major recommendations; of most concern to
him was the use of off-base sanctions. He wrote:
This is unquestionably the most controversial of the Gesell recommendations. The
services have slowly accepted the idea that their responsibility for equal treatment extends
off-base, but they have no stomach for the kind of fight which they think use of the off-
limits sanctions will mean.
There is a melange of reasons for the service reactions. One is that the connection
between off-base discrimination and on-base reduction in military effectiveness is no-
where so direct as in the instances of prostitution, illegal gambling, lack of sanitation and
the like.
The services are also troubled by enforcement problems, particularly those arising
out of a servicemans desire to be with his dependents. Military officers understandably
prefer not to start battles unless they see a prospect of winning.
Finally, there are vexing line-drawing aspects in carrying out the Gesell
recommendations, many of which would be eliminated if only Congress would prohibit
discrimination in public accommodations, and so they ask why not wait for Congress to
act?
My own judgment is that the off-limits sanctions is a severely limited weapon, to
be used only after negotiations make clear that a community is unwilling to end
objectionable practices involving servicemen and their families.
Hatred violence and murder are part of the struggle for civil rights. We must not
forget that we, not they themselves, have put Negro servicemen at bases in the South. We
owe them a duty not to exacerbate the hostility they already face when venturing off-base.
He gave only guarded approval for the use of sanctions and the imposition of
severe restraints in actually using it, and then only with Office of the Secretary of
Defenses approval of a specific program.38
Reaction to the Gesell Report
The military objections raised in Fitts memorandum were only the sound of a
falling stone before the rumble of an avalanche. With the publication of McNamaras
directive demonstrating that the Department of Defense took the Gesell report seriously
the opposition mounted. Many in the military who disliked the report had strong allies
in Congress.
Although a certain amount of criticism in Congress was regional, many of the
criticisms represented an open fear that the armed services were being misused for
political and social purposes. Was it the province of the military to intrude into the
domestic and political affairs of the nation? Should the armed forces become the tool of a
President who desires to improve the social and economic plight of a segment of his
constituency? Congressman Melvin R. Laird (Rep., Wis.), argued on the floor of the
House that the McNamara directive went far beyond the equal opportunity provisions for
all citizens which he and all Republicans had always supported.
Another Congressman, J. D. Waggoner, Jr., La., asked if the military was being
used for a purpose for which it was never intended. Would not the military be
misused if it helped to implement this report? Many congressmen also asked the same
questions. But what McNamara saw as a legitimate morale question, the congressmen
interpreted as a legislative prerogative to be discussed in the halls of Congress, and the
military did not have a right to partake in the debate. Congressman Thomas G. Abernethy
(Dem., Miss.), declared he was deeply shocked to find that the executive branch of our
government is diverting the serious mission of the Department of Defense and is now
using it for the purpose of molding the social and political life not only of the country but
of the military itself. Implementing this report, he claimed, would lower our standard of
national defense.39
There were other serious charges. Adam Yarmolinsky claimed that the entire thrust
of the off-limits sanctions was not to punish segregators, but to effect a direct military
benefit. The Department of Defense wanted to do the best it could for men and women
in the military. The idea of using the military as leverage in the South was never a
discussion topic, Yarmolinsky recalls, but if the military were to be the vanguard of
society at large, so be it. Something had to be done for blacks because they did not choose
their situation. Yarmolinsky said that laws binding them to segregation were
unconstitutional to my mind, and would not have stood up under a court test so we were
not involving them in law breaking. 40
Most military leaders, however, disagreed with Yarmolinsky and feared that
McNamara was leading the armed services into domestic controversy and that this was
politically motivated. McNamara admits in a book, written after he left office, that he used
the military to attack tormenting social problems. He justified this action by arguing that
poverty and social injustice could endanger our national security as much as any
military threat. His only reference to the Gesell Committee was the housing
recommendations, but the entire thrust of his chapter called New Missions was to
elaborate upon several examples of military efforts to solve social and economic
problems.41
Eugene Zuckert, Air Force Secretary during the Kennedy administration, was
familiar with Democratic party programs and no foe of civil rights. He found the Gesell
recommendations and McNamaras implementation of them transparent attempts to
make a significant advance in the battle against segregation. Zuckert added that if his sole
job was integration of the Air Force, he would have regarded the Gesell recommendations
as a very useful and effective way of going about the job. Racial integration, however,
wasnt my job, I had to balance a lot of other considerations. He did not necessarily
believe that using off-limits sanctions was a bad move, because he was fundamentally in
sympathy with the approach; he did not, however, favor it as Air Force Secretary. He said:
Yarmolinsky and company were social movers, and this was an instrument which they
thought would be very effective for their purposes. I dont say that with any rancor at all. I
think that the net result has been great. But at that time, with my responsibility, as least I
thought that they were adding to my problems and not helping me with them. He also
discovered that Air Force general officers were unanimously very much opposed to
imposing the Gesell off-limits sanctions.42
Though Zuckert was fundamentally in tune with the administration, he saw the
program as a misuse of the military. Other peoplesenators and congressmenwere less
friendly. Sen. J. W. Fulbright, (Dem., Ark.), wrote to McNamara complaining that the
military was being thrust into a political conflict and that it did not belong there. The
military, he believed, was too powerful to be used in domestic affairs and the potentialities
for abuse were great. He elaborated: My concern about the dangers of military
intervention in civil and political affairs is not satisfied by the fact that such intervention
may be done under the authority of civilian superiors.
The more important question is, what is the proper role of the military in our
national life? Using the military to intervene in the affairs of local communities, he held,
established a very bad precedent.43 Other congressional critics were more vitriolic in
their criticism of the report and the McNamara directive.
A flood of acidic editorials and essays inserted by hostile congressmen filled the
pages of the Congressional Record. Watkins Abbit (Dem., Va.) placed into the record an
editorial from the Lynchburg News titled, Our Coming Battle with the Military, in
which the commentator foresaw communities near military bases under a degree of
martial control through the power of economic boycott. He said that Pentagon statements
to the effect that these steps were being taken to protect military men and not for the
purpose of racial integration were at best lies. The editorial predicted dire consequences
if the Gesell recommendations were fully implemented.44
Representative F. Edward Hebert of Louisiana also read into the record a
resolution from the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) which condemned this forced
interference by the Armed Forces into domestic affairs. The VFW feared that the advice
would lead to an undermining of general morale and discipline, and the organization
vigorously opposed implementation of the report.45 Hebert added another editorial from
the New Orleans Times-Picayune and States Item which labeled the Gesell
recommendations a radical takeover of the defense establishment. The editorial further
claimed this would lead to a virtual transformation of the armed services of the United
States into an instrument of domestic sociological pressure and to the prostitution of a
vital national institution.46
Hebert was vocal in his opposition and initiated a personal correspondence with
Gesell and Horton Smith, and old law partner of Gesells and a personal friend of Hebert.
The exchange began when Smith wrote to Gesell stating that it was shocking that the
latter would lend his name to a document recommending the use of our armed forces for
political purposes. Regardless of the civil rights, it is a most improper use of the military
establishment and could certainly lead to greater abuses, even to influencing elections.
Smith included in his correspondence a number of articles, letters and editorials from the
Times-Picayune and States Item, claiming also that someone in the Department of
Defense had leaked the report to a hostile press. He believed that New Orleans was more
integrated than New York City and was too sophisticated to be concerned with the race
question; therefore, he maintained the editorials were prompted by a genuine concern for
the civil-military issues involved. Gerry, I think youve been taken, was Smiths parting
shot.47 Apparently, Gesell wrote to Smith and attempted to calm his fears because when
Hebert first wrote to Gesell, he was aware of both Horton Smiths letter and Gesells
answer.
Hebert knew, he wrote, that Gesell did not write the report which bears your
name, but at least I thought you read it. The congressman further condemned the use of
the military to advocate and influence social reforms off base. He admitted his point of
view might be suspect because of the geographical location of my district, but he did not
approach his criticisms on the basis of segregation or integration. I criticize the
report and assail it because of the misuse of the Department of Defense and its military
components in putting into effect that which has not been authorized by Congress .
Hebert claimed that he had not found a single officer in any branch of the service who
favored the report or concurred in its recommendations. And he added, Every man in
uniform that I have talked with is horrified and shaken by the use [to] which the military is
being put. Military men to whom he had spoken perceived preferences given to blacks in
future terms and Hebert had never known the morale of the military to be so affected
negatively by a proposal as in this instance. It is the most destructive document that has
ever been issued, and its effect upon the military is appalling. Because Gesell had
apparently told Smith that the services, specifically the Navy, were not in opposition to the
report, Hebert concluded his letter with a series of comments concerning the Navys
attitude toward the Gesell report. The congressman wrote that the Army and Air Force
share the Navys negative attitude, and he told Gesell that the quoted objections came
from internal Pentagon correspondence. He elaborated further:
The Navy rejects the contention that Negro officers had been discriminated against
when it came time for promotion . The Navy rejects any implication that officers
serving on a promotion board would, contrary to their statutory oaths, practice bias. The
Navy rejects the committees recommendation that photographs and racial designations be
eliminated from officers record jackets . The Navy rejects the contention that new
techniques be developed to assure that promotion board members are free from bias .
The Navy rejects the committees suggestion that special consideration for
promotion and career advancement be given to officers who promote integration . The
Navy rejects the recommendation that the history of Negro participation in the Armed
Forces and the alleged problems he confronts be made a part of the curricula of all levels
of officer and command training .
The Navy rejects the suggestion that economic sanctions be leveled at oft base
establishments which practice segregation .
The Navy flatly rejects the suggestion that curtailment or termination of activities
at certain military installations be considered as an ultimate lever of force .
The Navy rejects the recommendation that offices be established in each service
for the purpose of handling cases of alleged discrimination .
And finally, the Navy rejected all of these recommendations, because it denied that
there was an equal opportunity problem, according to Hebert.48
One of the most bitter critics of the committee was retired Army Lt. Gen. Edward
M. Almond. His remarks were inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative
Abbit. Almond condemned the report because it was biased and would deny essential
information to promotion boards in the military services, especially by withholding
photographs. He complained that the report demanded a higher percentage in Negro
promotions, than those qualifying by merit. Almond was upset further because the
report sought racial integration for the amalgamation of the races and not for military
purposes. He was concerned that it required commanders to use blackmail as a weapon
to force integration on civilian communities. Almond also castigated the report for its
recommendation to establish equal opportunity offices. This, he argued, would permit
blacks to make accusations through secret testimony without the person accused being
given the source of the accusation. He chided the report for not permitting a real
evaluation of the individual Negro based on merit, because the report consistently spoke
of evaluating the latent skills inherent in the Negro. It seems never to have occurred to
the authors of such projects that there may be a slight difference between the average
white and the average Negro in his ability to absorb information and to deliver a
satisfactory performance. The committee, he protested, was trying to introduce a spy
system to be called monitoring with an especially sympathetic monitor throughout the
range of troop levels to report on responsible commanders as how they carry out their
function. Almond grumbled that three of the members of this committee are Negroes
and the other four have a long career as racial agitators working with the ADA, ADL, and
the NAACP. These people were trying to impose a Soviet political commissar system on
the United States military and this was both shocking and revolting. Finally, Almond
alleged the report sought to pervert the Armed Forces mission from that of maintaining
the defense and security of the United States for the sake of one small segment of its
personnel. An example of this internal turmoil is the requirement of local military
commanders to prevent the practice of Negroes gravitating by choice to one post service
club and whites to another. This is intolerable interference with the off-duty rights of any
American.49
Almonds perception of an equal opportunity officer as a page out of Leon
Trotskys book was also seen by others. Congressman John J. Flynt of Georgia read an
essay into the Congressional Record which called attention to the fact that the greatest
problem besetting the Russian military was the political officer in each unit, because one
cannot have politics in the armed forces and efficiency too. The newspaper warned that
the next step in the process would be to order the men to vote for certain candidates in
presidential elections.50 Senator Thurmond of South Carolina struck a similar chord. An
editorial, written by Truman Sensing, was inserted by the senator. It lashed out at the
attempt to create a commissar system in the United States subject to the political order of
military base commanders . It was clear that the aim of the Kennedy administration
was to use the military bases to force radical social change in this country. As in the
Communist armies, political commissars ride herd on officers and men alike . In the
future, the editorial noted, officers would be required to hold the political opinions of the
administration. This is the kind of setup one finds in the Red Army. The editorialist
ended by calling the report a national shame. The armed forces do not exist for the
purpose of pushing the Kennedys pet social theories or for helping the Kennedy
administration win more Negro votes in the 1964 elections.51
Perhaps the most significant negative response to the Gesell report was an attempt
by Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the House Armed Services
Committee, to nullify by legislation all of the key recommendations contained in the
report. His bill would have made it a court-martial offense for any base commander to
invoke off-limits sanctions or similar means to prevent segregation of military personnel.
Vinson claimed his bill had nothing to do with segregation or integration; it was aimed
at keeping the military in the business of defending the nation. He wanted Congress,
the courts, the states and the people [to] worry about social reform. The congressman
also would have made it a court-martial offense for any officer who sought to direct or
control in any way the manner in which a member of the Armed Forces lives off military
base. Any base commander who because of race, color, or religion tries to prohibit a
member of the Armed Forces from making purchases for goods or services or renting
housing accommodations or engaging in recreational activities or any other similar
activities would be subject to court-martial. Any commander who directs, implements, or
requests use of an off-limits sanction because of race, color will also be subject to
court-martial. His bill made it illegal as well for anyone to make any notation on a
fitness report, or other written report, with respect to the manner in which a member of the
Armed Forces, because of race, color, or religion attempts to influence or fails to
influence the off-base activities or conduct of any member of the Armed Forces.52
Air Force Opposition
The Air Forces opposition to the report was very strong, but at the same time quite
muted. Air Force internal correspondence reflects an enormous dislike for nearly all
provisions of the report but, in a communication that it sent to the Department of Defense,
its repugnance is couched in philosophical and diplomatic language. Harris Wofford, who
was President Kennedys chief civil rights advisor, said that the military had been given
the hardest tasks because the armed services were asked to operate outside of their own
element. This, he believed, could cause nothing but apprehension.53 Beyond that, the
military had been told to abruptly change direction. Heretofore, the services had been
indifferent to off-base discrimination, but were now told to shift gears. James Goode wrote
to Zucker, pointing out that there had been a traditional military reluctance to take
positive steps insofar as off-base problems were concerned.54 He had written earlier to
the Air Force Secretary in late 1962 (when the main points of the Gesell recommendations
were being solidified) and declared that it was undesirable to relocate bases primarily
because of civilian discrimination. Goode, furthermore, did not believe that the off-limits
authority should be used to achieve social reform. He suggested that the courts should
handle such matters. But he did believe that base commanders could be more active than
they had been in the past and that they might seek assistance from the Justice Department
if laws were being broken. He advised Zuckert that servicemen should not consider a ban
on participating in test cases as an order to submit to segregation. Goode wrote: In my
opinion, colored military personnel should not be directed to comply with segregation
laws under any circumstances. They may, of course, be advised of local difficulties they
may get into in the event they should force a peaceable test of their constitutional rights,
but this should be a privilege which should not be curtailed by military fiat .55
Prior to the publication of the Gesell report, the Air Force created a Committee on
Equal Opportunity to review all policies and procedures concerning anti-discrimination.
This was an obvious reaction to the Gesells probings and Zuckert appointed leading
members of the Air Force to this bodyUnder Secretary Brockway McMillan was
designated chairman and the membership included the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel,
the Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, Director of Information, Director of
Legislative Liaison, and others. The committee had the responsibility to insure that Air
Force programs were in agreement with Defense policies and that Defense directives were
properly disseminated and clearly understood by all commanders. The committee,
furthermore, was to recommend equal opportunity measures to improve the racial climate
within the Air Force.56 The minutes of its fourth meeting reveal that the Gesell report was
discussed and an attempt was made to fashion an Air Force position. At the same time, the
Judge Advocate General, the chief lawyer of the Air Force, advised that the off-limits
sanctions suggestion was of doubtful legality, and argued further that the other service
Judge Advocates held the same opinion. They believed that the impetus for such moves
clearly had to come from the president or from the civilian heads of the Department of
Defense. The committee hoped that all actions would be deferred pending final passage
of civil rights legislation .57
Zuckert responded to a letter from McNamara that had requested official opinions
on the Gesell report. Zuckerts answer was temperate in tone. He stated that the Air Force
agreed that the full equality of treatment and opportunity is of the greatest importance to
the welfare and morale of the personnel in the Armed Forces. While the Gesell report
contained many thoughtful recommendations, and the Air Force intended to move into
those areas where its responsibility and authority were clear, certain recommendations
required further study. He elaborated:
First, I would expect that the Department of Defense establish and maintain closest
coordination with other Federal agencies which have an interest, or could assist in these
matters. I would also expect that the military services would defer action in those areas
where such agencies as the Department of Justice, Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, and Home Finance Agency have the primary responsibility and authority. My last
point concerns service action in the local communities which must be guided by the civil
rights legislation now under consideration in Congress. Pending the final outcome of this
legislation, I recommend the Services continue to plan, but defer implementation of such
plans where questions of law will subsequently determine the extent of authority which
can be exercised in the areas of public accommodations and the rights of individual
servicemen, their dependents, and local proprietors of business establishments.58
Zuckerts recommendation to delay all off-base action until congress had acted was
cautious, diplomatic, and seconded by the uniformed leadership. His reply, however, was
not fully indicative of the hostility the generals and colonels harbored.
More demonstrative was a memorandum prepared in July 1963 by the Air Force to
place before the Joint Chiefs of Staff the question of the Gesell report. The major issue, as
viewed by the Air Force leadership, was the nature and extent of involvement of active
military establishments in the enforcement, by base commanders, of sanctions against
communities and off-base business establishments which continue to engage in
discriminatory practices. The memorandum appears to have been prepared following
discussion at high levels, because it claimed that the Joint Staff and the Services have
expressed considerable concern over the proposed use of the military in coercing
compliance with civil rights edicts. The Air Force was uneasy because it was not entirely
clear that off limits actions were legal, and the ramifications of closing or relocating
installations based on civilian discrimination practices had not been thoroughly
researched. What would be the reaction, furthermore, of the local public if the base
interfered in civil affairs beyond showing a concern for the health and welfare of its
troops? The Air Force insisted that there must be complete coordination in these matters
with all governmental agencies and if the services were required to engage in off-limit
sanction actions, there must be well publicized guidance from the Department of Defense
of any responsibilities which may be assigned base commanders in these matters.
Clearly, the Air Force feared becoming the vanguard of this explosive issue. The
Air Force expressed other concerns too. Would standards be lowered by assigning
personnel for reasons other than qualifications or experience? Was it wise or proper to
establish a special complaint officer outside the existing inspector general procedures
and channels? Would overall morale be lowered if the Air Force tried to raise the morale
of blacks by extending their plight to all of their military associates? Why should
commanders be rated on their ability to cope with deep-rooted emotional problems? How
would one compare a man who might fail in Mississippi with a man who had succeeded in
a more salubrious climate? The Air Force sought to adopt the stand of firm opposition to
(the) use of the military as proposed in the Gesell Report as an instrument of public policy
in current civil/domestic issues.59
General William McKee, Vice Chief of Staff during this period, expressed his
opinion of the Gesell Committees recommendations during a personal interview. He
stated:
The Air Force, at least I was and I am sure that the leaderships view was, that the
Air Force should not be used as a tool for national integration, that it was not up to the
Air Force to do this. I took a very strong stand. There were lots of pressures for the Air
Force to put towns off-limits, to force integration in the South even to the extent urged by
some people of closing up a base or moving it away. And the Air Force took the position
that this was a national problem and a national enforcement problem and not one, repeat,
not one to be enforced on a national scale by the services and I still feel that way.
When asked if the Air Staff and Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay shared his opinion, he
answered:
We all felt that way very strongly. We were not in the business of being a police
force to enforce integration in communities. We didnt feel it was up to us to fight with
the local communities, to threaten the local communities . [The Kennedy advisers]
obviously were trying to use the military as an aid, as a major aid in the fighting. I didnt
think that was possible . I didnt find a single person, or remember a single person, in
the entire leadership of the Air Force that felt the Air Force ought to be a police agent to
enforce the recommendations of the Gesell Committee.60
The Air Force Times, in its editorial of 10 July 1963, expressed its views on this
subject. The newspaper had warmly supported racial integration in the 1940s in its news
coverage and found many good points to comment on in the Gesell report. It also believed
that some of the Gesell Committee recommendations were unwise. The Times did not
approve of the appointment of a special equal opportunity monitor (the paper referred to
him as an integration officer), arguing that this could create more problems than it
solves. The newspaper found that the off-limits sanctions suggestion was fraught with
problems, regardless of how worthy the principle behind it. So is the suggestion to close
bases in communities which do not integrate voluntarily.61 A month later, however, the
Air Force Times reversed itself and published a lengthy article calling on the services to
take the lead in the nations integration battle; it became the first service journal to favor
the Gesell affirmative action program. Blacks suffered terribly, the newspaper stressed,
and any reasonably sensitive person can appreciate the injustice of this situation . If
blacks were permitted to choose their assignment stations, the article maintained, there
might be no serious basis for complaints of off-post discrimination. But, the Times
noted, they are not able to do so. It added: While under orders they are often forced
to live under severely degrading conditions . The national interest is not served when
military personnel are seriously demoralized by the actions of the communities adjacent to
our bases. The Air Force Times admitted that there were serious problems on- and off-
base; there was a communications gap between officers and blacks; there were some
segregated (by custom) clubs; there was studied ignorance of off-base discrimination;
interracial association was discouraged in some parts of the country} no action was taken
in housing discrimination; and there were segregated schools and school buses. The article
cautiously endorsed the findings of the Gesell Committee.62
But once the problems had been systematically defined, solutions had to be
considered. No longer was it sensible to argue that the dimensions of the problems were
known and obvious and to do nothing to resolve them. For weeks thereafter in the letters
to the editor section of the Air Force Times, responses to the Gesell report arrived from
interested airmen. No subject in the history of the Air Force Times ever garnered such a
reaction. White airmen expressed fears that blacks might receive preferential treatment,
and in the intense competition for promotions no one wanted the other fellow to be in a
favored position. The Air Force Times had raised the favoritism argument by showing that
blacks made up 9 percent of the Air Force enlisted corps, but only .83 percent of the E-9s
and less than 2 percent of the E-8s. Immediately, a correspondent asked if blacks had the
native ability to deserve more.63 Most whites disliked the idea of an integration officer
to hear complaints from blacks outside of normal channels.64 White airmen complained
about the off-limits sanctions, arguing that their morale was not being considered.65 Some
blacks were distressed over the new attention they were receiving, stating that they
believed they had equal opportunity and wished no preferential treatment.66
Actually, the period from mid-1963 to the end of 1964 was a time of introspection.
The Air Force had begun to confront the issue before the Gesell report was published,
simply because it could read the unmistakable signs. The Air Force house was not in order
and the 1949 period of self-congratulation over its success at integration had to be
replaced by one of self-examination.
Air Force Equal Opportunity Efforts
In December 1962, Acting Secretary of the Air Force Joseph Charyk issued a
memorandum for Air Force commanders which Secretary McNamara believed was
worthy of emulation by the other services. Charyk designed a program to implement anti-
discrimination policies and McNamara asked the other services to develop similar
programs. It was obvious to the Air Force secretariat that studies by two government
bodies were a clear sign that something had to be done, and it was also clear that Charyks
memorandum was intended to have the Air Force take positive action to solve the
longstanding problems. Charyk recommended the following minimum actions:
All existing directives and policy guidance which have been transmitted to field
activities as Air Force policy should be reviewed to insure that they are consistent and
clear with the guidance furnished by the Secretary of Defense and the Commander in
Chief .
The Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel, furthermore, was to review all existing
curricula in the various Air Force schools (the Air University, Air Force Academy, Air
Force ROTC, Officer Training School) to insure that appropriate allocation of time
consistent with the length of the course is prescribed for education of the students on anti-
discrimination policy. Charyk directed that basic course textbooks would be developed to
that end. No officers hereafter would be assigned as base commanders who had not been
educated in detail on the provisions of Air Force equal opportunity policy; and they also
had to have acceptable efficiency ratings in compliance with such policies. He continued:
Military commanders will be expected to show some positive efforts to improve
conditions where off-base prejudices exist. Unsuccessful commanders were to apprise
higher headquarters of difficulties experienced in the treatment of minorities and request
assistance from other governmental agencies. If there was no progress at all, commanders
could request funds to build facilities on base to compensate for their absence in the
community.67
General LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, received this memorandum. But no
implementing directives were sent to the field, probably because Maj. Gen. John K. Hester
advised LeMay not to do anything until the Gesell Committee had published its report.
Hester informed LeMay that he did not want the Air Force to be in the forefront on the
issue.68 Gesell himself did not believe the Air Force would spearhead a revolution with
the publication of Charyks memorandum. And Gesell found many of the suggestions
premature, inadequate and ill-defined.69
To insure coordination on equal opportunity problems within the Air Staff, an
Equal Opportunity Group was created within the Directorate of Personnel Planning, an
office subordinate to the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel. The new group began operating
on 1 July 1963 and its membership included Col. Ray R. Koontz, Lt. Col. K. M. Farris,
Mr. Charles Doane, and two civilian clerks. The directorates history records: With the
establishment of this staff activity, all matters relating to equal opportunity in the Air
Force were forwarded to the Equal Opportunity Group for action. Thus, this group was
primarily an answering service for complaints focusing on questions of housing,
assignments, promotions, contracts, disciplinary actions, education, community relations,
and the like. If a congressman wrote to the Air Force complaining about the mistreatment
of a minority constituent, the new unit would research the matter and would either answer
the question or write a response for a senior officers signature. Additionally, the group
would have the function to advise the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel and through him
the Chief of Staff and others on equal opportunity matters. It was charged with
coordinating all Air Force staff agencies on equal opportunity matters and with
maintaining liaison with other services on such matters. Furthermore, it was to advise the
Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel on racial incidents involving military personnel . The
group was the Air Forces point of contact with the United States Commission on Civil
Rights and with the Gesell Committee. It was the executive secretary and recorder for the
Air Force Committee on Equal Opportunity. Finally, group members were charged with
the responsibility to formulate, coordinate, and publish Air Force equal opportunity policy
and to implement defense directives on the same subject.7 In reality, however, the group
formulated little policy and spent much of its time investigating alleged incidents for
congressmen and generals.
Air Force staff agencies maintain Read-Files, which contain copies,
chronologically organized, of correspondence generated by the office. The file serves as a
useful reference for those who have been gone for short periods of time and who desire to
familiarize themselves with the latest activity. The group read file reveals that attention
was given to answering complaints from politicians, superior officers, concerned Air
Force personnel, and interested civilians. For example, Colonel Koontz replied to a
lieutenant at Shaw Air Force Base, S.C., asking the young officer to be more
understanding and patient with his base commanders problems with that state. The
lieutenant had apparently written out of normal channels to gain some improvement in the
off-base situation. Koontz advised him to appreciate his commanders tasks in this area,
because it was not an easy one. The lieutenant had expected the base commander to
make improvements, even though the military lacked the authority to direct changes
within the community. Koontz noted as well:
The letter-writing campaign being conducted by you and your associates is of little
benefit to your base commander. He is subject to periodic reports on this subject and needs
your loyal support and cooperation if benefits are to be gained.71
At the same time, however, Koontz prepared for Maj. Gen. James Moores
signature a letter to the commander of the Tactical Air Command admonishing him that
more was expected of the command than waiting for the community of its own volition to
alter its customs and mores. Koontz added:
Military commanders must concern themselves with the off-base treatment of
military personnel and dependents . They should not confine their efforts on behalf of
military personnel to those changes that the community is willing to make for all its
minority group residents.
Then Koontz softened the blow: The lack of guidance that you have received on
this subject is recognized. Proposed Air Force directives to implement the Defense
Directive on this subject are awaiting the Department of Defense approval.72
Other correspondence reveals that the group tried to get another institution of
higher learning to replace the University of Mississippi, which decided to stop teaching at
Keesler Air Force because the Air Force asked it to desegregate its base extension classes.
A Jesuit college, Spring Hill, and American University volunteered to offer programs of
study.73 Elsewhere, the Strategic Air Command requested and received permission from
Air Force headquarters to deny the NAACP meeting space for its gatherings on Ellsworth
Air Force Base.74 The group was as well involved in an exchange of correspondence with
NAACP state and national offices, answering their complaints and providing
information.75 There were also letters from the group to other organizations soliciting
information for the Air Force leadership.76 One particular piece of correspondence by
Colonel Koontz is sarcastic. In a letter to General Stone, Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel,
Koontz wrote that Selmas Sheriff Jim Clark was effective in his dealings with blacks,
while his methods are not always universally acceptable .77 An Air Force officer
most familiar with the Selma, Ala., scene called Jim Clark a sadist.78
Over the next year, the groups mission changed little. When Koontz left in mid-
1964, he was not replaced, but the activities changed not at all. In 1964 the office
published a major revision to Air Force Regulation 35-78, but went no further than
Department of Defense directives. The group mainly investigated complaints and tried to
stay on top of the problems. The Department floated a trial balloon in the form of a draft
memorandum that would have denied the right of Air Force moonlighters to work for
employers discriminating against military personnel and their dependents because of race,
color, religion, or national origin. The group prepared an Air Force negative answer to the
proposal.79 A proposed directive prepared by Alfred Fitt is a measure of the control some
members of the Kennedy administration believed they had over uniformed personnel. Fitt
asked McNamara to consider adding the following passage to Defense Directive 5000.7,
then in draft:
No member of the Armed Forces on active duty may engage in off-duty
employment with an employer who, although ostensibly dealing with the public at large,
conducts his business in a fashion which results in discrimination on grounds of race;
creed, color or national origin against members of the Armed Forces or their dependents.
Fitt wanted the proviso added because there had been instances whereby Negro
servicemen were refused service by off-duty white military personnel.80 The idea was not
accepted, but enforcing such a regulation would have introduced all sorts of problems. The
proviso probably would have caused enormous resentment, since moonlighting
servicemen work a second job to earn money and not to humiliate fellow soldiers.
In a positive vein, the Air Force banned attendance of its personnel at schools
which would not accept them regardless of race. This provision was effective only if the
Air Force furnished any part of the tuition for an airman. The service permitted attendance
at segregated graduate schools, but only if the program was unique.81 The Air Force also
prohibited its personnel from speaking at segregated affairs.82
Passage of the Civil Rights Act
The major story of 1964 was the passage of the Civil Rights Act and the
promulgation of the revised and expanded Air Force Regulation 35-78. The landmark
legislation opened public accommodations to blacks, and appeared to be a life buoy for the
Air Force.83 Prior to the enactment of the legislation, the Air Force and the other services
were placed between a rock and a hard place by the Gesell Committee and the Kennedy
administration. Even if Adam Yarmolinsky was not attempting to use or misuse the
military as a lever to coerce recalcitrant southern communities into line, it so appeared to
senior military officers and to many politicians. What the Civil Rights Act did was to
place the law on the side of a commander who desired to assist his personnel in solving
problems with the civilian community. The Air Force and the other services did not delay
in publishing regulations taking advantage of their strengthened position. In a talking
paper prepared for the Air Force Chief of Staff by Lt. Col. Farris, the message was clear:
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gives added emphasis to the
requirement for commanders to take affirmative action in fostering equal opportunity and
treatment for all military personnel and their families in off-base communities.
We are no longer engaged in a social reform program that has a debatable basis in
law. We are now engaged in a program to provide for all of our people the basic rights that
are guaranteed by the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act and to support them in the
lawful assertion of those rights . Military personnel must be informed of these rights
and be informed of the type of support that the Air Force can and cannot provide.84
The Air Force Times informed its readers in bold headlines that read, Defense
Hits Hard at Bias and Commanders to Act. The Civil Rights Act had given the Air
Force the power to strike at discrimination. Pentagon memoranda appeared daily, noted
the newspaper, assisting the services to do all they could to help servicemen counter off-
base discrimination.85 In a supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders,
McNamara advised:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is an immensely important and historic expression of
this nations commitment to freedom and justice. It has special meaning for the members
of our Armed Forces, all of whom have already given a personal commitment to defend
freedom and full justice in their own country.
The President has made it very clear that he expects each Department to move with
dispatch within its areas of concern in developing programs and policies which will give
full impact to the Civil Rights Act.
In the Department of Defense this means, primarily the vigorous, determined,
sensitive commitments by military commanders to a program of fostering and securing
equal opportunity for all their men, and their families off-base as well as on .
This Department was created to defend the freedom of the United States. The
denial of the rights of members of the Armed Forces is harmful to the very purpose in
which we are engaged, for discrimination against our people saps the military
effectiveness we strive to maintain .
His statement is followed by one from Norman Paul:
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes provisions of major importance to the
Armed Forces. Of particular significance are the sections banning discrimination in
privately owned facilities of the kind frequently patronized by servicemen and their
families: hotels, motels, movie theaters, gasoline stations, restaurants and all other places
principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.
The act creates a specific judicial remedy for individual victims of discrimination
in most privately owned public accommodations, and it empowers the Attorney General to
bring such suits as well .
It is important that military personnel be acquainted with the pertinent provisions
of the Civil Rights Act, and be advised of their rights there under .
It is also important that responsible military officials understand that the passage of
the act is of itself not going to bring an end to the problem of unequal treatment off-
base for members of the Armed Forces . Consequently, it is more important than ever
that base commanders initiate or continue discussions with community leaders designed to
bring about the peaceful, proper and prompt implementation of the Civil Rights law as it
affects servicemen and their families.86
The Air Force Times spread the message further: When the President signs the
Civil Rights bill, 200,000 Negro servicemen will have a federal law supporting them
when seeking access to off-base public accommodations and other facilities. The
newspaper pointed out that new equal opportunity regulations were being prepared.87
The new directive, titled Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military
Personnel, published 19 August 1964, was quite explicit. A draft of the regulation had
first been prepared a year earlier and, with passage of the Civil Rights Act, the regulation
was published. The impact, then, of the legislation on the regulation is clear.88
The new regulation advised Air Force personnel how to go about changing the
situation for blacks and other minorities. The order stated:
It is the policy of the Air Force to conduct all of its activities in a manner which is
free from racial discrimination, and which provides equal opportunity and treatment for all
uniformed members irrespective of their race, color, religion, or national origin . The
equal and just treatment of all personnel is a well-established principle of effective
personnel management. Such treatment is essential to attaining and maintaining a high
state of morale, discipline and combat readiness.
Discriminatory practices directed against military personnel, all of whom lack a
civilians freedom of choice in where to live, to work, to travel and to spend his off-duty
hours, are harmful to military effectiveness.
The policy expressed in the regulation applied worldwide and as well to the Air
Force Reserve, but not to the Air National Guard, except when the latter was on active
duty in a Federal status.
Commanders were responsible for insuring that the policy was implemented in all
on-base activities; for orienting personnel on the new policy; for apprising personnel of
the provisions of Titles II, III, and IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ; and for
processing requests for suit by military personnel for action by the Attorney General .
For the first time, commanders were made directly responsible for fostering equal
treatment of military personnel and their dependents in off-base civilian communities.
Commanders were now required to provide unsegregated accommodations for
personnel attending or participating in command sponsored meetings, conferences, or
field exercises. The regulation required that all service members regardless of race,
color, religion or national origin be accorded equal opportunity for enlistment,
appointment, advancement, professional improvement, promotion, assignment, and
retention.
But the regulation hedged on the question of off-base implementation. Because
military commanders had no direct control over civilian communities, the regulation
claimed that there could be no complete uniformity in procedures for off-base programs.
The final resolution of difficulties was left to the individual communities. Commanders,
however, could assist urban centers in solving their problems. Military heads might use
the base-community council as a means of resolving local discriminatory practices.
Commanders could meet with local trade associations to solicit cooperation and with
realtors and others involved in the sale and rental of housing to ask for equal opportunity.
The chief officers could establish a local liaison with other federal agencies in an
attempt to adopt a common policy toward civilian community problems. The former could
request local cooperation from the community so that service members and their
dependents will have access to all public accommodations and facilities, will be served in
all business establishments, will be admitted to local sporting events on a nonsegregated
basis, and will be admitted to all community controlled public facilities. Commanders
were directed to publicize the success of on-base integration and to take advantage of any
state or local antidiscrimination laws that might benefit military personnel. Finally, the
military chiefs were to insure that no actual or tacit support was given to community
discriminatory practices.
The regulation devoted considerable attention to those means that would assist
blacks in bringing an end to housing discrimination. In addition to forbidding housing bias
on station, the regulation directed commanders to use their good offices to achieve the
same goal in the community. No sale or rental listings were to be posted by the housing or
family services office that did not make residences available to all without regard to race,
color, or national origin. Commanders were empowered to investigate any housing
projects constructed with the aid of federal funds and to help insure that they were
available to all without discrimination. The military heads could use their judge advocates
to assist personnel to file complaints against realtors or builders who acted in violation of
federal, state, or local laws. All housing leased by the government was to be available to
all service members without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin,
The regulation codified previous departmental rulings on education and further
stated:
Military personnel will not be sponsored or subsidized from Air Force funds while
attending civilian educational institutions in the course of such programs as Operation
Bootstrap, tuition assistance, and permissive TDY if the educational facility discriminates
on the basis of race . The Department of the Air Force supports the right of dependent
children of military personnel to be assigned to and to attend public schools without
regard to race, color, religion or national origin. Where deviations from this policy are
practiced with respect to dependents of military personnel, commanders will make
appropriate efforts on behalf of military children to eliminate these deviations.
Equally important, commanders were directed to transfer the registration of
children from segregated to non-segregated schools and to assist parents in providing
children with an unbiased education.
The regulation called it inappropriate for military personnel to participate in civil
rights demonstrations. It limited the rights of personnel to do so, but did not forbid it under
all circumstances. Air Force personnel could not participate in demonstrations when on a
military reservation, when breaking a law, when violence was attendant, when required to
be present for duty, when in uniform, or when in a foreign country. It advised airmen that
an attempt to exercise a right conferred or protected by the civil Rights Act of 1964 was
not in itself a civil rights demonstration. Commanders are to support military personnel
and their dependents in the lawful assertion of such rights.
The regulation forbade military personnel from attending or speaking at segregated
meetings in an official capacity. It stated:
Care must be exercised that acceptances of speaking engagements and
participation in conferences by military and civilian officials are consistent with this
policy. Officials should not participate in conferences or speak before audiences where
any racial group is segregated or excluded from the meeting or from any of the facilities
used by the conferences or meetings . The Air Force will not sponsor, support, or
financially assist, directly or indirectly, any conference or meeting held under
circumstances where participants are segregated or are treated unequally because of race.
Commanders were directed to report promptly all racial incidents on or off base
and to process rapidly complaints of racial discrimination. They were also asked to assist
their personnel in filing complaints with the attorney general. Included in the regulation
was an attachment that explained how to process complaints under the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, reading as follows:
The purpose of this attachment is to promote the Air Force policy of fostering
equal treatment for military personnel and their dependents by describing policies and
procedures for processing of requests for civil rights suits by military personnel electing to
utilize command assistance in forwarding such requests to the Attorney General.
Commanders were told to inform their personnel of the provisions of titles II, III,
and IV of the law and of the remedies provided in these titles. They also were to insure
that legal assistance offices serving the commander were available to advise personnel
eligible for legal assistance. Commanders were instructed to seek cooperation from
discriminating facilities before allowing the judge advocate to move the case through the
federal government to the attorney general.
Finally, the off-limits sanctions provision was seriously circumscribed. Yet it must
be remembered that no previous Air Force regulation had even hinted at the use of this
weapon. The regulation read:
Commanders will not use the off-limits sanction in discrimination cases without
the prior approval of the Secretary of the Air Force and then only after all reasonable
alternatives have failed to achieve the desired effect.89
When in August 1964 the Air Force Times publicized the new Air Force
Regulation 35-78, it pointed out the regulations shortcomings. Since the directive
indicated that uniform success could not be anticipated, the newspaper theorized that off-
limits sanctions were unlikely to be granted by the secretary. The paper also pointed out
the absence of a provision for the appointment of an anti-discrimination officer. Finally,
the newspaper took note that the regulation had no impact on the Air National Guard until
one of its units federalized.90 The regulation did mark an advance in civil rights
questions, however, because it transposed Air Force official policy from one of benign
neglect to one of open support for winning rights for black personnel under the
constitution and federal statutes. In reality, the new regulation meant little by itself. It
could serve as a platform for more aggressive actions if the leadership saw need for such
action.91
The Air Force Marks Time
With the passage of the law and publication of the regulation, the Air Force
seemed to accept its new role in granting equal opportunity to all of its personnel. Negro
airmen had reached another plateau and remained there until a series of race riots occurred
on military bases early in the next decade. But in the meantime, a new wave of civil
disturbances, many racially inspired, struck the United States in the mid-1960s. These
riots ushered in a new way of looking at the race question and precipitated attempts for the
first time to try to educate all military personnel on racial policy and on the history and
sociology of the race problems in America. A new perspective was needed probably
because the race issue seriously affected the militarys ability to fight. The civil and later
military riots were caused by minority frustrations after the promises of the Civil Rights
Act and the new service regulations were not fulfilled rapidly enough. The riots that tore
apart sections of New York, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Washington, Baltimore, Boston, and
a dozen other cities occurred after the passage of the most important piece of civil rights
legislation in this country. Revolutions take place when life is improving, but not
advancing rapidly enough for some segments of society. The Air Force experienced a
Watts at Travis Air Force Base in 1971 for the same reason that the United States suffered
a Watts in 1965.92
Unfortunately the Air Force, more and more distracted by the war in Viet Nam,
overlooked the lessons of the racial explosions in the 1960s. When Colonel Koontz left
the Equal Opportunity Group in 1964, no one replaced him to continue to keep an eye on
racial questions. He left in the same year as the bloody race riots in Bedford-Stuyvesant
and Harlem.93
Lt. Col. Farris continued to carry on the functions of the office, answering
correspondence to higher Air Force levels, to various congressmen, and to influential
organizations. Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana complained of an integrated Air Force
funeral procession for a white airman, but he was told that the Air Force could no longer
honor requests for all-white color guards or funeral parties.94 The group replied to
correspondence from Congressman Diggs and Senator L. Saltonstall of Massachusetts on
behalf of their constituents.95 There was a great exchange of traffic between the office
and Colonel Richard Ault about problems at Craig Air Force Base, near Selma. Ala.96
In a personal interview Ault revealed that he had not received much genuine
guidance from the Equal Opportunity Group. He said the office had been a link between
the field and the Air Staff and intended to keep each informed of the others situation. The
Equal Opportunity Group seldom offered Ault advice except to tell him to continue to
walk his narrow course (tight-rope walking according to General LeMay) between the
Department of Defense and the denizens of Selma. Without any help from the Air Force,
Ault was able to get the local Selma Housing Authority, a city organization, to integrate its
Nathan Bedford Forrest Homes by giving complete assignment control to Craig Air Force
Base personnel. This significant victory was not commonly known, because both Ault and
the Selma Housing Authority had agreed that there should be absolutely no publicity
about this agreement.97 The housing unit was built for and used solely by Air Force
personnel, but was segregated because it came under the jurisdiction of Selma.
Ault worked continuously for equal opportunity issues, and integration of the
housing project named for the founder of the Ku Klux Klan was one of his triumphs. He
readily admits that momentum was gained after the passage of the Civil Rights Act,
although the housing victory had come earlier. While Ault received few complaints, he
was aware of the problems blacks encountered in the community, and he created a bi-
racial military committee to serve as a form of sounding board for black troops. His
chief problems with Selma between 1962 and 1964 were caused by a traditionalist
southern mayor and his sadistic sheriff Jim Clark, who would not budge on racial
matters. Ault admits that he did not get very far with these people, although I tried.
After the appearance of the Civil Rights Act, an election brought a change in Selmas
administration. A new mayor, Joseph Smiterman, and a new sheriff, Wilson Baker, took
office and they undertook to improve conditions. Hereafter, Ault made headway, but even
then he was unable to advertise publicly the formation of an interracial base-town
committee. When he left Selma in 1966, however, it was a completely changed
community, much, much for the bettera whole other world.98 Yet, he accomplished
much on his own because the Equal Opportunity Group was not geared or manned to
assist.
By July 1965, the group had declined in importance and thereafter disappeared
entirely as a separate operating agency;99 it was merged with the Flying Status and
Entitlements Branch of the Personnel Plans division. The remnant was manned by only
one officer with no clerks until the Travis Air Force Base riot in 1971. The office then
expanded to a size even larger than it had been in 1963. During the years of decline, the
office primarily answered congressional inquiries, and interpreted its chief regulation for
the field.100 A Secretary of the Air Force investigation of race relations completed on 17
September 1968 found that the Air Force had no equal opportunity program at all,
although it had a regulation, and the investigators were unable to locate the office of equal
opportunity anywhere in the Pentagon except by accident and after many fruitless
calls.101
The fact is the Air Force no longer acted as it had in 1949. In that earlier time, the
Air Force hatched its own plan in a huddle before the commander-in-chief had sent in a
play. When given the ball, the Air Force ran with it until it scored its own goal. After 1964
and for the next 7-years, the Air Force received passes thrown by the Department of
Defense, dropping some, and downing the ball immediately on those caught. There is
nothing in Air Force Regulation 35-78 or in Air Force policy that was produced from
within. What the Air Force accomplished in race relation matters, it was told to do.
Making innovative social change in civilian communities probably is not a proper Air
Force mission, but seeing that the morale of its personnel was not adversely affected by
discriminatory practices now became one of its responsibilities. Some progress was made,
however, in housing, promotions, and off-base accommodations. Negro officer
procurement in the Air Force increased by 50 percent between 1961 and 1965from a
strength of from 1,300 to 2,026but the percentage of Negro officers in the latter year
was still less than 2 percent of the officer corps.102
Herein lies a clue to the question: why could not the Air Force avoid the problems
of general society even if it had regulations that tried to guarantee equal opportunity? The
Air Force was a part of the national structure, and unless it attempted to stay ahead of
societys problems, it would become enmeshed in them. That the Air Force was not
confronted with race riots until the events at Travis in 1971 may be attributed to the fact
that it provided greater equality than society at large. There were blacks in supervisory
positions and they received essentially equal treatment on the base. In contrast to some
civilian communities during this period, the Air Force may have looked wonderful.
But, even if the Air Force had been utterly free of racism, and no one would be so
naive to claim that it was, progress appeared suspiciously slow. By 1965, all vestiges of
official racism had disappeared; what remained was personal bias and prejudice and
residual problems off-base. When the Air Force decided in 1964 not to establish an on-
base equal opportunity officer, it eliminated the one communication link that might have
prevented the riots at the beginning of the next decade. When the Air Force permitted the
Equal Opportunity Group to atrophy, it insured that it would not hear the unpleasant racial
news from the field. The Air Force believed it had the problem resolved, yet saw to it that
the mechanism for telling the truth was stillborn.
The Air Force had progressed far from the prejudicial attitudes of the 1920s and
1940s. This can be demonstrated by quoting from several theses written at the Air
University, perhaps appropriate since this narrative began with a study prepared in 1925 at
the Army War College. Vergil M. Bates, an Air War College student in 1964-1965 wrote
that military commanders had new roles:
A man whose family is feeling the effects of discrimination will not be keenly
attuned to his team members goals as his mind will be searching for the answer to his
own problems. In welding his troops into a homogeneous fighting force, the commander
must strive to eliminate discrimination and social prejudice both on-base and off-base.103
Another work, prepared at the Air Command and Staff College by Don G. Harris,
shows the willingness of military men to adapt to the new demands placed upon them. He
wrote:
Off base equal opportunity for Negro military personnel is necessary. The use of
the Air Force, and the other services, as leaders in social reform to reduce discrimination
is unprecedented in United States History. However, this bold course of action established
by President Kennedy is justified by the United States constitution and current federal law.
At one time this use of military institutions to lead social reform may have been assessed
correctly as a purely political maneuver to achieve political objectives.
However, present day social attitudes and democratic ideals reflected in
congressional legislation and judicial decisions support the use of military institutions as
leaders in social reform . The man who commands an Air Force base plays the key role
in determining success or failure of Air Force off-base equal opportunities and community
relations policies. Ability to resolve local problems without outside publicity and
interference is required of every base commander. He must have a firm concept of
human relations and why human relations is important in military management . The
Air Force [should] use careful and prudent judgment in selecting officers as base
commanders, keeping in mind those managerial and communicative abilities required to
skillfully cope with problems by this conflict of responsibility .104
Such attitudes moved the Air Force to react positively when the Travis Air Force
Base conflagration turned its nightmare into reality. Henceforth, the Air Force put into
effect the remaining Gesell recommendations, enforced an improved Air Force Regulation
35-78, required all service personnel to attend courses in race relations, and, with the other
services, moved up to another plateau of consciousness. If this plateau is seen as the last
height to be reached, or if the Air Force relaxes its efforts again and fails to keep a
watchful eye for racial injustices and discrimination, the events at Travis might repeat
themselves.
EPILOGUE
 The purpose of this epilogue is to highlight only the most significant events
involving blacks in the Air Force since 1964. Between that time and the early 1970s, the
service did act to improve the racial climate of the service. The record reflects an
increased awareness and sensitivity among U.S. Air Force officials on the subject, but it
also indicates that they did not fully grasp the depth of Negro frustrations. The reforms
instituted earlier by the Air Force proved insufficient to prevent a major riot by black
airmen at Travis AFB, Calif., in May 1971 and other serious (but less violent) altercations
that followed. Thus, despite the substantial gains won by black airmen after 1964, they did
not fulfill their expectations of equal treatment. There is little doubt that the Air Force
failed to keep abreast of sentiments within the Negro community. Had it acted earlier to
establish equal opportunity offices at all command levels to respond to Negro airmen
grievances, the problems of 1971 might have been avoided. Although such offices were
set up in December 1970, they came too late to avert the Travis riot. The disorder led to a
wave of change in the Air Force, which has seemingly inaugurated a new period of racial
stability.
Positive Programs between 1964 and 1971
A significant step was taken in 1969 with the publication of Air Force Regulation
35-11, Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel in Off-Base Housing Programs. This
directive, which implemented a Department of Defense policy, had as its goal the
elimination of all discriminatory practices against military personnel in securing off-base
housing. As indicated in the previous chapter, the James C. Evans files are replete with
black complaints about housing. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had initiated
voluntary programs to encourage realtors and others to offer housing on a non-
discriminatory basis, and segregated housing listings had been banned from base files. The
changes brought about at the end of this decade included a provision that forbade military
personnel from leasing or renting housing which was not open to all service personnel.
This restriction put economic pressure on housing facilities located near military bases.
The goal of the regulation was not simply to find housing for blacks in a nearby Negro
district, but to locate housing anywhere in the surrounding area that would not force the
Negro servicemen to suffer indignities and humiliation because of their race.1
In 1970, Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE),
demonstrated an awareness of rising racial frustrations and published a Commanders
Notebook on Equal Opportunity and Human Relations. This pamphlet was an adaptation
of a similar publication printed by the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR). The
USAFE Notebook explained that the Air Force was fully committed to a policy of
fostering equal opportunity for all its members regardless of their race, color, religion or
national origins. The authors of the text believed that failures in communication
precipitated racial problems. They hoped to provide an insight into the factors leading to
racial tension and to provide guidance for a continuing program that will improve human
relations and assure equal opportunity and treatment .2
The study also observed that one of the strongest convictions held by the black
military member is that he does not have the same opportunity for advancement as his
white counterpart. Statistics tend to support this belief. The data included in the
Notebook show that the percentage of Negro Air Force officers increased from only 1.6
percent to 1.8 percent between 1965 and 1969. While the percentages of the top three
enlisted grades had doubled in the same period, blacks, constituting 11 percent of the
enlisted corps, made up less than 3 percent of the Chief Master Sergeant (E-9) ranks, only
4 percent of the Senior Master Sergeant (E-8) grades, and less than 6 percent of the Master
Sergeant echelon. The Notebook reported that 80 percent of the blacks surveyed in April
1970 did not believe they enjoyed equal opportunity in the Air Force. The authors stressed
that their attitude could be based on either fact or perception, but the evidence of mass
frustration was apparent whatever its cause.3

The study further discussed at some length racial irritants and grievances. Blacks
were upset with bar and tavern owners who overcharged them, refused them service, or
created private clubs that excluded them. Blacks were irritated at similar practices in
hotels and motels. They resented discrimination in housing through overcharging or an
outright refusal to rent. Blacks resented the custom in the German press to refer to Negro
crime suspects as black Americans instead of merely Americans. Blacks had grievances
regarding off-duty employment opportunities, unequal punishments for offenses, an
inordinate share of menial duties and details, poorer training opportunities, unequal on-
base dependent employment opportunities, little choice in NCO and service club
entertainment activities, no opportunity to pick ones roommates (supervisors arbitrarily
assigned whites and blacks to bunk together to insure that integration worked), and being
the targets of derogatory names (like boy and spook). Blacks often complained that
barbers were not qualified to cut their hair, and that there were inadequate stocks of their
special needs in the base exchange, commissary, and news-stand. Blacks believed they
were ineffective in having prejudiced officers and NCOs removed from supervisory
positions and were usually branded as militants or trouble makers if they voiced
grievances on racial subjects. Negro airmen believed that they were underrepresented on
club advisory boards, there were too few of their race teaching in overseas public schools,
few black studies courses were offered in extension programs, little publicity was given to
Negro entertainers, only minimal recognition was given for meritorious achievements, and
too little Negro literature was found in the base libraries. They resented the hostility and
bigotry displayed toward Negro dependents by white families.4 The Notebook played
down none of these irritants, because its authors knew that troubles brew from an
accumulation of grievances, no one of which might be considered serious in itself, but any
one of which, when combined with a plethora of other morale-depressing grievances,
could ignite a riot.
The study also listed indicators of racial unrest and evaluated several incidents for
the lessons that might be learned. It stressed: Lack of communication between
commanders, supervisors and lower grade airmen was one of the most significant factors
leading to racial disharmony and tension. As a means of suggesting methods for
improving communications, the Notebook produced descriptions of formal and informal
groups created at various military installations which had been established to air
grievances, squelch rumors, and improve situations that were injurious to morale. The
studys writers called on bases to establish equal opportunity seminars to heighten
sensitivity to racial questions and to discuss problems before they became serious.5 This
was a forerunner of the Defense Race Relations Institute program, which will be discussed
below.
In addition to the heightened awareness as demonstrated by one major air
command in the USAFE Notebook, Headquarters USAF implemented a controversial
Gesell Committee provisionthe appointment of an equal opportunity officer to the
commanders staff. He was to be a conduit of information between the community and the
commander, or between the field and the Pentagon, insuring that the local commander and
the Air Staff were aware of the racial problems. The directive stipulated:
Each major commander will appoint a command equal opportunity officer. The
officer should be of field grade or comparable civilian grade . The role of the command
equal opportunity officer should be that of the major commanders personal representative
for monitoring, guiding, and evaluating the command equal opportunity program .
Normally, the command equal opportunity officer duties are assigned as additional duty to
an officer or civilian assigned to the personnel function. However, a commander may
appoint a fulltime equal opportunity officer from within his manpower resources when he
determines that this is required to maintain adequate control of the program. Commanders
of all Air Force installations with a military population of 500 or more will appoint, on an
additional duty basis, a base equal opportunity officer . Officers assigned to the position
of senior base Chaplain, senior base Judge Advocate, Inspector General, and Chief
Security Police will not be appointed base equal opportunity officer. The role of the base
equal opportunity officer should be that of an informal counselor who has direct access to
the installation commander on equal opportunity matters and who is in a position to obtain
assistance of the staff activities concerned in resolving allegations of discrimination on an
informal basis. In all cases, he should strive to resolve issues at the lowest level of
command.6
The above text appeared as a change to Air Force Regulation 35-78 in late 1970. It
called upon commanders to establish effective lines of communication to assure good
human and race relations and to maintain an open door policy.7
Less than 6 months later, the Air Force again rewrote the regulation. The new text
called for more affirmative action on the part of the leadership. Published a week before
the Travis riot, the regulation called on commanders to initiate action to oppose and
overcome discriminatory treatment of personnel and their dependents on and off base.
The 1964 version had simply called for commanders to foster an atmosphere of equal
opportunity. The new revision also added a provision asking rating and indorsing
officials to consider the quality and effectiveness of an individuals leadership or
support of the Air Force equal opportunity and treatment policy. The regulation, however,
did not require a statement to this effect on all effectiveness reports. The new version also
removed the requirement for commanders to seek the approval of the Secretary of the Air
Force before imposing off-limits sanctions against all segregating establishments. The
directive simply stated: Commanders will impose off-limits sanctions against all business
establishments that discriminate against military personnel and their dependents.8
Despite the evidence incorporated in the USAFE Notebook and the revisions of
December 1970 and May 1971, to AFR 35-78, the Air Force was largely unaware of the
dimensions of its racial problem. This is evidenced by the size of the Equal Opportunity
Office in the headquartersstill a one-man operation until the Travis riot. At the same
time, the Army also faced a number of race riots, but it began to focus on the problem
before the Air Force. The Army first experienced bloodshed at Fort Bragg, Fort Dix, and
at various camps and cantonments in Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. The Air Force,
however, was relatively unscathed until May 1971, when Travis erupted. This riot
shattered the Air Forces complacent attitude and provoked probing reappraisals. At first,
the Air Force leadership believed that the Travis riot was a mere spillover from the steam
of racial prejudice that had infected society at large. They were to discover, however, that
the riot had been caused by a failure in leadership, which had led to a critical breakdown
in communication.9
The Travis Riot
The Air Force Times reported that the riot was caused by an accumulation of little
things. Representative of black grievances was the practice of imposing non-judicial
punishment on blacks for offenses for which whites received counseling or reprimands.
Blacks were equally disturbed that the base commander had apparently refused to place
off-limits an apartment complex in the nearby community which allegedly refused to rent
apartments to blacks. The base commander stated that he did not place a ban on the
apartment project because he had not received a fully substantiated report. He noted: I do
not administer social justice. I need a complaint. I do not wander around the
community looking for social injustices.10 Blacks were also disturbed because the
predominantly Negro staff at the NCO club was fired, allegedly because an audit showed
funds and property missing. They believed as well that the base commander demonstrated
insensitivity when he forbade the clenched fist salute at Travis. When asked by a reporter
if he would relax this prohibition, the commander said: Absolutely not. It will never be
[permitted] as long as Im a military officer. Blacks also alleged that there was
discrimination on the air base in duty assignments, leave, and promotions. There was also
a lack of recreational facilities suited to the tastes of young blacks. And finally, they
claimed that the civilian personnel office and the base exchange discriminated against
them and their dependents in its hiring practices.11
These little things provided the fuel for a 4-day riot which occurred between 21
and 24 May 1971. The spark igniting the outburst was a fight between a white and a black
over the high volume of a phonograph played during a party. When news of their
confrontation spread, whites and blacks spilled out from nearby barracks and joined in
general fighting. Security police successfully broke up the barracks area fight only to
encounter a new outbreak at the NCO club. Later, another struggle broke out in a base cafe
when blacks ordered all whites to vacate the building. At one stage police in riot gear
battled 200 brawling airmen. When the security forces tried to arrest a black who had
made obscene gestures and remarks to the base commander, a mob of blacks intervened
and the airman escaped. Later during the rioting, 60 blacks moved on the base jail to free
some arrested airmen, but they were turned back by the security police. The mob then set
upon some whites nearby and attacked them, then moved on to the barracks area and
assaulted whites along the way, smashed windows and damaged automobiles. A white
lieutenant colonel near the barracks area was beaten by the mob and suffered lacerations
and bruises. At times the security police had to use high pressure fire hoses to disperse the
mobs. In all, 135 were arrested (including 25 whites) and 89 of this number were detained
for the night. More than 70 civilian lawmen from neighboring communities had to be
brought onto the base to help restore order. There was one recorded death during the
riotinga civilian fireman died of a heart attack while helping to extinguish a fire set in
the transient officers quarters. More than 30 airmen and officers were treated at the base
hospital for riot-related injuries.12
The Travis riot shocked the Air Force into a vast expansion of the equal
opportunity office within the Directorate of Personnel Planning. It further precipitated a
restructuring of all programs dealing with equal opportunity. A new Social Actions
Directorate was created within the headquarters to monitor all social problemsrace
relations, human relations, drug abuse, and alcoholismand this organization was copied
by all bases within the Air Forceps A most significant innovation was the introduction of
mandatory race relations education for all personnel. In light of the increasing amount of
racial friction among the military, an all-service study group was formed to investigate the
problem. The group recommended the establishment of a Defense Race Relations Institute
(DRRI) to prepare personnel as instructors to teach race relations at the base level to all
people in the services. The Air Force soon published a regulation numbered 50-26, titled
Education in Race Relations, which described in detail a program intended to improve
and achieve equal opportunity within the USAF and to eliminate and prevent racial
tensions, unrest and violence. The directive prescribed classes, comprising 18 to 25
participants, to reflect the rank composition of the base at large. The course was to be 18
hours in length. All officers and airmen were required to attend during regular duty time
and training was to be accomplished beginning with the highest ranking officers and
airmen. While order was to be maintained in the classroom, an atmosphere of free
discussion was encouraged. All personnel sent to DRRI to become race relations
instructors were to be true volunteers. Finally, the regulation called for the establishment
of formal race relations courses at all military schools.14
Soon after the publication of the regulation, military personnel undertook courses
designed to broaden their ability to communicate across racial and ethnic barriers, to
heighten their awareness of the minority contribution to American history, and to assure
all personnel that the Air Force was serious about improving race relations. Students were
informed how institutional and personal insensitivity, personal prejudice, and unconscious
bigotry created racial problems. These would no longer be tolerated. If the program did
nothing else, it did convince most airmen of headquarters intent to eliminate friction
which hindered mission accomplishment.
Brig. Gen. Lucius Theus, Air Force representative on the study group which
recommended the formation of the DRRI (he later became chief advisor to the Deputy
Chief of Staff/ Personnel on racial matters), maintained that the program was established
to modify behavior. A change in attitudes was to be desired but it was almost too much to
expect from a short course. He assumed that the program could convince all personnel that
it was in their best interest to conduct their affairs in a non-discriminatory manner: We
want to explain the standards to you and demand compliance with those standards.15
Another innovation which was introduced after the Travis riot was the mandatory
requirement for all officers to be rated on their Equal Opportunity Participation.
Although AFR 35-78 of 1971 had called for rating in this area, the manual governing
effectiveness reports did not make this obligatory until late 1974. Under most
circumstances, if an individual being rated was not a commander or supervisor of blacks,
no remark was required until the latter date.16 With this addition to the effectiveness
report, the last unfulfilled major recommendation of the Gesell Committee was
implemented. And with the establishment of the Race Relations Education Program, the
Air Force finally decided to attempt an attack on the one remaining area of difficulty upon
which it had refused to focus since 1949the individual. If beliefs, attitudes, and inner
prejudices could not be modified, perhaps behavior could be.
Soon after the military began to conduct race relations courses, Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird appointed a biracial task force to study the administration of
military justice. This group published a four-volume study in the fall of 1972 that ranged
well beyond military justice. The task force determined that there were two forms of racial
discrimination within the military: intentional and systemic. The former was described as
individual bias with the intent to affect minorities negatively, and the latter referred to
neutral practices or policies which disproportionately impact harmfully or negatively on
minorities. A major example the task force offered of systemic discrimination was
aptitude testing which frequently determined an individuals entire service career pattern
almost before the career had begun. Minorities were frequently ill-prepared by civilian
society to take these tests and often found themselves locked into unsatisfying specialties
because of their poor educational preparation. The task force reported that some
discrimination was purposive, but more often it is not. Indeed it often occurs against the
dictates not only of policy but in the face of determined efforts of commanders, staff
personnel, and dedicated service men and women.17
The main body of the report was concerned with military justice. The task force
admitted that it had too small an Air Force sample upon which to base conclusions and,
instead, used courts-martial data in the Army and Marines. The report demonstrated that
23.3 percent of the whites on Army posts received counseling short of the punishment to
correct behavior, while only 8.3 percent of the blacks did for the same offenses. While
71.7 percent of Army blacks received nonjudicial punishment for short term Absence
Without Leave, only 63.1 percent of the whites did. Blacks served longer pre-trial
confinement than whites for the same offenses. Most revealingly, blacks had a higher
proportion of not guilty pleas than whites (47.6 percent to 35.5 percent) and were
acquitted 47.8 percent of the time as compared to an acquittal rate of only 22 percent of
whites. This indicated to the task force that blacks were more often falsely accused than
whites. The report also noted that blacks were much less likely to receive an honorable
discharge after conviction than whites for the same offenses. The task force discovered
that those individuals with the less satisfying or more menial jobs were more likely to
commit offenses drawing punishment than those personnel in more challenging
specialties. Since blacks, because of poor showing on aptitude testing, were more likely to
be relegated to these less satisfying positions their offense and confinement rates were out
of proportion to their percentage of the service population.18
Because personnel with deprived educational pasts were more likely to have
problems in the military, the task force called on the Department of Defense to lend its
considerable weight to a national movement to improve and upgrade educational
opportunities. The task force also made several other recommendations. The position of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity) should be upgraded to an
Assistant Secretary position with a commensurate increase in staff. Equal Opportunity
staffs should be added to Inspector General offices and to Judge Advocate General
Offices. A course in military discrimination should be added to the curriculum at the
Defense Race Relations Institute. Armed Forces Qualification Testing programs should be
reevaluated and service personnel interest and preference should be added to tested
aptitude as criteria for determining specialties. Personnel ought to be periodically rotated
out of low status jobs. Haircut and dress standards should be relaxed. A specific punitive
article prescribing discriminatory acts and practices ought to be included in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice in order to provide a more visible focus on detection and
elimination of discrimination.19
Probably the appointment of the Task Force and the publication of its report can be
taken as positive signs that the military had become more conscious of its responsibilities
in the area of race relations. As indicated above in chapter 5, the Air Force apparently
reached a new level of awareness following the Travis riot. But in the mid-1970s, it is
much too early to judge the success of the Race Relations Education Program or the new
social actions apparatus. This much, however, can be said: as long as communications
remain open and there are mechanisms which blacks trust to bring grievances to the
attention of the leadership; as long as there are devices by which the situation can be
effectively changed; as long as there are programs which attempt to modify negative
behavior; as long as there are leaders who are willing to trade the prejudices of the past for
sensitivity and a desire to increase racial harmony and, through it, mission effectiveness;
as long as there is no relaxation of these efforts while America at large still has a race
problem, the Air Force can expect to continue to enjoy the relative racial peace it has
experienced.
APPENDIX II
Documents
 Increase In Industrial Experience
The great expansion of Industry during the war gave the Negro greater opportunity
to gain Industrial experience than ever before. The War Manpower Board reports that
Negro participation In defense Industries Increased from 3% in 1942 to 8.3% in 194, or
over 100%. This Increase In Industrial experience Is an Important factor when considering
manpower from the standpoint of national defense.
FACTORS AFFECTING FUTURE UTILIZATION
The three factors of education, craftsmanship, and governmental participation have
enhanced the military value of the Negro. A broader selectivity le now available than was
heretofore possible, with a resultant beneficial effect on military efficiency.
SCOPE AND NATURE OF POLICY
While the lessons learned from the service of the Negro In the war Just concluded
are still fresh In our minds, and while the people as a whole are still military minded, It is
the considered opinion of this Board that a progressive policy for greater utilization of the
Negro manpower be formulated and Implemented now, If the nation Is to establish Its
military structure on the experiences of the past. The nation should not fall to use the
assets developed through a closer relationship of the races during the years of war.
The policies prepared by the War Department should be progressively flexible.
They should envision the continued mental and physical improvement of all citizens. They
should be implemented promptly. They must be objective by nature. They must eliminate,
at the earliest practicable moment, any special consideration based on race. They should
point towards the Immediate objective of an evaluation of the Negro on the basis of
individual merit and ability. They should point towards a long-range objective which
visualizes, over a period of time, a still greater utilization of this manpower potential in the
military machine of the nation.
REQUIRED ACTION
Courageous leadership in Implementing the program is imperative. All ranks must
be imbued with the necessity for a straightforward, unequivocating attitude towards the
maintenance and preservation of a forward-thinking policy.
B. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE- -
WORLD WAR II
1. General
A careful analysis of the combat service performed by the Negro In World War II
Indicates clearly that:
The participation of the Negro In World War II was In many Instances creditable,
and definitely contributed to the success attained by our military forces.
No analysis would be complete, however, that fails to evaluate the disadvantages
under which the Negro entered the conflict and which militated against his success.
2. Disadvantages Accrued to the Negro
The records and testimony Indicate that:
(1) Although it was definitely known that the Negro manpower would amount to
approximately 10% of the manpower available for war, plans were not prepared prior to
World War II for mobilization and employment of major units of all arms. This resulted in
some Instances in a disproportionate allocation of lover bracket personnel to combat
elements.
(2) Likewise, no provisions were made Initially for utilizing the Negro manpower
In supporting type combat units. These eventually embraced all categories. This latter
condition apparently resulted from the pressure Initiated by the Negroes themselves.
 (3) The Initial lack of plans for the organization and utilization of the wide variety
of combat units was reflected In frequent reorganization, regrouping, and shifting from
one type of training to another. For example, some engineers and artillery were thus
affected.
(k) Evidence indicates that in some instances units were organized without definite
T. of 0. and E. and without a general prescription as to the missions for which organized.
This was an expediency to offset the lack of plans when manpower was suddenly made
available in large numbers.
(5) The above factors, when added to the definite lack of Information as to ultimate
time and place of assignment and mission to be assigned the various units, was
undoubtedly confusing to the Negro mind and may have become a contributing cause for
some of the reported failures In combat.
(6) Official reports on Negro units do not reflect many factors which may have
been contributing causes of the sub-standard performance in combat.
An over-all far-reaching factor which affected adversely the efficiency of combat
units of all types was the shortage of trained subordinate leaders. This shortage stemmed
directly from limitations for which the Army was only partially at fault. Environment and
lack of administrative and educational advantages in pre-war days greatly handicapped the
Negro In the performance of his wartime duties.
3. Advantages Accrued to the Negro
Likewise in estimating the combat record of performance, careful scrutiny must be
given to the advantages which accrued to the units from the Negro manpower and the
resultant benefits derived therefrom. Consideration must be given to the facts that:
(1) First-class equipment and materiel, and ample munitions for training purposes,
were made available.
(2) Favorable training areas and aids were placed at the disposal of commanders
and in many cases, especially In combat units, normal training periods were extended to
insure adequately trained units.
(3) Experienced white commanders were assigned to direct training and to lead the
major elements into action.
(k) The combat units were carefully staged into the theater of operations and all
echelons of command were briefed meticulously prior to entry into action.
(5) Reorganization and regrouping were practiced with the objective of enhancing
the chances of success of the units involved.
k. Deductions of Facts
Certain facts were deduced from a careful check of the records and the testimony
of commanders, observers and participants In the war just terminated, and arrived at after
weighing the advantages and disadvantages previously outlined.
These are:
(1) There Is substantial evidence to Indicate that the least proficient performance
has been derived from combat units which were required to close with the enemy to
accomplish a prescribed mission.
(2) In general, relatively alight losses were experienced by Negro Infantry units.
(3) There was ample evidence to show that in certain instances small Infantry
composite units, Negro platoons in white companies when ably led were eminently
successful even though relatively heavy casualties were suffered.
(it) The Board likewise was convinced from evidence that the Negro soldier will
execute in satisfactory manner, combat duties In a supporting type unit; for example, an
artillery battalion.
(5) Evidence definitely indicated that the largest use of Negro manpower was In
the service type units, and that In this field they demonstrated their highest degree of
efficiency. However, some service units functioned directly in support of combat units,
being to all intents and purposes a part of them. Many of these elements performed most
creditably.
5. Summary
From the evidence presented by the most experienced commanders, the Board
cannot fail to conclude that the results obtained by all units are in direct proportion to the
leadership demonstrated. The failures of Negro units have in almost every case been
attributed to the lack of leadership qualities of Junior officers and non-commissioned
officers. Leadership, therefore, must be stressed and the development of all attributes
which contribute to this and must be the prime objective of those responsible for the
training of the postwar Army. In this endeavor, moat benefit will be derived from the
broader scope of activities which have been opened to the Negro during five years of war.
A corollary to this first objective is clearly defined, for it leads directly toward the
second objective.
Infantry must be made more effective. When the quality of the close combat
elements composed either wholly or in part from the Negro component Is raised to the
level desired and expected, the Army of this nation will be Immeasurably improved.
In Implementing the recommended program, all types of Negro units should be
Included in the peacetime Army. These units should eventually be officered by Negro
officers. In organizing units, a preference should be given to combat-type units, especially
infantry units, in which the Negro has demonstrated the least degree of efficiency. The
training of these units should stress initiative and command ability on the part of the
Negro soldier In order to improve his character and confidence, educate him to assume
responsibility, raise his morale, and better prepare him to assume the duties of a combat
soldier.
After weighing the evidence carefully and objectively, it seems evident that certain
remedial action can and must be taken. By so doing, the War Department will enhance the
military value of this potential and thereby increase the efficiency of the armed forces of
the nation.
III. CONCLUSIONS
 Having considered the factual and other official materials made available by the
War Department and the oral testimony of over 60 military and civilian wit nesses, this
Board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:
1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two wars indicates that the
Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army In case of
another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.
2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between
World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service,
it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this
manpower.
3. The advancement of the Negro In education, skills and crafts and resultant
economic betterment definitely Indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this
time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower In the military
establishment of the future.
k. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and
much of the confusion encountered In the placement of the Negro manpower during the
Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department
policies been fully Implemented.
5. The experiences gained In the utilization of the Negro manpower In two major
wars lead to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department
at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro soldier can be eliminated and
more efficient results derived from this manpower is the future.
6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro soldier In the past
can be eliminated by creating in the postwar Army, for purposes of expansion, a broader
Negro base of both officers and enlisted men to assist in the training of the peacetime
Army and to provide cadres and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the
Army in the event of a national emergency.
7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the postwar Army logically includes
organization of appropriate elements of any female component.
8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be
established a ratio of Negro to white manpower In the postwar Army. This ratio, for the
present, should be that which exists in the civil population.
9. In World War II some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency
than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than
combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In
organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the postwar Army, it is
concluded that combat units be stressed.
10. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a
general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national
emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department,
between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and.
local civil officials.
 11. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers,
experienced in command, who can devote their time to problems involving minority racial
elements In the military establishment is necessary to Insure adequate and continuous
coordination and cooperation In Implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a
similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.
12. The War Department policy announced far the administration and utilization of
minority groups In the postwar Army should be carefully coordinated with policies of the
slater services.
13. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of
personnel classified In the two lowest grades on the A.G.C.T. scale require more officer
supervision In training and In the field than units composed of personnel of normal
distribution. It Is. concluded, therefore, that attachment of officers to units Including
abnormal proportions of personnel In Grades IV and V on the A.G.C.T. scale Is necessary
when time Is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of
universal military training. This procedure is not necessary In the Regular Army In
peacetime.
14. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climatic or terrain
conditions should be evaluated against the factor of unfavorable community attitude with
its resultant effect on both training and morale. Troop locations should be selected after a
consideration of these opposing factors, due regard being given in all cases to the fact that
small civilian communities are Incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel
regardless of race. Exceptions to this principle may be necessary In the event of universal
military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or in the Interest of
national security.
15. Regardless of source or procurement and of racial antecedents all officers of all
components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for
advancement and professional Improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all
officers should be required to meet tie same standard for appointment, promotion, and
retention in all components of the Army.
16. The sources of potential officer material can be extended and fostered through
the medium of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.
17. Processing of all personnel entering the army, whether volunteers or selectees,
through reception and training centers promote and maintain the efficiency of the Army
and will Insure proper assignment of individuals.
18. The high reenlistment rate of professional privates in Negro units has in the
past denied entry into the service to much potential officer and noncommissioned officer
material. Economy and efficiency demand that men of low intelligence and education who
have proven incapable of developing Into specialists or leaders be eliminated from the
service at termination of the first enlistment. Any policy Implemented should Include all
races.
19. There are many places In the framework of the overhead units at army
installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage as
Individuals. Periodic surveys of the Installations are necessary to determine such
positions.
20. Experiments and other experiences of World War II Indicate clearly that the
most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units
closely associated with white units on similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was
obtained when small Negro organizations were so employed.
21. Experience, education and tolerance on the part of all personnel of the Army
will serve to rectify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.
22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of
educational, recreational and messing facilities and of Officers clubs at posts, camps and
stations where racial minority elements are located are considered adequate for the present
and should be continued in effect.
23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive .and
progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the postwar Army will
stimulate the Negros Interest, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and
facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.
24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower
In the military establishment will not In itself achieve the desired result.
Steps must be taken concurrently to Inform and Indoctrinate all ranks of the
military establishment concerning the Importance of the national security of the successful
accomplishment of the program.
25. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy
Involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay. By
such procedure the War Department will Indicate clearly an endeavor to capitalize on and
benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.
26. Existing laws, regulations and official publications should be examined for
determination of any conflict with the proposed policy envisaging a greater utilization of
Negro manpower.
27. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an
understanding attitude insofar as the press of the nation Is concerned and thereby indicate
that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower
utilization Is being Implemented.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Policy
In order that authorized Negro manpower may be utilized with maximum
efficiency during the postwar period, this Board recommends that the War Department
adopt, promulgate and Implement the following policy:
To utilize the Negro manpower in the postwar Army on a broader professional
scale than has obtained heretofore, and through the medium of installations and
organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively
the requirements of an expanded war Army.
 B. Implementation of Policy
In order to develop the means required for maximum utilization of the authorized
manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency, it is further recommended.
1. a. That combat and service units be organized and activated from the Negro
manpower available in the postwar Army to meet the requirements of training and
expansion and in addition qualified individuals be utilized in appropriate special and
overhead units.
b. The proportion of Negro to white manpower as exists In the civil population be
the accepted ratio for creating a troop basis in the postwar Army.
2. That Negro units organized or activated for the postwar Army conform In
general to other units of the postwar Army but the maximum strength of type units should
not exceed that of an Infantry regiment or comparable organization.
3. That in the event of universal military training In peacetime additional officer
supervision is supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel
falling into A.G.C.T. classifications IV and V.
k. That a staff group of selected officers whose background has included command
troops be formed within the G-1 Division of the staffs of the War Department and each
major command of the Army to assist in the planning, promulgation, Implementation and
revision of policies affecting all racial minorities.
5. That there be accepted into the Regular Army an unspecified number of
qualified Negro officers; that officers initially selected for appointment in the regular
establishment be taken from those with experience in World War II:
that all officers, regardless of race, he required to meet the same standard for
appointment.
6. That all officers, regardless of race, be accorded equal rights and opportunities
for advancement and professional Improvement; and be required to meet the same
standard for appointment, promotion and retention In all components of the Army.
7. That Negro officers to meet requirements for expansion of the regular
establishment and for replacements be procured from the following sources.
(a) Reserve officers, including ROTC graduates, who shall be eligible for active
duty training and service in accordance with any program established for officers of like
component and status.
(b) Candidates from the ranks.
(c) Graduates of the United States Military Academy.
(d) Other sources utilized by the Army.
8. That all enlisted men, whether volunteers or selectees, be routed through
reception and training centers, or other installations of a similar nature to Insure proper
classification and assignment of Individuals.
9. That reenlistment be denied to Regular Army soldiers who meet only the
minimum standards.
10. That surveys of manpower requirements conducted by the War Department
Include recommendations covering the positions in each Installations of the Army which
could be filled by Negro military personnel.
11. That groupings of Negro units with white units In composite organizations be
continued in the postwar Army as a policy.
12. The principle that Negro units of the postwar Army be stationed in localities
where community attitudes are most favorable and in such strength as will not constitute
an undue burden to the local civilian population be adopted; exceptions to this principle to
be premised on the basis of military necessity and in the interest of national security.
13. That at posts, camps and stations where both Negro and white soldiers are
assigned for duty, the War Department policies regarding use of recreational facilities and
membership In officers clubs, messes or similar social organizations be continued In
effect.
14. That commanders of organizations, installations and stations containing Negro
personnel be fully cognizant of their responsibilities In the execution of the overall War
Department policy; and conversely that they be permitted maximum latitude in the
solution of purely local problems.
15. That the War Department, concurrently with promulgation of the approved
policy, take steps to Insure the Indoctrination of all ranks throughout the Service as to the
necessity for an unreserved acceptance of the provisions of the policy.
16. That approval and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower
in the postwar Army be accomplished with the least practicable delay
17. That upon approval of this policy steps be Initiated within the War Department
to amend or rescind such laws and official publications as are in conflict therewith.
18. That the recommended policy as approved by the War Department, with
reference to the utilization of the Negro manpower In the postwar Army be unrestricted
end made public.
/s/ Alvan C. Gillem, Jr.
ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR.
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Chairman
/s/ Lewis A. Pick
LEWIS A. PICK
Maj. Gen., U. S. Army
Member
/s/ Winslow C. Morse
WINSLOW C. MORSE
 Brig. Gen., U. S. Army
Member
/s/ Aln D. Wamock
ALN D. WARNOCK
Brig. Gen., U. S. Army
Recorder, without vote
APPENDIX
The Board of Officers, in a supplementary memorandum, approved the following
statement with regard to the objectives of its Report:
Objectives: The Board visualizes at this time only two objectives:
The Initial Objectives: The utilization of the proportionate ratio of the manpower
made available to the military establishment during the postwar period. The manpower
potential to be organized and trained as indicated by pertinent recommendations.
The Ultimate Objective: The effective use of all manpower made available to the
military establishment in the event of a major mobilization at some unknown date against
an undetermined aggressor. The manpower to be utilized, in the event of another major
war, in the Army without regard to antecedents or race.
When, and If such a contingency arises, the manpower of the nation should be
utilized In the best interests of the national security.
The Board cannot, and does not, attempt to visualize at this time, Intermediate
objectives. Between the first and ultimate objective, timely phasing may be Interjected and
adjustments made in accordance with conditions which may obtain at this undetermined
date.
(AG 291.2 (20 Apr U6))
BY ORDER OP THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
OFFICIAL:
EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Chief of Staff
NOTES
Chapter I
 FLYING ON CLIPPED WINGS
1. The standard work on black troops in World War II is Ulysses Lees book, The
Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C., 1966). It is one of a multi-series of
histories dealing with the U.S. Army in World War II. Lee does not mention the Freeman
mutiny, although many other racial altercations of less significance are noted.
2. John Slonaker, The U.S. Army and the Negro (Carlisle, Pa., 1971), pp 12-13.
3. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 32-35. Lee quotes extensively from the 1922 plan and the
study that supported it.
4. This document is deposited at Carlisle, and in the Alan Gropman Collection
(AGC), Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center (AFSHRC), Maxwell AFB, Ala.
5. Memo, Maj. Gen. H. E. Ely for the Chief of Staff, 30 Oct 25, pp 1-2 (AGC).
6. War College Memo of 1925, Supporting Documents, material on Mental
Capacities, pages unnumbered. The source of the comments on cranium size and brain
weight are not documented.
7. Ibid., The Negro Officer.
8. Ibid., Morale.
9. Ibid., Social.
10. Ibid., pp 1-2.
11. For consideration of the treatment of the American black trooper after his
return from World War I, see especially John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A
History of Negro Americans (3d ed.; New York, 1969), pp 477-497. For other minorities,
see Maldwyn A. Jones, American Immigration (Chicago, 1960), pp 247-277. Popular
writers like Kenneth L. Roberts warned of Americas mongrelization. See his Why Europe
Leaves Home (New York, 1922), p 21. See also Madison Grant, The Passing of the Great
Race in America (4th ed.; New York, 1923), pp xxvii-xxxiii.
12. War College Memo of 1925, Supporting Documents, Performances in Past
Wars; Franklin, Slavery to Freedom, pp 125-144, 168-181, 271-296, and 418-425; Irvin
H. Lee, Negro Medal of Honor Men (3d ed.; New York, 1969), pp 139-141. Blacks won
no Medals of Honor in either world war.
13. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 25, and 28-29.
14. This fascinating man tried without success to join the Air Service after the
United States entered the war. He had fought with the French as an infantryman before
earning his wings. He returned to America after the German conquest of France in 1940
and ended up working as an elevator operator in Rockefeller Center, New York. A
photograph of Bullard taken on the NBC Today Show displays his numerous medals. See
P. J. Carisella and James W. Ryan, The Black Swallow of Death (Boston, 1972), p 256.
15. Lee, Negro Troops, p 49. See further the statement by the Army Chief of
Personnel, Oct 39.
16. Ibid., pp 49-50, and 82-84. See also War Department Policies Governing the
Employment of Negro Personnel upon Mobilization, G-3/6541-527, 3 Jun 40. Such
documents may be found in the Center of Military History (CMH) Collection,
Washington, D.C.
17. Ltr, Maj. Gen. Robert Olds to members of First Bomb Wing, 10 Jul 43, found
in Wg-l-Hi 1943, AFSHRC.
18. AG 291.2 (10-9-40) M-A-M, 16 Oct 40 (CMH). Also Lee, Negro Troops, pp
75-76.
19. Lee, Negro Troops, p 55. See The Crisis, Jul 40, p 1. It displays airplanes in
flight with the caption reading: WAR-PLANESNegro Americans may not build them,
repair them or fly them, but they must help pay for them On p 199, The Crisis discussed
the meaning of the cover. See also The Crisis, Dec 40, cover, which displays an Air Corps
trainer over Randolph Army Air Field; the caption is FOR WHITES ONLY.
20. Lee, Negro Troops, p 56.
21. Ibid., and Lawrence J. Paszek, Negroes and the Air Force, 1939-1949,
Military Affairs (Spring 1967), pp 1-9.
22. Ibid.; Richard M. Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting
on Two Fronts, 1939-1953 (Columbia, Mo., 1969), pp 28-29; and Patricia Strickland, The
Putt-Putt Air Force: The Story of the Civilian Pilot Training Program and the War
Training Service (1939-1944) (Washington, D.C., [1971]), pp 39-47.
23. Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 28-29; and Charles E. Francis, The Tuskegee
Airmen: The Story of the Negro in the U.S. Air Force (Boston, 1955), pp 11-18.
24. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 89, and 117-118; and Francis, Tuskegee Airmen, pp 11-
18.
25. Strickland, Putt-Putt Air Force, pp 39-47.
26. The most articulate statement on the point of view expressed here is Dalfiume,
Desegregation, pp 28-29.
27. Quoted in Dalfiume, Desegregation, p 57, Diary entry, 20 Sep 40.
28. Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 32-33, 36-37.
29. Lee, Negro Troops, p 79; and Dalfiume, Desegregation, p 41. In Apr 41, Brig.
Gen. W. R. Weaver wrote to Maj. Gen. George H. Brett reporting that the Negro race is
taking a tremendous amount of interest in the building of Tuskegee Army Air field.
These Negroes, he wrote, are wonderfully well-educated and as smart as they can be,
and politically they have back of them their race composed of some eleven million people
in this country. Weaver advised Brett that this new policy affected the entire Air Corps,
because of its political significance. Ltr, Weaver to Brett, 24 Apr 41 (AGC).
30. Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 26, 27, and 110-112. See The Crisis, Jan 42, p 7.
The editorial is titled: Now is the time Not to be Silent. With the country at war, the
publication declared that now is the time not to be silent about the breaches of democracy
in our own land. The Crisis pledged loyalty to the idea of American democracy, but not
to many of the practices. Fight not only Hitler, they exclaimed, but Hitler-isma
world in which lynching, brutality, terror, and humiliation and degradation through
segregation and discrimination, shall have no placeeither here or there. If forced labor
is wrong in Czechoslovakia, peonage farms are wrong in Georgia. If the Ghettos in Poland
are an evil, so are the Ghettos in America.
31. Lee, Negro Troops, p 37.
32. Ibid., pp 239-274, contains an outstanding explanation of AGCT. On aviation
squadrons, see pp 113-114; and Paszek, Negroes and the Air Force, pp 4-5.
33. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 93, 94, and 241-246; and William Hastie, On Clipped
Wings: The Story of Jim Crow in the Army Air Corps (Washington, D.C., 1944), p 4.
34. War Department Pamphlet No. 20-6, Command of Negro Troops (Washington,
D.C., 1944), p 4.
35. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World
War II, Vol. II: Europe-Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago,
1949), pp 655-656. In Volume VI, published in 1955, the editors noted that the section on
blacks was too limited. They suggested that the whole subject of Negroes in the armed
services is important enough to deserve a more careful study . (p xxxi).
36. Readers Digest, Sep 65. See also the testimony of Col. Benjamin 0. Davis, Jr.,
before the Gillem Board. The Gillem Board papers are deposited at the Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
37. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 162-168, 175, and 177; Hastie, On Clipped Wings, p 4;
History of the 2164th AAF Base Unit, Tuskegee Institute, 1 Jan 45-14 Apr 45, p 13; and
History of the 2164th AAF Base Unit, 1 Sep 45-31 Oct 45, Supporting Docs., chart on
numbers of men trained, unpaged. These and all other unit histories cited may be found in
the AFSHRC.
38. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 162-168, 175, and 177; Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp
83-84; and Hastie, On Clipped Wings, pp 110.
39. Hastie, On Clipped Wings, pp 10-12.
40. Pittsburgh Courier, 7 Oct 44, p 9.
41. Lee, Negro Troops, p 177; intvw, author with Noel F. Parrish, San Antonio,
Tex., Mar 73; and intvw, author with Marion Rodgers, USAF Academy, Colo., Feb 73.
Rodgers was a Tuskegee airman.
42. Noel F. Parrish, The Segregation of Negroes in the Army Air Forces, Air
Command and Staff College Thesis, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1947, pp 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11-13. The
report can be found in the Maxwell AFB Library and in several Record Groups in the
National Archives, including RG 340, Secretary of the Air Force papers. Those men
responsible for integrating the Air Force read and appreciated Parrishs thesis. Intvw,
author with Jack F. Marr, Cobbs Creek, Va., Mar 73. In 1949, Marr helped implement Air
Force integration.
43. Parrish, Segregation, pp 33 and 48-50.
44. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, II, 424; and Lee,
Negro Troops, pp 451-453.
45. Francis, Tuskegee Airmen, pp 41-44.
46. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 453-454.
47. Ibid., pp 454-461.
48. Ibid., pp 454-464, and 467.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p 406.
51. History of the 2164th AAF Base Unit, 1 Sep 45-31 Oct 45, p 1; Paszek,
Negroes and the Air Force, p 6; and Lee, Negro Troops, p 465.
52. A study made after the war which compared 815 white West Point cadets with
356 Negro flying cadets in terms of flying aptitude determined that the Air Corps testing
methods were valid in predicting on a pass-fail basis. The Air Corps had a valid device.
See William Burton Michael, Factor Analysis of Tests and Criteria: A Comparative Study
of Two AAF Pilot Populations (Washington, D.C., 1949).
53. Blacks were trained at Hondo Army Air Field, Hondo, Tex. See History of
Hondo Air Field, 1 Jan-28 Feb 45, pp 4447 (AFSHRC).
54. History of the 477th Bombardment Group, 15 Jan 44-5 May 44, Selfridge
Field; 6 May 55-15 Jul 44, Godman Field; pp 1, 2, 5, and 6 (AFSHRC).
55. Ibid., pp 1, 2, 10, and 12.
56. Ibid., pp 14 and 15.
57. The Training of Negro Combat Units by the First Air Force, Vol. I, Text
Copy 1, May 46, pp 140, 141, and 149. This history with its accompanying volume of
documents is a major source, not known to have been previously used. Nearly all of the
history and its collection of documents concerns the Freeman Field mutiny. It includes
direct transcriptions of telephone conversations between First Air Force Headquarters and
the 477th Headquarters, as well as between high Pentagon officials and First Air Force
Headquarters. The author of volume 1 is Capt. Earl D. Lyon. It will be subsequently
referred to as Training, First Air Force. Lyon also collected the phone conversations
transcripts as well as numerous documents to verify his account. Both volumes are in the
AFSHRC.
58. Chicago Defender, 22 Jul 44, p 11.
59. History of the 477th, 16 Jul-15 Oct 44, p 72.
60. Ibid., pp 3, 23, 29, 30, 33, and 56.
61. History of the 477th Bomb Gp, Medium, Freeman Field, Ind., 16 Jan-15 Apr
45, pp 2, 9, and 22; and Training, First Air Force, p 75.
62. History of the 477th Bomb Gp, 16 Apr-15 Jul 45, pp 1317. The lack of
comment on the mutiny suggests possible censorship. There was much to be learned from
this incident but the story was not told until Lyon wrote of it more than a year later. His
account was classified Secret and was not declassified until 1973.
63. Quoted in Training, First Air Force, p 114. Lyons work is primarily
documentary.
64. Ibid., p 145. Lyon included the entire conversation.
65. This phone conversation took place on 29 Jun 44 and is recorded in Training
of Negro Combat Units by the First Air Force, Vol. II, Docs., App. E. Hereafter, Vol. II
will be cited as Training, Documents. Phone transcripts and documents are
chronologically arranged in this volume.
66. Telecon between General Giles and General Hunter, 1 Jul 44, Training,
Documents, App. E.
67. This can be found in an article written by Truman Gibson in the Pittsburgh
Courier, 26 Jun 46, published under the headline, Army Inspectors Attempted Whitewash
of Freeman Field, p 12. One suspects Gibson wrote the reprimand and took a copy when
he left the Pentagon.
68. Telecon, General Hunter and Brig. Gen. Harper, 12 Apr 44, Training,
Documents, App. E.
69. Par. 19, Army Reg. 210-10, 20 Dec 40.
70. War Dept Pamphlet 20-6, 29 Feb 44, pp 12-13.
71. Quote is in Lee, Negro Troops, p 219. In a summary of the study, titled
Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military (prepared in mid-1945), the
white-over-black hierarchy was cited as the major reason for the mutiny. The unnamed
author wrote that the basic cause of the mutiny derived from the resentment harbored
by the Negro officers against white supervisory personnel . The white supervisory
personnel occupied the key positions and colored officers considered that their
opportunities for promotion and advancement were denied as a result. See App. U,
Summary, NARG 18, Air Adjutant General Mail and Records, File 291.2. Spann Watson,
a member of the 477th, stated in an interview that you know thats what the trouble at
Freeman was all about; it was position and promotion, it wasnt that damn club at all.
72. Chronological summary of events at Freeman Field, n.d., File 291-2, NARG
18. This document was marked in pencil as approved by the Inspector General.
73. Ibid.
74. Training, First Air Force, pp 184-186.
75. Training, Documents, App. E, Rpt. of Racial Situation, Freeman Field, 31
Mar 45. It covers the period 19 to 29 Mar 45.
76. See newspaper clipping from the Indianapolis Recorder, 17 Mar 45, File 291.2,
NARG 18.
77. Pittsburgh Courier, 31 Mar 45, p 2. This newspaper was by far the most widely
circulated Negro newspaper, having expanded from a circulation of 126,962 copies in
1940 to more than 286,000 in 1947. In both those years, its circulation was larger than the
next two largest Negro newspapers combined. The Courier was considered so powerful
that the War Department tried to bar its distribution, and other Negro journals, from
military posts. Stimson, McCloy, and others in the War Department blamed the Negro
press for bad morale among black troops. Emanating out of the Justice Department were
threats to try the Negro press for sedition with some officials proposing to withhold
newsprint from them. See Ronald E. Wolseley, The Black Press and U.S.A. (Ames, la.,
1971), pp 6 and 49; and Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 86, 87, and 124, who discusses the
War Departments attitude toward the Negro press.
78. Chronological Summary, Freeman Field, in File 291.2, NARG 18. Spann
Watson indicated in an interview with the author that he was contacted on the day of the
mutiny by 477th members who stated: We are going to the club tonight. Are you with us
or against us. They planned to go as an orderly group. Watson was arrested that night.
79. Memo for the Air Inspector, File 291.2, NARG 18.
80. Telecon between Brig. Gen. Ray L. Owens and General Hunter, 6 Apr 45,
Training, Documents, App. E.
81. An intelligence report, 7 Apr 45, stated that blacks had entered Officers Club
and Mess #2 (White), in Training, Documents, App. E.
82. Chronological Summary, Freeman Field, File 291.2, NARG 18. See also same
file, Memorandum for the Air Inspector. See Reg. No. 85-2, Hq, Freeman Field, subj.:
Assignment of Housing, Messing and Recreational Facilities for Officers, Flight Officers,
and Warrant Officers, 9 Apr 45. See File 291.2, NARG 18, and Training, Documents.
83. Telecon between Colonel Selway and General Hunter, 14 Apr 45, in Training,
Documents, App. E; Chronological Account, Freeman Field, and Memo for the Air
Inspector.
84. Telecon between General Kuter and General Hunter, 13 Apr 45, in Training,
Documents, App. E.
85. Draft ltr., Col. John E. Harris to Secretary Stimson, n.d., in File 291.2, NARG
18.
86. Telecon between Colonels Selway and Harris, and General Hunter, 13 Apr 45,
in Training, Documents.
87. Telecon between Air Inspectors Ofc. First Air Force and 477th Headquarters,
11 Apr 45, Training, Documents, App. E.
88. NAACP papers, Container 326, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.
89. Telecon between Brig. Gen. L. H. Hedrick and General Hunter, 16 Apr 45,
Training, Documents, App. E. See WD Pamphlet 20-6, p 14. Hunter did not use this
document as justification in previous conversations and it does not appear in
correspondence prior to mid-April. It was probably thought of after the fact. The
paragraph Hunter counted on was ambiguous and the pamphlet made it clear that blacks
hated segregation.
90. Ltr., Hedrick to Hunter, 16 Apr 45, Training, Documents, App. E.
 91. Ltr., Harold D. Gould to William A. Rowan, 17 Apr 45, File 291.2, NARG.
92. Ltr., White to Stimson, 17 Apr 45, NAACP Papers, Container 326, Library of
Congress.
93. Telecon recorded in Training, First Air Force, pp 216217. Two days earlier
Brig. Gen. Welsh, Air Corps Chief of Staff for Training and Hunters acting Chief of Staff,
Colonel Stewart talked on the phone. Stewart believed the rights of the whites had been
slighted during the Freeman altercation. Welsh agreed. He said: I have maintained all
along that its the whites that are being discriminated against in the army and not the
colored. Welsh also told Stewart that trouble should be avoided because First Air Force
headquarters was very near to Harlem and what Im afraid of is this, if this thing gets out
of hand you may have some of the jig-a-boos up there dropping in on you at Mitchell
Field. See telecon, 18 Apr 45, Training, Documents, App. E.
94. Memo for Asst Chief of Staff, 19 Apr 45, File 291.2, NARG 18.
95. Telecon between Glenn and Owens, 10 May 45, Training, Documents, App.
E.
96. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 157 and 161.
97. Summary Sheet, 5 May 45, Colonel Guenther, WDGAP, subj.: Racial
Incidents at Freeman Field, Indiana and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, File 291.2, NARG.
98. Ibid.
99. Rpt., Gibson to McCloy, 14 May 45, Carton 1 of 1, Accession 68A1137,
National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
100. Agenda for meeting of McCloy Comm., 18 May 45, File 23290, NARG 18.
101. Memo for the Secretary of War, subj: Report of Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Special Troop Policies, 4 Jun 45, in File 291.2, NARG 18. A memo to the
Inspector General from the War Department General Staff, undated, states that the
violation had been called to the attention of the Commanding General, First Air Force.
See also a letter from Maj. Gen. Philip E. Brown, Acting Inspector General, to Arnold. It
called to the AAF chiefs attention for appropriate action, to the nonconformance in this
case with Army Regulations and War Department policies. File 291.2, NARG 18.
102. Ltr., Owens to McCloy, 31 May 45, File 23-290, NARG 18.
103. Undated memo, Giles to McCloy, File 291.2, NARG 18.
104. This comment was appended to the bottom of the Summary Sheet, 5 May 45,
Racial Incidents at Freeman Field and Fort Huachuca, File 291.2, NARG 18.
105. NAACP papers, Container 326, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
106. Training, Documents, App. E, Staff Judge Advocate Brief, 11 Apr 45.
107. Memo, Max F. Schneider, Acting Air Inspector to Chief of Staff, File 291.2,
NARG 18. This shows a specification of charges drafted with a blank for the names of
those who failed to sign the regulation on club segregation.
108. Training, Documents, Official Summary of Roger C. Terry trial, App. E.
 109. Ibid., Review of the Staff Judge Advocate on Record of Trial by General
Court Martial, 23 Jul 45, App. E.
110. Ibid., Indorsement to Terrys sentence by Hunter, 30 Jul 45.
111. Memo, Brig. Gen. William W. Welsh to Commanding General, Continental
Air Force, 24 May 45, File 230-290, NARG 18.
112. Pittsburgh Courier, 23 Jun 45, p 1, and 30 Jun 45, pp 1, 4, 5, and 23; Chicago
Defender, 23 Jun 45, p 1; and Baltimore Afro-American, 23 Jun 45, p 1, and 30 Jun 45, pp
1 and 3.
113. Ltr., General Eaker to Gen. J. T. McNarney, 2 Jun 45 (AGC).
114. Memo, Eaker to Arnold, 19 Jun 45, File 231-290, NARG 18.
115. Msg., Kenney to Arnold, 19 Jun 45, Decimal File, 19381946, H.H. Arnold
papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
116. History of the 477th, 16 Apr 45-15 Jul 45, p 1.
117. Training, Documents, undated Report of First Air Force Liaison Party, App.
E.
118. Training, First Air Force, pp 86 and 87. Lyon recorded this entire
conversation verbatim.
Chapter II
MARKING TIME
1. AAF documents containing reports from all AAF units in the United States
which employed blacks can be located in the National Personnel Records Center (NPRC),
St. Louis, Mo., under File No. 114-528. Also in this file are materials on the MacDill riot
in October 1946 (see below) as well as other reports of racial incidents. The studies titled,
Participation of Negro Troops, are packaged in loose-leaf fashion, with the summary
study of various large units on top. For example, the reports of the numbered air forces
and other smaller, individual reports are attached to the summary report. Official
distillation of all this material, which also included reports from oversea units, was not
found in NPRC. The original of this report is in the H. H. Arnold papers at the Library of
Congress, with copies in the AFSHRC and the National Archives. Citation to the material
in St. Louis is as follows: title of specific report, followed by File 114-528, NPRC. All
reports were written in the summer of 1945; copies are in AGC.
2. Memo, John J. McCloy to members of Advisory Cmte, 1 Sep 44, File 114-528,
NPRC.
3. Maj. Gen W.F. Tompkins to CG, Army Air Forces, et ah, 23 May 45, File 114-
528, NPRC. Tompkins made reference to the McCloy memorandum in his letter. I Troop
Carrier Command advised its people to keep in mind that this project is SECRET.
Therefore colored personnel are not to know this survey is being made. See appendices to
Utilization of Negro Personnel Within I Troop Carrier Command, file 114-528, NPRC.
Brig. Gen. William E. Hall sent a letter dated 15 Jan 45 to AAF Personnel for General
Arnold, making reference to the McCloy memo of 1 Sep 44. Hall said that HQ AAF was
charged with the responsibility of furnishing information upon which to base a reply to
the [McCloy] memorandum . The results of the study will determine the MOS [Military
Occupational Specialty] and the types of units in which Negroes can be best utilized in the
Post War Military. Hall asked for references to the degree of proficiency attained and
the length of time required to train blacks. Also information was needed on which jobs
blacks were best qualified for. He set a deadline of 1 Sep 45 for the reports.
4. Utilization of Negro Personnel Within I Troop Carrier Command, App., rpt,
from George Field, 111., File 114-528, NRPC.
5. Training and Utilization of Negro Personnel in the Second Air Force, pp 1-5
and 8, File 114-528, NPRC. This material was culled from reports from Alamogordo,
Dalhart, Fairmont, Harvard, and Biggs AAF.
6. Ibid.; see attached report from Dalhart AAF.
7. Ibid.; see attached report from Harvard AAF.
8. Training of Negroes within Third Air Force, pp 3-7 and File 114-528, NPRC.
9. Training and Utilization of Negro Personnel in Second Air Force. See also
attached report from Smoky Hill AAF.
10. Western Signal Aviation Unit Training Center, Participation of Negro Troops
in the Post-War Military Establishment, p 5, File 114-528, NPRC. Second Air Force, in
its summary report, noted that race prejudice hampered Negro morale and in turn
proficiency. See specially pp 1-5.
11. Training and Utilization of Net *<> Personnel in Second Air Force, pp 1-5,
8-10, and 12-15, File 114-528, pp 1-5.
12. Ibid. Second Air Force, like most other units, also noted the higher venereal
disease rate among blacks, which occasionally was 10 times greater than the rate for
whites. See supporting documents for this report, File 114-528, NPRC.
13. Utilization of Negro Personnel Within I Troop Carrier Command, pp 6-8, 9,
11-15, and 17. File 114-528, NPRC.
14. Ibid., p 15. Compare attached rpt. from Bergstrom AAF. Unrelated to the
washrack episode, but included in the same package of material from I Troop Carrier
Command, was a vignette from Stout Field, Ind., which demonstrated why Negro morale
was fragile. Once during the war a Negro airman was chosen as Soldier-of-the-Month,
but he received none of the rewards in the civilian community which previous (white)
recipients got. Previously, soldiers selected as The-Soldier-of-the-Month for a given
month were rewarded by the citizenry with free passes to leading theaters, membership
privileges for a month in a leading Athletic Club and various other incidental and
monetary rewards. Upon selection of a colored Soldier-of-the-Month such rewards were
promptly withdrawn by the citizenry .
15. Ibid. See attached report from Bergstrom AAF.
16. Utilization of Negro Personnel Within I Troop Carrier Command, pp 52, 53,
68-71, and 75, File 114-528, NPRC. Italics theirs.
 17. Andersen to Commanding General, Army Air Forces, 20 Jul 45, File 114-528,
NPRC.
18. Hunter to Commanding General, Continental Air Forces, 20 Jul 45. File 114-
528, NPRC. Hunters letter was an indorsement to and accompanied the First Air Force
Report: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment, 19 Jul
45.
19. Training Documents, App. B. Lyon finds the Selway report factually
inaccurate. It makes uncritical and tendentious use of statistics .
20. Hunters letter, 20 Jul 45, File 114-528, NPRC.
21. First Air Force, Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military
Establishment, pp 1-4, File 114-528, NPRC.
22. Ibid., pp 19-20. Note the following: The 477th Bombardment Group (M)
activated on 15 January 1944. The main factor which retarded the training of this group
was the slowness of the individuals in attaining the minimum standards of proficiency
which would permit the organization to enter the final phases of training. Selway told the
reader that it took only three to four months to train white medium bombardment units,
and even allowing three to four times the training time for the 477th, blacks came only up
to the level of the poorest of white units. For the first 9 months, however, three times the
normal training period for white units, the 477th did not have navigatorsit could not
possibly have been checked out. In November, the 477th received bombardiers but these
did not have the necessary training to be navigators, further delaying the final check out.
All this time the unit was functioning on a base that was too small for its purposes; and
therefore it made frequent, upsetting unit moves. All these facts were known by Selway,
and all of them were omitted from his study.
23. Ibid., pp 1-4, and 40.
24. Ibid., p 42.
25. Ibid.
26. Training, First Air Force, pp 30-31, and 43-48.
27. Memo for the Chief of Staff, subj.: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-
War Military Establishment, 17 Sep 45 (AFSHRC), pp 1-10, hereafter referred to as
Nippert, Participation. A copy of the memo can also be found in the Arnold Papers in
the Library of Congress and in the National Archives.
28. The Selway report seems to have been effective in making this comparison.
29. Nippert, Participation, pp 1-10.
30. Ibid. One research study cited by Lyon in Training, First Air Force showed
that AGCT scores were influenced more by geographical location than by race. Blacks
from the North scored higher than whites from the South. The rejection rate for
substandard intelligence was impressively higher for white men who came from North
Carolina, Texas, and Arkansas than for Negroes who came from Massachusetts, Illinois,
and New York City. In fact, the rejection rate for whites in southern states was 3 to 4
times higher than for blacks from the northern areas mentioned. Lyon cited Martin D.
Jenkins, Charles Thompson, Francis A. Gregory, Howard H. Long, and Jane E.
McAllister, The Black and White of Rejection for Military Service, A Study of Rejections
of Selective Service Registrants, by Race on Account of Educational and Mental
Deficiencies (Montgomery, 1944). Lyon suggested that the question should have been
asked in 1944 how impoverished people could best be employed and not blacks, since
educational advantages determined the AGCT. Blacks from the South scored lower than
whites from the same region and their rejection rate for substandard intelligence was
higher also. Lyon also explored the possible reasons for excess trouble in the 477th. He
concluded that the unwillingness of the blacks to accept segregation and the tendency to
fight back stemmed from the fact that most of them were northerners who would not
submit easily to such humiliation. See Training, First Air Force, pp 13-32.
31. Nippert, Participation, pp 16-17.
32. Ibid., pp 1-4.
33. Ibid., pp 1-4, and 21-33. Nipperts remarks might be compared to Selways on
the same subject. Selway found blacks at Selfridge AAF were adversely affected by blacks
in Detroit. Since May of 1943, the Negro press has repeatedly attacked the white
personnel who were charged with the command and supervision of these programs [at
Selfridge AAF]. These newspaper articles made it difficult for the Commanding Officers
to maintain strict discipline, and after each article, it was found that the Negro personnel
were more indolent in their performance of their duties, and they would use the race issue
with accusations of discrimination in attempting to excuse their own failures. On many
occasions, it was apparent that the constant pressure from the Negro press, and the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, resulted in organized
insubordination and disobedience, which materially affected the training of these units.
Compare Nipperts remarks with the following taken from the Report from First Air
Force: Indications point to the fact that these racial irritations and disorders were
prompted and fostered by the Negro Press Association and the Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, for the sole purpose of advancing the race, and they used
these military units as vehicles on which to conduct their crusade.
34. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 397-401. See also the Chicago Defender, 12 Aug 44, p
1, for an indication of how cordially the Negro press welcomed this move.
35. Nippert, Participation, pp 1-4.
36. Parrishs recommendations are not contained in the body of data stored at the
St. Louis Records Center, and they may not have been included in the material given to
Nippert.
37. Parrish to Brig. Gen. William E. Hall, n.d., History of the 2143d AAF Base
Unit Pilot School, Basic, Advanced and Tuskegee Army Air Field, Tuskegee Alabama, 1
Sep 45-31 Oct 45, App.
38. Ibid.
39. Memo to the Chief of Staff, 17 Nov 45, [Alvan C] Gillem Board Papers, Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. This is the cover sheet of the report. A similar letter
from the Chief of Staff was found in the Gillem Board Papers, and in the margin was a
handwritten note: Add: The plan for implementation of same; marked approved by
Secretary Robert Patterson. Chief of Staff to Gillem Board, 4 Oct 45, Gillem Board
Papers.
40. See the Chicago Defender, 1 Dec 45, p 1, which headlined: ARMY TO END
JIM CROW. Future War Department policy on the utilization of the nations manpower
resources is expected to be one of complete integration and an end to Jim Crow in the
Army. There appeared additional page one stories in the Defender for the next 2 weeks.
The Pittsburgh Courier, 9 Mar 46, also headlined the Gillem Report. It said that this
signified an end of Jim-Crow in the army. On page 12 of the issue Truman Gibson, in the
first of a long series of articles, called the report a significant step forward in the building
of a truly democratic Army. He said the ultimate Gillem recommendation was
integration.
41. Memo to the Chief of Staff, 17 Nov 45, Gillem Board Papers. The clause
concerning qualified individuals in overhead units (such as administrative, finance,
personnel, housekeeping and other noncombatant organizations) was actually a call for on-
the-job integration. As will be seen, this provision was carried out, but to a far lesser
extent than the Gillem Board wanted. Certain highly qualified individuals were allowed to
work as technicians and specialists in overhead organizations, but they continued to live,
mess, and recreate in all-Negro units. This limited integration, it will be shown, influenced
the Air Force decision to desegregate in 1949.
42. The Gillem Board considered extremely important the participation of a
relative handful of blacks within white companies in the final days of fighting in World
War II in Europe. This subject is discussed below; however, the boards emphasis is
significant.
43. This reflected War Department orders on nonsegregation of recreational
facilities as reinforced by the decisions taken after the Freeman Field affair.
44. Memo to the Chief of Staff, Gillem Board Papers.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.; italics in original.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid. These remarks appear in a summary of Negro service from the
Revolutionary War to World War II. The short service of blacks in white units at the end of
World War II received disproportionate prominence.
51. The 92d Commander testified before the board and said that blacks did much
good work when not in immediate danger, but freeze up under fire. General Edwin
Almond told the board that the Negro division is a failure. Try combat platoons and
expand gradually or stick to service and support units. See the Briefs of Testimony
found in the Gillem Board Papers. While valuable, these briefs are difficult to use since
some are direct quotes and others are merely summaries of the testimony. Some 52 people
appeared before the board and their recommendations filled the spectrum from continued
segregation and worse to complete integration. Their testimony will be discussed below.
52. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 688-700.
53. TAB A, List of Documents, Gillem Board Papers. This is a compilation of
those documents the Gillem Board Studies while deliberating. It also lists the 52
interviewees. There were several reports on the success of the Negro platoons within
white companies as well as the results of the survey discussed below.
54. Information and Education Division, Opinions about Negro Infantry Platoons
in White Companies of 7 Division, Based on a survey made in May-Jun 45, Report No.
B-157, Headquarters, Army Service Forces, Washington, D.C., 3 Jul 45. Not everybody
was impressed with the survey. General Brehon Somervell, Commander of the Army
Service Forces, advised McCloy not to publish it. He wrote: An experiment conducted
with something like one thousand volunteers can hardly be regarded as a conclusive test.
Organizations such as NAACP might try to use pressure for similar experiments with
troops training in the United States and operating in the Pacific. Many members of
Congress, newspaper editors, and other leaders who have given strong support to the War
Department are vigorously opposed to mixing Negro and white troops under any
conditions. It is doubtful that the report would gain enough support for the Army to offset
the support it would lose on account of its implications. See ltr., Somervell to McCloy,
n.d., in Gillem Board Papers. General Marshall believed that the experiment should have
been followed up, but he also agreed with Somervell that the survey should not be
published. Marshall wrote: I agree with the practicability of integrating Negro elements
into white units should be followed up. It is further agreed that the results of the survey of
the Information and Education Division should not be released for publication at this time,
since the conditions under which the platoons were organized and employed were the
most unusual. Memo, Marshall to McCloy, 25 Aug 45, Gillem Board Papers. Maj. Gen.
F. H. Osborne recommended declassification and dissemination. See cover letter on the
report, Gillem Board Papers.
55. Opinions about Negro Infantry Platoons.
56. Briefs of Testimony, William H. Hastie, Gillem Board Papers.
57. Ibid., Truman Gibson.
58. Ibid., Brig. Gen. B. O. Davis, Sr.
59. Ibid., Col. B. O. Davis, Jr.
60. Ibid., Frederick Patterson, Charles Huston, and Walter White.
61. Ibid., Noel Parrish.
62. Ibid., Charles Dollard.
63. Ibid., Walter L. Wright.
64. Ibid., Bill I. Wiley.
65. Ibid., General Carl Spaatz. His views were important because he succeeded
Arnold as commander of the AAF and later became the first Chief of Staff of the newly
established independent Air Force. Under his leadership, pilot training was quietly
integrated and the first firm commitment to complete integration was made. His testimony
before the board, however, reveals contradictions. Blacks could not have been carefully
selected if they were taken with very low aptitude scores.
66. Ibid., Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker. Parrishs testimony refuted Eakers last two points as
did his letter to Gen. Hall, previously cited. Another Air Force witness, Lt. Col. Louis
Nippert, echoed Eakers testimony. Nipperts entire testimony centered about a segregated
Army Air Forces.
67. Ibid., Brig. Gen. Dean Strothers. The 322d, however, had been decorated.
68. Ibid., Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Chamberlain.
69. Ibid., Lt. Col. George L. Weber. See also General Almonds testimony.
70. Unsigned true copy of letter, 25 Jun 45, Gillem Board Papers.
71. Hull to Gillem Board, 4 Jan 46, Supp. to the Gillem Report Memo, Gillem
Board Papers.
72. Edwards to Gillem Board, 2 Jan 46, Supp. to the Gillem Report Memo, Gillem
Board Papers. Edwards statement is significant because he implemented integration in
1949. In fact, the rapid and complete compliance by the Air Force is more Edwards doing
than any other uniformed individual.
73. Noce to the Gillem Board, n.d., Supp. to the Gillem Report, Gillem Board
Papers.
74. Commanding General, Army Air Forces (but signed by Eaker) to Gillem
Board, n.d., Supp. to the Gillem Report, Gillem Board Papers.
75. Gibson to Robert P. Patterson, 28 Nov 45, Supp. to the Gillem Report Memo,
Gillem Board Papers. This and the next letter must have been forwarded to Gillem for
consideration. The italics appear in the original document.
76. McCloy to Patterson, 24 Nov 45, Supp. to the Gillem Report Memo, Gillem
Board Papers. Noel Parrish did not believe that piecemealon the jobintegration, and
the breaking up of the larger units was significant. He quoted George S. Schuyler of the
Pittsburgh Courier on the subject: Jim Crowism does not lose its vicious character when
administered in homeopathic doses. A Jim-crow company is just as bad as a Jim-crow
division because it emphasizes a phony racial difference which invites invidious
comparisons and leaves the doors open for discrimination against Negroes. Parrish,
Segregation, pp 51 and 52.
77. War Department Circular 76, 1947; and Army Talk 170, p 1.
78. Army Talk 170, p 1.
79. Ibid., pp 2-8.
80. Ibid., pp 12-20.
81. Ibid., pp 20-30; italics theirs. This author has never met a veteran from that
period who remembers discussing the pamphlet, nor has he found one that recalls it.
Allowing for poor memories, the pamphlet must not have made a great impression. The
Pittsburgh Courier (17 May 47, p 20), in an article titled, Brasshats Find Loophole,
states that Army Talk 170 was still just talk to tan GIs . There have been repeated
charges that in some southern camps, notably Fort Benning, Georgia, Army commanders
have refused to issue Army Talk 170 to the troops. The Pittsburgh Courier accused some
Army commanders in the South of preventing distribution of the pamphlet and barring all
discussion of it. Since the Gillem recommendations were never implemented, suppression
of the pamphlet would appear to be in line with general Army intransigence. See below.
82. The Fahy Committee was formally called The Presidents Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services. Report on Gillem Board
Policy and Implementation, [1949], Fahy Committee Files, Harry S. Truman Library,
Independence, Mo. (HSTL), pp 78-80, 81-85, 88, 89, 92, 112, and 117. Dalfiume and Lee
Nichols stress the Gillem failure on a lack of a clear-cut proposal for ending segregation.
Dalfiume Desegregation, pp 149-154; and Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front
(New York, 1954), pp 74 and 75. Dalfiume criticizes the language of War Department
Circular 124. He believes it did not denote a clear policy ending segregation; thus, it
created confusion and did not end segregation. According to Dalfiume, some War
Department officials believed in 1946 that segregation was to be ended, but others must
not have. He also criticizes the board for establishing a maximum quota of 10 percent,
while simultaneously calling for the maximum utilization of blacks. In addition to the
fuzzy language, the failure to implement the creation of a staff agency determined to effect
integration doomed Gillem Board policy to failure. Dalfiume writes that many theater
commanders, months after the circular was published, never heard of the policy nor had
any guidance on its implementation. I do not believe that the Gillem Board should be
criticized too harshly for its imprecise language, since the Truman Executive Order in
1948 was even more generalized. The insistence on a quota was probably invoked more to
help blacks than to hurt them, since they never approached the 10 percent figure in the
interwar military. The Army feared inundation and Truman later had to promise the Army
a 10 percent quota if Negro enlistment got out of hand. On the matter of the special staff
organization to implement the policy, the Gillem Board really sought this, knowing the
Army would oppose integration. The Gillem Board should not then be criticized for
recommending a cautious program in the 1940s, one that was far in advance of not only
the Army policy in the early 1950s, but also of civilian race relations. The Army did not
carry out the policy because it did not want to, not because of fuzzy language. When
Truman ordered integration in 1948, the Army did nothing for 3 years, and Truman made
more than clear that his vague language meant integration and appointed an agency to
carry it out (The Fahy Committee). Dalfiume probably did not have access to the
documents contained in the Gillem Board Papers, which were classified at the time of his
research. All his notes come from the published WD Circular 124. Gillem and company
would have changed the whole racial face of the Army if permitted; they knew that their
program was radical and they wanted it enforced. Their choice of language in the
memorandum to the Chief of Staff and to their detractors made this abundantly clear. See
especially the supplement to the original report in the Gillem Board Papers.
83. Discussion of responsibilities of the Commander, Supporting Documents,
Gillem Board Papers. Dalfiume probably never saw this document.
84. Lee, Negro Troops, pp 348-379.
85. Memo from the Central Intelligence Group to Military Units, n.d. [probably
1942], Document Number 1458190 (AFSHRC).
86. Intelligencer, Sep 44, pp 10-13 (AFSHRC). The counterintelligence pages of
these journals, required reading for command intelligence officers, were filled mainly with
material on blacks. The implication generally was that there was something artificial about
the claim of discrimination and something other than civil rights was behind the
agitation.
87. Nippert, Participation, App. U. In this portion of his report, Nippert listed
base by base the major racial altercations the Army Air Forces suffered.
88. Chicago Defender, 27 Apr 46, Weekly Magazine, p. 2.
89. Mutiny in the Colored Area, 27 Oct 46, Headquarters, Fifteenth Air Force,
Colorado Springs, Colo., File 114-528, NPRC. In this file, which also included the
Participation study, is a folder on racial incidents in 1946 and 1947. Full reports on the
MacDill and Fort Worth (see below) riots are in the folder as well as fragmentary reports
on other altercations. The MacDill material cited here was categorized SEDITION. It is
a counterintelligence report.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid. See also Report of the Air Inspector of the Deputy Commander Strategic
Air Command, Investigation of Incident at MacDill Field on 27 October 1946, 2 Nov
46. This report agrees with that previously cited in all details, but adds items the other
lacked. These quoted statements were corroborated by witnesses at the trials and were
confessed to by Treadwell.
93. Col. J. K. Fogle, Estimate of the Racial Situation, 8 Nov 46, File 114-528,
NPRC. He recommended a firm and uncompromising policy of dealing with Negro
troops .
94. Mutiny in the Colored Area. Harris complete report is also in the file.
95. COMMUNIST PARTY PROGRAMS AS RELATED TO ITS ACTIVITIES
AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES, n.d., File 114-528, NPRC. Attached to this estimate
are clippings provided for the Chief of Staff of SAC by Col. Fogle concerning the
Communist menace. Some of the clippings are about MacDill; one was about a Russian
investigation of racism in South Africa; another was an editorial in the Pittsburgh Courier
that opposed colonialism; another was a Pittsburgh Courier editorial that described Jesus
as a black. Attached was also a summary of a racial incident at Geiger Field, Wash., where
some blacks seized arms and fled into the hills near the base. Fogles comment:
Intelligence reports reveal unquestionably that condition No. 4 of the twenty-one
conditions cited as requisites for admission to the Communist International, the duty of
spreading communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on a vigorous and
systematic propaganda in the Army.
 96. History of MacDill Army Air Field, Dec 46, pp 14-36; Mutiny in the
COLORED Area; and New York Amsterdam News, 21 Dec 46, pp 1, 2, and 35. The
newspaper also claimed that the riot occurred when blacks tried to break into a white
dance, which was also false. According to the official MacDill history, there had been
attempts after the Harris report to improve the conditions in the colored area. A letter in
the MacDill file at NPRC from the Acting Adjutant General at MacDill to the Commander
in Chief of SAC, 19 Dec 46, complained that the situation at MacDill was made worse
because of desperate overcrowding in the Negro area. MacDill had facilities for only
1,330 blacks in their area and already 1,825 lived there, and it was soon to be increased to
3,395. The Adjutant requested immediate funds for more living quarters and to upgrade
recreational facilities.
97. Report of the SAC Inspector General to Deputy Commander, SAC, signed by
Lt. Col. Charles F. Fultin, n.d., File 114-528, NPRC. The Pittsburgh Courier of 11 Jan 47,
pp 1 and 4, reported that 300 blacks had rioted in October and that blacks had served as
officers at the court-martial.
98. Pittsburgh Courier, 26 Oct 46, p 11.
99. Investigation of Fort Worth Racial Incident, 10 Feb 47, MacDill file, File
114-528, NPRC. The investigation and report were accomplished by Eighth Air Force. In
this unsigned report the recorder referred to the blacks as boys and the whites as men.
100. Fogle to Deputy Chief of Staff, SAC, n.d., MacDill file, File 114-528, NPRC,
italics his.
101. Investigation of Possible Racial Incident at Fort Worth and Dallas Air Force
Base, Texas, 1946, File 114-528, NPRC.
102. History of Fifteenth Air Force. 1947, pp 48-61.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Maj. Gen. S. G. Henry to Army Personnel, 13 Jun 45, File 231-290, NARG
18. Notes on the map indicate that the Civilian Aides office prepared the map.
107. Army Air Forces (AAF) Ltr. 35-100, Mar 46. See attached ltr. from Army
Adjutant General, 4 Feb 46.
108. AAF Ltr. 35-268, 11 Aug 45, by Command of General Arnold.
109. AAF Ltr. 35-130, 21 Jun 46.
110. Pittsburgh Courier, 8 Feb 47, p 8.
111. Memo from the Secretary of War on War Department Policies and Practices
Regarding Civil Rights, 15 May 47, to Presidents Committee on Civil Rights Papers,
HSTL.
112. History of the Tactical Air Command, Mar 46 to Dec 46, Vol. I, 116 and
133-136; italics theirs.
 113. History of the Tactical Air Command, 1 Jan 48 to 30 Nov 48, pp 82 and 97.
114. Ibid., pp 88-91
115. Ibid. See also the Staff Study itself. Utilization of Negro Manpower, 18 Mar
48, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va. (AFSHRC).
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., pp 93-95. Paszek, Military Affairs, pp 8 and 9, citing a contemporary
Air Force leader, states that purely political pressures prevented the Air Force from
substituting whites for blacks in the 332d, for to do so would invite violent reactions of
the Negro press. Paszek also indicates that the commander of the Ninth Air Force
refused to let the unit die on the vine for political reasons. The TAC inspector reported
after an Operational Readiness Inspection that Officer promotion has been overlooked,
the personnel at Lockbourne cannot be considered in any overall AF policy as they are
completely isolated by their color from utilizing the overages in field grade ranks now
existing in the Air Force. The inspector cited the group commander, squadron
commanders, and operations officers as fulfilling their duties in a manner warranting
promotions. See the report of the TAC inspector on his visit to Lockbourne from 6 to 8
Apr 48 in History of Tactical Air Command, 1 Jan to 30 Nov 48.
118. History of Strategic Air Command, 1948, Vol. VI, 87-90.
119. Ibid; the complete text of the letter is in the SAC history.
120. Ibid. See also Vol. VIII of the 1948 SAC history: Supporting Documents, pp
112-122. Aviation engineers were construction workers. One unit in Europe built control
towers, hard stands, taxiways, and winterized living areas in addition to grading new
roads, and repairing old ones. Another unit constructed 1,500 feet of 8-inch water line,
patched the air strip with asphalt, and performed road maintenance, and improved the
drainage system of the air strip. This unit later helped build gasoline storage tanks and
pipelines. See History of the 837th Engineering Aviation Battalion, Nov 45, p 1; and the
History of the 811th Engineering Aviation Battalion, 1 Jan 47 to 31 Dec 47, pp 1 and 2.
Similar units without a military mission were the Aviation Squadrons, referred to in the
TAC histories. One of these supplied men to other base functions to work as laborers,
warehousemen, vehicle drivers, billeting attendants, and cooks. See History of the 385th
Aviation Squadron, Jan-Dec 47, p 1. The Army Air Forces Transport Command
complained about the conduct of such blacks. The War Department, they said, forced the
command to maintain separate housing and messing, separate orderly rooms and day
rooms. And while the command had done all it could to make blacks comfortable, they
have not earned a very enviable record by themselves. Most disconcerting was their
disproportionately high percentage of infractions and violations of military and civil
law. While there were 4 times as many whites in the command as blacks, blacks
committed about 30 percent more offenses than whites. While blacks constituted one-fifth
of the military personnel, they committed 57 percent of the violations. See History of the
Pacific Division AAF Transport Command, 1 Jun 46-31 Dec 46, pp 120-126.
121. History of the 2143d AAF Base Unit, Pilot School, Basic, Advanced, and
Tuskegee Army Air Field, 1 Sep 45 to 31 Oct 45, pp 1 and 2.
 122. Ibid., pp 34-39.
123. History of the 2143d AAF Base Unit, 1 Jan 46 to 14 Apr 46, pp 3 and 4.
124. Ibid., pp 9-12.
125. Pittsburgh Courier, 12 Jul 47, p 1. The newspaper identified five blacks at
Randolph.
126. History of the 2143d AAF Base Unit, 1 Sep 45 to 31 Oct 45, pp 10 and 11;
and clippings at the end of the history from the Pittsburgh Courier, 15 Sep 45, 29 Sep 45,
and 5 Oct 45; and from the Norfolk Journal and Guide, 6 Oct 45.
127. History of the 477th Composite Group, 15 Sep 45 to Feb 46, pp 1 and 2.
128. History of the 477th Composite Group, 15 Feb 46 to 31 Mar 46, p 1;
Chicago Defender, 9 Feb 46, p 18, and 16 Feb 46, p 1; and History of the 477th
Composite Group, 1 Mar 46 to 15 Jul 46, p 37.
129. History of the 477th Composite Group, 1 Mar 46 to 15 Jul 46, App. ltr.
from Davis to the Group, 24 Jun 46.
130. History of the 477th Composite Group, 1 Mar 46 to 15 Jul 46, pp 15-18;
History of the 477th Composite Group, 15 Jul 46 to 15 Oct 46, pp 8-11, 15 and 16; and
History of the 477th Composite Group, 15 Oct 46 to 31 Dec 46, pp 1 and 2.
131. History of the 477th Composite Group, 15 Jul 46 to 15 Oct 46, pp 3 and 17-
24.
132. Pittsburgh Courier, 7 Dec 46, pp 1 and 5.
133. Ibid., 27 Jul 46, pp 1 and 4.
134. Ibid., 31 Aug 46, p 5.
135. Ibid., 30 Aug 47, p 5.
136. Ibid., 20 Jul 46, pp 1 and 4.
137. History of the 477th Composite Group, 1 Jan 47-31 Mar 47, pp 5 and 6; and
History of the 477th Composite Group, 1 Apr 47-30 Jun 47, pp 1 and 2. Williams ltr. is
appended to the end of this latter volume, dated 6 May 47.
138. History of the 332d Fighter Group (SE), 1 Jul 45 to 14 Aug 47, pp 1-3.
139. History of the 332d Group (SE), 15 Aug 47-31 Dec 47, pp 1-4 and 21-25;
and ltr., Lt. Gen I. H. Edwards to Eugene Zuckert, 5 Dec 47, Special Interest File, 1948-
1949, 34A-35, NARG 340. Specifically, the figures Edwards uses are: 15,473 Negro
airmen of which 1,862 were at Lockbourne, and 257 total Negro officers, with 192 of
these at Lockbourne.
140. Baltimore Afro-American, 24 Jul 48, pp 1 and 2.
141. History of the 332d Fighter Wing, 1 Jan 48 to 31 Mar 48, p 7; and History
of the 332d Fighter Wing, 1 Apr 48-30 Jun 48, p 2.
142. Lt. Col. Marion Rogers, USAF Ret., personal intvw, Colorado Springs, Colo.,
Jan 73.
143. Pittsburgh Courier, 22 May 48, pp 1 and 5; Pittsburgh Courier, 29 May 48, pp
1 and 4.
144. History of the 332d Fighter Wing, 1 Apr 48 to 30 Jun 48, pp 16, 17, and 18-
20; History of the 332d Fighter Wing, 1 Jul 48 to 30 Sep 48, pp 1 and 12; History of
the 332d Fighter Wing, 1 Oct 48 to 30 Oct, Nov 48, p 16; History of the 332d Fighter
Wing, Jun 49, p 5; and Air Force Times, 21 May 49, pp 1 and 18. The only mention of
this unit (before articles about integration) covered athletics, e.g., Whitfields Olympic
victory, except for this story on the gunnery meet.
145. Memo from Vandenberg to H. H. Arnold, 16 Oct 45, Official Decimal File,
1938-1946, Arnold Papers, Library of Congress.
146. Ibid.
Chapter III
UNBUNCHING
1. This is Lee Nichols term for integration. It refers to the fact that concentrated
blacks produced weak units and that to improve the unit one had to unbunch it. There is
a difference between unbunching and integration; it is the difference between
desegregation and integration. Unbunching was the former, and that, not the latter, was
what the Air Force leadership intended. See Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 221-226.
2. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 77-81; and Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 177-178. It
may well be that the seminal idea for the Air Force to investigate this problem came from
James C. Evans, the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of Defense. In several memoranda
written after 1948, he makes oblique references to his 1947 suggestion that the Air Force
investigate segregation. Evans was always a behind-the-scenes fighter, and it is almost
impossible to gauge his influence, although one suspects it was great. In any case,
everybody who has researched this problem knows of Mr. Evans. See especially, Memo,
Evans to Marr, 7 Jun 50, which mentions previous contacts on this subject. Another
memo, Evans to Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert, June 1948, called upon the
Air Force to show independence in racial matters. Jack Marr told Morris Macgregor that
Evans instigated the original study which Marr completed; Marr to MacGregor, 19 Jun 70
(AGC). Marr also told MacGregor that there was no sociology involved, just a routine
personnel action. Marr found that despite official segregation, numerous competent blacks
were working alongside whites in a frictionless atmosphere. Ibid.; and Jack Marr, A
Report on the First Year of Implementation of Current Policies Regarding Negro
Personnel, 9 Jul 50 (AGC). See also General Edwards remarks to the Commanders
Conference in April 1949; Lt. Gen. I. H. Edwards, RemarksMajor Personnel
Problems, 12 Apr 49, in AFSHRC. In two other statements (14 Oct 47 and 9 Jan 50) to
the Air War College on personnel problems, Edwards did not mention blacks.
Unfortunately no copy of the Marr study has survived. He has confirmed, however, that he
had worked on such a study and recommended an end to segregation before Truman
ordered it. See intvw, author with Jack Marr, Cobbs Creek, Va., Mar 73. In Marrs 1950
report, he said that shortly after the Air Force was designated one of the Departments of
the National Military Establishment, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel,
undertook a review of the Air Force situation as it pertained to Negro personnel and Negro
units. The tangible considerations of sound management indicated that it would be in the
best interests of effective air power to consider all individuals on the basis of merit and
ability.
3. Intvw, author with Edwards, Arlington, Va. Mar 73.
4. Edwards remarks to the Commanders Conference of Apr 49.
5. Spaatz to Graves, 5 Apr 48, in Special File 35, Negro Affairs, 1948, Secretary of
the Air Force, NARG 340. The Pittsburgh Courier reported on 12 Jun 48 that the Air
Force was planning drastic changes. They predicted that the Air Force would have
trouble integrating Lockbourne, considering the mood in the Pentagon (pp 1 and 5).
6. Testimony before the National Defense Conference on Negro Affairs, 26 Apr
48, Zuckert Testimony, Special File 35, Negro Affairs, 1948, Secretary of the Air Force,
NARG 340.
7. Ibid., Royall testimony.
8. Ibid., Edwards testimony.
9. Royall to Forestal, 9 Apr 48, Special File 35, Negro Affairs, 1948, Secretary of
the Air Force, NARG 340.
10. Dalfiume, Desegregation, p 178; and Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 70 and 79. See
especially the Marr intvw. The Pittsburgh Courier blamed Royall for the delay in the Air
Force implementation of its program. According to the Courier: What is described as a
progressive forward-looking Air Force plan for gradually integrating Negroes in that
branch of the service is currently on the desk of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal .
Although approved and signed by Secretary Stuart Symington and Air Force Chief of
Staff Hoyt Vandenberg, details of the plan cannot be released until Secretary Forrestal
okays the release . Purpose of the delay, it is learned is to try to give the Army time
to consider the plan in the hope that Secretary Royall, can be persuaded to bring the
Army into line . The newspaper reported that Royall was emphatic in his desire to
hold up release, and the Pittsburgh Courier tied this to his aspirations to become Governor
of North Carolina. See Pittsburgh Courier, 5 Feb 49, pp 1 and 4.
11. Dalfiume discovered after extensive research in the Forrestal papers at
Princeton that Forrestal was actively seeking the desegregation of the Navy when he was
its Secretary during and shortly after the war. Forrestal hired Lester Granger to help him
unbunch the Navy. During the mid-1940s the Navy had the most progressive program
because of Forrestal. See Dalfiume Desegregation, pp 101-103; and oral history intvw
with Marx Leva, Dec 69 and Jun 70, in the Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL),
Independence, Mo. Leva was Forrestals Special Assistant and General Counsel, 1947-
1949, and later an Assistant Secretary of Defense (1949-1951). Leva found that Truman
felt strongly about integration and Forrestal drove like the very devil.
12. Nichols, Breakthrough, p 10; and Zuckert intvw. Zuckert said Symington was
enlightened about race and had been a pioneer in race-mixing in industry.
13. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 75, 76, and 78.
 14. Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 77 and 78.
15. See for example, Memo, Royall to Forrestal, 2 Dec 48, in Special Interest File
35, Negro Affairs, 1948, Secretary of the Air Force, NARG 340. Royall, who had earlier
rejected the idea of an experimentally integrated unit, now offered an Army post for such a
venture, but required all decisions on integration to be delayed until the results of such an
experiment had been examined. On 22 December 1948, Symington sent a memorandum to
Forrestal rejecting the Royall plan. He stated the Air Force planned to integrate anyway.
Attached to Symingtons response was a memorandum from Edwards to Vandenberg
recommending integration. In early January, Symington again told Forrestal he rejected
Royalls delaying tactics and told the Secretary of Defense that we propose to adopt a
policy of integration. See Memo, Symington to Forrestal, 6 Jan 49, Special Interest File
34A to 35, Secretary of the Air Force, NARG 340.
16. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 78 and 79.
17. Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 177 and 178.
18. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 98-99.
19. Zuckert intvw.
20. Even Jack Marr, whom Zuckert called a crusader for integration, refused to
go on record on this subject, although he was most candid off the record. He did identify
Gen. Muir Fairchild, on the record, as an opponent, but not as an obstructionist. Zuckert,
Symingtons project officer for integration, told the author that Marr wrote the
paperwork, rode herd on this thing for General Edwards, and did a terrific job.
According to Zuckert, Marr was interested; he was bright; he could write; and without
him, we wouldnt have been able to do the job.
21. Zuckert intvw.
22. Parrish intvw.
23. Intvw, author with Gen Dean Strother, USAF (Ret.), personal intvw, Colorado
Springs, Colo., Jun 74.
24. Nichols, Breakthrough, p 78.
25. Intvw, author with Stuart Symington, Washington, D.C., Jan 73. He also told
me that Zuckert carried out the program.
26. Nichols, Breakthrough, p 78.
27. Edwards intvw.
28. Symington intvw.
29. Edwards remarks before the Commanders Conference; italics his.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. These comprised most of the officers and about 60 percent of the enlisted
men at Lockbourne Air Force Base.
32. Ibid.
 33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Jack Marr disagrees with this interpretation and told me that I (Gropman) am
a veritable gold mine of misinformation. Token integration was never in Marrs mind,
and he is sure Edwards never expected it. He also told me that if recalcitrant white
commanders had been found, they would have been summarily relieved of their
commands. Ltr., Marr to author, 1 Oct 73 (AGC).
36. Edwards remarks before the Commanders Conference.
37. Ibid.
38. Another explanation for the timing of Air Force integration was the need to
eliminate some air groups during the fiscal year for budgetary reasons. This may have
been a major reason to integrate the 332d in the first place, since no one in the Pentagon
really believed that the unit would be effective in war. Symington sent a memorandum to
Forrestal on 17 Feb 49 telling him that the Air Force needed rapid approval of the
integration plan if it was going to make successful its necessary cutback programming.
He said the Air Force is committed to disbanding Lockbourne as a part of the new 48
group program. He also said it would increase the efficiency of the Air Force. Copies of
this memorandum were sent to Generals Eisenhower and Vandenberg, as well as to
Zuckert. See Memo, Symington to Forrestal, 17 Feb 49, NA folder OPD 291.2, (14 Nov
48). These plans were leaked to the Air Force Times, which announced that
SEGREGATION IN AF TO BE ENDED SOON. It was a positive article that described
Colonel Davis as a man with natural authority and commanding presence. It also
pointed out the apprehensions blacks might have over the potential damage that could be
inflicted by individual bigots. Air Force Times, 2 Apr 49, p 7.
39. Air Force Ltr. 35-3, 11 May 49. Attached to the drafts of AFL 35-3 and the
accompanying implementing letter was a staff summary sheet Edwards sent Vandenberg
telling him there was sufficient evidence to indicate that the number of Negroes who
would qualify for assignment to white units would be approximately 1% of the white
strength. Edwards told Vandenberg that segregation had debilitating aspects and must
go. His policy was similar to the Navys, and he planned to keep only qualified blacks.
To solve the barracks problems, he suggested separate sleeping facilities in the
barracks. Vandenberg approved the letters and the solution to the barracks problem. To
support the recommendations on the staff summary sheet, Edwards exposed the
inefficiency of segregation in the weaknesses in the 332d and in the underutilization of
skilled blacks such as former navigators who had become unusable. To convince
Vandenberg that the Air Force would not become flooded with blacks, he told Vandenberg
that James C. Evans had shown him statistics that proved that when relatively high initial
standards of qualification were maintained, blacks would only receive one percent of the
appointments. According to Edwards, blacks accounted for only 1 percent of civil service
appointments, 1 percent of pilots license-holders, and 1 percent of those serving with
whites in the Navy. Edwards also told Vandenberg that they could always institute an
administrative quota if blacks flooded into the Air Force in numbers too large to
assimilate. See Staff Summary Sheet, attachments, Edwards to Vandenberg, 29 Dec 48, in
Special Interest File 35, Secretary of the Air Force, NARG 340. Vandenberg wrote a letter
to Symington on 12 January 1949 to defend separate facilities in the barracks, although he
did not consider this to be the ultimate solution. He did consider separate facilities just a
progressive step toward eventual integration. See ltr., Vandenberg to Symington, 12 Jan
49, special Interest File 34A to 35, Secretary of the Air Force, NARG 340. The record
indicates that Edwards aimed too low and that his motivations were mainly to rid himself
of the inadequate 332d and get to the talented 1 percent. The reason the Air Force escaped
the Navys tokenism while trying to imitate it is that the Air Force was not deliberately
aiming at tokenism, and the Fahy Committee took from the Air Forces local commanders
the right to keep blacks segregated. The barracks problem was also solved (see below).
40. Ibid.
41. See Special Interest File 35, Negro Affairs, 1949, NARG 340, for this draft and
others. Jack Marr prepared these versions.
42. Hq USAF, to Major Commands, subj. Implementation of AF Letter 35-3, n.d.,
Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL. (See Appendix 2-3 below)
43. Draft of implementing letter, 31 Dec 48, Special Interest File 35, Negro
Affairs, 1949, NARG 340.
44. Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, Quest and Response: Minority
Rights and the Truman Administration (Lawrence Kans., 1973), pp 221-223. See also
Freedom to Serve: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, A
Report of the Presidents Committee (Washington, D.C., 1950), pp 34-70.
45. Zuckert intvw. Lem Graves claimed in February 1949 that Zuckert removed
the proposed partitions from the barracks because Colonel Davis suggested not to do so
would be unwise. See Pittsburgh Courier, 5 Feb 49, pp 1 and 4. Zuckert wrote to
Symington on 5 January 1949 mildly complaining of the barracks segregation, stating that
the plan admittedly only goes part of the way. A week later, on 12 Jan 49, Zuckert
wrote to him again outlining the policy, but omitting the paragraph that provided for
separation in the barracks. Zuckert to Symington, 5 and 12 Jan 49, Special Interest File
34A to 35, NARG 340.
46. Morris MacGregor, Armed Forces Integration, Forced or Free, unpublished
paper delivered to the 1972 U.S. Air Force Academy Military History Symposium, pp 1-
15.
47. Memo, Utilization of Colored Bombardiers and Navigators, unsigned, n. d.,
to Director of Military Personnel, NA OPD 291.2 (15 Apr 48). The Army Navy Journal,
12 Feb 49, p 693, reports that there were seven Negro navigators at Lockbourne.
48. McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, p 14. The authors deny that Truman
ever joined the Ku Klux Klan, although they admit he may have flirted with it. These
authors have written the most positive account of Trumans motivations in inspiring civil
rights actions.
49. William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration
(Columbus, Ohio, 1970), pp x and xii. Berman has the most cynical scholarly account of
Trumans motivations. His treatment should be contrasted with Dalfiume, Desegregation,
pp 139-140, who criticizes Berman for his negative judgments.
50. Berman, Politics, pp 237-240. Contrast Berman with Dalfiume, Desegregation,
especially pp 139 and 140; and McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, pp 1-25, and
249-250; the latter authors (p 221) label military integration as the most stunning
achievement of the Truman era in the field of civil rights.
51. Barton J. Bernstein, The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and
Civil Rights, a paper delivered before the American Historical Association in 1966; also
printed in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration
(Chicago, 1970), pp 271-296. Bernstein has been taken to task by Alonze L. Hamby of
Ohio University in his unpublished comment on the Bernstein paper at the American
Historical Association meeting; both papers are at the HSTL. Hamby finds Bernstein less
than generous to Truman in his Kansas City days and cites Roy Wilkins as pro-Truman,
even while a local politician. Hamby also believes Truman went further than he had to go
if he were as ambivalent and reluctant as Bernstein thinks. As for the importance of
rhetoric, Federal Judge Waites Waring, on overturning South Carolinas white primary,
quoted extensively from Trumans Lincoln Memorial speech to the NAACP. After quoting
Truman to the effect that the times required action on civil rights and an immediate attack
upon prejudice and discrimination, Waring told South Carolina it is time to rejoin
the Union. Memo, Robert C. Carr to George Elsey, 28 Jul 48, George Elsey Papers, file
on Presidents NAACP Speech 6/29/47, HSTL.
52. See Monroe Billington, White Southern Response to President Trumans Civil
Rights Legislation, an unpublished paper read at the Southern Historical Association
meeting, Memphis, Tenn., Nov 66; copy in HSTL.
53. Berman, Politics, pp 44-51; and Bernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, p 296.
Berman reminds the reader that Truman had unwittingly and inadvertently built up
political pressure that could spell trouble for him in the future, by creating a committee
that might develop an unacceptable program politically. Bernstein would not disagree.
Berman says that the committee report, To Secure These Rights, was a political
bombshell which had to be either detonated or defused. See Berman, Politics, p 72; and
Bernstein, Ambiguous Legacy, pp 278-282. Berman also argues that Trumans main
motivation for appointing the committee in the first place was to offset the Congressional
losses suffered by the party in Nov 46; see Berman, pp 77-78.
54. Nichols, Breakthrough, p 74; and Harry S. Truman, Memoirs of Harry S.
Truman, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), pp 210-213.
55. The Presidents Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights, (New
York, 1947), p vii.
56. Ibid., p ix.
57. Ibid., p 41. This chapter is called: The Record: Short of the Goal, and the
subchapter is titled: The Right to Bear Arms.
58. Ibid., pp 40-47.
59. Ibid., pp 82-87.
 60. Memo, Robert K. Carr to the Presidents Committee, subj: Negroes in the
Armed Forces, prepared by Milton D. Stewart and Joseph Murtha, 10 Jun 47, Papers of
the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights, HSTL.
61. To Secure These Rights, pp 162-163.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. This was confirmed by committee member Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn, in a
personal intvw, in Boston, Mass., Apr 70. This was not to be the last time somebody
wanted to use the military to destroy segregation. See Ch. V.
66. U.S., President, Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S.
Truman, 1947(Washington, D.C., 1953), pp 479-480.
67. Gittelsohn intvw.
68. Berman, Politics, pp 79-85.
69. Newsweek, 7 Jun 48, pp 28 and 29. See also Richard J. Stillman, Integration of
the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces (New York, 1968), pp 4 and 5.
70. Pittsburgh Courier, 27 Mar 48, pp 1 and 4.
71. Pittsburgh Courier, 10 Apr 48, pp 1 and 4. The headline read: BLAST AT
ARMY JOLTS ENTIRE NATION.
72. Pittsburgh Courier, 10 Apr 48, pp 1 and 4; italics in original. See also Chicago
Defender, 24 Apr 48, p 2.
73. Newsweek, 7 Jun 48, pp 28-29.
74. Confidential Memo, Clifford to the President, Nov 47, pp 11-13, Papers of
Clark M. Clifford, HSTL.
75. Ibid., pp 39-40. Later he told Truman that the negro vote in the crucial states
will more than cancel out any votes the President may lose in the South . This was a
remarkably accurate prediction. See Confidential Memo, 17 Aug 48, Clifford Papers,
HSTL.
76. Memo, William L. Batt to Gael Sullivan, The Negro Vote, 20 Apr 48, Batt
File Clifford Papers, HSTL. A copy of this was sent to Clifford. Batt was Research
Director of the Democratic National Committee.
77. Berman, Politics, pp 103,. 105, 106, and 112.
78. On 26 June 48 the Pittsburgh Courier (pp f and 4) on the eve of its formal
endorsement of Dewey, noted with some gloom that the Republican dominated eightieth
Congress closed shop early Sunday without passing a single piece of civil rights
legislationdespite the partys platform pledges of 1940 and 1944, and which at this
moment are piously being rewritten into the 1948 platform.
79. Public Papers of the President, Truman, 1964, p 279. See front page headlines
and related stories in the Chicago Defender, 31 Jul and 7 Aug 48.
80. The Nation, 28 Aug 48, p 279.
81. Confidential Memo, Clifford to Truman, 17 Aug 48, Clifford Papers, HSTL.
82. Baltimore Afro-American, 28 Oct 44, p 1. See also New York Amsterdam
News, 28 Oct 44, p 6A.
83. Pittsburgh Courier, 28 Oct 44, p 1.
84. Ibid., 21 Oct 44, pp 1 and 4, capitalization theirs.
85. Ibid., 4 Nov 44, p 4.
86. Ibid., pi.
87. Ibid., 5 Jul 47, pp 1 and 4.
88. Ibid., 1 Nov 48, p 5; and 8 Nov 48, pp 1, 4, and 6. See 15 Dec 46 for the
coverage of the creation of the Presidents Committee on Civil Rights (pp 1 and 4).
89. Ibid., 17 Jan 48, p 7; 3 Jan 48, p 1 and 4; and 8 Mar 47, p 5, in which Truman
was saluted for praising the Negro press.
90. Ibid., 14 Feb 48, pp 1 and 4.
91. Ibid., 31 Jul 48, p 1; and 7 Aug 48, pp 1 and 4. See also Baltimore Afro-
American, 31 Jul 48, pp 1, 2, and 8.
92. Pittsburgh Courier, 25 Sep 48, pp 1 and 5.
93. Ibid. For a contrary point of view, see Chicago Defender, especially 30 Oct 48,
p 1; 2 Oct 48, p 1; and any issue approaching the election of 1944, all of which opposed
the editorials in the Pittsburgh Courier and the Baltimore Afro-American.
94. Pittsburgh Courier, 28 Feb 48, pp 1 and 4. On 21 Feb, they had identified the
following 15 states: N.Y., Pa., 111., Ohio, Mich., Calif., Ky., N.J., Ind., Kans., Md., Mo.,
W.V., Tenn., and Del. (p 1). Adding Mass. and Conn, to these would give a candidate 277
electoral votes with 266 needed to win.
95. Ibid., 13 Nov 48, p 3.
96. Ibid., 5 Feb 49, p 3.
97. Berman, Politics, pp 129-133. Berman said that Truman climaxed his
campaign with a civil rights speech on 29 Oct in Harlem. This was a master stroke and
Dewey had ignored the Negro vote. This election, Berman says, meant that civil rights has
become institutionalized on the national level, and blacks had become the balance of
power in national politics.
98. Pittsburgh Courier, 20 Nov 48, p 8. The newspaper very rarely printed letters to
the editor in those days.
99. Stillman, Integration, pp 44.
100. McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, pp 221-222.
101. When it first met, the committee was given a banner headline by the
Pittsburgh Courier ((22 Jan 49, p 3): COMMITTEE BEGINS WORK ON ENDING
SERVICE BIAS. This was one of many articles on the work of the Fahy Committee. The
members who were active were Charles Fahy, Dwight Palmer, William Stevenson, John
Sengstacke, and Lester Granger. The last two were black. Two other men on the
committee did not actively participate in its work.
102. Meeting of the President and the Four Service Secretaries with the
Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
Cabinet Room, the White House, 12 Jan 49, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File
1285, 1948-Apr 1950, HSTL.
103. John H. Sengstacke, An Outline Discussion of the Presidents Executive
Order 9981, n.d., Fahy Committee Papers, HSTL.
104. McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, pp 222 and 223. See also Fahy to
Truman on the progress of the committee to date, 27 Jul 49, Enclosure E: The Air Force,
Official File 1285, Truman Papers, HSTL.
105. Fahy to Truman, 27 Jul 49, Encl. E: The Air Force, Official File 1285,
Truman Papers, HSTL.
106. Ibid and McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, pp 223-224.
107. See, for example, Dalfiume, Desegregation, pp 180-200.
108. Ibid.; and McCoy and Ruetten, Quest and Response, pp 226-250. See also
Army Reg. 600-629-1, 16 Jan 50: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army. This
called for equality of treatment and opportunity without regard to race, color, religion,
or national origin, but did not end, or intend to end, segregation. It called for the opening
of all occupational specialties to blacks and for all assignments to be made without regard
to color; yet segregation continued for more than a year and was not completely
eliminated for another 4 years.
109. Thomas Reid to Richard Dalfiume, 12 Feb 65, copy in Evans Military
Correspondence File, James C. Evans Papers, Carlisle Barracks. See also Dalfiume,
Desegregation, p 183, in which he describes the function of the Reid Board.
110. Testimony before the Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services, Afternoon Sessions, 28 Mar 49, Pentagon, pp 5 and
30-34, NARG 341. Earlier in the afternoon General Edwards said that he had been
involved in this Negro problem even during the war . Proposals had been in the wind
since 1943, but the climate had not been right until after the war. Edwards told Fahy that if
integration proved damaging to efficiency it would have to be abandoned. See pp 28, 29,
and 30-34, for Edwards testimony.
111. Air Force Times, 2 Apr 49, p 7. See also the story on 14 May 49, p 1. In an
interview, Spann Watson said that he was responsible for the paragraph in the Air Force
Times that suggested some blacks had fears.
112. Army Navy Journal, 31 Jul 48, pp 1321 and 1329. See further the editorial
page. On the Bradley issue, letters exchanged between the general and Truman in July and
August reveal that Bradley had not known that the executive order had been released and
he believed he was being baited by reporters when he made his statement. No one should
imply, he told Truman, that the Army would stubbornly resist integration . See ltrs.,
Bradley to Truman, 30 Jul 48, and Truman to Bradley, 4 Aug 48, in Negro Pamphlet File,
Carlisle Barracks. At least the Air Force Times and the Army Navy Journal reported
integration. Two other Air Force-oriented journals ignored the event entirely. Air Force
Magazine (The Official Journal of the Air Force Association) made only one brief
mention of the breakup of Lockbourne in August 1949. The Air University Review,
devoted to stimulating healthy discussion of Air Force problems which may ultimately
result in improvement of our national security, also failed to report the change in
integration policy.
113. Ltr., The Interested People of Lockbourne Air Force Base to Robert L. Carter,
Assistant Special Counsel, 16 Mar 49, Container 405, NAACP Papers, Library of
Congress. See the earlier memo of 10 Mar 49 regarding Lockbourne. Carter disagreed
with the men at the base and recommended no NAACP action.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid. See the memo from the Lockbourne personnel which was attached to the
16 Mar 49 ltr. to Carter. A copy in the NAACP files has no names on it, but Spann Watson
showed this author the original (AGC), and it indicates that Watson wrote it with the
collaboration of George lies, Silas Jenkins, Andrews McCloy, and Samuel Lynn. Watson
said that he had flown all over the East protesting the Air Force plan, and that he had
spoken to the Air Force Times, Pittsburgh Courier, NAACP, and the Urban League. A
letter to the editor in the Pittsburgh Courier, 2 years earlier (21 Jun 47, p 13) demonstrates
that at least one enlisted man found the officers to be selfish: It was everyone for himself
and God for all. If we dont help ourselves when we have the authority, we should not
expect help from someone else. Until we learn unity and cooperation, we will forever be
the white mans foot stool.
116. Ibid.
117. Wilkins to Branch Officers, 6 Nov 49, Container 395, NAACP Papers,
Library of Congress. At about the same time, James C. Evans wrote to Roy Wilkins that
he had expected negative reactions from some blacks expressing the arguments that we
would rather be together, or we could advance better in our own group, or we can
make a better record for the race in racial units. Evans, moreover, was pleased to say that
the preponderance of expressions were not negative but, rather positive and
affirmative. Evans to Wilkins, 16 Nov 49; Container 395, NAACP Papers, Library of
Congress.
118. History of Ninth Air Force, Dec 48-Jan 50, Vol. II, Supporting Documents.
119. Memo, E. H. Underhill, Deputy Director of Military Personnel, to Director of
Personnel Planning, DCS/P, Status of Implementation of AFL 35-3, n. d. (AGC), was
the cover sheet on a memo that Zuckert was to take to the Fahy Committee on the progress
of September 1949. All the men were given a 3-part examination for aptitude, and all were
interviewed. A small number were eliminated because they were marginal or
extraordinary cases. The report notes: Upon reporting to his new station, each airman is
assigned to the performance of the duty recommended in the original screening process at
Lockbourne.
120. Testimony before the Fahy Committee on 28 Mar 49; Idwal H. Edwards
testimony, pp 28-34, NARG 341.
121. Rpt., Hq 2260th Air Base Squadron, Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio, to Air
Force DCS/P, Personnel Plans, Personnel Progress as of 20 September 1949, (AGC).
122. Air Force Times, 23 Jul 49, p 7.
123. Records on Racial Policies 1944-1950, appended to a report on Racial
Integration of the Air Force, 6 Feb 50, NARG 341. Edwards missed his 1 percent
estimate of Negro qualifications by 500 percent. Zuckert admitted to the author that the
screening boards might have been a mistake because of their impact on Negro morale. The
eight bases reported in the results of screening were Lockbourne, Lackland, Barks-dale,
Randolph, Waco, Mather, Williams, and Goodfellow Air Force Bases. See Zuckert intvw.
See also tables 1, 2, 4, and 11 in Appendix 1.
124. Pittsburgh Courier, 21 May 49, pp 1 and 4.
125. Ibid., 28 May 49, sec. 2, p 1.
126. Ibid., 6 Aug 49, p 2; 18 Jun 49, pp 1 and 4; and 22 Oct 49, pp 1 and 4.
127. History of Ninth Air Force, Dec 48-Dec 50, Vol. II, Supporting Documents.
128. Kuter to MATS Commanders, 1 May 49, File 250.1 to 291.2, MARG 340.
129. Edwards to Lt. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, Commanding General, CONAC, 29
Jul 49, Whitehead Correspondence (AFSHRC). In the same file are letters from
Whitehead to Edwards reporting that all was going reasonably well. See, for example, his
letter of 2 Mar 50.
130. LeMay to Edwards, 27 Sep 49, History of the Strategic Air Command, Jan
to Dec 50, Supporting Documents.
131. LeMay briefing to SAC unit commanders, History of SAC, Jan-Dec 50,
Supporting Documents.
132. LeMay to Ramey, 10 Oct 49, History of SAC, Jan-Dec 50, Supporting
Documents. In this history, there is a report of a white sergeant who tried to force newly
arrived blacks to bunk together at one end of the barracks. He was disciplined. The
incident convinced the blacks that the Air Force was in earnest about its policy of non-
discrimination. See Supporting Documents.
133. [E. W. Kenworthy], A First Report on the Racial Integration of the Air
Force, 6 Feb 50, Records on Racial Policies 1944-1955, NARG 341.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid. Members of the Presidents Committee on Religion and Welfare in the
Armed Forces demonstrated no great willingness to come to grips with this type of
problem. In their report on Keesler AFB, the problem is ignored; in their report on
Maxwell AFB they commented only on the fact that the base was integrated. But blacks
were not allowed to play on the base athletic teams. See Community Organizations,
Papers of Presidents Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, HSTL.
See also data on Biloxi, Miss., and Montgomery, Ala.
138. [E. W. Kenworthy], First Report, section on Keesler AFB. Nichols wrote
that if there were provocations by whites in Biloxi, plans were in readiness to spirit the
Negroes away from the area instantly. Nichols, Breakthrough, p 100.
139. [E. W. Kenworthy], First Report, section on Lackland AFB. Joseph H. B.
Evans, Kenworthys assistant and a black, also visited Lackland unannounced and was
favorably impressed. Blacks were very pleased with their treatment. He noted that there
were blacks in supervisory positions over whites. He also noted that the Officer Candidate
School club was in a hotel in downtown San Antonio and was therefore segregated,
neglecting the black cadets socially, but he observed that the whites were as upset over
this as were the blacks. See Memo, Joseph H. B. Evans to the Fahy Committee, subj.:
Treatment of Negroes at Lackland Air Base, 3 Nov 49, Fahy Committee File, HSTL.
140. [E. W. Kenworthy], First Report, section on Maxwell AFB. More will be
said about Maxwell AFB in this and the next chapter. General Edwards told me in an
interview that he personally disbanded the 3817th. The fact that the men worked in 29
organizations is a reflection of the Gillem policy. When Negro officers, however, tried to
force the municipal buses to integrate while on the base, Maxwell officials refused to
support the blacks and permitted continued segregation. See Pittsburgh Courier, 12 Jul 49,
p 5.
141. E. W. Kenworthy, main body of the report.
142. Project Clear, Summary, Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro
Manpower, n.d., Operations Research Office, The John Hopkins University, copy in
Maxwell AFB Library (AFSHRC). The report was compiled during the Korean War and
before the Army decision to integrate. The Air Corps polled 5,872 whites in 1942 and
found that most wanted blacks to receive the same training they got, but wanted such to be
segregated. See Attitudes of Enlisted Men towards Negroes for Air Corps Duty, 30 Nov
42, Research Branch, Special Services Division, Services of Supply, Maxwell AFB
Library.
143. Attitude Research Branch, Morale Attitudes of Enlisted men, May-June
1949, Attitudes toward integration of Negro Soldiers in the Army, Dec 49, Maxwell AFB
Library, italics theirs.
144. Parrish, Segregation, pp 54, 59-60, 66, 93, 95, 100, and 101.
145. Lt. Col. Solomon Cutcher, Effective Utilization of Negro Personnel in the
Armed Forces, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb., Mar 48, Maxwell
AFB Library, pp 22 and 23. A complete perusal of all catalogues, indexes, and
bibliographies at Maxwell and in the AFSHRC reveals that after integration in 1949, no
other reports were compiled on this subject until the 1960s. The students research
subjects demonstrates their lack of interest in race relations from 1949 until the early
1960s.
 146. Lt. Col. John B. Gaffney, Application of Personnel Management as Applied
to Negro Troops in the Air Force, Air Command and Staff College Research Study,
unpb., Oct 48, Maxwell AFB Library, pp 14-15.
147. Maj. Hugh D. Young, Effective Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
United States Air Force, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb., Dec 48,
Maxwell AFB Library, pp 22-26.
148. Economic Mobilization Course, Training and Utilization of Manpower
(Washington, D.C.: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1948), Maxwell AFB,
Library, p v. The committee members were all lieutenant colonels or colonels or the Navy
equivalent.
149. Ibid., p 52.
150. Ibid., pp 56-63, and 64.
151. Ibid., pp 66-69.
152. Ibid., p 73.
153. Ibid., p 77.
154. Ibid., p 81
155. Ibid., pp 82-83.
156. Ibid., p 84.
157. Ibid., p 86.
158. Ibid., p 106.
159. Col. Lester L. Kunish, Utilization of Negro Airmen on Air Force Bases, Air
War College Research Study, unpb., Feb. 49, Maxwell AFB Library, pp 8, 10, 11, and 12.
Although Kunish recommended no real advance for blacks, there were no jobs essentially
that blacks could not hold. See pp 26-32.
Also note a similar study at the War College by Col. Philip BB. Klein, Utilization
of Negro Personnel in the Air Force, Air War College thesis, unpb., Mar 49, especially pp
25-26, and one by Col. W. E. Covington, Jr., The Utilization of Negro Personnel, Air
War College, unpb., Mar 49, especially pp 13 and 14. Covington had commanded blacks.
See also Lt. Col. Rollen H. Anthis, Utilization of Negro Personnel in the Armed Forces,
Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb., Mar 49, pp 13-15.
160. Maj. John J. Pesch, Should Negroes and Whites be Integrated in the Same
Air Force Units?, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb., Apr 49,
Maxwell AFB Library, pp 12-14.
161. Maj. James D. Catington, Sociological Factors Concerned with the
Segregation of Negro Troops in the Armed Forces, Air Command Staff College Research
Study, unpb., May 49, Maxwell AFB Library, pp 12 and 13. See also Lt. Col. Orville C.
Tangen, Negro Personnel Management in the United States Air Force, Air Command
and Staff College Research Study, unpb., May 49, especially pp ii, hi, and 20-23. Tangen
commanded blacks and blamed all the problems on segregation and recommended its
immediate abandonment.
162. Lt. Col. Jack E. Cunningham, Non-Segregation v. Prejudice Air Command
and Staff College Research Study, unpb., Nov 49, Maxwell AFB Library, pp 13 and 14.
See also Lt. Col. Fidelis A. Link, Determination of Policies for Utilization of Negro
Manpower in the U.S. Air Force, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb.,
Nov 49, pp 13-14. He said that the Air Force will profit by leading in social reform.
Also see Lt. Col. D. B. Avery. The Negro and the Air Force, Air Command and Staff
College Research Study, unpb., Nov 49, especially pp 3, 4, 17, 18, and 19.
163. Inspector General Report on Racial Affairs, San Antonio, Tex. 13 Oct 49,
Secretary of the Air Force, File 291.2, NARG 340.
164. Ibid. A wholesome reaction to racial integration was expected according to
David Mandelbaum. He drew on his knowledge of in-group sociology and suggested that
esprit de corps would be the adhesive that would bind blacks and whites in the same
unit together. Citing Ardant du Picq, Mandelbaum said that the cohesion du Picq wrote of
in combat was no less important an influence during training and in [the] garrison.
Morale is dependent upon social relations within the soldiers primary group or unit.
Segregation would work against unit effectiveness by increasing a lack of confidence. He
believed that integration would overcome adverse racial attitudes. In the unit color would
make little difference. See David G. Mandelbaum, Soldier Group and Negro Soldiers
(Berkeley, 1952), pp 1, 2, 39, 55, 88, 90, 131, and 132.
165. A Report of the First Year of Implementation of Current Policies Regarding
Negro Personnel. See also ltr., General Edwards to Kuter 17 Oct 49, File 291.2, NARG
340. Edwards said that the expression scarcely a ripple described the situation
throughout the Air Force.
166. History of SAC, Jan to Dec 49, pp 43-45. Orlando AFB reported that 2
NCO clubs and 2 service clubs were established upon the suggestion of Negro personnel
who believed that both Negroes and whites would be more at home in a group where the
majority of their race congregate. Although the policy of separate clubs was unstated,
white personnel gravitated to one club and blacks to the other, although either race was
welcome at social events at either club. This history took note of Ku Klux Klan hostility
to Air Force integration, some of it physical, in the Orlando, Fla., area. History of the
Fourteenth Air Force, Jan to Jun 51, Vol I, 61-66.
167. History of Air Training Command, 1 Jul-31 Dec 49, pp 29-31.
168. Gen. Robert Old to Whitehead, 19 Sep 49, History of Ninth Air Force, 1
Dec 48-1 Jan 50, Supporting Documents.
169. History of Ninth Air Force, 1 Jan 50-1 Jul 50, pp 92-94. Brig. Gen. H. W.
Bowman described the visit in a letter to the author. Bowman was Deputy Chief of Staff
for Ninth Air Force. He had been ordered by Maj. Gen. Willis Hale to insure complete
integration well before Johnsons visit in February 1950. Hale had met Mordecai Johnson
and found him to be critical of Air Force integration, though he had never seen an active
air base. Hale asked Johnson to visit Langley to look for himself, and he accepted.
Johnson was free to do and go where he wished, all out, no holds barred, all day . As
Johnson boarded his plane to return to Washington, D.C., he was asked by Bowman to
comment: Well, I dont believe its that way everywhere. Bowman to the author, 15 May
73. The Pittsburgh Courier also commented on Johnsons visit. They quoted him as saying
that the Air Force is making a genuine effort at Langley Air Force Base to deal with
Negro airmen stationed there on a strict basis of individual merit . The evidence is clear
and substantial. The newspaper did note Johnsons disappointment with the small number
of Negro aviators. Pittsburgh Courier, 4 Mar 50, p 6.
170. Freedom to Serve, pp 6, 7, 17-26, and 49-60. Lee Nichols wrote that Air
Force integration worked as a lever on the Army, moving them into integration. Nichols,
Breakthrough, pp 139 and 140. The Army Navy Journal covered the release of the Fahy
report on a piece that was sympathetic toward integration, while the Army still had not
really budged. They noted that the committee had to battle on the basis of justice, while
their opponents argued for efficiency, but the article came down on the side of justice.
The integrity of the individual, his equal worth in the sight of God, his equal protection
under law, his equal rights and obligations of citizenship, and his equal opportunity to
make constitutional use of his endowmentthese are the very foundation of the American
system of values. The Presidents Committee throughout its deliberations shaped its
course constantly with these principles. Army, Navy Journal, 3 Jun 50, p 1091.
171. Pittsburgh Courier, 30 Apr 49, pp 1 and 4; 30 Jul 49, p 5; 8 Oct 49, pp 1 and
5; 12 Nov 49, pp 1 and 4; and 9 Jun 51, pp 1 and 10.
172. Ibid., 25 Jun 49, pp 1 and 4.
173. Ibid., 28 Jul 51, p 2.
174. Ibid., 25 Aug 51, p 2.
175. Ibid., 14 Apr 51, pp 1 and 4. The unit George wrote of was the same 3817th
that Kenworthy had seen in 1950.
176. The history of the 3817th Air University Wing is unique for the fact that the
reader is never informed that it is a Negro unit. It describes low morale and makes vague
statements about its dwindling size. Finally, the unit disbanded without a trace and no
acknowledgment is made as to why it no longer existed. See History of the 3800th Air
University Wing, Maxwell AFB, Apr-Jun 49, pp 21-22; Jul-Dec 49, p 22; Oct-Dec 49, p
19,; Jan-Jun 50, pp 46-47; 1 Jul-31 Jul 51; Appendix C, pp 6 and 7; and Jan-Mar 52,
unpaged.
James L. Hicks of the Baltimore Afro-American severely criticized discrimination
at Shaw AFB, S. C, because blacks there had been barred from using the base swimming
pool, service club, and NCO club. Blacks coming from integrated basic training at
Lackland AFB had their morale lowered severely by their treatment at Shaw. Base
personnel worked and lived in a frictionless atmosphere, but at five oclock in the
evening, the integration ends. Baltimore Afro-American, 9 Jun 51, p 5. There apparently
was some hesitant integration at Eglin AFB, Fla., for there is a communication between a
senior and junior military historian concerning the issue. The junior complained that the
service squadron took too long to dissolve; the senior called for patience and told him to
dig into the fact that the base commander had complaints from whites over integrating
base housing. The senior seemed to recall that the swimming pool and officers club
policy has changed after integration. This is a draft with comments of Jul to Dec 50
History of the 3203d Installations Group, Eglin AFB, Fla.; it was given to this author by
a historian in OCMH (AGC). The work shows that historians wrestled with this problem.
177. Report on Incidents at Brookley AFB, Ala., Secretary to the Air Force,
Decimal File 291.2 (1951-1953), NARG 340, (AGC). One nearby base commander
wanted to turn in the complainant, a Mr. LeFlore, because he was an NAACP official
while working for the Post Office. The officer was told that such activities did not violate
the law. The Negro press covered the Brookley incidents, believing they demonstrated the
federal governments seriousness about integration. See Chicago Defender, 6 Oct 51, p 1.
The Air Force, furthermore, required barbers employed by the base exchange to cut
everyones hair or to quit. See unsigned memorandum to James Goode, 13, Oct 51, File
291.2, NARG 340.
178. Assignment to Overseas Area for Negroes, Decimal File 291.2 (1948-
1949), NARG 340. See numerous letters from Eugene Zuckert and others in the
Department of the Air Force, Secretary of Defense Johnson, and members of the
Department of State. Letters are from the fall of 1949 to spring of 1950.
179. A.G.K. to Louis Johnson, 21 Aug 50, Decimal File 291.2, NARG 330.
A.G.K. was judge of probate in Union, S.C. Johnson employed a soft answer to turn away
his wrath. See also in same file Johnson to A.G.K., 29 Aug 50.
180. Telegram, Governor J. Strom Thurmond to Senator Burnet Maybank, Jul 49,
forwarded to Symington whose answer is clipped to the telegram, Decimal File 250.1 to
291.2, NARG 340.
181. Colonel Bell to Congressmen Allen of Louisiana incorporating Zuckerts
reply, Decimal File 250.1 to 291.2, NARG 340.
182. Secretary of Defense, 1950, Decimal File 291.2, NARG 330.
183. Memo for General Vandenberg on Activity Within the Office of Inspector
General During the Current Calendar Year, n.d., in History of the Office of the Inspector
General, United States Air Force, 1 Jul-31 Dec 50 (AFSHRC).
184. Air Force Times, 25 Oct 52, pp 1 and 25. See also History of the Deputy
Chief of Staff, Vol. I: Directorate of Personnel Planning, DCS/P, p 11. Marr worked in
this agency, which had been charged with overseeing racial affairs since 1948. In the next
decade they had to be reintroduced to their responsibilities. One might have anticipated
that the history of integration would be told in these volumes, but it is a very disappointing
source. The office engaged in many activities and its history devotes little space to
integration. For example, the page of the history covering the first full year of integration
is devoted to generalizations on the subject. Although Plans initiated, planned,
controlled, and implemented integration, they were involved in all manner of other
activities including promotion, procurement, separation, utilization, and all major
personnel projects not under the control of any one operating agency. They had many
special projects. See History of the Deputy Chief of Staff/Personnel, Jul 49 to 30 Jun 50,
pp 1033.
185. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 100, 101, 102, 104, and 105.
186. Ibid, p 156.
 187. Ibid., pp 165-168.
188. Ibid., pp 168-170.
189. Ibid. See also Alice M. Yohalem, Growing Up in the Desegregated Air
Force, Columbia University manuscript, 1973. This study demonstrates that Negro
children of Air Force non-commissioned officers have higher aspirations than do Negro
children of the same age growing up in segregated neighborhoods. They are also more
likely to go to college.
The military environment appears to provide young dependents of black Air
Force sergeants with more extensive interracial experiences than are available to their
civilian peers . Greater exposure to interracial experiences, while not a key factor in
their goal formulation, appears to have placed these blacks in a better position to further
their career objectives. See esp. pp 233-242.
190. Nichols, Breakthrough, pp 223-225.
191. Ibid, pp 166-167.
192. AFR 35-78, 4 Sep 50; and AFR 35-78, 15 Sep 55. See App. 2-4 and 2-5.
Chapter IV
BENIGN NEGLECT
1. See, for example, Experiment in Democracy, Baltimore Afro-American, 17
Jun 50, p 13, about Selfridge AFB, Mich. The men were lavish in their praise of the Air
Force because personnel were integrated at all levels. Also on 1 Jul 50, the magazine
section, pp 3 and 4, shows photos of one of the Negro jet pilots at Selfridge AFB. There is
no mention of any off-base problems. See the Pittsburgh Courier, 29 Mar 52, pp 1 and 4,
in which the Air Forces in Europe are held up as a model of democracy for the Army.
The 3 previous weeks articles by Collins George struck at Army discrimination (8, 15,
and 22 March). This message was repeated in the 5 April edition with a headline on p 13,
which read: Air Force Integration Shames Army in Europe. The 16 Jun 52 Baltimore
Afro-American crowed on p 3 that Everybodys Mixed at Robins Air Force Base, and
marvelled at the lack of segregation deep in the heart of Georgia. A black, it said, would
not have known he was in Georgia once inside the base. The paper had no criticism
about the Air Force failure to provide for its men off the post. See similar articles in the
Chicago Defender, 5 Aug 50, magazine section, p 1, and 24 Feb 50, p 2. The Baltimore
Afro-American expressed its attitude in a front page headline which stated: Air Force
Best Deal. In an article written by James Hicks, the newspaper pointed out that 30,000
airmen were in training in harmony at Lackland AFB, Tex., that 6,000 blacks were
totally integrated with 24,000 whites, and that Air Force policy was to totally ignore
race. Hicks reported that he had not received a single complaint from blacks at Lackland.
It would seem that engaging in activities outside the base gates required a heightening of
consciousness on everybodys part.
2. With minor exceptions, the Negro press seldom criticized the military after
integration in the early 1950s. The Chicago Defender, 16 Nov 57, p 1, said that military
integration was complete, without a single complaint or mention of any problem, save the
lack of assignments of blacks to the attache corps outside of Africa. The Baltimore-Afro-
American, 23 May 60, magazine section, in the midst of a burgeoning tide of racial
protest, spoke only of the great strides in the military since 1948, giving a listing of
those who had achieved rank and responsibility in the integrated service, complete with
pictures. There is not a hint of the job left to be done.
3. Pittsburgh Courier, 8 Jul 50, p 1. See also the Chicago Defender, 15 Jul 50, p 8;
and Baltimore Afro-American, 8 Jul 50, pp 1 and 2. The Baltimore Afro-American had an
article on 29 Sep 51, p 9, on a Negro fighter bomber squadron commander, Maj. Charles
McGee, who was cited in the Pittsburgh Courier, 29 Nov 51, p 3. The New York
Amsterdam News picked up the Korean story last and on 15 Jul 50, buried the war on
page 3.
4. Pittsburgh Courier, 27 Jan51, p 3. In the 1970s, James rose to 4-star rank,
serving as Commander of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). No
other Negro airman has received the attention paid James, except for Benjamin Davis, Jr.
See also the Chicago Defender, 26 Apr 55, p 3; 2 Apr 55, p 20; and Baltimore Afro-
American, 26 Apr 55, p 5. Here James was cited as a Fighter Squadron Commander, one
of the first to have such a position in the integrated era. See also Chicago Defender, 2 Feb
57, p 10.
5. Baltimore Afro-American, 8 Dec 51, p 1; Chicago Defender, 8 Dec 51, p 1; and
Pittsburgh Courier, 29 Dec 51, p 5.
6. Baltimore Afro-American, 19 Aug 50, p 1 and 2.
7. Pittsburgh Courier, 25 Nov 50, p 2.
8. See numerous copies of the four major members of the press during the war. For
example, the Chicago Defender, 3 Feb 51, pp 1 and 2; and 4 Aug 51, pp 1 and 2; and
Pittsburgh Courier, 12 Jul 51, p 2; and 9 Sep to, pp 1 and 4. See also Dalfiume,
Desegregation, pp 201-219.
9. Gen. E. E. Partridge, Diary of Korea, 1950-1951, vol 3, Entry 22 Jan 51
(AFSHRC). TACP meant Tactical Air Control Party. A photo published in the Baltimore
Afro-American, 20 Nov 54, p 5, shows General Partridge pinning stars on newly
promoted Brig. Gen. B. O. Davis, Jr.
10. Pittsburgh Courier, 1 Nov 51, pp 1, 4, and 5. A Pittsburgh Courier poll in mid-
1952 found that Truman was the most popular candidate among blacks, 7 Jun 52, p 2.
11. Baltimore Afro-American, 16 Feb 52, p 5; 14 Jun 52, pp 1 and 4.
12. Baltimore Afro-American, 4 Oct 52, p 5. The covenant had been signed in July
1951. The Nixon California home was also covered by a covenant; see the Baltimore
Afro-American, 25 Oct 52, p 7.
13. The Chicago Defender, as it usually did, supported the Democratic ticket and
often criticized Eisenhower after he took office. See 2 Aug 52 edition, p 10; 6 Sep 52, p 1;
and 20 Sep 52, p 1, informing its readers that the NAACP Gives OK to Stevenson. After
Eisenhower was inaugurated, headlines proclaimed that IKE PUT ON SPOT BY
POWELL, 12 Apr 53; and 14 June 53, pp 1, 2, Ike Stumbles over FEPC-Dashes Hopes
of LiberalsDixiecrats Laud Generals Views.
 14. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change (New
York, 1963), pp 285-287. Eisenhower claimed too much credit for himself on military
integration, mentioning that Truman had only begun it. See pp 292-295.
15. Pittsburgh Courier, 3 Nov 56, pp 1 and 3.
16. Baltimore Afro-American, 3 Nov 56, pp 1 and 4. The Chicago Defender,
supported Stevenson, 3 Nov 56, p 4.
17. Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, the Inside Story (New York, 1956), pp 154-
155. See Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the President (New York, 1956), for a complete
absence of material on blacks. Eisenhowers primary assistant, Sherman Adams, tried to
put Ike in the best light in his book, First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower
Administration (New York, 1961). Adams found that Eisenhower had been surprised by
the Warren Court decision and believed it would require an evolutionary process to
succeed (pp 331-332). Eisenhower earns Adams praise for appointing blacks to key
government positions, but fails to mention what these were (p 333). Adams stumbles
hardest over the military. He wrote: Meanwhile, the administration was making big
strides in removing segregation from the armed services where the previous
administration had accomplished little (p 334). When Eisenhower completed the
second volume of his memoirs, he devoted an entire chapter to civil rights, perhaps
because of interest generated in the subject by the Kennedy-Johnson administrations
(Eisenhowers book was published in 1965). Eisenhower covered all of his moves
bordering on civil rights even though the material belonged in his first volume of
memoirs. The former President wrote that he agonized over signing a weakened civil
rights bill in 1957, agreeing to sign it because a half loaf was better than none. See
Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace (New York, 1965), pp 148-176.
18. Executive Order 10590, 18 Jan 55. This committee did not look into the
military other than to examine the lot of the civilians in the Department of Defense. See
Official File 103-U, White House Central Files, D. D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans.
19. Eisenhower, Waging the Peace, pp 148-176; and Adams, First Hand Report, p
335. This act established the Civil Rights Commission; John Hannah was its first
chairman and Father Theodore Hesburgh its vice-chairman. The act also provided the
Justice Department with a Civil Rights Division and new authority to investigate voting
fraud and discrimination. It was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1960 which made it
illegal to use force or threats to obstruct court orders, required states to preserve voting
records for 22 months and open them for inspection by the Attorney General, and
authorized the armed services to educate children of servicemen when local schools near
military bases closed rather than integrated. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 is P.L. 85-135,
85th Congress, H.R. 6127, 9 Sep 57; 71 Statutes at Large 634. The act of 1960 is P.L. 86-
449, 86th Congress, H.R. 8601, 3 May 60; 74 Statutes at Large 86. See also Richard
Bardolph, ed, The Civil Rights Record: Black Americans and the Law, 19491970 (New
York, 1970), pp 399-405; Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, p 624; and Harry Golden,
Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes (New York, 1964), pp 136-138.
20. Adams, First Hand Report, pp 331-359; and Eisenhower, Waging the Peace, pp
148-176. This was Eisenhowers finest hour, if his most reluctant one, in the civil rights
epoch. Harry Golden is especially critical of Eisenhower for his lack of leadership, lack of
courage, and overall poor record in assisting blacks. He condemns Eisenhower for
repeating over and over that you cant legislate morality, and believes Eisenhower
played politics with the issue, to his everlasting shame. See Golden, Kennedy and the
Negroes, pp 100-108. Another man who found Eisenhowers actions at Little Rock
insufficient was the man Ike appointed to the White House staff but waited 5 years to
swear in, E. Frederick Morrow, Ikes Black Man in the White House. It is not difficult to
read the heartbreak in Morrows words: President Eisenhowers lukewarm stand on civil
rights made me heartsick it was obvious that he would never take any positive giant
step to prove that he unequivocally stood for the right of every American to walk this land
in dignity and peace, clothed with every privilege accorded a citizen of our
Constitution. His failure to clearly and forth rightly respond to the Negros plea for a
strong position on civil rights was the greatest cross I had to bear in my eight years in
Washington . During his presidency, he had generalized on the whole question of civil
rights. At no time had he made any overt gesture that would encourage Negroes to believe
that he sympathized with, or believed in, their crusade for complete and immediate
citizenship. See E. Frederick Morrow, Black Man in The White House: A Diary of the
Eisenhower Years by the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, The White House,
1955-1961 (New York, 1963), pp 298-300. See also Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of
Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New York, 1963). Hughes, an insider
with keen political perceptions, found Eisenhower profoundly reticent on civil rights,
and claims that the President acted with the most conservative caution. He also quoted
Eisenhower negatively on the Brown decision, claiming that it would set back progress in
the South at least fifteen years . Feelings are deep on this . Hughes believes that
Eisenhowers lukewarm support of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 almost invited the
confrontation at Little Rock. See Hughes, Ordeal of Power, especially pp 200, 201, and
242.
21. Wilson to Eisenhower, 29 May 53, Secretary of Defense, 1953, File 291.2,
NARG 330 (AGC). The Air Force had 10 of the 21 schools. See the Pittsburgh Courier, 11
Jul 53, pp 1, 5.
22. Pittsburgh Courier, 4 Apr 53, pp 1 and 4; and Chicago Defender, 4 Apr 53, p
11.
23. Memo, Oveta Culp Hobby to Wilson, 13 Apr 53, with a confidential
memorandum to Eisenhower attached (AGC).
24. Draft dated 6 Jun 53, White House Central Files, Official Files, Eisenhower
Library. This can be said with certainty: the sum total of the material on race in the
Eisenhower Library can be housed in a very few boxes. There are literally hundreds of
times more material in the Truman and Kennedy libraries.
25. Shivers to Eisenhower, 16 Jul 53, White House Central Files, Official Files,
Eisenhower Library.
26. Air Force Times, 26 Sep 53, p 3; and 5 Dec 53, p 3.
27. Memo, Wilson to the service secretaries, 12 Jan 54, in un-labeled box of
correspondence, James C. Evans Papers, Carlisle Barracks. See also the Army Navy Air
Force Journal, 6 Feb 54, p 647.
28. Harold Talbot to C. M. Dannely, 12 Jan 55, Air Force, File 291.2, NARG 340.
The Air Force Times, p 3, reported on 2 Jul 55 that the Air Force was taking over the
operation of eight more on-base schools this fall to meet Defense orders against racial
segregation in dependent schools . With that eight they will now be operating 10 in all,
taken over because local school boards would not cooperate. These were schools in
Maryland, Florida, Virginia, Alabama, and Texas.
29. Dalfiume, Desegregation, p 4. His evidence is a letter from Lee Nichols to the
USIA, January 1963, copy in the possession of James C. Evans. When Evans was asked
for the letter, he said he could not locate it.
30. Ltr., Warren to the author, 9 Feb 73 (AGC), and intvw, author with Warren,
Washington, D.C., Apr 73.
31. Intvw, author with Clark, Washington, D.C., Mar 73. Clark had some
interesting things to say about the decision: (1) it did not come out the blue, but was one of
many decisions moving in that direction for several years; (2) the Court had not delayed
making the decision to avoid difficulties but to gather several cases together to make as
broad a decision as possible; (3) integration had not worked as it should because certain
politicians failed to provide the leadership demanded of them by the times; (4) Clark truly
regretted the deliberate speed qualification on implementing the decision, saying that he
favored then a year-at-a-time program beginning with kindergarten; (5) the decision would
have been made in 1954 even if Warren had not come to the bench and Chief Justice
Vinson would have voted with the majority had he been alive; (6) Justice Hugo Black and
he had strenuously objected to using Gunnar Myrdal anywhere in the written opinion
because sociology had nothing to do with a decision based entirely on law.
32. Marshall to the author, 5 Jul 74 (AGC).
33. Suitland, Md., National Record Center, Accession 68 A 1006, Carton 2 of 6;
see several folders, one which is full of letters from objecting parents.
34. Air Force Times, 8 Feb 58, p 3. Public Law 815 provided funds to build
schools and Public Law 374 provided operating funds.
35. Chicago Defender, 18 Oct 58, p 2, and its issues both before and after that date.
36. Army Navy Air Force Journal, 30 Aug 58, p 8.
37. Memo for the Record, James Goode, 24 Nov 58, subj: Little Rock Air Force
Base School; this was attached to a memo to the Secretary of the Air Force from Charles
Finucane, 10 Oct 58; and Goode Memo for the Record, 17 Oct 58, after meeting with
Finucane and Steve Jackson (AGC).
38. Air Force Times, 20 Dec 58, pp 1 and 33; and 1 Jan 59, p 14.
39. Ltr., Maxwell M. Rabb to Joan Bopp, 18 Jan 54, White House Central Files,
General Files, Eisenhower Library. When Rabb resigned in 1958, E. Frederick Morrow
assumed his responsibilities.
40. Ltr., Powell to Wilson, 24 Feb 54, White House Central Files, General Files,
Eisenhower Library.
41. Draft of a letter from Rabbs office, Oct 54, White House Central Files,
General Files, Eisenhower Library.
42. See series of correspondence on the 1957 Tulane-West Point game, White
House Central Files, General Files, Eisenhower Library.
43. These are segments of annual reports of the Secretary of Defense, White House
Central Files, Official Files, Eisenhower Library.
44. James C. Evans, Integration in the Armed Services: A Progress Report
(Washington, D.C., 1955.
45. This term is used by David Sutton in his The Military Against Off-Base
Discrimination, in Charles Moskos, Public Opinion and the Military Establishment
(Beverly Hills, Calif., 1971), pp 149-179. Commanders tended to become members of the
establishment and therefore listened sympathetically to the town fathers. Sutton claims
that civilian leaders would advance the military career of cooperative commanders or
would provide for them in retirement with a job. Recalcitrant commanders might be
punished by powerful southerners in the Congress. These were offered by Sutton as
reasons for the failure of the Gesell Committee Recommendations (see below) to modify
southern practices, but assuredly they also applied in the era before Gesell.
46. Emmet S. Walden, Jr., Capt. USAF, Maxwell Air Force Base, An Equal
Opportunity Case Study, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, unpb. 1965,
pp iii and iv.
47. Ibid., pp 9-11.
48. Ibid., pp 11-18. When I was stationed at Maxwell in 1965, I was told clearly
not to entertain blacks in my home. I was asked not to make waves and spoil the good
relationship the base had with the town. If there was trouble, if the police were to invade
homes to prevent violence, whites would be on their own, and police visits often were
violent, the base warned.
49. Ibid., pp 18-25. The quoted message, dated 21 Jun 61, was sent by Lt. Gen.
Walter E. Todd, Air University Commander, and is repeated in its entirety in the thesis.
The message was in response to queries for information by the Deputy Chief of
Staff/Personnel about a controversy that began with the withdrawal of an invitation for
400 white Boys State attendees to have lunch on the base. The withdrawn invitation
provoked the sponsor, the Alabama American Legion, to react with rage. The base had
forbidden the segregated group the use of base facilities because of an interpretation of a
Kennedy Executive Order (10925, 6 Mar 61) which required immediate and specific
action to assure that no use is made of the name, sponsorship, facilities, or activity of
any executive department or agency by or for any employee recreational organization
practicing discrimination based on creed, color, or national origin. A message from the
Secretary of the Air Force required all commanders to certify in writing that they
understood and were in full compliance with the order. See msg., Dir/Personnel Planning
to all Major Commands, (ALMAJ-COM), 22 May 61. Maxwells commander had
stipulated that no facility would be available in the future to segregated organizations.
Earlier, Todd suggested in a letter to Lt. Gen. Truman Landon that these types of
prohibitions would destroy community good will. He added: Many of these activities are
long standing, have been built up over the years, and have been extremely valuable in the
fine relationships with the local community of Montgomery. These and other functions
that will be closed down entirely or modified to exclude joint participation with
Montgomery organizations will severely strain, if not completely destroy, a workable
relationship with the local community. This relationship is among the finest that exists in
the Air Force and is the result of years of close cooperation and good will. See ltr., Todd
to Landon, 25 May 61.
50. Walden, Maxwell Air Force Base, pp 18-25.
51. Ibid., pp 51-54. Of course, all schooling was segregated except for a single
elementary school on the base.
52. Ltr., with attachments from Legislative Liaison to Diggs. 1 Jul 60, Hist, Office
of the Inspector General, United States Air Force, 1 Jul 31 Dec 60, pp 49-60.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. George N. Dubina, Air University History, 1971, pp 4250 (AFSHRC).
57. Alfred E. McEwen, Permanent Change of StationA Continuing Problem for
Negro Airmen, Air Command and Staff College thesis, 1966, unpb. pp 1-7, 23 and 24.
58. Ibid., pp 46-49, and 50-56.
59. Folder on Lt. Titus A. Saunders, Jr., James C. Evans File, Carton 13 of 15,
Accession 68-A-1033, National Records Center, Suitland, Md. There is a long loose leaf
on Saunders from which this section is taken. It shows that ultimately Saunders received
an honorable discharge. See ltr., Saunders to Evans, 14 Feb 57; and Memo for the Record
by Evans, 27 Nov 56. See clipping from New York Times, 2 Dec 56, for the Quarles
quote. Saunders was supported in his claims against Mississippi by a chaplain at the
Columbus base. See also ltr., Chaplain Pilcher to Governor Lausche, 29 May 56. The file
includes a resume of the court transcript of the Lowndes County trial, 5 May 55. The
Baltimore Afro-American, 8 Dec 56, pp 1 and 2, blasted the Air Force in an article titled,
The Ugly Truth: Air Force Bowed to Miss. Bigotry, by Louis Lomax. He accused the
Air Force of giving Saunders a second-rate discharge to appease Mississippi politicians.
The Air Force Times, 28 Nov 53, p 29, reported a similar incident involving a Negro
lieutenant who was discharged under a reduction-in-force after being reprimanded by his
superiors for refusing to sit in the rear of the bus on a trip from Florida to Alabama. The
NAACP publicized the incident and accused the Air Force of knuckling under to southern
discrimination; the Air Force Times merely reported the facts of the incident.
60. Hist, of the Inspector General, Inquiries and Complaints, 1 Jul 62 to 31 Dec 62,
pp 22-29. A ltr. from the NAACP, 11 Apr 62 to the inspector is included in this history.
This was not the first time someone requested the use of off-limits sanctions.
61. Ibid., pp 18-21.
 62. Ltr., Maj. Gen. Joe Kelly to Diggs, 29 Aug 56, Diggs Folder, Carton 8 of 15,
Accession 68A 1033, National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
63. Ltr., Kuter to Edwards, 13 Dec 48, File 291.2 35 (50), NARG 340.
64. Ltrs., James L. Flaherty to Vandenberg, 20 Sep 49; and Vandenberg to Flaherty,
20 Oct 49, File 291.2 34(40), NARG 340.
65. Ltr, Edwards to Kuter, 11 Jan 50, File 291.2 35(50), NARG 340.
66. Memo by the Office of Community Services, Military Personnel Division, Air
Force Finance Center, Denver, Colo., n.d., File 291.2 36 (50), NARG 340.
67. Ibid. Collins George reports in the Pittsburgh Courier, 14 Jul 51, that he
investigated Great Falls and found the base integrated, but the town hostile. A week
earlier, 7 Jul 51, p 1, George had called for legislation to protect Negro servicemen from
laws and customs that harmed their morale.
68. Memo, Brig. Gen. John Ives to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Management), subj.: Racial Discrimination in Great Falls, Mont., 7 Jul 53, File 291.2
36(50), NARG 340. The Chicago Defender, 23 May 53, p 12, complained that blacks in
Great Falls received the silent treatment.
69. Ltr., Hart to the Secretary of the Air Force, 28 Dec 61, Pohlhaus Folder, Carton
11 of 15, Accession 68A 1033, National Records Center, Suitland, Md. The folder
contains numerous items on discrimination at Glascow.
70. Pittsburgh Courier, 19 Sep 53, pp 1 and 4.
71. James A. Madison, Summary of Services to the United States Air Force for
the Period September 1, 1952, to December 31, 1954, N.Y. National Recreational
Association (AGC). Madisons report does not seem to have sparked any response from
the Air Force. The Air Force Times, summarizing Madisons findings, stated that it was
Air Force policy to conform to local community practices. See Air Force Times, 2 Apr
55, p 2. Some Madison recommendations were not adopted until the advent of the
Kennedy administration.
72. Suitland, Md., National Records Center, Accession 68 A 1033, Carton 15 of
15, Housing Folder. Nearly half of the folder is concerned with the Bunker Hill problem.
See also Carton 2 of 15 for other materials. Evans is an interesting figure in all of this.
Basically a conservative, his goal was equality of opportunity. The Baltimore Afro-
American, 28 May 60, p 8 of magazine section, stated that Evans was the man most
responsible for carrying out integration in the armed forces. Although one finds this
assessment difficult to document, the general reaction of those involved in black issues
supports such a claim. An article in the Army Navy Air Force Register, and Defense
Times, 28 Nov 59, pp 9-11, by John Wiant, shows what Evans thought about the problems
confronting blacks. Evans was quoted: A Negro with a college degree still has to know
how to speak clearly, write clearly and understand that there is more to day-to-day
existence than knowing the theory that goes with a college degree. An example was cited
of a black forced out of the service, even though he held a degree, because he could not
communicate effectively. The separated officer claimed that that he was the victim of
racial discrimination because he had married a white woman, but Evans believed his
education at a Negro college in Alabama was the major factor.
Evans said: The day of military integration has arrived. There is no discrimination
or so little that it is unimportanton the basis of race. The white military man, officer
and enlisted, has accepted the idea that the skin color of the man working or sleeping next
to him is unimportant. Whites, however, do not have to accept as equal a man he
considers educationally or socially inferior. It doesnt matter if this man has white, brown
or purple skin. What does matter is his ability to pull his share of the load. Evans office
found virtually no cases of discrimination. It is not surprising that Evans showed little
enthusiasm for the Kennedy administrations approach to the problem. After 1961, Evans
views appear less frequently in the documents.
73. Suitland, Md., National Records Center, Accession 68 A 1033, Carton 4 of 15,
Folder 350 on Schools. The main plaintiff is a Staff Sgt. A. L. who wrote often and was
able to provide Evans with affidavits. See ltrs., A. L. to Evans, 6 Sep 63, and Evans to A.
L., 17 Sep 63. Also ltr., A. L. to Evans, 26 Jul 63. Italics his.
74. Ltr., S. L. to Jack Greenberg, 3 Nov 57. Folder OASD(m) Cr and IR Division,
Personnel Complaints and Investigations. Carton 10 of 15, Accession 68A 1033, National
Records Center, Suitland, Md. Greenberg forwarded the letter to Evans.
75. Ltr., David S. Smith to Powell, 19 Dec 57, Folder OASD(m) Cr and IR
Division, Personnel Complaints and Investigations, Carton 10 of 15, Accession 68A 1033,
National Records Center, Suitland, Md. This letter included a 10-page, single spaced
investigation of S. L.s claims. See also ltrs., S. L. to Evans, 23 Jul 57, 28 Oct 57, and 17
Dec 57; and Evans to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., 2 Mar 61.
76. Air Force Times, 30 Apr 55, p 29.
77. Pittsburgh Courier, 14 Aug 54, pp 1 and 4. Three years earlier, Ollie Stewart
reported in the Baltimore Afro-American, 20 Oct 51, p 5, that there was no color
problem at Chateauroux Air Base, France. But Powell was most critical of Chateauroux
later.
78. Chicago Defender, 29 Aug 59, p 1.
79. Ltr., Diggs to Dudley Sharp, 7 Jul 60 (AGC).
80. Chicago Defender, 28 Apr 61, pp 1 and 2.
81. History of the 6139th Air Base Group, 1 Jan 63-31 Dec 63, pp 31-34
(AFSHRC).
82. Memo, Nichols to Robert S. McNamara, 13 May 63, Folder on Lee Nichols,
Carton 5 of 15, Accession 68 A 1033, National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
83. Memo, William Gorman to Norman Paul, 16 Jul 63. The memo is a distillation
of the statistics given to the Gesell Committee. See App. 1, tables 3-15 for data on slow
promotion progression.
Chapter V
THE KENNEDY ERA
1. Memo by E. Frederick Morrow, 7 Mar 60, in Staff Files, Eisenhower Library. It
is not known if Eisenhower saw the memo. John Hope Franklin begins his chapter The
Negro Revolution with the Greensboro sit-ins. He believed the sit-ins inaugurated the
most profound, revolutionary changes in the status of Negro Americans that had occurred
since emancipation. See his book, From Slavery to Freedom, pp 624625.
2. Pittsburgh Courier, 5 Mar 60. The first three pages are devoted to the sit-ins.
Consecutive issues were devoted to the sit-down front. The Baltimore Afro-American
picked up the story a week earlier and ran with it for the next several months. See the 27
Feb 60 issue and others over several months. This story flowed into the Freedom Rides,
Birmingham, the legislation, Selma and beyond.
3. Intvw, John Stewart with Clarence Mitchell, Feb. 67. Mitchell had favored
Stuart Symington or Hubert Humphrey until the nominating convention. He did not find
Kennedy committed to civil rights even after the election. Roy Wilkins believed Kennedy
to be unknowledgeable about the subject in 1957, although he saw in Kennedy a man with
a keen sense of the morality of the question. According to Wilkins, Kennedy in office
made it no longer fashionable to be prejudiced. Intvw, Berl Bernhard with Wilkins, Aug
64. Bernhard also interviewed Thurgood Marshall in Apr 64. Marshall found Kennedy
more aware than either Mitchell or Wilkins, but there is a tone of trying to say something
good about the assassinated President in all of these interviews. The Mitchell, Wilkins,
and Marshal interviews are at the John F. Kennedy Library, Waltham, Mass.
4. Chicago Defender, 29 Oct-4 Nov 60, pp 1 and 2; and Baltimore Afro-American,
23 Jul 60, p 2; 15 Oct 60, p 4; 5 Nov 60, pp 1 and 4. In 1964 all three papers supported
Lyndon Johnson; the Pittsburgh Courier, thereby, broke a tradition (only twice broken
previously in the century) by endorsing a Democrat, 10 Oct 64, p 1. See also the Baltimore
Afro-American, 17 Oct 64, p 4; and Chicago Defender, 10-16 Oct 64, pp 1 and 2.
5. Pittsburgh Courier, 19 Nov 60, pp 1, 3. Harry Golden agrees and says that
Kennedy received 85 percent of the Negro vote. Golden, Kennedy and the Negroes, pp 70
and 154.
6. Chicago Defender, 19-25 Nov 60, p 1. Arthur Schlesinger would agree with the
margin of victory coming from Negro voters. Had only white gone to the polls in 1960,
Schlesinger wrote, Nixon would have taken 53 percent of the vote. See Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965),
pp 928-930.
7. Baltimore Afro-American, 19 Nov 60, pp 1 and 2. Theodore Sorensen would
agree with this general analysis. See The Kennedy Legacy:, A Peaceful Revolution for the
Seventies (New York, 1969), pp 218-219, and by the same author, Kennedy (New York,
1965), pp 243 and 250.
8. Like his Democratic predecessor, Kennedys motivations seem to be open to
question. Although as fruitless to examine as it was with Truman, the parallel is worth
following for a moment. Father Theodore M. Hesburgh was a man in a position to know
from his vantage point on the Civil Rights Commission. In his interview by the Kennedy
Library (by Joseph OConnor, Mar 66) Hesburgh praised, faintly, the dead President,
making a direct comparison to Eisenhower, believing that both men had equally very
good basic instincts. When interviewed by Paige Mulholland for the Johnson Library
(Feb 71), Hesburgh was more candid. He stated Johnson was more active and sincere than
Kennedy on civil rights. My general impression, Hesburgh said, is that while the
Kennedy administration got very high marks on civil rights because of the personal
attractiveness of the President, and his rather outspoken manner, the simple fact is that the
performance I thought was rather miserable as far as legislation. Hesburgh claimed that
none of the Johnson legislative achievements were possible during the Kennedy
administration. The Kennedy attitude was dont do anything until you absolutely have
to. Hesburgh claimed that there was a strong Kennedy myth in civil rights and that the
President described in the Schlesinger and Sorensen biographies was not the guy that I
had to do business with. See Schlesingers A Thousand Days, pp 924-977; and
Sorensens Kennedy, pp 528-569, for an opposing view. Harry Golden is even more pro-
Kennedy in Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes. For a balanced view and an objective treatment
of Eisenhower too, see James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson Years (Washington, 1968), pp 221-286.
9. Executive Order 10925, 6 Mar 61. See the TIG Brief, 26 May 61. This weekly
publication, issued by the Air Force Inspector General, contained a brief of selected items
that were of special interest to commanders, their inspectors general, and other staff
officers. Often these items dealt with soft areas which could become trouble spots,
management oversights, and various other subjects.
10. Memo, Dep. Secy, of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to the Service Secretaries, 19
Jun 61. In keeping with the executive profile, Kennedy appointed a Presidents Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity which first met on 27 Jul 61 with Vice President
Johnson as its chairman and Arthur Goldberg as its vice chairman. This group was to
oversee civilian equal opportunity in government and to extend protection to those who
worked for employers servicing government contracts. See Memo for the Record, by
James C. Evans, 31 Jul 61, Carton 1 of 15, Accession 68A 1033, National Records Center,
Suitland, Md. Earlier, Kennedy had created a civil rights sub-cabinet group which first met
on 14 Apr 61 and was scheduled to meet once a month in the White House. This group
saw itself as a service committee trying to insure close coordination within the
administration and the cabinet. It was composed of men at the assistant secretary level.
See unsigned memorandum, Civil Rights Sub-Cabinet Group, the minutes of the first
meeting, 14 Apr 61 (AGC).
11. Intvw, author with Adam Yarmolinsky, Boston, Mass., Jul 73. Yarmolinsky
comments about military race relations in his book, The Military Establishment Its Impact
on American Society (New York, 1971), pp 340-354.
12. Ltr., Diggs to McNamara, 12 Feb 62, Diggs Folder, Carton 8 of 15, Accession
68A 1033, National Records Center, Suit-land, Md.
13. Suitland National Records Center, Accession 68 A 1033, Carton 15 of 15,
Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 24 Jun 62, (Gesell Committee)
Folder. See especially James Evans Memo for the Record, 26 Oct 61.
14. Ltr., Kennedy to Chairman, Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, 24 Jun 62, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F.
Kennedy, 1962, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p 257. The Air Force Times noted the
formation of the Committee (3) Jun 62, p 24) and had earlier commented on the fact that
blacks faced enormous troubles off base, noting especially housing difficulties. See Air
Force Times, 21 Apr 62, p 25. An internal White House staff memorandum shows that the
creation of a committee was decided upon before mid-November 1961. Carlisle Runge of
Defense Manpower wrote to Harris Wofford, Kennedys first special assistant for civil
rights, on 15 Nov 61 indicating that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has approved the
establishment of an advisory committee comprised of distinguished citizens to look into
problems of discrimination affecting servicemen. Harris Wofford papers, Sub-Cabinet
Group on Civil Rights, JFKL. It still took six more months to appoint the committee. The
Negro press still did not consider off-post discrimination a special problem outside of the
larger one of general segregation and discrimination. The Gesell Committee appointment
received scant mention in the press. The Pittsburgh Courier noted its formation on 7 Jul
62, but gave it only half a column on pp 1 and 4.
15. John Horne, Memo for the Record, 20 Nov 62. Second meeting of the
Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity, in the Armed Forces (AGC). There was
great reluctance in the Air Force to appear to be gathering data on the South for the
Kennedy administration. In 1962 the Defense Department required each base with a
population of more than 500 to supply Manpower with an Equal Opportunity survey. This
was kept out of the press for almost a year because it probably embarrassed the military.
All of these surveys are marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, which means that no one
in the service could release the information. The hope was to gather data about each
particular situation for Defense planners, and, perhaps, entirely as a byproduct, open the
eyes of the post commanders to the situation confronting blacks. All facets of community
lifefrom public accommodations to private housingwere to be covered. See Alfred B.
Fitt to White, 8 Jan 63, Civil Rights File, Lee C. White Papers, JFKL. The Army Navy Air
Force Journal, 23 Oct 63, pp 1, and 38-39, took up the military point of view and begged
McNamara to stop or slow down the mimeograph machines which are clacking in the
sensitive area of civil rights and the Armed Forces. See related in the Air Force Times, 15
Jan 64, p 18; 11 Mar 64, p 3; 22 Apr 64, p 26; and 9 Sep 64, p 4. These surveys would
surprise no one, especially white leaders in southern communities. In the case of the
South, all facilities were segregated.
16. James P. Goode, Memo for the Record, 14 Nov 62, with copies to Benjamin
Fridge and John Horne (AGC). James P. Goode claimed that there was no Air Force policy
which excluded blacks from Maxwell. While it is well known that there were Negro
enlisted personnel at Maxwell during all eras, no one the author interviewed could ever
remember a Negro officer being stationed at Maxwell unless he was attending one of the
professional schools. It would appear that it was not until the 1970s that Maxwell
received Negro officers in other than a students role.
17. Ltr., Gesell to Zuckert, 8 Oct 62 (AGC). The answers came on 30 November
and 4 April the following year. The first set of answers covered 19 of the questions in no
set order. The staff summary sheet was signed by Maj. Gen. Albert Clark of Military
Personnel. Goode sent the answers to the remaining 11 questions to Gesell in April 1963
(AGC). The key to the Air Force attitude was demonstrated in its answer to the first
question on the method of dealing with discrimination. It stated: While we abhor
discriminatory laws and customs, Air Force commanders have extremely limited powers
to alleviate undesirable off-base situations. The Air Force did not have a program. It had
a policy as expressed in Air Force Regulation 35-78, which is not a substitute for a
program.
18. The Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, Initial
Report, Equality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro Military Personnel Within the
United States, 13 Jun 63 (hereafter cited as: Gesell, Initial Report). See also the
Congressional RecordHouse 1963, 1435814369.
19. Gesell, Initial Report, pp 5-8 and 25, 26.
20. Ibid., p 10.
21. Ibid., pp 48-49.
22. Ibid., p 52.
23. Ibid., pp 69-71. Italics in the original. As indicated in sections of the previous
chapter, the use of off-limits sanctions to encourage integration was not a totally new idea
in 1963. Symington told this author that he had used such a threat successfully in 1949.
Blacks in Alaska had complained to him of segregation in local taverns. Symington called
the mayor of the town and told him that if I hear one complaint like this again from
anybody on this base, Ill declare the entire town off-limits to every member of the base.
The former Air Force Secretary said it worked. Intvw, author with Symington, Mar 73.
24. Gesell, Initial Report, pp 69-71.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., pp 27-31.
27. Ibid., pp 61-64.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., pp 34-35.
30. Ibid., p 65. But who in the southern white power structure would agree to
sitting down with blacks on such a commission?
31. Ibid., pp 85-88.
32. Ibid., pp 39-41.
33. Ibid., pp 38 and 39. Nearly all these recommendations were echoed in a study
published by the United States Commission on Civil Rights in October 1963. The
commission had begun work on their report at about the same time the Gesell Committee
had begun its work. It published its findings in a well-prepared book, titled Civil Rights
63 (Washington, D.C., 1963). The specific chapter is titled The Negro in the Armed
Forces, pp 171-224. Commission Chairman John Hannah notified Robert McNamara that
the commission would investigate the military. See ltr., Hannah to McNamara, 26 Mar 62
(AGC). In the investigative process the commission staff found that blacks stationed in the
South were bitter over the lack of support from the military in their interactions with
civilian communities. The staff also found none of the base commanders interviewed had
ever heard of the Gilpatric memorandum and southern commanders had done little to
improve the life of black servicemen within the civilian community. (See U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, Summary of Staff Reports, Nov 62.) In its formal report the
commission catalogued Negro grievances and recommended an end to all military
encouragement of civilian segregation and discrimination. It sought an end to ROTC at
segregating institutions, an end to all vestiges of segregation and discrimination on base, a
total ban on participation in segregated athletic contests or events, an upgrading of
housing opportunities, removal of impact funds from segregating school systems, and the
use of off-limits sanctions to force civilian businesses to integrate. See Civil Rights 63, pp
174, 179-180, 186-189, 191, 197, 204-209, and 215217. The commission also published a
separate pamphlet on Family Housing and the Negro Serviceman, 1963 Staff Report, Oct
63 (AGC). This outlined the severe problems Negro servicemen have in finding decent
homes. See especially pp 110.
34. Ibid., pp 92-93. Copies of the Gesell Committees Final Report, are very
difficult to find. The latter report dealt with overseas discrimination and segregation in the
National Guard. The report echoes the findings of Congressmen Diggs and Powell that
whites had infected Europeans and Asians with bias and in the process made life hard on
blacks. It recommended the rapid application of corrective measures as indicated in the
initial report. The report pointed out that the National Guard had still not been brought
under the provisions of Executive Order 9981 and, since nearly all of its money came
from the Federal Government, the Guard should be integrated immediately. See the
Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces, Final Report, Military
Personnel Stationed Overseas, and Membership and Participation in the National Guard,
Nov 64 (AGC).
35. Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1963, p 495.
36. McNamara sent a memo to Kennedy summarizing the report and telling the
President that military effectiveness is unquestionably reduced as a result of civilian
discrimination against men in uniform. McNamara told Kennedy that he was about to
create a civil rights staff within his office and he included a draft of a Defense Directive
on equal opportunity. See Memo, McNamara to Kennedy, 24 Jul 63, Office of Civil Rights
Folder Carton 2 of 6, Accession 68 A 1006, National Records Center, Suitland, Md.
37. Memo, Fitt to Marshall, 19 Jul 63, Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL. There are
two attached memoranda, one addressed to the President and one to McNamara. The one
to the President is similar to the memo sent him by McNamara. The Fitt memo to
McNamara is in great detail. Fitt became the director of the Civil Rights Division within
Defense Manpower, working in Norman Pauls office. It can be assumed that Fitt wrote
the Department of Defense Directive on Equal Opportunity, although no drafts have
surfaced with his name on them.
38. Ibid.
39. Congressional Record, House, 1963, pp 14369-14380.
40. Intvw, author with Adam Yarmolinsky, Boston, Mass., Jul 73. Yarmolinsky
found Kennedy committed to civil rights before the election, but he became more
educated as time went on. He stated that Kennedy was not a crusader on the issue,
although he came across that way.
 41. Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New
York, 1968), pp 122-140.
42. Intvw, author with Zuckert, Washington D.C., Apr 73.
43. Army Navy Air Force Journal, 21 Sep 63, pp 8 and 30.
44. U.S. Congress, House, Cong. Watkins Abbitt, extension of remarks from
Lynchburg, Virginia, News editorial of 10 Oct 63, Congressional Record 109: A 6370.
45. Ibid., Cong. F. Edward Hebert, extension of remarks, pp A 5673-A 5638;
Hebert inserted more remarks than any other individual. He also added editorials from
northern newspapers.
46. Ibid., Cong. Hebert, extension of remarks from the New Orleans newspaper
editorial of 30 Jul 63, p A 4950.
47. Smith to Gesell, 5 Aug 63, Civil Rights File, Lee White Papers, JFKL.
48. Hebert to Gesell, 9 Aug 63, Civil Rights File, Lee White Papers, JFKL.
49. U.S. Congress, House, Watkins M. Abbitt, extension of remarks, Congressional
Record 109: A 4575 - A 4578. Almond appears not to have changed his estimate of the
ability of Negro servicemen since World War II and the Korean War.
50. Ibid. John J. Flynt, extension of remarks from an editorial in the Thomaston,
Georgia Free Press, 21 Aug 63, pp A 5350 -A 5351. Earlier, Flynt had another editorial
inserted from the same paper which claimed that the report would so demoralize the
troops that we could fall to the Russians without so much as firing a weapon (6 Aug 63
editorial, p A 5038).
51. Ibid., Strom Thurmond, extension of remarks, p A 5422. The newspaper
platform for editorialist Truman Sensing was not identified.
52. Air Force Times, 25 Sep 63, p 5. Hebert supported this legislation, which was
not successful, by reading into the Congressional Record an editorial from the Norfolk,
Va. Ledger-State. See Congressional Record 109: A 6467.
53. Intvw, Larry Hackman with Harris Wofford, May 68, JFKL.
54. Memo, Goode to Zuckert, 9 Nov 63 (AGC).
55. Memo, Goode to Zuckert, 5 Dec 62, Folder on Presidents Committee on Equal
Opportunity in the Armed Forces, 1963, Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL.
56. Memo from Office of the Secretary of the Air Force to Special Assistant
(Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve Forces), 10 Apr 63 (AGC).
57. Air Force Committee on Equal Opportunity, Minutes of the Fourth Mtg, 8 Jul
63 (AGC). The Civil Rights bill went to Congress in June 1963.
58. Ltr., Zuckert to Norman Paul, 10 Jul 63 (AGC). It included an attached memo
titled Air Force Comments on Reports by the Presidents Committee on Equal
Opportunity in the Armed Forces. In it, the Air Force promised to vigorously attract
blacks, and reaffirmed its colorblind promotion policy. It promised fair assignments, a
review of the promotion process, and adoption of antidiscrimination policies. The Air
Force, however, wished to delay action on off-base discrimination until the civil rights bill
had been acted upon.
59. Memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 Jul 63 (AGC). Italics theirs.
60. Intvw, author with Gen. William McKee, Washington, D.C., May 73.
61. Air Force Times, 10 Jul 63, p 12. They also pointed out that if the Air Force
prevented school buses from segregating children, the Air Force might not be able to
afford replacing such buses with its own resources.
62. Air Force Times, Family Magazine, 21 Aug 63, pp 3 and 8.
63. Air Force Times, 24 Jul 63, p 16, and the letters on the same page. Some
whites praised the report, but not too many.
64. Air Force Times, 17 Jul 63, p 18; 7 Aug 63, p 18; 14 Aug 63, p 18; 24 Jul, p
16; 18 Sep 63, p 26 and 28 Aug 63, p 22.
65. Ibid., 31 Jul 63, p 16; and 28 Aug 3, p 23.
66. Ibid., 7 Aug 63, pp 12 and 18.
67. Memo, Charyk to Chief of Staff, 8 Dec 62 (AGC).
68. Memo, Hester to Secretary of the Air Force, 26 Feb 63 (AGC).
69. Memo, Gesell to Marshall, 7 Mar 63, Burke Marshall Papers, JFKL.
70. Hist of Personnel Planning, 1 Jul 63-31 Dec 63, pp 177191. Koontz was the
first secretary of the Air Force Committee on Equal Opportunity. This history
demonstrates that the Air Force opposed the Gesell Committee recommendations, which it
called highly controversial and sensitive. The history also indicated that Air Force
Regulation 35-78 was being revised. Several Negro organizations had asked for off-limits
sanctions, but these requests were all denied. The Equal Opportunity Group tried to get
children who lived at Columbus AFB, Miss., into integrated schools, but ended by getting
the children banned from all schools temporarily until the Air Force dropped its demand.
71. Memo, Koontz to Jones, 10 Dec 63, in Dir. of Personnel Planning, Read File,
Jul-Dec 63 (AGC).
72. Memo, Moore to Commander, Tactical Air Command, 10 Dec 63; Dir of
Personnel Planning Read File (AGC).
73. Memo for Record by Koontz, 27 Dec, in Dir. of Personnel Planning Read File
(AGC).
74. Memo, Dir. of Personnel Planning to SAC, 1 Oct 63 (AGC).
75. Memo, Koontz to W. K. Williams, 7 Nov 63; Moore (written by Farris) to J. F.
Pohlhaus, 10 Dec 63 (AGC).
76. Msg, Koontz to SAC, 12 Dec 63 (AGC).
77. Memo, Koontz to Stone, 14 Oct 63 (AGC).
78. Intvw, author with Brig. Gen. Richard Ault (USAF, Ret), Washington, D.C.,
Jun 1973. Zuckert told the author that Aults splendid performance at Craig earned him a
star.
79. Hist, Directorate of Personnel Planning, 1 Jan 64-30 Jun 64, pp 187-184; and
History, Directorate of Personnel Planning, 1 Jul 64-31 Dec 64, pp 174-183.
80. Memo, Fitt to McNamara, 9 Mar 64, in Folder on Eglin AFB, Carton 2 of 6,
Accession 68A 1006, National Records Center, Suitland, Md. (AGC). Fitt asked for
comments on his proposal from the services. This was discussed at the tenth meeting of
the Air Force Committee on Equal Opportunity, 13 Apr 64. See minutes (AGC). The
senior members of the staff were present and they disapproved.
81. Col. L. T. Seith to all Major Commands, 24 May 64 (AGC). This implemented
a Defense ruling on school attendance. The Air Force Times broadcast this new move,
telling its readership that the effect of the directive would be massive because 100,000
servicemen were enrolled in courses that were paid in part or wholly by Defense. See 15
Apr 64, edition, p 3; and 6 May 64, p 2.
82. Ltr., Stone to all Major Commands, 15 Jul 64 (AGC). This was also publicized
in the Air Force Times, which told its readers that hence forth Air Force speakers would
have to shun segregated audiences. As in all of these changes, the impetus for the new
direction came from the Department of Defense. McNamara issued a directive requiring
the military to refrain from sponsoring, supporting, or financially assisting, directly or
indirectly, any conference or meeting held under circumstances where participants are
segregated or treated unequally because of race. For the defense policy, see the Air Force
Times, 2 Jul 64, p 8. The Air Force echo was Stones letter.
83. Of course, the Civil Rights Act was far more than a public accommodations
bill, but as far as the Air Force was concerned this title was the one of significance since it
would lend the weight of law to any actions that base commanders might take to force
integration on segregating communities. The Civil Rights Act (Statutes at Large 241, P. L.
88-352, 88th Congress, H.R. 7152, 2 Jul 64), has been called by John Hope Franklin the
most far-reaching and comprehensive law in support of racial equality ever enacted by
Congress. (Slavery to Freedom, p 635). The bill contained 10 titles dealing with voting,
public accommodations public facilities, public education, Commission on Civil Rights,
federally assisted programs, equal employment opportunity, voting statistics, intervention
and removal in civil rights cases, and community relations service. See also Bardolph, ed.,
Civil Rights record pp 405-410.
84. Talking Paper for the Chief of Staff, n.d., Dir. of Personnel Planning, Read
File, Jul - Dec 64 (AGC).
85. Air Force Times, 22 Jul 64, pp 1 and 4. The newspaper also advertised the fact
that blacks were now encouraged to file bias suits, and bases were urged to assist
them. See also edition of 12 Aug 64, p 2.
86. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Supplement to the Air Force Policy
Letter for Commanders, Aug 64.
87. Air Force Times, 1 Jul 64, p 10.
88. See minutes of the ninth meeting of the Air Force Committee on Equal
Opportunity, 15 Jan 64 (AGC). By then the regulation had been submitted and was
awaiting approval. The Air Force Times, 1 Jan 64, p 8, has an outline of the essential parts
of what became Air Force Regulation 35-78. Unfortunately no early drafts of this
regulation have surfaced in the same way as the first drafts of Air Force Letter 35-3.
89. Air Force Regulation 35-78, 19 Aug 64, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of
Military Personnel. The impact of the Gesell Committee is reflected in the emphasis on
off-base problems and the fact that off-post problems cover half of the regulation. The
other services also produced new equal opportunity regulations similar to 35-78. See
appendix 2-6 for the entire regulation. Titles II, III, and IV of the Civil Rights Act dealt
with public accommodations, public facilities, and public education.
90. Air Force Times, 26 Aug 64, pp 1 and 10. See also 12 Aug 64, p 2.
91. There are numerous documented cases of servicemen taking complaints to the
Judge Advocate and gaining his support in desegregating communities which were in
violation of the new law. In most cases, once the base commander and the Judge Advocate
told the community that legal action was being taken, the facilities desegregated. See
Request for Suits by Servicemen, folder on the Civil Rights Bill, Carton 15 of 15,
Accession 68A 1003, National Records Center, Suitland, Md. This is a folder of dozens of
cases filed under Air Force Regulation 35-78 and similar Army and Navy regulations.
Also see Memo for Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), unsigned, 27 Nov 64, in
Dir. of Personnel Planning Read File, Jul-Dec 64 (AGC). This is a cover sheet for a
request for a suit by an airman at Keesler Air Force Base, Miss. It stated that after suits
had been threatened in the past, in each instance, voluntary assurances have been given
by the establishments concerned that future practices would provide for nondiscriminatory
treatment of military personnel and their dependents.
92. The Watts riot left 34 dead, 1,032 injured, and 3,952 arrested. Although it was
not the first race riot of the new era, it was probably the most violent, and it certainly
caught the worlds attention. See Franklin, Slavery to Freedom, pp 642643. The Travis
AFB riot was the worst the Air Force has ever experienced. It continued for 3 days, 22-24
May 1971, and resulted in 1 dead, 30 injured, and 135 arrested. The Travis riot reoriented
the entire Air Force way of looking at the race problem. See the Air Force Times, Family
Magazine, 18 Aug 71, pp 4-7, 19.
93. Fred C. Shapiro, and James W. Sullivan, .Race Riots New York, 1964, (New
York, 1964).
94. Ltr, Koontz to Ellender, 7 Apr 64, Dir of Personnel Planning, Read File, Jan-
Jun 64 (AGC).
95. Ltrs, Dir. of Personnel Planning to Diggs, 30 Jan 64, Saltonstall, 15 Oct 64
(AGC).
96. For example, see Memo for the Record, telephone conversation between
Koontz and Ault, 16 Jan 64; memo to General Martin on Craig AFB, 16 Jan 64; and
another to General Martin on 14 Apr 64 (AGC).
97. Intvw, author with Ault, Washington, D.C. May 73. This victory occurred in
Apr 64. There were 200 units in the Nathan Bedford Forrest Homes. See memo to General
Martin, 14 Apr 64 (AGC).
98. Ault intvw, cited above. Ault had received a tongue lashing from Robert
Kennedy after the Air Force colonel tried to explain to the Attorney General that his
mission was to train pilots at Craig, not to shut down Selma. After the Civil Rights Act,
the town got with the program. Ault threatened off limits sanctions and the threat
opened the facilities. Throughout his four years at Selma he could not remember any
advice from the Equal Opportunity Group, although he was in constant communication
with them. He said, however, that he appreciated the lack .of guidance because this gave
him wide latitude to solve his own problems.
99. Hist, Directorate of Personnel Planning 1 Jul 65-31 Dec 65, pp 8-14. In the
history for the previous 6 months Equal Opportunity was still listed as a Group.
100. Intvw, author with C. S. Doane, Washington, D.C., Jun 73. Doane said that
Farris proposed the downgrading of the Group, believing the problem was in hand. At the
time of the Travis riot the director of the equal opportunity section was Lt. Col. Hughie
Mathews. In an interview, he related that the Air Force had no program until after the
Travis riot. Mathews claims that his predecessors back to Colonel Farris were serious but
hamstrung by the lack of Air Staff interest. The man Mathews succeeded was called
nigger lover by some of his coworkers in the Air Staff. Mathews said that this was
somebodys poor idea of a sick joke. After the Travis riot, the office staff rose from 1
officer to 6, plus a corresponding number of clerks to make the office efficient. Mathews
believes that the Air Force made more progress after the Travis riot than in the 23 years of
Air Force history before it. After Travis. , he said, the Air Force got serious. Intvw,
author with Mathews, Washington, D.C., Jun 73.
101. Memo, J. William Doolittle to the Chief of Staff, subj.: Racial Relations
within the Air Force, 17 Sep 68 (AGC). Who would have thought to look for equal
opportunity in the flying pay and entitlements branch? Doolittle was in the Secretarys
office in Manpower and Reserve Affairs. He believed the Air Force was doing well in
racial affairs, but pointed out the lack of a program, saying that a policyas written in Air
Force regulationswas not a substitute for a program.
102. Memo, Civil Rights Office to Norman Paul, 21 Sep 65, subj.: Policy
Formulation, Planning and Action in the ofc of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Civil Rights), 26 Jul 64-26 Sep 65 (AGC). This memorandum shows that all of the Air
Force equal opportunity efforts preceding Publication of AFR 35-78such as a ban on
housing listings which specified race and a ban on official attendance at segregating
institutions of higher learninghad come as initiatives from the Department of Defense.
The Air Force, like the other services, had been ordered to produce a new equal
opportunity regulation by November 1963, but these were all held up until after passage of
the important legislation. The memo, furthermore, pointed out a growth in the Negro
officer corps and the advance of blacks into positions of command and into the senior
service schools. Between the time Benjamin Davis had attended the War College in 1949,
and the time Col. Frederick E. Davison entered the Army War College in 1962, no black
officers had attended these important schools. When the memorandum was written, there
were two blacks at the Naval War College, one black at the Army War College (and only
three graduates in the history of the school), one black at the National War College, two
blacks at the Air War College, and none at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
The memo noted that between 1950 and 1965, only 26 blacks had achieved command of
Air Force tactical units.
103. Vergil M. Bates, The Commanders Role in the Problem of Equal
Opportunity, Air War College thesis, 1965, pp 48-49. 48.49.
104. Don G. Harris, A Conflict of Responsibilities: Community RelationsOff-
Base Equal Opportunities for Negroes Air Command and Staff College Research Study,
1965, pp 68-71.
Epilogue
1. AFR 35-11, Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel in Off-Base Housing
Program, 14 Apr 69. Personnel who rent or lease housing in violation of this regulation
can be penalized under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and, as a minimum, would
jeopardize their housing allowance.
2. Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe, Commanders Notebook on
Equal Opportunity and Human Relations, [1970]. See the foreword by Brig. Gen. Brian
Gunderson.
3. Ibid., pp 2, 3, 4, and 5-7.
4. Ibid., pp 8-11.
5. Ibid., pp 12-21, 22-34, and 39-41.
6. AFR 35-78, Change B., 14 Dec 70. Change A called for regular Off-Base
Equal Opportunity Status Reports. This had been published on 8 Apr 65.
7. Ibid.
8. AFR 35-78, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel, 18 May
71. See app. 2-7.
9. Air Force Times, Family Magazine, 18 Aug 71, pp 4-7 and 19. An example of
complacency is provided in an Air War College thesis produced by an Air Force colonel,
Charles W. Kinney, in 1970 who determined that the race problem in America was a
civilian problem and that the Air Force had solved its racial issues. See his The Other
War, Air War College Thesis, Apr 70, unpb., p 1. A Marine lieutenant colonel, George B.
Crist, at the War College produced a paper eight months earlier that came to the opposite
conclusionthat the military was not ahead of society at all and that the services were
bringing on serious race problems because of complacency. See his Black is Beautiful
and the Military Establishment, Air War College Professional Study, Dec 70, unpb., pp 1
and 2. After the Travis riot the solutions became more radical than those suggested in the
past. See for example Walter A. Collins, The Race Problem in the United States Air
Force, Air Command and Staff College Research Study, May 72, unpb., pp 96-97; and
William T. Fuller, Jr., An Analysis of Racial Discrimination in the US Air Force, Air
Command and Staff College Research Study, May 72, unpb., pp vii, 11, 33, 53-55, and 61.
10. Air Force Times, Family Magazine, 18 Aug 71, pp 4-7, and 19.
11. Ibid. This analysis of the causes for in-service riots is corroborated in part by
Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective (New
York, 1973), p 201. Foner believed that the Pentagon tried to avoid racial friction, but that
it was frustrated by bigots at lower levels. On pp 201-260, he examined the Viet Nam
period and demonstrated that continuous race rioting was brought about by bigotry and
residual institutional racism. Although the Travis riot is discussed, Air Force problems are
regarded as much less severe than those of the other services. Foner believed that blacks
encountered the same problems a decade earlier, but now would no longer put up with
discrimination. He concluded that blacks were changing faster than the services could
improve. This view is shared by Robert W. Mullen, Blacks in Americas Wars: The Shift
in Attitudes from the Revolutionary War to Viet Nam (New York, 1973), pp 83-85.
12. Air Force Times, Family Magazine, 18 Aug 71, pp 4-7, and 19.
13. The first of the Air Force Social Actions Directorate was Colonel David L.
Thompson. He supplied me with this information and gave other assistance, including
permission to duplicate the files of the Equal Opportunity Office which date back to Jack
Marrs time. Personal intvw, Mar 73, Washington, D.C.
14. AFR 50-26, Education in Race Relations, 2 Dec 71.
15. Personal intvw with General Theus, Jan 73, Washington, D.C. I taught the base
race relations course for one year as an additional duty and am familiar with the
curriculum. Richard Dalfiume wrote that Benjamin 0. Davis, Sr., recommended race
relations training for all personnel as early as September 1942. See Dalfiume,
Desegregation, p 76. For an example of how one major command implemented the new
Air Force policy, see Pacific Air Forces Manual 35-1, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of
Military Personnel, 15 Apr 72. This manual instructs social actions personnel not to direct
their energies toward changing attitudes. Efforts directed toward the re-education of
attitudes produces few results, as only behavior is measurable.
16. AFM 36-10, Officer Evaluation Reports, 25 Nov 74.
17. Department of Defense, Report of the Task Force on the Administration of
Justice in the Armed Forces, 4 vols. (Washington, 20 Nov 72) I, 2 and 17. There were
fourteen members on this task force: 5 blacks, 9 whites; 1 woman and 13 men. Among its
members were civilian and military lawyers, the Judges Advocate General of all the
services; and the Commander of the First Army and the General Counsel of the NAACP
(who served as co-chairman). Five (white) members disagreed with the main thrust of the
report and were permitted to express their objections in a minority section of the text. The
dissenters believed that the report overemphasized the depth of systemic discrimination in
the military and also found fault with the panels conclusion that race discrimination was
the primary reason for the differences between court-martial and promotion rates. They
did not object to the factsblacks had a higher court-martial rate and a lower promotion
rate than whitesbut they did not believe prejudice explained the entire differential. They
hastened to state, however, that they were in complete accord that racial and minority
discrimination is present in the military establishment, just as it is in the civilian society.
Its presence in any degree denigrates the individual, reflects adversely on the service, and
makes the military mission more difficult of accomplishment. Ibid., I, 129.
18. Ibid., I, 25-32 and 39-41. The task force surveyed 19 Air Force bases, but had
less than 60 courts-martial to work with. Reversing the trend elsewhere, they found that 16
percent of the blacks received counseling short of punishment while less than 3 percent of
the whites did. Whites had a higher court-martial rate, but blacks had a higher non judicial
punishment rate. As with the Army, more blacks than whites submitted not guilty pleas
and more blacks than whites received acquittals. In another part of the report the task force
gathered some data from 1,299 Air Force courts-martial cases over a period of years from
all bases. While whites and blacks generally had the same court martial rates when
considered by specialty, this study proved that men in the more menial career fields were
far more likely to fall afoul of the system and receive a court-martial than men in the more
technological or mission-oriented career fields. More than 66 percent of the courts-martial
were shown to occur in four menial specialties and the blacks were concentrated in these
fields: 39.7 percent of the whites worked in the technological or operational specialties,
while only 25 percent of the blacks did. Ibid., Ill, 8, 9, 71, 87, 228, and 229; IV, 25 and 27.
19. Ibid., I, 112-117.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AAF Army Air Forces, Army Air Field
AB Air Base
ADA Americans for Democratic Action
ADL Anti-Defamation League
AFB Air Force Base
AFL Air Force letter, American Federation of Labor
AF/JA Air Force Judge Advocate General
AFM Air Force Manual
AFPDPE Air Force Equal Opportunity Group
AFR Air Force Regulation
AFSHRC Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center
AG Adjutant General
AGC Alan Gropman Collection
AGCT Army General Classification Test
AGSE-P The Adjutant Generals Office, Enlisted Branch
(War Department)
ALMAJCOM all major commands
APP appendix
AR Army Regulation
ATC Air Training Command
Bootstrap, Operation The general plan for raising the educational level of U.S. Air
Force personnel, as described in Air Force Letter 34-52, Dec. 23, 1949.
CCTS Combat Crew Training Squadron
CIO Congress of Industrial Organizations
CMH Center of Military History
CONAC Continental Air Command
CP Communist Party
CPTP Civilian Pilot Training Program
CU Columbia University
DCS/P Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
DRRI Defense Race Relations Institute
E.O. Executive Order
E-1 Private (to 1953); thereafter, Airman, Basic
E-2 Private, First Class (to 1953); thereafter, Airman, Third Class
E-3 Corporal (to 1953); thereafter, Airman, Second Class
E-4 Sergeant (to 1953); thereafter, Airman, First Class
E-5 Staff Sergeant
E-6 Technical Sergeant
E-7 Master Sergeant
E-8 Senior, Master Sergeant (since 1958)
E-9 Chief, Master Sergeant (since 1958)
FEAF Far East Air Forces
FEPC Fair Employment Practices Committee
FW-190 Focke-Wulf 190 (German fighter aircraft)
G-3 Operations
GI Government Issue
HEW Health, Education and Welfare
HQ headquarters
HSTL Harry S. Truman Library
ICAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces
JFKL John F. Kennedy Library
M Medium
MATS Military Air Transport Service
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
MP Military police
NAACP National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NARG National Archive Record Group
NBC National Broadcasting Company
NCO noncommissioned officer
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
NPRC National Personnel Records Center
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCMH Office of the Chief of Military History
OCS Officers Candidate School
OD officer of the day
OTU Officers Training Unit
O-1 Second Lieutenant
O-2 First Lieutenant
O-3 Captain
O-4 Major
O-5 Lieutenant Colonel
O-6 Colonel
O-7 Brigadier General
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PL Public Law
RG Record Group
ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAFOI Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Information
TAC Tactical Air Command
TACP Tactical Air Control Party
TDY temporary duty
TIG The Inspector General
USAAF United States Army Air Forces
USAF United States Air Force
 USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe
USAREUR United States Army Europe
USIA United States Information Agency
USO United Services Organization, Inc.
VFW Veterans of Foreign Wars
WAC Womens Army Corps
WD War Department
YMCA Young Mens Christian Association
ZI Zone of the Interior
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscript Collections
In addition to archival collections, the author was fortunate to obtain access to
several unusually fruitful sources. Not only was he allowed to duplicate the material in the
files of active offices, but he was permitted to copy material previously obtained by other
researchers. Several working historians also sent the author copies of documents they
thought would prove useful for this narrative. Such material has been cited as the Alan
Gropman Collection (AGC), located in the Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center
(AFSHRC), Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., to add to their growing body of material on
blacks in the Air Force. Future scholars who wish to work in this area will find several
offices in the Pentagon most useful for their purposes. The Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower Policy (present incumbent Mr. James P. Goode)
was very generous and helpful. The Equal Opportunity Division within the Deputy Chief
of Staff/Personnel deputate had material going back to the 1940s. If these files have been
thinned to make room for current business, the Record Manager for the division should be
able to provide information as to the location of the extant files. Most noncurrent files in
the Pentagon are moved to the National Records Center in Suitland, Md.
Adjutant General Decimal File, 1945. Record Group 18, National Archives.
Washington, D.C.
H. H. Arnold Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, Civil Aide to the Secretary. Record Group
107, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Central Files. General File, Eisenhower Library. Abilene, Kans.
Central Files. Official File, Eisenhower Library. Abilene, Kans.
Office of Civil Rights. Office Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CR & IR)
OASD (M). Accession no. 68-A-1066. National Records Center. Suitland, Md.
Office of the Deputy Assistant of Defense (CR & IR) Counselor, OASD (M).
Accession No. 68-A-1033. National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.
Clark M. Clifford Papers. Harry S. Truman Library. Independence, Mo.
 George Elsey Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
James C. Evans Papers. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Alvan C. Gillem Board Papers. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Lyndon B. Johnson Papers. Lyndon B . Johnson Library. Austin, Tex.
Burke Marshall Papers. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham, Mass.
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers. Library of
Congress. Washington, D.C.
Negro Pamphlet File. Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Presidents Committee on Civil Rights Papers. Harry S. Truman Library.
Independence, Mo.
Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services Papers. Harry S. Truman Library. Independence, Mo.
Presidents Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces Papers. Harry
S. Truman Library. Independence, Mo.
Director of Personnel Planning, USAF, Papers. Record Group 561. National
Archives. Washington, D.C.
Secretary of the Air Force Papers. Record Group 340. National Archives.
Washington, D.C.
Secretary of Defense Papers. Record Group 330. National Archives. Washington,
D.C.
Staff Files. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Abilene, Kans.
Harry S. Truman Papers. Harry S. Truman Library. Independence. Mo.
Lee White Papers. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham, Mass.
*Hoyt S. Vandenberg Papers. Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.
* Consulted but not cited.
Ennis C. Whitehead Papers. Albert F. Simpson Memorial Archives. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Ala.
Harris Wofford Papers. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham, Mass.
File 114-528. National Personnel Records Center. St. Louis, Mo.
Public Documents
The author has placed the numerous regulations and other directives issued by the
Army and Air Force in this section. The files of the Office of the Chief of Military History
(CMH, Washington, D.C.) contain the most complete collection of Army regulations. The
Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., contains the Air Force collection.
The directives will be listed chronologically.
War Department Policies Governing the Employment of Negro Personnel upon
Mobilization on, G-3/6541-527, 3 Jun 40. AG 291.2 (10-9-40) 16 Oct 40.
Army Regulation 210-10, Posts, Camps, and Stations Administration, 20 Dec 40.
War Department Pamphlet no. 20-6, Command of Negro Troops, 29 Feb 44.
War Department Memo 600-45, 14 Jun 45.
Army Air Forces Letter 35-100, Utilization of Negro Personnel, 1 Mar 46.
War Department, Adjutant Generals Office, AGSE-P 342.06.
Enlistment of Negroes, 27 Aug 46. War Department Circular 124, Utilization of
Negro Manpower in the Postwar Army Policy, 27 Apr 46.
Army Air Forces Letter 35-101, Utilization of Negro Manpower in Postwar Army,
10 Jun 46.
Army Air Forces Letter 35-130, Enlistments and Reenlistments in the Regular
Army, 21 Jun 46.
Army Talk 170. War Department, 12 Apr 47.
Air Force Letter 39-8, Assignment of Air Force Enlistees, Reenlistees, and
Returnees, 14 Feb 49.
Air Force Letter 35-3, Air Force Personnel Policies, 11 May 49.
Army Regulation 600-629-1, Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, 16 Jan
50.
Air Force Regulation 35-78, Air Force Personnel Policies, 14 Sep 50.
Air Force Regulation 35-78, Air Force Personnel Policy Regarding Minority
Groups, 15 Sep 55.
Department of Defense Directive 5120.36, Equal Opportunity in the Armed
Forces, 26 Jul 63.
Air Force Regulation 35-78, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military
Personnel, 19 Aug 64.
Air Force Regulation 35-11, Equal Opportunity for Military Personnel in Off-Base
Housing Program, 24 Sep 69.
Air Force Regulation 35-78, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military
Personnel, 18 May 71.
PACAF Manual 35-1, Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel, 15
Apr 72.
Department of Defense. Integration and the Negro Officer in the Armed Forces of
the United States of America. Washington, D. C, 1962.
Department of Defense. I & E Division, Attitude Research Branch, Morale
Attitudes of Enlisted Men, May-June 1949: Attitude Toward Integration of Negro Soldiers
in the Army. Washington, D. C., Mar 49.
Department of Defense. Report of the Task Force on the Administration of
Military Justice in the Armed Forces. 4 vols., Washington, D. C., 30 Nov 72.
Information and Education Division, Army Service Forces. Opinions About Negro
Infantry Platoons in White Companies of 7 Divisions Based on Survey Made in May-June
1945. Washington, D.C., 3 Jul 45.
The Inspector General, USAF, United States Air Force TIG Brief, 26 May 61.
The Presidents Committee on Civil Rights. To Secure These Rights. Washington,
D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1947.
The Presidents Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. Initial
Report. Mimeographed, 13 Jun 63.
-.Final Report. Mimeographed, Nov 64.
The Presidents Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Services. Freedom to Serve. Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing
Office, 1950.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947, 1948.
Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office.
-. John F. Kennedy, 1962, 1963. Washington, D.C: United States Government
Printing Office.
Headquarters United States Air Forces in Europe. Commanders Notebook on
Equal Opportunity and Human Relations. Mimeographed [1970].
Project Clear. Summary Preliminary Report on Utilization of Negro Manpower.
Operations Research Office, Baltimore. The Johns Hopkins University, [1951]
Mimeographed.
Slonaker, John. The U.S. Army and the Negro. Army War College. Carlisle
Barracks, Pa. Mimeographed, 1971.
Strickland, Patricia. The Putt-Putt Air Force: The Story of the Civilian Pilot
Training Program and the War Training Service (1939-1944). Washington, D.C: Federal
Aviation Administration, [1971].
United States Commission on Civil Rights. Civil Rights 63. Washington. D.C:
United States Government Printing Office, 1963.
-. Family Housing and the Negro Serviceman. Washington, D.C: United States
Government Printing Office, Oct 63.
Research Branch, Special Service Division, Services of Supply. Attitudes of
Enlisted Men toward Negroes for Air Force Duty. 30 Nov. 42.
U.S. Congressional Record. House 1963.
U.S. Congressional Record. Volume 109, App., 1963.
Office of Statistical Control. Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II.
Dec. 45.
Statistical Control Division. Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: 1946. June 1947.
 Statistical Services. United States Air Force Statistical Digest: 1948, Jan 1949-
June 1950, Fiscal 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954.
Newspapers
Baltimore Afro-American, 1944-1964.
New York Amsterdam News, 1944-1957.
Pittsburgh Courier, 1944-1964.
Chicago Defender, 1944-1964.
Air Force Times, 1944-1964.
Army, Navy, Air Force Journal.
Personal Correspondence
H. W. Bowman to the author, 15 May 73.
Jack Marr to the author, 1 Oct. 73.
Thurgood Marshall to the author, 5 Jul. 73.
Earl Warren to the author, 9 Feb. 73.
Interviews
The author has included all interviews consulted, including the oral history
collections, those conducted by colleagues and forwarded to the author, and those in
which he himself participated. Those that can be found in the Oral History collection at
Columbia University will be marked (CU).
Personal Interviews:
Richard L. Ault. May 73. Washington, D.C.
Thomas Clark, Mar. 73. Washington, D.C.
Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. Jan 73. Washington, D.C. (CU).
Mr. and Mrs. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. (joint interview) May 73. Colorado Springs,
Colo. (CU).
C. S. Doane. May 73. Washington, D.C.
Idwal Edwards. Feb. 73. Arlington, Va. (CU).
James C. Evans. Jan 73. Washington, D.C. (CU).
Roland Gittelsohn. Apr. 70. Boston, Mass.
James P. Goode. Feb. 73. Washington, D.C.
Daniel James, Jr. Jan. 73. Washington, D.C.
Jack Marr. Feb. 73. Cobbs Creek, Va. (CU) Hughie E. Mathews. Apr. 73.
Washington, D.C. (CU).
William F. McKee. May 73. Washington, D.C.
 Noel F. Parrish. Mar. 73. San Antonio, Tex. (CU).
Marion R. Rodgers. Jan. 73. Colorado Springs, Colo.
Dean Strother. Jun. 74. Colorado Springs, Colo.
Stuart Symington. Mar. 73. Washington, D.C.
Lucius Theus. Jan. 73. Washington, D.C. (CU).
David Thompson. Jan. 73. Washington, D.C.
Earl Warren. Apr. 73. Washington, D.C.
Adam Yarmolinsky. Jul. 73. Boston, Mass.
Eugene Zuckert. Apr. 73. Washington, D.C.
Spann Watson. Apr. 73. Washington, D.C. (CU).
Interviews Conducted by Others:
Richard Nugent by Alan Osur. Jun 73. Indian Harbor Beach, Fla.
Interviews in Oral History Collections:
Theodore Hesburgh by Joseph OConnor. Mar. 66. John F. Kennedy Library.
Waltham, Mass.
Theodore Hesburgh by Paige Mulholland. Feb. 71. Lyndon B. Johnson Library.
Austin, Texas.
Marx Leva. December 1969 and June 1970. Washington, D.C. Harry S. Truman
Library. Independence, Mo.
Thurgood Marshall by Berl Bernhard. Apr. 64. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham,
Mass.
Clarence Mitchell by John Stewart. Feb. 67. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham,
Mass.
Roy Wilkins by Berl Bernhard. Aug. 64. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham, Mass.
Harris Wofford by Larry Hackman. May 68. John F. Kennedy Library. Waltham,
Mass.
Unpublished Studies
The extensive collection of unit histories and other studies available at the Albert
F. Simpson Historical Research Center at the Air University Library form the spine of this
narrative. Everything listed in this section can be found in the Simpson Center or the Air
University Library.
Professional School Studies and Special Reports:
Anthis, Rollen H. Utilization of Negro Personnel in the Armed Forces. Air
Command and Staff College Research Study, Mar 49.
Avery, D.B. The Negro and the Air Force. Air Command and Staff College
Research Study, Nov 1949.
 Bates, Vergil M. The Commanders Role in the Problem of Equal Opportunity.
Air War College Thesis, 1965.
Catington, James D. Sociological Factors Concerned with the Segregation of
Negro Troops in the Armed Forces. Air Command and Staff College Research Study,
May 49.
Covington, W. E. The Utilization of Negro Personnel. Air War College Thesis,
Mar 49.
Crist, George B. Black is Beautiful and the Military Establishment. Air War
College Thesis, Dec 70.
Collins, Walter A. The Race Problem in the United States Air Force. Air
Command and Staff College Research Study, May 72.
Cunningham, Jack E. Non-Segregation vs. Prejudice. Air Command and Staff
College Research Study, Nov 49.
Cutcher, Soloman, Effective Utilization of Negro Personnel in the Armed
Forces. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Mar 48.
Fuller, William, T., Jr. An Analysis of Racial Discrimination in the U. S. Air
Force. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, May 72.
Gaffney, John B. Application of Personnel Management as Applied to Negro
Troops in the Air Forces. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Oct 48.
The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. Economic
Mobilization Course 1947-1948, Training and Utilization of Manpower.
Harris, Don G. A Conflict of Responsibilities: Community RelationsOff-Base
Equal Opportunities for Negroes. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Jun
65.
Klein, Phillip B. Utilization of Negro Personnel in the Air Force. Air War
College Research Study, Mar 49.
Kinney, Charles W. The Other War. Air Force War College Research Study, Apr
70.
Kunish, Lester L. Utilization of Negro Airmen on Air Force Bases. Air War
College Research Study, Feb 49.
Link, Fidelis, A. Determination of Policies for Utilization of Negro Manpower in
the U.S. Air Force. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Nov 49.
McEwen, Alfred E. Permanent Change of StationA Continuing Problem for
Negro Airmen. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Jun 66.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War
Military Establishment.
Office of the Commandant, Army War College. Memorandum for the Chief of
Staff: The Use of Negro Manpower in War. 30 Oct 25.
 Parrish, Noel F. The Segregation of Negroes in the Army Air Forces. Air
Command and Staff School Research Study, May 47.
Pesch, John J. Should Negroes and Whites be Integrated in the Same Air Force
Units. Air Command and Staff College Research Study, Apr 49.
Report of the War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower. Policy for
Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army with Recommendations for
Development of Means Required and a Plan for Implementation of the Same. Nov 45.
Tangen, Orville C. Negro Personnel Management in the United States Air Force.
Air Command and Staff College Research Study, May 49.
Walden, Emmet S. Maxwell Air Force Base, An Equal Opportunity Case Study.
Air Command and Staff College Research Study, 64.
Young, Hugh D. Effective Utilization of Negro Manpower in the United States
Air Force. Air Command and Staff School Research Study, Dec 48.
Unit Histories and Miscellaneous Studies:
[Lyon, Earl D.] The Training of Negro Combat Units by the First Air Force. 2
Vols., May 46.
History of the First Bomb Wing. 1 Jul-43 to 31 Dec 43.
History of the Ninth Air Force. 1 Dec 48-1 Jan 50, 1 Jan 5031 July 50.
History of 14th Air Force. 1 Jan-30 Jun 51.
History of the Fifteenth Air Force. 47.
History of 90th Food Service Squadron. Feb 52.
History of the 332d Fighter Group (SE). 1 Jul-14 Aug 47, 15 Aug-31 Dec 47, 1
Apr-30 Jun 48, Jul-Sep 48, Oct-Nov 48.
History of the 332d Fighter Wing. 1 Jan-31 Mar 48, Jun 49.
History of the 385th Aviation Squadron. Jan-Dec 47.
The Composite History of the 477th Composite Group, Godman Field,
Kentucky. Jan 44 to Sep 45.
History of the 477th Bombardment Group (Medium). 15 Jan 44 to 5 May 44, 6
May 44-15 Jul 44, 16 Jul 44-15 Oct 44, 16 Oct 44 to 15 Jan 45, Jan 45 to Apr 45, 16 Apr
45 to 15 Jul 45.
History of the 477th Composite Group. 15 September 1945 to 15 February 1946,
15 Feb 46-31 Mar 46, 1 Mar 46 to 15 Jul 46, 15 Jul 46-15 Oct 46, 31 Oct 46-31 Dec 46, 1
Jan 47 to 31 Mar 47, 1 Apr 47-30 Jun 47.
History of the 811th Engineering Aviation Battalion. 1 Jan 47 to 31 Dec 47, Jan
50.
History of the 837th Engineering Aviation Battalion. Nov 45.
History of the 2164th AAF Base Unit Tuskegee Institute. 1 May 45-30 Jun 45.
 History of the 2143d AAF Base Unit Pilot School, Basic, Advanced and
Tuskegee Army Air Field, Tuskegee, Alabama. 1 Jan 45-14 Apr 45, 1 Sep 45-31 Oct 45,
1 Nov 45-31 Dec 45, 1 Jan 46-14 Apr 46.
History of the 2500th ABG, Mitchell AFB. Oct, Nov 49.
History of the 3800th Air University Wing, Maxwell AFB. Apr-Jun 49, Jul-Sep
49, Oct-Dec 49, Jan-Jun 50, Jul-Dec 50, 1 Ju 51-31 Dec 51, Jan-Mar 52.
History of the 3904th Air Base Group, Stead AFB, Nevada. May 52.
History of the 6139th Air Base Group, Misawa Air Base, Japan. 1 Jan 63-31 Dec
63.
History of the Air Training Command. 1 Jul 49 to 31 Dec 49. [George N.
Dubina] Air University History. Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala, 1971.
History of Continental Air Command. Dec 48-Dec 49.
History of Far East Air Forces. Jan-Jun 55.
History of Hondo Army Air Field. 1 Jan-28 Feb 45.
History of the Office of the Inspector General. 1 Jul 50-31 Dec 50, 1 Jul 60-31
Dec 60, 1 Jul 62-31 Dec 62.
History of MacDill Army Air Field. Dec 46.
Madison, James A. Summary of Services to the United States Air Force for the
Period 1 Sep 52 to 31 Dec 54.
Partridge, E. E. Diary of Korea. 1950-51.
History of the Directorate of Personnel Planning. 1 Jul 49 to 30 Jun 50, 1 Jul 63-
31 Dec 63, 1 Jan 64-30 Jun 64, 1 Jul 64 to 31 Dec 64, 1 Jan 65-30 Jun 65, 1 Jul 65-31 Dec
65.
History of Tactical Air Command. Mar 46 to Dec 46, 1 Jan 48-30 Nov 48.
Tactical Air Command, Utilization of Negro Manpower. 18 Mar 48.
History of the Strategic Air Command. 1948, Jan 49 to Dec 49.
Books
Adams, Sherman. First Hand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration.
New York: Harper, 1961.
Bardolph, Richard, ed. The Civil Rights Record: Black Americans and the Law,
1849-1970. New York: Crowell, 1970.
Berman, William C. The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration.
Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1970.
Bernstein, Barton J., ed. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
Bogart, Leo. ed. Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two
Original 1951 Field Research Reports. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969.
 Cornish, Dudley Taylor. The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-
1865. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956.
Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lea Cate, eds. The Army Air Forces in World
War II, Vols. II and VII. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949, 1955.
Carisella, P. J. and James W. Ryan. The Black Swallow of Death. Boston:
Marlborough House, 1972.
Dalfiume, Richard M. Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two
Fronts, 1939-1953. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1969.
Donovan, Robert J. Eisenhower: The Inside Story. New York: Harper, 1956.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956.
New York: Signet Books, 1963.
-. The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. New York: Doubleday,
1965.
Foner, Jack D. Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective.
New York: Praeger, 1974.
Fowler, Arlen Lowery. The Negro Infantry in the West, 18691891. Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood, 1971.
Francis, Charles E. The Tuskegee Airmen. Boston: Bruce Humphries, 1955.
Franklin, John Hope. From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans. 3d
ed. New York: Vintage, 1969.
Golden, Harry. Mr. Kennedy and the Negroes. New York, Cleveland: World, 1964.
Grant, Madison. The Passing of the Great Race in America. 4th ed. New York:
Scribners, 1923.
Hughes, Emmet John. The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower
Years. New York: Atheneum, 1963.
Jones, Maldwyn A. American Immigration. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1960.
Leckie, William H. The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the
West. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967.
Lee, Irvin H. Negro Medal of Honor Men. 3d ed. New York: Dodd, Mead &
Company, 1969.
Lee, Ulysses. The Employment of Negro Troops. Washington, D.C: Government
Printing Office.
McCoy, Donald R. and Ruetten, Richard T. Quest and Response: Minority Rights
and the Truman Administration. Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1973.
McNamara, Robert S. The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York:
Harper and Row, 1968.
 Mandelbaum, David G. Soldier Groups and Negro Soldiers. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1952.
Morrow, E. Frederick. Black Man in the White House: A Diary of The Eisenhower
Years by the Administrative Officer for Special Projects, The White House, 1955-1961.
New York: Coward-McCann, 1963.
Moskos, Charles, ed. Public Opinion and the Military Establishment. Beverly
Hills, Cal.: Russel Sage, 1971.
Mullen, Robert W. Blacks in Americas Wars: The Shift in Attitudes from the
Revolutionary War to Viet Nam. New York: Monad Press, 1973.
Nichols, Lee. Breakthrough on the Color Front. New York: Random House, 1954.
Polenberg, Richard. War and Society: The United States 19411945. Philadelphia:
Lippincott, 1972.
Pusey, Merlo J. Eisenhower the President. New York: Macmillan, 1956.
Quarles, Benjamin. The Negro in the Civil War. Boston: Little Brown and
Company, 1953.
-. The Negro in the American Revolution. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1961.
Roberts, Kenneth L. Why Europe Leaves Home. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1922.
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White
House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.
Shapiro, Fred C. and James W. Sullivan. Race Riots New York, 1964. New York:
Crowell, 1964.
Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York: Bantam Books, 1965.
-. The Kennedy Legacy. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
Stillman, Richard J. Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces. New York:
Praeger, 1968.
Sundquist, James L. Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
Years. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. 2 Vols. New York: Signet, 1956.
Wolseley, Roland E. The Black Press and U.S.A. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State
University Press, 1971.
Yarmolinsky, Adam. The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society.
New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
Articles and Pamphlets
Finkle, Lee. The Conservative Aims of Militant Rhetoric: Black Protest during
World War II. Journal of American History, 60 (December 1973), pp. 692-713.
Hastie, William H. On Clipped Wings: The Story of Jim Crow in the Army Air
Corps. NAACP Pamphlet, 1 July 1943.
Racial Troubles Increasing, Intelligencer, Stout Field, Ind., September 1944.
Paszek, Lawrence J. Negroes and the Air Force, 1939-1949, Military Affairs,
Spring 1967, pp 1-10.
Wiant, John. Integration A Fact in Services, But. Army-Navy-Air Force
Register & Defense Times, 28 November 1959.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community
Senate Armed Services Committee
James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
February 26, 2015
INTRODUCTION
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, Members of the Committee, thank you
for the invitation to offer the United States Intelligence Communitys 2015 assessment of
threats to US national security. My statement reflects the collective insights of the
Intelligence Communitys extraordinary men and women, whom I am privileged and
honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to provide
the nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic
law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and Americas interests
anywhere in the world. Information available as of February 13, 2015 was used in the
preparation of this assessment.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
GLOBAL THREATS
Cyber * Counterintelligence * Terrorism * Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Proliferation * Space and Counterspace * Transnational Organized Crime * Economics
and Natural Resources * Human Security
REGIONAL THREATS
Middle East and North Africa * Iraq * Syria * Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
* Iran * Libya * Yemen * Lebanon * Egypt * Tunisia * Europe * Turkey * Key Partners *
Russia and Eurasia * Russia * Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus * The Caucasus and Central
Asia * East Asia * China * North Korea * South Asia * Afghanistan * Pakistan * India *
Sub-Saharan Africa * West Africa * Sudan * South Sudan * Nigeria * Somalia * Lords
Resistance Army * Central African Republic * The Sahel * Latin America and the
Caribbean * Cuba * Central America * Venezuela * Haiti
* * * * * * * * * * * *
GLOBAL THREATS
CYBER
 Strategic Assessment
Cyber threats to US national and economic security are increasing in frequency,
scale, sophistication, and severity of impact. The ranges of cyber threat actors, methods of
attack, targeted systems, and victims are also expanding. Overall, the unclassified
information and communication technology (ICT) networks that support US Government,
military, commercial, and social activities remain vulnerable to espionage and/or
disruption. However, the likelihood of a catastrophic attack from any particular actor is
remote at this time. Rather than a Cyber Armageddon scenario that debilitates the entire
US infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-
to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose
cumulative costs on US economic competitiveness and national security.
A growing number of computer forensic studies by industry experts strongly
suggest that several nationsincluding Iran and North Koreahave undertaker offensive
cyber operations against private sector targets to support their economic and foreign policy
objectives, at times concurrent with political crises.
Risk. Despite ever-improving network defenses, the diverse possibilities for
remote hacking intrusions, supply chain operations to insert compromised hardware or
software, and malevolent activities by human insiders will hold nearly all ICT systems at
risk for years to come. In short, the cyber threat cannot be eliminated; rather, cyber risk
must be managed. Moreover, the risk calculus employed by some private sector entities
does not adequately account for foreign cyber threats or the systemic interdependencies
between different critical infrastructure sectors.
Costs. During 2014, we saw an increase in the scale and scope of reporting on
malevolent cyber activity that can be measured by the amount of corporate data stolen or
deleted, personally identifiable information (Pll) compromised, or remediation costs
incurred by US victims. For example:
After the 2012-13 distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks on the US
financial sector, JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan) announced plans for annual cyber security
expenditures of S250 million by the end of 2014. After the company suffered a hacking
intrusion in 2014, JPMorgans CEO said he would probably double JPMorgans annual
computer security budget within the next five years.
The 2014 data breach at Home Depot exposed information from 56 million
credit/debit cards and 53 million customer email addresses. Home Depot estimated :he
cost of the breach to be $62 million.
In 2014, unauthorized computer intrusions were detected on the networks of the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) as well as its contractors, US Investigations
Services (USIS) and KeyPoint Government Solutions. The two contractors were involved
in processing sensitive PI I related to national security clearances for Federal Government
employees.
In August 2014, the US company, Community Health Systems, informed the
Securities and Exchange Commission that it believed hackers originating from China
had stolen Pll on 4.5 million individuals.
 Attribution. Although cyber operators can infiltrate or disrupt targeted ICT
networks, most can no longer assume that their activities will remain undetected. Nor can
they assume that if detected, they will be able to conceal their identities. Governmental
and private sector security professionals have made significant advances in detecting and
attributing cyber intrusions.
In May 2014, the US Department of Justice indicted five officers from Chinas
Peoples Liberation Army on charges of hacking US companies.
In December 2014, computer security experts reported that members of an
Iranian organization were responsible for computer operations targeting US military,
transportation, public utility, and other critical infrastructure networks.
Deterrence. Numerous actors remain undeterred from conducting economic cyber
espionage or perpetrating cyber attacks. The absence of universally accepted and
enforceable norms of behavior in cyberspace has contributed to this situation. The
motivation to conduct cyber attacks and cyber espionage will probably remain strong
because of the relative ease of these operations and the gains they bring to the
perpetrators. The result is a cyber environment in which multiple actors continue to test
their adversaries technical capabilities, political resolve, and thresholds. The muted
response by most victims to cyber attacks has created a permissive environment in which
low-level attacks can be used as a coercive tool short of war, with relatively low risk of
retaliation Additionally, even when a cyber attack can be attributed to a specific actor, the
forensic attribution often requires a significant amount of time to complete. Long delays
between the cyber attack and determination of attribution likewise reinforce a permissive
environment.
Threat Actors
Politically motivated cyber attacks are now a growing reality, and foreign actors
are reconnoitering and developing access to US critical infrastructure systems, which
night be quickly exploited for disruption if an adversarys intent became hostile. In
addition, those conducting cyber espionage are targeting US government, military, and
commercial networks on a daily basis. These threats come from a range of actors,
including: (1) nation states with highly sophisticated cyber programs (such as Russia or
China), (2) nations with lesser technical capabilities but possibly more disruptive intent
(such as Iran or North Korea), (3) profit-motivated criminals, and (4) ideologically
motivated hackers or extremists. Distinguishing between state and non-state actors within
the same country is often difficultespecially when those varied actors actively
collaborate, tacitly cooperate, condone criminal activity that only harms foreign victims,
or utilize similar cyber tools.
Russia. Russias Ministry of Defense is establishing its own cyber command,
whichaccording to senior Russian military officialswill be responsible for conducting
offensive cyber activities, including propaganda operations and inserting malware into
enemy command and control systems. Russias armed forces are also establishing a
specialized branch for computer network operations.
Computer security studies assert that unspecified Russian cyber actors are
developing means to access industrial control systems (ICS) remotely. These systems
manage critical infrastructures such as electric power grids, urban mass-transit systems,
air-traffic control, and oil and gas distribution networks. These unspecified Russian actors
have successfully compromised the product supply chains of three ICS vendors so that
customers download exploitative malware directly from the vendors websites along with
routine software updates, according to private sector cyber security experts.
China. Chinese economic espionage against US companies remains a significant
issue. The advanced persistent threat activities continue despite detailed private sector
reports, public indictments, and US demarches, according to a computer security study.
China is an advanced cyber actor; however, Chinese hackers often use less sophisticated
cyber tools to access targets. Improved cyber defenses would require hackers to use more
sophisticated skills and make Chinas economic espionage more costly and difficult to
conduct.
Iran. Iran very likely values its cyber program as one of many tools for carrying
out asymmetric but proportional retaliation against political foes, as well as a sophisticated
means of collecting intelligence. Iranian actors have been implicated in the 2012-13
DDOS attacks against US financial institutions and in the February 2014 cyber attack on
the Las Vegas Sands casino company.
North Korea. North Korea is another state actor that uses its cyber capabilities for
political objectives. The North Korean Government was responsible for the November
2014 cyber attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment (SPE), which stole corporate
information and introduced hard drive erasing malware into the companys network
infrastructure, according to the FBI. This attack coincided with the planned release of a
SPE feature film satire that depicted the planned assassination of the North Korean
president.
Terrorists. Terrorist groups will continue to experiment with hacking, which could
serve as the foundation for developing more advanced capabilities. Terrorist sympathizers
will probably conduct low-level cyber attacks on behalf of terrorist groups and attract
attention of the media, which might exaggerate the capabilities and threat posed by these
actors.
Integrity of Information
Most of the public discussion regarding cyber threats has focused on the
confidentiality and availability of information; cyber espionage undermines
confidentiality, whereas denial-of-service operations and data-deletion attacks undermine
availability. In the future, however, */e might also see more cyber operations that will
change or manipulate electronic information in order to compromise its integrity (i.e.
accuracy and reliability) instead of deleting it or disrupting access to it. Decisionmaking
by senior government officials (civilian and military), corporate executives, investors, or
others will be impaired if they cannot trust the information they are receiving.
Successful cyber operations targeting the integrity of information would need to
overcome any institutionalized checks and balances designed to prevent the manipulation
of data, for example, market monitoring and clearing functions in the financial sector.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
 We assess that the leading state intelligence threats to US interests in 2015 will
continue to be Russia and China, based on their capabilities, intent, and broad operational
scopes. Other states in South Asia, the Near East, and East Asia will pose increasingly
sophisticated local and regional intelligence threats to US interests. For example, Irans
intelligence and security services continue to view the United States as a primary threat
and have stated publicly that they monitor and counter US activities in the region.
Penetrating the US national decisionmaking apparatus and Intelligence
Community will remain primary objectives for foreign intelligence entities. Additionally,
the targeting of national security information and proprietary information from US
companies and research institutions dealing with defense, energy, finance, dual-use
technology, and other areas will be a persistent threat to US interests.
Non-state entities, including transnational organized criminals and terrorists, will
continue to employ human, technical, and cyber intelligence capabilities that present a
significant counterintelligence challenge. Like state intelligence services, these non-state
entities recruit sources and perform physical and technical surveillance to facilitate their
illegal activities and avoid detection and capture.
The internationalization of critical US supply chains and service infrastructure,
including for the ICT, civil infrastructure, and national security sectors, increases the
potential for subversion. This threat includes individuals, small groups of hacktivists,
commercial firms, and state intelligence services.
Trusted insiders who disclose sensitive US Government information without
authorization will remain a significant threat in 2015. The technical sophistication and
availability of information technology that can be used for nefarious purposes exacerbates
this threat.
TERRORISM
Sunni violent extremists are gaining momentum and the number of Sunni violent
extremist groups, members, and safe havens is greater than at any other point in history.
These groups challenge local and regional governance and threaten US allies, partners,
and interests. The threat to key US allies and partners will probably increase, but the
extent of the increase will depend on the level of success that Sunni violent extremists
achieve in seizing and holding territory whether or not attacks on local regimes and calls
for retaliation against the West are accepted by their key audiences, and the durability of
the US-led coalition in Iraq and Syria.
Sunni violent extremists have taken advantage of fragile or unstable Muslim-
majority countries to make territorial advances, seen in Syria and Iraq, and will probably
continue to do so. They also contribute to regime instability and internal conflict by
engaging in high levels of violence. Most will be unable to seize and hold territory on a
large scale, however, as long as local, regional, and international support and resources are
available and dedicated to halting their progress. The increase in the number of Sunni
violent extremist groups also will probably be balanced by a lack of cohesion and
authoritative leadership. Although the January 2015 attacks against Charlie Hebdo in Paris
is a reminder of the threat to the West, most groups place a higher priority on local
concerns than on a tacking the so-called far enemythe United States and the Westas
advocated by core al- Qaida.
Differences in ideology and tactics will foster competition among some of these
groups, particularly if a unifying figure or group does not emerge. In some cases, groups
even if hostile to each other will ally against common enemies. For example, some
Sunni violent extremists will probably gain support from like-minded insurgent or anti-
regime groups or within disaffected or disenfranchised communities because they share
the goal of radical regime change.
Although most homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will probably continue to
aspire to travel overseas, particularly to Syria and Iraq, they will probably remain the most
likely Sunni violent extremist threat to the US homeland because of their immediate and
direct access. Same might have been inspired by calls by the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) in late September for individual jihadists in the West to retaliate for US-led
airstrikes on ISIL. Attacks by lone actors are among the most difficult to warn about
because they offer few or no signatures.
If ISIL were to substantially increase the priority it places on attacking the West
rather than fighting to maintain and expand territorial control, then the groups access to
radicalized Westerners who have fought in Syria and Iraq would provide a pool of
operatives who potentially have access to the United States and other Western countries.
Since the conflict began in 2011, more than 20,000 foreign fightersat least 3,400 of
whom are Westernershave gone to Syria from more than 90 countries.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND PROLIFERATION
Nation-states efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
their delivery systems, or their underlying technologies constitute a major threat to the
security of the United States, its deployed troops, and allies. Syrian regime use of
chemical weapons against the opposition further demonstrates that the threat of WMD is
real. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is
past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dual-use, move
easily in the globalized economy, as do personnel with the scientific expertise to design
and use them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse rapidly around the
globe.
Iran Preserving Nuclear Weapons Option
We continue to assess that Irans overarching strategic goals of enhancing its
security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its
civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it
chooses to do so. We do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear
weapons.
We also continue to assess that Iran does not face any insurmountable technical
barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making Irans political will the central issue.
However, Iranian implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) has at least
temporarily inhibited further progress in its uranium enrichment and plutonium production
capabilities and effectively eliminated Irans stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium.
The agreement has also enhanced the transparency of Irans nuclear activities, mainly
through improved International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access and earlier
warning of any effort to make material for nuclear weapons using its safeguarded
facilities.
We judge that Tehran would choose ballistic missiles as its preferred method of
delivering nuclear weapons, if it builds them. Irans ballistic missiles are inherently
capable of delivering WMD, and Tehran already has the largest inventory of ballistic
missiles in the Middle East. Irans progress on space launch vehiclesalong with its
desire to deter the United States and its alliesprovides Tehran with the means and
motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs).
North Korea Developing WMD-Applicable Capabilities
North Koreas nuclear weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to the
United States and to the security environment in East Asia. North Koreas export of
ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria,
and its assistance? to Syrias construction of a nuclear reactor, destroyed in 2007, illustrate
its willingness to proliferate dangerous technologies.
In 2013, following North Koreas third nuclear test, Pyongyang announced its
intention to refurbish and restart its nuclear facilities, to include the uranium enrichment
facility at Yongbyon, and to restart its graphite-moderated plutonium production reactor
that was shut down in 2007. We assess that North Korea has followed through on its
announcement by expanding its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the reactor.
North Korea has also expanded the size and sophistication of its ballistic missile
forces, ranging from close-range ballistic missiles to ICBMs, while continuing to conduct
test launches. In 2014, North Korea launched an unprecedented number of ballistic
missiles.
Pyongyang is committed to developing a long-range, nuclear-armed missile that is
capable of posing a direct threat to the United States and has publicly displayed its <N08
road-mobile ICBM twice. We assess that North Korea has already taken initial steps
toward fielding this system, although the system has not been flight-tested.
Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders
are focused on developing missile and WMD capabilities, particularly building nuclear
weapons. Although North Korean state media regularly carries official statements on
North Koreas justification for building nuclear weapons and threatening to use them as a
defensive or retaliatory measure, we do not know the details of Pyongyangs nuclear
doctrine or employment concepts. We have long assessed that, in Pyongyangs view, its
nuclear capabilities are intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive
diplomacy.
Chinas Expanding Nuclear Forces
The Peoples Liberation Armys (PLAs) Second Artillery Force continues to
modernize its nuclear missile force by adding more survivable road-mobile systems and
enhancing its silo-based systems. This new generation of missiles is intended to ensure the
viability of Chinas strategic deterrent by providing a second strike capability. In addition,
the PLA Navy continues to develop the JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
and might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The
JIN-class submarines, armed with JL-2 SLBMs, will give the PLA Navy its first long-
range, sea-based nuclear capability. We assess that the Navy will soon conduct its first
nuclear deterrence patrols.
Russias New Intermediate-Range Cruise Missile
Russia has developed a new cruise missile that the United States has declared to be
in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In 2013, Sergei
Ivanov, a senior Russian administration official, commented in an interview how the world
had changed since the time the INF Treaty was signed 1987 and noted that Russia was
developing appropriate weapons systems in light of the proliferation of intermediate-
and shorter-range ballistic missile technologies around the world. Similarly, as far back as
2007, Ivanov publicly announced that Russia had tested a ground-launched cruise missile
for its Iskander weapon system, whose range complied with the INF Treaty for now.
The development of a cruise missile that is inconsistent with INF, combined with these
statements about INF, calls into question Russias commitment to this treaty.
WMD Security in Syria
In June 2014, Syrias declared CW stockpile was removed for destruction by the
international community. The most hazardous chemical agents were destroyed aboard the
MV CAPE RAY as of August 2014. The United States and its allies continue to work
closely with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to verify
the completeness and accuracy of Syrias Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
declaration. We judge that Syria, despite signing the treaty, has used chemicals as a means
of warfare since accession to the CWC in 2013. Furthermore, the OPCW continues to
investigate allegations of chlorine use in Syria.
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE
Threats to US space systems and services will increase during 2015 and beyond as
potential adversaries pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Chinese
and Russian military leaders understand the unique information advantages afforded by
space systems and services and are developing capabilities to deny access in a conflict.
Chinese military writings highlight the need to interfere with, damage, and destroy
reconnaissance, navigation and communication satellites. China has satellite jamming
capabilities and is pursuing antisatellite systems. In July 2014, China conducted a
nondestructive antisatellite missile test. China conducted a previous destructive test of the
system in 2007, which created long-lived space debris. Russias 2010 Military Doctrine
emphasizes space defense as a vital component of its national defense. Russian leaders
openly assert that the Russian armed forces have antisatellite weapons and conduct
antisatellite research. Russia has satellite jammers and is pursuing antisatellite systems.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is a global, persistent threat to our
communities at home and our interests abroad. Savvy, profit-driven criminal networks
traffic in drugs, persons, wildlife, and weapons; corrode security and governance;
undermine legitimate economic activity and the rule of law; cost economies important
revenue; and undercut US development efforts.
 Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking will remain a major TOC threat to the United States. Mexico is
the largest foreign producer of US-bound marijuana, methamphetamines, and heroin, and
the conduit for the overwhelming majority of US-bound cocaine from South America. The
drug trade also undermines US interests abroad, eroding stability in parts of Africa and
Latin America; Afghanistan accounts for 80 percent of the worlds opium production.
Weak Central American states will continue to be the primary transit area for the majority
of US-bound cocaine. The Caribbean is becoming an increasingly important secondary
transit area for US- and European-bound cocaine. In 2013, the worlds capacity to produce
heroin reached the second highest level in nearly 20 years, increasing the likelihood that
the drug will remain accessible and inexpensive in consumer markets in the United States,
where heroin-related deaths have surged since 2007. New psychoactive substances (NPS),
including synthetic cannabinoids and synthetic cathinones, pose an emerging and rapidly
growing global public health threat. Since 2009, US law enforcement officials have
encountered more than 240 synthetic compounds. Worldwide, 348 new psychoactive
substances had been identified, exceeding the number of 234 illicit substances under
international controls.
Criminals Profiting from Global Instability
Transnational criminal organizations will continue to exploit opportunities in
ongoing conflicts to destabilize societies, economies, and governance. Regional unrest,
population displacements, endemic corruption, and political turmoil will provide openings
that criminals will exploit for profit and to improve their standing relative to other power
brokers.
Corruption
Corruption facilitates transnational organized crime and vice versa. Both
phenomena exacerbate other threats to local, regional, and international security.
Corruption exists at some level in all countries; however, the symbiotic relationship
between government officials and TOC networks is particularly pernicious in some
countries. One example is Russia, where the nexus among organized crime, state actors,
and business blurs the distinction between state policy and private gain.
Human Trafficking
Human trafficking remains both a human rights concern and a challenge to
international security. Trafficking in persons has become a lucrative source of revenue -
estimated to produce tens of billions of dollars annually. Human traffickers leverage
corrupt officials, porous borders, and lax enforcement to ply their illicit trade. This
exploitation of human lives for profit continues to occur in every country in the world -
undermining the rule of law and corroding legitimate institutions of government and
commerce.
Wildlife Trafficking
Illicit trade in wildlife, timber, and marine resources endangers the environment,
threatens rule of law and border security in fragile regions, and destabilizes communities
that depend on wildlife for biodiversity and ecotourism. Increased demand for ivory and
rhino horn in Asia has triggered unprecedented increases in poaching in Africa. Criminal
elements, often in collusion with corrupt government officials or security forces, are
involved in poaching and movement of ivory and rhino horn across Africa. Poaching
presents significant security challenges for militaries and police forces in African nations,
which often are outgunned by poachers and their allies. Illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing threatens food security and the preservation of marine resources. It
often occurs concurrently with forced labor in the fishing industry.
Theft of Cultural Properties, Artifacts, and Antiquities
Although the theft and trafficking of cultural heritage and art are traditions as old
as the cultures they represent, transnational organized criminals are acquiring,
transporting, and selling valuable cultural property and art more swiftly, easily, and
stealthily. These criminals operate on a global scale without regard for laws, borders,
nationalities or the significance of the treasures they smuggle.
ECONOMICS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
The global economy continues to adjust to and recover from the global financial
crisis that began in 2008; economic growth since that period is lagging behind that of the
previous decade. Resumption of sustained growth has been elusive for many of the
worlds largest economies, particularly in European countries and Japan. The prospect of
diminished or forestalled recoveries in these developed economies as well as
disappointing growth in key developing countries has contributed to a readjustment of
energy and commodity markets.
Energy and Commodities
Energy prices experienced sharp declines during the second half of 2014.
Diminishing global growth prospects, OPECs decision to maintain its output levels, rapid
increases in unconventional oil production in Canada and the United States, and the partial
resumption of some previously sidelined output in Libya and elsewhere helped drive down
prices by more than half since July, the first substantial decline since 2008-09. Lower-
priced oil and gas will give a boost to the global economy, with benefits enjoyed by
importers more than outweighing the costs to exporters.
Macroeconomic Stability
Extraordinary monetary policy or quantitative easing has helped revive growth
in the United States since the global financial crisis. However, this recovery and the
prospect of higher returns in the United States will probably continue to draw investment
capital from the rest of the world, where weak growth has left interest rates depressed.
Global output improved slightly in 2014 but continued to lag the growth rates seen
before 2008. Since 2008, the worldwide GDP growth rate has averaged about 3.2 percent,
well below its 20-year, pre-GFC average of 3.9 percent. Looking ahead, prospects for
slowing economic growth in Europe and China do not bode well for the global economic
environment.
Economic growth has been inconsistent among developed and developing
economies alike. Outside of the largest economiesthe United States, the EU, and China
economic growth largely stagnated worldwide in 2014, slowing to 2.1 percent. As a
result, the difference in growth rates of developing countries and developed countries
continued to narrowto 2.6 percentage points. This gap, smallest in more than a decade,
underscores the continued weakness in emerging markets, whose previously much-higher
average growth rates helped drive global growth.
HUMAN SECURITY
Critical Trends Converging
Several trends are converging that will probably increase the frequency of shocks
to human security in 2015. Emerging infectious diseases and deficiencies in international
state preparedness to address them remain a threat, exemplified by the epidemic spread of
the Ebola virus in West Africa. Extremes in weather combined with public policies that
affect food and water supplies will probably exacerbate humanitarian crises. Many states
and international institutions will look to the United States in 2015 for leadership to
address human security issues, particularly environment and global health, as well as those
caused by poor or abusive governance.
Global trends in governance are negative and portend growing instability. Poor and
abusive governance threatens the security and rights of individuals and civil society in
many countries throughout the world. The overall risk for mass atrocitiesdriven in part
by increasing social mobilization, violent conflict, and a diminishing quality of
governanceis growing. Incidents of religious persecution also are on the rise. Legal
restrictions on NGOs and the press, particularly those that expose government
shortcomings or lobby for reforms, will probably continue.
Infectious Disease Continues To Threaten Human Security Worldwide
Infectious diseases are among the foremost health security threats. A more
crowded and interconnected world is increasing the opportunities for human and animal
diseases to emerge and spread globally. This has been demonstrated by the emergence of
Ebola in West Africa on an unprecedented scale. In addition, military conflicts and
displacement of populations with loss of basic infrastructure can lead to spread of disease.
Climate change can also lead to changes in the distribution of vectors for diseases.
The Ebola outbreak, which began in late 2013 in a remote area of Guinea,
quickly spread into neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone and then into dense urban
transportation hubs, where it began spreading out of control. Gaps in disease surveillance
and reporting, limited health care resources, and other factors contributed to the outpacing
of the international communitys response in West Africa. Isolated Ebola cases appeared
outside of the most affected countriesnotably in Spain and the United Statesand the
disease will almost certainly continue in 2015 to threaten regional economic stability,
security, and governance.
Antimicrobial drug resistance is increasingly threatening global health security.
Seventy percent of known bacteria have acquired resistance to at least one antibiotic that
is used to treat infections, threatening a return to the pre-antibiotic era. Multidrug-resistant
tuberculosis has emerged in China, India, Russia, and elsewhere. During the next twenty
years antimicrobial drug-resistant pathogens will probably continue to increase in number
and geographic scope, worsening health outcomes, straining public health budgets, and
harming US interests throughout the world.
 MERS, a novel virus from the same family as SARS, emerged in 2012 in Saudi
Arabia. Isolated cases migrated to Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States. Cases of
highly pathogenic influenza are also continuing to appear in different regions of the world.
HIV/AIDS and malaria, although trending downward, remain global health priorities. In
2013, 2.1 million people were newly infected with HIV and 584,000 were killed by
malaria, according to the World Health Organization. Diarrheal diseases like cholera
continue to take the lives of 800,000 children annually.
The worlds population remains vulnerable to infectious diseases because
anticipating which pathogen might spread from animals to humans or if a human virus
will take a more virulent form is nearly impossible. For example, if a highly pathogenic
avian influenza virus like H7N9 were to become easily transmissible among humans, the
outcome could be far more disruptive than the great influenza pandemic of 1918. It could
lead to global economic losses, the unseating of governments, and disturbance of
geopolitical alliances.
Extreme Weather Exacerbating Risks to Global Food and Water Security
Extreme weather, climate change, and public policies that affect food and water
supplies will probably create or exacerbate humanitarian crises and instability risks.
Globally averaged surface temperature rose approximately 0.8 degrees Celsius (about 1.4
degrees Fahrenheit) from 1951 to 2014; 2014 was warmest on earth since recordkeeping
began. This rise in temperature has probably caused an increase in the intensity and
frequency of both heavy precipitation and prolonged heat waves and has changed the
spread of certain diseases. This trend will probably continue. Demographic and
development trends that concentrate people in citiesoften along coastswill compound
and amplify the impact of extreme weather and climate change on populations. Countries
whose key systems - food, water, energy, shelter, transportation, and medical - are resilient
will be better able to avoid significant economic and human losses from extreme weather.
Global food supplies will probably be adequate for 2015 but are becoming
increasingly fragile in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. The risks of worsening
food insecurity in regions of strategic importance to the United States will increase
because of threats to local food availability, lower purchasing power, and
counterproductive government policies. Price shocks will result if extreme weather or
disease patterns significantly reduce food production in multiple areas of the world,
especially in key exporting countries.
Risks to freshwater suppliesdue to shortages, poor quality, floods, and climate
changeare growing. These problems hinder the ability of countries to produce food and
generate energy, potentially undermining global food markets and hobbling economic
growth. Combined with demographic and economic development pressures, such
problems will particularly hinder the efforts of North Africa, the Middle East, and South
Asia to cope with their water problems. Lack of adequate water might be a destabilizing
factor in countries that lack the management mechanisms, financial resources, political
will, or technical ability to solve their internal water problems.
Some states are heavily dependent on river water controlled by upstream nations.
When upstream water infrastructure development threatens downstream access to water,
states might attempt to exert pressure on their neighbors to preserve their water interests.
Such pressure might be applied in international forums and also includes pressing
investors, nongovernmental organizations, and donor countries to support or halt water
infrastructure projects. Some countries will almost certainly construct and support major
water projects. Over the longer term, wealthier developing countries will also probably
face increasing water-related social disruptions. Developing countries, however, are
almost certainly capable of addressing water problems without risk of state failure.
Terrorist organizations might also increasingly seek to control or degrade water
infrastructure to gain revenue or influence populations.
Increase in Global Instability Risk
Global political instability risks will remain high in 2015 and beyond. Mass
atrocities, sectarian or religious violence, and curtailed NGO activities will all continue to
increase these risks. Declining economic conditions are contributing to risk of instability
or internal conflict.
Roughly half of the worlds countries not already experiencing or recovering
from instability are in the most risk and significant risk categories for regime-
threatening and violent instability through 2015.
Overall international will and capability to prevent or mitigate mass atrocities
will probably diminish in 2015 owing to reductions in government budgets and spending.
In 2014, about two dozen countries increased restrictions on NGOs.
Approximately another dozen also plan to do so in 2015, according to the International
Center for Nonprofit Law.
REGIONAL THREATS
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Iraq
Over six months into the coalition campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL), the frontlines against the group in Iraq have largely stabilized; no side is
able to muster the resources necessary to attain its territorial ambitions. The Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF), Peshmerga, Shia militants, and a few tribal alliesbolstered by air and
artillery strikes, weapons, and advice from the United States, Arab and Western allies, and
Iranhave prevented ISIL from gaining large swaths of additional territory.
Sectarian conflict in mixed Shia-Sunni areas in and around Baghdad that can
undermine progress against ISIL is growing. ISF and Shia militants are conducting a
campaign of retribution killings and forced displacement of Sunni civilians in several
areas contested by Sunni militants.
Since taking office, Prime Minister al-Abadi has taken steps to change the ethno-
sectarian tone in Baghdad, including engaging Sunni tribal leaders and reaching a tentative
oil agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government. However, the ethnosectarian
nature of security operations and persistent distrust among Iraqi leaders risk undermining
Abadis nascent political progress.
Syria
 The Syrian regime made consistent gains in 2014 in parts of western Syria that it
considers key, retaking ground in eastern Damascus, Horns, and Latakia; it is close to
surrounding Aleppo city. The regime will require years to reassert significant control over
the country.
The bulk of the opposition in the north is fighting on three frontsagainst the
regime, the al-Qaida-affiliated Nusrah Front, and ISIL. The opposition in the south has
made steady gains in areas that the regime has not made a priority and where ISIL has
only a limited presence.
The stability of Syrias neighbors is at risk due to the countrys prolonged conflict,
which will strain regional economies forced to absorb millions of refugees. The conflict
will also encourage regional sectarianism and continue to incubate extremist groups that
will use Syria as a launching pad for attacks across the Middle East.
The Syrian conflict is also putting huge economic and resource strains on
countries in the region primarily due to the nearly 4 million refugees fleeing the conflict.
Most of the refugees have fled to neighboring states. More than 620,000 are in Jordan;
almost 1.6 million are in Turkey; almost 1.2 million are in Lebanon; and more than
240,000 are in Iraq. These states have requested additional international support to
manage the influx.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
In an attempt to strengthen its self-declared caliphate, ISIL probably plans to
conduct operations against regional allies, Western facilities, and personnel in the Middle
East; it has already executed Western and Japanese hostages as well as a Jordanian Air
Force pilot. ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi outlined the groups ambitious external
goals, including the expansion of the caliphate into the Arabian Peninsula and North
Africa and attacks against Western, regional, and Shia interests, according to a public
statement in November 2014.
In September 2014, ISIL publicly called on all Sunnis to retaliate for US-led
airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, advocating the targeting of law enforcement and other
government officials using any means available. Individuals from Europe and North
America who have trained and fought with ISIL can return home and conduct attacks
either on their own or on ISILs behalf. The French citizen arrested in May 2014 for a
shooting at a Jewish museum in Brussels had returned from fighting, probably with ISIL
in Syria, and was wrapped in a flag with ISIL inscriptions when he was apprehended. We
do not know whether he acted at ISILs behest.
Iran
The Islamic Republic of Iran is an ongoing threat to US national interests because
of its support to the Asad regime in Syria, promulgation of anti-Israeli policies,
development of advanced military capabilities, and pursuit of its nuclear program.
President Ruhania longstanding member of the regime establishmentwill not depart
from Irans national security objectives of protecting the regime and enhancing Iranian
influence abroad, even while attempting different approaches to achieve these goals. He
requires Supreme Leader Khameneis support to continue engagement with the West,
moderate foreign policy, and ease social restrictions within Iran.
 Iran possesses a substantial inventory of theater ballistic missiles capable of
reaching as far as some areas of southeastern Europe. Tehran is developing increasingly
sophisticated missiles and improving the range and accuracy of its other missile systems.
Iran is also acquiring advanced naval and aerospace capabilities, including naval mines,
small but capable submarines, coastal defense cruise missile batteries, attack craft, anti-
ship missiles, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles.
In Iraq and Syria, Iran seeks to preserve friendly governments, protect Shia
interests, defeat Sunni extremists, and marginalize US influence. The rise of ISIL has
prompted Iran to devote more resources to blunting Sunni extremist advances that threaten
Irans regional allies and interests. Irans security services have provided robust military
support to Baghdad and Damascus, including arms, advisers, funding, and direct combat
support. Both conflicts have allowed Iran to gain valuable on-the-ground experience in
counterinsurgency operations. Iranian assistance; has been instrumental in expanding the
capabilities of Shia militants in Iraq. The ISIL threat has also reduced Iraqi resistance to
integrating those militants, with Iranian help, into the Iraqi Security Forces, but Iran has
uneven control over these groups.
Despite Irans intentions to dampen sectarianism, build responsive partners, and
deescalate tensions with Saudi Arabia, Iranian leadersparticularly within the security
servicesare pursuing policies with negative secondary consequences for regional
stability and potentially for Iran. Irans actions to protect and empower Shia communities
are fueling growing fears and sectarian responses.
Libya
We assess that Libya will remain volatile in 2015. Political polarization and
broadening militia violence have pushed Libya into a civil war. Nearly four years since the
evolution that toppled Qadhafi, rival governments have emerged, leaving the country with
no clear legitimate political authority or credible security forces. Militias aligned with the
rival governments continue to vie for dominance in Tripoli and Benghazi.
In Benghazi, fighting that began in May 2014 is ongoing between forces aligned
with former General Khalifa Haters Operation Dignity forces and Ansar al-Sharia (AAS)
and allied groups. In Tripoli, the Libya Dawn militias have driven their Zintani militia
rivals out of the city, but fighting continues southwest of Tripoli.
UN efforts to facilitate a negotiated resolution between Libyas rival governments
have shown limited momentum but as of early February 2015 have not made tangible
progress toward a unity government or a durable cease-fire.
Extremists and terrorists from al-Qaida-affiliated and allied groups are using
Libyas permissive security environment as a safe haven to plot attacks, including against
Western interests in Libya and the region. ISIL also has declared the country part of its
caliphate, and ISIL-aligned extremists are trying to institute sharia in parts of the country.
Yemen
The Huthis have emerged as the most powerful group in Yemen since taking Sanaa
last fall and are poised to dominate the political process after Presidents Hadis
resignation and their dissolution of the government. The group, however, continues to face
resistance as it expands toward the south and east. Southern Yemeni leaders have been
alarmed by the Huthis consolidation of control in Sanaa and are poised to oppose further
Huthi expansion south. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage
of many Sunni tribes opposition to Huthi expansion to gain recruits to fight against the
Huthis.
Chronic and severe economic and humanitarian problems, exacerbated by repeated
pipeline attacks and the Huthis push to reinstate costly fuel subsidies, will continue to
undercut government control and legitimacy. Yemen will probably continue pressuring
donor nations to make good on aid pledges while negotiating with tribes outside of
Sanaas control to keep oil exports flowing.
Huthi ascendency in Yemen has increased Irans influence as well.
Lebanon
Lebanon continues to struggle with spillover from the Syrian conflict, including
periodic sectarian violence: terrorist attacks: and the economic, political, and sectarian
strain associated with refugees.
Lebanon faces growing threats from terrorist groups, including the al-Nusrah
Front and ISIL. Sunni extremists are trying to establish networks in Lebanon and nave
increased attacks against Lebanese army and Hizballah positions along the Lebanese-
Syrian border. Lebanon potentially faces a protracted conflict in northern and eastern parts
of the country from extremist groups seeking to seize Lebanese territory, supplies, and
hostages.
The presence of over one million mostly Sunni Syrian refugees in Lebanon,
which has a population of only 4.1 million, has significantly altered Lebanons sectarian
demographics and is a continuing burden on the Lebanese economy. In October 2014, the
cabinet further tightened entry restrictions to allow only extreme humanitarian cases
into the country. Arrivals have declined 75 to 90 percent since August, most recently due
in part to the new restrictions.
Egypt
Egyptian officials have announced that legislative elections will start in March
2015 and that voting will be staggered in phases over seven weeks. Egypt faces a
persistent threat of terrorist and militant violence that is directed primarily at the state
security forces both in the Sinai Peninsula and mainland Egypt. Since mid-2013, Sinai-
based terrorist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM)affiliated since November with ISIL
has claimed responsibility for some of the most sophisticated and deadly attacks against
Egyptian security forces in decades.
Tunisia
Tunisia has transitioned to a permanent democratic government. Beji Caid Essebsi
was elected President in the presidential runoff election in December 2014. In January
2015, Essebsis political party Nidaa Tounes selected former Interior Minister Essid to
become Prime Minister.
In early February, Prime Minister Habib Essid formed a broad-based coalition
government, led by Nidaa Tounes. which included Islamist party al-Nahda and several
smaller parties. The new government almost certainly recognizes Tunisias economic and
security challenges.
The permanent government will inherit one of the highest youth unemployment
rates in the world, a high budget deficit, and decreasing Foreign Direct Investment and
balance of payments. It will struggle to meet public expectations for swift economic
progress.
EUROPE
Turkey
Turkey will remain a critical partner in a wide range of US security policy
priorities, including anti-ISIL and broader counterterrorism efforts. Joint US-Turkish
efforts to stem instability in Iraq and Syria share the same goals but employ different
approaches, increasing tension in the bilateral relationship. Turkish President Erdogan and
leaders of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) are focused on the general
elections, which are scheduled to be held in June 2015
Ankara will be more inclined to support the anti-ISIL coalition if the coalition
agrees to focus efforts against Asad, including setting up an internationally guaranteed
buffer zone in Syria.
Turkey is concerned that the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD)a group it
believes is affiliated with the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK/former PKK)will gain
international legitimacy.
Key Partners
The Transatlantic partnership remains vital as the United State:, works with
European leaders to maintain a concerted response to Russias action in Ukraine and to
other security challenges on the European continent and beyond. Europeans are working
to address fiscal challenges and encourage economic growth while maintaining and
strengthening financial governance.
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has the potential to help
generate economic growth for both the United States and Europe, reinforce the
transatlantic link, and address public concerns about data privacy and food and health
standards.
RUSSIA AND EURASIA
Russia
The Ukrainian crisis has profoundly affected Russias relations with the West and
will have far-reaching effects on Russias domestic politics, economic development, and
foreign policy.
President Vladimir Putin enjoys some of his highest domestic approval ratings in
all his years in office. An intense state media propaganda campaign has stoked Russians
perception that Putin righted a historical wrong in orchestrating Russias seizure of Crimea
and reasserted Russias great-power interests against a hostile West.
 At the same time, the crisis in Ukraine has exacerbated preexisting domestic
problems in Russia. The fall of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovychs
government in February 2014 has almost certainly deepened the Kremlins concerns over
the dangers of mass demonstrations and has intensified the Kremlins efforts to defuse
what it sees as potential catalysts for protests in Russia.
Russias economy was in decline even before the crisis began. Growth stagnated in
2014 due to declining oil prices, large capital outflows, and a sharply declining ruble. In
addition, economic sanctions cut off some Russian firms from Western financing. These
factors have increased the real and perceived risks of doing business in Russia, raised the
overall cost of international credit, and will probably drive Russia into recession in 2015.
Moscow is pushing for greater regional integration, pressing neighboring states to
follow the example of Belarus and Kazakhstan and join the Moscow-led Eurasian
Economic Union. The Kremlin is also cultivating its relationship with China, seeking to
maintain some influence in Europe and emphasizing multilateral forums to counter what
Moscow views as US unilateralism. These trends were already present in Russian
diplomacy, but the Ukrainian crisis has almost certainly lent emphasis to these policies.
Russia is taking information warfare to a new level, working to fan anti-US and
anti-Western sentiment both within Russia and globally. Russian state-controlled media
publish false and misleading information in an effort to discredit the West, undercut
consensus on Russia, and build sympathy for Russian positions.
In Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated its willingness to covertly use military and
paramilitary forces in a neighboring statea development that raises anxieties in states
along Russias periphery. Future Russian deployments and force posture changes will
probably be designed to maximize their diplomatic and public impact in Europe. Russian
military officials have announced plans to conduct more out-of-area air and naval
deployments, to include greater activity in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas.
Moscow has made headway in modernizing its nuclear and conventional forces,
improving its training and joint operational proficiency, modernizing its military doctrine
to integrate new methods of warfare, and developing long-range, precision-strike
capabilities. Despite its economic difficulties, Moscow is committed to modernizing its
military.
Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus
Ukraine faces a daunting array of problems after nearly a year of conflict with
Russia and its proxies in eastern Ukraine. At the same time, the crisis has fostered a sense
of national identity and unity. Public opinion has shifted heavily in favor of pursuing
integration with the EU while views of Russia have become sharply negative. Moreover,
for the first time, a narrow majority of the population supports NATO membership.
Negotiations over the status of the separatist-held territory in eastern Ukraine will
almost certainly be difficult and protracted. Russia has supplied substantial quantities of
heavy weapons to strengthen the separatists forces and covertly supports them with its
own troops, both within Ukraine and from across the border. More importantly, Moscow
has demonstrated that it is willing to intervene directly to prevent the separatists from
being defeated on the battlefield. Further fighting is likely in 2015.
 Ukraines dire economic situation presents no less a challenge to Kyiv than the
conflict in the east. Ukraine will be highly dependent on substantial outside financial
assistance for years to come.
In Moldova, the narrow victory of pro-EU parties in the latest parliamentary
elections suggests that Moldova will push ahead with its European integration agenda.
However, Chisinau still faces numerous challenges in seeking to overcome economic
difficulties, entrenched corruption, and Moscows displeasure with Moldovas rejection of
closer integration with Russia. Any progress on resolving the political status of the ethnic-
Russian separatist region of Transnistria is unlikely.
On 1 January 2015, Belarus became, along with Kazakhstan, a founding member
of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), a regional integration project that Moscow
eventually plans to transform into a Eurasian Union as a counterpart to the EU. President
Lukashenko has tread carefully in regard to the Ukrainian crisis, declining to recognize
Russias seizure of Crimea, but agreeing nevertheless to deepen military cooperation with
Moscow.
The Caucasus and Central Asia
In Georgia, progress is unlikely on the core disputes between Tbilisi and Moscow,
including Georgias NATO aspirations and the status of the occupied territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tensions with Russia will remain high, and we assess that
Moscow will press Tbilisi to abandon closer EU and NATO ties.
Armenia and Azerbaijan saw an increase in 2014 of ceasefire violations and a
record number of casualties along the Line of Contact (LOC), which separates ethnic
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces near the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The
increased violence highlights how the close proximity of opposing military forces
continues to pose a risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation. Prospects for a
peaceful resolution in the foreseeable future are dim.
Central Asian states remain concerned about regional instability in light of a
reduced Coalition presence in Afghanistan. Although they have long been alarmed about
the activities of Central Asian militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they
are increasingly worried about the threat posed by the return of the small but growing
number of their nationals who have traveled to Syria to join violent Islamist extremist
groups. On the whole, however, the Central Asian states will probably face more acute
risks of instability in 2015 from internal issues such as unclear political succession plans,
weak economies, ethnic tensions, and political repressionany of which could produce a
crisis with little warning.
EAST ASIA
China
China will continue to pursue an active foreign policyespecially within the Asia
Pacificbolstered by increasing capabilities and its firm stance on East and South China
Sea territorial disputes with rival claimants. The chances for sustained tensions will persist
bees use competing claimants will probably pursue actionsincluding energy exploration
that others perceive as infringing on their sovereignty. China will probably seek to
expand its economic role and outreach in the region, pursuing broader acceptance of its
economic initiatives, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. Although China
remains focused on regional issues, it will seek a greater voice on major international
issues and in making new international rules.
Notwithstanding this external agenda, Chinese leaders will focus primarily on
addressing domestic concerns. The Chinese Communist Party leadership under President
Xi Jinping announced an ambitious agenda of legal reforms in late 2014 that built on its
previous agenda of ambitious economic reformsall aimed at improving government
efficiency and accountability and strengthening the control of the Communist Party. The
difficulty of implementing these reforms and bureaucratic resistance to them create the
possibility of rising internal frictions as the agenda moves forward. Beijing will also
remain concerned about the potential for domestic unrest or terrorist acts in Xinjiang and
Tibet, which might lead to renewed human rights abuses. Following months of pro-
democracy protests in late 2014, Chinese leaders will monitor closely political
developments in Hong Kong for signs of instability.
North Korea
Three years after taking the helm of North Korea, Kim Jong Un has further
solidified his position as unitary leader and final decision authority through purges,
executions, and leadership shuffles. Kim was absent from public view for 40 days in late
2014, leading to widespread foreign media speculation about his health and the regimes
stability. The focus on Kims healths a reminder that the regimes stability might hinge on
Kims personal status. Kim has no clearly identified successor and is inclined to prevent
the emergence of a clear number two who could consolidate power in his absence. Kim
and the regime have publicly emphasized his focus on improving the countrys troubled
economy and the livelihood of the North Korean people while maintaining the tenets of a
command economy. He has codified this approach via his dual-track policy of economic
development and advancement of nuclear weapons. (Information on North Koreas
nuclear weapons program and intentions can be found above in the section on WMD and
Proliferation.) Despite renewed efforts at diplomatic outreach, Kim continues to challenge
the international community with provocative and threatening behavior in pursuit of his
goals, as prominently demonstrated in the November 2014 cyber attack on Sony.
SOUTH ASIA
Afghanistan
President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah secured
Parliaments approval of the Bilateral Security Agreement and NATO Status of Forces
Agreement prior to the NATO Ministerial in December 2014. Despite the 12 January
announcement of the r cabinet nominees, Ghani and Abdullah have yet to win legislative
approval for all of those nominated or resolve the final details of their shared political
powers derived from their national unity government agreement. Resolving these issues
will require continued international engagement and support.
International financial aid remains the most important external determinant of the
Kabul governments strength. However, the slow economic recovery from the global
financial crisis has created fiscal challenges for many of Afghanistans primary donors,
particularly in Europe and Japan. These economic hurdles at home have reduced donors
enthusiasm and capacity to provide Afghanistan additional long-term financial aid above
levels pledged through 2017 and reaffirmed in 2014 at the London Conference and NATO
Wales Summit.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) prevented the Taliban from
achieving a decisive military advantage in 2014. The ANSF, however, will require
continued international security sector support and funding to stave off an increasingly
aggressive Taliban insurgency through 2015. The ANSF, with the help of anti-Taliban
powerbrokers and international funding, will probably maintain control of most major
population centers. However, the forces will most likely cede control of some rural areas.
Without international funding, the ANSF will probably not remain a cohesive or viable
force.
The Taliban will probably remain largely cohesive under the leadership of Mullah
Omar and sustain its countrywide campaign to take territory in outlying areas and steadily
reassert influence over significant portions of the Pashtun countryside, positioning itself
for greater territorial gains in 2015. Reliant on Afghanistans opiate trade as a key
domestic source of funding, the Taliban will be able to exploit increasing opium poppy
cultivation and potential heroin production for ready revenue. The Taliban has publicly
touted the end of the mission of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
and coalition drawdown as a sign of its inevitable victory, reinforcing its commitment to
returning to power.
Pakistan
Pakistan will probably continue to implement some economic reforms and target
anti-Pakistan militants and their activities.
Prime Minister Sharifs promises to address economic, energy, and security
issues almost certainly fell short of high public expectations. Furthermore, his standing
weakened when he reportedly asked the Army to step in and handle opposition protests in
late 2014.
We assess that Islamabad will approve some additional economic reforms in
2015. Undertaking future economic and energy reforms will be more challenging and will
probably face greater political and popular opposition.
The Pakistan Government will probably focus in 2015 on diminishing the
capabilities of the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which claimed the attack on a school in
December - leaving over 100 children dead.
We judge that Pakistan will aim to establish positive rapport with the new Afghan
Government, but longstanding distrust and unresolved disputes between the countries will
prevent substantial progress.
Pakistans provision of safe haven to Lashkar-e Tayyiba will probably continue to
be a key irritant in relations with India.
India
Prime Minister Narendra Modis decisive leadership style, combined with the 2014
election of an absolute majority in the lower house of Parliament of his Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), will enable more decisive Indian decisionmaking on domestic and foreign
policy. Although India has a long-standing position that it maintain an independent policy,
Modi will probably seek to work more closely with the United States on security,
terrorism, and economic issues.
India wants to maintain a stable peace with Pakistan but views Pakistan as a direct
terrorism threat and a regional source of instability.
India is concerned about the stability of Afghanistan and its own presence there
following the drawdown of international forces and is looking for options to blunt the
influence of Pakistani-supported groups and ensure that Afghanistan does not revert to a
haven for anti-Indian militants.
Indian leaders will almost certainly pursue stronger economic ties with China that
support the governments economic agenda of closing the trade gap and attracting
investment in infrastructure. New Delhis concern over perceived Chinese aggressiveness
along he disputed border and in the Indian Ocean is probably growing in light of border
incidents and the visit of a Chinese submarine to Sri Lanka in 2014.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Sub-Saharan Africa will face political and security challenges in 2015 including
numerous presidential elections, ongoing insurgencies, and continuing intrastate conflict.
The ongoing Ebola virus epidemic will undoubtedly challenge both Western African
nations and the larger international community in trying to contain the virus spread and
counter economic degradation in fragile West African nations. Stability in South Sudan,
Nigeria, Somalia, and the Central African Republic (CAR) will almost certainly remain
tenuous throughout 2015.
West Africa
The Ebola virus will persist throughout West Africa in 2015, posing a significant
threat to the economic viability and consequently the stability of the region. The continued
drain on resources and unprecedented need for medical personnel will strain governments
and economies in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guineathe three worst-affected countries.
Sustained financial and materiel assistance from the international community, continued
domestic support for the governments anti-Ebola efforts, and community engagement to
change local misperceptions about the diseases cause, treatment options, and burial
practices will remain critical to slowing the epidemic. Economic growth in the outbreak
zone has already slowed and will continue to slow during 2015, straining budgets and
probably increasing dependence on international donor aid. A prolonged or severe
outbreak that continues well into 2015 might prompt Guinea to delay Presidential
elections, increasing the possibility of election-related violence. Military and security
services in the key outbreak countries will probably successfully contain isolated unrest
and local hostility toward Ebola-response personnel.
Sudan
Khartoum will almost certainly confront a range of challenges, including continued
insurgencies in the periphery, public dissatisfaction over continued economic decline, and
potential protests surrounding its April 2015 elections. Sudanese economic conditions
since South Sudans independence in 2011 continue to deteriorate. Such conditions,
including rising prices on staple goods, fuel opposition to the Sudanese Government.
South Sudan
Clashes between opposition forces and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
(SPLA) will almost certainly increase during the dry seasonwhich lasts from November
to Aprilundermining ongoing peace talks and putting tenuous humanitarian gains at
risk. Peace talks between Juba and opposition elements will probably remain slow-going.
Nigeria
Instability in Nigeria will probably increase in 2015, given contentious elections
delayed until March and April, plummeting oil revenue, and the militarys inability to
check Boko Harams ascendancy in the northeast. The election will occasion violence,
with prospects for protests in the months following the election. In addition, militants
might remobilize in the Niger Del a and attack the oil industry. Boko Haram will probably
continue to solidify control over its self-declared Islamic state in northeastern Nigeria and
expand its terror campaign in neighboring Nigerian states, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad.
Abujas reliance on oil exports for revenue will almost certainly ensure that Nigeria
remains vulnerable to fluctuations in the global oil market in 2015. Declining oil prices
will probably squeeze government revenues and drain currency reserves. Abujas
overtaxed security forces will have e limited ability to anticipate and preempt threats.
Somalia
In Somalia, al-Shabaab is conducting asymmetric attacks against government
facilities and Western targets in and around Mogadishu. The credibility and effectiveness
of the young Somali Government will be further threatened by persistent political
infighting; ill-equipped government institutions; and pervasive technical, political, and
administrative shortfalls.
Lords Resistance Army
The Lords Resistance Army (LRA), even in its weakened state, probably has the
ability to regenerate if counter-LRA operations are reduced. The LRA continues to display
great agility in its geographic areas of operation and in the operational security of its
activities.
Central African Republic
Despite the presence of international peacekeeping forces, the risk of continued
ethno-religious clashes between Christians and Muslims throughout the country, including
in the capital, remains high.
The Sahel
Governments in Africas Sahel regionparticularly Chad, Niger, Mali, and
Mauritaniawill remain at risk of terrorist attacks and possible internal conflict. Al-
Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups are committed
to continuing their terrorist activity in the Sahel, including against Western interests. They
will probably seek to increase the frequency and scale of attacks in northern Mali.
Sahelien militaries will struggle to handle a wide array of security threats.
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Cuba
Cuban President Raul Castros focus will almost certainly be preparing the country
for the eventual end of the Castro era and maintaining tight political control. He is
cautiously implementing economic and leadership reforms and released dozens of political
prisoners in early January. Cubas principal interest in normalizing relations with the
United States is probably linked to its recognition of the need to ease discontent over
dismal living conditions and poor economic prospects. The slow rollout of economic
reforms and a fall in nickel output cut GDP growth to 1.2 percent in 2014. Crucial
components of the economic reform programreducing the state role in the economy and
opening up a few opportunities for self-employmentwill probably produce numerous,
short-term economic dislocations before gradually increasing productivity and jobs.
Cubas population of 11 million has been declining since about 2005 because of
falling birthrates and emigration. Cuban migrant arrivals at the US southwest border rose
from 10,400 in FY12 to 17,300 in FY14. Maritime arrivals and interdictions will probably
increase in 2015 because of rumors that if the two countries normalize relations, the
United States would change immigration policies that allow Cubans who reach the United
States to obtain status.
Central America
Weak institutions, poor economic prospects, and the growing strength of criminal
gangs will probably limit the ability of the governments of Central Americas northern tier
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Hondurasto improve rule of law, job opportunities, and
citizen security, which will probably continue to fuel immigration to the United States in
2015. Fractured legislatures, political challenges, and entrenched business interests will
probably slow agreement on raising soma of the lowest tax collection rates in the world or
adopting economic and social policies that would help -educe the high rates of poverty
that spur migration to the United States. About 25 percent of El Salvadors population has
emigrated during the past two decades, mostly to the United States, because of lack of
economic opportunities and widespread insecurity. El Salvadors economy has
experienced the lowest economic growth rates in the region for eight consecutive years.
Guatemalas weak fiscal position will undermine efforts to ameliorate extreme poverty,
particularly in rural areas. About 1.6 million Guatemalans reside in the United States and
send about $5.5 billion in remittances back home each year. Honduras, one of the
hemispheres poorest countries, is struggling to make headway against ineffective, corrupt
institutions. Honduras has the worlds highest rate of homicides per capita, despite a
repotted modest decline in 2014, and criminal gangs are forcibly recruiting youth and
extorting businesses and individuals.
Venezuela
Like most oil-exporting nations, Venezuela is experiencing the economic
consequences of policy choices and the decline in global oil prices. Oil accounts for about
95 percent of Venezuelan export earnings and 45 percent of government revenue. Caracas
will face a strained fiscal environment in 2015 along with rising inflation and shortages of
essential goods.
Legislative elections are slated to occur by the end of 2015; voters will be
concerned about public security, the economy, and political rights. President Nicolas
Madura appointed a presidential commission to review the countrys police system and
recommend reforms after the high-profile murder of a national assembly deputy and a
violent law enforcement confrontation in October 2014 with a radical, armed group known
as a colectivo.
Haiti
Political tensions between Haitian President Martelly and his opponents will
probably flare during 2015 and might undermine preparations for overdue local and
parliamentary elections as well as for the vote for a new president in November 2015.
Haiti will need substantial technical and financial support from the international
community to organize and hold elections. Some violent protests are probable and might
become more intense or widespread if political opponents believe that electoral
preparations favor Martellys party or allies.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
DIA Director Worldwide Threat Assessment
Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Vincent R. Stewart
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Information available as of February 20, 2015 was used in the preparation of
this assessment
* * * * * * * * * * * *
INTRODUCTION
Iraq and Afghanistan Terrorism * Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) *
Al-Qaida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) * Al-Nusrah Front * Khorasan Group
* Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) * Boko Haram
REGIONAL THREATS
Russia * East Asia * China * North Korea * Middle East and North Africa * Iran *
Syria * Libya * Egypt * Yemen * South Asia * Pakistan * India * Africa * Somalia *
Nigeria * Latin America * Mexico * Colombia * Venezuela * Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala
GLOBAL THREATS
U.S. Space Systems and Services * Cyber * Proliferation of WMD and Ballistic
Missiles * Proliferation of Advanced Conventional Weapons * Infectious Diseases *
Foreign Intelligence & Insider Threats
 * * * * * * * * * * * *
INTRODUCTION
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and Members of the Committee, thank
you for the invitation to provide the Defense Intelligence Agencys (DIA) assessment of
the global security environment and to address the threats facing the nation. A confluence
of global political, military, social, and technological developments, taken in aggregate,
have created security challenges more diverse and complex than those we have
experienced in our lifetimes.
Our challenges range from highly capable, near-peer competitors to empowered
individuals and the concomitant reduction in our own capacity will make those challenges
all the more stressing on our defense and intelligence establishments. This strategic
environment will be with us for some time, and the threats increasing scope, volatility,
and complexity will be the new normal.
The 16,500 men and women of DIA stationed around the globe are confronting
this rapidly evolving defense landscape head-on, and leading the Intelligence Community
(IC) in providing unique defense intelligence from the strategic to the tactical level to
deliver a decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, the defense acquisition
community, and policymakers. The men and women - both uniformed and civilian - of
your DIA know they have a vital responsibility to the American people and take great
pride in their work. I am privileged to serve with them and present their analysis to you.
My hope is that this hearing will help the nation - through the important oversight role of
Congress - to better understand the diversity of the global challenges we face and to
support this committee in developing possible responses to these threats. Thank you for
your confidence and support.
I will begin first with an assessment of Iraq, followed by Afghanistan, where the
Department of Defense (DoD), DIA, the IC, and our Coalition partners are on the front
lines, actively supporting military operations against threats from the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL), al-Qaida, and the Taliban. I will then transition to a selected group
of violent extremist organizations, and conclude with other regional challenges and global
threats.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
ISILs resurgence since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 was
vividly displayed by the groups rapid advance across much of northern and western Iraq
last spring. Since that time, Coalition airstrikes have removed a number of ISIL senior
leaders and degraded the groups ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria. We expect
ISIL to continue entrenching itself and consolidating gains in Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria
while also fighting for territory outside those areas. We also expect ISIL to continue
limited offensive operations, such as the groups recent operations in Syria and Anbar
province of Iraq. Seizing and holding Shia and Kurdish-populated areas of Iraq have been,
and will continue to be difficult for ISIL in 2015. ISILs ability to govern the areas it has
captured in Iraq and Syria, and its ability to keep the support - or at least acquiescence - of
the Sunni population will be key indicators of the success or failure of the self-declared
Islamic state. With affiliates in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, the group is beginning to
assemble a growing international footprint that includes ungoverned and under-governed
areas. Similarly, the flow of foreign fighters into, and out of, Syria and Iraq - many of
whom are aligned with ISIL- is troubling.
Defeats of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the collapse of multiple army divisions
highlight large-scale institutional deficiencies within the ISF. Several of the more
concerning deficiencies include poor logistics and endemic corruption that has bred
ineffective commanders and led to poor morale. Force generation efforts will be
complicated by a lack of experienced and qualified soldiers. Local and tribal pro-
government forces suffer from similar supply and manning shortages.
The ISF remains unable to defend against external threats or sustain conventional
military operations against internal challenges without foreign assistance. Iraq is
diversifying its defense acquisitions through numerous foreign military sales including
with Russia and other non-U.S. suppliers to overcome equipment shortfalls and capability
gaps. These decisions are reducing ISF interoperability.
Turning to Afghanistan, the still-developing Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF) remain stalemated with the Taliban-led insurgency. In 2015, we expect the ANSF
to maintain stability and security in Kabul and key urban areas while retaining freedom of
movement on major highways. However, the Taliban, al- Qaida, and their extremist allies
will likely seek to exploit the reduced Coalition presence by pressuring ANSF units in
rural areas, conducting high profile attacks in major population centers, and expanding
their safe havens.
ANSF will remain reliant on Coalition enablers for air, intelligence, and
maintenance support. As NATO and our allies carry out their scheduled drawdown, the
ANSF will struggle to effectively replace these lost enablers, deal with interoperability
challenges between the army and police, and address persistent maintenance and logistical
issues.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is the most proficient security institution in
Afghanistan, and has shown the capacity to plan and conduct multi-corps operations in
high-threat areas. However, the ANA will continue to struggle with permanently denying
the insurgents freedom of movement in rural areas, and will remain constrained by its
stretched airlift and logistical capacity. High attrition also continues to plague the force,
which has struggled to keep its numbers near full capacity.
The Afghan National Police (ANP) provide sufficient presence and security within
urban centers and provincial and district hubs, but remain vulnerable in controlling high-
threat, rural areas. ANP challenges include manpower shortages, inadequate training,
attrition, logistics shortfalls, and the corrosive influence of corruption. These factors have
diminished the effectiveness of the ANP and undermined its popular image.
In 2014, the Afghan Air Force (AAF) improved its support to ground operations,
significantly increasing the number of casualty evacuation missions and forward
deployments of Mi-17 transport helicopters and Mi-35 gunships into contested areas.
Despite these improvements, the AAF is not a reliable source of close air support and still
struggles with recruiting qualified pilots and technicians.
The development of ANSF capabilities in 2015 will be critical as the insurgency
will again attempt to increase its influence in rural areas, operate in larger formations, and
continue to test security forces by temporarily seizing a number of vulnerable rural
Afghan checkpoints and district centers. This will include increased high profile attacks,
particularly in Kabul, where the Taliban seeks to undermine perceptions of Afghan
security. The Taliban will probably sustain the capability to propagate a rural-based
insurgency that can project intermittent attacks in urban areas through at least 2018.
TERRORISM
Al-Qaida core is now focused on physical survival following battlefield losses. At
the same time, the group is trying to retain its status as the vanguard of the global
extremist movement, being eclipsed now by ISILs rising global prominence and powerful
competition for adherents. Al-Qaida core in Pakistan continues to retain the loyalty of its
global affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, Syria, and South Asia.
Despite ongoing counterterrorism (CT) pressure and competition from ISIL, al-
Qaida will likely retain a transnational attack capability, and will likely try to expand its
limited presence in eastern Afghanistan as Western CT operations there decline. Beyond
core al-Qaida, I would like to highlight for the committee a handful of other violent
extremist groups that are of particular concern to DIA.
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains committed to attacking the
West, probably by targeting commercial aviation with innovative explosives, and will
leverage instability in Yemen to its advantage.
Al-Qaida in Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) recently increased efforts to
expand its operating areas across North and West Africa by working with, and through,
other regional terrorist groups. AQIM almost certainly continues to plan attacks and
kidnapping operations against U.S. allies in the region.
As part of the larger al-Qaida network, we are concerned about the support al-
Nusrah Front provides to transnational terrorist attack plotting against U.S. and Western
interests.
The Khorasan Group is a cadre of experienced al-Qaida operatives that works
closely with al-Nusrah Front. Although coalition airstrikes have killed a number of senior
Khorasan Group members, the group almost certainly will maintain the intent to continue
plotting against Western interests unless completely destroyed.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Lebanese
Hizballah are instruments of Irans foreign policy and its ability to project power in Iraq,
Syria, and beyond. Hizballah continues to support the Syrian regime, pro-regime militants
and Iraqi Shia militants in Syria. Hizballah trainers and advisors in Iraq assist Iranian and
Iraqi Shia militias fighting Sunni extremists there. Select Iraqi Shia militant groups also
warned of their willingness to fight U.S. forces returning to Iraq.
Boko Harams (BH) offensive in northeastern Nigeria, largely against the Nigerian
government, includes near daily attacks. If continued, BHs successes could grow into a
significant regional crisis with implications outside northwest Africa.
REGIONAL THREATS RUSSIA
 Russia has made significant progress modernizing its nuclear and conventional
forces, improving its training and joint operational proficiency, modernizing its military
doctrine to integrate new methods of warfare, and developing long range precision strike
capabilities. Despite its economic difficulties, Moscow is fully committed to modernizing
both nuclear and conventional forces. At the same time, Russian forces have conducted
exercises and a record number of out-of-area air and naval operations. We expect these to
continue this year to include greater activity in the Caribbean and Mediterranean Seas.
In 2014, Moscow moved to shape events in Ukraine, employing its improved
military capabilities to create a long-term conflict in Ukraines Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. All indications are that Moscow will continue to employ a mix of military and
nonmilitary pressure against Kyiv this year, to include the use of propaganda and
information operations, cyberspace operations, covert agents, regular military personnel
operating as volunteers, mercenaries, arms transfers to the separatists, and the threat of
military intervention. These actions are consistent with Russias new military doctrine
Moscow affirmed its intent to improve the militarys capability to control the Russian
Arctic region, stressing the areas current and future strategic and economic importance.
In December Moscow announced the activation of a Joint Service Command
(OSK) North, highlighting the importance of the Arctic to Russian leaders.
Russia will continue to place the highest priority on the maintenance of a robust
and capable arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons. Priorities for the strategic nuclear forces
include the modernization of its road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and upgrades to strategic forces command and control facilities. In the next year, Russia
will field more road-mobile SS-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles. It also will continue development of the RS-26 ballistic missile, the
Dolgorukiy ballistic missile submarine, its SS-N-32 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic
missile, and next-generation air-and ground-launched cruise missiles.
EAST ASIA
Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is building a modern military capable of
defending Chinas core interests of preserving its political system, protecting territorial
integrity and sovereignty (China views these to include Taiwan and other contested claims
to land and water), and ensuring sustainable economic and social development.
The PLA remains focused on transforming the army into a fully mechanized force.
The PLA is converting its divisions into brigades to increase lethality and improve combat
capabilities. Chinas national-level training focus has been on brigade-level exercises that
stress unit combat mission capabilities under realistic conditions, long distance mobility,
and command and control. We expect these trends to continue.
The PLA Navy continues to expand its operational and deployment areas. Chinas
first aircraft carrier, commissioned in late 2012, will not reach its full potential until it
acquires a fully operational fixed-wing air regiment, but we expect the navy will make
progress toward its goal this year.
The South China Sea (SCS) remains a potential flashpoint. Overlapping claims
among China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Brunei- exacerbated by
large-scale construction or major steps to militarize or expand law enforcement- has
increased tensions among claimants. This has prompted an increase in defense acquisition,
to include submarine capabilities, in some of these countries.
In 2014, China twice deployed submarines to the Indian Ocean. The submarines
probably conducted area familiarization to form a baseline for increasing Chinas power
projection. China continues production of JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We expect China to conduct its first
nuclear deterrence patrols this year.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is approaching modernization on a scale
unprecedented in its history. China now has two stealth fighter programs - the third and
fourth J-20 prototypes, which conducted their first flights in March and July 2014. Further
PLAAF developments are anticipated.
Chinas nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50-60 ICBMs. China is adding more
survivable road-mobile systems, enhancing its silo-based systems, and developing a sea-
based nuclear deterrent. They are also augmenting more than 1,200 conventional short-
range ballistic missiles deployed opposite Taiwan with a limited but growing number of
conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-16, which will
improve Chinas ability to strike regional targets. China continues to deploy growing
numbers of the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile and is developing a tiered ballistic
missile defense system, having successfully tested the upper-tier capability on two
occasions.
The Democratic Peoples Republic of Koreas (DPRK) primary goals are
preserving the control of the Kim family regime, improving its poor economy, and
deterring attack by improving its strategic and conventional military capabilities.
Pyongyang maintains that nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are essential to ensure
its sovereignty.
The DPRK continues to prioritize maintaining the readiness of its large, forward-
deployed forces. While Pyongyang is stressing increased realism in military training,
exercises still appear to do little more than maintain basic competencies. Because of its
conventional military deficiencies, the DPRK is also concentrating on improving its
deterrence capabilities, especially its nuclear technology and ballistic missile forces.
We believe the DPRK continues to develop its nuclear weapons and missile
programs which pose a serious threat to the U.S. and regional allies. We remain concerned
that the DPRK will conduct a nuclear test in the future. Following the United Nations
(U.N.) condemnation of its human rights record in November 2014, Pyongyang indicated
it would not refrain any further from conducting a nuclear test. This followed a
statement in March 2014 wherein North Koreas Foreign Ministry warned it would not
rule out a new form of nuclear test.
Pyongyang is also making efforts to expand and modernize its deployed close-,
short-, medium-, and intermediate-range systems. It seeks to develop longer-range ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the U.S., and continues efforts to bring
its KN08 road-mobile ICBM to operational capacity. In 2015, North Korea will continue
improving the combat proficiency of its deployed ballistic missile force, and will work to
improve missile designs to boost overall capability. Pyongyang likely will launch
additional ballistic missiles as part of its training and research and development process.
We remain concerned by North Koreas illicit proliferation activities and attempts to evade
U.N. sanctions.
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to threaten U.S. strategic interests in the
Middle East. Irans actions and policies are designed to further its goal of becoming the
dominant regional power, as well as enhance its strategic depth.
Tehran views the U.S. as its most capable adversary and has fashioned its military
strategy and doctrine accordingly. Irans military posture is primarily defensive and is
designed to deter an attack, survive an initial attack if deterrence fails, and retaliate against
its aggressor to force a diplomatic resolution. Irans numerous underground facilities have
helped reduce its military vulnerabilities. We do not anticipate any changes to this posture
in 2015.
We continue to assess Irans goal is to develop capabilities that will allow it to
build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. The
regime faces no insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon, making
Irans political will the central issue.
Irans overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater ballistic
missiles capable of reaching as far as southeastern Europe. Iran continues to develop more
sophisticated missiles, and is improving the range and accuracy of its current missile
systems. Iran publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as early as
this year capable of ICBM ranges, if configured as such.
Iran is also steadily improving its military capabilities. The navy is developing
faster, more lethal surface vessels, growing its submarine force, expanding its cruise
missile defense capabilities, and increasing its presence in international waters. The navy
aspires to travel as far as the Atlantic Ocean.
Iran is laboring to modernize its air and air defense forces under the weight of
international sanctions. Each year, Iran unveils what it claims are state-of-the-art, Iranian-
made systems, including surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), radars, and unmanned aerial
vehicles. It continues to seek an advanced long-range SAM.
We assess the conflict in Syria is trending in the Asad regimes favor, which holds
the military advantage in Aleppo - Syrias largest city. In 2015, we anticipate the regimes
strategy will be to encircle Aleppo, cut opposition supply lines, and besiege the
opposition. Hizballah and Iran, Damascus key allies in its fight against the opposition,
continue to provide training, advice, and extensive logistical support to the Syrian
government and its supporters. Despite the regimes military advantage - particularly in
firepower and air superiority - it will continue to struggle and be unable to decisively
defeat the opposition in 2015.
In Libya, political instability and ongoing militia violence have worsened over the
year, exacerbating conditions that have already made Libya an attractive terrorist safe
haven. ISIL has increased its presence and influence in Libya, particularly in Darnah,
where it has begun establishing Islamic institutions. Without a unified government and
capable military, there is limited possibility of stability in the near-term.
As Egypt prepares for parliamentary elections this spring, its leaders are facing
numerous security concerns driven by regional unrest and several major terrorist attacks in
2014. Egyptian security forces face frequent attacks in Sinai and the Nile Valley despite
suppressing most of the political unrest last year. Egyptians have also been attacked from
and within Libyan territory. Egypt has responded to these attacks by increasing its CT
campaign in Sinai and tightening security on the Gaza and Libya borders to reduce
militant and arms flow into Egypt. Egypt has also responded to attacks on its citizens in
Libya with airstrikes and has called on the international coalition fighting ISIL to include
Libya in the fight. The upcoming year will likely see Egyptian security forces stressed by
internal terrorist activities and efforts to manage instability in Libya.
In Yemen, instability has increased since the Huthis, a northern Zaydi Shia group
with Iranian ties, captured the Presidential Palace in mid-January and attained senior
positions in nearly all key Yemeni government and security institutions. Current
conditions are providing AQAP operational space. Meanwhile, Yemens neighbors are
increasingly concerned about instability spilling across their borders, potentially spreading
another humanitarian crisis in the region.
SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan Army ground operations in North Waziristan Agency (NWA) have
cleared antistate militants from most population centers, and we expect the military will
continue targeting remaining militant strongholds in 2015. The December 2014 Tehrik-e
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Peshawar attack against the army-run school that killed more than
140 people, mostly children, spurred the government and military to implement a national
action plan against terrorism, including the establishment of military courts.
Despite ongoing military operations, Pakistan will continue to face internal
security threats from militant, sectarian, and separatist groups and remains concerned
about ISIL outreach and propaganda in South Asia.
India is in the midst of a major military modernization effort to address problems
with its aging equipment and to better posture itself to defend against both Pakistan and
China. New Delhi is working to address impediments to modernization, such as its
cumbersome procurement process, budget constraints, and an inefficient domestic defense
industry. Indias relationship with Pakistan remains strained, marked by periodic
skirmishes on or near the Line of Control that separates Indian and Pakistani Kashmir,
resulting in the highest number of civilian casualties since 2003. Occasional unofficial
Track-II dialogue resulted in little progress in resolving bilateral disputes.
New Delhi and Beijing maintain limited military-to-military engagement and
continue to discuss their longstanding border dispute, despite occasional altercations
between troops patrolling the border. Indias concern over increased Chinese activity in
South Asia has pushed New Delhi to base advanced fighter aircraft and to raise additional
ground forces opposite the China border.
India continues to conduct periodic tests of its nuclear-capable missiles to enhance
and verify missile reliability and capabilities. India will continue developing an ICBM, the
Agni-VI, which will reportedly carry multiple warheads, and is working on the
development of several variants of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.
AFRICA
Security conditions in Somalia improved in 2014 as progress was made against al-
Shabaab, but challenges remain. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and
the Somali National Army (SNA) conducted two rounds of offensive operations, liberating
several al-Shabaab-held towns in south-central Somalia, including the lucrative port city
of Baraawe. Somali militia participated in these operations, but remains unable to
maintain control of cleared areas due to a number of factors, including endemic corruption
and underlying clan tensions. Mogadishus focus on governance and force integration
efforts should help decrease prospects for instability as regional administrations evolve
during the next year.
Nigerias presidential election, now scheduled for 28 March to allow for additional
security measures, will probably be the closest and most contentious since civilian rule
was restored in 1999. Violence throughout the election - and probably thereafter - will
stretch security and military forces thin. The military leadership - often focused on
advancing private gain over strategic imperatives - has failed to properly resource and
train troops. Nigeria recently acquired new weapons systems, but troops lack the training
and motivation to effectively employ them. This instability is likely to lead to massive
population displacements, more civilian deaths and kidnappings, growing extremist safe
havens, and refugee spillover into neighboring countries.
LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America, transnational threats such as drug- and arms- trafficking and
special interest alien transit, coupled with porous borders, have increased insecurity and
challenged stability and prosperity. Moreover, outside actors are increasingly seeking to
challenge the U.S. as the defense partner of choice in the region.
Mexico remains the principal transit country for U.S.-bound cocaine, and the
primary foreign supplier of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana to the U. S. Civilian
and military security force pressure on all major drug trafficking groups has likely
contributed to the decline in drug-related homicides.
The Colombian government has made significant progress reducing cocaine
production. While no longer the top cocaine producer globally, it remains the principal
supplier of cocaine to the U.S. Drug profits fund insurgent and illegal armed groups,
which increasingly work directly with Mexican drug cartels.
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has not resolved the factors that contributed
to nationwide anti-government protests in 2014, including a poor economy, shortages of
basic goods, unchecked violent crime, and the governments authoritarian tactics against
the political opposition. We anticipate student organizations and the political opposition
will stage protests in the months leading up to 2015 legislative elections. Military leaders
have remained loyal and will continue to quell anti-government protests. We anticipate
security forces occasionally will use heavy-handed tactics to restore order.
In Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, violence levels tied to gang, drug, and
criminal activity remain amongst the highest in the world.
 GLOBAL THREATS
The threat to U.S. space systems and services will increase as potential adversaries
pursue disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities. Rapidly evolving commercial
space technology will support the global pursuit of enhanced space and counterspace
capabilities that may narrow the technological gap with the U.S.
Chinese and Russian military leaders understand the unique information
advantages afforded by space systems and are developing capabilities to deny U.S. use of
space in the event of a conflict. Chinese military writings specifically highlight the need to
interfere with, damage, and destroy reconnaissance, navigation, and communication
satellites. China has satellite jamming capabilities and is pursuing other antisatellite
systems. In July 2014, China conducted a non-destructive antisatellite missile test. A
previous destructive test with this same system in 2007 created long-lived space debris.
Russias military doctrine emphasizes space defense as a vital component of its
national defense. Russian leaders openly assert that the Russian armed forces have
antisatellite weapons and conduct antisatellite research.
The global cyber threat environment presents numerous persistent challenges to
the security and integrity of DoD networks and information. Threat actors now
demonstrate an increased ability and willingness to conduct aggressive cyberspace
operationsincluding both service disruptions and espionageagainst U.S. and allied
defense information networks. Similarly, we note with increasing concern recent
destructive cyber actions against U.S. private-sector networks demonstrating capabilities
that could hold U.S. government and defense networks at risk.
For 2015, we expect espionage against U.S. government defense and defense
contractor networks to continue largely unabated, while destructive network attack
capabilities continue to develop and proliferate worldwide. We are also concerned about
the threat to the integrity of U.S. defense procurement networks posed by supply chain
vulnerabilities from counterfeit and sub-quality components.
Threat actors increasingly are willing to incorporate cyber options into regional
and global power projection capabilities. The absence of universally accepted and
enforceable norms of behavior in cyberspace contributes to this situation. In response,
states worldwide are forming cyber command organizations and developing national
capabilities. Similarly, cyberspace operations are playing increasingly important roles in
regional conflictsfor example, in eastern Ukrainewhere online network disruptions,
espionage, disinformation and propaganda activities are now integral to the conflict.
Iran and North Korea now consider disruptive and destructive cyberspace
operations a valid instrument of statecraft, including during what the U.S. considers
peacetime. These states likely view cyberspace operations as an effective means of
imposing costs on their adversaries while limiting the likelihood of damaging reprisals.
Non-state actors often express the desire to conduct malicious cyber attacks, but
likely lack the capability to conduct high-level cyber operations. However, non-state
actors, such as Hizballah, AQAP, and ISIL will continue during the next year to effectively
use the Internet for communication, propaganda, fundraising and recruitment.
 The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
ballistic missiles is a grave and enduring threat. Securing nuclear weapons, materials, and
the scientific capabilities to develop chemical and biological weapons is a worldwide
imperative. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous
technologies is past, and the use of chemicals in Syria further demonstrates the threat of
WMD is real. China will continue to be a source of dual-use WMD-applicable goods,
equipment, and materials to countries of concern, like Iran, North Korea, and Syria. North
Korea is among the worlds leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technologies
and, despite the adoption of U.N. Security Council resolutions, the DPRK continues
proliferating weapons-related materiel. Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea engage in
national-level military denial and deception programs that include the use of underground
facilities to conceal and protect WMDs, and command, control, and other strategic assets
and functions.
The proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, especially air defense
systems and antiship cruise missiles, is a military issue of growing concern. Russian
exports of these arms, including the SA-17, SA-22, SA-20 SAM systems and the SS-N-26
Yakhont supersonic antiship cruise missile is particularly troubling. Russia has exported
several of these systems to countries of concern, including the SA-17 to Venezuela, and
the SA-17, SA-22 and Yakhont to Syria. The 300-kilometer-range Yakhont poses a major
threat to U.S. naval operations particularly in the eastern Mediterranean. There are no
signs these sales will abate in 2015. If Russia was to sell the SA-20 to Iran, it would
significantly increase Iranian military capabilities.
Infectious diseases are emerging as a global health concern. The Ebola epidemic in
West Africa is the most visible reminder that health issues can suddenly materialize from
anywhere and threaten American lives and interests. Our ability to mitigate and control
health threats before they impact the U. S. relies on early warning, despite the absence of
precise indicators of when and where new diseases will emerge. Pandemic warning likely
will become more challenging and complex in 2015.
Finally, foreign intelligence threats from Russian, Chinese, and Cuban intelligence
services continue to be a challenge. Trusted insiders who disclose sensitive U.S.
information for nefarious purposes will also remain a significant threat in 2015. The
technical sophistication of this insider threat exacerbates the challenge.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee - 27 January 2015
William J. Fallon, Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Madame Chairwoman, Senator Reed, members of the Committee. Thank you for
your essential and enduring support for our men and women in uniform and the
opportunity to address this distinguished body and to offer my perspective on current
threats to national security, American Foreign Policy and National Defense topics.
There are certainly many areas of concern around the world and we see the most
spectacular and troubling highlighted regularly in the media. I believe that a coherent
national security strategy requires a long term focus with well thought out objectives. We
should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near term fixes for pop up issues
which arise continuously and compete for attention with what we should determine are
higher priority interests.
In surveying the worldscape today, I would suggest that we focus on where we, as
a nation, want to be in the future. My vote would be for improving world security and
stability with more people around the world enjoying a better life in conditions of their
choosing, with responsible elected leaders providing good governance and respect for
human dignity. This scenario, clearly in our better national interest, is not going to happen
without lots of hard work, informed and guided by an effective national security strategy.
The United States government has provided, and must continue to provide;
leadership, good example and active political, economic and military security assistance in
working toward these desired objectives.
The fundamental prerequisite for any successful national security strategy is a
sound and strong domestic foundation. Our credibility in the world is based on the
example of our actions and how people perceive we might act in current and future
situations. It is fair to wonder if people in other parts of the world take us seriously when
they observe partisan political bickering preclude agreement on fundamental issues like
national operating budgets or cyber policies, and seemingly ever changing policies and
priorities.
Our military capability is an essential element of national power but only one of
many key tools which include diplomacy, development, economic, financial and political
and certainly, moral leadership. We face tough choices ahead, about when, where and if to
engage our forces. We also face tough choices about capabilities and what to acquire. We
cannot afford everything.
As we contemplate myriad challenges to world stability and U.S. security, we
should first acknowledge, distasteful as it might be, the reality that nuclear weapons, and
aspirations for them, continue to proliferate. In this regard, it is discouraging to note that
after more than two decades of nuclear counterproliferation progress, fueled in large
measure by the Nunn-Lugar initiative, Russian-U.S. cooperation appears to have ground
to a halt in the wake of dangerous Russian bad behavior.
U.S. strategy for dealing with the potential use of these weapons of mass
destruction has been our heretofore successful National Strategic Deterrent Force. But the
critical components of this force have been aging without significant upgrade.
Modernization of the force, particularly the survivability of the sea based deterrent, should
be a top priority consideration for us to remain credible in deterring worst case scenarios.
In my view, one of our most important strategic interests, with huge implications
for national security and the stability of the vast Asia-Pacific region, is our long term
relationship with China. Mutually beneficial in many respects, it has other dimensions,
notably in the areas of cyber security, military expansion and regional disputes with
neighboring countries, which are a cause for concern and need to be addressed.
A key focal point of this hearing is conflict in the Middle East and the spread of
violent extremism in the region, and from it, to other places in the world. The Middle East,
an area of high interest to us for many reasons, continues to be buffeted by challenges
which have vexed years of U.S. attempts to improve stability in the area. Nonetheless, we
should continue to engage in the region, using all aspects of national power, but with the
understanding that we are not likely to be successful by mandating U.S. solutions. People
in the region are sooner or later going to have to step up and address the issues which
torment and divide them. We can and should assist but we are not going to resolve their
problems.
Some recommendations for addressing the current challenge from the so called
Daesh in Iraq and Syria include; (1) Recognition that success in Iraq will rest on the
ability of the new government of Haider al Abadi to convince the majority of his
countrymen, particularly the Sunni minority, that they will get a fair shake going forward.
Absent this political foundation, nothing we do will be effective in the long term. (2)
Getting Islamic leaders, the elites of the Arab countries, to actively counter the extremist
ideology and cut funding to Daesh and other extremists. In a positive note here, I would
highlight recent remarks by Egyptian leader Abdel al Sisi. And (3) Continue U.S. military
efforts to work closely with the Iraqi military to enhance capabilities, increase combat
effectiveness and support them with training, airpower and SOF as required to defeat
Daesh and reclaim areas overrun last summer. Simultaneously pressing Daesh rear areas in
Syria to degrade and deny their ability to expand or sustain operations in Iraq. No single
one of these actions will defeat the threat. All need to occur.
Combating violent extremism worldwide will be a long term effort requiring close
cooperation with allies and willing nations, especially in areas of intelligence sharing and
U.S. military training and assistance for less capable colleagues.
In summary, strategic coherence in foreign policy and national security would
benefit from strong, credible and consistent domestic policies and actions to return this
great nation to the position of exemplary leadership it earned and enjoyed not that long
ago. Building on this position of domestic strength, a thoughtful, focused and
collaborative strategy formulation process to agree on a relatively few high priority
national security goals and objectives should set us on a fair course.
At the international level, active engagement using all aspects of national power
underpinned with a strong forward presence by U.S. military forces, with credible
capabilities, is our best deterrent and response to security threats.
Thank you. I will be pleased to address specific questions you may have.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
National Security Strategy
February 2015
The White House
Washington
Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities
of a still new century and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world.
Americas growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security
and a critical source of our influence abroad. Since the Great Recession, we have created
nearly 11 million new jobs during the longest private sector job growth in our history.
Unemployment has fallen to its lowest level in 6 years. We are now the world leader in oil
and gas production. We continue to set the pace for science, technology, and innovation in
the global economy.
We also benefit from a young and growing workforce, and a resilient and
diversified economy. The entrepreneurial spirit of our workers and businesses undergirds
our economic edge. Our higher education system is the finest in the world, drawing more
of the best students globally every year. We continue to attract immigrants from every
corner of the world who renew our country with their energy and entrepreneurial talents.
Globally, we have moved beyond the large ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
that defined so much of American foreign policy over the past decade. Compared to the
nearly 180,000 troops we had in Iraq and Afghanistan when I took office, we now have
fewer than 15,000 deployed in those countries. We possess a military whose might,
technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history. We have renewed our
alliances from Europe to Asia.
Now, at this pivotal moment, we continue to face serious challenges to our national
security, even as we are working to shape the opportunities of tomorrow. Violent
extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America and
our allies. Escalating challenges to cybersecurity, aggression by Russia, the accelerating
impacts of climate change, and the outbreak of infectious diseases all give rise to anxieties
about global security. We must be clear-eyed about these and other challenges and
recognize the United States has a unique capability to mobilize and lead the international
community to meet them.
Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance
our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truthAmerica must lead.
Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order
that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all
peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.
Abroad, we are demonstrating that while we will act unilaterally against threats to
our core interests, we are stronger when we mobilize collective action. That is why we are
leading international coalitions to confront the acute challenges posed by aggression,
terrorism, and disease. We are leading over 60 partners in a global campaign to degrade
and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria,
including by working to disrupt the flow of foreign fighters to those countries, while
keeping pressure on al-Qaida. We are leading a global effort to stop the deadly spread of
the Ebola virus at its source. In lockstep with our European allies, we are enforcing tough
sanctions on Russia to impose costs and deter future aggression.
Even as we meet these pressing challenges, we are pursuing historic opportunities.
Our rebalance to Asia and the Pacific is yielding deeper ties with a more diverse set of
allies and partners. When complete, the Trans-Pacific Partnership will generate trade and
investment opportunitiesand create high-quality jobs at homeacross a region that
represents more than 40 percent of global trade. We are primed to unlock the potential of
our relationship with India. The scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented,
even as we remain alert to Chinas military modernization and reject any role for
intimidation in resolving territorial disputes. We are deepening our investment in Africa,
accelerating access to energy, health, and food security in a rapidly rising region. Our
opening to Cuba will enhance our engagement in our own hemisphere, where there are
enormous opportunities to consolidate gains in pursuit of peace, prosperity, democracy,
and energy security.
Globally, we are committed to advancing the Prague Agenda, including by
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing nuclear materials. We are currently
testing whether it is possible to achieve a comprehensive resolution to assure the
international community that Irans nuclear program is peaceful, while the Joint Plan of
Action has halted the progress of Irans program. We are building on our own energy
securityand the ground-breaking commitment we made with China to reduce
greenhouse gas emissionsto cement an international consensus on arresting climate
change. We are shaping global standards for cybersecurity and building international
capacity to disrupt and investigate cyber threats. We are playing a leading role in defining
the international communitys post-2015 agenda for eliminating extreme poverty and
promoting sustainable development while prioritizing women and youth.
Underpinning it all, we are upholding our enduring commitment to the
advancement of democracy and human rights and building new coalitions to combat
corruption and to support open governments and open societies. In doing so, we are
working to support democratic transitions, while also reaching out to the drivers of change
in this century: young people and entrepreneurs.
Finally, I believe that America leads best when we draw upon our hopes rather
than our fears. To succeed, we must draw upon the power of our examplethat means
viewing our commitment to our values and the rule of law as a strength, and not an
inconvenience. That is why I have worked to ensure that America has the capabilities we
need to respond to threats abroad, while acting in line with our valuesprohibiting the use
of torture; embracing constraints on our use of new technologies like drones; and
upholding our commitment to privacy and civil liberties. These actions are a part of our
resilience at home and a source of our influence abroad.
On all these fronts, America leads from a position of strength. But, this does not
mean we can or should attempt to dictate the trajectory of all unfolding events around the
world. As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite.
And in a complex world, many of the security problems we face do not lend themselves to
quick and easy fixes. The United States will always defend our interests and uphold our
commitments to allies and partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many
competing priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make
decisions based upon fear. Moreover, we must recognize that a smart national security
strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to
work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism
will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield.
The challenges we face require strategic patience and persistence. They require us
to take our responsibilities seriously and make the smart investments in the foundations of
our national power. Therefore, I will continue to pursue a comprehensive agenda that
draws on all elements of our national strength, that is attuned to the strategic risks and
opportunities we face, and that is guided by the principles and priorities set out in this
strategy. Moreover, I will continue to insist on budgets that safeguard our strength and
work with the Congress to end sequestration, which undercuts our national security.
This is an ambitious agenda, and not everything will be completed during my
Presidency. But I believe this is an achievable agenda, especially if we proceed with
confidence and if we restore the bipartisan center that has been a pillar of strength for
American foreign policy in decades past. As Americans, we will always have our
differences, but what unites us is the national consensus that American global leadership
remains indispensable. We embrace our exceptional role and responsibilities at a time
when our unique contributions and capabilities are needed most, and when the choices we
make today can mean greater security and prosperity for our Nation for decades to come.
Barack Obama
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Security
Strengthen Our National Defense
Reinforce Homeland Security
Combat the Persistent Threat of Terrorism
Build Capacity to Prevent Conflict
Prevent the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Confront Climate Change
Assure Access to Shared Spaces
Increase Global Health Security
III. Prosperity
Put Our Economy to Work
Advance Our Energy Security
Lead in Science, Technology, and Innovation
Shape the Global Economic Order
End Extreme Poverty
IV. Values
Live Our Values
Advance Equality
Support Emerging Democracies
Empower Civil Society and Young Leaders
Prevent Mass Atrocities
 V. International Order
Advance Our Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific
Strengthen Our Enduring Alliance with Europe
Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa
Invest in Africas Future
Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas
VI. Conclusion
I. Introduction
In a young century, opportunities for America abound, but risks to our security
remain. This new National Security Strategy positions the United States to safeguard our
national interests through strong and sustainable leadership. It sets out the principles and
priorities to guide the use of American power and influence in the world. It advances a
model of American leadership rooted in the foundation of Americas economic and
technological strength and the values of the American people. It redoubles our
commitment to allies and partners and welcomes the constructive contributions of
responsible rising powers. It signals our resolve and readiness to deter and, if necessary,
defeat potential adversaries. It affirms Americas leadership role within a rules-based
international order that works best through empowered citizens, responsible states, and
effective regional and international organizations. And it serves as a compass for how this
Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will lead the world through a shifting
security landscape toward a more durable peace and a new prosperity.
This strategy builds on the progress of the last 6 years, in which our active
leadership has helped the world recover from a global economic crisis and respond to an
array of emerging challenges. Our progress includes strengthening an unrivaled alliance
system, underpinned by our enduring partnership with Europe, while investing in nascent
multilateral forums like the G-20 and East Asia Summit. We brought most of our troops
home after more than a decade of honorable service in two wars while adapting our
counterterrorism strategy for an evolving terrorist threat. We led a multinational coalition
to support the Afghan government to take responsibility for the security of their country,
while supporting Afghanistans first peaceful, democratic transition of power. The United
States led the international response to natural disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti,
the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the typhoon in the Philippines to save lives,
prevent greater damage, and support efforts to rebuild. We led international efforts to stop
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, including by building an unprecedented international
sanctions regime to hold Iran responsible for failing to meet its international obligations,
while pursuing a diplomatic effort that has already stopped the progress of Irans nuclear
program and rolled it back in key respects. We are rebalancing toward Asia and the Pacific
while seeking new opportunities for partnership and investment in Africa and the
Americas, where we have spurred greater agriculture and energy-related investments than
ever before. And at home and abroad, we are taking concerted action to confront the
dangers posed by climate change and to strengthen our energy security.
Still, there is no shortage of challenges that demand continued American
leadership. The potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear
weapons, poses a grave risk. Even as we have decimated al-Qaidas core leadership, more
diffuse networks of al-Qaida, ISIL, and affiliated groups threaten U.S. citizens, interests,
allies, and partners. Violent extremists exploit upheaval across the Middle East and North
Africa. Fragile and conflict-affected states incubate and spawn infectious disease, illicit
weapons and drug smugglers, and destabilizing refugee flows. Too often, failures in
governance and endemic corruption hold back the potential of rising regions. The danger
of disruptive and even destructive cyber-attack is growing, and the risk of another global
economic slowdown remains. The international communitys ability to respond effectively
to these and other risks is helped or hindered by the behaviors of major powers. Where
progress has been most profound, it is due to the steadfastness of our allies and the
cooperation of other emerging powers.
These complex times have made clear the power and centrality of Americas
indispensable leadership in the world. We mobilized and are leading global efforts to
impose costs to counter Russian aggression, to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, to
squelch the Ebola virus at its source, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons materials, and
to turn the corner on global carbon emissions. A strong consensus endures across our
political spectrum that the question is not whether America will lead, but how we will lead
into the future.
First and foremost, we will lead with purpose. American leadership is a global
force for good, but it is grounded in our enduring national interests as outlined in the 2010
National Security Strategy:
The security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners;
A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international
economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity;
Respect for universal values at home and around the world; and
A rules-based international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes
peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.
Especially in a changing global environment, these national interests will continue
to guide all we do in the world. To advance these interests most effectively, we must
pursue a comprehensive national security agenda, allocate resources accordingly, and
work with the Congress to end sequestration. Even so, our resources will never be
limitless. Policy tradeoffs and hard choices will need to be made. In such instances, we
will prioritize efforts that address the top strategic risks to our interests:
Catastrophic attack on the U.S. homeland or critical infrastructure;
Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies;
Global economic crisis or widespread economic slowdown;
Proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction;
Severe global infectious disease outbreaks;
Climate change;
 Major energy market disruptions; and
Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states
(including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime).
We will seize strategic opportunities to shape the economic order and cultivate new
relationships with emerging economic powers and countries newly committed to peaceful
democratic change. We will also capitalize on the potential to end extreme poverty and
build upon our comparative advantages in innovation, science and technology,
entrepreneurship, and greater energy security.
We will lead with strength. After a difficult decade, America is growing stronger
every day. The U.S. economy remains the most dynamic and resilient on Earth. We have
rebounded from a global recession by creating more jobs in the United States than in all
other advanced economies combined. Our military might is unrivaled. Yet, American
exceptionalism is not rooted solely in the strength of our arms or economy. Above all, it is
the product of our founding values, including the rule of law and universal rights, as well
as the grit, talent, and diversity of the American people.
In the last 6 years alone, we arrested the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression and catalyzed a new era of economic growth. We increased our competitive
edge and leadership in education, energy, science and technology, research and
development, and healthcare. We achieved an energy transformation in North America.
We are fortifying our critical infrastructure against all hazards, especially cyber espionage
and attack. And we are working hard to safeguard our civil liberties while advancing our
security.
Americas strategic fundamentals are strong but should not be taken for granted.
We must be innovative and judicious in how we use our resources to build up our national
power. Going forward, we will strengthen our foundation by growing our economy,
modernizing our defense, upholding our values, enhancing the resilience of our homeland,
and promoting talent and diversity in our national security workforce.
We will lead by example. The strength of our institutions and our respect for the
rule of law sets an example for democratic governance. When we uphold our values at
home, we are better able to promote them in the world. This means safeguarding the civil
rights and liberties of our citizens while increasing transparency and accountability. It also
means holding ourselves to international norms and standards that we expect other nations
to uphold, and admitting when we do not. We must also demonstrate our ability to forge
diverse partnerships across our political spectrum. Many achievements of recent years
were made possible by Democrats and Republicans; Federal, state and local governments;
and the public and private sectors working together. But, we face continued challenges,
including political dysfunction in Washington that undermines national unity, stifles
bipartisan cooperation, and ultimately erodes the perception and strength of our leadership
abroad. American leadership is always most powerful when we are able to forge common
ground at home around key national priorities.
We will lead with capable partners. In an interconnected world, there are no
global problems that can be solved without the United States, and few that can be solved
by the United States alone. American leadership remains essential for mobilizing
collective action to address global risks and seize strategic opportunities. Our closest
partners and allies will remain the cornerstone of our international engagement. Yet, we
will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-
state and private actors, and international institutionsparticularly the United Nations
(U.N.), international financial institutions, and key regional organizations. These
partnerships can deliver essential capacity to share the burdens of maintaining global
security and prosperity and to uphold the norms that govern responsible international
behavior. At the same time, we and our partners must make the reforms and investments
needed to make sure we can work more effectively with each other while growing the
ranks of responsible, capable states. The United States is safer and stronger when fewer
people face destitution, when our trading partners are flourishing, and when societies are
freer.
We will lead with all the instruments of U.S. power. Our influence is greatest
when we combine all our strategic advantages. Our military will remain ready to defend
our enduring national interests while providing essential leverage for our diplomacy. The
use of force is not, however, the only tool at our disposal, and it is not the principal means
of U.S. engagement abroad, nor always the most effective for the challenges we face.
Rather, our first line of action is principled and clear-eyed diplomacy, combined with the
central role of development in the forward defense and promotion of Americas interests.
We will continue pursuing measures to enhance the security of our diplomats and
development professionals to ensure they can fulfill their responsibilities safely in high-
risk environments. We will also leverage a strong and well-regulated economy to promote
trade and investment while protecting the international financial system from abuse.
Targeted economic sanctions will remain an effective tool for imposing costs on
irresponsible actors and helping to dismantle criminal and terrorist networks. All our tools
are made more effective by the skill of our intelligence professionals and the quality of
intelligence they collect, analyze, and produce. Finally, we will apply our distinct
advantages in law enforcement, science and technology, and people-to-people
relationships to maximize the strategic effects of our national power.
We will lead with a long-term perspective. Around the world, there are historic
transitions underway that will unfold over decades. This strategy positions America to
influence their trajectories, seize the opportunities they create, and manage the risks they
present. Five recent transitions, in particular, have significantly changed the security
landscape, including since our last strategy in 2010.
First, power among states is more dynamic. The increasing use of the G-20 on
global economic matters reflects an evolution in economic power, as does the rise of Asia,
Latin America, and Africa. As the balance of economic power changes, so do expectations
about influence over international affairs. Shifting power dynamics create both
opportunities and risks for cooperation, as some states have been more willing than others
to assume responsibilities commensurate with their greater economic capacity. In
particular, Indias potential, Chinas rise, and Russias aggression all significantly impact
the future of major power relations.
Second, power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state. Governments once
able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more
accountable to sub-state and non-state actorsfrom mayors of mega-cities and leaders in
private industry to a more empowered civil society. They are also contending with citizens
enabled by technology, youth as a majority in many societies, and a growing global
middle class with higher expectations for governance and economic opportunity. While
largely positive, these trends can foster violent non-state actors and foment instability
especially in fragile states where governance is weak or has broken downor invite
backlash by authoritarian regimes determined to preserve the power of the state.
Third, the increasing interdependence of the global economy and rapid pace of
technological change are linking individuals, groups, and governments in unprecedented
ways. This enables and incentivizes new forms of cooperation to establish dynamic
security networks, expand international trade and investment, and transform global
communications. It also creates shared vulnerabilities, as interconnected systems and
sectors are susceptible to the threats of climate change, malicious cyber activity, pandemic
diseases, and transnational terrorism and crime.
Fourth, a struggle for power is underway among and within many states of the
Middle East and North Africa. This is a generational struggle in the aftermath of the 2003
Iraq war and 2011 Arab uprisings, which will redefine the region as well as relationships
among communities and between citizens and their governments. This process will
continue to be combustible, especially in societies where religious extremists take root, or
rulers reject democratic reforms, exploit their economies, and crush civil society.
Fifth, the global energy market has changed dramatically. The United States is now
the worlds largest natural gas and oil producer. Our dependence on foreign oil is at a 20-
year lowand decliningand we are leading a new clean energy economy. While
production in the Middle East and elsewhere remains vitally important for the global
market, increased U.S. production is helping keep markets well-supplied and prices
conducive to economic growth. On the other hand, energy security concerns have been
exacerbated by European dependence on Russian natural gas and the willingness of Russia
to use energy for political ends. At the same time, developing countries now consume
more energy than developed ones, which is altering energy flows and changing consumer
relationships.
Todays strategic environment is fluid. Just as the United States helped shape the
course of events in the last century, so must we influence their trajectory today by
evolving the way we exercise American leadership. This strategy outlines priorities based
on a realistic assessment of the risks to our enduring national interests and the
opportunities for advancing them. This strategy eschews orienting our entire foreign
policy around a single threat or region. It establishes instead a diversified and balanced set
of priorities appropriate for the worlds leading global power with interests in every part of
an increasingly interconnected world.
II. Security
The United States government has no greater responsibility than protecting the
American people. Yet, our obligations do not end at our borders. We embrace our
responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interests,
upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global.
There is no substitute for American leadership whether in the face of aggression, in the
cause of universal values, or in the service of a more secure America. Fulfilling our
responsibilities depends on a strong defense and secure homeland. It also requires a global
security posture in which our unique capabilities are employed within diverse international
coalitions and in support of local partners. Such a shift is possible after a period of
prolonged combat. Six years ago, there were roughly 180,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Today, there are fewer than 15,000. This transition has dramatically reduced
U.S. casualties and allows us to realign our forces and resources to meet an evolving set of
threats while securing our strategic objectives.
In so doing, we will prioritize collective action to meet the persistent threat posed
by terrorism today, especially from al-Qaida, ISIL, and their affiliates. In addition to
acting decisively to defeat direct threats, we will focus on building the capacity of others
to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and
dangerous ideologies. Keeping nuclear materials from terrorists and preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons remains a high priority, as does mobilizing the
international community to meet the urgent challenges posed by climate change and
infectious disease. Collective action is needed to assure access to the shared spaces
cyber, space, air, and oceanswhere the dangerous behaviors of some threaten us all.
Our allies will remain central to all these efforts. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is the worlds preeminent multilateral alliance, reinforced by the
historic close ties we have with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada.
NATO is stronger and more cohesive than at any point in its history, especially due to
contributions of the Nordic countries and newer members like Poland and the Baltic
countries. Our alliances in Asia underwrite security and enable prosperity throughout Asia
and the Pacific. We will continue to modernize these essential bilateral alliances while
enhancing the security ties among our allies. Japan, South Korea, and Australia, as well as
our close partner in New Zealand, remain the model for interoperability while we
reinvigorate our ties to the Philippines and preserve our ties to Thailand. And our allies
and partners in other regions, including our security partnership and people-to-people ties
with Israel, are essential to advancing our interests.
Strengthen Our National Defense
A strong military is the bedrock of our national security. During over a decade of
war, the All-Volunteer Force has answered our Nations call. To maintain our military
edge and readiness, we will continue to insist on reforms and necessary investment in our
military forces and their families. Our military will remain ready to deter and defeat
threats to the homeland, including against missile, cyber, and terrorist attacks, while
mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters. Our military is postured
globally to protect our citizens and interests, preserve regional stability, render
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and build the capacity of our partners to join
with us in meeting security challenges.
U.S. forces will continue to defend the homeland, conduct global counterterrorism
operations, assure allies, and deter aggression through forward presence and engagement.
If deterrence fails, U.S. forces will be ready to project power globally to defeat and deny
aggression in multiple theaters.
 As we modernize, we will apply the lessons of past drawdowns. Although our
military will be smaller, it must remain dominant in every domain. With the Congress, we
must end sequestration and enact critical reforms to build a versatile and responsive force
prepared for a more diverse set of contingencies. We will protect our investment in
foundational capabilities like the nuclear deterrent, and we will grow our investment in
crucial capabilities like cyber; space; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
We will safeguard our science and technology base to keep our edge in the capabilities
needed to prevail against any adversary. Above all, we will take care of our people. We
will recruit and retain the best talent while developing leaders committed to an ethical and
expert profession of arms. We will honor our sacred trust with Veterans and the families
and communities that support them, making sure those who have served have the benefits,
education, and opportunities they have earned.
We will be principled and selective in the use of force. The use of force should not
be our first choice, but it will sometimes be the necessary choice. The United States will
use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our enduring interests demand it: when
our people are threatened; when our livelihoods are at stake; and when the security of our
allies is in danger. In these circumstances, we prefer to act with allies and partners. The
threshold for military action is higher when our interests are not directly threatened. In
such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share the burden and achieve
lasting outcomes. In all cases, the decision to use force must reflect a clear mandate and
feasible objectives, and we must ensure our actions are effective, just, and consistent with
the rule of law. It should be based on a serious appreciation for the risk to our mission, our
global responsibilities, and the opportunity costs at home and abroad. Whenever and
wherever we use force, we will do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our
legitimacy.
Reinforce Homeland Security
Our homeland is more secure. But, we must continue to learn and adapt to
evolving threats and hazards. We are better able to guard against terrorismthe core
responsibility of homeland securityas well as illicit networks and other threats and
hazards due to improved information sharing, aviation and border security, and
international cooperation. We have emphasized community-based efforts and local law
enforcement programs to counter homegrown violent extremism and protect vulnerable
individuals from extremist ideologies that could lead them to join conflicts overseas or
carry out attacks here at home. Through risk-based approaches, we have countered
terrorism and transnational organized crime in ways that enhance commerce, travel, and
tourism and, most fundamentally, preserve our civil liberties. We are more responsive and
resilient when prevention fails or disaster strikes as witnessed with the Boston Marathon
bombings and Hurricane Sandy.
The essential services that underpin American society must remain secure and
functioning in the face of diverse threats and hazards. Therefore, we take a Whole of
Community approach, bringing together all elements of our societyindividuals, local
communities, the private and non-profit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of
governmentto make sure America is resilient in the face of adversity.
We are working with the owners and operators of our Nations critical cyber and
physical infrastructure across every sectorfinancial, energy, transportation, health,
information technology, and moreto decrease vulnerabilities and increase resilience. We
are partnering with states and local communities to better plan for, absorb, recover from,
and adapt to adverse events brought about by the compounding effects of climate change.
We will also continue to enhance pandemic preparedness at home and address the threat
arising from new drug-resistant microbes and biological agents.
Combat the Persistent Threat of Terrorism
The threat of catastrophic attacks against our homeland by terrorists has
diminished but still persists. An array of terrorist threats has gained traction in areas of
instability, limited opportunity, and broken governance. Our adversaries are not confined
to a distinct country or region. Instead, they range from South Asia through the Middle
East and into Africa. They include globally oriented groups like al-Qaida and its
affiliates, as well as a growing number of regionally focused and globally connected
groups many with an al-Qaida pedigree like ISIL, which could pose a threat to the
homeland.
We have drawn from the experience of the last decade and put in place substantial
changes to our efforts to combat terrorism, while preserving and strengthening important
tools that have been developed since 9/11. Specifically, we shifted away from a model of
fighting costly, large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the United States
particularly our militarybore an enormous burden. Instead, we are now pursuing a
more sustainable approach that prioritizes targeted counterterrorism operations, collective
action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent
extremism and radicalization that drives increased threats. Our leadership will remain
essential to disrupting the unprecedented flow of foreign terrorist fighters to and from
conflict zones. We will work to address the underlying conditions that can help foster
violent extremism such as poverty, inequality, and repression. This means supporting
alternatives to extremist messaging and greater economic opportunities for women and
disaffected youth. We will help build the capacity of the most vulnerable states and
communities to defeat terrorists locally. Working with the Congress, we will train and
equip local partners and provide operational support to gain ground against terrorist
groups. This will include efforts to better fuse and share information and technology as
well as to support more inclusive and accountable governance.
In all our efforts, we aim to draw a stark contrast between what we stand for and
the heinous deeds of terrorists. We reject the lie that America and its allies are at war with
Islam. We will continue to act lawfully. Outside of areas of active hostilities, we endeavor
to detain, interrogate, and prosecute terrorists through law enforcement. However, when
there is a continuing, imminent threat, and when capture or other actions to disrupt the
threat are not feasible, we will not hesitate to take decisive action. We will always do so
legally, discriminately, proportionally, and bound by strict accountability and strong
oversight. The United Statesnot our adversarieswill define the nature and scope of
this struggle, lest it define us.
Our counterterrorism approach is at work with several states, including Somalia,
Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, we have ended our combat mission and transitioned
to a dramatically smaller force focused on the goal of a sovereign and stable partner in
Afghanistan that is not a safe haven for international terrorists. This has been made
possible by the extraordinary sacrifices of our U.S. military, civilians throughout the
interagency, and our international partners. They delivered justice to Osama bin Laden and
significantly degraded al-Qaidas core leadership. They helped increase life expectancy,
access to education, and opportunities for women and girls. Going forward, we will work
with partners to carry out a limited counterterrorism mission against the remnants of core
al-Qaida and maintain our support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). We
are working with NATO and our other partners to train, advise, and assist the ANSF as a
new government takes responsibility for the security and well-being of Afghanistans
citizens. We will continue to help improve governance that expands opportunity for all
Afghans, including women and girls. We will also work with the countries of the region,
including Pakistan, to mitigate the threat from terrorism and to support a viable peace and
reconciliation process to end the violence in Afghanistan and improve regional stability.
We have undertaken a comprehensive effort to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.
We will continue to support Iraq as it seeks to free itself from sectarian conflict and the
scourge of extremists. Our support is tied to the governments willingness to govern
effectively and inclusively and to ensure ISIL cannot sustain a safe haven on Iraqi
territory. This requires professional and accountable Iraqi Security Forces that can
overcome sectarian divides and protect all Iraqi citizens. It also requires international
support, which is why we are leading an unprecedented international coalition to work
with the Iraqi government and strengthen its military to regain sovereignty. Joined by our
allies and partners, including multiple countries in the region, we employed our unique
military capabilities to arrest ISILs advance and to degrade their capabilities in both Iraq
and Syria. At the same time, we are working with our partners to train and equip a
moderate Syrian opposition to provide a counterweight to the terrorists and the brutality of
the Assad regime. Yet, the only lasting solution to Syrias civil war remains politicalan
inclusive political transition that responds to the legitimate aspirations of all Syrian
citizens.
Build Capacity to Prevent Conflict
We will strengthen U.S. and international capacity to prevent conflict among and
within states. In the realm of inter-state conflict, Russias violation of Ukraines
sovereignty and territorial integrityas well as its belligerent stance toward other
neighboring countriesendangers international norms that have largely been taken for
granted since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, North Korean provocation and tensions
in the East and South China Seas are reminders of the risks of escalation. American
diplomacy and leadership, backed by a strong military, remain essential to deterring future
acts of inter-state aggression and provocation by reaffirming our security commitments to
allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, imposing costs on
those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms, and
embedding our actions within wider regional strategies.
Within states, the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows
extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state
structures. To meet these challenges, we will continue to work with partners and through
multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to
contain and resolve them when they do. We prefer to partner with those fragile states that
have a genuine political commitment to establishing legitimate governance and providing
for their people. The focus of our efforts will be on proven areas of need and impact, such
as inclusive politics, enabling effective and equitable service delivery, reforming security
and rule of law sectors, combating corruption and organized crime, and promoting
economic opportunity, particularly among youth and women. We will continue to lead the
effort to ensure women serve as mediators of conflict and in peacebuilding efforts, and
they are protected from gender-based violence.
We will continue to bolster the capacity of the U.N. and regional organizations to
help resolve disputes, build resilience to crises and shocks, strengthen governance, end
extreme poverty, and increase prosperity, so that fragile states can provide for the basic
needs of their citizens and can avoid being vulnerable hosts for extremism and terrorism.
We will meet our financial commitments to the U.N., press for reforms to strengthen
peacekeeping, and encourage more contributions from advanced militaries. We will
strengthen the operational capacity of regional organizations like the African Union (AU)
and broaden the ranks of capable troop-contributing countries, including through the
African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership, which will help African countries
rapidly deploy to emerging crises.
Prevent the Spread and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction
No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential
use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists. We therefore
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear
weapons exist, the United States must invest the resources necessary to maintainwithout
testinga safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent that preserves strategic stability.
However, reducing the threat requires us to constantly reinforce the basic bargain of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits nuclear weapons states to reduce their
stockpiles while non-nuclear weapons states remain committed to using nuclear energy
only for peaceful purposes. For our part, we are reducing the role and number of nuclear
weapons through New START and our own strategy. We will continue to push for the
entry into force of important multilateral agreements like the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test-Ban Treaty and the various regional nuclear weapons-free zone protocols, as well as
the creation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing or
acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them. The
Nuclear Security Summit process has catalyzed a global effort to lock down vulnerable
nuclear materials and institutionalize nuclear security best practices. Our commitment to
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the profound risks posed by
North Korean weapons development and proliferation. Our efforts to remove and destroy
chemical weapons in Libya and Syria reflect our leadership in implementation and
progress toward universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention.
We have made clear Iran must meet its international obligations and demonstrate
its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. Our sanctions regime has demonstrated that the
international community can and willhold accountable those nations that do not meet
their obligations, while also opening up a space for a diplomatic resolution. Having
reached a first step arrangement that stops the progress of Irans nuclear program in
exchange for limited relief, our preference is to achieve a comprehensive and verifiable
deal that assures Irans nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. This is the best
way to advance our interests, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, and enable
Iran to access peaceful nuclear energy. However, we retain all options to achieve the
objective of preventing Iran from producing a nuclear weapon.
Confront Climate Change
Climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security,
contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic
resources like food and water. The present day effects of climate change are being felt
from the Arctic to the Midwest. Increased sea levels and storm surges threaten coastal
regions, infrastructure, and property. In turn, the global economy suffers, compounding the
growing costs of preparing and restoring infrastructure.
America is leading efforts at home and with the international community to
confront this challenge. Over the last 6 years, U.S. emissions have declined by a larger
total magnitude than those of any other country. Through our Climate Action Plan and
related executive actions, we will go further with a goal of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by 26 to 28 percent of 2005 levels by 2025. Working with U.S. states and
private utilities, we will set the first-ever standards to cut the amount of carbon pollution
our power plants emit into the air. We are also working to strengthen resilience and
address vulnerabilities to climate impacts.
These domestic efforts contribute to our international leadership. Building on the
progress made in Copenhagen and in ensuing negotiations, we are working toward an
ambitious new global climate change agreement to shape standards for prevention,
preparedness, and response over the next decade. As the worlds two largest emitters, the
United States and China reached a landmark agreement to take significant action to reduce
carbon pollution. The substantial contribution we have pledged to the Green Climate Fund
will help the most vulnerable developing nations deal with climate change, reduce their
carbon pollution, and invest in clean energy. More than 100 countries have also joined
with us to reduce greenhouse gases under the Montreal Protocolthe same agreement the
world used successfully to phase out ozone-depleting chemicals. We are partnering with
African entrepreneurs to launch clean energy projects and helping farmers practice
climate-smart agriculture and plant more durable crops. We are also driving collective
action to reduce methane emissions from pipelines and to launch a free trade agreement
for environmental goods.
Assure Access to Shared Spaces
The world is connected by shared spacescyber, space, air, and oceansthat
enable the free flow of people, goods, services, and ideas. They are the arteries of the
global economy and civil society, and access is at risk due to increased competition and
provocative behaviors. Therefore, we will continue to promote rules for responsible
behavior while making sure we have the capabilities to assure access to these shared
spaces.
Cybersecurity
 As the birthplace of the Internet, the United States has a special responsibility to
lead a networked world. Prosperity and security increasingly depend on an open,
interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet. Our economy, safety, and health are linked
through a networked infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and
individual actors who try to avoid attribution. Drawing on the voluntary cybersecurity
framework, we are securing Federal networks and working with the private sector, civil
society, and other stakeholders to strengthen the security and resilience of U.S. critical
infrastructure. We will continue to work with the Congress to pursue a legislative
framework that ensures high standards. We will defend ourselves, consistent with U.S. and
international law, against cyber attacks and impose costs on malicious cyber actors,
including through prosecution of illegal cyber activity. We will assist other countries to
develop laws that enable strong action against threats that originate from their
infrastructure. Globally, cybersecurity requires that long-standing norms of international
behaviorto include protection of intellectual property, online freedom, and respect for
civilian infrastructurebe upheld, and the Internet be managed as a shared responsibility
between states and the private sector with civil society and Internet users as key
stakeholders.
Space Security
Space systems allow the world to navigate and communicate with confidence to
save lives, conduct commerce, and better understand the human race, our planet, and the
depths of the universe. As countries increasingly derive benefits from space, we must join
together to deal with threats posed by those who may wish to deny the peaceful use of
outer space. We are expanding our international space cooperation activities in all sectors,
promoting transparency and confidence-building measures such as an International Code
of Conduct on Outer Space Activities, and expanding partnerships with the private sector
in support of missions and capabilities previously claimed by governments alone. We will
also develop technologies and tactics to deter and defeat efforts to attack our space
systems; enable indications, warning, and attributions of such attacks; and enhance the
resiliency of critical U.S. space capabilities.
Air and Maritime Security
The United States has an enduring interest in freedom of navigation and overflight
as well as the safety and sustainability of the air and maritime environments. We will
therefore maintain the capability to ensure the free flow of commerce, to respond quickly
to those in need, and to deter those who might contemplate aggression. We insist on safe
and responsible behaviors in the sky and at sea. We reject illegal and aggressive claims to
airspace and in the maritime domain and condemn deliberate attacks on commercial
passenger traffic. On territorial disputes, particularly in Asia, we denounce coercion and
assertive behaviors that threaten escalation. We encourage open channels of dialogue to
resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. We also support the early
conclusion of an effective code of conduct for the South China Sea between China and the
Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). Americas ability to press for the
observance of established customary international law reflected in the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea will be enhanced if the Senate provides its advice and consentthe
ongoing failure to ratify this Treaty undermines our national interest in a rules-based
international order. Finally, we seek to build on the unprecedented international
cooperation of the last few years, especially in the Arctic as well as in combatting piracy
off the Horn of Africa and drug-smuggling in the Caribbean Sea and across Southeast
Asia.
Increase Global Health Security
The spread of infectious diseases constitute a growing risk. The Ebola epidemic in
West Africa highlights the danger of a raging virus. The spread of new microbes or
viruses, the rise and spread of drug resistance, and the deliberate release of pathogens all
represent threats that are exacerbated by the globalization of travel, food production and
supply, and medical products. Despite important scientific, technological, and
organizational accomplishments, most countries have not yet achieved international core
competencies for health security, and many lack sufficient capacity to prevent, detect, or
respond to disease outbreaks.
America is the world leader in fighting pandemics, including HIV/AIDS, and in
improving global health security. At home, we are strengthening our ability to prevent
outbreaks and ensure sufficient capacity to respond rapidly and manage biological
incidents. As an exemplar of a modern and responsive public health system, we will
accelerate our work with partners through the Global Health Security Agenda in pursuit of
a world that is safer and more secure from infectious disease. We will save lives by
strengthening regulatory frameworks for food safety and developing a global system to
prevent avoidable epidemics, detect and report disease outbreaks in real time, and respond
more rapidly and effectively. Finally, we will continue to lead efforts to combat the rise of
antibiotic resistant bacteria.
III. Prosperity
Our economy is the largest, most open, and innovative in the world. Our leadership
has also helped usher in a new era of unparalleled global prosperity. Sustaining our
leadership depends on shaping an emerging global economic order that continues to reflect
our interests and values. Despite its success, our rules-based system is now competing
against alternative, less-open models. Moreover, the American consumer cannot sustain
global demandgrowth must be more balanced. To meet this challenge, we must be
strategic in the use of our economic strength to set new rules of the road, strengthen our
partnerships, and promote inclusive development.
Through our trade and investment policies, we will shape globalization so that it is
working for American workers. By leveraging our improved economic and energy
position, we will strengthen the global financial system and advance high-standard trade
deals. We will ensure tomorrows global trading system is consistent with our interests and
values by seeking to establish and enforce rules through international institutions and
regional initiatives and by addressing emerging challenges like state-owned enterprises
and digital protectionism. U.S. markets and educational opportunities will help the next
generation of global entrepreneurs sustain momentum in growing a global middle class.
To prevent conflict and promote human dignity, we will also pursue policies that eradicate
extreme poverty and reduce inequality.
Put Our Economy to Work
 The American economy is an engine for global economic growth and a source of
stability for the international system. In addition to being a key measure of power and
influence in its own right, it underwrites our military strength and diplomatic influence. A
strong economy, combined with a prominent U.S. presence in the global financial system,
creates opportunities to advance our security.
To ensure our economic competitiveness, we are investing in a new foundation for
sustained economic growth that creates good jobs and rising incomes. Because knowledge
is the currency of todays global economy, we must keep expanding access to early
childhood and affordable higher education. The further acceleration of our manufacturing
revolution will create the next generation of high technology manufacturing jobs.
Immigration reform that combines smart and effective enforcement of the law with a
pathway to citizenship for those who earn it remains an imperative. We will deliver
quality, affordable healthcare to more and more Americans. We will also support job
creation, strengthen the middle class, and spur economic growth by opening markets and
leveling the playing field for American workers and businesses abroad. Jobs will also
grow as we expand our work with trading partners to eliminate barriers to the full
deployment of U.S. innovation in the digital space. These efforts are complemented by
more modern and reliable infrastructure that ensures safety and enables growth.
In addition to the positive benefits of trade and commerce, a strong and well-
regulated economy positions the United States to lead international efforts to promote
financial transparency and prevent the global financial system from being abused by
transnational criminal and terrorist organizations to engage in, or launder the proceeds of
illegal activity. We will continue to work within the Financial Action Task Force, the G-
20, and other fora to enlist all nations in the fight to protect the integrity of the global
financial system.
Advance Our Energy Security
The United States is now the world leader in oil and gas production. Americas
energy revival is not only good for growth, it offers new buffers against the coercive use
of energy by some and new opportunities for helping others transition to low-carbon
economies. American oil production has increased dramatically, impacting global markets.
Imports have decreased substantially, reducing the funds we send overseas. Consumption
has declined, reducing our vulnerability to global supply disruption and price shocks.
However, we still have a significant stake in the energy security of our allies in Europe
and elsewhere. Seismic shifts in supply and demand are underway across the globe.
Increasing global access to reliable and affordable energy is one of the most powerful
ways to support social and economic development and to help build new markets for U.S.
technology and investment.
The challenges faced by Ukrainian and European dependence on Russian energy
supplies puts a spotlight on the need for an expanded view of energy security that
recognizes the collective needs of the United States, our allies, and trading partners as well
as the importance of competitive energy markets. Therefore, we must promote
diversification of energy fuels, sources, and routes, as well as encourage indigenous
sources of energy supply. Greater energy security and independence within the Americas
is central to these efforts. We will also stay engaged with global suppliers and our partners
to reduce the potential for energy-related conflict in places like the Arctic and Asia. Our
energy security will be further enhanced by living up to commitments made in the Rome
Declaration and through our all-of-the-above energy strategy for a low-carbon world. We
will continue to develop American fossil resources while becoming a more efficient
country that develops cleaner, alternative fuels and vehicles. We are demonstrating that
America can and will lead the global economy while reducing our emissions.
Lead in Science, Technology, and Innovation
Scientific discovery and technological innovation empower American leadership
with a competitive edge that secures our military advantage, propels our economy, and
improves the human condition. Sustaining that edge requires robust Federal investments in
basic and applied research. We must also strengthen science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) education to produce tomorrows discoverers, inventors,
entrepreneurs, and high-skills workforce. Our commitment remains strong to preparation
and compensation for STEM teachers, broadband connectivity and high-tech educational
tools for schools, programs that inspire and provide opportunities for girls and
underrepresented minorities, and support for innovation in STEM teaching and inclusion
in higher education. We will also keep our edge by opening our national labs to more
commercial partnerships while tapping research and development in the private sector,
including a wide range of start-ups and firms at the leading edge of Americas innovation
economy.
Shape the Global Economic Order
We have recovered from the global economic crisis, but much remains to be done
to shape the emerging economic order to avoid future crises. We have responsibilities at
home to continue to improve our banking practices and forge ahead with regulatory
reform, even as we press others to align with our robust standards. In addition to securing
our immediate economic interests, we must drive the inclusive economic growth that
creates demand for American exports. We will protect the free movement of information
and work to prevent the risky behavior that led to the recent crisis, while addressing
resurgent economic forces, from state capitalism to market-distorting free-riding.
American leadership is central to strengthening global finance rules and making
sure they are consistent and transparent. We will work through the G-20 to reinforce the
core architecture of the international financial and economic system, including the World
Trade Organization, to ensure it is positioned to foster both stability and growth. We
remain committed to governance reforms for these same institutions, including the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to make them more effective and
representative. In so doing, we seek to ensure institutions reinforce, rather than undermine,
an effective global financial system.
We believe trade agreements have economic and strategic benefits for the United
States. We will therefore work with the Congress to achieve bipartisan renewal of Trade
Promotion Authority and to advance a trade agenda that brings jobs to our shores,
increases standards of living, strengthens our partners and allies, and promotes stability in
critical regions. The United States has one of the most open economies in the world. Our
tariffs are low, and we do not use regulation to discriminate against foreign goods. The
same is not true throughout the world, which is why our trade agenda is focused on
lowering tariffs on American products, breaking down barriers to our goods and services,
and setting higher standards to level the playing field for American workers and firms.
Through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (T-TIP), we are setting the worlds highest standards for labor
rights and environmental protection, while removing barriers to U.S. exports and putting
the United States at the center of a free trade zone covering two-thirds of the global
economy. Our goal is to use this position, along with our highly skilled workforce, strong
rule of law, and abundant supply of affordable energy, to make America the production
platform of choice and the premier investment destination. In addition to these major
regional agreements, we will work to achieve groundbreaking agreements to liberalize
trade in services, information technology, and environmental goodsareas where the
United States is a global leader in innovation. And we will make it easier for businesses of
all sizes to expand their reach by improving supply chains and regulatory cooperation.
All countries will benefit when we open markets further, extend and enhance tools
such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and reduce inefficiencies in the
global trading system through trade facilitation improvements. And through our
development initiativessuch as Power Africa, Trade Africa, Feed the Future, and the
Open Government Partnershipwe will continue to work closely with governments, the
private sector, and civil society to foster inclusive economic growth, reduce corruption,
and build capacity at the local level. Investment in critical infrastructure and security will
facilitate trade among countries, especially for developing and emerging economies.
End Extreme Poverty
We have an historic opportunity to end extreme poverty within a generation and
put our societies on a path of shared and sustained prosperity. In so doing, we will foster
export markets for U.S. businesses, improve investment opportunities, and decrease the
need for costly military interventions. Growth in the global economy has lifted hundreds
of millions out of extreme poverty. We have already made significant progress guided in
part through global consensus and mobilization around the Millennium Development
Goals. The world cut the percentage of people living in extreme poverty in half between
1990 and 2010. In that period, nearly 800 million people rose above the international
poverty line. By 2012, child deaths were down almost 50 percent since 1990. Twenty-nine
countries registered as low-income in 2000 have today achieved middle-income status,
and private capital and domestic resources far outstrip donor assistance as the primary
means for financing development. Trends in economic growth also signal what is possible;
sub-Saharan Africa has averaged an aggregate annual growth rate of over 5 percent for the
last decade despite the disruptions of the world financial crisis.
We are now working with many partners to put ending extreme poverty at the
center of a new global sustainable development agenda that will mobilize action for the
next 15 years. We will press for transformative investments in areas like womens equality
and empowerment, education, sustainable energy, and governance. We will use trade and
investment to harness job-rich economic growth. We will concentrate on the clear need for
country ownership and political commitment and reinforce the linkage between social and
economic development. We will lead the effort to marshal diverse resources and broad
coalitions to advance the imperative of accountable, democratic governance.
We will use our leadership to promote a model of financing that leverages billions
in investment from the private sector and draws on Americas scientific, technological,
and entrepreneurial strengths to take to scale proven solutions in partnership with
governments, business, and civil society. And we will leverage our leadership in
promoting food security, enhancing resilience, modernizing rural agriculture, reducing the
vulnerability of the poor, and eliminating preventable child and maternal deaths as we
drive progress toward an AIDS-free generation.
IV. Values
To lead effectively in a world experiencing significant political change, the United
States must live our values at home while promoting universal values abroad. From the
Middle East to Ukraine to Southeast Asia to the Americas, citizens are more empowered
in seeking greater freedoms and accountable institutions. But these demands have often
produced an equal and opposite reaction from backers of discredited authoritarian orders,
resulting in crackdowns and conflict. Many of the threats to our security in recent years
arose from efforts by authoritarian states to oppose democratic forcesfrom the crisis
caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine to the rise of ISIL within the Syrian civil war. By
the same token, many of our greatest opportunities stem from advances for liberty and rule
of lawfrom sub-Saharan Africa to Eastern Europe to Burma.
Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national
interest. It aligns us with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world. We
know from our own history people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those
struggles are to succeed. But America is also uniquely situatedand routinely expected
to support peaceful democratic change. We will continue mobilizing international support
to strengthen and expand global norms of human rights. We will support women, youth,
civil society, journalists, and entrepreneurs as drivers of change. We will continue to insist
that governments uphold their human rights obligations, speak out against repression
wherever it occurs, and work to prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities.
Our closest allies in these efforts will be, as they always have, other democratic
states. But, even where our strategic interests require us to engage governments that do not
share all our values, we will continue to speak out clearly for human rights and human
dignity in our public and private diplomacy. Any support we might provide will be
balanced with an awareness of the costs of repressive policies for our own security
interests and the democratic values by which we live. Because our human rights advocacy
will be most effective when we work in concert with a wide range of partners, we are
building coalitions with civil society, religious leaders, businesses, other governments, and
international organizations. We will also work to ensure people enjoy the same rights
and securityonline as they are entitled to enjoy offline by opposing efforts to restrict
information and punish speech.
Live Our Values
Our values are a source of strength and security, and our ability to promote our
values abroad is directly tied to our willingness to abide by them at home. In recent years,
questions about Americas post-9/11 security policies have often been exploited by our
adversaries, while testing our commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law at home.
For the sake of our security and our leadership in the world, it is essential we hold
ourselves to the highest possible standard, even as we do what is necessary to secure our
people.
To that end, we strengthened our commitment against torture and have prohibited
so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were contrary to American values, while
implementing stronger safeguards for the humane treatment of detainees. We have
transferred many detainees from Guantanamo Bay, and we are working with the Congress
to remove the remaining restrictions on detainee transfers so that we can finally close it.
Where prosecution is an option, we will bring terrorists to justice through both civilian
and, when appropriate, reformed military commission proceedings that incorporate
fundamental due process and other protections essential to the effective administration of
justice.
Our vital intelligence activities are also being reformed to preserve the capabilities
needed to secure our interests while continuing to respect privacy and curb the potential
for abuse. We are increasing transparency so the public can be confident our surveillance
activities are consistent with the rule of law and governed by effective oversight. We have
not and will not collect signals intelligence to suppress criticism or dissent or to afford a
competitive advantage to U.S. companies. Safeguards currently in place governing how
we retain and share intelligence are being extended to protect personal information
regardless of nationality.
Advance Equality
American values are reflective of the universal values we champion all around the
worldincluding the freedoms of speech, worship, and peaceful assembly; the ability to
choose leaders democratically; and the right to due process and equal administration of
justice. We will be a champion for communities that are too frequently vulnerable to
violence, abuse, and neglectsuch as ethnic and religious minorities; people with
disabilities; Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) individuals; displaced
persons; and migrant workers.
Recognizing that no society will succeed if it does not draw on the potential of all
its people, we are pressing for the political and economic participation of women and girls
who are too often denied their inalienable rights and face substantial barriers to
opportunity in too many places. Our efforts include helping girls everywhere get the
education they need to participate fully in the economy and realize their potential. We are
focused on reducing the scourge of violence against women around the globe by providing
support for affected populations and enhancing efforts to improve judicial systems so
perpetrators are held accountable.
Support Emerging Democracies
The United States will concentrate attention and resources to help countries
consolidate their gains and move toward more democratic and representative systems of
governance. Our focus is on supporting countries that are moving in the right direction
whether it is the peaceful transitions of power we see in sub-Saharan Africa; the
movement toward constitutional democracy in Tunisia; or the opening taking place in
Burma. In each instance, we are creating incentives for positive reform and disincentives
for backsliding.
The road from demanding rights in the square to building institutions that
guarantee them is long and hard. In the last quarter century, parts of Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Africa, and East Asia have consolidated transitions to democracy, but not
without setbacks. The popular uprisings that began in the Arab world took place in a
region with weaker democratic traditions, powerful authoritarian elites, sectarian tensions,
and active violent extremist elements, so it is not surprising setbacks have thus far
outnumbered triumphs. Yet, change is inevitable in the Middle East and North Africa, as it
is in all places where the illusion of stability is artificially maintained by silencing dissent.
But the direction of that change is not predetermined. We will therefore continue to
look for ways to support the success and ease the difficulties of democratic transitions
through responsible assistance, investment and trade, and by supporting political,
economic, and security reforms. We will continue to push for reforms in authoritarian
countries not currently undergoing wholesale transitions. Good governance is also
predicated on strengthening the state-society relationship. When citizens have a voice in
the decisionmaking that affects them, governments make better decisions and citizens are
better able to participate, innovate, and contribute.
The corrosive effects of corruption must be overcome. While information sharing
allows us to identify corrupt officials more easily, globalization has also made it easier for
corrupt officials to hide the proceeds of corruption abroad, increasing the need for strong
and consistent implementation of the international standards on combating illicit finance.
The United States is leading the way in promoting adherence to standards of accountable
and transparent governance, including through initiatives like the Open Government
Partnership. We will utilize a broad range of tools to recover assets stolen by corrupt
officials and make it harder for criminals to hide, launder, and benefit from illegal
proceeds. Our leadership toward governance that is more open, responsible, and
accountable makes clear that democracy can deliver better government and development
for ordinary people.
Empower Civil Society and Young Leaders
Democracy depends on more than elections, or even government institutions.
Through civil society, citizens come together to hold their leaders accountable and address
challenges. Civil society organizations often drive innovations and develop new ideas and
approaches to solve social, economic, and political problems that governments can apply
on a larger scale. Moreover, by giving people peaceful avenues to advance their interests
and express their convictions, a free and flourishing civil society contributes to stability
and helps to counter violent extremism.
Still, civil society and individual activists face challenges in many parts of the
world. As technology empowers individuals and nongovernmental groups to mobilize
around a wide array of issuesfrom countering corruption and advancing the rule of law
to environmental activismpolitical elites in authoritarian states, and even in some with
more democratic traditions, are acting to restrict space for civil society. Restrictions are
often seen through new laws and regulations that deny groups the foreign funding they
depend on to operate, that criminalize groups of people like the LGBT community, or
deny political opposition groups the freedom to assemble in peaceful protest. The United
States is countering this trend by providing direct support for civil society and by
advocating rollback of laws and regulations that undermine citizens rights. We are also
supporting technologies that expand access to information, enable freedom of expression,
and connect civil society groups in this fight around the world.
More than 50 percent of the worlds people are under 30 years old. Many struggle
to make a life in countries with broken governance. We are taking the initiative to build
relationships with the worlds young people, identifying future leaders in government,
business, and civil society and connecting them to one another and to the skills they need
to thrive. We have established new programs of exchange among young Americans and
young people from Africa to Southeast Asia, building off the successes of the International
Visitor and Young African Leaders initiatives. We are fostering increased education
exchanges in our hemisphere. And we are catalyzing economic growth and innovation
within societies by lifting up and promoting entrepreneurship.
Prevent Mass Atrocities
The mass killing of civilians is an affront to our common humanity and a threat to
our common security. It destabilizes countries and regions, pushes refugees across
borders, and creates grievances that extremists exploit. We have a strong interest in
leading an international response to genocide and mass atrocities when they arise,
recognizing options are more extensive and less costly when we act preventively before
situations reach crisis proportions. We know the risk of mass atrocities escalates when
citizens are denied basic rights and freedoms, are unable to hold accountable the
institutions of government, or face unrelenting poverty and conflict. We affirm our support
for the international consensus that governments have the responsibility to protect
civilians from mass atrocities and that this responsibility passes to the broader
international community when those governments manifestly fail to protect their
populations. We will work with the international community to prevent and call to account
those responsible for the worst human rights abuses, including through support to the
International Criminal Court, consistent with U.S. law and our commitment to protecting
our personnel. Moreover, we will continue to mobilize allies and partners to strengthen
our collective efforts to prevent and respond to mass atrocities using all our instruments of
national power.
V. International Order
We have an opportunityand obligationto lead the way in reinforcing, shaping,
and where appropriate, creating the rules, norms, and institutions that are the foundation
for peace, security, prosperity, and the protection of human rights in the 21st century. The
modern-day international system currently relies heavily on an international legal
architecture, economic and political institutions, as well as alliances and partnerships the
United States and other like-minded nations established after World War II. Sustained by
robust American leadership, this system has served us well for 70 years, facilitating
international cooperation, burden sharing, and accountability. It carried us through the
Cold War and ushered in a wave of democratization. It reduced barriers to trade, expanded
free markets, and enabled advances in human dignity and prosperity.
 But, the system has never been perfect, and aspects of it are increasingly
challenged. We have seen too many cases where a failure to marshal the will and resources
for collective action has led to inaction. The U.N. and other multilateral institutions are
stressed by, among other things, resource demands, competing imperatives among
member states, and the need for reform across a range of policy and administrative areas.
Despite these undeniable strains, the vast majority of states do not want to replace the
system we have. Rather, they look to America for the leadership needed to both fortify it
and help it evolve to meet the wide range of challenges described throughout this strategy.
The United States will continue to make the development of sustainable solutions
in all of these areas a foreign policy priority and devote diplomatic and other resources
accordingly. We will continue to embrace the post-World War II legal architecturefrom
the U.N. Charter to the multilateral treaties that govern the conduct of war, respect for
human rights, nonproliferation, and many other topics of global concernas essential to
the ordering of a just and peaceful world, where nations live peacefully within their
borders, and all men and women have the opportunity to reach their potential. We will
lead by example in fulfilling our responsibilities within this architecture, demonstrating to
the world it is possible to protect security consistent with robust values. We will work
vigorously both within the U.N. and other multilateral institutions, and with member
states, to strengthen and modernize capacitiesfrom peacekeeping to humanitarian relief
so they endure to provide protection, stability, and support for future generations.
At the same time, we will exact an appropriate cost on transgressors. Targeted
economic sanctions remain an effective tool for imposing costs on those irresponsible
actors whose military aggression, illicit proliferation, or unprovoked violence threaten
both international rules and norms and the peace they were designed to preserve. We will
pursue multilateral sanctions, including through the U.N., whenever possible, but will act
alone, if necessary. Our sanctions will continue to be carefully designed and tailored to
achieve clear aims while minimizing any unintended consequences for other economic
actors, the global economy, and civilian populations.
In many cases, our use of targeted sanctions and other coercive measures are meant
not only to uphold international norms, but to deter severe threats to stability and order at
the regional level. We are not allowing the transgressors to define our regional strategies
on the basis of the immediate threats they present. Rather, we are advancing a longer-term
affirmative agenda in each of the regions, which prioritizes reinvigorating alliances with
long-standing friends, making investments in new partnerships with emerging democratic
powers with whom our interests are increasingly aligned, and continuing to support the
development of capable, inclusive regional institutions to help enforce common
international rules.
Advance Our Rebalance to Asia and the Pacific
The United States has been and will remain a Pacific power. Over the next 5 years,
nearly half of all growth outside the United States is expected to come from Asia. That
said, the security dynamics of the regionincluding contested maritime territorial claims
and a provocative North Korearisk escalation and conflict. American leadership will
remain essential to shaping the regions long-term trajectory to enhance stability and
security, facilitate trade and commerce through an open and transparent system, and
ensure respect for universal rights and freedoms.
To realize this vision, we are diversifying our security relationships in Asia as well
as our defense posture and presence. We are modernizing our alliances with Japan, South
Korea, Australia, and the Philippines and enhancing the interactions among them to ensure
they are fully capable of responding to regional and global challenges. We are committed
to strengthening regional institutions such as ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation to reinforce shared rules and norms, forge collective
responses to shared challenges, and help ensure peaceful resolution of disputes. We are
also working with our Asian partners to promote more open and transparent economies
and regional support for international economic norms that are vital to maintaining it as an
engine for global economic growth. The TPP is central to this effort.
As we have done since World War II, the United States will continue to support the
advance of security, development, and democracy in Asia and the Pacific. This is an
important focus of the deepening partnerships we are building in Southeast Asia including
with Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia. We will uphold our treaty obligations to South
Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, while encouraging the latter to return quickly
to democracy. We will support the people of Burma to deepen and sustain reforms,
including democratic consolidation and national reconciliation.
The United States welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China.
We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our
two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world. We seek
cooperation on shared regional and global challenges such as climate change, public
health, economic growth, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. While there
will be competition, we reject the inevitability of confrontation. At the same time, we will
manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold
international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human
rights. We will closely monitor Chinas military modernization and expanding presence in
Asia, while seeking ways to reduce the risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. On
cybersecurity, we will take necessary actions to protect our businesses and defend our
networks against cyber-theft of trade secrets for commercial gain whether by private
actors or the Chinese government.
In South Asia, we continue to strengthen our strategic and economic partnership
with India. As the worlds largest democracies, we share inherent values and mutual
interests that form the cornerstone of our cooperation, particularly in the areas of security,
energy, and the environment. We support Indias role as a regional provider of security and
its expanded participation in critical regional institutions. We see a strategic convergence
with Indias Act East policy and our continued implementation of the rebalance to Asia
and the Pacific. At the same time, we will continue to work with both India and Pakistan
to promote strategic stability, combat terrorism, and advance regional economic
integration in South and Central Asia.
Strengthen Our Enduring Alliance with Europe
The United States maintains a profound commitment to a Europe that is free,
whole, and at peace. A strong Europe is our indispensable partner, including for tackling
global security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding international norms. Our
work with Europe leverages our strong and historic bilateral relationships throughout the
continent. We will steadfastly support the aspirations of countries in the Balkans and
Eastern Europe toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration, continue to transform our
relationship with Turkey, and enhance ties with countries in the Caucasus while
encouraging resolution of regional conflict.
NATO is the strongest alliance the world has ever known and is the hub of an
expanding global security network. Our Article 5 commitment to the collective defense of
all NATO Members is ironclad, as is our commitment to ensuring the Alliance remains
ready and capable for crisis response and cooperative security. We will continue to deepen
our relationship with the European Union (EU), which has helped to promote peace and
prosperity across the region, and deepen NATO-EU ties to enhance transatlantic security.
To build on the millions of jobs supported by transatlantic trade, we support a pro-growth
agenda in Europe to strengthen and broaden the regions recovery, and we seek an
ambitious T-TIP to boost exports, support jobs, and raise global standards for trade.
Russias aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the
international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. In
response, we have led an international effort to support the Ukrainian people as they
choose their own future and develop their democracy and economy. We are reassuring our
allies by backing our security commitments and increasing responsiveness through
training and exercises, as well as a dynamic presence in Central and Eastern Europe to
deter further Russian aggression. This will include working with Europe to improve its
energy security in both the short and long term. We will support partners such as Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine so they can better work alongside the United States and NATO, as
well as provide for their own defense.
And we will continue to impose significant costs on Russia through sanctions and
other means while countering Moscows deceptive propaganda with the unvarnished truth.
We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our
allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary. At the same
time, we will keep the door open to greater collaboration with Russia in areas of common
interests, should it choose a different patha path of peaceful cooperation that respects
the sovereignty and democratic development of neighboring states.
Seek Stability and Peace in the Middle East and North Africa
In the Middle East, we will dismantle terrorist networks that threaten our people,
confront external aggression against our allies and partners, ensure the free flow of energy
from the region to the world, and prevent the development, proliferation, or use of
weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we remain committed to a vision of the
Middle East that is peaceful and prosperous, where democracy takes root and human
rights are upheld. Sadly, this is not the case today, and nowhere is the violence more tragic
and destabilizing than in the sectarian conflict from Beirut to Baghdad, which has given
rise to new terrorist groups such as ISIL.
Resolving these connected conflicts, and enabling long-term stability in the region,
requires more than the use and presence of American military forces. For one, it requires
partners who can defend themselves. We are therefore investing in the ability of Israel,
Jordan, and our Gulf partners to deter aggression while maintaining our unwavering
commitment to Israels security, including its Qualitative Military Edge. We are working
with the Iraqi government to resolve Sunni grievances through more inclusive and
responsive governance. With our partners in the region and around the world, we are
leading a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL.
At the same time, we will continue to pursue a lasting political solution to the devastating
conflict in Syria.
Stability and peace in the Middle East and North Africa also requires reducing the
underlying causes of conflict. America will therefore continue to work with allies and
partners toward a comprehensive agreement with Iran that resolves the worlds concerns
with the Iranian nuclear program. We remain committed to ending the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict through a two-state solution that ensures Israels security and Palestines viability.
We will support efforts to deescalate sectarian tensions and violence between Shia and
Sunni communities throughout the region. We will help countries in transition make
political and economic reforms and build state capacity to maintain security, law and
order, and respect for universal rights. In this respect, we seek a stable Yemen that
undertakes difficult structural reforms and confronts an active threat from al-Qaida and
other rebels. We will work with Tunisia to further progress on building democratic
institutions and strengthening its economy. We will work with the U.N. and our Arab and
European partners in an effort to help stabilize Libya and reduce the threat posed by
lawless militias and extremists. And we will maintain strategic cooperation with Egypt to
enable it to respond to shared security threats, while broadening our partnership and
encouraging progress toward restoration of democratic institutions.
Invest in Africas Future
Africa is rising. Many countries in Africa are making steady progress in growing
their economies, improving democratic governance and rule of law, and supporting human
rights and basic freedoms. Urbanization and a burgeoning youth population are changing
the regions demographics, and young people are increasingly making their voices heard.
But there are still many countries where the transition to democracy is uneven and slow
with some leaders clinging to power. Corruption is endemic and public health systems are
broken in too many places. And too many governments are responding to the expansion of
civil society and free press by passing laws and adopting policies that erode that progress.
Ongoing conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the
Central African Republic, as well as violent extremists fighting governments in Somalia,
Nigeria, and across the Sahel all pose threats to innocent civilians, regional stability, and
our national security.
For decades, American engagement with Africa was defined by aid to help
Africans reduce insecurity, famine, and disease. In contrast, the partnerships we are
forging today, and will expand in the coming years, aim to build upon the aspirations of
Africans. Through our Power Africa Initiative, we aim to double access to power in sub-
Saharan Africa. We will increase trade and business ties, generating export-driven growth
through initiatives like Trade Africa and AGOA. We will continue to support U.S.
companies to deepen investment in what can be the worlds next major center of global
growth, including through the Doing Business in Africa campaign. Moreover, we are
investing in tomorrows leadersthe young entrepreneurs, innovators, civic leaders, and
public servants who will shape the continents future. We are strengthening civilian and
military institutions through our Security Governance Initiative, and working to advance
human rights and eliminate corruption. We are deepening our security partnerships with
African countries and institutions, exemplified by our partnerships with the U.N. and AU
in Mali and Somalia. Such efforts will help to resolve conflicts, strengthen African
peacekeeping capacity, and counter transnational security threats while respecting human
rights and the rule of law.
Our investment in nutrition and agricultural capacity will continue, reducing
hunger through initiatives such as Feed the Future. We will keep working with partners to
reduce deaths from Ebola, HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis across Africa through
such initiatives as the Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Global Health
Security Agenda. The Ebola epidemic in 2014 serves as a stark reminder of the threat
posed by infectious disease and the imperative of global collective action to meet it.
American leadership has proven essential to bringing to bear the international community
to contain recent crises while building public health capacity to prevent future ones.
Deepen Economic and Security Cooperation in the Americas
We will continue to advance a Western Hemisphere that is prosperous, secure,
democratic, and plays a greater global role. In the region as a whole, the number of people
in the middle class has surpassed the number of people living in poverty for the first time
in history, and the hemisphere is increasingly important to global energy supplies. These
gains, however, are put at risk by weak institutions, high crime rates, powerful organized
crime groups, an illicit drug trade, lingering economic disparity, and inadequate education
and health systems.
To meet these challenges, we are working with Canada and Mexico to enhance our
collective economic competitiveness while advancing prosperity in our hemisphere. With
Chile, Peru, Mexico, and Canada, we are setting new global trade standards as we grow a
strong contingent of countries in the Americas that favor open trading systems to include
TPP. We seek to advance our economic partnership with Brazil, as it works to preserve
gains in reducing poverty and deliver the higher standards of public services expected by
the middle class.
We are also championing a strong and effective inter-American human rights and
rule of law system. We are expanding our collaboration across the Americas to support
democratic consolidation and increase public-private partnerships in education,
sustainable development, access to electricity, climate resilience, and countering
transnational organized crime.
Such collaboration is especially important in vulnerable countries like Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras, where government institutions are threatened by criminal
syndicates. Migration surges involving unaccompanied children across our southern
border is one major consequence of weak institutions and violence. American leadership,
in partnership with these countries and with the support of their neighbors, remains
essential to arresting the slide backwards and to creating steady improvements in
economic growth and democratic governance. Likewise, we remain committed to helping
rebuild Haiti and to put it and our other Caribbean neighbors on a path to sustainable
development.
We will support the resolution of longstanding regional conflicts, particularly
Colombias conclusion of a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia. Overall, we have deepened our strategic partnership with Colombia, which is a
key contributor to international peace and security. Equally, we stand by the citizens of
countries where the full exercise of democracy is at risk, such as Venezuela. Though a few
countries in the region remain trapped in old ideological debates, we will keep working
with all governments that are interested in cooperating with us in practical ways to
reinforce the principles enumerated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. As part of
our effort to promote a fully democratic hemisphere, we will advance our new opening to
Cuba in a way that most effectively promotes the ability of the Cuban people to determine
their future freely.
VI. Conclusion
This National Security Strategy provides a vision for strengthening and sustaining
American leadership in this still young century. It clarifies the purpose and promise of
American power. It aims to advance our interests and values with initiative and from a
position of strength. We will deter and defeat any adversary that threatens our national
security and that of our allies. We confidently welcome the peaceful rise of other countries
as partners to share the burdens for maintaining a more peaceful and prosperous world.
We will continue to collaborate with established and emerging powers to promote our
shared security and defend our common humanity, even as we compete with them in
economic and other realms. We will uphold and refresh the international rules and norms
that set the parameters for such collaboration and competition. We will do all of this and
more with confidence that the international system whose creation we led in the aftermath
of World War II will continue to serve America and the world well. This is an ambitious,
but achievable agenda, especially if we continue to restore the bipartisan center that has
been a pillar of strength for American foreign policy in decades past. America has greater
capacity to adapt and recover from setbacks than any other country. A core element of our
strength is our unity and our certainty that American leadership in this century, like the
last, remains indispensable.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on the 2015 National
Security Strategy
Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you, Strobe, for your kind words and to
everyone at Brookings. This was my home for six peaceful years. I miss it. Looking
around the room, I see many friends who challenged and encouraged me and who
continue to generate some of the best ideas for Americas foreign policy. So, Im very
pleased to be here.
This morning, President Obama released his 2015 National Security Strategy.
Fundamentally, its a strategy to strengthen the foundations of Americas power
political, economic, and militaryand to sustain American leadership in this new century
so that we can surmount the challenges of today and capture the opportunities of
tomorrow.
Our strategy is guided by the same four enduring national interests we laid out in
the 2010 National Security Strategy security, prosperity, values, and a rules-based
international order. Our interests are enduring, but in many respects, 2015 is a whole new
ballgame. Much has changed in the last five years.
As a nation, we are stronger than weve been in a long time. Since President
Obama took office, we arrested the worst financial crisis and repaired the biggest collapse
in world trade since the Great Depression. In 2010, unemployment in the United States
was almost 10 percent. Today, businesses have added more than 11 million new jobs, and
unemployment is down to 5.7 percent. In 2010, our deficit topped $1 trillion; today, weve
cut that in half, to less than $500 billion. Our kids are graduating at higher rates, and
millions more Americans have healthcare. Weve unlocked a domestic energy boom that
has made us the worlds number one producer of oil and gas, strengthening our energy
security with huge ripple effects for global oil markets and geopolitics. Weve brought
home almost 170,000 American troops, responsibly ending two long and costly ground
wars and re-purposing our military strength so we can better respond to emerging threats
and crises. The diversity and creativity of the American people continue to be a wellspring
of American powerdriving innovations that are revolutionizing everything from the way
we hail a cab to the way we treat disease. By fortifying our foundational strengths,
America is in a better position to confront current crises and seize the opportunities of this
new century.
Yet, few know better than we the complexity of the challenges that America faces.
Every day, I start my morning with a briefing that covers the most sobering threats and the
difficult problems we confront around the world. These include the fall-out from the Arab
uprisings, Russian aggression, Ebola, cyber attacks, and a more diffuse terrorist threat.
But, too often, whats missing here in Washington is a sense of perspective. Yes,
theres a lot going on. Still, while the dangers we face may be more numerous and varied,
they are not of the existential nature we confronted during World War II or the Cold War.
We cant afford to be buffeted by alarmism and an instantaneous news cycle. We must
continue to do the hard work of leading a complex and rapidly evolving world, of seizing
opportunities, and of winning the future for our children.
Strong and sustained American leadership remains essential, as ever. Think for a
minute where the world would be today without decisive U.S. leadership. Ebola would be
spreading throughout West Africa and likely to far corners of the world. Instead, America
galvanized the world to roll back this horrible disease. Without us, Russia would be
suffering no cost for its actions in Ukraine. Instead, the ruble is in a free fall, and Russia is
paying dearly for flaunting the rules. Without us, there would be no military campaign or
sixty countries countering ISILs advance. There would be no prospect for a global deal on
climate change; no pressure for Iran to be at the negotiating table; and, no potential for
trade that meets a higher standard for our workers and businesses.
Nonetheless, there is a loud debate in Washington about American leadership in
the 21st century. But the issue is not simply when we should have started arming Syrian
rebels or whether we should provide lethal weapons to Ukraine. It is about the nature of
U.S. leadership for the future. With this national security strategy, we stake out a much
larger role for America in shaping our world, while anticipating the challenges to come.
Before I go through the elements of this strategy, I want to note how our approach
may differ from what others may recommend. We believe in the importance of economic
growth, but we insist upon investing in the foundations of American power: education and
health care; clean energy and basic research. We will always act to defend our country and
its people, but we aim to avoid sending many thousands of ground forces into combat in
hostile lands. We have renewed our core alliances, while also building partnerships with
emerging powers and neglected regions. We are committed to fighting terrorism and
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, even as we rally the world to meet the threats of
tomorrowmalicious cyber actors and deadly pandemics; climate change and competition
in space. We focus every day on the crises in the Middle East and Ukraine, but we are
simultaneously rebalancing to the regions that will do more to determine the course of the
21st centuryEast Asia and India, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas.
So, with that in mind, let me outline the four ways we are advancing our core
interests.
The first element of our strategy is to secure the U.S., our citizens, our allies and
partners through a dynamic global security posture in which we employ our unique
capabilities, forge diverse coalitions, and support local partners. This approach builds on a
more secure homeland and a national defense that is second to none. President Obama is
committed to maintaining the best trained, best equipped, and best led military force the
world has ever known, while honoring our promises to service members, veterans, and
their families. To ensure success, we call on Congress to support responsible investments
in our national security, including by ending sequestration.
To counter todays threats, were implementing a comprehensive counter-terrorism
approach that takes account of how the enemy has evolved. As al-Qaida core has been
decimated, weve seen the diffusion of the threat to al-Qaida affiliates, ISIL, local
militias, and home-grown violent extremists. This diffusion may for now reduce the risk
of a spectacular attack like 9/11, but it raises the probability of the types of attacks that
weve seen in Boston and Ottawa, Sydney and Paris. To meet this morphing challenge, we
are combining our decisive military capabilities with local partnerships, with the financial
tools to choke off funding, and the international reach of our law-enforcement and
intelligence agencies. Were strengthening the capacity of weak states to govern their
territory and provide for their citizens, while countering the corrosive ideology of violent
extremism. Fighting terrorism is a long-term struggle. There will be setbacks, and there
are no one-size-fits-all solutions. We have to work across multiple lines of effort in diverse
contexts to be effective.
To degrade and ultimately defeat ISIL, we assembled a broad coalition that is
confronting this scourge from all anglesfrom training Iraqi security forces and
supporting the moderate Syrian opposition to encouraging political reforms in Iraq that
foster greater inclusion. Together, weve taken out thousands of ISILs fighters; destroyed
nearly 200 oil and gas facilities that fund their terror; and pushed them out of territory,
including areas around Baghdad, Sinjar, and the Mosul Dam. Just last week, ISIL
conceded defeat in their months-long siege of Kobane. And with the world united in
condemnation of its horrific executions, ISIL should know that their barbarism only
fortifies the worlds collective resolve.
Our counter-terrorism strategy is still at work in Afghanistan, where we ended our
combat mission as planned. Now, we are focused on supporting a sovereign and stable
Afghanistan that will not be a safe haven for al-Qaida terrorists. Even as we help develop
Afghan security forces, we will continue to keep pressure on al-Qaida through a capable
counterterrorism mission.
American leadership remains essential not only to tackling todays threats but also
to addressing the global challenges that will define the nature of security for our children
and grandchildren. And here, too, we have to lead with our heads, enlisting partners to
work alongside us.
American leadership is addressing the danger of nuclear proliferation. No threat
poses as grave a risk to our security as the potential use of nuclear weapons. That is why
we continue to secure nuclear material and strengthen international norms against the use
of all weapons of mass destruction, moving us closer to achieving the peace and security
of a world without nuclear weapons.
American leadership rallied the world to toughen sanctions against Iran. Through
diplomacy and sustained economic pressure, weve halted the progress of Irans nuclear
program and rolled it back in key respects. Now, we must give diplomacy a chance to
finish the job. If diplomacy fails, it will not be for lack of good faith by America or the
P5+1. And then, if necessary, we would be stronger in leading our partners to dial up the
pressure and in making sure Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon.
American leadership is addressing the dangers of pandemic disease. Our agenda to
improve global health security doesnt end with Ebola. It strengthens the capacity of states
and international institutions to prevent, detect, and respond to future outbreaks, before
they become deadly epidemics.
American leadership is addressing the very real threat of climate change. The
science is clear. The impacts of climate change will only worsen over timeeven longer
droughts, more severe storms, more forced migration. So were making smart decisions
today that will pay off for generations, like our ground-breaking climate commitment with
China that will limit both our nations greenhouse gases and bend down the global
emissions curve.
American leadership is also addressing the pressing need for enhanced cyber-
security. As more of the world comes online, were leading an international effort to
define the rules for how states engage with one another in cyberspace, while ensuring the
Internet remains a powerful tool to drive future advances. At the same time, we are
committing new resources to bolster the security of U.S. critical infrastructure,
government networks, and other systems against cyber threats.
Second, we will expand prosperity by using our renewed economic strengthour
resurgent economy and improved energy securityto bolster the global financial system,
advance an open international economic order, and reduce inequality and poverty.
 With the worlds top universities, premier research facilities, and a culture of
entrepreneurship, America already has the keys that will drive our knowledge economy
through the coming century. And, with critical investments in technology and innovation,
well keep sharpening our technological edge to keep the American economy at the
forefront of innovation.
Were opening more markets to American businesses, workers, and farmers while
forging trade agreements that set high standards for fair wages, safe workplaces, and
environmental protections. And, to make sure new trade and growth benefit people around
the world, well continue to pursue a sustainable development agenda, grounded in our
commitment to end extreme poverty.
Well work with Congress to pass Trade Promotion Authority so we can finalize
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, thus securing a free trade agreement with many of the
worlds fastest-growing economies. Were working to make rapid progress with the
European Union on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, expanding what is
already the largest trading relationship in the world. And, we are committed to renewing
and enhancing the African Growth and Opportunity Act to further deepen our investment
in that promising region.
Africa is primed to become a major center of global growth. Weve ramped up our
commitments across the continent, including through the Presidents Power Africa
initiative to connect millions more people to reliable electricity. Through Feed the Future,
were helping farmers plant better crops and raise their incomes, while also improving the
food security of the region. And last August, for the first time ever, President Obama
hosted some 50 African leaders to chart ways our nations will do more together and seize
opportunities for U.S. businesses to invest in Africas future.
Third, at a time when citizens in every region are demanding greater freedom and
more accountability from their governments, our strategy is to defend democracy and
human rights, combat corruption, promote open government, and stand with civil society.
We do so by living our values at home, growing the ranks of capable democratic states,
and defending universal rights. Well help countries in transitionlike Burma, Tunisia,
and Sri Lankabecome more open, more democratic, and more inclusive societies. Well
support established democracies that are in danger of backsliding. Well empower citizens
and NGOs in places where they are under attack.
At the same time, President Obama has deepened our commitment to promoting
that basic American value: equality. We believe everyone should be able to speak their
minds and practice their faith freely. We believe all girls deserve the very same
opportunities as boys. We believe that all humans are created equal and are worthy of the
same love and respectincluding our lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender brothers and
sisters. These beliefs are fundamental to who we are.
Advancing equality is both morally right and smart strategy. If we reduce
disparities, which can lead to instability and violence, we increase our shared security.
Reams of empirical evidence demonstrate how countries do betteracross every metric
when they tap the talents of all their people. So, we champion the rights of vulnerable
communitiesthose targeted by abuse or excluded from societyand counter escalating
cycles of hatred that can spark violence. Mass killings threaten our common security and
diminish our shared humanity, so we affirm that governments have a responsibility to
protect civilians. Well continue to lead global efforts to prevent atrocities and hold
accountable those who commit the worst abuses.
Were also reaching out to populations that America can ill-afford to neglect. With
more than half the world under the age of 30, our strategy invests in and empowers young
people through educational exchanges and entrepreneurship. Our Young Leaders
initiatives in Africa and Southeast Asia identify and mentor the next generation of talent to
grasp opportunity.
And, because we seek to lead by example, well keep working to make our own
laws more inclusive, to sustain our prohibitions against torture, to protect civil liberties
and privacy, and to improve transparency on issues like electronic surveillance. Weve
reduced the population of Guantanamo by nearly half, and while there are tough
challenges ahead, we mean to keep going until we finish the job.
Finally, our strategy leverages American leadership to uphold the liberal
international order, which has served the world well for 70 years, by reinforcing rules-of-
the road and strengthening and diversifying our alliances and partnerships in every region
of the world.
Russias aggression against Ukraine is a heinous and deadly affront to long-
standing international law and norms. In lock-step with our European allies, we have built
a coalition of partners around the world to impose steep political and economic costs on
Russia, in contrast to its cost-free invasion of Georgia. And, we will continue to turn up
the pressure, unless Russia decisively reverses course. At the same time, were providing
vital economic support to help the Ukrainian people write a better future for their country,
and we are strengthening our enduring alliance with Europeby reassuring our allies in
Eastern Europe and investing in modernizing NATO to meet emerging threats.
As we update the existing international system, our strategy is to enhance our
focus on regions that will shape the century ahead, starting with the Asia-Pacific. Our
rebalance is deepening longstanding alliances and forging new partnerships to expand
cooperation. Were investing in ASEAN, the East Asia Summit, and the Pacific Islands
Forum to strengthen their capacity to enforce regional norms, respond to crises like natural
disasters, and resolve disputes peacefully, so that the Asia Pacific remains a region of
dynamic growth and opportunity.
With China, were building a constructive relationship that expands practical
cooperation across a wide spectrum of issues from global health to non-proliferation, even
as we confront real differences over human rights, cyber-enabled economic espionage, and
the use of coercion to advance territorial claims. President Obamas recent trip to India
strengthened another critical partnership that will deliver economic and security benefits
for both our nations and the broader region, and help lift up the lives of more than a billion
people. In furtherance of our relationships throughout the region, Im pleased to announce
today that we have invited Prime Minister Abe of Japan and President Xi of China for
state visits, and we look forward to welcoming other Asian leaders to the White House
this yearincluding President Park of South Korea and President Widodo of Indonesia.
 At the same time, we seek a Middle East thats more secure, prosperous, and where
democracy can take root. Thats the ultimate vision were working toward with partners
throughout the region. Well continuously strengthen the unique bonds that unite the
peoples of Israel and America. Our commitment to Israels security remains enduring and
unshakeable. We refuse to give up on a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Israelis
and Palestinians. Well keep investing in the ability of our Gulf partners, like Saudi Arabia
and the UAE, to deter aggression, even as we deepen our cooperation on regional
challenges. Since Libya, Syria, and Yemen confront persistent violence and instability,
well protect our people, work with partners to shrink terrorist safe havens, and support
those working to achieve political and social reform.
To be sure, the regions challenges are many, including: a generational
transformation; citizens legitimate demands for political and economic reform; sectarian,
ethnic, and tribal tensions; and Irans destabilizing influence. But, well keep leading
international efforts to reduce insecurity and, drawing on all sources of our influencenot
just our militarywe will work to foster progress that endures.
Closer to home, Latin America and the Caribbean is a region thats experienced
rapid growth, with a large and growing middle class, vibrant democracies, and still
untapped potential. Its grappling with challenges like transnational crime and trafficking
that have serious implications for our own security. Thanks in part to our opening with
Cuba, which turns the page on 50 years of fruitless policy, we have new opportunities to
strengthen our partnership with our neighbors. Were investing particularly in Central
America to improve governance and citizen safety to address some of the root causes of
mass migrations, like we saw last summer.
Across a range of issues, with an array of partners, the United States is proudly
shouldering the responsibilities of global leadership. As President Obama made clear
during his State of the Union address: The question is not whether America leads in the
world, but how. The answer is: we are pursuing an ambitious, yet achievable agenda,
worthy of a great power. The Presidents Budget directly supports his strategy. Our
national security leadership is united around this shared vision and agenda. And, we are
eager to work with Congress to restore the vital bi-partisan center to U.S. foreign policy.
Our unparalleled leadership is grounded in Americas enduring strengths and
guided by a clear sense of purpose. We approach challenges using all levers of our power
vigorous diplomacy, broad-based development, economic leverage, our technological
advantages, the talent and diversity of our people, and, when needed, our military might.
We rally partners to enact sustainable solutions when challenges arise. We strive to set the
highest standards by our own example. And, we lead with our eyes fixed firmly on the
future, alert to opportunities to make the world safer and increasingly just.
President Obama has two years left in his termand two years is plenty of time.
This national security strategy is a blueprint for what we intend to get done over the next
two years from degrading ISIL and opposing Russian aggression, to leaving behind a
world that can more effectively meet the dangers of climate change and disease, cyber
threats, and extreme poverty.
If we run through the tape, America will be better and more sustainably positioned
to continue leading on the issues, and in the regions, that will shape our future.
One thing I can guarantee you: President Obama is going to leave everything on
the field, and so will the rest of us. The challenges ahead will surely continue to be many
and great. Progress wont be quick or linear. But, we are committed to seizing the future
that lies beyond the crisis of the day and to pursuing a vision of the world as it can and
should be.
Thats our strategy for sustaining the leadership that future generations deserve.
Anything less would not be worthy of the American people or of our great nation.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Additional National Security Testimony and Intelligence Community Material
2015 and 2014)
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy Testimony
United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
General John M. Keane, USA (Ret)
27 January 2015
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Room SD-G50
Mr. Chairman, ranking minority and members of this distinguished committee,
thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue as Americas global security
challenges. Am honored to be here today with General Jim Mattis and Admiral Fox
Fallon, both highly respected military leaders who I have known for years.
The U.S. is confronting emerging security challenges on a scale it has not seen
since the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status following WWII, with radical
Islam morphing into a global jihad, Iran seeking regional hegemony and revisionist
powers capable of employing, in varying degrees of sophistication, disruptive methods of
war that will severely test the U.S. militarys traditional methods of projecting and
sustaining power abroad. Given U.S. defense budget projections, the U.S. will have to
confront these challenges without its long standing decided advantage in the scale of
resources it is able to devote to the competition. Indeed the Budget Control Act (BCA), or
sequestration, is not only irresponsible, in the face of emerging challenges, it is downright
reckless.
Let me briefly outline the major security challenges and what can be done about
them.
1. RADICAL ISLAM
As much as Nazism and communism both geopolitical movements, ideologically
driven, were the major security challenges of the 20th century, radical Islam is the major
security challenge of our generation. Nazism was defeated by overwhelming brute force
and communism was defeated by better ideas. Radical Islam will take a combination of
force and better ideas to ultimately add it to the trash heap of unrealized and unfulfilled
ideological movements.
Radical Islam as I am defining it for todays discussion consists of 3 distinct
movements, who share a radical fundamentalist ideology, use jihad or terror to achieve
objectives yet compete with each other for influence and power.
First, the Shia based, Iranian sponsored radical Islamist movement that began in
1979 with the formation of the Islamic State of Iran. In 1980 Iran declared the U.S. as a
strategic enemy and its goal is to drive the U.S. out of the region, achieve regional
hegemony and destroy the state of Israel. It uses proxies, primarily, as the worlds number
one state sponsoring terrorism. Beginning in the early 1980s it began jihad against the
U.S. by bombing the Marine barracks, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Embassy Annex in
Lebanon, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, the AF barracks , Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia
and attacking the U.S. military in Iraq using Shia militias trained in Iran with advanced
IEDs developed by Iranian engineers. To date, the result is, U.S. troops left Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia and Iraq while Iran has direct influence and some control over Beirut,
Lebanon, Gaza, Damascus, Syria, Baghdad, Iraq and now Sanaa, Yemen (as you can see
on the map.)
Is there any doubt that Iran, is on the march and is systematically moving toward
their regional hegemonic objectives. Iran has armed Hezbollah and Hamas with thousands
of rockets and missiles in order to attack Israel, has propped up the Assad regime with
Quds force advisors and fighters plus tons of military supplies, was the first to come to the
assistance of the beleaguered Iraq government after the ISIS invasion and today has
hundreds of Quds force advisors on the ground in Iraq , backing Iranian trained Shia
militias, with Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds force, a frequent visitor and now
using the Houthis, has managed to topple the Yemen government, an ally in the fight
against Al Qaeda.
The Iranian strategy of using proxies to conduct jihad and to launch conventional
military attacks while propping up countries it desires to influence is a winning strategy.
Despite 30 years of proxy attacks against American interests in the region and an almost
10 year kidnapping campaign in the 80s resulting in the death of CIA station chief
Buckley not a single American president, republican or democrat has ever countered.
Iran also has been on a 20 year journey to acquire nuclear weapons, simply
because they know it guarantees preservation of the regime and makes them along with
their partners the dominant power in the region thereby capable of expanding their control
and influence. Add to this their ballistic missile delivery system and Iran is not only a
threat to the region but to Europe as well, and as they increase missile range, eventually a
threat to the U.S.
- Second , the Al Qaeda (AQ), Sunni based movement, declared war on the U.S. in
the early 90s, desires to drive the U.S. out of the region, dominate all Muslim lands, and
as the most ambitious radical Islamist movement, eventually achieve world domination.
The U.S. has a 20 year history with AQ who began its jihad in the early 90s with the
attack on the WTC, U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole, the 9/11
attacks and a number of planned attacks since 9/11 that were either thwarted or bungled.
As you can see on the map, AQ and its affiliates, exceeds Iran in beginning to dominate
multiple countries. AQ has grown fourfold in the last 5 years. Unable to project power out
of the region due to US drone attacks, in Pakistan, AQ central franchised out to AQAP in
Yemen, by providing some key leaders, the responsibility to conduct out of region attacks
e.g. in the U.S. and Paris, France. No one is suggesting that the red on that map is under
the direct control and influence of AQ central. They are not. But what binds them together
is a shared and common ideology using jihad to accomplish their political objective,
which is the overthrow of their host governments.
Third, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is an outgrowth from Al Qaeda
in Iraq which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. Conducting assessment visits for GEN
Petraeus many times in Iraq, on one occasion in late 2008 I was shown a number of AQ
message intercepts where AQ admitted defeat and was advising AQ central not to send
any more brothers because it is over. In 2011 the U.S. unplugged its sophisticated
intelligence capability, and pulled out the CT force whose main task was to hunt down AQ
leaders. A week after the last troops left, General Caslen, then U.S. commander indicated,
the first suicide bomb in over 6 months went off in Baghdad. And so it began the
beginnings of ISIS as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 2012, and began
seizing towns and villages from the Syria/Iraq border all the way to western Syria from
Aleppo to Damascus. We tracked this by day and by week at the Institute for the Study of
War (ISW) providing briefings to CIA, DIA, CJCS, DOS, congressional intelligence
committees and to members of this committee.
After many terrorist attacks and assassinations in Mosul and Anbar province in
2013 to set the conditions for follow on operations, ISIS launched a conventional attack
back into Iraq beginning in 2014 with the seizure of Falujah and culminating in the seizure
of Mosul and many other towns and villages.
- Why Are We Failing: Is it possible to look at the map and claim that U.S. policy
and strategy is working or that AQ is on the run. It is unmistakable that our policies
have failed and the unequivocal explanation is U.S. policy has focused on disengaging
from the Middle East. The Arab Spring, a strategic surprise, began in 2010 in a region
where democracy does not exist in the Arab world, as the people in the streets were
seeking political reform, social justice and economic opportunity. No one was in the
streets advocating radical Islam or jihad but the radical Islamists saw political upheaval as
an opportunity to gain control and influence. Meanwhile the U.S. in terms of policy
emphasis was conducting the so called pivot to the east. We failed to see the Arab
Spring as a U.S. opportunity to influence political reform and social justice. The radicals
filled that vacuum as the Arab Spring became an accelerant for them. As such ISIS
reemerged in Iraq, then Syria, after U.S. troops pulled out, the White House announced a
similar pullout of all troops in Afghanistan. In Libya, the moderate regime, friendly to the
U.S., that replaced Qaddafi requested assistance to form an effective security force to
safeguard the government and protect the people from the armed militant groups. We
refused and the radical Islamists (AAS) tried to kill the UK Ambassador, burned down the
U.S. consulate and killed Ambassador Stephens, and, now, the country is being taken over
by the radical Islamists, forcing the shutdown of the U.S. Embassy. In Syria, in 2010,
moderate rebels (now, the FSA) had the initial momentum against the Assad regime, many
believed the regime was about to fall. Then Iran, Hezbollah and the Russians assisted the
Assad regime thereby forcing the FSA to request arms and training assistance. They never
requested any U.S. boots on the ground or even, at the time, any use of air power. As
late as the summer of 2012 Director Petraeus, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta and General
Dempsey recommended we assist the FSA, who the CIA vetted. The President of the
United States refused and ISIS and other radical groups to include AQ moved into Syria
while the Assad regime was systematically killing 200,000 Syrians and displacing more
than 13 million from their homes, a human catastrophe by any definition. Even after the
Assad regime used chemical weapons (CW) to kill Syrians by the thousands, thereby
crossing the infamous U.S. red line, the U.S. failed to engage. Our allies in the region
lost confidence in U.S. leadership and question, to this day, U.S. resolve. U.S. policy
makers chose to ignore the very harsh realities of the rise of radical Islam. In my view, we
became paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences in the Middle East after fighting
two wars. Moreover, as we sit here this morning in the face of radical Islam, US policy
makers will not only accurately name the movement as radical Islam , we further choose
not to define it, nor explain its ideology and most critical, we have no comprehensive
strategy to stop it or defeat it. We are reduced to a very piecemeal effort using drones in
Yemen and Pakistan, a vital tactic but not a strategy and air power in Iraq and Syria , while
assisting an indigenous ground force. This approach almost certainly guarantees we will
be incrementally engaged against one radical group after another, with no end in sight.
- What Can Be Done: To stop and defeat a global radical Islamist movement and
Iranian regional hegemony requires a broad, long term, comprehensive strategic approach
with strategic objectives both near and long term supporting the strategy. We should be
informed by the successful defeat and collapse of another ideology, communism. World
leaders understood how formidable the communist, Soviet threat was to the world order
and formed political and military alliances i.e., NATO and SEATO to counter it. The
power and influence of countries working together against a common enemy is the
preferred way to achieve a comprehensive and synergistic outcome. Forming political and
military alliances or using a combination of existing alliances offers the opportunity by
member nations to develop a comprehensive strategy to discuss and set goals for
necessary political and social reforms, and to share intelligence, technology, equipment
and training. The alliance is mostly about supporting countries in the region to make
internal changes and to assist comprehensively in countering radical Islam. This is not
about major military intervention by the U.S., it is about assisting alliance members with
training their counter-terrorism force and their conventional military in counterinsurgency
and yes conducting U.S. CT operations as required. While killing and capturing terrorists
is key, so is the strategy to organize an alliance wide effort to undermine the radical
Islamist ideology, to counter its narrative, to counter recruiting and to target outside
financing.
- ISIS/ AQ/ Iran in Iraq/ Syria: The ISIS advance is stalled in Iraq due to effective
air power with modest gains in retaking lost territory. However, a successful counter
offensive to retake Mosul and Anbar province is a very real challenge. No one knows for
certain how the indigenous force consisting of IA, Peshmerga, Sunni tribes and Shia
militia will perform. The U.S. should plan now to have U.S./coalition advisors accompany
front line troops with the added capability to call in air strikes. Direct action SOFs both
ground and air should assist by targeting ISIS leaders. U.S. and coalition combat brigades
should be designated for deployment and moved to Kuwait to be ready for employment if
the counter offensive stalls or is defeated.
The Syria policy is a failure. There is wide disagreement in DOD, DOS, and the
NSC over the current Syrian policy. ISIS is continuing to advance throughout Syria and is
gaining ground, taking new territory. The plans for training and assisting the FSA, is not
robust enough, 5,000 in one year, and permitting Assad to continue to bomb the FSA
faster than new members are trained makes no sense. The U.S. should heed the advice of
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Turkey to establish a No Fly Zone (NFZ) to shut down
Assads air power and a buffer zone to protect refugees.
ISIS, AQ and Iran are competing in Iraq and Syria. Their competition raises the
stakes for all of them. They do not cancel each other out. They make each other stronger
and induce them to act with greater impunity. Their competition risks hijacking the
internal struggles within Iraq and Syria. The longer these wars go on, the better off they
will do. Their struggle will also raise the stakes for Saudi Arabia and disrupt the regional
balance of power in the Middle East.
The wars in Iraq and Syria cannot be contained. ISIS and AQ are trying to bring
them to Europe. Not just through terrorist attacks, but through polarizing identity. They
are deliberately working to radicalize sympathizers. Providing security against terrorism
and stopping radicalization is a rising challenge for our European allies, and, fortunately,
less for the U.S. This is a war of ideas, but it is also a war in which military might matters.
These groups have laid down stakes in Iraq and Syria. They will be very hard to lose
without tipping the region into a sectarian war. The barriers to their entry have to hold.
We are living through a time when the regional refugee crisis is out of control. 13
million Syrians displaced. Thats well over 60% of Syrias pre-war population displaced or
killed. Iraq is on the rise with 3 million Iraqis internally displaced as of late 2014. This is
not a stable system, and the chaos favors these three groups.
- Iran : The long term goal for any alliance should be Irans regime change or a
collapse of the existing government framework, similar to the collapse of the Soviet
Union. And the reason is clear; Irans stated regional hegemonic objectives are
incongruous with the peace, prosperity and stability of the Middle East.
Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon or a threshold capability
allowing rapid nuclear development. Sadly, we are already about there! Congress should
do 2 things now in reference to Iran. 1) authorize increased sanctions now with automatic
implementation if talks are extended or fail 2) legislate ratification of any deal by the
Senate.
- Afghanistan: The political situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably
with the reform leadership of Ashraf Ghani but the security situation remains at risk.
While the security situation in the South is relatively stable with some exceptions, the
situation in the East is not satisfactory. The problem is the area generally from Kabul to
the Pakistan border which is the domain of the Haqqani network (HQN). Because the
White House provided 25% less surge forces than requested and then pulled the surge
forces out prematurely, these forces were never applied to the East as they were,
successfully, in the South. As such HQN has not been rooted out of their support zones
and safe areas in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for the ANSF. It follows that the
ANSF needs the funding to support its current troop levels of 352K and much needed U.S.
and coalition troops to conduct CT and to advise, train and assist the ANSF beyond 2016.
All we accomplished will be at risk, as it was in Iraq, if the troops are pulled out not based
on the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the obvious and painful lesson
from Iraq ?
2. SECURITY CHALLENGES POSED BY REVISIONIST EUROASIAN
NATIONS i.e. RUSSIA AND CHINA
- Russia: In Europe, Russias recent behavior suggests that its 2008 military
campaign against Georgia was not an aberration but rather an initial effort to overturn the
prevailing regional order. By seizing the Crimea, supporting trumped up rebel forces in
eastern Ukraine and engaging in military deployments that directly threaten its Baltic
neighbors, Moscow has made it clear that it does not accept the political map of post- Cold
War Europe. I believe we need to realistically conclude that Moscow is also willing to
challenge the very existence of NATO.
- What Can Be Done: Given the dramatic drop in oil prices, Russia is beginning to
suffer economically and is likely heading toward a recession if not already there.
Additional tough sanctions should be put back on the table to coerce Russia to stop the
Ukraine aggression. It is a disgrace that once again we have refused to assist a people
being oppressed when all they asked for is the weapons to fight; that policy decision
which the White House states could lead to an escalation in the conflict, makes no sense.
We should robustly arm and assist Ukraine. Additionally, NATO military presence should
be significantly shifted to the Baltics and Eastern Europe with plans for permanent bases.
A clear signal of Article 5 intent must be sent to Moscow. These actions will strengthen
our diplomatic efforts which to date have failed.
- China: Chinas continuing economic growth has fueled a major conventional
military buildup that is beginning to shift the local balance of power in its favor. As a
result Beijing has been emboldened to act more assertively toward its neighbors,
especially in expanding its territorial claims, which include not only Taiwan, but also most
of the South China sea islands and Japans Senkaku Islands. China has embarked on a
strategy of regional domination at the expense of U.S. interests, as a pacific nation, and
decades of partnership with allied countries in the region.
- What Can Be Done: Develop a regional strategy with our allies to counter
Chinas desire for dominant control and influence. Recognize that Chinas military
strategy to defeat U.S. reliance on military information networks which they believe alone
may defeat the U.S. militarily and their exploding precision strike capability threatens
surface and naval forces, forward staging bases, and air and sea ports of debarkation. The
U.S. no longer enjoys the commanding position in the precision strike regime that it
occupied in the two decades following the Cold War. We should stress test U.S. regional
military defense to counter Chinas threat and recognize that a change in regional defense
strategy is likely.
3. SEQUESTRATION:
It must be repealed and reasonable resources restored to meet the emerging
security challenges. All the services have a need to capitalize their investment accounts
and to maintain readiness which is rapidly eroding.
In conclusion, given the emerging security challenges and limited resources, the
need for well-crafted regional defense strategies in an overall integrated defense strategy
and posture is clear. Yet this is not what we do. What we do is the QDR, every four years,
which is largely driven by process and far too focused on the budget.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
ODNI General Counsel Robert Litts As Prepared Remarks on Signals
Intelligence Reform at the Brookings Institute
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
February 4, 2015
Thanks for that nice introduction, Cam.
A year and a half ago, in July 2013, I gave a speech here about Privacy,
Technology and National Security. It was just about a month after classified documents
stolen by Edward Snowden began appearing in the press, at a time when people in the
United States and around the world were raising questions about the legality and wisdom
of our signals intelligence activities. My speech had several purposes.
First, I wanted to set out the legal framework under which we conduct signals
intelligence and the extensive oversight of that activity by all three branches of
Government. Second, I wanted to explain how we protect both privacy and national
security in a changing technology and security environment, and in particular how we
protect privacy through robust restrictions on the use we can make of the data we collect.
Third, I wanted to demystify and correct misimpressions about the two programs that had
been the subject of the leaks, and to commit the Intelligence Community to greater
transparency going forward.
I began by noting the huge amount of private information that we all expose today,
through social media, e-commerce, and so on. But I acknowledged that government access
to the same information worries us more with good reason because of what the
government could do with that information. So I suggested we should address that
problem directly.
And in fact, I said, we can and do protect both privacy and national security by a
regime that not only puts limits on collection but also restricts access to, and use of, the
data we collect based on factors such as the sensitivity of the data, the volume of the
collection, how it was collected, and the reason for which it was collected, and that backs
up those restrictions with technological and human controls and auditing.
This approach has largely been effective. The information that has come out since
my speech, both licitly and illicitly, has validated my statement then: While there have
been technological challenges and human error in our current signals intelligence
activities, there has been no systematic abuse or misuse akin to the very real illegalities
and abuses of the 1960s and 1970s.
 Well, you may have noticed that my speech did not entirely put the public concerns
to rest. Questions have continued to be asked, and weve continued to address them.
In particular, just over a year ago, President Obama gave a speech about
surveillance reform, and issued Presidential Policy Directive 28. The President reaffirmed
the critical importance of signals intelligence activity to protect our national security and
that of our allies against terrorism and other threats. But he took note of the concerns that
had been raised and directed a number of reforms to give the American people greater
confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our intelligence and law
enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need to keep us safe, as well as to provide
ordinary citizens in other countries confidence that the United States respects their
privacy too.
The Intelligence Community has spent the year since the Presidents speech
implementing the reforms he set out, as well as many of the recommendations of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (or PCLOB) and the Presidents Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies.
And Id note in passing that the PCLOB last week issued a report finding that we
have made substantial progress towards implementing the great majority of its
recommendations. Weve consulted with privacy groups, industry, Congress and foreign
partners.
In particular, we have a robust ongoing dialogue with our European allies and
partners about privacy and data protection. Weve participated in a wide variety of public
events at which reform proposals have been discussed and debated. And yesterday the
ODNI released a report detailing the concrete steps we have taken so far, along with the
actual agency policies that implement some of those reforms.
What I want to do today is drill down on what we have done in the last year, and in
particular explain how we have responded to some of the concerns that have been raised in
the last year and a half.
Let me begin by laying out some premises that I think are commonly agreed upon
and that should frame how we think about signals intelligence. The first is that we still
need to conduct signals intelligence activities. As the President said in his speech last year,
the challenges posed by threats like terrorism and proliferation and cyber-attacks are not
going away any time soon. If anything, as recent events show, they are growing. Signals
intelligence activities play an indispensable role in how we learn about and protect against
these threats.
Second, to be effective, our signals intelligence activities have to take account of
the changing technological and communications environment. Fifty years ago, we could
more easily isolate the communications of our target: the paradigm of electronic
surveillance then was two alligator clips on the targets telephone line. Today, digital
communications are all mingled together and traverse the globe. The communications of
our adversaries are not separate and easily identified streams, but are part of an ocean of
irrelevant conversations, and that creates new challenges for us.
Third, its critical to keep in mind that signals intelligence like all foreign
intelligence is fundamentally different from electronic surveillance for law enforcement
purposes. In the typical law enforcement context, a crime has been or is being committed,
and the goal is to gather evidence about that particular crime. Intelligence, on the other
hand, is often an effort to find out what is going to happen, so that we can prevent it from
happening, or to keep policy-makers informed. This means that we cannot limit our
signals intelligence activities only to targeted collection against specific individuals whom
we have already identified. We have to try to uncover threats or adversaries of which we
may as yet be unaware, such as hackers seeking to penetrate our systems, or potential
terrorists, or people supplying nuclear materials to proliferators. Or we may simply be
seeking information to support the nations leadership in the service of other important
foreign policy interests.
Fourth, we can also agree that in part because of these considerations signals
intelligence activities can present special challenges to privacy and civil liberties. The
capacity to listen in on private conversations or read online communications, if not
properly limited and constrained, could impinge upon legitimate privacy interests, and
could be misused for improper purposes.
Finally, as the President also said, for our intelligence community to be effective
over the long haul, we must maintain the trust of the American people, and people around
the world. So although we must continue to conduct signals intelligence activities to
protect our national security, we need to do so in a way that is consistent with our values,
that treats all people with dignity and respect, that takes account of the concerns that
people have with the potential intrusiveness of these activities, and that provides
reassurance to the public that they are conducted within appropriate limits and oversight.
So with these premises, let me address some of the concerns that people have
raised about our signals intelligence activities.
Transparency
I want to start with the issue of transparency, both because it is something I care
about deeply and because our commitment to transparency is what enables me to explain
the other changes we have made. One of the biggest challenges that we have faced in
responding to the events of the past year and a half is that to a great extent our intelligence
activities have to be kept secret.
The public does not know everything that is done in its name and that has to be
so. If we reveal too much about our intelligence activities we will compromise the
capability of those activities to protect the nation. And I want to reiterate what I have said
before while there have been significant benefits from the recent public debate, the leaks
have unquestionably caused damage to our national security, damage whose full extent we
will not know for years. We have seen public postings clearly referencing the disclosures,
such as an extremist who advised others to stop using a particular communications
platform because the company that provided it, which had been discussed in the leaked
documents, was part of NSA.
And yet the Intelligence Community, from the Director of National Intelligence on
down, recognizes that with secrecy inevitably come both suspicion and the possibility of
abuse. I and many others in the Intelligence Community firmly believe that there would
have been less public outcry from the leaks of the last year and a half if we had been more
transparent about our activities beforehand. Indeed, as we have been able to release more
information, it has helped to allay some of the mistaken impressions people have had
about our intelligence activities.
And so we have committed ourselves to disclosing more information about our
signals intelligence activities, when the public interest in disclosure outweighs the risk to
national security from disclosure:
We have declassified thousands of pages of court filings, opinions, procedures,
compliance reports, congressional notifications and other documents.
We have released summary statistics about our use of surveillance authorities, and
have authorized providers to release aggregate information as well.
Representatives of the Intelligence Community have appeared in numerous public
forums such as this one.
Weve also changed the way we disclose information to enable greater public
access, by establishing IContheRecord, a tumblr account where we post declassified
documents, official statements, and other materials.
Finally, we have developed and issued principles of transparency to apply to our
intelligence activities going forward.
The transparency process will never move as quickly as we would like. Public
interest declassification requires a meticulous review to ensure that we dont inadvertently
release information that needs to remain classified, and we have limited resources to
devote to the task. The same people who review documents for discretionary
declassification also have to review thousands of documents implicated by FOIA requests
with judicial deadlines and all this on top of their day job of actually working to keep
us safe. But we recognize the importance of this task and are committed to continued
greater transparency.
In general, our transparency efforts have focused, and will continue to focus, on
enhancing the publics overall understanding of the Intelligence Communitys mission and
how we accomplish that mission, while continuing to protect specific targets of
surveillance, specific means by which we conduct surveillance, specific partnerships and
specific intelligence we gather. Its particularly important that we give the public greater
insight into the laws and policies we operate under and how we interpret those authorities,
into the limits we impose upon our activities, and into our oversight and compliance
regime. I hope that our efforts at transparency will continue to demonstrate to the
American people and the rest of the world that our signals intelligence activities are not
arbitrary and are conducted responsibly and pursuant to law.
Limitations on Surveillance
One persistent but mistaken charge in the wake of the leaks has been that our
signals intelligence activity is overly broad, that it is not adequately overseen and is
subject to abuse in short, that NSA collects whatever it wants. This is and always has
been a myth, but in addition to greater transparency we have taken a number of concrete
steps to reassure the public that we conduct signals intelligence activity only within the
scope of our legal authorities and applicable policy limits.
 To begin with, in PPD-28 the President set out a number of important general
principles that govern our signals intelligence activity:
The collection of signals intelligence must be authorized by statute or Presidential
authorization, and must be conducted in accordance with the Constitution and law.
Privacy and civil liberties must be integral considerations in planning signals
intelligence activities.
Signals intelligence will be collected only when there is a valid foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence purpose.
We will not conduct signals intelligence activities for the purpose of suppressing
criticism or dissent.
We will not use signals intelligence to disadvantage people based on their
ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation or religion.
We will not use signals intelligence to afford a competitive commercial advantage
to U.S. companies and business sectors.
Our signals intelligence activity must always be as tailored as feasible, taking into
account the availability of other sources of information.
The President also directed that we set up processes to ensure that we adhere to
these restrictions, and that we have appropriate policy review of our signals intelligence
collection. I want to spend a little time now talking about what these processes are how
we try to ensure that signals intelligence is only collected in appropriate circumstances.
And youll forgive me if I get a bit down into the weeds on this, but I think this is
important for people to understand.
To begin with, neither NSA nor any other intelligence agency decides on its own
what to collect. Each year the President sets the nations highest priorities for foreign
intelligence collection after an extensive, formal interagency process. Moreover, as a
result of PPD-28, the rest of our intelligence priorities are now also reviewed and
approved through a high-level interagency policy process. Overall, this process ensures
that all of our intelligence priorities are set by senior policy-makers who are in the best
position to identify our foreign intelligence requirements, and that those policy-makers
take into account not only the potential value of the intelligence collection but also the
risks of that collection, including the risks to privacy, national economic interests and
foreign relations.
The DNI then translates these priorities into the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework, or NIPF. Our Intelligence Community Directive about the NIPF, ICD 204,
which incorporates the requirements of PPD-28, is publicly available on our web site. And
while the NIPF itself is classified, much of it is reflected annually in the DNIs
unclassified Worldwide Threat Assessment.
But the priorities in the NIPF are at a fairly high level of generality. They include
topics such as the pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities by particular foreign
adversaries, the effects of drug cartel corruption in Mexico, and human rights abuses in
specific countries. And they apply not just to signals intelligence, but to all intelligence
activities. So how do the priorities in the NIPF get translated into actual signals
intelligence collection?
The organization that is responsible for doing this is called the National Signals
Intelligence Committee, or SIGCOM. (We have acronyms for everything). It operates
under the auspices of the Director of the NSA, who is designated by Executive Order
12333 as what we call the functional manager for signals intelligence, responsible for
overseeing and coordinating signals intelligence across the Intelligence Community under
the oversight of the Secretary of Defense and the DNI. The SIGCOM has representatives
from all elements of the community and, as we fully implement PPD-28, also will have
full representation from other departments and agencies with a policy interest in signals
intelligence.
All departments and agencies that are consumers of intelligence submit their
requests for collection to the SIGCOM. The SIGCOM reviews those requests, ensures that
they are consistent with the NIPF, and assigns them priorities using criteria such as:
Can SIGINT provide useful information in this case? Perhaps imagery or human
sources are better or more cost-effective sources of information to address the
requirement.
How critical is this information need? If it is a high priority in the NIPF, it will
most often be a high SIGINT priority.
What type of SIGINT could be used? NSA collects three types of signals
intelligence: collection against foreign weapons systems (known as FISINT), foreign
communications (known as COMINT), and other foreign electronic signals such as radar
(known as ELINT).
Is the collection as tailored as feasible? Should there be time, focus, or other
limitations?
And our signals intelligence requirements process also requires explicit
consideration of other factors, namely:
Is the target of the collection, or the methodology used to collect, particularly
sensitive? If so, it will require review by senior policy makers.
Will the collection present an unwarranted risk to privacy and civil liberties,
regardless of nationality? And
Are additional dissemination and retention safeguards necessary to protect privacy
or national security interests?
Finally, at the end of the process, a limited number of trained NSA personnel take
the priorities validated by the SIGCOM and research and identify specific selection terms,
such as telephone numbers or email addresses, that are expected to collect foreign
intelligence responsive to these priorities. Any selector must be reviewed and approved by
two persons before it is entered into NSAs collection systems. Even then, however,
whether and when actual collection takes place will depend in part on additional
considerations such as the availability of appropriate collection resources. And, of course,
when collection is conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, NSA
and other agencies must follow additional restrictions approved by the court.
So thats how we ensure that signals intelligence collection targets reflect valid and
important foreign intelligence needs. But, as is typically the case with our signals
intelligence activities, we dont just set rules and processes at the front end; we also have
mechanisms to ensure that we are complying with those rules and processes.
Cabinet officials are required to validate their SIGINT requirements each year.
NSA checks signals intelligence targets throughout the collection process to
determine if they are actually providing valuable foreign intelligence responsive to the
priorities, and will stop collection against targets that are not. In addition, all selection
terms are reviewed by supervisors annually.
Based on a recommendation from the Presidents Review Group, the DNI has
established a new mechanism to monitor the collection and dissemination of signals
intelligence that is particularly sensitive because of the nature of the target or the means of
collection, to ensure that it is consistent with the determinations of policy-makers.
Finally, ODNI annually reviews the ICs allocation of resources against the NIPF
priorities and the intelligence mission as a whole. This review includes assessments of the
value of all types of intelligence collection, including SIGINT, and looks both backward
how successful have we been in achieving our goals? and forward what will we need
in the future? and helps ensure that our SIGINT resources are applied to the most
important national priorities.
The point I want to make with this perhaps excessively detailed description is that
the Intelligence Community does not decide on its own which conversations to listen to,
nor does it try to collect everything. Its activities are focused on priorities set by
policymakers, through a process that involves input from across the government, and that
is overseen both within NSA and by the ODNI and Department of Defense. The processes
put in place by PPD-28, which are described in the report we issued yesterday, have
further strengthened this oversight to ensure that our signals intelligence activities are
conducted for appropriate foreign intelligence purposes and with full consideration of the
risks of collection as well as the benefits.
Bulk Collection
One of the principal concerns that has been raised both here and abroad is with
bulk collection. Bulk collection is not the same thing as bulky collection; even a narrowly
targeted collection program can collect a great deal of data. Rather, bulk collection
generally refers to collection that is not targeted by the use of terms such as a persons
phone number or email address.
We do bulk collection for a number of reasons, although like all of our intelligence
activities it must always be for a valid foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose.
In some circumstances, it may not be technically possible to target a specific person or
selector. In other circumstances, we need to have a pool of relevant data to review as
circumstances arise, data which might not otherwise be available because, for example, it
would have been deleted or overwritten. In particular, we can use metadata that we collect
in bulk to help identify targets for more intrusive surveillance. But because bulk collection
is not targeted, it often involves the collection of information that is ultimately not of
foreign intelligence value along with information that is, and it is therefore important that
we regulate it appropriately.
Weve taken a number of steps to provide appropriate and transparent limits on our
bulk collection activities. First, agency procedures governing signals intelligence now
explicitly provide that collection should be targeted, rather than bulk, whenever
practicable. Second, the President in PPD-28 required that when we do collect signals
intelligence in bulk we can only use it for one of six enumerated purposes, which I can
paraphrase as countering espionage and other threats from foreign powers,
counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, cybersecurity, protecting our forces, and
combating transnational criminal threats. We cant take information collected in bulk and
trawl through it for any reason we please; we have to be able to confirm that we are using
it for one of the six specified purposes. Agencies that have access to signals intelligence
collected in bulk have incorporated these limitations in procedures governing their use of
signals intelligence, which we released yesterday. This is not a meaningless step; it means
that violations of those restrictions are subject to oversight and significant violations must
be reported to the DNI.
Third, in PPD-28 the President directed my boss, the Director of National
Intelligence, to study whether there were software-based solutions that could eliminate the
need for bulk collection. The DNI commissioned a study from the National Academy of
Sciences, which was conducted by a team of independent experts. They issued their report
a few weeks ago, and it is publicly available. To summarize, they concluded that to the
extent the goal of bulk collection is, as I said a moment ago, to enable us to look
backwards when we discover new facts for example to see if a terrorist arrested overseas
has ever been in contact with people in the US there are no software-based solutions
available today that could accomplish that goal, but that we could explore ways to use
technology to provide more effective limits and controls on the uses we make of bulk data
and to more effectively target collection. Ill return to technology a bit later in my
remarks. To be clear, this report doesnt purport to settle whether bulk collection is a good
idea, or whether it is valuable; it simply concludes that present technology doesnt allow
other, less intrusive ways of accomplishing the same goals we can achieve with bulk
collection.
Finally, the President directed specific steps to address concerns about the bulk
collection of telephone metadata pursuant to FISA Court order under Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act. Youll recall that this was the program set up to fix a gap identified in
the wake of 9/11, to provide a tool that can identify potential domestic confederates of
foreign terrorists. I wont explain in detail this program and the extensive controls it
operates under, because by now most of you are familiar with it, but there is a wealth of
information about it available at IContheRecord.
Some have claimed that this program is illegal or unconstitutional, though the vast
majority of judges who have considered it to date have determined that it is lawful. People
have also claimed that the program is useless because they say its never stopped a
terrorist plot. While we have provided examples where the program has proved valuable, I
dont happen to think that the number of plots foiled is the only metric to assess it; its
more like an insurance policy, which provides valuable protection even though you may
never have to file a claim. And because the program involves only metadata about
communications and is subject to strict limitations and controls, the privacy concerns that
it raises, while not non-existent, are far less substantial than if we were collecting the full
content of those communications.
Even so, the President recognized the public concerns about this program and
ordered that several steps be taken immediately to limit it. In particular, except in
emergency situations NSA must now obtain the FISA courts advance agreement that there
is a reasonable articulable suspicion that a number being used to query the database is
associated with specific foreign terrorist organizations. And the results that an analyst
actually gets back from a query are now limited to numbers in direct contact with the
query number and numbers in contact with those numbers what we call two hops
instead of three, as it used to be.
Longer term, the President directed us to find a way to preserve the essential
capabilities of this program without having the government hold the metadata in bulk. In
furtherance of this direction, we worked extensively with Congress, on a bipartisan basis,
and with privacy and civil liberties groups, on the USA FREEDOM Act. This was not a
perfect bill. It went further than some proponents of national security would wish, and it
did not go as far as some advocacy groups would wish. But it was the product of a series
of compromises, and if enacted it would have accomplished the Presidents goal: it would
have prohibited bulk collection under Section 215 and several other authorities, while
authorizing a new mechanism that based on telecommunications providers current
practice in retaining telephone metadata would have preserved the essential capabilities
of the existing program. Having invested a great deal of time in those negotiations, I was
personally disappointed that the Senate failed by two votes to advance this bill, and with
Section 215 sunsetting on June 1 of this year, I hope that the Congress acts expeditiously
to pass the USA FREEDOM Act or another bill that accomplishes the Presidents goal.
Incidental Collection
A second set of concerns centered around the other program that was leaked,
collection under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Section 702
enables us to target non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States for foreign
intelligence purposes with the compelled assistance of domestic communications service
providers. Contrary to some claims, this is not bulk collection; all of the collection is
based on identifiers, such as telephone numbers or email addresses, that we have reason to
believe are being used by non-U.S. persons abroad to communicate or receive foreign
intelligence information. Again, there is ample information about this program and how it
operates on IContheRecord.
Unlike the bulk telephone metadata program, no one really disagrees that Section
702 is an effective and important source of foreign intelligence information. Rather, the
concerns about this statute, at least within the United States, have to do with the fact that
even when we are targeting non-U.S. persons we are inevitably going to collect the
communications of U.S. persons, either because U.S. persons are talking to the foreign
targets, or, in some limited circumstances, because we cannot technically separate the
communications we are looking for from others. This is called incidental collection
because we arent targeting the U.S. persons, and I want to emphasize that when Congress
passed Section 702 it fully understood that incidental collection would occur.
Some of this incidental collection may be important foreign intelligence
information. To pick the most obvious example, if a foreign terrorist who we are targeting
under Section 702 is giving instructions to a confederate in the U.S., we need to be able to
identify that communication and follow up even if we werent targeting the U.S. person
herself. But people have asked: What are we allowed to do with communications that
arent of foreign intelligence value but may be, for example, evidence of a crime? And to
what extent should we be allowed to rummage through the database of communications
we collect to look for communications of U.S. persons?
Part of the problem was that the general public didnt know what the rules
governing our activities under Section 702 were. And so we have declassified and released
the CIA, FBI and NSA procedures for minimizing the collection, retention and
dissemination of information about U.S. persons under Section 702.
But to address these concerns further, the President in his speech directed the
Attorney General and the DNI to institute reforms that place additional restrictions on
governments ability to retain, search, and use in criminal cases, communications between
Americans and foreign citizens incidentally collected under Section 702. We are doing
so. First, as the PCLOB recommended, agencies have new restrictions on their ability to
look through 702 collection for information about U.S. persons. The agencies various
rules are described in the report we issued yesterday. Its important to note that different
agencies in the Intelligence Community have been charged by Congress and the President
with focusing on different intelligence activities. For example, NSA focuses on signals
intelligence; CIA collects primarily human intelligence; and FBI has a domestic law
enforcement focus. Because these agencies missions are different, their internal
governance and their IT systems have developed differently from one another, and so the
specifics of their procedures differ somewhat. But they will all ensure that information
about U.S. persons incidentally collected pursuant to Section 702 is only made available to
analysts and agents when appropriate.
Second, we have reaffirmed that intelligence agencies must delete communications
acquired pursuant to Section 702 that are to, from or about U.S. persons if the
communications are determined to be of no foreign intelligence value, and we have
strengthened oversight of this requirement. Third, the Government will use information
acquired under Section 702 as evidence against a person in a criminal case only in cases
related to national security or for certain other enumerated serious crimes, and only when
the Attorney General approves. In short, we have taken concrete steps to ensure that there
are limits on our ability to identify and use information about U.S. persons that we
incidentally collect under Section 702.
In his as delivered remarks, Mr. Litt went on to describe the enumerated serious
crimes for which the Government will use information acquired under Section 702 as
evidence against a person:
Under the new policy, in addition to any other limitations imposed by applicable
law, including FISA, any communication to or from, or information about, a U.S. person
acquired under Section 702 of FISA shall not be introduced as evidence against that U.S.
person in any criminal proceeding except (1) with the prior approval of the Attorney
General and (2) in (A) criminal proceedings related to national security (such as terrorism,
proliferation, espionage, or cybersecurity) or (B) other prosecutions of crimes involving (i)
death; (ii) kidnapping; (iii) substantial bodily harm; (iv) conduct that constitutes a criminal
offense that is a specified offense against a minor as defined in 42 USC 16911; (v)
incapacitation or destruction of critical infrastructure as defined in 42 USC 5195c(e); (vi)
cybersecurity; (vii) transnational crimes; (or (vii) human trafficking.
Protection for Non-U.S. Persons
But one refrain that we often hear from some of our foreign partners is that our
rules are focused only on protecting Americans, and that we ignore the legitimate privacy
interests of other persons around the world. The fact that we have strong protections for
the rights of our citizens is hardly surprising, and Im not going to apologize for it. Indeed,
the legal regimes of most if not all nations afford greater protection to their own citizens or
residents than to foreigners abroad. Nonetheless, it was never true that the Intelligence
Community had a sort of open season to spy on foreigners around the world; we have
always been required to limit our activities to valid intelligence purposes, as I outlined
above.
However, the President recognized that, given the power and scope of our signals
intelligence activities, we need to do more to reassure the world that we treat all persons
with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality and where they might reside,
and that we provide appropriate protection for the legitimate privacy interests [of all
persons] in the handling of their personal information. And so Section 4 of PPD-28,
which I think is an extraordinarily significant step, requires that we have express limits on
the retention and dissemination of personal information about non-U.S. persons collected
by signals intelligence, comparable to the limits we have for U.S. persons. These rules are
incorporated into the agency procedures that we released yesterday, and into another
publicly available Intelligence Community Directive, ICD 203, governing analytic
standards in reporting.
With respect to retention, we now have explicit rules that require that personal
information about non-U.S. persons that we collect through SIGINT must generally be
deleted after five years unless comparable information about a U.S. person could be
retained. And we have likewise prohibited the dissemination of personal information
about non-U.S. persons unless comparable information about U.S. persons could be
disseminated. In particular, SIGINT information about the routine activities of a foreign
person would not be considered foreign intelligence that could be disseminated by virtue
of that fact alone unless it is otherwise responsive to an authorized foreign intelligence
requirement.
This last point in particular is, in my opinion, a big deal. Over the last year and a
half, in defending our signals intelligence activity, we have repeatedly said that we protect
personal information because we only disseminate valid foreign intelligence information.
But many have expressed concerns that our limitations on dissemination are neither
transparent nor enforceable. Moreover, people have noted that the definition of foreign
intelligence includes information about the capabilities, intentions, or activities of
foreign persons, and have therefore questioned whether the foreign intelligence
requirement imposed any meaningful limits to protect the privacy of foreign persons. The
new procedures address this concern, by making clear that just because an IC officer has
signals intelligence information about a foreign person doesnt mean she can disseminate
it as foreign intelligence, unless there is some other basis to consider it foreign intelligence
information.
In short, for the first time, we have instituted express and transparent requirements
to take account of the privacy of people outside our nation in how we conduct some of our
intelligence activities. These new protections are, I think, a demonstration of our nations
enduring commitment to respecting the personal privacy and human dignity of citizens of
all countries.
Other Activities/Going Forward
There is much more that we have done but I am running short of time. The
Administration has endorsed changes to the operation of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that were contained in the USA FREEDOM Act, not because the court
is a rubber stamp as some charged the documents we have released make clear that it is
not but in order to reassure the public. These include creation of a panel of lawyers who
can advocate for privacy interests in appropriate cases, and continued declassification and
release of significant court opinions. We are taking steps to limit the length of time that
secrecy that can be imposed on recipients of National Security letters. We are continuing
to implement rules to protect Intelligence Community whistleblowers who report through
proper channels. These steps are discussed more fully in the materials we released
yesterday.
So where do we go from here? The President has directed that we report again in
one year. In the interim, we will continue to implement the reforms that the President
directed in PPD-28 and his speech. We will declassify and release more information, we
will continue to institutionalize transparency, and we will continue our public dialogue on
these issues. We will work with Congress to secure passage of the USA FREEDOM Act or
something like it.
And I hope that we will be able to work together with industry to help us find
better solutions to protect both privacy and national security. One of the many ways in
which Snowdens leaks have damaged our national security is by driving a wedge between
the government and providers and technology companies, so that some companies that
formerly recognized that protecting our nation was a valuable and important public service
now feel compelled to stand in opposition. I dont think that is healthy, because I think that
American companies have a huge amount to contribute to how we protect both privacy
and national security.
When people talk about technology and surveillance, they tend to talk either about
how technology has enabled the Intelligence Community to do all sorts of scary things, or
about how technology can protect you from the scary things that the Intelligence
Community can do. But theres a third role that technology can play, and that is to provide
protections and restrictions on the national security apparatus that can assure Americans,
and people around the world, that we are respecting the appropriate limits on intelligence
activities, while still protecting national security. This is where the genius and capabilities
of American technology companies can provide invaluable assistance.
In this regard, Id like to point you to the National Academy of Sciences report that
I mentioned earlier. The last section of their report identified a number of areas where
technology could help us target signals intelligence collection more effectively, and
provide more robust, transparent and effective protections for privacy, including enforcing
limitations on the use of data we collect. One challenge they mentioned is the spread of
encryption, and in my view this is an important area where we should look to the private
sector to provide solutions. And I should emphasize that I am speaking for myself here.
Encryption is a critical tool to protect privacy, to facilitate commerce, and to
provide security, and the United States supports its use. At the same time, the increasing
use of encryption that cannot be decrypted when we have the lawful authority to collect
information risks allowing criminals, terrorists, hackers and other threats to escape
detection. As President Obama recently said, [i]f we get into a situation in which the
technologies do not allow us at all to track someone that were confident is a terrorist
thats a problem. Im not a cryptographer, but I am an optimist: I believe that if our
businesses and academics put their mind to it, they will find a solution that does not
compromise the integrity of encryption technology but that enables both encryption to
protect privacy and decryption under lawful authority to protect national security.
So with that plea for help, let me stop and take your questions.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
27 January 2015
Statement of James N. Mattis before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Senators of this
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I request that my statement be
accepted for the record.
During my active duty years I testified many times before this committee and
gained the highest regard for the manner in which you carried out your role. I also recall
with gratitude your support for our armed forces through good times and bad and Im
honored to return here today.
I commend the committee for holding these hearings. As former Secretary of State
George Shultz has commented, the world is awash in change. The international order, so
painstakingly put together by the greatest generation coming home from mankinds
bloodiest conflict, is under increasing stress. It was created with elements we take for
granted: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods and more. The
constructed order reflected the wisdom of those who recognized no nation lived as an
island and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that for better or worse impacted
all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger world and must carry out our
part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here or it will be too late; rather we must
remain strongly engaged in this complex world.
The international order built on the state system is not self-sustaining. It demands
tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the freedoms each
of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to
adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from its reactive crouch and to take a
firm strategic stance in defense of our values. While we recognize that we owe future
generations the same freedoms we enjoy, the challenge lies in how to carry out our
responsibility. For certain we have lived too long now in a strategy-free mode.
To do so America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a key
role in crafting a coherent strategy with bi-partisan support. Doing so requires us to look
beyond events currently consuming the executive branch. There is an urgent need to stop
reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. Such response often creates
unanticipated second order effects and more problems for us. The Senate Armed Services
Committee is uniquely placed in our system of government to guide, oversee and ensure
that we act strategically and morally, using Americas ability to inspire as well as its
ability to intimidate to ensure freedom for future generations. I suggest that the best way
to cut to the essence of these issues and to help you in crafting Americas response to a
rapidly changing security environment is to ask the right questions. If I were in your shoes
these are some that I would ask:
What are the key threats to our vital interests?
- The intelligence community should delineate and provide an initial prioritization
of those threats for your consideration. By rigorously defining the problems we face you
will enable a more intelligent and focused use of the resources allocated for national
defense.
Is our intelligence community fit for its expanding purpose? -Today we have less
of a military shock absorber to take surprise in stride, and fewer forward-deployed
military forces overseas to act as sentinels. Accordingly we need more early warning.
Working with the intell committee you should question if we are adequately funding the
intell agencies to reduce the chance of our defenses being caught flat-footed. We know
that the foreseeable future is not foreseeable; your review must incorporate
unpredictability, recognizing risk while avoiding gambling with our nations security.
Incorporating the broadest issues in your assessments, you should consider what
we must do if the national debt is assessed to be the biggest national security threat we
face?
- As President Eisenhower noted, the foundation of military strength is our
economic strength. In a few short years paying interest on our debt will be a bigger bill
than what we pay for defense. Much of that interest money is destined to leave America
for overseas. If we refuse to reduce our debt/pay down our deficit, what is the impact on
national security for future generations who will inherit this irresponsible debt and the
taxes to service it? No nation in history has maintained its military power if it failed to
keep its fiscal house in order.
How do you urgently halt the damage caused by sequestration?
-No foe in the field can wreck such havoc on our security that mindless
sequestration is achieving. Congress passed it because it was viewed as so injurious that it
would force wise choices. It has failed and today we use arithmetic vice sound thinking to
run our government, despite emerging enemy threats. This committee must lead the effort
to repeal the sequestration that is costing military readiness and long term capability while
sapping troop morale. Without predictability in budget matters no strategy can be
implemented by your military leaders. Your immediate leadership is needed to avert
further damage.
In our approach to the world we must be willing to ask strategic questions. In the
Middle East where our influence is at its lowest point in four decades we see a region
erupting in crises. We need a new security architecture for the Mid-East built on sound
policy, one that permits us to take our own side in this fight. Crafting such a policy starts
with asking a fundamental question and then others:
Is political Islam in our best interest? If not what is our policy to support the
countervailing forces?
- Violent terrorists cannot be permitted to take refuge behind false religious garb
and leave us unwilling to define this threat with the clarity it deserves. -We have potential
allies around the world and in the Middle East who will rally to us but we have not been
clear about where we stand in defining or dealing with the growing violent jihadist
terrorist threat.
Iran is a special case that must be dealt with as a threat to regional stability, nuclear
and otherwise. I believe that you should question the value of Congress adding new
sanctions while international negotiations are ongoing, vice having them ready should the
negotiations for preventing their nuclear weapons capability and stringent monitoring
break down. Further question now if we have the right policies in place when Iran creates
more mischief in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the
region, recognizing that regional counterweights like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council can reinforce us if they
understand our policies, clarify our foreign policy goals beyond Irans nuclear weapons
program.
In Afghanistan we need to consider if were asking for the same outcome there as
we saw last summer in Iraq if we pull out all our troops on the Administrations proposed
timeline. Echoing the military advice given on the same issue in Iraq, gains achieved at
great cost against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. We should recognize that we
may not want this fight but the barbarity of an enemy that kills women and children and
has refused to break with Al Qaeda needs to be fought.
More broadly, is the U.S. military being developed to fight across the
spectrum of combat?
- Knowing that enemies always move against perceived weakness, our forces must
be capable of missions from nuclear deterrence to counter-insurgency and everything in
between, now including the pervasive cyber domain. While surprise is always a factor, this
committee can ensure that we have the fewest big regrets when the next surprise occurs.
We dont want or need a military that is at the same time dominant and irrelevant, so you
must sort this out and deny funding for bases or capabilities no longer needed.
The nuclear stockpile must be tended to and fundamental questions must be
asked and answered:
 - We must clearly establish the role of our nuclear weapons: do they serve solely to
deter nuclear war? If so we should say so, and the resulting clarity will help to determine
the number we need.
- Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This
would reduce the false alarm danger.
- Could we re-energize the arms control effort by only counting warheads vice
launchers?
- Was the Russian test violating the INF treaty simply a blunder or a change in
policy, and what is our appropriate response?
The reduced size of our military drives the need to ask other questions:
Our military is uniquely capable and the envy of the world, but are we
resourcing it to ensure we have the highest quality troops, the best equipment and the
toughest training?
- With a smaller military comes the need for troops kept at the top of their game.
When we next put them in harms way it must be the enemys longest day and worst day.
Tiered readiness with a smaller force must be closely scrutinized to ensure we arent
merely hollowing out the force. While sequestration is the nearest threat to this national
treasure that is the U.S. military, sustaining it as the worlds best when smaller will need
your critical oversight.
Are the Navy and our expeditionary forces receiving the support they need in
a world where Americas naval role is more pronounced because we have fewer
forces posted overseas?
- With the cutbacks to the Army and Air Force and fewer forces around the world,
military aspects of our strategy will inevitably become more naval in character. This will
provide decision time for political leaders considering employment of additional forms of
military power. Your resourcing of our naval and expeditionary forces will need to take
this development into account. Because we will need to swiftly move ready forces to act
against nascent threats, nipping them in the bud, the agility to reassure friends and temper
adversary activities will be critical to Americas effectiveness for keeping a stable and
prosperous world. Today I question if our shipbuilding budget is sufficient, especially in
light of the situation in the South China Sea.
- While our efforts in the Pacific to keep positive relations with China are well and
good, these efforts must be paralleled by a policy to build the counterbalance if China
continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea and elsewhere. That
counterbalance must deny China veto power over territorial, security and economic
conditions in the Pacific, building support for our diplomatic efforts to maintain stability
and economic prosperity so critical to our economy.
In light of worldwide challenges to the international order we are nonetheless
shrinking our military. Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a
reduced role for that shrunken military?
- Strategy connects ends, ways and means. With less military available, we must
reduce our appetite for using it. Connecting the dots is appropriate for this committee.
Absent growing our military, there must come a time when moral outrage, serious
humanitarian plight, or lesser threats cannot be militarily addressed. Prioritization is
needed if we are to remain capable of the most critical mission for which we have a
military: to fight on short notice and defend the country. In this regard we must recognize
we should not and need not carry this military burden solely on our own:
Does our strategy and associated military planning take into account our
nations increased need for allies?
- The need for stronger alliances comes more sharply into focus as we shrink the
military. No nation can do on its own all that is necessary for its security. Further, history
reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those without. A capable U.S.
military, reinforcing our political will to lead from the front, is the bedrock on which we
draw together those nations that stand with us against threats to the international order.
Our strategy must adapt to and accommodate this reality. As Churchill intimated, the only
thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. This committee should
track closely an increased military capability to work with allies, the NATO alliance being
foremost but not our sole focus. We must also enlist non-traditional partners where we
have common foes or common interests.
- In reference to NATO and in light of the Russian violations of international
borders, we must ask if the Alliances efforts have adjusted to the unfortunate and
dangerous mode the Russian leadership has slipped into?
- With regard to tightening the bond between our smaller military and those we
may need at our side in future fights, the convoluted foreign military sales system needs
your challenge. Hopefully it can be put in order before we drive more potential partners to
equip themselves with foreign equipment, a move that makes it harder to achieve needed
interoperability with our allies and undercuts Americas industrial base. Currently the
system fails to reach its potential to support our foreign policy.
As we attempt to restore stability to the state system and international order, a
critical question will be, Is America good for its word? -When we make clear our position
or give our word about something, our friends (and even our foes) must recognize that we
are good for it. Otherwise dangerous miscalculations can occur. This means that the
military instrument must be fit for purpose and that once a political position is taken, our
position is backed up by a capable military making clear that we will stand on our word.
When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat, the committee
should ask if the military is being employed with the proper authority. I believe you
should examine answers to fundamental questions like the following:
- Are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable? Murky or quixotic
political end states can condemn us to entering wars we dont know how to end. Notifying
the enemy in advance of our withdrawal dates or reassuring the enemy that we will not use
certain capabilities like our ground forces should be avoided. Such announcements do not
take the place of mature, well-defined end-states, nor do they contribute to ending wars as
rapidly as possible on favorable terms.
- Is the theater of war itself sufficient for effective prosecution? We have witnessed
safe havens prolonging war. If the defined theater of war is insufficient, the plan itself
needs to be challenged to determine feasibility of its success or the need for its
modification.
- Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war (POs) appropriate for the enemy
and type war that we are fighting? We have observed the perplexing lack of detainee
policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not
engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact,
as hostile.
- Are Americas diplomatic, economic and other assets aligned to the war aims,
with the intent of ending the conflict as rapidly as possible? We have experienced the
military alone trying achieve tasks outside its expertise. When we take the serious decision
to fight, we must bring to bear all our nations resources. You should question how the
diplomatic and development efforts will be employed to build momentum for victory and
our nations strategy needs that integration.
Finally the culture of our military and its rules are designed to bring about
battlefield success in the most atavistic environment on earth. No matter how laudable in
terms of a progressive countrys instincts, this committee needs to consider carefully any
proposed changes to military rules, traditions and standards that bring non-combat
emphasis to combat units. There is a great difference between military service in
dangerous circumstances and serving in a combat unit whose role is to search out and kill
the enemy at close quarters. This committee has a responsibility for imposing reason over
impulse when proposed changes could reduce the combat capability of our forces at the
point of contact with the enemy.
Ultimately we need the foresight of this committee, acting in its sentinel and
oversight role, to draw us out of the reactive stance weve fallen into and chart a strategic
way ahead. Our national security strategy needs your bipartisan direction. In some cases
you may need to change our processes for developing an integrated national strategy,
because mixing capable people and their good ideas with bad processes results in the bad
processes defeating good peoples ideas nine times out of ten. This is an urgent matter,
because in an interconnected age when opportunistic adversaries can work in tandem to
destroy stability and prosperity, our country needs to regain its strategic footing. We need
to bring clarity to our efforts before we lose the confidence of the American people and
the support of our potential allies. This committee can play an essential strategic role in
this regard.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Joint Statement of Michele Flournoy and Eric Edelman
before the Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearing on Quadrennial Defense Review National Defense Panel
Washington, DC
February 10, 2015
9:30 a.m. - 216 Hart Senate Office Building
 Chairman McCain and Ranking Member Reed, thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you and other members of this distinguished Committee to discuss the final
report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) National Defense Panel.
As you know, the 2014 QDR National Defense Panel, which included 2 appointees
of the Secretary of Defense and 8 appointees of Congress, and was facilitated by the
United States Institute of Peace, had been asked to submit a written assessment of the
QDR. We are here today as the designated representative of the co-chairs, former
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and General (Retired) John P Abizaid, to discuss
with you the Panels report which was released on July 31, 2014.
Mr. Chairman, our panel observed recent events across the globe from the rise
of the Islamic State, Russias invasion of Ukraine, war between Hamas and Israel, violent
confrontations and air strikes in Libya, and continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula
and in the East and South China seas and was reminded that the United States faces
perhaps the most complex and volatile security environment since World War II.
This realization has led to repeated calls for U.S. leadership to sustain the rules-
based international order that underpins U.S. security and prosperity. But scant attention
has been paid to ensuring that we have a robust and ready military, able to deter would-be
aggressors, reassure allies and ensure that any president, current or future, has the options
he or she will need in an increasingly dangerous world.
The National Defense Panel concluded in its recent report that the Budget Control
Act of 2011 was a serious strategic misstep that has dangerously tied the hands of the
Pentagon leadership, forcing across-the-board sequestration cuts in defense spending
and subjecting the nation to accumulating strategic risk. The commissions report
concluded that, without budgetary relief, the U.S. armed forces soon will be at high risk of
not being able to accomplish the national defense strategy. The panel also believes if the
United States returns to sequestration-level cuts in Fiscal Year 2016, we will face
significant risks across the board, and may have to reassess our defense strategy.
The provisions of the Budget Control Act and sequestration have already
precipitated a readiness crisis within our armed forces, with only a handful of Army
brigades ready for crisis response, Air Force pilots unable to fly sufficient hours to keep
up their skills and Navy ships unable to provide critical U.S. security presence in key
regions. We also understand that the Department has reported that if sequestration returns
in Fiscal Year 2016, the Navy would be unable to support its current force of 11 carriers.
And we note with grave concern the statement Dr. Ashton Carter, the nominee for
secretary of defense, made at his hearing when he noted that sequestration threatens DoD
modernization and that in turn would threaten our Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy.
Although last years congressional budget deal has granted some temporary relief, the
return to sequestration in fiscal 2016 and beyond would result in a hollow force
reminiscent of the late 1970s.
The U.S. military is an indispensable instrument underpinning the diplomatic,
economic and intelligence elements of our national power: It keeps key trade routes open,
maintains stability in vital regions such as the Persian Gulf and sustains alliances that
serve U.S. and global interests.
 Thats why the National Defense Panel urged and we reiterate today that
Congress and the president repeal the Budget Control Act immediately, end the threat of
sequestration and return, at a minimum, to funding levels proposed by then-Defense
Secretary Robert Gates in his fiscal 2012 budget. That budget called for modest nominal-
dollar increases in defense spending through the remainder of the decade to stabilize the
defense program.
The report argues that, to meet the increasing challenges of the deteriorating
international security environment, the U.S. military must be able to deter or stop
aggression in multiple theaters, not just one, even when engaged in a large-scale war. This
requires urgently addressing the size and shape of our armed forces so they can protect
and advance our interests globally and provide the war-fighting capabilities necessary to
underwrite the credibility of the United States leadership and national security strategy.
But under sequestration, our forces would have to accept a much higher level of risk in
order to implement our current strategies.
Whether confronting the threat of the Islamic State or reassuring allies in Asia, the
president must have options, and the Defense Department needs the flexibility to provide
the best alternatives that secure our interests. In particular, the Pentagon needs relief from
the budget cuts of the past few years and from limitations on its authority to make
judicious cuts where they are most needed and least harmful to our security. This would
allow further savings through modest cuts to the rate of growth in already generous
military compensation and benefits, further reforms in the acquisition of equipment and
materiel, elimination of an estimated 20 percent excess in military infrastructure such as
bases, and reductions in overhead and the burgeoning civilian and contractor defense
workforce.
These savings and additional budgetary resources must go toward investment in
critical capabilities, such as long-range strikes, armed unmanned aviation, intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance, undersea warfare, directed energy, cybersecurity and
others that will safeguard our continued military superiority.
The threat of sequester was never meant to be carried out. It was supposed to be a
sword of Damocles ensuring that lawmakers would reach an agreement on ways to cut
the federal deficit. Those efforts failed, putting the defense budget on the chopping block
and holding our nations security hostage at a particularly dangerous moment in world
affairs. As we enter another presidential election cycle, our nations leaders will need to
examine the National Defense Panel report and explain to voters how they intend to
address its recommendations. The stakes could not be higher.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. We
welcome your questions and input regarding the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review
National Defense Panel.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Congressional Testimony
China, India and Pakistan - Growing Nuclear Capabilities With No End In
Sight
 Testimony by Dr. Ashley J. Tellis
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee
February 25, 2015
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly and Members of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, thank you for the invitation to testify on regional
nuclear capabilities and their impact on U.S. security. I will focus my attention today on a
segment of the Asian nuclear space, namely China, India, and Pakistan, their strategic
interactions, and the impact of their nuclear weapons modernization on each other and on
the United States. The nuclear weapon programs in these three countries are worthy of
attention because they are active, expanding, and diversifying at a time when the overall
global trend remains a continuing contraction of nuclear inventories. As requested by you,
Mr. Chairman, my testimony will explore why this is the case and what challenges ensue
from such expansion.
China
Unlike India and Pakistan, China is formally a nuclear weapon state under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China is also a major nuclear power possessing
advanced, repeatedly tested, and diverse nuclear weapons designs, diverse delivery
systems, and a centralized command and control network that is intended to ensure that
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party can exercise effective command of the
countrys nuclear weaponry.
In contrast to the United States and the former Soviet Union, China historically
maintained a small nuclear force consisting primarily of land-based missiles whose
warheads were stored separately, with the delivery vehicles maintained routinely in un-
alerted status in silos or caves. This relatively relaxed posture was viewed as sufficient to
protect Chinese security during the Cold War because Beijing believed that the positive
externalities of mutual U.S.-Soviet nuclear deterrence bestowed on China sufficient
protection. Because even a small number of survivable nuclear weapons capable of
reaching an adversarys homeland could wreak unacceptable damage, Chinese leaders
sought to maintain relatively modest forces that through a combination of opacity,
sheltering, and sometimes limited mobility, could survive the remote contingencies of
direct nuclear attack at a time when these dangers were limited principally by the political
constraints of strong bipolar competition.
With the ending of the Cold War and with the progressive rise of Chinese power,
Beijing whether it publicly admits it or nothas come to view the United States as its
principal strategic competitor. Given Chinas recognition of the sophistication of U.S.
nuclear and conventional forces in the face of Beijings desire to reclaim the strategic
primacy it once enjoyed in Asia, Chinese nuclear modernization became inevitable. This
modernization, which consists principally of efforts to increase the survivability of its
nuclear deterrent in the face of what it perceives to be a formidable U.S. nuclear threat
supplemented by other major regional dangers from Russia, India, and other prospective
nuclear powers, has taken the following form: the deployment of new land-based solid-
fueled ballistic missiles of varying ranges (to include intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles); ballistic missile submarines with weapons capable of reaching the continental
United States; new highly survivable nuclear weapon storage sites; and a robust national
command and control system that incorporates a resilient, dedicated nuclear command and
control segment.
The number of nuclear warheads in the Chinese arsenal has also progressively
increased as the nuclear delivery systems have been augmented, but there still significant
uncertainties about the existence and the number of nuclear gravity bombs and tactical
nuclear weapons in the Chinese arsenal. The total size of the Chinese nuclear weapons
inventory today is widely believed to consist of some 250 nuclear warheads, but the
accuracy of these or any other numbers is debatable. China has a substantial fissile
material stockpile consisting of some 16 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and some
1.8 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium, so there are no practical constraints on its
ability to produce an arsenal of any size it chooses. Given the choices China makes in
regard to delivery systems, it could deploy anywhere up to an additional 150 warheads
over the next ten years.
At arsenal levels of such size, the Chinese nuclear force will be oriented
fundamentally towards deterring nuclear use (or the threat of use) against China by
maintaining a survivable retaliatory capacity during conflicts with any nuclear-armed state
and by maintaining the capacity for escalation dominance vis-a-vis weaker nuclear
adversaries. Toward these ends, China will continue to reiterate its no first use nuclear
policy, though what that doctrine means precisely is unclear.
China today views the United States as its principal active nuclear and
conventional threat, followed by India in the nuclear realm. Russia remains a latent
nuclear threat and although it was historically an important driver of Chinese nuclear
planning, Russia has receded considerably in Chinese calculations today. North Korea,
Taiwan, and Japan remain longer-term sources of strategic uncertainty for Beijing, with
nuclear threats remaining a current or prospective challenge in all three cases. The most
pressing practical contingencies involving Chinese nuclear use in the prospective future,
however, involve employment against U.S. forces to forestall defeat or signal a
willingness to risk further escalation in the context of a successful U.S. intervention in a
Taiwan crisis or in another crisis of similar magnitude in East Asia (for example, on behalf
of Japan), and the use of tactical (or other) nuclear weapons in a conflict with India.
India
The rivalry between China and India since their birth as modern states after the
Second World War created the preconditions for a nuclear rivalry between thema
competition that was inflamed when China first tested nuclear weapons in 1964 driven by
its antagonism to the United States and its emerging split with the Soviet Union. The first
Chinese nuclear test, coming two years after Indias defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian
conflict, precipitated the Indian nuclear weapons program, which in turn first
demonstrated its capacity in 1974. Despite the supposed Chinese disdain of India, Beijing
began to systematically target India with nuclear weapons after the latters first nuclear
test, and sometime in the late-1980s transferred a nuclear weapon design and fissile
material to Pakistan, at least in part as a strategy of containing India. New Delhi responded
to the Chinese challenge with additional nuclear tests in 1998, declared itself to be a
nuclear weapon state, and began to overtly develop its nuclear deterrent sinceaimed at
both China and Pakistan.
India today is believed to possess an arsenal of some 100 nuclear weapons, though
this figure is highly uncertain. The country is thought to have produced close to 600
kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, though it is unclear whether all this material has
been machined into warheads. India can produce extremely large quantities of weapons-
grade plutonium, should it chose to use its power reactors currently outside of safeguards
for this purpose. To date, however, there is no evidence that India has embarked on any
crash program to enlarge its nuclear arsenal, despite its having the technical capacity to do
so. If India persists in producing about 5-6 nuclear weapons annually (as it is believed to
have done since 1998), the India nuclear deterrent would consist of some less than 200
nuclear weapons by 2025 assuming the public assessments of its current inventory are
correct. These weapons will be deployed aboard primarily mobile, solid-fueled, ballistic
missiles of up to intermediate range, though these will be supplemented by a limited
number of legacy gravity weapons and a small but growing number of sea-launched
ballistic missiles. All Indian nuclear weapons currently are maintained routinely in de-
mated condition, though whether this posture will persist after the four ballistic missile
submarines are eventually inducted into its arsenal is unclear.
The heart of Indias current nuclear modernization program, which is centered on
developing and inducting mobile, sold-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
deploying ballistic missile submarines, developing a ballistic missile defense system,
building weapon storage and integration sites, and completing its command and control
network, is aimed principally at refurbishing its deterrence capability vis-a-vis China. The
threats emerging from Pakistan are significant, but Indian policy makers judge that their
current deterrent against Islamabad as generally adequate. The deterrence gap versus
China, however, is considerable and it will not be bridged until India acquires the capacity
to range the Chinese heartland with missiles of adequate reach.
Even when the effort to reach this goal is completedan endeavor that will
continue well beyond 2025it is likely that New Delhi will persist with its currently
relaxed nuclear posture so long as current trends in Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani
relations persist. This posture is predicated on the requirement of a minimum deterrent
(whose numerical size is not publicly known) and a strict no first use policy (which is
likely to subsist durably because of Indias general conventional military superiority over
Pakistan and its still substantial, though decaying, operational military superiority over
China along their disputed border). As long as these conditions obtain, there is little
incentive for India to violate its no first use policy, which is oriented fundamentally
towards deterring nuclear attack (or threats of attack) emerging from Pakistan and China.
Pakistan
The contrast between India and Pakistan on no first use could not be greater.
Unlike India, which is both stronger than Pakistan and no pushover where China is
concerned, Pakistan is a weak state that is unfortunately growing even weaker as a result
of its awful strategic choices. Pakistans security competition with India, which dates back
to the creation of the two countries as independent states, is multi-dimensional in nature
and involves territorial, religious, and power-political dimensions. These grievances have
combined in unhelpful ways to make Pakistan the anti-status quo power in the Indian
subcontinent. Having fought four unsuccessful wars with India in an effort to secure its
strategic aims, Pakistan switched to a dangerous and provocative strategy in the last
decades of the 20th centurya strategy of supporting terrorist groups aimed at enervating
India through a thousand cuts, even as Pakistan began to feverishly expand its nuclear
arsenal in an effort to prevent New Delhi from retaliating with conventional forces.
The post-2001-02 shift in Indian policy, which holds out the threat of conventional
retaliation to Pakistani-supported terrorist attacks (despite the overarching presence of
nuclear weapons in the subcontinent), has only deepened Pakistans dependence on
nuclear weapons further, resulting in an acceleration of its weapons program. Today, the
Pakistan arsenal includes both gravity weapons and ballistic missiles of up to medium
range as well as cruise missiles, glide bombs, and a plethora of new and diverse tactical
nuclear weapons. The Pakistani nuclear arsenal is judged by many reputable scholars to
consist of some 90-110 weapons, though at the current pace of growth the force could
easily expand to over three times that number within a decade.
Pakistans strategic weaponry is believed to be deployed in de-mated condition
routinely in peacetime. Whether that posture will apply to the newer tactical systems is
unclear. Pakistans nuclear doctrine, unlike India or Chinas, is centered fundamentally on
first use, and it is oriented primarily towards defeating Indias conventional superiority in
the event of conflict. Although Pakistans nuclear forces are intended, strictly speaking,
for deterrence and not war fighting, Islamabads emerging tactical capabilities could
inadvertently push Pakistan towards the latter.
The external dangers of deterrence breakdown, which could precipitate the
catastrophe of Pakistani nuclear use against India, are complemented by internal dangers
as well. Pakistans internal fissures, it is often feared, could bleed into its armed forces,
resulting in risks to the security of its nuclear weaponry. Although the Pakistani military
has made enormous investments in enhancing nuclear security (aided by the United
States) in recent years, fears about the loss or compromise of its nuclear weaponry because
of domestic dangers still persistand not unreasonably so.
Taking Stock
When all three states are synoptically considered, therefore, the following
contingencies remain the most pressing from the viewpoint of U.S. strategic interests for
the reasons adduced below:
1) Chinese use or threats of use of nuclear weaponry to deter U.S. military
intervention on behalf of Taiwan or other American allies in Asia.
Of the three nuclear weapons states that are the subject of this testimony, only
China conceives of its nuclear arsenal as having direct utility for deterring U.S. military
operations directed against its interests at various locations along the Asian rimland. Any
contingency that brings U.S. forces in confrontation with China would represent a
dangerous predicament and would require both local conventional and overall nuclear
superiority for political and military success. Any failure on this score could not only
precipitate immediate operational reverses that would frustrate the realization of U.S.
political aims, but it could lead over time to the erosion of the U.S. alliance system in East
Asia, the future acquisition of nuclear weapons by current American allies, and the
eventual loss of American primacy in the Indo-Pacific. For all these reasons, preparing
seriously to ensure success in this contingency should remain at the top of American
strategic priorities. The recent innovations centered around the AirSea Battle concept
indicate that the Pentagon has taken the emerging Chinese threats to the U.S. ability to aid
its East Asian allies seriously, though it is unclear whether force planning for nuclear
escalation vis-a-vis China has been adequately integrated into the current war plans. If this
lacuna is real, it could prove costly in the context of a conflictand could undermine the
confidence of the allies in the viability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
2) Pakistani use of nuclear weapons as cover to support continued terrorist
attacks against India.
Although this contingency derives from Pakistans ability to exploit the deterrence
capability inherent in its nuclear reserves for revisionist endsand represents the
dominant threat levied by the Pakistani military against India now for some three decades
it embodies the most likely route to nuclear deterrence breakdown in South Asia.
Neither Indian nor U.S. nuclear capabilities are directly useful in defeating this threat, but
U.S. and international political pressure on Pakistan, which has been employed
episodically, might offer a means of mitigating its worst dangers. The most likely antidote
that could alter such Pakistani behavior, however, would be the rising costs of terrorist
blowback within Pakistanwhich is, unfortunately, an expensive way of getting Pakistan
to change course.
3) Pakistani nuclear use against India or against Indian military forces in the
context of Indian retaliation against Pakistani-supported terrorist attacks against
India.
This contingency arises if India decides to retaliate against Pakistan through the
large scale use of military force for punitive purposes. Any significant employment of
Indian military force obviously carries the risk of a Pakistani nuclear response, which is
why Indian leaders have shied away from exercising major conventional war options that
require especially the large scale use of land forces. Should India contemplate major
military operations, however, it is likely that the United States would intervene, but mainly
through energetic diplomacy as it did in 2001-02 and again in 2008. It is unlikely that the
United States would choose to intervene militarily to prevent either conflict escalation or
nuclear weapons employment for a host of operational reasons, though some kinds of
trans- or post-conflict assistance might be feasible: in such circumstances, the most
important U.S. capabilities that would be relevant would be intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, capabilities required for noncombatant evacuation operations,
and Nuclear Emergency and Support Teams (NEST) and other assets essential for post-
detonation assistance and recovery (if nuclear use has occurred). Because of the large
numbers of U.S. citizens normally resident or traveling in India, and the complexity of
evacuation operations in a nuclear environment, this scenario can be more stressing than is
commonly realized. The most useful U.S. contribution towards preventing a Pakistani use
of nuclear weapons in such a scenarioand the Indian nuclear retribution that would
result thereafterwould be to press Pakistan to exit the terrorism business or risk being
left alone (or, even worse, the object of international sanction) if a major Indian military
response ensues in the aftermath of any pernicious terrorist attack. Other than this, there is
little that the United States can do to preserve deterrence stability between two
asymmetrically-sized states where the gap in power promises to become even wider
tomorrow than it is today.
4) Pakistani loss of control over nuclear assets in the context of conventional
military operations against India OR a compromise of nuclear security in peacetime
in Pakistan.
This scenario, which has been discussed considerably in recent years both in India
and in the United States, would also be highly complex in the demands it places on the
U.S. military, depending on the details of the contingency. U.S. ISR elements, special
operations forces, and other quick reaction capabilities would be highly relevant in such a
contingencyas would close coordination with the government of Pakistan and its armed
forces. The United States has already aided Pakistan significantly in regards to nuclear
weapons protection, but there are obvious limits to further assistance beyond a point, not
least because of the deep-rooted Pakistani fears about the United States seeking access and
information about the location of Pakistans nuclear weaponry.
5) Chinese or Indian nuclear coercion against the other in the context of a
border crisis OR in the limiting case, the actual use of nuclear weapons to stave off
battlefield defeat.
This last contingency, admittedly remote today, would put a high premium on U.S.
ISR assets as well as, obviously, active U.S. diplomacy. At the present, it is unlikely that
the United States would find itself involved in such a conflict except as a concerned
bystander, but if this situation were to change as U.S.-Indian ties grow deeper over time,
U.S. conventional and nuclear forces might acquire new roles for extended deterrence and
reassurance with respect to India. Until then, however, U.S. ISR capabilities and
diplomacy would represent the instruments most relevant to coping with such a scenario.
Implications for the United States
The broad range of nuclear challenges arising from a consideration of the problems
involving China, India and Pakistan suggest several important conclusions as far as U.S.
strategic forces are concerned.
First, U.S. nuclear forces will continue to remain the ultimate backstop where
American national security is concerned. The notion that these forces will become
irrelevant any time soon, or that their abolition can be contemplated, is a dangerous
fantasy. Eliminating nuclear weapons globally must instead take a backseat to protecting
U.S. nuclear dominance and maintaining the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent
over the long term.
Second, the progressive growth of Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear forces
over the next ten yearsand the likelihood of further proliferation elsewhere in years to
come-implies that any further reduction of U.S. nuclear forces beyond the New Start treaty
ought to be eschewed. Given the complexity of the emerging nuclear environmenta
world that is best described as asymmetric nuclear multipolaritythe United States must
seek to maintain the requisite superiority of the total force that permits it to achieve
conventional success in regional contingencies while preserving the advantages currently
enjoyed by U.S. nuclear forces. Given the onerous U.S. extended deterrence commitments
in Europe and Asia, American nuclear parity with Russia must not diminish to a point
where parity with China slinks into reach.
Third, the United States must think seriously about the threat of nuclear deterrence
breakdown in Asia as a time when the continent will host many nuclear powers whose
arsenals vary in capacity, architecture and doctrine. The desire to reduce the salience of
nuclear weaponry in global politics is estimable. That means that U.S. nuclear weapons
ought not to be brandished unnecessarily. However, it does not imply forgetting that U.S.
nuclear weapons are still essential for deterring not only nuclear attacks (or the threats
thereof) on the United States and its allies but also major conventional attacks as well,
while still remaining useful as tactical warfighting instruments in certain specific,
admittedly limited, contingencies where conventional weapons currently remain
ineffective. As a general rule, therefore, the desire to reduce the salience of nuclear
weapons in world politics should not extend to devaluing the utility of nuclear weapons
for deterrence because these instruments will continue to remain the ultima ratio in an
environment that only promises more, not less, proliferation.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Testimony by George Perkovich
Vice President for Studies
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
February 25, 2015
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to testify before you. I
have worked on nuclear-weapons-related issues since 1982, first with a focus on the
Soviet Union, then, after 1992, on India, Pakistan and Iran. I have written extensively on
each of these countries nuclear programs and policies. Over the past ten years I also have
analyzed nuclear dynamics in Northeast Asia, particularly Chinese and Japanese
perspectives on them.
Because time here is short and the range of topics you have asked my colleagues
and me to address is extensive, I concentrate my testimony on what I think are some
cutting-edge strategic challenges in Northeast Asia and South Asia that need to be more
creatively addressed by U.S. policy-makers. These are problems to which no one has tidy,
feasible solutions - that is, solutions that would change to our complete satisfaction the
military capabilities and behaviors we want other states to change, and thereby
significantly reduce risks of conflict that could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons.
This is largely because the other states involved have different interests and objectives
than the U.S. does and will search for ways to pursue them. Knowing that they cannot
compete directly and symmetrically with U.S. conventional and strategic forces, these
states will often seek to develop and apply asymmetric capabilities and strategies to
balance U.S. power. This is especially true of two of the states under consideration - the
DPRK and China - whose governments fear the U.S. seeks ultimately to displace them.
The challenge, then, for the U.S. and these states is to achieve tolerable stability, avoid
escalatory warfare, and establish ways of getting along through political-diplomatic
processes backed by balances of power.
I have divided my testimony into five key points that describe the regional
dynamics at play and suggest priority policies the U.S. could pursue to mitigate
instabilities and risks of nuclear escalation.
1. Complex causal dynamics drive the threat perceptions and nuclear requirements
and policies of states in Northeast Asia and South Asia.
This is an analytic and conceptual point that must be recognized if the U.S. and
others are to devise policies and deploy capabilities that will improve security and
ameliorate instability in these two inter-related regions. Setting North Korea to the side for
a moment, it may help to conceptualize the Northeast Asian and South Asian nuclear
system in the form of two strategic triangles that are connected by a common node,
which is China. The following diagram represents this idea.
The first triangle includes the U.S., Russia and China. Each of these states nuclear
requirements and policies (as well as non-nuclear instruments of force, deterrence and
coercion) affects and is affected by the other two states. For example, the U.S. has long
seen Russia as a benchmark for determining U.S. nuclear posture and policy, and recently
has factored China more heavily into policy calculations, including regarding strategic
conventional weapons, cyberwarfare capabilities, and ballistic missile defenses. China in
turn calculates its strategic military requirements and options by reference to current and
potential threats that it perceives emanating from the U.S., and to a lesser extent from
Russia.
The second triangle includes China, India and Pakistan. India seeks strategic
capabilities to deter major aggression from China and from Pakistan today and in the
future. Many of the delivery systems and nuclear warhead capabilities India seeks are
intended to increase its capacity to deter China, whose current and future capabilities in
turn are driven in large part by perceptions of threat from the U.S. Pakistan then seeks
nuclear and other capabilities to balance what it perceives India to be acquiring. Many
Indian analysts perceive that China is assisting Pakistans strategic acquisitions, so India
seeks not only to balance China, but also to balance the gains Pakistan may achieve in
cooperation with China. For its part, Pakistan increasingly perceives the U.S. and India to
be cooperating in buttressing Indian military capabilities with which Pakistan must
contend.
From the perspective of the United States, the main takeaway from this depiction
of the strategic force dynamics involving these states is that policies, capabilities, and
operational plans we develop to affect one of these states may cause others also to react in
turn.
For example, a former commander of Indias strategic forces recently explained to
me that what the U.S. does to extend deterrence to its allies in East Asia affects China
which then acts in ways that challenge India. The Chinese note and build up capability,
strategy and philosophy to deal with what the U.S. is doing. The Chinese have deployed
large numbers of conventionally armed ballistic missiles and cyber capabilities and anti-
satellite weapons to deny U.S. forces access into areas sensitive to them, primarily around
Taiwan. Those capabilities could be used against India, too.
Pakistanis constantly assert that the so-called U.S.-India nuclear deal could
significantly boost Indias stockpile of fissile material that could be used to build up its
nuclear forces. Similarly, they say, potential U.S. cooperation with India on ballistic
missile defenses could require Pakistan to further increase the numbers and diversity of its
missile armory and nuclear warhead inventory.
Of course, much the same could be said about Chinas cooperation with Pakistan
and Russias cooperation with India. This is not to suggest that the U.S. and these other
states should desist from all such policies and activities. Rather, the point is that these
policies and activities are inter-related more than is commonly recognized. If strategic
instability is going to be redressed in Northeast and South Asia, each state, including the
U.S. must be more willing than they heretofore have been to acknowledge and address
how their own capabilities and actions affect the others. Among other things, this means
that prospective policies must be considered in a regional context, not merely a bilateral
one.
2. Regarding China, the most fundamental challenge for U.S. policy is to engage
Beijing in tempering several forms of security dilemmas and affirming that neither state
will initiate the use of force to change the territorial status quo in Northeast and South
Asia.
In John Herzs famous words (at least amongst wonks), the security dilemma is A
structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs
tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its
own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening.
The U.S. and China confront security dilemmas of their own making in at least
three domains.
One pertains to concerns of the U.S. and its protectorates - most acutely Taiwan
and Japan -that China may use its growing economic and military power to coerce them in
territorial and political disputes. China, for its part, has countervailing concerns that the
U.S. and its allies may seek to apply military power to advance their preferred positions
vis a vis China, particularly in case of a crisis over the political evolution of Taiwan as it
relates to China. (China has a deeper concern that the U.S. seeks to subvert its political
order and foster democratization. It is difficult for the U.S. to convince Chinese leaders
that while we desire political change in their country we do not intend to use our military
capabilities and policies to bring this change about). The famous three communiques
issued by the U.S. and China between 1979 and August 1982 1 created a modus vivendi
on these questions related to Taiwan, but both countries remain wary that it could be
fragile. Each side in this security dilemma builds military power, and, in the U.S. case
occasionally sells arms to Taiwan. Each also sometimes makes political declarations
intended to preserve its defensive positions, but which the other side may interpret as
expressions of intent to change the status quo.
 A second security dilemma arises from each sides build-up of non-nuclear forces -
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, naval and air forces, ballistic missile defenses,
and cyberwarfare capabilities - which each justifies as means to defend against the
presumed offensive intentions of the other. This dynamic creates arms race instability,
whether of a symmetric or asymmetric nature. For example, China for years has steadily
augmented its arsenal of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles and anti-satellite
weaponry to offset the United States superior naval power projection capabilities. The
United States ongoing ballistic missile defense program can be seen as an effort to
maintain a long-standing asymmetric advantage in the nuclear domain, and as a way to
offset Chinas build-up of conventionally armed ballistic missiles. Both states, led by the
U.S., are developing conventional prompt-strike weapons. Additionally, the U.S. and
China both are engaged in a cyberweapon arms race, with China trying to catch up to the
U.S.
A third security dilemma exists in the domain of nuclear policy. China fears that
the U.S. seeks to acquire means to negate its nuclear deterrent, through some combination
of offensive nuclear forces, future hypersonic conventionally-armed missiles, ballistic
missile defenses, and cyberwarfare capabilities.
China is assessed to possess approximately 250 nuclear warheads. It is assessed to
deploy between 50-75 ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the United
States, and another approximately 60 intermediate range ballistic missiles suited for use
against India, Japan or Taiwan. By comparison the United States operationally deploys
2,200 nuclear weapons. China is estimated to possess an additional 16 tonnes of highly-
enriched uranium and 1.8 tonnes of non-civilian separated plutonium, compared to the
United States stockpile of 604 tonnes and 87 tonnes, respectively. The U.S. and its
proteges fear that China may someday add dramatically to its nuclear forces in ways that
would undermine - along with conventional anti-access area-denial capabilities - the
American deterrent extended to Taiwan and Japan. Each side in this competition does not
adequately acknowledge how its own actions drive the other to take the actions that it sees
as threatening.
To deal with these challenges, the U.S. does not need more or different nuclear
forces than it already possesses and plans to possess after implementation of the New Start
Treaty with Russia. In terms of capabilities, the greater imperative is to acquire and/or
deploy non-nuclear instruments to preserve the United States capacity to quickly defend
its protectorates against and to deter Chinese actions to initiate changes in the territorial
status quo in the region. Such potential Chinese actions are very unlikely to involve its
nuclear forces, and it is thus in the U.S. interest to counter with strong, symmetrical
conventional capabilities.
A more immediately pressing need is to motivate Chinese leaders to join the U.S.
and, where appropriate its allies, in articulating and authenticating policies that would
reassure all sides in these security dilemmas that they will not initiate the use of force to
change the territorial or political status quo or to otherwise coerce each other. To this end,
it will be necessary for Chinese officials to understand the concept of the security dilemma
and recognize how their words and deeds sometimes exacerbate it.
With regard to nuclear policy, the key dilemma concerns first-use of nuclear
weapons. Retaliatory use of nuclear weapons is a comparatively straightforward
proposition; the destabilizing factor is the prospect that the U.S. or China would initiate
attacks by nuclear, conventional, or cyber means on the others nuclear deterrent
forces and/or their command and control systems. The U.S. would be wise to overcome its
politically motivated reluctance to assure China that it will not seek to negate Chinas
nuclear deterrent. Washington should do this out of recognition that mutual nuclear
vulnerability is a fact of 21st century life with China, and attempting to negate this fact
through a combination of new offensive and defensive systems would not succeed at a
cost that the U.S. would find acceptable to itself. The language authored by a 2009
Council on Relations Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy chaired by William Perry and
Brent Scowcroft could be a model: mutual vulnerability with China - like mutual
vulnerability with Russia - is not a policy choice to be embraced or rejected, but rather a
strategic fact to be managed with priority on strategic stability.
For its part, China should be motivated to reciprocate constructively by clarifying
that as long as U.S. policies and military capabilities reflect this assurance China will not
significantly increase its nuclear weapon arsenal and threaten to use force to alter the
territorial status quo and/or resolve the Taiwan question.
Such declarations of fundamental policy would not preclude the U.S., China, or
other states from modernizing and bolstering their strategic offensive and defensive
capabilities, but they would provide a framework within which each party could explain to
the other how its actions are not inconsistent with fundamentally defensive intentions and
assurances. This would be constructive on its own terms, and could eventually create
conditions for possible negotiation of arms limitations.
3. One of the most complicated challenges facing U.S. policy-makers today is to
reassure Japan that the U.S. has the resolve and capabilities to defend it against armed
attack from China or any other state.
Extended deterrence is never easy to provide or depend upon. The protege often
will fear that its protector will abandon it. At other times, the protege may fear that the
protector will entrap it in a war that the protege would otherwise seek to avoid. The
guarantor, on the other hand, must convince the protege as well as the adversary that the
guarantor will put its soldiers and citizens and treasury at risk in order to defend another.
This is especially problematic insofar as the protege may itself act in ways that instigate a
potential conflict, raising legitimate questions about whether the guarantor should or
would invite the costs of coming to its defense in such a situation.
Extended deterrence is often conflated with extended nuclear deterrence. While it
may be tempting to believe that the potential use of nuclear weapons always strengthens
extended deterrence, the issue is problematic. Potential use of nuclear weapons in an
escalating conflict can indeed strengthen the potency of the guarantors deterrent against a
potential aggressor. But the very destructiveness that this portends also can weaken the
resolve of the guarantor states population (should we trade Los Angeles for Taipei?) as
well as the proteges population (if the U.S. uses nuclear weapons on China, China will
respond first by targeting nuclear weapons at Japan). These possible reactions may tempt a
potential aggressor into thinking that the mere threat of aggression that could escalate to
nuclear use can split an alliance, or demonstrate the guarantors weak resolve, constituting
a bluff that may be called.
On the other hand, if the guarantors resolve is unquestioned in the face of a
countervailing nuclear threat, nuclear moral hazards may be created. Like a finance
company whose managers believe that the government will bail them out if they face
ruinous losses, the protege may take unwise risks in its policies toward its adversary,
feeling that the nuclear threat proffered by the guarantor will deter the adversary from
reacting forcefully. The protege also may under-invest in non-nuclear defensive
capabilities that would otherwise obviate the need to resort to nuclear threats to deter the
adversary, like a bank that does not maintain conservative levels of reserves to cover its
commitments.
This sort of hazard has long affected the United States relations with its NATO
allies, most of whom do not meet their commitments to devote two percent of their GDP
to defense. Japan, too, has not always carried its full share of the defense burden with the
United States. Its defense spending declined between 2002 and the arrival of the new Abe
government in 2013. Now Japan is pursuing plans for an increase in procurement of major
systems, and the U.S. and Japan have intensified exercises and other cooperative activities
to solidify defense in the East China Sea. Still, the national government in Tokyo has not
successfully overcome local governments reluctance to cooperate in relocating U.S.
military bases on Okinawa. It is common in Washington to hear complaints that an
administration is not doing enough to reassure Japan of the United States commitment to
defend it; it is less common to hear of even private congressional remonstrances to
Japanese officials that they should do more to buttress the alliance materially and
diplomatically (vis a vis Japans neighbors). A careful complementarity is required to
match increases in defense preparedness with political and diplomatic sensitivity to the
concerns this can cause in states that experienced Japanese aggression in the 1930s.
These considerations can be applied to the issue that currently poses the greatest
risk of potential conflict involving Japan and China, and implicating the U.S. as Japans
protector.
There is a cluster of islands and rock outcroppings in the East China Sea that Japan
calls the Senkaku Islands and China calls the Diaoyu Islands. Japan incorporated the
islands under the administration of Okinawa, in January 1895, during the first Sino-
Japanese War. The U.S. took control of these outcroppings as a result of World War II, and
returned them to Japanese control in 1972. China disputes Japans right to sovereignty
over these islands. The U.S. does not offer a judgment on the disputed claims to
sovereignty, but says that the islands fall within the territory the U.S. is obligated by treaty
to help Japan defend. The Japanese government in late 2012 bought the islands from a
private owner, explaining that it did so to prevent the nationalist governor of Tokyo from
acquiring and developing them. Reflecting the logic of security dilemmas, China
intensified its contestation over the issue, and deployed naval vessels and aircraft around
and over the islands in order to manifest its claim and pressure Japan to proceed carefully.
A non-trivial risk now appears that either state could act physically to change the status
quo on or around these islands, and/or that the naval vessels or aircraft could collide, as
happened with a Chinese fishing vessel and a Japanese Coast Guard ship in 2010. Such
collisions could create a severe crisis that the highly nationalistic Chinese and Japanese
governments could find difficult to de-escalate.
Were such a crisis to occur when China and Japan are led by strength-projecting
nationalistic figures, the U.S. would face excruciatingly complex challenges. The first
priority would be to resolve the crisis diplomatically. But this could be very difficult to do,
depending on the circumstances. Japan and China would dispute whose actors and actions
were to blame for the precipitating action. If the U.S. did not take its ally Japans side,
whatever the merits of the case, some faction in Washington would decry the
abandonment of an ally. And, if Japan were at fault and the U.S. did not acknowledge this
for political-diplomatic reasons, China would become even more determined to press its
claims on this dispute and others that involve U.S. allies. If evidence held that China was
at fault, the political-diplomatic position of the U.S. would be simpler, but then the U.S.
and Japan would likely find themselves in a potentially escalating conflict with China.
In either case, to augment diplomacy and strengthen deterrence, and to prevail in
case diplomacy fails, the U.S. and Japan would need to have the conventional military
means to prevent China from creating new facts on the ground, for example by
physically taking control of the islands. Failure to ensure this initial defense could create a
situation where the U.S. and Japan would feel compelled to fight China to reverse its gain.
Such a conflict could escalate and expand to a wider naval battle or blockade contest as
each leadership would feel its credibility and political survival at stake. Were the U.S. and
Japan not prevailing, someone in Washington or Tokyo would at least raise the prospect
that the conflict could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. After all, thats how nuclear
deterrence is supposed to work. Yet, would even implying a nuclear threat be advisable
and therefore credible? Would and should the United States be willing to risk nuclear war
over uninhabited rocks in East Asia that 99 percent of the American people have never
heard of and could not find on a map? Recall, the issue here would be first-use of nuclear
weapons: if China, despite its commitment and force posture of no-first-use, took steps
signaling that it would break the nuclear taboo, U.S. recourse to retaliatory nuclear
weapons reasonably would be on the table. But threatening to initiate the use of nuclear
weapons in conflict that erupted over these disputed outcroppings - no matter how far it
escalated would constitute a profound over-reaction.
Japanese leaders and citizens may not appreciate this analysis. They may prefer to
over-rely on the magic of nuclear deterrence. But statesmanship requires realism, dealing
with facts and assessing strategic risks. Japan and the United States must recognize the
imperative of developing and deploying diplomacy and conventional military power to
prevent efforts by anyone to forcibly change the status quo surrounding this territorial
dispute. The combination of clear commitments not to upset the status quo and
demonstrable non-nuclear means to prevent anyone else from physically changing it
constitutes the strongest possible extended deterrent, for it reaffirms a fundamentally
defensive posture that augments national and international resolve.
The current and projected nuclear arsenal of the United States is more than
sufficient to perform the physical requirements of extending nuclear deterrence to Japan
against China. Nor is it evident that strengthening U.S. declaratory policy regarding the
use of nuclear weapons would enhance (and not otherwise undermine) the feasibility and
durability of the extended nuclear deterrent.
 4. North Korea will not in the foreseeable future agree to relinquish all of its
nuclear weapons and related capabilities. The near-term imperative should be to negotiate
constraints on the buildup of DPRK nuclear capabilities and enforceable commitments not
to transfer them to others.
Japanese and South Korean leaders are politically and psychologically unprepared
to negotiate anything less than complete DPRK disarmament, for complex reasons. This in
turn intensifies political pressures on any American administration not to deviate from this
stated objective. This motivates North Korea to demand an exorbitant price for
cooperation, which its interlocutors doubt the DPRK will fully implement in any case.
A more realistic alternative would be to bargain for incremental steps by the DPRK
to stop increasing its nuclear stockpile and to eschew proliferation of nuclear materials and
know-how to other actors. These forms of restraint by the DPRK could be more
achievable at a lower price than the DPRK seeks for the illusory objective of total nuclear
disarmament.
Acknowledging that DPRK will retain some nuclear weapons for the foreseeable
future offends our sense of virtue, as does embarking on what amounts to a protection-
racket arrangement to pay the DPRK for not damaging the neighborhood. But the perfect
may be the enemy of the somewhat tolerable here: by acknowledging that the DPRK
would retain a limited nuclear capability to satisfy its regimes need to deter U.S. and
other efforts to displace it, the U.S. and other negotiating parties would strengthen their
leverage to obtain North Korean cooperation in mitigating its other threatening behaviors.
Arguably, this is the best outcome that might be achieved today.
For such an adjustment in negotiating objectives to be sustainable, the U.S., Japan,
South Korea, China and Russia would need to devise a formula that would affirm their
ultimate goal to be the creation of a regional security environment free of nuclear weapons
on the Korean Peninsula. Such a goal is necessary to satisfy the political-psychological
needs of South Korea
and Japan. Yet, the prospect of freeing the Korean Peninsula of all nuclear
weapons and (still to be defined) supporting infrastructure would be more realistic after
the relevant parties had incrementally built mutual confidence by stopping the expansion
of North Koreas nuclear arsenal and infrastructure and authenticating that the DPRK was
not transferring weapons, material, and know-how to others.
In terms of U.S. nuclear force requirements and posture, the nuclear threat posed
by the DPRK is a lesser-included challenge that can be more than adequately covered by
nuclear (and non-nuclear) forces that the U.S. will retain as part of its larger requirement
to deter Russia and China.
5. India and Pakistan will continue to augment their nuclear arsenals. The
imperatives now are to prevent another major terrorist attack from Pakistan against India
and reduce the risks of escalation to nuclear war.
South Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in the
foreseeable future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan
competition. The next major terrorist attack in India, emanating from Pakistan, may
trigger an Indian conventional military riposte that could in turn prompt Pakistan to use
battlefield nuclear weapons to repel an Indian incursion. India, for its part, has declared
that it would inflict massive retaliation in response to any nuclear use against its territory
or troops. Obviously, this threatening dynamic -whereby terrorism may prompt
conventional conflict which may prompt nuclear war -challenges Indian and Pakistan
policy-makers. India and Pakistan both tend to downplay or dismiss the potential for
escalation, but our own history of close nuclear calls should make U.S. officials more alert
to these dangers. The U.S. is the only outside power that could intervene diplomatically
and forcefully to de-escalate a crisis.
India, is believed to possess approximately 90-110 nuclear weapons. It plans to
deliver them via aircraft and/or a growing fleet of ballistic and perhaps cruise missiles.
Available information suggests it keeps the nuclear bombs and warheads separate from
their aircraft and missile delivery systems. With a historically entrenched doctrine of No
First Use, and a strict insistence on civilian control over nuclear policy, India plans to mate
weapons and delivery systems only when the need for their potential use appears
imminent. While India retains significant quantities of plutonium outside of civilian
control, which it conceivably could use to dramatically expand its nuclear arsenal, India
thus far rejects ideas of nuclear war-fighting and corresponding development of a large
nuclear arsenal, much as China does.
Pakistan is estimated to have 100-120 nuclear weapons, with a continually
growing capacity to produce plutonium and highly-enriched uranium to expand this
arsenal if it chooses to. Pakistan continues to add new missile delivery capabilities to its
arsenal. Most noteworthy has been the development of the NASR 60-kilometre range
missile, which Pakistan projects as a battlefield weapon to deter Indian ground-force
incursions into its territory. Pakistan proffers the threat of initiating nuclear use if and
when it would be necessary to defeat what it would perceive as Indian aggression from
land, air and/or sea.
India faces two inter-related strategic challenges vis a vis Pakistan: to compel
Pakistani authorities to curtail the operations of anti-Indian terrorists; and to deter Pakistan
from engaging in escalatory warfare if and when India responds violently to a terrorist
attack. The new prime minister of India, Narendra Modi came to power with a reputation
for strong action, which he and his supporters juxtapose to the perceived weakness of his
predecessors. Indeed, Modis government recently unleashed the Indian Army to retaliate
with disproportionate force against traditional Pakistani artillery shelling across the
disputed Line of Control in Kashmir. Senior advisors to the prime minister have said that
there should be little doubt he will respond forcefully if India is attacked again by
terrorists associated with Pakistan.
The questions are, what strategy (or strategies) and capabilities would be feasible
and effective to enable India to motivate Pakistans security establishment to demobilize
anti-India terrorist groups? If terrorist attacks cannot be prevented, how can India respond
to them in ways that minimize risks of escalation that would be unfavorable to India?
Since the major Indo-Pak crisis of 2001-2002 following a terrorist attack on Indias
parliament building, Indians have debated options ranging from Army-centric ground
thrusts into Pakistan, precision air strikes, covert operations, and non-kinetic efforts to
isolate and sanction Pakistan.
 Clearly, some actions that could most probably satisfy one of Indias multiple
domestic and bilateral objectives would lessen the chances of achieving others. For
example, satisfying the desire to punish Pakistan could be achieved by a relatively wide
range of military actions and international economic sanctions. But the more destructive of
possible military actions could raise the overall scale and costs of the conflict to levels
disproportionate to the harm done by the initial attack on India, and invite unwelcome
international responses. For example, a successful ground campaign into Pakistan would
be most likely to prompt Pakistan to use battlefield nuclear weapons to stop Indian forces
and compel them to leave Pakistani territory.
No theories in the existing international literature or in other states practices offer
guidance regarding how India could most effectively proceed here. Studies of strategies
and tactics to deter and defeat terrorism have not addressed situations when the major
antagonists possess nuclear weapons. Theories and case studies of nuclear deterrence and
escalation management in a nuclearized environment have not involved cases where
terrorists with unclear relationships to one of the state antagonists are the instigators of
aggression and the unitary rational actor model may not apply. The Indo-Pak
competition features both sets of challenges with the added complication that third states -
primarily the U.S. and China - also figure heavily in the calculations of decision-makers.
All of this has implications for U.S. policy-makers. Historically and today, the U.S.
has not planned for its nuclear forces to serve deterring or war-fighting roles against
Pakistan and/or India. Thus, South Asian scenarios do not figure in calculating the
adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces.
However, there are possible scenarios in which the U.S. could become directly
implicated in nuclear crises with Pakistan and/or between India and Pakistan. Pakistan
fears that the U.S. in
certain circumstances might conduct military operations to capture or otherwise
neutralize Pakistans nuclear forces and fissile materials. Indeed, one of the most telling
Pakistani reactions to the U.S. raid that killed Osama Bin Laden was to intensify efforts to
hide and secure their nuclear assets. Some of these protective steps could be welcome
insofar as they also could help secure Pakistans nuclear assets against possible efforts by
militant non-state actors or rebelling military units to capture them. This scenario -
radicals in Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons and/or fissile materials - has alarmed
successive U.S. administrations. Given fears of nuclear terrorism, it would be reasonable
for relevant U.S. government actors to aspire to have the precise intelligence and
capabilities required to, in a crisis, locate Pakistans nuclear assets and seek to remove or
disable them. Whether the U.S. has the requisite capabilities cannot be gleaned from
public sources, but the task would be extremely daunting given the number of Pakistans
nuclear weapons, the volume of its fissile material, and their dispersal to well-hidden and
defended facilities.
In any case, while some Pakistani authorities might welcome a successful U.S.
operation during an internal Pakistani crisis to keep the countrys nuclear weapon
capabilities from falling into the hands of anti-state groups, the possibility of such an
operation would generally be seen as deeply threatening to Pakistan. Few would be
confident that the U.S. would only intervene when it might be welcomed; all would worry
that the U.S. might intervene in a very different scenario in which Pakistan was embroiled
in a conflict with India. Indeed, the worst nightmare for Pakistani strategic planners is a
combined U.S.-Indian effort to negate, or at least degrade, their nuclear deterrent.
This may seem far-fetched today, and I am unaware of scholarly or official
analyses of such a possibility. However, I think the following questions suggest that it
would behoove the U.S. government to work discreetly on this problem. If India and
Pakistan become embroiled in a major military conflict following a major terrorist attack
on India attributed to Pakistan, and the U.S. detects Pakistan to be readying nuclear forces
for use, should the U.S. intervene to prevent the use of nuclear weapons?
Consider that the U.S. and India are now self-proclaimed strategic partners, and
many thousands of Americans live in India or regularly visit it, reflecting ever-increasing
U.S. commercial investments and interests in India. Consider also the large and prominent
Indian-American community who feel passionately about their native home and
participate ever more actively in American politics. If nuclear weapons were being readied
for use, with a real prospect of escalation to nuclear war between India and Pakistan,
would U.S. leaders feel they should simply stand back and watch? If, God forbid, nuclear
weapons were detonated and Americans were among the casualties, would not Congress
demand an inquiry to learn what did the president know and when did he know it, and
why did he or she not act to try to prevent it? Would there not be an expectation that the
government had done contingency planning for such an emergency, given how long
Pakistan and India have had nuclear weapons and how central the U.S. has been in
resolving earlier crises between them?
Members of Congress are much better positioned to answer these questions than I
am. But I would wager that there is some prospect that U.S. leaders would at least be
expected to have prepared for such a contingency, even if the preparations concluded there
was little that could be done physically to prevent it.
Indeed, we should assume that Pakistani military strategists are thinking of
scenarios in which the U.S. might alone, or in cooperation with India, intervene in a
looming nuclear conflict to stay Pakistans hand. In this case, Pakistani planners will be
considering whether and how they could deter the U.S. from such intervention. Of course,
inviting war, possibly nuclear war, with the United States would be a terrible risk. But in a
scenario in which Pakistani military leaders were considering nuclear war with India
already, and the U.S. was seen to be denying this recourse to a perceived existential
necessity, this could be a risk that they could be willing to threaten to run.
I close by suggesting that, as in the earlier discussion concerning Northeast Asia,
the nuclear challenges in South Asia will not be redressed by more or newer U.S. nuclear
weapons or changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine. There is no evidence to the contrary. The
most immediately pressing objective of U.S. policy should be to apply vigorous, creative
diplomatic and political energy to prevent another crisis between India and Pakistan, and if
one cannot be prevented, to enhance the preparation of Indian, Pakistani and American
officials to manage it with minimal escalation.
1 The third communique, in August 1982, states in part: The United States
Government attached great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has
no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in
Chinas internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of Two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.
The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving
for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in Chinas Message to
Compatriots in Taiwan issued on Jan. 1, 1979, and the nine-point proposal put forward by
China on Sept. 30, 1981.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Statement of Dr. Matthew Kroenig
Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Service, Georgetown
University and Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security,
Atlantic Council
Hearing on Regional Nuclear Dynamics
Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Thursday February 25, 2015
2:30 p.m. - 222 Russell Senate Office Building
Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the committee, thank
you for inviting me to participate in this important hearing. I am pleased to be here
alongside my distinguished colleagues Andrew Krepinevich, George Perkovich, and
Ashley Tellis.
I would like to commend the committee for initiating this timely discussion of
regional nuclear dynamics. I have worked on nuclear issues both in and out of government
for over a decade and, as a professor at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the
Atlantic Council, I have focused increasingly on Russian nuclear capabilities and strategy
and its implications for the United States and NATO.1 It is this subject on which I have
been invited to speak today.
I will begin with Russias nuclear capabilities. Along with the United States,
Russia is one of the worlds foremost nuclear powers. At the strategic level, it possesses a
triad of nuclear bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarines.2
Under the New START Treaty, signed in 2010, Russia has committed to deploying no
more than 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads by 2018.3
Russia has made the thoroughgoing modernization of its nuclear forces and the
development of new nuclear capabilities a national priority even under difficult economic
circumstances.4 Russia is updating its bomber fleet, which will carry a new precision-
strike, long-range, nuclear-armed cruise missile. A new generation of nuclear submarines
is set to enter service and they are designed to deliver a new, more advanced submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM), intended to penetrate enemy missile defenses. Moscow
is also developing new silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs capable of carrying warheads
with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), also designed to defeat
enemy defenses.
 In addition, Russia has tested a new intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise
missile (GLCM).5 This development is of particular concern because it is in violation of
Russias commitments under the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,
the only arms control treaty ever to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.6 In
addition, Russias RS-26 ballistic missile, although tested at longer ranges, can be
operated at intermediate range, providing a technical circumvention of the INF Treaty.
In addition to its strategic forces, Russia retains an arsenal of around 2,000 tactical
nuclear weapons for battlefield use.7 This arsenal includes nuclear-armed: torpedoes,
depth charges, short-range surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles and bombs,
and surface-to-air missiles for use in air defense. Although Russia has not publicized plans
to modernize its tactical nuclear forces, it is possible that Russia is also upgrading some of
these systems as it modernizes its strategic forces.
Turning next to Russian strategy and doctrine, it is important to emphasize that,
unlike the United States, since the end of the Cold War, Russia has moved nuclear
weapons toward the center of its national security strategy and military doctrine. In the
past, Moscow maintained a nuclear no first use doctrine, but this policy was abandoned
in the year 2000. Since the early 2000s, Russian strategists have promoted the idea of de-
escalatory nuclear strikes.8 According to this escalate to de-escalate concept, Moscow
will threaten, or, if necessary, carry out, limited nuclear strikes early in a conventional
conflict in order to force an opponent to sue for peace on terms favorable to Moscow.9
Russias 2000 military doctrine stated that nuclear strikes might be conducted in any
situation critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.10 The more
expansive language about nuclear preemption was excluded from Russias most recent
public documents, but the idea remains firmly engrained in Russian thinking and some
speculate that the language remains in classified annexes.11
At least as telling as public documents, however, are how military forces actually
plan and exercise. Nearly all of Russias major military drills over the past decade have
concluded with simulated nuclear strikes.12 Moreover, President Putin himself has
personally overseen such nuclear exercises.13
In some ways, it is not surprising that Russia, as the conventionally inferior power
in relation to the United States and NATO, would consider the use of nuclear weapons
early in a conventional war, as this is essentially the reverse of NATO strategy during the
Cold War when it faced a conventionally superior Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Russias
nuclear capabilities and strategy pose a serious threat to the United States and should be a
cause of concern.
This brings me to my next major subject, the possibility of nuclear escalation. For
years, Western analysts assumed that Russias heavy reliance on nuclear weapons was
envisaged in the context of a defensive war, but recent events have shown that these
tactics can also be employed as part of an offensive campaign. The ongoing conflict in
Ukraine is very much a nuclear crisis.14 Throughout the crisis, President Putin and other
high-ranking officials have repeatedly issued thinly-veiled nuclear threats. Moreover,
these threats are backed up by explicit brandishing of Russias nuclear forces at a level we
have not seen since the end of the Cold War. Russia has also reserved the right to deploy
nuclear weapons in Crimea and Kaliningrad.15 The message is clear: the West must not
interfere in Russias invasion of Ukraine lest things escalate to catastrophic levels.
If the conflict in Ukraine were to escalate or President Putin were to rerun his
playbook of hybrid warfare from Ukraine against a NATO member, the United States
could find itself in direct military confrontation with Russia. In the event of such a
conflict, Russia will likely issue nuclear threats in a bid to force NATO capitulation and, if
on the losing end of a conventional conflict, Moscow may conduct a limited nuclear strike
in an effort to de-escalate the conflict.
I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of these developments for
U.S. nuclear strategy and posture. So long as nuclear weapons retain such a prominent
place in Russian force structure, procurement priorities, doctrine, and political rhetoric, it
remains an important deterrence mission for the United States and NATO to retain a policy
of, and a serious capability for, nuclear deterrence as a potential instrument for dealing
with the remote but calamitous contingency of a military confrontation with Russia.
At a minimum, U.S. nuclear deterrence doctrine needs to be clear and firm that any
use of nuclear weapons against the United States or an ally would result in a nuclear
counterstrike. In addition, the United States should leave on the table the possibility of a
nuclear response to a strictly conventional Russian assault against a NATO ally. The
reason for not foregoing this option is not that an early nuclear response would be
necessary or automatic, but rather because there is no reason to assure Russia that this
would not happen. Moreover, the possibility of nuclear response to nonnuclear attack has
a critical assurance element as NATOs easternmost neighbors would prefer that any
potential Russian attack be deterred by the threat of nuclear strike, rather than needing to
wait for a costly and lengthy conventional war of liberation.
To make these threats credible, the United States must field a sufficiently large,
flexible, and resilient nuclear force, including capable nuclear delivery systems and
supporting infrastructure. I, therefore, urge this body to fully fund the much-needed
modernization of this countrys nuclear forces and infrastructure as planned.
In addition, the United States should upgrade its homeland and theater ballistic and
cruise missile defense systems. While missile defenses could not meaningfully blunt a
large-scale Russian attack, an upgraded system could better provide a defense against, and
thus complicate Russian calculations for, a more limited strike on the United States or its
allies.
At the sub-strategic level, the United States must seek to negate Russias
overwhelming battlefield nuclear advantage as this is a major contributing causes to
Russias belief that it can achieve escalation dominance through a limited nuclear strike.
Ideally, this would be done through arms control negotiations, but the Russians have
refused to discuss the reduction of their tactical nuclear weapons and striking an
agreement under current conditions would be extremely challenging.
The United States must make sure, therefore, that it has a credible response to any
Russian battlefield use of nuclear weapons and it is not at all clear that it does at
present.16 The yields of strategic warheads may be too large for a credible response to a
tactical strike and their use would risk escalation to a catastrophic, strategic nuclear
exchange. The B61 gravity bombs in Western Europe are out of range of potential conflict
zones in the East without redeployment and/or refueling, and the aircraft on which they
are delivered would be highly vulnerable to Russian air defenses. American B-52H
bombers and nuclear-armed ALCMs are based in the United States, reducing their utility
for deterrence and assurance missions in Europe.
The United States should, therefore, consider additional options to deter Russian
nuclear aggression, assure regional allies, and if necessary, respond to a limited Russian
nuclear strike. The options could include: placing lower-yield nuclear warheads on
SLBMs and ICBMs, training European crews to participate in NATO nuclear strike
missions, forward basing B61 gravity bombs in Eastern Europe, rotationally basing B-52
bombers and nuclear air-launched cruise missiles in Europe, and developing a new sea-
launched cruise missile, or designating the planned long-range standoff weapon (LRSO)
for delivery by both air and sea.
The United States must also convince Russia to return to compliance with the INF
Treaty and, if that fails, to prevent Russia from gaining a military advantage from its
violation. Washington should, therefore, study the development of new GLCMs and their
deployment to Europe. It should also consider the deployment of cruise missile defenses
in Europe to defend against Russian nuclear aggression.
Following through on some of these proposals would reverse longstanding U.S.
and NATO policy of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons as an objective in and of itself.
This policy was justifiable so long as Russia remained cooperative, but given increased
Russian nuclear aggression, we no longer have the luxury of reducing reliance on nuclear
weapons for its own sake and arguably never did.
Some of these proposals, if adopted, would also run counter to promises made to
Russia in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, but Putin has already violated key
provisions of this act, including the commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force
against any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence in
any manner.17 It would be foolish for the United States to be constrained from taking
action necessary for its national security by a document that Russia routinely ignores.
I know this Committee will help ensure the maintenance of the strong American
nuclear forces that have undergirded international peace and security for nearly seventy
years.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your
questions.
FOOTNOTES
1 For my recent work in this area, see Matthew Kroenig and Walter Slocombe,
Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO, The Atlantic Council (August 2014),
available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Why Nuclear Deterrence
Still Matters to NATO.pdf and Matthew Kroenig, Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready
for a New Cold War, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (February/March 2015), pp.
49-70.
2 For more detail on Russias nuclear forces, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S.
Norris, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 2
(2014), pp. 75-85.
3 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), April 8, 2010, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm
4 On Russian nuclear modernization, see also Kristensen and Norris, 2014.
5 Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,
The New York Times, July 28, 2014.
6 Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet
Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range
Missiles (INF Treaty), December 8, 1987, available at
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm.
7 Kristensen and Norris, 2014.
8 Nikolai N. Sokov, Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike de-escalation,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, available at http://thebulletin.org/why-
russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation.
9 Ibid.
10 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2000, available at
http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/502378.pdf
11 Elbridge Colby, Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a
Blind Spot in the Pentagons New Initiative, Center for a New American Security
(February 2015), pp. 6, available at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Nuclear%20Weapons%20in%20the%203rd%20Offset%20Strategy.pdf.
12 Sokov, Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike De-escalation.
13 Alexey Nikolsky, Putin Holds Military Drills to Repel Nuclear Strike, RT,
May 8, 2014, available at http://rt.com/news/157644-putin-drills-rocket-launch/.
14 For more on this point, see Kroenig, Facing Reality.
15 On Russias claims about nuclear weapons in Crimea, see Sergei L. Loiko,
Russia Says it Has a Right to Put Nuclear Weapons in Crimea, Los Angeles Times,
September 15, 2014, available at http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-
nuclear-crimea-20141215-story.html. On Russias threats to deploy nuclear weapons in
Kaliningrad, see Bruno Waterfield, Russia Threatens NATO with Military Strikes over
Missile Defence System, The Telegraph, May 3, 2012, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-
Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html.
16 For information on U.S. nuclear forces and further details on the items in this
paragraph, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 70, no. 1 (2014), pp. 85-93.
17 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO
and the Russian Federation, May 27, 1997, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official texts 25468.htm.
 * * * * * * * * * * * *
February 25, 2015
STATEMENT BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES ON THE IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. SECURITY OF GROWING NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST
By Andrew F. Krepinevich
President
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Mr. Chairman, Senator Donnelly, Members of the Committee, thank you for
inviting me to appear before you today to present my thoughts on the implications of
growing regional nuclear capabilities for U.S. security. As requested, I will focus my
remarks on the situation in the Middle East over the next decade. 1
U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The United States arguably has three overriding security objectives in the Middle
East. First, we have to eliminate sanctuaries for fanatical cults like ISIS from which they
could mount catastrophic attacks against the U.S. homeland in the future. Second, we want
to maintain access to the global economys principal energy source. Third, we want to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region, particularly to Iran, whose hostility to
the United States and its partners in the region has persisted over thirty-five years since the
Khomeini revolution in 1979.
These objectives cannot be viewed in isolation. For example, should ISIS solidify
its gains in the region, it could not only generate an ability to mount larger-scale terrorist
attacks beyond the region, but also destabilize local oil and gas producing states.
Armed with nuclear weapons, Iran could prove an even more aggressive supporter
of terrorism than it has been to date. Moreover, it could also be emboldened to increase its
efforts to subvert the governments of regional U.S. partners. Over time a nuclear-armed
Iran could threaten vast devastation to the regions oil and gas economic infrastructure, as
well as to U.S. and allied military forces operating in the Middle East. Should Iran
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile and reduce the size of its nuclear warhead, it
could also pose a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.2
As I will elaborate upon presently, a nuclear-armed Iran could create a structurally
unstable nuclear balance with the regions only current (albeit undeclared) nuclear power,
Israel. The balance would likely become even less stable should other states in the region
follow Irans path. With this in mind, my testimony first provides an overview of current
Israeli and Iranian capabilities, both in terms of weaponry and delivery systems. Second, it
offers some observations on the nuclear doctrine both Israel and Iran might adopt. This is
followed by my assessment of the prospective characteristics of a nuclear competition
between Israel and Iran, and those of a prospective n-player competition should Irans
acquisition of nuclear weapons lead other states in the region to follow suit. My testimony
concludes with some thoughts on what this means for the United States, to include the
strategic choices we confront.
CURRENT CAPABILITIES AND DOCTRINE 3
Israel
Motivation, Arsenal and Delivery Systems
Israel began seeking nuclear weapons not long after its formation. As a small
country with a small population surrounded by hostile, larger neighbors, Israels leaders
felt they could not count on being able to defeat their enemies in a conventional conflict.
Nuclear weapons represented a way to offset a prospective inferiority in conventional
forces. The Holocaust also had a substantial impact on the thinking of Israeli leaders of
that time (as it still does), and there is a determination that such an abomination should
never be allowed to happen again.4
Although Israel has been a nuclear power for nearly half a century, it follows a
policy of nuclear opacity. Under this policy, Israel does not admit to having nuclear
weapons. As a result, no publically available official statements exist regarding Israels
nuclear doctrine.
Reliable and accurate information about Israels nuclear arsenal is also difficult to
obtain given its highly secretive status. Nevertheless, credible reports generally estimate
Israel possesses enough weapons-grade plutonium for one hundred to two hundred nuclear
warheads. Some estimates place Israels arsenal as high as three hundred nuclear
warheads, composed primarily of two-stage thermonuclear devices.5
Most of Israels nuclear weapons are believed to be in unassembled mode, with
fully functional weapons capable of being constructed in a matter of days.6 Israel is
assessed to possess a triad of delivery systems that includes nuclear-capable F-16I
fighters, road-mobile Jericho ballistic missiles with estimated ranges of 1,800-3,000 miles
(depending on the variant),7 and five German-built diesel-powered Dolphin-class
submarines (with one more on order).8
Doctrine
Israeli national security decision-makers since the late 1960s have conceived
Israels nuclear arsenal solely as a deterrent against existential threats, and not as war-
fighting instruments or means of coercion. 9 Israels nuclear doctrine likely remains one of
defensive last resort, with procedural safeguards in place to minimize the risk of
accidental or unauthorized use.10
That said, due to its lack of strategic depth and small population, Israeli military
doctrine has emphasized preemption, preventive action, and fighting on enemy territory.
How this would translate to nuclear doctrine against a regional power with nuclear
weapons remains to be seen. To date the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has relied on its
conventional superiority to defeat its adversaries, with nuclear weapons assuming the role
of weapons of last resort to be employed only if the countrys very existence were at
risk. Should Iran acquire nuclear weapons and Israel judge that such capabilities pose an
existential threat, the IDFs nuclear forces could assume a substantially greater role in the
countrys defense planning.
 Command and Control: Authority
Command authority for the use of nuclear weapons almost certainly rests with the
prime minister. However, specific lines of authority are not known.11 One report states
Israel has an elaborate civilian-controlled [command-and-control] C2 system, which
requires three layers of approval to be activated.12 The one instance where there is
publically available information on Israeli considerations of nuclear weapons use involves
the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The accounts make it clear that the final decision was then
Prime Minister Golda Meirs.13
Command and Control: Early Warning
Israel has advanced, networked command-and-control systems that are linked by
satellite, fiber, and radio communications. Some command-and-control centers, such as
the Israeli Air Forces operational command bunker in Tel Aviv, are believed to be
hardened to withstand nuclear attack.14
Israel has an extensive early warning system that is integrated with its ballistic
missile defenses. Its Elta Green Pine early warning and fire control radar for the Arrow
antimissile system can track targets out to 500 km. The U.S.-controlled AN/TPY-2 radar
deployed to Israel has a detection range of over 4,500 km against ballistic missiles and can
detect a launch from Iran within seconds. However, the U.S. controls this facility and
shares the information it provides with Israel at its discretion. The Israeli military does
operate its own reconnaissance satellites, some of which may be able to provide early
warning, and it has modern airborne early warning and control aircraft.15
Iran
Motivation and Delivery Systems
Irans rationale for seeking nuclear weapons has several possible elements, none of
which preclude the others. One is regime preservation in the face of a hostile superpower
in the form of the United States, a nuclear-armed enemy in Israel, Sunni Arab rival states,
and a neighbor, Turkey, which aspires to expand its influence in the region. Yet Iran could
also seek nuclear weapons to support its revisionist goal of reordering the regional
geopolitical order with itself at the head, bolstering the regimes sagging domestic
legitimacy. Nuclear weapons could enable Tehran to increase its efforts to coerce other
states and to expand its support for proxies with less fear of reprisals.
At least initially, Iranian nuclear weapons are likely to rely on a simple design.
Such a device would resemble first-generation implosion devices and have a low yield of
around 20 kt (slightly more than the Trinity test shot conducted by the United States on
July 16, 1945) and a weight of about 1,000 kg (or 2,200 pounds). 16 According to some
estimates, Iran probably has enough low-enriched uranium to make seven such weapons
upon further enrichment, and it could enrich enough additional material for one bomb
every two months. Should Irans supreme leader give authorization, it could likely convert
sufficient low-enriched uranium to high-enriched uranium and assemble a bomb within a
year. 17
What can be stated with a high degree of confidence is that, in addition to its
efforts to produce plutonium and enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels, Iran has also
been purchasing or developing and fielding delivery systems that would likely comprise
part of an overall nuclear force posture. Principal among these capabilities are its ballistic
missiles. It seems unlikely, however, that Iran has the financial means, requisite
technology, or sufficient skilled manpower to field, man, and maintain a state-of-the art
early warning and command and control network of the kind required to deal effectively
with the highly compressed warning times associated with an Israeli ballistic missile
nuclear attack.
Based on Tehrans recent and ongoing military efforts, an initial Iranian nuclear
force would probably rely heavily on road-mobile ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab 3,
as the principal form of delivering nuclear weapons to targets in Israel.18 At least some of
Irans ballistic missiles are placed in underground silos. Others are kept on
transporter/erector launchers (TELs) concealed in caves and bunkers.19 It is unlikely that
Iran has the ability to produce a warhead small enough to fit on a cruise missile. Since
Irans existing missile forces do not appear accurate enough to destroy hardened or buried
targets (e.g., missile silos),20 Tehrans initial nuclear weapons would likely be targeted
against soft counterforce (e.g., unhardened naval and air bases) and especially
countervalue (e.g., population and economic infrastructure) targets. It would also appear
likely that, at least initially, Israel would be the primary and perhaps exclusive target of
Irans nuclear forces, although targets in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as
U.S. military bases in the region could also be placed at risk.
Doctrine
Given Tehrans repeated declarations that it is not developing nuclear weapons,
there is nothing in the public domain in the way of an official statement as to what its
nuclear doctrine might be.
Command and Control: Authority
There is little information on Iranian command and control systems, let alone on
what a prospective Iranian nuclear command and control system might look like. There
are reports of Iran recently fielding indigenously produced tactical command and control
systems that can integrate command and control centers and early warning, air defense,
and missile strike systems. These could be linked via fiber/wired and wireless connections
to multi-layered communications networks that provide short-, medium-, and long-range
encrypted communications. Iran also has a network of underground command and control
facilities.21
Command and Control: Early Warning
Irans early warning system appears incapable of providing reliable detection of
low-observable aircraft; however, it is assessed to be effective against fourth generation
fighters. Most notably, three long-range early warning radars have been constructed in the
past few yearstwo Ghadir radars with 1,000 km ranges and one Sepehr radar with a
3,000 km range. They provide 360-degree coverage of the entire country and significant
coverage of the region. Tehran claims these radars can detect and identify aircraft, cruise
missiles, ballistic missiles, and low-altitude satellites. There is an additional network of
twenty-four shorter-range early warning radars located throughout the country. 22
Assuming these capabilities function as advertised, Iran could have warning of a
ballistic missile strike or non-stealthy cruise missile strike.
REGIONAL RESPONSE: IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR ARMED
IRAN
A Bipolar Nuclear Balance
Should Iran acquire a nuclear capability, any assumption that mutual deterrence
and strategic stability could be established between Iran and Israel along the lines of that
which characterized the U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition should be viewed with
skepticism. Based on the historical record of the Cold War and the circumstances in which
Iran and Israel would find themselves, a nuclear competition between them will not
necessarily curb risk-taking. There are several instances during the Cold War where one
protagonist greatly miscalculated the others willingness to take such risks. 23 Moreover,
there is no compelling evidence that Iranian and Israeli leaders have a clear sense of how
the other side calculates cost, benefit, and riskthe factors that form the basis of a
deterrent posture. Nor does it seem likely at this point that they would engage in
confidence-building measures to promote such an understanding if Iran were to field a
nuclear weapons capability.
Israels lack of strategic depth presents it with an enduring and supreme
vulnerability, fundamentally different the vast territorial depth enjoyed by both the United
States and Soviet Union during the Cold War. In terms of a nuclear strike, Israel has been
described as a one-bomb country. While this may be an overstatement, a few nuclear
detonations over cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa would represent the end of Israel as a
viable state. Of course, in the event of such an attack Iran could count on being subjected
to a devastating Israeli nuclear counterstrike. Thus Iran in principle would be deterred
from initiating a nuclear conflict. Again, however, it is not clear how Irans leaders would
view nuclear weapons use. For example, former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani
argued that, One nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything, [but Israels
retaliation] will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an
eventuality. 24
Considering its inability to absorb even a limited nuclear attack of a half dozen or
so warheads and the limitations of ballistic missile defenses, Israel will likely seek to
maintain as long as possible the option of executing a decisive, preemptive nuclear attack
against Irans nuclear arsenal if it believes an attack is imminent. Israeli leaders recognize
that a first strike against Iran would likely be met with universal condemnation from the
international community. Nevertheless, if the very survival of the state of Israel were at
stake, then the costs of failing to execute a first strike would likely be viewed as far
exceeding the benefits of exercising restraint. Accordingly, Israeli decision-makers will
have strong incentives to pursue a counterforce capability in addition to a countervalue
(assured destruction) capability. Yet Irans mobile missile launchers would very likely
present significant challenges to Israeli efforts at counterforce targeting. The Israelis
problems could be further compounded if the Iranians hide some missiles in underground
shelters, or acquire the technology to deploy nuclear-tipped cruise missiles at sea. As
Irans nuclear arsenal becomes more survivable through their growing numbers and/or
diversification of delivery systems, the challenges associated with Israel maintaining a
preemptive nuclear posture would only worsen.
 Even assuming both Israel and a nuclear-armed Iran would seek to avoid nuclear
use, geographic realities combined with missile speed may conspire to undermine their
efforts. Ballistic missile flight times between the two countries are so short that even
advanced early warning and command and control systems are likely to be inadequate to
enable their leaders to have confidence that they can confirm the attack, decide upon an
appropriate response, and issue the commands for executing the response. The problem
may not be acute in the course of day-to-day or steady state activities; however, in the
event of a crisis, these factors may create an incentive to strike first.
The short warning times could pressure both sides to adopt a heightened alert
status, especially in a crisis. Israel could choose to do so in order to preserve the option of
launching a decisive pre-emptive first strike, while Iran would do so to avoid becoming
the victim of such an attack. To the extent either side seeks to resolve the problem by
placing its forces on a hair-trigger alert or extending nuclear release authority to lower
commands, the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation would inevitably increase,
especially during a crisis.
The prospects for avoiding nuclear use might be enhanced if, over time, both Israel
and Iran fielded secure second-strike forces capable of inflicting assured destruction.25
Yet even after both the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated vast numbers of
nuclear weapons during the Cold War, fears continued to persist on both sides regarding
their vulnerability to a disarming first strike.
An N-State Nuclear Competition?
It is possibleperhaps even likelythat Irans acquisition of a nuclear capability
would not only produce a nuclear competition with Israel, but also prompt other states in
the region to acquire nuclear weapons, creating a multipolar, or n-state, nuclear
competition. While the path toward a nuclear capability has historically been long and
arduous, this may not be the case in the wake of Irans ascension to nuclear power status.
Such a shock to the nonproliferation regime could, in fact, precipitate its collapse. Saudi
Arabia might exercise what some believe to be a standing option to acquire nuclear
weapons from Pakistan or base Pakistani nuclear weapons on its territory with Riyadh
exercising de facto control.26 Or nuclear proliferation might occur on an accelerated
schedule, with designs, components, and even fissile materialeverything but an
assembled warhead itselfbeing provided on an installment plan in a market where the
barriers to transfer have all but collapsed.27
Despite the uncertainties regarding which path the region will follow toward a
multipolar nuclear competition once Iran achieves nuclear-armed status, several things
seem clear. First, even if Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and/or Egypt were to follow Iran into the
nuclear club, over the near-term, Israel would likely to maintain a dominant position in
which its nuclear arsenal and capabilities far outstrip those of its neighbors. Absent a
large-scale transfer of nuclear weapons from an established nuclear power to a regional
nuclear aspirant, for perhaps a decade or so Israels arsenal would likely far exceed the
combined arsenals of all other nuclear powers in the region both in terms of the numbers
of nuclear weapons and their respective yields. While Israel might lose its formidable
advantage over time, early on it will likely maintain a very robust preventive strike
capability as well as an assured destruction capability, especially considering that its rivals
will also likely lack effective air and missile defenses, early warning, and command and
control systems. Yet Tel Aviv would also confront the hard reality that still more countries
in the region will have the ability, even with only a handful of nuclear weapons, to inflict
devastating damage on the Israeli people and their economy.
A Nuclear Great Game
Some declared and undeclared nuclear powers, as well as non-nuclear powers that
nevertheless have capable civilian nuclear enterprises outside the Middle East, might have
strong incentives to assist states in the region seeking to create or enhance their nuclear
posture. The region possesses the worlds greatest concentration of oil and natural gas,
which are critical to global economic growth. The region is a key geostrategic location,
with several maritime trade chokepoints such as the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and
Bab el-Mandeb. Given their dependence on oil and natural gas to fuel their economies, the
major powers of the developed and developing world have strong incentives to seek
access to and influence in that region. In a proliferated Middle East, this could be achieved
in a number of ways, to include assisting local states efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
program, enhancing their existing nuclear forces, and/or providing competing nuclear
security guarantees, any of which could further destabilize the region.
This could result in a latter-day Nuclear Great Game where states external to the
region compete for power and influence within it. In such an environment there could be
many potential suppliers of nuclear weapons-related technology. Not all extra-regional
suppliers would necessarily have a strong interest in regional stability. Major oil and gas
exporters outside the region, Russia in particular, could potentially benefit from the
corresponding increase in oil and gas prices that would accompany instability. Thus
Moscow may be far less concerned about the consequences of its actions on regional
stability.28
Among the technologies and capabilities that are likely to be in highest demand by
new nuclear powers in the region are those related to warhead miniaturization and
precision guidance, missile defenses, and various forms of intelligence (e.g., early
warning; rival force development), while thermonuclear weapons, MIRV technology,
depressed trajectory ballistic missiles, and missile-carrying submarines are apt to be
accorded lesser priority.
Even those states with an interest in stability may not act in their own best
interests. States have been prone to act in ways that value narrow, short-term interests at
the expense of more important long-term interests.29 For example, states like Pakistan or
North Korea that are financially strapped may act primarily out of an immediate need for
revenue and discount heavily the longer-term consequences of their actions on regional
stability and even their own long-term security. Nor can China be counted upon to
exercise restraint, given its history of enabling nuclear programs in North Korea and
Pakistan.30
Perhaps most worrisome from Washingtons perspective, the opportunities for
other powers to displace its influence could increase dramatically if the United States (and
perhaps its allies as well) were to withhold military support for nuclear-armed states in an
effort to shore up the NPT regime. Should these efforts fail the United States could end up
in the worst of both worlds: failing to achieve its nonproliferation goals while also losing
influence with regional nuclear powers to extra-regional rivals.
The N-State Competition and Crisis Stability
In a Middle Eastern n-player competition, all nuclear powers would be
challenged to establish an assured destruction capability against all the other regional
nuclear powersanother Cold War desideratumgiven their relatively modest
economies. An assured destruction capability in an n-state competition would require
that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals
and still be able to devastate the countries of all potential attackers. It would also require
that the source of the attack be reliably identified. This may prove difficult given likely
limitations on these states ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example,
would Saudi Arabia be able to determine with confidence the perpetrator of a ballistic
missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any
cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify
the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the
attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? A decapitation strike could
preclude an assured destruction retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to
execute one.
This, in turn, raises the possibility of a catalytic warone that is initiated
between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described here,
the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be
easily dismissed. To the extent cyber weapons could be employed to introduce false
information into a states decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase.
Further complicating matters, the early warning requirement following a
proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees,
especially if multiple nuclear rivals deploy a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. Early
warning requirements would be stressed even further if an adjacent state (e.g., Saudi
Arabia in the case of Iran) were to acquire nuclear weapons. In this case warning times
would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its
proximity to Iran, Saudi Arabia, for example, could have less than five minutes to react to
a suspected Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and
command and control systems.
As noted earlier, regardless of what assumptions are made with respect to a
regional nuclear powers early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight
times, it seems likely that preserving command and control of the states nuclear forces
while under attack will prove challenging. States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-
warning posture, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command
and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning
and instead attempt to ride-out a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its
command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack.
Absent a highly resilient command and control system, a states ability to launch a
retaliatory nuclear strike may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-
level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be
possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear
powers.
Finally, a state could forego a prompt counterstrike in favor of responding days or
even weeks following an attack. In theory there is no reason why a nuclear counterstrike
would have to be prompt if it were focused solely on punishing the attacker through
strikes on counter-value targets. Following this line of reasoning, a regime could hide its
nuclear weapons and launchers, recover them in the days following an attack, and launch
its retaliatory blow once its surviving nuclear forces had been reconstituted.
While this buried bomb posture might be appealing in the abstract, there are
significant potential drawbacks that must be addressed. First, the country adopting this
posture would have to be able to identify the source of the attack. Second, depending upon
the attackers nuclear arsenal, a time delay may enable a follow-on strike. Third, there
would always be a risk that the buried bombs would be located and destroyed in the initial
attack or in the follow-on strike. Fourth, the nuclear weapons might even be physically
seized by the attackers conventional or special operations forces following the first strike
during what would almost certainly be a period of widespread disorder in the state that had
been attacked. Fifth, a coherent command and control system would need to be
maintained, not only during the minutes or hours immediately following an attack, but
also for days or weeks. Failing that, the states leadership would likely have to devolve
nuclear release authority to lower commands. While this could enhance the prospects of a
successful buried bomb retaliatory strike, it would almost certainly increase the risks of an
unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND FORCE POSTURE
Given the current state of Irans nuclear program, the immense resources Irans
leaders have invested in it, the great lengths to which they have gone to deceive the
international community regarding their nuclear program, and the substantial advantages
that would accrue to Tehran from possessing nuclear weapons, it seems unlikely that
anything short of the threat or use of force would deflect the current regime from its
objective. Even if the United States and Iran concluded an agreement on Irans nuclear
program in the coming days or weeks, it seems unlikely to alter Tehrans ultimate aim.
If so, these circumstances would leave the United States and its security partners
with two basic strategic choices: compel the Tehran regime through the threat or the use of
force to abandon its nuclear weapons program, or prepare to live with whatever nuclear
posture Iran chooses to adopt, which could range from a short sprint to a nuclear
capability; an opaque nuclear posture similar to Israels; or a declared nuclear capability
such as North Koreas or Pakistans.
I will focus my remarks here on the challenges associated with a nuclear-armed
Iran. First, I offer some suggestions as to the kind of analyses we might want to do to help
insure that we make the best of what is likely to be a difficult situation. Second, I present
some thoughts as to what the character of a nuclear competition in the Middle East might
imply for U.S. security policy and strategic force posture.
Before proceeding, however, I want to make clear that crafting a well-designed
U.S. policy, strategy, and associated force posture in the wake of Iran becoming a nuclear-
armed state would be a formidable task, requiring persistent, focused intellectual effort by
skilled strategists, as well as execution by highly skilled diplomats and military leaders.
Determining the appropriate U.S. policy, strategy, and military posture in this
regard might be usefully informed by assessments of the following issues:
Developing as best an understanding as possible regarding how Israel and the
regions prospective nuclear powers view nuclear weapons, to include the conditions
under which they might be employed and how their decision-makers tend to view costs,
benefits, and risks (e.g., What do they value most, such as regime survival? What do most
fear? How risk tolerant/risk averse are they? Do their worldviews match ours? Etc.)
Identifying and evaluating a set of scenarios that address the prospective
immediate and long-term consequences of a U.S./allied use of force to preclude Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons.
Identifying and evaluating a set of scenarios that address a regional bipolar
nuclear competition between Israel and Iran, to include potential crisis situations as well
as a steady state, long-term competition to include the second-order effects on the region
(such as an expanded use of proxy warfare by Tehran).
Identifying and evaluating a set of scenarios that address the prospective
emergence of an n-state nuclear competition in the region, to include potential crisis
situations as well as a steady state, long-term competition to include the second-order
effects on the region (such as in the event external major powers engage in a Nuclear
Great Game for influence in the region).
Undertaking an assessment of the implications of these prospective futures for
U.S. security interests in the region, as well as our force posture and associated
capabilities.
In structuring the kinds of assessments and planning scenarios described above,
consideration should be given to a range of key factors shaping the nuclear competition, to
include the dynamics of n-player competitions, the progressive blurring of the
firebreak between nuclear and advanced conventional weaponry, and geography, to
name a but a few.
The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal and Extended Deterrence
Should Iran acquire a nuclear capability, the United States might look to stretch its
nuclear umbrella over friendly states in the Middle East in order to enhance their sense of
security and reduce their incentive to obtain their own nuclear weapons. This would likely
raise familiar issues regarding the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, as well
as Washingtons credibility.
Lets take the last issue first. During the Cold War, Americas NATO allies
questioned whether Washington would risk a Soviet nuclear attack on Chicago by
retaliating for a Soviet nuclear attack on Bonn. In the event of a nuclear-armed Iran, one
might suspect Saudi leaders challenging Washingtons willingness to order a nuclear
response against Tehran should Riyadh be the target of an Iranian nuclear-tipped missile
particularly if Iran had acquired an ability to strike the United States.
The U.S. ability to assure those countries to which it proposes to offer extended
deterrence may also depend to a significant extent on the mix of nuclear weapons in its
arsenal. While many other nuclear powersChina and Russia in particularare investing
in advanced nuclear designs, to include weapons with very low yields and more focused
effects, the United States has chosen to limit its nuclear weapons inventory to weapons
designed during the Cold War. By limiting the range of nuclear response options available
to the president, this posture may run a significant risk of weakening the U.S. ability to
deter its enemies as well as the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees to allies
and partners.
Given the dramatic reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal since the Cold War,
questions might also arise as to how thinly Americas nuclear umbrella is stretched. New
START provides the United States parity with Russia in numbers of strategic nuclear
weapons. Moscow, however, has not sought to extend nuclear guarantees to other states,
while the United States has done so with its European allies, and other allies such as Japan
and South Koreapresumably to counter any threat that might be posed by China and/or
North Korea. When the United States had thousands of nuclear weapons, one might
discount the matter. With the New START commitment to reduce the arsenal size to 1,550,
and with the administration floating proposals to reduce the number further to 1,000, one
can understand why those offered shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella are beginning to
wonder if it leaks. Put another way, the United States has nuclear parity with Russia, but it
is also committed to defend allies and partners against nuclear threats posed by China,
North Korea, and, prospectively, Iran as well.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts on these important
issues. I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have to the best of my ability
during the discussion period.
About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent,
nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and
debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBAs goal is to enable
policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and
resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior
decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the
broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the
development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce
human and capital resources. CSBAs analysis and outreach focus on key questions related
to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will
require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping
achieve this end.
FOOTNOTES
1 I would like to acknowledge the very helpful research support provided by Sean
Cate in the preparation of this testimony.
2 Of course, there would be nothing to stop the Iranians from delivering a nuclear
weapon to a major U.S. port in the hold of a cargo ship, a threat that occasionally worried
Cold War era planners. While the shock of an attack such as this would be great, the
damage caused by detonating a weapon at or below the surface would be far less than
optimal.
3 Those familiar with Israeli and Iranian capabilities may wish to proceed to the
section titled, Regional Response: Implications of a Nuclear Armed Iran.
4 Jeffery Goldberg, The Point of No Return, The Atlantic, September, 2010,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/09/the-point-of-no-
return/308186/.
5 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Analysts: Israel viewed as
worlds 6th nuclear power, AFP, April 10, 2010, available at: http://www.iiss.org/whats-
new/iiss-in-the-press/april-2010/israel-viewed-as-worlds-sixth-nuclear-power-analysts/.
See also Goldberg, The Point of No Return.
6 IISS, Analysts: Israel viewed as worlds 6th nuclear power.
7 Jericho 1/2/3 (YA-1/YA-3/YA-4), in, Janes Strategic Weapon Systems
(London: IHS Janes, 2012); and Israel Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile,
Press TV, September 8, 2013, available at:
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/07/13/313543/israel-test-fires-nuclearcapable-missile/;
and Jericho 1/2/3 (YA-1/YA-3/YA-4), in, Janes Strategic Weapons Systems (London:
IHS Janes, 2015).
8 Robert Farley, Nukes on the High Seas: Israels Underwater Atomic Arsenal,
The National Interest, October 9, 2014, p. 1, available at
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/nukes-the-high-seas-israels-underwater-atomic-arsenal-
11434; and Barbara Opall-Rome, Israel Inaugurates 5th Dolphin-Class Sub, Defense
News, April 29, 2013, available at:
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130429/DEFREG04/304290008/Isra-el-
Inaugurates-5th-Dolphin-Class-Sub.
9 Avner Cohen, Nuclear Arms in Crisis under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of
the 1967 and 1973 Wars, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds.,
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 123124.
10 Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, Bringing Israels Bomb out of the
Basement, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2010, p. 39.
11 Bennett Ramberg, Wrestling With Nuclear Opacity, Arms Control Today, The
Arms Control Association, November 4, 2010, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_11/BookReview.
12 Shahram Chubin, Command and Control in a Nuclear-Armed Iran, Proliferation
Papers No. 45 (Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationale, 2013), available at
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp45chubin.pdf.
13 Jeffrey Lewis, Israel, Nuclear Weapons and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Arms
Control Wonk, October 21, 2013, available at
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/6909/israel-nuclear-weapons-and-the-1973-
yom-kippur-war.
 14 Israel: Upgraded Air Force command center can withstand nukes, I24News,
December 14, 2014, available at http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-
defense/54399-141214-israel-new-air-force-command-center-can-withstand-nukes.
15 Arrow 2 Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System, Israel, Army-Technology,
accessed February 17, 2015 at http://www.army-
technology.com/projects/arrow2/arrow23.html; Karl Vick and Aaron J. Klein, How a
U.S. Radar Station in the Negev Affects a Potential Israel-Iran Clash, Time, May 30,
2012, available at http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2115955,00.html;
CAEW Conformal Airborne Early Warning Aircraft, Israel, Airforce Technology,
accessed February 16, 2015 at http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/caew/; Israel
Air Force Janes World Air Forces, IHS Janes; and Brian Berger, Israeli Rocket
Launches Radar Reconnaissance Satellite, Space News, April 10,2014, available at
http://spacenews.com/40170israeli-rocket-launches-radar-reconnaissance-satellite/.
16 Irans Nuclear Timetable, Iran Watch, December 2, 2014, available at
http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable; and
Abdullah Toukan and Anthony Cordesman, Irans Nuclear Missile Delivery Capability
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), pp. 5, 10.
17 Based on the calculation that it could produce a 20 kt yield using 16 kg of
highly enriched uranium. Irans Nuclear Timetable, Iran Watch; and Thomas B. Cochran
and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium
Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense
Council Inc., 1995) Table 1, available at
https://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/fissionw/fissionweapons.pdf; Irans Nuclear Timetable,
Iran Watch; and Julie Pace, Obama says Iran at least a year from getting bomb, The
Boston Globe, October 7, 2013, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/10/07/obama-says-iran-year-more-from-
getting-bomb/MNBOHNW4ffkvONE24hRp1L/story.html. Although the last estimate is
somewhat dated, it probably reflects the time for Iran to convert its low enriched uranium
to highly enriched uranium and weaponize it, rather than any fixed timeline along which
Iran may be proceeding.
18 Iran has fourth generation fighters, such as F-14s and MiG-29s. However,
without aerial refueling, they would be unable to reach Israel with a nuclear bomb payload
(although they could be sent on a one-way suicide mission or attempt to recover in
Lebanon or Syria). They would also likely be highly vulnerable to Israels air defenses.
19 The United States Institute of Peace, US Intel Assessment, in, The Iran
Primer (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014), available at
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2014/feb/01/us-intel-assessment; and Michael Connell,
Irans Military Doctrine, in, The Iran Primer (Washington, DC: United States Institute of
Peace, n.d.), accessed on February 15, 2015 at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-
military-doctrine
20 The mainstay of Irans long-range missile force is currently the Shahab 3,
which is inertially guided and believed to have a circular error probable, or CEP, of
roughly 8,000 feet (1.5 miles), although some analysts believe it may be as low as 600
feet. This means that Shahab 3 missiles will land within this distance (i.e., between 600-
8,000 feet) of their target 50 percent of the time. When delivering nuclear weapons, this
degree of accuracy is good enough for large, soft targets like cities or airbases.
Destroying underground bunkers and missile silos, however, requires a much higher
degree of accuracy or significantly higher-yield weapons. Shahab 3, Missile Threat,
available at: http://missilethreat.com/missiles/shahab-3/; and Shahab-3/Zelal-3,
Federation of American Scientists, October 1, 2013, available at:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/militarysumfolder/shahab-3.html.
21 Sara Rajabova, Iran unveils new command, control systems, Azernews, May
26, 2014, available at http://www.azernews.az/region/67421.html; Iran unveils new air
defense command systems, Trend, May 26, 2014, available at
http://en.trend.az/iran/2278250.html; and William J. Broad, Iran Shielding Its Nuclear
Efforts in a Maze of Tunnels, The New York Times, January 5, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/06/world/middleeast/06sanctions.html?
pagewanted=all& r=0.
22 Sealing off skies: Iran finalizes 360 degree early warning air defense radar,
RT, February 15, 2015, available at http://rt.com/news/232515-iran-sepehr-radar-
installed/; and Joseph S Bermudez, Jr., More long-range Iranian early-warning radars
revealed, IHS Janes 360, September 4, 2014, available at
http://www.janes.com/article/42794/more-long-range-iranian-early-warning-radars-
revealed; and Sean OConnor, Strategic SAM Deployment in Iran, Air Power Australia,
April, 2012, available at http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Iran-SAM-
Deployment.html#mozTocId484494.
23 The October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is perhaps the best example of risk-
taking that brought the two nuclear powers perilously close to nuclear war.
24 Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express (Minneapolis,
MN: Zenith Press, 2009), p. 298.
25 Assured destruction as defined here refers to the ability to inflict casualties and
economic damage against a state such that it is annihilated as a functioning entity.
26 Saudi King Abdullah stated, If Iran developed nuclear weapons everyone in
the region would do the same. A similar statement was made by Prince Turki al-Faisal,
former head of Saudi Arabias General Intelligence Directorate. In 2012, a senior Saudi
source declared, There is no intention currently to pursue a unilateral military nuclear
program but the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their own
nuclear capability . Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a
nuclear capability and not the kingdom. On the persistent but unconfirmed reports of a
Saudi-Pakistani nuclear connection, see Naser al-Tamini, Clear or Nuclear: Will Saudi
Arabia Get the Bomb? Al Arabiya, May 21, 2013, available at:
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/05/21/Will-Riyadh-get-the-bomb-.
html. See also Chain Reaction: Avoiding a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, Report
to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 2008), pp. ix, 12, 20; and Ibrahim al-Marashi, Saudi Petro-
Nukes? Riyadhs Nuclear Intentions and Regime Survival Strategies, in William C.
Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st
Century, Vol. II: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2010), pp. 7778.
27 Take the example of what Pakistan alone has provided and could provide to
accelerate the rate of proliferation. It has, via the A.Q. Khan network, seeded parts of the
developing world with nuclear weapon designs and key components (e.g., centrifuges).
See Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks:
A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). See also
David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms Americas Enemies
(New York: Free Press, 2010). Moreover, Pakistans projected production of plutonium
will far exceed its projected arsenals requirements. There are reports that Pakistan may
have completed a second nuclear plutonium production reactor (Khushab-II) near
Khushab, which is the site of the countrys first plutonium production reactor (Khushab-I).
A third reactor, Khushab III, is under construction. The two reactors are estimated to
produce roughly 22 kg of plutonium a year, enough for 10 nuclear weapons. Assuming the
third reactor is similar in design to the second (which it appears to be), within a few years
Pakistan will be producing enough plutonium for thirty or more nuclear weapons each
year. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and
Security Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 2012), pp. 5-6,
26-27. See also Christopher Clary and Mara E. Karlin, The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to
Stop It, American Interest, July-August 2012, pp. 24-31.
28 This is not to say that Russia would seek to promote a nuclear war, or even a
nuclear crisis. Yet, as has been described above, political leaders are not always the
masters of events once they are put in motion.
29 For example, in the nuclear competition alone, Chinas support for Pakistans
nuclear program appears to be a case of pursuing short-term geopolitical gains at the
expense of potentially far greater long-term problems, as described in this paper.
Arguably, the U.S. pursuit of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV)
technology, rather than first attempting to ban it through arms control agreements, proved
short sighted, as it ultimately worked to the relative benefit of the Soviet Union, whose far
larger ballistic missiles could accommodate more warheads than their U.S. counterparts.
30 See Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear Express, pp. 328-29.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
New Intelligence Agency Established
December 1, 2014
The National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) debuts Monday as
the U.S. intelligence community seeks to stay ahead of the aggressive evolution of
complicated espionage, cyber and security threats.
The NCSC will now become the parent organization of the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), which was created by the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002 to carry out counterintelligence and security responsibilities for
the Director of National Intelligence.
 * * * * * * * * * * * *
Remarks as delivered by The Honorable James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
IATA - AVSEC World
Monday, Oct 27, 2014
9:30 a.m.
Grand Hyatt Hotel, Washington DC
Thank you, Tony [Tyler, IATA Director General and CEO] for that kind
introduction. Ive been told Im the first person to represent the Intelligence Community
speaking at AVSEC World, and thats probably a precedent we should have set a long time
ago. Since this is my first time speaking publicly with IATA at all, I really appreciate you
extending this invitation.
This is a propitious time to be talking about the intersection of intelligence and
aviation, in light of current world events and in light of historical perspectives. I cant find
a citation for the precise day of the very first use of an airplane for intelligence purposes,
but its almost certainly 100 years ago, near the start of World War I, probably within a
month or two of today.
For decades before that first reconnaissance flight, field commanders had
employed tethered balloons to get a birds eye view and to scout out enemy positions. Its
the historical version of UAVs. But it was 1914 when planes were first used on the
battlefield.
That was just 11 years after the Wright brothers first demonstrated that 3-axis
controls could make controlled flight possible, and so aviation was a dangerous business,
but that first recon flight in 1914 gave a glorious freedom to see the full scope of the
battlefield and to move freely across battle lines.
I remember it fondly. [laughter]
Of course, the connections between the worlds of intelligence and aviation have
changed a lot in 100 years. We in the U.S. Intelligence Community still use aviation for
surveillance and reconnaissance of course, but aviation has grown into a huge, and hugely
important, industry.
We pulled the numbers as of a few months ago. Globally, there are 47 million
flights each year with 3.3 billion passengers, about the population of China and India
combined; and 48 million tons of cargo, valued at 5.3 trillion (with a T) dollars. Thats a
few hundred million larger than the GDP of Japan, which is behind only the U.S. and
China. And civil aviation is critical for global supply chain networks commerce and
tourism. So its critical to everyones economy.
So, over the past few decades, because of its massive scale and importance, the
civil aviation world has increasingly crossed paths with my world of intelligence, as we
try to see, hear, or sniff out threats to the safe and legal use of air travel, which is so
critical to the world. And, of course, both of our worlds changed forever 13 years ago with
the terrorist attacks here in the United States.
I dont know how many people here have read the 9/11 Commission Report, but
its worth reading, or reading again, when you get a chance. It opens with the story of
people going to work in New York and Arlington, Virginia, and with Mohamed Atta and
his terror cell getting on a plane in Portland, Maine.
It tells what happened that day and how we responded, and it analyzes the missed
opportunities the Intelligence Community had to perhaps keep the terrorist attacks from
happening. The 9/11 commissioners graphically describe the intelligence picture for the
summer before the attacks with the phrase, the system was blinking red.
I want to read a passage that I think nails the problems we had as a community.
The commissioners wrote, The agencies cooperated, some of the time. But even such
cooperation as there was is not the same as joint action. When agencies cooperate, one
defines the problem and seeks help with it. When they act jointly, the problem and options
for action are defined differently from the start. Individuals from different backgrounds
come together in analyzing a case and planning how to manage it.
Ten years ago, to correct that fault in the Intelligence Community, Congress and
the President created the position of the Director of National Intelligence, which I now
occupy and have for the past four years. And it feels like it.
Part of my statutory job description designates me as the Presidents senior
intelligence advisor, and another part says I control the national intelligence budget, which
by the way has not gotten a pass from sequestration either. But I believe the third duty of
the DNI is the most critical, bridging that joint action gap that the 9/11 Commission
identified.
And that responsibility goes way beyond just getting the intelligence agencies to
talk to one another. Its about helping them to recognize the cultural strengths and
capabilities that each of the 17 Intelligence Community elements brings to the table and
then getting them to think as a community, bringing our best and most appropriate
community resources to bear against our toughest community problems.
Thats what Ive referred to as intelligence integration, and its been my theme
for the past four years, because I believe thats what the 9/11 Commission had in mind and
what was instantiated in law by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004. I believe its the prerequisite to reaching the 9/11 Commissions goal that we act
jointly as an integrated Intelligence Community.
Thats integration horizontally, across agency lines, with each agency on equal
footing and stature. But I also believe we have to work toward vertical integration from
federal to state, and to local, tribal, and territorial governments and their law-enforcement
to other government agencies, like the FAA & TSA, and also to industry partners, like
many here.
Thats why Im here this morning, and thats why I designated Tina Gabbrielli as
my de facto national intelligence manager for aviation, dedicated support staff, reporting
directly to me on threats to aviation. She is responsible for planning and integrating
intelligence on aviation threats, both horizontally and vertically. She and her staff
regularly engage people in this room and others in civil aviation to include equipment
manufacturers, airlines, cargo carriers, general aviation, airports, technology firms and
elements of leadership, security, and critical infrastructure.
In September, working with the private sector, we stood up an air domain
intelligence-integration and analysis fusion cell at TSA, where analysts and security
professionals from both the public and private sector, including manufacturers, airlines,
and airports, can voluntarily share threat information and intelligence, and we hope to
grow this capability.
The cell has been invaluable in helping to sort information on the current Ebola
crisis, and we think it will continue to get stronger and better as it integrates with other
government and private sector participants. Tina will be speaking later today, and shell
get into more details on our initiatives to partner more closely with you and to address the
threats weve identified together.
Tony asked me to talk about those threats today, and thats certainly something that
falls into my job jar. Every spring for the past four years, and Ill be doing it again this
spring, Ive made the rounds on Capitol Hill, testifying in open sessions to our various
Congressional oversight committees about our assessments of worldwide threats.
Talking to Congress about classified matters in televised sessions is one of my
favorite things to do, [laughter], right up there with a root canal, or folding fitted sheets.
[laughter] But its good to be as transparent with the public as we can. Thats been my
major takeaway of the past year-and-a-half of the extensive public discussions about the
Intelligence Community.
The best way to deal with misconceptions that have resulted from the leaks, I
believe, is, to the extent we can, to increase transparency. And I think it surprises some
people that we also focus on threats that arent terrorists, particularly in the aviation
sphere. Thats why, a year-and-a-half ago, we really made news with the Intelligence
Communitys threat assessment, when cyber bumped terrorism off the top of our list
of threats.
Every year, Ive told Congress that were facing the most diverse array of threats
Ive seen in all my years in the intelligence business. That line has morphed from my
almost 50 years in the intelligence business, to my 50 years, to my more than 50 years
in the intelligence business. [laughter] And Ill keep doing that till Im done.
That line continues to be true, because the threats have grown substantially more
diverse every year, so much so that this year I had to go back to the Hill in the late
summer to give a mid-year threat update.
That diversity of threats continues to grow, across the board, for global regions and
intelligence functions. And in the civil aviation world, the threats, as all of you know
painfully well, are myriad. That includes both threats to aviation and threats enabled
by aviation.
Were spending more and more time with that second category. Everyone here
knows illicit logistics networks are a global industry, and that nation-states, corporations,
criminal organizations, terrorist networks, and individuals use the global air transport
system to move money and goods illegally.
That can be anything from weapons of mass destruction to counterfeit and
contraband goods, and even people. Some are looking to evade international sanctions.
And some are trafficking in narcotics and human beings. These are all national, and
global, security threats.
And very recently, weve had to think about Ebola as a security issue. Ive spent
more time and energy on Ebola than most people would think a DNI would. Its not the
sort of thing we spy on, but nevertheless there are intelligence implications of Ebola as
well. Its got our attention. It is indeed, as the President has said, a national security issue.
And were very open to working with you to find solutions to prevent a West African
epidemic from turning into a global pandemic.
So the scope of threats enabled by air travel has shifted and grown, and so has
the scope of threats to aviation. That conversation, of course, starts with terrorism.
We all know civil aviation is a reoccurring target for terrorist groups, because of
the size and scope of the aviation industry, the dependence of the global economy on
aviation, and the significant and dramatic effects a successful attack on civil aviation can
have on world psyche.
While there had been terrorist attacks of aviation for many years, most notably the
Libyan bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, they were at their most
coordinated and destructive, of course, on September 11, 2001. And the threat really isnt
diminishing. Its spreading globally and it is morphing into more and more so-called
franchises several of which have great aspirations for attacking civil aviation.
In the past 13 years as we have significantly degraded al Qaidas ability to
coordinate attacks, weve seen potential terrorists try a variety of tactics, including hiding
explosives in their shoes, underwear, and air cargo and also attempting to explode car
bombs outside airports.
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, has tried to attack airliners and air
cargo flights three times, in 2009, 2010, and 2012. And as has been recently reported, the
Khorasan Group in Syria would like to strike at civil air targets.
Those threats are frightening enough, but weve seen a number of trends that make
the terrorist threat more dangerous and harder to defend against. First and foremost, the
more than 16,000 foreign fighters who gravitated to Syria are now returning to their
countries of origin, including in the West. Theyve picked up dangerous skills and
radicalization, both at the same time.
Recently, a man named Abdifatah Ahmed traveled to Syria to join ISIL. He is a
former Minneapolis aircraft cleaner and refueler - with about 10 years working behind the
scenes in airport operations. So we find it frightening to imagine how terrorist groups
could take advantage of expertise people like him could bring to the group.
And the thought of malicious insiders now working in the industry is even scarier.
These are potential lone-wolf terrorists who have, not only knowledge about how to
conduct an attack, but also access to planes, aviation systems, and airport secured areas.
 Were also concerned with advances with, and globalization of, technology.
Aviation IT systems are as vulnerable to cyber theft and attack as any others.
Were also concerned with advances in UAVs and their proliferation in the hands
of bad guys.
Developments in the fields of plastics and non-metallic explosives will challenge
existing security screening capabilities.
And its less exotic, but shoulder-launched surface to air missiles have proven
deadly. Weve seen more than 50 deliberate attacks on civilian planes with those missiles,
mostly in Africa and Asia, and mostly just after takeoff. Thirty of those have resulted in
1,000 civilian deaths.
So the terrorist threat has not diminished and is not diminishing, and the
intelligence and aviation communities have other threats to contend with besides
terrorism.
The recent shoot down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over Ukraine showed that
threats to civilian aviation are not limited to terrorists bringing down aircraft on takeoff,
when planes are most vulnerable, with whatever technology they can scrape together. We
have to be concerned that nation states with sophisticated surface to air weapon systems
can threaten aircraft at cruising altitude.
The downing of MH-17 felt very personal for me. It stirred up some emotions from
three decades ago when I was one of two Air Force Colonels who led the investigation
into the Soviet Union intercepting and shooting down Korean Airlines Flight 007 over the
Sea of Japan.
Its a curious and interesting aspect of reaching geezerdom, and Ive got one foot
in assisted living at this point [laughter], but I tend to dwell on history. And I see a lot of
similarities between the two incidents. Ive seen similar global outrage, and Ive seen
efforts by the Russians to spin and obfuscate what happened, just as the Soviets did 31
years ago. That includes fabricating imagery to convey another story.
And so this has also conjured up memories of how hard it was to reconstruct what
happened to KAL-007. It took us months to piece things together well enough to draw
preliminary conclusions.
Thats the one huge difference between what happened in 1983 and what happened
this year. The U.S. Intelligence Community is much more capable now. We have National
Technical Means sources that we didnt have then. We have social media, which is huge
for intelligence purposes, and open source intelligence that didnt exist then.
There are new and powerful capabilities in all of the Intelligence Community
agencies and components. And weve integrated in ways we simply werent, even a few
years ago. We learned tough lessons about integration from 9/11.
So as a result of the Intelligence Communitys transformation of the past decade
we had a very good idea of what happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 within hours.
Of course, some people want us to be more transparent, to lay out everything we
know. And while were definitely headed in the direction of more transparency, we also
have to protect our intelligence sources and methods, our sensitive tradecraft, so we can
keep using them. In other words, transparency is great, but a double-edged sword. Our
adversaries go to school on us.
I also have to note that the Intelligence Community has neither the eyes nor ears of
God, as some people ascribe to us. And I think people really saw that with respect to the
unfortunate loss of Malaysian Airlines Flight 370.
And many people want us to be faster - instantaneous - and were working toward
that too. But I remember my days in Vietnam, when automation was acetate, grease
pencil, and two corporals. [laughter]
Weve come a long way as a Community since then, and since 2001. And the work
of intelligence integration is still going on. I think of it as a perpetual journey, not a
destination. Thats something the civil aviation community knows a lot about. And our
journey going forward is going to include working more closely with you.
This industry is critical to the global economy. It promotes commerce, travel, and
freedom of movement around the world. So you arent going to shut down to avoid
threats.
Charles Lindbergh once said, If one took no chances, one would not fly at all.
Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes.
I believe thats the flight path our perpetual journey follows, helping each other
assess and understand the world of aviation, its threats and its opportunities, and in
working toward making good judgments in the choices we make and chances we take.
Thank you again for inviting me to speak this morning. I hope the rest of this
conference is productive. And I hope the partnership of the U.S. Intelligence Community
with the international civil aviation community continues to grow in depth and strength
going forward.
Thanks for having me here and for listening.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Remarks as delivered by DNI James R. Clapper on National Intelligence,
North Korea, and the National Cyber Discussion at the International Conference on
Cyber Security
National Intelligence, North Korea, and the National Cyber Discussion
International Conference on Cyber Security
Fordham University
Wednesday, Jan 7, 2015
9:00 a.m.
Its great to be here after fighting the snow traffic in Washington to get to the
airport, and then flying here.
I want to thank Father McShane [Fordham University President Joseph M.
McShane], for that kind introduction. You have some truly remarkable speakers and
panels this week, and Im humbled that you invited me to speak. Thanks for having me.
Later this morning, in fact right after me - Im serving as the warm-up act for FBI
Director Jim Comey. He really is the senior expert on the investigative side of
cybersecurity. And tomorrow, CYBERCOM Commander and NSA Director Admiral
Mike Rogers is speaking, and hes the senior expert on how cybersecurity ops actually
happen.
You have three-and-a-half days filled with cyber experts, from government, the
academic world, and industry. So in the interests of truth in advertising, Im not an expert
on cyber. I guess thats a way of saying Im going to refer technical questions to the real
experts here.
So, I was trying to think through what my contribution to this conference could
possibly be. Well, I recently traveled to North Korea (and back, happily). So I thought Id
talk about that. [delayed laughter]
Yes, thats a joke. [laughter] I learned from Father McShane that this crowd needs
cuing. [laughter, applause]
Ill talk about that and how it applies to this weeks conversation about cyber,
given the Sony hack.
The first question I always get about the trip is: Why you? As in, Why on earth
would we send the DNI, the director of national intelligence, especially this DNI, on a
diplomatic mission to get two American citizens who were imprisoned in North Korea?
Why would they send me? The truth is, the mission had been in the works for quite
a while. North Korea wanted an active member of the National Security Council and a
cabinet level official to come and to bring a letter from President Obama.
The White House knows Ive had a long history of working Korean issues, since I
served as chief of intelligence for U.S. Forces in Korea in the mid-80s. So the White
House put my name forward to the DPRK, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea as
they call themselves, government in Pyongyang. And I think we were all surprised, to
include me, when they agreed. Thats how and why I was picked to go.
Actually, I thought the New York Times had a better explanation: Clapper is
Gruff, blunt-speaking and seen by many as a throwback to the Cold War. [laughter]
An unlikely diplomat, but perfect for the North Koreans. [laughter]
Thats the nicest thing the New York Times has ever written about me. [laughter,
applause]
So I want to talk about a few experiences from that trip, and how some insight
from the trip could play into our discussion about cyber. But first, for those who may not
be familiar with the director of national intelligence, I thought Id spend a couple of
minutes on that.
Later this spring, my office will be celebrating our tenth anniversary of our standup
in April of 2005. Our establishment came from shortfalls perceived by the 9/11
Commission. The assertion was that the intelligence agencies werent sharing information
with each other and were incapable of acting jointly.
So ten years ago, Congress and the President created the position of the DNI,
which I now occupy and have for the past four-and-a-half years, and it feels like its been
at least four-and-a-half years.
That was a joke too. [laughter]
Part of my statutory job description designates me as the Presidents senior, but by
no means exclusive, intelligence advisor. We have many, many experts on intelligence.
Another part of the law says I manage the national intelligence budget, which, by
the way, has not gotten a pass, as some people seem to think, from the Balanced Budget
Act and sequestration.
But I believe the third duty of the DNI is the most critical, which is bridging that
joint action gap that the 9/11 Commission identified.
And that responsibility goes way, way beyond just getting the intelligence agencies
to talk to one another. Its about helping them to recognize the cultural strengths and
capabilities that each of the 17 Intelligence Community elements brings to the table and
then getting them to think as a community. Its about the intelligence culture, bringing our
best and most appropriate community resources to bear against our toughest national
security problems.
Thats what Ive referred to as intelligence integration. Its been my theme, my
shtick, my mantra, for the past four-and-a-half years, because I believe thats what the 9/11
Commission had in mind. And that was instantiated in law by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that created my position - a seriously flawed piece of
legislation, as most legislation is.
Intelligence integration is the prerequisite to reaching the 9/11 Commissions goal
that we act jointly as an Intelligence Community. That means integration horizontally,
across agency lines, with each agency on equal footing and stature. Im speaking of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, etc.
But I also believe we have to work toward vertical integration from federal to state
and local governments, and also to commercial partners, like many here. So thats
primarily why Im here today; to take advantage of a great opportunity to encourage
intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, state and locals, and private industry to
work together, to the fullest extent we can, on this difficult cyber problem.
But, Im also here to promote transparency. Thats the big lesson Ive learned from
the past few years of unauthorized leaks. Weve got to preserve and protect our tradecraft,
the special skills and capabilities that let us do our work. At the same time, we need to talk
to the American public more about other things, the things we can talk about.
So with that long preamble, I want to jump into the things we need to talk about as
part of an ongoing cyber conversation. From an intelligence standpoint, that conversation
starts with the cyber threat, of course.
Every spring for the past four years, Ive made the rounds on Capitol Hill,
testifying in open sessions to our various Congressional oversight committees, about our
assessments of worldwide threats. Talking to Congress in the open about classified matters
and dancing around many issues, in televised sessions, while trying to protect intelligence
tradecraft, is one of my favorite things to do. [laughter]
Right up there with getting a root canal or folding fitted sheets. [laughter and
applause]
But Ill be doing it again, starting in just a few weeks, because its important to be
open and transparent with the issues we can discuss, even though for me as a career
intelligence guy, its almost genetically antithetical to be transparent.
Each of the past four years, Ive told Congress that were facing the most diverse
array of threats Ive seen in all my years in the intelligence business. That line has
morphed from my almost 50 years in the intelligence business, to my 50 years, to my
more than 50 years in the intelligence business, because the threats have grown
substantially more diverse every year - so much so that in 2014, I had to go back to the
Hill in the late summer to give a mid-year threat update.
At the threat hearings two years ago, we made news when cyber bumped
terrorism off the top of our list of threats. That was the first time since 9/11. But that
top-of-the-list cyber threat doesnt mean what a lot of people think it means. Although we
must be prepared for a large-scale strike - a Cyber Pearl Harbor scenario or Cyber
9/11, (Big scary things like that get play in the media), our reality is that weve been
living with a constant barrage of cyber attacks for some time now.
And those attacks are not monolithic. Different cyber actors have different
capabilities and different goals when conducting operations in Cyberspace. Russia for
example, has a broad range of highly sophisticated technical and human intelligence
capabilities. Moscows focus goes beyond just taking advantage of common
vulnerabilities that can be fixed with a software patch, and in the event of a military
conflict or geo-political crisis with Russia, some U.S. critical infrastructure networks will
be at risk.
So the Russian cyber threat is much more sophisticated than the others and weve
seen that Iran and North Korea are now unpredictable and aggressive cyber actors who
arent afraid to undertake offensive cyber operations against private sector targets. But we
hear a lot more public discussion of the Chinese, because they, and now the North
Koreans, are much noisier. China has been robbing our industrial base blind, largely with
vulnerabilities that are easy to guard against or to simply fix. And thats one of the places
where we can talk about a government and industry partnership.
Now, I recognize that banks and retail stores arent about to turn their systems over
to the FBI and Department of Homeland Security to look for cracks in their cyber firewall,
but we can definitely help each other carry out our respective roles. So I want to lay out
three things that the private sector can do today that will protect them from the vast
majority of attacks, from the Chinese and elsewhere.
One: Patch IT software obsessively. Most Chinese cyber intrusions are through
well-known vulnerabilities that can be fixed with patches already available.
 Two: Segment your data. A single breach shouldnt give attackers access to an
entire network infrastructure and a mother lode of proprietary data.
If youve seen James Camerons movie, Titanic, and I guess statistically, everyone
here has seen it six times [laughter], youll remember the forensic reconstruction of the
sinking - how the ship had segmented bulkheads, so that if the hull was breached, the
flooding would stay isolated to just one section, and the ship would stay afloat.
But the forensic analysis in the film showed that the bulkheads didnt go high
enough, and so the water spilled over the top of each section into the next section until the
entire ship was flooded. So we tell the private sector: Dont let that happen to your data.
Make sure a single breach wont sink your entire company, your entire enterprise.
And Three: Pay attention to the threat bulletins that DHS and FBI put out. This is
the easiest and least intrusive way for industry and government to partner on cyber. Were
already warning about the intrusions that are taking place against U.S. businesses and
advising the private sector about how to protect itself. So please take necessary measures
and encourage your customers, partners, and contacts to pay attention to those bulletins,
and let the Bureau know when an intrusion or attack happens, so that the FBI can do its
part and help.
So those are the three free pieces of advice our cyber professionals are out
proselytizing. Im sure those are things everyone here already knows, but theres a good
reason Im saying them again: because bad cyber actors are using precisely those avenues
to steal our lunch every day. The Chinese in particular are cleaning us out, because we
know were supposed to do those simple things, and yet we dont do them.
And, if theres a fourth commandment, its this: Teach folks what spear phishing
looks like. So many times, the Chinese and others get access to our systems just by
pretending to be someone else and then asking for access, and someone gives it to them.
In national defense, few things turn heads like seeing your aviation system flying
over the skies of a foreign nation with a different flag on its tail, or finding out that an
adversary is already working to counter your expensive, cutting-edge capabilities that
havent been released yet. And in the private sector there are few things more dispiriting to
corporate health and morale and corporate wealth than seeing proprietary products show
up on a foreign market a month before product-launch at a tenth of the price.
Thats Chinas primary motivation: to catch up to and then surpass Western
industrial and defense capabilities and to eventually pass by the U.S. economy.
The Chinese are focused on those goals; whereas the recent cyber attack from
North Korea, which by the way is the most serious cyber attack ever made against U.S.
interests with potentially hundreds-of-millions of dollars and counting in damages, was
driven by an entirely different philosophy.
So, back to the weekend trip I took, which was exactly two months ago today. We
flew into Pyongyang, the capital city, on Friday evening, the seventh of November. And
the first thing that struck me was just how dark the city and airport were, just completely
dark. We damaged a tire on the plane while taxiing in the dark, because of the poor
construction of the taxiways and runways at Sunan airport.
 Then, when I saw the city on Saturday, I was expecting to see drab clothes and
lack of modern tools, people walking to get around, people sweeping and doing similar,
mundane, labor-intensive jobs. And those expectations were met, from what I saw of
Pyongyang. But I was also struck by how impassive everyone was. They didnt show any
emotion. They didnt stop to greet each other, didnt nod hello, and we didnt see anyone
conversing or laughing. They were just going about their business, going wherever they
were going. It was almost automaton like. It was eerie.
And the plight of the citizens of Pyongyang stood in solemn contrast to the dinner I
had the previous night, Friday the seventh, an elaborate 12-course Korean meal. Having
spent time in Korea, I consider myself somewhat a connoisseur of Korean food, and that
was one of the best Korean meals Ive ever had. Unfortunately, the company was not
pleasurable.
My dinner host was General Kim, the four-star general in charge of the
Reconnaissance General Bureau, the RGB, the organization later responsible for
overseeing the attack against Sony. The RGB is an amalgam of special operations and
intelligence resources. They do overseas collection, reconnaissance, and importantly,
cyber operations.
General Kim claimed to me that he was my North Korean counterpart. He was just
a couple years younger than I, and we had to communicate through a translator, a North
Korean who spoke flawless English but with a British accent that was pretty strange.
[laughter]
General Kim spent most of the meal berating me about American aggression and
what terrible people we were. He said that North Korea was under siege by its closest
neighbors, who were supported, aided, and abetted by the United States. He got louder and
louder, and he kept leaning toward me, pointing his finger at my chest and saying that U.S.
and South Korean exercises were a provocation to war.
And not being a diplomat, my reaction was to lean back across the table, point my
finger at his chest, [laughter] and respond that shelling South Korean islands wasnt the
most diplomatic course of action they could have taken either. [laughter] This kind of
connoted the entire evenings conversation. [laughter and applause]
But of course, my purpose was to secure the release of our two citizens. So at one
point, my executive assistant suggested I take a head break to let things cool off, which I
did.
I guess I have to give the New York Times credit, Gruff and blunt-speaking
arent too far off. [laughter] Im not sure I was perfect for the North Koreans, though.
At the end of the evening, I presented General Kim with a letter from President
Obama. The letter didnt say much, except to designate me as his envoy, and that releasing
our two citizens would be viewed as a positive gesture.
Saturday, the next day, was nerve wracking. We werent sure, (I wasnt at least),
whether we were going to get our two citizens back or not. So we stayed around the state
guesthouse all morning.
About 11:00 in the morning, Saturday, an emissary from the minister of state
security showed up to announce that the DPRK government had demoted me. They no
longer considered me the Presidents envoy, and accordingly, they couldnt guarantee my
safety and security in the city of Pyongyang. He said the citizens of Pyongyang were
aware and my purpose was to secure the release of our two criminals.
Thanks. [laughter]
So we waited around and waited around. Its not like you can hail a cab and go ride
around.
We were under their control.
About 3:00 that afternoon, this same emissary from the minister of state security
came back and said: Youve got 20 minutes to hustle together your luggage and check out
of this place. Were leaving.
We went in the vehicles to downtown Pyongyang, and we were ushered into a
conference room there, and sat through an interesting amnesty-granting ceremony, I
guess Id call it, in which the minister of state security read a proclamation from Kim Jong
Un, the Supreme Leader .
That was the first time Id seen our two citizens, who were still in their prison
garb. They were turned over to us. We got them a change of clothes, out to the vehicles,
and back to the airport. I cant recall a time when an aircraft with United States of
America emblazoned across it ever looked as good. [laughter]
The next day, really our second Saturday after we crossed the date line, we landed
at McChord Air Force Base, near Seattle. I went up to the cockpit and watched the two
family reunions, which were very gratifying and very emotional, and at that moment, it
was all worth it to me.
Okay, I want to bring this story back to cyber. I think its important to note that the
general I had dinner with that first night, General Kim, is the director of the RGB. Hes the
guy who ultimately would have to okay the cyber attack against Sony, and he really is
illustrative of the people were dealing with in the cyber realm in North Korea.
All of that vitriol he spewed in my direction over dinner was real. They really do
believe that theyre constantly under siege from all directions. Painting us as an enemy
thats about to invade their country any day now is one of the chief propaganda elements
thats held North Korea together for the past 60 years. And they are deadly serious about
affronts to the Supreme Leader, whom they consider to be a deity.
I watched The Interview over the weekend, and its obvious to me that the North
Koreans dont have a sense of humor. [laughter and applause]
The DPRK is a family-owned country. Its been that way ever since it was founded
in the 40s. And theres no room for dissent, not when the favorite management technique
of their leader is public executions. Its super effective as a management tool. [laughter]
Behind all of this, North Korea wants to be recognized as a world power. They see
nuclear weapons as their insurance policy and ticket to survival, and the rest of their
society, including their conventional military forces, suffers for it. But cyber is a powerful
new realm for them, where they believe they can exert maximum influence at minimum
cost, and this recent episode with Sony has shown that they can get recognition for their
cyber capabilities.
Thats why we have to push back. If they get global recognition at a low cost with
no consequence, theyll do it again, and keep doing it again until we push back. And of
course others will follow suit.
So, here in the United States, the role of the Intelligence Community is to put all of
those factors in context, to give our national leaders the intelligence they need, everything
that figures into their calculus to make good decisions about how to respond, and we have
to do that without oversimplifying the situation and while acknowledging the things we
dont know.
Despite what some people think, the Intelligence Community doesnt have the eyes
and ears of God. Were not omniscient. A closed society like North Korea is a really hard
target for intelligence, and theyre just one small piece of the cyber-threat puzzle, which
includes actors that arent nation-states. We see indications that some terrorist
organizations are very interested in developing offensive cyber capabilities, and that
cybercriminals are using a growing black market to sell cyber tools with little regard for
whose hands they fall into.
Taken all together, cyber poses an incredibly complex set of threats, because
criminals, and hacktivist collectives like Anonymous, are all thrown in together with
aggressors like North Korea and Iran, and with the Russians and Chinese, who could do
real damage if they are so inclined. Each of those actors has different capabilities and
different objectives when they engage in Cyberspace, and all them of operate on the same
Internet.
It makes me long for the halcyon days of the Cold War, when the world essentially
had two large, mutually exclusive communications networks. One belonged to the United
States, dominated by the United States and our Allies, and the other was dominated by the
Soviets and theirs. So we could be reasonably sure that if we were listening to someone on
the Soviet network, that person was not a U.S. citizen.
Today, the internet and telecommunications networks are all interconnected and
global, and much of the technology the infrastructure relies on comes from the U.S. Our
task, as an Intelligence Community, is to find the bad actors and to distinguish a terrorist
sending directions on how to build a bomb or how to defeat TSA procedures, from
someone sending their granddaughter a recipe for apple pie.
So were not just looking for a needle in a haystack. Were looking for thousands
of needles scattered over acres and acres of haystacks.
Its our job to provide insight into the nature of cyber intrusions and give warnings
where we can, and that job is extremely difficult in the absence of international norms and
standards. Were, to borrow a legal phrase, developing a body of case law to define what
constitutes a cyberwar, or act of cyber terrorism, or cyber vandalism, or cybercrime. And
were learning as we go, just as everyone else is.
And through it all, the IC holds civil liberties and privacy as a top priority. Were
going to make mistakes, (and some of those have been exposed), a small percentage of the
time. Were going to accidentally intercept someones grandmas apple pie recipe. But
weve shown that when we do, as soon as we realize our mistake, we get rid of that
information, and we report ourselves to the bodies that conduct oversight, in all three
branches of the government. Thats important to me, personally, because, by the way, Im
an American citizen, and I care about my civil liberties and privacy too.
Beyond that, when we can do so without compromising our tradecraft, weve been
transparent with the public about our mistakes. So weve published about 5,000 pages of
previously classified documents on our Tumblr website: IC on the Record, many of
which are pretty critical of our mistakes, including classified court documents that show
the FISA court, (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court that oversees sensitive
surveillance programs), is not a so-called rubber stamp.
Two years ago, I didnt know what a Tumblr was. Two weeks ago, Tumblr
featured our site, the ICs site, as one of a select few Big in 2014 sites for their end of
year review. We were right up there with Lil Bub. [laughter]
Another joke. [laughter] Sorry, I said Ill try to give you warning. [laughter]
Im here to tell you, sharing the stage with a famous cat - on the internet - thats
how you know youve arrived. [laughter and applause]
That, and traveling to North Korea.
So let me end with that point, and I think we have some time for some questions.
Thanks.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
2014
Foreword
Ive often said publicly that we are facing the most diverse set of threats Ive seen
in my 50 years in the intelligence business. Thats true. Its also true, however, that we are
better organized to face these threats than we were 13 years ago. We have strengthened
and integrated our Intelligence Community (IC) in the decade since 9/11, supported by the
National Intelligence Strategy (NIS).
This, the third iteration of the NIS, is our guide forward for the next four years to
better serve the needs of our customers, to make informed decisions on national security
issues, and ultimately, to make our nation more secure. We face significant changes in the
domestic and global environment and must be ready to meet 21st century challenges and
to recognize emerging opportunities. This guidance is designed to propel our mission and
align our objectives with national strategies. The NIS provides an opportunity to
communicate national priority objectives to our workforce, partners, and customersfrom
the policy maker, to the warfighter, to the first responder, to our fellow citizens.
To navigate todays turbulent and complex strategic environment, we must: (1)
Execute our mission smartly and identify ways to better leverage the substantive work of
our partners and potential partners; (2) Continue to integrate, transform, and strengthen the
ICs support to national security; (3) Protect privacy and civil liberties and adhere to the
Principles of Professional Ethics for the IC; and (4) Adapt to changing needs and
resources and innovate to provide unique anticipatory and strategic intelligence.
We have seen a great deal of success in integrating intelligence in the five years
since our most recent NIS, with both high-profile operational achievements and significant
enterprise improvements. Together, we must build on our successes and mitigate risks,
guided by this updated strategy. We must continue to evolve as an integrated Community,
advance our capabilities in technology and tradecraft, and push for improvements in both
mission and enterprise management, through initiatives such as the IC Information
Technology Enterprise.
We have crucial work before us. Senior policymakers depend on us to enable them
to make wise national security decisions and Americans count on us to help protect the
nation from attack, while increasing transparency and protecting their privacy and civil
liberties. We must provide the best intelligence possible to support these objectives; doing
so is a collective responsibility of all of our dedicated IC professionals and, together with
our partners, we will realize our vision.
Thank you for your dedication to our mission and to the security of our fellow
citizens as we continue this journey together.
James R. Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
Purpose
In support of the National Security Strategy, which sets forth national security
priorities, the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) provides the IC with the mission
direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the next four to five years. IC
activities must be consistent with, and responsive to, national security priorities and must
comply with the Constitution, applicable statutes, and Congressional oversight
requirements. The NIS should be read along with the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework and Unifying Intelligence Strategies to inform and guide mission, as well as
planning, programming, and budgeting activities.
Organizational Framework
The NIS has four main components, described as follows: (1) the Strategic
Environment section portrays the global national security milieu; (2) the Mission
Objective section describes key mission priorities and expected outcomes; (3) the
Enterprise Objective section describes resource and capability outcomes needed to enable
mission success; and (4) the Implementing the Strategy section provides broad
organizational guidance to meet the NISs requirements.
Our success as a Community is measured as much by our defense of Americas
values as it is by the execution of our intelligence mission. What follows is a succinct
depiction of the ICs Mission and Vision, which serves as the foundation for the Mission
and Enterprise Objectives. Fundamental to all of these elements are the Principles of
Professional Ethics for the IC.
 IC Mission
Provide timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence to inform decisions
on national security issues and events.
IC Vision
A nation made more secure by a fully integrated, agile, resilient, and innovative
Intelligence Community that exemplifies Americas values.
Mission Objectives
Strategic Intelligence
Anticipatory Intelligence
Current Operations
Cyber Intelligence
Counterterrorism
Counterproliferation
Counterintelligence
Enterprise Objectives
Integrated Mission Management
Integrated Enterprise Management
Information Sharing and Safeguarding
Innovation
Our People
Our Partners
Principles of Professional Ethics for the Intelligence Community
As members of the intelligence profession, we conduct ourselves in accordance
with certain basic principles. These principles are stated below, and reflect the standard of
ethical conduct expected of all Intelligence Community personnel, regardless of individual
role or agency affiliation. Many of these principles are also reflected in other documents
that we look to for guidance, such as statements of core values, and the Code of Conduct:
Principles of Ethical Conduct for Government Officers and Employees; it is nonetheless
important for the Intelligence Community to set forth in a single statement the
fundamental ethical principles that unite us and distinguish us as intelligence
professionals.
MISSION. We serve the American people, and understand that our mission
requires selfless dedication to the security of our nation.
TRUTH. We seek the truth; speak truth to power; and obtain, analyze, and provide
intelligence objectively.
LAWFULNESS. We support and defend the Constitution, and comply with the
laws of the United States, ensuring that we carry out our mission in a manner that respects
privacy, civil liberties, and human rights obligations.
INTEGRITY. We demonstrate integrity in our conduct, mindful that all our
actions, whether public or not, should reflect positively on the Intelligence Community at
large.
STEWARDSHIP. We are responsible stewards of the public trust; we use
intelligence authorities and resources prudently, protect intelligence sources and methods
diligently, report wrongdoing through appropriate channels; and remain accountable to
ourselves, our oversight institutions, and through those institutions, ultimately to the
American people.
EXCELLENCE. We seek to improve our performance and our craft continuously,
share information responsibly, collaborate with our colleagues, and demonstrate
innovation and agility when meeting new challenges.
DIVERSITY. We embrace the diversity of our nation, promote diversity and
inclusion in our workforce, and encourage diversity in our thinking.
Strategic Environment
The United States faces a complex and evolving security environment with
extremely dangerous, pervasive, and elusive threats. The IC remains focused on the
missions of cyber intelligence, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counterintelligence,
and on the threats posed by state and non-state actors challenging U.S. national security
and interests worldwide.
Key nation states continue to pursue agendas that challenge U.S. interests. China
has an interest in a stable East Asia, but remains opaque about its strategic intentions and
is of concern due to its military modernization. Russia is likely to continue to reassert
power and influence in ways that undermine U.S. interests, but may be willing to work
with the United States on important high priority security issues, when interests converge.
The IC spotlight remains on North Koreas pursuit of nuclear and ballistic missile
capabilities and its international intransigence. Irans nuclear efforts remain a key concern,
in addition to its missile programs, support for terrorism, regime dynamics, and other
developing military capabilities. The potential for greater instability in the Middle East
and North Africa will require continued IC vigilance. Finally, continued IC vigilance will
be required to maintain global coverage of conflicts as they arise and potentially threaten
U.S. interests.
Violent extremist groups and transnational criminal networks threaten U.S.
security and challenge the U.S. both in the homeland and abroad. Al-Qaida, its affiliates,
and adherents, continue to plot against U.S. and Western interests, and seek to use
weapons of mass destruction if possible. The actions of transnational criminal
organizations have the potential to corrupt and destabilize governments, markets, and
entire geographic regions. The IC will increasingly serve homeland security as well as
military and foreign policy objectives.
Domestic Environment. The IC faces fiscal challenges as the U.S. Government
operates under tightened budgets. We must meet our mission needs in innovative ways and
sustain our core competencies with fewer resources. Likewise, our customers and partners
will also grapple with resource challenges. While such constraints will require the IC to
accept and balance risks, addressing these challenges presents additional opportunities to
enhance partnerships, information sharing, and outreach.
The U.S. will continue to face threats of unauthorized disclosures from insiders
and others that compromise intelligence sources, methods, capabilities, and activities, and
may impact international and domestic political dynamics. These disclosures can degrade
our ability to conduct intelligence missions and damage our national security.
Global Environment. Global power is becoming more diffuse. New alignments
and informal networksoutside of traditional power blocs and national governments
will increasingly have significant impact in economic, social, and political affairs.
Resolving complex security challenges will require the ICs attention to a broader array of
actors. Private, public, governmental, commercial, and ideological players will become
increasingly influential, both regionally and virtually. The projected rise of a global
middle class and its growing expectations will fuel economic and political change. Some
states and international institutions will be challenged to govern or operate effectively.
Many governments will face challenges to meet even the basic needs of their
people as they confront demographic change, resource constraints, effects of climate
change, and risks of global infectious disease outbreaks. These effects are threat
multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental
degradation, political instability, and social tensionsconditions that can enable terrorist
activity and other forms of violence. The risk of conflict and mass atrocities may increase.
Small, local actions can have disproportionate and enduring effects. Groups can
form, advocate, and achieve goalsfor political, social, and economic changeall
without central leadership. Identifying, understanding, and evaluating such movements
will be both a continuing challenge and an opportunity for the IC.
Technology. Technology is constantly advancing, bringing benefits and challenges.
Technological developments hold enormous potential for dramatic improvements in
individual health, employment, labor productivity, global communications, and
investment.
Technology will continue to be a catalyst for the rapid emergence of changes
difficult to anticipate or prepare for; these forces can test the strength of governments and
potentially jeopardize U.S. citizens and interests overseas. Technological advances also
create the potential for increased systemic fragility as foreign governments and non-state
actors attempt to leverage new and evolving technologies to press their interests.
Natural Resources. Competition for scarce resources, such as food, water, or
energy, will likely increase tensions within and between states and could lead to more
localized or regional conflicts, or exacerbate government instability. In contrast,
prospective resource opportunities beyond U.S. borders and the potential for the U.S. to
meet anticipated fossil fuel requirements through domestic production are likely to alter
dramatically the global energy market and change the dynamics between the U.S. and
other oil producing nations.
Introduction to Mission Objectives
 The seven Mission Objectives broadly describe the priority outputs needed to
deliver timely, insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence to our customers.
Intelligence includes foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. The Mission Objectives
are designed to address the totality of regional and functional issues facing the IC; their
prioritization is communicated to the IC through the National Intelligence Priorities
Framework.
IC Customers
The President
National Security Council
Heads of Departments and Agencies of the Executive Branch
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders
Congress
Others as the DNI determines appropriate
Source: National Security Act of 1947, as amended
Three Mission Objectives refer to foundational intelligence missions the IC
must accomplish, regardless of threat or topic:
Strategic Intelligenceinform and enrich understanding of enduring national
security issues;
Anticipatory Intelligencedetect, identify, and warn of emerging issues and
discontinuities;
Current Operationssupport ongoing actions and sensitive intelligence
operations.
Four Mission Objectives identify the primary topical missions the IC must
accomplish:
Cyber Intelligenceprovide intelligence on cyber threats;
Counterterrorismunderstand and counter those involved in terrorism and
related activities;
Counterproliferationcounter the threat and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction;
Counterintelligencethwart efforts of foreign intelligence entities.
1
Strategic Intelligence: Provide strategic intelligence on enduring issues to
enrich understanding and enable decision advantage.
Strategic intelligence is the process and product of developing deep context,
knowledge, and understanding to support national security decision-making.
The foundation for strategic intelligence is in understanding the histories,
languages, and cultures of nations and non-state entities, their key leaders and opponents,
their objectives and concerns, as well as natural resources, technology, and transnational
issues. The IC masters vital national intelligence issues through research, knowledge
development, outreach, and tradecraft in order to provide deep context for a wide variety
of policy and strategy communities.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Deepen understanding of the strategic environment to enable IC customers to
pursue national security, mission- and issue-specific goals;
Access and assess foreign capabilities, activities, and intentions to provide IC
customers with greater insight and certainty;
Provide in-depth and contextual objective analysis and expertise to support U.S.
national security policy and strategy.
2
Anticipatory Intelligence: Sense, anticipate, and warn of emerging conditions,
trends, threats, and opportunities that may require a rapid shift in national security
posture, priorities, or emphasis.
Anticipatory intelligence is the product of intelligence collection and analysis
focused on trends, events, and changing conditions to identify and characterize
potential or imminent discontinuities, significant events, substantial opportunities, or
threats to U.S. national interests.
The complexity, scale, and pace of changes in the strategic environment will test
the ICs ability to deliver insightful and actionable intelligence with the fidelity, scope, and
speed required to mitigate threats and exploit opportunities. The IC will expand its use of
quantitative analytic methods, while reinforcing long-standing qualitative methods,
especially those that encourage new perspectives and challenge long-standing
assumptions. With evolving intelligence requirements, anticipatory intelligence is critical
for efficient IC resource allocation. The IC will improve its ability to foresee, forecast, and
alert the analytic community of potential issues of concern and convey early warning to
national security customers to provide them with the best possible opportunity for action.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Create capabilities for dynamic horizon-scanning and discovery to assess
changing and emerging conditions and issues that can affect U.S. national security;
Deepen understanding of conditions, issues, and trends to detect subtle shifts and
assess their potential trajectories, and forecast the impact on U.S. national security thus
generating opportunities to alert or warn;
Develop integrated capabilities to create alerts within the IC and to provide
timely and relevant warning to our customers.
3
Current Operations: Provide timely intelligence support to achieve
operational and national security goals.
Intelligence support to current operations, whether collection, analysis,
counterintelligence, or intelligence operations, occurs in almost all IC organizations
and cuts across almost every topic addressed by the IC. Intelligence support to
current operations is characterized by the immediacy of the support provided. In
addition to being responsive, this support also shapes future operations and
investigations.
The IC will adapt to evolving operational requirements, maintain the robust
support customers expect, and further enhance capabilities. As the IC facilitates whole-of-
government efforts to take action against terrorists and transnational organized crime,
address cyber threats, and respond to emerging crisesfrom geo-political to humanitarian
it will also need to support policy imperatives such as the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific
region and transition of the allied mission in Afghanistan. Faced with a wide spectrum of
operations in support of military, diplomatic, and homeland security activities, the IC will
prioritize its efforts and mitigate risk, operate in denied areas, balance forward presence
with robust reach-back, and provide operational resiliency to more fully integrate
intelligence with operations.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Provide actionable, timely, and agile intelligence support to achieve and maintain
operational decision advantage;
Integrate and collaborate with diverse partners to maximize the effectiveness and
reach of intelligence capabilities in support of operations;
Conduct sensitive intelligence operations to support effective national security
action.
4
Cyber Intelligence: Detect and understand cyber threats to inform and enable
national security decision making, cybersecurity, and cyber effects operations.
Cyber intelligence is the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of
information from all sources of intelligence on foreign actors cyber programs,
intentions, capabilities, research and development, tactics, and operational activities
and indicators; their impact or potential effects on national security, information
systems, infrastructure, and data; and network characterization, or insight into the
components, structures, use, and vulnerabilities of foreign information systems.
State and non-state actors use digital technologies to achieve economic and
military advantage, foment instability, increase control over content in cyberspace, and
achieve other strategic goalsoften faster than our ability to understand the security
implications and mitigate potential risks. To advance national objectives, customers
increasingly rely upon the IC to provide timely, actionable intelligence and deeper insights
into current and potential cyber threats and intentions. The IC also provides needed
expertise to defend U.S. Government networks along with other critical communications
networks and national infrastructure. To be more effective, the IC will evolve its cyber
capabilities, including our ability to attribute attacks. The IC will focus on identifying
trends and providing the context to improve our customers understanding of threats,
vulnerabilities, and impact.
 To meet this objective, the IC will:
Increase our awareness and understanding of key foreign cyber threat actors
including their intentions, capabilities, and operationsto meet the growing number and
complexity of cyber-related requirements;
Expand tailored production and dissemination of actionable cyber intelligence to
support the defense of vital information networks and critical infrastructure;
Expand our ability to enable cyber effects operations to protect the nation and
support U.S. national interests.
5
Counterterrorism: Identify, understand, monitor, and disrupt state and non-
state actors engaged in terrorism-related activities that may harm the United States,
its people, interests, and allies.
The dynamic and diverse nature of the terrorist threat will continue to challenge
the U.S. and our interests and will require continued emphasis on targeting, collection, and
analysis. The IC supports the national whole-of-government effort to protect the homeland
from terrorist attack, disrupt and degrade terrorists who threaten U.S. interests abroad,
counter the spread of violent extremist ideology that influences terrorist action, disrupt
illicit financial and other support networks, and build counterterrorism capacity at home
and overseas. Our government and our partners must anticipate, detect, deny, and disrupt
terrorism wherever and however it manifests against U.S. interests. The IC will continue
to monitor this threat to protect our nation, provide warning and assess the strategic factors
that may enable future terror plots.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Conduct innovative analysis that supports disruption of terrorist actors posing
threats to the U.S. and our interests;
Provide insight to mitigate the spread of violent extremist ideology;
Anticipate new and developing terrorist threats and explore opportunities to
counter them;
Bolster resiliency and build adaptive capability to counter terrorism at home and
abroad.
6
Counterproliferation: Counter the threat and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery by state and non-state actors.
The intelligence requirements and challenges related to countering the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are increasing. The IC will support objectives for
countering the threat and proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as well as
WMD-related materials, technology, and expertise. The IC will work with partners inside
and outside the U.S. Government to better understand, detect, and warn on foreign WMD
capabilities, plans, and intentions; thwart WMD acquisition and employment; and inform
U.S. policies and initiatives.
 To meet this objective, the IC will:
Develop capabilities and inform U.S. policies and efforts to dissuade or prevent
states from acquiring WMD-related technologies, materials, or expertise or from
reconstituting former programs;
Advance our understanding of established state WMD programs to inform U.S.
counterproliferation decisions, policies, and efforts to disrupt, roll back, and deter use;
Support interagency efforts to secure global stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction and warn of and prevent the transfer of WMD-related materials, technology,
and expertise to terrorists, extremists, or other non-state actors;
Improve U.S. capabilities to anticipate and manage crises and support integrated
U.S. Government responses to mitigate the consequences of WMD use or loss of state
control.
7
Counterintelligence: Identify, understand, and mitigate the efforts of foreign
intelligence entities to compromise U.S. economic and national security.
A foreign intelligence entity is any known or suspected foreign organization,
person, or group (public, private, or government) that conducts intelligence activities
to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S. intelligence collection, unlawfully
influence U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. The term includes
foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorists.
The U.S. faces persistent and substantial challenges to its security and prosperity
from the intelligence activities of traditional and non-traditional adversaries. Foreign
intelligence entities relentlessly target the U.S. Government, the private sector, and
academia to acquire national security information and to gain economic, diplomatic,
military, or technological advantage.
IC elements will identify emerging technologies that can be leveraged by our
adversaries to compromise classified information and assets, and develop and adopt robust
mitigation strategies. Counterintelligence activities must be integrated into all steps of the
intelligence process.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Understand, anticipate, and penetrate increasingly sophisticated foreign
intelligence entity capabilities;
Develop and implement capabilities to detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats;
Stem the theft and exploitation of critical U.S. technologies, data, and
information;
Neutralize and/or mitigate adversarial attempts to exploit U.S. supply chain and
acquisition vulnerabilities.
Introduction to Enterprise Objectives
Accomplishing the seven NIS Mission Objectives depends on achieving six
Enterprise Objectives, which describe the resources and capabilities that are essential to
fulfilling the Mission Objectives.
Two Enterprise Objectives focus on enterprise integration while optimizing
resource management and decision making:
Integrated Mission Managementoptimize capabilities to achieve unity of effort;
Integrated Enterprise Management improve IC integration and interoperability.
Four Enterprise Objectives describe our strategy to build a solid foundation of key
capabilities and capacity:
Information Sharing and Safeguarding improve collaboration while protecting
information;
Innovationimprove research and development, tradecraft, and processes;
Our Peoplebuild a more agile, diverse, inclusive, and expert workforce;
Our Partnersimprove intelligence through partnership.
The Enterprise Objectives address both mission and enterprise integration and rest
on the Principles of Professional Ethics for the IC.
1
Integrated Mission Management: Optimize collection, analysis, and
counterintelligence capabilities and activities across the IC to achieve unity of effort
and effect.
Integrated mission management is the strategic prioritization, coordination,
and deconfliction of intelligence activities to align the interdependent disciplines of
collection, analysis, and counterintelligence.
Collection activities are responsive to and inform analytic requirements.
Analytic activities produce intelligence judgments, identify intelligence gaps,
and provide the basis for guidance to collectors.
Counterintelligence activities complement collection and analytic activities
and identify vulnerabilities of intelligence sources, methods, and activities.
Effective mission execution requires flexible, responsive, and resilient efforts to
appropriately share knowledge, information, and capabilities across organizational
boundaries. The IC will increase integration and collaboration across the Community to
meet customer needs efficiently and effectively. In doing so, the IC will strike a balance
between unity of effort and specialization within each discipline and function, using the
best of each to meet mission requirements. Intelligence products will be appropriately
tailored and classified at the lowest possible level.
Analytic, collection, and counterintelligence professionals, supported by
coordinated governance, joint processes, and improved capabilities, will collaboratively
work together to define and solve problems.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
 Leverage cross-IC, multi-disciplinary expertise and the full range of IC
capabilities to jointly define and anticipate intelligence problems, develop options for
action, and understand tradeoffs for implementing solutions;
Strengthen and integrate governance bodies to optimize resources and manage
risk;
Foster joint IC planning, targeting, tasking, and assessment processes to
coordinate intelligence activities and promote continuous improvement;
Drive integrated investment decisions and the delivery of multi-disciplinary,
integrated capabilities to provide optimal solutions for mission success.
2
Integrated Enterprise Management: Develop, implement, and manage IC-
oriented approaches to improve integration and interoperability of IC enabling
capabilities.
Integrated enterprise management is the strategic coordination of IC business
practices to optimize resource management and enterprise business process decision
making.
Effectively managing enterprise resources enables the IC to fully execute its
mission efficiently. Specifically, the IC will seek solutions that increase efficiencies in
areas such as continuity, security, acquisition and procurement, finance, facilities, and
logistics. IC-wide performance evaluation and data-driven reviewsaligned to strategy
and budgetswill strengthen performance, enhance oversight and compliance, and lead to
unmodified audit opinions, improved results, and lower costs. The IC will promote
information security, share timely intelligence with our partners, and educate customers on
proper use and handling of classified information.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Advance a personnel security infrastructure that supports a one-Community
approach through continuous evaluation and common practices and standards accepted
across the IC;
Pursue acquisition and procurement strategies and processes across the IC that
enhance the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of procuring common-use products and
services;
Implement IC enterprise financial standards, processes, tools, and services that
leverage both government and industry best practices;
Mature strategy-based performance and evaluation across the IC to support
proactive, balanced, and informed IC decision making;
Leverage existing and future IC facilities and physical infrastructure to support
joint-use functionality and improve energy efficiency;
Adopt a risk management approach to continuity of operations efforts to provide
an uninterrupted flow of national intelligence in all circumstances;
Continue to implement approaches to provide appropriate transparency, protect
privacy and civil liberties, and enhance oversight and compliance.
3
Information Sharing and Safeguarding: Enhance, integrate, and leverage IC
capabilities to improve collaboration and the discovery, access, retrieval, retention,
and safeguarding of information.
The Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE)
transforms agency-centric information technology to a common enterprise platform
where the IC can easily and securely share technology, information, and capabilities
across the Community.
Mission success depends on the right people getting the right information at the
right time. Improving our information sharing and safeguarding capabilities, as mutually
reinforcing priorities, requires strengthening our people, processes, and technologies. The
IC will continue to identify and address information sharing gaps and coordinate efforts to
reduce duplication across the IC Information Technology Enterprise to yield better results
more efficiently.
In addition to recognizing the responsibility to provide intelligence and the
growing demand to make information available across the IC, the IC will enhance
safeguards to protect information and build trust among partners. An integrated
information sharing environment, dedicated to protecting privacy and civil liberties,
allows the IC to carry out the mission, protect against external and insider threats, and
maintain the public trust.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Consolidate existing and future information technology requirements into an
effective and efficient IC information technology infrastructure to enable greater IC
integration, information sharing, and safeguarding;
Provide the IC workforce with discovery and access to information based on
mission need to deliver timely, tailored, and actionable information;
Integrate enterprise-wide information, as appropriate, to enhance discovery,
improve correlation, and enable advanced analytics consistent with protection of privacy
and civil liberties;
Strengthen and synchronize security and data protection standards for new and
existing intelligence information systems based on policy-driven interoperable approaches
and attribute-based access to provide a trusted and secure IC-wide information
environment;
Promote a culture that embodies, supports, and furthers responsible information
sharing respectful of privacy and civil liberties.
4
Innovation: Find and deploy new scientific discoveries and technologies,
nurture innovative thought, and improve tradecraft and processes to achieve mission
advantage.
 Innovation begins with a commitment to research and development as the seed for
breakthroughs in science and technology. In order for innovation to provide results, the IC
will further develop, support, and foster intellectual curiosity and creative problem
solving. The IC must accept that initial failures may lead to successes and be willing to
take calculated risks for high-value results when a rational basis for the risk is
demonstrated. The IC will leverage innovation wherever it is found, incorporating
scientific breakthroughs and cutting-edge technologies for mission excellence. The IC will
extend innovation to our daily work by embracing new processes and automation to
streamline the business aspects of intelligence.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Conduct and leverage basic research and maintain core independent research in
the most sensitive applied and social sciences, technologies, and mathematics arenas to
achieve breakthrough results;
Transition creative ideas and promising innovations to improve intelligence
services and processes across the IC;
Strengthen and unleash the innovative talents of the workforce to accept risk,
improve tradecraft, and embrace new technologies and processes.
5
Our People: Build a more agile, diverse, inclusive, and expert workforce.
Inclusion describes a culture that connects each employee to the organization;
encourages collaboration, flexibility, and fairness; and leverages diversity of thought
throughout the organization so all individuals can excel in their contributions to the
IC mission.
Workforce planning is a framework addressing the total workforce balance
(civilian, military, and core contract personnel) to ensure the IC has the right people
with the right skills in the right place at the right time to accomplish the mission in
high-performing teams and organizations.
Diversity considers, in a broad context and in relation to the mission, all
aspects that make individuals unique and America strong including race, color,
ethnicity, national origin, gender, age, religion, language, disability, sexual
orientation, gender identity, and heritage.
The IC workforce is united in protecting and preserving national security, which
could not be accomplished without a talented workforce that embraces the ICs core
values and Principles of Professional Ethics for the IC. To this end, the IC will continue to
attract, develop, engage, and retain a workforce that possesses both the capabilities
necessary to address current and evolving threats and a strong sense of integrity. Even
with constrained budgets, the IC will make long-term strategic investments in the
workforce to promote agility and mobility throughout employees careers. Special
emphasis is needed to recruit, retain, develop, and motivate employees with skills
fundamental to the success of the intelligence mission, including foreign language,
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.
 The IC needs effective tools for workforce planning, transformational learning
programs, skills assessment and knowledge sharing, joint duty and other experiential
assignment opportunities, and the resources to encourage and facilitate work-life balance.
All employees are accountable for cultivating a performance-driven culture that
encourages collaboration, flexibility, and fairness without the fear of reprisal.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Shape a diverse and inclusive workforce with the skills and capabilities needed
now and in the future;
Provide continuous learning and development programs based on a mutual
commitment between managers and employees to promote workforce competency,
relevance, and agility;
Nurture a culture of innovation and agility that advocates the sharing of ideas and
resources adaptable to the changing environment, and promotes best practices across the
IC;
Provide a workplace free of discrimination, harassment, and the fear of reprisal,
where all are treated with dignity and respect and afforded equal opportunity to contribute
to their full potential.
6
Our Partners: Strengthen partnerships to enrich intelligence.
Partners consist of elements working to protect U.S. security interests,
including U.S. military, our allies, foreign intelligence and security services, other
federal departments and agencies, as well as state, local, tribal governments, and
private sector entities.
The Communitys partnerships are fundamental to our national security. Our
partners are force multipliers, offering access, expertise, capabilities, and perspectives that
enrich our intelligence capacity and help all of us succeed in our shared mission. The IC
will deepen existing partnerships and forge new relationships to enhance intelligence and
inform decisions.
Our approach to strengthening partnerships will align with broader national policy
guidance and harmonize partner initiatives across the IC through policies, procedures, and
practices that clearly delineate roles, responsibilities, and authorities. In working with the
array of government, foreign, military, and private sector partners, the IC will remain
cognizant of, and dedicated to, protecting privacy and civil liberties and maintaining the
public trust.
To meet this objective, the IC will:
Increase shared responsibility with and among, and incorporate insights from, all
partners to advance intelligence;
Develop an enterprise approach to partnership engagement to facilitate
coordinated, integrated outreach;
Deepen collaboration to enhance understanding of our partners and to effectively
inform decisions and enable action.
Implementing the Strategy
The IC is an integrated intelligence enterprise working toward the common vision
of a more secure nation. The NIS provides the overarching framework to accomplish the
mission and achieve the vision. The IC will implement the NIS consistent with its
statutory authorities under Congressional oversight.
The DNI and IC elements work together in an integrated fashion to execute the
NIS. Functional managers monitor the health of important intelligence capabilities.
Mission managers examine all facets of collection, analysis, and counterintelligence
against specific areas of concern across missions. Program managers scrutinize how funds
are executed. IC enterprise managers align support functions to enable each mission. The
IC elements recruit, train, equip, and conduct intelligence missions. Inspectors General,
legal counsel, and privacy and civil liberties officers ensure proper compliance and
oversight.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence provides the IC with
overarching guidance and coordination. IC elements execute their missions consistent with
their statutory authorities. Finally, it is the responsibility of all members of the IC
workforce to understand how they contribute to the IC mission and execute their specific
role to the best of their ability and consistent with the protection of privacy and civil
liberties.
DNI
Serve as Principal Intelligence Advisor.
As principal intelligence advisor to the President, the DNI must ensure intelligence
addresses threats to national security. The DNI establishes the ICs strategic priorities and
sets forth the enabling capabilities needed for mission success in the NIS.
Set Strategic Priorities for the IC. The NIS, in concert with the National Security
Strategy and the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, represents the ICs mission
priorities. The DNI informs Congress of significant priority realignment and activities.
Align the National Intelligence Program.
The NIS serves as the DNIs mechanism to align the National Intelligence Program
and guide the reporting of resource expenditures and performance to Congress.
Additionally, the National Intelligence Program is coordinated with the Military
Intelligence Program and the DNIs joint annual planning and programming guidance for
the IC.
IC Elements
Align Strategies, Plans, and Actions. The mission and enterprise objectives in the
NIS shall be incorporated and cascaded into IC element strategies and plans. IC elements
and functional managers will facilitate an integrated approach to these objectives to
achieve the ICs mission.
Inform Resource Allocation. The NIS will inform decisions about programs,
budgets, policies, and acquisitions to develop and sustain capabilities. IC elements and
program managers will reflect NIS objectives in their annual strategic program briefs and
will articulate their intentions to mitigate risks in their annual planning and programming
activities.
Measure Outcomes. The execution of the NIS objectives requires constant and
consistent evaluation. IC elements will provide information through existing processes to
clearly illustrate how they have performed against NIS objectives and the IC Priority
Goals, which measure progress against enduring national security issues. Measuring
progress against the NIS is crucial to improving overall IC performance.
Conclusion
The NIS supports intelligence integration and the ICs mission to provide timely,
insightful, objective, and relevant intelligence to inform decisions on national security
issues and events. The IC must fully reflect the NIS in agency strategic plans, annual
budget requests, and justifications for the National Intelligence Program. The DNI will
assess IC element proposals, projects, and programs against the objectives of the NIS to
realize the ICs vision of a nation made more secure by a fully integrated, agile, resilient,
and innovative Intelligence Community that exemplifies Americas values.
The Intelligence Community exists to provide political and military leaders with
the greatest possible decision advantage. We understand, now more than ever, that the
best way to accomplish our goal is thorough integration of all national intelligence
capabilities.
- James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Data Mining Report for Calendar Year 2013
I. Introduction
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) provides this report
pursuant to Section 804 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of2007, entitled The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of2007 (Public Law
110-53).
A. Scope
This report covers the activities of all ODNI components from January 1, 2013
through December 31, 2013. Other elements of the Intelligence Community (IC) are
reporting their activities to Congress through their own departments or agencies.
B. Reporting Requirement
The Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 (hereafter referred to as
the Data Mining Reporting Act) requires departments and agencies of the Federal
Government engaged in data mining activities to submit an annual report to Congress.
Under this law, data mining is defined as:
a program involving pattern-based queries, searches or other analyses of one
or more electronic databases, where
(A) a department or agency of the Federal Government, or a non-Federal entity
acting on behalf of the Federal Government, is conducting the queries, searches, or other
analyses to discover or locate a predictive pattern or anomaly indicative of terrorist or
criminal activity on the part of any individual or individuals;
(B) the queries, searches, or other analyses are not subject-based and do not use
personal identifiers of a specific individual, or inputs associated with a specific individual
or group of individuals, to retrieve information from the database or databases;1 and
(C) the purpose of the queries, searches, or other analyses is not solely (i) the
detection of fraud, waste, or abuse in a Government agency or program; or (ii) the security
of a Government computer system. 2
C. Report Content
We continue to look for opportunities to rework the format of this report for clarity
and readability. In prior reports, we have used Part II to describe those ODNI programs, if
any, that meet reporting requirements of the Data Mining Reporting Act, and Part III to
describe other programs in the interest of transparency. This year, consistent with the
emphasis on transparency in the IC, we will use Part II to more broadly describe programs
in the interest of transparency, which may only meet some of the criteria defining data
mining. We will use Part III of this report to provide updates on programs included in the
prior years report. We have added a new Part IV of this report, to provide an overview of
the Privacy and Civil Liberties infrastructure within which ODNI conducts it activities.
II. Newly Reported Activities
This section describes activities that are responsive to the Data Mining Reporting
Act, and errs on the side of reporting activities in the interest of transparency. This report
includes one newly-reported activity, involving an analytic technique used by ODNIs
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to narrow the pool of information within
NCTC databases that analysts will assess in response to specific threat reports. As noted
above, this technique does not meet all of the statutorily-defined criteria for data mining
under the Act.
A. NCTC and Threat Reporting.
As the Federal Governments lead in providing the counterterrorism community
with 24/7 counterterrorism intelligence monitoring, assessments and situational
awareness, NCTC receives intelligence reports relating to terrorism threats, which it
analyzes in order to develop lead information for operational partners in the
counterterrorism community. To support that effort, NCTC also has access to other
agencies datasets pursuant to applicable laws, executive orders, guidelines, and policies.
In analyzing such threat reporting and government data, NCTC analysts employ analytic
techniques tailored to the level of detail known to the government about the threat.
In situations where the government is aware of specifics about a threat, the
corresponding threat reports received by NCTC will likely include details about the
individuals, relevant dates and locations, modes and routes of travel, etc. NCTC uses those
details to identify specific information about the threat, including possible actors. For
example, NCTC relies to a great degree on the terrorism information in its Terrorism
Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which is its centralized repository of
information about known or suspected international terrorists (KSTs). It also has access to
other government information about terrorists and terrorist organizations. NCTC uses
threat report details to help it identify the terrorism information most responsive to the
threat. It then correlates that terrorism information with other pertinent datasets to which
NCTC has access. 3 NCTC examines the results in order to identify, analyze, and provide
leads to its partners.
For example, if the threat stream involves travel by a particular KST to carry out
an attack at a particular location, NCTC identifies terrorism information from its holdings,
and then uses that information to assess travel-related datasets to identify information
about that KSTs travel to the location in question. NCTC then prepares intelligence
reports for appropriate partners based on what it discovers.
Where the government is aware of a threat, but lacks details, NCTC is less able to
tap into existing terrorism information that might provide leads for analysis and follow-up.
For example, a threat report might warn of a terrorist plot by a particular group involving
travel to a particular region during a particular timeframe, but lack any specifics on the
individuals involved. In such a case, NCTC could theoretically correlate all accessible
travel-related data with all accessible terrorism information. However, assuming this was
feasible, this approach would be time-consuming and resource-intensive, and would
generate over-inclusive results, i.e., all instances in which any terrorism-related record
matches any travel-related record. While the result of that correlation might serve other
counterterrorism purposes, it is not responsive to the specific threat at issue.
B. Narrowing the Data to be Correlated.
When responding to generalized threat reporting of this sort, NCTC narrows the
data to be correlated with NCTCs terrorism information holdings in order to generate
appropriately-focused results. NCTC does this by deriving limiting parameters, based in
part on analytic assumptions derived from experience and knowledge about the
characteristics of the group or individuals historically involved in such threats, and about
general terrorist tradecraft (e.g., communications, travel and counterintelligence). NCTC
then applies those parameters to the data at hand.
For example, a threat report may lack specifics about how unidentified terrorist
plotters will travel to the identified geographical area to carry out the threatened attack. In
such a case, NCTC narrows the possibilities by filtering the accessible travel data based
upon previously-utilized modes of travel, or route of travel, or group or individual
characteristics of the potential plotters. The resulting body of data is then correlated with
TIDE and other terrorism information. The resulting matches, if any, are more likely to
yield focused results that can be analyzed for lead information (i.e., focused on those
KSTs with travel matching the parameters.)
C. Procedures for Protecting Privacy and Civil Liberties.
When these kinds of analytic parameters are applied to non-terrorism information,
it is important to ensure that the results themselves are not used as analytic conclusions. In
other words, if information from a travel dataset is identified based on a travel pattern that
fits certain parameters, that narrowed-down travel information should not be used, by
itself, to predict whether particular individuals who fit that travel pattern might be
engaged in terrorist activity. NCTC does not use this technique in that way. Rather, NCTC
directly and immediately correlates such subsets with its existing terrorism holdings.
Analytic determinations are made by trained NCTC analysts based on the resulting
matches with terrorism information already accessible to NCTC - such as TIDE records.
Through this technique, analysts focus only on terrorism information that NCTC has
already identified through other means, as highlighted, supplemented and prioritized for
NCTC analytic review by virtue of this focused correlation. Authorized and trained
analysts then analyze the results to identify leads, including information about the identity
of individuals with an apparent nexus to terrorism, to report to counterterrorism partners in
response to the threat reporting. NCTC does not otherwise make use of the information
that is narrowed down through the use of these parameters.
If this technique is applied to U.S. government datasets obtained or accessed by
NCTC pursuant to the 2012 DNI-Attorney General guidelines, NCTC must apply the
baseline safeguards under Section III.C.3(d) of the guidelines in order to protect the
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. Persons (USP) whose personal information is contained
within this data.4 Under the baseline safeguards, assessment of information in these
datasets must be designed solely to identify information that is reasonably believed to
constitute terrorism information, and to minimize the review of USP information that does
not constitute terrorism information. Pattern-based assessment is permitted, subject to
appropriate reporting under the Data Mining Reporting Act, but must comply with the
baseline safeguards. Because the narrowing technique described above is designed solely
to narrow the data to be correlated with NCTCs terrorism information holdings, such as
KST information in TIDE, it is designed to identify terrorism information. Similarly,
because the narrowed-down information is used only for the purposes of such correlation,
with NCTC only analyzing the resulting matches with existing terrorism information, the
technique is designed to minimize the review of non-terrorism information by analysts.
NCTC has applied the 2012 DNI-Attorney General guidelines to non-terrorism and
non-U.S. Person datasets, such as the Department of Homeland Securitys Electronic
System for Travel Authorization data. For example, in searching these non-U.S. Persons
datasets (and in accordance with the established baseline safeguard), analysts are trained
to narrowly tailor their queries to identify information that is reasonably believed to
constitute terrorism information and to minimize the review of information about
persons that does not constitute terrorism information. This has both an important privacy
protective impactby reducing the number of non-terrorist non-U.S. Persons scrutinized
in the analytical processas well as a practical benefit to the individual analyst, in that it
minimizes the need to review unresponsive or irrelevant search results.
In addition, as required by the 2012 DNI-Attorney General guidelines, only
specially trained, authorized personnel are permitted to access the information involved in
this process, and their analytic activities on NCTC systems are monitored, recorded, and
audited. If erroneous or outdated data is identified, it must be corrected, updated, or
removed from NCTC systems as appropriate, and the data provider must be notified of the
error. Determinations regarding permanent retention, use, and dissemination of USP
information are predicated upon an appropriate assessment that the USP information is
reasonably believed to constitute terrorism information. Disseminations must satisfy the
dissemination requirements of the 2012 guidelines (including any requirements
established by the agency that originally provided the data to NCTC), as well as the
Privacy Act. Once information has been disseminated by NCTC to its counterterrorism
partners, the information is protected by applicable laws and policies, including the
Privacy Act (for all Federal agencies) and Executive Order (EO) 12333 (for IC elements).
These measures are subject to compliance and oversight measures at NCTC, as
implemented by the NCTC Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, NCTC legal counsel, and
NCTC management.
III. Previously Reported Activities
This section provides updates on programs that were described in last years
report. In the interest of transparency, certain research programs of the Intelligence
Advanced Research Project Activity (IARPA) were discussed in last years report. The
mission of IARPA is to invest in high-risk/high-payoff research programs that have the
potential to provide the United States with an overwhelming intelligence advantage over
its future adversaries. It does not have an operational mission and it does not deploy
technologies directly to the field. As a scientific research funding organization, IARPA
does not use, nor does it expect to make use of, data mining technology. IARPA programs
are by nature experimental and are designed to produce new capabilities. The end goal of
an IARPA program is typically a proof-of-concept experiment or prototype of an entirely
new capability. Due to their high-risk research nature, IARPA programs do not always
achieve their end goals, and when they do, further steps are required to transform the
results into real world applications. Any results from IARPA research programs that do get
incorporated into future operational programs within the IC, or other parts of the Federal
Government, will be subject to appropriate legal, privacy, civil liberties and policy
safeguards.
A. Knowledge Discovery and Dissemination (KDD) Program.
The KDD scientific research program is an IARPA program begun in 2009. A
Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for KDD was released on December 22, 2009 and
KDD research contracts were awarded in September 2010. The KDD program completed
its third period in November 2013.
The objective of the KDD program is to enable an analyst to utilize large, complex
and varied datasets not seen previously to produce actionable intelligence in a timely
manner. KDD tackles two significant technical areas: (1) how to quickly understand the
novel data sets so that the contents can be correctly integrated with data sets that are
already in use (this is termed alignment); and (2) how to construct automatic analysis
tools that are able to work effectively across multiple aligned data sets. KDD research
results are evaluated using realistic challenge problems throughout the program.
In evaluations of research teams prototypes, the KDD scientific research program
utilizes real-world, classified data sets that are large and complex. KDD research is
evaluated in the context of challenge problems using these data sets. The challenge
problems are not problems that require data mining technology as defined by the Data
Mining Reporting Act. The data sets used by researchers are highly varied, including,
regional biographic data, incident reports, translated newspaper articles, etc. The use of all
data sets is consistent with all U.S. laws and regulations.
B. Automated Low-level Analysis and Description of Diverse Intelligence
Video (ALADDIN Video) Program.
The ALADDIN Video scientific research program released a BAA in June 2010,
and research contracts were awarded in February 2011. The ALADDIN program
completed its third round of testing in the Fall of 2013.
The objective of the ALADDIN program is to enable an analyst to query large
video data sets to quickly and reliably locate those video clips that show a specific type of
event. The ALADDIN program is researching technologies designed to automatically
search large numbers of video data files for analyst-defined events of interest and directing
the analyst to those video data files that are likely to contain occurrences of those events.
ALADDINs technologies, if successful, will help to automate a triage process that is
mostly performed manually by analysts at the current time. Although this is not data
mining, technologies that result from ALADDIN research could potentially be applied by
operational organizations to support capabilities that involve pattern recognition.
ALADDIN research addresses three significant technical areas: (1) High-speed
processing of large amounts of video clips to extract information that can later be used to
support queries about each clips contents; (2) Generation of effective queries from small
sets of example video clips and a textual description; and (3) Robust query processing that
identifies the clips of interest and summarizes the rationale for their selection. ALADDIN
research results will be evaluated by IARPA and the National Institute for Standards and
Technology (NIST).
The ALADDIN program uses video data files in its research and evaluations that
are acquired by NIST for its annual, international video search technology research
program (TRECVID). TRECVID sponsors public evaluations of video and multimedia
search technologies that are open to worldwide participation. ALADDIN performers will
participate in these evaluations to demonstrate objective progress in their research. The
data collection used in the TRECVID evaluations are made available to all participants
through an evaluation participation agreement that stipulates that the TRECVID data is to
be used for research purposes only. The TRECVID data is collected using a rigorous
process that protects privacy.
C. Security and Privacy Assurance (SPAR) Program.
The SPAR program is a follow-on effort to the Automatic Privacy Protection
(APP) program discussed in the 2009 and 2010 ODNI Data Mining Reports. Neither the
SPAR nor APP programs involve data mining, but the research results from both programs
may enhance security and protect privacy in data mining activities.
The APP program ended in 2010 after achieving two goals. First, it developed
secure distributed private information retrieval (PIR) protocols that permit an entity
(Client) to query a cooperating data provider (Server) and retrieve only the records that
match the query without the Server learning what query was posed or what results were
returned. These protocols are able to add only minimal overheads in computation and
communication for simple queries and databases by using a cooperating third party who
has access only to encrypted data. Second, APP demonstrated algorithms to determine
automatically if complex queries are in compliance with privacy policies. This allows a
Clients auditor with access to the policy and the query history to rapidly verify that only
authorized queries have been submitted to the Server.
The SPAR program was launched in 2011 to build on the successes of APP and
explore additional applications of PIR to realistic IC scenarios. The program completed its
first phase of research in March 2013 and started its second phase of research in April
2013. SPAR includes research projects in three technical areas. The first technical area
protects security and privacy for database access. Unlike the simple queries and static
databases of APP, SPAR will investigate protocols that handle multiple types of complex
queries and databases whose records are frequently created, deleted, or updated. In
addition, the protocols must integrate policy compliance checking with the security and
privacy assurances so that the Server can verify that a query is compliant with a policy
even though the query is never learned. The second technical area will build on advances
in fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes to implement PIR without relying on
any third parties. FHE is a recent breakthrough result of thirty years of cryptographic
research, but current schemes are impractical due to high costs in time and memory. SPAR
will attempt to explore gains in performance by modified FHE schemes that support only
the computations necessary for information retrieval. The third technical area will
investigate applications of PIR to the specialized information sharing architectures of
publish/subscribe, email/message queues, and outsourced data storage systems.
If successful, the SPAR protocols will enable the IC to meet the need to access data
for classified or sensitive purposes with strong civil liberties and privacy protections.
SPAR allows the IC to access specific records without having to disclose classified data
and without accessing, learning, ingesting, or retaining any private information about non-
relevant persons. The technology may enhance cooperative information sharing with the
IC and other parts of the Federal Government, and with the private sector, by expanding
policy options for satisfying security and privacy concerns when information is shared.
IV. Protection of Privacy and Civil Liberties.
The ODNI Civil Liberties and Privacy Office (CLPO) works closely with the
ODNI Office of General Counsel, other ODNI components and with IC elements to ensure
appropriate legal, privacy, and civil liberties safeguards are incorporated into policies,
processes and procedures that support the intelligence mission. The CLPO is led by the
Civil Liberties Protection Officer, a position established by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. The duties of this position are set
forth in this Act, and include: ensuring that the protection of civil liberties and privacy is
appropriately incorporated in the policies of the ODNI and the IC; overseeing compliance
by the ODNI with legal requirements relating to civil liberties and privacy; reviewing
complaints about potential abuses of privacy and civil liberties in ODNI programs and
activities; and ensuring that technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections
relating to the use, collection, and other disclosure of personal information.5 Before any
tool or technology could be used in an operational setting, the use of the tool or
technology would need to be examined pursuant to EO 12333, the Privacy Act, and other
applicable requirements to determine how the tool could be used consistent with the
framework for protecting USP information.
The IC has in place a protective infrastructure built in principal part on a core set
of USP rules derived from EO 12333. This EO requires each IC element to maintain
procedures, approved by the Attorney General, governing the collection, retention and
dissemination of USP information. These procedures limit the type of information that
may be collected, retained or disseminated to the categories listed in part 2.3 of the EO.
Each IC elements Attorney General-approved USP guidance is interpreted, applied, and
overseen by that elements Office of General Counsel, Office of Inspector General, and
other compliance offices as appropriate. Violations are reported to the Intelligence
Oversight Board of the Presidents Intelligence Advisory Board. In addition to EO 12333,
IC elements are subject to the requirements of the Privacy Act, which protects information
about U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens that a government agency maintains and
retrieves by name or unique identifier.
The ICs privacy and civil liberties protective infrastructure is also bolstered by
guidance and directives issued by the Office of Management and Budget, including
memoranda regarding the reporting of and response to incidents involving personally
identifiable information and the minimization of Social Security Numbers.
Going forward, the IC will also conform to policies and procedures relating to
protections for all personal information contained in SIGINT, which are required to be put
in place by Presidential Policy Directive 28 (issued on January 17, 2014).
FOOTNOTES
1 As stated in prior reports, certain analytic tools and techniques, such as link-
analysis tools, rely on personal identifiers of a specific individual, or inputs associated
with a specific individual or group of individuals, such as a known or suspected terrorist,
or other subject of foreign intelligence interest, and use various methods to uncover links
or relationships between the known subject and potential associates or other persons with
whom that subject has a link (a contact or relationship). Such tools and techniques are
not considered to meet the data mining definition of the Act.
2 Section 804(b)(1)(A) of Public Law 110-53.
3 Overview of NCTCs Data Access as Authorized by the 2012 Attorney General
Guidelines, published by the National Counterterrorism Center, available at
www.nctc.gov/transparency.html
4 Upon certain findings (for which every data set acquired by NCTC is reviewed) -
such as data that contains especially sensitive personal information - Enhanced
Safeguards may also be applied. NCTC reports annually to the ODNI CLPO, the ODNI
General Counsel and the IC IG on the measures that NCTC is taking to ensure that USP
information in its possession is being handled appropriately.
5 National Security Act of 1947 [50 U.S.C. 3029].
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Interim Progress Report on Implementing PPD-28
 By Robert Litt and Alexander W. Joel
As the President said in his speech on January 17, 2014, the challenges posed by
threats like terrorism, proliferation, and cyber-attacks are not going away any time soon,
and for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul, we must maintain
the trust of the American people, and people around the world.
As a part of that effort, the President made clear that the United States is
committed to protecting the personal information of all people regardless of nationality.
This commitment is reflected in the directions the President gave to the Intelligence
Community on that same day, when he issued Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28,
Signals Intelligence Activities.
New Standards for Safeguarding Privacy
PPD-28 reinforces current practices, establishes new principles, and strengthens
oversight, to ensure that in conducting signals intelligence activities, the United States
takes into account not only the security needs of our nation and our allies, but also the
privacy of people around the world.
The Intelligence Community already conducts signals intelligence activities in a
carefully controlled manner, pursuant to the law and subject to layers of oversight,
focusing on important foreign intelligence and national security priorities. But as the
President recognized, [o]ur efforts will only be effective if ordinary citizens in other
countries have confidence that the United States respects their privacy too.
To that end, the Intelligence Community has been working hard to implement
PPD-28 within the framework of existing processes, resources, and capabilities, while
ensuring that mission needs continue to be met.
In particular, PPD-28 directs intelligence agencies to review and update their
policies and processes - and establish new ones as appropriate - to safeguard personal
information collected through signals intelligence, regardless of nationality and consistent
with our technical capabilities and operational needs.
Released Today - The PPD-28 Interim Report
As we work to meet the January 2015 deadline, PPD-28 called on the Director of
National Intelligence to prepare an interim report on the status of our efforts and to
evaluate, in coordination with the Department of Justice and the rest of the Intelligence
Community, additional retention and dissemination safeguards.
The DNIs interim report is now being made available to the public in line with our
pledge to share as much information about sensitive intelligence activities as is possible,
consistent with our national security.
The report is the product of many months of work within the Intelligence
Community and with our partners in the other parts of the United States Government, and
it draws on conversations agencies have held with outside stakeholders.
Key Privacy Principles for the Intelligence Community
We encourage you to read the whole report released today. It articulates key
principles for agencies to incorporate in their policies and procedures, including some
which afford protections that go beyond those explicitly outlined in PPD-28. These
principles include the following:
* Ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are integral considerations in signals
intelligence activities.
* Limiting the use of signals intelligence collected in bulk to the specific approved
purposes set forth in PPD-28.
* Ensuring that analytic practices and standards appropriately require that queries
of collected signals intelligence information are duly authorized and focused.
* Ensuring that retention and dissemination standards for United States person
information under Executive Order 12333 are also applied, where feasible, to all personal
information in signals intelligence, regardless of nationality.
* Clarifying that the Intelligence Community will not retain or disseminate
information as foreign intelligence solely because the information relates to a foreign
person.
* Developing procedures to ensure that unevaluated signals intelligence is not
retained for more than five years, unless the DNI determines after careful evaluation of
appropriate civil liberties and privacy concerns, that continued retention is in the national
security interests of the United States.
* Reinforcing and strengthening internal handling of privacy and civil liberties
complaints.
* Reviewing training to ensure that the workforce understands the responsibility to
protect personal information, regardless of nationality. Successful completion of this
training must be a prerequisite for accessing personal information in unevaluated signals
intelligence.
* Developing oversight and compliance programs to ensure adherence to PPD-28
and agency procedures, which could include auditing and periodic reviews by appropriate
oversight and compliance officials of the practices for protecting personal information
contained in signals intelligence and the agencies compliance with those procedures.
* Publicly releasing, to the extent consistent with classification requirements, the
procedures developed pursuant to PPD-28.
In the coming months, we will continue to work to complete this review. Taken
together, these principles make meaningful progress towards the Presidents goal of
ensuring that ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States
respects their privacy, too.
Robert Litt is the General Counsel for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Alexander W. Joel is the Civil Liberties Protection Officer for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
 Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Evaluation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Under the Reducing Over-Classification Act
Report Number INS-2014-002
30 December 2014
UNCLASSIFIED
Executive Summary
Evaluation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG) conducted this evaluation
pursuant to the Reducing Over-Classification Act (ROCA), Public Law 111-258 (October
7, 2010). The ROCA states, the Inspector General of each department or agency of the
United States with an officer or employee who is authorized to make original
classifications, in consultation with the Information Security Oversight Office, shall carry
out no less than two evaluations of that department or agency or a component of the
department or agency
(A) to assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and
regulations have been adopted, followed, and effectively administered within such
department, agency, or component; and,
(B) to identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices
that may be contributing to persistent misclassification of material within such
department, agency or component.
IC IG found no instances where classification was used to conceal violation of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or
agency; restrain competition; or prevent or delay the release of information not requiring
protection in the interest of national security.
IC IG found the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has
adopted all applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations. However,
some ODNI procedures and management practices require refinement to ensure full
compliance with, and effective administration of, the prescribed standards and
requirements. Specifically, IC IG found:
Original Classification Authority (OCA) training records, and the business
processes used to monitor that training, require improvement.
The ODNI OCA program is generally effective, with built-in redundancy to
ensure uniformity and compliance with Executive Order (E.O.) 13526; however, the
number of authorized ODNI OCAs may be too high compared to other Intelligence
Community elements.
ODNI compliance with mandatory derivative classifier training periodicity
requirements, records of training, and the business processes used to monitor training,
require improvement to meet the requirements of E.O. 13526.
 Derivative classifier training and product quality assurance by supervisors,
managers, and production officers requires improvement.
The focused engagement of the ODNI Chief Management Officer (CMO),
Director Information Management Division, and other senior leaders throughout ODNI
will be needed to ensure maximum compliance.
The Intelligence Community: Common Themes
In addition to the evaluation of the ODNI under ROCA, the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community directed the IC IG to conduct a review and analysis of the
ROCA reports from the Inspectors General (IG) of five Intelligence Community (IC)
partners - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), and
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) - and the IC IG evaluation of the ODNI to
determine the extent that systemic issues might require the immediate attention of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on an IC-wide basis.
The IC IG review and analysis identified three key areas requiring emphasis across
the IC enterprise - training, effective program management, and oversight. Specifically:
Training:
* Two IG reports noted that less than half of their workforce met the recurring
biennial training requirement, while two others noted their organizations did not measure
compliance with this requirement.
* Five of the six IG reports found their training for derivative classifiers did not
adequately prepare those personnel to make derivative classification decisions.
Program management:
* All six IG reports noted their organizations self-inspection program did not fully
comply with the E.O. 13526 requirements.
Oversight:
* One IG report noted its organization did not assess appropriate performance
metrics as part of its oversight of the IC classification markings program.
The use of standardized classification and control markings, part of classification
management, are the primary means by which the IC protects intelligence sources,
methods, and activities. The proper application and use of these markings enables
information sharing while allowing information to be properly safeguarded from
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure.
The development of a modular IC-wide derivative classifier training program
could reduce costs and enhance efficiency. The bulk of the IC derivative classifier training
requirements are derived from common sources: E.O. 13526; 32 Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) 2001; the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) booklet,
Marking Classified National Security Information; ISOO Notice 2012-01: Requirements
for Derivative Classifier Training; the Intelligence Community Markings System Register
and Manual; Intelligence Community Directives; and Intelligence Community Policy
Guidance.
Overall, effective program management - including high quality training, self-
inspections, and adequate oversight - requires an increased emphasis across the IC
enterprise.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Evaluation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The Intelligence Community: Common Themes
Results and Recommendations
Finding 1: Intelligence Community Enterprise: The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence oversight of the Intelligence Community classification management
program requires improvement
Finding 2: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: The Original
Classification Authority training records, and the business processes used to monitor that
training, requires improvement
Finding 3: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: The Original
Classification Authority Program was generally effective with built-in redundancy to
ensure uniformity and compliance with E.O. 13526; however, the number of authorized
ODNI OCAs appears greater than the minimum required
Finding 4: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Compliance with
mandatory derivative classifier training, maintenance of training records, and the business
processes used to monitor training, requires significant improvement
Finding 5: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Derivative classifier
training and product quality assurance by supervisors, managers, and production officers
requires improvement
Appendix A: Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Appendix B: Background and Authorities
Appendix C: Definitions
Appendix D: Acronyms
Appendix E: References
Appendix F: ODNI Chief Management Officer Comments
Results and Recommendations
Finding 1: Intelligence Community Enterprise: The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence oversight of the Intelligence Community classification
management program requires improvement.
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 710, Classification Control Markings and
Management System (June 21, 2013), and its predecessor ICD 710, Classification and
Control Markings System (September 11, 2009), require the heads of Intelligence
Community (IC) elements to certify the training of their workforce with an annual report
to the Director of National Intelligence through the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX). ONCIX prepares that report with IC elements
input provided in response to an annual ONCIX questionnaire. The process does not
include independent ODNI data validation.
ICD 710 also assigns the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC
CIO) the responsibility to [m]onitor IC element compliance, implementation, and
reporting activities associated with EO 13526 requirements.
IC IG reviewed the 2012 ONCIX report Annual Report to the Director of
National Intelligence on the Use of Control Markings in the Intelligence Community. A
comparison of that report with the findings from the same time period contained in the
ROCA reports from Inspectors General (IG) of five Intelligence Community (IC) partners
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), National Security Agency (NSA), and National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) - and the IC IG evaluation of the ODNI determined there
were significant differences in the conclusions between the ONCIX report to the DNI and
the IG reports.
According to the Policy Compliance and Oversight section of the 2012 ONCIX
report, [a]ll IC elements and OUSD(I) have established self-inspection programs as
directed by EO 13526. However, all six IG reports noted their organizations self-
inspection program did not fully comply with the requirements of E.O. 13526. A review of
the 2012 ONCIX questionnaire revealed that ONCIX asked agencies if they had an
organizational program, but did not ask if that program was in full compliance with the
requirements set forth in E.O. 13526 and 32 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) 2001.
Similarly, according to the Workforce Training section of the 2012 ONCIX report,
[a]ll IC elements reported being in compliance with EO 13526. The EO mandates that
persons who apply derivative classification markings receive training in derivative
classification principles, with an emphasis on avoiding overclassification [sic], at least
once every two years. Two of the IG ROCA reports noted less than half of their
workforce met the recurring biennial training requirement while two others noted their
organizations did not track compliance with this requirement. Further, five of the six IG
reports found their training for derivative classifiers did not sufficiently prepare personnel
to make accurate derivative classification decisions. Again, a review of the 2012 ONCIX
questionnaire revealed the question ONCIX posed measured for the presence of an
organizational training requirement, but failed to measure for compliance with that
requirement or assess the quality of the training.
The 2013 ONCIX Control Markings report questionnaire did not contain most of
the questions regarding Policy Compliance and Oversight, and Workforce Training
because ONCIX personnel reasoned the continued reporting of full compliance with those
questions provided little-to-no actionable information to ODNI leadership.
IC CIO leverages the Classification Markings Implementation Working Group to
engage on specific agency classification issues. IC CIO also uses self-inspection reports
from CIA, DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA to monitor those elements compliance with E.O.
13526; however, IC CIO does not use self-inspection reports from other IC elements for
monitoring because the responses from those cabinet-level departments comingle
intelligence and non-intelligence classification management data.
Recommendation 1: The ODNI should align the monitoring authorities and
reporting responsibilities for the IC Classification Management Program under a
single office to provide more effective and efficient oversight. Performance metrics
that office develops should measure workforce compliance and assess the quality of
IC training efforts.
Management Comments: Concur. ODNI management will review options for
consolidating classification monitoring and reporting responsibilities in one office.
That component will be tasked with providing effective oversight of IC training and
compliance efforts.
Finding 2: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: The Original
Classification Authority training records, and the business processes used to monitor
that training, require improvement.
IC IG partnered with the Information Management Division (IMD) within the
ODNI Office of the Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC CIO) to
evaluate ODNI Original Classification Authority (OCA) training compliance with E.O.
13526, 32 C.F.R. 2011.70-71, Intelligence Community Directives, and ODNI
Instructions.
OCAs are individuals authorized in writing, by either the President, the Vice
President, or agency heads, or other officials designated by the President, to originally
classify information. By definition, original classification precedes all other aspects of the
security classification system, including derivative classification, safeguarding, and
declassification. 32 C.F.R. 2011.70 requires OCAs to receive training in proper
classification and declassification prior to originally classifying information, and at least
once each calendar year thereafter. Both E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2011.70 require the
agency head or senior agency official to suspend the classification authority of any OCA
who fails to meet this training requirement until such training has taken place.
ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of Original
Classification Authority (OCA) (December 3, 2013), ODNI Instruction 80.12,
Classification of Office of Director of National Intelligence Information (October 25,
2010), and ODNI Instruction 80.16, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Original Classification Authority (May 19, 2014) require that ODNI OCAs receive
training prior to originally classifying information and at least once each successive
calendar year. ODNI Instruction 80.12 5.F further states [p]ersonnel designated as
OCAs will receive mandated training when designated
IC IG reviewed the training records for all ODNI OCAs who made an original
classification decision between January 2008 and May 2014. In all but one case, OCAs
had the mandated training prior to making an initial original classification decision.
Redundant review processes established under ODNI Instructions 10.03, 80.12, and 80.16
ensured the one decision made prior to the responsible OCA completing training was
reviewed by a certified OCA for compliance with E.O. 13526 prior to being published.
Evaluators found minor discrepancies in the administration of the ODNIs OCA
training program in the following areas:
On two occasions, OCAs were given credit for completing training in both CY
2012 and CY 2013 by completing their CY 2012 training in early January 2013.
OCA initial training did not meet the when designated requirement of ODNI
Instruction 80.12; however, average elapsed time between designation and initial training
has steadily dropped since 2012 and now stands at slightly over 70 days.
Some OCAs were erroneously given credit for their predecessors training due to
IMD tracking training by position only, instead of by position and name.
IMD staff reconstructed some records of OCA training from the personal records
of some Special Assistants due to a transition between records hosting environments.
Recommendation 2: None. ODNI-initiated corrective actions for these minor
discrepancies were already underway during this evaluation. Accordingly, we make
no specific corrective recommendations on these points.
Management Comments: All OCA training will be conducted in a limited
period of time to cover the particular calendar year. This change, in addition to a
significant reduction in the number of OCAs, will greatly improve compliance with
training requirements.
Finding 3: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: The Original
Classification Authority Program was generally effective with built-in redundancy to
ensure uniformity and compliance with E.O. 13526; however, the number of
authorized ODNI OCAs appears greater than the minimum required.
IC IG found the ODNI Original Classification Authority program is generally
effective with built-in redundancy to ensure uniformity and compliance with E.O. 13526.
Presidential Order, Original Classification Authority (December 29, 2009), designated the
DNI to classify information originally up to and including TOP SECRET. The DNI
delegated this authority to 24 senior intelligence officers within the ODNI via ODNI
Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of Original Classification
Authority (OCA) (December 3, 2013).
ODNI instructions require advanced coordination with the Director, Information
Management Division (D/IMD) for all original classification decisions to ensure
uniformity and compliance with E.O. 13526. In the rare event an emergent, operational
circumstance requires an OCA decision and immediate coordination with the D/IMD is
not feasible, the OCA is required to notify the D/IMD as soon as feasible, but not later
than ten days after making the decision.
E.O. 13526 1.3(c)(1) directs [d]elegations of original classification authority
shall be limited to the minimum required to administer this order. ODNI Instruction
10.03 further directs the D/IMD to periodically review the positions granted OCA for
removal if OCA has not been utilized.
Three ODNI OCAs made a total of 45 original classification decisions between FY
2011 and FY 2013. One was a major revision to the ODNI Classification guide while 44
were element classification guides authored by two ODNI components.
Recommendation 3: D/IMD should review positions granted OCA pursuant to
ODNI Instruction 10.03, and in consultation with the Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Intelligence Integration and through the Chief Management Officer,
recommend to the DNI adjustments minimizing those positions delegated OCA.
Note: The DNI updated ODNI Instruction 10.03 on October 31, 2014 in response to
this recommendation.
Management Comments: Concur; action completed. A revised Instruction
10.03 was signed by the DNI on 31 October 2014, reducing the number of ODNI
OCAs from 24 to 10.
Finding 4: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Compliance with
mandatory derivative classifier training, maintenance of training records, and the
business processes used to monitor training, requires significant improvement.
32 C.F.R. 2011.70 requires derivative classifiers to receive training in proper
application of the derivative classification principles of E.O. 13526 prior to derivatively
classifying information (initial) and at least once every two calendar years thereafter
(recurring). 32 C.F.R. 2011.71 and ISOO Notice 2012-01: Requirements for Derivative
Classifier Training (December 8, 2011) establish minimum training content.
ODNI Instruction 80.12, which applies to all ODNI components and all
categories of ODNI personnel, mandates training for derivative classifiers, states
[p]ersonnel authorized to derivatively classify ODNI information will receive basic
classification training within 30 days of arrival (normally as part of [Entry on Duty]
training) as well as mandated refresher training. ODNI Instruction 80.12 6 also directs:
C. Program Managers who control and administer programmatic, financial,
contractual, and other resources will:
(1) Ensure that all derivative classifiers, including contractor personnel, attend
training on the proper classification of information.
Mandatory Initial Training
ODNI removed the 15-minute segment dedicated to initial derivative classifier
training from the Entry on Duty (EOD) course in late 2012. Instead, in CY 2013 ODNI
used two online courses: the Agency Information Security Course (AISC) and Staying Out
of Trouble on the Internet. Both courses were required on first login to gain general
classified computer access and to meet the initial derivative classifier training
requirement. According to IMD, completion of the ODNI Classification Management
Course (classroom or web-based training) was also encouraged, but not required.
IC IG reviewed the EOD derivative classifier training (prior to its removal), and
the AISC and Staying Out of Trouble on the Internet courses, against the minimum
training requirements described in 32 C.F.R. 2011.71 and ISOO Notice 2012-01, and
found all three inadequate (see table below).
Based on a direct comparison of electronic training records with EOD attendance
records, IC IG was able to substantiate that only 70 percent of the government employees
and 20 percent of the contractor employees who initially reported to ODNI between
January 2012 and April 2014 completed the mandatory initial classification management
training.
Mandatory Recurring Training
ODNI Human Resources (HR) accepted two courses to fulfill the mandatory
recurring derivative classifier training requirements of E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R.
2011.71 during FY 2012 and FY 2013:
ODNI Classification Management Course (classroom or web-based training)
CIA Derivative Classification Course - 2013
Compliance with the mandatory recurring derivative classifier training requirement
for the overall ODNI government workforce was calculated as 44 percent based on a
comparison of the total number of government employee course completions documented
in electronic training records between January 2012 and April 2014 with the total ODNI
government workforce during the same timeframe.
Two factors, however, mitigate the calculated low compliance rate:
1. During quality assurance review of the initial training data, evaluators
discovered the Lawson training system underreported course completion by 4.5 percent.
The results of this report reflect the corrected data.
2. The web-based ODNI Classification Management Course did not automatically
update the employees training record, and instead the employee had to print a certificate
and provide it to their components HR representative for manual electronic training
record entry. This manual process introduced an unknown number of compliance errors.
Both E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2011.70 require the agency head or senior
agency official to suspend the Derivative Classification Authority of anyone who fails to
meet this training requirement until such training has taken place. None of the ODNI
Instructions emphasize the requirement for suspending Original or Derivative
Classification Authority contained in E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2011.70. IC IG found no
instances where ODNI suspended Original or Derivative Classification Authority for non-
compliance with training requirements.
On June 26, 2014, subsequent to the evaluation of the electronic training records,
but prior to the publishing of this evaluation, the ODNI CMO directed all ODNI cadre
who had not completed the mandatory derivative classification course in the past nine
months to complete the CIAs online training module (Derivative Classifier Training 2013
- Web Based Training) prior to October 1, 2014.
Recommendation 4: ODNI CMO should require completion of initial
derivative classifier training for all categories of newly reporting employees pursuant
to E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2001.
Management Comments: Concur; action completed. CIO/IMD has resolved
this issue by working with MSD to track all new EODs to ensure that training is
completed within ten days of arrival or CWE access is suspended. This process has
been in place since June 2014.
Finding 5: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Derivative classifier
training and product quality assurance by supervisors, managers, and production
officers requires improvement.
32 C.F.R. 2001.23 Classification marking in the electronic environment, in
implementing E.O. 13526, specifically requires national security information in the
electronic environment to meet all classification marking requirements. When it cannot be
appropriately marked, 32 C.F.R. 2001.23(a)(4) requires .a warning shall be applied to
alert users that the information may not be used as a source for derivative classification
and providing a point of contact and instructions for users to receive further guidance on
the use and classification of the information.
The IC IGs review of 200 intelligence products electronically published between
January and March 2014 by the National Counterterrorism Center and National
Intelligence Council, as well as 66 pieces of classified correspondence signed by senior
ODNI officials, found that less than 10 percent were fully compliant with classification
directives contained in E.O. 13526, 32 C.F.R. 2001, and the Intelligence Community
Markings System Register and Manual (Dec. 31, 2013). Some examples of the
nonconformities with the materials IC IG reviewed included:
Eight percent of the NCTC products continued to use the 25X1-Human entry in
the classification block. E.O. 13526 eliminated the use of 25X1-Human when the E.O.
was fully implemented on June 27, 2010. The Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) also emphasized this through the issuance of ISOO Notice 2012-02: Classification
Marking Instructions on the Use of 50X1-HUM vs. 25X1-human as a Declassification
Instruction (December 23, 2011).
Twenty-eight percent of the intelligence products used the 50-year
declassification date when there was no sensitive human source information to justify the
extended period of classification. E.O. 13526 prohibits the use of 50X1 except for
information that should clearly and demonstrably be expected to reveal the identity of a
confidential human source or a human intelligence source (50X1-HUM) or key design
concepts of weapons of mass destruction (50X2-WMD).
Forty percent of the intelligence products were marked HCS vice specifying
HCS-P (product) or HCS-O (operational). The Intelligence Community Markings
System Register and Manual (December 31, 2013) states All HCS information is
contained within the O and P compartments; the HCS marking may no longer be used
alone. Legacy information marked HCS must be remarked HCS-P if reused. However,
the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on May 20, 2014 issued new
guidance to the IC delaying the required implementation of the HCS-P and HCS-O
markings until January 1, 2015.
Twenty-three percent of the intelligence products used Multiple Sources on the
Declassify On: line of the classification block but did not include the listing of source
materials as E.O. 13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2001 required. Another ten percent did include a
list of source materials, but failed to fully comply with the content provisions of E.O.
13526 and 32 C.F.R. 2001. The ODNI Classification Management Self-Inspection
Program report for FY 2013 (November 22, 2013) found a similar percentage of reviewed
documents citing Multiple Sources that failed to provide a list of source documents to
support the classification decision.
A number of products failed to follow guidance on portion markings. This
included classification of country names, the names of common chemical compounds, and
individual words (e.g., in one product, the word Assumptions was by itself portion
marked S//NF). There were several instances where identical text was classified at two
different classification levels (i.e., TOP SECRET in one document and SECRET in
another) or two different dissemination caveats (i.e., NOFORN in one document and
Releasable in another), an example of overgrading. 32 C.F.R. 2001.21 states, In cases
where portions are segmented such as paragraphs, sub-paragraphs, bullets, and sub-bullets
and the classification level is the same throughout, it is sufficient to put only one portion
marking at the beginning of the main paragraph or main bullet. If there are different levels
of classification among these segments, then all segments shall be portion marked
separately in order to avoid over-classification of any one segment. If the information
contained in a sub-paragraph or sub-bullet is a higher level of classification than its parent
paragraph or parent bullet, this does not make the parent paragraph or parent bullet
classified at that same level. Each portion shall reflect the classification level of that
individual portion and not any other portions.
While the apparently low compliance with the initial and recurring Derivative
Classifier training requirement identified in Finding 4 may have contributed to a higher
error rate, IC IG also identified another contributing factor - ODNI mandatory annual
training does not fully incorporate the recommended annual refresher security education
and training elements listed under 32 C.F.R. 2001.71(f) (table below).
IC IG evaluated the current ODNI Classification Management Course training
materials (classroom and online) to determine if the course was in compliance with the
minimum derivative classifier training criteria established under E.O. 13526 2.1(d); 32
C.F.R. 2001.71(e) and (f); and ISOO Notice 2012-01: Requirements for Derivative
Classifier Training (December 8, 2011). IC IG determined the course materials did comply
with the minimum training criteria; however, some areas requiring improvement may be
contributing to the issues noted above. Those areas are:
The classroom and online courses were insufficiently modified between 2012 and
2014 to address issues identified during the 2013 ODNI annual self-inspection.
The online course is generic to the IC and touches on the elements of a
classification block; however, it does not address the specific steps or citations necessary
to make a derivative classification decision using the ODNI classification guide, nor does
it delve into the nuances of those decisions; and,
The practical exercises included as part of the classroom and online courses
focused solely on the proper construction of a security banner.
Subsequent to the evaluation of the online ODNI Classification Management
Course, but prior to the publishing of this evaluation, the ODNI CMO on June 26, 2014
directed all ODNI cadre who had not completed the mandatory derivative classification
course in the past nine months to complete the CIAs online training module (Derivative
Classifier Training 2013 - Web Based Training) prior to October 1, 2014.
Recommendation 5a: ODNI CMO should direct IMD to enhance the training
of derivative classifiers to thoroughly explain their responsibilities and how to
properly apply classification concepts and markings.
Management Comments: Concur. As noted in the report, the current courses
meet the minimum training requirements, but IMD will continue to enhance the
training based on the feedback from this report and other sources.
Recommendation 5b: ODNI CMO should direct supervisors, managers, and
production officers to emphasize classification review as part of their quality
assurance procedures.
Management Comments: Concur. The CMO will work with IMD to identify
ways to emphasize classification review to supervisors, managers, and production
officers.
Recommendation 5c: ODNI CMO should explore additional strategies to
ensure information is systematically reviewed for overgrading and over-
classification.
Management Comments: Concur. We will charge CIO/IMD with a
requirement to develop a continuous education campaign to inform/sensitize/remind
managers that they need to specifically check for over-classification on intelligence
reports and products that they approve. In addition, we will explore with other IC
elements initiatives they are taking to minimize or eliminate over-classification,
especially given that the limited classification experts we have are largely dedicated
to addressing the FOIA and other required declassification backlog. It is important
to note that employees make complicated classification decisions every day, and while
it is clear over-classification does occur, all ODNI documents are reviewed by
classification experts when information is to be released; adjustments are made at
that time, if necessary, to correct over- and underclassification.
Appendix A: Evaluation Scope and Methodology
Scope
IC IG conducted this evaluation pursuant to the Reducing Over-Classification Act,
Public Law 111-258 (October 7, 2010). The ROCA requires the Inspector General of
each department or agency of the United States with an officer or employee who is
authorized to make original classifications, in consultation with the Information Security
Oversight Office, shall carry out no less than two evaluations of that department or agency
or a component of the department or agency
(A) to assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and
regulations have been adopted, followed, and effectively administered within such
department, agency, or component; and
(B) to identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or management practices
that may be contributing to persistent misclassification of material within such
department, agency or component.
 Additionally, IC IG evaluated the IC ROCA reports from the Inspectors General
(IG) CIA, DIA, NGA, NSA, and NRO for IC-wide issues.
Methodology
The evaluation team used the Department of Defense Inspector General authored
guide, A Standard Users Guide for Inspectors General Conducting Evaluations Under
Public Law 111-258, the Reducing Over-Classification Act (January 22, 2013), to
conduct the evaluation, to ensure our evaluation followed a consistent methodology to
allow for cross-agency analysis. Evaluators reviewed the following eight areas for
compliance with Executive Orders, regulations, directives, policies, and procedures:
Original classification authority;
General program management responsibilities;
Original classification, to include control markings;
Derivative classification, to include control markings;
Self-inspections;
Reporting;
Security education and training; and,
Intelligence Community cross-cutting issues, as applicable.
The evaluation team reviewed:
Relevant documents establishing criteria (Executive Orders, regulations,
directives, policies, and procedures);
Relevant Intelligence Community Directives, Intelligence Community Policy
Guidance, Intelligence Community Standards, and internal ODNI Instructions;
Original Classification Authority training records from January 2008 to May 2014;
Staff and contractor derivative classifier training records from January 2012 to
May 2014;
ODNI and component authored or assigned Security Classification Guides;
Original and derivative classifier training materials from January 2011 to May
2014;
A judgmental sample of classified correspondence senior ODNI officials signed;
A judgmental sample of classified intelligence products the National
Counterterrorism Center and National Intelligence Council produced and electronically
published; and,
ODNI Self-Inspection and SF-311 Reports for FY 2011 through FY 2013.
Appendix B: Background and Authorities
Background
Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, Classified National Security Information,
December 29, 2009, prescribes a uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and
declassifying national security information.
E.O. 13526 also expresses the Presidents belief that the Nations progress depends
on the free flow of information, both within the government and to the American people.
Accordingly, protecting information critical to national security and demonstrating a
commitment to open government through accurate and accountable application of
classification standards and effective declassification are equally important priorities.
Federal Government organizations that create or hold classified information are
responsible for its proper management. Classification management includes developing
security classification guides (SCGs) through which Original Classification Authorities
(OCA) provide instructions to derivative classifiers. These instructions identify elements
of information on a specific subject that must be classified and the classification level and
duration for each element.
Only OCAs may originally classify information. These are individuals authorized
in writing, by either the President, the Vice President, or agency heads, or other officials
the President designates to originally classify information. By definition, original
classification precedes all other aspects of the security classification system, including
derivative classification, safeguarding, and declassification.
ODNI Senior Agency Official
Pursuant to E.O. 13526, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) designated the
Chief Management Officer (CMO) as the ODNI Senior Agency Official accountable for
directing and administering the program under which ODNI information is classified,
safeguarded, and declassified. The Director, Information Management Division (IMD), in
the Office of the IC Chief Information Officer (OIC/CIO), supports the CMO in carrying
out these responsibilities. The Director, IMD, serves as the ODNI focal point for
developing and implementing policies and procedures on the creation, classification,
maintenance, use, disposition, access, review, release, and declassification of all ODNI
records. Additionally, IMD is responsible for classification training.
Original Classification Authority
The Presidential Order, Original Classification Authority (December 29, 2009),
designated the Director of National Intelligence as one of the officials to classify
information originally as Top Secret. The DNI, pursuant to E.O. 13526 1.3(c), has
further delegated original classification authority up to and including TOP SECRET to a
select group of 24 senior intelligence officers within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence through ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation
of Original Classification Authority (OCA) (December 3, 2013). Of note, ODNI
Instruction 10.03 was updated on October 31, 2014 and reduced the number of ODNI
OCAs to ten.
E.O. 13526 and its implementing directive, 32 Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) 2001, require OCAs to receive detailed training in the proper classification and
declassification, with an emphasis on the avoidance of over-classification, prior to
originally classifying information, and at least once each calendar year thereafter. ODNI
Instruction 80.12, Classification of Office of Director of National Intelligence Information
(October 25, 2010), further stipulates OCAs will receive mandated training when
designated. According to 32 C.F.R. 2001.70, At a minimum, the training shall cover
classification standards, classification levels, classification authority, classification
categories, duration of classification, identification and markings, classification
prohibitions and limitations, sanctions, classification challenges, security classification
guides, and information sharing. 32 C.F.R. 2001.71(c)(3) also directs that Original
classification authorities who do not receive such mandatory training at least once within a
calendar year shall have their classification authority suspended until such training has
taken place.
Derivative Classification Authority
All ODNI personnel are authorized to apply derivative classification provided they
have a valid need-to-know, signed a non-disclosure agreement, and received proper
training regarding their responsibilities. Derivative classifiers must receive training on the
proper application principles of E.O. 13526 prior to derivatively classifying information
and at least once every two years thereafter. Information may be derivatively classified
from a source document or documents, or by using a classification guide.
Classification Challenges
IC marking challenge procedures are detailed in Attachment 1 to ODNI National
Counterintelligence Executive memorandum, Subject: DNI Guidance for Intelligence
Community Marking Challenge Procedures, NCIX 260-11 (January 18, 2012). Authorized
holders of information (including authorized holders outside the classifying organization)
who, in good faith, believe that its classification status is improper, are encouraged and
expected to challenge the classification status of information.
Appendix D: Acronyms
AISC Agency Information Security Course (CIA)
C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CMO Chief Management Officer
CY Calendar Year (January 1 through December 31)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DOD Department of Defense
E.O. Executive Order
EOD Entry on Duty
FCGR Fundamental Classification Guidance Review
FY Fiscal Year (October 1 through September 30)
GS General Schedule
HCS HUMINT Control System
HCS-O HUMINT Control System - Operations
HCS-P HUMINT Control System - Product
HR Human Resources
HUMINT human intelligence (contraction)
IC Intelligence Community
IC CIO Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer
ICD Intelligence Community Directive
IC IG Intelligence Community Inspector General
ICPG Intelligence Community Policy Guidance
IG Inspector General
IMD Information Management Division
ISOO Information Security Oversight Office
NCIX National Counterintelligence Executive
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NF NOFORN (abbreviation)
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NOFORN No Foreign Distribution (contraction)
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NSA National Security Agency
OCA Original Classification Authority
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OIC CIO Office of the IC Chief Information Officer
OIG Office of the Inspector General
ONCIX Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
ORCON Originator Controlled (contraction)
OUSD(I) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
ROCA Reducing Over-Classification Act
SCG Security Classification Guide
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information
SF Standard Form
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix E: References
 1. Exec. Order No. 13,526, Classified National Security Information, 75 Fed. Reg.
707 (January 5, 2010).
2. Presidential Order, Original Classification Authority (December 29, 2009).
3. Presidential Memorandum, Implementation of the Executive Order, Classified
National Security Information (December 29, 2009).
4. 5 C.F.R. 430, Performance Management, 60 Fed. Reg. 43943 (August 23,
1995).
5. 32 C.F.R. 2001, Classified National Security Information (June 28, 2010).
6. 50 U.S.C. 4301 (2014).
7. Reducing Over-Classification Act, Public Law 111-258, (October 7, 2010).
8. ISOO Booklet, Marking Classified National Security Information, Rev. 2
(January 2014).
9. ISOO Notice 2012-01: Requirements for Derivative Classifier Training
(December 8, 2011).
10. ISOO Notice 2012-02: Classification Marking Instructions on the Use of
50X1-HUM vs. 25X1-human as a Declassification Instruction (December 23, 2011).
11. Intelligence Community Markings System Register and Manual (December 31,
2013).
12.Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 403, Foreign Disclosure and Release
of Classified National Intelligence (March 13, 2013).
13. ICD 501, Discovery and Dissemination or Retrieval of Information within the
IC (January 21, 2009).
14. Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) 501.2, Sensitive Review
Board and Information Sharing Dispute Resolution Process (May 26, 2009).
15. ICD 651, Performance Management System Requirements for the Intelligence
Community Civilian Workforce (November 28, 2007, amended April 4, 2012).
16. ICD-656, Performance Management System Requirements for Intelligence
Community Senior Civilian Officers (April 28, 2008, amended April 4, 2012).
17. ICD 700, Protection of National Intelligence (June 7, 2012).
18. ICD 701, Security Policy Directive for Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified
Information (March 14, 2007).
19. ICD 703, Protection of Classified National Intelligence, Including Sensitive
Compartmented Information (June 21, 2013).
20. ICD 710, Classification Management and Control Markings System (June 21,
2013).
21. ICD 710, Classification and Control Markings System (September 11, 2009),
superseded.
 22. ICPG 710.1, Application of Dissemination Controls: Originator Control (July
25, 2012).
23. ICPG 710.2/403.5, Application of Dissemination Controls: Foreign Disclosure
and Release Markings (March 20, 2014).
24. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Instruction 10.03,
Director of National Intelligence Delegation of Original Classification Authority (OCA)
(October 31, 2014).
25. ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of
Original Classification Authority (OCA) (December 3, 2013) (superseded).
26. ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of
Original Classification Authority (OCA) (January 23, 2013), (superseded).
27. ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of
Original Classification Authority (OCA) (February 2, 2011), (superseded).
28. ODNI Instruction 10.03, Director of National Intelligence Delegation of
Original Classification Authority (OCA) (April 16, 2010), (superseded).
29. ODNI Instruction 10.20, The ODNI Director, Information Management (May
18, 2009).
30. ODNI Instruction 80.12, Classification of Office of Director of National
Intelligence Information (October 25, 2010).
31. ODNI Instruction 80.16, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Original Classification Authority (May 19, 2014).
32. ODNI Instruction 80.16, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Original Classification Authority (October 21, 2010), (superseded).
33. Office of the Director of National Intelligence Classification Guide, Version
2.0 (July 3, 2012).
34. Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency booklet, Quality
Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (January 2011).
35. DOD IG Guide, A Standard Users Guide for Inspectors General Conducting
Evaluations Under Public Law 111-258, the Reducing Over-Classification Act (January
22, 2013).
36. CIA OIG Report, Report of Evaluation, Evaluation Required by the Reducing
Over-Classification Act, 2013-0016-AS (September 26, 2013).
37. DIA OIG Report, Reducing Over-Classification Act Inspection - Final Report,
2012- 200008-HQ (July 11, 2013).
38. NGA OIG Report, NGAs Implementation of the Reducing Over-Classification
Act, OIGE-13-09 (September 2013)[sic].
39. NRO OIG Report, Final Report - Evaluation of the National Reconnaissance
Office Classification Management under Public Law 111-258, Project Number 2013- 001
S (September 30, 2013).
 40. NSA OIG Report, Report on the Audit of NSAs Compliance with Public Law
111258, the Reducing Over-Classification Act, AU-13-0005 (August 7, 2013).
41. ODNI CMO memorandum, Subject: ODNI Classification Management Self-
Inspection Program (November 22, 2013).
42. Information Security Oversight Office memorandum, Subject: Annual Senior
Agency Official Self-Inspection Program Report (May 7, 2013).
43. Information Security Oversight Office memorandum, Subject: Feedback on
2012 Annual Senior Agency Official Self-Inspection Program Report (March 6, 2013).
44. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: Standard Form 311, Agency Security Classification Management Program Data
for Fiscal Year 2012 (undated).
45. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: ODNI Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (FCGR) Report (June 27,
2012).
46. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: ODNI Classification Management Self-Inspection Report (October 24. 2012).
47. Information Security Oversight Office memorandum, Subject: Annual Senior
Agency Official Self-Inspection Program Report (June 29, 2012).
48. Director, ODNI Information Management Division memorandum, Subject:
Standard Form 311, Agency Security Classification Management Program Data for Fiscal
Year 2013 (December 4, 2013).
49. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: Corrected Standard Form 311, Agency Security Classification Management
Program Data for Fiscal Year 2012 (Undated).
50. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: Corrected Standard Form 311, Agency Security Classification Management
Program Data for Fiscal Year 2011 (November 7, 2011).
51. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: ODNI Classification Management Self-Inspection Program (November 23,
2011).
52. Information Security Oversight Office memorandum, Subject: Self-Inspection
Program (April 5, 2011).
53. Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence memorandum, Subject:
Changes to the HUMINT Control System (HCS) (May 20, 2014).
54. National Counterintelligence Executive memorandum, Subject: DNI Guidance
for Intelligence Community Marking Challenge Procedures, NCIX 260-11 (January 18,
2012).
55. Chief, ODNI Information and Data Management Group memorandum,
Subject: ODNI Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (January 27, 2012).
 56. Director, ODNI Information Management Division, Subject: Standard Form
311, Agency Security Classification Management Program Data for Fiscal Year 2013
(December 4, 2013).
57. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive DRAFT report, Subject:
Report to the Director of National Intelligence On the use of Control Markings in the
Intelligence Community 2013.
58. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report, Subject: Report to
the Director of National Intelligence On the use of Control Markings in the Intelligence
Community 2012.
59. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report, Subject: Report to
the Director of National Intelligence On the Use of Control Markings in the Intelligence
Community 2011.
60. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive report, Subject: Report to
the Director of National Intelligence On the Use of Control Markings in the Intelligence
Community 2010.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security
Worldwide Threats to the Homeland
September 17, 2014
Matthew G. Olsen
Director
National Counterterrorism Center
Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the
Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss the terrorist threat
against the United States and our efforts to counter it.
As I conclude three years as Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, I
also want to express my deep appreciation to the Committee for its unflagging support of
the men and women at the National Counterterrorism Center and our counterterrorism
community, as a whole. I am also particularly pleased to be here today with Secretary of
Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and FBI Director James Comey. DHS and the FBI are
two of our closest partner agencies. Together we are a part of the broader counterterrorism
effort that is more integrated and more collaborative than ever.
Earlier this summer the 9/11 Commissioners released their most recent report, and
asked national security leaders to communicate to the publicin specific termswhat
the threat is, and how it is evolving. Hearings like this provide an opportunity to continue
this dialogue with the public and their elected representatives.
The Overall Terrorist Threat
In May, the President told the graduating class of West Point cadets, For the
foreseeable future, the most direct threat to America at home and abroad remains
terrorism. The 9/11 Commissioners agreed, noting in their July report, the terrorist
threat is evolving, not defeated. From my vantage point at the National Counterterrorism
Center, I would agree. Since we testified before this committee last year, the terrorist
threat has continued to evolve, becoming more geographically diffuse and involving a
greater diversity of actors.
Overseas, the United States faces an enduring threat to our interests. We have
adopted precautionary measures at some of our overseas installations. The threat emanates
from a broad geographic area, spanning South Asia, across the Middle East, and much of
North Africa, where terrorist networks have exploited a lack of governance and lax
security.
Here in the United States, last years attack against the Boston Marathon
highlighted the danger posed by lone actors and insular groups not directly tied to terrorist
organizations, as well as the difficulty of identifying these types of plots before they take
place. The flow of more than 15,000 foreign fighters to Syria with varying degrees of
access to Europe and the United States heightens our concern, as these individuals may
eventually return to their home countries battle-hardened, radicalized, and determined to
attack us.
In the face of sustained counterterrorism pressure, core al-Qaida has adapted by
becoming more decentralized and is shifting away from large-scale, mass casualty plots
like the attacks of September 11, 2001. Al-Qaida has modified its tactics, encouraging its
adherents to adopt simpler attacks that do not require the same degree of resources,
training, and planning.
Instability in the Levant, Middle East, and across North Africa has accelerated this
decentralization of the al-Qaida movement, which is increasingly influenced by local and
regional factors and conditions. This diffusion has also led to the emergence of new power
centers and an increase in threats by networks of like-minded violent extremists with
allegiances to multiple groups. Ultimately, this less centralized network poses a more
diverse and geographically dispersed threat and is likely to result in increased low-level
attacks against U.S. and European interests overseas.
Today, I will begin by examining the terrorist threats to the homeland and then
outline the threat to U.S. interests overseas, including from the Islamic State in Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL). I will then focus the remainder of my remarks on some of NCTCs
efforts to address this complicated threat picture.
Threat to the Homeland
Starting with the homeland, terrorist groups continue to target Western aviation. In
early July, the United States and United Kingdom implemented enhanced security
measures at airports with direct flights to the United States, which included new rules
aimed at screening personal electronic devices. This past winter, we implemented
additional security measures for commercial aviation to address threats to the Sochi
Olympics. Although unrelated, taken together these two instances reflect the fact that
terrorist groups continue to see commercial aviation as a desirable symbolic target,
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the al-Qaida affiliate most
likely to attempt transnational attacks against the United States. The groups repeated
efforts to conceal explosive devices to destroy aircraft demonstrate its longstanding
interest in targeting Western aviation. Its three attempted attacks demonstrate the groups
continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against the West, its awareness of security
procedures, and its efforts to adapt.
Despite AQAPs ambitions, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) remain the
most likely immediate threat to the homeland. The overall level of HVE activity has been
consistent over the past several years: a handful of uncoordinated and unsophisticated
plots emanating from a pool of up to a few hundred individuals. Lone actors or insular
groups who act autonomously pose the most serious HVE threat, and we assess HVEs will
likely continue gravitating to simpler plots that do not require advanced skills, outside
training, or communications with others.
The Boston Marathon bombing underscores the threat from HVEs who are
motivated to act violently by themselves or in small groups. In the months prior to the
attack, the Boston Marathon bombers exhibited few behaviors that law enforcement and
intelligence officers traditionally use to detect readiness to commit violence. The
perceived success of previous lone offender attacks combined with al-Qaidas and
AQAPs propaganda promoting individual acts of terrorism is raising the profile of this
tactic.
HVEs make use of an online environment that is dynamic, evolving, and self-
sustaining. This online environment is likely to play a critical role in the foreseeable future
in radicalizing and mobilizing HVEs towards violence. Despite the removal of important
terrorist leaders during the last several years, the online outlets continue to reinforce a
violent extremist identity, highlight grievances, and provide HVEs the means to connect
with terrorist groups overseas.
This boundless virtual environment, combined with terrorists increasingly
sophisticated use of social media, makes it increasingly difficult to protect our youth from
propaganda. ISILs online media presence has become increasingly sophisticated,
disseminating timely, high-quality media content across multiple platforms.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
ISIL is a terrorist organization that has exploited the conflict in Syria and sectarian
tensions in Iraq to entrench itself in both countries. The groups strength, which we
estimate may include more than 30,000 members as well as its expansionary agenda pose
an increasing threat to our regional allies and to U.S. facilities and personnel in both the
Middle East and the West.
ISILs goal is to solidify and expand its control of territory and govern by
implementing its violent interpretation of sharia law. The group aspires to overthrow
governments in the region, govern all the territory that the early Muslim caliphs
controlled, and expand. ISILs claim to have re-established the caliphate reflects the
groups desire to lead violent extremists around the world.
ISIL exploited the conflict and chaos in Syria to expand its operations across the
border. The group, with al-Qaidas approval, established the al-Nusrah Front in late 2011
as a cover for its Syria-based activities but in April 2013, unilaterally declared its presence
in Syria under the ISIL name. ISIL accelerated its efforts to overthrow the Iraqi
government, seizing control of Fallujah this past January. The group expanded from its
safe haven in Syria and across the border into northern Iraq, killing thousands of Iraqi
Muslims on its way to seizing Mosul this June.
Along the way, ISIL aggressively recruited new adherents. In Syria, some joined
ISIL to escape Assads brutal treatment and oppression of the Syrian people. Others in
Iraq joined out of frustration, marginalized by their own government. But many joined out
of intimidation and fear, forced to choose either obedience to ISIL or a violent death.
The withdrawal of Iraqi Security Forces during those initial military engagements
has left ISIL with large swaths of ungoverned territory. The group has established
sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq from where it plans, trains, and plots terrorist acts with little
interference. We assess ISILs strength has increased and reflects stronger recruitment this
summer following battlefield successes, the declaration of a caliphate, and additional
intelligence. ISILs freedom of movement over the Iraq-Syria border enables the group to
easily move members between Iraq and Syria, which can rapidly change the number of
fighters in either country. ISIL is also drawing some recruits from the more than 15,000
foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria.
ISILs recent victories have provided the group with a wide array of weapons,
equipment, and other resources. Battlefield successes also have given ISIL an extensive
war chest, which as of early this month probably includes around $1 million per day in
revenues from black-market oil sales, smuggling, robberies, looting, extortion, and ransom
payments for hostages. While ISIL receives some funding from outside donors, this pales
in comparison to its self-funding through criminal and terrorist activities.
ISIL has sought to question the legitimacy of Ayman al-Zawahiris succession of
Usama bin Ladin. While al-Qaida core remains the ideological leader of the global
terrorist movement, its primacy is being challenged by the rise of ISIL whose territorial
gains, increasing access to a large pool of foreign fighters, and brutal tactics are garnering
significantly greater media attention. We continue to monitor signs of fracturing within al-
Qaidas recognized affiliates.
ISILs safe haven in Syria and Iraq and the groups access to resources pose an
immediate and direct threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in the region. This includes our
embassy in Baghdad and our consulate in Erbiland, of course, it includes the Americans
held hostage by ISIL.
But ISILs threat extends beyond the region, to the West. This January, ISILs
leader publicly threatened direct confrontation with the U.S., and has repeatedly taunted
Americans, most recently through the execution of two American journalists who were
reporting on the plight of the Syrian people, and one British aid worker. In Europe, the
May 2014 shooting in Brussels by an ISIL-trained French national and the separate, earlier
arrest of an ISIL-connected individual in France who possessed several explosive are two
examples that demonstrate this threat, and the overall threat posed by returning foreign
fighters.
In the United States, the FBI has arrested more than half a dozen individuals
seeking to travel from the U.S. to Syria to join the fighting there, possibly with ISIL. We
remain mindful of the possibility that an ISIL-sympathizer could conduct a limited, self-
directed attack here at home with no warning.
Al-Qaida Core and Afghanistan/Pakistan-based Groups
Turning to core al-Qaida and Afghanistan/Pakistan-based groups, we anticipate
that despite core al-Qaidas diminished leadership cadre, remaining members will
continue to pose a threat to Western interests in South Asia and would attempt to strike the
homeland should an opportunity arise. Al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiris public
efforts to promote individual acts of violence in the West have increased, as the Pakistan-
based groups own capabilities have diminished.
Despite ISILs challenge, Zawahiri remains the recognized leader of the global
jihadist movement among al-Qaida affiliates and allies, and the groups continue to defer
to his guidance on critical issues. Since the start of the Arab unrest in North Africa and the
Middle East, Zawahiri and other members of the groups leadership have directed their
focus there, encouraging cadre and associates to support and take advantage of the unrest.
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent. This month, al-Qaida announced the
establishment of its newest affiliate, al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Al-
Qaida used social media and online web forums to make known the existence of AQIS,
which al-Qaida said it has worked for more than two years to create. We assess the
creation of AQIS is not a reaction to al-Qaidas split with ISIL, though the timing of the
announcement may be used to bolster al-Qaidas standing in the global jihad movement.
AQIS, which is led by Sheikh Asim Umer, has stated objectives that include violence
against the U.S., establishing Islamic law in South Asia, ending occupation of Muslim
lands, and defending Afghanistan under Mullah Omars leadership. AQIS on 11
September publicly claimed responsibility for a thwarted September attack on a Pakistani
Naval vessel at the Karachi Naval Dockyard. The group had planned to use the attack to
target a U.S. Navy ship. AQIS also claimed responsibility for the killing of a senior
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence officer earlier this month.
South Asia-Based Militants. Pakistani and Afghan militant groupsincluding
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)
continue to pose a direct threat to U.S. interests and our allies in the region, where these
groups probably will remain focused. We continue to watch for indicators that any of these
groups, networks, or individuals are actively pursuing or have decided to incorporate
operations outside of South Asia as a strategy to achieve their objectives.
TTP remains a significant threat in Pakistan despite the ongoing Pakistan military
operations in North Waziristan and leadership changes during the past year. Its claim of
responsibility for the June attack on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi that killed
about 30 people underscores the threat the group poses inside the country.
The Haqqani network is one of the most capable and lethal terrorist groups in
Afghanistan and poses a serious threat to the stability of the Afghan state as we approach
2014 and beyond. Last month, the Department of State listed four high-ranking Haqqani
members Aziz Haqqani, Khalil Haqqani, Yahya Haqqani, and Qari Abdul Raufon the
Rewards for Justice most-wanted list for their involvement in terrorist attacks in
Afghanistan and ties to al-Qaida. The Haqqanis have conducted numerous high-profile
attacks against U.S., NATO, Afghan Government, and other allied nation targets. In
October 2013, Afghan security forces intercepted a truck bomb deployed by the Haqqanis
against Forward Operating Base Goode in the Paktiya Province. The device, which did not
detonate, contained some 61,500 pounds of explosives and constitutes the largest truck
bomb ever recovered in Afghanistan.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) remains focused on its regional goals in South Asia. The
group is against improving relations between India and Pakistan, and its leaders
consistently speak out against India and the United States, accusing both countries of
trying to destabilize Pakistan. LT has attacked Western interests in South Asia in pursuit of
its regional objectives, as demonstrated by the targeting of hotels frequented by
Westerners during the Mumbai attacks in 2008. LT leaders almost certainly recognize that
an attack on the U.S. would result in intense international backlash against Pakistan and
endanger the groups safe haven there. However, LT also provides training to Pakistani
and Western militants, some of whom could plot terrorist attacks in the West without
direction from LT leadership.
Al-Qaida Affiliates
AQAP. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the affiliate most
likely to attempt transnational attacks against the United States. AQAPs three attempted
attacks against the United States to datethe airliner plot of December 2009, an
attempted attack against U.S.-bound cargo planes in October 2010, and an airliner plot in
May 2012demonstrate the groups continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against the
United States. In a propaganda video released in March, the groups leader threatened the
U.S. in a speech to recruits in Yemen, highlighting AQAPs persistent interest in targeting
the United States.
AQAP also presents a high threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in Yemen and
Saudi Arabia. In response to credible al-Qaida threat reporting in August 2013, the State
Department issued a global travel alert and closed U.S. embassies in the Middle East and
North Africa as part of an effort to take precautionary steps against such threats. We assess
that we at least temporarily delayed this particular plot, but we continue to track closely
the status of AQAP plotting against our facilities and personnel in Yemen. AQAP
continues to kidnap Westerners in Yemen and carry out numerous small-scale attacks and
large-scale operations against Yemeni government targets, demonstrating the range of the
groups capabilities. In addition, this past July AQAP launched its first successful attack in
Saudi Arabia since 2009, underscoring the groups continued focus on operations in the
Kingdom.
Finally, AQAP continues its efforts to radicalize and mobilize to violence
individuals outside Yemen through the publication of its English-language magazine
Inspire. Following the Boston Marathon bombings, AQAP released a special edition of the
magazine claiming that accused bombers Tamarlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were inspired
by Inspire, highlighting the attacks simple, repeatable nature, and tying it to alleged U.S.
oppression of Muslims worldwide. The most recent Inspire issue in MarchAQAPs
twelfthcontinued to encourage lone offender attacks in the West, naming specific
targets in the United States, United Kingdom, and France and providing instructions on
how to construct a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.
 Al Nusrah Front. Al-Nusrah Front has mounted suicide, explosive, and firearms
attacks against regime and security targets across the country; it has also sought to provide
limited public services and governance to the local population in areas under its control.
Several Westerners have joined al-Nusrah Front, including a few who have perished in
suicide operations, raising concerns capable individuals with extremist contacts and
battlefield experience could return to their home countries to commit violence. In April
2013, Al-Nusrah Fronts leader, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, pledged allegiance to al-
Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly affirming the groups ties to core al-Qaida.
Al-Zawahiri named the group al-Qaidas recognized affiliate in the region later last year,
ordering ISIL to return to Iraq.
Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab and its foreign fighter cadre are a potential threat to the
U.S. homeland, as some al-Shabaab leaders have publicly called for transnational attacks
and the group has attracted dozens of U.S. personsmostly ethnic Somaliswho have
traveled to Somalia since 2006. A recent U.S. military airstrike killed al-Shabaabs leader,
Ahmed Abdi. This removes a capable leader of the group, but also raises the possibility of
potential retaliatory attacks against our personnel and facilities in East Africa.
Al-Shabaab is mainly focused on undermining the Somali Federal Government
and combating African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional military forces
operating in Somalia. While al-Shabaabs mid-September 2013 attack on the Westgate
mall in Kenya demonstrated that the group continues to plot against regional and Western
targets across East Africa, as part of its campaign to remove foreign forces aiding the
Somali Government.
AQIM and regional allies. Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and its allies remain focused on local and regional attack plotting, including
targeting Western interests. The groups have shown minimal interest in targeting the U.S.
homeland.
In Mali, the French-led military intervention has pushed AQIM and its allies from
the cities that they once controlled, but the groups maintain safe haven in the less
populated areas of northern Mali from which they are able to plan and launch attacks
against French and allied forces in the region. Elsewhere, AQIM is taking advantage of
permissive operating environments across much of North Africa to broaden its reach. We
are concerned that AQIM may be collaborating with local violent extremists, including
Ansar al-Sharia groups in Libya and Tunisia.
In August of last year, two highly capable AQIM offshoots, Mokhtar Belmokhtars
al-Mulathamun battalion and Tawhid Wal Jihad in West Africa, merged to form the new
violent extremist groupal-Murabitunwhich will almost certainly seek to conduct
additional high profile attacks against Western interests across the region. Belmokhtar
the groups external operations commanderplayed a leading role in attacks against
Western interests in Northwest Africa in 2013, with his January attack on an oil facility in
In-Amenas, Algeria and double suicide bombings in Niger in May. Early this year,
Belmokhtar relocated from Mali to Libya to escape counterterrorism pressure, and
probably to collaborate with Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) and other violent extremist elements
in the country to advance his operational goals.
 Boko Haram. While Boko Haram is not an official al-Qaida affiliate, the group is
waging unprecedented violence in northeast Nigeria this year and is expanding its reach
into other parts of Nigeria and neighboring states to implement its harsh version of sharia
law and suppress the Nigerian Government and regional CT pressure. Since late 2012,
Boko Haram and its splinter faction Ansaru have claimed responsibility for five
kidnappings of Westerners, raising their international profile and highlighting the threat
they pose to Western and regional interests, although Ansaru has not claimed an operation
since February 2013. Boko Haram has kidnapped scores of additional Nigerians in
northeast Nigeria since the kidnapping of 276 school girls from Chibok, Nigeria in April
2014.
Threat from Shia Groups
Iran and Hizballah remain committed to defending the Assad regime, including
sending billions of dollars in military and economic aid, training pro-regime and Shia
militants, and deploying their own personnel into the country. Iran and Hizballah view the
Assad regime as a key partner in an axis of resistance against Israel and the West and
are prepared to take major risks to preserve the regime as well as their critical
transshipment routes.
Lebanese Hizballah. In May of last year, Hizballah publicly admitted that it is
fighting for the Syrian regime and its chief, Hasan Nasrallah, framed the war as an act of
self-defense against Western-backed Sunni violent extremists. Hizballah continues
sending capable fighters for pro-regime operations and support for a pro-regime militia.
Additionally, Iran and Hizballah are leveraging allied Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist
groups to participate in counter-opposition operations. This active support to the Assad
regime is driving increased Sunni violent extremist attacks and sectarian unrest in
Lebanon.
Beyond its role in Syria, Lebanese Hizballah remains committed to conducting
terrorist activities worldwide and we remain concerned the groups activities could either
endanger or target U.S. and other Western interests. The group has engaged in an
aggressive terrorist campaign in recent years and continues attack planning abroad. In
April 2014, two Hizballah operatives were arrested in Thailand and one admitted that they
were there to carry out a bomb attack against Israeli tourists, underscoring the threat to
civilian centers.
Iranian Threat. In addition to its role in Syria, Iran remains the foremost state
sponsor of terrorism, and works through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods
Force and Ministry of Intelligence and Security to support groups that target U.S. and
Israeli interests globally. In March, Israel interdicted a maritime vessel that departed Iran
and was carrying munitions judged to be intended for Gaza-based Palestinian militants.
Iran, largely through Qods Force Commander Soleimani, has also provided support to
Shia militias and the Iraqi government to combat ISIL in Iraq.
Iran continues to be willing to conduct terrorist operations against its adversaries.
This is demonstrated by Irans links to terrorist operations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, India,
and Thailand in 2012. Iran also continues to provide lethal aid and support the planning
and execution of terrorist acts by other groups, in particular Lebanese Hizballah.
 NCTCs Missions and Initiatives
NCTC serves as the primary U.S. government organization for analyzing and
integrating all terrorism information. Now in our 10th year of service, we are guided by
our mission statement: Lead our nations effort to combat terrorism at home and abroad
by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our partners, and integrating all
instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort.
Intelligence Integration and Analysis. NCTC has a unique responsibility for the
U.S. government to examine all international terrorism issues, spanning geographic
boundaries to identify and analyze threat information, regardless of whether it is collected
inside or outside the United States.
Leading the Intelligence Communitys Terrorism Warning Program. NCTC
chairs the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), which is the ICs
terrorism warning body. The IICT - which is comprised of the CIA, DHS, DIA, FBI,
NCTC, NGA, NSA, and DOS - is responsible for the publication of products that warn of
threats against U.S. personnel, facilities, or interests. The IICT serves several thousand
customers, from senior policymakers, to deployed military forces and state and local law
enforcement entities.
Watchlisting and TIDE. As you know, this committee and the Congress charged
NCTC with maintaining the U.S. governments central and shared knowledge bank of
known and suspected international terrorists (or KSTs), their contacts, and their support
networks. To manage this workload, NCTC developed a database called TIDE - the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. Through TIDE, NCTC advances the most
complete and accurate information picture to our partners in support of terrorism identities
analysis, travel screening, and watchlisting activities.
The Kingfisher Expansion visa counterterrorism screening process for U.S. visa
applicants successfully launched in June 2013 and provides a secure on-line vetting
platform for FBI, DHS, and the Terrorism Screening Center to participate in the review of
applicants. This process allows for a more comprehensive and coordinated response back
to the State Department. To date, this program has conducted the review of more than 11
million visa applications.
In addition, in the last year, NCTCin coordination with DHSdeployed the
Kingfisher Expansion Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program.
NCTC has been providing screening support on ESTA applicants since 2010, however, the
new interface provides NCTC analysts with a streamlined method of performing identity
resolution on potential matches and provides a means for matches to be automatically
populated into DHS National Targeting CenterPassengers ESTA Hotlist.
Situational Awareness and Support to Counterterrorism Partners. NCTC
via the NCTC Operations Center and Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team (JCAT)
is engaged 24/7/365 as the eyes and ears of the U.S. governments global counterterrorism
situational awareness effort. The Operations Center uses unique accesses and works with
collocated assets, personnel, and resources from across the Intelligence Community to
identify, track and share key threat reporting streams and information with appropriate
audiences in a timely fashion at a variety of classification levels.
 JCAT complements the Operations Centers situational awareness efforts by
building collaborative ties and enhancing information flow with our federal, state, tribal,
and local partners through a variety of specialized downgraded products that can be shared
across a much wider audience. Most recently, NCTC developed a new unclassified
magazine, Alliance, which features counterterrorism articles from FBI, DHS, and NCTC,
and serves our state, local, and tribal customers.
Strategic Operational Planning. NCTC is charged with conducting strategic
operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national
power, including diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law
enforcement activities. In this role, NCTC looks beyond individual department and agency
missions toward the development of a single unified counterterrorism effort across the
federal government.
NCTC develops interagency counterterrorism plans to help translate high level
strategies and policy direction into coordinated department and agency activities to
advance the Presidents objectives, for example in confronting ISIL and al-Qaida. These
plans address a variety of counterterrorism goals, including regional issues, the use of
weapons of mass destruction by terrorists, and countering violent extremism. Additionally,
working with our colleagues from DHS, FBI, and other agencies, NCTC engages with
domestic and international partners on initiatives to improve resiliency, engage
communities on countering violent extremism, and enhance response plans and
capabilities in the face of evolving terrorist threats.
Addressing the Threat from Syria Foreign Fighters
NCTC draws on these capabilities and initiatives to address the threat posed by
Syrian foreign fighters. The United States, the European Union including the United
Kingdom, France, and other member states and the broader international community
have increasingly expressed concerns about the greater than 15,000 foreign fighters who
could potentially return to their home countries to participate in or support terrorist
attacks. The UKs Home Secretary announced the terrorist threat level in the United
Kingdom had been raised to severe, explaining, The increase in threat level is related to
developments in Syria and Iraq where terrorist groups are planning attacks against the
West. Some of those plots are likely to involve foreign fighters who have traveled there
from the UK and Europe to take part in those conflicts. This past week, Australia also
raised its threat level from medium to high.
Syria remains the preeminent location for independent or al-Qaida-aligned groups
to recruit, train, and equip a growing number of violent extremists, some of whom we
assess may seek to conduct external attacks. The rate of travelers into Syria exceeds the
rate of travelers who went into Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, or Somalia at any point
in the last ten years.
European governments estimate that more than 2,000 westerners have traveled to
join the fight against the Assad regime, which include more than 500 from Great Britain,
700 from France, and 400 from Germany. Additionally, more than 100 U.S. persons from
a variety of backgrounds and locations in the United States have traveled or attempted to
travel to Syria.
 NCTC, FBI, and DHS are part of a broader U.S. government and international
effort to resolve the identities of potential violent extremists and identify potential threats
emanating from Syria. Central to this effort is TIDE, which is much more than a screening
database - it is an analytic database. It feeds the unclassified screening database so that
DHS, the State Department, and other agencies have access to timely and accurate
information about known and suspected terrorists. Initiatives such as Kingfisher aid in this
screening process. As disparate pieces of information about KSTs are received, trained
analysts create new records in TIDE, most often as the result of a nomination by a partner
agency. The records are updatedor enhancedregularly as new, related information is
included and dated or as unnecessary information is removed. In all cases, there are
several layers of review before a nomination is accepted into the system. In the case of
U.S. persons, there are at least three layers of review, including a legal review, to ensure
the derogatory information is sufficient and meets appropriate standards.
To better manage and update the identities of individuals who have travelled
overseas to engage in violence in Syria and Iraq, weve created a special threat case in
TIDE. This is a special feature in the TIDE system which allows us to focus efforts on
smaller groups of individuals. A threat case links all known actors, and their personal
information, involved in a particular threat stream or case and makes that information
available to the intelligence, screening, and law enforcement communities.
NCTCs management of this unique consolidation of terrorist identities has created
a valuable forum for identifying and sharing information about Syrian foreign fighters
including ISILwith community partners. It has better integrated the communitys efforts
to identify, enhance, and expedite the nomination of Syrian foreign fighter records to the
Terrorist Screening Database for placement in U.S. government screening systems.
Counterterrorism efforts focused on law enforcement disruptions are critical to
mitigating threats. We also recognize that government alone cannot solve this problem and
interdicting or arresting terrorists is not the full solution. Well-informed and well-equipped
families, communities, and local institutions represent the best long-term defense against
violent extremism.
To this end, we continue to refine and expand the preventive side of
counterterrorism. Working with DHS, in the last year NCTC revamped the Community
Awareness Briefing (CAB), a key tool we use to convey information to local communities
and authorities on the terrorist recruitment threat. The CAB now also includes information
on the recruitment efforts of violent extremist groups based in Syria and Iraq.
Additionally, this year NCTC and DHS developed and implemented a new program - the
Community Resilience Exercise program, designed to improve communication between
law enforcement and communities and to share ideas on how to counter violent
extremism.
Conclusion
Confronting these threats and working with resolve to prevent another terrorist
attack remains the counterterrorism communitys overriding mission. This year, NCTC
celebrates its 10th year in service to the nation, and we remain focused on continuing to
enhance our ability to counter the terrorist threat in the years ahead.
 Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this morning. I look forward to
answering your questions.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs
Cyber security, Terrorism, and Beyond: Addressing Evolving Threats to the
Homeland
September 10, 2014
Mr. Nicholas Rasmussen
Deputy Director
National Counterterrorism Center
Opening
Thank you Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Coburn, and members of the
Committee for the opportunity to testify here today so that we might discuss the terrorist
threat to the United States, as well as our efforts to counter it.
NCTC Director Olsen and I dont often testify in open hearings, and so we see
today as an important opportunity to share our understanding of an evolving, dynamic
terrorist threat with the Committee and with the American public.
Indeed, earlier this summer the 9/11 Commissioners challenged national security
leaders to communicate more regularly with the American public, and we hope to do just
that.
Framing the Threat
As I begin this morning, Id like to frame this evolving threat in broad terms that
are generally applicable across the threat landscape.
The threat from terrorist groups is geographically diffuse, from a diverse array of
actors, and it is proving to be both resilient and adaptive to our counterterrorism pressures.
The global jihadist movement continues to increasingly decentralize, both in terms
of geography and command and control.
Geographically, it is no longer generally confined to the Afghanistan/Pakistan
region; it now covers a broad swath of territory from the Indian Subcontinent, across the
Middle East and the Levant, and throughout northern Africa.
Of greatest concern are those terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levantor ISILthat have taken a foothold in areas where governments have been
unable to govern and where lax security has allowed these groups to coalesce, train, and
plot.
In terms of command and control, here too we see decentralization, with the amir
of an al-Qaida affiliate, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, now serving as deputy to al-
Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Additionally, al Qaida core is encouraging groups and individuals to act
independently in support of the global movement.
There is no longer an expectation that regional affiliates will discuss their
operational plans with al-Qaidas senior leadership prior to execution.
This diffusion has led to an increase in threats by networks of like-minded violent
extremists with allegiances to multiple groups.
This evolution is the result of an adaptive enemy.
Our counterterrorism operations continue to degrade al-Qaida cores ability to
lead the global terrorist movement and to plan sophisticated attacks.
As a result of leaks and disclosures, including those attributable to Edward
Snowden, terrorists now understand the scope and scale of western collection capabilities
and they are changing the way they communicate, adopting encryption technologies,
shifting accounts, or avoiding electronic communication altogetherall of which frustrate
our counterterrorism efforts.
In short, we cannot connect the dots if we cannot collect the dots that matter most.
Mr. Chairman, Id like to focus on three specific areas for the remainder of my
timethe threat from ISIL, the threat from AQAP, and the threat from Homegrown
Violent Extremists.
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
The greatest threat to the United States and its interests from ISIL is inside Iraq,
which combined with Syria, constitutes the groups power center. As we move further
from that base of strength, ISILs ability to develop and execute a significant, sophisticated
attack diminishes. This is not to say it doesnt pose a threat outside the region.
Indeed, the arrest in France of an individual and the subsequent discovery of
explosive devices in his possession, as well as the killing of four individuals at a Jewish
museum in Belgium provides clear evidence of ISILs ambition to operate outside the
Middle East.
Both of the responsible individualswho are in custodyreportedly fought
alongside ISIL elements. However, these examples also demonstrate that ISILs ability to
carry out complex, significant attacks in the West is currently limited. Left unchecked, that
capability is likely to grow and present a more direct threat to the Homeland.
With over 2,000 westerners now believed to be fighting in Syria and Iraq, we
assess that the threat to Europe is more immediate. Nevertheless, the United States is not
immune.
Over 100 U.S. persons from a variety of backgrounds and from across the country
have traveled or attempted to travel to the region, including some who have looked to
engage with ISIL. Most of these individuals are believed to have western travel
documentation that would ease their re-entry, which is why identifying them is a top
priority for the United States and its allies.
 This is why it is so important that the international community challenge ISILs
regional ambitions now and work together over time to defeat ISIL. Left unchecked, ISIL
poses an increasing threat to all governments it considers apostatenot just to the United
States or European nations, but also Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African nations.
Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Let me now turn to al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. We continue to assess that
AQAP remains the al-Qaida affiliate most likely to attempt transnational attacks against
the United States.
The groups repeated efforts to conceal explosive devices to destroy aircraft
demonstrate its continued pursuit of high-profile attacks against the West, its awareness of
Western security procedures, and its efforts to adapt.
AQAP also presents a high threat to U.S. personnel and facilities in Yemen and
Saudi Arabia. In August of 2013, the State Department issued a global travel alert and
closed U.S. embassies in the Middle East and North Africa as a precautionary step against
such threats. We assess that we at least temporarily delayed this plot, but we continue to
track closely any information on AQAP plotting against our personnel and facilities.
The group continues its efforts to radicalize and mobilize individuals outside
Yemen through its Inspire magazine. The most recent issueits twelfthwas released in
March and continued to encourage lone offender attacks in the West, naming specific
targets in the United States, United Kingdom, and France.
Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)
Finally, let me say a few words about Homegrown Violent Extremists. The
boundless online virtual environment, combined with terrorists increasingly sophisticated
use of social media, makes it increasingly difficult to protect our youth from messaging
designed to radicalize and motivate to action homegrown violent extremists.
NCTC is working closely with our partners at DHS, FBI, and DOJ to inform and
equip families, communities, and local institutions who provide our best defense and
ability to counter the narrative of violent extremism. Despite our efforts, HVEs remain the
most likely immediate threat to the homeland.
We expect the overall level of HVE activity to remain the same over the course of
the next year: We would expect to see a handful of uncoordinated and mostly
unsophisticated plots emanating from a pool of up to a few hundred individuals.
Last years Boston Marathon bombing underscores the threat from HVEs who are
motivated, often with little or no warning, to act violently by themselves or in small
groups. As we have discussed with the Committee in the past, these lone actors or insular
groups who act autonomously are the most difficult to detect or disrupt.
Mr. Chairman, during your April 30th hearing you noted that identifying and
deterring terrorist plots by lone wolves was extremely challenging, and I think
everyone here would agree with that assessment.
NCTC Efforts to Identify Foreign Fighters
 Let me take one moment to talk about just one of our efforts at NCTC to counter
the array of threats we face, and that is through identifying itby putting a face and a
name to that threat wherever possible. Under the law, NCTC is charged with maintaining
the U.S. governments central and shared knowledge bank of known and suspected
terrorists, as well as their contacts and support networks.
NCTCs Terrorist Identities Datamart Environmentor TIDEis our database of
known and suspected international terrorists, and it helps us ensure that all relevant
information about identified individualssuch as Syrian foreign fightersis shared with
appropriate intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies.
We are relentless in our efforts to ensure the data in TIDE is accurately entered,
and that our records are as comprehensive as possible. And we are especially mindful of
privacy and civil liberties concerns, particularly with respect to U.S. persons.
In the case of U.S. persons, any nomination goes through at least four layers of
review including a legal reviewto ensure the derogatory information is sufficient and
meets established legal standards.
NCTCs management of this unique consolidation of terrorist identities has created
a valuable forum for identifying and sharing information with community partners, and
has better integrated our collective efforts to identify, enhance, and expedite the
nomination of Syrian foreign fighters for placement in U.S. government screening
systems.
This work greatly increases the chances that we will be able to disrupt potential
terrorist activity by individuals seeking to return from Syria.
Closing
Members of the Committee, we face an evolving, decentralized threat from a
diffuse set of actors who are adapting to our countermeasures. This is why the NCTC and
its partners within the Intelligence Community must continue to adapt to this threat, within
the bounds of our existing resources.
We appreciate this committees continued support in these efforts, and I would
encourage the members to visit NCTC to see first-hand the breadth of counterterrorism
efforts in which we are engaged.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share with youand the American public
our assessment of the current terrorist threat, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Remarks as delivered by Stephanie OSullivan
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
Open Hearing:
USA FREEDOM Act (H.R. 3361)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
 Location: 216 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
Date: Thursday June 5, 2014
Time: 2:30 p.m. EDT
Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, and distinguished members of the
Committee we are very pleased to appear before you to express the Administrations
strong support for the USA Freedom Act, H.R. 3361, as recently passed by the House of
Representatives. The Deputy Attorney General has provided an in-depth overview of the
USA Freedom Act passed by the House last month, but I wanted to touch on a few key
points in my remarks.
Over the past year, the nation has been engaged in a robust discussion about how
the Intelligence Community uses its authorities to collect critical foreign intelligence in a
manner that protects privacy and civil liberties. We take great care to ensure the protection
of individual privacy and civil liberties in the conduct of intelligence activities.
Nevertheless, we have continued to examine ways to increase the confidence of our fellow
citizens that their privacy is being protected while at the same time providing the
Intelligence Community with the authorities it needs to fulfill its mission and
responsibilities.
To that end, we have increased our transparency efforts, and the Director of
National Intelligence has declassified and released thousands of pages of documents about
intelligence collection programs including court decisions, and a variety of other
documents. Were continuing to do so.
These documents demonstrate the commitment of all three branches of
government to ensuring these programs operate within the law and apply vigorous
protections for personal privacy. It is important to emphasize that although the information
released by the Director of National Intelligence was properly classified originally.
The DNI declassified it because the public interest in declassification outweighed
the national security concerns that originally prompted classification. In addition to
declassifying documents, weve already taken significant steps to allow the public to
understand how we use the authorities in FISA, now and going forward. For example, we
are currently working to finalize a transparency report that will outline on an annual basis
the total number of orders issued under various FISA authorities and an estimate of the
total number of targets affected by those orders.
Moreover, we recognize that its important for companies to be able to reassure
their customers about the limited number of people targeted by orders requiring the
companies to provide information to the government. And so we support the provisions of
the House bill that allow the companies to report information about the national security
legal demands and law enforcement legal demands that they receive each year. We believe
that this increased transparency provides the public with relevant information about the
use of these legal authorities, while at the same time, protecting important collection
capabilities.
Making adjustments to our intelligence activities - and, as appropriate, our
authorities -is also part of this effort. For several years, the government has sought - and
the FISA Court has issued - orders under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act allowing
the bulk collection of metadata about telephone calls. The President has ordered a
transition that will end this bulk collection in a manner that maintains the tools
intelligence agencies need for national security. We are committed to following this
mandate.
The Intelligence Community believes that the new framework in the USA Freedom
Act preserves the capabilities the Intelligence Community needs without the government
holding this metadata in bulk. The USA Freedom Act would prohibit all bulk collection of
records pursuant to Section 215, the Pen Register Trap and Trace provision of FISA, and
National Security Letter statutes going forward. Let me repeat that: The Intelligence
Community understands and will adhere to the Bills prohibitions on all bulk collection
under these authorities.
Moreover, the USA Freedom Act makes other important changes by further
ensuring that individuals privacy is appropriately protected without sacrificing
operational effectiveness. To that end, we support the USA Freedom Act as an effective
means of addressing the concerns that have been raised about the impact of our
intelligence collection activities on privacy while preserving the authorities we need for
national security.
We urge the Committee to give the House bill serious consideration, as
expeditiously as possible, consistent with this Committees deliberations. And we are
ready to work with the Senate to clarify any language in the bill as necessary. We
appreciate this committees leadership and, particularly your support over the past year in
considering issues related to our intelligence collection activities, and privacy and civil
liberties.
We also appreciate your support for the men and women working throughout the
Intelligence Community to include those at NSA who remain dedicated to keeping our
nation safe and protecting our privacy, and who have upheld their oath by conducting
themselves in accordance with our nations laws.
We look forward to answering your questions.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
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