1 2 1B “4 15 16 7 8 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 a 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 39 a 42 43 45 46 a7 48 49 50 IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS AND STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY KEVIN PATRICK BRADY NOTICE OF v A MERITORIOUS CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES STATE OF NEW YORK BE ADVISED that a meritorious claim for damages has been filed in New York Court of Claims to survive a continuous, wide spread, and persistent pattern of misfeasance, nonfeasance and unconstitutional conduct by New York court officers acting administratively, and duplicitously without personal and/or subject matter jurisdiction and upon unanimous failures to perform ministerial acts specifically required by law. Since 1995 officers of the Unified Court System and the Attorney General/Department of Law have constructively conspired to injure, disfranchise, slander and deprive me of meaningful access to court. Their lawless, malicious and unconstitutional agenda rises to the level of extrinsic fraud and violates 18 U.S.C. § 1346 Honest Services Law. This agenda began and remains without probable cause, is evidenced by Claimants most recent! Injury on July 25, 2015. It gives rise to this claim for $2,871,141.00. | It is further evidenced by the predictable failure of the Department to admit or deny the ‘substantive allegations on or before the return date. ‘This claim is NOT a motion to file a late claim. It is made returnable on or before" 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a1 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39+ 40 | at 42 43 45 46 47 48 49 50 BE IT KNOWN that on J 1 personally served this Notice and Claim on the HEATHER MICK Af New York Attorneys General Department of Law 144 Exchange Blvd. Rochester, New York 14614 The following interested parties were provided copies by US Mail. Senator John Bonacic New York Legislative Committee on the Judiciary 188 State Street Room 509 Legislative Office Building Albany, NY 12247 William J. Hochul, Jr. US Department of Justice ‘950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Room 2242 ‘Washington, DC 20530-0001 KEVIN PATRICK BRADY) . 508 Locust Lane, + East Rochester NY 14445 yo Aigus) ois, ° —SAREN A, SMITH dct tact | NOTARY PuBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK | CQ No, o15m6741488 = we ES XS uated in Monroe County Thereby iat everything alleged herein is to the best of my néwiecelerueanet dbenpiate exept here alleged on information and belief, and I believe those matters to be true. Nothing is intended to be frivolous, vexatious, and/or completely without merit as defined by 22 NYCRR 130.1, further depose that I have never filed any action in any court that legally, or constructively, rose to the level of frivolous, vexatious, and/or completely without merit. NO REAL PARTY has ever alleged otherwise! ‘AND NO EVIDENCE has ever been shown to the contrary to any court1" 12 13 14 18 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 7 28 29 30 a 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS. AND STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY KEVIN PATRICK BRADY NOTICE OF v A MERITORIOUS CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES. STATE OF NEW YORK BE THIS KNOWN By Order of June 23 2015, supreme court/appellate division in the Fourth Department DEFIED state and federal constitutional law, rules of civil procedure, and New York Public Officers Law by terminating, at the complaint stage, a facially meritorious Article 78 petition for relief declared to be mandatory in New York. ‘The Order confirms [1] the court had not bothered to read/consider the pro se pleadings but merely acquiesced to a meritless Motion to Dismiss from an assistant attorney general/ Department of Law. Insofer as this summary termination was consistent with similar terminations in the lower courts, all at the complaint stage, without cause, it constitutes not only a ministerial failure but another in long stream of injurious ministerial failures that rise to the level of extrinsic fraud, consumer fraud and criminal negligence. It demonstrates that the courts of New York are patently not responsive to this pro se party regardless of the urgency of my pleas or the merits of the aborted actions. ‘The Rules that should have prohibited another exasperating summary termination limited the court to the following options:} ||§ 7806. The judgment may grant the petitioner the relief to which he is entitled, or 3 || may di the proceeding either on the merits or with leave to renew. 4 5 6 || § 7804 When the proceeding comes before it, ******* whether by appeal or 7 g || transfer, the appellate division shall dispose of all issues in the proceeding, or, if the 2 || papers are insufficient, it may remit the proceeding. 1 12 1} || The issues on which jurisdiction was invoked in the appellate court had been bottlenecking in 14 15 16 || implicate a constructive conspiracy to obstruct and deprive me of a forum in which to redress 7 18 ||My injuries. To wit: 19 20 2 1. The existence of a continuous, wide spread, and persistent pattern of 22 23 24 25 26 2. Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by policy-making 27 28 29 30 31 3. The custom/policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violations that 32 33 34 35 5 36. || Upon information and belief I am a continuous victim of insurmountable cultural prejudice, 37 38 39 40 41 || The evidence of conspiring, unconstitutional agenda extends to eleven [11] jurisdictionally VOID} 42 43 44 || these crimes was also asserted in my Article 78 petition, as was the mandate to transfer this 45 46 || part of the pleadings, if necessary, to the proper venue pursuant to NYS Const. Art VI § 5[b]. 47 | 48 49 || The court did nothing but remove the pleadings from the title of the action. 50 and by the lower courts for nearly twenty [20] years. The chronic, unlawful terminations unconstitutional misconduct by judges and Department of Law employees officials after they were notified of the misconduct and have seriously and irreparably injured pro se claimant. repugnant subject matter and ABA Rule 1.6. criminal convictions I have suffered in Monroe County justice courts. My ‘actual innocence’ toSSSSSERSRSLSSSYSRLSSLSBSVBRESRVSSSISGRSRASCarvauEoNH ‘These eleven [11] false convictions may not be directly actionable in the Court of Claims, but exemplify the bad faith, negligence and unconstitutional practice. Insofar as I have been wrongfully ‘blocked’ from proving ANYTHING in New York superior courts, the State MUST accept liability for the damages. BACKGROUND BE IT KNOWN that I have been petitioning state courts with facially meritorious allegations of government fraud, negligence, retaliation and serial, witra vires prosecutions by Assistant AG Carlos Rodriguez in conspiracy with two [2] supreme court judges since 2004. The evidence proving the serial proceedings and every judgment deriving from them were absolutely VOID voluminous. T have deposed essentially ad nauseum ‘it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly that [AAG Rodriguez] has set in motion an unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial systems ability to impartially adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claims’. ! Rodriguez’ 2002-2004 contempt prosecutions in supreme court was a subterfuge to punish me by incarceration for having exercised state and federal right of self representation. Iwas ultimately incarcerated for four [4] months causing extreme havoc in my life ever since. The countless defects are detailed in annexed Memo A + Fraud on the Court as defined in Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989) Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th Cir.1989); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.1976); England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (Sth Cir.1960); United Business Comms, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 1172, 1186-87 (D.Kan.1984); United States v. ITT Corp., 349 F.Supp. 22, 29 (D.Conn.1972), affd mem., 410 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 1363, 35 L.Ed.2d 582 (1973).Swworvansons " 12 3 14 18 16 7 8 19 20 21 23 24 25 26 2 28 29 | 30 31 32 33 35, 37 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 EVERY petition has included prima facie proof of inter a/ia, fatal jurisdictional defects. EVERY petition was timely served on the Attorney General/Department of Law. EVERY petition was dismissed on sight, ? without notice, without a hearing, without answers from the state attorneys AND without the relief that is mandatory in New York Ihave incurred an estimated $11,000 in petition fees and related costs. ? However, to this day NO COURT has adjudicated a single issue on which I invoked its jurisdiction. Collectively, my honorable court officers have shown unconscionable indifference for the misfeasance, nonfeasance and constitutional violence that has plagued me since the outset. I have in fact been raped, abused, defrauded, disfranchised and abandoned by EVERY court and EVERY legal practitioner I have EVER come into contact with. They have ignored my basic rights to such a degree as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,’ for mere exercise of state and federal right. THE COVER UP Its inconceivable that the Attorney General/Department of Law continues this subterfuge after that ™*** ‘so many years. Every AAG subsequently assigned to this case has failed to ads the Attorney General is ‘without any prosecutorial power except when specifically authorized by statute™ ‘Those statutes are: Business Corporation Law § 1607; Education Law § 6514; Energy Law § 7905.6(d); General Business Law §§ 85, 347, 358, 692; Labor Law § 214; Real Property Law §§ 338, 442-e, 446-h; Public Health Law §§ 2897-b, 3455; Tax Law §§ 512, 691, 1091; Workers’ Compensation Law § 132. ? at times, sua sponte Not including unfathomable personal losses. * De La Rosa v State of New York, Davis v State of New York, 5 Misc 3d 1011(A) (Ct C1 2004).Insofar as the ONLY statutory authority for the Attorney General is Judiciary Law § 476-a, it is clear that this pro se party was surreptitiously prosecuted and punished under the guise of ‘unlawful practice of law’. Acting without probable cause and on a personal and professional vendetta, Rodriguez (1) ‘commenced and continued serial criminal proceedings against me in which he (2) intended to confine me, as I was for four months. (3) At all times I was conscious of the confinement and fearful for my sole proprietorship, (4) I did not consent to the confinement and (5) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" * In fact, supreme courts jurisdiction was proscribed by statute. Insofar as failure to establish termination of these prosecutions in my favor is fatal to a claim for malicious prosecution, my government co conspirators have continuously denied my right of| access to subsequent courts. This case has been an abomination of due process and equal protection. The courts have enabled this subterfuge by /nter alla refusing to require the State attorneys to answer or deny my allegations. have simply been the continuous victim of subterfuge and bad faith agenda that, upon information and belief includes ABA Rule 1.6 CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE AND NONFEASANCE Members of the bench and bar know or should know that ABA Rule 1.6 shields attorneys from ‘acknowledging the misconduct. However, the Rule does not TRUMP CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, to wit; due process and equal protection under the law. ‘And “Fraud” does not include conduct, although characterized as fraudulent by statute or administrative rule, which lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct misrepresentations whi it imental reliance by another. DR-7 5 Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456, 335 N.E.2d 310, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87 [1975], cert denied sub nom Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 U.S, 929, 96 S. Ct. 277, 46 L. Ed. 2d 257 [1975])" 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 33, 35 36 37 38 39 40 4a 42 43 44 45 46 a7 48 49 Essentially, bench and bar have participated by foreclosing what are in fact triable issues, ‘exemplified by the summary terminations of Court of Claims Judge Richard Sise between October 2006 and April 2013. Sise recited ‘the Court rejects Movant's contention that he is not challenging judicial decisions and [court] rulings made ‘after consideration of the facts and law. He then declared the VOID actions ‘legitimate and issued by the appropriate judicial officers who were consequently cloaked in absolute judicial immunity. Sise simply refused to observe the prima facie evidence before him that destroyed the PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY/JURISDICTION in the courts below. Like EVERY court before he simply acquiesced triable issues to the attorney generals in willful violation my due process. After this perpetually obstructed pro se litigant perfected and filed a very expensive appeal to the Third Department, the appellate ruling was entirely consistent with the misfeasance and nonfeasance deposed here. [SEE More definite statement page 14 ] After twenty [20] years in the Unified Court System, up close and personal, it is overtly apparent that regardless of the merits and/or how urgent relief may be, courts to do not bother reading papers submitted pro se and will seldom allow them to prevail. ‘The seeming regular and ‘legitimate’ judgments that have bottlenecked my life for years are, as a matter law, jurisdictionally VOID. Although New York law MANDATES the courts to vacate them, in the final analysis, ‘Law’ is ONLY as good as ones ability to enforce. Honorable courts leave non-lawyers ‘Howling at the Moon’ AND THE CHEAT GOES ON While I once enjoyed a highly successful family and professional life; I am today, at 65, unemployed and unemployable in my chosen profession. Owing to serial prosecutions, wrongful Incarcerations and fraudulently obtained money judgments, I am no longer bondable and thus 1no longer employable in my profession of choice.Swoworvmmson " 12 13 14 18 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 7 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48, 49 This is my punishment for threatening the cash cow of legal professionals by exercising my | inalienable state and federal rights. Every court and government attorney has gone out of their way to teach me the lesson of ‘the FOOL who comes to court pro se’, | After a career of counseling others to a secure retirement, I'm entering my senior years in abject poverty. To simply survive, I was forced into premature withdrawal with substantially reduced Social Security Benefits in 2013,. My health and quality of life has been deciining for years. My life expectancy MUST be down at least twenty [25] five years. In short, I am alive, but living in a constructive ghetto. ‘While the honorable court officers who left me here are secure in their annuity [tortfeasors] I am forced to resort to my ultimate remedy. MONEY DAMAGES OR NOTHING ‘The New York Court of Appeals has declared that damage claims against the State for violation: of the State Constitution come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. They wrote ' constitutions assign rights to individuals and impose duties on the government to regulate the government's actions to protect them. It is the failure to} fulfill a stated constitutional duty which may support a claim for damages in a constitutional tort action. . In New York, constitutional provisions are presumptively self-executing °. They define judicially enforceable rights and provide citizens with a basis for judicial relief against the State if those rights are violated. Actions of State or local officials which violate these constitutional guarantees are void ” * see, People v Carrol, 3 N.Y.2d 686, 691, 171 N.Y.S.2d 812, 148 N.E.2d 875), ” Foss v City of Rochester, 65 N.Y.2d 247, 491 N.Y.S.2d 128, 480 N.E.2d 717 [equal protection]; People v Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409 [search and seizure]).Soavsssens " 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 a 32 33 35 36 7 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 | ‘The factors on which this Court MUST consider to determine if a cause of action exists for a State constitutional tort are whether: (1) the applicable constitutional provision is self- executing; (2) whether monetary damage remedies further the purpose of the underlying constitutional provisions and necessarily assure its effectiveness; (3) the provisions impose a clearly defined duty on the State officers and/or employees; (4) declaratory and injunctive relief are inadequate; and (5) money damages are necessary deter governmental conduct and make the claimant whole. Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 (1996). T submit that this claim satisfies on every point. ‘The New York Constitution and CPLR § 321 provides that "a party, *** may prosecute or defend a civil action in person or by attorney” and the word "attorney" includes" a party prosecuting or defending an action in person’ CPLR § 105 (c) The New York Court of Appeals says ‘[t]he right of [access] derives from guarantees of freedom of association, [ist Amend., NY Const, Art I, § 9] and, will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public interest. ® {exceptions not instantly applicable] ‘In New York, law and public policy mandates any restriction imposed on the right [of access] will be carefully scrutinized. Matter of Abrams. 465 N.E.2d 1; People v Doe, 98 Misc. 2d 805 But apparently NOT for falsely labeled and ‘permanently’ enjoined non-lawyers. § 11 No person shall be denied equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. lf This case establishes the following to be empty and very dangerous rhetoric ® Matter of Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378, n 3; Matter of Gopman, 531 F2d 262, 268.1" 12 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 7 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 | | lf and timely resolution of disputes. It is inherent in this obligation to ensure that court users have ease of access to court-related information processes. It is the responsibility of all court personnel to fulfill the public's right to fair and efficient justice with dignity, professionalism, and courtesy. The UCS is dedicated to serving all who enter our facilities. Our goal is to provide you the best service possible, we welcome your comments about**** the treatment, you received during your last experience in court. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR; FRAUD AND NEGLECT This is NOT an ‘appeal’ as the word culturally implies. After forty [40] or more petitions to rid my life of court imposed bottlenecks, at costs in excess of $11,000, I have NEVER obtained a inal’ order. I have NEVER obtained a judicial decision. NO COURT has ever adjudicated a single issue on which I invoked its jurisdiction New York’s Unified Court System is not about administration of justice. It has been hijacked | into a definitive pay-to- play, racketeering influenced corrupt corporate enterprise. [SIC # 9211] I submit that if New York court officers; including government lawyers do not know, or are free to ignore the fundamental rights at issue here, others are at substantial risk of learning the lesson of ‘the FOOL who comes to court pro se’. Accordingly, money damages are necessary to deter governmental conduct and make the claimant whole. Brown v State, 89 NY2d 172 (1996). ‘At this point nothing can make this victim whole." 12 13 14 15 16 17 || 18 19 20 24 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 a1 42 43 44 45 | 46 47 48 49 50 Money damages are necessary to prevent bench and bar from cleansing our courts of non- lawyer litigants and extorting them of pay-to-play fees and doing so again to redress boldly unlawful acts in our trial courts. | ‘The US Supreme Court has ruled ‘a natural individual is entitled to relief; “entitled to free access to judicial tribunals and public offices in every State of the Union. ° Plaintiff should not be charged fees or costs for the lawful and Constitutional Right to petition this court in this matter in which [she is entitled to relief, as it appears that the filing fee rule was originally implemented for fictions and subjects of the State and [thus] should not be applied to Plaintiff who is a natural individual and entitled to relief” Petitioner cannot be charged a fee as no charge can be placed upon a citizen as a condition precedent to exercise his/her Constitutional Rights, his/her rights secured by the Constitution. A fee is a charge “fixed by law for services fixed by public officers or for use of a privilege under control of government.” BE THIS KNOWN . Claimant is a natural born American: resident of New York since 1962 and of Monroe County since 1982. | have never knowingly expatriated my state or country. Thave never filed any action in any court that legally, or constructively, rose to the level of frivolous, vexatious, and/or completely without merit. NO REAL PARTY has ever alleged otherwise AND NO EVIDENCE to the contrary has ever been shown to any court. “haven't broken any laws, wrongfully prosecuted and incarcerated myself, violated my own constitutional rights or destroyed my own livelihood. In fact, I have no ‘complicity whatsoever for the abuses I live with daily AND I challenge EVERY allegation to the contrary. ° (2 Black 620, see also Crandell v Nevada, 6 Wall 35]. °° Hale v Hinkel, 201 US 43, NAACP v Button, 371 US 415); United Mines v Gibbs, 383 US 715; and Johnson v Avery, 89 S.Ct. 747 (1969). * Fort Smith Gas Co. v Wisemen” 189 Ark.675 74 SW.2d 789,790, from Black’s Law Dictionary Sth Ed.See also New York Public Officers Law § 67 1) Each public officer upon whom a duty is expressly imposed by law, * must execute same without fee or reward, except where a fee or other compensation is expressly allowed by law. [An officer, or other person, SHALL NOT demand o receive any fee or compensation, | allowed by law for any service, unless the service was actually rendered by him; ® | VOID INJUNCTIONS | Contrary to the position of said court officers, I am absolutely entitled to bring meritorious complaints of the bottlenecks and oppressions that injure and immobilize me to the place[s] constitutionally mandated to resolve such grievances. ‘The purported restrictions imposed on me at the outset CANNOT impede or subjugate my fundamental right to do so. The controlling mandates are memorialized in Memo The Court of Appeals has declared; constitutional guarantees worthy of protection and courts are obligated to enforce these rights by ensuring each individual an adequate| remedy for violation of a constitutional duty. ** It is herein established that the Unified Court System will not provide and/or ensure adequate remedy for constitutional injuries. In fact it perpetuates, with full participation and protection of the New York Department of Law, one the greatest consumer frauds in the world. A definitive ‘scheme or artifice to defraud” *° and I am one of it's victims. 2 vacating constitutional and jurisdictionally defective court proceedings IS SUCH A DUTY. To date, NO COURT has ever adjudicated even a single issue onwhich I had invoked jurisdiction. 4 Brown v. State 674 N.E.2d 1129, 89 N.Y.2d 172 45 18 U.S. § 1346 a.k.a Honest Services Law 1)1" 12 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25 26 a 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 a7 38 39 40 4 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 MY ONLY REMEDY The Court of Claims Act; from 1939 purportedly confers jurisdiction on the court to hear and determine "almost every conceivable kind of action against the State" *° The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims adheres to public policy which seeks to reduce rather than increase the obstacles to recovery of damages. "” AND “liability is the rule, immunity is the exception" Nevertheless, in anticipation of another attempt by state attorneys to block this claim from continuing, this Court must adhere to the following. “It is settled that, in considering a motion to dismiss ** for failure to state a cause pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the facts pleaded MUST be presumed true and accorded every favorable inference, and the sole criterion is whether from [the complaint's] four corners, factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause cognizable at law' (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83,[1994] Said principles include “the court's focus will be to flush out whether a claim exists rather than merely whether the plaintiff has formally stated one. The emphasis is on| substance, not form. If plaintiff merely overlooked a technical pleading requirement, a court will freely and liberally grant leave to amend so that the deficiency can be easily corrected”. ° “If from the four corners of the complaint factual allegations are discerned which, taken together, manifest any cause of action cognizable at law, a motion to fail’, 511 West 232nd Owners Corp. v J. Realty Co., 98 NY2d 144, 152, 773 N.E.2d 496, 746 N.Y.S.2d 131 [2002] 1® Breuer, New York Court of Claims: Its History, Jurisdiction and Reports, p 13 Abbott v Page Airways, 23 N.Y.2d 502, 507, 297 N.Y.S.2d 713, 245 N.E.2d 388; see also, Bing v ‘Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 +8 [sua sponte or otherwise] 12)IN THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS AND STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY KEVIN PATRICK BRADY v A MERITORIOUS CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES STATE OF NEW YORK A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENTBRADY v MILLER, et al. # 8309 -95 In 1994, I filed a civil rights action in the WNY District Court alleging, inter alia, that family court officals, acting in administrative capacities, had arbitrarily suspended my parental rights, refused to provide me a vindication hearing, and threatened me with criminal prosecution for having exercised my right to represent myself. The incident became 'Ground Zero’ of the unfathomable injuries to come. ‘The action was ultimately dismissed by U.S district court judge David Larimer without ‘appearances, who cited [1] on going state proceedings that [2] implicate important states interests. He opined that [3] the state forum [ostensibly] offered me an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. Larimer wrote '[pllaintiff made no showing that his constitutional claims could not be adequately adjudicated in the state courts” AND "[a]lthough defendants allege plaintiff engaged in extensive, harassing litigation, there is no evidence of such pattern in the record before me. I then filed in New York supreme court, only to be dismissed again, on papers alone, AND permanently * disfranchised of my right to free court access by a multi- defective pre-filing injunction issued in violation of due process, contrary to rules of the court, AND which left me with patently ambiguous commencement procedures. : The Memo Decision of Judge Jerome Gorski dated February 1996 states; “This Court will grant an injunction that Plaintiff may not bring any other lawsuits, in any court [state or federal] based on the family court matter, or its progeny, without prior permission from that courts presiding judge or designee. A violation shall subject [plaintiff] to possible imposition of further sanctions, costs and fees. "The word "permanently’ was arbitrarily drafted into the final order by AAG Carlos Rodriguez.Contrary to the deliberate misapplications by subsequent ‘gatekeepers’, all encouraged by assistant attorney generals, the injunction never intended to prohibit me from all future free access to courts. That would be patently unconstitutional. ‘The injunction is VOID for unconstitutional application and Doctrine of Ambiguity. [procedure] Gorskis Memo also said; nt attorneys fees and/or actual expenses, same will be reimbursed. Said parties shall submit detailed affidavits in support of claimed fees’. Although none of the opposing parties incurred actual fees or expenses,? nor did any submit detailed affidavits, their attorney; AAG Carlos Rodriguez drafted the ‘final’ judgment to his ‘own liking. He appointed himself both beneficiary and receiver of the unsubstantiated claims. To wit: (BRADY), within 30 days of entry and service of this order, shall pay the sum of $2,767.00 to Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General, Carlos Rodriguez, Asst. AG, payable to the New York State Department of Law, for reasonable attorney's fees and costs | on behalf of the defendant judges’ Money judgments are VOID for inconsistency with the Memorandum decision. ‘[a] written order must conform strictly to the court's decision, * * *when there is conflict between the two, decision controls" (Di Prospero v Ford Motor105 AD2d 479, [1984)) Judgment is also VOID for having ‘ordered payment of attorneys’ fees and costs arising from petitioner's frivolous conduct in this and in previous actions’. A court cannot fine, Punish and/or sanction a party retroactive to cases already concluded. And VOID for failing to dispose of all issues ? Indemnified by Public Officers Law Sec. 17a 2 | {| "An order or judgment is deemed "final" if it "disposes of all of the causes of action between the parties in the action or proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial action apart from mere ministerial matters” (Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 15). Despite my objections to these fatal defects, including Rodriguez’ sleigh of hand’ modifications, Gorski signed the order as submitted. In the subsequent seven [7] years the only attempt to collect the money was by Rodriguez. CHILD SUPPORT JUDGMENT October 2001 The next VOID judgment derived from child support proceedings that were wrongfully severed from the main action for a change of custody in September ’99. Respondent [Mom] answered the action by cross petition seeking an increase of support for the child she had so ‘alienated’ that the child ceased all contact with her father upon barely reaching adolescence Later, Mom amended her cross petition to charge [Dad] with willful failure to pay. Following a hearing on March 27, 2000, the hearing examiner [support magistrate] issued the following Findings of Fact. Respondents request for upward modification of support was DENIED. Petitioner was declared guilty not for failure to pay basic child support, but ‘willful failure! to reimburse [R] for incidental medical costs incurred for the child. “Willfulness’ was said to be prima facie pursuant to Powers v Powers, thus - an award of attorney fees was [allegedly] mandatory TIMELY WRITTEN OBJECTIONS [Dad] filed timely written objections [FCA 439] to the ‘willfulness’ finding which purportedly mandated an award of attorney fees because the authority cited; ‘Powers v Powers’ had no instant application. ‘A prima facie ‘wilful violation’ is not made by a non-custodial parent's failure to reimburse expenses that are [1] subject to qualification and [2] contingent upon precursory action by the custodial parent.Swwris9®HsHeNn= "1 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 7 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 7 38 39 40 4 42 43 45 46 47 48 49 50 They become obligations only after these conditions are met... ‘Mom’ did not meet them. Also ‘willful’ is tantamount to criminal contempt that requires proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. County of Rockland v. Civil Service Employ Assoc., Inc. 62 N.Y.2d 11,14 [1984] As hearing examiners [support magistrates] are non-judicial employees * they cannot adjudicate, controversies or impose punishments. They must refer them to the family court judge. \‘a hearing examiner shall have the authority to determine that any person before the | said examiner is in violation of an order of the court as authorized ***** subject to ‘confirmation by a judge of the court * FCA Sec. 439 [Dads] timely written objections included the lack of fact-finding as to his request to suspend or cancel ALL child support based on ‘visitation as a defense’ which was not properly referred the assigned judge. [Donofrio] “One of the issues [examiners/magistrates] cannot hear is ** visitation as adefense, | which must be referred to a Judge.” FCA 439 [a] All litigation between the parties concluded with Donofrio’s order on August 16, 2001, which was amended on August 17 for the sole purpose of denying attorney fees. Having been superseded by Donofrios order in the plenary action, the contested child support judgment lost full force and effect. “Pending review of the objections and rebuttal, if any, the order ***shall be in full force and effect and no stay of such order shall be granted’. FCA 439(e). But this is ONLY how the Family Court Act and Due Process of Law are SUPPOSED to work. The combined effect of ‘Dad’ representing himself and Gorski’s injunction wrongfully applied, left the} | VID support judgment with appearance of validity. When Attorney Steven Feder entered the superceded judament in county clerks office, he knew it was void and unenforceable. 5 see 22 NYCRR $ 205.32 (b)(1);However, because ‘enduring consequences potentially flow from an order adjudicating| a party in contempt" * Dad had to seek higher authority and wound up in the courtroom of ‘Thomas VanStrydonck on Nov. 13, 2002. “THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK v KEVIN PATRICK BRADY’ # 2002/13647 In September 2002, I requested and was granted leave to file action in supreme court to compel family court judge, Ann Marie Taddeo, to inter alia disclose the reason for having blocked my facially meritorious petitions to obtain the hearing I was entitled to under FCA 439. Upon notice from the court, I appeared in the courtroom of Thomas VanStrydonck on Nov 13, 2002 to argue the merits for 'Brady v Taddeo, et af. In less than two [2] minutes it became| lear that VanStrydonck had a different agenda in mind. What I expected to be a civil action turned into a jurisdictionally defective quasi criminal prosecution entitied "the People by Eliot Spitzer v Kevin Patrick Brady’. \VanStrydonck accused me, sua sponte, of ‘malicious use of the courts’ and failing to pay money to supreme and family court judges. He ordered me to appear for trial on Dec. 10, 2002, He then adjourned ‘Brady v Taddeo’ According to court dockets that was the first and only time ‘Brady v Taddeo’ was heard On Nov 27", AAG Carlos Rodriguez feigned initiation of special proceedings by filing, retroactively, a Motion to Punish for Contempt which Vanstrydonck had already ordered to be heard on Dec 10, 2002. From that point forward, without my knowledge, all proceedings were docketed under the criminal title. By the time these unrestrained co-conspirators were through with me fourteen [14] months later, I had been falsely accused sua sponte, ordered to appear and to incriminate myself or face immediate incarceration. I was then serially prosecuted and jailed for non-crimes and non- offenses, under inapplicable statute and long passed time limitations. ‘ Matter of Bickwid v Deutsch, 87 NY2d 862, 863; see Brill v Bril, 288 AD2d 335; Matter of Stone v Stone, 236 AD2d 615),SSSSSERERLESSLSRE Based on hearsay alone, without cause, without notice, without real party complainants, without any evidence whatsoever, AND, without personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction proscribed by statute, VanStrydonck enlarged the earlier injunction to prohibit me from ‘commencing any new litigation unless represented by an attorney’, ‘The long dormant money judgments] signed by Gorski seven [7] years earlier were arbitrarily and recklessly reopened and prematurely modified by VanStrydonck, without the knowledge or consent of the real judgment parties, and rolled into a new judgment naming substituted parties under title of the void criminal proceedings. ‘These abusive, fraudulently obtained money judgments have plagued and discredited me for years, and eventually obstructed my ability to sell my property.. BE IT KNOWN. I was never served Notice to appear under any title than ‘Brady v Tadeo, et a/’ It was not until VanStrydoncks ‘Decision and Order’ [Sept 9, 2003] that I learned he had "denied the respondent [then Petitioner] the right to proceed and dismissed the Writ of Mandamus". ‘This comment implies that "Brady v Taddeo’ never commenced in the first place. Thus, dismissal was not final, and it was certainly not ‘on the merits’. ‘A Writ was necessary because Ann Marie Taddeo had willfully ignored my right to a hearing mandated by FCA 439 which then allowed Steven Feder to enter the void child support order in October 2001 causing an unacceptable stain on my personal and professional credibility. Brady v Taddeo commenced when I paid the fee, obtained an index number and served the papers on the New York Department of Law. [commencement by filing system] SERIAL PROSECUTION AND TRIAL IN ABSENTIA # 03-11838 In October 2003, while Vanstrydonck had me incarcerated, Rodriguez initiated another maliciou: criminal prosecution against me under the same title, with separate docket #03-11838. He ‘asked that I again be punished by incarceration for failing to report to jail on October 2nd as allegedly ordered.Rodriguez knew, or should have known, that NO COGNIZABLE CAUSE EXISTED because the underlying proceedings were proscribed by statute. He knew he was acting under color of law, again, and outside the scope of his employment duties. His petition requested NO REMEDIAL RELIEF whatsoever, only punishment. On Feb. 3, 2004; despite my absence from court, he encouraged the judge, Stephen Sirkin, proceed to trial anyway which he did. I was ultimately declared guilty by fiat and incarcerated for another 30 days. ‘On February 4, sheriff deputies again pounded on our door during early hours, climbed through ‘our bedroom window to arrest and take me to jail. ‘Throughout both incarcerations I was conscious of my unlawful confinement. I did not consent to it AND due to serial lack of jurisdiction; it was not privileged in any way. New York Attorneys General have absolutely NO PROSECUTORIAL AUTHORITY under Judiciary Law, other than 467. Upon my release I found that NO TRIAL ORDER OF DISPOSITION or mandate of commitment had been reduced to writing and thus NO APPEAL would be possible. I regarded this characteristic of Carlos Rodriguez. BRADY V VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ. [Docket # unassigned] In April 2003 I attempted to file an urgent petition in the appellate division to arrest the lawless, jurisdictionally void proceedings occurring in supreme court. Despite facially valid allegations and liberalized pleading standards, appellate court clerk L. Dalton shipped all eleven [11] copies straight back to me citing instructions of Justice Eugene Pigott. Although the reason was not provided, it is hard to fathom any experienced legal professional who, upon reading the petition would not confront at least one glaring fatal defect warranting intervention from a higher court. This would prove characteristic of the courts|| CPLR § 3012. answer or reply shall be made within twenty [20] days after ser In January 2004 I attempted to file another urgent petition in the appellate court to arrest the second jurisdictionally void prosecution in supreme court. Apparently, NO ONE in the appellate observed, at the very least that "the Attorney General is ‘without any prosecutorial power except when specifically authorized by statute" The reason for the failure is that courts have granted themselves leave to not bother reading papers submitted by non-lawyers, OR in this case, read the pro papers only until the repugnant subject matter became apparent. IN RE KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, PETITIONER, v. HON. JEROME C. GORSKI, et al., This action to compel was filed in the Fourth Dept. in September 2004. When permission was granted it was timely served on the Attorney General. Subsequently, without notice, it was transferred sua sponte to the First Dept. Upon the failure of the Attorney General to timely respond to either court, I moved for summary judgment. ‘The Order of the First Department says [11] Application for an order pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR denied, cross motion granted and the petition dismissed, without costs or disbursements, Petitioner's request for sanctions denied. All concur. No opinion. Order filed. NOTE: there was no cross motion to dismiss; * tardy or otherwise. AND, dismissal without answers, without opinion, arid without the mandatory relief requested is NOT among the option: limited by statute. CPLR § 3011. There shall be a complaint and an answer. pleadings CPLR § 3012 (d) the court may extend the time to appear or plead, or compe! acceptance of a pleading untimely served. 5" the time prescribed for a motion to dismiss in CPLR article 78 proceeding coincides with the time to || answer" . (see CPLR 7804(f) Perez v Perez, 131 A.D.2d 451, 516 N.Y.S.2d 236However, no said extension was requested or granted CPLR § 7804 [e] Should the body or officer fail either to file and serve an answer or to’ move to dismiss, the court may either issue a judgment in favor of the petitioner or order that an answer be submitted. Finally, "Where affirmative words in the statute are explicit, peremptory and used in contradistinction to permissive words in another section of the same statute, it will NOTE: Permission would not have been granted by the Fourth Department unless the petition demonstrated at least one cognizable cause of action. This aggrieved party was expected to believe that five [5] honorable justices of the appellate court failed to observe that fact. And yet all purportedly concurred in violation of procedural statutes to summarily dismiss. BRADY v VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ, et all In November 2005, I purchased index # 2005-904 for a Title 42 1983 civil rights complaint and sent it to VanStrydonck for permission. I provided a copy to the Department of Law. \VanStrydonck never responded. Neither did the Department of Law. BRADY V VANSTRYDONCK, RODRIGUEZ. [Docket # 10367/04] It is undeniable that the allegations enunciated in my September 1994 petition to the Fourth Department [Article 78] were facially meritorious and raised triable issues. But said issues were usurped by the states Motion to Dismiss and dismissal as a sanction by Judge John Lane. © McKinney's Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 177, p. 262; see Matter of Talbot v. Board of, Educ. of City of N. Y., 171 Misc. 974, 979-980; cf. Rosenblum v. Gorman, 21 App. Div. 618). |" 12 13 4 16 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 3 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Contrary to Lane’s findings, the action WAS commenced in the appellate division because the respondent judges had acted without jurisdiction. AND, because the pleadings raised triable issues summary dismissal as a sanction or otherwise, was prohibited. ‘The Attorneys General/Depart ment of Law knew or should have known that is public policy in New York that cases be resolved on the merits. The question is therefore why they brought such a Motion in the first place and why Judge Lane acquiesced to it. “Dismissal is the most drastic sanction contemplated by the CPLR and should be imposed only when the offensive conduct is wi jul, contumacious, or in bad faith." AND Due Process mandates that such conduct be established in a hearing and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, Lane summary dismissed because ‘petitioner failed to comply with earlier orders to first obtain permission’. In the final analysis, the need for permission is the excuse of choice to keep the very repugnant, ‘subject matter from being proved on the record. In fact the unanimous summary dismissals rise} to the level of extrinsic fraud, fraud on the court, and failure to perform a ministerial act specifically required by law to be performed. ‘THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS Lawless summary dismissals continued with my claims for damages in the Court of Claims Judge Richard E. Sise terminated every timely filed, duly served claim since March 2006. ” Despite countless pages complaining of overt constitutional and ministerial torts inflicted on me by officers of the Unified Court System, Sise purported that I failed to state_even a single cognizable claim. ” Docket #'s M-71491 M-72717, M-72812, M-72976, M-73333, M-73540, M-73541, M-73707, M-73867, M-74024, M-76775 , M-77760, M-77631, M-77632, M-80869 -10-Although fees were initially paid, Sise cited the injunctions as authority to subjugate every claim into a ‘motion’ to permit late filing. He then terminated every ‘motion’, sua sponte, without notice, without opportunity to amend ostensibly defective pleadings and without requiring answers from State attorneys. Despite countless on-point case citations demonstrating his unconstitutional application of the gatekeeper injunctions, the judge and state attorneys concocted their story and stuck to it, To wit: “in the absence of permission to file his claim, ‘movant’ did not commence an action against the State and, thus, the State had no duty to answer or respond" ‘This FIAT has no legal authority whatsoever. The role of ‘gatekeeper’ is simply to review the complaint for facial sufficiency, NOT to provide excuse for blocking injured non-lawyers from court to protect the State. Sise’ clearly advocated for the State and perpetuated my ‘infamia facti” by comments such as “[w]hen it becomes clear that courts are being used for harassment by an experienced pro se party’ ***,, ® In this case however no real party has ever alleged legal harassment. He wrote: [Brady's] conduct in repeatedly attempting to litigate the same issue is ‘frivolous’. In law, NOTHING is litigated unless the parties get into court. Given the chronic extrinsic fraud in practice here this comment was reckless and irresponsible, Sise concluded; '[these] proposed claim{s] [are] meritless on it's face** ** judicial officers *** are entitled to absolute immunity *** [A]ctions ** associated with the prosecutorial phase are ***quasi-judicial ** and invoke ** absolute immunity This conclusion alone presents a controversy sufficient to invoke preliminary jurisdiction, ® McFadden v State UID #2003-032-070, Claim Nos. 103390, et al., Motion Nos. M-66233, et al., June 30, 2003, Hard, J., see also Moore v State, UID #2001-028-0511, Claim No. 100767, 2001, Sise, J.)Without further inquiry Sise had no authority to declare by FIAT the injurious actions to have been "legitimate and issued by appropriate judicial officers who were consequently ‘cloaked in absolute judicial immunity.” Jf he had read the pro se pleadings without agenda he would have learned that the actionable conduct were NOT judicial acts, AND that the Claimant had been unanimously deprived of any judicial forum. His conclusion “[t]here can be no dispute that in ruling on the prior motions for permission to file this Court was exercising its judicial function”. Sise remained so fixed on his erroneous interpretation of the void injunctions that he failed to recognize the role of gatekeeper is not a judicial function. It is administrative. ‘PRE FILING’ REVIEW IS NOT A JUDICIAL ACT. While the role is often performed by a judge, it is not necessarily performed by a judge or performed exclusively by a judge. Because it does not present a controversy between two or more parties for resolve, it is not a judicial function. Insofar as every ‘proposed’ action and/or claim presented as facially meritorious, every refusal to allow it to proceed "is a failur it ifical red by law. T submit that every premature termination manifests an unwarranted agenda ‘to avoid vexatious or oppressive litigation and discovery * His recitation of my having saved the fifty [50] dollar filing fee is patently insulting. By the time I filed claims for damages, intentionally ignorant officers of New York courts had already cost me at least $1,000,000 in current and future income. ° “the prior motions’ were in fact arbitrarily subjugated timely claims. * Brady v Kearns, CAF 00086-88 Brady v Taddeo, 02/10624 Brady v VanStrydonck, 02/13647 Brady v Gorski, Brady v State 21" 12 3 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 24 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 a4 32 33 34 35 36 7 38 39 40 4 42 43 45 46 47 48 49 50 |] ¥ 9 A.0.3d 23, 776 N.Y.S.2d 643 ( 05/13/2004) Sise other Opinions # 1" “Movant, who must obtain Court permission to commence an action, has moved for a default judgment, contending the submission he filed and served was not an application for permission to file but, rather, the claim itself. Opinion # 2: " [T]nasmuch as "Movant" cannot commence an action without the Court's permission, and no such permission has been granted, there is no Claim that must be answered, and Defendant is not in default. In fact, the controlling principles establish otherwise. In fact, in his recitations include his own ‘Separate observation”? *** New York practice, *** does not expressly give courts authority to dismiss even frivolous actions, *** there is scant authority for such dismissals, no matter what the reason. ***" As a general rule, ** sua sponte dismissals are discouraged and ultimately invalidated. Clearly NOT however where this pro se litigant is concerned, ‘APPEAL OF SUA SPONTE DISMISSALS Consider the findings in Brown v. State "* in which Third Dept. held "the Court of Appeals has left no room for doubt that " * * * " no right of appeal exists from **** order[s] entered sua sponte. The Third Dept has also said “Claimants' remedy was to move to vacate the sua sponte | order and, if denied, appeal the denial as of right (Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333] But it held to a different standard the pro se appeal of "Brady v State’ 4 M-73540 ® Frasier v. State, 11 Misc.3d 497, 810 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y.CL.CI. 11/21/2005) ° see also discussion in Myung Chun v N.A. Mortgage Co., 285 AD2d 42, 46 [1st Dept 2001]["sua sponte dismissal must be restricted to the most extraordinary circumstances"). 13Its order in January 2009 says only ‘affirmed on the opi ns of Judge Richard Sise’. The problem is that this ‘affirmation’ conflicts absolutely with the unanimous declaration of the U.S Supreme Court in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. [1] "a judge’s opinion of whether a litigant will prevail or not is irrelevant’, [2] it is “a gross violation of procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at the complaint stage” and [3] "fundamentally unfair to dismiss ** before the whole body of facts can be revealed 15 through discovery.” Although I have twice moved the Court of Claims to vacate it’s sua sponte dismissals, to this date I have never received its final order The Court has invoked a standing rule to subjugate ALL my claims, regardless of timeliness or facial merit into Motions to Permit Late Filing. This violates the prohibition against PRIOR RESTRAINT. “Although the prohibition ** is not absolute, it comes with "a ‘heavy presumption’ against its constitutional validity” ** and may be imposed only in the most “exceptional cases" 7 JUDGE FRANK WILLIAMS Having been blocked from Monroe County courts for more than a decade, having no income anc quickly depleting assets, I sought emergency relief in September 2008 by petition to Saratoga County Supreme Court. I pleaded to the court as follows: * 534 U.S, (2002), 2 Organization for a Better Austin v Keefe, 402 US 415, 419, 91 S Ct 1575, 29 L Ed 2d 1 [1971], quoting Carroll v President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 US 175, 181, 89 S Ct 347, 21 L Ed 2d 325 [1968]; see Bantam Books, Inc. v Sullivan, 372 US 58, 70, 83 S Ct 631, 9 L Ed 2d 584 [1963]), 7 Near v Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 US 697, 716, 51 $ Ct 625, 75 L Ed 1357 [1931]; accord CBS Inc. vy Davis, 510 US at 1317; see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tomnillo, 418 US 241, 259, 94 S Ct 2831, 41 [.N.Y.S.2d Page 459 } L Ed 2d 730 [1974] [White, J., concurring] “4.“As of April 2007, I am no longer bondable and thus no longer employable in my chosen profession. Void judgments on my record have destroyed my professional credibility and credit rating and block my access the equity in my property. **** “To avoid further economic loss by foreclosure and/or bankruptcy, I must remove these clouds immediately and sell it as quickly thereafter. For reasons deposed within, this action, in this venue, is the only remedy I have. Despite my plea of financial emergency, this action was dismissed, sua sponte, without notice, before service, as a sanction by Judge Frank Williams, citing only an ‘excerpt’ from the 1996 ;, NO attempt was made to verify that the thirteen [13] injunction. Upon information and bel year old injunction, [or the one page excerpt], even remained in effect. Williams summarily aborted the action, then attempted to foreclose future actions by writing ‘matters not decided are denied’. However, this did not make it valid, res judicata or otherwise. Williams acted solely in administrative capacity. JUDGE BARRY KRAMER In March 2009, I applied for permission from district administrative judge Vito Caruso who assigned the petition to Judge Barry Kramer,. Before 'RJI’ had even been filed, Kramer summarily dismissed, sua sponte, as a sanction citing the void injunction of Judge VanStrydonck. Kramer failed to disclose how this had come to his attention since I made no mention in pleading. . Upon information and belief, following service on him, AAG Rodriguez (or accomplice] simply phoned up Kramer's office and urged dismissal. This constituted an ex-parte conspiracy to commit and perpetuate extrinsic fraud. Kramer also raised, sua sponte, what would have been a waivable defense; statute of limitations, and then purported to decide the defense in favor of defendants. ae" 2 B 4 15 16 7 18 19 a 23 24 25 2 28 31 32 33 35 7 39 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 His ‘ruling’ was not even factual. In New York, the doctrines of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel "may be invoked to defeat a statute of limitations defense when the plaintiff, was induced by fraud, misrepresentations or deception to refrain from filing a timely| action." ‘There should be absolutely no doubt as to its application here. In Rankin v Howard the Court held that [although a party who connives with a judge to| [dismiss the action in which he is a defendant] may deal with him in "judicial capacity,” the other party's expectation, ‘ec, judicial impartiality, is actively frustrated by the scheme. Although the serial terminations were absolute nullities, they were highly injurious for me. A judge who acts as ‘gatekeeper’ only to dismiss as a sanction facially meritorious pleadings, acts in administrative capacity only, NOT judicial. These constitute willful fallures of a ministerial acts required by law to be performed. They constitute willful violations of constitutional law. ‘THE ASTONISHING UNRESTRAINED FRAUD ON THE COURT, DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS, AND FATAL DISPOSITONS OF JUDGE JOHN ARK ‘At the time this action was filed, March 2009, by foreclosure mill Steven Baum Assocs. the scandalous deeds of Wells Fargo Bank and others by securitization of mortgage debt and fabricated documents was already widely known. Judge John Ark needed not have resorted to ‘liberally construing’ the pro se response to confirm a non waivable jurisdictional challenge had been raised. Iwrote "J reject this complaint for lack of standing and lack of verification. Until a definitive standing is established I challenge the courts jurisdiction to proceed. 16Swworameone 1 12 8 4 15 16 7 18 19 2 23 25 28 29 30 a 32 33, 35 36 7 38 39 40 41 42 43 45 47 48 49 50 Ark apparently became wrathful that I challenged his jurisdiction. Rather than insist that the Bank meet the threshold requirements and satisfy the challenge, he apparently deemed the pro se response an unqualified refusal to submit to the courts jurisdiction. . [And to this date ‘the Bank’ never has met the threshold. Ark has never required them to. ‘Ark knew or should have known that ownership of a note and mortgage is not proven by an attorney's affirmation or by a putative plaintiff affidavit, but he dismissed my answer and signed a proposed order that claimed ‘no one was heard in opposition’. He ignored my timely jurisdictional challenge and turned my home and property over to a known corporate marauder simply for the asking. His order of foreclosure has tied up my home, slandered my credit and credibility since it was issued in December 2009. He has received multiple objections from me stating absolutely valid reasons why his order is void for fraud and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He has ignored every one but the following. In June 2013, more than two [2] years after my jurisdictional challenge, Ark feigned that ‘standing was necessarily decided against defendant’ . This was absolutely false and completely unsupported by the record.” In May 2014 attorneys for Wells Fargo Bank filed Motion, ex parte, to modify; nunc pro func, the initiating pleadings purportedly to comply with New York’s heightened pleading standards in foreclosure actions. In fact it was another fraud Upon learning of this ex parte subterfuge I vehemently objected to Ark of the deceit and lack ‘of Notice. I informed him of Wells Fargo Bank v Podeswik 2014-01045 wherein the Fourth Department had characterized a similar attempt as, at worst WFB had perpetrated a FRAUD ON THE COURT or at best engaged in misconduct by not revealing all the facts to the court. “7‘Ark signed WFB's jurisdictionally defective proposed order anyway, perpetuating the fraud that has permeated the case from the outset. His order confirmed the proceedings were VOID ‘AB INITIO because the March 2014 ex parte motion was intended to ‘omit * a material statement from the commencing pleadings. With the words ‘[plaintiff is] the owner and the holder of a note a note and mortgage being foreclosed’ surreptitiously omitted by Arks order of April 23, 2014 the initial pleadings were rendered insufficient to commence action in supreme court. During my appearance on June 18, 2014 and I asked Ark, ‘How can you ratify facially defective exhibits’? He failed to answer any of my questions EXCEPT that I asked to tell me what he meant by * [jurisdiction] was necessarily decided against defendant’. He wouldn't acknowledge having made such statement. He deferred only to an assertion made by Wells Fargo attorney who had not even been assigned to the case at that time. ‘Ark then ordered that permission would be required should I wish to make further motions to the court. Although I objected vehemently in writing, Arks verbal mandate does not appear in the transcripts The overtly fraudulent proceedings were deposed in my Article 78 petition to the Fourth Department and yet summarily dismissed on June 23, 2015. The refusals by both courts to observe the fraud and vacate Arks jurisdictionally void orders constitute failures to perform ministerial acts required by law. As the result of such consistent treasonous failures I am still being harassed and threatened by Wells Fargo attorneys as of August 5, 2015.Somvsamsena "1 12 8B “4 16 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 26 a7 28 29 31 32 3 35 36 7 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 a7 48 49 THE HONORABLE RICHARD DOLLINGER, JSC In June 2013 I petitioned supreme court for mandatory relief from $30,000 or more in VOID judgment liens encumbering my property and slandering my personal/professional records. “The petition was assigned to Judge Richard Dollinger who had earlier served as courthouse investigator and czar over orders of other judges. In August 2012 he conspired with Administrative Judge Craig Doran to cancel the financial relief I was awarded by order of Judge Lawrence Fisher on July 31, 2012. Dollinger acting as Yudge of his own cause’ concluded I should suffer this sanction based on what he heard about me through the courthouse grape vine. By time I left his courtroom on October 8 2013 he had dismissed as a sanction while the previous void judgments remained AND I had additional money sanctions accruing indefinitely He had surreptitiously elevated the States benign civil cross motion for dismissal into a criminal contempt inquiry. His threats of incarceration and loss of my drivers’ license manifested criminal punishment. Dollingers’ malicious agenda to ‘chil’my rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment. AND under NYS constitution was so obvious that on November 8" I came to court prepared to be incarcerated again for duration unknown. He ordered that I voluntarily purge my complaint from county clerk files or accrue a fine of $50.00 a day until I did. As of October 8 2015 the amount owed will be $36,500. On November 2013, AAG Hilell Deutsch, 2.4.2 ‘Public Integrity Officer’ appeared for the State and declared ‘Brady has filed ‘35 cases and appeals against the State and its officers’ AND he lamented ‘these cases have been repeatedly found to be frivolous and without merit’, He recited from Judge Tom VanStrydonck’s order of 2003, “19." 12 3 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 2 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 40 a 42, 43 45 47 49 ‘fining Brady $1,000 and sentencing him to 30 days jail for criminal contempt [§ 750 (3)] for ‘failure to abide by Judge Gorski's order; (b) finding him in civil contempt [§ 753] and a choice of serving an ‘additional 60 days in jail and paying approximately $15,000 in fines to various parties he had previously sued. And (c) further extending Judge Gorski's Order barring Brady from filing any suit, even unrelated to the underlying Family Court Decision, absent an attorney or certification that he had attempted to, and failed, to obtain representation from various free legal services «He then moved the court [Dollinger] verbally, without notice, for an order permitting the Department to ignore all further pleadings I may serve on them AND Dollinger granted the request immediately, by FIAT. Dollinger wrote: “[r]espondents [the State] and their counsel [attorneys general] are not to respond to any papers filed or served by BRADY in this or an action he has previously filed or may file in the future ...[without permission] ‘Thus, Dollinger solved the ABA Rule 1.6 controversy by FIAT disfranchising me completely from the ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM OF JUSTICE " and imposing further Prior Restraint on me. | | He verbally modified the purported injunctions thus imputing additional provisions to satisfy members of the bench and bar. Note however CPLR § 5019 ‘a judgment or order shall not be stayed, impaired or affected by any mistake, defect or irregularity in the papers or procedures in the action not affecting a substantial right of a party, NO COURT HAS EVER CONSIDERED MY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS IN ANY ACTION TAKEN.| 28 § 3011, There shall be a complaint and an answer. § 3018. A party shall deny those statements | known or believed by him to be untrue. | -20-T submit that Judges Ann Marie Tadeo, Jerome Gorksi, Tom VanStrydonck, Stephen Sirkin, Frank Williams, Barry Kramer, Richard Sise, Craig Doran, and Richard Dollinger knew, or should have known, they were willfully violating my right of access to the courts and denying ‘equal protection under the law by taking the actions deposed here in a reckless, injurious and unconstitutional manner. 1. New York practice DOES NOT allow summary dismissal of a facially valid petition as a sanction; AND its long stated public policy of deciding cases on the merits still prevails 2. when an action is filed against judgments obtained by fraud: pled with specificity, to wit attorney fraud, government attorney fraud, fraud on the courts perpetuated by fraud on the court and lack of personal and subject Jurisdiction, a court HAS NO DISCRETION to ignore it. 3. AND it is MANDATORY for a court to observe jurisdictionally VOID judgments and VACATE them, unconditionally, even on its own initiative 4. When injuries from mistake, defect or irregularity not affecting any adverse party's rights are shown, such as here, CPLR § 5015 and § 5019 provides authority on motion to VACATE it 5. that a constructively expired ‘pre-filing order’ issued to remedy an adverse family court DOES NOT TRUMP the constitutional rights of the enjoined party years after the protected child is emancipated. WHY DID DOLLINGER INSIST THAT I PURGE THE COMPLAINT? Note that had I complied with this threat there would be no initiating pleadings on record for appeal by right. The proceedings would be VOID for multiple reasons. Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill, 118, 122 [1930),Why have my honorable New York Attorneys General participated and perpetuated in this subterfuge of fraud, fraud on the court and unconstitutional practice since the outset? ‘AAGs Carlos Rodriguez, Robert Gelormini, Thomas Ramsey, Hilell Duetsch knew or should have known that Rule 1.6 is NOT the only ABA Rule that binds them. * A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair. A government lawyer not having such discretionary power who believes there is lack of merit in a controversy submitted to the lawyer should so advise his or her superiors and recommend the avoidance of unfair litigation. * A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to develop a full and fair record, and should not use his or her position or the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results. The responsibilities of government lawyers *** are generally the same as those of public prosecutors. The officers of courts identified here have continuously acted like thugs in the school yard to ‘obstruct the proper administration of justice. They all knew or should have known that "no court rule can enlarge or abridge rights conferred by statute"; Broome County Farmers’ Fire Relief Assn. v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 239 App Div 304, 306, 268 N.Y.S, 131, affd 264 NY 614, 191 N.E. 591), and this bars the imposition of additional procedural hurdles that impair statutory remedies (see, Chase Watch Corp. v Heins, 284 NY 129, 29 N.E.2d 646; ‘The injuries identified here derive from a pattern or practice by courts of discrimination against 1 pro se litigant. New York law holds ' the continuing violation doctrine can be satisfied ‘when specific acts of discrimination are permitted to go un-remedied for so long as to amount to a policy or practice. * 49 Bloom v NYC Board Ed. 2003 WL 1740528 (SDNY 2008) Clark v State, 302 AD 944 (4" Dept. 2003) Branch v Guilderland School Dist. 239 F.Supp 242 (NDNY 2003)The doctrine also provides "the existence of a continuous policy or practice delays the commencement of the statute of limitations until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of that policy or practice." ELEVEN [11] JURISDICTIONALLY VOID CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS Since January 1995, I have [coincidentally 7] been criminally prosecuted four [4] times in Monroe County courts, convicted by ill-informed juries, fined, incarcerated and ordered to report to probation officers for years thereafter. As a matter of long established law every accusatory instrument failed to state a crime or offense cognizable in New York. Every accusatory instrument was state and federal constitutionally VOID Although I asserted these fatal defects at every arraignment or in pre-trial motion, ** the court[s] and prosecutors ignored them and proceeded to trial. Despite having been found GUILTY misinformed juries there is NO EVIDENCE in any trial record to support conviction. In the final analysis, EVERY conviction is absolutely void. EVERY court and EVERY prosecutor knowingly proceeded without trial and/or subject matter jurisdiction, PETITIONS FOR CORAM NOBIS On July 21 2011, I submitted two [2] applications to the Administrative Office of Seventh [7°] Judicial District; one for relief by coram nobis, the other pursuant to CPLR Artie 11. ‘The applications consisted of 92 pages of swom allegations and exhibits that destroyed the presumptive jurisdiction of the justice courts that prosecuted, incarcerated, fined, sanctioned, and/or otherwise punish me over the years. ® Salgado v, City NY, 2001 WL 290051 (S.D.N.Y.). Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, (2d Cir, 1994). 2 and upon EVERY appealBoovemsona " 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 29 30 ct 32 33 35, 36 7 38 39 40 4 42 43 44 45 46 7 48 49 T asked for a hearing to show proof of * Actual and Factual Innocence 2.4.2 ‘Ordinary Injustice’ ” + Constitutional rights violations + Lack of jurisdiction in the trial courts + Ineffective representation at the trial and appellate level due to pro se prejudice + Prosecutorial misconduct, including fraud on the courts T asked for judicial notice of the controlling principles annexed as MEMO Judge Lawrence Fisher confirmed that the petition demonstrated merit by granting me financial relief by order dated July 31, 2012 In August 2012, Dollinger acting as judge of his own cause’ conspired with Doran to cancel the financial relief Fisher had awarded. He concluded I should suffer this sanction from what he had heard about me through the courthouse grape vine. Although the coram nobis was NOT subject to pre-filing instructions, it was intercepted by Doran in violation of the random case assignment system. Doran continued the constructive conspiracy of extrinsic fraud, fraud on and by the courts that has injured and plagued me from the outset. He claimed the petition was ‘frivolous’ and blocked it being filed. All one needs to do to confirm Doran's misfeasance and neglect is to read the questions posed in the petition. Doran obviously failed to perform a specific ministerial act required by law ta be performed; constitutional rights not withstanding. Ordinary Injustice’ results when a community of legal professionals becomes so accustomed to a ‘pattern of lapses that they can no longer see their role in them.” Amy Bach. Metropolitan Books 2009 heSewriv]}]HMs48onH— " 12 13 14 15 16 7 8 19 20 24 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 |] 31 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 Since July 2012, under Dorans instructions, clerks for Monroe county and supreme courts have refused to accept any documents I have presented for filing AND that even my most minute courtesy to be requested in writing. His staff then usually fails to respond. MEMO; FACIALLY DEFECTIVE ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENTS It is well established in New York that a criminal defendant has a ‘constitutional right to be prosecuted on a jurisdictionally valid accusatory instrument. ” "A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a non-waivable prerequisite to a criminal prosecution” (People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 103 [2010]). The factual portion of an information "must contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges” (CPL 100.15 (31), which facts, if true, must establish every element of the offenses prima facie (CPL 100.40 [1] [b], [c]; People v Jones, 9 NY3d 259, 261-262 (2007]). The Court of Appeals says that ‘an information MUST allege every element of the offense charged and defendants commission thereof. People v Tarka (1990) ‘A PRIMA FACIE CASE In fact, the Court says; ' the failure to make a "prima facie case" pursuant to CPL 100.40 (1) (c) and CPL 100.15 (3) is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect . ** And, "[because] the information charging defendant with [an intentional crime] fails to allege the essential element of * intent ** the information is jurisdictionally defective and MUST be dismissed" “The failure to comply with the "prima facie case" requirement for facial sufficiency is a jurisdictional defect in accord with our decisions in [People v Hall (48 N.Y.2d 927), People v Case (42 N.Y.2d 98). People v Miles (64 N.Y.2d 731) People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227,738 N.E.2d 773,715 N.Y.S.2d 369 People v Sobotker, 61 NY2d 44, > People v Alejandro (70 N.Y.2d 133) People v Tarka (1990) 75 NY2d 996. -25-1 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 28 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 a7 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 People v Jones * "because the factual allegations in the accusatory *** failed to establish a prima facie case, the conviction should be vacated and the information dismissed”. See also People v. Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133 The Pittsford Accusatory Instrument failed to allege any facts tending to support the charge. | “Unlike a felony complaint , an information must demonstrate both reasonable Cause and a legally sufficient case against the defendant. People v Fletcher Gravel Co. (05/07/75) 68 N.Y.S.2d 392; 82 Misc. 2d 22. Comn Staff Notes to CPL 100.40 “[B]ecause the factual allegations in the accusatory *** failed to establish a prima facie case, the conviction should be vacated and the information dismissed”. * “The rationale of this distinction is, in part, that the felony complaint is not the instrument of ultimate prosecution and must be followed by a grand jury proceeding and an indictment based upon legally sufficient grand jury evidence" *” The Commissions’ Staff notes elaborate: “The lodging of the information is not, as with a felony complaint, followed by a preliminary hearing and a grand jury proceeding, and nowhere at any time prior to pleading or trial are the People required to present actual evidence demonstrating a prima facie case. Under the circumstances, the least that should be required of them is an information if given in the form of containing sworn allegations of an evidentiary nature whi trial testimony, would spell out a legally sufficient case." * People v. Jones No. 145 (11/20/2007) 2007 NY Slip Op 09070, 2007.NY.0011618 2 People v. Jones No. 145 (11/20/2007) 2007 People v. Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133, 7 People v.Bridget Alejandro; 511 N.E.2d 71; 70 N.Y.2d 133 -26-" 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 35 36 37 38 39 40 4 42 43 45 46 47 48 49 50 In ‘Alejandro’, Judge Bellacosa explained:" this is a small price to pay for upholding the logic of the statutory framework, It supplies elemental fairness to defendants prosecuted for less serious crimes, but crimes nevertheless, which affect ordinary People and produce lifetime criminal records. ‘The Rule in the Fourth Department is that ‘a count *** that omits an element of an offense from its factual allegations is deficient under the CPL, notwithstanding its reference to the title and statutory citation of the offense. People v. Santos, (N.Y.Sup. 08/12/2008) Another Fourth Dept. is rule says "if the instrument is not legally sufficient, the court has no authority at all to proceed with the arraignment" * ‘AND, "where the statute has no application, the authority of the court to correct its ‘own error of law or fact is not restricted. ” “Of course, with an intentional crime, the factual part of the information must include allegations that, if true, establish the essential element of intent.” People v. Khan, 15 Misc.3d 1131(A) (N.Y.City Crim.Ct. 05/07/2007) ‘A mere “conclusory statement ** does not meet the reasonable cause requirement" (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]). “an accusatory is jurisdictionally defective if the acts it accuses ** simply do not constitute a crime or fails to allege act{s] constituting every material element of the crime. (People v Case, 42 N.Y.2d 98) see People v McGuire, 5 N.Y.2d 523). 2® Fitzpatrick v. Rosenthal, (2006) also Preiser, Practice Commentaries, Mckinney's Cons Book 11A, CPL 170.10 at 12; see Matter of Dyno v Hills, 274 AD2d 908, 909, % People v. Wroten, 732 N.Y.S.2d 513 ( 11/09/2001) 27CerVensens SUMMARY It is said ‘New York law has long been the vanguard of jurisdictions that have adopted an expansive concept of actionable fraud. In this jurisdiction protection is Given to [those] injured by falsehood or deception; *** fraud vitiates everything it touches, and destroys the very thing it was devised to support; *** Law does not temporize with trickery or duplicity." ” That is precisely at issue at issue here. The unrestrained inclination of bench and bar at every level to steamroll over these years of manifest duplicity, disfranchisement and abandonment creates presumption of a cognizant, systematic effort to cheat me by systematic "misuse of government power *** made possible only because the wrongdoers [are] clothed with state authority " My honorable and entrusted court officers expect me to simply absorb my unfathomable losses ‘and live my remaining years in poverty; AND do so under the nose of the Attorney General/ Department of Law. Court Claims Act §11[a][i] identifies the Attorney-General as the "officer responsible for the investigation and litigation of the claim" ( Andriola v. State, 53 AD2d 966, Matter of Welch v. State, 71 AD2d 494, Exec. Law § 63{1] and who must ascertain the agency's liability. Court of Claims Act Art III, § 20-a says ‘the attorney general shall cause a review to be made within the department of law of all cases filed in the court of claims to determine which cases are appropriate for possible settlement. I submit that if the State legislature wanted to exclude pro se litigants cheated of their claims by extrinsic fraud it could have said so. In fact the Attorney General HAS NEVER admitted or denied this injured state residents injuries. 5° angerosa v White Co., 248 App Div 425, 431, affd 275 NY 524, cited in Sabo v Delman,3 N.Y.2d 155, 161. -28-“The failure to deny an allegation in the complaint constitutes an admission to the truth of that allegation” (see CPLR 3018[a]; Human Dev. Servs. of Port Chester v Zoning Bd. of Appeals/ Vil. of Port Chester, 67 NY2d 702,; Santiago v County/Suffolk, 280 AD2d 594, “Failure to deny an allegation is as much admission as (one) specifically stated”, Louise Mitchell v. Ann Lewis Shops 166 N.Y.S.2d 365; 4 A.D.2d 849 (1957) " 12 UNTIL THE CONTRARY APPEARS 13 {g || "A superior court of general jurisdiction, proceeding within the general scope of its 16 || powers, is presumed to act rightly. All intendments of law are in favor of its acts. It {3 || is presumed to have jurisdiction to give the judgments it renders until the contrary 19 || appears. ** HOWEVER, when it appears that an oon step was omitted, the 20 p q 2 22 23 || In the final analysis, the reason my honorable Attorneys General absolutely REFUSE to answer 24 || the allegations of this injured pro se victim, and why NO COURT will require them to, is that 26 || they have NO COGNIZABLE DEFENSE for what I have been subjected to. 7 28 29 || THE CHEAT IS COMPLETE 30 31 32 || Please note my damages on the following page. 33, 34 35 || I do hereby depose under penalty of law that everything alleged herein is correct and truthful to the best 36 || of my knowledge except for matters alleged on information and belief and I believe those to be true. 7 38 @ < © } Kevin Patrick Brady, prose Ji Fe el Epd- 508 Loast Lane East Rochester, NY 14445 Vecleve we oe nei Peea Prquss HIS, UK KAREN A. SMITH NOTARY PUBLIC-STATE OF NEW YORK No. 018M6241488 uatitied in Monroe County 49 ||5; 50 ||*" Galpin v. Page, 78 Wall. (85 U.S] 350, 365-366, ‘ay Commission Expires May 23. 2017 * Smith v. Central Trust Co., 154 N. Y. 333, p. 341 29.sie TION AGAINST JURISDICTION Office of the County Clerk Monroe County, New York Cheryl Dinolfo County Clerk SEARCH RESULTS 0) CRIMINAL/FELONY x} CIVIL ) OTHER State of New York) County of Monroe) ss. City of Rochester) 1, Cheryl Dinolfo, Clerk of the County of Monroe, of the County Court of said County, and of the Supreme Court, both being Courts of Record, having a common seal, DO HEREBY CERTIFY: (]_ That I have made a search of the records of the Monroe County Clerk's Office from _November 26, 2002 _ through February 4, 2009 for 12/13647 Peo the te of New Y« General of the State of New York vs Kevin Patrick Brady, and indie following: There is no Affidavit of Servic thi n, served upon Patrick Brady, filed in the time peri . No Affidavit entitled “the People of the State of New York by Eliot Spitzer vs Kevin Patrick Brady”, (1#2002/13647) hi n in the record of same for the period o such search. [] No civil record has been found at the Monroe County Clerk's Office as of for 11 _No felony record has been found at the Monroe County Clerk's Office as of Please check with the local jurisdictions and with the Rochester City Court regarding the disposition in question. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, | have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said County and Courts, at Rochester, New York, this _4th_day of February 2009. Cheryl Di AS is Monroe County ClerkOOTHT TL8'Z$ o0'00s'e$ oo'00s'e$ 00082 "bs 00'000'000'rs 00'000'0eT$ 00'00s'9es oo'000'Ts o0'00s'0es 00'000'00s$ oo'000'0ss$ 00'000'00s$ oo'000'e¢ OoTTT OTs oorosz$ 00'000'09$ 00'000'sts o0'000'9Ts oo'00s'ts o0'000'ss 00000'T$ ANAWHSINNd ‘INsONOUM Yos ALMIaWrT Oe oo0'ts SAVO OE ooo'zs TIVOTs oss Sava OzT ‘sAva 9ST SAVOZE oos'ts Sava zs savaz aasodWi ANSWHSINNd Wi 3OINUaS Nowwondowd s3a41un0o diysuonejea yo sso) Ayodosd /ewoy Jo $80} uy UNO ewesdns GO0Z SAVG OEL ‘STOz ‘8 1090190 30 Sy 49BulIiog ynog ewesdng ETOz NOWLONYS NOILWe3OUVONI puis unog ewasdng poor NOWLONNIN G3aNWaxa 490189 Jo $807 youopsiguen ynog ewasdng £007. NOWLONNINI ANSNWAU3d ‘TOET UNOAN ZZ NOILONYS ‘sapanr asunawiay 148109 unog awosdns 966T wnO9 LWA UMO] UOIUEd OTOZ NOLWYaDUYONI nog fig 48189490 200Z NOLLWYSOUVON! NOMWAOUd SUVEA E NOUWYaDUYONI ‘SQN3W3IM YOM OT 3Nid nog uMo] uoWUHad 6EET NOIWu3OUVONI NOLLWEOUd HVA T NOLWYSOUVON! (ONa33M MUOM T nog UMOL PIO}SHId BEET NoloIasIunr 40 YOWT ‘S3WIHD NON HOd SADVWVG 4O4 WIV) G3ZIWALITIN THE NEW YORK COURT OF CLAIMS AND STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY KEVIN PATRICK BRADY v A MERITORIOUS CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES STATE OF NEW YORK ADDITIONAL EXHIBITSa) e: SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department DOCKET NO. OP 14-01563 PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, PERADOTTO, AND CARNI, JJ. KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, PETITIONER, v HONORABLE JOHN J. ARK, MONROE SUPREME COURT, HONORABLE RICHARD A. DOLLINGER, MONROE COUNTY SUPREME COURT, RESPONDENTS. Respondents having moved to dismiss the CPLR article 78 proceeding on the ground that the petition fails to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, and for other relief, ‘Now, upon reading and filing the affirmation of Frank Brady, Esq., dated May 20,2015, the notice of motion with proof of service thereof, and the affidavit of Kevin Patrick Brady received May 28, 2015, and due deliberation having been had thereon, It is hereby ORDERED that the motion is granted and the petition is dismissed without costs. Entered: June 23, 2015, FRANCES E. CAFARELL, Clerk| 6 eo CONSTITUTIONAL TORTFEASORS ON NEW YORK'S PAYROLL ‘Supreme Court Judges Rate of Pay Total ‘Ark, John J Judge Supreme $141,700 $146,700 Demarco, John L Act Sup Ct Jus $136,700 $143,700 Doran, Craig J ‘Act Sup Ct Jus $136,700 $148,913 kramer, Barry Judge Supreme $138,470 $148,700 Lane, John P. Judge Supreme RETIRED $03,324 Marks, Patricia D Judge County Court $141,700 $146,700 McNamara, Thomas J Judge Supreme $141,700 $141,700 Renzi, Alexander R Judge Supreme $141,700 $148,700 Schwartz, John R ‘Acting County Judge $125,600 $135,800 Sirkin, Stephen R. Judge Supreme $141,424 $141,424 Sise, Richard € ‘Judge Court Claims $157,055 $162,531 Taddeo, Annmarie ‘Judge Supreme $136,700 $146,700 Valentino, Joseph J Judge Supreme $136,700 $141,115 \Vanstrydonck, Thomas M Judge Supreme $149,602 ‘$153,800 Willams, Frank B ‘Judge Supreme $141,700 $141,700 AppellateCourt Judges Buckley, John T ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div, Tpct $144,000 $153,605 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,600 $161,800, Judge Appellate Fourth $149,000 '3149,000, ‘Judge Appeliate Fourth $149,000 '$149,000 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div, Tpct ‘$144,000 $154,000, Judge Appellate Fourth $149,000 $149,000 ‘Judge Appeliate Fourth $149,500 $149,500 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,000 $154,000 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $164,000 3184,000 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,000 $154,800 Justice, Court of Appeats. $151,200 $161,000 ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,000 $154,000 Judge Appellate Fourth $152,600 ‘$157,600 Spain, Edward Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,000 $15,300 Sullivan, Joseph ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div $144,000 - $144,000 Tom, Peter ‘Asc Jus, Ap Div ‘$144,000 ‘$154,000 ‘Town City Court Judges ‘Amold, Michael Judge Local $111,925 $149,543 ‘Aronson, Stephen D Cty Ct Jge ‘$108,800 $124,482 Farber, Sidney General Employee $35,000 Gallina, Fred General Employee $35,000 Johnson, Teresa D Judge Rochester City $190,600 $130,600, Kionick, Thomas Judge Local $36,860 $36,860 Odorisi, JT ‘Act Cty Jge 30 $7,625 Argento, Victoria ‘General Employee $21,000 Public Prosecutors. Gallagher, Patrick General Employee $71,000 Granville, Brett General Employee $82,500 Martin, Debra A Attomey General $129,720 $129,720 Morgan, Patrica L Judicial Clerk $138,200 $198,200 Rodriguez, Cartos Assistant Attorney General RETIRED ‘$68,000 Schlia, Robin Monroe County DA $61,648 $61,648 Vacca, Merideth General Employee ‘$67,000 ‘Senators Alesi, James NYS Senate Member $88,000 ‘Sampson, John NYS Senate Member $79,000 Average Annual Salary per Tortfeasor $120,313UPREME COURT O-HE STATE OF NEW YORK (OUNTY OF MONROr: |THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, y ELIOT SPITZER, ATTORNEY GENERAL F THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COMMITMENT FOR CIVIL Petitioner, CONTEMPT - JUDICIARY LAW ove SECTION 753 EVIN PATRICK BRADY, Index No. 2002/13647 Respondent. |TO THE SHERIFF FOR THE COUNTY OF MONROE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, being a male, whose age is 152 DOB. 10_\ te \5O residing at SOB Lecust Lane, E. Rochester NY having been found of civil contempt of this Court pursuant to the Decision and Order of this Court dated eptember 9, 2003; and itis further ORDERED, that KEVIN PATRICK BRADY is directed to pay: $2,500.00 to the State of New York ; 52,798.00 to Saperston and Day, P.C.. $2,112.00 to James P. Vacca, Esq.; and $2,767.00 to the Attorney General of the State of New York by certified bank draft with copies of same provided to the Court on or before October 1, 2003 in order }0 purge this contempt; and itis further ORDERED, that KEVIN PATRICK BRADY is sentenced to sixty (60) days in the Monroe bn Ail if he fails to purge the contempt, said sentence to be consecutive to the thirty (30) day centence imposed upon the above person for his criminal contempt. Dated: September 10, 2003 aoe. / (ON. THOMAS STRYDONCK Justice of the Supreme Courtsd : . SUPREME COURT OR@E STATE OF NEW YORK e@ COUNTY OF MONROE HE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, yy ELIOT SPITZER, ATTORNEY GENERAL )F THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COMMITMENT FOR CRIMINAL Petitioner, CONTEMPT - JUDICIARY LAW “vs. SECTION 750 EVIN PATRICK BRADY, Index No. 2002/13647 Respondent. |TO THE SHERIFF FOR THE COUNTY OF MONROE: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said KEVIN PATRICK BRADY, being a male, whose age is [52 .pow. \O\ & \50 residing at 508 Locust Lane, E. Rochester, NY ibe and he hereby is committed to a term of thirty (30) days commencing at Noon on October 1, 2003; ind it is further ORDERED, that KEVIN PATRICK BRADY is directed to pay a fine in the amount of 1,000.00 to the New York State Office of Court Administration on or before October 1, 2003. \Dated: September 10, 2003 HON. THOMAS M. VAN STRYDONCK Justice of the Supreme Courtoe e ‘ e@ . MEMO A; FATAL DEFECTS. The Order, money judgment, sanction and permanent injunction of Jerome Gorski (March 1996] is VOID and unenforceable for the following reasons’ A memorandum decision that states the ruling, but no opinion is not subject to appeal by the dissatisfied party. West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. “If a court grants relief, which under the circumstances it hasn't authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void.” (1 Freeman on Judgments, 120c.) “A final order or judgment that disposes of all of the causes of action between the parties in the action or proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial action apart from mere ministerial matters’ is appealable. Otherwise it is not. see Burke v Crosson, 85 NY2d 10, 15 ‘{a] written order must conform strictly to the court's decision, * * * when there is a conflict the decision controls” (Di Prospero v Ford Motor Co., 105 AD2d 479, (1984) TERMINATION ON PAPERS ALONE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS The US Supreme Court said in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. (2002) [1] Its “a gross violation of procedures to dismiss a lawsuit at the threshold stage of the proceedings; that (2) a judge's opinion of whether or not a litigant will prevail is irrelevant: that (3) a plaintiff can prevail without establishing a prima facie case, and (4) it is fundamentally unfair to dismiss a lawsuit before the whole body of facts can be revealed through discovery. Gorski's orders are Coram Non Judice: + Fails to render findings on plaintiffs’ preeminent cause of action. Title 42, Sec 1983, Lacks findings mandated by 22 NYCRR 130.1.1 * Violates the US Supremacy Clause by enjoining federal rights. + Awards sanctions and fees retroactive to cases already disposed, + Orders ambiguous payments to ambiguous parties + Violates Separation of Powers Act. * Rodriguez’ constructively commits Fraud upon the Court * Violates New York CPLR sec 6301. + Permanent Injunction unauthorized, not requested or actually ordered. + Violates Doctrine of Ambiguity + Orders money paid to judges of supreme and family court for ‘reimbursement’ of costs and fees NOT actually incurred ; not actually claimed.‘THE PEOPLE BY ELIOT SPITZER V KEVIN PATRICK BRADY (2002) NO CAUSE AND NO AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE “Special proceedings’ commenced by ambush. Ortega v City of NY, 11 Misc.3d 848, 809 NYS2d 884 (2006) jurisdictionally proscribed by Judiciary Law 750 and 753, Initiated ultra vires by subterfuge and with conflict of interest. Court of Appeals says “"*** since 1796 the Legislature has never accorded general prosecutorial power to the Attorney General” People v DiFalco, 44 NY2d 482, 486 (1978). Indeed * ‘the Attorney General has no * * * general authority (to prosecute] and Is ‘without any prosecutorial power except when specifically authorized by statute™ “As Judiciary Law does not specifically authorize prosecutorial authority ** the AG had no authority and could not prosecute [the] case. People v. Rormero,. 393 N.Y. In CUff v. Vacco, the Third Department said “While under certain defined circumstances the Attorney-General may institute a civil action to enforce the laws of the State (Exec. Law § 63) or otherwise take action to protect the public interest (563 (8)), we find no support ** that this authority extends to the representation of private individuals (for) enforcement of private rights. ORDERS OF COMMITMENT VOID FOR INAPPLICABLE STATUTES And “enforcement of a judgment directing the payment of money is accomplished through execution rather than through contempt proceedings ***' “Since a direction to pay money is itself not a mandate issuing from a court, as that term is used in the criminal and civil contempt provisions of the Judiciary Law (§ 750, subd A, par 3: § 756), contempt proceedings cannot be initiated against a recalcitrant judgment debtor absent a violation or impairment of legal process issued under the judgment, such as an execution pursuant to CPLR 5230 (subd (b]) (see CPLR 5251; O'Gara v Kearney, 77 NY 423; Matter of Watson v Nelson, 69 NY 536, 542-543; Hennig v Abrahams, 246 App Div 621, affd 270 NY 626; Williamson Mill & Lbr. Co. v Valentine, 206 App Div 252: Le Gros v Chain Shirt Shops, 187 App Div 368: Matter of Ryan, 73 App Div 137, 139; Matter of Kramsky, 172 Misc 935, 937-938; Dollard v Koronsky, 67 Misc 90; Gresswell v O'Rourke, 163 NYS 580). * CPLR 5104; SCPA 606; National Sur. Corp. v Silver,23 A.D.2d 398, revd on other grounds 17 N.Y.2d 477).4 @ @: CIVIL COMMITMENT is void because the power to punish under Judiciary Law 753s limited to cases pending in the court .The underlying action for these hopelessly defective special proceedings (Brady v Miller) was not pending. Judiciary Law 753 also requires findings of “disobedience that defeated, impaired, or prejudiced another's rights’ which is not found in VanStrydonck's defective findings. Incarceration for civil contempt cannot be for a fixed period of time. ORDER OF CRIMINAL COMMITMENT VOID Note that there is NO ACT OR FAILURE TO ACT; not capital, for which a person can be criminally prosecuted and incarcerated beyond state and/or federal statutes of limitations, GOMPERS v US 233 U.S. 604, 58 L. Ed. 1115, 34 S. Ct. 693 VANSTRYDONCK IGNORES JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGE, USURPS COMITY § 5019. A judgment or order shall not be stayed, impaired or affected by any mistake, defector irregularity in the papers or procedures in the action not_affecting a substantial right of a party. The ‘rolling up’ of dormant, fraudulent fee awards into one naming substituted parties as judgment creditor constitutes FRAUD ON THE COURT. CPLR 5017 (subd (a}) directs that: *{a] judgment-roll shall be prepared by the attorney for the party at whose instance the judgment is entered or by the clerk.” COVERT DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS All judgments hopelessly void for gross due process violations. ‘{iJudgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside, Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.0.N.Y.1994, 158 F.R.D. 278.1 NO ‘VEXATIOUS’ STATUTE IN NEW YORK 2 DISMISSAL AS SANCTION UNAUTHORIZED 4 5 || Although vexatious litigation is considered an abuse of the judicial process and almost always § || results in sanctions on the offender; sua sponte dismissal of a facially meritorious, lawfully 8 || commenced action is not permissible. Our state and federal constitutions zealously protect 9 || every citizen's right to resolve civil disputes in a timely and equitable manner. 10 1 : 12 || Itis said that in a civilized democracy everyone is "entitled to his day in court.” 3 {2 || "the right to file a lawsuit pro se is one of the most important rights under the 16 || constitution." Elmore v. McCammon (1986) * 7 {8 || "The right ** derives from guarantees of freedom of association, [NY Const, Art I, § 9] 20 || and, will not yield unless confronted with some overriding competing public 21 || interest.’ is 5 : 23 24 ||"In New York, law and public policy mandates any restriction imposed on that right 25 || will be carefully scrutinized. * 27 28 || The Court of Appeals has declared “The procedural mechanism in New York for bringing a matter to the attention of courts is to "commence" an action *** by following the steps outlined in the CPLR. * “Commencement” ** specifies “filing” [payment] as the dispositive event. 36 ||"Until an action has commenced, a court cannot conduct any type of proceeding 37 || because there is nothing before the court. This is not a mere technicality. It is the 38 | essential key to the courthouse door and the exercise of judicial power. 40 * “Since a court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction of a matter not brought 45 || before it, **** compliance with the ‘commencement-by-filing system’ is a 44 || substantive, necessary condition precedent to the exercise of judicial authority. 45 46 far |e 4g || 640F. Supp. 905 4g ||‘ Matter of Kelly, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378, n 3; Matter of Gopman, 531 F2d 262, 268. 50 ||? Matter of Abrams. 465 N.E.2d 1; [1984] People v Doe, 98 Misc. 2d 805. * Fry v. Village Tarrytown 680 N.E.2d 578, 89 N.Y.2d 714 03/27/97" 12 3 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 2 28 29 30 31 32 35, 36 37 38 39 40 a 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 a e: Following repeal of ‘common barratry’ in 1986, the Court of Appeals said that the most, practicable means to deal with vexatious litigants is by plenary rule rather than ad hoc judicial decisions.® Thus, 22 NYCRR 130.1.1 declared conduct frivolous if it is: [1] completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false. Florida, Hawaii and Texas, have passed vexatious litigant statutes modeled on California's statute which allows the court on motion to declare a pro se litigant vexatious if s[he] has filed five [5] unsuccessful lawsuits in the past seven [7] years and no reasonable attorney would anticipate success on the current action. However, New York has no such statute. Once an action has been lawfully commenced in New York there is no lawful authority to abort it. ‘As noted by Court of Claims Chief Judge Richard Sise ° =**New York practice, *** does not expressly give courts authority to dismiss even frivolous actions, *** there is scant authority for such dismissals, no matter what the reason. ***" As ‘a general rule, **** sua sponte dismissals are discouraged and ultimately invalidated. ” ‘The Court of Appeals has also said “leave to sue is not statutory and not elementary to the action. Suing without leave is purely a question of contempt ® The court, on motion, may set aside or stay the proceeding commenced without [permission] BUT until the court interferes the action is regular. ° **** **+#*plaintiff might have been in contempt for failure to obtain the court's permission **** [but otherwise] the suit was "regular". * Matter A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. V. Lezak (12/18/86) ® Frasier v, State, 11 Misc.3d 497, 810 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y.CL.CI. 11/21/2005) ” Myung Chun v N.A. Mortgage Co., 285 AD2d 42, 46 [1st Dept 20011{ "sua sponte dismissal must be restricted to the most extraordinary circumstances"). Chautauqua County Bank v. Risley, 19 N. Y. 369, Hackley v. Draper, 4. & C. 614; affd., 60 N. Y. 88. "© Copeland v. Salomon 436 N.E.2d 1284; 56 N.Y.2d 222 (05/20/82)wea Sowrv]SHMaens " 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 26 7 28 29 30 a 32 33 34 35 36 7 38 39 40 4 42 43 44 45 46 a7 48 49 50 oe r) e° PUNISHMENT BY CONTEMPT, NOT DISMISSAL The Second Department elaborates. "Our system of justice provides a variety of carefully crafted remedies and sanctions for dealing with abusers of the system. The basic sanction, is the contempt power as set forth in Judiciary Law article 19, '' In Spremo v. Babchik, "? the court said “violation of this [injunction] will result in service upon [Spremo] of an order to show cause issued by the court for him to show cause why he should not be adjudicated and punished for criminal contempt pursuant to § 750 et seq. of the Judiciary Law, [and subjected to] the maximum penalty provided by law. PLEASE NOTE that Judiciary Law § 750 [3] provides courts the power to punish for ‘willful disobedience to its [own] lawful mandate’. "It is elementary that the court against which a contempt is committed has exclusive jurisdiction to punish for such contempt. In re Debs, 1895, 158 U.S. 564, 565, 595, 15S, Ct. 900, 910, 39 L. Ed. 1092; Ex parte Bradley, 1868, 74 U.S. 364, , 7 Wall. 364, 19 L. Ed. 214. DISMISSAL AS A SANCTION IS PUNISHMENT WITHOUT A HEARING FOR EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT "Lillian Gabrelian v. Gabriel Gabrelian (05/20/85) 489 N.Y.S.2d 914; 108 A.D.2d 445 | ® Alfred Spremo v. Fred Babchik et al. (09/20/92) 589 N.Y.S. 2d 1019; 155 misc. 2d 796