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5

Unofficial Actors and their


Role in the Policy Process
Avinash Samal

The policy studies scholars have divided the players in the policy process
into two main categories such as official and unofficial actors. Official actors
are those involved in public policy by virtue of their statutory or
constitutional responsibilities and have the power to make and enforce
policies. This does not preclude the possibility of these people being
influenced by others, like political party bosses or other interest/pressure
groups. The actors belonging to legislature, executive (including
bureaucracy), judiciary and regulatory agencies are clearly the official
actors.
Besides the official actors, there are many other groups and
organizations which do participate in the policy-making process. These
actors are called unofficial because their participation in the policy process
is not a function of their duties under the Constitution or the law. This is not
to say that these actors have no rights or standing to participate in the
process.
Rather, it means that their mode of participation in policy
formulation is not specified in law. On the other hand, it has evolved and
grown as the nation has evolved and grown. So the unofficial actors refer to
those who play a role in the policy process without any explicit legal
authority to participate, aside from the usual rights of participation in a
democracy. These groups include the interest/pressure groups of various
types, political parties, individual citizens, research organizations and think
tanks, and the mass media. They considerably influence policy formulation
without possessing legal authority to make binding policy decisions. While
the previous chapter focused on the role of official actors (legislature,
executive and judiciary) in policy formulation, the present chapter discusses
in detail the role of unofficial actors in the policy process.
Interest Groups

At the societal level, interest or pressure groups play a significant role in the
policy-making in many countries. While policy-making is a preserve of
the government, and particularly of the executive and bureaucracy,
the realities of modern politics enable groups formed specifically to
promote the interests or positions of specialized social groups to play
a significant role in the policy process. One of the most important
resources that differentiates such actors from others is the specific
knowledge they have at their disposal. The possession of specific
information that may be unavailable or less available to others
constitutes a very important advantage for them. The members of
specialized groups often know a great deal about their area of
concern. Since policy-making is a highly information-intensive
process, those with information may normally expect to play an
important role than the other. Politicians and bureaucrats often find
the information provided by interest groups indispensable for
performing their tasks. Government and opposition parties at times
curry favour with such groups to secure the information required for
effective policy-making or for attacking their opponents. Bureaucrats
similarly often need these groups help in developing and
implementing many policies (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).
The other resources possessed by interest or pressure groups are
organizational and political. The primary concern of a pressure group is to
influence policy in a particular manner. They may also supply the official
lawmakers with much technical information for and against a specific issue
and possible consequences of a policy proposal. Special interest groups
often make financial contributions to the campaign chests of sympathetic
political parties and politicians. They also campaign for and deliver votes to
sympathetic candidates who they think would support their cause in the
government. The main function of these groups is to express demands and
present alternatives for policy action. Often there are several groups with
conflicting desires on a particular policy issue, and policy makers are faced
with the problem of having to choose between conflicting demands.
However, interest groups political impacts on the formulation and
implementation of public policies vary considerably according to their
access to differing levels of organizational resources.
First, interest groups differ tremendously in terms of size of
membership. All other things being equal, larger groups can be expected to
be taken more seriously by the government. Well-organized and active
groups naturally have more influence than groups whose potential
membership is poorly organized and inarticulate.
Second, their propensity to associate with other similar groups also
works as a powerful influential factor. Some groups often form a peak
association consisting of representatives from other groups with similar
interests. A coherent peak association may be expected to be more
influential than those interest groups operating individually.

Third, some groups are well funded which enables them to hire
permanent specialized staff and influence parties and candidates during
elections.
Fourth, their influence and effectiveness also depends on other
resources like cohesiveness, leadership skills, social status and attitudes of
the policy makers on specific policy issues. The strength and legitimacy of
groups also differs from country to country, depending upon whether they
are democratic or dictatorial, developed or developing.
While the exact impact of interest group campaign expenditures on
government policy is contentious, there is no doubt that differences in
financial resources matter and that in democratic political systems the
information and power resources of interest groups make them key
members of policy subsystems. While this does not guarantee that their
interests will be accommodated, they are unlikely to be entirely ignored
except in rare circumstances when executive makes a high-level and
deliberate decision to go ahead with a policy despite opposition from
concerned groups.
Interest groups are found to be more numerous in the USA, UK and
India than they are in the Soviet Union or China. Given the plural character
of USA or Indian society, it is not surprising that pressure groups are many
and varied in number, interests, size, organization and style of operation. In
fact, the number of interest groups has rapidly expanded since the 1960s.
Today, while many groups are local and deal with local issues, many interest
groups and popular movements cannot be confined to small states or
communities. Rapid socio-economic and technological changes, coupled with
transportation and communications capabilities unimagined in the past, has
made it possible for large many groups to mobilize quickly on a regional or
national scale. With freedom of association and speech guaranteed by the
Constitution, neither US nor India place any legal burden in the path of
those who wish to mobilize and form an interest group. Grassroots
organizations form nearly daily to pursue myriad goals, such as halting the
construction of multipurpose dams across rivers to banning the screening of
some of the movies in the theatre halls. While mobilization and group
development are not greatly constrained in our political system, the mere
existence of a group does not necessary suggest that it will have any voice in
policy making. While some groups, particularly those representing
concentrated economic and business interests, have considerably more
power, other groups simply do not have it. Groups that represent powerful
or privileged interests are partly responsible for Americans suspicion of
interest groups or, as they are often called, special interest groups. In fact,
some groups call themselves public interest groups to signal that they view
their mission as a counterweight to these special interests.
Types of Interests Groups
There are many ways to categorize interest groups. One can distinguish
between an institutional interest group, whose members belong to a
particular institution, and a membership group, whose members have

chosen to join. If one happens to be a student at a university, he or she is a


member of an institutional interest group university students union
because he or she shares some interests with the fellow students, such as
affordable tuition fee and quality education. If one joins the NCC or a Public
Interest Research Group (PIRG), he or she becomes part of a membership
group because he or has chosen to join the same deliberately.
One can also categorize interest groups as economic or private
interest groups versus public interest groups. While the difference between
the two is sometimes rhetorical almost every group believes it is acting,
directly or indirectly, in the broader public interest there is also a more
technical way to distinguish between the two. Public interest groups, such as
environmental groups, Common Cause, and the like, seek to create broad
benefits for the entire society, not simply their members. Indeed, it is
difficult to allow only public interest group members to reap the benefits of,
say, a cleaner environment without providing such benefits to others. While
public interest groups would like more people to join their causes, they also
know that non-members constitute a potential force of supporters, and, as
mentioned earlier, when many such people are mobilized, a social movement
may result.
In economic terms, we can say that non-members of public interest
groups are free riders who benefit from the work of the group without
contributing resources such as labour or money. Economic groups, on the
other hand, seek to overcome the free-rider problem by creating benefits
only for the members of their groups. For example, labour unions,
particularly in closed shop states where all workers must pay dues to the
union, work to provide wage and benefit agreements that benefit only the
members of the union. By restricting benefits in this way, the union seeks to
promote cohesion and to encourage others to join the union. Industry
groups, such as FICCI, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the
National Automobile Dealers Association, are clearly economic groups.
These tend to be small groups in terms of the actual numbers of members,
but are powerful because of what these groups are: collections of powerful
economic interests that often enjoy considerable local, regional, or national
political support. Finally, one can consider professional and trade
associations to be economic associations. Groups such as the Indian Medical
Association and the Bar Council of India seek to promote and protect the
professional and economic interests of doctors and lawyers. While they
provide important benefits and services to their members, such as journals
and continuing education, they also seek to protect the economic interests of
their members. They play an active role in the education and licensing of
doctors and lawyers, thereby seeking to keep the size of the profession
relatively fixed. When their interests are threatened, they lobby elected and
appointed officials for its redress.
In both public interest and economic groups, people join because they
gain some benefit. The challenge for public interest groups is to make clear
what those benefits are in order to attract and keep members. As a rule, it is
easier for economic groups to do so because their members have their

economic security at stake, and the benefits are then more tangible. Public
interest groups, on the other hand, must appeal to other motivations than
economics. Most public interest groups make an appeal to peoples desire to
do good, augmenting it by material benefits like discounted nature tours,
glossy magazines, calendars, etc. These benefits seem trivial, but they help
to attract new members and promote group cohesion. Still, they are not as
powerful as economic inducements in promoting group unity.
Finally, it is important to note that some groups do not fit neatly into
the public interest-economic dichotomy. In particular, the United States
contains many religious and ideological groups that come together without
being based on economics or a broader public interest mission. Rather, their
mission is to promote their religious, moral, and ideological values among
their members and, sometimes, in the broader society. These groups range
from the mainstream churches to the more fundamentalist churches, and
from the politically moderate to the politically extreme on both ends of the
ideological spectrum. Such groups can become important players in the
policy process, at least briefly, during times of social upheaval and crisis or
when issues of morality and values are paramount.
As pointed out by both neo-pluralist and corporatist theorists, the
organization of business and labour is often seen as the most significant
factor in determining a states policy capabilities. This is because of the vital
role each plays in the production process, which is, in every society, a
fundamental activity that has effects far beyond the economy.
Business Associations
Among the various types of interest groups, business is generally the most
powerful, with an unmatched capacity to affect public policy. The increasing
globalization of production and financial activities, due to improvements in
modem means of communication and transportation and the gradual
removal of controls on international economic transactions, has contributed
tremendously to the power of capital in recent decades. It is possible for
investors and managers to respond, if they so wish, to any unwanted
government action by moving capital to another location. Although this
theoretical mobility is limited by a variety of factors including the
availability of suitable investment opportunities in other countries the
potential loss of employment and revenues is a threat with which the state
must contend in making decisions. Because of their potential to affect state
revenues negatively, capitalists both domestic as well as foreign have the
ability to punish the state for any action it might take of which they
disapprove (Hayes 1978).
The financial contributions that businesses make to political parties
also afford them an important resource for influencing policy-makers.
Elections can sometimes turn on relatively short-term issues and
personalities, which necessitate large budgets to influence voters through
extensive media advertising campaigns. In such situations, political parties
supported by contributions from business are in a better position to run such
campaigns and thus influence voting behaviour. This can lead political

parties and candidates running for office to accommodate business interests


more than they would for those of the other groups. Similarly, the financial
contributions that businesses often make to public policy research
institutions and individual researchers serve to further entrench their power.
The organizations and individuals receiving funds tend to be sympathetic
towards business interests and can provide business with the intellectual
wherewithal often required to prevail in policy debates (McGann and Weaver
1999, Abelson 1999).
A strong business organization is able to adopt a bold position if
necessary and convey it to the government, without incurring serious
opposition from its rank and file. It usually takes the form of a peak
association (a sort of federation of associations) with the authority to impose
sanctions and discipline among its members. Moreover, if the state is
confident of the strength of the business association, then it can delegate
some business-related responsibilities to the business association itself.
Generally speaking, the US is regarded as having the weakest business
organizations in the industrialized world and Japan the strongest, with
countries like Britain or Canada falling closer to the US model. Other
European countries, such as France, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Sweden,
fall closer to the Japanese model (Katzenstein 1977).
The strength or weakness of business and the varying patterns of
government-industry relations found in a country are usually shaped by a
range of historical factors. Although the example of Japan cited above is
somewhat typical, business is often strongly organized if it has been
confronted with strong, persistent challenges from trade unions or socialist
parties. The stronger the unions, the stronger will be the business influence.
Second, countries with strong states often have strong business
organizations because in order to pressure strong governments business
itself must be well organized. A strong state may also nurture a strong
business association in order to avoid the problems arising from too many
groups making conflicting demands on the same issue. The existence of
strong business associations simplifies the governments job by aggregating
their demands within the organization. Third, the organizational strength of
business is affected by the structure of the economy. In national economies
characterized by low industrial concentration or high levels of foreign
ownership, it is difficult for the disparate elements to organize and devise a
common position. Fourth, political culture, too, has an important bearing on
the extent and nature of business involvement in politics. In countries such
as the US and Canada with cultures highly supportive of business,
corporations have seen few reasons to organize.
Labour
Groups
Labour, too, occupies a powerful position among social groups, though not
so powerful as business. Unlike business, which enjoys considerable weight
with policy-makers even at the individual level of the firm, labour needs a
collective organization, i.e. a trade union, to have its voice heard in the
policy subsystem. In addition to bargaining with employers on behalf of their
members wages and working conditions, which is their primary function,

trade unions engage in political activities to shape government policies


affecting them (Taylor 1989). The origin of the role of the trade unions in the
public policy process is rooted in late nineteenth-century democratization,
which enabled workers, who form a majority in every industrialized society,
to have a say in the functioning of the government. Given the voting clout
afforded to them in a democracy, it was sometimes easier for them to
pressure the government to meet their needs than to bargain with their
employers. The creation of labour or social democratic parties, which
eventually formed governments in many countries, further reinforced
labours political power (Qualter 1985).
The nature and effectiveness of trade unions participation in the
policy process depend on a variety of institutional and contextual factors.
The structure of the state itself is an important determinant of trade union
participation in the policy process. A weak and fragmented state will not be
able to secure effective participation by unions because the latter would see
little certainty that the government would be able to keep its side in any
bargain. Weak businesses can also inhibit the emergence of a powerful trade
union organization because the need for it is less immediate.
However, the most important determinant of labours capacity to
influence the policy process and its outcomes is its own internal
organization. The level of union membership affects the extent to which
states seek or even accept union participation in the policy process. The
same is true for the structure of bargaining units: decentralized collective
bargaining promotes a fragmented system of articulation of labour demands.
Britain, Canada, and the United States, for example, have decentralized
bargaining structures, whereas in Australia, Austria, and the Scandinavian
countries bargaining takes place at the industry or even countrywide level
(Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1984, Hibbs 1987). A union movement
fragmented along any or all of possible regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious,
or industrial versus craft, foreign versus domestic, or import-competing
versus export-oriented lines will also experience difficulties in influencing
the policy process. Fragmentation among labour ranks tends to promote
local and sporadic industrial strife and incoherent articulation of labours
interest in the policy process (Lacroix 1986).
Finally, to realize its policy potential labour needs a central
organization, such as the Australian or British Trade Union Congress (TUC),
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the Canadian Labour Congress
(CLC), and the American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO), even more than does business. Since collective
action is the only tool through which labour can influence the employers or
the governments behaviour, the more united a front it is able to put up, the
more successful it is likely to be. To be effective, the trade union needs to
enjoy comprehensive membership and have the organizational capacity to
deal with conflicts among its members and maintain unity. Trade Unions
role in the policy process tends to be the highest in corporatist political
systems such as the ones in Scandinavian countries, in Austria and the
Netherlands, where the state encourages the formation and maintenance of

strong trade unions, and the lowest in pluralist political systems such as the
United States and Canada, where it does not.
Political Parties
Political parties are an intermediating actor existing on the margins or
border between state and societal actors. They have a significant impact on
public policy, though in the modern era this usually has been only indirectly.
Though they are not directly represented in the policy subsystem, the party
to which they are affiliated may influence many of the actors in the
subsystem. Political parties tend to influence public policy indirectly,
primarily through their role in staffing the executive and, to a lesser degree,
the legislature. Indeed, once in office, it is not uncommon for party members
in government to ignore their official party platform while designing policies
(Thomson 2001).
In modem societies, political parties generally perform the function of
interest aggregation, i.e. they seek to convert the particular demands of
interest groups into general policy alternatives. The way in which parties
aggregate interests is affected by the number of parties. In predominantly
biparty systems such as the United States and Great Britain, the desire of
the parties to gain widespread electoral support will force both parties to
include in their policy proposals popular demands and avoid alienating the
most important social groups. In multiparty systems, on the other hand,
parties may do less aggregating and act as the representatives of fairly
narrow sets of interests as appears to be the case in France.
In India, there is a multiparty system, with half a dozen national
parties and regional parties of twice the number. Most of the national
parties have manifestos, which only differ in stress rather than in content
since their common desire is to extend their electoral base as wide as
possible. The regional parties, however, are more sectarian in their approach
since they desire mainly to woo a particular regional segment of the
population. In one-party systems like the Soviet Union and China, they are
the chief official framers of public policy. Generally, political parties have a
broader range of policy concerns than interest groups. Hence, they act
more as brokers than as advocates of particular interests in policy
formation.
In parliamentary democracies, the political party that has a majority
of votes in parliament forms the government, which is the chief official
policy maker. Needless to say, most of the governments make policies
according to the policy manifestos on which they have been elected to office.
In presidential systems like the United States, the fact that members of
Legislatures often vote in accordance with their party policy, the party that
controls the Congress exercises significant influence on policy matters.
The idea that political parties play a major role in the public policy
process, of course, stems from their undeniable influence on elections and
electoral outcomes in democratic states. While vote-seeking political parties
and candidates attempt to offer packages of policies they hope will appeal to

voters, the electoral system is not structured to allow voters a choice on


specific policies. The representational system also limits the publics ability
to ensure that electorally salient policy issues actually move onto official
government agendas. The official agenda of governments is, in fact,
dominated by routine or institutionalized agenda-setting opportunities
rather than by partisan political activity (Kingdon 1984, Howlett 1997).
Even when parties do manage to raise an issue and see it move from
the public to the official agenda, they cannot control its evolution past that
point. As Richard Rose (1980: 153) puts it:
A party can create a movement on a given issue, but it cannot ensure
the direction it will lead. Just as defenders of the status quo may find it
difficult to defend their position without adapting it, so too proponents of
change face the need to modify their demands. Modifications are necessary
to secure the agreement of diverse interests within a party. They will also be
important in securing support, or at least grudging acceptance, by affected
pressure groups. Finally, a governing party will also need to make changes
to meet the weaknesses spotted by civil service advisors and parliamentary
draftsmen responsible for turning a statement of intent into a bill to present
to Parliament.
While their direct influence may be muted, however, their indirect
influence is not. The role played by political parties in staffing political
executives and legislatures, of course, allows them considerable influence on
the content of policy decisions taken by those individuals, including those
related to the staffing of the senior public service. However, this power
should not be overestimated. In modem governments, as we have seen, the
degree of freedom enjoyed by each decision-maker is circumscribed by a
host of factors that limit the conduct of each office and constrain the actions
of each office-holder. These range from limitations imposed by the countrys
constitution to the specific mandate conferred on individual decision-makers
by various laws and regulations (Pal 1988, Axworthy 1988). Various rules set
out not only the decisions that can be made by government agencies or
officials, but also the procedures they must follow in doing so.
Political parties tend to have only an indirect effect on policy making
through their role in determining who actually staffs legislative, executive,
and judicial institutions. Their role in agenda setting is very weak, as they
play a stronger but still indirect role in policy formulation and decisionmaking due to the strong role played in these two stages of the policy cycle
by members of the political executive. Their role in policy implementation is
virtually nil, while they can have a more direct effect on policy evaluation
undertaken by legislators and legislative committees (Minkenberg 2001).
The fact that the influence of parties on particular stages of the policy
process may be muted, or that any such influence may be waning, does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that parties do not matter. That is, as
Richard Rose argued almost a quarter century ago in the case of Britain:

Parties do make a difference in the way [a country] is governed, but


the differences are not as expected. The differences in office between one
party and another are less likely to arise from contrasting intentions than
from the exigencies of government. Much of a partys record in office will be
stamped upon it from forces outside its control...parties are not the primary
forces shaping the destiny of society; it is shaped by something stronger
than parties. (Rose 1980: 141).
The Public (Individual Citizens)
Since democratic governments are representative governments, it is often
said that citizens arc therefore indirectly represented in the policy-making
process. In an abstract sense, this is true. But concretely, this aphorism
means very little. Surprising as it may appear, the public plays a rather
small direct role in the public policy process. Citizen participation in policymaking, even in democratic countries, is very negligible. Many people do not
exercise their franchise or engage in party politics. Neither they join
pressure groups nor do they display any active interest in public affairs. This
is not to say that its role is inconsequential, as it provides the backdrop of
norms, attitudes, and values against which the policy process is displayed.
However, in most liberal democratic states, policy decisions are taken by
representative institutions that empower specialized actors to determine the
scope and content of public policies, rather than the public per se
determining policy.
One important role played by members of the public in democratic
polities, of course, is voting. On the one hand, in democratic states voting is
the most basic means of participating in the political and, by implication,
policy process. It not only affords citizens the opportunity to express their
choice of government, but also empowers them to pressure political parties
and candidates seeking their votes to offer them attractive policy packages.
On the other hand, the voters policy capacity usually cannot be actualized,
at least not directly, for various reasons. In modern democracies policies are
made by representatives of voters who, once elected, are not required to
heed the preferences of their constituents in their day-to-day functioning.
Moreover, as was discussed above, most legislators participate very little in
the policy process, which tends to be dominated by experts in specific
sectoral areas rather than by legislative generalists. More significantly,
candidates and political parties often do not run in elections on the basis of
their policy platforms. Even when they do, voters usually do not vote on the
basis of proposed policies alone. However, despite such political attitudes of
a great majority of citizens, some still participate directly in decisionmaking. In some of the American states (like California) and some countries
(like Switzerland) citizens can and still vote directly on a legislation or on
constitutional amendments which are submitted to the voters for approval.
Elections are the major instruments in democratic countries to gauge
public opinion or popular wishes. The most conspicuous difference between
authoritarianism and democratic regimes is that democracies choose their
top policy makers in genuine elections. Voting in genuine elections may be
an important method of citizen influence on policy; not so much because it

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actually permits citizens to choose their officials and to some degree


instructs these officials on policy, but because the existence of genuine
elections puts a stamp of approval on citizen participation. Indirectly,
therefore, elections enforce on proximate policy makers a rule that citizens
wishes count in policy making.
However, it is a truism that no government, howsoever dictatorial, can
afford to go against the desires, wishes, customs or traditions of the people.
Even dictators undertake many popular measures to keep down unrest or
discontent against the regime. One-party systems like the Soviet Union also
seem concerned to meet many citizen wants even as they exclude citizens
from more direct participation in policy formation.
Research Organizations and Public Policy Think Tanks
Another significant set of unofficial actors in the policy process is composed
of the researchers working at universities, research institutes, and thinktanks on particular policy issues. University researchers often have
theoretical and philosophical interests in public problems that may not lead
to research results that can be translated directly into usable knowledge for
policy purposes. To the extent that they do conduct research for the
purpose of participating in policy debates, they often function in a manner
similar to their counterparts in think tanks. Indeed, in many instances,
academics undertaking directly relevant policy research are sponsored by
think-tanks (Ricci 1993).
In fact, the development of more complex government problems and
the need for greater analytic capacity than that possessed by the
governments have led to the growth of independent research organizations,
or what are often called think tanks. A think-tank can be defined as an
independent organization engaged in multidisciplinary research intended to
influence public policy (James 1993). Such organizations maintain an
interest in a broad range of policy problems and employ, either full-time or
on a contract basis, experts on various issue areas in order to develop a
comprehensive perspective on the issues facing governments. Their
research tends to be directed at proposing practical solutions to public
problems or, in the case of some think-tanks, finding evidence to support the
ideological or interest-driven positions they advocate. This sets them apart
somewhat from academic researchers at universities, whose interests are
more specialized and who do not necessarily seek practical solutions to
policy problems.
While think-tanks are generally more partisan than their purely
academic counterparts, they too maintain an image of intellectual autonomy
from the government or any political party in order to be taken seriously by
policy-makers. Some of the prominent think-tanks in the United States are
the Brookings Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, the Cato
Institute, the Urban Institute, and the RAND. Similar organizations in
Canada include the C.D. Howe Institute, the Fraser Institute, the Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, and the Institute for Research on Public
Policy. Major think-tanks in Britain include the Policy Studies Institute and

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the National Institute for Economic and Social Research. In India too, there
are a few policy think tanks like Centre for Policy Research, Observer
Research Foundation, etc. which have come up in recent years. Literally
hundreds of such institutes are active in the Western, developed, and
developing countries, some with broad policy mandates, and others that are
more limited in their purview such as the Canadian Environmental Law
Association (Lindquist, 1993; Abelson, 1996).
Many think tanks are
associated with a particular ideological position. While Brookings and Urban
Institute are center-left, the American Enterprise Institute is somewhat more
to the right, and Cato is libertarian. Others, like RAND, are more closely
associated with their methodological style. RAND uses very sophisticated
techniques in its analyses of a range of public issues.
Think-tanks target their research and recommendations to those
politicians who may be expected to be favourably disposed to the ideas
being espoused. They also seek originality in their ideas and, unlike the
researchers working in universities or the government, spend a great deal of
effort publicizing their findings. The need for a quick response to policy
issues and problems has forced many think-tanks to develop new product
lines. Short reports, journal articles, and policy briefs that can be quickly
read and digested have replaced book-length studies as the primary output
of many think-tanks. In addition, a premium has been placed on writing
articles and pieces for newspapers and making appearances on radio and
television programmes. This new brand of research and analysis is
dependent on the public policy food chain, which includes a range of
knowledge and policy-oriented institutions. Over the last few decades, much
of the work of think-tanks has been devoted to promoting economic
efficiency, since this has been an important preoccupation of the
governments in the industrialized world.
Mass Media
Last but not the least, media constitutes one of the important intermediating
actors active in the policy-making process. While some regard the role of the
mass media in the policy process as pivotal (Herman and Chomsky 1988,
Parenti 1986), others describe it as marginal (Kingdon 1984). There is no
denying that the mass media are crucial links between the state and society,
a position that allows for significant influence on the preferences of
government and society in regard to the identification of public problems
and their solutions. Yet, at the same time, like political parties, their direct
role in the various stages of the policy process is often sporadic and most
often quite marginal.
The role of the media in the policy process originates in the fact that
in reporting problems they function both as passive reporters and as active
analysts, as well as advocates of particular policy solutions. That is, news
programmes do not just report on a problem but often go to great lengths in
locating a problem not otherwise obvious, defining its nature and scope and
suggesting or implying the availability of potential solutions. The medias
role in agenda-setting is thus particularly significant. Media portrayal of
public problems and proposed solutions often conditions how they are

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understood by the public and many members of government, thereby


shutting out some alternatives and making the choice of others more likely.
However, the mass media has the tendency to be a one-sided source for
setting the policy agenda, as it has an inclination toward the sensational
news and also a tendency to exaggerate some aspects of an issue, while
playing down others.
This is particularly significant considering that news reporting is not
an objective mirror of reality, undistorted by bias or inaccuracy. Reporters
and editors are newsmakers, in the sense that they define what is worthy of
reporting and the aspects of a situation that should be highlighted. Thus,
policy issues that can be translated into an interesting story tend to be
viewed by the public as more important than those that do not lend
themselves so easily to narrative structures and first-person accounts and
sound bites. This partially explains why, for example, crime stories receive
so much prominence in television news and, as a corollary the public puts
pressure on governments to appear to act tough on crime.
We must not, however, exaggerate the mass medias role in the policy
process. Other policy actors have resources enabling them to counteract
media influence, and policy-makers are for the most part intelligent and
resourceful individuals who understand their own interests and have their
own ideas about appropriate or feasible policy options. As a rule, they are
not easily swayed by media portrayals of issues and preferred policy
solutions or by the mere fact of media attention. Indeed, they often use the
media to their own advantage. It is not uncommon for public officials and
successful interest groups to provide selective information to the media to
bolster their case. Indeed, very often the media are led by state opinion
rather than vice versa (Howlett 1997).
Conclusion
To conclude, it can be said that while the official actors like the minister(s)
and bureaucrats by virtue of their central position in the policy subsystem
and access to abundant organizational resources critically affect and
influence the policy process, their societal counterparts like interest groups
(business and labour), political parties, research organizations/think tanks
and the media often play a significant role in many policy areas. All these
actors have their own objectives, which they seek to achieve through
subsystem membership and participation in the policy process. But what
objectives they pursue, how they do so, and the extent to which they
succeed in their efforts depend to a large extent on the institutional context
in which they operate. At the domestic level, the structure of political
institutions affects the autonomy and capacity of the executive and
bureaucracy, a situation paralleled at the international level by the structure
of international regimes and the role played by state resources within them.
These structures have a decisive effect on actors interest and behaviour,
and on the outcomes of the policy process.

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