Digested Cases ; Admin Law.

Mark Nino De Asis

US vs Barrias 11 Phil 327
FACTS:
Defendant Aniceto Barrias was charged in CFI with violations of par. 70 and 83 of
Circular no. 397.Paragraph 70 of Circular No. 397 reads as follows: No heavily
loaded casco, lighter, orother similar craft shall be permitted to move in the
Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate
power.Paragraph 83 reads, in part, as follows:For the violation of any part of the
foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable toa fine of not less
than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.Counsel for the
appellant attacked the validity of paragraph 70 on two grounds: Firstthat it is
unauthorized by section 19 of Act No. 355; and, second, that if the acts of
thePhilippine Commission bear the interpretation of authorizing the Collector
topromulgate such a law, they are void, as constituting an illegal delegation of
legislativepower.The complaint in this instance was framed with reference to
sections 311 and 319 [19 and311] at No. 355 of the Philippine Customs
Administrative Acts, as amended by Act Nos.1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235,
the Collector is not only empowered to makesuitable regulations, but
also to "fix penalties for violation thereof,"
notexceeding a fine of P500.
ISSUE: WON Collector of Customs can fix the penalty of a law?
HELD: The answer is in the Negative. Although the Collector of Customs can
make and publish rules andregulations but it cannot make the duty of the
legislature to fix the penalty of a certain law. It is in this case that it will be an
illegal delegation of power.One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that
the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by
that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the
State has locatedthe authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional
agency alone the laws must be made until theconstitution itself is changed.This
doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter
of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another