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A HISTORICAL

COMMENTARY ON

POLYBIUS
BY

F.W. WALBANK
RATHBONE PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY
AND CLASSICAL ARCHAEOI.OGY IN THE
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

VOLUME I
COMMENTARY ON BOOKS I-VI

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

!957

ISBN-10: 0198141521
ISBN-13: 978-0198141525

CONTENTS
:POLYBIUS

(By permission of the Staatliche Museen, Berlin) frontispiece

LIST OF MAPS
ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SHORT TITLES

xii
xiii

INTRODUCTION
I.

Polybius' Life and journeys

2.

Polybius' Views on History

3 Tyche

16

4 Polybius' Sources

26

5 Chronology

35

COMMENTARY
Book I

39

Book II

I5I

Book III

292

Book IV

450

BookY

538

Book VI

635

INDEXES
1.

General

747

2.

Authors and passages

769

3 Inscriptions and Papyri

773

4 Greek

775

xi

LIST OF MAPS
I. THE BATTLE OF

xii

ECNOMUS

84

2. LILYBAEUM

106

3 THE BATTLE OF DREPANA

1I2

SITUATIO~ OF CARTHAGE

138

THE BATTLE OF SELLAS IA

276

6.

THE BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

398

7 THE BATTLE OF TRASIMENE

416

8. CALLICULA

428

530

ALIPHEIRA

10. PHILIP'S MARCH ON THERMUM

542

II.

554

LACONIA

12. AREA OF ATTALUS' OPERATIONS IN 218

602

13. A

710

ROMAN CAMP ACCORDING TO POLYBIUS

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


OF SHORT TITLES
AA = Archaeologischer Anzeiger (incorporated in JDAJ).
Abh. Bay. Akad.
Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
phil.hist. Abteilung.
Abhatldlungen der PreujJischen Akademie der WissenAbh. Berlin. Akad.
schaften, Berlin, phil.hisl. Klasse.
Abh. Heidelb. Akad. = Abhandlungm der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissmschaftm, phil.-hist. Klass e.
Accame, Lega aleniese = S. Accame, La lega ateniese del secolo IV a.c. Rome, 1941.
Acme = Acme: an naZi della facolta di filos'?fia e lett ere dell' U niversita slat ale di
.Milano.
Aa. arch. = Acta archaeologica.
Act. lnst. Rom. Suec.
Acta inslituti romani regni Sueciae (Skrifter utgivna av
Svenska b1stitutel i Rom).
AEl'v! = Archeiologisch-epigraphische Miueilungm aus Osterreich-Ungarn.
AIPhO = Annuaire del' lnstitul de philologie et d'histolre orientale de l'Universite
libre de Bruxelles.
A]P = Ameritan journal of Philology.
Altheim, Epochen = F. Altheim, Epochr:n der romischen Geschichte. 2 vols.
Frankfort, I934-5
AM = Mitteilungen des deutschen archtiologisthen lmtituts, athenische Abteilung.
Annales du Service
Annales du service des antiquitis de l'Egypte.
Annuario = Annuario deUa R. Scuola archeologica in Atene e delle lvfissioni
italiane in Oriente.
Anth. Pal,
Anthologie grecque, ed. P. Waltz. 6 vols. Paris, 1928-44,
Arangio-Ruiz, Storia dir. rom.
V. Arangio-Ruiz, Storia del diritto romano.
Ed. 5 Naples, 1947.
)Jpx. 8.>..,.. = Jl.pxcuo>..oyu;dv lltATlov.
)Jpx. i>. = J4.pxato>..oy~<~ frlp.tpls.
Arch. Pap.
Archiv fiir Papyrusforschung.
Arch. Zeit.
Archiiologische Zeitung.
Arnim, SVF = H. von Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. 4 vols. Leipzig,
1903-24-

Arnold, Oorzaak =C. J. C. Arnold, Oor:r.aak m Schuld van den tweedetr punischen
Oorlog. Amsterdam, I939
Atti Ace. Torino = Atti della R. Accademia delle Scimze di Torino.
Alii I st. Vmeto = Atti dell' lstituto Veneto di Scienze, Leitere ed Arti.
Aymard, ACA
A. Aymard, Les assemblies de la confederation achaimne.
Bordeaux, 1938.
Aymard, PR = A. Aymard, Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la amjidiration
achaienne (.r98-189 av. f.-C.). Bordeaux, I938.
Dabelon = E. Babelon, M onnaies de la ripublique romaine. 2 vols. Paris, I88s-6.
Barber = G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus. Cambridge, I935
lkumeister, Denkmiiler = A. Baumeister, Denkmiiler des klassischm Altertums.
3 vols. Munich-Leipzig, I885-S.

xiii

A BBitEVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

JI..J,.,J.

K. 1. Bcloeh, Griechische Geschichte. Ed.

2.

4 vols. Strassburg-

ltcoliu ,,.,;1 Leipzig, 1912-27.


J!..J.,do, Ji,.,,,;fkrrung = K. J. Beloch, Die Bevolkerung der griechisch-romischen
It'd!. Leipzig, 1886.
It,.],wll, /JJ - K. J. Beloch, Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie. Leipzig,
.x~o.

lkloch, RG = K. J. Beloch, Romische Geschichte zum Beginn der punischen


K ricge. Berlin-Leipzig, 1926.
Benecke, Seepolitik = H. Benecke, Die Seepolitik der Atolier. Diss. Hamburg,
1934

Bengtson = H. Bengtson, Griechische Geschichte von den Anjtingen bis in die


romische Kaiserzeit. Muller-Otto, Ilandbuch, iii. 4 Munich, 1950.
Bengtson, Strat. = H. Bengtson, Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit. 3 vols.
Munchener Beitrage, vols. 26, 32, and 36. Munich, 1937-52.
Benseler = G. E. Benseler, De hiatu in oratoribus atticis et historicis graecis.
Fribergae, 1841.
Berger = E. H. Berger, Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen.
Ed. 2. Leipzig, 1903.
Berve = H. Berve, Das Alexm1derreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage. 2 vols.
Munich, 1926.
Bettingcn = W. Bettingen, K5nig Antigonos Doson von Makedonien (229-220
v. Chr.). Diss. Jena. Weida i. Th. 1912.
Bevan, Seleucus =E. R. Bevan, The House of Seleucus. 2 vols. London, 1902.
Bikerman = E. Bikerman, ln>titutions des Sileucides. Paris, 1938.
Black Sea Pilot = Admiralty Sailing Directions. The Black Sea Pilot. Ed. 7
London, 1920. (Ed. 9, 1942, with Suppl. 3 to 1948.)
Blilmner = H. Blilmner, Technologic und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Kiinste
bei Griechen und R6mern. Ed. 2. Leipzig, 1912.
B.M.C. Lycia = G. F. Hill, Greek Coins of Lycia, Pamphylia and Pisidia. British
Museum Catalogue. London, 1897
B.M.C. Phoen. = G. F. Hill, Greek Coins of Phoenicia. British Museum Catalogue.
London, 1910.
B.M.C. Ptol. Kings of Egypt= R. S. Poole, The Ptolemies, Kings of Egypt.
British Museum Catalogue. London, 1883.
B. M. C. Rom. Rep. = H. A. Grueber, Coins of the Roman Republic in the
British :Museum. 3 vols. London, 1910.
Blv11 = The Collection of Ancient Greek Inscriptions in the British Museum.
London, 1874-1916.
Boll. fil. class. = Bollettino di filologia classica.
Bonn. ]ahrb. = Botmer ]ahrbucher.
Bouche-Leclercq, Lagides =A. Eouche-Leclercq, Histoire des Lagides. 4 vols.
Paris, 1903-7
Bouche-Leclercq, Sileucides = A. Bouche-Leclercq, Histoire des Sileucides, 32364 av. f.-C. 2 vols. Paris, 1913-14.
BPW = Berliner Philologische W ochenschrift.
Brandstaeter = F. A. Brandstaeter, Die Geschichten des t'itolischen Landes,
Volkes und Bundes, nebst einer historiographischen Abhandlung iiber Polybios.
Berlin, 1844.
Broughton = T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic.
2 vols. New York, 1951~2.

xiv

ABBREVIATIONS

A~D

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BSA = Annual of the British School at Athens.


BSR
Papers of the British School at Rome.
Bullettino della commissione archeologica comunale di
Bull. Comm. Rom.
Roma.
Bull. de la sot:. nat. des antiquaires de France
Bulletin de la sociitl nationale des
antiquaires de France.
Bull. de l'inst. arch. bulgar.
Bulletin de l'institut archiologique bulgare (in
Bulgarian).
Bull. ipig. = L. Robert's Bulletin ipigraphique in REG.
Bull. Inst. Class. Stud.
Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the
Uni~ersity of London.
Bull. soc. arch. Alex.= Bulletin de la societe royale d'archiologe d'Alexandrie.
Bung
P. Bung, Q. Fabius Pictor, der erste riimische Annalist. Diss. Cologne,
1950.

Burnet, EGP
J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. Ed. 4 London, 193o.
Burr = Y. Burr, Mare Nostrum. (Wurzburger Studien, 4.) Stuttgart, 1932.
Bursian = K. Bursian, Geographic von Griechculand. z vols. Leipzig, 18G2-iz.
Busolt-Swoboda = G. Buso!t-H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde. (llliillerOtto's Handbuch, iv. 1. x.) Ed. 3 z vols. Munich, 192o--6.
Calhoun = G. M. Calhoun, Greek Legal Sience. Oxford, 1944.
Cardinali
G. Cardinali, ll regno di Pergama. Turin, 19o6.
Cary, GB
M. Cary, The Geographic Background of Greeh and Roman History.
Oxford, 1949.
Cary, Ilist.
M. Cary, A History of the Greek World fr!YIIl 323 to I46 B.C.
London, 1932 (ed. 2, 1951).
Cary, IIR = M. Cary, A History of Rome down to the Re.ign of Constantine.
London, 1935
Castiglioni
L. Castiglioni, Decisa farficibus. Milan, 1954.
CGF
G. Kaibel, Comicorum graecarum fragmenta. Berlin, 1899
Chilver G. E. F. Chilver, Cisalpirte Gaul: Social and Economic History from
49 B.c. to the death of Trajan. Oxford, 1941.
Chrimes = K. M. T. Chrimes, Ancient Sparta. Manchester, I949
Chron. d'Egypte = Chnmique d'Egypte.
Cichorius = C. Cichorius, Riimische Sltldien. Leipzig-Berlin, 1922.
C!L
Corpus inscriptionum latinarum.
Carpus inscriptionum semiticarum.
C.I.Sem.
C]
Classical journal.
Class. el med. = Classica el mediaevalia.
ClermontGanneau, Rec. arch. or.
C. S. ClermontGanneau, Receuil d'archiologie orientale. 8 vols. Paris, J888-I924
Cook, Zeus
A. B. Cook, Zeus: a Study in Atuient Religion. 3 vols. Cambridge,
1914-40,

Cornelius
F. Cornelius, Cannae. (Klio, Beiheft, 26.) Leipzig, 1932.
Corradi
G. Corradi, Studi ellenistici. Turin, 1929.
Couissin= P. Couissin, Les annes romaines. Paris, 1926.
CP
Classical Philology.
CQ Classical Quarterly.
CR = Classical Revie'W.
CRAI
Comptes rendus de l'Acadt!mie des inscriptions et belleslettres.
XV

A llllHEVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


t,..,;~,y

nnd 1:racc
M. Crosby and E. Grace, An Achaean League Hoard.
(Numi.,nwti< Notes and l11onographs, 74.) ~ew York, 1936.
Cnult.
0. Cuntz, Polybius und sein Werk. Leipzig, 1902.
t 'uri i<h
K Curt ius, Peloponnesos, ei1xe hislorisch-geographische Beschreibung
J,.r JJalbinsel. 2 vols. Gotha, 1851-2.
llanx =G. Daux, Delphes au II et au/"' siecle depuis l'abaissemmt de l'Etolie
jusqu'a la paix romaine, I9I-JI av. ].-C. Paris, 1936.
De Beer = G. de Beer, Alps and Elephants. London, 1955.
Delatte, Constitution = A. Delatte, La Conslilt~tion des Etats-unis et les Pytha
goriciens. Paris, 1948.
Delatte, Essai = A. Delatte, Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne. Liege, 1922.
Delbriick
II. Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen
Gescht'chte. 4 vols. Berlin, 19oo-2o.
Denkschr. Wien = Denkschriften der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien.
DeSanctis
G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Ronmni. Vols. i-iv. 2, in six parts. TurinF1orence, 1907-23, I953
De Sanctis, Problemi = G. De Sanctis, Problemi di sloria antica. Bari, 1932.
De Sanctis, SG
G. De Sanctis, Storia dei Greci dalle origini allafine del secCllo V.
2 vols. Florence, 1939 (with appendice bibliografica (I940-52) by A. Momi
gliano, 1954).
Die Is, Dox. graec. = H. Diels, Doxographi graeci. Ed. 2. Berlin, 1929.
Diels, FVS
H. Diels-W. Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 vols. Ed. 6.
Berlin, 1951-2.
Dinsmoor, Archons = W. B. Dinsmoor, The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic
Age. Cambridge (C.S.A.), 1931.
DLZ = Deutsche Literatur-Zeilung.
Drachmann = A. B. Drach mann, Sagunl und die EbrCl-Gren::;e in den V erhand
lungen zwischen Rom und Karthago, zzo-zi8. Kgl. Danske Videnskab.
Selskab, Hist. fil. Meddelelser, iii. 3 Copenhagen, 1920.
Droysen
J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des HeUenismus. 3 vols. Ed. 2. Gotha,
1877-8.
DS = Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des antiquitis grecques et romaines. Paris,
1877-1919.
Dunbabin = T. J. Dunbabin, The }Veslern Greeks: the History of Sicily and
South Italy from the fow:dation of the Greek Colonies to 480 n.c. Oxford, 1948.
Dussaud, Topographic
R. Dussaud, Topographic historique de !a Syrie antique
et midievale. Paris, 1927.
E. and J. = V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones, Documents illustrating the reigns
of Augustus and Tiberius. Oxford, 1949.
EHR
English Historical Revie-li!.
Ehrenberg, Aristophanes = V. Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophane. Ed. 2.
Oxford, 1951.
Ehrenberg, Karthago
V. Ehrenberg, Karthago: ein Versuch weltgeschicht
licher Einordmmg. (Morgenland, vol. 14.) Leipzig, r927.
Enc. it.
Enciclopedia italiana.
Erkell
H. Erkell, Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna: lateinische Wortstudien.
Goteborg, 1952.
Farrington = B. :Farrington, Science and Politics in the Ancient World. London,
1939
xvi

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

FD = Fouilles de Delphes, Vol. iii, Inscriptions, ed. by G. Colin, E. Bourguet,


G. Daux, and A. Salac. Paris, 1909-
Feldmann = A. Feldmann, Zum Aufbau der Geschichtserziilzlung bei Polybios.
Bern, 1929.
Ferguson = W. S. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens. London, 19II.
Ferguson Studies = Athenian Studies presented toW. S. Ferguson. Harvard, 1940.
Ferrabino = A. Ferrabino, II problema dell' unita nazionale nella Grecia antica.
I. Arato di Sicione e l'ideafederale. Florence, 1921.
Feyel = M. Feyel, Polybe et l'histoire de Biotie au III siecle avant notre ere.
Paris, 1942.
Feyel, Epig. = M. Feyel, Contribution a l'ipigraphie biotienne. Le Puy, 1942
(Paris, 1943).
FGH =F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker. Berlin-Leiden,
1923- .

FHG =C. and Th. Muller, Fragmenta historicorum graecorum. 5 vols. Paris,
1841-70.

Fick, Vorgr. Ortsn. = A. Fick, Vorgriechische Ortsnamen als Quelle fur die
Vorgeschichte Griuhenlands. Gi:ittingen, 1905.
Flaceliere = R. Flaceliere, Les Aitoliens a Delphes: contribution a l'histoire de
la Grice centrale au I II siicle av. ].-C. Paris, 1937.
Fougeres = G. Fougeres, 111antinie et l'Arcadie orientale. Paris, 1898.
FPhG =F. G. A. Mullach, Fragmenta philosophorum graecorum. 3 vols. Paris,
r88r-3.

Frank, ES = T. Frank, editor, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome. 5 vols.


Baltimore, 1933-40.
Frank, RI = T. Frank, Roman Imperialism. New York, 1914.
Fraser and Bean = P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, The Rhodian Peraea and
Islands. (Oxford Classical and Philological Monographs.) Oxford, 1954.
Frazer, Pausanias = ]. G. Frazer, Pausanias' Description of Greece. 6 vols.
London, 18g8.
Freeman, HFG =E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and
Italy. Ed. 2 by J. B. Bury. London, r893
Freeman, History of Sicily =E. A. Freeman, The History of Sicily from the
Earliest Times. 4 vols. Oxford, 18gr-4.
GAR = Gruce and Rome.
GDI = Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-ltJschriften, edited by H. Collitz and
F. Bechtel. Gottingcn, 1884-1915.
Geist. Arb. = Geistige Arbeit.
Gelzer, Vom riimischen Staat = M. Gelzer, Vom riimischen Staat: zur Politil1 und
Gesellschajtsgeschichte der romischen Republik. 2 vols, Leipzig, 1944.
Germ. Forsch. = Germanistische Forschungen: Festschrift des Wiener Akad,
Germanistmvereins. Vie1ma, 1925.
GGA = Giittingische gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGM = C. Muller, Geographi graeci minores. 2 vols. Paris, 1855-61.
Gidion = H. Gidion, Untersuchungen iiber das III. Buck des Polybios. Diss.
Gottingen, 1919.
Glotz-Cohen = G. Glotz and R. Cohen, Histoire grecque, vols. i-iv. I. (In
Glotz's Histoire gtnirak.) Paris, 1925-
Giitt. Abh. = Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Giittingen.
Giitt. Nachr. = Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschliften zu Gottingen.
4866

xvii

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gomme, Essays =A. W. Gomme, Essays in Greeh History and Literature.


Oxford, I937
Granier = F. Granier, Die 1i1alcedflllisthe lleeresversammlung: Ein Beitrag zum
antihm Staatsr<dt/. Muuich, I<JJI.
CrtTnidg"
:\. I I. J. I ;.-".. uidge, Noman Public
London, 190r.
{;, itlrl"
I:. T. I;, iltrllo, n,,. 11/tr(CIUlries of the Hellenistic World. Cambridge,
l:r<>:q:
1:-...11

t-:. L;n.;:. llrwui!Jfll als Politiker. Vienna, 1929.


S. 1: ...11,/J,_,fotrran<imnedel'Afriquedu.Nord. 4vols. Paris, I913-2o.

I :11ir.11rd
1'. I :ninnd,/.a j1roj>riite fonciere en Grece. Paris, 1893.
11.""1 ,J, .\t'"'""'ln~t:<' -- F. I-Iampl, Die griechischen Staalsverlni:ge des 4 Jahr
itl!udnf, ,., l'ltr. Leipzig, 1938.
II;""'"
[.;, llanell, Das altriimische eponyme Amt. (Act. Inst. Rom. Su.ec. 2.)
l.u11d, t<).JI.
ll:r""'"
E. V. Hansen, The Attalids of Pergamum. Cornell, I947
ll:llrkr, Oallus Lucanus
R. Harder, Ocellus Lucanus: Text und Kommen/ar.
(Nruc philologische Unterszuhungen, i.) Berlin, 1926.
llm1'. Stud. = Harz'ard Studies in Classical Philology.

llan. Theol. Re11. = Haroard Theological Review.


Head =B. V. Head, Historia Numorum. Ed. 2. Oxford, 19II.
Jleichelheim, Aus-.m'irlige BePiilkcrung
F. M. Heichelhcim, Die auswartige
Leipzig, 1925.
Bevolkerung im Ptolemiierreich. (Klio, Beiheft,
Heichelheim, Wirtsch. Schwank.
F. M. Heichelheim, Wirtschaftliche Schwan
kungm der Zeit von Alexander bis Augustus.
1930.
Hercod - R. Hercod, La couception de l'histoire dans
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1902.
Hermath. = Herma/hma.
Hesp. = Hesperia,
Hesselbarth = H. Hesselbarth, llistorisch-kritische Untersuchuugm ::;ur drittm
Delwde des LiPius. Halle, 1889.
Heurgon = J. Heurgon, Recherches sur l'histoire, Ia religion, et la civilisatiotl de
Capoue prtromaine des origines a Ia deuxit!me guerre punique. Paris, I942.
Heuss, Stadt und Herrscher =A. Heuss, Stadt und Herrscher des llellenismus
in ihrm staats- und volkerrechllichw Beziehungen. (Klio, Beiheft, 39.) Leipzig, 1937.
Heuss, Vi.ilk. Grund. =A. Heuss, Die tOlkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der riJmischen Auj1enpolitik in republikanischer Zeit. (Klio, Beiheft, 31.)
1933

Heuzey = L.A. lleuzey, Lemont Olympe et l' Aca:rnanie, exploration de ces deux
regions. Paris, r86o.
Hill = H. Hill, The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period. Oxford, 1952,
Hill, Hisl. Greek Coins = G. F. Hill, Historical Greek Coins. London, ryo6.
Hiller von Gaertringen, Hist. gr. Epi,g. llislorische griechis<.hc E.pigramme,
edited by F. Hiller von Gaertringen. (Kleine
rs6.) Donn, 1926.
Hirschfeld, Kl. Schr. = 0. Hirschfeld, Kleine Sch:rijien. Berlin, 1913.
Hirzel = R. Hirzel, Unlersudnmgen zu Cicero's philosophischeu Sdmjten, ii.
Leipzig, r88z.
Hoffmann = W. Hoffmann, Lir>ius Ultd der II. putlische Krieg. (Hermes, Einzel
schrift, 8.) Leipzig, 1942.
xviii

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ilolleaux = M. Holleaux, Rome, Ia Grece, et les monarchies hellinistiques au III


siecle av. ].-C. (27 3-205). Paris, 1921.
Holleaux, Etudes= M. Holleaux, Etudes d'ipigraphie et d'histoire grecques.
Edited by L. Robert. Vols. i- . Paris, 1938- .
Holm, Gesch. Sic. = A. Holm, Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum. 3 vols. Leipzig,
187e>-98.

Howald= E. Howald, Vom Geist antiker Geschichtsschreibung. Munich-Berlin,


1944

HRR = H. Peter, llistoricorum romanorum reliquiae. Leipzig, 1906 (vol. ii),


1914 (vol. i, ed. 2).
HZ = Historische Zeitschrijt.
IG = lnscriptiones graecae.
IG 2 = lnscriptiones graecae, editio minor.
IGR = Inscriptiones graecae ad res romanas jJertinentes.
ILS = lnscriptiones latinae selectae, ed. I-1. Dessau. 3 vols. Berlin, r892-I9r6.
lnsch. JV!ag. = Die lnschrijten von Magnesia-am-1liiiander, ed. 0. Kern.
Berlin, 1900.
Insch. Perg. ''" M. Frankd, Die Inschrijten von Pergamon. (Alter!Umer von
Pergamon, viii.) 2 vols. Berlin, r89o--5.
Insch. Priene = F.lliller von Gaerlringen, Die lnschrijten von Prien e. Berlin, 1906.
IPE = inscriptiones orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini. Ed. Latyshev. St.
Petersburg, 1885--1901 (Ed. 2 of vol. i, 1916).
Jahrb. =Neue jahrbucher fur Philologie und Piidagogik (1831-97), Neue Jahrbucher fur das klassische Altertum und fur J>aJagogih (r898-1924), Neue
Jahrbucher fur Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung (1925-36), Neue ]ahrbucher
fur deutsche Wissenschaft (1937), Nme jahrbucher fiir Antike und deutsche
Bildung (1938-42), Die Antike: alte Sprachen und deutsche Bildung (1943- ).
]ahresberichte d. phil. Ver. Berlin= Jahresberichte des philologischm Vereins zu
Berlin.
Jahresh. = ]ahreshefte des iisterreichischen archiiologischen Instituts.
} DAI = ]ahrbuch des deutschen archiiologischen lnstituts (incorporating AA).
Jones, CERP = A. II. M. Jones, The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces
Oxford, 1937.
Jones, Greek City = A. H. M. Jones, The Greeh City. Oxford, 1940.
Joum. Sav. =journal des savants.
]P =Journal of Philology.
Jullian = C. Jullian, Histoire de Ia GauZe. 8 vols. Paris, 1909-26.
Kahrstedt, iii= U. Kahrstedt, Vol. iii of Meltzer's Geschichte der Karthager.
Berlin, 1913.
Kienast = D. Kienast, Cato der Zensor, seine Personlichheit mul seine Zeit.
Heidelberg, 1954.
Kiepert, FOA = 11. and R. Kiepert, Formae orbis antiqui. Berlin, 1893Klatt = M. Klatt, Forschungm zur Geschichte des acha'ischen Bundes, i. Berlin
1877-

Kiatt, Beitriige = M. Klatt, Chronologische Beitriige zur Geschichte des achiiischen


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xix

ADDREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Kromayer-Veith, Sdzla.chlenatlas = J. Kromayer and G. Veith, Schlachlcnatlas
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La Roche = P. La Roche, Clwrakteristik des Polybios.
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Leaf, Troad =IV. Leaf, Strabo on the Troad, Book XIII,


I, edition and
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Leake, M(irea = vV. M. Leake, Travels in the Morea. 3 vols. London, 1830.
Leake, NG ~ vV. M. Leake, Travels in Northern Greece. 4 vols. London, 1835.
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Lex. Polyb. = Lexicon Polybianum, ed. Schweighaeuscr. Leipzig, 1795
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XX

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Meyer, Grenzen = Ernst Meyer, Die Grenzen der hellenistischm Staaten m
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Meyer, Kl. Schr. = Ed. Meyer, Kleine Schriften. 2 vols. Halle, H)I024.
Meyer, Pel. Wand. = Ernst )!eyer, Peloponnesische Wanderungen, ZurichLeipzig, 1939
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Minar = E. L. Minar, Early Pythagorean Politics iu Practice and Theory. Baltimore, 1942.
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Mommsen, RG = T. Mommsen, Romische Geschichte. Ed. 8. Vols. 1-3, 5 Berlin,
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Mommsen, Rom. Forsch.

T . .Mommsen, Romische Forscltungen.

vols. Berlin,

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Mommsen, St.-R. = T. Mommsen, Romisches Staatsrechl. 3 vols. (Vols. 1-3 of


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Muller, Dorians = C. 0. Muller, The History and Antiquities of the Dorian Race
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Munch. Beitrage = Aliinchener Beitrage zur Papyrusforschung und antiken
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Munzer, Adelsparteien = F. Mlinzer, Romische Adelsparteim und Adelsfamilim.
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~Mus. Ilelv. = J1!useum Helveticum.
Nauck = A. Nauck, Tragicorum graecorum fragmmta. Ed. 2. Leipzig, r88<).
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Nettleship, Essays = H. Nettleship, Lectures and Essays in Latin Literature and
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Newman = W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle. 4 vols. Oxford, r887-1902.

xxi

ABBREVIATIO~S

:Kiccolini

G. Niccolini, La

AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

confederaziM~e

achea. Pavia, rgr4.

Niebuhr, RG
B. G. Niebuhr, Romische Geschichte. Berlin, r8z8 (vol. i, ed. 3),
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Niese
R. Niese, Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staalen seil der
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Ninck
M. H. Ninck, Die Entdeckung von Europa durch die Griechen. Basel, 1945.
Nissen, It. Lattd.
II. Nissen, Italische Landeskunde. 2 vols. Berlin, r883-1902.
H.
Kritische Untersuchungm uber die Quellen der vierten
Nissen, KU
zmd funftm Dekade
Livius. Berlin, r863.
Norden, Agnoslos Theos
E. Norden, Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur
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Norden, Urgesch.
E. Norden, Die germanische Urgeschichte in Tacitus' Germmlia. Leipzig-Berlin, 1920.
Not. d. scav.
Noli3ie degli Scavi di Antichita.
Oberhurnmer, Akarnanien
E. Oberhummer, Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum. Munich, r887.
OGIS - Orimtis
inscriptiones selectae, ed. Dittenberger. 2 vols. Leipzig,
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Oilier
F. Oilier, Le mirage spartiate: etude sur !'idealisation de Sparte dans
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S. I. Oost, Roman Policy in Epirus and Acarnania in the Age of the
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Pais, Ricerche
E.
Ricerche storiche e geographiche sull' Ilalia antica.
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Pais, Storia critica
E. Pais, Storia critica di Roma durante i primi cinque secoli.
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Pais-Bayet
E. Pais- J. Bayet, Histoire romaine des origines a l'achevement de
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au. ]..C.). (Vol. i of the Iiistoire romaine in Glotz's llistoire
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Partsch
J. Partsch, Griechisches Burgschaftsrecht, i. Leipzig, I909
Partsch, Olympia
J. Partsch (and others), Olympia, die Ergebnisse der ron
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P BA
Proceedings of the British Academy.
P. Berol.
Berlin
cited by inventory number.
Pelekidcs = s. Pelekides, )hr.:\ 'T~l! 11'0A!Tda. Ka.l 'T~V KOtvwv{a. Tijs apxa{a<; BwaaAoYtK')S. Salonica, 1934.
P. Enteux.
Publications de la Sociitl royale igyptienne de Papyrologie. Textes
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Pfeiffer, Callimachus
R. Pfeiffer, Callimachus. 2 vols. Oxford, 1949-53.
P. Graec.llaun.
Papyri gratci Hawzienses, fasc. i, ed. T. Larsen. Copenhagen,
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Phil. = Philologus.
Philippson, Thessalien u. Epirus = A. Philippson, Thessalien und Epirus.
Berlin, 1897.
Phil. Woch.
Philologische Wo,henschrift.

P. Lille
lnstitut papyrologique de l'universiti de Litle: papyrus grecs publiis
sous la direction de P. Jouguet. Paris, rgo7-28.

x:xii

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


P. Lond. =Greek Papyri in the British Museum, ed. by F. G. Kenyon (vols. i
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Pohlmann
R. von Pohlmann, Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus
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Posch!
V. Posch!, Romischer Staat und griechisches Staatsdenken bei Cicero.
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Pohlenz, Antikes Fiihrertum = M. Pohlenz, Antikes Fiihrertum: Cicero De
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Porter
V\'. H. Porter, Plutarch's Life of Aratus with introduction, notes and
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P. Oxy.
Oxyrhytzchus Papyri, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt. London,
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P. Paris= Notices et extraits des manuscrits grecs de la bibliothique impi!riale,
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P. Petr.
The Flinders Petrie Papyri, ed. by J. P. Mahaffy and J. G. Smyly.
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llpaKTHal = llpa.t<Tit<ii Tfj> lv illl~a.<> &.pxa.w>..orocijs inupdas.
Prcger, lnsc. gr. metr.
T. Preger, lnscriptiones graecae metricae ex scriptoribus
praeter Anthologiam collectae. L~ipzig, 1891.
Proc. Prehist. Soc.
Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society.
P. Teb. = Tebtunis Papyri. Ed. by R P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, J. G. Smyly,
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P. Vat., see .Mal, Class. auct.
Ramsay, Asia Minor = W. M. Ramsay, llistorical Geography of Asia lvlinor.
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Ramsay, Cities= W. M. Ramsay, The Cities and Bishoprics of Phr_vgia. z vols.
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RE = Pauly-Wissowa's Real-encyclopa:die der classischen Alterl!m/S'.t'issenschaft.
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REA
Revue des etudes anciennes.
REG = Revue des etudes grecques.
Rehm, Delphinion =G. Kawcrau and A. Rehm, Das Delphinion in i'r1ilet.
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RE] = Revue des etudes juives.
Rend. Ace. ltalia
Rendiconti della R. Accademia d'ltalia, Classe di scienze
morali.
Rend. !st. Lomb. = R. lstituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere, Rendiconti.
Rend. Line. = Rendiconti della R. Accademia dei Lincei.
Rend. Pontif. Acr. Rom. Arch. = Rendiconti della Ponteficia Accademia Romana
di Archeologia.
Rev. arch. = Revue arch!ologique.
Revue biblique.
Rev. bibl.
Revue d' Assyriologie.
Rev. d' Ass.
Rev. des Univ. du ,'.fidi = Revue des Universitis du Jfidi.
Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquite.
Rev. int. droits d'ant.

x.-.:iii

/1 BBHEVJ AT IONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

!,'n. fhil.
Nh. rllrH.

l.'rmcr dr philologie, de litttfrature et d'histoire anciennes.


Nhrinisches Museum fur Philologie.
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llidtt'Wity Studies
Essays and Studies presmted to William Ridgeway. Cambritlgc, 1913.
Riv. fil.
Rivista di filologia e d'istruzione dassica.
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Robert, Et. anat.
L. Robert, Etudes anatoliennes: recherches sur les inscriptions
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Robert, Et. epig.
L. Robert, Etudes epigraphiques et philologiques. Paris, 1938.
Robert, Hellenica
L. Robert, Hellenica, recueil d'e'pigraphie, de numismatique
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Robert, Villes = L. Robert, Villes d'Asie Mineure: etudes de geographie antique.
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Robinson Studies
Studies presented to D. M. Robinson. Vol. i. St. Louis, 1951.
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Rostovtzeff, Staatspacht
M. Rostovtzeff, Gcschichte der Staatspacht in der
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Ryffel
H. Ryffel, MoafloA~ "'o.\tntwv: der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen.
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Sabine Essays
Essays in Political Theory presented to George N. Sabine.
Cornell, 1948.
S.-B. Berlin = Sitzungsberichte der Preuj3ischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
phil.-hist. Klasse.
S.-B. Heidelberg
Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissen
schaften, phil.-hist. Klasse.
S.B. Leipzig
Sitzungsberichtt der Siichsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
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S.B. Miinchen = Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
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S.-B. Wietl
Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, phil.
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W. Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen I.iteratur. (l\fi.iller-Otto's
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Schmidt
M. C. P. Schmidt, De Polybii geographia. Diss. Berlin, 1875
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xxiv

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Thiel

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J.

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Wilamowitz, Lesebuch
TJ. von Wilamowitz-1\foellendorff, Griechisches Lesebuch.
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A. \Vilhelm, Beitrii'ge zur griechischm Insclzriftenkwzde.
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Wilhelm, Neue Beitra'ge
A. Wilhelm, Neue Beitriige zur griechischen In
schriftenkunde, i. (S.-B. Wien, I9II,) Vienna, 19II.
Willems == P. Willems. Le senat de la rlpublique romaim. 2 vols. and appendix.
l.ouvain, r878-85.
Willetts
R. F. Willetts, Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete. London, 1955.
Wissowa
G. Wissowa, Rel~l{ion und Kultus der Romer. Ed. 2. (Ml'uler'sllandbuch, v. 4.) Munich, 1912.
fVJ
Wurzburger jahrbi<cher fur die lllassische Altertumswissenschajt.
W. J. Woodhouse, Aelolia, its Geography, Topography, and
Woodhouse
Antiquities. Oxford, 1897.
Wui\leumier = P. Wuilleumicr, Tarmte, des origines
la conqufte romaine.
z vols. l'aris, 1939
Wunderer, i, ii, or iii
C. Wunderer, Polybios-Forschungen, i: Sprichworter tmd
sprichwiJrtliche Redensarlen bei Polybios; ii: Citate und gefliigelte W orle bei
Polybios; iii: Gleichnisse und J'v!etaphern bei Po~ybios. Leipzig, I&)8, 1901,
and 1909.
Wunderer, Pol. =C. Wunderer, Polybios: Lebens- und Weltanschauung aus dem
zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrlzundert. (Das Erbe der Allen, n.) Leipzig, 1927.
Yale Stud. = Yale Classical Studies.
ZA = Zeitschrift Jii.r Assyriologie und verwandte Gebiete.
ZDA = Zeitschrift fur das deulsche Altertum.
ZDMG = Zeilschrijt der deutschen morgenla'ndischm Gesellschajl.
ZDPV
Zeitschrift des deutschen Paltlstinavereins.
Zippel =G. Zippel, Die romische Herrschaft in Illyrien. Leipzig, rSn
ZN = Zeitschriftfiir Numismatik.
Z. Sav.Stift. = Zeitschrift der Saviguy"Stiflullgjiir Rechtsgeschichle, Romanistische
Abteilung.

xxvH

INTRODUCTION
A FULL-LENGTH picture of Polybius will not be attempted in this introduction, which is intended merely to
survey a number of problems relevant to the study of his text. Because his upbringing and political fortunes
played a part in determining the sort of book he was to write, the first section is concerned with his life and the
places he visited. The second deals with his views on history and the writing of it. These views reflect external
influences and the literary traditions of the Hellenistic age, but even more the innate disposition of the man. The
impression he makes is of a somewhat crude and utilitarian rationalist; but this attitude is not without its
inconsistencies. No one, for example, can read many pages in the Histories without running into difficulties
raised by Polybius' references to Fortune, Tyche. Belief in Tyche, a characteristic ingredient of the popular
philosophy of Polybius' time, is not easily reconciled with either his rationalism or his moral purpose; section
three is devoted to an analysis of this central problem. The fourth section contains a brief survey of the sources of
which Polybius availed himself in the different parts of his work; and a short final section outlines the
chronological system which forms the framework of the Histories. In all sections discussion has been kept to a
minimum, with frequent references forward to the commentary for particular examples and details of
bibliography; for in a work of this kind it is in close association with the relevant passages that detailed problems
are most profitably discussed.
1. Polybius' Life and Journeys
Born about the end of the third century1 at Megalopolis, Polybius spent his first thirty years acquiring the
military and political experience of an Achaean statesman. His father Lycortas was an eminent politician, a
follower, though hardly (as has been suggested)2 a relative, of Philopoemen. In 182 the young Polybius was
selected to
[1]

The date is uncertain. Beloch (iv. 2. 228), following Mommsen (RG, ii. 449; Rm. Forsch. ii. 538 f.) in the view
that Polybius took part in Manlius Vulso's Galatian expedition of 189, dates it to 208; Susemihl (ii. 80 n. 2c) puts it
as early as 211/10. Against this is the reference in iii. 39. 8 to the measuring of the Via Domitia (see ad loc.),
which certainly suggests that Polybius lived until 118. If any trust can be placed in the statement of Ps.-Lucian
(Macrob. 23) that Polybius died from a fall off a horse at the age of 82, this would suggest a date round about 200
for his birth; but the author of the Macrobioi may be inaccurate, and in any case we do not know how long after
118 he may have lived, so that attempts to be more precise are somewhat hypothetical.
2

See ii. 40. 2 n.

carry the ashes of Philopoemen to burial,1 and some time later he wrote his life.2 The boy's upbringing was shaped
by the family's position as rich landowners. His interest in military matters is shown by his lost book on Tactics,3
and by many digressions in the Histories;4 he was also much given to riding and hunting.5 His knowledge of
literature was not extensive;6 the occasional quotations from the poets frequently suggest the use of a
commonplace-book rather than first-hand acquaintance,7 and his philosophical studies too were of a limited
character.8 Despite his use of the word as a term of abuse,9 and despite references to Heracleitus,10
Plato,11 Aristotle,12 Demetrius of Phalerum,13 and Strato of Lampsacus,14 he shows little evidence of deep study of
any of these writers; and the philosophical background in book vi seems to lie mainly in recent or contemporary
popular writers rather than in the original minds of the fourth and third centuries.15 On the other hand, he had
obviously read closely and critically the historians of his own and preceding generations, such as Timaeus,
Phylarchus, Theopompus, and Ephorus.16
[2]

Cf. Plut. Philop. 21. 5 ; the phrase would fit a birth-date about 200,
but hardly one much earlier.
2
x. 21. 5 f. The Life of Philopoemen was probably an earlier work. Against the view of P. Pdech (REG, 1951,
82103) that it was written at Rome for Scipio Aemilianus see Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios', cols. 14723 n. It was
Plutarch's source for his Philopoemen.
3
Cf. ix. 20. 4; Arrian, Tact. 1; Aelian, Tact. 1, 3. 4, 19. 10.
4
e.g. iii. 81. 10, 105, v. 98, x. 16. 117. 5, 2224, 32. 733, 4347, xi. 25. 6; but Polybius' detailed description of
military matters throughout his Histories reveals the technical skill and passionate eye of the professional.
5
xxxi. 14. 3 (boar-hunting with Demetrius of Syria), 29. 8 (hunting with Scipio); other references in von Scala, 24
n. 3.
6
So, rightly, Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1465, against von Scala, 65 ff.
7
Cf. Wunderer, ii, passim.
8
Cf. Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 146771, drawing on and modifying the conclusions of von Scala, 86255.
9
e.g. xii. 25. 6 (Timaeus), xxxvi. 15. 5 (Prusias).
10
iv. 40. 3, xii. 27. 1.
11
Cf. iv. 35. 15, vi. 5. 1, 45 (mentioned with Ephorus, Xenophon, and Callisthenes), vii. 13. 7, xii. 28. 2; on the
theory of Friedlnder (AJP, 1945, 337 ff.) that Polybius based his account of his own early relations with Scipio on
the pattern of Socrates and Alcibiades in the Greater Alcibiades see xxxi. 2330 n.
12
See Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1470, criticizing von Scala, 127 ff. Susemihl (ii. 81 n. 4) and Niese (GGA, 1890, 892)
are agreed that von Scala has not proved that Polybius was acquainted with such rare works as the Poetics,
Politics, and Nicomachean Ethics.
13
Especially xxix. 21; but this does not imply an extensive knowledge of Demetrius.
14
Polybius shows a first-hand acquaintance with Strato's theories on the silting-up of the Black Sea; cf. iv. 3942
nn.
15
See the commentary to this book, passim.
16
See i. 5. 1, ii. 16. 15, viii. 10. 12, xii. 315, 2328 a, xxxiv. 10. 5, xxxix. 8. 4(Timaeus); ii. 56. 1-63. 6, v. 35-39 n.
(Phylarchus); viii. 9-11, xii. 4 a 2 (reference in Timaeus), 25 f 6, 27. 8, xvi. 12. 7 (Theopompus); iv. 20. 5, v. 33. 2,
vi. 45. 1, ix. 1. 4, xii. 4 a 3 ff. (reference in Timaeus), 22. 7, 23. 1, 23. 8, 25 f 27. 7, 28. 9-12, xxxiv. 1. 3.

Of Polybius' career between Philopoemen's death and the Third Macedonian War only a little is known. In
181/0 the Achaean Confederation designated him one of three ambassadors to visit Ptolemy V Epiphanes in
Egypt, ,1 but the trip was cancelled when the king suddenly died,
and he next appears as Hipparch of the Confederation for the year 170/69.2 This was a critical moment in his
country's history. Involved in an irksome war with Perseus of Macedonia, the Romans were carefully watching all
Greek states for signs of disloyalty. Polybius has left a detailed defence of his behaviour;3 but his family tradition
was one of maintaining an independent, if friendly, attitude towards Rome, and in 170 independence among
Greeks was a quality little respected by the Senate. In the purge which followed the downfall of Perseus Polybius
found himself one of a thousand eminent Achaeans who were summoned to Rome, ostensibly for examination,
and subsequently detained there without any pretence of justice.4
Once at Rome, Polybius was more fortunate than most of his colleagues. Soon after his internment began, and
while he was still in the city, he had the good fortune to attract the attention of the 18-year-old Scipio
Aemilianus. The acquaintance, which took its origin 'in the loan of some books and conversation about them',5
quickly ripened into friendship, and when shortly afterwards the other internees were distributed into custody
among the municipal towns of Italy,6 Polybius received permission to stay on in Rome, where he became Scipio's
mentor and close friend.7 His position was now highly ambiguous. Technically a foreign internee, he enjoyed
friendship on equal terms with men like Aemilianus, his brother Q. Fabius,8 and the whole of their brilliant circle.
In this company he made the acquaintance of the Seleucid prince Demetrius, and did not hesitate to encourage
and support his plans to escape from Italy.9
[3]

xxiv. 6. 5. Polybius will have been little more than twenty at this time; see above, p. 1 n. 1.
xxviii. 6. 9.
3
xxviii. 13. 913, xxix. 24. 14, 78.
4
xxx. 13, 32. 112; Paus. vii. 10. 11; Livy, xlv. 31. 9.
5
xxxi. 23. 4; the books may well have been lent from the library of Perseus, which had fallen into the hands of
Scipio's father, Aemilius Paullus (Plut. Aem. Paul. 28. 8; Isid. Orig. vi. 5. 1). See von Scala, 176; and above, p. 2 n.
11.
6
xxxi. 23. 5; Paus. vii. 10. 11.
7
xxxi. 23 ff.; Diod. xxxi. 26. 5; Vell. i. 13. 3; Plut. Mor. 659 F; Ps.-Plut. Mor. 199 F.
8
xxx i.23. 5.
9
Cf. xxxi. 11-15 for his own account of the incident, probably written shortly afterwards, but reserved for later
incorporation in the Histories, when its publication could no longer harm him. See discussion ad loc. for Ziegler's
view (op. cit., col. 1452) that Polybius was acting with the connivance of Scipio, and virtually in the role of 'eines
geheimen politischen Agenten im Dienste dieser Partei'.
2

Cuntz has argued1 that until the remnant of the internees was amnestied in 150, Polybius will have been
restricted to Latium under pain of death; but there was all the difference in the world between allowing him to
return to Greece, where he could exercise political influence, and letting him leave the boundaries of Latium and
even Italy in responsible company in order to make journeys in the west.2 As De Sanctis points out,3 Polybius is
known to have visited Epizephyrian Locri several times,4 and by his influence to have secured the immunity of its
citizens from military service 'in the Spanish and Dalmatian campaigns'. Since Schweighaeuser this Dalmatian
campaign has been identified with that of 156/5;5 Cuntz's argument6 that the reference is to the war of 135 against
the Ardiaei and Pleraei,7 is unconvincing, for these peoples were not Dalmatians.8 On balance, then, it may be
assumed that Polybius was allowed as far as Locri during his internment. In that case why not also outside Italy?
It seems in fact probable (though it is a hypothesis not susceptible of complete proof) that the journeys which
Polybius made 'through Africa, Spain, Gaul, and on the ocean that lies beyond',9 are to be dated in part before his
release from internment. The evidence is discussed in the relevant notes. Summarized, it suggests that Polybius
accompained Scipio to Spain in 151, when he acted as legatus to the consul Lucullus, that during his stay in Spain
he went with Scipio to Africa, where he met Masinissa, and that he crossed the Alps on his way back to Italy.10 In
150, thanks to the influence of Scipio and the acquiescence of Cato,11 the internees were released, or at least the
three hundred of them who still survived. Polybius had barely had time to reach Arcadia when a request arrived
from the consul
[4]

Cuntz, 5556; this penalty seems implied by Paus. vii. 10. 12, .
His parole would have afforded sufficient security, especially when underwritten by Scipio, who, though
certainly still young, must have carried weight by reason of his family connexions.
3
iii. 1. 20910.
4
xii. 5. 13.
5
Cf. xxxii. 13; Livy, ep. 47; Flor. ii. 25; Zon. ix. 25; App. Illyr. 11; Strabo, vii. 315; auct. de uir. ill. 44; Zippel, 130
ff.; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 210.
6
Cuntz, 4649; accepted by Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1461. Cuntz also makes the Spanish War that of D. Iunius
Brutus in 138/7 (Strabo, iii. 152) rather than that of 153 (xxxv. 1), the usual view.
7
Livy, ep. 56; App. Illyr. 10; cf. Zippel, 132. The Dalmatian War of 119 (App. Illyr. 10; Livy, ep. 62) is certainly
too late.
8
Cf. De Sanctis, iii. 1. 210.
9
iii. 59. 7.
10
Cf. iii. 48. 12 n.; 5759 n.
11
xxxv. 6; Paus. vii. 10. 12. Unsuccessful attempts had been made in 164 (xxx. 32), 159 (xxxii. 3. 1417), 155
(xxxiii. 1. 38. 3), and 153 (xxxiii. 14).
2

for149, M'. Manilius, to proceed to Lilybaeum ;1 he readily obeyed,


but when at Corcyra he received reports which suggested that the Carthaginians had accepted the Roman terms,
he returned home.2 After the war again flared up, however, he joined Scipio at Carthage and was present at its
fall.3 It was probably in 146, shortly afterwards, that he undertook the voyage of exploration in the Atlantic,
which carried him both down the African coast and some way up that of Portugal.4 Ziegler5 would date this
voyage to 147 before the fall of Carthage; but Polybius will scarcely have left Scipio during the siege,6 and there is
no chronological difficulty in placing his voyage of exploration after the fall of Carthage and before his return to
Greece. He is known to have been at Corinth shortly after its destruction; but this event cannot be dated with
accuracy,7 and an Atlantic voyage may have been a welcome distraction from the embarrassment of being in
Achaea at the headquarters of a Roman general operating against the Confederation.
The Histories enable us to follow Polybius' movements for the next two years. He spent the rest of 146 and
part of 145 working to secure as favourable a settlement as possible in Greece,8 and he visited Rome once more in
the course of these negotiations.9 After that it becomes impossible to attach dates to his journeys. He was at
Alexandria sometime during the reign of Ptolemy Euergetes II (Physcon),10 but whether in the company of
Scipio11 or not cannot be determined. At some equally uncertain date he was at Sardes, where he met the Galatian
Chiomara,12 and he may have visited Rhodes.13
[5]

xxxvi. 11. 1.
Ibid.
3
xxxviii. 1922.
4
See iii. 5759 n.; xxxiv. 15. 7.
5
Op. cit., col. 1455.
6
Cf. Cuntz, 53.
7
xxxix. 2; cf. De Sanctis, iii. 1. 211.
8
On the honours paid to Polybius see xxxix. 3. 11; Paus. viii. 30. 9. Other statues were erected according to
Pausanias at Megalopolis (Paus. viii. 30. 8), Tegea (Paus. viii. 48. 8), Pallantium (Paus. viii. 44. 5), Lycosura (Paus.
viii. 37. 2;
cf. IG, v. 2. 537) and Mantinea (Paus. viii. 9. 1; IG, v. 2. 304). There is also epigraphical evidence for dedications
at Cleitor (IG, v. 2. 370; see Frontispiece) and Olympia (Syll. 686).
9
xxxix. 8. 1.
10
Strabo, xvii. 797 = P. xxxiv. 14. 6. Physcon reigned 170163 and again 145116; Ziegler seems right in dating
Polybius' visit to the second of these two periods; he stresses the elimination of the Greek element from the city
(op. cit., col. 1461).
11
Scipio's embassy to the east was probably in 140 (Broughton, i. 4801, with references); fg. 76 neither supports
nor contradicts the view that Polybius accompanied him on it. Mioni (15) connects Polybius' visit to Alexandria
with his reorganization of Greece, but there is no evidence for such an assumption.
12
xxi. 38. 7 = Plut. Mar. 258 E. Chiomara was probably young when the incident of 189 took place; and there is
no necessity to date Polybius' meeting with her before 169 rather than after 146, though of course the earlier date
cannot be excluded.
13
xvi. 15. 8 refers to archives in the Rhodian prytaneum; but Polybius had not necessarily consulted these in
person (see below, p. 31 n. 8). Nor can it be deduced from xvi. 29 that he had visited Sestus and Abydus (so
Mioni, 125); and had he seen Byzantium (iv. 38), he would almost certainly have said so. Valeton (190-3) assumed
that Polybius had visited Media (v. 44) and Ecbatana (x. 27); here again silence seems to suggest the opposite.
2

During these years he undoubtedly spent some time in the company of Scipio. Cicero1 makes Laelius say that
Scipio, Polybius, and Panaetius had frequently discussed together problems of the Roman constitution; but when
such conversations are to be datedwhether at Carthage or on some subsequent occasion, such as Scipio's eastern
embassyremains quite obscure.2 It is often assumed that Polybius accompanied Scipio to Numantia;3 but his
personal acquaintance with New Carthage,4 and Scipio's inquiries in Gaul (probably incited by Polybius),5 can
equally well date to the earlier Spanish journey of 151/0, for the composition of a monograph on the Numantine
War6 is no evidence that Polybius himself took part in it, when approximately seventy years old. Another work
by Polybius, , on the habitability of the equatorial region, is recorded by
Geminus;7 it has been conjectured8 that this was in fact merely part of book xxxiv of the Histories, but Ziegler9
rightly argues that Geminus is quite explicit in his statement, and that there is no reason to think that Polybius did
not write a separate monograph on a topic for which Strabo consulted only the general historyThe date when this
monograph was written is quite unknown. Pdech (Reg, 1948, 439; Mthode, 58890) argues that the work
was written after P.s voyage along the coast of Morocco and utilized the
results of that voyage.
Polybius died, according to the author of the Macrobioi,10 from a fall off a horse at the age of 82; the authority
is not impeccable, but the statement would fit reasonably well into the other data on Polybius' life,11 and may be
accepted.12
2. Polybius' Views on History
At the outset of his work Polybius indicates its double purpose:13 it is to provide useful training and experience
for the practical
[6]

1
2

De rep. i. 34.

On the date of Panaetius' arrival in Rome see Pohlenz, RE, 'Panaitios', col. 424 f.; Brink and Walbank, CQ,
1954, 103 n. 3. The evidence is not adequate to determine when it took place, and views fluctuate between a date
before 149 and one as late as 132.
3
e.g. Cuntz, 16 ff., 5659; Mioni, 16; Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 1458 f.
4
x. 11. 4; cf. De Sanctis, iii. 1. 112.
5
xxxiv. 10. 67 = Strabo, iv. 190; cf. Class. et med., 1948, 161.
6
Cic. fam. v. 12. 2.
7
Geminus, 16. 12. (*p. 628.)
8
Cf. M. C. P. Schmidt, Jahrb. cxxv, 1882, 113.
9
Op. cit., col. 1474.
10
Ps.-Lucian, Macrob. 23.
11
See above, p. 1, n. 1, for the evidence suggesting that Polybius lived after 120.
12
How the composition of the Histories fits into the above chronology is a subject enveloped in controversy. It is
fully discussed in the commentary at iii. 15 and vi introduction; see also Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 98102.
13
i. 1. 2.

politician, and at the same time to teach the reader how to bear the vicissitudes of Fortune, by describing
those that have befallen others. Throughout the Histories both aspects are repeatedly stressed. The discussion in
book iii1 on the distinction between causes, pretexts, and beginnings is specifically directed towards the
statesman,2 and it is as something essential for statesmen as well as students that he includes his account of the
Carthaginian treaties.3 The description of the Gallic invasions of Italy is designed especially to teach those who
direct the fortunes of the Greeks how to cope with such attacks.4 It is, in particular, statesmen who can correct
their own conduct by a study of the change in character displayed by Philip V,5 and statesmen (as well as students)
who will profit from the account of the Roman constitution.6 The moral lessons of history, though useful to
(for indeed they are often bound up with the practical lessons),7 are frequently aimed at a
wider public. Thus the fate of Regulus, which illustrates the unexpected element in history and the success that
can be achieved by determination,8 is recounted 'in order to improve the readers of this History';9 and these
readers are invited in their turn to pass moral judgement on the government exercised by Rome.10
Usually, however, it is not clear to what particular audience Polybius is directing his frequent didactic
observations on the advantages that will accrue from reading his work, for, as he himself admits,11 many of these
hammer at ancient themes; and the constantly repeated antithesis between and 12 and
their synonyms smacks of the schools and rhetorical communes loci. Both aims, pleasure and profit, are
admissible; but the scale comes down very sharply on the side of profit. The criterion of utility is repeatedly urged
whether the point in question be great or trivial. It may be the claims of history in general13usually implying
[7]

iii. 6. 6 ff.
iii. 7. 5,
; iii. 31 develops the theme as it concerns both statesmen and others.
3
iii. 21. 910; for the distinction between statesmen and students see the note ad loc.
4
ii. 35. 510, especially 35. 9 for the reference to Greeks.
5
vii. 11. 2.
6
iii. 118. 12. In ii. 61. 11 Polybius implies that it is especially statesmen who will profit from reading of the loyal
and courageous behaviour of the Megalopolitans.
7
e.g. the study of Philip's metabole (above, n. 5), the factor of morale in meeting a Gallic tumultus (above, n. 4).
Polybius regarded both right conduct and morale as ultimately paying practical dividends.
8
The same lesson is drawn from the Gallic tumultus: compare ii. 35. 510 with i. 35. 15.
9
i. 35. 6.
10
iii. 4. 7.
11
i. 1. 2.
12
Cf. i. 4. 11, vii. 7. 8, ix. 2. 6, xi. 19 a 13, xv. 36. 3, xxxi. 30. 1.
13
e.g. ii. 56. 10, v. 75. 6, xii. 25 g 2, xxxix. 8. 7.
2

'political history'1which Polybius is pressing; it may be the study of a particular topic, geography,2 causality,3
the biography of some selected individual (provided this is not treated as encomium),4 or even so practical a
matter as the principles of fire-signalling,5 perfected by Polybius himself. What matters is that the reader shall gain
advantage from his reading. To this end Polybius draws a clear distinction between political (and military)
history, ,6 on the one hand, and, on the other, forms of history written with different objects
in view and other criteria in the writing. Thus genealogies may interest , and accounts of colonies,
foundations of cities, and relationships ; but the is interested in the
affairs of nations, cities, and rulers, and it is for him Polybius writes. This kind of writing is
,7 and it is austere in character (though it can include contemporary developments in art and science).8 In
this austerity it stands in contrast to the sensational and rhetorical writing of so many of Polybius' immediate
predecessors. Phylarchus, for example, confuses the categories of history and tragedy;9 and this is true of many
other writers, whose names are not always mentioned,
[8]

Cf. ix. 2. 4, where is preferred . . . .


On the meaning of see below, n. 6.
2
iii. 57. 9.
3
vi. 2. 8 (hence the study of the Roman constitution, a prime cause of Roman success), xi. 19 a 13; see below, p.
11 n. 8.
4
x. 21. 3; cf. xv. 35: in discussing great men one should add appropriate remarks on the role of Tyche together
with any instructive reflections one can.
5
x. 47. 1213.
6
Polybius often uses the phrase as a mere synonym for , 'serious history'; in ix. 12
it distinguishes a political and military narrative from the more mythical studies of genealogies, or of the
foundations of cities, colonization, and ties of kinship. It never means 'history which investigates causes'. This is
. Thus in ii. 37. 3 Polybius calls his main history, contrasted with the summary account in
books i and ii, (cf. iii. 1. 3 ); and in iv. 40. 1 his account of the Black
Sea is , being based on the principles of natural science, in contrast to the unsupported assertions of
other writers; in x. 21. 3 he admits that writers on the foundations of citiesa branch of history which is
specifically contrasted with (ix. 12)may give an account of these topics , though
in the same chapter (x. 21. 8) he contrasts his own history, written impartially and , with the
encomium, which is both and exaggerated (cf. viii. 8. 59); and in xviii. 33. 6 Polybius claims to
have recounted Philip V's metabole and the actions involved in it ( ) ,
inasmuch as he has described . Cf. CQ, 1945, 1516; Gelzer, Hermes, 1954, 347.
Pdech (Mthode, 2132) stresses three elements in , (a) the account of public events and
political actions, (b) the narrative part of a historical work, (c) concern with contemporary history in contrast to
(cf. ix. 2. 4 n.); on see Petzold, Studien, 16 ff. and Walbank, Polybius, 57 n. 153; n.
9: on 'tragic history' see Meister, Kritik, 10926.
7

ix. 1. 45, 2. 4.
x. 47. 1213, a concession to his own interest in fire-signalling; cf. above, n. 5. can also
properly include an account of the anacyclosis (vi. 5. 2), since it is relevant to an understanding of the growth of
the Roman state.
9
ii. 56. 10-13. On 'tragic history' see Bull. Inst. Class. Stud., 1955, 4-14.
8

among them historians of Hannibal's Alpine crossing,1 others (perhaps Timaeus is meant)2 who include fables
about Phaethon in their accounts of the Po valley,3 and writers about Hieronymus of Syracuse,4 Agathocles of
Alexandria,5 the wonders of Ecbatana,6 or the miracles of Iasus.7 Zeno of Rhodes is given to such sensationalism;
Polybius singles him out for special criticism.8 In general, exaggeration and the
rhetorical elaboration of such matters as descriptions of places and accounts of sieges Polybius considers more
likely to be found in the work of historians whose theme is limited ( )
than in that of universal historians like himself.9
In several places Polybius expatiates upon the superior merits of universal history. None of his
contemporaries10 and virtually none of his predecessors11 had attempted history of this sort. Yet it is only from
universal history that one can gain a proper notion of cause and effect and estimate the real importance of events,
and so understand and appreciate the work of Tyche.12 It is true that universal history acquires a special
significance from the hundred and fortieth olympiad, since from that date events themselves had taken on a
universal character, and the history of the various parts of the inhabited world had coalesced into an organic
whole;13 but Siegfried is hardly right in thinking14 that universal history is proper only to the period with which
Polybius is concerned, otherwise he would not have praised Ephorus as
.15 The position is rather that universal history, while always preferable, had now become the
only form capable of treating the period which opened in 220; and it is the type of history which is at once
universal and that Polybius especially commends.
[9]

iii. 48. 8; elsewhere Sosylus and Chaereas, writers on Hannibal, are criticized for retailing the gossip of the
barber's shop (iii. 20. 5; see below, p. 28).
2
Timaeus is accused of sensationalism in xii. 24. 5, 26 b 4 ff.; but cf. ii. 1315 n.
3
ii. 16. 1315.
4
vii. 7. 12.
5
xv. 34. 136. 11 (probably aimed at Ptolemy of Megalopolis).
6
x. 27. 8.
7
xvi. 12. 3.
8
xvi. 18. 2.
9
xxix. 12. 45; cf. vii. 7. 6, making the same point in criticism of historians writing special histories, which give
over-sensational accounts of the downfall of Hieronymus of Syracuse.
10
i. 4. 2.
11
ii. 37. 4.
12
iii. 32; cf. ix. 44, viii. 2. 111; see below, p. 11 n. 8.
13
i. 3. 45; cf. iii. 1. 4, iv. 2. 1 ff.
14
Siegfried, 21; on pp. 2025 Siegfried has an interesting survey of the works of Polybius' predecessors.
15
v. 33. 2; on the limitations of Ephorus' universal history see Mioni, 23, who points out that Ephorus did not
write a history of the whole world, but welded into a whole the separate histories of the Greek states; the
conception of a worldhistory could hardly precede the career of Alexander.

In the course of his work Polybius succeeds in conveying a fairly comprehensive picture of what he regarded
as the prerequisites for the writing of . In an elaborate comparison between the career of
medicine and that of the historian,1 he defines the latter's task as the study and collation of memoirs and other
documents, acquaintance with cities, districts, rivers, harbours, and geographical features generally, and finally
experience of political activity; and of these the last two are essential, for one can no more become an historian by
studying documents than one can become a painter by looking at works of former masters.2 The essential thing is
to see the sites, so that one can, for example, test out the account of a battle on the spot,3 and as far as possible to
interview those who actually took part in important events4 . Equally, no
one can write about fighting and politics who has not had some experience as a soldier and as a practical
politician.5 It is on personal experience that Polybius lays his main emphasis, ,6 and above all on
personal inquiry, .7 'It will be well with history', he writes,8 adapting Plato's famous words
(Rep. v. 473 CE), 'either when statesmen undertake to write history . . . or when those proposing to become
authors regard a training in practical politics as essential to the writing of history.' He could put forward this thesis
with the greater confidence because he had himself made many voyages,9 and played an active part as a politician
and a general.
The object behind this programme of restless activity was to get at the truth. 'Truth is to history', Polybius
writes,10 'what eyesight is to the living creature.' If history is deprived of truth, all that
[10]

xii. 25 e.
xii. 25 e 7; the analogy is a false one, for Polybius' arm-chair historian does not study memoirs as a model, as the
painter studies his predecessors, but as a source.
3
Cf. xii. 25 f 5.
4
xii. 4 c 3, ; this like so much else was scamped by Timaeus. The main period of
Polybius' history fell within the lifetime of people who could be questioned (iv. 2. 23), and he made full use of
his opportunities; see below, pp. 33 f.
5
xii. 25 g 12.
6
xii. 25 h 4 ff.; such personal experience would give among other things the ability to appreciate the economic
problems which arise in history; cf. ii. 62. 2.
7
xii. 2728, 28 a.
8
xii. 28. 35.
9
Cf. iii. 59. 7; see iii. 5759 n. and above, 1, for discussion of the chronology of Polybius' journeys in the west.
He was famous as a traveller, and on a stele at Megalopolis, Pausanias records (Paus. viii. 30. 8),
. . . . For his role as cf. iii. 4. 13.
10
i. 14. 6, quoted again at xii. 12. 3; cf. xxxiv. 4, if indeed this passage of Strabo is from Polybius.
2

remains is an idle tale, . . . .1 One of the main objections to the sensational history of such
writers as Phylarchus is that it obscures the truth and so prevents the reader from benefiting by what he reads;2
and it is a great fault in Timaeus that he puts out false statements.3 What would be permissible in panegyric is
quite out of place in history;4 and Polybius contrasts his own treatment of Philopoemen in his encomium on the
hero with that in the Histories, where he has tried to apportion praise and blame impartially.5 In general, only
absolute truth is to be tolerated in history;6 and the problem of securing it Polybius sees partly as one of scale. As
the writer of a 'universal history'7 he is critical of those who work on a smaller canvas. The fault of the special
study, the monograph, is that it puts things out of perspective, and does not allow the reader to see events in their
proper proportions, and so to appreciate the continuous nexus of cause and effect;8 it is also an incentive to its
author to exaggerate the importance of his own topic and material.9 On the other hand, the very magnitude of his
task perhaps renders the universal historian more liable to the occasional factual slip or misstatement; if this should
unfortunately happen, it is excusable,10 and such errors should be treated, not with the bitterness and virulence
displayed by Timaeus in his attacks on Ephorus, Theopompus, and Aristotle,11 but with the kind of charitable
good nature which led Polybius himself to write to Zeno pointing out his errors 12
unfortunately after the book was already published and so too late for Zeno to correct them.
In two situations Polybius was prepared to allow exceptions to his general rule. Certain historians had reported
miraculous happenings in connexion with the statue of Artemis Cindyas at Bargylia
[11]

i. 14. 6.
ii. 56. 12 (cf. 56. 2); the same point is made in iii. 47. 6 of the historians who describe Hannibal's Alpine crossing.
3
xii. 7. 1.
4
viii. 8. 59.
5
x. 21. 68.
6
xxxviii. 4. 5,
; here in fact the assertion is intended to justify Polybius in haranguing his Greek audience in a
rhetorical rather than an historical fashion (
.
7
See above, p. 9.
8
Cf. iii. 32. Polybius is saying the same thing in a slightly different way in viii. 2, when he argues that it is only
from general histories that one really appreciates the grandeur of the great achievement of Tyche in reducing the
world to the dominion of Rome. On the importance of establishing causes see iii. 6. 6 f. (and especially 6. 147.
3), iii. 31, v. 21. 6, vi. 2. 8, xi. 19 a 13, xii. 25 b 1, xxii. 18. 6, xxix. 5. 13, xxxvi. 17. 4. For the problem of
causality and Tyche see below, 3.
9
vii. 7. 6.
10
xxix. 12. 11.
11
xii. 4 a 1, 7. 6, 8. 1, 11. 4, 12. 14.
12
xvi. 14. 78, 20. 8.
2

and the temple of Zeus in Arcadia. 'To believe things which are beyond the limits of possibility', comments
Polybius,1 'reveals a childish simplicity, and is the mark of a blunted intelligence.' On the other hand, such
statements may contribute towards sustaining a feeling of piety towards the gods among , and if so
they are excusable, provided they do not go too far; . This admission may seem
shocking, but it hardly affects Polybius as an historian, since he was little concerned with miracles and not in any
case writing for the common people. More dangerous is his concession to patriotism. 'I would admit', he writes,2
'that authors should show partiality towards their own country ( ), but they
should not make statements about it which are contrary to the facts.' The concession is carefully hedged about;
but it is clear that Polybius availed himself of it in his own work. The extent of his bias can easily be exaggerated.
It has, for example, been alleged3 that Polybius' picture of Philip V is distorted in order 'to motivate and thus to
excuse the Achaean League's declaration of war on Philip in 198 B.C.'; and the fragment 'on traitors and
treachery' (xviii. 1315) has been quoted as evidence for the violent controversy which surrounded the Achaean
decision. The digression on treachery was, however, evoked by the handing over of Argos by Philip to Nabis of
Sparta in the winter of 198/7.4 Certainly there is a hint at Aristaenus' decision to have the Achaean League declare
war on Macedon: Polybius wishes to make it quite clear that this was not treachery according to his definition.
But there is no evidence for a storm of controversy. Polybius needed to provide no elaborate apologia for the
Achaeans, since only an insignificant minority queried the wisdom of the official policy.
It is much more in the hostile treatment he accords to opponents of the Achaean League that Polybius'
appear. His venom towards Aetolia has long been noted and needs no illustration;5 and if the hostile picture of
Cleomenes of Sparta and the distorted account of Aetolian machinations in the decade before the Social War go
back to Aratus' Memoirs, Polybius must shoulder the responsibility for swallowing his version uncritically, as well
as for many anti-Aetolian obiter dicta.6 Recently it has been demonstrated7
[12]

xvi. 12. 311.


xvi. 14. 6.
3
Edson, AHR, 1942, 827.
4
See Aymard, REA, 1940, 919; probably inaccessible to Edson.
5
See Brandstaeter, 199 ff.; J. V. A. Fine, AJP, 1940, 12965. But the case should not be overstated. Thus
Brandstaeter makes a long and eloquent defence of the Aetolian claim to be considered true Greeks; but the
accusation that they were not comes in a speech of Philip V, which may well record his actual words (xviii. 5. 8),
and does not therefore necessarily commit Polybius.
6
e.g. ii. 46. 3, iv. 3. 1, ix. 38. 6 (but this is in a speech of Lyciscus of Acarnania).
7
Feyel, passim; for detailed discussion of his thesis see the commentary on xx. 47.
2

that political prejudice has also produced a completely false picture of conditions in third-century Boeotia; the
account of social decadence in xx. 57 can be refuted from the evidence of contemporary coins and inscriptions,
and is to be interpreted as a reflection of Achaean hostility. Frequently, too, Polybius' assessment of a situation is
determined by the attitude of those concerned in it towards Achaea or Rome.1 How far in all these instances the
bias is consciously applied it is difficult to say; but Polybius' willingness to grant something to patriotic prejudice
probably rendered him less alert to the risks he was running.
Another field in which practice fell short of theory was in the speeches which, following Greek tradition,
Polybius included at intervals throughout his Histories; some thirty-seven survive, and several times Polybius
makes it clear that such speeches should represent the actual words of the speaker. It was the custom of Hellenistic
historians to set rhetorical compositions in the mouths of their characters, and Polybius condemns this
wholeheartedly in Timaeus. 'A writer who passes over in silence the speeches made and the reason (sc. for their
success or failure) and in their place introduces false rhetorical exercises and discursive speeches, destroys the
peculiar virtue of history.'2 Similarly Phylarchus tries3 'to imagine the probable utterances of his characters' instead
of 'simply recording what was said, however commonplace'; and both Chaereas and Sosylus4 are roundly
condemned for setting down versions of rival speeches made in the Senate on the question of war with Carthage,
when they had no access to a reliable source. There is certainly a proper place in historical composition for
speeches 'which, as it were, sum up events and hold the whole history together';5 but they must give what was
actually said, .6 In fact Polybius does not always come up to the standard he sets. The
long report of the speeches delivered by Flamininus, Philip V, and the other participants in the conference held in
Locris in the winter of 1987 has all the marks of being derived from a verbatim account of the meeting, and may
be accepted as authentic. But once he went outside the scope of Achaean and Roman records, Polybius is unlikely
to have had access to much reliable material for speeches, and must have drawn largely on earlier literary accounts
or the
[13]

See below, p. 24.


xii. 25 b 4.
3
ii. 56. 10.
4
iii. 20. 1, 20. 5.
5
xii. 25 a 3. Polybius here classifies speeches as (addresses in public assembly),
(exhortations, usually to soldiers), and
(ambassadors' speeches); in xii. 25 i 3 are called . For an analysis of
Polybius' surviving speeches according to these three categories see Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 15257.
6
Cf. ii. 56. 10, xii. 25 b 1, 25 i 8, xxxvi. 1. 7.
7
xviii. 110; cf. Walbank, Philip, 159 ff., and references there quoted.
2

uncertainties of an oral tradition; this probably helps to explain why many of his speeches, and especially such
pairs as those of Hannibal and Scipio before Zama,1 read like a series of commonplaces. But he never concedes to
the historian the right to improvise,2 and it would be unjust to assume that he consciously composed rhetorical
exercises for inclusion in his Histories. Set occasions are apt to produce commonplaces, and people's speeches, like
their actions, are often governed by prevalent attitudes and traditions.3 Polybius is therefore entitled to our
confidence that he made a determined effort to discover what was actually said
,4 and that any failure here and there is due to practical shortcomings rather than a deliberate
betrayal of principle.
There is, however, another field in which Polybius sometimes appears to fall short of the standards implied in
his criticisms of others. His attacks on various of his predecessorsTimaeus, Phylarchus, and othersfor a style of
presentation that is inaccurate, sensational, and full of expressions of wonder, has already been mentioned.5 But it
was so deeply rooted a feature of historical writing in the Hellenistic period that Polybius allows it to influence his
own presentation to a greater degree than his professions would suggest; indeed the principle of adducing the
which have befallen others in order to encourage the reader to endure the vicissitudes of fortune,
, was in itself an invitation to dwell on such events. The clearest example of this is his treatment
of the downfall of the royal house of Macedon;6 but the use of the word fifty-one times in books i-iii,
apart from various
[14]

xv. 6. 48. 14, 10. 17, 11. 612.


Ziegler (op. cit., col. 1527) asserts that for a great many of his speeches Polybius must have either drawn his
material from literary sources or 'followed the formula indicated in xxxvi. 1. 6, not
, v v and to give
of these'. But here Ziegler confuses two things, the behaviour proper to a politician and that
proper to an historian; it is the former who should avoid discursive talk and restrict himself to what the occasion
demands; the latter must find out as carefully as possible , and then report only the
most vital and effectual part of this. There is a similar error in my observations in CQ, 1945, 10 n. 4 (rightly
criticized by Balsdon, CQ, 1953, 158 n. 4), where the argument in xii. 25 i 4 ff. is misrepresented; in that passage,
as in xxxvi. 1. 6, it is the statesman, not the historian, who is required (sc. )
. The misunderstanding (shared by Wunderer, ii. 11) arose through the sudden changes of point of
view, which cause Polybius to speak now as an historian (xii. 25 i 6) and now as a statesman profiting from the
reading of history (xii. 25 i 8).
3
See below, pp. 1920.
4
xxxvi. 1. 7.
5
See above, pp. 89, and for general observations along these lines, iii. 58. 9.
6
xxiii. 1011; cf. Livy, xl. 3. 3 ff., drawing on Polybius. For discussion see JHS, 1938, 5568; Ullman, TAPA,
1942, 2553; cf. Warde Fowler, CR, 1903, 448.
2

synonyms like , , ,1 clearly indicates the part played by the unexpected


in his narrative. An example of this tendency towards a sensational presentation can be seen in Polybius' battlepieces. Thus Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone, with the enemy on one side and the Carthaginians on the other,
gives scope for a vivid picture.
'With the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the
current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following
the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense (), and the
barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and
thrilling ( ).'2
This account may go back to some eyewitness such as Silenus; but one cannot but observe a certain affinity with
similar passages such as that in which the feelings and behaviour of the people of Lilybaeum are described as they
stand on the walls to watch the trierarch Hannibal run the Roman blockade,3 or in particular the description of
the clash at Cynoscephalae. 'As the encounter of the two armies was accompanied by deafening shouts and cries,
both of them uttering their war-cry and those outside the battle also cheering the combatants,
.'4 The two rival armies, and the third group shoutingthe parallel is
complete, and suggests the influence of rhetorical elaboration which may ultimately draw on Thucydides' famous
account of the battle in the Great Harbour at Syracuse. Nevertheless, in such passages as these Polybius does not
develop the situation at length nor with the resources of emotional and tragic writing necessary to elicit the pity
of his readers and to thrill them with sensation for its own sake. He feels no obligation to omit everything that
savours of ,5 but he draws a contrast6 between the sieges and battle-scenes of the 'tragic' historians and
his own accounts, . . . , and asks the reader's pardon if he appears to be
which would seem to cover
the kind of instance just mentioned. In short, the degree of rhetorical embroidery which appears in these examples
is something very different from that displayed in the works of the 'tragic' writers. If Polybius seems often to lay
special stress on the unexpected, it is because he regards it as objectively present in the fabric of events, and
necessarily to be stressed if the historian is to fulfil his true function as a moral historian.7
[15]

Lorenz, 1112; cf. CQ, 1945, 810.


iii. 43. 78.
3
i. 44. 45.
4
xviii. 25. 1.
5
Cf. i. 4. 11.
6
xxix. 12. 710.
7
See below, 3.
2

A slight concession (in principle) to politic piety and (in practice) to local patriotism, a limited success in
retailing the real contents of some of his reported speeches, a readiness to embrace the terminology (but not the
emotional attitudes) of 'tragic' history in the interest of or moral edificationthese probably represent
the sum of what a critic of Polybius' truthfulness can assemble. They amount in total to very little, and leave the
overwhelming impression of a reliable and conscientious writer, with a serious theme and a determination that at
all costs his readers shall comprehend and profit by it.
3. Tyche
The role in history which Polybius assigned to Tyche is notoriously hard to define. He regarded the study of
the past as essentially a means of attaining practical ends by learning lessons;1 but the value of such lessons is
seriously reduced if the sequence of cause and effect is at the whim of some incalculable and capricious power.2
On the other hand, the lessons of history were moral as well as political, and one important moral lesson lay in
learning how to meet those vicissitudes which demonstrably occurred in every man's life.3 To have left these out
of his Histories would have falsified the observed course of human events. It would also have deprived Polybius of
much of his purpose in writing at all. Unfortunately in discussing these vicissitudes he made use of a word familiar
to his contemporaries, but to us (and probably to them too) exceptionally ambiguous because of the variety of its
meanings and the difficulty of deciding which is present in any particular passage.
It is clear that in many places the word Tyche is used quite loosely, where a tense of would have
served as well.4 When, for instance, the Mamertines took possession of the wives and families of the men of
Messana, ,5 the sense is simply 'as they
happened upon them'. Such examples6 can be neglected; they reflect current colloquial usage, and have no special
significance. Elsewhere, however, the introduction of Tyche seems to mean something rather more, and
fortunately a passage survives7 in which Polybius discusses the
[16]

See above, pp. 6 ff.


Cf. Erkell, 140.
3
Cf. i. 1. 2, stressing the two purposes, political and moral, and describing history as . . .
.
4
These passages are conveniently assembled in Hercod, 1001; cf. Warde Fowler, CR, 1903, 446 ff.; P. Shorey,
CP, 1921, 281.
5
i. 7. 4.
6
There are similar examples at v. 42. 8 and x. 33. 45; they are common throughout the Histories.
2

occasions when Tyche may properly be invoked. 'In the case of things of which it is difficult or impossible for
mortal men to grasp the causes,' he writes, 'one may justifiably refer them, in one's difficulty, . . .
; such things are heavy and persistent rain, drought destroying the crops, outbreaks of plague, in short
what would today be termed 'acts of God'.1 When a cause is to hand, as for example in the case of the
contemporary depopulation of Greece,
;2 'but where it is impossible or difficult to detect the cause, . One example of such an
aporia is the Macedonian rising behind the false Philip, a wholly incomprehensible movement, which can only be
termed . . . 3. But in general one should not be prompt to ascribe to Tyche4
events for which a cause can be found.
This passage reserves for the workings of Tyche the area which lies completely outside human control and
those events of which the causes are not easy to detect or for which there are apparently no rational causes at all.
Clearly 'acts of God' and irrational or fortuitous acts of men are not identical; but they have this in common, that
they stand outside the sphere of rational analysis. Consequently they can both be described in terms of , or
, or the who nurse their , or (elsewhere) or (for all these phrases
seem to be roughly synonymous).
It is well known that Polybius' concept of cause and effect is somewhat one-sided, and fails to allow
adequately for the interaction of events and the dynamic and dialectical character of almost any train of
causation.5 This may help to explain why happenings which are external to the particular sequence of cause and
effect with which he is concerned are often attributed to Tyche, though there may be a perfectly rational
explanation of them in their own context. Thus the early fortunes of the elder Scipio in Spain received a great
fillip from 6 when the Spaniard Abilyx persuaded Bostar to release the Spanish hostages, and promptly
handed them over to the Roman; for this act of Abilyx, though based on reason and calculation (cf. iii. 98. 3,
), was extraneous to Scipio's plans and unforeseeable on the Roman side.7 Tyche can
also
[17]

For an example see xi. 24. 8; at Ilipa Hasdrubal would have been driven from his entrenchments but for the
intervention of ; in short, a storm of unprecedented magnitude forced the Romans back into their camp.
2
xxxvi. 17. 4 ff.
3
xxxvi. 17. 15.
4
xxxvi. 17. 1, where, however, the words appear to be those of
the excerptor.
5
See the notes to iii. 6 ff., discussing Polybius' account of the causes of several wars.
6
iii. 97. 5; cf. 99. 9 .
7
Similarly, in iv. 3. 4, the Aetolian aggression in the Peloponnese was assisted by ??, since the home
authorities did not foresee the relations between Dorimachus and the brigands; and in v. 34. 2 Ptolemy IV
contrasts his own action in ridding himself of domestic dangers with the help given him ? ? ? in the
deaths of his two rivals, Antigonus and Seleucus, abroad. Here the concept of synchronism (see below, n. 2) also
comes in. Hannibal's attack on Rome foundered (ix. 6. 5) because ? ?? ? ? ?
? ? ? ??; by a pure coincidence an abnormally large number of troops happened to be
present at Rome and could be led out against the enemy. Rhodian feeling against Philip was exacerbated by the
action of Tyche (xv. 23. 1); for at the moment when his representative was expatiating on his magnanimity, a
messenger arrived with news of the enslavement of the Cians.

manifest itself in the simultaneous occurrence of similar events within separate and independent fields. The
fact that the Romans defeated the Boii at Lake Vadimo only five years before the destruction of the Gauls at
Delphi1 suggests that 'Tyche, as it were, afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war'; and Polybius
chose the date at which he begins his main narrative2
, for by a series of coincidences new figures were then active in almost every part of the
world.
Within the field thus assigned to Tyche it might logically seem that events of any kind might be regarded as
her handiwork; but in practice she is restricted to certain contexts. In particular, events of a sensational and
capricious character are attributed to her.3 Often she will decide great issues by a narrow margin; thus the Illyrian
invasion which compelled Antigonus Doson to march north came just too late to save Cleomenes.4 Or a great
general, Epaminondas or Philopoemen,5 having risen to success on his merits, may be defeated through no fault of
his own, . In such cases, Tyche may justly be censured.6 Her caprice is especially liable to
precipitate a sudden reversal of men's lot. Thus Tyche caused Hannibal to be crucified on the very cross on which
Spendius had died, apparently for the sake of ironical contrast.7 At Medion the Aetolians debated in whose name
they should dedicate the spoil
[18]

ii. 20. 7.
iv. 2. 4. Similarly the Roman defeat in Cisalpine Gaul just after Cannae occurred
(iii. 118. 6; on the chronology see the note).
3
These will frequently be disasters; but in such cases one must be careful to distinguish the occasions when they
are due to lack of judgement rather than to Tyche (i. 37. 4, ii. 7. 13).
4
ii. 70. 2.
5
ix. 8. 13, xxiii. 12. 3. A few stout-hearted men make headway , but they are few (xvi.
28. 2).
6
xv. 20. 58, xvi. 32. 5, xxxii. 4. 3. Tyche turns against Sparta so that her constitution deteriorates and after being
the best becomes the worst (iv. 81. 12); and Athens and Thebes in turn decline
(vi. 43. 35).
7
i. 86. 7; contrast rather than a specific pleasure in cruelty (so Erkell, 140) is what Polybius associates with Tyche.
2

they were going to win; but Tyche showed her power inasmuch as they were themselves obliged to concede
spoils to the Medionians.1 Sometimes this reversal of fortune is vividly illustrated, as on the occasion when
Callicrates' portraits were carried away into the darkness on the same day that those of Lycortas were brought out,
so that people observed that 'it is the characteristic function of Tyche to bring to bear in turn on the lawgivers
themselves the very laws they originated and passed'.2 This capricious and irrational force allows no one to
prosper indefinitely; and recognizing this Demetrius of Phalerum was able to foretell the downfall of Macedon, a
prophecy which greatly impressed Polybius, who witnessed its fulfilment.3
One of Polybius' main moral lessons is the need for moderation in success, in the light of this instability of
fortune, and the certainty that no prosperity can last.4 The events at Medion,5 the fate of Achaeus6 or Perseus,7 the
contrast of the pictures of Lycortas and Callicrates,8 and the fate of Hasdrubal at Carthage9 evoke the same trite
homily with monotonous regularity; sometimes it comes from Polybius' own mouth, sometimes in the words or
behaviour of some historical figureAntiochus weeping at the downfall of Achaeus, remembering the
inconstancy of Tyche10 (just as Scipio Aemilianus was to weep over the sight of burning Carthage, and for the
same reason),11 Scipio himself pointing to the wretched Hasdrubal12 exactly as his father Aemilius Paullus had
moralized over the vanquished Perseus,13 the Punic envoys before Zama urging moderation on the Romans,14
Hannibal begging the elder Scipio to remember
, so that it behoves all men 15 Scipio accepting these premises in
his replies both to Hannibal and to the Punic envoys who came after the battle,16 Syrian ambassadors making a
similar plea after Magnesia.17 It is the mark of a great man to have learnt this lesson;18 both Scipio19 and Hannibal20
came up to this test, whereas Philip V,21 and the Spartans after the Peloponnesian War,22 failed.
[19]

ii. 4. 3. Tyche likes to dash reasonable expectations by lifting a man up and then suddenly ( ) casting
him down (xxix. 22. 12).
2
xxxvi. 13. 2.
3
xxix. 21.
4
Cf. xxiii. 12. 47 (on Philopoemen's death):
, ; ii. 31. 3.
5
ii. 4. 3.
6
viii. 21. 11.
7
xxix. 20. 14.
8
xxxvi. 13. 2.
9
xxxviii. 20. 1.
10
viii. 20. 10.
11
xxxviii. 21. 13, 22; cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 104.
12
xxxviii. 20. 1.
13
xxix. 20. 14.
14
xv. 1. 8.
15
xv. 6. 67. 6. Mioni (141 n. 13) thinks that Tyche is here equivalent to Providence (see below, p. 22); but the
passage is exactly parallel to the others quoted.
16
xv. 8. 3, 17. 46.
17
xxi. 16. 8.
18
Cf. vi. 2. 56.
19
x. 40. 6, 40. 9, xxxviii. 21. 13.
20
xv. 15. 5.
21
xviii. 33. 4.
22
xxxviii. 2. 7; shortly afterwards .

Polybius implies that the reversal which is bound to follow upon prosperity will come because that is the way
things happen, the way of Tyche, regardless of any steps we may take.1 It is in the nature of prosperity that it does
not last; and the reason for behaving moderately is not to avert the blow, but simply that moderate conduct is
more fitting to a man and may help to secure mitigation of one's lot when misfortune comes.2 There is one
exception. After a minor success, Perseus' friends urged him to offer terms to the Romans;3 the latter, they
thought, might be disposed to accept them as a result of their set-back, and if they rejected them,
, whereas the king by his would win over . Now it is true
that Polybius' views often coincide with those expressed by his historical characters;4 but on this occasion he
immediately makes it clear5 that Perseus' friends were quite wrong in their views about how the Romans would
behave, and Perseus' fate shows equally well that they were wrong about the behaviour of . Polybius
did not believe that heaven could be moved by a politic exhibition of or indeed that arrogance in itself
drew divine vengeance upon it.6 It is the instability of fortune which he makes his theme; and indeed it was
morally more edifying to have men behave with moderation in prosperity because it could not in any case last,
than to have them moderate because they were afraid lest arrogance might precipitate disaster.
Slightly different is the concept of Tyche as a power which punishes wrongdoing. For example, she punished
the Boeotians for the unhealthy state of their public affairs, . . . .7 The
Spartan ephors, who had been bribed to make Lycurgus king, were murdered by Cheilon, Tyche thus exacting
. . . .8 This phrase is also used of Philip and
[20]

In xxxix. 8 Polybius says that Tyche is ; on the personification of Tyche see


below, p. 25.
2
For public opinion will then operate; and this is a powerful force; cf. xxxviii. 3. 2.
3
xxvii. 8. 4.
4
See above, p. 19.
5
xxvii. 8. 8 ff.
6
Cf. above, n. 1, where it is prosperity which arouses the jealousy of Tyche, not arrogance. In several passages
(e.g. xxvii. 6. 2, 15. 2, xxxi. 11. 3), where Polybius is believed with good reason to be his source, Diodorus
introduces Tyche in a form which (as in Polyb. xxvii. 8. 4) penalizes arrogance. It does not, however, follow that
the same nuance was in Polybius, for in the case of Regulus Diodorus has the concept of divine nemesis (Diod.
xxiii. 15. 26), which is wholly absent from Polyb. i. 35; see the note on the latter passage.
7
xx. 7. 2.
8
iv. 81. 5. A parallel case is that of the Carthaginian mercenaries, who had broken every law and to whom
gave , forcing them to eat each other.

Antiochus,1 who after their nefarious plot against the dominions of the infant Ptolemy, were led on by Tyche
to attack the Romans, and so met ruin and defeat; their dynasties perished, while that of Ptolemy was revived. The
action of Tyche against Philip is developed at length.2 As if to punish him, she sends against him a host of furies,
which lead him into a succession of acts culminating in the destruction of his own son, a sign of divine wrath.3
Here Tyche takes on a purposive character, which is also evident when the sacrilege committed by Antiochus
Epiphanes and Prusias meets speedy vengeance in the form of death or disaster.4
Close in attitude to this are several passages in which Tyche seems to approximate to something like Fate or
Providence.5 'Tyche', writes Polybius,6 'is for ever producing something new () and for ever
playing a part () in the lives of men, but in no single instance has she ever put on such a showpiece as in our own times', with the rise of Rome to world-dominion in fifty-three years. In this passage, as
Warde Fowler observed,7 the use of such words as (i. 4. 1), , and (i. 4. 3) suggests
that Tyche is here conceived as a power working to a definite goal, the domination of Rome. It is this Tyche
which Hirzel compares with the Stoic ,8 and Fowler with the of book. vi;9 it appears again when
the Gallic invasions, interludes in the main drama, which contribute nothing to its development, are described as
.10 It does, of course, create a difficulty, on Polybius' definition of Tyche as a power which
restricted its activity to that
[21]

xv. 20. 58.


Cf. JHS, 1938, 5568.
3
xxiii. 10. 14.
4
xxxi.9. 4 , xxxii. 15. 14 ; cf. xviii. 54. 11 (Dicaearchus). See below, p. 25 n. 5.
5
Cf. Warde Fowler, CR, 1903, 4467.
6
i. 4. 5. The metaphor of Tyche as a producer of plays appears elsewhere. Thus a Rhodian ambassador tells the
Aetolians that the evil effects of their Roman alliance are now manifest,
(xi. 5. 8); and Polybius makes the same remark (xxix. 19. 2; cf.
fg. 212) of the Rhodians themselves after their left-handed diplomacy during the war between Rome and Perseus.
It links up with similar metaphors making Tyche an umpire (e.g. i. 58. 1) or the stager of a contest (ii. 66. 4), and
reproduces the vocabulary of popular philosophy; see the examples from Diogenes and Lucian quoted by HerzogHauser, RE, 'Tyche', cols. 16689.
7
CR, 1903, 446.
8
Hirzel (8629, Appendix VII) suggests that, where it is not a purely verbal echo of popular usage, Polybius'
Tyche is equivalent to the Stoic ; but if this were so, there seems no good reason why he should not have
used the technical term, rather than a word like Tyche, which is so fraught with ambiguities (cf. Hercod, 76103;
Mioni, 199 n. 32; Erkell, 1401).
9
CR, 1903, 4467; Fowler suggests that Polybius avoids the word in this context, because in book vi it
describes recurrent process, whereas the rise of Rome is a unique problem, soluble only in the course of his
history. He therefore preferred the word to one which might imply that the growth of Rome was the result
of natural law.
10
ii. 35. 5; see the note ad loc.
2

sphere which is not amenable to reason;1 for the whole of his history is based on the assumption that Roman
success can be explained in rational terms. 'By schooling themselves in vast and perilous enterprises', he writes,2 'it
is perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their
purpose'; and the sixth book is written mainly in order to analyse the role which the Roman constitution played
in Roman success.3
There are other passages in which this stress on rational explanation is given great prominence. The
achievements of the elder Scipio had been attributed by most people to Tyche; in fact, Polybius replies, it is those
who are incapable of taking an accurate view of opportunities, causes, and dispositions who attribute
what is really due to shrewdness, calculation, and foresight.4 Both Eumenes and Hiero owed their
success entirely to their merits, and had no help at all from Tyche.5 Flamininus,6 like the younger Scipio,7 was
helped a little by , but in the main prospered through his own innate qualities. When men act
foolishly they must take the responsibility, and not try to make Tyche the scapegoat.8 Nor must the rise of the
Achaean League be attributed to Tyche: v
v v vv v .9 Roman success in battle has its
specific causes; only the superficial will attribute it to Tyche.10 These passages do not deny the existence of Tyche;
but they clearly limit the area within which one may legitimately use it to account for historical events.
Consequently, in attributing Roman success both to calculation and rational causes and, simultaneously, to the
overriding power of a Tyche which comes close to 'providence', Polybius raises a problem which has stirred up
much debate and evoked many attempts at a solution. One answer has been to postulate a development in his
beliefs: beginning as a believer in the capricious Tyche of Demetrius of Phalerum, he later came round to the
view that was merely
[22]

See above, p. 17.


i. 63. 9; on this passage, which clearly belongs to the same order of thought as i. 3. 710, see the note ad loc.
3
Cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 97122.
4
x. 5. 8; cf. 2. 5, 3. 7, 7. 3, 9. 23, and (in general terms) fg. 83. But in x. 40. 6 and 40. 9 Polybius speaks without
hesitation of Tyche's having favoured Scipio.
5
xxxii. 8. 4, vii. 8. 1.
6
xviii. 12. 2.
7
xxxi. 25. 10, 29. 2, 30. 13; probably fg. 47, which, Ziegler (op. cit., col. 1534 n. 1) thinks, refers undoubtedly to
the younger Scipio.
8
Cf. ii. 7. 13 (Epirotes), xv. 21. 3 (people of Cius), i. 37. 4 (the Roman commanders at Camarina; but in i. 59. 4
the disaster at Camarina is included among ).
9
ii. 38. 5; here, as at Rome, the cause lies mainly in the constitution.
10
xviii. 28. 5; and cf. i. 63. 9, quoted above (n. 2).
2

a convenient label to cover a gap in our knowledge,1 and, in Cuntz's opinion, ended up a complete rationalist
who would allow nothing to be without its cause;2 alternatively, he began by attributing Roman success to
prowess, but subsequently came to belive in a Tyche which meant rather different things at the different stages of
the ideological development which this theory postulates.3 The fatal objection to such views is that they not only
build up a preconceived system by an arbitrary division of passages, but that in each case they are obliged to
separate passages which despite apparent contradictions can be shown to be closely linked together. For example,
the ideas of Tyche as a capricious, and as a just, retributive power are fundamentally contradictory. But Polybius
can write without any feeling of awkwardness: 'Who of those who reasonably find fault with Tyche for her
conduct of human affairs, will not be reconciled to her when he learns how she later imposed on Philip and
Antiochus the fitting penalty, and exhibited to those who came after, as a warning for their edification, the
exemplary punishment which she inflicted on the above-named kings?'4 Clearly it is the same Tyche which is
now just and now capricious; and it is consistent with this that the metaphor of Tyche as the play-producer is
applied both in contexts where mere change and sensational incident are uppermost, and in those where the
concept is that of providential design.5 Since the same Tyche operates on both occasions, her characteristics are
the same; thus it is a mark of the capricious power of Demetrius of Phalerum's Tyche that she is always
, but this is also true of the providential Tyche which seems to stand behind the rise of Rome,6 and
is not inconsistent with a rational nexus of causation.7 This simultaneous application of both Tyche and rational
causation itself has its parallel in the incident of Regulus,8 whose failure is on the one hand attributed to two
straightforward causes, viz. his error in demanding unconditional surrender and the arrival of Xanthippus,9 and on
the other used as an illustration of the caprice of Tyche.10
This absence of well-marked divisions between the various uses of a word which, by its very history, had
become singularly illadapted to the conveying of clear and precise thoughts11 is against
[23]

von Scala, 159 ff.; his views were adopted by Bury, Ancient Greek Historians (Cambridge, 1909), 200 ff.
Cuntz, 4346.
3
Laqueur, 24960.
4
xv. 20. 56.
5
Cf. xi. 5. 8 (Tyche as it were deliberately brings the folly of the Aetolians on the stage), i. 4. 5 (the show-piece of
Tyche, the rise of Rome to world-dominion), xxix. 19.2 (Tyche brings the folly of the Rhodians on the stage).
6
xxix. 21. 5; cf. i. 4. 5.
7
Cf. i. 63. 9; above, p. 22 n. 2.
8
i. 3035.
9
Cf. Balsdon, CQ, 1953, 159 n. 2.
10
Cf. i. 35. 2; the contradiction is noted by Siegfried, 67 n. 119.
11
Cf. Erkell, 146.
2

any theory which would assign these different usages to different periods of Polybius' mental development. It
is equally against the theory of Siegfried,1 who sees Polybius as a man 'with two souls in his breast', switching
easily and without inner conflict from a scientific, rational, view of a universe subject to the law of cause and
effect, to a religious attitude which sees history as the working out of a plan by an external power of Tyche. This
bisection is not plausible as a psychological account of Polybius, as one comes to know him in his work; nor is it
adequate as a treatment of the evidence, for the contradictions in Polybius' account of Tyche are not one but
several. The various conceptions merge one into another; and it often appears as if the particular aspect of Tyche
which Polybius invokes in any instance, no less than the extent to which he allows Tyche to be introduced into
the situation at all, depends in part at least upon his own sympathies in the matter, and upon how far he is
removed from the incidents he is describing. When, for example, the Macedonians rallied behind Andriscus with
such will and vigour that they even defeated the Romans, their perversity placed them outside the range of
comprehensible conduct, and Polybius dismisses it as what might be called a heaven-sent infatuation,
. . . .2 The same word, , is used of the folly which led
Perseus to ruin his hopes of Genthius' help by his niggardliness;3 and when Philip V, whose end is portrayed in
the form of a tragedy, murders his son,4 Polybius comments: 'Who can help thinking that, his mind being thus
afflicted and troubled, it was the wrath of heaven ( . . . ) which had descended on his old age,
owing to the crimes of his past life.'5 One of the most notorious of these crimes was the compact made with
Antiochus to partition the domains of the infant Ptolemy Epiphanes; and this outrage was doubly avenged by
Tyche, at once when she raised up the Romans against the two guilty kings, reducing them to tributaries, and
again later, when she re-established Ptolemy's dynasty, while those of his enemies sank in ruin.6 In all these
casesPhilip, Perseus, and the Macedonian peoplePolybius' own sympathies were heavily engaged, and he uses
a terminology which represents a fundamentally anti-Roman policy as divinely inspired infatuation.7
This does not necessarily imply that was the work of an objectively existing power. On the
contrary, most progress has been made in the understanding of Polybius' attitude towards
[24]

Op. cit., passim.


xxxvi. 17. 15.
3
xxviii. 9. 4.
4
See above, p. 14 n. 6.
5
xxiii. 10. 14.
2

xv. 20; cf. xxix. 27. 1112 (Tyche arranges that the fall of Perseus shall involve the survival of Egypt).
Where Tyche is not specifically mentioned, the word , like , has the same
implications.

Tyche and its synonyms by those scholarsShorey, De Sanctis, Mioni, and Erkellwho have stressed the
verbal and rhetorical elements in his formulation.1 It has been correctly pointed out that he is not unwilling to
draw his colours from the palette of the tragic historians 'wenn es mglich ist, ohne die Wahrheit zu verletzen'.2
Ziegler has drawn attention3 to the fact that in several passages Polybius modifies his references to Tyche with
some such words as or .4 Similarly, of the two instances where sacrilege seems to be followed by a
swift, retributive punishment, it is significant that that of Antiochus Epiphanes was the result of divine anger,
, while Prusias' fate was such .5
These qualifications suggest a real and prolonged doubt about the existence of an objectively active Tyche; and
this impression is confirmed by what Polybius has to say about religion in general, in a passage6 which stamps him
as fundamentally a sceptic, and by his definition of Tyche as the convenient label with which one distinguishes
acts of God and the irrational or fortuitous interventions of men.7
To a large extent, therefore, the personality with which Polybius invests Tyche is a matter of verbal
elaboration, helped by current Hellenistic usage, which habitually spoke of Tyche as a goddess; and this helps to
explain many of the inconsistencies, for consistency is not essential to a rhetorical flourish. With regard to his
main theme, howeverthe work of Tyche in making Rome mistress of the world in fifty-three yearsone must
allow for at least the possibility that as he looked back on this startling and unparalleled process Polybius jumped
the step in logic between what had happened and what had had to happen, and so in a somewhat muddled way
invested the rise of Rome to world power with a teleological character; in so doing he probably fell a victim to
the words he used and to his constant personification of what began as a mere hiatus in knowledge. Certainly the
use of teleological expressions8 in i. 4. 13 points in that direction. But if this is so, it remains equally true that
Polybius had neither the clarity in philosophical thought nor a sufficiently fine sense of language to enable him to
isolate the contradiction in his ideas. The word 'Tyche' was already corrupted
[25]

Shorey, CP, 1921, 280 ff.; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 21315; Mioni, 1407; Erkell, 1406.
Erkell, 145; see above, pp. 1415.
3
Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 1538 f.
4
e.g. ii. 20. 7, xxiii. 10. 2 . . . . . ., 10. 16 , xx. 7. 2
. . . , xxix. 19. 2, xxxviii. 18. 8; and in iv. 2. 4 the word
is qualified with .
5
xxxi. 9. 4, xxxii. 15. 14.
6
vi. 56. 615.
7
xxxvi. 17.
8
See above, p. 21 n. 7. That here means simply 'the course of events' (so Nilsson, Geschichte der
griechischen Religion, ii (Munich, 1950), 194) is hard to reconcile with 4. 4.
2

when he adopted it; as Erkell observes,1 it covered all the gradations in sense between a sharply defined
philosophical concept and a hazy, outworn clich, and Polybius was not the man to find a lonely way across the
morass. Consequently, to the question whether he believed in an objective power directing human affairs, the
answer cannot be an unqualified 'No'; but in so far as it is a qualified 'Yes', his belief was neither sufficiently
strong nor sufficiently clear for him to recognize any inconsistency with his normal, rational formulation of the
character of Tyche.
This is perhaps unsatisfactory; but Polybius' lack of clarity can be paralleled in other writers. Shorey2 quotes
the hesitations of Plato, who in the Laws attributes a great role to Tyche yet insists on the control extended by
Providence over the minutest details, of Julian the Apostate, of Dante, and of Renan, all of whom at times
admitted Fortune illogically into their philosophical schemes. This discussion may conveniently close with an
extract from a contemporary historian. 'The putsch would have succeeded if Hitler had not been saved by what
can only be regarded as a miracle. It was mere chance that on 20 July the midday conference should have been
held in a flimsy wooden hut, and not in the usual concrete bunker, where the explosion would have been
deadly.'3 The author of this passage was habitually a clear and factual writer. The equivocal and contradictory
terms in which he comments on an incident sensational in itself and fraught with fatal consequences are perhaps
not without relevance to the problem of Tyche in Polybius.
4. Polybius' Sources
The vast literature which exists on Polybius' sources4 is perhaps disproportionate to the results it has achieved;
and the chief reason for this is that for the main part of his work Polybius has used a great variety of material,
much of it no longer identifiable, and has woven it into a close and homogeneous fabric in which the separate
threads are not now distinguishable. Both the character of this material and Polybius' method of dealing with it
are alike described in the course of his work with complete and typical frankness. In a passage in book xii, already
quoted,5 the preparation of the historian is defined as the study and collation of written sources, acquaintance
[26]

Erkell, 146.

CP, 1921, 2801.

Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), 421.


There is a sensible survey in Mioni, 11927; see also the useful summary in Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 15604, with
bibliography in cols. 14414; among older works those of von Scala and Valeton are still worth consulting,
though neither recognizes the limit of what is possible and useful in studying this problem. More detailed
references and bibliography will be found in the commentary.
5
xii. 25 e; see p. 10 n. 1.
4

with relevant sites, and political experience; but in the same book1 Polybius explains that the most important
activity, at any rate for recent and contemporary history, is the questioning of as many as possible of those who
participated in the events. Indeed, one reason for his choice of 220 as the opening date for his main history was
the fact that , ;2
evidence for events of an earlier date would be mere and would serve as a safe foundation neither
for judgements nor for statements.3 From this it follows that the introductory books i and ii must necessarily fall
into a different category from the Histories proper. They are admittedly derivative, and based wholly on written
authorities. Here, to an extent unnecessary for the later books, Polybius finds it important to discuss the merits of
these authorities and to explain what amount of confidence he places in them. On the other hand, neither his
inclination nor ancient historical practice led him to indicate how closely he followed them nor the points at
which he passed from one to another.
Four historians receive special mention in books i and ii. They are Aratus and Phylarchus on Greek events,
and Fabius Pictor and Philinus for the First Punic War.4 Aratus is explicitly given as the source for the
Cleomenean War, though Polybius does not conceal the omissions which are to be found in his Memoirs;5 the
rejection of Phylarchus is justified at length, but he appears nevertheless to have been used occasionally in default
of other evidence.6 In contrasting Fabius and Philinus, Polybius' sympathies are less closely engaged; he
recognized both to be honourable men, and uses their accounts to check each other.7 That Philinus was also his
source for the Carthaginian Mercenary War is improbable;8 but Fabius is likely to have been used for the account
of the Gallic Wars in book ii9 as well as for later events.10 These four writers, however, cover neither the whole of
the contents of the introductory books nor yet the many digressions in the main part of the work which draw on
incidents taken from earlier periods in Greek history. For the preliminaries of the First Punic War, including the
rise of Hiero of Syracuse, Polybius probably followed Timaeus;11 and Timaeus was very probably his
[27]

xii. 4 c 25; see p. 10 n. 4.


iv. 2. 2.
3
iv. 2. 3.
4
Cf. i. 1415 (Fabius and Philinus); iii. 26. 34 (criticism of Philinus); ii. 56. 2 (Aratus and Phylarchus).
5
ii. 56. 2 (source), 47. 11 (omissions); see in general ii. 40. 4 n.
6
Cf. ii. 47. 11 n., 70. 6 n. On the probable use of Phylarchus for the account of Cleomenes' death see v. 3539 n.
7
See i. 14. 1 n. for discussion of these two authors and criticism of recent attempts to minimize or even to deny
the use of Fabius and Philinus by Polybius.
8
i. 6588 n.
9
ii. 1835 n.; no source is specifically mentioned.
10
See below, p. 28 n. 11.
11
i. 8. 39. 8 n.; cf. 6. 2 n.
2

source for the digression on the Pythagoreans in south Italy as well.1 This is not rendered less likely by the
violent and even malevolent attacks on Timaeus in book xii and elsewhere,2 for criticism of an author by Polybius
did not exclude use of his works. Callisthenes, for instance, is severely attacked in book xii,3 but Polybius uses him
for a digression on early Messenian history,4 and probably for references to the Spartan seizure of the Cadmea in
382 and the peace of Antalcidas.5 Ephorus too was both criticized and used. Though he is the object of polemic in
several parts of book xii,6 he is mentioned with approval on various occasions,7 and Polybius may have used him
in book iv for the passage dealing with the wealth and neutrality of Elis.8 Theopompus is also criticized,9 but there
is no evidence that Polybius used him as a source.
These are in general10 the authorities to which Polybius turned for his account of events before 220. When he
comes to his main narrative in book iii, written sources are still very important, though hereand no doubt
increasingly in the later booksthey are supplemented by other material. For the Hannibalic War Fabius
continues to be used.11 But it seems reasonable to assume12 that in addition Polybius read as widely as possible
among writers on both the Roman and the Carthaginian sides. Of these he mentions two, as usual censoriously;
they are Chaereas, and Sosylus of Lacedaemon, who retail 'the gossip of the barber's shop'.13 But there were
others, too, writing about the Hannibalic War in Greek, and mainly from the Carthaginian side: Silenus of
Caleacte, who like Sosylus accompanied Hannibal on his expedition, and may well be Polybius' source for the
Carthaginian campaigns in Spain before Hannibal set out for Italy,14 Eumachus of Naples, and Xenophon. The
latter two15 are
[28]

ii. 39. 1 n.
See i. 5. 15 n., ii. 16. 15, viii. 10. 12, xii. 316, 2328 a.
3
xii. 1722.
4
iv. 33. 2 n.
5
Cf. iv. 27. 47; alternatively the source may be Ephorus. See the note ad loc.
6
xii. 22. 7, 25 f; see also vi. 4547. 6 n.
7
For references see iv. 20. 5 n.
8
iv. 73. 674. 8 n.
9
viii. 911; cf. Mioni, 119.
10
The account of early Roman history in book vi presents a special problem. The half-dozen fragments which
survive do not allow anything very useful to be said about the sources of the section as a whole. See vi. 11 a n.
11
11 Cf. iii. 8. 1 for his view of the causes of the war; for his career during the war see i. 14. 1 n.
12
Cf. Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1562: 'Im ganzen darf man als sicher annehmen, da P. alles, was es an Literatur ber
den 2. Punischen Krieg gab, sich verschafft und mit dem ihm eigenen kritischen Scharfsinn die verllichsten
Nachrichten herausgesucht und verarbeitet hat.'
13
iii. 20. 5; see discussion ad loc.
14
See iii. 13. 514. 8 n., discussing the relationship with Livy, who probably went back to Silenus via Coelius.
Ziegler (op. cit., col. 1562) hazards a guess that Polybius may have introduced the works of Silenus to Coeliusan
hypothesis not in the nature of things susceptible of proof.
15
On them see i. 3. 2 n.
2

no more than names; and from such references as iii. 47. 6 it is apparent that there will have been others, of
whom not even names now survive.1 On the Roman side we are rather more fully informed. L. Cincius
Alimentus, who was praetor in Sicily in 210/9, and was taken prisoner by Hannibal,2 wrote a history of Rome
from the earliest times which helped to fix the senatorial tradition for the Hannibalic War; like that of Fabius it
was in Greek. He will hardly have been overlooked by Polybius. The histories (also in Greek) of C. Acilius will
perhaps have been used for the later part of the Hannibalic War; but if they were published about 142, as seems
likely,3 they must have appeared too late for Polybius to use them for the years down to Cannae. Also available,
and equally certain to have been read by Polybius, was the of A. Postumius Albinus, the
consul of 151, whom he censures sharply for his vanity, loquaciousness, indifferent Greek, and love of pleasure.4
There is, however, no indication in the text of how Polybius used these or other Roman historians writing in
Greek;5 nor is it clear whether he drew on Cato's Origines, for, as De Sanctis points out,6 if books i to xv were
written before 146,7 he will scarcely have been able to utilize for this part of his work Cato's later books, which
were in all probability published after their author's death.8 Another possible Latin source is L. Cassius Hemina,9
who may have published his first three books before 150; but almost nothing is known about him or the contents
of his work. Ennius Polybius may have readAnnales ix and x dealt with the Second Punic Warbut there is no
evidence for use of him in the Histories.10
For his account of the Greek East, Polybius' written sources are even more obscure. For events round about
the end of the third
[29]

There were for instance the writers of epitomes of the Hannibalic War (v. 33. 2 n.), among whom Meyer would
include Menodotus of Perinthus, known only as a writer of Hellenica.
2
Livy, xxi. 38. 3.
3
Cf. Livy, ep. 53, accepting Madvig's emendation C. Acilius. Acilius wrote a history of Rome going down at least
to 184 (Dion. Hal. iii. 67. 5).
4
xxxix. 1, retailing Cato's witticism in reply to Postumius' attempt to excuse his Greek. Cicero (pr. Acad. ii. 137)
on the contrary calls him 'doctum sane hominem, ut indicat ipsius historia scripta graece'.
5
Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1562. Mioni (122) suggests that one of these authors was P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of
Africanus Maior, the author of 'historia quaedam Graeca scripta dulcissime' (Cic. Brut. 77); but nothing is known
of its contents, though Graeca historia can mean 'history written in Greek' (cf. Cic. de diu. i. 49, where Silenus'
work is called Graeca historia).
6
iii. 1. 203.
7
See Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 9899.
8
Cf. R. Helm, RE, 'Porcius (9)', cols. 1601; there seems to have been a gap between the publication of books i
iii and ivvii. It is of course not impossible that Polybius had access to the manuscript, but not particularly likely.
9
Cf. De Sanctis, iv. 2. 66.
10
Cf. Scullard, Scip. 9.

century he quotes the Rhodian historians Antisthenes and Zeno1 as typical of writers of 'particular histories'
covering that period, and deserving special regard because they were Rhodian statesmen. Zeno was the author of
a history of Rhodes, but this probably contained wider material used by Polybius; he is likely to be the source for
the events in Crete and Sinope in book iv,2 and for the chapters on the earthquake of 225 in book v.3 Polybius
criticizes his accounts of the battles of Chios and Lade,4 of Nabis' attempt on Messene,5 and of the siege of Gaza
and the battle of Panium,6 and relates with satisfaction his own letter to Zeno correcting them.7 But for other
names one has to fall back on conjecture. There were, for example, writers of monographs on Philip and Perseus
and their wars with Rome;8 they included a certain Strato, and the Poseidonius mentioned by Plutarch in his Life
of Aemilius Paulus.9 As Mioni observes,10 there were many local historians, whom Polybius' general contempt will
not necessarily have precluded him from using. The writers on Hieronymus who are criticized at vii. 7. 1 may
have included Baton of Sinope, who was probably his contemporary and wrote
.11 Polybius mentions the public career of Ptolemy of Megalopolis;12 he may have made a limited use
of his anecdotal and scandalous history of Ptolemy Philopator for Egyptian events, including the death of
Cleomenes.13 But the complicated picture of the use of sources which seems to emerge from a comparison
between the treatment of the events associated with Cleomenes' death in Polybius and in Plutarch14 shows how
little can be ascertained about the literary sources for the greater part of the Histories.15
Moreover, Polybius' written sources were not limited to published histories. He is the more ready to criticize
historians of Scipio Africanus' achievements16 in Spain and Africa, who attribute his
[30]

xvi. 14. 2; he will direct his criticism ,


. It seems probable that Polybius knew Antisthemes only through Zeno; he is never quoted as an

independent authority.
2
iv. 5356.
3
v. 8890.
4
xvi. 14. 515. 8.
5
xvi. 16. 117. 7.
6
xvi. 18. 119. 1.
7
See above, p. 11 n. 12.
8
viii. 8. 5, xxii. 18. 5; cf. iii. 32. 8 n. They will include the writers mentioned by Livy, xl. 55. 7 (following
Polybius) for their accounts of the fate of Philocles, Demetrius' murderer.
9
Diog. Laert. v. 61; Plut. Aem. Paul. 19.
10
Mioni, 123.
11
Athen. vi. 251 E; see Polyb. vii. 7. 1 n.
12
xv. 25. 14, xviii. 55. 68.
13

von Scala, 2635; see v. 3539 n. On the possible use of Ptolemy Physcon see xxvi. 1 n.
See v. 3539 n.
15
For some suggestions on the type of source which seems to have been used for the revolts of Molon and
Achaeus and the Fourth Syrian War see v. 40. 4 57. 8 n.
16
x. 2. 5 ff., 9. 2.
14

success to Fortune and the gods, because he had had the advantage of drawing directly on the evidence of his
friend and close companion C. Laeliusthough whether C. Laelius composed memoirs on the subject or merely
talked to Polybius is conjectural.1 Still more valuable, he had at his disposal a letter sent by Africanus himself to
Philip V of Macedon, in which he apparently dealt with his Spanish campaign and in particular his capture of
New Carthage.2 Polybius also used an written 3 by Scipio Nasica on the
campaign against Perseus in the Third Macedonian War; but it is significant for his critical attitude towards his
sources that he did not accept Nasica's figures for the forces involved.4 Such material as this, similar in genre to
Aratus' Memoirs, and leading on to the memoirs and commentaries of the first century, may have been available
to a wider extent than can be ascertained. It will have been supplemented by published speeches, such as that of
Astymedes of Rhodes,5 which Polybius appears to have read, or Cato's famous speech on the Rhodians,6 which he
inserted in the fifth book of the Origines.
Written material was also to be had in official archives, and Polybius made some use of these. He supports his
polemic against Zeno and Antisthenes, who represented Lade as a Rhodian victory, by an appeal to the dispatch
sent by the Rhodian admiral to the Council and Prytaneis 'which is still preserved in the Rhodian Prytaneum'.7
This may imply that he consulted the document himself; on the other hand, he does not say so, and it is equally
possible that Zeno quoted it, but tried to draw from it conclusions unacceptable to Polybius. Schulte discusses a
number of passages for which he is inclined, in the main following Ullrich, to see a source in the Rhodian record
office.8 There is not one of these, however, which
[31]

x. 3. 46; for the theory that Laelius' Memoirs were an important source for Polybius' account of Africanus see
Laqueur, Hermes, 1921, 131 ff., 20725. But his information to Polybius is generally thought to have been oral;
cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 427 ff. In either case, despite many faults in the tradition going back to him, he will have
been a most valuable source of information (cf. Scullard, Scip. 1012).
2
x. 9. 3; according to Cicero (off. iii. 4) 'nulla . . . eius ingenii monumenta mandata litteris, nullum opus otii,
nullum solitudinis munus exstat', which suggests that the letter was no longer extant; cf. Scullard, Scip. 10.
3
xxix. 14. 3.
4
Cf. Plut. Aem. Paul. 15. 5; see Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1562.
5
xxx. 4. 1011.
6
Livy, xlv. 25. 3; Gell. vi. 3. 7.
7
xvi. 15. 8.
8
Ullrich, 27 ff., 39, 44, 59, 73; Ullrich considerably reduces the number of passages which, according to Valeton
(21316, 2212), had drawn on the Rhodian records, and his own list is yet further reduced by Schulte (3639),
who leaves only iv. 52. 5 ff., 56. 23, v. 88. 5 ff., xvi. 7. 1, xviii. 2. 3 ff., xxxi. 31. 1. See ad locc. for discussion of
these passages. Mioni (123 n. 38) has a much longer list, and has apparently reverted to the more credulous
attitude of Valeton.

could not equally well have drawn on some other source, such as Zeno, and a direct use by Polybius of the
Rhodian records has yet to be proved. For the Achaean records at Aegium1 the case is altogether stronger and
more likely. It is conceivable that Polybius owes to a memorandum kept here his detailed account of the
conference between Philip and Flamininus in Locris in 198.2 But it is no longer possible to assign passages to
sources deriving from the Achaean record office with any degree of certainty.3 A similar use of Aetolian and
Macedonian royal records has been alleged;4 neither source seems very likely. Indeed Polybius' main access to
public records was at Rome, where there would be official accounts available of embassies sent or received by the
Senate.5 Whether he himself consulted the Carthaginian treaties in the 'treasury of the aediles'6 or merely saw a
version privately circulated7 is uncertain. But such passages as those giving the senatus consultum relative to the
peace with Philip,8 or the terms of the peace with the Aetolians9 or Antiochus10 clearly go back to a documentary
source, for which a Roman origin seems plausible.11 Another official source available at Rome was the annales of
the pontifex maximus. It now seems established12 that the annales maximi were first published by P. Mucius
Scaevola, who was pontifex maximus from 131/0 to a date between 123 and 114; but the material then published
will have been available in the form of inscriptions on the original wooden boards in the regia at an earlier date
for any historian who wished to consult it, including Polybius. M. I. Henderson argues (JRS, 1962, 2778) that
there was only a single board, the entries on which could be erased with a sponge; if this is so there was no
accumulation of boards within the regia. It seems doubtful, however, if the records of magistrates, elections, and
commands, and the sacerdotal details which made up the contents of the annales will have been of great interest
to him. Finally, mention should be made of the inscription on a bronze
[32]

This seems to be implied in xxii. 9. 10, (contra Schulte,


40).
2
xviii. 111; see above, p. 13 n. 7.
3
Cf. Schulte, 40, 'inritum esse puto in Polybii historiis tabularii Achaici
reliquias indagare'. Valeton (20613, 222) has a fanciful list of passages, and Mioni (123 n. 37) is equally
unconvincing. Details of Achaean embassies at Rome can have come just as easily from a Roman source.
4
Schulte (4041) attributes the treaty between Philip and Hannibal (vii. 9) to the Macedonian records; but the
Romans captured the first version sent and Polybius can have seen this in Rome. Mioni (123 n. 39) attributes xi. 5
to the Aetolian records; but the general reference to the Romano-Aetolian treaty carries no such implications.
5
Cf. Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1564, 'nicht zu bezweifeln ist, daihm das rmische Archiv zugnglich gewesen ist'.
6
iii. 26. 1 n.
7
Cf. iii. 21. 910.
8
xviii. 44.
9
xxi. 32. 214.
10
xxi. 43. 127.
11
See also n. 4, above, for the treaty between Philip and Hannibal.
12
For the most recent discussion of the problems connected with the annales
maximi and bibliographical references to earlier work on the subject see J. E. A. Crake, CP, 1940, 37586. (*p.
628.)

tablet, which Polybius himself discovered on the Lacinian Promontory,1 giving full details left by Hannibal of
his numbers and troop formations. The use which he made of this shows that not too much attention need be
attached to his gibes at Timaeus for his discovery of 'inscriptions at the back of buildings and lists of proxeni on
the jambs of temples'.2
Literary sources, official documents, and archives provide the framework of Polybius' history; but, as the
passages quoted above3 make clear, the real business came in the questioning of eyewitnesses. It seems fair to
assume that Polybius' insistence on this is not mere talk, and that he had in fact mastered and habitually used this
specialized technique in order to ascertain what he wanted to know; indeed on occasion he appears to have
enlisted his friends to make inquiries for him.4 Of the hundreds of informants who must in this way have
contributed to Polybius' material and share the anonymous responsibility for a fact here and a mark of emphasis
there few can still be identified. If C. Laelius gave Polybius his information orally,5 he was not the only
representative of an older generation to be questioned. Whether the men 'present at the occasion' (
) of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps6 were Gauls, Greeks, or Carthaginians, we
cannot say; but if Polybius met them after he came to Italy, they must already have been men of 70. He certainly
talked to Carthaginians who had known Hannibal,7 and supplemented his information from Masinissa,8 who
(probably in 151/0) discoursed on Hannibal's avarice as a particular illustration of a fault common to
Carthaginians in general. Masinissa's son Gulusa is also mentioned as an informant, specifically on the use in parts
of Africa of elephants' tusks as door-posts and palings, but almost certainly also for events connected with the
Third Punic War.9
Polybius' detention at Rome was no handicap in carrying out his interrogations. It was if anything an
advantage; for, apart from the great concourse of internees and resident Greeks, there was a constant stream of
ambassadors and other visitors from all parts of the Mediterranean, to whom it cannot have been difficult for
Polybius to gain access. Thus he mentions Perseus' friends as informants on the negotiations between Perseus and
Eumenes, which broke down
[33]

iii. 33. 1718, 56. 14.


xii. 11. 2; in any case the gibe is rather that a man who claimed to make such search for accurate information
should be as unreliable as he claims Timaeus is.

See p. 27 nn. 1 and 2.


xxxiv. 10. 67; Polybius probably had Scipio question the Massaliotes about Britain and north-west Europe (cf.
p. 6 n. 5).
5
See above, p. 31 n. 1.
6
iii. 48. 12; this is clearly not a reference to Silenus, as Mioni (121) seems to think, but to oral informants.
7
ix. 25. 2.
8
ix. 25. 4.
9
xxxiv. 16, xxxviii. 78; cf. von Scala, 269.
4

through the avarice of the two kings;1 one of these was probably Pantauchus, the son of Balacrus, one of
Perseus' ,2 who played an important role in the approach to Genthius. Both he and Hippias
surrendered to the Romans after Pydna,3 and it seems certain that they and many other eminent Macedonians will
have been brought to Rome. It was no doubt to some member of this group that Polybius owed intimate
knowledge of affairs at the Macedonian court during the last years of Philip's reign.4 Besides Macedonians, there
were assembled in Italy internees from most of the states of Greece. Since the thousand Achaeans fell in number
to three hundred in sixteen years,5 they were evidently for the most part elderly men in 167, and so valuable
informants on earlier events. Aetolians, too, like Nicander of Trichonium,6 could supplement the Achaean version
from the opposite camp. von Scala7 has many suggestions on informants both in Rome and elsewherePraxo of
Delphi,8 Menyllus of Alabanda,9 Stratius the doctor of Eumenes,10 and a source for the affairs of Athamania and
Zacynthus dependent on the close connexion between Amynander and Philip of Megalopolis;11 the case for some
is plausible, but more often von Scala presses the details in a way which testifies only to his own fertile
imagination. In any case a list of names is without significance. One has only to consider the multitude of highly
placed informants who will have found themselves in Rome at some time or other during the years 167 to 150,
and the host of others whom Polybius will have met and talked to during the years 145 to his death, when we
know virtually nothing of his movements, to realize that the identification of half a dozen names means next to
nothing. Faced with the anonymity of almost all his informants, Polybius' readers can only take on trust his facts
and the exercising of his critical judgement in selecting them.
The above account of Polybius' use of his sources neglects two special problemsbooks vi and xxxiv.
Following a tradition of old standing, which was to be maintained by ancient historians long after his time,12
Polybius treated geography as an essential part of
[34]

xxix. 8. 10.

xxix. 3. 3; cf. xxvii. 8. 5.


Livy, xliv. 45. 2.
4
Cf. JHS, 1938, 6465.
5
Paus. vii. 10. 12. von Scala (2745) suggests that Stratius of Tritaea, who is mentioned as a fellow internee, and
later resumed political life in Achaea, may have given Polybius information on the assemblies at Corinth in 146
(xxxviii. 12. 513. 7, 17. 118. 6). So he may; but so may dozens of others.
6
Probably a source for Philip V's invasion of Thermum in 218 (v. 614) and for events in the Syrian War (xx. 11,
xxi. 25). On Nicander see further xxvii. 15. 14, xxviii. 4. 6 (deportation to Rome); cf. Woodhouse, 258 n. 1; von
Scala, 275.
7
von Scala, 2708.
8
Cf. Livy, xlii. 15 ff.
9
xxxi. 12. 8; cf. Livy, xliii. 6. 5. von Scala thinks he is meant in xxxix. 7. 2.
3

10

xxx. 2. 24.
Livy, xxxv. 47. 58, xxxvi. 14. 7.
12
See Class. et med., 1948, 1567.
11

historical studies. References to geographical details occur throughout the Histories. In book iii. 57. 3, for
example, there is criticism of writers who gave fantastic accounts of the Spanish minesalmost certainly
Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, and Pytheas;1 and book iv contains a highly technical discussion of the merits of the
site of Byzantium and the hydrography of the Bosphorus and the Pontus.2 In the main, however, Polybius
reserved questions of geography for special treatment in book xxxiv; it is consequently more convenient to deal
with the sources there used as part of the commentary to that book. Book vi likewise stands by itself. Polybius'
sources for the discussion on the Roman constitution present a complicated and perhaps ultimately insoluble
problem; they are treated in detail in the commentary to vi,3 along with the problems of Polybius' sources for
other parts of this book, such as the archaeologia,4 and the chapter on the constitutions of Crete and Sparta.5
5. Chronology
In default of any universally accepted era such as we use today, Polybius adopted as a chronological framework
for his Histories a system based on 'Olympiad years'. It had probably originated with Timaeus;6 but whether in
the meantime other historians had taken it over is unknown.7 As the basis of a narrative largely concerned with
military history the Olympiad system, calculated from a festival which took place each fourth year in late July or
early August, was far from ideal. Without adaptation it would have involved dividing each campaign into two
halves, recounted under separate olympiad years; and naturally no military historian was prepared to accept a
limitation so irrational. Consequently Polybius used a 'manipulated'8 olympiad year, which allowed him to treat a
single season's campaigning as a whole. The occasions on which he gives precise chronological data are few; the
main passages are iii. 1. 11, 16. 7, 118. 10, iv. 66. 767. 1, v. 105. 3, 111. 9.9 Hence there has been much
controversy about his system, and a variety of attempts to formulate the principle which allowed him to divide up
his campaigns in the way he does. The best solution, and almost certainly the right one,
[35]

See the note ad loc.


iv. 3845; see the note to iv. 38. 145. 8 for the special source-problem.
3
See in particular notes to vi. 3. 5, 3. 7, 4. 79. 14.
4
See above, p. 28 n. 10.
5
Cf. vi. 4547. 6 n.
6
Cf. xii. 10. 4, 11. 1 f.; whether Ephorus had preceded him in this is not known (so Unger, Phil., 1881, 49 ff.). See
Kubitschek, RE, 'Aera', cols. 6278.
7
Cf. Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1565.
8
Ibid.
9
iv. 14. 9 is probably an insertion by some later reader, which has been incorporated in the text; see the note ad
loc.
2

is that of De Sanctis,1 which assumes a certain flexibility in Polybius' methods. Polybius wrote, he argues,
without any consistent and rigid chronological scheme. Normally he closed his olympiad years with the end of
the year's campaigning and the retirement of the troops into winter quarters; this meant that its end coincided
roughly with the autumn date of the Aetolian new civil year and, for the greater part of the period of the
Histories with that of the Achaean.2 However, this system was capable of modification. The third book, for
instance, ends virtually with the battle of Cannae, for obvious reasons; and such incidents as are appended in iii.
1183 are selected to confirm the impression of overwhelming disaster, despite the fact that the revolt of Tarentum
did not take place until 213, and the defeat of Postumius Albinus was probably not sustained until the end of
winter 216/15. On the other hand, many of the events which followed on the defeat of Cannae, including the
revolt of Capua, which opened up a new series of actions, were reserved for book vii4 (which nominally covered
Ol. 141, 1. 2 = 216/14) though many of them may have occurred before the end of the campaigning season of
216. Similarly in book xv, which contained the events of Ol. 144, 2 = 203/2, Polybius included the peace
negotiations after Zama,5 because, though they belonged to the end of 202 or even early 201, they rounded off his
account of the battle and the war. In this way Polybius was ready to modify his olympiad system for dramatic or
other reasons. But as a rule a year would be reckoned from the beginning of the campaigning season subsequent
to its nominal opening. Thus Ol. 140 covers 219216 (though in book iii Polybius includes Hannibal's
preliminary campaigns in Spain for 221 and 220),6 Ol. 141 the years 215212, and so on; in short an olympiad
year was equated for practical purposes with the Julian or consular year coinciding with its second half.7
For indicating dates during the period before his main history opens Polybius uses various methods.
Frequently he gives synchronisms based on olympiad years for the convenience of his Greek
[36]

iii. 1. 21923; accepted by Ziegler, op. cit., cols. 15647. For earlier discussion see Unger, Phil., 1874, 239; S.-B.
Mnchen, 1879, 119 ff.; Nissen, Rh. Mus., 1871, 244 ff., 1885, 349 ff.; H. Steigemann, De Polybii olympiadum
ratione et oeconomia (Diss. Breslau, 1885); O. Seipt, De Polybii olympiadum ratione et de bello Punico primo
quaestiones chronologicae (Diss. Leipzig, 1887).
2

See v. 106. 1 n.
See notes ad loc.
4
Cf. De Sanctis, iii. 1. 222; Ziegler, op. cit., col. 1566.
5
xv. 1719.
6
iii. 1314.
7
The general problem of the relationship between Polybius' olympiad year and the plan of the history as a whole
will be discussed in the second volume, since it is one immediately relevant to the assembling of the fragments
and the assigning of them to their books. (*p. 628.)
3

readers;1 and having thus established a date he works forwards or backwards from it.2 It has been argued3 that for
his earlier Roman chronology, including the lost parts of the archaeologia in book vi,4 he made use of a
synchronized table with olympiad years as its basis. But this has not been established, and it seems more probable
that for these earlier periods lying outside his main history, Polybius drew largely on his sources, and that, for
example, his account of the Gallic Wars was based on consular years, and his chronology of the early development
of the Achaean Confederacy on Achaean strategos years running from May to May.5 For the view that P. sticks
closely to the Olympiad year see R. Werner, Die Begrndung der rmischen Republik (Munich, 1963), 46 ff., 68
f.; H. H. Schmitt, Antiochos, 194 n. 1. P.'s chronological method is also discussed in Pdech, Mthode, 449 ff. His
chronology for the earliest Roman history, including the regal period, constitutes a special problem, which is
discussed in its proper place.6
[37]

1
2

See for example i. 3. 1, 6. 5, ii. 20. 6, 41. 1, 41. 11, 43. 6, iii. 22. 12.
e.g. i. 6. 1, ii. 1835 (Gallic Wars), ii. 41. 1115, 43. 18 (early Achaean history).

Leuze, Jahrzhlung, 105209.


See notes on vi. 11 a.
5
See references in n. 2.
6
See vi. 11 a 2 n.
4

BOOK I
1-5. Introduction
The purpose of this introduction is to arrest the reader's attention,
and to outline the contents of the work and the author's reason for
composing it. There are many precedents (e.g. Hecataeus, FGH,I
F I; Herod. i, prol.; Thuc. i. I ; Eph. FGH, 70 F 7--9) and the same
practice is found at Rome (e.g. Sail. Hist., fg. I. I 1\1.; Livy, praef.;
Tac. Hist. i. I; Ann. i. I); on the principle see Lorenz, 73 nn. I-2,
who analyses P. i. I-5 in detail. P.'s prooemium falls into two sections
of approximately equal length: I. I-3 6 is a general introduction
and discusses the nature of history, 3 7-5. 5 is a particular introduction to books i and ii.

1. 1. Twv TOLouTwv 01TOJ.LVT)J.laTwY: 'such histories as these'. P. normally uses the word v1rop.~-l)p.am in this general sense: cf. 35 6, etc.
The didactic view of history which appears here is common to the
earlier Greek historians, e.g. Thuc. i. 22, ii. 48. 3; see also Isoc. Nic.
35, Arch. 59; Arist. Rhet. i. IJ68 a 29. It persists of course into Roman
times; cf. Diod. i. Iff.; Sempronius Asellio, HRR fg. 2; Sail. lug.
4. 5-6. Cicero, de orat. ii. 9 z,6 calls history magistra uitae; and see
Pliny, epist. v. 8. II: 'nam plurimum refert, ut Thucydides ait,
KTfjp.a sit an &.ywvW'fLa; quorum alterum oratio, alterum historia est.'
Consequently, although the Stoics also subscribe to this belief, there
is no need to assume Stoic influence here (with Lorenz, 8--9).
TllS mO'TtJJ.LT)S: genitive of comparison after Totp.oTipav, not
objective genitive after 3u)p8wow (so Shuckburgh).
2. 1ravTES ws e1ros Et1TEIY: not identifiable. Diod. i. I-3 probably
derives from Poseidonius, a post-Polybian source, rather than from
Ephorus (as Barber, ro3; B. L Ullman, TAP A, 1942, 30 n. 31,
following Jacoby); and, though attempts have been made to detect
Theopompus and Theophrastus, or Demetrius of Phalerum, in the
reference to Ttls- n"js rox1Js p.t;TafJo>..lls yvvalws {nrorf>ipotv (cf. Lorenz,
Io-n; von Scala, 164), the idea is a commonplace: cf. vi. 2. 6; Plut.
Aem. Paul. 27. 2.
npxfi t<a.l. TEAEL I<EXPflYTQL TOilT'f: the sense is not local (so Laqueur,
257), but qualitative: 'they make this the be-ail and end-all of their
work'. On this proverbial phrase (cf. vi. 6. 7 n.) see Wunderer, i. 73;
Lorenz, i6 n. 33
P. here asserts two main functions for history: (a) as a training
ground for the active politician, (b) as a vicarious method of obtaining the experience which enables us to endure life's vicissitudes.
39

I. r. 4

INTRODllCTIOK

4. To '!l'a.pa8osov: since the unexpected element in F.'s material will


itself attract readers, he can dispense with praise of history in general.
(On a similar argument in Dion. Hal. i. r see Kaibel, Hermes, t885,
501ft.) This, ro 77ap&Jiogov, is part of F.'s legacy from the Hellenistic
historians, who borrowed it from tragedy, where Aristotle (Poet. 9
1452 a 4) defined its function as the arousing of fear and pity; but
\vhereas they employed it to thrill the reader, P. claims that he uses
it to a moral end. For it forms an important element in P.'s analysis
of the rise of Rome to world-empire, as the unforeseen, irrational
factor, controlled by TJx'lJ, and working (throughout the period
under consideration) in favour of Rome (cf. ii. 37 6, viii. z. 3 f., ix.
fi. s). Apart from synonyms like 77ap&.Aoyos, aviA1TGaTOS', ar.po<JOdKTJTOS,
the word occurs 51 times in books i-iii (see above, pp. 16-17).
5-6. P. here states his theme: How and under what systt'fn of government the Romans have succeeded in under
years in bringing almost
repeated at i. 2. 7, 4 r,
the whole inhabited world under them. It
iii. I. 4, r. 9, 2. 6, .3 9, 4 2, uS. 9, vi. 2. 3, viii. 2. J, xxxix. 8. 7. The
constitution is specially treated in book vi. Tile fifty-three years are
from 220 to 167; for although the defeat of Perseus left many states
still independent, none now stood on equal terms with the Romans,
who held an acknowledged first place. Lorenz, 14, recalls the Pentecontaetia of the Athenian rise to power (Thuc. i. n8. 2); but P. had
no regard for Athens (cf. vi. 44), omits her empire from those mentioned in ch. 2, and is probably uninfluenced by Thucydidcs here.
But he was undoubtedly impressed by Demetrius of Phalerum's
discussion of the fall of Persia and the rise of Macedon, unforeseeable
fifty years before (xxix. 2r. 4), and their counterpart in the overthrow of Macedon by Rome (d. Lorenz, 14; Siegfried, ror n. 191).
For P.'s revised scheme, carrying his history down to 145. see
below, iii. 4 ff.
6. O!!a.p.aTwv 1\ p.a.9'lp.aTwv: Thuc. ii. 39 r has the same contrast.
Ch. 2 compares the Roman with past empircs~Persian, Spartan,
Macedonian. Such syncriseis are common in didactic history, especially in P.: for their application to persons see Bruns, 90 ff. Other
examples are vi. 43 (comparison of constitutions), xviii. 28 (legion
and phalanx). Here, by displaying the superiority of the Roman
empire, P. implicitly magnifies the importance of his own work.
On this, and on similar syncristis in Dion. Hal. i. r and App. Hist.
praef., see Lorenz, IS, 8r n. 74
2. 2. nepaa.~ ...u:yaA'lV O.pxf)v KO.Tf.KT'I}aa.vTo: the Persians rose to
eminence under Cyrus (559-529), who united the Iranian peoples
from Persia to Media, reached the Aegean (546), and conquered
Babylon (5,)9) His successor Cambyses (529-522) annexed Egypt;
and Darius (522-486) invaded Scythia, and made the first attempt

40

INTRODUCTION

Iz.7

on mainland
which foundered at Marathon in 490. (Buchanan
Gray, C AH, iv (1926), chs. i and vii; Cary, ibid., ch. vii, 7-8;
Bengtson,
The Persian attempts to 'overstep the bounds of
Asia' are
Scythian expedition (which led to the Ionian
Revolt), and Darius' and Xerxes' invasions of Greece, thwarted at
Marathon, and at Salamis and Plataea. Both Aeschylus (Persae,
790 ff.) and Herodotus (vii. 10) associate the idea of v{Jpt<:: with overstepping the boundary between the continents; and the antithesis
between Europe and Asia runs through Herodotus' work. Revived
by !socrates as a fourth-century political slogan, it again achieved
prominence at the time of the war between Rome and Antiochus III
CQ, 1942, I41-3), and seems to be in P.'s mind here.
3. /\a.~~:EOmj16vLot 1161us ET"l 8w8E~~:a.: viz. from Lysandex's victory
at Aegospotami (4o5) to Conan's victory over the Spartans with a
Persian fleet off Cnidos (394). Cnidos marked the end of Theopompus'
Hellenica (Diod. xiv. 84. 7); and Iustin. vi. 4 I and ~epos, Conon, 4
agree in making it the end of Sparta's hegemony; but
Panath. 56 (but cf. A reap. 6 f.; Phil. 47), who limits the hegemony to
lTIJ biKa p.6At;:, apparently makes it end with the outbreak of the
Corinthian War (396/5).
4. Tav "laTpov 'ITOTa.j16v: an exaggeration. Though Alexander crossed
the Danube against the Triballi and Getae in 3:35, and Zopyrion,
Antipater's
in Thrace, perished at the hands of Scythians
across the Danube in 325, the river was never the regular frontier of
Macedon. P. is describing in very general terms Philip's European
possessions prior to the invasion of Asia, when by his control of
Epirus he reached the Adriatic. For P.'s concept of the Adriatic see
ii. 14. 4 n.
5. TTJV Ti\S :.\ata.s &.pxt}v: cf. . 2. After Darius' death in 330, Alexander
became Great King by right of conquest, and ruler over Egypt,
Syria, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and the eastern provinces to the
Jaxartes and Indus.
7-8. The most satisfactory reconstruction of this defective passage
is that of Lorenz, 82-83:
oiKOV!L.!J-'1]JJ U7T~KOOV avTOL;: [ dvu7Tdcrm ]Tov p.~v
TO&<; =VVV um:fpxou]aw, dvtmi:[pfJATJTOV 8J] TO~<;
myt vop.~vots V7TEp jox~v
Ka[T~Amov TfjS avTwvJ OuvaaT[E[a<;. 7TEpl. Toil] p.Jv T<a> 6>..a Sui T[l {;7TEpE'ixov JK ri]s ypa- J
cpfj> Jf~GTat aacf>laTEpOll KaTavoEL'v KTA.

!.2.7

INTRODUCTION

The Greek world probably recognized Rome as mistress over the


oecumene after Magnesia (cf. xxi. 16. 8: a speech of Antiochus'
envoys; xxi. 23. 4: speech of a Rhodian), unless we are here dealing
with later commonplaces as we are in Scipio's speech before Zama
(xv. ro. 2; cf. 9 5; see La Roche, 67; E. Bickerman, CP, 1945. 148).
The concept appears as a T07To> in a speech of Ti. Gracchus (Plut.
Ti. Gr. 9 5: KVptot Tij> olKovp.lvYJ> lvat .\eyop.vot); for its later use,
and comparisons between the Roman and earlier empires see the
passages collected by Kaibel, Hermes, r885, 497 f.; Lorenz, 84
nn. 8o-83. Cf. also 3 g, iii. 59 3
8. o Tfjs 1Tpa.ytJ.anKfjS iaTop(a.s Tp61ros: cf. xxxvi. 17 1. This phrase
is virtually the same as o 7Tpayp.anKo> Tpo7To> Tij> iaTop{a., ; cf. iii.
109. 6 where 6 Tij> 7TapaKA~aw> Tpo7TO> = o TTapaKATJTLKD> Tpo7To> Tij>
Alfw>. Applied to history 7Tpayp.anKo> in P. connotes a narrative
of events (political, military, etc.) as opposed to any kind of category,
e.g. a history of colonization; hence ~ 1rpayp.anK~ i.aTopta is little
more than 'history', and bears no overtones of 'didactic' or 'politically useful'. (See Schweighaeuser, ad loc.; Strachan-Davidson, 1-5;
Walbank, CQ, 1945, 16; above, p. 8 n. 6.)

3. 1-6. The 1rp#n> of the 14oth Olympiad (220-216 B.c.) are (r) the
Social War (cf. iv. 3-37,57-87, v. 1-30, gr-106), (2) the Fourth Syrian
War (v. 31-87). (3) the Second Punic War (iii, relevant parts of
vii-xv, extending down to 202). The Social War began in 220, the
other two in 219. Cf. ii. 37 2, 71. g, iv. 2.
1. ov 1rpwTov i~..]vEyKe: i.e. it was Philip's first war.
2. ov o~ 1TAE'i:aToL vpoaa.yope6ouaw ~vvL~La.K6v: i.e. most Greek historians, who wrote mainly from the Punic point of view and round
the personality of Hannibal. Examples are Sosylus of Lacedaemon
(FGH, 176), Chaereas (FGH, 177; cf. iii. 20. 5), and perhaps Silenus
of Caleacte (FGH, 175), Eumachus of Naples (FGH, 178: cf. Athen.
xiii. 577 A) and Xenophon (FGH, 179: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 59). The
Romans from the annalists downwards spoke of the bellu.m Punicum secundum (Coelius Antipater (HRR, i. 158) fg. 1 ( = Cic. orat.
6g, 229) ; (HRR, i. 177) fg. 66; Cic. de re pub. i. 1. 1; de diu. i. 35 77;
Sall. Jug. 5 4, 42. 1; Livy, xxi. 1. 2, xxxi. 1. 1, 3; also the epitomators
of Livy, the elder Pliny, etc.). However, in iii. 6. 1 a reference to the
writers on Td., KaT' Yl.wtfiav 1rpat"'" is probably to Roman historians
(see note); and P.'s phraseology is perhaps due to the fact that he
has Greek readers in mind (cf. 3 3-7, ii. 35 g, iii. 59 8; and for
special explanations of Roman institutions iii. 87. 7. 107. ro ff., x.
4 g, xiv. 3 6, xxi. 2. 2, 13. n). See von Scala, 288 ff.; Susemihl, ii. 95;
Lorenz, 13, 81 n. 66; and on the Hannibal-historians E. Meyer, Kl.
Schr. ii. 338; Scullard, Scip. 6 ; Lorenz, 84-85 n. 84.
TTJS vap' ~paTou auvTa~ews: cf. ii. 40. 4 n., iv. 2. 1. The Achaean
42

INTRODUCTION

I. 3 4

statesman composed memoirs (ii. 40. 4, iJTTofLVTJfLanap.otf~; 47 u,


so Plutarch) in over thirty books: FGH, 23I; Walbank,
Aratos, 6--8. In making himself Aratus' continuator P. followed an
established tradition. Among Thucydides' continuators were Xenophon (Hell. i. I), Theopompus (P. viii. n. 3), and Cratippus (Dion.
Hal. Thuc. 16); and Xenophon anticipates a continuator (Hell. vii.
5 27). Further examples (not all certain) in Lorenz, 85-86 n. 85. In
his introductory books P. also continues Timaeus (5. r, xxxix. 8. 4);
and he was in tum followed by Poseidonius (FGH 87 T I and 12 b:
iaTopla ~ fLETa IIo>..uf1tov, beginning 145{4) and by Strabo (FGH, 91
T 2: Ta fLETa IIo>.vf1w~). The same practice was followed at Rome;
for example Ammianus continues Tacitus.
3. <daavet 0'1Topa8a.s nl.s Tfjs oh<ou!J.EVTJS ""Page,s: perhaps
suggesting a parallel between the separate, scattered life of individuals, which preceded the establishment of the first communities
(d. vi. 5 6; and elsewhere, e.g. Plato, Protag. 322 A; Isoc. Paneg. 39;
Arist. Pol. i. 2. 7. 1252 b 23; Diod. i. 8. I, iii. s6. 3; Dion. HaL i. 9 2;
San. Cat. 6. r), and the change over in the political sphere from
separate national states to a single unit, the object of an organic,
interwoven (cf. awfLaToHoij, O'VfL7TAlea6m), universal history. See
Taeger, 19; Lorenz, 86-87 n. 91.
4. otovei O'WflllTOIIi:~Sij TTJV [aTop(av: cf. xiv. 12. 5 : with his account
of the whole of the latter history of Ptolemy IV, P. can depict his
character oiovd awfLa'Totoij, i.e. as a unified whole (not 'a life-like
picture' (Paton)). Similarly Tyche concentrates events from all over
the World in an organic unity (cf. 4 I, 6. 3 Where avvavfr;at!> iS a
word normally applied to organic growth). History is the work of
Tyche, just as his 1rpay1La'Tela is the work of P. The concept of such a
7rpayfLaTtda as a awfLa reaches P. from Hellenistic historiography; d.
Dion. Hal. ad Pomp. 3; Thuc. 5 f., 10; Diod. xx. I. 5; and Cicero
writes to Lucceius (Jam. v. I2. 4): 'a principia enim coniurationis
(sc. Catilinae) usque ad reditum nostrum uidetur mihi modicum
quoddam corpus confici posse.' The idea derives ultimately from the
Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the unity of a literary work; cf.
Plato, Phaedr. 264 c; Arist. Poet. 23. 1, 1459 a 17 f. (who, however,
excepts history from its application). See Lorenz, 87 n. 92; 99 n. 227.
The novelty in P. is that, facilitated by his conception of the role
of TJche, he projects the notion of the unity of an historical work
upon the objective course of historical events. The reason why history nmv becomes universal is summarized in 6. It is because,
encouraged by their victory in the Second Punic War, the Romans
hereafter consciously stretched out their hands towards Greece and
Asia, as steps towards universal dominion (cf. 3 7, 7TEpt Tij~ nuv
OAWV dpxijs, 3 9-IO, iii. 2. 6, EVVOtaV axfv 'Tfi~ 'TWV o>.wv mf1o'Afis,
v. 104. 3 (Agelaus at Naupactus), xv. 9 2-5 (Zama)). Thus the
vTTofLv~fLaTa,

43

L 3 4

I~TRODUCTIO~

Hannibalic War is the decisive period in Roman history. Cf. iii.


7
7. Tile second part of the introduction opens with the stylistic device
used at r. I: Ei p.v . , i:uws- J1rd &J : cf. iii. 4 r~4. ~p.f:v is
'us Greeks': cf. 3 2 n. The justification of the 7TpoKo.TaaKev~ of books
i and ii which P.
here (viz. to explain the earlier policy and
resources of the two rivals for world-power to Greeks ignorant of
them) does not explain the inclusion of the Achaean history in
ii. 37 ff. (cf. i. IJ. r 5). For the theory that the Achaean section is
a later addition see ii. 37 n.
9. tmcml.s i.v' c.uh~v TTJV Twv vpayfl6.Twv E~TJYTJCTLV: 'after becoming
engrossed in the narrative' (Paton), rather than Strachan-Davidson
'when he has come to the actual story of events'.

.)2.

vo(OLs 8La~ouAlOLS ~ 'ITOLO.LS 8uvttflEC1L Kai xopTjylaL<.; XPTJCTCtflEVOL:

corresponds to 7: dm:l 7To{as- 1Tpo(UutWS' ~ OUl!df.LEWS opp.YJBvTE<;. There


are in fact two things, the in tcllectual plan and the material resources, the first essential 1rp6s T~v TT{vma.v, the second 1rpik Tijv
awd.\eLav ( 1o). This analysis makes the Hannibalic War the first
step in the plan of universal dominion (cf. 3 6); it is slightly inconsistent with iii. 2. 6 >vhich makes the project follow on their victory
in that war.
10. Tfj<.; '~~'poKaTacrKeufj<.;: P.
used this term for the
contents of books i and ii: d. i. 13. I, 13. 7. r3. 8, ii. 14. I, r6. 14,
37 z, jr. 7, iv. r. g, v. rrr. ro (q.v.; this refers to the events tozr6).
But, though the word is a new technical expression for an 'introduction'. the custom of appending introductions was already usual:
cf. Thuc. i; and other authors listed by Lorenz, 87~88 n. 93
xe~pLC1flO\I Tfj<.; TOXTJ'> KTA.: viz. the historical process, 1TW')
Kai T{vL yvlf:L r.o.\mdas (cf. I. 5, viii. z. 3). Tyclze has worked her
purpose with Rome; cf. 4 3, 1ron Ka~ 1ro8Ev ri.lpp.~OTJ Kai r.ws ax T~v
auVTl.\Ewv (see above, p. 25 n. 8). On the comparable roles of Tyche

4. 1. TOV

and the historian see 3 4 n. Furthermore, no contemporary historian


has undertaken a universal history (Ephorus, praised in v. 33 2, is not
a contemporary). aVvTafts ( 2) alone means 'historical composition'
(not 'universal history', as Lorenz, 22): d. 3 2 (Aratus' Memoirs),
viii. 2. IT (d. z. s). ~ TWJJ KaT<i fdpos aVVTafLs.
3. Tou<.; fLEV KMa flpo<.; 'lrOAEflOVS KTA.: examples of such contemporary writers of particular histories are the Hannibal-historians
(3. 2 n.), Phylarchus, who wrote the Seleucid history of 222-187
around the figure of Antiochus HI (FGH, 81 T I), Mnesiptolemus of
Cyme (FGH, 164 T r) and Hegesianax of Alexandria Troas (FGH,
45 T 3; cf. xviii. 47 1). For Zeno and Antisthenes, who wrote local
histories of Rhodes (FGH, so8 and 523), see xvi. I4. 2 ff., for Ptolemy
of Megalopolis, who wrote a court history of Ptolemy IV (FGH r6I),

44

I~TRODUCTION

I. 4 6

xviii. 55 6. Baton of Sinope wrote on Hieronymus of Syracuse


(F'GH, z68 F 4). For historians of the wars between Rome and
Philip V and Perseus of Macedon see below, iii. 32. 8 n.
4. TO KaAALO"TOV njlO. S' W~EALjl(;)T(lTOV hnn]SeUjlCI. TTJ'!> TUXTJS: cf. ix.
44 2. 'This, the achievement of Fortune most excellent and profitable
to contemplate', not 'the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune' (Paton). P. is here concerned to expound the
advantages of studying history (cf. H), not to pass judgement on
the rise of Rome (so, correctly, Strachan-Davidson and Shuckburgh).
The conjunction or opposition of KaAoll and w,Pf.A<JLD!l is popular in
Stoic theory: cf. Hirzel, ii.
ff.; P. often borrows it: see iii. 4 II,
31. 13, vi. z. 3, xi. 19 a 2, xv. 36. 3, xxiv. 12. 2, xxxviii. 5 3; and
Wunderer, ii.
The concept of Tyche uppermost in F.'s mind at
this point is of a force in the universe which takes a pleasure in
change for its own sake ( s, TloMa ~eaworrowiiaa; cf. 86. 7); it
is the Tyche of Demetrius of Phalerum (cf. xxix. 21. 3-<l), and it is
significant that the word 1Wtll011"0tfv, otherwise found only in verse
prior to Polybius, is taken from Demetrius. Other examples of this
irrational, novelty-mongering, Tyche are ii. 4 3~4, 70. 2, iv. 2. 4, viii.
2. 3, 2o. 10. But here P. ha.::; the further metaphor of Tyche as the producer of plays (as in xi. 5 8, xxiii. 10. r6, xxix. 19. 2, fg. 212; cf. Diod.
xxxii. 10. 5; above, p. 21 n. 6). The phrase ~yu.wlaar' dywYtafLa is 'put
on a show-piece' (not 'act such a drama' (Shuckburgh) or 'achieved
such a triumph' (Paton); cf. IG, xii. 7 226, ll.4-6, where &pafLaTa dywv{{wOa, means 'to put on plays for competition', and, for dywv~opa,
Thuc. i. 22. 4, and Arist. Poet. 9 ro. 1451 b 37 The concept fits into
the general Hellenistic tendency, elsewhere criticized strongly by
P. (ii. 56, iii. 47 6-48. I2, s8. g, vii. 7 1~2. 6, X. 2.
xii. 24. s. 26 b.
4 ff., XV. 34 I-J6. II, XVi. T2. 7-9, 14, I, 17. 9, I8. 2, XXiX. 12. 1-3. 8),
to confuse the Aristotelian
of history and tragedy. See
further the discussion in CQ, r945, 8 ff., and especially 9 n. 1.
6-8. For the argument cf. iii. 32. World-history cannot be understood from reading TOus KaTtt fLtpo:; ypd.,Ponas, any more than one
can (a) picture the world as a whole from visits to separate cities or
studying pictures of them, (b)
a living creature from con~
sidering its dissected parts. The second example
the 'organic'
conception of history-writing (cf. 3 4 n.), to correspond to the new
era of 'universal' history. Similarly in Arist. Poet. 7. 4 1450 b 35 ff.
the 'qiov to which tragedy is compared is probably a 'living organism'
(though Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Fine Art4 (London, 1923), 188,
takes it to be 'a picture of a living organism'). yypaJLtLiva, in the
first comparison, are probably 'pictures' (Strachan-Davidson; cf.
ypa<foal, xxi. 30. g, xxxix. 2. 3; see also xii. 28 a r), not 'plans' (Paton).
For L Hostilius Mancinus' picture of Carthage see Pliny, Nat. hist.
xxxv. 23. The distinction between the genuine knowledge which
45

I. 4 6

INTRODUCTION

comes from universal history and that derived from 'special histories' is the distinction between the truth and a mere dream ( 8) ;
but genuine knowledge is essential if history is to provide ;o xp~atfLDV.
Cf. iii. 32. IO: 6atp Ota~ipH ;6 !La8efv ;oil fL6vov a1wiJaat, ;oao&rtp Kat
i~IJ ~fLilpav la;oplav urroAafLfldvw Ota~ipetv T<VIJ E1TL fLEpovs auv;agWII.

5. 1-5. The introduction to the rrpoKa;aaKEv~, like the general introduction (cf. 3 1-6), ends with the problem of a starting-point. 01. 129
(z64-z6r) has the double advantage of (a) being the date when the
Romans first crossed the seas from Italy, (b) immediately following
on Timaeus' history (3. 2 n.). The crossing into Sicily is that of
Ap. Claudius Caudex, consul 264, and must have occurred in the
late summer of z64; for the war lasted twenty-four years (cf. 63. 4;
actually 24 campaigns, but 23 years and some months). Against
Beloch's attempt to date the crossing to spring 263 see 56. I n.
Timaeus of Tauromeniurn (c. JSO-C. 255). son of the tyrant Andromachus, was expelled by Agathocles between 317 and 312, and spent
some fifty years at Athens (cf. xii. 25 d r) composing a history of the
western Greeks, including the barbarian peoples, Rome, and Carthage. Originally ending with the death of Agathocles, the work
was continued to cover the history of Pyrrhus (though Cic. ad Jam.
v. 12. 2 suggests that this was in some sense separate from the main
work). Whether it went down as far as 264 ('a splendid opening,
but no conclusion'-Laqueur) is uncertain, despite P.'s claim; but
see 8. 3--9 8 n. Though painstaking and careful, Timaeus displayed
excessive credulity and superstition; and he showed pronounced
prejudice for Timoleon, who enjoyed his father's help, and against
Agathocles. His work was an inexhaustible source for later writers
including P., who criticizes him severely in book xii. His system of
reckoning by olympiads became a generally adopted device; and his
chronology formed the basis of later history. For polemic against
him (apart from book xii) see ii. r6. I5, viii. IO. 12. See FGH, s66;
Beloch, iv. I. 483-5; Susemihl, i. 563-83; Laqueur, RE, 'Timaios' (3),
cols. ro76-I203. In the rest of the chapter P. is concerned with justifying his date as one requiring no earlier motivation (ovva.fLlVIJV
avTI]v .g airrijs 8Ewp.,ta8at), and comprehensible to his Greek readers
(d. 6. r); there is a similar argument at v. 31. 8.

6-12. Italy and Sicily up to the First Punic War (cf. 5 z)


6. L
2

~To-; ivE~O'TTtKEt KTA.:

the year meant is apparently OL 98,

= 387/6 B.C.; and F.'s indications are intended to make the matter

clear to Greeks, west Greeks, and Romans. The peace of Antalcidas


fell in Ol. 98, 2, in fact in spring, 386; Leuctra was fought on 5 Hecatombaeum in the Attic archon year of Phrasicleides, and so in July
46

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO THE FIRST PUNIC \VAR

371, at the very end of 01. 102, I

372/r B.C.; and Aegospotami was


in the archon year of Alexias (Arist. Ath. Pol. 34 2), and so in the
late summer of 405, in 01. 93, 4 By inclusive reckoning 01. 98, 2 is
the nineteenth year after 01. 93, 4, and the sixteenth year before
01. 102, I. Leuze (]ahrziihhmg, II5 n.), apparently identifying the
Olympiad year with the Attic archon year, puts Leuctra in 01.
1o2, 2, and being unwilling to assume that P. reckoned inclusively
in the case of Aegospotami and exclusively in that of Leuctra,
assumes that he is reckoning from the actual day, and not by years;
but this assumption seems both unsatisfactory and improbable.
Leuze's criticism of Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 359) is, however,
valid: it is highly unlikely that in dealing with this period P. was
working with an Olympiad year which went down to the end of the
campaigning season. These synchronisms suggest that the Gallic
capture and occupation of Rome fell also in 387/6. Leuze (op. cit.
n5-r6) has argued that because Dionysius (i. 74) dates the Gallic
lcpoSos to the archonship of Pyrgion at Athens (388/7), P. must be
distinguishing between the capture of Rome (J.\6vns) in that year,
and the occupation (Kadx.,~~) in 387/6. It is true that in the previous
clause vevLK7JKtiJS' refers to an event of 01. 97, 4
389/8, and bro>.u>p~eu
to a siege beginning in 01. 98, 1
388/7 (see below); but the capture
and occupation of Rome form much more of a single episode than
the battle of Elleporus and the
of Rhegium, and it is difficult
to believe in Leuze's distinction.
date was not necessarily that
of Dionysius; and the natural interpretation is that the Gauls seized
and held Rome in OL 98, 2
387/6. P. probably had this synchronism
from Timaeus (cf. Beloch, RG, 14o; Stuart Jones, CAH, vii. 32o--3);
it appears again in lustin. vi. 6. 5, 'hie annus non eo tantum insignis
fuit, quod repente pax tota Graecia facta est, sed etiam eo, quod
eadem tempore urbs Romana a Gallis capta est'; and (dependent
on him) in Oros. iii. 1. I.
2. TTJV hr' !l>.vTa.AK8ou AEYOf'kVflV Elp,v'lv: cf. iv. 27. 5. vi. 49 5 The
war between Sparta and the allied forces of Athens, Thebes, Argos,
and Corinth, instigated by Persia after the Spartan defeat off Cnidos
in 394, ended in 387/6, when Tiribazus. on royal instructions, summoned the belligerents to Sardes to receive the conditions for a peace
(subsequently described by Isocrates (Panegyr. 176) as rrpocl'rayJ-Lam),
viz. all the Asiatic mainland and the islands of Cyprus and Clazomenae to be the king's; Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros to remain
Athenian; all other Greek states to be autonomous (cf. iv. 27. 5);
the king, assisted by the
to punish any breach (cf. Xen.
Hell. v. r. 31; Diod. xiv. IIo). The precise relationship of the king
to the treaty is a matter of controversy. The likeliest view is that of
Wilcken (Abh. Berlin. Akad., 1941 (1942), no. 15; cf. S-B. Berlin, 1929,
292-3), who distinguishes a Sparto-Persian peace agreed on at Susa
47

I. 6.

ITALY AN"D SICILY UP TO

from a subsequent Kou~ eZp~VYJ of Greek states, sworn at Sparta in


accordance with Antalcidas' undertaking. In view of many passages,
epigraphical and historical (including this one), which suggest that
the king was a direct participant in some agreement, it is difficult
to follow V. ~1artin {Mus. Helv., 1944, r3-3o), who, on the basis of
Diod. xv. rg. I' Tct!) KO~vas cruve~Kas 7'0.)' lrr' }1ITaAKl3ou YVOJ.M!Ia<;
uvvtnAa{1op,lvou Toii flp(1(7w (3aat'Mws, argues for a single peace, announced at Sardes and sworn at Sparta, a KDLvTJ ~dp~VYJ of all Greek
states, with the king as benevolent overseer. Whatever its precise
legal form, this D~'ktat re-established Persia in the Greek cities of
Asia Minor; and in Greece proper Spartan coercion soon nullified the
'autonomy' clause, and provoked a growing opposition which culminated in the Theban victory over Sparta at Leuctra in 371.
TTI 11'Ept Tov 'EXXt'!T'opov '!T'OTa.p.ov p.a.x'fi: after defeating Carthage in
396, Dionysius I of Syracuse crossed into Italy and in 389, near the
Elleporus (modern Stilaro; Nissen, It. La.nd. ii. 949), just north of
Caulonia in Bruttium, defeated an I taliote army of 27 ,ooo led by
a Syracusan exile, Heloris (Diod. xiv. ro4, "E,\wpos by confusion with
He loris; Polyaen. v. 3 2; below, ii. 39 7). Rhegium resisted Dionysius
for almost a year {387): when it fell, its inhabitants were treated
with severity (Diod. xiv. 1o6-8, III, nz; Frontin. Strat. iii. 4 3;
[Arist.] Oec. ii. 2. 1349 b I]). These victories established Dionysius
firmly on the Italian side of the straits. For Polybius they do not
merely give Sicilian readers a useful synchronism, but as an example
of how a strong power in Sicily or Italy would eventually cross the
straits they act as a pointer to the First Punic \Var. Timaeus linked
up the Gallic catastrophe with the siege of Rhegium (Diod. xiv.
IIJ. r) and is therefore probably P.'s source here (Beloch, RG, qo-r).
On the chronology see Meyer, v. IJO-J2.
ra.XaTO.~ 1TA~\I TOU Ka'!T'ETwMou: cf. ii. 18. I-2ll., 22. 4-5 n. P.'s
date for Brennus' seizure of Rome (387/6) will be Timaeus' (above);
the usually accepted Varronian chronology made it A.TJ.C. 364
390 B.C. For discussion see below, ii. r8. 6 n.
3. eu8oKOUf1EVO.S r a.AaTO.tS: a ransom of I,ooo lb. of gold (Livy, V. 48;
Diod. xiv. I 16): other authorities said 2,ooo lb., in either case a sum
'more probably dictated by later Roman pride than possible for
Roman resources at the time' (Stuart Jones, CAll, vii. 565 n. r).
a\IEA'!T'lO'TWS tyKpa.n'is: 'unexpectedly' because they were relieved
by an unforeseeable Venetie invasion of Gallic territory (ii. 18. 3).
Thus an element of fortune (d. 8, 7rapaSotw>) combines with Roman
courage to secure the conquest of Italy; cf. 4, (J,Q. .,., T~v av3pdav
Kal .,~v . errL'I'vxfav; 6-7. This combination of rational and
irrational factors is P.'s answer to the 1Tws of 5 2; cf. Lorenz, 35-36.
4-6. Twv Aa.T1vwv KTA.: cf. ii. 18. 5 After the Gallic invasion separatism appeared in the Latin confederation, Tibur and Praencste tried

48

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 6. 5

to form
leagues, and the seceding cities called in Volsci,
later Gallic mercenaries. In 358 Rome reconstituted the
Hernici,
confederacy, and by 354 the last town submitted; but in 338, after
a further revolt, they dissolved it and made sep:rrate settlements
with the Latin cities, leaving some independent and incorporating
others in Rome. (See Adcock, CAH, vii. 589-94; Sherwin-White,
2r~3o; Gobler, 4-13; Beloch, RG, 373 ff.) The fighting against the
Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites was not in successive periods, as P.
might suggest. By 387 (Varr.) southern Etruria had been recovered
and made into four tribes; and in 351 Tarquinii and Falerii received
a forty years' truce. (Homo, CAH, vii. 574-5; Sherwin-White, rrs~
r6; Gohler, I9-2o; Beloch, RG, 301 ff. (sceptical}.) On the Gauls
(whom P. calls K().:roi and TaJ..amt indiscriminately) see below, ii.
J8~zo. The Samnites fought (traditionally) three wars against Rome.
Adcock, CAH, vii. 594 ff., rejects the first (343--34r) as unhistorical
(but cf. Beloch, RG, 369 ff.); the second and most important (327-304)
brought substantial Roman gains; and in the third (298-290), which
developed into a clash between a coalition, including Gauls and
Etruscans, and 1\'ome, the Samnites were reduced to impotence.
These wars consolidated the Roman position in central Italy, and
extended their power to the threshold of Magna Graecia. P. uses
Eauvimt in a broad sense to include Marsi, Paeligni, and other minor
Sabellian tribes (Philipp, RE, 'Samnites', cols. zq8-9), and therefore
places them north as well as east of Latium. {According to Ps.Scylax, 15 (a corrupt passage) the Samnite League (in about 350)
stretched from sea to sea; d. DeSanctis, i. 103 n. 1.)
5. T a.pa.VTLVWV E'II'\O"TTO.O'O.J.lEYWV nuppov: in
folloVving the
sending of help to Thurii against the Lucanians, ten Roman ships
appeared off Tarentum. The Tarentines, alleging a treaty 1 which
pledged the Romans not to sail east of the Lacinian Promontory,
sank four and seized one; they then expelled the Roman garrison
from Thurii. Envoys sent to demand satisfaction were insulted
(r~v . . . aai.\yav); the incident was much exaggerated in the annalistic tradition (e.g. Dion. Hal. xix. 5; App. Samn. 7; Livy, ep.
12). \Vhen in 281 the consul L Aemilius Barbula was sent to
harry the Taren tines, they invited in Pyrrhus of Epirus, who accepted
their offers and crossed with zs,ooo men.
TQ ttpOTEpov ETE\ TllS TWY r O.AO.TWV q.6Sou: c/JO'e3o') is used of the
Gauls in Syll. 3<)8, I. 8, and an inscription in Klio, 1914, 276, no. 5;
it is not peculiar toP. (as Laqueur, rs6 n. I.) The synchronism recalls
ii. 20. 6 (Pyrrhus' crossing two years before the destruction of the
Gauls at Delphi) and ii. 4r. I I (events of OL 124 (284/3-z8rjo) are
' For di!Ierent views of its date see Adcock, CAH, vii. 544; Frank, ibid. 640
(334); De Sanctis, ii. 347 (302-but it will scarcely have been later than the
planting of the colvny at Luceri::t in Apulia in 314 (Lhy, ix, :!6. t-s)).
4800

49

I. 6. 5

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO

KaTd. T1JY llJppov Suipamv d, 'lTailtav). Pyrrhus crossed in May z8o


(01. 124, 4): for the month cf. Plut. Pyrrh. IS I, f3oplq. dvl;.u.p 1Ta.p' cnpav
tKpay~vn (preferable to Dio's statement (fg. 40. 6; cf. Zan. viii. 2)
that 'he did not wait for the spring'). The destruction of the Gauls
at Delphi was in Ol. 125, z (Paus. x. 23. 14) = 279/8, hence late
autumn 279 or early spring 278, for at the time there was snow at
Delphi (FD, iii. 2. r38ll. 31 ff.); autumn 279 is the more likely, as the
Gauls would hardly begin their expedition in winter. Unfortunately
the foSo>, i.e. the first Gallic irruption into Macedon (in which
Ptolemy Ceraunus met his death), is not to be dated with any certainty. It is here dated the year after the Tarentine appeal to
Pyrrhus (not, it should be noted, after Pyrrhus' crossing); but
although this appeal took place in the consulship of L. Aemilius
Barbula and Q. Marcius Philippus (A.u.c. 473 = 281 B.c.), it is uncertain if it fell in 01. 124, 3 or 01. 124, 4 Hence for all the evidence
this passage offers, the lfooo> (and Ceraunus' death) may have fallen
before or after midsummer z8o. ~ew evidence from a Babylonian
king-list (d. A.]. Sachs and D. ]. Wiseman, Iraq, 1954,
has
established that Seleucus I perished at Ceraunus' hands between
25 August and 24 September 281 ; 1 and since Corupedium, where
Seleucus defeated and destroyed Lysimachus, occurred seven
months earlier (Iustin. xvii. 2. 4), this battle was evidently fought
c. February 28I. This new inforrnation, however, gives no basis for
calculating when Ceraunus perished. Eusebius (following Porphyry)
allots him a reign of one year and five months; but even though the
lists omit the seven months of Seleucus, it does not necessarily follow
that Ceraunus' reign is to be calculated from Corupedium. According
to Plutarch (Pyrrh. 22. 1), Pyrrhus heard of Ceraunus' death shortly
after Ausculum in summer 279. If Ptolemy's one year and :five months
are dated from Seleucus' death in Aug./Sept. 28r, he will have died
in Jan./Feb. 279, which (allowing for some delay in sending a message
across the Adriatic in late winter) would fit Plutarch's statement.
On the other hand, January or February does not seem a very likely
time of the year for the Gallic </JoSo;;. A further piece of evidence is
the name 'ET7Jalas, given to Antipater who reigned for forty-five
'as long as the Etesians blow' after .Meleager had followed
Ceraunus' death with a reign of two months (Euseb. i. 235). If
Antipater's reign coincided with the Etesians (and did not merely
last as long as they, which would make the point a poor one), it fell
in July/August; and Ceraunus perished in May (279). But in that
case no signiiicance can be attached to the figure of one year and
five months accorded to Ceraunus' reign; and Beloch (iv. :2. ro9),
1 The text from 1: ruk which suggested that SeleucliS' death was still not known
there in December 28r (cf. Be]och, iv. 2. 108~) must therefore be regarded as
anachronistic (Sachs and Wiseman, op. cit., 205).

50

THE FIRST PTJNIC WAR

L 6. 6

who argues for May as the date of Ceraunus' death, attempts to


dispose of it by adding the seven months of Seleucus' rule, and so
making two years, which can be dismissed as a round figure. But
this is violent, and the figure of one year five months, like rhe two
months given to M:eleager and the forty-five days of Antipater, seems
to deserve some respect. Finally, it may be noted that in ii. 41. 2
P. places Ceraunus' death in Ol. 124, which would make it earlier
than summer z8o; but here the synchronism is very general, and
merely seeks to relate Ceraunus' death to those of Ptolemy I,
Lysimachus, and Seleucus, which did in fact occur within that
Olympiad.
No solution covers all this evidence. The outside dates for the
rpo3os remain July z8o (if one reckons one year five months from
Corupedium) and May 279 (if one attaches weight to Plutarch's
report of Pyrrhus' receipt of the news, and to the nickname assigned
to Antipater). A closer dating must await further evidence. For
discussion see Beloch, iv. 2. IOj-II, 485-9; Corradi, 67-71 (preferable
to Niese, ii. 15 f.; DeSanctis, ii. 39o-2 n. z).
The Gauls destroyed at Delphi and those who crossed into Asia
(cf. iv. 46. I) were separate detachments (Paton's translation misses
this) : cf. M. Segre, Jlistoria, 1929, 596. It was Brennus' small force
which marched on Delphi, and the Tolistoagii and Trocmi (along
with the Tectosages, who left the main body in Greece after the
Delphic catastrophe) who first plundered the coastal districts of
Asia Minor, and later settled down in the interior as Galatians (Livy,
xxxviii. 16). Two armies had invaded Macedon in the original ,Po8os.
That of Bolgius withdrew after destroying Ceraunus, the other under
Brennus and Acichorius continued south into Greece (without the
Tolistoagii and Trocmi). The body under Brennus was a mere
raiding party; but P. already follows the tradition fostered by the
Aetolians, who identified its defeat with the preservation of Greece
and the destruction of the main Gallic army. A contemporary Coan
inscription (Syll. 398, 11. 8-9) confirms the oldest tradition that
Delphi was preserved. The Aetolians compelled the Gauls to withdraw, and legend embroidered their exploits with a report of the
epiphany of Apollo, fighting for his sanctuary. The story of its
partial pillage (in Livy and Strabo) probably goes back via Timagenes or Poseidonius to a second-century Italian story (Flaceliere,
roi). See S. Reinach and R. Herzog, CRAI, 1904, 158-73; 'M. Segre,
Histor-ia, 1927, r8-42; 1929, 592--648; Tarn, AG, 439-42; C AH, vii.
101--6; Flaceliere, 94--ro4; Launey, REA, 1944, 217-36; and below,
ii. 35 7 n.
6. w<> lnrep i8wv ... 1TOAEjl~cro\I'Tec;;: cf. ii. 20. ro. The Pyrrhic War
led the Romans to envisage the conquest of all Italy, just as the
Hannibalic War led them to turn to the conquest of the whole
51

I. 6. 6

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO

world (cf. 3 4 n.). This is P.'s interpretation of Roman imperialism,


simple and rationalistic, and in conflict with the Roman 1rpoapwtc;
which sought, from the time of Fabius Pictor, to interpret all Roman
expansion as defensive action. See Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, I37
7. nuppov tK~aAOVTe<; EK Tfj<; '1TaA1as: from autumn 278 to spring
275 Pyrrhus was fighting Carthage in Sicily. Upon his return to
Italy his depleted forces were defeated by the Romans, traditionally
near Beneventum (but perhaps ncar Paestum in Lucania: Beloch,
iv. 2. 475-6), in autumn 275, whereupon he returned with S,soo men
to Epirus (Plut. Pyrrh. 26. 2). See De Sanctis, ii. 4I5; Frank, CAH,
vii. 652-3. From 270 the Roman federation embraced all Italy, excluding Cisalpine Gaul (1rA~v K<EA.-wv); for its organization see Frank,
ibid. 658-64; Sherwin-White, 9I-125.
7. 2. Kajl:rravoi wap' Aya9oKA~ f!L09ocpopouVTES: Agathocles, the
tyrant of Syracuse (317-289: with the title of king from 304), captured
Messana between 3T5 and 3I2 (Diod. xix. 65ft.). Its seizure by Campanian mercenaries (i.e. Oscans) whom he had settled in Syracuse,
and who had agreed after his death to leave Sicily, occurred between
288 and 283 (Beloch, iv. 1. 543 n. r). Here they took the name
Mamertini (from Mamers, the Oscan form of Mars); cf. 8. I ; Diod.
xxi. I8; Dio, fg. 40.8; Alfius in Festus, p. 158M., S.V. 'Mamertini'. For
their few coins and inscriptions see Conway, The Italic Dialects, i
(Cambridge, 1897), I f.; M. Siirstri:im, A Study in the Coinage of the
Mamertines (Lund, 1940).
6-13. P. records the garrisoning of Rhegium, and the revolt and
subsequent reduction of the garrison from a Roman source (probably
Fabius: Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 134-6), which defends Roman fides in
the matter; a less creditable version held the Romans responsible
(Livy, xxxi. 29. ro, 31. 6); and the obviously distorted account in
Dion. Hal. xx. 4-5 is a further development of the defence. P.'s
account presents several difficulties:
1. Date of garrisoning. The reference to fear of Pyrrhus ( 6) suggests 28o (so Frank, CAH, vii. ~3). But Dion. Hal. xx. 4 records that
the garrison was against Bruttians, Lucanians, and Tarentines, and
was sent in the consulship of C. Fabricius (282). Despite Dionysius'
general inferiority as a source, this may well be true; and no doubt
fear of the Mamertini played its part. If the revolt of the garrison
was in 28o, after Heraclea (cf. Diod. xxii. r. 2-3), its establishment
at Rhegium may well have been attributed (by P. or his source) to
the same year, and the new motive (fear of Pyrrhus) added. In fact,
it is improbable that a Greek town should require a garrison against
Pyrrhus. See Beloch, iv. I. 545 n. 2; 2. 479-85; DeSanctis, ii. 379 n. 2,
395 n. 3; contra C. Scano, Rend. Line., 1925, 70-87. On this view the
words xpo1ov . . . nva ( 7) refer to the years 282-280.
52

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 8. 3

2. Size a_{ garrison. Dion. Hal. xx. 4 gives 1,2oo, and later at xx. r6
makes it 4,5oo. Livy (ep. 15; xxviii. 28. 3) and Orosius (iv. 3 4) speak
of a legio, which can hardly be taken literally. However, legio is often
used in early Latin of 'a body of troops', and P.'s 4,000 may spring
from a misunderstanding of the word in an original Roman source.
Cf. Beloch, iv. 2. 484. (But it does not follow that Dionysius' 1,2oo
therefore deserves any credence (so Beloch, and Bung, 132 n. 4).)
The alternative explanation that the 4,ooo are a confusion with
forces sent by the Romans to Rhegium in 278 to prevent Pyrrhus'
crossing into Sicily seems improbable; for Diod. xxii. 7 s. the
source for this incident, speaks only of soo men. Hcurgon (204-6)
argues that the Campanians are a band of irregulars in Roman employ.
l1i~ews: Decius Vi belli us (Livy, ep. r2), a member of a famous Capuan
family (d. Syme, CP, 1955, 129). Livy (xxviii. 28. 4) calls him a military
tribune. App. Samn. 9 2 has a romantic story of his blinding by a
Rhegine refugee doctor, called in to treat his eyes. Other sources for
the dispossessing of the Rhegines are Dio, fg. 40. 7-12; Dion. Hal.
xx. 4-5; Diod. xxii. r. 2-3.
The Roman reduction of Rhcgium (cf. 6. 8) is in 270; Dionysius
(xx. 16) and Orosius (iv. 3 3-6) attribute it to the consul C. Genucius,
but his colleague Cn. Cornelius Blasio triumphed de Rcgineis [act.
tr.). According to Zonaras (viii. 6), Hiero sent Syracusan troops to
help the Romans (accepted by DeSanctis, iii. r. 95; Stauffenberg, 8:
it may well be true). There is evidence that the Romans took action
against the troops in Rhcgium only when they spread their activity
to seize Croton (Zon. viii. 6) and destroy Caulonia (Paus. vi. 3 12);
then their punishment was represented as retribution for their breach
of 1Tl07<>. Rhcgium joined the Roman federation as an autonomous
member of the socii nauales (Philipp, RE, s.v. 'Regium', cols. soo-r).

8. 1. 1Tt:pl Tfjs auvopoua'l']s: in 270 Carthage possessed western and


central Sicily (1o. 6 n.), the Mamertini the north-cast corner and west
as far as Halaesa. Syracuse held the east coast from Tauromenium
to C. Pachynus (or the R. Helorus) with the hinterland to Agyrium
(Diod. xxii. 13. 2). The main clash was with Syracuse (De Sanctis,
iii. r. 92 n. 4, who thinks the Mamertini are unlikely to have spoilt
the good relations established with Carthage (Diod. xxiii. 7. 4) ; but
see 43 2 n. for a possible attack on Carthaginian Agrigentum).
2. TTJS 1Tpoup'l']f.'iV'I']S tm~eoupias: 'the Romans in Rhegium', i.e. the
revolted garrison. But the reduction of Rhegium was in 270, and the
pro-Roman tradition exaggerates its contribution to the difficulties
of the Mamertines in 264 (De Sanctis, iii. r. 224).
1rapa 1roSas: as in 7 s. this phrase is not to be pressed.
8. 3-9. 8. This digression on the rise of Hiero, with its clearly marked
53

I. 8. 3

ITALY

A~D

SICILY UP TO

beginning and end (cf. 8. :2 and ro. r), seems to follow a west-Greek
source (cf. the use of f3ripf3apoL of the Mamertini), who is most
probably Timaeus; so Meltzer, ii. sso-I; De Sanctis, iii. I. 225;
Beloch, iv. 2. II; RG, I4I; Stauffenberg, 19 n. 15, Bung, 128 n. r
(criticizing Laqueur's attribution to Philinus).
8. 3. xpovo~s ou 1TOAAois 1Tp0Tepov: the chronology of the early part
of Hiero's reign cannot be established with certainty. According
to 9 8 he assumed the title of king after the battle of the Longanus.
But in vii. 8. 4 P. states that on his death, in 215 (DeSanctis, iii. 2.
329), he had been king (f3arnAevaas) fifty-four years. This would imply
that the Longanus was in 270{69; and this view is defended by some
scholars (e.g. Niese, ii. 179 n. 5; Pais-Bayet, 2r8; Gelzer, Rom u.
Karthago (ed. Vogt, Leipzig, 1943), 182; Thiel, Hist. 145 f.). On the
other hand, ro. r-2 closely relates the Longanus to the Mamertine
embassy to Rome; and the battle described in Diod. xxii. r,), which
is almost certainly the Longanus (Diodorus calls it Ao[mvos), appears
to be about this time. Hence, if P. is correct in dating the assumption
of the royal title to after this battle, the fifty-four years of Hiero's
'reign' must be reckoned back to a seizure of power in 27o{69, and
must include five years of autocratic control during which he was
not yet called ,Baaw\eus- (so Lenschau (RE, 'Hieron (r3)'. col. 1505),
who would place his coup in autumn 270, in time for help to go to the
Romans besieging Rhegium; Beloch (iv. 2. 279) makes the coup 269/8,
since he dates Hiero's death to 214); or, alternatively, one must reject P.'s statement that Hiero took the title of king only after the
Longan us. In favour of the second solution is the following evidence:
r. There is a unanimous tradition (probably from Timaeus) in
Iustin. xxiii. 4 I, and Zon. viii. 6 that Hiero's rise to power
was after the departure of Pyrrlms from Sicil:r; and since it was
connected with his achievements against the Carthaginians, it
would seem to be about 275/4, a date actually given by Paus.
vi. I2. 2 (01. 126, 2).
2. Wilamowitz, Textgesch. der gr. Bukoliker (Berlin, r9o6), 153 ff.,
has shown convincingly that Thcoc. I d. xvi in honour of Hiero
is to be dated before I d. xvii in honour of Ptolemy Philadelphus; since the latter poem must be before 270, and is
probably 273/2 (cf. Gow, Theocritus, ii (Cambridge, 195o), 3os-6),
Id. xvi will have been composed about 275{4, which fits
Pausanias' date for Hiero's coup.
3 Hiero's son was called Gelo: and it is perhaps more likely that
he received this significant name after Hiero became king,
though this is not an argument to be pressed. vii. 8. 9 makes
Gelo over so on his death, which preceded his father's: hence
he was born before 265. This would favour an assumption of the
royal title in 27oj69 rather than after Longanus.
54

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

l. 9

4 In the present sentence Hiero is described as vov


oVTa.
KOf.Lt8fj when he seized power. On his death in 2I5 he was over
9o; vii. 8. 7; cf. [Lucian] Macrob. Io (aged 92); Livy, xxiv. 4 4
(in his ninetieth year). This would make him 36-38 in 27o{69,
and would on the whole favour the earlier date (275{4) for the
coup, when he would be 3I-33 Again taken alone this argument is not very weighty, since vov ovm may conceal some
exaggeration ad maiorem Hieronis gloriam.
Other solutions are possible, certainty is not. De Sanctis (iii. r. 94
n. 7; 95 n. u) accepts Pausanias' date for Hiero's dpxl}, but emends
vii. 8. 4 so as to give Hiero only fifty-one years' reign, reckoned from
the Longan us; and he dates Theoc. I d. xvi, with its exhortation to
make war on Carthage, after the Longanus and before Hiero's
assumption of the royal title (i.e. in 265). Stauffenberg, 92--95, accepts
all three dates (in 275{4 Hiero was elected to a legal generalship in
the army, in 27o{69 he carried out a coup, and in 265 was saluted
king); he dates I d. xvi to 275{4. when, however, it is hard to reconcile
Hiero's position in it with a normal republican aTpaTYJyla. In general
the solution sketched above seems the best way of dealing \vith
evidence which is ultimately irreconcilable.
The words xpovw; OV 1TOAAoi's 7TpOTEpov ('not long before': Paton
is misleading) form a general transitional phrase from I-2 to the
digression on Hicro, and their meaning is not to be pressed, since in
fact 2 covers a period of approximately five years (the SyTacusan
attack of 8. 2 is not to be distinguished from the situation in Io. 1,
as by Bung, I27-8). The sudden leap forward in 8. 2 from the investment of Rhegium by the Romans in 270 to the Syracusan investment
of Messana in 265 is due to P.'s lo\e of parallelism, and also to his
desire to motivate his digression on the rise of Hiero, which is
essential to his account of the opening stages of the First Punic War.
The earliest events in the digression (8. 3-4) will (on the above view)
date to 27 5/4
Mt:pycl.v"llv: otherwise unknown. Various emendations have been proposed. Perhaps identical with M6pyvva, a 1ToAts- LtKEAwv mentioned in
Philistus (Steph. Byz.), but also otherwise unknown.
vpos: Sen yi.vos: . otKovoflias:: for this characterization cf. v. 39 6 (on
Cleomenes) : 7TpOS" 7Tpayf.LaTWJJ OtKOVOf.Llav Ev</>v0s- J(d avAAl]f38YJV ~YEf.LOVtKOS'
Ka~ {3aatAtKos Tfj <f>vaEt. Artemidorus is not mentioned elsewhere.

9. 1. AmTlVTJS: Hiero's wife was called Philistis (Syll. 429; Head,


I84-5), which suggests that Leptines was descended from Philistus
the historian, who served as minister to Dionysius I and his son, and
married the daughter of the elder t)Tant's brother Leptines (Plut.
Dion, II. 6). The Leptines whom Timoleon expelled from a tyranny
at Engyion and Apollonia (Plut. Tirnol. 24) and banished to Corinth
55

l. 9

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO

(Diod. xvi. 72. 3, 5) was probably the son of this union, and the
grandfather of Hicro's father-in-law. The latter is most likely not
Agathocles' general Leptines (Diod. XX. s6. 2-3, 62. 3-s). See Beloch,
iv. 2. 283-4 for the reconstructed family tree; Holm, Gesch.. Sic. ii.
28i ff., 491 ff.
3. KUXEKT<1S ovTaS Kd.l KL\IT]TIICOIJS: KaXEF<ITf:> in P. has usually a
political sense, 'male animatus ciuis, non contentus praeseuti rerum
statu' (Schweighaeuser); cf. xxii. 4 3 (of Boeotia) : 8td ,-c) rrAEiov:::
dva.t Toti<: KUXEKTa<; nov drr6pwv; and, for the conjunction with
KLI!TJTLKO{, :XXViii. 17. I2 COntrasting ol uyta{VOVTffS With oi KLilTJTUt Kat
Ka.XEKTa.t (at Rhodes). See also i. 68. 10; and 6 below.
4. 11'pi KevTopL1t'a: modern Centuripe lies on the high ground south
of the Cyamosorus (modern Fiume Salso). Hiero was following the
inland route west of Etna, perhaps hoping to take over some of the
forts in this neighbourhood (Diod. xxii. 13). The phrase o~<: . .
crVfLf.d!wv may point to the tactics of the battle, viz. to make a flank
or rear attack with the citizen troops (Stauffcnbcrg, r8-19). If the
abandoning of the mercenaries was forced on Hiero by the fortunes
Timaeus' infelice apologia
of the battle, P.'s story will
(De Sanctis, iii. r. 94 n. 8). Since this battle was among Hiero's
7Tpwm Jmvo~1w.:ra (8. 5) it WaS probably fought shortly after 2i5/4.
It was followed by a period of military inactivity (g. 6: du,Pa'Aws ...
8tE!fjy"); this is, however, concealed in P.'s narrative, which in 8. 7
goes straight on to the Longanus campaign, immediately preceding
the First Punic War (8. 3 n.).
7. 1l'Epl Tov Aoyyo.vov 1TOTO.tJ-OV: the campaign is more fully
described in Diod. xxii. 13 (source uncertain: cf. Reuss, Phil., 19or,
104 (Philinus); Laqueur, RE, 'Philinos (8)', col. 2181 (Timaeus)).
After a preliminary attack on Messana, and a diversion during which
he took Mylae (if the coastal town, it was soon back in .Mamertine
hands: Stauffenberg, 95) and Ameselon (its garrison joined Hiero,
and its territory was divided between Agyrium and Centuripa).
Hiero advanced north, was joined by Halaesa, Tyndaris, and A bacaennm on the north coast, and with ro,ooo foot and r ,soo horse
met the :\1amertini near the R. Longan us (AolTavos: Diod.), probably
in the coastal plain to the west of Mylae (Stauffenberg, 20, 96). The
issue was decided when 6oo of Hiero's picked men took the enemy
in the rear.
8. Twv TjytJ-ovwv ~YKPUTTJS: one, named Klws, let himself bleed to
death (Diod. xxii. 13. 6).
T~v TWV (3ap(30.pwv Ko.n\1Taua TOAtJ-av: the phrase conceals a diplomatic setback; for Hannibal, the Punic admiral, who was off
Lipara, after congratulating Hiero accepted the Mamertine invitation
to garrison Messana (xo. r, II. 4) by sending troops under Hanno on to
the acropolis (Diod. xxii. IJ. i ; De Sanctis, iii. I.
; Stauffen berg,
56

THE FIRST PUNIC \VAR

T.

10.

21). It seems probable that Hiero's withdrawal followed Hannibal's


arrival (cf. Thiel, Hist. 146 n. 258).
~alAEVS . 11'poaT)yopEu9"1: probably incorrect: see above 8. 3 n.
Nor is P.'s credit to be saved by distinguishing the present recognition as !mJ ... TwP O'Vf<fl-axwv (so Reuss, Phil., rgor, ro4): see Hultsch,
ed. alt. praef., pp. xxxv-xxxvi; Luterbacher, Phil., r9o7, 398. The
salutation of the Syracusans is naturally implied, and P. calls Hiero
King of the Syracusans (i. 8. 3, II. 13, cf. vii. 8. r : TTJV Evpa.Koulwv
Ka1 Twv crVfLfixwv dpX"/v) : epigraphical evidence in Syll. 427 (perhaps
the dedication after Longanus), also coins. See also Justin. xxiii.
4 2 ; Diod. xxii. 13. 6~8 (who uses the word f3am/..d, for the period
before the Longanus). Hiero's monarchy was in the simple 'democratic' Syracusan tradition, and Stauffenberg, 22-23, has shown that
it owed little to Hellenistic ideas.

10. 1. o[ JLiv e1r~ KapxTJ&ov(ovs !CTecj>euyov: viz. to Hannibal, who at


once responded (above g. 8 n.). In their appeal to Rome the other
party could, as Campanians, claim a degree of kinship ( 2, Of.Locpv/..o>); cf. Cichorius, 58 ff.
3. 'PwJLtOI . i)1r6pT)aa.v: P. attributes two considerations to the
Senate: (r) Support of the :Mamcrtini was morally dubious (ro. 4,
SuuarroilonTo"), especially in view of recent action at Rhegium (cf.
iii. 26. 6). (z) Self-defence, however, demanded the occupation of
Messana. Since the two weigh almost equally (n. 1), the final issue
is left to the Comitia; and the People, played upon by the Consuls,
are persuaded through greed to sanction the war (n. Iff.). P. has
no reference to Philinus' allegation (sec iii. z6. 3) that the Roman
occupation of Messana contravened a Roman-Carthaginian treaty;
partly because he did not believe in such a treaty, and perhaps too
because he did not wish to complicate his argument with discussion of
Philinus at this point (Jacoby, on FGH, I74 F r).
P.'s account is open to t~o criticisms: it exaggerates Carthaginian
power (ro. 5-6 nn.) and it exaggerates the Carthaginian danger. A
Punic garrison ensconced in Messana was not such a threat to Italy
as P. suggests in ro. 9; as Heuss (HZ, 169, 1949~so. 471) correctly
observes, there is no evidence that Carthage had designs on Italy.
Indeed, it can fairly be argued that the real change was in the
situation of Rome rather than in that of Carthage. And yet, if Roman
power and interests had extended to the straits, that had another
side: Rome was now exposed at a greater number of points. Events
at Rhegium must have made her conscious of the straits and their
implications (the Mamertines had helped the Campanians at
Rhegium). Carthage was perhaps not openly hostile: but there was
a history of secular conflict to keep her within the western bounds
of Sicily. She had not before reached Messana; and the war with
57

1.

10.

ITALY AND SICILY t:P TO

Pyrrhus had perhaps made Rome over-sensitive to the dangers


which might come from foreign interference in south Italy. Such
arguments as these may well have been played up by the Mamertine
envoys who came to ask for the alliance. There is nothing difficult
in the view that these Campanians occupied the role that was to
belong to Massilia before the Second Punic War, and to Rhodes and
Pergamum before the Second \Var with Philip. In the main, therefore,
F.'s account is not unconvincing; and the slight anachronisms contained in its stress on the Punic Empire abroad, and what we may
call the 'Mediterranean' aspect of the Carthaginian threat, are easily
explained if P. has followed as his source the version of Fabius Pictor
(see r4. r n.), who, writing after the Second Punic War, naturally
read later motives into the earlier events. F.'s account is accepted
in the main by Thiel (Hist. I357), whose discussion must, however,
be read in the light of hi.s belief in the reality of Philinus' treaty as
a compact dating to 306 (iii. 26. 3-4). Recently a more radical assessment of F.'s account has been made by Bung, 135--8, who would
reject it entirely as a product of the discussions of the middle of the
second century, and of his own 'researches and combinations'; this
view implies that Fabius barely touched upon the causes of the war
(which seems most improbable, when the Romans were taking their
first steps overseas), and for the debate in P. substitutes one on 'the
pros and cons of a war with a naval power, the end of which could
not be foreseen'. This theory seems based on an anachronistic view
of the perspectives which opened out before the Roman senate of
264. It makes the senate irresponsible, it completely discredits P.,
and it throws his readers back on pure conjecture.
The likelihood is rather that the arguments in P. are substantially
those which were presented to the Senate in 264 : fides and selfinterest were weighed
each other in considering whether to
accept the Mamertine offer of alliance. That this involved the possibility of a clash with the Punic garrison already in the town the
envoys must have made clear: at the same time they will have
stressed the threat to Rome if it remained there. The Romans will
also have recognized the risk of
to fight Hiero. But it is hard
to accept the argument of Reuss (op. cit., 478 ff.), that it was only
Hiero they expected to ftght; for in fact Appius declared war on the
Carthaginians, and hardly without the authorization of the Senate
(n. I I n.). Naturally there were other motives. Some senators may
have felt the threat from Carthage to be unreal, and an overseas
policy a disaster when so much remained to be done in Italy; and
the consuls (or at least Appius Claudius) welcomed an opportunity
for military fame (cf. II. 2 n.). But in broad outline Gelzer (Hermes,
1933, 133-42) is to be followed in his interpretation of P.'s account
as both reproducing Fabius, and substantially reliable.
58

THE FIRST PFNIC WAR

I. 10. 5

5. Ta KO.Tn TTJV AL~ullv: Carthaginian territory proper was not large.


T. Frank (CAH, vii. 665; 68z) reckons it at c. 6oo square miles of
arable soil (plus rough pasture), with a west frontier ai Dougga, and
a south at Zaghouan. But before 400 much of neighbouring Libya
was tributary (Justin. xviii. 5 14, xix. r. 3, z. 4); and from the sixth
century Carthage had formed a strong confederacy of the west
Phoenician colonies, capable of ending Greek expansion in the
western Mediterranean. In 265 her power embraced the whole coastline from the Altars of Philaenus on the Syrtis to the Straits of
Gibraltar (see iii. 39 2 n.; date 218), and these important Phoenician
colonies: Acholla, Lcpcis Minor, Hadrumetum, Utica, both Hippos,
and Canthale (site unknown). There were other Carthaginian or
Phoenician towns around C. Metagonium (cf. iii. 33 12 ff.) and a
minor group beyond the Straits; in Tripolis there were Sabratha,
Oea, and Lepcis Magna. The towns were closely bound to Carthage
by separate treaties, carrying rights of intermarriage; and though
some paid tribute, they are distinct from the 'subject cities and
races' of vii. 9 5 Sec De Sanctis, ilL r. 25-.34, _36-40; Pais-Bayet,
194-6; Meltzer, ii. 74-95.
Tf)s '1!3TJpa.s un'fttcoa. n'o/\/\0. j.!Ef>TJ n'E'IfOLlll-lf.vous: not many details
are known. Gades was probably secured by a treaty against occupation (De Sanctis, iii. r. 35 n. 97). Malaca (on the site of the Greek
Maenace) and Abdera are known Punic stations; and one should
probably add Sexi (Phoenician coinage) and, in view of their positions, Carteia and Calpe. The treaty of 348 with Rome (iii. 24) made
Mastia (probably Cartagena) a limit for Roman ships, i.e. the empire
in Spain was still intact. It may have been lost during the First
Punic War (Schulten, CAH, vii. 78r). ln any case its extent is not
to be exaggerated. Probably only a few coastal tribes were controlled
(Meltzer, ii. 102-4; R. L. Beaumont, ]RS, 1939, 83). Here Fabius
may well be reading into the argument the conditions of the Barcid
empire (ro. 3 n.), while the Barcids in their turn recognized the
propaganda value of a claim to be merely recovering (cf. ii. I. 6:
aVEK'TCL'TO) ancient Carthaginian possessions.
Twv vftawv &n'a.awv: the Sardinian Sea (iii. 41. 7, 47. 2, xxxiv. 6) covers
the waters round Sardinia and Corsica and westward towards the
Gulf of Lions and the Spanish coast: on the Tyrrhenian Sea cf.
ii. I4. 4 n. Sardinia contained a group of Phoenician (probably
Punic) colonies: Caralis, Nora, Sulci, Tharros, and Olbia (DeSanctis,
i . .334); and except in the north-east the natives had been reduced
and made subject (cf. 79 6). But it is unlikely that the Carthaginians
held either Elba or Corsica (which the Romans took in 259; Flor.
i. 18. r5-16; Zan. viii. u); though no confidence can be placed in
Serv. ad Aen. iv. 628: 'in foederibus (sc. between Rome and Carthage) . . . cautum est ut Corsica esset media inter Romanos et
59

I. IO. 5

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO

Carthaginienses', for the Romans never questioned Punic interference in the island between 306 and 264. The Aeolian Islands became
Punic after Agathocles' death; and south of Messana there were
Phoenicians on Melitc, Gaulos, and Cossyra (Ps.-Scylax, I I I ; Diod.
v. I2. 3-4; evidence of coins), and a Punic colony on Ebusus in the
Pityussae Islands (Diod. v. r6 . .z).
6. Ei ItKE~ia.s En Kvp,euaatev: Carthage already controlled western
Sicily, including several Greek cities. There were Phoenician colonies
at Motya (later Lilybaeum). Panormus, Soluntum, and Thermae.
After Pyrrhus left, Agrigentum and Phintias came to terms with
the Carthaginians (IS. Io; Diod. ::<L-..:iii. r. z; Beloch, iv. r. 649 n. r),
and Syracuse had her bounds restricted (8. I n.). The Romans may
well have feared that from 11cssana the Carthaginians might impede
their free passage through the straits, or interfere in Italy through
the Oscans or Greeks.

11. 1. To f.Lkv auvSptov ooo' d.s TEAos eKupwaE TTJV yvwp.TJv: 'the
Senate did not sanction the proposal at all'. (On the meaning of
Els- reAos see Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. T/.)..or;.) The issue was
clearly one of admitting :\lcssana as an ally, not one of war with
either Hiero or Carthage; d. iii. 26. 6; Florus, i. r8. 3, 'cum de
Poenorum impotentia foederata Siciliae ciuitas .Messana quereretur';
Livy, xxx. 31. 4 Some difticulty has been felt about this account of
an ovcrscrupulous Senate referring the decision to a war-weary but
easily converted people; and Livy, e:rh. r6, 'auxilium Mamertinis
ferendum serratus censuit, cum de ea re inter suadentes, ut id f1eret,
dissuadentcsque contentio fuissct', suggests that the Senate in fact
took the decision, a view which might appear to be supported by
rr. 3, Kvpw8l!nos St roD 86ytto:ros- {;rro roD 3~ttov. It is true that 86ytta
is the normal Greek translation of (senatus) consultum; but it is also
used in Res Gest-ae, 12, to translate (senatus) auctorilas, i.e. a resolution
of the Senate which is invalid on formal g~ounds. It is not impossible
that P. may have used it here to describe a measure which the
Senate had neither approved nor rejected; and it would not be
illegal, if it was unusual, for a consul (rr. 2 n.) to bring such a
measure before the people (:'<lommsen, St.-R. iii. 345 n. I, n7o ff.).
P.'s account clearly derives from Fabius Pictor, who sought to put
any odium for a dubious policy upon the people; but this does not
mean that it is untrue and that we should follow De Sanctis' s version
of a war-weary people led to acquiesce in a senatorial war-policy
after assurances that it did not really mean war (iii. r. 99). If the
issue that divided the Senate was, as P. says, whether interest or
morality should prevail (1o. 3, 10. 9), they might well accept the
suggestion of an eager consul that the people should decide; and in
the assembly arguments of a very different character would naturally
6o

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

!.

II.

be used (u. 2). The popular decision may well have received senatorial approval in retrospect, for there is no evidence that there was
strong political opposition to the policy of the .M:amertine alliance.
2. ot Se 1To>.>.oL: the striking of a Jaedus was normally a matter for
the tribal assembly (cf. Livy, xxix. r2. r6, xxx. 43 2, xxxiii. 25. 6),
whereas a war-motion must have gone to the comiHa centuriata
(Mommscn, St.-R. iii. 344) ; and since the approach was made by the
consuls (aTpaTTjyo{, z), the comitia tr1:buta is indicated (not thr~
concdimn plebis: so Frank, C AH, vii. 671-2). Several scholars (including Paton) render aTpaTTjyol 'military leaders': but it is difficult
to see who these would be, and in any case, though P. occasionally
uses aTpa:TTj'JH)s for commander, where the meaning is unambiguous,
or where (as in 3; d. 59 8) the commander is the consul, his normal
meaning for the word in Roman contexts is 'consul'. (E. Meyer
(Kl. Schr. ii. 376) points out that as M. Fulvius Flaccus was operating
at this time against Volsinii (he triumphed hal. nozt.), only Appius
Claudius can in fact have brought the matter before the people.)
No account need be taken of .Meyer's view that the initiative came
from the equites, a complete anachronism for 264 (cf. Hill, 45).
w<jlt:Xda.s '11"po8Tj>.ous KCli j1Ey0.Xas: the reference is to booty, pure and
simple: d. ii. 29. 9 imo
TOV AVO"LTAOVS t:l:rr{oos ayop.EvaL, 3I. 4 (also
from Fabius).
3. J\.1T1TLOv KXa.u8Lov: Ap. Claudius C.f. Ap.n. Caudex, cos. A.U.c.
490 = 264/3 B.C. (his colleague was M. Fulvius Flaccus). Neither his
family connexions (he was too young to be the brotl1er of Caecus,
as auct. de uir. 1:/l. ,n. 1) nor the origins of his cognomen are known.
Munzer, RE. 'Claudius (1o2)', cols. 26)2-4; 'Fulvius (ss)', col. 239.
4. Tov j1~V Twv KapxTJ8ovwv 1npa.TT]Yov .. s~a.Xov: his name was
Hanno (Zon. viii. 9; above, 9 8 n.). "Whereas P. attributes his expulsion to the :\lamcrtines (probably following Philinus), the
annalistic tradition in Dio, fg. 43 7-ro and Zon. viii. 8 has an
account of a tribune C. Claudius, who made several trips across the
straits and played a prominent and not wholly honourable part in
the expulsion of the garrison ; this exploit is preceded by a seabattle (cf. Diod. xxiii. 2; AmpeL 46. 3). Much of this is clearly
fabricated; whether it conceals a core of truth, and a tribune C.
Claudius in fact crossed ahead of the consul, is probably past knowing.
De Sanctis (iii. r. ro4, 236) and Thiel (Hist. T49 ff.) accept his existence; Beloch (iv. r. 647 n. 2), followed by Hcuss (HZ, r69, r949-50,
483-4), is wholly sceptical. There is, however, no trace of him in P.,
despite attempts to discover him (Miinzer, RE, 'Claudius (r8}', col.
26&); DeSanctis, iii. r. I05 n. 22.: Bung, I4o). It has been argued that
the words Tov 8' J1mTwv vexdpL'(,av must refer to an earlier
occasion than the crossing described in 9 In fact, the imperfects
are to be given their full force, 'they invited Appius over, and were
6J

J.

II.

ITALY AND SICILY UP TO

for placing the city in his hands' (for this meaning of the imperfect
see the examples quoted at iii. 21. I n.); having described this
decision P. then passes on to the Carthaginians and Syracusans,
and finally comes back to relate Appius' arrival in 9 Consequently there is no need to assume two expeditions and two separate
Claudii.
5. TOV crTpaTT)yOv aveaTaOpwcrav: i.e. Hanno: cf. Zon. viii. 9
A Roman general with limited powers and precise instructions could
rely on the backing of the Senate; a Punic commander had greater
authority for decisions, but might always be sacrificed in a crisis.
See De Sanctis, iii. I. I03 ff. Here P.'s narrative suggests Hanna's
immediate crucifixion (by his soldiers?) : but the account is compressed and he may have been recalled and then executed.
6. 1l'Epi ner,wp~a.sa crTpaT01l'ESeocravn:s: modem Capo di Faro, the
north-east promontory of Sicily; cf. 42. 5 TheL'JvEts- (Diod. xxiii. 1. 3,
Evvas-) are unknow-n: but the description in Zon. viii. 9 suggests that
the spot lay near the coast to the north of Messana, and De Sanctis
(iii. 1. 108 n. 26) locates it 'fra Ganzirri e Faro inferiore'. The topographical details in 6-8 are also in Diod. Joe. cit. and will be from
Philinus.
7. Tl9ETm 1l'pos To(Js KapxTJSovlous cruv9..]Kas: with Hanna, son of
Hannibal, according to Diod. xxiii. 1. 2. Hiero's motives must be
conjectural. His readiness to sink past disputes may signify that he
realized the full significance of the present situation (De Sanctis,
iii. 1. 105-6: but this is only true if he knew the Romans had been
invited in). Alternatively, he was moved by sheer pique at the
ingratitude of the Romans, whom he had helped at Rhegium. But
what P. says is that he now saw a chance to combine with Carthage
to expel his old enemies, the {3ap{3apot in Messana; the Romans are
not mentioned.
8. 11'Epi TO XaAKLSLKOV opos: evidently to the south of Messana, 'nell'
interno verso mezzogiorno, forse tra la citta e il Forte Gonzaga'
(DeSanctis, iii. 1. 108 n. 26).
9. vuKTOS 11'Ep~LW9els Tov 11'op9JLov: despite which he was attacked
by the Punic fleet: i. 20. I4. See further Zon. viii. 9; Frontin. Strat.
i. 4 11; auct. de ur. ll. 37; on the date, above 5 I-5 n. 7rapa{36Aws
'at great risk' or perhaps (cf. 23. 7) 'in a remarkable fashion'.
11. SLE1l'p(O"~E0ETO 11'p0S a~OTEpous: d. Diad. xxiii. I. 4 (the envoys
conveyed friendly messages to Hierc, who replied justifying his
attack on the Mamertini, and accusing the Romans of concealing
their ambitions under a false cloak of fides). In Diodorus Appius
sent envoys to both Hiero and the Carthaginians from Rhegium,
before crossing the straits ; and the Carthaginians sent a return
embassy to Rhegium (Diad. xxiii. 2. I). An embassy from Rhegium
was also implied in Philinus' account, vvhich made Appius attack
62

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

as soon as he was in Messana (rs. z). Since the Roman embassy was
followed by an attack, it presumably delivered the indictio belli;
probably the revised procedure was employed, by which legati went
armed with a conditional authorization from Senate and People, so
that if the rerztm repetitio were rejected, there need be no delay in
legitimizing hostilities (d. 88. 8 n.). This is recorded by Ennius, 223
Vahlen 2 : Appius indixit Karthaginiensibus bellum (cf. Naevius, 3I
Mor.; Cichorius, z6-z7); and, as we have no reason for assuming that
Appius declared war on his own responsibility, the original decision
to accept the Mamertine alliance must since have been followed by
an appeal by the new ally for assistance, and a war-motion in the
Senate and the Comitia Centuriata. That the embassy went from
Rhegium is on the whole more probable (De Sanctis, iii. I. ro8; for
discussion see Stauffenberg, 28 n. 21: Heuss, HZ, r69, 1949~5o, 48I
n. I; Thiel, Hist. 149 ff., who accepts three embassies).
11-15. This account (probably based on Fabius)
Appius the
victory over Hiero, and is in contrast to Philinus' version (IS. r-u)
of the battle as a H.oman defeat; similarly the victory over the
Carthaginians in 12. 3 is contrasted with Philinus' version in the
same chapter.

12. 5-9. Here P. recapitulates ch. 5 The disaster to Rome ( 7) is


of course the Gallic invasion (cf. 6. z~3). Examples of digressions
surveying earlier events ( 8) are those on the Gauls (ii. 14 I ff.), on
the Achaeans and Macedon (ii. 37 7 ff.), and on Antiochus III and
Ptolemy IV (v. JI. 8 ff.). In 7 'TO K<4>ailawv avrwv rfjs; vvv V7TI:.poxif' is
'their present supremacy, taken as a whole'; in 9 x&.ptv roil Aa.ftpavnv dpxd, Tota-&Tas is 'in order to take such a starting-point .. .'
(d. iv. z8. 3), not (as Paton) 'to establish such a fundamental view'.

13-64. The First Punic War


13. L Ktttl>a.Ao.~w8&s 1TpOK9"J-1-~vous: for a discussion of this phrase
see iii. r. 5 n.
2-5. Here P. summarizes the contents of books i and ii: the First
Punic \Var (264-24I) is described in i. 13--{)4, the Mercenary War
(241-238) in i. 6s-88, Hamilcar's exploits in Spetin (237-229) in ii. I,
Hasdru bal's (zz8-zzr) in ii. 13 and 36; the First Illyrian War (22g-:zz8)
in ii. z I2; the Celtic Wars (zzs-zzz) in ii. n-35; and the Cleomenean
War (zzS-222)-with a summary of earlier Achaean history-in
ii. 37-70.
9 t~>n'lTTEa9<:u: 'to touch on' (d. ii. 37. s); not (as Laqueur, 201-J)
'to link up (my narrative with that of previous historians)' (which is
rather avv&.wrnv: cf. 8). oi </>tAolwfJoiJvns arc 'students of history':

L IJ. 9

THE FIRST

PF~IC

WAR

d. 65. 9. iii. :zr. 9-ro, where they are mentioned in contrast to states-

men.
13. 10-14. l. The 'war for Sicily' (cf. 2o. :z) deserves special attention
for three reasons:
Its magnitude compared with other wars( n). This is a commonplace already found in Thuc. i. :zJ (on the Peloponncsian
War).
2. Because of their circumstances, it offers an unequalled opportunity of understanding the special characteristics of Rome
and Carthage ( r:z). (For (r) and (:z) see further GJ. 4-64. 6.)
3 Its previous historians have written as partisans ( r).
I.

In fact P. does not treat this war in any greater detail than the
Illyrian \Var or the Mercenary War (Laqueur, 201).
13. 11. oun . 1ToAuxpov~wTEpov . 1TOAJ1-0V: d. Diod. xxiii. IS 4:
Sto Ked awifJ'YJ Tov 7ToA,;p.ov p.a.Kpo'Ta'Tov yHiaOat Twv p.v'YJp.ovwop.ivwv
(probably from Philinus).
12. aKJ1-YJV aKepa.~a. .. Tots i9~0'f10lS: cf. vi. sr. I-4 By the time of the
Hannibalic War the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated.
p.eTp~a. Ta.'ts Tuxa.~s: 'receiving but modest help from fortune' (so
convincingly) ; d. x. S 8, d, 8wV> Kat 'T11xa> dvaipovcn 'TOS a.iT{a.<:; Twv St' dyx{votav . imHAovp.ivwv. The important
factor was the courage and constancy of the belligerents (for 7TEptmmda> in I I is 'disasters').
14. I. E1TLcrTfjua.t Toun:J T~ 'll'oAe11-~: either 'to direct (readers') attention to' (d. ii. 6r. n), or 'to pay attention to' (cf. ix. 23. I, xv. 9 3).
4l~Atvov t<a.l. <1>Q.~~ov: these writers are somewhat exceptional in being
criticized in moderate terms: cf. i. IS. r:z, 58. 5. iii. 8. r-g. 5 (Fabius),
i. 15. r
iii. z6 (Philinus).
Q. Fabius Pictor, the oldest Roman historian, has not survived
(Peter, IIRR, i. 5 ff.), which are really referexcept in
ences in later writers. He was a senator (iii. 9 4) and contemporary
with the Hannibalic War; in 225 he had fought at Telamon (Eutrop.
iii. 5; Oros. iv. r3. 6), and in 216 visited Delphi as senatoriallegatus
(Livy, xxii. 57 s. xxiii. II. 1-ti). His history, which traced the story
of Home from its foundation (dated 748/7: see vi. II a 2 n.) to his
own time. was written in Greek (Diou. Hal. i. 6. 2; Cic. de din. i. 43),
and had the definite political purpose of justifying Roman policy to
the Greeks. The earlier picture of Fabius as a jejune recorder of
consulships, omens, auspices, and little else (Mommsen, R6m. Forsch.
ii. 272 ff.) has been properly revised; but the antithesis between him
and the later annalists must not be exaggerated (as by Gelzer,
Hermes, 1933.
; r934, 46-55; see now the modified statement in
Hermes, 1954,
criticizing F.
Ilisioria, 1953, r8g-zog),

64

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I.

If. I

for, though Hellenistic influence can be traced in a liking for the


sensational and paradoxical, much of Fabius' work betrays the raw
Roman material-Fasti, pontifical records, magistrate lists, family
traditions, tituli, elogia, laudationes in crabbed Latin, formal in expression, repetitive, and without literary pretensions (Walbank, CQ,
1945, rs-rs). Further discussion in Munzer, RE, 'Fabius (rz6}'. cols.
1836-4r; Peter, HRR, i. lxix-c; Bung, op. cit.
Philinus of Agrigentum (FG/l, 174) was probably a contemporary
of the war, and wrote from the Carthaginian standpoint; his hostility
towards Rome may have been accentuated by the treatment of
Agrigentum in 26r (r9. rs). The fact that Diodorus used Philinus only
for the First Punic \Var, and went over to P. as his source for the
Mercenary War, suggests that Philinus wrote a monograph on the
former subject (Jacoby, FGH, ii D, p. 598); and this may be confirmed
by the superlatives applied to the First Punic War in 13. I I and 63. 4,
if indeed these are taken over from Philinus (cf. Klotz, Hermes, 1952,
326)~~certainly they are more fitting to a monograph on that war
than to a subject which is merely the introduction to P.'s main
history. See too rs. I n. There is evidence that Philinus, like Fabius,
wrote in the 'tragic' Hellenistic style, with its stress on paradox and
sensational events, and on the role of Fortune, but harnessed to a
didactic purpose (CQ, 1945, 5 ff.}.
It is generally agreed that Fabius and Philinus are P.'s exclusive
sources for the First Punic War; this seems implied by his reference
to them at this point, and recent attempts to minimize considerably
the role of Fabius (so Bung), or to argue paradoxically against the
use of either Philinus or Fabius (P. Pedech, REA, 1952, 246-66) are
unconvincing. There is, however, violent disagreement on the apportionment of P.'s narrative between the two. The problem is complicated by the fact that Fabius may have used Philinus himself,
and also because P. is far from mechanical in his interweaving of
sources. On one occasion his narrative allows us to compare the
same events as recorded by Fabius (rr. IJ-I2. 4) and by Philinus
(rs. z-s); but normally he accepts one or the other without discussion. In general, it is likely that references to consul-names in
P. are taken from Fabius, and those to 'years of the war' from
Philinus' monograph ; and this would suggest a greater use of the
former for the earlier part of the war, and of the latter for the later
years, especially when Hamilcar comes on the scene. Problems are
discussed below, as they arise. See De Sanctis, iii. r. 224~30 (with
earlier literature); L. Sisto, Alene e Roma, 1931, r76--2o2; Gclzer,
opp. cit.; Walbank, CQ, 1945, I-I8; Bung, 49-150; Heuss, HZ, r69,
1949-50, 457-513; Pedech, REA, 1952, 246-66; Klotz, Hermes, 1952,
32 5-34; La nouvelle Clio, r 953, 237-48. Laqueur' s article in RE, 'Philinos
(8)', cols. zr8o-93, is perverse, though here and there very suggestive.
F

I. 14 z

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

2-3. a.ip~aEUlS arpeaLV: 'principles'( z), 'partisan zeal' ( 3); On


the use of this word in epigraphical texts (une jormule banale, Holleaux), see welles, 310. P. often uses a word in two senses in close
juxtaposition, e.g. s8. I (7rapa{loAws-, 'by a bold stroke'' 7Tapaf3o"Aw-repov,
'more desperate'); ii. 40. 3, 5 (lTTta-ra(ns-, 'notice', 'starting-point');
iii. II4. 3 (Ka-rarpopd., 'cutting-edge', 'cutting'); iv. zo.
(perhaps
vofLOt: but see note).
2. 1rapa1rA1)aLov 'I"OLS Epwat: cf. Plato, Laws, v. 73I E: -rvrpAov-rat TTepi
-r6 rptAoVfL~vov 6 rptAwv, wa-re -rei SLKata Kat -ra dya8ci Ka1. -rd KaAci KaKwsKpLv<.t.
5. 'l"o '~"tlS LCT'I"op[as ~8os: the duty to be impartial and truthful is
reaffirmed repeatedly: cf. ii. 56. 2, 56. 12, iii. 47 6, viii. 8. 5-9, X.
21. 8, xii. 7 3-6, u. 8, 12. 3, 27-28, xxxiv. 4, xxxviii. 4 5 But slight
concessions are permissible in the interests of piety (xvi. 12. 9); so
too is a slight twist in favour of one's own country (xvi. 14. 6).
Involuntary errors are of course pardonable in a universal historian
(xxix. 12; cf. xii. 4 a I, 7 6, 8. 1, n. 4, 12. 1-5, xvi. 14 7-8). P. falls
short of these standards in many cases, especially when he is concerned with enemies of Achaea (like the Aetolians or Boeotians) or
with rival historians (like Phylarchus or Timaeus). See above, pp. Io ff.
6-7. l:Ja1rEp ~~ou K'I"A.: P. recalls this passage in his polemic
against Timaeus (xii. 12. 3), as he recalls 7 in describing Philip V's
firmness of purpose in his campaign of zoo (xvi. z8. 5). In general
P. prefers to judge, not the man as a whole, but his separate actions
as they occur: cf. x. z6. 9 A comprehensive criticism is left till the
end. On this practice see Bruns, Personlichkeit, 5 ff.
8. 6.1ro<f!aaELS Kat OLaX1)tELS: 'statements (of fact) and judgements
(on matters of opinion)': Strachan-Davidson.
15. 1-11. Philinus' account of Ap. Claudius' operations: cf. II. nIz. 4 It would seem that both Philinus and Fabius were agreed that
Claudius advanced on Syracuse, and attacked Echetla; but in
Fabius this was preceded by a victory, in Philinus by a defeat.
However, the consul M'. Valerius, Claudius' successor, took the cognomen Messalla, triumphed (act. tr.)~unlike Ap. Claudius- and
exhibited on the wall of the Curia Hostilia a picture representing
his victory over the Carthaginians and Hiero. In view of this it is
hard to accept Fabius' version, which leaves no room for Valerius'
victory; and there is a good deal to be said for Beloch's hypothesis
(iv. z. 533-6) that Ap. Claudius' march on Syracuse is a doublet from
that of M'. Valerius (Diod. xxiii. 4 1), introduced by Fabius, and taken
over by later annalists (Zon. viii. 9), some of whom (Eutrop. ii. 18;
Sil. It. vi. 66z) even invented Ap. Claudius a triumph. However, this
requires the assumption that P. misread Philinus, and thought that
a reference to a Roman advance on Syracuse (which was in fact that
66

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. !6.

of M'. Valerius) applied to the advance under Ap. Claudius which he


found recorded in Fabius. It also implies that Diod. xxiii. 3, with its
reference to a Carthaginian defeat (not in Philinus), and the attack
by the consul on a town called "Ey<aTa (? 'Exi.T/..a, cf. IS. 10), is
from an annalistic source (Fabius, according to Jacoby, on FGH,
174 F 2). In that case the attack on Echetla was transferred by
Fabius from M'. Valerius to Ap. Claudius, since IS. IO shows it to have
been mentioned by Philinus, ex hypothesi in connexion with M'.
Valerius. (DeSanctis (iii. I. I09 n. 29, 232, 236-7) makes the alternative suggestion that Diod. xxiii. 4 is taken from Philinus, and applies
to M'. Valerius; but this does not explain why Diodorus speaks of
a Carthaginian defeat, whereas Philinus made it a victory (rs. 2).
Moreover, the motivation of Hiero's retreat~suspicion of Carthaginian false play-looks like an annalistic
since the Carthaginians clearly bore Hiero no malice, and shortly afterwards sent
a fleet to his aid (Diod. xxiii. 4 I ad fin.).) If this thesis of Beloch's is
accepted, one may assume the annalistic building-up of Ap. Claudius
to be
of an attack by Fabius Pic tor on the record of M'. Valerius,
who
been reduced to insignificance in P.'s account. To him is
attributed the victory outside Messana; and his subsequent setbacks (d. Zon. viii. 9) explain why his pretended campaign produced
no results. Bung's discussion, pp. I41-3 (cf. 78 ff.), is based on the
unconvincing thesis that II. u-r2. 4 is simply Philinus' version,
corrected on the basis of the logical criticism enunciated in 15. 9-n.
1. -rf\ s Seu-repa.s ~u ~.Aou : the first book will have given the preceding
events, probably including Hiero's rise to power (cf. 9 7 n.). This
further confirms the view that Philinus wrote a monograph on the
war.
10. T~V 'Exe-r.Aa.v: a xwplov oxvp6v between Leontini and Camarina
(Diod. xx. 32), not yet located; suggestions in Holm, Gesch. Sic. iii.
342-3; Hi.ilsen, RE, 'Echetla', cols. r9rs-r6 (ruins on the hill Occhiala
near Granmichele, east of Caltagirone, where remains of a sanctuary
of Demeter have been discovered).
12. 1ra.pa.1rAT)O'LW') BE Kat <>a~tOV: e.g. s8. s. iii. 8. I-9 15. Absence of
criticism of Fabius here suggests that it was the desire to indulge in
polemic
Philinus on a specific issue that prompted the present
digression.
16. 1. Mavtov '0-ra.KlAtov Ka.t Mavtov Ooa..Aeptov: M'. Otacilius C.f.
M'.n. Crassus and M'. Valerius M.f. M.n. Maximus (Messalla), coss.
A.U.C. 491
B.C. Otacilius was a plebeian and a nouus homo,
Valerius from a gens traditionally hostile to the Claudii; their election
denotes a reaction against the Senate and its representative, Ap.
Claudius: De Sanctis, iii. r. no; Munzer, 67; RE, 'Otacilius (1o)',
cols. r859-6r. Thiel (Hist. 73) has recently argued that Valerius was
67

I.

I6. 2

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

an active advocate of a naval policy. That both consuls were sent


to Sicily is con finned by Diod. xxiii. 4 I; Zon. viii. 9; Oros. iv. 7. 3
Otacilius' role is implied by Naevi.us fg. 32 Mor. (Cichorius, 27):
'Manius Valerius i consul partem exerciti in expeditionem I ducit';
and he had left Rome on r3 September, when in consequence a
dictator clau figendi causa was appointed (Fast. Cap.). But the
prominence given to Valerius in the tradition-his cognomen Messalta, the picture depicting the battle (or battles?) fought victoriously
against the Carthaginians and Hiero (Pliny, Nat. hist. xxxv. 2:2; cf.
Cic. in Vat. 9 n), his sole responsibility for the peace (ined. Vat. 4 (ap.
von Arnim, Hermes, 18gz, 120 ff.) quoted below, 67 n.)-all suggest
that Otacilius crossed after his colleague, and took no part in the
battle at Messana; for their later joint successes see below, 3 n. The
sending of a double consular army-a nonnal year's full levy (cf.
vi. zo. 8-9, iii. 72. I2) together with the allies-was exceptional, and
a
of the gravity of the occasion. In all about 4o,ooo troops must
have been sent to Sicily in :z63. See Luterbacher, Phil., I907, 403;
Beloch, iv. 2. 535-6. The rejection of Valerius' victory by DeSanctis
(iii. I. uo n. 31) is unconvincing.
3. a.l 1TAEiou'> &.~~aTajLEva.t 1ToAe~'>: details in Diod. xxiii. 4, who
attributes the campaign to both consuls. After Adranum, south-west
of
had fallen to assault, and Centuripa was being besieged,
envoys came to offer the surrender of Alaesa; and a general surrender induded Centuripa and probably Enna (Diod. xxiii. g. 4).
Camarina came over now or after Hiero's capitulation; so too
Catana (Pliny, Nat. hist. vii. :214); but Tauromenium remained
Syracusan, despite Eutrop. ii. 19. I. The siege of Echetla may belong
to this expedition (I5. I-II n.). Diodorus' figure of sixty-seven towns
which joined Rome may be an anticipation (by Philinus or some
annalist) of the later number of Sicilian communes (sixty-seven
excluding Messana, or excluding Syracuse); De Sanctis, iii. I. n4-15
n. 36; Bung, 79 n. I. Holm (Gesch. Sic. iii. u) attributes the speed of
the Roman conquest to an upsurge of sympathy for an Italian conqueror among the Sicel population.
7. 9a.Aa.no~epa.To{l\l'rwv Twv Ka.pxl]Soviwv: the Roman naval inferiority is stressed by I ned. Vat. 4: Mdvms oi BaAlp~os o) Tas rrp6;;
'1/.pwva avvll~Kas rro~7JcrdJ.J-"~'os So~<fii Kal. f3paxlws Kat d.A7Jilws Elrrwv
rrpoTplif;at 7'~11 povA~v exwllat 'TWII l'll.VTLI<WV o-n 'ITEPL !n]aov Kll.t iv ll~Utp
f.laxaJJ-ivovs ovK la-n -r(i; 'ITaV'Tt vtKav JJ-~ vavKpa-roilv-ra;;;. The statement
attributed to L. Piso (Pliny, Nat. hist. xvi. 192), that the Romans
built 220 ships against Hiero in forty-five days, reads like an anticipation of the ships built in 255/4 (i. 38.
; cf. Thiel, Hst. 70-73 against
Beloch, iv. I. 649 n. L
9. 1TO~l]<T6.p.evm 8 <Tuv9~Ka.'>: technically a foedus aequum, with
special clauses governing the conclusion of peace (Stauffenberg, 40);

<

6R

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. I7. (,

it had to be confirmed by the people (17. 1, d. vi. 14. 10 f.). P.'s


figure for the tribute is probably Fabius' and is preferable to the
200 talents of Eutrop. ii. 19; Oros. iv. 7 3; Diodorus' 25 talents may
be a first instalment (Diod. xxiii. 4 1), though DeSanctis (iii. I. II7)
argues that it is an annual tribute in addition to the indemnity. The
treaty was renewed in 248, when any outstanding tribute was cancelled (Zon. viii. 16) ; and Diod. xxiii. 4 I can hardly be right in
stating that it was only established for fifteen years in the first
instance, since this was not Roman practice (Taubler, 91 f.). Hiero
kept Syracuse, Acrae, Leontini, Megara, Helorus, and Neaetum,
with Tauromenium (Diod. xxiii. 4 r); later he had Erbessus (Livy,
xxiv. 30. ro) and perhaps Centuripa (Lenschau, RE, 'Hieron (IJ)',
col. 1507) and other places {Stauffenberg, 46). Cf. Beloch, iv. 1. 65o
n. I. The prisoners had probably been taken from Ap. Claudius outside Messana (15. r-n n.).
10-11. P.'s praise of Hiero for his pro-Roman policy probably goes
back to Fabius. He had in fact much greater independence than the
Italian socii, and during the first two Punic wars Roman control was
hardly noticeable: cf. Beloch, iv. 1. 65o; Stauffenberg, 40 ff. If he
was debarred an independent foreign policy, he enjoyed Roman
protection (d. 62. R), and was unhampered in internal affairs. On
the honours received from the Greeks cf. vii. 8. 6, t:vpyt:-nKW'1'a.'1'o<; ~<:at
u\of>ot6raros yt:voJLt:to<; t:ls 'Toik "EJ..J..T)t'a>; on his gifts to Rhodes in
227 after the earthquake see v. 88. 5-8. He may also have taken part
in the Olympic Games, following the precedent of Hicro I (Paus.
vi. 15. 6: statues at Olympia). See further, 83. 2-4.

17. 1. SUo tt6vov <M'pnTI1rreoa.: 'only two legions'. In fact two consuls
and four legions were sent ( 6), perhaps after the Punic preparations
( 3) became known (Meltzer, ii. 27o). This information may come
from Fabius (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933. 139), but the reference to Carthaginian reinforcements is probably from Philinus (Bung, 82). On
the Carthaginian use of mercenaries see Griffith, 207 ff.
5. TTJV Twv ~Kpa.ya.vTivwv 'll'OALV: with fewer and inferior forces the
Carthaginians restricted themselves to holding strong points, as in
the war with Pyrrhus. Acragas (Agrigentum), lying midway on
the south-west coast, was the second city of Sicily: cf. ix. 27. Diod.
xxiii. 4 :z, 5 supplements P. with details of further Roman activity
after the peace with Syracuse: Segesta and Halicyae came over
voluntarily (and became 'ciuitates sine foedere immunes et Iiberae',
Cic. Verr. iii. 6. 1.3; on the Segestan claim to kinship with Aeneas
(Zon. -..iii. 9; cf. Cic. Verr. iv. 33 72) see Frank, CAH, vii. 676). The
Romans took several unknown places, but were repulsed from
Adranum and Macella (see 24. 2 n.); on Camarina see r6. 3 n.
6. ot p.v 0'1'pa.T11 yol l!.vnKEXwpfjKELO"a.v: M'. Valerius Maximus

I. 17. 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

triumphed, 17 )larch 262, 'de Poenis et rege Siculor. Hierone' (Act.


tr.), having returned to Rome otd r6v xetp.Wva (Zon. viii. ro): avaxo.lpef:v = decedere. The new consuls for A.U.c. 492
z6z/1 B.C. are
L. Postumius L.f. L.n. Megellus and Q. Mamilius Q.f. M.n. Vitulus.
17. 7.-19. 15. The capture of Agrigentum. It seems likely that this
account goes back to Philinus, the historian from Agrigentum, who
is the basis of Diodorus' account in xxiii. 7~8, tl>tAtva;; 8 o }~xpa
yavrf~os lcrroptKOS" avEypdtfoa-ro. But Diodorus' account survives only
fragmentarily, and it is clear that P. has rejected some of his
statistics (e.g. the exaggerated figure of roo,ooo Roman troops). The
detailed comparison of the two versions in Bung, 84-85, is therefore
not very enlightening; but the complete rejection of Philinus as
P.'s source (Pcdech, REA, 1952, 252-3) is over-sceptical.
17. 8. ev o~<:T~ crTa8(o~~: i.e. c. mille passt,s. In xxxiv. 12. 3-4 a mile
is 8! stades, in iii. 39 8 the looser equivalent is employed. The
approximation to a Roman measurement here is no proof of the use
of Fabius: for Fabius, >vTiting in Greek, probably used stades (cf.
Dion. Hal. i. 79 4).
Topography. Agrigentum lay about z! miles from the coast, on
a height sloping steeply to the north and east, and gradually to
the west. Its natural defences were strengthened by the rivers
Hypsas (F. Drago) to the west and Acragas (F. S. Biagio) to the
east, which almost surround the town and meet just below it. Cf.
Hiilsen, RE, 'Akragas', cols. II87 ff. (with sketch-map); Holm,
Gesch. Sic. iii. 345-6; De Sanctis, iii. r. rzo n. 49 Below, ix. 27. I-{).
There is a convenient sketch-map in J. B. Bury, History of Greece3
(London, I95I), 636.
9. &.tcJ.La~ouo-11~ TTl~ Toll crtTou cruvaywyfj~: i.e. the month was
June. Since the consuls proceeded with haste ( 8: cfopwres} they
could easily begin the siege within six weeks of entering office on
r .May. Beloch (iv. 2. 287) argues that the siege of Agrigentum began in
June z6r (cf. Heuss, HZ, 169, 1949-_o;o, 490 n.); but it seems improbable
that z62 passed without any significant action, and P.'s chronology
offers no difficulties on the assumption that the calendar was running
roughly equinlent to the Julian: DeSanctis, iii. r. 254.
11. ij Twv MhcrJ.LwV lhacpopO.: 'the excellence of their institutions': cf.
vi. 56. 6 o~acpopdv ... rrp6;; T(j f3l>..nov. These reflections are paralleled
in vi. 37 u-r2, and arc probably P.'s own, not from Fabius (so De
Sanctis, iii. 1. 225). In such cases as P. here mentions, death was
inflicted by tvAo~<:orrla,Justuarium (vi. 37. 9).
13. 3crov oorrw lho.cnrwVTO.S TOV xO.po.tc(l.: 'when they were about to
tear Up the Stockade' (whereaS in IO xapa{; lS 'camp'); cf. iii. 102. 4,
v. i3 10. The Carthaginian error on this occasion is reprehended by
the tenth-century Anonymus de obsidione toleranda, uo-r2 (ed.
70

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. rg.

II

Van den Berg); and Schweighaeuser contrasts the Roman discipline


which forbade plundering until the signal was given (x. rs. 4 ff.).
18. 2. To :A.c:rt<AfJTrLEiov: identified by the Duke of Serradifalco
(Le antichita della Sicilia (Palermo, 18.34-42), iii. 28, 75) as the temple
beside the church of S. Gregorio, which lies to the south of the town
between the two rivers. (But Holm, Gesch. Sic. iii. 345-6, seeks it
east of the town.) The cult-statue was the work of Myron (Cic. Verr.
iv. 43 93), and represented Apollo. The other force camped to the
west of Agrigentum, for Heradea :Minoa (cf. 25. 9; Diod. xvi. 9 4)
lay about Ii miles north-west up the coast.
5. ELS 'Ep~fJc:r6v: ml p.aKpav from Agrigentum, and so not the Sicel
town near Syracuse. It is also mentioned by Diod. xxiii. 8. 1 (offer
to betray it to Hanno) and 9 5 (its abandonment in 258). Meltzer,
ii. 563; Ziegler, RE, 'Herbessos (r)', col. 530. The site is unknown.
6. mfvn l''lvas: i.e. about November (q. 9 n.).
7. :A.vv(Pas b TETayJ.L!vos irri Twv rroAtopKOUflEVWV 8uvci.J.LE:WV: the
son of Gisgo (Zon. viii. IO), who as admiral occupied Messana after
Hiero's victory at the Longanus (9. 8 n.). 0. Leuze (Klio, I9IO,
427-8) argued plausibly that P.'s apparent interest in Hannibal (cf.
I9. 7 19. !2-14, 21. 6, 2I. II (doublet of Mylae), 23. 7. 24. s-6, 4.3 4) is
taken from Philinus, who felt a proper concern for the fate of the
defender of Agrigentum.
8, ~vvwva TOV ETepov O"Tf><lTTJYOV: called 6 1TpEa(jifrpos by Diod. xxiii.
8. I, who brings him with his army from Africa. He is Hanno. son
of Hannibal, who fortified Agrigentum in 264, made the Punic
treaty with Hiero (u. 7 n.), and besieged Messana (Diod. xxiii. 1.
I-3), where he was victorious according to Philinus (15. z), and
defeated according to P. (rz. 3). Philinus records (Diod. xxiii. 8. r)
that Hanno brought so,ooo foot, 6,ooo horse, and 6o elephants;
Orosius (iv. 7 5) gives .3o,ooo, r,soo, and 30 respectively. P. quotes
a figure of about so for the elephants only. Cf. Lenschau, RE,
'Hanno (7)', cols. 2.354-5; De Sanctis, iii. r. r2o n. so.
9. rrpasu<om)c:ras K<lTEO"XE 'Ti)v TWv 'Ep~flc:r~wv rroAtv: by collusion
with a party within (Diod. xxiii. 8. r, Philinus). The subsequent
help to Rome from Hiero is also mentioned by Zon. viii. ro; the
source will again be Philinus (DeSanctis, iii. I. 225-6).
19. 5. TOV M+ov TOV KO.AOUJLEVOV T opov: otherwise unknown.
Meltzer, ii. 273 places Hanno 'on the eastern slopes of Monserrato'
(which lies to the west of Agrigentum).
6. 8Uo l'fivas: i.e. December 262-January 26r, the
having
lasted some seven months (six in Diod. xxiii. 9 I).
9. Tovs fl'c:rOo+6pou~: probably Gauls: see ii. 7 7 n.
11. ot ... rrAEic:rTm 8te+90.p'lc:rav: according to Zon. viii. 10 Hanno

7I

I.

Ig. II

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

abandoned his army, but Philinus (Diod. xxiii. 8. I) made his losses
in two engagements only 3,ooo foot and :zoo horse killed, and 4,ooo
prisoners (whereas the Roman losses for the whole siege are put at
3o,ooo foot and 540 horse-if the reading can be accepted : Diod.
xxiii. 9 r). P. has followed here a source (Fabius), which exaggerates
Hanno's losses: and it i..;; significant that neither consul triumphed
(Beloch, iv. I. 653 n. I; De Sanctis, iii. I. I2I n. 52). Similarly,
Philinus ((tp. Diod.) records only the death of 8 elephants and the
wounding of 33 (unless Diodorus is abridged).
12. L'lpiJ.T)aE EK Tfj~ ttOAEws: the escape of zo,ooo men by this
stratagem (which is recorded by Frontinus, Strat. ii. r. 4) Beloch
(iv. r. 653 n. r) rejects as derived from Fabius and of disconcerting
naivete. He would make Hannibal's escape the direct consequence
of the dubious conflict with Hanno. The annalistic version made
Hannibal, too, suffer heavy losses at the hands of Romans and
Agrigentines (Zon. viii. ro): cf. 14.
15. 1TOAAWV O"WIJ.aTWV iyeVOVTO ey~~:pa.TEt~: Diod. xxiii. 9 1
and Oros. iv. 7 6 both agree that the whole population was enslaved,
and Diodorus puts it at 25,ooo. The original so,ooo (r8. 7) had
evidently been reduced by deaths and the escape of the Punic
garrison (if indeed the garrison was included in the so,ooo; T. Frank
(CAH, vii. 677) assumes it to be excluded). The prosperity of the
city during the Second Punic War is no reason for rejecting the
account of its sack and the enslavement of its population now (with
Beloch, iv. r. 653 n. 1). It was common Roman practice to treat a
conquered city in this way, and the siege had been severe. The
effects of the Roman action on the attitudes of other Sicilians are
discussed by T. Frank (CAH, vii. 677): 'A stubborn hatred displaced
goodwill, and henceforth Rome had to fight for every advance and
guard her gains with wasteful garrisons.'
20. 1-2. oOK iiJ.EVov l,-l. TWV E~ O.pxfis Aoy~criJ.wV KTA.: the capture of
Agrigentum leads the Romans to aspire to the expulsion of the
Carthaginians from Sicily; and their failure to take the sea-board
towns then motivates the building of a fleet ( 7-8). This account is
accepted by Frank (CAH, vii. 678): 'This decision could only mean
that Rome had determined to rule subject-peoples, and therefore
had frankly adopted from her foes the policy of imperialism from
which Sicily had already suffered too severely.' But comparison
with the similar motivation attributed to the Romans after the battle
of Telamon (ii. JL 7) suggests that the schematic development of
Roman ambitions may in fact be the interpretation of P.; for the
annalistic tradition (which perhaps reproduces Fabius) attributes
the decision to build a fleet to an earlier stage in the war, since it
figures in the reply of Ap. Claudius' envoys, and M'. Valerius Messalla
72

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I.

20.9

strongly favours such a policy (Diod. xxiii. 2; ined. Vat. 4). Further,
Diodorus (xxiii. I . 4) shows Hiero reproaching Ap. Claudius with
concealing imperialistic ambitions under a pretence of aiding those
in trouble. In making the adoption of a naval policy the turningpoint of the warP. is undoubtedly right; but he may exaggerate the
importance of the capture of Agrigentum. That the consuls received
no triumph for its capture (Eutrop. ii. 19. 3 may be neglected; cf.
Bung, 88 n. 3) is not without significance; and there is a good deal
to be said for the argument of Heuss (HZ, 169, I949-5o, 488 ff.), that
what really inspired the Roman naval policy was alarm at the
Carthaginian reinforcement of the forces in Sardinia in z6z before
the assault on Agrigentum (Zon. viii. ro), and at the ravaging of the
Italian coast by Hannibal (Zon. viii. ro; cf. Oros. iv. 7 7) and
Hamilcar (Zon. viii. 10). These attacks on Italy are confirmed in 7,
and suggest that Roman motives, though no doubt mixed, were
concerned more with defensive measures than P.'s version implies.
2. I'Eyci>."lv ~'ll'8o<7\v a.\nwv AYJijsE0"6a.~ TO. trpayl'a.Ta.: for the imperialist
note cf. Diod. xxiii. 1. 1, LLKeAla 1raawv Twv n]awv Ka.MlaTTJ !J1Td.pxe,, W>
p.ey&.Aa OVVafLeVTJ avp.f3&JJ...ea8aL 1Tpos: a~eTJO'LV 1,yEp.ovlar;. On the Hellenistic use of nl 1rpd.yp.aTa = 'the State' (usually of a kingdom: cf.
ii. 4 7) see Holleaux, Etudes, iii. zzs-{j; Bickermann, Gnomon, I9JZ,
426 ff.
4. AEOKLos Oua.>.p,os tca.1 Thos 'OTa.tci>.tos: L. Valerius M.f. Ln.
Flaccus and T. Otacilius C.f. M'.n. Crassus, coss. A.U.C. 493 =
z6rfo B.C. Their predecessors (17. 6) had wintered in Messana (Zon.
viii. ro).
6. tro>.>.a.t I'EV tro>.ns trpooul0EVTO KTA.: the details of this year,
dismissed by P. in 3--7, are mainly lost, since Diod. xxiii. 9 z-5
compresses several years' activity together. The destruction of 4,ooo
unreliable Gallic mercenaries by a trick of Hanna (Frontin. Strat.
iii. r6. 3: cf. Diod. xxiii. 8. 3) belongs to this year (though Zon. viii.
10 attributes it to Hanna's successor, Hamilcar); and the surrender
of a Roman force (Frontin. Strat. iv. I. 19) may also go here (De
Sanctis, iii. I. 124 n.; contra Meltzer, ii. 564).
9. 'll'EifTTlp~tc&. l'~v itca.Tov, Eftcocn S TpL1\pns: the nature of the warships known to the Greeks as triereis, tetrereis, and pentereis (and
usually translated in their Latin forms as triremes, quadriremes, and
quinqueremes} is still hotly disputed. Since ]HS, 1905, IJ7 ff. Tarn
has argued that a trireme had three groups of rowers at the same
level, one man to an oar, viz. 8po.vnu. aft, {t1ytot amidships, and
8a.Aap.tol fore; but this view has been successfully challenged by
J. A. Morrison, who argues for oarsmen at three levels, thranites
rowing over an outrigger, zygii over the gunwale, and thalamii
through oar-ports. The controversy can be followed in Tarn, CR,
1906, 75: Mariner's Mirror, 1933, 52-74, 457-6o; CR, 1941, 89-90;
73

I.

20.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Morrison, Mariner's ~Mirror, 1941, 14-44; CQ, 1947, 122-35; R. C.


Anderson, Mariner's Mirror, 1933, 237-8; 1941,314-23; H. I. Chapelle,
Jfariner's Mirror, 1933, 342-3; F. Brewster, Harv. Stud., 1933, 205-25.
It is agreed that the quinquereme was rowed five men to an oar,
and it is probable that the quadrireme was likewise rowed four men
to an oar. Tarn, HMND, IJI n. I, has argued that in Alexander's
time the Athenians
some quadriremes (and also seven
quinqueremes), the oars of which were interchangeable with those
of a trireme; hence these larger ships were also rowed with groups
of oars, one man to an oar. But the evidence (IG, ii 2 r632, 11. 25,
233, 336: date 323/2 B.c.) is not decisive (d. Morrison, CQ, 1947,
132-5), and in any case, as Tarn says, it would not tell us anything
about the Hellenistic quadriremes. The likelihood is that for boats
bigger than a trireme the principle of several men to an oar was
adopted from the outset. See further, v. 62. 3 n.
P. frequently uses 7TEvr1}pYJS to include other types of ship, since
from z6o onwards the 7TEvr1}pYJS was the R.oman warship par excellence
(and probably the only type built at Rome): Tarn, ]HS, 1907,
Of the ships here mentioned, the twenty triremes are probably the
equivalent of the old duumviral squadron ( 13 n.), and the 100
quinqueremes modern vessels on the Punic model: Tarn, ibid. so.
The figures of Orosius (130 ships) and Florus (16o
may be
neglected.
12, T~V KllTtL lla).!lTT!lV tlYEflOV(av lJ.O,plTOV: 'what is called the COmmand of the sea at this time only meant that the Power who claimed
it had a good prospect, if challenged, of getting a fleet to sea, which
might defeat the challenger' (Tarn, HMND, 142). For many years
Carthage had had no challenger.
13. oox otov KO.Taq,pa.KTOS . ooo' ets: cf. Flor. i. r8. 5-7; Zon. viii.
ro. The crossing referred to is that of Ap. Claudius in 264 (u. 9 n.).
t<ard<fopat<ro~ vfjES" are larger, decked warships, Latin constratae, tectae
naues, including anything larger than a trireme: Tarn, Mariner's
Mirror, 1933, 68; below, v. 62. 3, xvi. 2. 10. 1r/..oa 11-at<pa, naues longae,
are warships in general: cf. Herod. v. 30. 4; Time. i. 14. r. M11-f3o~ are
light, undecked ships: i. 53 9, ii. 3 8, etc. P.'s account-perhaps
from Fabius--reinforces the intended expression of wonder at the
Roman achievement. Since JII there had been a naval board of
dumnui1i nauales (Livy, ix. 30. 4), probably controlling a squadron
of twenty ships (Tarn, ] HS, 1907, 49); see Mommsen, St.-R. ii. 57981 ; one had been attacked off Tarentum in 282 (Livy, ep. I2; Zon.
viii. 2; App. Samn. 7 I, l1r~ t<ara<fopdt<rwv 8.t<a vewv-were they really
'cataphracti'? See above 6. 5 n.). But these ships may well have
been allowed to decay since that date (cf. Thiel, Hist. 26 n. 71). The
four quaestores classici set up in 267 (Livy, ep. IS; Lydus, de mag.
i. 27) are probably to be associated with the auxiliary system based

74

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

l.

20.

I5

on the socii nauales (on whom see Thiel, Hist. 33 n. 89). Whether the
nauis Zanga which was conducting legati to Delphi in 394 {Livy,
v. 28. 2) was
a warship, we cannot be sure; but there is no
reference to
in the first treaty with Carthage {cf. iii. 23.
2 n.). The probability is that prior to the First Punic War there was
and that ships were put in commission only when
no permanent
required.
14. n-apa TapaVT(vwv KTA.: of these cities Locri had probably joined
the Roman alliance with Rhegium (7. 6-13 n.); after twice deserting
to Pyrrhus she returned to Rome in 275. Tarentum and Velia (Elea)
became allies by 272 at the latest; and the Xeapolitan alliance was
in 327. As socii nattales these south Italian towns were exempt from
the military levy but required from time to time to provide ships.
They must have furnished the bulk of the sailors for the new fleet,
and probably undertook much of its construction: De Sanctis, iii.
I. 125; Thiel, Hist. 46-47. Their pentekontors were swift boats, naucs
actuariae, with twenty-fi \'C men at single oars on either side; Tam,
..'!ariner's Mirror, 1933, 59
15. -rrapaS~:tyflan xpwfi~:voL: cf. auct. de tf-ir. ill. 37. 4; Enn. Ann. fg.
225 V. 2 This story of the use of a captured Punic ship as a pattern
probably comes from Fabius {Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 139: contra
Laqueur, RE, 'Philinus', col. 2184, who thinks rather of Philinus,
who in turn used annalists). It is a particular instance of the popular
communis locus that the Romans were especially successful at learnrr, fg. 179), which
ing from, and improving on, their foes (cf. vi.
87 F 59; Athen.
appears also in Diod. v. 40. r, xxiii. 2. r; Poseid.
vi. 273 D, E.; SaiL Cat. sr. 37-39; Cic. Tusc. i. I; de rc pub. ii. 30; Varro
apud Serv. ad A en. vii. 176. See Gelzer, loc. cit.; P6schl, 79 n. (who
gives examples of the same theme applied to Greeks borrowing from
barbarians). For this reason the present incident is usually regarded
(cf. DeSanctis, iii. I. 125 n. 6r,
n. 89; Scullard, Hist.
argued that
(a) models must already have been available from Tarentum or

(b)

incident seems to foreshadow the imitation of the quinquereme of Hannibal taken at Lilybaeum in 250 {cf. 47, 59 8;
Zon. viii. r5).

On the other hand, the Punic vessels may well have been preferable
to those of Syracuse or Tarentum, even if those cities had quinqueremes, for which there is no evidence; and if the Romans could
copy Hannibal's ship later, they could copy a Punic model now.
Indeed, careful scrutiny of enemy weapons has always been a
normal feature of warfare. See, for a good discussion, Thiel, Hist.
I7I ff. But in I6 P. clearly exaggerates the importance of the
75

I.

20.

15

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

incident, which represents the irrational side of Roman success;


for this is due to a combination of rational and irrational factors:
d. 6. 7-8, yEVVa.lws- 1Tapa36ews-, 24. r, wapa36Gw> . JmrppwaBT)rrav. Cf. 1. 4 n.
21. 1. ~SISa.aKov KW'ITTJXa.Tttv: this practice wa..c; essential, as
rowing quinqueremes is quite different from rowing triremes. This
occasion seems to be referred to in Enn. Attn. fgs. 227, 230, 23I V. 2
Naevius, fg. 36 Baehr. is from a tragedy and irrelevant here. For
training on land cf. Polyaen. iii. II. 17 and other examples quoted
by Thiel, Hist. 172 n. 345; he regards it as normal.
3. 8.11-n Tlf! auvnXEa{Hjva.t: within sixty days, according to the tradition in Pliny, Nat. hi st. xvi. 192; Flor. i. r8. 7; Oros. iv. 7. 8.
4. rvcuos Kopv~XLos: the consuls for A.U.C. 494 = z6o/s9 B.C. were
Cn. Cornelius L.f. Cn.n. Scipio Asina and C. Duilius M.f. M.n.:
:Munzer, RE, 'Cornelius (341}', cols. q85-7; 'Duilius (3)', cols. 1777-8r.
The famous inscription on the columna rostrata (CIL, i:t, z. 25 = ILS,
65) attributes the institution of the fleet to Duilius; perhaps, therefore, both consuls shared the responsibility, though Scipio was in
command at first.
5. rrpoo"!l'EO'OUO'T]S s O.UT!f! rrpO.~ews 'ITEpl TfjS rroXEws: 'when
an opportunity occurred of obtaining the city ... by treachery'.
On F.'s use of rrpfi.Gt>, 'treacherous attack', see the discussion in
Feyel, 149 f. The town of Lipara lay on the east coast of the island
of that name, the largest of the Aeolian Islands; it was in Carthaginian hands. The Hannibal who sends Boodes to its defence is the
late commander at Agrigentum (r8. 7 n.), who had since been
ravaging the Italian coast (2o. r-2 n.).
6. TTJS yEpouu~a.s: there were two Councils at Carthage, a smaller
(probably of thirty) and a larger of several hundred members (a
system found elsewhere only at Cyrene: Ehrenberg, Karthago, 24):
P. calls them the yepovula and aVyKATJTOS" (x. r8. I, xxxvi. 4 6; Livy,
xxx. r6. 3), but his usage does not distinguish clearly to which he is
referring; and occasionally he describes one or the other as rrw3pwv.
Here Boodes would seem likely to be a member of the more select
body. See Meltzer, ii. 47o-1; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 5o-51; ClermontGanneau, ]ourn. Sav., 1921, 223 ff.
7. rra.pSwKEv o.uTov Tot~ 'll'oXEp.Lots: hence his nickname, Asina
(Pliny, Nat. kist. viii. 169). He returned to Rome under an exchange
of prisoners before 254 (Livy, xxii. 23. 6; Fast. Cap. for 254, when he
is again consul). viii. 35 9 suggests, rather differently, that he was
the victim of Punic treachery (the annalistic version, Livy, ep. r7;
Val. Max. vi. 6, z; Flor. i. r8. u ; Eutrop. ii. zo. 2; Oros. iv. 7. 9;
App. Lib. 63; Ampel. 36. 1; Polyaen. vi. r6. 5; Zon. viii. 10), and
76

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. zz. 3

perhaps even that, like the other examples (except Pelopidas) here
mentioned, he perished. Probably P. is here using Philinus. In
9-12 he records what may be that writer's version of the battle of
Mylae, described in 23 after Fabius; so Beloch, iv. I. 654 n. 1; Tarn,
]HS, 1907, 51 n. 19; DeSanctis, iii. I. IZS-9 n. 73 Bung (96-97) argues
that it is Philinus' account of some minor engagement that P. is
following; and certainly a mere fifty ships and no reference to the
coruus make this look like a very queer account of Mylae. Moreover,
if Philinus appeared to P. to have omitted Mylae (as he must on
Beloch's hypothesis), it would be odd that P. never criticizes him
on that score (cf. Thiel, Hist. 122-7). On the whole, then, this is
probably to be regarded as a separate engagement.
11. TO T~~ 'ITa.Ma.s nKpWT~plov: it is not clear what P. or his source
understood by this: perhaps the Taurianum promontory on the west
coast of south Bruttium between Tropaea and Herculis Portus
(modern C. Vaticano).
22. 1. r cuov BthlOV TOY i]yoVfLEVOV Tii~ TrEtf\s 5uvafLEWS: Duilius has
already taken over his command in Sicily, and accordingly leaves
his legions in charge of military tribunes (23. 1); whereas the
annalistic version brings him news of Scipio's catastrophe while still
at Rome, and accordingly he hands over to the praetor urbanus
(Zon. viii. u. 1). For the possibility that the praetor took over from
the military tribunes see Cichorius, 32 f.; Thiel, Hist. 81 n. 58. For
other variants in the tradition see 24. 2 n.
3. Tou~ iwLKATJ9VTa.s KOpo.Ko.S: d. 27. I z. Tarn has argued that
the cor1Uts (Frontin. Strat. ii. 3 24; Flor. i. 18. 9; au ct. deuir. ill. 38. 1;
Zon. viii. n), which is not heard of again after Ecnomus, is due in
its traditional form to Fabius Pictor, and that it is no more than an
1mproved form of the grapnel used by the Athenians in 413 (Thuc.
vii. 41. z; Aristoph. Eq. 762, with scholia; Pliny, Nat. hist. vii.
209), and commonly employed in the Second Punic War; the t<6pat<E~
used against Sex. Pompeius at Mylae in 36 were likewise grappling
irons (App. Bell. ciu. v. Io6) and Agrippa's apTTat at Naulochus was a
mere extension of these (App. ibid. n8). F.'s coruus, then, is a 'pure
myth', and must have overturned a quinquereme. Against this there
is the very circumstantial nature of F.'s description; and Thiel has
pointed out that the Roman ships at this time were heavier and
slower than they were later (<f>a:u>.wv Kal cvat<t~Twv, cf. 51. 4),
when the model was improved (59 8). Hence the coruus could be
employed now, but not later; and this explains why it disappears
from the tradition after Ecnomus. For a full discus,1.on of the problem
see Fiebiger, RE, 'corvus (3)', col. 1665; Lammert, ibid., 'korax (4)',
col. 138r; De Sanctis, iii. I. 128 n. 72; Tarn, ]HS, 1907, SI n. r9;
HMND, tn-12, 149-so; Holland Rose, The Mediterranean in the
77

I.

22. 3

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Ancient World (Cambridge, 1933), 97--98; Thiel, 432-47; Hist. 101-28;


E. de Saint-Denis, Latomus, 1946, 359-67; 1948, 129 n. r.
In general outline P.'s account is clear. A round pole, 24 ft. high
and 3 palms, i.e. 9-10 in., in diameter, was set vertically in the ship's
prow with a pulley on top. Around the bottom of this pole was fixed
a gangway (P. calls it a KALj.tag, 'scaling-ladder'), 36 ft. by 4 ft., of
planks nailed across each other and made to swivel around the pole,
which passed through an oblong hole (?Tapap..r]las: 6), set 12 ft.
from one end of the gangway. To the far end of the KALp..ag (which
had a railing the height of a man's knees) was attached an iron spike,
with a ring on the upper side, whence a rope rose to a pulley at the
top of the pole, thus enabling the gangway to be raised into the air.
When the gangway was dropped, either directly beyond the prow,
or sideways if the ships were broadside on, upon the enemy's deck,
the spike became embedded and so the Romans could board. So
much is clear. But there are two possible ways in which the gangway
may have been connected to the deck and the pole. Either it was
roped down at the inside end, and rose and fell in a piece about the
pole, in which case the presence of the pole prevented its being
raised to a completely vertical position; or it was hinged at the point
of intersection with the pole, and only 24 ft. of the gangway was
actually lifted into the air, rising when vertical to the same height
as the pole. Thiel, who formerly defended the second of these alternatives, now (Hist. ror-28) inclines to the first (proposed independently
by H. Bolkestein and H. T. Wallinga), largely because hinges
(which P. nowhere mentions) would be a source of weakness on
board ship; and on the whole his second thoughts seem the more
convincing.
7. Tals ouorrouKals I-1TJxavfJcrow: the reference is clearly to a
resemblance between the coruus as a whole (rd 0/l.ov) and some kind
of device for crushing corn by means of a pestle mounted on an
arm. There is no ancient evidence for such a device ; for though
Thiel (Hist. ro8-r2) would deduce its existence from a diagram
accompanying Hesiod, op. 4ZJ-s, in the codex Galeanus (illustrated
in Paley's Hesiod), since the artist 'could never have erroneously
projected it into Hesiod's text', had he not already been familiar with
it, the evidence is tenuous, especially now that Thiel himself no
longer interprets op. 424-s as a reference to acorn-grinding machine.
Nevertheless, some device more complicated than a simple pestle
(v?TEpov) and mortar {o..\p..os-)-on which see Bliimner, i. 14-15-seems
indicated, and evidence for its existence may one day be forthcoming.
8. cl.vnrrEpu].yovTES nis .. Ej.l~OAas: avn?TEpLa")'DJITES" must mean
'swinging round . . . to meet (the enemy)': Schweighaeuser
makes the ship the object, circumacta naui; but more probably it
is the coruus which is swung round to face the point of collision (cf.
78

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I.

24 2

23. Io). Biittner-\Vobst's reading yields no sense, and a preposition


must be inserted before T(fs. Since the whole phrase aVTo71'ptayovn:>
l.p,f3oJ\as is parallel to Kani 'TT'pwppav, the preposition omitted is
probably not KaTa (Casaubon and Schweighaeuser} but 'TT'po:> (Campius) or Ei:> (Paton). The comus could not, of course, be used against
an enemy attacking on the stern; hence (as Thiel, Hist. ns. r85,
points out) its use demanded a second line of ships to protect the
stems of the first.

23. 2-10. Battle of Mylae. Mylae (modem Milazzo) lay on the neck
of a promontory on the north coast of Sicily about 25 miles west of
Pelorus (Capo di Faro): cf. 9 7, To Mul\afovmrOiov. The battle occurred
in summer 26o. The 130 Punic vessels were probably a nonnal complement prior to the war with Rome (Tarn, JHS, 1907, 49, comparing
earlier statistics in Diodorus: the latter's figure for Mylae (xxiii.
ro. r) viz. 2oo, may be neglected; De Sanctis, iii. r. IZj n. 7o). The
Punic losses were 5o ( ro) ; whether 30 or 31 of these were captured
depends on whether ativ ats ( 7) means 'including' or 'as well as'.
(The annalistic tradition offers no help, since Eutrop. ii. 20. 2 gives
31 taken and 14 sunk, Oros. iv. 7 1o gives 31 taken and 13 sunk, and
auct. de w:r. ill. 38. r gives 3o taken and 13 sunk. The columna rostrata
inscription (cf. 21. 4 n.) has a lacuna at the vital point: u[ique
nau[ eis cepe ]t cum socieis septer[esmom unam quin-] f [queresmos]que
triresmosque navels x[..... ) The Punic flagship was a hepteres,
a galley with a single bank of oars, seven men to an oar: Tarn,
HMN D, 136; it is mentioned on the columna rostrata inscription
(above) and probably was taken from Pyrrhus in the naval battle
recorded by App. Samn. r2. P. omits the total of Roman ships;
reckoning allied auxiliary ships, it probably came to about 140 (Thiel,
Hist. 84-86).
1

24. 2. n)v T AtyEaTa.iwv . 'll"o:>uop..:&a.v: Zon. viii. rr records a


Roman defeat before Segesta under a C. Caecilius, apparently about
the time of Scipio's disaster; but like P. he puts the raising of the
siege of Segesta after Mylae. The columna rostrata inscription mentions both this and the capture of Macella before the naval action:
[Secest]ano)que .............. op-]
[sidione]d exemet lecione[sque Cartaciniensis omnis]
[ma]ximosque macistr[a~tos l[uci palam post dies]
Lno]uem castreis exfociont, Macel[amque opidom ui]
[p:ucnandod cepet. enque eodem mac[istratud bene]
[r]ern nauebos marid consol primos c[eset copiasque]
Lc]lasesque nauales primos ornauet pa[rauetque], etc.
Likewise the act. tr. record Duilius' triumph de Sicul. et clas. Poenica.
79

I.

24. 2

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

It is quite possible that Duilius' land campaign in fact preceded


Mylae (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 127): it included the capture of Macella
(perhaps Macellaro, near Camporeale, about 15 miles east of Segesta:
Ziegler, RE, 'Makella', cols. 772~3), on which the Romans had made
one vain assault after the peace with Hiero (17. 5 n.; Diod. xxiii. 4 z),
and perhaps an unsuccessful attempt on Mytistratum, which
eventually fell in zs8 (Diod. xxiii. 9 3-4): De Sanctis, ibid. For a
defence of the order of events given in P. see Thiel, Hist. I87--9, who
argues that both Duilius' inscription and the act. tr. follow the order
terra marique.
3. :A.fLtAK!; oTnyfLevos ,.\ Twv 1TEtucwv 8uv6.f1twv: this Hamilcar, who succeeded Hanno after the fall of Agrigentum, and defeated
C. Caedlius (24. z n.), later plays an important role in the war. An
ancient tradition identified him with Hamilcar Barca; but in s6. I
P. introduces the latter as a new figure, and the identification (cf.
Cic. off. iii. 99; Zon. viii. 10) is to be rejected: Meltzer, ii. 570; De
Sanctis, iii. I. 124 n. 59; and (less certain) Lenschau, RE, 'Hamilkar
(6) ', cols. zJo2-J.
O"TUO"t6.tovms Tou<; aUfLf16.xous: probably Sicilians, not Italian socii
(Meltzer, ii. 282; Niese, ii. 185 n. 3). On the ensuing Carthaginian
victory see Diod. xxiii. 9 4 Despite his figure for the Roman losses
(6,ooo)-which may well be unreliable in our abridged version-it
seems likely that P. and Diodorus have the same source; and this
will be Philinus, who is more likely than Fabius to report the discreditable quarrel between the Romans and their allies (Leuze,
Klio, xgiO, 438; Bung, 1oo f. against De Sanctis, Hi. I. 133 n. 85, and
others). Paropus (a town, not a river, as Paton) is perhaps to be
identified with ruins on the R. Roccella, just west of modern
Collesano (Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 71). The battle was probably in the
coastal plain east of Thermae (modern Tennini); its date is 26o/59.
and probably spring 259 (Duilius has apparently returned to Rome,
where he triumphed, February 259). According to Diodorus Hamilcar
followed up his success by taking a fortress called Md.,apcv (perhaps
Mazara between Selinus and Lilybaeum; Meltzer, ii. 566-7).
5-7. Hannibal in Sardinia. These paragraphs are fully discussed by
Leuze (Klio, rgro, 406-44). P.'s purpose, he points out, is not to
recount the Roman action in Sardinia so much as to round off the
story of Hannibal : hence his neglect of chronology and return to
259 in 8 (~<cml -rov (~fj;; Jvtal)'Tov). After his return to Carthage-for
a worthless anecdote on how he avoided punishment for his defeat
see Diod. xxiii. ro. I ; Val. Max. vii. 3 ext. 7; Dio, fr. 43 18; Zon.
viii. II; auct. de uir. ill. 38--Hannibal crossed to Sardinia, probably
in 258; the arrival of his squadron will have caused the return to
Rome of L. Scipio, who triumphed 'de Poenis et Sardin. Corsica
V id. mart'. (act. tr.): his achievements are celebrated in his verse
So

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

J. 24. 10

elogium (CJL. i 2 2. 8 and 9 = ILS, 2 and 3):


Hec cepit Corsica Aleriaque urbe,
dedet Tempestatebus aide mereto[d].
Scipio, who was consul in 259, is omitted by P., who is almost certainly following Philinus. Hannibal's defeat was at the hands of
C. Sulpicius Paterculus, consul in 258 (24. 9 n.), near Sulci, Zon.
viii. 12. On his crucifixion see Livy, ep. 17 (he was stoned to death
according to Orosius (iv. 8. 4)).
8. otJ8Ev a~LOV Myou: Mylae had made no fundamental change
in the situation in Sicily, and the dispersal of forces to include
Sardinia had caused some deterioration. Of the consuls for A.u.c.
495 = 259{8 B.c., L. Cornelius L.f. Cn.n. Scipio and C. Aquillius
M.f. C.n. Florus (Munzer, RE, 'Cornelius (323)', cols. 1428-31; Klebs,
RE, 'Aquilius (zo)', col. 327), the former was sent to Sardinia, the
latter to Sicily, where the Carthaginians recovered Enna and
Camarina ( 12) and, in the west, fortified Drepana and transferred
to it the population of Eryx (Diod. xxiii. 9 4). This latter step
Zonaras (viii. u) dates just prior to Florus' wintering in Sicily,
259{8 (an innovation deemed necessary to prevent Hamilcar's reducing the whole island!). On the Roman disaster at Thermae see 4
9. 1Tpoa8E~af1EVot Tous E1TtKa.9EUTcif1EVous lipxovTa.s: the consuls for
A.U.c. 496 = 258(7 B.c., A. Atilius A.f. C.n. Caiatinus and C. Sulpicius
Q.f. Q.n. Paterculus (Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (36)', cols. 2079-81; Munzer,
RE, 'Sulpicius (81)', cols. 816-17) But Sulpicius' triumph de Poeneis
et Sardeis (act. tr.) confirms Zonaras' statement (viii. 12) that he was
sent to Sardinia. In Sicily Florus appears to have been joined by
Caiatinus in the summer, where consul and proconsul attacked
Panormus together. Florus triumphed as proconsul de Poeneis IV
non. oct. (258). In Klio, 1910, 431 ff., Leuze argued unconvincingly
that 1Tpoa'fu;fdp,c:vot means 'awaiting', that Florus operated alone
until he was relieved by Caiatinus in September, and that ot arparrryot
( 10) can refer to a single general. Clearly P. is wrong, and his error
may well go back to a failure in his source (probably Fabius: Bung,
103-4) to distinguish consul and proconsul.
Sta To . . . 1ra.pa.xufla~ELV: since the attack was after Caiatinus'
arrival, i.e, ] une at the earliest, the expression cannot be pressed;
evidently the Carthaginians had made no move from their winter
quarters of 259/8.
10. 'I1T1rava.v: identical with .Etrni.va, the capture of which the abbreviated Diodorus (xxiii. 9 5) puts after that of Camarina, i.e. in 259.
Holm's identification (Gesch. Sic. iii. 347-8) with Mte Castellacio near
Termini is wholly hypothetical; but a coin showing a dolphin and a
mussel, with the legend lrANATAN, suggests thatitlayon the coast
(Holm, ibid. iii. 6o3 no. 122). Cf. Ziegler, RE, 'Hippana', col. 1662.
4866

I. 24.

It

THE FIRST Pl:NIC WAR

11. MuTT(aTpaTov had twice before been besieged by the Romalls


( 2 n.); it was now burnt, and its population enslaved (though the
Punic garrison escaped) (Diod. xxiii. 9 4; Zon. viii. II). Coins inscribed MYTI have been found near Marianopoli (near S. Caterina
Villarmosa, 30 km. west of Enna), which probably belong to this
town. Pliny, Nat. kist. iii. 91, mentions the Mutustratini as stipen; Holm, Gesclt. Sic.
dian:i. Ziegler, RE, '.Mytistraton', cols.
iii. 663.
12. "Evvav KTA.: see above 8 n. Auct. de Hir. ill. 39 describes the
recovery of Enna with much fantastic detail. Of the other noAt(fp.dma
Diod. xxiii. 9 5 mentions Camicus and Erbessus, both in the territory
of Agrigentum.
13. Amapaous eTrExelp'!}aa.v 1To1uopKEiv: evidently a failure; cf. Zon.
viii. I2, VVJmk OE J\a8wv npoKaT(1')(11 a~n}v (i.e. Amdpa.v) Kat
imgA06.Jv alqwtS!wc; noMotk OLI.!/>8tp.
25. 1. r&Los J\TLALoc;: the consuls for A.U.c. 497
257/6 B.c. were
C. A til ius M.f. M.n. Regulus and Cn. Cornelius P .f. Cn.n. Blasio
(Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (47)', cols. 2084-5; Munzer, RE, 'Cornelius (73)',
cols. 1271-2). Again the Romans concentrated all their forces on
Sicily. Blasio probably joined Caiatinus, who stayed on as praetor
(or proconsul: cf. Thiel, Hist. 2oi n. 446): Blasio's failure (cf. 6)
explains why he had no triumph, that celebrated by Caiatinus being
for his achievements in 258 ('ex Sicilia de Poeneis XIIIl k.f[ebr.]'
(act. tr.): see Broughton, i . .:208). Munzer, loc. cit., argues that Blasio
remained at Rome: but see Meltzer, ii. z87, 567; Luterbacher, Phil.,
1907, 409; De Sanctis, iii. I. I36. Thiel (Hist. 2oo-1) argues that he
was maintaining a strict defensive on the Senate's instructions;
preparations were concentrated on the next year's expedition. As
P. records, the fleet was under Regulus; the Carthaginians were
conunanded by Hamilcar (cf. 27. 6).
1Tpos TuvSa.pl8a Ka9opll-La9eis: C. Tyndaris lies about 15 miles west
of .Mylae (modern C. Tindaro). P. seems to have used Philinus here;
the engagement only just escapes being indecisive, whereas 'for an
annalist an indecisive battle is always a Roman victory' (DeSanctis,
iii. r. 226). :.\Ioreover, P.'s account differs from the Roman tradition;
Zon. viii. 12 puts both consuls in charge of the fleet; and though the
figures in Polyaen. viii. 2o (2oo Roman triremes against 8o Punic
ships) are exaggerated, it is likely that Atilius had a superiorityTarn (]HS', 1907, sz) thinks he may have had ISO ships in alL He
subsequently triumphed: 'cos. de Poeneis naualem
VIII k .. .'
(fragmentary notice in act. tr.).
7-9. The rz'val fleets, sz,mmer zs6. P.'s figures, 330 Roman and 350
Punic warships, are accepted by Gelzer (Hermes, r935, 275 n. 1),
as based on official sources: but their acceptance is not without
8z

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 25. 7

difficulty. To take the Roman figures first: at Ecnomus the loss of


24 was compensated by the capture of 64 Punic vessels (2S. 14). At
the subsequent battle of C. Hermaea (J6. 10-12) the Romans had
350 ships; they had no (recorded) losses and took 114 prizes. In the
storm which followed they lost all but So of their 364 ships (37 2).
Now, if P.'s figures were consistent, there should have been 464 ships
in the storm (i.e. 350+ n4) or even 504 if one includes the 40 ships
previously left behind in Africa (zg. g). Such a total is, however,
highly improbable; and it looks as though the real Roman figure for
C. Hermaea was 25o (including the 40 based on Africa), for this
figure, together with II4 prizes, gives the required 364 for the storm
(d. Tarn, JHS, 1907, 52 ff.; DeSanctis, iii. 1. 137 n. 9S; Thiel, Hist.
84--85). What then of Ecnomus? Here the real total was probably
not 330, but 230; the larger figure, which will have come from Fabius,
may have arisen from adding in the transports (though it does not
follow that there were in fact precisely 100 of these: there were
probably about So; cf. Thiel, Hist. 85 n. 7o): 230, less 24 sunk, plus
44 out of the 64 prizes (it does not follow from 29. 1 that all the prizes
were fitted out; the Romans will have picked out the least damaged)
bring the total up to the required zso for the fleet which sailed to
C. Hermaea. Frank (CAH, vii. 681-z) has slightly different figures for
Ecnomus: zso for the Roman fleet and Punic losses amounting to
30 sunk and so captured; but he does not defend these in detail, and
the so prizes seem to be those taken from the left wing alone (zS. 12).
Here Tarn's scheme seems preferable.
The Punic figures may be from Philinus, reflecting a Punic source
(Bung, 105), or they may be Fabius', calculated in part at least on
the basis of the Roman; the latter seems more likely, for the Carthaginian 350 at Ecnomus seem to outnumber the Roman 330 ad
maiorem gloriam patriae. If the figure of zoo Punic ships at Hermaea
(36. 9) is approximately right (and 200 is about what Carthage
regularly manned in a crisis), there will have been between 200 and
250 ships at Ecnomus. Tarn prefers 200 on the grounds that (a) the
Roman figure of 230 (see above) suggests that the Romans expected
to meet no more than zoo (and in general he makes out a good case
for thinking that in this war the Romans took care to outbuild the
enemy), (b) the Roman figure of 250 at Hermaea shows that nothing
had happened in the meantime to alter that estimate. De Sanctis
(iii. I. 13S n. 9S) and Frank (CAH, vii. 6S2) prefer zso because (De
Sanctis argues) P. is likely to have been exactly 100 out; but if the
figure is from Fabius, and is designed to be larger than the Roman
total, this would of course not follow.
Tarn's scheme is not watertight; but his figures look about right
and his arguments are plausible. No help comes from the Roman
tradition. Oros. iv. S. 6 repeats P.'s figure for the Roman fleet, 330;
83

FIRST PHASE

~,r-

SECOND PHASE

-~

I
f

'-----~-----

:...(---.:------~

1...,.1 I

I I
, ~31 14
~

'
I I
--~'.(I

r
l

',,_2. . __>-

lVI_)
m. 1000

1.2.3.4. Rornan Fleet.

-- .... _
0

--------

,..,....,,.

"'

1 km.

I. II. ill. IV. Carthaginian Fleet

I. THE BATTLE OF ECNOMUS.

Based on Kromayer.

THE FIRST PUXIC WAR

I. z6. 6

Appian, Lib. 3, gives 350. Diod. xxiii. II is corrupt; and 15. 4 merely
speaks in general terms of Roman fleets of 300 ships.
8. nuxuvov . . . "EKVO .... OV: Pachynus is modern c. Passero, the
south-east promontory of Sicily; Mt Ecnomus is a hill on the right
bank of the R. Himera (modern Salso), near its mouth, today Poggio
S. Angelo or Mte Cufino above Licata. Mt Ecnomus was traditionally the place where Phalaris kept his brazen bull (Diod. xix. ro8. r),
and was famous for a Punic victory over Agathocles in JII (id. ro?ro). Hiilsen, RE, 'Eknomon', col. 2214. The relative positions of the
fleets were determined by the practice of hugging the coast, which
meant that the Romans would sail up the south coast as far as
Selinus before crossing the open sea.

26. 1-28. 14. The battle of Ecnomus. P.'s detailed account suggests
that either his source or ultimate source was an eyewitness; the
intimate knowledge of the Carthaginian dispositions points to
Philinus. In addition, however, P. appears to have used Fabius
(cf. 26. 6 n.). The Roman order has been criticized as improbable
(Tarn, HMND, 149-51; De Sanctis, iii. r. 141 n. 102; Thiel, Hist.
u9): the wedge fonnation, with the third and fourth squadrons
along the base, would have been beyond the skill of the pilots: 'no
captains, let alone Roman captains, could have kept station' (Tarn).
The essence of the formation appears to be to protect the third
squadron, which is towing the horse transports; and this would be
secured if the first two squadrons advanced ahead, slightly in
echelon, with the flanks overlapping the ends of the third squadron.
If, encouraged by the Punic tactics, the joint centre of squadrons
one and two raced ahead, a Punic observer may well have gained
the impression of the closed wedge which P. describes (Scullard,
Hist. r63; Thiel, Hist. 120). P.'s account is accepted as it stands by
Kromayer (Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt., col. 5) and Frank (CAH,
vii. 68r). The Carthaginian tactics are not wholly clear. Thiel (Hist.
u7) argues that Hamilcar's plan was to draw the Roman first line
forward and envelop it in the rear out of reach of the corui, before
the second line (P.'s third squadron) could come up; but he has to
admit that the independent action of the two wing-commanders is
not consistent with these tactics.
26. 6. Tp~ap~o~ . . . wvo11atovTo: on the four categories of troops,
enrolled in the uelites, the hastati, the principes, TOV> o rrpea-{JvTUTOV>
el> Tov> Tpw.p{ov>, see vi. 21. 7-ro. These categories are distinguished
in age and, to some extent, in income and prestige, a distinction
which did not apply to the four squadrons at Ecnomus, who were all
picked troops (26. 5). It therefore seems probable that the name
triarii was a popular nickname given by troops to whom the sea
and its ways were still novel; and though the fourth squadron may

ss

I. zr,. 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

have called themselves 'the tried veterans', it is perhaps more likely


that their comrades dubbed them 'the old men'. The source here must
be Roman, i.e. Fabius. See, for fuller discussions and parallels for
such military slang, CR, 1950, 1o-1I.
7-8. Roman and Carthaginian numbers. P.'s figures of 14o,ooo
(Roman) and 15o,ooo (Carthaginian) seem to be calculated from the
numbers of ships, and probably derive from Fabius. Three hundred
rowers (which, allowing for the inclusion of officers and sailors,
would imply rather less than 30 oars per side) is acceptable as the
complement of a quinquereme (Tarn, HMND, 14o); and 120 soldiers,
raising the total complement to 420, is also reasonable-certainly
not an exaggerated figure, for we hear of 4,ooo soldiers transported
in 15 warships {Livy, xxvii. 32. 2) (cf. Thiel, Hist. :269 n. 681). P.'s
four aTpaTom:oa provide a problem. Presumably arpaTo'lTOoll here
half
translates legio (though cases occur where arpaTimOoll is
a legion, i.e. two OTpaTo'lTEOa form one legion with its
,
cf. 88. 7 n.); but it looks as if these four legions are calculated from
the 39,6oo marines implied in a fleet of 330 quiuqueremes, each
canying 120. This is indeed the basis of Meltzer's figure (ii. 290) of
4o,ooo. But, as Thiel (Hist. :w9) observes, four legions cannot have
been selected out of four legions, which is the most that can have
been in Sicily at this time; and since the quinqueremes will have had
their permanent garrison of 40 proletarians (vi. 19. 3. if indeed this
passage refers to marine service, and not to rowers; Kromayer, Phil.,
1897, 485 f.) from the Italian port, and since the real total for the
fleet was not 330, but 230 (25. 7-9 n.}, the number of forces embarked
at Ecnomus (25. 8, 26. s) will not have exceeded r8,4oo, i.e. 230 x 8o.
This is equivalent to a consular army of two legions at fullest strength.
These calculations assume that P.'s figure of 120 soldiers to a ship
is reliable; possible, though less likely, is the hypothesis that he or
his source got it by assuming an army of four legions of maximum
size, i.e. 4o,ooo including socii (vi. 20. 8) and dividing it among 330
ships. Regulus was later left behind in Africa (:zg. 9) with rs,ooo foot
and soo horse. De Sanctis (iii. r.
n. 3) takes these to be the bulk
of the army originally embarked in Sicily, and this view seems
substantially correct {see 29. 9 n.); Sicily cannot have been left
without troops.
The Punic figures are derived from the number of ships ( 8) ; they
assume the presence of marines in the same proportion as on the
Roman side, which seems unlikely since the Carthaginians were not
planning an invasion (DeSanctis, iii. I. 139 n.
11. Tao; . . . f:~l)pt:lS: 'sixes', i.e. large
decked, with a single
bank of oars, six men to an oar (not 'six-banked galleys' (Paton)).
ot O'TpanlYo(: the consuls for A.U.c. 498
256/5 B.C., M. Atilius M.f.
L.n. Regulus (suffectus in place of Q. Caedicius) and L. Manlius A.f.
86

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

LzJ.II

P.n. Vulso Longus (Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (sr)', cols. zo86-92; Munzer,
RE, '11anlius (10r)', col. 1225). Regulus was probably brother of the
consul of 257.
12. Ka.TO. J.L~a.v va.uv: 'in single file', cf. 13 lrrl p.lav vauv, 'in line one
deep'.
Ta.ts S trpwppo.ts ElxEv: 'the ships were ranged one behind the
other with their prows pointing outwards'; but tgw must in fact
mean 'towards the open sea' and not towards the ship in front
(which would have involved a converging rnovement)-so Paton,
correctly. The ships were in fact in echelon.
13. lv J.1TW1T"!!: 'facing the front', i.e. in contrast to the first two
squadrons; cf. v. 8z. ro, where cavalry are placed lv p.HdJrr<p in contrast to elephants iv hnKap.rr{<p (on this phrase cf. 27. 4 n.).
16. KoiAov . O"TEpEbv: 'hollow ... compact', i.e. the front part of
the formation enclosed an area of empty sea, whereas the base consisted of two lines, with horse-transports between.
27. 1. trnpa.Ko.Aeaa.vTE'S: the Roman motives given in 26. I are now
put into the mouth of the Carthaginian commander; the source may
be Philinus (Bung, uo n., regards the whole of the implied strategy
as a Polybian anachronism).
4. v ttrucnJ.11Tit@ vuov 1Tpos TT-jv yf\v: 'reached shoreward at an angle
with the rest' (Paton): the angle is probably forwards, so that the end
of the line is ahead of the centre. Cf. Xen. C_vrop. vii. 1. s-6. where
forces irrKap.nTov t:ls: KVKAwaLv, w(]ne.p yap.p.a lxaTpwfhv T~v la.vTwv
nl~w 7TOL~(]G.JITIES, W> mi.vToO~:v ap.a p.axotVTO. But the Punic line was
not necessarily at right angles to the centre, i.e. advancing in
column. See further v. 82. 9 n.
5. 1T(1TAovs: naues rostratas (Casaubon): cf. so. 6. Also found in
Philo Mech. Belop. 104. 16.
'Avvwv 6 .. Aetcp9ds Tft 1Ta.pa.Tn~e~: cf. 19. 8 ff.
6. :AJ.LLAKa.s o 1TEpt TT-jv T vv5a.p(5a. v<lUJ.ia.x~aa.s: cf. 25. 1~4 (name
omitted): he is the Hamilcar of 24. 3 The left and right wings are
so named, excluding the squadron on the left ( 4), and represent
the two halves of the main line: hence Harnilcar is KaTa p.i(n]V r~v
TG.gtv. We are not told who commanded the real left flank.
8. EK 1TnpayyE:AJ.inTos KAwavTwv 1Tpos cpvy~v: 'Ecnomus is Cannae
with the result reversed' (Tarn, HMND, rso). For Hannibal's successful use of the yielding centre at Cannae see iii. IIS; at Ecnornus
the centre proved too weak to hold the Romans. Here P.'s authority
seems to be in touch with the Punic plan, and is probably Philinus
(unless P. has deduced the plan from the subsequent Punic resistance
( Io)).
11. EtctrEp~trAeovTes: cf. 23. 9 At the battle of Chios (xvi. 4 14) the
Rhodian plan was to pierce the enemy's line by the manceuvre

l. 2].

II

THE FIRST PUNIC \VAR

known as SdK1TAovs, so putting his oars out of action, ftET<z S~ Taih"a


m:i:Aw wrrtEpmAlovns ('turning and sailing round again', Paton), to
ram the enemy from the stern. Ecnomus, like Chios, was a battle
between navies built for ramming and for boarding respectively.
28. 2. 1ra.payeyovoTES e~s f1ETW1TOV: 'deploying into line' (Paton), i.e.
by abandoning its position 11 mKaft1T{lfJ. The third squadron was
exposed by the advance of the first two against the Carthaginian
centre.
6. ol. yap 1rpwTo~ llu:Kp(9rJC7a.v: the sense is that where three
equally matched struggles begin successively, it is natural that an
issue should be reached in the one which began first, i.e. in that
between the Roman vanguard and Hamilcar commanding the Punic
centre: see Schweighaeuser, ad. lac. OtEKp{OTJaav may mean 'separated' (Paton, Shuckburgh) or (d. ii. 22. II, iii. III. 2) 'brought the
issue to a decision'.
10. O"uyKEKAe~O"f1Evov 1rpos TU yft: 'As fleets hugged the coast whenever they could, a really decisive victory meant driving the enemy
ashore' (Tarn, HMND, ISo). On this occasion the arrival of the
consuls turned the tables; and, of the 64 Punic ships taken, so were
from this left wing which failed to get out to sea. On the few that
escaped see Frontin. Strat. ii. I3 Io.
14. Losses: cf. 25. 7---9 n. P. has exact Roman and only approximate
Carthaginian figures (imp Tptcf.KovTa) : his source is evidently Fabius.
The same figures, with slight variants, due to careless transmission,
appear in the annalistic tradition: Oros. iv. 8. 6 and Eutrop. ii. 2I.
I (Punic losses 64: Roman losses 22 (Eutrop.)); auct. de uir. ill. 40. I
(63 Punic ships taken).
29. 1. civ~yoVTo , . AL~OT)V: Zonaras' account of the Roman fleet's
returning to Messana after Ecnomus (viii. 12) is not inconsistent with
P.; and the Punic peace overtures mentioned by Zonaras, ibid. (d.
Dio, fg. 43 22; Val. Max. vi. 6. 2) may also be genuine (though the
account includes details that are manifestly invented).
2. TT]v aKpa.v TtlV 'Epf10.LUV EnOVOf1U~OI'EVT)V: modern c. Bon (Ras
Adder), which lies north-east of Carthage; on the identification of
the capes in this area see iii. 22. s n. (a).
TT]v ::A.0'1T(Iia KaAouf1EvT)V 1roAw: Aspis, the Roman Clupea (though
Ptol. Geog. iv. 3 2 seems to distinguish the two), lay a little south of
C. Bon, on the east side of the peninsula, and somewhat north of
(modern) Menzel Temine; cf. Lehmann-Hartleben, 246. From here
the expedition could cut the communications between Carthage and
her rich possessions to the south-east (Frank, CAH, vii. 682-3).
9. Regulus' forces: 15,ooo foot and soo horse represent the bulk of the
legionaries and probably the whole of the cavalry originally embarked
88

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

l. JO. ]

at Ecnomus (on the horse see Thiel, Hist. 216-I7). Probably between
2,ooo and 3,ooo marines went down in the 24 ships lost at Ecnomus
(28. 14) ; and the original total of soldiers on board was c. 27 ,6oo (i.e.
9,2oo permanent garrison from Italy and c. I8,4oo embarked in Sicily
from the legions there). Since 40 ships remained behind in Africa, the
210 which returned (for the total of 250 see 25. 7--9 n.) would require
8,4oo marines and the 40 at Clupea some I,6oo, as permanent garrison,
i.e. Io,ooo in all. This figure, taken from the c. 25,ooo which survived
Ecnomus, gives almost exactly Regulus' rs,ooo. Manlius' return is
dated to autumn (256) by Zon. viii. I3 He triumphed: 'cos. de
Poeneis naualem egit VIII k .. .' (act. tr.).
30-34. Reg1dus in Africa: in contrast to 29, which is written from
the Roman point of view, and probably comes from Fabius, chs. 3o34 seem to follow Philinus almost exclusively, as can be seen from
a comparison "'ith Diodorus, from the stress on the Carthaginian
point of view, and from the exaltation of Xanthippus, a Greek (like
Philinus) in Punic service. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. r. 226-7; Bung, I I r-rs
(contra Laqueur, RE, 'Philinus', col. 2186, who argues for contamination of Fabius and Philinus).
30. 1. 1t.aopou~a.v ~ea.t BwaTa.pov: Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, here
makes his first appearance; he plays an important role down to his
execution in 25I (d. 40. r-Is). Bostar is not otherwise known: he
may be the Vodostor (or Bodostor) who died from ill-treatment in
Roman captivity, c. 243 (Diod. xxiv. 9 I, 12). Orosius (iv. 8. r6)
speaks of Hasdrubales duo. The divided command was unusual,
though not unprecedented; Meltzer, ii. 72
2. e~ouAeueTo f1ET0. Twv 1rept Tov A.aopou~a.v: 'with Hasdrubal and
his staff' (Paton), 'with Hasdrubal and his colleague' (Shuckburgh);
but Polybian usage sanctions the simple translation 'with Hasdrubal'.
5. 1rpos m)1uv A.8Uv: not mentioned elsewhere; the nominative is
therefore irrecoverable. It is perhaps identical with the Roman town
of Uthina (modern Oudna), about IS miles south of Tunis, and
somewhat east of the Wadi Meliane and the railway from Tunis to
Pont du Fahs and Zaghouan. Meltzer, ii. 569-70; De Sanctis, iii.
I.

47 n. 5

7. acflUfj OE Ta.is ta.uTWV OuVUf1EO'~V : the folly of the Carthaginians


prior to Xanthippus' arrival (d. 32. 2) is part of Philinus' version;
but the Punic generals may have feared the superiority of the
Roman infantry on the plains (De Sanctis, iii. r. I47-8). That they
did not have to wait for a Greek to tell them that cavalry and elephants are most useful on level ground had already been observed
by :Mommsen, Rom. Gesch. i. 523 n. Zon. viii. 13 mentions this battle;
so too Oros. iv. 8. I6 and Eutrop. ii. 21. 3 (with exaggerated Punic
losses from Livy).
8g

l.

30. Ij

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

15. TuvTJTos: Tunis lay at the mouth of the R. Catada, on a slight


eminence between a lagoon, modern El Bahira (on the north-east),
and a salt marsh, modern Sebka es Sedjoumi (on the south-west):
d. 73 5, 1Tapd. r0v :\lpv1JV (the lagoon). It played a prominent part in
any fighting near Carthage (Diod. xiv. 77. J, xx. 8. 7, etc.). Its distance
from Carthage is given as 120 stades = r85 km. (67. IJ, xiv. 10. 5);
but Livy, xxx. 9 II makes it 15 milia passuum.
31. 4. aywvtwv J..L~ O'UJ..L~TI KTA.: the motivation here contradicts
that in the rest of the tradition. Here l~egulus takes the initiative
'With peace terms, lest he be superseded; elsewhere it is unanimously
stated that the Carthaginians took the initiative from weariness
(Oros. iv. g. r; Zon. viii. 13; Diod. xxiii. r2. r), and that Regulus' command was prolonged against his wishes (Livy, ep. r8; Frontin. Strat.
iv. 3 3; Val. Max. iv. 4 6). The latter statement is probably part of
the Regulus saga; but the harshness of the terms offered by Regulus
suggests that the Carthaginians did in fact make the offer, and this
version, which is in Diodorus, \.\'as probably that of Philinus. P.'s
stress on Regulus' fear of supersession may come from Fabius (De
Sanctis, iii. 1. 227; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 140 n. :2, who compares
ii. 27. 5, 34 r (not a good parallel), and Livy, viii. 30. 9), or may
indeed be a general deduction from similar situations of which he
was cognizant (e.g. that of Flamininus, xviii. rr. z); Zon. viii. I7
attributes the same motives to Catulus in 24r; and indeed the situation was inherent in a system of annual commands. T. Frank
(CAH, vii. 683) offers a pretty example of compromise: 'he announced
his readiness to receive offers of peace.' On the phrase rrJV Jmyparf;ijv
rwl' 1Tpayparwv see ii. 2. 9 n.
5. -rb j30.pos Twv emTay!J-0.-rwv: according to Dio, fg. 43 2:2~23 (who
alone records them), they required the payment of an indemnity,
the surrender of Roman and ransoming of Punic prisoners, and also
the evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia, the signing of a foedus iniquum, the surrender of the whole Punic fleet but for one ship, and
an undertaking to furnish a squadron of fifty vessels for Rome at
any time upon demand. This version is accepted by Meltzer (ii. 299,
570-1), Arnold (Oorzaak, 71), and Frank (CAH, vii. 683, 'Dio's account
may be correct, and as such a fair commentary on the consul's
stupidity'); but (a) it is not clear by what channel Dio could have
obtained a faithful record, (b) if the annexation of Sardinia was envisaged in 256, its omission from the Treaty of Catulus is odd (62. 8~
63. 3). Hence Dio's account is probably to be rejected. The harsh
terms are also mentioned by Diod. xxiii. r:2. r5; Eutrop. ii. 2r. 4;
Oros. iv. 9 I; Zon. viii. IJ. In fact a successful outcome at this stage
was mled out, since the Romans were bound to demand, and the
Carthaginians bound to reject, the evacuation of Sicily.
90

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

1.32. 9

8 . .ivSpwSws .. Kat yevva~ws: this praise of the Carthaginian aw{8pwv (on which see 21. 6 n.) reveals the source, Philinus (d. 14. 3).
32. 1. =:av9~n..rrov .. Antte5at!Jovwv: Diod. xxiii. I-J.. 1 calls him a
Spartiate, which would fit the words rii> AaKWVtKij> aywyij;:; J.LISTEOXTJKOTa (a training still admired, though its rigours were much diminished, Plut. Ags, 5); he was a mercenary (cf. Diod. xxiii. 15. 7),
despite Eutropius (ii. 21. ..J.) and Appian (Lib. 3), who make him an

ally sent by Sparta, and Oros. iv. 9 z, who calls him Lacedaemoniorum regem. For a useful summary of the history of Spartan mercenaries in the Hellenistic period see Launey, i. IIJ ff.
5. auT<t> .. Tns Suvh. ..u:~s evexdp~aav: Zon. viii. IJ describes him as
r~v aihoKpdropa d.px~v dATJ</>d,. But despite some ambiguity
(e.g. 32. 7, rwv 7Tporepov orpar"f/ywv) the generals did not (nor indeed
could they) hand over an official command to Xanthippus.
8. J.I.ET' oA.iyas i)J.tipu<.; wp~TJOClY: the dating of Regulus' defeat and
the subsequent Roman relief expedition have caused unnecessary
difficulties. The consuls for 255 set sail rij;:; Opda, dpxoJ.L~II"f/> (36. ro);
but as they stayed in Africa only long enough to pick up the survivors (36. 12 n.), and were wrecked 'between the risings of Orion
and Sirius', i.e. in July (37 4 n.), this expression must refer to a date
not earlier than late May or early June (the same phrase is used very
vaguely at v. 1. 3). News of Regulus' disaster reached Rome before
the fleet set out (36. 5); but it is quite possible that its fitting out
was already advanced, since the Romans w1Jl hardly have intended
lea\ing Regulus for the summer without supplies or reinforcements.
Since a message could be in Rome from Carthage in three days
(Plut. Cato mai. 27. r), the battle can easily have been fought in early
May, and news of it have reached Rome in time for the sending of
the fleet to look like an expedition of succour. With this chronology
it is necessary neither to reject P.'s statement that the sending of
the fleet followed news of the disaster (with De Sanctis, iii. r.
nor to adopt with many scholars (Reuss, Phil., r9or, 108 ff.; Igog,
4r7, Gsell, iii. 90 n. 4; Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (97)', coL 269; Beloch,
iv. 2. 288; Bung, u6) the improbable hypothesis that the expedition
of relief was not sent until 254 (against this see the convincing arguments of De
iii. I. 257-60). The words wpq, KaUJ.LClTOS in App.
Lib. 3 (in any case, an unreliable account) refer to the time of day,
and not to the season of the disaster; and though there is substantial
evidence for the prorogation of Regulus' command (Frontin. Strat.
iv. 3 3; VaL Max. iv. 4 6; Sen. de ben. v. 3 2; cons. ad Helv. rz. 5;
auct. de uir. ill. 40), this might be granted well before the end of his
year of office, and is no evidence for the date of his defeat.
9. Carthaginian numbers. An army of only r6,ooo in Africa seems
very small; and Philinus may have reduced the number to enhance
9I

L 32. 9

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Xanthippus' victory (De Sanctis, iii. I. 150-I n. 13) The Roman


tradition (Appian, Eutropius, Orosius) gives Regulus 3o,ooo to 32,ooo
men; but even with Libyans he can hardly have raised his rs,ooo to
more than 2o,ooo.
33. 6. Ti]v . .p&.Xa.yya. Twv Ka.pxTJSovlwv: citizen-soldiers, who only
come into the picture when Africa is invaded. Meltzer (ii. rr6-r7,
508--9) estimates that two-thirds of the Punic force was made up
of citizen troops.
9. Taus ypocr.pop.axous: the uelites,lit. 'javelin-fighters'. See vi. 2r.
7 n. The UTJp.1:at are 'maniples'; meaning primarily uexillum, this
word is also extended to refer to the soldiers serving beneath it.
10. TfjS rrpbs Ta OT)p(a. p.axTJs SeoVTWS . EO'Toxa.crp.evol: P. here
seems oblivious of the lesson of Zama, that elephants should be met
with an open formation. But he had no first-hand experience of
elephants, since these were last used in a major battle at Magnesia:
Griffith, 214.
34. 2. cruvelj!o.PTJO'O.V TOlS orrhots KTA.: d. Caesar, BC, iii. 92 5:
'neque frustra antiquitus institutum est ut signa undique concinerent
clamoremque uniuersi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostis terreri et
suos incitari existimauerunt.' De Sanctis (iii. r. 227) questions the
accuracy of P.'s comment (from Philinus) for soldiers carrying
leather shields; but it was always possible to strike the iron boss or
rims (vi. 23. 4-5).
4. Twv p.tcrOo,Popwv: i.e. on the Carthaginian right (d. 33 7). These
were apparently the mercenaries of Xanthippus, who did his best
to rally them (Diod. xxiii. 14. 2); DeSanctis, iii. I. 152 n. 15.
5. Twv . Ka.Ta To us iXe,Pa.vTa.s Ta.xOevTwv: according to 33 6 the
elephantS had been posted 7Tp0 7TaUTj<; Ti]<; Ovvap.ln<; lv fLETWmp, and SO
opposite the whole Roman front. P. must therefore mean 'of those
left drawn up opposite the elephants' after the legion on the left
had broken away in pursuit of the Carthaginian right.
6. KuKXoup.evot rro.vTo.x68ev u1To Twv trrrrewv: De Sanctis (iii. r. 152)
suggests that the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Roman legions
in the flank and rear only after a successful pursuit of the horse
( 3) ; this would explain how the Roman left had the chance to
break away against the mercenaries.

35. Reflections on the fate of Regulus. In this chapter P. singles out


the double peripeteia of Regulus and of Carthage under Xanthippus
as an example of the moral uses of history (d. r. z), which allows the
reader to gain his experience vicariously. Regulus, inexorable in his
terms when victorious, but soon after forced to sue for terms from
his Punic captors, illustrates the peripeteia wrought by a fortune,
92

THE FIRST PU:'{IC WAR

I. 35

which is conceived as a force which suddenly reverses one's lot at


the moment of extreme prosperity (~<alp.rD..taTa KaTd. Tas mrpaylas);
and Carthage was restored to confidence and success through the
aid of a single man ( 4-5). This is all typically Polybian; but he
may well have drawn to some extent on the congenial reflections of
Philinus. Diodorus (xxiii. 15. 1-{i) has a not dissimilar account of
Regulus' fate: JJv {mr::pTJrf>rfvTJaE T~v d:ruxtav, Tovnuv ~vayKd.aBTJ T~v
tt'Q

'tt

..1...1

tf

..,.

Vl"'ptv Ka' TTJV EsOVO'Lal! 't'EpEW, 7rpoa't'TJPTJ/LfiJJOS E'O.VTOV TTJV O'!JyYVWp.TJV


Kal TOJJ avy~<xwpT}p.lvov Tofs tlTTTatKomv E',\r::ov ( 4); and likewise he
stresses the role of a single man in raising up Carthage: 'TTapaSo[ov
yap lrf>ali'ETo mi.au el "11'poayEvop.lvou Tois KapxTJoovlot> ivos p.avov dvop6s,
TTJALKUVTTJ Ttlll' oAwv ,;ylveTO p.e-rafloJ.~ KTA. ( s). Diodorus, it is true,

introduces an idea not present in P. when he makes Regulus' overbearing conduct, WUTE TO . ocup.oVLOV vr::p.euijaat ( 2), the 'metaphysical' cause of his reversal, for there is no trace in P. of the notion
that Regulus' peripeteia was due to his arrogance (so, correctly,
Balsdon, CQ, 1953. 159 n. 2, criticizing what I wrote in CQ, 1945, 10);
but whether this was cut out of a common source by P. (who adopts
the view that a peripeteia follows upon hybris only in one passage,
xxvii. 8. 4), or Diodorus added it (he is fond of the theme: cf. xxvii.
6. 2, 15. 2, xxxi. rr. 3), it seems probable that both P. and Diodorus
are here follo>Ving a common source, Philinus. It is not an argument
against this hypothesis th:at P. has parallels elsewhere both for his
view of Tyche and his stress on the role of one man (cf. viii. 3 J, 7 7,
ix. 2:::. I, 2:z. 6, xxxii. 4 2) for both are common (for the latter cf.
Plut. lrfor. 325 A, ann Ennius, 'unus homo nobis cunctando restituit
rem'). This conclusion is rejected both by Bung (us n. 3) and by
Pedech (REA, r95Z, 255-{i). Pedech asserts (a) that the word TVXTJ
as well as the theme of the caprice of fortune are both absent from
Diodorus (Philinus), (b) that for Philinus the example of Xanthippus
illustrates not the triumph of the individual but the victory of intelligence and skill over brute force. But: (a) though Diodorus does
not use the word TUXTJ he attributes Regulus' downfall to TO Satp.olLov
( 2) ; and there is no reason to think that he distinguished between
the two any more than does P. (d. i. 84. Io); (b) the second distinction
is artificial, for Diodorus stresses the words Jvos p.6vov avSpos and P.
quotes Euripides' words on v aorf>ov povJ.wp.a. The power of the
individual resid.es in his intelligence. The slightly different attitude
towards Tyche's role in the two authors is mentioned above; it is
no serious obstacle to the view that the common source is Philinus,
and Bung's thesis that Diodorus has introduced Polybian material
in the middle of his Philinian account is not well grounded.
P. here makes no reference to the famous legend of Regulus'
visit to Rome on a peace-mission, under oath to return to Carthage
if he failed, and of his return and death by torture; and had he
93

I. 35

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

known of it, he must have made some mention of it in this d~dactic


passage. It seems well established that this story was wholly legendary, and invented by annalists to cover up the well-founded tradition that after Regulus' (natural) death in captivity, his widow
tortured two Punic prisoners held in the custody of the Atilii, so
that one died (Diod. xxiv. 12). There is an excellent analysis of the
growth of the Regulus legend by Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (51)', cols.
2088-92: see also DeSanctis, iii. 1. I54-6. T. Frank has argued for the
authenticity of the peace-mission (CP, I926, 311 ff.); but the legend
seems to stand or fall as a whole.
4. To 1ra.p' Eupl1TH5n: Nauck, fg. no. 3 from the Antiope, a frequently
quoted line (d. Plut. M or. 790 A; Sex. Emp. adu. math. i. 279; Galen,
Protrept. I3; Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 372, p. 240. 42; Themistius, or. I6,
p. 207 D), which refers to the strength of autocracy as against ochlocracy. P. quotes Euripides elsewhere at v. 106. 4 and xii. 26. s. and
perhaps echoes him at xv. 33 I; but he may owe his acquaintance to
some collection of passages (Wunderer, ii. 57-58).
7. OuE'Lv y4ip llvnJV Tpcmwv KTA.: cf. 1. 2 for the theme: for the
parallel in Philinus here see Diod. xxiii. 15. 4: Tot<; 8~ lStot<; avp.r.nl>p.aat TOV<; a.\.\ov<; JS{oag<e p.hpw 9povELV Jv Tat<; Jgovafat<;. On npayp.anK-l]
taTop{a ( 9) see 2. 8 n.
36. 3. cf>Oovous OLa.~oA.O.s: these reflections may also echo
Philinus, whose interest in mercenary captains (cf. 43 2 ff.) perhaps
indicates another Greek in Carthaginian service. But the theme
appears elsewhere in P.: cf. vii. 8. 4, ix. ro. 6.
4. npos .. A.Oyos: for the version that the faithless Carthaginians
drowned (or tried to drown) Xanthippus on his way home see Zon.
viii. 13; Val. Max. ix. 6. ext. I; Sil. It. vi. 682; App. Lib. 4; Tzetzes,
Hist. iii. 38o-6 = Diod. xxiii. I6. But if this is what P. had in mind,
he clearly disbelieved it. That the Xanthippus whom Ptolemy III
appointed governor of the newly-won prouinciae lrans Euphraten
before June 245 (Hieron. in Daniel. xi. 7---9) is the same man, was
suggested by Droysen, iii. 1. 386 f., and half accepted by DeSanctis,
Atti Ace. Torino, 1911-I2, 963 ('forse'), but remains uncertain: cf.
Bengtson, Strat. ii. 84, iii. 172-3. If it is true, P. may have resen:ed
his (lost) npo<; Aoyo<; for some context treating Egypt.
7. ITjv yEvvmoT'lTa. Ka.i. ToAfJ-a.v: it has been suggested by Cichorius,
41-42, that Naevius, fg. 42-43 ~for. refers to these Roman survivors.
The lines

'seseque ei perire mauolunt ibidem,


quam cum stupro redire ad suos popularis' (fg. 42)
are thought to imply the rejection by the garrison of a Punic offer
of ships to transport them to Sicily (though in fact the Romans had
94

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 36. II

their own forty vessels); and


'sin illos deserant fortissumos uiros
magnum stuprum populo fieri per gentes' {fg. 43)
suggest some opposition at Rome to the sending of a relief expedition. Neither detail is in P.; but whereas the first contradicts his statement that the Carthaginian object was to reduce the garrison,not to let
it get away (6), the second is at least consistent with P.'s version that
news of the disaster reached Rome before the expedition of 255 set sail.
9-10. The rival fleets in 255. The Punic figure of 2oo is usually
accepted as inherently probable: the difficulties in the Roman figure
have been discussed at 25. 7--{) n. :Meltzer (ii. 307) would reconcile the
figures here with the losses in the subsequent storm (37 2) by raising
the latter from 364 to 464; Frank (CAH, vii. 684 n. r) and DeSanctis
(iii. I. 157 n. 25) prefer to accept Diodorus' figure (Diod. xxiii. r8. r)
of 24 prizes at C. Hermaea rather than P.'s n4, and assume some
Roman losses--Orosius mentions 9-to reduce the resulting 374 to
364. But it is difficult to accept a fleet of 350 ships for the relief
expedition; and the subsequent erection of a columna rostrata on
the Capitol (Livy, xlii. 2o. r) and the granting of a triumph to both
consuls (celebrated in January 253, after their year as proconsuls in
Sicily) favours the higher figure for the Punic prizes, as does the
description of the victory as g icpoSov Kat r)q.8iw; ( n). Tarn's solution, to reduce the figures for the relieving fleet, thus seems the most
probable. As we saw (25. 7~9 n.) the error of an additional roo vessels
goes back to P.'s source for Ecnomus. In fact, the relieving fleet
will have been 2ro, not 250 strong, for 40 ships had been left behind
at Aspis (29. 9). According to Zonaras (viii. 14), these ships arrived
to join the main fleet during the battle. Laqueur's explanation of
the discrepancy, namely that the figure in 36. ro is from Philinus
and that in 37 2 from Fabius (RE, 'Philinos', col. 2187), rests on a
fallacious criterion for isolating passages derived from Philinus.
10. MapKov At(-!iAwv Ka.l. Iepou~ov 4>oAoutov: the consuls for A.U.c.
499 = 255/4 B.C., M. Aemilius M.f. Ln. Paullus and Ser. Fulvius
M:.f. M.n. Paetinus l\obilior {Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius {rq)', cols. sso~r;
Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (97)', cols. 269~7o).
E1TAeov 1ra.pn TlJV ILKEAia.v: the compression may be to compensate
for the long account of Ecnomus (Tarn, JHS, 19o7, 53). Zon. viii. 14
records that the fleet, overtaken by a storm, put in at and occupied
Cossyra (modern Pantelleria), which was recovered by the Carthaginians the following year. This is confirmed by the consuls' triumph
which each of them 'procos. de Cossurensibus et Poeneis naualem
egit' (act. tr.), in January 253.
11. TouTous (-!EV Tpe"'a(-ievol: this battle off C. Hermaea (cf. 29.2)
is also described by Diod. xxiii. r8. I; Zon. viii. 14; Eutrop. ii. 22. I;
95

!. 36.

I I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Oros. iv. 9 5 f. According to Zonaras it was laxupd vauJLaxla, and this


version, including the 24 Punic losses instead of II4 (Diodorus),
probably goes back to Philinus.
12. -rovs 8' ~~~ AL~on ... veo.v(O"~<ous avo.Xa.~6vTes: there may have been
land fighting; but the annalistic tradition of Roman land successes
looks like an attempt to counterbalance Regulus' defeat (Livy, ep.
r8; Oros. iv. 9 7; Eutrop. ii. 22. 2; Zon. viii. I4) DeSanctis (iii. I.
227) suggests that vmvlaKous is P.'s translation of Fabius' tironesa piece of apologetics for Regulus' defeat; but to P. vEavlaKot are
'soldiers' without qualification (see Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v.),
and in xxi. 36. 2, where our abbreviated text
vEavlaKovs, the
fuller version in Livy, xxxvii. 20 says they were veterans.

37. 1. 1Tp00'flo.vns TU TW\1 Ko.f!o.pwo.(wv xwpq;: i.e. towards c.


Pachynus.
2. Roman losses: see above 36. 9-10 n. Eutrop. ii. 22. 3 and Oros.
iv. 9 8 also record So ships surviving, but give the total fleet as 464
and 300 ships respectively. The losses are given in Diod. xxiii. r8. I
as 340 warships and 300 transports sunk.
4. fl~ 1TAE'i:v 1rapO. T~\1 e~w 1TAeup6.v: a criticism which evidently
entered the tradition later, since, with Lilybaeum, Drepana, and
Panormus in Punic hands, ancient methods of navigation allowed
the Romans no choice of route besides that round C. Pachynus.
Meltzer, ii. 308; DeSanctis, iii. r. rs8.
T~v f!EV ooSe1rw I<O.To.Xt]yeLv E1TLO''I'JflO.O"lav, T~v 8' mlj>epe0"9aL: cf. Diod.
i. 49 s, 7TapayEypaJLJLrfvwv TWV KO.Ta rJatv ywoJLr!vwv TOtS' aarpots
avaToAwv TE Kai BvaEWV Kat Bta TO.VTO.<; E1TLTEAO!!JLEVWJ.J E7Tta7JJLaatwJJ KO.Tct
Toil<; Alyv7TTlovs aaTpo.\6you<;. These E7TtU7JJLaalat are the risings and

settings of constellations, and other astronomical phenomena with


which changes of weather were believed to be connected, in this case
the risings of Orion and Sirius. Such phenomena are discussed in the
weather-calendar appended to the Eisagoge of Geminus (d. Tittel,
RE, 'Geminos (r)', cols. 1035-6), in which JmaTJJLaaf.a appears to
denote specifically a phenomenon heralding bad weather (as here).
In Eisagoge, 17 Manit. Geminus insists that such calendars have only
empirical, and no scientific, value-a point of view in advance of
that expressed here.
flETa.~u Ti}S '.Qp(wvos ~<at ~<uvos ~mToAfjs: by the rising of a
star (d. ii. r6. 9, iv. 37 2, v. 1. r, ix. r8. 2, 43 4) P. invariably means
its heliacal rising, i.e. the date at which it first becomes visible on
the eastern horizon before the light of the rising sun causes it to
disappear. It is the first of the nine ax7JJLO.TtaJLol described by
Ptolemy, Alm. viii. 4: o Ka.\ovruvos 1rpwrv6s a7TTJAUnTTJs, (hav o dar~p
E7Ti TOV 7Tp6s dvaToAas opl,OVTOS' YEVTJTO.t avv ~AL<tJ, and later defined as
l~a 1rpoavaTo.\~ rf>mvoJLlv71 , 'the morning appearance of the rising
g6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 38.

before sunrise'. By the setting of a star (cf. iii. 54 r) P. means the


date at which it first sets before sunrise, having hitherto become
inv1.sible while still above the horizon. This is Ptolemy's third
O'X.TJJl.anap.<k (loc. cit.), described as 6 KaAoVp.Evos 1Tpwrv6s Ali/J, lhav Tov
~>.lou J7Ti TOV 7TpOs avaTOAas dpl,oVTOS ()VTOS 6 aO'T~p fJ i1Tt TOV 1TpD<;
3uap.ds, and defined as lc.{;a 11po3uats if>atvop.,vTJ, 'the morning appearance of the setting before sunrise'. Strachan-Davidson (15-zr) discusses the relationship between these two axryp.aTtap.ot and appends
calculations of the dates of the rising of the Pleiades, of Orion, and
of Sirius, for P.'s date and the latitude of Rome. The rising of Orion
he makes 4 July, of Sirius z8 July (Gregor.): other scholars (e.g. De
Sanctis, iii. r. 258) vary by a day or two.
dates-July for
Sirius and December for Orion-make nonsense of the passage; and
Luterbacher's interpretation of rising as the 'sunset rising' (Ptolemy's
seventh 'aspect') is equally impossible, since it would set the Roman
voyage in December (Phil., 1907, 412).) Ps.-Aristotle (Problem. z6.
13. 941 b) also associates the rising of Orion with uncertain weather;
and (ibid. rz. 941 a-b) associates the rising of Sirius with the south
wind.
7-10. Criticism of Roman headstrong behaviour: this follows P.'s consistent interpretation of the return of this expedition (cf. 37 4-6),
which, as we saw, seems based on an anachronistic judgement on
the consuls. The didacticism recalls that of 35, and there is the same
stress on v{3pts, which turns good qualities such as ToAp.a (cf. 20.
n-r3) into vices. The repetition of such words as {3ta ( 7 and IO),
8p!L7J ( 7), ToAp.a ( IO), {3tawp.ax.dv ( 9) is noteworthy, but need not
indicate the use of specifically Stoic terminology (so Lorenz, 45).
P. is especially interested in Roman naval policy, and in vi. 52 he
assesses the Roman performance at sea more favourably; Laqueur's
view that his criticism here is taken straight out of Philinus (RE,
'Philinos', col. zr87) is neither proved nor probable.
38. 1-4. Dispatch of Hasdrubal to Sicily. This is Hasdrubal, son of
Hanno (cf. 30. r n.), and the source will be Philinus. His arrival in
Sicily is dated to 251 by Orosius (iv. 9 r4) and Eutropius (ii. 24);
and P.'s silence on Hasdrubal's action at the time of the capture of
Panormus ( 7-ro) is in favour of the view that he was not yet in
Sicily. DeSanctis (iii. r. r64 n. 46, :227) makes the plausible suggestion
that Philinus related Hasdrubal's dispatch after a Roman naval
disaster, in fact that of 253 (39 6), and that P. confused it with the
shipwreck off Camarina. Meltzer (ii. 309, 574-5) also dates Hasdrubal's dispatch to 252 (cf. 39 rz n.); see also Thiel, Hist. :243 n. 584.
P. argues (probably again with Philinus) that the Carthaginians now
commanded the sea; but this is not the picture that emerges from
the next few years' campaigning, especially during the blockade of
486!!

97

I. 38.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.); on this see especially Thiel, Iiist. 252 n. 6n.
The 2oo ships of 3 never appear to accomplish anything, and Tarn
(]HS, r9o7, 56) is probably right in thinking that they were really
transports used to convey Hasdrubal. He is wrong, however, in
supposing that this is implied by P., who, judging from the text,
pretty clearly took them to be warships prepared after Hasdrubal's
crossing (cf. too 38. r, vavnt<<ls "'T'apaut<was). It is indeed just
possible, though not very likely, that they were warships and that
lack of funds or some other factor prevented the Punic government
from exploiting them fully. On the situation of Lilybaeum see 42. 6 ff.
5. e'lKo<Tl Ka.t S1a.Ko<T1a. aKO.cp'T}: the 8o surviving from the wreck
(37 2) would bring the total up to 300 ( 7); and if the Carthaginians
really built 2oo ( 3) in addition to what survived from C. Hermaea,
they would need them alL DeSanctis (iii. I. 159 n. 29) accepts P.'s
figure, and suggests (following Meltzer, ii. 57 3) that a distorted recollection of this shipbuilding survives in Pliny, Nat. hist. xvL 192,
'contra uero Hieronem regem ccxx naues effectas diebus xxxxv
tradit L Piso'. But this is improbable; and the likeliest explanation seems to be that of Tarn (]HS, 1907, 55; cf. Thiel, Hist. 87),
namely that P.'s 220 really included the surviving 8o, and are not
additional to them. I cannot understand the basis of T. Frank's
figure of 200 quinqueremes as the total of new Roman ships (CAH,
vii. 685).
6. ev TPlllTJVIt': cf. Zon. viii. 14. This account, probably from Fabius,
is not necessarily exaggerated; if the timber was cut at once it could
season through the winter and be ready for construction in February
to April 254 (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 261; Thiel, Hist. 242 n. 578). The fleet
could not set sail until the good season (despite d(Uws-). Beloch's
chronology, dating the sending of the relief fleet to 254, and the fall
of Panormus to 253, depends on his theory that the Roman calendar
was at this time running one to two months behind the seasons
(iv. 2. 26:;, 288--9); against this see DeSanctis, iii. 1. 248 ff.
Ao.Aos ::A.TtAIOS KO.L rvO.,os KopvT)AIOS: the consuls for A.U.C. 500 =
254/3 B.C. had already served in 26o (21. 4 n.) and 258 (24. 9 n.), and
were evidently chosen at this crisis on account of their experience
rather than their success.
7. Ka.TO.pa.vTES Els nO.vopllOV: since the loss of Agrigentum (on which
cf. q. s. using the same phrase) Panormus (modern Palermo) was
the bastion of Punic power in Sicily, and economically, if not
militarily, the capital city of the Punic area. The identification of
P.'s New and Old Towns is not easy, partly because of the silting
up of the harbour since ancient times. The most recent account,
by G. M. Columba, 'Per la topografia antica di Palermo', in Centetlario della nascita di Michele Amari, ii (Palermo, 19ro), 395 ff. (non
uidi), is conveniently summarized, with a map, by K. Ziegler, RE,
98

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 39 1

'Panormos (15)', cols. 668-77 (with earlier bibliography). Columba


has argued that both the IlaAatd. 7TOA<s- (dpxala m5Ats-, Diodorus; aKpa,
Zonaras) and the Nia '1TOAS' (EKTOS' 'lTOAts, Diodorus; KllTw 1TOAts,
Zonaras) are contained within the central area (modern Cassaro)
west of the (then much extended) harbour (the Kala), and between
two streams, the Fiume del Papireto on the north and the Fiume di
Mal Tempo on the south; and that the Old Town lay at the west end
of this oval enclosure, in a district of about 10 ha. known as the
Galea. But it seems unlikely that the original Phoenician settlement
was so far away from the sheltered harbour; and Cassaro with its
43 ha. seems very small for Old Town and New Town together. Hence
it seems likely that Cassaro was the Old Town (Cassaro
AI Qa$r.
'the fortress'), and that the New Town lay south of the Fiume di
Mal Tempo, towards, and probably including, the modern Kalsa.
See De Sanctis, iii. 1. r6o-1 n. 33 The assault is described also in
Diod. xxiii. r8. 3-5, after his mention of the Roman seizure of
Cephaloedium (modern Cefalu) and an unsuccessful attempt on
Drepana; and by Zon. viii. 14. According to Diodorus 14,ooo escaped
from the Old Tmm by paying a two minae ransom, and the remaining 13,ooo were enslaved: this would include former slaves (De
Sanctis). Only Scipio triumphed procos. de Poetteis X k. april. (hence
:zs:z); consequently, despite P., Atilius did not share in the assault
on Panormus (Zonaras also speaks of I17TaTot).
10. nwE1TAEUO'(l,V d':i TTJV 'Pti>JLTJV: before this Soluntum (ro miles east
of Panormus), Tyndaris (12 miles west of Mylae), and three other
places came over (Diod. xxiii. 18. 5: leta, Petra, and Imachara); and
the Carthaginians under Carthalo took, and, being unable to hold it,
burnt Agrigentum (Diod. ibid.), and recaptured Cossyra (Zon. viii. 14).

39. 1. fvluo'i I10poulhLO'i M:o.l f6.1o'i IEjl'lrpWvLo'i: the consuls for

A.U.C. SOl = 253/2 B.C., Cn. Servilius Cn.f. Cn.n. Caepio and c. Sempronius Ti.f. Ti.n. Blaesus (Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (43)', col. 178o;
'Sempronius (28)', cols. IJ68-9) Eutropius (ii. 23), Orosius (iv. 9 10),
and Zonaras (viii. 14) agree in putting both consuls in charge of the
fleet; but as in the former year, only one consul triumphed, Sempronius, cos. de Poeneis k. april. (i.e. 252). Probably Servilius operated
in Sicily with Cornelius Asina, the proconsul; De Sanctis, iii. 1. r63.
Eutropius and Orosius put the size of the fleet at 26o ships: Tarn
(] HS, 1907, 55) makes it 220 as in the previous year (on his calculation
cf. 38. 5 n.). Zon. viii. 14 records a fruitless attack on Lilybaeum,
probably true, as the Romans could now, since the capture of Panormus, take the northern route round Sicily ( 5). The policy of using
the fleet to raid Africa instead of pressing on with combined
operations against western Sicily seems to have been a serious error,
even on the assumption that the raids were designed to stimulate

99

J. 39

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

native revolts and to hinder the Punic naval programme; see Thiel,
Hist. 247-8, J23
2. TTJV Twv AwTotfl6.ywv vf)crov: cf. xxxiv. 3 I2. The identification of
Meninx (modern Djerba, off the Tunisian coast, about 35 miles
south-west of Gabes} with the Homeric island was made by Eratosthenes (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 41); and the name Lotophagitis was
extended to the Lesser Syrtis (Strabo, xvii. 834; Eustath. ad Dion.
Perieg. 198 (GGM, ii. 252); Agathem. v. 22 (GGM, ii. 483)); Schwabe,
RE, 'Lotophagitis', col. ISIS The raids made en roztte for Meninx are
exaggerated by Eutropius and Orosius into the capture of plurimae
cittitates with much plunder.
3. 1rpo<nrcrovTES Eis nva (3paxEa: Meninx was also known as
Bpaxlwt (Ps.-Scyl. uo: GGM, i. 86); and for these shoals cf. Virg.
A en. i. rrr; .lVedZ:terranean Pilot7, i. 369-71. Tides are not significant
in the Mediterranean, except at particular points and times: cf.
x. 14. 2 (Scipio at New Carthage), xx. 5 7 5 n (Doson in the
Euboean straits). According to the Medit. Pilot7, i. 33, the spring
tide can amount to as much as 6 ft. at Borj Jilij at the north-west
extremity of Djerba, and from 3 to s ft. elsewhere in the Gulf of
Qabes (Syrtis minor)-exceptional figures for the western Mediterranean. According to Diodorus (xxiii. 19), the Carthaginians prevented the expedition from landing.
6. 1Tnpo.(36A.ws ~eo.t oul. 1Topou: rashly because over the open sea. Diod.
xxiii. 19 and Oros. iv. 9 rr also give the losses as 150; Orosi us calls
them transports, but Diodorus mentions horse transports in addition.
Tarn (]HS, 1907, 55) calculates that as the building of another so
ships (39 15) gave the Romans a total of 243 in 249 B.C. (i.e. r23
(51. TI-12) +12o (52. 6)), they still had 193 after the storm; but as
they only had 22o in 2S4 and 253 (cf. 38. 5 n.), their losses from the
storm will have been only 27. P.'s rso+ is rejected as 'a duplicate of
the loss in the first storm' (where, however, Tarn calculated the
Roman losses as r7o, excluding the prizes). But the loss of only
27 ships would not explain the reversal of Roman policy ( 7); and
in any case Tarn's calculations of the number of Roman ships at
Drepana seem in error (SI. II-I2 n.). The figure of 150 sinkages in
this storm is therefore to be accepted; it left the Roman fleet at
only c. 70 vessels from 253 until 250 (41. 3). Only Orosius (iv. g. u)
locates the disaster as having occurred off C. Palinurus in Lucania.
7. ~e:ai'II'Ep tfl~MT~flo~: added to forestall the criticism that the
Roman action was out of character (37 7-ro).
8. AuK~OV Ka~~e:Ouov ICO.l raLOV <>oupwv: the consuls for A.U.C. 503
zsrfo B.C., L. Caedlius L.f. C.n. Metellus and c. Furius C.f. C.n.
Pacilius (Munzer, RE, 'Caecilius (72)', cols. I203-4; 'Furius (75)', col.
359). Those for 252/r B.C. are omitted, like those of 259 (24. 8 n.), as
having accomplished nothing of note: they were C. Aurelius L.f.
100

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 40.

C.n. Cotta and P. Servilius Q.f. Cn.n. Geminus (Klebs, RE, 'Aurelius
(94)', cols. 2481-2; Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (6z)', cols. 1795-6).
10. Tijs . Oo.XaTTTJS ~'II"Etcpa.Touv: echoing Philinus: on the true
picture cf. 38. 1-4 n. On this occasion the Romans sent reinforcements with a convoy of only sixty ships ( 8) ; and for whatever
reason their enemy made no effective moves against them.
12. 'ITt So' evLo.umvs: apparently the two years following the wreck
off C. Palinurus, viz. 252 and 251 (De Sanctis, iii. r. r65 with n. 46,
who, however, is surely wrong in speaking of 'consul years' (cf.
39 IS n.}: for the source is Philinus). ~!eltzer (ii. 574-6) dates the
two years from Hasdrubal's arrival in Sicily to the battle of Panormus
(2s2-june zso); but the change seems to date from the resumption
of a naval policy ( IS), the thing P. is interested in.
13. 0Eplla.v KaL A.mapav: so too Diod. xxiii. 19. 20, who also
mentions an unsuccessful attack on Heirkte. On Lipara see zr. 5,
24. 13; on Tbermae (of Himera: c. Zon. viii. 14) see 24. 4 Zon., ibid.,
dates the capture to the consulship of Aurelius and Servilius (252/1),
and this is confirmed by the coins struck in imitation of those of
Lipara by L. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 65 B.C. Aurelius triumphed
'cos. de Poeneis et Siculeis idibus apriL' (z51).
15. r aLOV J\T0..LOV tca.i Aeotuov MaXLOv: the consuls for A.U.C. 504
zso/49 B.C. were experienced in naval warfare-C. Atilius Regulus,
the victor of Tyndaris (25. In.) and L. Manlius Vulso, who shared
in that at Ecnornus (26. I I n.). The building of tbe fleet will obviously have begun before 11ay, as an integral part of the policy
..........~.,_,.,,"'"' in the election of these two men; but the words Ka:racrn}crai!TES' crTpaTY)yous mean simply 'electing as consuls'; and De
Sanctis (iii. r. 263) is forcing the Greek when he translates 'appointing
as commanders of the fleet', i.e. after their entry into office (crTpetTY)y&>
is used in this sense only when there is no ambiguity, e.g. II, 3.
59 8; but for a parallel to this passage cf. 52. s). DeSanctis is misled
by his desire to postpone Roman activity till after the end of the
two 'consul years' 2s2/1 and 251/o (39 12 n.).
'ITEVT~tcovTa. aK6.<fTJ: having lost over ISO of their 220 ships off C
Palinurus (39 6 n.), they had manned only 6o ( 8) of the approximatel.y 70 surviving. The present so bring their fleet up to rzo,
which is the number in commission this year (cf. 41. 3 n.).
J\aSpou~o.s: cf. 38. 1-4 n. P.'s main source now becomes
Philinus: the regular naming of consuls ceases, and we have two references to the 'year of the war', appropriate to a monograph (14. r n.).
T<lV 11~v l1va. TWV aTpa.TT]ywv TOv OE Ka.ltclXLOv: i.e. Furius and
Caecilius, the consuls for 251/o; in 39- rs P. has anticipated zso/49
(from Fabius}. Furius left Caecilius with two legions at Panormus:
on the date see the next note.

40. 1.

IOI

I.

40. I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

G1Cjla.too1711s TllS auy~eojlLS-i)s: d. 17. 9; it was June: but of which year?


The battle of Panormus is variously dated to 251 (Mommsen, Holm,
Reuss (Phil., r9or: less certainly 1909)) and 250 (Meltzer, Beloch, De

Sanctis, Frank, Luterbacher, Scullard). Furius' departure would


naturally point to 25o: but against this it has been argued (r) that
Caedlius fought as consul; so Florus, i. r8. 27; Eutrop. ii. 24; Oros.
iv. 9 14; and less definitely, Frontin. Strat. ii. 5 4; Pliny, Nat. hist.
vii. 140; Diod. xxiii. 2r; (z) that there is a tradition of peace negotiations after the battle; but that as Caecilius triumphed in early
September 250, his successors must have left Rome no later than the
end of July, thus leaving no room for such negotiations in 250. De
Sanctis (iii. I. 262-3) has shown that the tradition that Caecilius
fought as consul derives from Livy, who elsewhere confuses consuls
and proconsuls at this time; and the peace embassy is part of the
Regulus myth, and quite worthless (35 n.). Moreover, the 251 dating
has its own difficulties, best set out by Leuze (Phil., 1907, 137-9;
but his own dating of the battle to April or early May zso involves
translating dKp.a{ovmy; ri)s avyKop.tSijs 'when the time of harvest
should be at hand', op. cit. 145-6). The date of the battle, then, was
June 250, probably after the entry of the new consuls into office
(though this is not to be deduced from 39 15).
4. StO. TWV an:vwv El$ TTjv na.vopjltTw: d. Diod. xxiii. 21, S"t Tfjs
1J1ttvomJTws Svaxwp{as ~lt8v Els 'T(J II&.vopp.ov. Probably the route via
Iaitia (modern S. Giuseppe, 15 miles south-west of Palermo) over
into the valley of the Orethus (modern Oreto, Tdv 7Tpb Tijs 1TDAws
7ToTap.ov), which reaches the sea through the plain of the Conca
d'Oro, just south of Palermo.
6-16. The battle of Panormus. Diod. xxiii. 21 records how the
Carthaginians' Celtic mercenaries contributed to the disaster by
their drunkenness; Zon. viii. 14 gives the Punic fleet a sensational
but ineffective part in operations (accepted by Thiel, Hist. 261-2),
and describes how Metellus eliminated a potential fifth column, and
later transported his captured elephants across the Straits of Messana
{cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. viii. r6; Frontin. Strat. i. 7 r). Eutrop. ii. 24 and
Oros. iv. 9 15 give Punic losses as 2o,ooo (out of 3o,ooo: Orosius); and
Orosius records that Hasdrubal was condemned to death.
10. Toi<; <i~epo~oA~OjlEVOLS: the Ev~wvot of 6 ; the ~KtVTJTOt ( 7), who
were stationed before the trench and wall, and appear in 12 as
dKEpawL 'fresh troops', are quite distinct.
12. OO'O'Ot$ ICO.t , , ypoa,Pms: i.e. pita and hasfae Uelitares: cf, Vi, 22.
4 n., 23. 8-II n., for a description of these weapons.
15. uuv a.1hois . 'lv8ol<;: 'Iv8ol is used by P. as a generic term for
mahouJs, whether Indian or not: cf. iii. 46. 7, 46. H, xi. I. 12; Gowers
and Scullard, NC, 1950, 271 ff. Caecilius Metellus offered freedom and
immunity to any prisoners who brought them in the number; taken
102:

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 41. 4

is variously given as 142 or qo (Pliny), r2o (Livy, Seneca, Zonaras),


104 (with 26 killed: Orosius), roo (Florus), and 6o (Diodorus). They
were butchered in the circus; and henceforth coins of the Caecilii
Metelli frequently display an elephant; cf. B.M.C. Rom. Rep. i.
xss-6, ii. 3S7 J 570.
41. 2. 1T6.Aw i1Teppwa9"1aav .. tcaTA Tl)v t~ O.px* 1Tpo9Emv: 'they
were again encouraged to send out ... in accordance with their
original plan'. See 20. 7 for this plan: abandoned after the shipwreck of 39 6, it was resumed as a policy of desperation (39 14-rs)
after a two years' interval (39 12). The victory of Panormus led the
Romans to pursue it with the hope of bringing the war to a successful
conclusion. The change in policy has already been recorded (39 rs):
the important thing here is the change in spirit.
3. l11TAEOV StaKOO'l(11S vauaiv: having been mentioned in 39 rs,
the consuls are not named here. P.'s total of 2oo ships (also in Oros.
iv. 10. z) depends on his belief that the total in 2S4 was 300 (38. 7);
this figure was reduced to ISO by the losses off C. Palinurus (39 6)
and is now raised to 200 by the building of an additional so {39 15).
These figures are consistent, and probably go back to Fabius; but
they are probably all So too large, since the 220 ships of 254 almost
certainly included the So surviving from the storm (37 2). Hence the
real figure for 2so D.c. is 120 ships (cf. Thiel, Hist. 88-Sg). Philinus
in Diodorus (xxiv. 1. 1) gave 240 quinqueremes and 6o cerwri (light
warships; cf. Livy, xxiii. 34 4; App. Lib. 75), an exaggeration. De
Sanctis (iii. r. 171 n. 6s) wavers between the view that P. has 'corrected' this figure from Fabius and that the words (t.:ai n7'1'a.pdKoV7'a) have fallen out of his text; and he mentions 2oo ships on p. 166
and 240 on p. r68. In fact P.'s figures are quite consistent; but
wTong. Philinus' total may be due to confusion with the combined
total for Claudius' and Junius' squadrons in 249 (so Thiel, His!.
257 n. 63z); but this is quite uncertain.
4. lhos TETTapEcrtcm5ktcaTov: it is the departure of the consuls of
250/49 for Sicily which-probably following Philinus (CQ, 1945,
P. so dates. If Ap. Claudius crossed to Messana in fate summer, 264
(s. I-S n.), the departure of Atilius and Manlius shortly after the
battle of Panormus (June zso) will still be in the fourteenth year of
the war. Supporting his view that Ap. Claudius crossed in spring
263, Beloch (iv. 2. 285-6) argues that P. can never have mentioned
what year it is in connexion \vith an event occurring at the end of
a year: P., he insists, must have referred the beginning of the siege
of Lilybaeum to the fifteenth year, if in fact his (i.e. Philinus') 'years
of the war' began in late summer. But both Beloch and DeSanctis,
whom he is criticizing, miss the point that it is not the siege of
Lilybaeum which matters to P. and is being dated here: it is the
103

L 41. 4

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

active resumption of a naval policy, a critical moment (cf. 41. 2 n.).


Since this came clearly within the fourteenth year, P.'s date is
without difficulty.
6. cicj:opfltJV: 'military base': cf. Thuc. i. 90. 2, T~v IkAo7TOW'f/aov cf>aaav . d.cf>opf-L LKav~v lilvat. Understand: 'if Lilybaeum
fell'.
-rrXY)v Ape-rravwv: modern Trapani, lay at the west end of Sicily, about
20 miles north of Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.). Drepana was one of the most
important remaining Punic bases. (The plural form is more correct:
in Diod. xxiii. 9 To .1p~7Tavov may be the peninsula.)
42. 1-7. Geography of Sicily and Lilybaeum. The comparison with
the Peloponnese, clearly intended for Greek readers (cf. 3 8), perhaps
hints at the tradition that Sicily too was once part of the mainland,
Rhegium being the 'town of the break-through' (Myvvf.Lt) : Aesch. fg.
402 (Strabo, vi. 258); Diod. iv. 85. 2 f.; authorities quoted by Ziegler,
RE, 'LK<)..{a ', col. 2467. Though superficially plausible (Cuntz, 71),
P.'s account of the shape and bearings of Sicily is faulty. The direction of the three capes is given as: Pachynus 7rpos f-LW"fJf.LfJplav, south
( 4). Pelorias Els Tns apKTOVS KEKALf-L~l!OV, north ( s), Lilybaeum ds
xaf.LEptvas Mans, south-west (qualified as 'turned towards Libya':
6). The two latter bearings are found elsewhere. Pelorias is the
north tip of the island in Strabo, vi. 265 and Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87,
though in fact it is not so far north as the Phalacrian Promontory
(Ptol. Geog. iii. 4 2), modern C. Rasocolmo, ro km. to the northwest; and of Lilybaeum Strabo, ibid., writes, Tp{TrJ o' iaTLV (axpa)
~ 7Tpoa<x~s Tfj AtfJvv. {JAl7TOVaa 7Tp6s TUVT'f!V apa Kat T~l! XHf-L<pLv~v
ovaw, cf. Diod. xiii. 54 2. In fact the promontory of Lilybaeum

(modern C. Boco) is the most westerly tip of Sicily. Both Strabo and
Pliny make Pachynus project east towards Greece; and the explanation of their bearings (which derive from Poseidonius) is that the
island has been distorted thus:
Pe!orias

r/Pachynus

.N.

lt7ybaeom//

The real east-south-east side is here represented as north-north-east,


the north side as north-west, and the south-west side as southeast; the island is about 90 out of true position, and the distortion
perhaps goes back to Eratosthenes, who placed Rome, Messana, and
Carthage on a single meridian (Strabo, i. 93), which implies that the
north coast of Sicily runs virtually north-south (map in Thomson, 142 ),
and the other sides with corresponding errors. Despite his correction
104

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 42.7

of Pachynus, which lies 1rpos fWJYJfLflplav, P.'s account especially of


Lilybaeum suggests that he is partly the victim of the same distorted
picture. Ziegler, loc. cit., cols. 2468~, 247r.
4. To ILt<~Au(ov TrEAa.yos: Strabo, vi. 265, also makes Pach_y'llus extend
into the Sicilian Sea, which washes the northern part of the shore
between Pachynus and Lilybaeum (the southern part being washed
by the Libyan Sea); see the diagram above. (In ii. r23, where he
follows a better tradition for the bearings of the capes, he defines the
Sicilian Sea on the west by C. Pachynus, by Locri Epizeph_yTii in
Italy, and by the west end of Crete.) To P. the Sicilian Sea was
separated from the Ionian Sea in the north by C. Cocynthus (ii. 14.
5); and it included the Gulfs of Corinth and Ambracia (iv. 63. s.
v. 3 g, 5 IJ). Whether its southern boundary was a line going east
from Pachynus (so Burr, 54-56) is by no means clear. Ziegler, Joe.
cit., cols. 247I-2.
5. op(~El TO Trpos 8uO'El<; !J.Epos: P. has a correct picture of the
Straits of Messana as running north-south. His 12 stades are in
Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 73 (cf. iii. 86: MD passus); and in Ps.-Scyla.x,
13 (Pelorias to Rhegium, rather too little). The narrowest width
today is 17! stades; but there may have been an increase since
ancient times (so Ziegler, loc. cit., coL 2473; Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 328,
is dubious).
6. TOLS nKpWTTJp(OLS: c. Bon and c. Farina: see iii. 22. 5 n. (a).
The distance to Africa is variously given as r,soo stades (Strabo,
vi. 267; Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg. 473 (GGM, ii. 306); !tin. Ant. 494).
and r8o milia passuum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87). P.'s figure of r,ooo
stades (i.e. IIS miles or 125 milia passuum) is nearest to the actual
distance of 140 km. (c. 88 miles). Ziegler, RE, 'Lilybaeum (r)', col. 542.
&ta.LpEi: To ALf3utcbv tcal. To Ia.p&~ov Traayo<;: the reference to the
mare Sardoum raises difficulties. The sea north (here read north-west)
of Sicily is the Tyrrhenian Sea, ii. 14. 4, r6. r, iii. 6r. 3, no. 9; and the
mare Sardown lay west of Sardinia (ro. 5 n.; cf. Herod. i. r66).
Ziegler (RE, EtKr:.Ala, coL 2471) argues that P.'s meaning is 'that
Lilybaeum marks the eastern terminus of the line of demarcation
between the Libyan and Sardinian Seas', and quotes Eratosthenes
(ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 75). But why should such a line of demarcation extend 200 miles east of Sardinia, when the Sardinian Sea lay
to its west?
7. TroAts OfLWVVfLOS: Lilybaeum, modern Marsala, the main centre
of Punic Sicily. P. may have visited it en route for Africa in 149,
and perhaps on his return in 146 (d. xxxvi. II. r for his broken-off
journey thither) ; but his detailed account of the topography is not
without difficulties, and though De Sanctis (iii. I. 228) speaks of the
'fleeting impressions of a traveller who once landed at Lilvbaeum',
it is unlikely that these lines were written after his visit. Cf. Cuntz,
105

0
w

2. LILYBAEUM.

to6

Based on Freeman

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 42. n

J. Schubring, Phil. xxiv, 1866, 62 ff.;


Freeman, History of Sicily, iv. 93 ff. (map on p. 74). Diod. xxiv. I-4
precedes his account of the operations with the statement that at
some unspecified date (but evidently recently: cf. 39 12) Selin us
had been destroyed by the Carthaginians and its population transferred to Lilybaeum. On the operations here P., like Diodorus, seems
to follow Philinus; but not exclusively (cf. Bung, 57-58). The discrepancies between P. and Diodorus (cf. Pedech, REA, I952, 258-62)
are explicable on the assumption of a different selection of material
and the correction of Philinus' figures from Fabius in P.
Tcici>p'l.J !3a.llEL4: 6o cubits wide and 40 deep (Diod. xxiv. 1. 2) ; a cubit
is about 1! ft.
Tvaymw EK lla.AciTT1)S: cf. 46. 9 The ancient harbour had an artificial
mole north of the town (the modern one lies south of Marsala); on
the shoals cf. Virg. A en. iii. 706, 'uada dura ... saxis Lilybeia caecis'.
LS To(,s ALp.tvo.s: 'into the harbour' (not plural): cf. Schweighaeuser,
Lex. Polyb. s. v. ALJ.L~v.
8. 1Tpoucnpa.T01T80uo.vTE<; oi 'Pwp.a.'LoL: their numbers are a
problem. Philinus (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) made them 11o,ooo, of which at
least 84,ooo were no doubt ships' crews and marines (he assumed a
:fleet of 240 ships: 41. 3 n). In addition there were the land forces
(41. 4), which Orosius (iv. Io. 2) not unreasonably reckons at four
legions. On the other hand, the fleet was in reality only 120 ships
strong. In 45 8, where the defenders are reckoned at 2o,ooo, the
attackers are only -n 7TA<'lov>. This would appear to rule out Thiel's
belief (Hist. 263) that they came to 3o,ooo. The probability is that P.
is not including oarsmen in his purview. Four legions of 3,ooo gives
32,ooo men; 1oo marines for I20 ships another I2,ooo. But both figures
may well have been smaller, and the effective soldiers (excluding
ships' crews) outside Lilybaeum probably came to 35,ooo-4o,ooo
men. For Roman losses see 42. 12 n. The Roman fortifications are
mentioned by Diod. xxiv. I. I, -.Yjv J.LEV yijv am) 8a>..d.cra'1]> tl> 80.>..aaaav

69-71; and, for the topography,

7dfpo/ U7TtoTfxwav.
9, 1TpOUKnTnUKUatovTE<; , , al TOlS li'TTOKELj.LEVOL<;: 'constantly

adding something to what they had already constructed' (Shuckburgh). (In xxi. 11. 6 :rrpoaKa-raaKVd,tv means 'to create new (kings)
in addition to those already existing'.) Paton's translation, 'gradually
advancing from the base thus acquired', gives the false impression
that the southern tower 7Tp6> -ro At{3vK6v m>..ayo> fell; the fall of the
six adjacent towers suggests that this was not so.
11. T~JV j-1-Lullocpopwv elc; p.upouc;: 'about Io,ooo', partly Greeks, partly
Celts (43 4, 48. 3), under Himilco (who is otherwise unknown).
Diod. xxiv. 1. I gives 7,ooo foot and 7oo horse, later reinforced by
4,ooo under Adherbal (Diod. xxiv. I. 2; below, 44 I n.); P. probably
rounds off these u,7oo to 1o,ooo (Thiel, Hist. 263-4).
107

I.

{2. 12

THE FIRST PUNIC "\VAR

12. ouSv 1TO.pEAEL1T~ TWV SuvaTWV: P.'s UVTotKOOop.wv is expanded in


Diod. xxiv. 1. 2 (cf. Zon. viii. 15), which records the building of a
second wall (behind that linking the six towers) ; Diodorus gives the
exaggerated figure of 1o,ooo Roman casualties, and attributes a
further 1o,ooo deaths ( 4) to an epidemic caused by an exclusively
meat diet.
43. Alexan saves the Carthaginians from the treachery of their mercenaries. This incident, which is described at quite disproportionate
length, is clearly from Philinus (that 43-48 are taken from this source
is generally admitted; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 228; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933,
141; Bung, 56: contra Pedech, REA, 1952, 258 ff.). The loyalty of a
Greek in Punic service, who had helped Agrigentum, naturally
appealed to the historian of that city; and the Achaean historian was
sufficiently interested to allot this digression to a fellow-countryman. The story occurs, with slight variations, in Zon. viii. 15. The
identification of the incident at Agrigentum has caused difficulties.
The 'mercenaries of Syracuse' are apparently the Mamertini (7. 2 n.)
who, either before or after seizing Messana, made several similar
plundering expeditions; cf. Diod. xxiii. 1. 4 (destruction of Gela and
Camarina). It has been suggested, however, that the incident here
mentioned is that in ii. 7 7, where Gallic mercenaries in Carthaginian
pay plunder Agrigentum (which became Punic shortly after Pyrrhus'
departure): De Sanctis, iii. 1. 91-92; Kirchner, RE, 'Alexan (1}',
col. 1471; Beloch, iv. 1. 558 n. 2. But P. speaks definitely of Syracusan
mercenaries, and he says that Alexan saved Agrigentum (whereas
the Gallic mercenaries plundered it). Consequently, the two incidents must be distinct. The present one is linked with the death of
the tyrant Phintias, c. 28o, by "Meltzer (ii. 544); and Holm (Gesch.
Sic. ii. 487} puts it even earlier, before the Mamertini broke away
from Syracuse, i.e. before 288-283. But a date before 280 would
perhaps make Alexan rather old for a mercenary captain.
2. 1ra.pa0"1TovSe~v: used by P. to describe the seizure of Messana and
Rhegium by mercenary garrisons: cf. 7 2, 7 8, 10.4,43 7, iii.26. 6. But
it can also refer to any treacherous onslaught; cf. ii. 7. 6, 46. 3, 58. 4,
6o. J, xxxiii. 10. J, xxxviii. 7 10. Reuss, Volk. Grund. 71 n., '1Tapaa1Tovoefv ist im allgemeinen ein Ausdruck fiir ein unredliches
Verhalten'; cf. Hesselbarth, 86.
4. >\vv(~av TOV utov TOU >\vv(~ou: 24. 5-7 n.; cf. 18. 7 n. Nothing
further is known of the son.
8. To us voflous Kat -nlv EA~u9Epta.v: suggests a time when Agrigentum
was independent.
44. 1. >\vv!3o.v, Ss ~v 1l.fltAKou u~o<; KTA.: from Oros. iv. 10. 2,
'Hannibale qui Hamilcaris filius fuit uicti' (where uicti evidently
I08

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 45 9

refers to Ecnomus (26. r) and Adys (3o. 5}), this Hamilcar is clearly
the commander in these battles {24. 3 n.}, who since Regulus' defeat
had been active in reducing the revolted Numidians and Moors
(Oros. iv. 9 9). Diod. xxiv. r. 2 mentions 4,ooo reinforcements under
Adherbal; and the name cannot be a copyist's slip; cf. Zon. viii. 15,
JtpSf3a.v Q't)v vava11T/..El(TTatS: atmv dyoJaa.~s: Kat XP~fl.a.Ta {and Dio's
source was not Diodorus). The discrepancy can be explained in
various ways. There may have been two separate expeditions; or
P. may have 'corrected' Philinus from Fabius (though this is unlikely for a detail of this kind). But the most likely explanation is
that Adherbal was in charge of the expedition, but went on to
Drepana (46. r), leaving Hannibal (Tp~pa.pxos: Ka1 <f>l/..os: Jt--rdpf3ov
1TpwTos:) at the Aegates Islands to run the blockade of Lilybaeum.
Cf. De Sanctis, iii. r. 232-3. The phrase 1TpWTo:; <f>l,/..os: is normally used
of the intimate circle round the king in a Hellenistic court; Bikerman, Sileucides, 40-42; Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 220 ff. = BCH, 1933,
31 ff.; its use here suggests the importance of Adherbal, and Hannibal's position of trust relative to him.
2. ~v Tnl:s Atyoucrall~S: the Aegates Islands lie off the west tip
of Sicily between Drepana and Lilybaeum, and include Aegusa
(modern Favignana) and Phorbantia (modern Levanzo), and in some
writers Riera Nesos (modern Maritima), 15 miles farther west (cf.
6o. 3; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 92). That they lie 'between Lilybaeum and
Carthage' is true only on P.'s bearings (42. 1-7 n.); Biittner-Wobst's
explanation, that P. means simply that Hannibal's course was via
the Aegates Islands (Klio, 1905, 94), is unconvincing.
E1TET1'JpE~ Tov 1TAouv: 'he waited for favourable weather'; for this
sense of 1r'Aoiis d. iv. Si 2, 57 6.
4-5. Reaction to Hannibal's action. The contrast between the reaction
of the Romans and the besieged population, with Hannibal between,
creates a picture which is reproduced elsewhere; cf. the scene at
Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone (iii. 43 7-8), or the clash at
Cynoscephalae (xviii. 25. 1), which show the same rhetorical influence
and stress on the sensationaL The ultimate forebear may be Thucydides' famous description of the battle in the Great Harbour of
Syracuse (Thuc. vii. 71). In xxix. 12. ro P. shows himself to be
conscious of such repetitions.
45. 8. oliK ~Aa.TTous Swr-tup(wv: i.e. ro,ooo of the original garrison
(42. n), with ro,ooo reinforcements (44 z).
9. KilT' livSpll Kill KllTa ~uyov: 'man to man and rank to rank', cf.
iii. 81. 2, ii. 69. 5 (KaT' avOpa Kat KO.Ta nf.yp.a.). 'V}'OIJ is Strictly a rank
of soldiers, ordo, in contrast to (TTot:xos:, a file; xviii. 29. 5, 30. :2. Here
it is used loosely, as the parallel example with Ka.Ta rdyp.a shows.
109

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

46. 3. w~ ll.v EKO.TOV Ka.l E'lKOO'~ O'TtLO~a.: about 25 miles, a figure rather
on the low side; cf. Meltzer, ii. 326-7.
46.4--47. 10. The blockade-running of Hannibal 'the Rhodian'. De
Sanctis (iii. r. 228) suggests that Philinus, to whom this meticulous
detail is ultimately due, was perhaps an eyewitness and shared the
; so too Cuntz, 69. It must go back ultimately to an eyewitness,
whether Philinus or his source. Xicknames were common at Carthage,
where the same personal names were used to excess; and these are
often taken from some locality; cf. ix. 25. 4, MO:yuwos 'ToiJ l.:auvl'Tou
1rpooayopevopivou; xxxvi. 5 1, Maywva -rcivBpl:rrwv. \Vere such names
hereditary, like Roman cognomina? A Punic emissary to Alexander's
court, named Hamilcar, was nicknamed Rhodanus (Oros. iv. 6. 21; cf.
lustin. xxi. 6. r) or Rodinus (Frontin. Strat. i. 2. 3). If the real form
was Rhodius (or the Punic equivalent), he may be an ancestor of this
Hannibal.
46. 9. errTepwKuia.t: cf. II, 7TTpt.!Joas -r~v vauv. The phrase means 'to
have the oars stretched out like wings ready to strike thewater': cf.
Plut. Anton. 63; Eurip. I.T. 1346.
47. 2. E1TE~T ll.v emrrpoa6et:v O.rra.a~: 'coming from the direction
of Italy he would keep the sea-tower on his bows, so as to cover the
whole line of the city's towers in the direction of Africa'. The words
dm~ -rwv . fLEpwv can hardly go with -rdv 7Tllpyov (as Paton). The seatower is not that mentioned in 42. 8, but another at the western
extremity of the fortifications (Meltzer, ii. 577). Hannibal sailed in
along a line which kept this tower covering other towers on the south
side; he came 'from the Italian direction', i.e. from the north (for
the sake of the manceuvre; that the Aegates Islands were north-west
of Lilybaeum (so Cuntz, 69) is irrelevant). Though P. does not say so,
at some point Hannibal must have swerved left from the above
course to enter the harbour: the use of the towers as sights was to
evade the shoals (Twv 1rpof5paxiwv). lumpoolhrv, 'to cover one thing
by another', is Schweighaeuser's certain emendation.
3. XWVVUEW errexECp'J0'<1V: cf. Diod. xxiv. I. z; the Romans had already
sunkrs cercuri in the entrance (r. r), but without completely blocking it.
7. eK Ka.Ta.~oXfjs: either 'anew' (cf.
8), i.e. after the Romans had
for some time made no attempt to take him (Paton and Shuckburgh) ; or 'from the start', i.e. starting the moment he left harbour
(Reiske); or 'deliberately' (so LSJ, quoting xxiv. 8. 9, where, however, the sense 'from the outset' is equally in place). Schwcighaeuser,
in Lex. Polyb. Ka-raf5ol.:r], finally comes down in favour of a most
forced interpretation: 'uidensquadriremem,quaeolim simul cumipso
(et cum ipsius naui) primum e statuminibus in mare excurrerat (cui us
structura adeo probe ei nota erat)'. Reiske's interpretation seems the
most likely; but there are probably overtones from the other two.
IIO

I. 48.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

10. KUPLEOC1<LVTE!) TllS VEW!): Zon. viii. IS, who calls Hannibal
'Hanno' (perhaps through confusion with the incident of 264, cf.
20. IS n.), puts his capture after the arrival of Claudius Pulcher
(49 3) ; he adds that 'Hanno's' ship was used as a pattern by the
Romans (cf. 59 8).

48. 2. y(vETa.l TL!) aVE!J.OU Q'TaO'L!): cf. 75 8, ix. 25. 3. v. 5 3. TWV


'ETY}alwv ifo7J araaV Jx6vrwv. Paton and Shuckburgh translate a storm
of wind', 'a turbulent storm of wind', Schweighaeuser uenti tempestas
-but wrongly, as he later realized. d.vp.ov arams has three meanings: the first, 'a dropping, cessation of the wind', may be neglected
here; the second is that found in the three Polybian passages mentioned above, 'the direction, state of the wind' or simply 'the wind in
a certain direction'. Finally, by a metaphor taken from civil discord, it
may mean' seditio uentorum, a squall'. This is the sense in Alcaeus, fg.
30 Diehl, davvvTY}p. TWV avl.p.wv aramv (which Heracleitus, alleg.
Homer. s. p. 6 ed. Bonn., took as an allegorical reference to the
rvpavvKai rapaxui at Mytilene); so too Aesch. P. V., 1086, d.vl.p.wv
71'VJp.ara . . . aramv avT{TI'VOOV d.TI'o0EKVJp.eva. Similarly in Virgil
(Aen. i. I48) the quelling of the storm by Neptune is likened to the
calming of seditio in a city. But in all these examples there is a clash
of winds; and this idea is quite inappropriate here, where the plan
of the Greek mercenaries depends solely on the fact that the wind is
blowing steadily from the city towards the Roman camp, so that it
becomes an ally in spreading the fire and driving the smoke and
sparks in the faces of the defenders ( 6, vmj Tfj-; Els avroi:J<; rppop.EV7J'>
Atyvvos). As Schweighaeuser points out in his commentary, the idea
of force and violence is separately expressed and need not be present
in araa,.,, which therefore means uenti directio. Suidas, s.v. an:lmv,
referring to this passage, says that the word is applied JTI'i Tl'voijs
f3wlov avl.p.ov ; but there is no evidence for this meaning unless there
are conflicting winds. Translate 'a steady wind' (correct in LSJ).
Diod. xxiv. 1. 3 also records the incident.
Tas Twv ll"lXa.v"lf.6.Twv rrpoaa.ywy6.s: 'the apparatus for advancing
the engines' (Paton): less satisfactory Schweighaeuser (in his note
ad loc.), in ipsas machinas quae admouebantur. In xiv. Io. 9 the sense
is abstract: 7rpoaaywylis TWV opyavwv, 'the bringing up of siege
engines'; but here P. refers to uineae, etc., under shelter of which
the engines were advanced. See next note.
Tas aToas ~haaa.AE{n;w: uineas concutere. A uinea is a shed or penthouse to protect men of a besieging force. Caesar, BC, ii. 2. 3,
similarly calls it a porticus. In xxi. 28. 4 P. refers to a arod which
Livy, xxxviii. 7 6, translates by uineae. See Veith in KromayerVeith, Heerwesen, 444
I

III

m.1000

----

tt!JliH!!j

Il2

1 km.
I

Roman

flflet

Carthag/nian flee/;

THE BATTLE OF DREPANA.

Based on Kromayer

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 49 6

5. TlJV ... vo~l]v Tau 'n'Upos: 'the action of the flames' (Paton). For
this metaphor of grazing cf. xi. 4 4
8. E-rr! TE Taus ~oTJBouVTGS KGi T~v TWV ~pywv 8Ln+Oop4v: 'against the
rescuers and to secure the destruction of the works'. i7Tt is used in
two different senses.
9. Ta aT\J1TTJ Twv ~<ptwv: MS. T07T1J corrected by Scaliger; 'the beams
of the rams', to which the battering-tip was affixed; arietum trabes,
Schweighaeuser. Less likely is Paton, 'the posts that supported the
battering-rams'.
10. Telxos 'JTpo~aM~evot: on the previous Roman siege-works see
42. 8. It is difficult to believe that their own camp was not fortif1ed
until now, vi. 34 r; and P. may perhaps have exaggerated a reference
in Philinus to some reinforcement of the defences. Similarly for the
circumvallation of the town (Meltzer, ii. 578); the discrepancy between this passage and 42. 8 is underestimated by Bung, 56.
49. 2. ets ~up{ous: allowing only 250 rowers per ship instead of the
normal 300 (26. j), this number would man only 40 ships; and the
Roman fleet came to 120 ships (41. 3 n.). Hence the statement ( r)
that most of the crews had perished seems exaggerated. Thiel (Hist.
273-4) suggests that Claudius may have pressed legionaries into service as rowers; but P. ( 5) speaks only of their volunteering as
marines.
3. noTrALOS KXa~Stoc;: one of the consuls for A.U.C. 505 = 249/8 B.C.:
they were P. Claudius Ap.f. C.n. Pulcher and L. lunius C.f. Ln.
Pullus (Munzer, RE, 'Claudius (3o4)', cols. 2857-8; 'Iunius (rJ.))',
cols. ro8o-r). Cic. de diu. i. 29, makes Claudius the son of Ap. Claudius
Caecus, but his father was more probably the consul of 264 (II . .1 n.):
De Sanctis, iii. 1. 170 n. 62. Diod. xxiv. 3 describes his headstrong,
bullying character, his criticism of his predecessors, and his own
mistakes. But by mentioning his conference with the xJ..iapxo~,
tribuni militum, P. stresses against the tradition that his plan found
general support ( s).
49.6-51.12. The battle of Drepana. The point of view is Carthaginian
and the source clearly Philinus in the main, though the Roman
tradition is present, and the whole well worked over by P., cf. Bung,
6r. The annalistic version is in Orosius and Eutropius; see also Diod.
xxiv. I . 5; Frontin. Strat. ii. 13.9; Schol. Bob., P90 Stangl. The famous
anecdote that Claudius threw the recalcitrant sacred chickens in the
sea with the words ut biberent quando esse nollent (Cic. nat. deor. ii. 7;
de diu. i. 29, ii. 20, 7I; Livy, ep. 19, xxii. 42. 9; Florus, i. r8. 29;
Eutrop. ii. 26. r ; VaL Max. i. 4 3, viii. I. ext. 4; Suet. Tib. 2 ; Serv.
ad A en. vi. 198) may be genuine (so Munzer, RE,Ioc. cit.), but is more
probably a later invention, to explain the Roman defeat: it is in
!866

113

I. 49 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

neither P. nor Diodoms. On the number of ships involved see sr. uI2 n. For discussion see Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval warfare
(U.S. Naval Institute, I937). 297--9; Thiel, Hist. 275-81.
50. 5. eAa.~E T~v du.:wu1-1ov Ta~LV: Drepana lies on a small peninsula extending to the west and prolonged in a south-westerly direction by rocks and small islands: see the maps in Kromayer, AS,
iii. I, and in Enc. it. s.v.; there is a map of the battle in KromayerVeith, Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt r. The harbour opens to
the south and is covered by the island of Colombaia; having cleared
it Claudius reformed his line with the right flank hugging the coast
south of the harbour mouth, and himself on the left. But Adherbal's
five ships succeeded in getting between him and the open sea.
9. JLEyaAa. , ~AMTw9fjva.L: the Roman fleet had been mana:uvred
into the situation of the Punic left at Ecnomus, 28. Ion.

51. 6. To'L<; 1rpo'ITi'ITTOUO'L Twv SLwKovTwv: 'the foremost of their pursuers'; Paton's 'the ships that pursued and fell on them' translates
the MS. reading 7rpomrl7TTovat (but he prints the generally accepted
emendation of Hervagius).
9. SLEK'ITAe'Lv o'ITep tun 'ITpaKnl<wTa.Tov: a classic mana:uvre,
but never employed by the Romans. Indeed in Hellenistic times it
tended to disappear with the adoption of boarding tactics, though
the Rhodians used it successfully at Chios (xvi. 4 I4); 27. 11 n.;
Tarn, HMND, I44 ff.
11-12. Size of the Roman squadron. P. gives the total of ships escaping
as about 30, and 93 Twv .\o7Twv as captured. Tam (]HS, I9o7, 54 ff.}
assumes that these figures together give the size of the Roman
squadron; and, indeed, if P.'s 7TEpl rpuf.Kovra vi}E'> are really 27 (as
they well might be), the total of 120 is precisely the number of ships
available since the building of so in 250 (cf. 41. 3 n.). Against this is
the reference to many sinkages in 6 (7ro,\,\d ... ij3a7Tn~ov); but as
Thiel (Hist. 279 n. 7I6) points out, 'the character of the inshore
battle does not admit of the sinking of a large number of ships'.
P., who believed that Claudius had 2oo ships (41. 3) would be naturally disposed to exaggerate the number of sinkages; the few which
really took place may well be included in the 93 captured. Diodoms
(xxiv. 1. s} reckons the Roman total as 2Io and the losses at 117.
De Sanctis (iii. r. 170-I n. 65) adds in Io ships which appear in a
corrupt passage at the end of Diod. xxiv. 1. 5, to give the Romans
a total of 22o, and assumes that of the squadron of 240 which Philinus
gave Claudius (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) 20 ships had been left behind at
Lilybaeum; but P. (49 3) says that Claudius proposed sailing from
Lilybaeum to Drepana 7Tavn rep ar6Ao/, and it is dangerous to use
the Io ships as part of any argument (cf. Thiel, Hist. 28o n. p6). De

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 52. 5

Sanctis also suggests that the n7 lost vessels are obtained by subtracting the 93 which P. gives as captured from 210: but these II7
are not simply sinkages, but losses in general, and probably represent
Philinus' exaggerated version of those losses. As we saw (4r. 3),
Philinus' figures are to be rejected. Other f1gures, which can be
neglected, are: escaped, 30 (Eutropius, Orosi us), 20 (Frontinus); sunk,
120 (Schol. Bob.), Ioo (Eutropius); captured, 9o (Eutropius). P. gives
no losses of men. Orosius (iv. Io. 3) records 8,ooo dead and 2o,ooo
prisoners; and the latter figure receives slight confirmation from
Diod. xxiv. r. 5 (2o,ooo losses; the 35,ooo dead and an equal number
of prisoners of Diod. xxiv. I. u may be ignored). Roman losses were
probably reduced through survivors-marines more easily than rowers
-swimming ashore (51. 12). No figures survive for the Punic side.
52. 3. JlEyaAQ.L') tT}Jl(nL') KQ.LKLVOUVOL') KpL9ELS nEpLtE'ITEO'EY: the initiative
came from two tribunes, and the movement against Claudius was
apparently popular. P. probably follows a Roman tradition here
(Bung, 63 n. I, is less certain); for other sources on his downfall see the
authorities quoted at 49 6-51. 12 n. According to Valerius Maximus
he was charged with perduellio but acquitted; Schol. Bob. records a
second trial on a reduced charge and a fine aeris grauis cxx milibus.
Modern historians have judged him less harshly. Tarn (JHS, r9oj,
54) suggests that he attacked hoping to forestall the arrival of the
reinforcements under Carthalo, of which he knew (53 2 n. : Meltzer
(ii. 326) thinks they came before the battle; but the order is clear
from Diodorus); and though his tactics were faulty, the general plan
was by no means ill-conceived; De Sanctis, iii. I. 170; Scullard,
Hist. 168.
5. AeuKlov 'louvLov: in fact Claudius' colleague for 249/8, not his
successor, 49 3 n. Beloch (iv. :z. 289) suggests in explanation of P.'s
error that Iunius did not come to Sicily till spring 2, after the
consuls for 248/7 had already been elected; and that P. confused
him with one of these. But after Iunius' naval disaster (54 8}
Claudius was constrained to appoint a dictator, and named M.
Claudius Glicia, whom the Senate rejected (Livy, ep. 19); A. Atilius
Caiatinus (24. 9 n.) was then appointed in his stead. But, if Iunius
did not leave for Sicily till spring 248, there is no time for this before
I May (and little before I8 June, which is Beloch's Julian equivalent
for I May in accordance with his unacceptable view of the calendar) ;
and it is unlikely that the Senate would have required the nomination of a dictator if the consular year was almost at an end. Further,
Iunius' considerable activity after the naval catastrophe suggests
that he came out to Sicily in 249. De Sanctis (iii. I. 263-4) suggests
that he arrived in the second half of the summer, and so in the
sixteenth year of the war by Philinus' calculations (41. 4). This
II.)

I. 52. 5

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

would explain how P.'s error arose; and since, if Iunius already
knew of his colleague's disaster, it is hard to understand his decision
to send half his fleet ahead without adequate protection (52. 7; cf.
Meltzer, ii. 330; Reuss, Phil., I90I, 119), it is possible that when he
sent the ships on from Messana he had not yet heard of the defeat
at Drepana. No conclusions as to date can be drawn from the reference to corn in 52. 8 ; there is no evidence that it was part of the
249 harvest (so Meltzer, ii. 330).
Ta~ onapxa~: here 'corn allowance'; on the various meanings of
this and similar words see 66. 3 n.
6. &no ... 'TOu aTpaTo11'Hiou: perhaps Lilybaeum is meant (so Paton):
but if any of the 6o ships which joined Iunius in Sicily (cf. 52. 5,
52. 6; Diod. xxiv. 1. 9 also gave him a total of I2o, i.e. I3 burnt+105
sunk+2 survivors) were from Lilybaeum, they left before Drepana,
for aftenvards Carthalo and his fleet lay between Lilybaeum and
Messana (Tarn, J HS, I9o7, 55 n. 38) ; and that the 30 survivors
(51. n) had not got away to Messana is clear from 53 3 f. Thiel
(Hist. 88) suggests that the 6o ships which joined Iunius at .Messana
were in fact allied auxiliaries; and he despairs of finding any reasonable sense for the words am:\ TOV UTpaT07dSov.
KaLpou~: a loose link; but here correct,
for Iunius cannot have reached Sicily much later than the battle
of Drepana (52. 5 n.).
2. Kap90.Awva: in 254 Carthalo had relieved Drepana, after sacking
Agrigentum (Diod. xxiii. I8. 2-3): 38. 7 n., 38. Ion. Diodorus (xxiv.
1. 6-7) dates his arrival at Drepana in 249 (with 70 ships and supplies)
after the naval battle; between the two he relates the dispatch of
Hannibal (cf. 44 I) to seize a Roman convoy off Panormus. Carthalo
appears to be Aclherbal's subordinate.
Sou~ TpLaKOVT11 vau<;: the size of Aclherbal's fleet at this time is not
recorded; but it seems likely that the Punic fleet at Drepana was
smaller than the Roman, though in view of its success perhaps not
very much smaller (cf. Tarn, JHS, I9o7, 54-55). It is possible that
Claudius attacked when he did in order to forestall the arrival of the
70 reinforcements, fearing that he would then be outnumbered (Thiel,
Hist. 272; above, 52. 3 n.). Hence Tarn's figure of Ioo (before the
arrival of Carthalo) is likely to be about right (Thiel, Hi st. 266 n. 667).
7. oA[ya . Ta flEV a1I'OO"TI'a0'11<;, Ta OE O'UVTptljia~: 'contented himself
with either towing off or breaking up some few of the vessels'
(Shuckburgh). Schweighaeuser omits dMya from his translation,
Paton takes it with a1roamiaas- only; the point is that the total
Roman loss was small. Diod. xxiv. 1. 7 gives some sunk and five
dragged off.
10. 1rp6<; n 11'0ALu!-lnnov: according to Diod. xxiv. I. 7 the fleets

53. 1. Ka'Ta Touo; all'Tou<;

II6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

sighted each other near Gela, and this roadstead was off Phintias
(modern Alicata), east of the river Himera, and opposite Mt
Ecnomus. Diodorus puts Carthalo's fleet at 120 ships.
13. bMyu Twv TrAOt{)JV 6.Troamia!lvTi: according to Diodorus
(loc. cit) the Carthaginians sank so transports and I7 warships, and
put 13 warships out of action. P. omits these Roman losses (which
were probably not in Fabius), evidently because he mistrusts
Philinus; cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 233-4. Thiel argues that they should
be accepted (Hist. 285 n. 731); but P.'s account of the quaestors
falling back on shore fire from catapults to defend their ships is
plausible, and would explain Carthalo's failure .

54. The shipwreck off Caman:na. According to Diod. xxiv. I. 7-9,


Carthalo retired to the R. Halycus (modern Platani) near Heraclea
Minoa to attend to his wounded. Iunius advanced to Phintias,
where he was joined by the remnants of the first convoy, but on
sighting the Punic fleet burnt the r3 damaged vessels and set off
back for Syracuse; overtaken near Camarina o;l, T~v yfjv Ko.Tlcjwyt
7tpos T(l1TOt!S' Tpaxi:s Kat vif;a/..wSets. A storm got up, Carthalo rounded
Pachynus and was saved; Iunius lost all his transports, and all but
2 of his ro7 warships. P.'s account is quite different. Here, too,
Carthalo puts into a river, unnamed; but as he hopes to prevent
a union between the two Roman squadrons ( 2), this can hardly
be the Halycus, about 45 miles north-west of the scene of the
disaster. After Iunius has anchored off the dangerous coast ( 3),
Carthalo gains a cape from which he can watch both squadrons
( 5) ; the storm breaks and Carthalo escapes as in Diodorus. The
discrepancy is clear; and since the Carthaginian standpoint in P.
prevents our assuming that he is giving Fabius' version, the likelihood is that he has merely 'corrected' Philinus, Diodorus' source,
and that his version is a contamination with Fabian tradition. In
fact, he must have felt Philinus' account to be less probable on
comparing the two; and his refusal to identify the scene of the first
disaster with Phintias, and the river whither Carthalo retired as the
Halycus, is probably deliberate. We are not justified in rejecting P.'s
considered account in favour of an abridged version of Philinus
(certainly abridged: e.g. Diodorus has no reference to Iunius' putting
in at Syracuse, xxiv. r. 8). Thiel (Hist. 287 n. 734) defends Diodorus'
version from Philinus against P.'s on the assumption that the latter
gives an account contaminated with Fabius (which may well be
true) and that Fabius has concealed the Roman losses in the quaestars' squadron at Phintias; and he deduces all the other variants in
P.'s account from this 'original sin' of Fabius. Carthalo must have
tried to destroy some of the Roman ships; and 'it is absurd to
suppose he could not destroy them'. In fact, he did not-thanks to
II7

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

the catapults (53 IJ n.). P. is therefore to be followed. Cf. Meltzer,


ii. 33I-2, 579; and for the topography, J. Schubring, Phil., I873,
504 ff., especially 526; Rh. Mus., I873, 137 f. Schubring thinks Iunius
took refuge in the harbour of Caucana, a little south-east of Camarina, while Carthalo anchored off the promontory of Bucra (modern
Braccetto). Other sources for the shipwreck are Eutrop. ii. 26. 2;
Oros. iv. ro. 3; Zon. viii. 15; Iunius was said also to have disregarded
the auspices, and subsequently to have committed suicide: Cic. nat.
deor. ii. 7; de diu. ii. 7I; Val. Max. i. 4 4; Minuc. Felix, 7. 4, 26. 2.
The date cannot be fixed with certainty; Meltzer (ii. 33o) makes it
July, like that of 255 in the same waters (37 I), but this is not
compelling, since storms are not limited to that month.
2. O'TJJLTJVavToov Twv aKo1Twv . TTJV &m4>6.veLa.v: this seems to exclude
the view that Carthalo was at the Halycus.
6. 1TEptaTaaEOOS oAoaxepEaTepa.s! 'a peril of some magnitude';
contrast 32. 3 and 35 ro, where 1Tpfarar:ns = 'situation, Circumstances'. On this word see Strachan-Davidson, II.

55. 2. Ka.pxTJS6vLOL s~ Tils JLEV 9a.AaTTTJS &Kup(EUOV: but they never


exploited this superiority, perhaps because they were occupied for
several years with war in Africa, where Hanno took Hecatompylus
(73. I n.). It is possible that Hanno, a later enemy of the Barcid
family, stood for a policy of African expansion rather than foreign
conquests in the interests of the merchant class (T. Frank, CP, 1926,
313-I4; CAH, vii. 689); this would be a situation not unlike that
which developed between the Senate and equites at Rome 150 years
later. See also De Sanctis, iii. r. I79; Tarn, ]HS, 1907, 56. Bung
(65 n. 4) follows Campe's view that the words KapxTJMvtot .
d.m).\m~ov are an interpolation, but quite unnecessarily.
7. "Epu~: modern Mte San Giuliano. It is 75I m. above sea-level, and
manifestly not the next highest mountain in Sicily after Etna
(3,3I3 m.); for one cannot distinguish J.tEY0os, bulk, and uifios, height,
with Biittner-Wobst (Klio, I905, 95-96). On its topography see
Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 25 ff.), who explains the mistake as easily made
if one approaches Trapani from the sea, when Mte San Giuliano
stands out in imposing isolation. (But P.'s own visit will probably
have been later than the composition of this passage; Cuntz, 7o.)
The vast height of Eryx becomes an established tradition; cf. Solin.
5 9; Virg. A en. xii. 701; Val. Flacc. ii. 523. Here the north coast of
Sicily correctly 'faces Italy' (42. 1-7 n.).
8. T6 TTlS :t\.4>po~HTT)s . ~ep6v: a temple of great antiquity and betraying, by its system of temple-prostitution, an eastern origin.
Diod. iv. 83 describes it in Roman times; and Pans. viii. 24. 6 compares it to the temple of Aphrodite at Paphos. Its goddess, whom
the Phoenicians identified with Astarte, was linked with Venus in
II8

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 56. r

Roman legend; and the founding of the temple was attributed to


Aeneas (Virg. A en. v. 759 ff.; cf. i. 570; Mela, ii. II9; etc.). Later
Venus Erycina was one of the most venerable deities at Rome, especially when she could be linked significantly with the gens Julia
(e.g. Hor. Odes, i. 2. 33). Jessen, RE, 'Erycina', cols. 562-5; Hiilsen,
RE, 'Eryx (I)', cols. 6o2-4. On the plunder of this temple by Gallic
mercenaries see ii. 7. 8.
9. t\8E 1TOAlS U1T' aun1v TTJV Kopu<PTjv TETaKTaL! cf. s8. 2. The town of
Eryx was of Elymian origin (Thuc. vi. 2. 3); its population had been
removed to Drepana in 259 (24. 8 n.). The site has been variously
sought on the mountain slope to the south (Holm, Gesch. Sic. iii.
354-5) or, more probably, to the north-west (Kromayer, AS, iii.
I. 25 ff.) of the modern town of San Giuliano.
10. Ofhows 8E Kat TTJV lmo .dpe1r6.vwv 1rpoa~aaw: Diod. xxiv. r. Io
relates the occupation of Eryx by Junius with 8oo men: Kat rclv
Alyl8aJ.Aov irelxuiV, ovmtp viiv .i:I.KeMov Ka.Aovat. VVnereupon Carthalo
landed troops and seized the position. Zon. viii. IS adds that Junius
was himself taken prisoner-a possibility, since although one tradition states that Junius was indicted and avoided condemnation by
suicide (authorities quoted, 54 n.), there was an exchange of prisoners
in 247 (Livy, ep. 19; Zon. viii. I6): De Sanctis, iii. r. 177 n. 73 The
identification of Aegithallus is not certain; cf. J. Schubring, Phil.
24, I866, 59; Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 13. 333 ; iii. 354 (revised view) ;
Meltzer, ii. 333 Meltzer thinks it is Cape S. Teodoro, on the north
side of the bay of Motya, and c. 20 km. south of Eryx. But Kromayer
(AS, iii. r. 35) identifies it with the spur of Eryx here mentioned by
P., and with the modern Pizzo Argenteria or Sant' Anna; if this is
correct, it must be assumed that the Romans recovered it (58. 2),
and in a short survey P. may have felt justified in omitting the
seizure by Carthalo.
56. 1. )\JhLAKav Tov BapKav: the arrival of Hamilcar Barca, the
father of Hannibal, in Sicily, to succeed Carthalo (Zon. viii. r6)
marks a new stage in the war. (The name Barca(s) is usually associated with the Semitic Baraq, 'lightning--or sword-flash': Lenschau,
RE, 'Hamilkar (7)', col. 2303, who does not confirm the doubts of
Meltzer, ii. 582.) Hamilcar's arrival is dated by Zon. viii. r6 under the
consuls C. Aurelius L.f. C.n. Cotta and P. Servilius Q.f. Cn.n.
Geminus (A.U.C. 506 = 248/7 B.C.). However, P.'s reference to the
eighteenth year of the war (from Philinus) applies to the active
opening of Hamilcar's campaign, his attacks on Italy, and his seizure
of Heircte (as a counter-move to the Roman occupation of Eryx);
and since on his arrival Hamilcar had first to suppress a mercenary
revolt (Zon., loc. cit.), he may well have reached Sicily in spring 247,
and opened his campaign against the Romans only in late summer,
II9

I. 56. r

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

i.e. in the eighteenth year of the war (which began in late summer
264; 4r. 4 n., 5 r-s n.). De Sanctis, iii. I. 253. This chronology is
confirmed by the later course of Hamilcar's command; 56. II, he
was axt"86v lrr Tp&; EVLCWTOUS on Heircte (247/6, 246/s. 245/4); sS. 6,
the struggle continued for two years more on Eryx, until the war
was settled by other means (244/3, 243/2). This brings us to the
arrival of Lutatius Catulus in Sicily in 242 (which signifies the Roman
resumption of a naval policy after a five years' lapse (59 I n.)-for
this, not the battle of the Aegates Islands {so Beloch, iv. 2. 285), is
the decisive point to P. (d. 20. 8)). See DeSanctis, loc. cit.; Luterbacher, Phil., r9o7, 419-20.
3. KO.TO.O"Upa.s TTJV AoKp(lia. KO.l TTJV BpETT~a.vtiv xwpa.v: following
up similar raids by Carthalo in 248 (Zon. viii. r6; Oros. iv. ro. 4).
The Romans replied with citizen colonies at Alsium {247) and
Fregcnae (245) on the Etruscan coast (VeiL Pat. i. 14. 8).
TOv t1rt TTjs EpKTijs AEY61-'evov To1rov: 'the so-called position near
(above?) Heircte'. (Diodorus reads 'EpKml or 'EpKn) (xxiL ro. 4,
xxiii. zo) and Hultsch adopts Tats ElpKm"i:s here). Heircte is thus the
name of a strong-point, applied by extension to the hill above. This
hill is usually identified with :Mte Pellegrino, the 6oo m. hill which
rises in isolation to the north of Panormus; d. J. Schubring, H~'sto
rische Topographic von Panormos, i (Progr. Liibeck, 187o), 24 ff.;
Holm, Gesclt. Sic. i. rs. 334 f.; iii. 28 f., 354 ; De Sanctis, iii. I. I8I n. 83;
K. Ziegler, RE, 'Heirkte', col. 2645; Cary, IJR, 155 n. 17. However,
there are strong arguments against this identification; and Kromaycr (AS, iii. r. 4 ff.} has a cogent defence of the view that Heircte
is Mte Castellacio, an 890 m. hill about ro km. north-west of Palermo,
and more particularly of the fort which he would locate in the pass
which lies between the north-east spurs of Mte Castellacio and Mte
Gallo, just above (and south of} the modern coastal village of Sferracavallo (the name Heircte will then mean 'obstruction' (in the pass)).
Thus F.'s description of Heircte as lying between Eryx and Panormus, though highly inaccurate (and a sign of F.'s meagre knowledge
of Sicilian geography when he was writing this), is perhaps less
unsuitable to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. The perimeter
of the mountain { 4), roo stadcs (u! miles), corresponds fairly
closely to that of the plateau of Mte Castellacio, but it is a third too
much for that of Mte Pellegrino (Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 15), which
Kromayer makes only n! km. (7-7! miles). The convenient harbour
( 7) is hard to identify if Heircte is .Mte Pellegrino. Meltzer (ii.
341-2) speaks of Mondello to the north-west; but the connexion
between :Mondello and the mountain is difficult. DeSanctis (loc. cit.)
therefore follows G.M. Columba, and locates it in the bay of Palermowhich can hardly be feasible. But on the view that Heircte is Mte
Castellacio, the harbour will be that at! sola delle Femmine. Finally, the

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 5 8.

phrase 1rpos Tds 1TAa.yEovs 1rlloLas Ell</>vw> KdJ-Lello> ( 4), though usually
taken (since Schweighaeuser) as 'well placed to receive the breezes'
(and regarded as an example of P.'s belief that climate affects men's
characters; cf. Class. et med., r948, 178-8r), probably means 'lying
well-protected against the sharp sea-winds' ; and this applies far
more to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. Frank (CAll, vii.
6go) puts the choice between Mte Pellegrino and Mte Billiemi (a col
and slope 2 km. east of Mte Castellacio); but Kromayer's identification seems in all respects the most satisfactory.
11. va.pa.aTpa.TovEOEuaciv1'wv tv 'Laws vivTE aTa.8(o~<;: the Romans'
position cannot be located; nor is one to suppose that they maintained the same camp for three years.
57. The fighting romzd II eircte. The details of this protracted struggle
are compressed into this general characterization, whereas P.'s
sources no doubt emphasized details; some fragments of these are
preserved in Diod. xxiv. P. uses metaphors taken from athletes
elsewhere, perhaps ii. 65. rr, xvi. 28. 9 (runners in the stadium),
xxvii. g. 2 (boxing), xxxix. r. 8 (pancration or boxing); shorter
examples, xxix. 8. s. 8. g, 17. 4. xxxviii. 18. 8. They clearly reflect his
own interests, and it is unnecessary to assume Isocratean or Stoic
influence (so von Scala, 22; and, with reservations, Wunderer, iii. rr2).
2. T(;'w vuv AeyotJ-EvWv aTpa.ntywv: P. has mentioned only Hamilcar
and L. Iunius Pullus; but Iunius had probably left the scene before
Hamilcar arrived (55 Ion.). In fact Hamilcar's activity on Heircte
coincided with a succession of consuls in Sicily, L. Caecilius Metellus
and N. Fabius Buteo (247/6), M'. Otacilius Crassus and M. Fabius
Lidnus (246/5), M. Fabius Buteo and C. Atilius Bulbus (245/4). That
P.'s metaphor has led him into a careless expression is more likely
than a fault in the text (aTpaTwv, aTparWJ-LaTwv, and a-rparo1riDw11
have been suggested: but AEyoJ-Levwll is against such an emendation,
and the language of 57 is more appropriate to two individuals than
two armies; the comparison of the two sides begins in 58).
6. a.t 8uvcitJ-ElS E;JlcitJ-~).o~: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. ron. r) estimates Hamilcar's force on Heircte at 15,ooo-zo,ooo men.
TU TE Ka.Ta TOU<; xd.pa.Ka.<.;: 'their camps' (not 'trenches'. Paton).
58. l. wcrm;p 0,ya.9o<; j3pa.~EUT~S ~ TIJXTJ: i.e. in Order to Secure a
decision between the closely matched pair, Fortune as umpire redefines the terms of the conquest, so as to render it a more severe
test. The word f3paf3eveu is often used with rvx11 (e.g. xxvii. r6. 4,
xxix. 27. r2); but the full metaphorical force is not necessarily felt.
The phrase is found in Diodorus not only in a Polybian passage
(xxviii. 4), but elsewhere (xiii. 53 2 (Timaeus?), xxxiv. 27 (Poseidonius ?). Elsewhere P. makes Tyche distribute prizes (iii. 6J. J,
121

I. 58.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

xv. 9 4, to. s. xxxii. 4 3) and crowns (ii. 2. 10). In such passages the
personification is formal and rhetorical; it represents part of the
common reservoir of expression on which P. drew. Siegfried, 81,
' ... pure metaphor, springing for the most part from an atmosphere
heightened to match the situation'. See above, p. 25 n. r.
1Tapa~6Aws: 'in a remarkable manner' {Strachan-Davidson); 'by a
bold stroke' (Shuckburgh) : Paton's 'unexpectedly' does not quite
get the sense.
2. Twv 'Pwllalwv Tov "EpuKa. TllpoOVTwv: i.e. at the temple of Venus,
and on the slope from Drepana, 55 ro.
KaTEAa~ETo Tt,v ,.6}\w: evidently in 244, judging by the order of
events in Diodorus, who {xxiv. 8--9) adds that Hamilcar slew the
Roman garrison, and transferred the inhabitants (such as had returned, presumably, 24. 8 n.) to Drepana. Following Kromayer, De
Sanctis (iii. I. 183) puts the Punic landing at modern Tonnara di
Bonagia, north of Eryx. Already Hamilcar had made one attempt
to ease the blockade of Drepana by an unsuccessful attempt on the
island of Pelias (modern Columbara) at the harbour-entrance, which
had been seized by N. Fabius Buteo, the consul for 247 (Zon. viii. r6).
3. 1Tapa~oAWS , {J1TOJlEVEW Kat ~ho.kLV5UVEUELV 'ITOALOpKOUJlEVOUS;
'a siege of the Romans ... supported by them with extraordinary
hardihood and adventurous daring' {Shuckburgh). Paton is here
quite misleading: 'the Romans-a thing they had never expectedremained besieged and in considerable peril'.
5. 1Epov ~1Toh1uo.v Tov a-Te<tavov: 'they left the contest dra-wn', cf.
xxix. 8. 9 In the event of a drawn contest, the crown of victory was
dedicated to the gods; cf. Sen. ep. 83. s. 'quod raro cursoribus euenit,
hicran fecimus'; Gell. xviii. z. 4-5, 'quaestio ... sol uta corona et praemio donabatur .. si nemo dissoluebat, corona eius quaestionis deo
cuius id festum erat dicabatur'.
6. Ko.i11"Ep M' h1J mi.Aw 5to.ywvlO'O.JlEvous KTA.: 'before either
could ma...'>ter the other, although they had continued the conflict
in this spot for another two years, it came about that the war was
decided in another fashion.' It was decided by the Roman decision
once again to resume her naval policy (59 z); and this was in 242.
Hence the two years of warfare around Eryx are 244{3 and 243/2
(56. In.). If the decisive point is taken to be the battle of the
Aegates Islands, either one must force the evidence to date this :242
(Reuss, Phil., 19o1, rzr-3) or date Hamilcar's arrival in Sicily 246
(Beloch, iv. 2. 285), both unsatisfactory. Paton mistranslates,
'though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the
war had been decided by other means'.
7. Tot; o/uxollaxouut Twv Ellyevwv 6pvi9wv: the change of metaphor to
a cock-fight {a common sport at all times in Greece; K. Schneider, RE,
'Hahnenkampfe', cols. zzro-15) varies the picture. Such a metaphor,
IZZ

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 59 6

already in Plato, Theaet. 164 c, need be neither a borrowing from


Fabius (so \Vunderer, iii. ros; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141), nor a proof
of Stoic influence (von Scala, 327: d. Epictet. ii. 2, 13, iv. r. 124;
Clem. Al. Paed. iii. r8, p. 262 P.). P. could surely draw on his own
experience. The parallel is closely developed ; the loss of the use of
their "rings corresponds to the five-year duel on land, the death
grapple to the new naval policy culminating in the battle of the
Aegates Islands.
8. i!ws O.v cuhofJ-aTws ~<TA.: 'until accidentally falling foul of one
another they grapple without difficulty'. aVTop.ATws is not quite
'involuntarily' (Paton) ; but Isaac Casaubon's sponte sua, i.e. 'without
outside intervention', is not unattractive. s~aSpauuwOa~ is a rare
compound; the meaning is probably that of the simple verb 'to
seize hold of'.
59. 1. Ofl-o{ws S: 'similarly', i.e. to the cocks. The parallel is stressed
(cf. 58. 7 n.), and Paton is wrong in following Casaubon's emendation
Of-LW'i.

ET1'J crxeSov ~bYJ 'II'EVTE: from the shipwreck off Camarina in 249. to the
new decision (of winter 243/2) is in fact six complete years. P.'s error

is due to his identification of the period of land activity with Hamilcar's command in Sicily, i.e. 247-243; and this identification is made
easier because P. imagines Iunius Pullus to be Claudius' successor,
and hence dates his shipwreck to 248 (52. 5 n.). P.'s view that the
Romans had envisaged finishing the war by land fighting is dismissed
by Thiel (Hist. 333 n. 85r) as nonsensical.
2. ou 'll'poxwpouv auTo'Ls Toupyov: the motive alleged is the same as
that which led to the change of policy before Drepana (39 14; cf.
41. 2 n.).
4. er~avTEs Tois ~I( TTJS TUXYJS aufJ.'II'TWJJ.aaw: i.e. the shipwrecks off
Camarina (255) and C. Palinurus (253), 37 r-2, 39 6-7.
~AaTTw9evTEs TU 1repi Ta Api'll'ava vaut:J.ax~: in 249; 49 7 f. But an
equal motive was the second shipwreck off Camarina the same year
(SS r-2); its omission here helps P. to make a rhetorical distinction
between the blows of Fortune and the blows of the enemy.
6. ~v Se To 1rAeiov o/uxot:J.ax(a: 'in this undertaking resolution
had to supply for the most part the want of material resources'
(Strachan-Davidson). ifivxof-Laxla means fighting by the aid of the
psyche, not to save it (as Paton, who translates 'a struggle for
existence'). The source for this characterization may well be Fabius;
but the concept appears elsewhere in P., e.g. ii. 30. 7 (on the Celts),
iii. 9 7 (on Hamilcar): cf. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141.
T~v n7.1v 1rpoeaTwTwv O.vSpwv <JitAOTL(J-tav I<TA.: the account of this
loan (perhaps compulsory), and the implied praise of the 'leading
men' will also be from Fabius (doubts in Bung, 71). See De Sanctis,
123

I. 59 6

THE FIRST PUKIC WAR

iii. I. :z:z8 (d. 184 n. 87, where he observes that P.'s account of this
'sacrifice' on the part of the senators is much exaggerated; 'in fact
the sacrifice of the Athenian trierarchs at the end of the Peloponnesian \Var was proportionately much heavier'), and Thiel, Hist.
303, who points out that P.'s words do not exclude an interestbearing loan.
8. Suucoalwv 1TAOlwv: probably Fabius' figure. The annalistic tradition gave 300 (Eutrop. ii. 27. I; Oros. iv. ro. 5; auct. de uir. ill. 41);
also Diod. xxiv. II. I, adding 700 transports. Tam (]HS, 1907, s6)
estimates the total Roman fleet (including the ships surviving after
Drepana) at about 220; but the Romans probably did not include
the 20 survh'ing ships built on a heavier model than their new fleet
(Thiel, }fist. 93, 305 n. 786).
1Tpos TTjv ToG 'Polilou va.Ov: cf. 47. 1o n. This new fleet of lighter vessels
was necessarily committed to Punic tactics (d. Thiel, Hist. 304).
raLOV AuTaTLov: 'appointing c. Lutatius to the command', cf. 6o. 3,
II. 2 n., 39 15 n. The consuls for A.U.c. 512 =- 242/I B.C. were C.
Lutatius C.f. C.n. Catulus and A. Postumius A.f. L.n. Albinus
(Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', cots. zo68-71; 'Postumius (3o)', col. 902).
The plebeian pontifex maximussecured the command for the plebeian
Lutatius by forbidding Postumius, as flamen Martialis, to leave Rome
(Livy, ep. 19, xxxvii. 51. r-2; VaL Max. i. r. 2; Tac. Ann. iii. 71;
Munzer, Adelsparteien, 261); the command was shared by Q. Valerius
Falto, the praetor urbanus (Val. Max. ii. 8. :z; Zon. viii. 17), who
celebrated a naval triumph pro praetore ex Sic::lia in 241/o (act. tr.).
9. 1TO.VTOS O.vo.I<XWPTJKOTOS Ets TTjv ot~eEio.v ToG vo.uTLKOu; the
reasons behind this policy can only be the object of speculation.
Frank (CAli, vii. 691-2) attributes it to the ascendancy of Hanno
and the anti-Barcan faction, De Sanctis (iii. 1. 185) to Hamilcar
himself, who 'had let himself become so engrossed in his guerilla
warfare around Eryx and Heircte that he lost sight of the primary
importance of controlling the seas'; against the latter view see
Thiel, 1list.
306.
60-61. Battle of the Aegates Islands. The substantial agreement with
Diod. xxiv. I I points to the continued use of Philinus as P.'s main
source (though he corrects the numbers from Fabius, 6r. 6 n.); see
also Zon. viii. 17. Eutrop. ii. 27. 2 dates the battle VI idus martias,
i.e. ro March; Zon. viii. 17 puts it at the end of Lutatius' consulship;
and the act. tr. give him a naval triumph de Poenis ex Sicilia as proconsul on 4 October 241. Beloch (iv. 2. 261-2) argues that Lutatius
did not reach Sicily till April 241 (59 8, apxof-Livr;r; TfjS' 8epda.:;), and
that at this time 10 March fell in May (Jul.); but De Sanctis (iii. 1.
264-7) shows that, if Lutatius went out in April, it would have been
impossible for the battle to take place before July at the earliest.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 6I. 6

P.'s account is indecisive. But it seems unlikely that the Carthaginians could have been ready as quickly as Beloch suggests, despite
the stress on their speed in 2; they must have needed a considerable
time, perhaps even six months (Luterbacher, Phil.,
424). Hence
De Sanctis's arguments seem conclusive. And if P. narrative nowhere makes dear that a winter intervened between Lutatius'
arrival and the battle of the Aegates Islands, he was perhaps misled
by stress on the speed of Punic preparations in Philinus, who may
have used this theme partly to excuse the defeat {cf. 6r. 4, uAiw-;
avaO'K'If7'a). It may be assumed that Lutatius left for Sicily in summer,
242, and won his victory in March 241 {Meltzer, ii. 347-9; DeSanctis,
iii. r. 264-7; Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', col. 2069; Frank, CAH,
vii.
; Scullard, Hist. qo). Reuss (Phil., r9or, r2r-6) has argued
that the battle was in 242, largely on the basis of a synchronism in
ii. 43 6; but this can be otherwise explained (see ad loc.), and
Reuss's theory is too ruthless towards the other evidence to be
seriously considered.
60. 3. 'Avvwva: perhaps the vanquished general at Agrigcntum (r8.
8), who was defeated at Ecnomus (28. 1 ff.); but Punic precedent
would not lead us to
that he survived this second defeat (he
returned to Carthage, Zon. viii. r2), and this is probably another:man.
6. cpopov nVj.lOV Kai. AO.j.l1Tpov: 'a fresh (AafL7rpov) and favourable
(,Popov) wind'; cf. 44 3. ovp~ov Kal AtlfL7rpov aVEfLOV, with the same
Sense; XXXi. 15. 8, rpop011 UliEfLOV.
7. auAAoyL~Of-LEvos KTh.: Lutatius is made to foresee Hanno's purpose as expressed in 3 (d. 27. r for an example of the same technique). The source is probably Philinus; cf. Klotz, La nMtvelle Clio,
1953, 238.
10. E1Tl. 1-l(a.v vaGv: 'in line one deep', 26. I 2 n.

61. 1. Ka8EAOf-LVoL Tous la-rous: they were sailing, not rov.ing, as


this was faster with a favourable wind; cf. Caesar, BC, iii. 26, for
the example of the Pompeian squadron under saiL For fighting, the
fuller control by oars was essential. See Strachan-Davidson, ad lac.
6. Losses in the battle. P. gives the Punic losses as so ships sunk and 70
captured with their crews; the prisoners amount to nearly Io,ooo
( 8). Diod. xxiv. r x. 1 gives II7 ships lost, 20 of them with their
crews; and 6,ooo prisoners (i.e. 300 for each of zo crews) according
to Philinus, 4,040 according to others (but De Sanctis, iii. I. 235
emends to give 6,ooo Carthaginians and 4,o4o Tuw lTpwv, i.e. c.
Io,ooo in all). The annalistic tradition (Eutrop. ii. 27. 2; Oros. iv.
Io. 7) gives 63 ships taken, 125 sunk, 32,ooo prisoners, and I_),oooI4,ooo killed. Diodorus makes the Punic fleet 25o ships, excluding
transports; the annalistic tradition raises it to 400 or even 6oo, to
make the Roman victory the more glorious.
two separate methods
125

I. 6r. 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

of calculation Tam (JHS, 1907, 56-57) arrives at a total of c. qo.


Diodorus puts the Roman losses (including damaged ships) at So,
the annalistic tradition at only 12. F.'s total of Punic losses (so+7o =
r2o) does not differ greatly from Diodorus' total of rq; and Jacoby,
FGH, 174 F 5 (commentary), suggests that Diodorus' figure of 2o
ships lost with their crews may be corrupt, and that in fact P. is
here reproducing Philinus (cf. Reuss, Phil., r9or, 146). Alternatively,
P. may have corrected Philinus' figures from Fabius, as he has done
elsewhere.
7. ~'ITa.pafl.-;:vov ToOs luTous: a very difficult, if not impossible,
manceuvre at sea; perhaps the Punic ships got away with the aid
of the dolon, a subsidiary sail attached to the foremast (d. Thiel,
Hist. 314 n. 8r8).
62. 1. Ta.~s flEV opfla.L's Ka.l TaL's 4nAonf11a.~s KTA.: 'as far as resolution
of mind and will to conquer went, they were still ready to fight on'.
Paton's translation, 'had they let themselves be guided by passion
and ambition', introduces a critical note absent from a phrase which
echoes Philinus' defence of the Carthaginians' courage. Similarly
P. gives full credit to Hamilcar ( 3-5; d. 6o. 8, iii. 9 7, and Diod.
xxiv. 5 r-2); whereas to the Roman annalistic tradition Sicily was
nimis celeri desperatione rerum concessam (Livy, xxi. r. 5); Reuss,
Phil., 1901, 147; DeSanctis, iii. 1. 229.
7. '1Tpo9uflws o.-;:~a.flivou Ta 'ITa.pa.Ka.AOlJj.LVa.: according to Diod. xxiv.
13 Lutatius demanded the surrender of arms and deserters, according
to Nepos, Ham. r. 5, the laying down of arms; the source is probably
Philinus. But when Hamilcar refused, Lutatius seems not to have
pressed these demands, perhaps because he wished to anticipate his
successor's arrival in concluding terms (Zon. viii. 17; the demand,
here mentioned, that Hamilcar and his forces should pass under the
yoke, is improbable).
TOLO{IT(oJV nvwv uuv9YJKWV: F.'s source for the text of this preliminary
draft treaty is unknown. The words TowvTwv nvwv are no indication of
a literary source (so Thommen, Hermes, 1885, 203: d., however, iii. 22.
4, 24. 3, where the source is documentary) ; but the general absence of
hiatus (Hultsch, Phil., 1859, 288-319) indicates that P. is not reproducing any document uerbatim (see Schulte, 19 f.). Probably the
account goes back ultimately to a document, but through Fabius;
though in view of the probable origin of F.'s account of the Punic
treaties in iii. 22 ff., direct access to a documentary source is possible
(De Sanctis, iii. I. 229). N aevius, fg. 49 and so Mor. are concerned
with this treaty (d. Cichorius, so-52; Taubler, Hermes, 1922, 156 ff.;
E. Fraenkel, RE, 'Naevius', Suppl.-B. vi, col. 639) but do not
necessarily derive from the same source as P. See further iii. 27.
1-6 nn. for the emended treaty. Meltzer, De pace a.u.c. SIJ inter
I:Z6

THE FIRST PUXIC WAR

L 63.4

Romanos Poenosque constituta (Festschr. des \Vettiner Gymnasiums


zu Dresden, r884); Ttiubler, r88 ff.; Vorgesch. 108 ff.
8. M.v Kal T~ OTJIJ-<tl TWV 'Pwj.Lalwv <TuvSoKij: cf. Zon. viii. 17. On this
clause see iii. 29. 3 The people had the right to ratify all treaties,
vi. 14. u-rz; but that the comitia demanded a revision of the terms
(63. r) is proof that the Senate had not yet achieved its later preponderance in the constitution (Frank, CAH, vii. 696).
1-LTJ TroA~:j.L~:'Lv 'IEpwv~ KTA.: the formula recognized Hiero's hegemony
over his allies; Stauffenberg, 85. The same prohibition must have
been extended a fortiori to the other Roman socii.
9. xwpls A6Tpwv UTrGVTGS TOO<;; alxj.LaAwTOUS: d. Zon. viii. 17. There
was apparently a restoration of Punic prisoners too, 83. 8 n.; Eutrop.
ii. 27. 4
tv h~:<TLV eiKOO'~ OL<TXLALa Ka.t OlO.KOO'~(I. TUAC1VTO. Eu~o'it<6.: the hiatus is
exceptionaL Other figures (App.Sic. 2. 2, 2,ooo talents; Oros. iv.u. 2,
3,ooo talents) may be neglected. In xxi. 42. 19 (d. xxi. q. 4; Uvy,
xxxviii. 38. r3) a Euboic-Attic talent is equated with 8o Roman
librae; and as the libra weighs 327'45 grammes, the talent will be
zs8 kg. of silver. On a gold : silver basis of rst : I, this comes to just
over 2Jo; and Catulus' proposed indemnity is rather over soo,ooo.
Such calculations, however, take no account of relative purchasing
power.

63. 1. ou 1Tpo<Te8~aTo Tas <Tuv&r\~<as o Sfj~J.os: this is no doubt based


on Fabius and links with his thesis (10. 3 n., 11. r) of popular greed
deciding the issue of helping the 1\Iamertini; d. Gclzer, Hermes, 1933.
142. If in fact the commission of ten was sent by the people (as
Mommsen argues, St.-R. ii. 643, 692; contra Taubler, Vorgesch. 109),
its composition shows that there was no break with the nobility, for
it was led by Q. Lutatius C.f. C.n. Cerco, consul for A.U.c. 513
241/o B.c., and brother of Lutatius Catulus: Zon. viii. 17; Val. Max.
i. 3 z (Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (13)', col. zo95). Our sources offer no
support for either E. Meyer's theory (Kt. Schr. ii. 38o) that the word
ofip.o> here cloaks the activities of the equites (cf. II. 2 n.), or De
Sanctis's assumption (iii. I. 190) that the people voted to continue
the war, and that the Commission was sent out by the Senate as
a wise compromise.
2-3. ~paxa. 8E 1Tpo<TE1Thnva.v KTA: see iii. 27. z-6 n. for the revised
treaty.
63.4-64. 6. Swmmary on the First Punic War. P. takes up and
develops two of the points made in r3. ro-12, (a) The magnitude of
the war (r3. u): discussion in 63. 4-9, ending with P.'s conclusions
about the forces directing Roman success. (This point may have
been in Philinus; Klotz (Hermes, 1952, 326) observes that P.'s superlatives perhaps neglect the Hannibalic War, which was admittedly
I27

L 63. 1

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

shorter, but no less in scope and significance.) (b) The light thrown
on the special characteristics of the two powers (13. 12) : the moral
aspects are discussed (64. s-6), and also the political institutions of
Rome, which will be treated below (book vi). Thus P. stresses both
the moral and the political virtues of Rome at the outset (contra
Komemann, Phil., 1931, 175; cf. CQ, 1943, 81). The reference back
is underlined by the phrase
'Pwrtaf.os Kct~ KapxTJSovlo~s avo-Tas
7Tp/. .EoKr).to.s m5A<ftOS: cf. IJ. 10; at what stage it became a war 'for
Sicily' is indicated in zo. 2.
63. 4. ETTJ etKOI7l Kal TETTpa. auvexws: from late summer 264
to 241, i.e. 23 years and a few months, 5 I-S n. This figure is confirmed by Zon. viii. 17; Eutrop. iii. r; Oros. iv. II. 4 De Sanctis,
iii. I. 251-2.
5. Numbers engaged. According to P.'s figures there were 250 ships
at Mylae (zo. 9, 23. 3), 68o at Ecnomus (25. 7--9), and 550 at Hcrmaea
{36. 9-10); the numbers at Drepana and Tyndaris are not recorded,
nor the total at the Aegates Islands, where the Romans had zoo
ships (59 8). The two battles are therefore Hcrmaea and Ecnomus;
and r1rro.~ rtv . nciAw Si must be 'on one occasion .. on another'
(so Shuckburgh: Paton translates 1rdAw S 'and on a subsequent
one'). For P.'s analysis of naval strength see 20. 8.
6. Losses on either side. The Punic total is reached thus: Hannibal's
first battle (21. n), say 30; .Mylae (2J.IO), so; Sardinia (24. 6) rroMcis,
say 20-40; Tyndaris (25. 4), 18; Ecnomus (z8. 14), 94+; Hermaea
(36. II), 114+; Aegates Islands (61. 6), 1zo: Total: 446+ (probably
470---90). The Roman figures are: Lipara (21. 4), I7; Tyndaris (25. I-J),
9; Ecnomus (28. 14), 24; first wreck off Camarina (37 2), 284;
Palinurus (39 6), ISo+; Drcpana (sr. Iz), 93+; Lilybaeum (53 7),
JAtyo.; second wreck off Camarina (s:z. 6, 54 8), 120: Total, 697 +
Tarn (]HS, I907' s8-s9) reduces the Roman losses to c. 4/0, which,
by adding say 10 for Mylae and an unknown figure for the Aegatcs
Islands, he brings up to about soo. These calculations involve reducing the losses off Camarina in the first wreck to I7o+, since of
the total of 364 some n4 were prizes, and not all these will have gone
down. But Tarn's figures for Palinurus (27 instead of ISo) are not
acceptable (39 6 n.); here P. is to be preferred. Hence the only
change which has to be made in calculating the total is in connexion
with the first wreck off Camarina; and this makes the total Roman
(real) losses about 6oo (cf. Thiel, llist. 94). De Sanctis (iii. r. I9o
n. 98) makes the Roman total683 +, apparently by raising the losses
at Camarina (first wreck) to 384, and then subtracting the 114 prizes,
thus making the loss 270. Beloch (iv. I, 363 n. 3) thinks both
Roman and Punic totals are from Fabius and much exaggerated;
but they seem to be calculated by P. himself for the figures in his
own text.

o...

128

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 63. 9

7. ))..vnyovou Ka.l nTOAE!L(I.LOU Ka.~ ATI!L'lTPLOU: e.g. Salamis (Jo6),


where Demetrius Poliorcetes defeated Ptolemy I, Cos, Andros, and
Ephesus (Egyptian defeats: all three dates uncertain: see A. Momigliano and P. Fraser, CQ, 1950, 107-18; E. Manni, Athen., 1952,
182 ff.; Treves, Eujorione, 75-83, 124-8 (with notes)).
v~;pt TouTwv {aTopftaavTa.s: 'if they were to read the account of this
war' (Strachan-Davidson : cf. Schweighaeuser; for this sense of
laTopiv cf. ii. 6z. 6, xii. 3 5; perhaps ii. 17. 2) ; 'if they had to tell the
story of this war' (cf. 13. j) (Shuckburgh). But the latter interpretation involves taking 'l"oos 8avp.d~oVTa:; as historians; whereas it is
clearly with readers of history that P. is concerned. Paton's translation is satisfactory, 'if they inquired into the history of this
war'.
8. ou8' O.v ... 8uv119t:t11 EUpEiV: for the claim cf. 2 nn. Indirectly
P. is here challenging comparison with Herodotus and Thucydides.
On the change from trireme to quinquereme see Tarn, liMN D, 122 ff.
9. TO vpoTE9v ft!LiV ~s npxf\s: in 3 g-Io P. undertook to explain the
grounds (ri<{>opfLal) which led the Romans to conceive the ambition
of a world-empire, and gave them the means to acquire it. The First
Punic \Var, and especially Roman naval policy, provide the answer.
Not by chance, nor by purely fortuitous circumstances (rox"7 and
Ta.vT<~fLarov are virtually synonymous: cf. x. 2. s. xv. 16. 6, xxi. z6.
16, xxxi. 30. J. and other passages quoted in Siegfried, 6o--66 ;
Susemihl, ii. Ioi n. 79 compares Arist. Phys. ii. 4--6), but by deliberately schooling themselves amid dangers, the Romans conceived
their ambition (7re{3a.Aovro . 'ToAfL'Y]pws) and accomplished it
(Ka8lKovro rfjs 1rpo8laews). Thus this passage was clearly written in
close relationship to 3 7-10, part of the introduction to books i and ii
(cf. Shorey,CP, 1921, 282). von Scala (182), Susemihl (ii. non. 104), and
Cuntz (46) have argued that it represents a later stage in P.' s thought,
when he has modified or rejected his belief in the power of Fortune
(cf. ii. 38. 5). The assumption is unnecessary and unconvincing. P.'s
concept of Tycke varies from one part of his work to another; but
even so positive a concept as that of 4 4 is complementary to a
belief in causation, and not exclusive of it. In the case of the Roman
Empire P. was faced with a dilemma, and the present passage is his
solution. The rise of Rome to world dominion was the act of Tyche
(4. 1 ff.); yet if it was that and nothing more, P.'s history had no
lesson to teach. The answer to this aporia is that Fortune favoured
the Romans because they were worthy. It was the a<{>opwd as analysed in the First Punic War which marked them out to become the
proteges of Fortune, so that the rise of Rome to world power defined
itself as the main-stream of history and the will of Providence. It
was no doubt from a similar passage in book vi, now lost, that
Cicero borrowed the statement (de re pub. ii. 30) that 'non fortuito
K

129

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

populum Homanum, sed consilio et disciplina confirmatum esse


nee tamen aduersante fortuna' (where nott fortuito does not exclude
the positive aid of fortuna, just as here ov -r6X'll does not exclude the
guidance of 4 1 :ff.). See above, pp. 2I-22,
Ka.9a1TEp vaol 5oKouaL -rldv 'EAAt}vwv: who they are is uncertain.
P. may be thinking of some of the unidentified writers on the Roman
constitution, attacked in
3-4 (if these were Greeks); or he may
simply be referring to orally expressed opinions.
64. 1. olJ-r' O.v 1TA1]pldaa.a ou-r' avt:mAEuaa.a .. 0UV1]9E~ev: the
promised discussion has not survived among our fragments of book
vi, but the difficulty appears to be in assembling the crews rather
than in building the ships. The passage is of interest as an indication
that at the very outset of his history P. was awake to signs of
deterioration at Rome after her acquisition of world dominion, i.e.
after 167 (KtrKpa.T7JICO'TS 'TWV oAwv).
3-4. Twv 1TEpl a.1hfjc; uuyyEypo.cjll)-rwv: who these authors were,
whether Greeks or Romans, is not known. For the utilitarian
criterion applied to their work (uMws- dvwf.Mj) see 1. In.
6. Tous ye JlTJV O.vSpa.s: 'individual soldiers'. P. here puts his finger
on an essential factor in the Homan victory, the quality of the
citizen troops compared with the mercenaries of Carthage.
~lltAKa.v . Tov BapKa.v (mKa.AoullEvov KTA.: the full description both
identifies Hamilcar and prepares the ground for the later discussion
of the causes of the Second Punic War; cf. iii. 9 6, where the
description recurs in that context. The phrase KaTa va'" is used by
P. (I) in contrast to Ka.Ta (Um.v, 'natural' as opposed to 'adoptive'
(e.g. iv. 2. s, cf. iv. 25. 6 (Philip V of .l\facedon, natural son of
Demetrius II, but adopted son of Doson), xviii. 35 9, xxxi. 25. Io,
26. I {Scipio and Fabius the natural sons of L. Aemilius Paullus));
(z) to express genuine relationship where it is called in question, i.e.
'natural' as opposed to 'supposititious' {without reference to legitimacy) (e.g. xxx. 2. 6, Eumenes' successor his son K!ua Jaw, though
not as yet recognized as such (dva.oeoe,yptf"o>)). But in the case of
Hannibal and Hamilcar P. frequently uses the phrase {iii. 9 6, 12. 3,
cf. xi. 2. 2, Hasdrubal is Hannibal's brother Ka'Ta 6a~v), though there
was never any question of adoption or doubt concerning Hannibal's
direct descent from Hamilcar. Hence the meaning (as in xxxi. 13. 3)
seems to be no more than 'own'.
65-88. The Carthaginian Mercenary War

Besides P. there is the account in Diod. xxv, which is usually


assumed to be derived directly from P. (Mommsen, Rom. Forsch.
ii. 266; Schwartz, RE, 'Diodorus (37)', col. 689; De Sanctis, iii. I.
130

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

1. 65.

385 n. 10); but the theory of a common source for P. and Diodorus
has been put forward by Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 357) and by Laqueur
(RE, 'Philinos (8)', col. 2I9o), who believe this source to be Philinus
(cf. Unger, Rh. Mus., I879, 90-105). For the view that Philinus wrote
a monograph on the First Punic war, however, see 14 n n. P.'s
source is on this assumption unidentified. He is a military historian,
rather less competent than Philinus, but sharing his enthusiasm for
the Barca family, and hostile to the mercenaries (whose case is
consequently to be recovered only by conjecture).

65. 2. 1TOAEJJ-05 JJ-cpUAl05: cf. iii. 9 9, lp.<f>vMw; Tapaxars. The Falisci


were allies; and the Carthaginian mercenaries were assisted by
Libyan subjects of Carthage, who were probably themselves largely
Carthaginianized.
o 1Tpos Tous ca>a.A.io"Kouo;; Ka.AOUJJ-Evous: the usual Greek form is
tPaAEplot, and the participle softens the use of the Latin word.
Further, the phrase o 7Tpos Tovs tPaAlaKovs parallels o 7Tpos Tovs
Alf3vos ( 3). This is against accepting KaAovp.Evos, the reading of
D and E, with Schweighaeuser, despite the passages i. 70. 7, o 7Tpos
TDV<; tivovs KaL Avj3tKo<; lmKA-qBds 7ToAEp.os, and iv. 33 6, Tj fLUX7J 1}
KaAovp.117] 7TEpL Ta<f>pov.
Faleria, the capital of the Falisci, lay c. 30 miles north of Rome in
south Etruria; but its people were probably of Italic origin (Strabo,
v. 226; Hiilsen, RE, 'Falisci', col. I9p). The revolt, in 24I, may have
followed the expiry of a fifty years' treaty two years earlier (De
Sanctis, ii. 362, iii. I. 279). The Romans took the revolt seriously
and sent a double consular army to suppress it (which it did in
six days). On I and 4 March 240 the two consuls Q. Lutatius C.f.
C.n. Cerco and A. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus Atticus celebrated
triumphs de Falisceis (act. tr.). See Livy, ep. 20; Val. Max. vi. 5 1;
Eutrop. ii. 28; Zon. viii. I8; Oros. iv. II. 5-ro. The Falisci were
harshly treated; deprived of arms, horses, slaves, household effects,
and half their land (which became ager publicus), they were forced
to migrate from their hill-city (the modern Civita Castellana) to
the plain at the site of the church (now ruined) of S. Maria di Falleri
(Hiilsen, RE, 'Falerii', cols. I97o-r).
5. Ka.Tu Ti]v ~~ 6.pxi]s 1Tpo0EoW: cf. I3. 3, oAtj3vKos 7TOAEp.os.
5-9. Reasons for narrating the Mercenary War. P. gives four:
(a) It is a good example of a 'truceless war'. (The phrase d.U7Tovoos
'TTOAEp.os occurs in Aeschines (ii. 8o), and in Demosthenes (xviii.
262), in both authors in conjunction with the word &.wr)pvKTDS',
'relentless' (on which see J. L. Myres, CR, I943 66-67); it
means a war shorn of the normal usages of international law,
and fought out to a finish.)
(b) It affords a useful lesson to the employers of mercenaries.
IJI

I. 65- 5

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

(c) It gives a clear picture of the difference between barbarians


and civilized men (a subject in which P. was interested, cf.
iv. 20-21).
(d) It is the key to an understanding of the causes of the Hannibalic War.
In fact the link with the Hannibalic War is very tenuous, and
amounts to no more than the Roman seizure of Sardinia during the
Libyan War (88. 8 n.; but in iii. ro. 4 this seizure is admittedly
regarded as the greatest cause of the Hannibalic War); Laqueur,
159. Having decided on a detailed account of the Libyan War, P.
is determined to justify it in terms of the whole work. Laqueur's
view that the Libyan War was a later addition to the Histories may
be neglected.
7. K TTJS Ton 11"pLaTnaws: 'from the circumstances of that war'
(cf. 35 1o); or 'from the danger Carthage underwent' (cf. iii. II2. 9).
On the two meanings of 7rEpla-ramo: in P. see Strachan-Davidson,
II-12.

9. Ka.l1ra.pa To'Ls 11"11"0A!1TJKOan: i.e. many combatants in the Second


Punic War were still alive. P. appears to be referring to general
discussions on the causes of the war such as had continued since
the works of Fabius Pictor and writers on Hannibal (iii. 6. r ff.);
it is not necessary to see here a reference to the sharp debates on
war-guilt which arose from 152 onwards, when the text of the
treaties was circulating in senatorial circles (iii. 21. 9-10 n.); so
Taubler, Vorgesch. 8 (see rather Thommen, Hermes, r885, 201-2).
The present passage is likely to have been written long before 152.
66. l. cm9To Ttl" cl.pxfJv: the mercenaries thought that he resigned
voluntarily; cf. 68. 12, where, however, Do~<Eiv seems to imply that
this was not so. De Sanctis (iii. r. 383 n. 3) argues that Hamilcar's
appointment would automatically terminate with the end of the war
in Sicily; but it seems more probable that he was ousted by political
opponents (Meltzer, ii. 369; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 525 f.).
o 1rl TTJS 11"0AWS cnpTTJyos rEaKwv: evidently the man who took
part in the preliminary peace negotiations (Diod. xxiv. 13) ; he is
important in the opening stages of the Mercenary War. Niese, RE,
'Geskon (3)', cols. 1322-3.
3. Ta 1rpoaocjiLA0!1VO. TWV otjlwv(wv: 'the pay owing to them' (the
compound verb has no special significance). o.f;wvtov (from o.f;ov,
'relish'), perhaps originally soldiers' slang, had become the regular
word for the classicalJ.naOo> in Hellenistic times, and it frequently
occurs on papyri and inscriptions. Normally it is distinct from
cn-rwvtov, a cash allowance in lieu of rations, and atToJu-rpla, rations
in kind (68. 9 n.). Another word, at-rapxla, has a looser use; sometimes, as in UPZ, i. 16. 7, it covers both wages and ration-allowance,
IJ2

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 67. 6

but elsewhere (e.g. 6; xi. 25. ro, 28. 3; SyU. 421, l. 38) it is the
equivalent of &,Pwvtol', 'pay'; and in v. so. r f. it is uncertain whether
it means pay, ration-allowance (cf. 52. s), or both. There was no
technical expression for the whole of a soldier's allowance (wages+
rations) ; hence the use of the part for the whole. Griffith, 2j4--6;
Launey, ii. 725 ff.
4. ixottEvo~ Tc.uTTJ'i Tfj~ ivvo(c.s: the validity of this motivation,
presumably from P.'s source, can no longer be tested. Meltzer (ii.
370 ff.) argues that Gisgo had no choice but to convey 2o,ooo men in
detachments (so, too, De Sanctis, iii. 1. 383 n. 4); and this seems
likely, despite the argument of Veith (AS, iii. 2. 527 n. r) that the
provision of sufficient transports would have constituted no difficulty for Carthage.
6. I(KKc.v: Sicca Veneria, a Roman colony under Octavian, lay a
little over roo miles (the itineraries made it r22 miles) south-west of
Carthage, on the site of the modern El Kef, at the terminus of the
road from Tunis through Medjez el Bab. El Kef is still known
locally as 'Shikka-Benar'; Dessau, RE, 'Sicca Veneria', col. 2187.
Here Carthaginian matrons prostituted themselves in the temple of
Venus (Val. Max. ii. 6. rs, who attributes the custom to Cirta);
no doubt a licentious atmosphere prevailed.
xpuaouv: sc. O'Ta.-n]pa. This payment was evidently as ration-money.
The gold stater normally weighed the same as the silver didrachm,
and the Carthaginians used a Phoenician standard independent of
those current in Greece. Head (877-8o) gives examples of Punic coins
of this period, on the standard of a drachma of 59 gr.
7. Ta<; t:ivoaKeuO.s: cf. 9; 68. 3 Literally 'baggage', the word becomes a technical term in the Hellenistic age, and covers a soldier's
private possessions, including persons, e.g. wife, mistress, servants.
Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 15-26, especially 19 ( = REG, rg26, 355--66).
ll. TTJ'i eaoll~""l'> . ivc.vop9waew~: 'the gain that was due to them';
cf. v. 88. 3, xxvii. 7 12, xxx. r6. 2, for this sense of brav6p8wats, which
is missed by Paton and omitted by LSJ.
67. 1. :&.vvwva: called 'the Great' by App. Hisp. 4 and Zon. viii. 22;

leader of the anti-Bardne faction. He survived the Second Punic


War. Lenschau, RE, 'Hanna (r4)', cols. 2355-7
To j30.pos TWv +opwv: i.e. the tribute due to Rome (cf. Gsell, iii. roz;
Schweighaeuser, grauitatem. tributorum caussatus: Paton and Shuckburgh both translate incorrectly 'taxes'). In xviii. 44 7 (s.c. dealing
with Macedonian tribute after Cynoscephalae) Ka'Ta cfo6povs means
'by instalments', and the plural here may carry a similar meaning.
6. li.1To9"lpLoua9a,: 'be rendered savage'. A favourite word; cf. 70. r,
79 8, 8r. 5, 8r. 9, iii. 6o. 6, vi. 9 9, xv. 22. 5
11'apaaTC.TLKTJV .. 8u~9eaw: 'a desperate state of mind'.

I. 67. 7

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

7. f.u;A.A.f)VES: Tarn (Bactria, 38) discusses the word (he finds only
three other examples: Plut. Crass. 31. r; Hellanicus, FGIJ, 4 F
7I a; Syll. 495, 1. 114): it implies a type of half-breed no longer felt
to be Greek, and so despised. Cf. Gsell, ii. 389. The linguistic confusion was an important factor (cf. So. 5). But the sending of Hanno,
who had been responsible for the heavy taxation in Libya and the
suppression of the recent revolt and capture of Hecatompylus (72.
r-3, 73 r), was even more decisive in causing disaffection; for Hanno
was known as Hamilcar's opponent (d. 55 2 n.). Veith, AS, iii. 2. 528.
A(3ut:s: cf. Diad. xxv. 2 (who adds (/>olvtK<S, i.e. Libyphoenicians, by
error). Here the Libyans appear, not as subject-allies, but as mercenaries. The reference to increased taxation (72. r ff.) perhaps supports Griffith's suggestion (219-20) that before or during the First
Punic War the Carthaginians had substituted a cash tribute for
compulsory service among their Libyan subjects, thus leaving the
Libyans free to enlist as mercenaries.
13. hrt T<e TuVfJTL: cf. 30. 15, xiv. ro. 5 The mercenaries were
encamped near the town (cf. 73 3), at a point identified by Veith
(AS, iii. 2. 530) v:ith Belvedere Park, north of the city. The number
of mercenaries is also given by Nepos, Ham. z. z.
68. 5. C..yopO.s Etc1TE!1-1fovns: here O.yopa is the technical term for a
market set up by the authorities in which the soldiers can spend
their amlma (66. 3 n.). In the Egyptian papyri the word has sometimes this sense, sometimes that of 'payment in kind', virtually
equivalent to atTOJME-rpta (68. 9 n.), though not restricted to corn.
P. often uses it in the broad sense of 'food-supplies', e.g. r8. 5. 52. 5,
82. 6, etc. (cf. Griffith, z8o). For the practice of holding an agora
with reduced
see Launey, ii. 740, commenting on OGIS, 266, an
inscription
the agreement between Eumenes I and his revolted troops; in this, as at Carthage, the soldiers appear to fix the
price.
6. TO tca.O' tc6.0'T'fiV tlll-Epav ~1TLVoou11-evov: f.m- here means 'in
addition', as in 8, br{Bruvav, 'they advanced farther' (in their
demands).
8. TC~v n0vEW1-wv ~1T1TWV Tas O.s(as: since this is regarded as outrageous, the probability is that Carthage had provided the horses
in the first instance (Griffith, 289; d. 28r, n. r; this appears to have
been the Ptolemaic practice).
9. Tijs a~Toll-ETpta.s 1"1)v !1-t:YLO'T'fiV T~ll-'l": certain rations
(atTOfLE-rpla)-normally paid in advance-were still owing to the
mercenaries: and this debt they now demanded should be paid in
money. As in all cases of adaeratio, the question arose: At what rate
should the debt in corn be transmuted into a debt in cash? The
mercenaries answer: At the highest rate reached by corn during the
IJ4

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 70.3

war. This is the meaning accepted by Paton, Shuckburgh, and


Schweighaeuser; so, too, Launey (ii. 729, 'le versement en especes
du ble qu'on leur doit'). It is clearly preferable to the explanation of
Griffith (288-g), viz. that the mercenaries had already been paid a
ration-allowance, but now demanded supplementation sufficient to
bring up all past payments to the level represented by the amount
paid when commodities were at their dearest. This seems too outrageous a demand even for the mercenaries in the situation described ;
and it involves translating atTOf.Lt:Tpla 'ration-allowance' (though
elsewhere Griffith commits himself to the correct view that a<Tof.LETpla 'always means an allowance in kind' (275 n. z)). vi. 39 12 ff.
shows that as late as 150 B.C. aiTos was still paid in kind in the
Roman army.
10. t:l<; aSUva:rov ~K~tlAA,QVTES T.f]v Suift.uow: since Casaubon this has
been taken to mean 'postponing an agreement by putting forward
impossible demands'. Alone, the phrase eKficD.>.nv T~v S<ti>.va<v would
mean 'to reject a settlement' (d. 14. 4, xxii. 8. 13); but iKfJrillllnv lS'
dovva.TDv recalls such phrases as EK{JMAEtV "ls a1TEtpov, 'to produce to
infinity' (Philodemus, D. i. 12
Abh. Berlin. Akad., 1915, 7) or~ ElS'
TO dSvvaTOV a1Taywy7], 'reductio ad impossibile' (Arist. Anal. pr1:or.
i. 7 29 b 5), and probably means 'to postpone agreement till it is an
impossibility'. Gronovius, comparing the use of omMt:LV with Ta
1Tpoaoc/>nll6p.EYa in 6g. 3,
8, and 72. 6, here translated 'extendentes
solutionem in earn summam, quae sol vi non poterat', i.e. 'increasing
the sum required for a settlement to such a figure as could not be
paid'; but the sense suggested above seems more likely.
12. Kouuws SoKELV a1I'OTE9t:i:u9a.l: cf. 66. I n.
69. 4. Ka.p.va.vc)s ovop.a. I1TEV0lOS: \V. Schulze (Eigenn. ZJ6 n. z)
suggests that this represents the Oscan praenomen l:7Tf:OLS'. He may
have deserted from the Romans during the recent war; Griffith, 220
(who suggests that he had served in the fleet). The motives attributed to him are probably slanderous; De Sanctis, iii. I. 385. The
penalty to which he was liable was to be scourged and beheaded.
7. U11'Ept:l0'0VTO.L "~'tt"' ... opyl\v: 'they would vent their anger';
cf. xviii. J6. 4, iva p.ij xwpwfJ/v;rov 'Pwp.a.[wv .. fls: eKEivov a7TplO'l)T<U
'T~V opy~v

.:fJ/).L1T1TOS'.

12. ~aAAt:: an exaggeration; it is clear from 8o. 6 that they were


mostly acquainted with Carthaginian.
U11'0 TWV aptuTWV: at this time the midday meal.
70. 3. Twv AL~vwv ooo1rw KEKOJlLCYJlfvwv ,.Q.s uLTa.pxla.s: the fact that
the o!/JWVLOV had been paid (6g. 3) SUggestS that atTapxJa~ are here the
'ration-allowance' : so Griffith, 289; and cf. 66. 3 n. On the other hand
it is possible that there is some ground for Spendius' allegation that
135

I. 70. 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

the Carthaginians were trying to drive a wedge between the Libyans


and the rest, and that the Libyans had not yet received their pay.
This would imply a degree of Carthaginian treachery which F.'s
source has obscured.
M6.9w ToY ITrpUTT}yov: ironical. There is no basis for Meltzer's view
(ii. 374) that Gisgo's answer was meant to be conciliatory. See De
Sanctis, iii. I. 385.
6. 1rnpO. TO. KOLVU Twv 6.v8p6nrwv (9'1: such 67] included respect for
heralds (ii. 8. 12), and those who surrendered in battle (xxxviii. 8. 2).
From similar references it is possible to reconstruct F.'s conception
of international law and a natural ius gentium; see von Scala, 299-324.
What oaths the mercenaries swore is left vague.
7. il ... AL~UI<:os ~mKA118Ets -rroAEJ-LOS: P. prefers the form At{:lvKO>
1Tollt:JJ-o>, IJ. J, 88. 5, ii. r. 3, iii. 27. 7; cf. Diod. xxvi. 23; App. Hisp. 4
Livy uses the phrase Africum bellum, xxi. I. 4, 2, r, 4I. 12.
9. Tftv 'ITuKT}V Tous 'I'II''II'UKpha.s; Utica lay on the (then) coast,
c. zo miles north-west of Carthage, on the outer spurs of a hill
running south-west to north-east, the modern Djebel Menzel Roul
(or Ghoul); it was subject to Carthage, but enjoyed special privileges
(Meltzer, ii. 75 ff.). The Hippacritae are the inhabitants of Hippo
Diarrhytus (modern Bizerta), which was earlier known as Hippou
Acra (Diod. XX. 55 3; Ps.-Scylax (GGM, i. 89). III gives both e lmrov
aKpa and" l1T1TOU (' 11T1TciJV Muller) 1TOIIt>); cf. Step h. Byz. "11T1TOU aKpa,
1r6Ats At{.M7]s J trot..lT7]S 'lmraKp{T7]> P.'s circumlocutions (cf. 82. 8,
88. 2) suggest some embarrassment about the name of the town.
The name Hippo Diarrhytus is not attested before the Roman
period. From 77 I it appears that Spendius besieged Utica, and
Mathos Hippou Acra.
71. 1. Tous KUT' tSiuv ~ous 8uga.yny6vns: 'support life
individually' (cf. iii. 4 6, vi. 48. 3, 48. 7); hardly, with Paton, 'depend
for their private supplies'. For y~:vJn)JJ-aTa, 'harvests', see the interesting note in Welles, 323, s.v. yiv7]JJ-a.
6. va.uTLKfJ Sova.1.uc;: 'a naval force, sailors', cf. 41. z.
ou 1rAowv Ka.TUc::rKeu-rl: in 21. 1, 22. 3 (and elsewhere) ~ TwJJ 1rAolwv
KaTaaKt:v~ is 'the construction of ships'. Here Schweighaeuser argues
that, as in ii. 23. IO (where MSS. vary between trapa<:rKE:tnJv and
KaTaaKw~v), KaTaaKw~ means 'supply', and he translates 'they had
no supply of ships'. This seems preferable to Paton, 'nor the material
left to construct (a fleet)'.
o6Se xopT}yLWv 8L6.8c::rLs: 'no arrangement for supplies' (StrachanDavidson). This seems satisfactory; Paton translates 'no means of
providing supplies', and Shuckburgh 'no store of provisions ready'.
72. 1. EOAOyous
!36

O.~op!-'cl.s:

'a reasonable pretext'.

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 73

1ta.pc:upouJlt;VO~ TWV aAAwv 11'QVTWV TWV 1<a.p11'WV TOVS 1\JlLO'ELS :


1rd.VTwv goes with rwv aA:\wv (Paton, Schweighaeuser, Cardona), not
with rwv Kap71wv (Shuckburgh) : it parallels the refusal of any

2.

exemptions to the townsmen. There is no other evidence on the rate


of taxation among the Libyan subjects; but if the burden of the
peasants was increased proportionately to that of the townsmen, the
normal exaction was evidently a quarter of all crops. Meltzer, ii. 85.
Ta.'ls 'll'ohEo': cf. 86. I. These 1r6.\ns-, simple settlements, some fortified,
are mentioned in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of
Macedon, vii. 9 5 Strabo reckons 300 of them (xvii. 833; cf. Flor.
i, r8. rg; Oros. iv. 8. 8), Diod. xx. 17. 6 over 200. Details of their
taxation are unknown. Meltzer, i. 381, 426, ii. 496.
3. TWv O"Tpa.T,ywv: evidently the regular governors of the
Carthaginian territories in North Africa. See 67. I for Hanno rov
imdpxoVTa UTparTJyov f!v rfj .thf36rJ. He was followed by Hamilcar
Barca, after the conclusion of the Mercenary War (Diod. xxv. 8), and
Hamilcar was subsequently UTpaTTJyos in both Spain and Africa, like
Hasdrubal and Hannibal after him (iii. 33
n.). These rrrparTJyol
are distinct from the individuals whom Aristotle describes as sent out
from Carthage i1TL rds 7TOAtS' (Pol. ii. II. rs. 1273 b, viii (vi). 5 9
1320 b), and perhaps represent a borrowing from the equipment of
the Hellenistic states, where a crrparTJy6s held a military command
within a prescribed territorial sphere. See H. Bengtson, Aegyptus,
1952, 3i8-82, with the qualifications advanced by A. Aymard, REA,
1953, 138-9. Other minor Punic governors are known; Diod. xvi. 9 4
(cf. Plut. Dian, 25) records an bnrmiTTJs governing a subject town in
Sicily, and in the second century a f3o~8a.pxo> seems to exercise a
territorial function (App. Lib. 68; but the f3o-t)8apxos- in 79 2 (below)
is a Carthaginian captain over mercenaries).
1'0\:S I<O.Ta ,;v xwpa.v: Viz. the COUntry people as opposed (not to the
townsfolk, but) to the Carthaginians; cf. x. 36. 3, where the phrase
indicates the inhabitants of the province of Spain, without distinc~
tion of town and country. In Hellenistic terminology the whole of
Libya would be xwpa, as distinct from Carthage, the 'IToAts (cf. 73 6,
Sta.K.\daavTS a1TO rfjs xwpa<; TOVs KapX'}Oovtovs).

73. 1. Ta ~<a.1'a 1'TJV 'E~<a.TovTa1fvAov: H ecatompylos in Diodorus, who


mentions it in iv. r8. I, and in xxiv. ro. 2 describes its capture by
Hanno (probably after 247: see Thiel, Hist. 295 n. 755). This form
is found elsewhere (e.g. in Parthia, x. 28. 7, 29. r), and is usually
accepted. Hanno treated the town with forbearance (Veith, AS, iii.
2. 5z8, inadvertently speaks of its destruction), but took 3,000
hostages; it was, therefore, of some considerable size. F. C. Movers
(Die Phonizier (Bonn, I84I-S6), ii. 2. II9, sr8-I9) has argued plausibly
for its identification with the later Theveste (modern Tebessa),
137

SITUATION OF CARTHAGE

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 74 3

which lay on a high plateau (828 m.) at a point a little over the
Algerian frontier, commanding a wide district. Cf. H. Treidler, RE,
'Theveste', cols. 249~52.
3. Eis EvTa p.upuJ.Sas Al~uwv: clearly exaggerated; Veith, AS, iii. 2.
568; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 386 n. 11. Since Spendius had a little over
rs,ooo at Utica (76. r), and the armies at Hippou Acra and Tunis
had less difficult tasks, and are therefore likely to have been smaller,
De Sanctis sets 4o,ooo as a maximum for the total insurgent forces;
within these there will have been an increase in the number of native
Libyans, and a reduction through losses in that of trained mercenaries. P. gives other figures at 77 4, 78. 9. 84. 3, and 85. 7 (the two
last also exaggerated).
4-5. Situation of Carthage. Since P.'s time the coast round Carthage
has changed considerably, mainly through the accretion which had
already then begun (75 8), especially to the north of Carthage,
between the town and C. Farina (Ras Sidi Ali el Mekki). Carthage
lay on a peninsula stretching due east into the Gulf of Carthage, the
KoA1ros of 4 The northern promontory of the peninsula is C.
Camart; and the south side of the peninsula is washed by the Alp.,v7)
( 4), to which entrance is made between two narrow spits of land.
The isthmus linking the city with the mainland (laep.,6s, 5; avx.Jv,
75 4; d. App. Lib. 95) is here reckoned at 25 stades, i.e. 46 km. (The
view of Schulten (AA in ]DAI, 1913, 249), that the la(}p.,os was the
neck of the sand-bank of La Goletta, which helps to close the lagoon
El Bahira to the so.uth of Carthage, is refuted by Kromayer, GGA,
1917, 451 ff.) The extent of the Punic city is still controversial. See
R. Oehler, RE, 'Karthago', cols. 2150-224; A. Audollent, Carthage
romaine (Paris, 1901), 143-323; H. P. Hurd, The Topography of
Punic Carthage (Williamsport, U.S.A., 1934); H. H. Scullard, OCD,
'Carthage (Topography)'; D. B. Harden, GAR, 1939, 1-12. On Tunis
see 30. 15 n.; on Utica, 70. 9 n.
74. 2. i~opp.l]aas S p.ETa TTJS Suvcip.Ews:: Hanno can scarcely have
been in a position to send aid to Utica before spring, 240; Meltzer,
ii. 375-6. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 386-7), who argues, reasonably, that
Hanno's force does not appear to have exceeded that of Spcndius,
who was in charge at Utica with rs,ooo men (76. r), reckons it at the
same figure (against Veith (AS, iii. 2. 566-7), who, arguing from the
forces raised at Carthage against Agathocles, makes it 3o,ooo).
3. ds 'ITuKTJV 1rapa~o1181Jaas: along the coast, avoiding Tunis
(Meltzer, ii. 376; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 531). Gsell (iii. 107 n. 6) suggests
he went by sea; but 73 6 does not imply the complete isolation of
Carthage by land, and to transport roo elephants by sea would have
been no easy manceuvre. The criticism of Hanno reflects P.'s proBarcine source ; despite his discomfiture he retained his freedom of
139

L 74 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

movement. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 387 n. 14. On the battle of Utica


see Veith, AS, iii. z. 53r.
4. EK TTjs r.oXews: 'out of Utica', not 'from Carthage' (as Paton and
Shuckburgh); d. 12 for the artillery which Hanno had brought
lK Tfj;; 'TI'oAew> and added to his own; moreover, '11'p6 Tfj;; r.6t\ew;; in the
same sentence clearly refers to Utica. The story of the loss of the
siege-engines may be una inve1tzione maligna (De Sanctis, iii. I. 387
n. I4).
6. r.pos Twa. Mcpov puJlvov ~<a.t crutJ.cpuTov: the Djebel Menzel Roul
to the south-west of the town {7o. 9 n.). This phrase is to be taken
with otaaw~6p..evov, so that p...;VE is used absolutely.
13. r.ept TttV tca.XoutJ.EvTtV r opta.v: situation unknown, but evidently
near Utica-between Utica and Hippou Acra, according to De
Sanctis {iii. I. 387 n. I4).
75. 1. :AtJ.tXKa.v Bap~<a.v: cf. 66. r. Hamilcar had been out of
favour since the end of the war with Rome, perhaps because of his
concessions to the Roman commission, and his repeated promises to
the mercenaries (66. I2, 67. 12; App. Hisp. 4. cf. Sic. 3, Lib. 5), but
more likely on political grounds; for he persisted in an intransigent
attitude towards Rome, and rejected Hanno's policy of extending
Punic influence in Libya. It is possible that the story of his being
brought to trial after the Libyan War {App. Hisp. 4) really falls in
this interim period. See DeSanctis, iii. I. 387-8 n. I6.
2. ets JlUptous: largely composed of cavalry. This is the only figure
given for a Punic force in this war.
4. Twv yewMcpwv Twv r.tteuyvuvTwv tcTX.: 'the chain of hills joining
up ... ' ; cf. iii. 49 7. where lm~eryvvp..t is used of hills forming the
base of a triangle of which the two arms are {probably) the Rhone and
the Isere, and of the sea forming the base of the Nile Delta between
the two outer mouths. Meltzer (ii. 158) identifies these hills with the
Djebel Ahmor, a range lying well to the west in the direction of the
R. Medjerda (Bagradas), and rising to r ,coo ft. But more probably P.
is referring to the Djebel Naheli, to the east of the Djebel Ahmor,
for it is this range (rising to 6ooft.) that blocks the roads to the lower
river and the ford; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 533 ff., and map r2 c, g. On the
mlx~v d. 7.J. 4-.5 n.
Tous r.ept TOY MCi.Ow: Mathos is mentioned as the main leader (d.
73 3); but as he later appears at Hippou Acra (77- r), it is likely that
Spendius was in charge of operations between Carthage and Utica.
Meltzer, ii. 590.
5. Tou '11'pocra.yoptuollvoo Ma.Kcpa. r.oTa.Jlov: cf. 86. 9, xv. 2. 8; better
known as the Bagradas (modern Wadi Medjerda), of which this is
a by-form. Silting and land accretion have forced the river mouth
farther and farther north, so that today only an artificial channel to

THE CARTHAGINIAN }'!ERCENARY WAR

I. 75Jl

the east prevents it debouching in (and silting up) the shallow harbour of Porto Farina. In the third century B.C. it skirted the north
flank of the Djebel Ahmor and Djebel Naheli, to enter the Gulf of
Tunis in an east-north-east direction at a point just north of the
modem salt lake, Sebka er Riana (then open sea). The mouth was
thus about u miles south of its present position. Gsell, ii. 143-4.
1nos . y~cj>upo.s: its situation is controversiaL If the road from
Carthage to Utica ran over the Djebel Naheli and through La
Sebbala (which lies in the north entrance to the gap between the
Djebel Naheli and Djebel Ahmor}, it must have crossed the Bagradas
about a mile north-west of La Sebbala, and about 5 miles from its
mouth. The modern Tunis-Bizerta road follows the same route
(though of course it crosses the river much farther north, owing to
the shift in the river's course). However, this assumption raises
difficulties (cf. Gsell, iii. III n. 2). Presumably Hamilcar started upstream immediately after crossing the river ( ro); but before he
reached the mercenaries' bridge-head he was met not only by troops
from there, but also by those who had come 12 miles from Hippou
Acra, after hearing of the crossing from a messenger who had himself
covered those 12 miles. Yet Veith's position for the bridge-head (as
described above; cf. AS, iii. 2, map u, c, g) is only two hours' march
upstream. Hence Gsell locates the bridge-head farther south, near
Henchir Bou Djaoua, west of Djebel Ahmor, and about 12 miles
from the river mouth. The battle he places north of Sidi Tabet,
about 4-5 miles due west of La Sebbala. This hypothesis implies
that the bridge lay, not on the Utica road, but on one leading southwest to the xwpa or the upper waters of the Bagradas towards Sicca
Veneria, and hence that the important Utica road crossed the river
north of La Sebbala by a ford or ferry-which is hard to believe. A
possible explanation is that P.'s pro-Barcine source has exaggerated
the surprise element in Hamilcar's crossing, and that the insurgents
from both Utica and the bridge-head were in motion long before
it was completed; but the nearer troops (whose numbers P. exaggerates, 76. r n.) may have hesitated to act alone against a superior
force. On this hypothesis Veith's topography can be reconciled with
the course of the battle.
11'0AlV rn' O.UTfji ~K080j.l"lKbTCI.S: cf. Gsell, iii. IIO, 'les cantonnements
constituaient une sorte de ville'. According to 76. r this camp acted
as headquarters for an army of about ro,ooo. For P.'s use of the word
1TOAs for something much smaller than a city see Poseidonius'
criticism in xxv. r (Strabo, iii. 163) ; cf. 72. 2 for the m)A,.,,s of Libya.
8. Ka.TO. TLVa.<; aVEj.lWV OTQaU~: cf. 48. 2 n. Probably the east winds;
Gsell, iii. uo, on the authority of Bernard, Bull. de geog. historique,
I9II 1

9.

213.

To'Ls lv Tfi 1roA~l

tent Tots

U11'Eva.vT{oLS:

which city? Schweighaeuser


r ..p

l.tS-9

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

and Paton leave this undetermined, but Shuckburgh translates with


some probability: 'to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well as
of the enemy'. That the news reached Utica quickly is clear from the
arrival of forces from there (76. 1).
76. 1. Numbers of the insurgents. Since Spendius was later prepared
to follow Hamilcar's Io,ooo with only 8,ooo (77. 4-5), it is improbable
that he had recently been defeated (and sustained losses amounting
to 8,ooo) when facing him with 25,000. DeSanctis (iii. I. J88 n. I7)
suggests plausibly that the real total of insurgents involved in this
battle was not more than Is,ooo.
2-9. The battle of the Bagradas. P.'s account does not permit a wholly
satisfactory reconstruction. Hamilcai, he says, was advancing upstream, with elephants in front, cavalry and light-armed behind, and
heav-y-armed in the rear ( 3). On seeing the enemy ready to attack,
he ordered the whole army to face about (avaa'Tp'if>w, 4), and the
front ranks (i.e. elephants, cavalry, and light-armed) to retire
quickly; those in the rear (who now had their backs to the enemy)
he wheeled round (~ lrrunpoif>ij<> TrEpunrwv, 5) and drew up facing
the enemy. The mercenaries now pressed on against the Carthaginians in some disorder, but Hamilcar's cavalry, having retreated
almost to the hoplites (aw.:yylaai!'Tas Tols 7rapa'TETayfL'"ots, 7), suddenly turned about once more and resisted (JK fL<ETa{1o>..ijs irrrorn1jvat,
cf. xviii. 30. 4, T~v Els To!Jmcr8"v fL"Ta{lo>..~v), while the rest of the Punic
forces advanced against the enemy, who fled in confusion. Such is
P.'s account; but he leaves it fai from clear what precisely happened
to the heavy-armed. lmuTpo</>~ and 7rfi.ptcr7raafL1)s (cf. x. 23. 3, xii. 18. 3)
signify movements in drill, by which a body of troops wheel round
through 90 and I8o respectively (see Schweighaeuser on x. 23. 3);
but Je l.Trtcrrpoif>ij<> 7r!ptcr7rwv most probably means that the heavyaimed troops, who had their backs to the enemy, were wheeled
round (Veith (AS. iii. z. 534-5 and map 12 c, g) thinks to the left)
through goo, and then turned left to face the enemy; thus the column
had turned through goo and each individual through I8o 0 , since they
were now in line. Veith thinks that this manceuvre enabled them to
catch Spendius' troops from Utica in the left flank. Other writers have
suggested other, less probable, interpretations. C. G. Guichard,
M lmoires militaircs sur les Grecs et les Romains, i (Lyon, 176o), 17-25,
propounded an involved scheme by which the hoplites divided into
columns to let the retiring vanguaid pass through. De Sanctis (iii. I.
388 and n. 17) believes that P. has misunderstood his source, and
that in fact Hamilcar, having drawn on the enemy by a mock retreat
of the vanguaid, drew up his rear in battle order on the flanks of his
retreating troops. Gsell (iii. I II n. I) supposes that the hoplites were
ordered to advance obliquely, some to the right, and some to the
0

142

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 78.

IZ

left, to meet the two insurgent forces. All these theories go beyond
what P. records. The feigned retreat seems certain. It was a difficult
manceuvre, which Hannibal later used to great effect in conjunction
with such outflanking as De Sanctis postulates for this battle. In
fact the last stages of the battle of the Bagradas may have contained
the germs of the tactics Hamilcar's son later perfected; but the text
does not enable such a hypothesis to be proved.
2. U1Tou8fi 1TUpTJyyuwv &f1a 1TapaKaAouVTES a~as aihous! 'they
eagerly passed on the watchword for battle, at the same time exhorting each other.' 1rapt:yyvav is 'to pass the word along the line';
d. vii. IS. 4
9. ot 8' 1rl. TTJV 1rpos 'lniKn 1Tapef1{3oAt]v: this suggests that Spendius
(who subsequently took the greater part of his army from the camp at
Tunis, not at Utica, 77 4) did not abandon the siege of Utica; and
the defection of the town (82. 8) points to continued pressure. Hence
the statement (75 3) that by the present action Hamilcar :D\vat: T~v
Tfj> 'Inlwq> 1TOALopKlav seems to be part of the pro-Barcine exaggerations of P.'s source.
11. TTJS 8uaeAmaT(as: d. 71. 2.
77. 1. b 8 MaOws E1TEjlEvev: he had been in charge at Hippou
Acra ab initio, 70. 9 n. Mathos' advice is the reverse of that given by
Xanthippus to the Carthaginians (3o. 7 n.), the relation of forces
being reversed.
4. TOUS (-lET' AuTap(ToU raM.TaS: on the desertion of their companions
to the Romans ( 5), after failure to seize Eryx and hand it over to
them, see ii. 7. 8 and Zon. viii. I6; at an earlier date they had tried
to seize Agrigentum and plundered it (d. 43 n., ii. 7 7). They were
originally 3,ooo strong (ii. 7 7); and evidently about I,ooo deserted
at Eryx, since the remnants of these, now Soo, turn up in the pay of
the Epirotes (ii. 5 4). On the camp at Eryx see 58. 2 n.
6. Ev TWl 1TE8L'l,l 1TUVTaxOOev apEal 1TEplEXOf1EV'l;): not identifiable.
Veith (AS, iii. 2. 539 ff. and map 12 a and d) locates it in the valley
of Khangat el Hadjaz, beneath the north slope of Djebel Ressas,
between Creteville and Grombalia, c. 20 miles south-east of Tunis.
But as Hamilcar's object was to relieve Hippou Acra (and perhaps
Utica too, 76. 9 n.) a site north of the Bagradas is perhaps more
probable; DeSanctis, iii. I. 389 n. 19.
78. 1. 1TaTplKTJV EXWV auaTaUlV! 'having ancestral ties of friendship';
d. xxiv. 6. 6, SuJ. Ta> 1TpoyovtKa> avaTaaH> 1rpo> T~v f3aaLJ.,{av.
7. UUCfTUIJTJCTOflEVOS aUT~: 'to join his CaUSe'; d. iii. 68. 8, iV. I. 6, for
the idea of alliance. Paton, less probably, follows Casaubon and
translateS: 'to introduce himself' (d. aVa.-aaL> in 2).
12. et; j1Up1ous ets TnpaKlOXlMous: these figures, especially the
143

I. 78. 12

THE CARTHAGINIAN

MERCE~ ARY

WAR

former, seem exaggerated in the interest of Harnilcar's reputation.


See De Sanctis, iii. 1. 389 n. 20.
79. 1. KaTa . . . Tous auTous Kalpous: that the revolt of the Sardinian mercenaries occurred at the time of the second battle between
Hamilcar and Spendius is confirmed by the story of the letter ( 8).
2. Tiw ~o~8apxov Bwcnapov: a Punic captain of foreign auxiliaries
(72. 3 n.); on which acropolis he was shut is not clear.
3. 'Avvwva: it is improbable that he is the Hanna who secured a
victory in Sardinia in 258 (Zon. viii. 12) and had fought earlier in
Sicily {18. 8), as De Sanctis (iii. 1. 397) suggests. That Hanno is
unlikely to have long survived Ecnomus, 6o. 3 n.
5. ~~E1TEaov . ElS TTJV 'ITaXiav: see 83. 11, 88. 8. The date of this
expulsion, and of the appeal to Rome, is not certain, for in 83. 11 it
is mentioned in a digression. It seems not unlikely, however, that the
appeal to Rome was in 239, after Hamilcar had destroyed Spendius
(85. 5 ff.) and the mercenary cause was declining in Africa; De
Sanctis, iii. 1. 398.
6. TTI 1ToAuav9pw1TL~ Sla+.Epouaa: an exaggeration (cf. Beloch,
Bevolkerung, 445), perhaps copied from Timaeus, the main source
for the early history of the island (J. Geffcken, Timaios' Geographie
des Westens (Berlin, I892), 52 ff.); cf. Paus. x. 17. I, p.iydJos . Ka~
EfJOmp.ovW.v .. op.of.a Tats p.cf)..,ara d1Tatvovp.lvats (from Timaeus). The
other \\ri.ters to whom P. refers cannot be identified, unless one is
Myrsilus of Methymna (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 85), whom Sallust
probably used for details in book ii of his Histories; Philipp, RE,
'Sardinia', cols. 2481-2.
8. M0.9ws: not evidence that the insurgents had abandoned the siege
of Hippou Acra (so Meltzer, ii. 381). The site of the meeting is not
known (though it was not in the camp near Tunis, 79 14) ; but
Mathos may well have come over to it from Hippou Acra, if indeed
he was present. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 543 n. I} thinks that he was not
(the plural Elm}yayov in 9 could include Spendius and Autaritus) ;
and he certainly did not speak at the meeting.
9. tils a1TEaTaX.Uvov tJ1To Twv atpEncnwv: P. alleges that he was
a fake; cf. 14 The arrest of Gisgo and those with him is related
Ill 70. 4

14. 1rapa1rA,ala . . Staaa+wv: 'bearing a dispatch containing


similar warnings' (Shuckburgh). For Otaaa4>dv 'to give instructions'
(especially by letter) cf. IO, iv. 26. 3
80. 1. ~+' Bv ~mf3aAwv: 'speaking next in succession'. d1rf.+acc.
'following after', not uncommon in P. (cf. xxviii. 4 4), is omitted
from LSJ.
6. o' 1TAEiaTOl auvEaalvoVTo TD SlaAEKT'tl: 'Phoenician was the

THE

CARTHAGINIA~

MERCENARY WAR

I. 8z. 6

language to which the largest number of men ... could listen with
satisfaction' (Shuckburgh). Cf. Soph. Ant. 1214, 7m.t6ds- p.~ aa.lve
86yyos: the compound verb is not found elsewhere.
81. 5-11. Reflections on the brutality of the mercenaries. The soul can
have diseases comparable to ulcers and tumours (Twv . Du<:iiw ~<a~
<fovp.&trwv) in the body. Such diseases are caused partly by a bad upbringing, and partly through giving ear to violent and greedy
leaders. For the metaphor cf. xi. 25. 2, fg. 41; the comparison of ills
in the community to diseases of the body goes back through the
Stoics, especially Chrysippus, and through Plato, to Solon: TofiT' ~STJ
7raafi 7TO/.<;t epx~:Ta (,\Kos il.<fovKTOV (J. 17 Diehl) ; Wunderer, iii. 108.
The word (1ho)8rJpofi(]8a, has the meaning 'to become malignant':
cf. Theoph. Char. 19. 3, AKrJ iiiaa 8rJptw8fjvat; and P. here uses it
in reproducing the Academic analogy between sickness of the body
and soul. In his Ilp~ 1riv8ovs the Academic philosopher Crantor had
attacked the Stoic idea of arr&O~:ta, arguing that if we must be sick,
it was better to retain our feeling, even if we were losing a limb;
freedom from pain could be bought only at a great cost: Tc:8rJpwa9at
yap <tKOS KH~ fLEll <lWp.a T00VT01-' el-'TUV
-ea QE
"' 't'VX!JV
' ' (PlUt . M Or. 102 C;
cf. Cic. Tusc. iii. 6. u). (The malignant tumour itself, 'quod fJr/Plwp.a
Graeci uocant', had no feeling; 'prurigine tantum mouetur: at circa
dolor est et inflammatio'; Celsus, de med. v. 28. 3.) In adopting this
Academic analogy P. does not of course commit himself to its philosophical implications (and in xii. 26 c he attacks the Academic
paradoxes).
7. W!7TE 1-'-TJSEv ai1Ej3EtrTEpov TWV ~~wv: in vi. 9 9 this degeneration
is treated as the last stage of political decline.
9. aov K~Act> Tdl1-1-EVOt TTJV TOtG.UTTjV TOA!-'-~V: 'imagining that such
recklessness is to their credit'.
10. Tpoq,T)v EK 1T~(8wv K~Kt}v: on the importance of education for the
civilizing of manners cf. iv. 20-21 (on music and the men of Cynaetha).
In vi. I I a 7 Tarquin was successful p.a).wTa Sta T~v iK 1ra8wv dywyr/JJ;
and in xxiv. 7 I Chaeron of Sparta is criticized as 8r]p.on;c:fjs aywyfj~
TTwxws. Prusias' faults are due to a lack of 7Tat8c:la~ Kal <fotl.oaofj>{as
(xxxvi. 15. 5). Finally, education at Rome was the thing 'in qua una
Polybius, noster hospes, nostrorum institutorum neglegcntiam accusat' (Cic. de re pub. iv. 3; cf. P. Friedlander, A]P, 1945, 345 ff.).
,

82. 1. Tov 1-1-ev 1a.vvwv~ 1Tpos ~a.uTov EKaAH: this union of the two
armies was a vital step in the campaign; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 390 n. 21.
6. EK Twv 'EJ41Top(wv: Emporia was the district around SyTtis
Minor, the modern Gulf of Qabes; cf. iii. z:;. 2, xxxL 21. I; Livy, xxix.
25. 12, on the fertility of this area, the granary of Carthage (Pliny,
Nat. hist. v. 24, xvii. 41, xviii. 94). Gsell, ii. 127-8.
L

I. 82. 7

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

7. Ta S Ka.Ta T'i-Jv Ia.pSova.: 79 I-7 The loss is mentioned here again


partly to reinforce the story of the sudden 7Ta>.lppota Twv 7TpayfLaTwv
( 3), and partly because it made the loss of supplies from Emporia
doubly disastrous.
8. Tous Ka.T' >\ya.9oK}..Ea. Ka.Lpoos: Diod. xx. 54-55 describes the long
resistance of Utica; but both towns fell to Agathocles in 307/6,
whereas others held out (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 44 n. 12o).
TTJV 'Pw...,a.twv E~oSov: there is no suggestion elsewhere that Regulus'
expedition threatened Utica or Hippou Acra.
10. TOUS 1TO.pa.~E~OTJ9TJKOTO.S a1TOKTE~VO.VTES: Veith (AS, iii. 2.
543) places this massacre at Utica: but P. leaves the matter open.
12. >\vv(~a.v: perhaps the friend of Adherbal, who ran the Roman
blockade at Lilybaeum in 250/49 (44 I ff.): but the identification is
quite uncertain.
83. 2-4. Hiero's policy. The praise of his whole-hearted collaboration
with Rome in I6. 11 probably follows Fabius Pictor; the more
sophisticated comment here may be P.'s own. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933,
138.

5-11. Roman support for Carthage: cf. iii. 28. 3 The Roman tradition

on the events here described is given, with some distortion, in Zon.


viii. 17; App. Lib. 5; Sic. 2. 3; Nep. Ham. 2. 3; Val. Max. v. I. I;
Eutrop. ii. 27. It is unlikely that the Romans in fact authorized the
recruiting of mercenaries by Carthage in their territory.
8. 5La }..6you: such Punic prisoners as were still unransomed after
the First Punic War (2,743 in number, according to the Roman
tradition; Eutrop. ii. 27; Val. Max. v. 1. I) were exchanged for these
Italians (iii. z8. 3).
11. Ka.9' ov KO.lpov a1TEO'TTJO'O.V: 79 5 n. The appeal was in fact
some little time after the revolt.
Twv 5' 'ITuKa.twv ~YXELpLtoVTwv O'~cis: probably after Spendius' death
(86. 4), and not (so 0. Gilbert, Rom u. Karthago (Leipzig, 1876), 49)
before Utica went over to the mercenaries. To have accepted the
Utican offer would have been a breach of the Treaty of Catulus, with
its rfoJ..la clause (62. 8).
84. 3. ~;is 1TEVTa.KLO'jJ-uptous: unlikely in reality to have been more
than zo,ooo (d. 73 3 n.): the figure is exaggerated in the interest of
Hamilcar. On the insurgents' tactics cf. 77 2 ff.
6. ~jJ-1TELpLa. jJ-E9oSLKTJ Ka.i O'Tpa.nwTLKTJ SUva.jJ-LS: cf. iii. I05. 9 for a
similar contrast; in ix. 14. 1-4 ~fL7THpla fLE8ofmcr}, 'experience scientifically acquired' (e.g. geometry and astronomy), is distinguished from
aTpanwnK~ Tpt{Jr), 'routine experience of a soldier', obtained partly by
doing the job oneself (avTovpyla) and partly by inquiring from others
([aTopla). Together these qualities make the general. In the interest
q6

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 86. r

of his contrast P. here minimizes the importance of a-rpa.-rtw-rt~<~ -rpt{3~


(which can be 'unreasoning'). Diod. xxv. 4 2-3 copies the passage.
7. Ev Ta.is ~ta.TO. JL.ipo<; XfnLO.~'i: 'separate actions', as opposed to 'fullscale battles' (ev -rot> o>.oaxEptUL l<tv8uvots). Schweighaeuser is disturbed by the fact that P. relates the ambuscades and sudden
appearances to the latter rather than the former; but both have
their place in major encounters, as the narrative of Trasimene shows.
a>.oaxEPELS' ~<Lvowot are not conflicts quibus de summa rerum agitur
(Schweighaeuser), but battles in which all the forces were engaged.
For the simile of the player of 7Tf.TTE(a. see Plato, Rep. vi. 487 B
(1TErrE{a. is apparently a generic name for a group of games of the
'battle' type; cf. R. G. Austin, Antiquity, 1940, 26o-3).
9. E(.+ucn St 1rp0<; T'l)v ta.oToo Suva.JLLV: 'favouring his own army'
(and 'unfavourable for action on their part', 1rpos -r~v l~<f.tvwv XPda.v).
Paton takes o!lva.fLW as a-rpa'1'7}yt~<~v SvvafLW (d. 6), 'his own strong
point-generalship', and this is also a possible rendering (cf. xi.
19. 6), though perhaps less likely (cf. 30. 7 n.).
s~a. TO Tn4>plf:l Ka.i. xO.paKL 1Tt:pLELAij4>9cn: built of course by Hamilcar.
10. ToO Sa.LJ-Lovou E'I1'L+povTos: To Srup.ovwv is virtually equivalent
to TVx:rJ (cf. 35 n.), which is a bringer of retribution in iv. 81. 4
(Cheilon's assassination of the ephors) and xx. 7 2 (the downfall of
the Boeotians); d. xv. 20. 5, xxiii. 10 .2, xo. 12; above, p. 2a. Elsewhere the action of Tyche shades off into caprice: cf. CQ, 1945, 5-6;
Mioni, 141. Here the justice of the punishment lies in the directing of
the mercenaries' aat{3Eta and 1TapaVOfL{a against themselves. dut{3Eta.
and 1Tapa.vollla are again linked in xviii. 54 10; they imply outrage
to the laws of God and man respectively.
85. 7. TOV npLova. KaAOOJlEVOv: cf. App. Jllyr. 25, lllyrian peaks JeErs
ota 7rplovEs; and the Spanish 'Sierra'. This 'Saw' is no longer identifiable. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 545--54) locates the surrounding and massacre
of the mercenaries in a valley north of the Djebel el Jedidi, c. 10 miles
due west of Hammamet, on the road to Zaghouan. But as Harnilcar
was concerned to cut off food and reinforcements from the insurgents
at Tunis, it is not clear what either he or Spendius could have been
doing so near the Gulf of Hammamet (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 392 n. 27).
The narrative here suggests a version very favourable to Hamilcar.
The mercenary leaders who ventured into his camp and agreed
to the surrender of 'any ten he might choose' must have known the
implications of their action. The subsequent massacre of the army
for whom they had given their lives looks very much like Punica fides.
86. 1. TT)v xwpav E1TtlEL KO.L Tci.S 'll'OAELS: 'he proceeded against the
countryside and the towns' (i.e. of Libya, 72. 2). For this sense of
bruwa' cf. iv. 83. 5

I. 86. 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

3. tca-rcl. -rTjv lnro KapxTJSOvo~ 1TAupcl.v: i.e. north of the town, on


the shores of El Bahira, the lagoon before Tunis. Hamilcar was to
the south and the only land communication was round the inner lake,
the Sebka es Sedjoumi (cf. 30. IS n.), a distance of IS miles. The
Carthaginians of course controlled the shorter communications
across El Bahira.
6. -rpuitcov-ra -rwv KapxYJSov[wv -rou~ E'll'lcpvu-rcl.-rou~: there is no
reason to think these were the thirty members of the Carthaginian
gerousia, who had come out to superintend Spendius' execution (so
Meltzer, ii. 40).
7. TYJ~ TUXT)~ . evaAXcl.~ SLSOUO"T]~ &.cpopp.cl.~ KTX.: here Tyche is a
power which delights in change for its own sake, especially when
the peripeteia carries an ironic flavour. This is the aspect of Tyche
stressed by Demetrius of Phalerum, xxix. 21; and it is not peculiar
to P. See von Scala, I64, I/4-S; Siegfried, 75; Walbank, CQ, I945. 6;
above, p. IS.
9. '~~'Po~ -rt;i u-rop.an -rou 'II'OTp.ou: apparently in order to maintain
his communications with Carthage, and those of Carthage with the
interior.

87. 3. -rpul.tcov-ra -rij~ ypouuia~: cf. 2r. 6 n. Perhaps the smaller body
is here indicated, and all its members visited Hamilcar (Meltzer,
ii. 40). Clearly this move represents a growth in the power of Hanno's
faction (for his previous dismissal, cf. 82. r2), probably since the setback before Tunis, for which Hamilcar must have been held responsible: Meltzer, ii. 386; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 556-7; De Sanctis, iii. r. 394
The metaphor of olov axa-r'r)v -rpxovus -rav-r'rJ" (from the games)
occurs also at xviii. 49 r.
7. '11'pi -rt,v AE'II'TLV: Leptis (or Lepcis) minor, the Phoenician town
c. 20 miles south-east of Sousse, where Hannibal landed in 203 (Livy,
xxx. 25. 12). The war of movement had recommenced, and evidently
Mathos had abandoned Tunis.
8. EKKU~ULV U'II'Ep TWV oXwv: for this common metaphor cf. ii. 63.
2 n., iii. 94 4
9-10. The last battle. Neither the site nor the numbers involved are
known. Veit.h (AS, iii. 2. 565ft.) gives the Carthaginians 4o,ooo, the
insurgents 3o,ooo; see his table, p. 57r.
88. 3-4. p.EyaATJV SLa.cpopcl.v ~ f.'ETj)LOTTJ~: a moral not wholly
confirmed by the treatment of lJtica and Hippou Acra; for lJtica
at least was restored to its former privileged position (vii. 9 5, 9 7,
treaty between Hannibal and Philip V).
6. ot VEOL: soldiers, like vwviaKot: cf. v. 26. 8.
7. The length of the war. Diod. xxv. 6 gives -r'r) -rEaaapa Kat p..ijvas
TEauapas, Livy, xxi. 2. I, quinque annos. P. may be reckoning from
q8

THE CARTHAG-INIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 88.8

autumn 241 to the end of 238 (De Sanctis, iii. I. 396 n. 3o) : in this
case Livy' s iive years probably cover the whole period from the end of
the First Punic War to Hamilcar's crossing into Spain. But Diodorus'
figures (for what they are worth) are not easily explained. De
Sanctis's suggestion that 'il primo TEI7Ua.pa e forse una dittografia del
secondo' is not very persuasive. An alternative explanation is that
the three years four months are reckoned from the outbreak of
fighting at the beginning of 240 until the early summer of 237;
Diodorus will be including the preliminaries of 241, and Livy's fl.ve
years will be a rounding off of this figure (so Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr.
ii. 382 n. 2). Though neither view can be regarded as certain, the
second is perhaps rather more likely; for its implications for the
chronology of the annexation of Sardinia see below, 8 n. The internal
chronology of the war is past recovery. De Sanctis, loc. cit., dates
the sending of Hanno to Utica to spring 240 (73 ff.), and the last
campaign to 238 (87. 6 ff.); but on Meyer's chronology the latter will
be in 237. DeSanctis puts the battle of the Bagradas in 240 (75), and
the rebel concentration at Tunis, and the battle of the 'Saw' (85), in
239. But this is all hypothetical.
8. Roman annexation of Sardinia. On hearing of the Roman expedition the Carthaginians evidently sent an embassy to Rome announcing their claim to the island and intention of recovering it ( 9);
whereupon the Romans, alleging their preparations to constitute
hostile action directed against themselves, passed a war-resolution
( to), which was conveyed to Carthage in the form of a rerum
repetitio (either ... or ... ) by senatorial legati (see iii. ro. r n., 20.
6 n.}. Upon the Carthaginians' accepting the terms( rz, EgaVTE>: -roi,;
t<atpoi:s-) the situation was restored, and no indictio belli ensued.
Hence the new terms were not embodied in a new foedus, but formed
an EmuvvB~t<Yf to the treaty of 241 (iii. 27. 7-8 n.; on the technical
term see Schwyzer, 63x. 4 (a second-century decree of Methymna));
cf. Walbank, CP, 1949, rs-r6.
(i) Chronology. The annexation o( Sardinia is dated to 238 by
Zon. viii. r8, and by Sinnius Capito (apud Fest., p. 322M., s.v. 'Sardi
uenales'), who attributes it to Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (consul
A.U.c. 5r6 = 238/7 B.c.). But the Livian tradition (Eutrop. iii. 2) puts
it in the next year; and it has been suggested that the date 238 is
due to a confusion between Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, who overthrew the Sardinians as consul in 177, and his grandfather, the
consul of 238 (Ed. Meyer, Kl. Scltr. ii. 385-6). From iii. ro. I it is clear
that the Roman ultimatum to Carthage was after the conclusion of
the Mercenary War; hence, if this war lasted until early summer 237
( 7 n.), the ultimatum was in the same summer, whereas if the war
ended late in 238, the ultimatum may be either at the end of that
year (Meltzer, ii. 387) or eady in 237, while Gracchus was still consul.
149

I. 88.8

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

A possible explanation of the divergent traditions for the year in


which Sardinia was annexed may be that the original Roman expedition, undertaken on the invitation of the mercenaries ( 8), was dispatched in Gracchus' consulship (whether in fact the Mercenary
War in Africa was already over or not; KaTa Tdv KatpJv TovTov is a
loose copula}, but the Roman ultimatum to Carthage and the
renunciation of any claim to the island did not occur until the
consular year 237/6 (probably summer 237, since peace will have
been restored before Hamilcar crossed into Spain in autumn 237,
ii. r. 5). Such an hypothesis would explain how the acquisition of
the island could be dated either to 238/7, when the expedition was
sent, or to 237/6 when its annexation was formally conceded.
(ii) The mercenary appeal described in 8 is clearly subsequent
to that of 83. I r, which the Romans rejected. Evidently the Romans
had now decided, belatedly (see below), to make the Tyrrhenian Sea
a mare clausum by striking before Carthage could recover her
strength (Scullard, Hist. r8o). Later propaganda strove to justify
the Senate's action in one of two ways: (a) A version, combated by
P. in iii. 28, and probably deriving from Fabius Pictor (Gelzer,
Hermes, 1933, 142; Bung, 17, thinks rather of Cato), represented the
cession of Sardinia as compensation for the seizure of Italians who
had carried materials to the rebels during the Mercenary War (83. 7);
when the Carthaginians subsequently manned a fleet to recover the
island, the Romans were obliged to declare war. Cf. App. Hisp. 4;
Lib. 5, 86; Dio, fg. 46; Zon. viii. r8. (b) A later annalistic account
associated the ceding of the island with the Treaty of Catulus,
Livy, xxii. 54 n, cf. xxi. 40. 5 (contrast xxi. r. 5); Ampel. 46. 3;
Eutrop. iii. 2. 2; Oros. iv. II. 2; auct. de uir. ill. 41. 2. But in fact the
Roman decision to annex the island was evidently taken after the
Treaty of Catulus, for had its acquisition seemed desirable in 241,
there was nothing to prevent the Romans from insisting on it.
(Mommsen's view that the Carthaginians would have fought on to
save Sardinia (Rom. Gesck. i. 543 4) is unconvincing; and Heuss's
suggestion that the popular rejection of the preliminary agreement
(63. r) had something to do with Sardinia (HZ, 1949-so, 492) is unsupported by the sources. Cf. Taubler, V orgesch. r6 ff.; Ed. Meyer,
Kl. Schr. ii. 384. The reference to Sardinia in Regulus' peace terms
(31. 5 n.) is part of the untrustworthy account in Dio.
11. Tov vponpfJvivov voAEJ.lov: the Mercenary War (not the First
Punic War, as Laqueur, :to).
12. A,.EaTf)crav T"i~ Iap5ovo~ KTA.: P. has a slightly fuller account
of these events in iii. ro. 1-3.
,.poa8f)Ka.v: 'they agreed to pay in addition' (sc. to the former
indemnity, cf. iii. ro. 3. 1rp6; Toi:; 1rponpov).

BOOK II
l. Risumi of Book I; Hamilcar in Spain

1. 3. Ttt va.pO.J..oya Twv ~pywv: 'its dramat!c surprises' (Paton). nl


lpya are, strictly, the warlike acts on both sides; but 1Tap&.Jo.oyo> is
'unexpected' (cf.i. I.4n.) ratherthan 'monstrous' (soSchweighaeuser:
'facta immania'), an idea already expressed in &.aef3~fLaTa. P. gives
especial prominence to the paradoxical elements in the Mercenary
War. Cf. Feldmann, 37
4. ~<E4>aJ..a.1wSw~ . ~wtljla.uovn:s: on the summary character of
books i and ii see i. 13. 7~. and, for the contrast with the fuller
treatment of the history proper (&.1ro8e~1mK~ lcrropia), below, 37 3;
d. iii. I. 3
' E~
t BPX"l~
'
~ wpovEow:
'"'
5; P. refers to his scheme as set
KaTa.' TfJV
Cf . 1..
out at i. 13. 2-5.
5. EU9tw<o :.\11AKav !sa.vEaTEAAov: P. treats the building of the Punic
empire in Spain in three sections, here (Hamilcar), 13 (Hasdrubal),
and 36 (Hannibal's advent). The three chapters serve as a 'frame'
for the First Illyrian War and those with tile Gauls. Their source is
not determined, but P.'s account continues to be pro-Barcine.
In iii. Io. 5-7 P. says that Hamilcar intended the resources of
Spain to serve his revanche against Rome, and his venture is P.'s
third alTia for the second war; and, even if in fact he was not planning
war, he may well have sought to put Carthage in a position to wage
it successfully if it came (d. DeSanctis, iii. I. 401 ff.; Problemi, 171-3)
-rather like Philip V of Macedon between 179 and 171 (Walbank,
]HS, I9J8, 64 ff.). Probably resentment at Roman policy over Sardinia
helped Hamilcar to win support against Hanno and his African
policy (De Sanctis, iii. I. 402). An unreliable annalistic tradition,
accepted by E. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 355) and Taubler (Vorgesch. 70 ff.),
lets Hamilcar go to Spain without the consent of his government;
App. Hann. 2; cf. Hisp. 5; Zon. viii. 17 The non-Polybian tradition
also records a joint Numidian campaign by Hanno and Hamilcar
after the Libyan War, and after a threat to impeach Hamilcar;
App. Hisp. 4-5; cf. Hann. 2; Diod. xxv. 8, xo. 1; Nepos, Ham. 2, 5
Though accepted by Meltzer (ii. 591-2), this seems to be a reduplication of Hamilcar's eclipse and return to favour between the end of
the First Punic War and the Bagradas battle (De Sanctis, iii. I.
388 n. 16).
6. Ka.Tn Tn~ 'HpaK~Eou<o O'TTJAa.~: i.e. over the Straits of Gibraltar to
Gades (App. Hisp. 5 ;Hann.2). Diod. x..w. xo. I suggests that Hamilcar
coasted along the shores of Numidia and Mauretania and through

II.

I.

HAMILCAR IN SPAIN

the straits (cf. Meltzer, ii. 4oo); but Lenschau (RE, 'Hamilkar',
col. 23o6) and Gsell (iii. 124-5) think he marched to the straits.
civEKTii.To: 'set about recovering'; on the earlier Punic empire in
Spain see i. Io. 5 n.
7. ~T, crxeSov vvia.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. I; Nepos, Ham. 4 2. Hamilcar
died ten years before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War (iii. Io. 7).
and so in 229; his governorship is therefore from 237 to 229.
1roAAous . 1fOLTjcra.s 'IJ3Tjpwv l111'1')Koous: Meltzer (ii. 399) compares
the career of Caesar in Gaul, both militarily and as an example of
a military autocrat relying on popular support to counter a landed
aristocracy which mistrusted him. Records are slight. Diod. xxv.
ro. I relates a victory over the Turdetani, the east coast Iberians,
and Celtic (Celtiberian ?) mercenaries. The foundation of Acra Leuce
(Alicante) probably marked the limit of Hamilcar's advance, Diod.
xxv. Io. 3 See Schulten, CAH, vii. 786-7.
7-8. KC.TEcrTpeljse Tov J3tov ci~iws KTA.: according to Diod. xxv. 10. 3-4
(d. 12, 19, Tzetzes) the king of the Orissi (Oretani; cf. P. iii. 33 9)
marched to relieve Helice (? Ilici, modern Elche), which Hamilcar
was besieging, and in the subsequent flight the latter was drowned,
still fighting and attending to his family's safety, in an unnamed river
(Tzetzes calls it the Ebro) which was in flood (i.e. it was winter, 229/8).
Livy, xxiv. 41. 3, puts the disaster near Castrum Album (Alicante ?) .
This account, though anti-Barcine, is not inconsistent with P., who
prefers to stress Hamilcar's death KaTa Tdv Tov Ktv3uvov Katp6v. A
stratagem recorded by App. Hisp. 5; Zon. viii. r8; and Frontin.
Strat. ii. 4 17, will not :fit into Diodorus' account.
P.'s high praise of Hamilcar seems to have penetrated the Roman
tradition, despite the hatred of his son. Thus Cato crowns a list of
those who were happier than kings with the name of Hamilcar
(Plut. Cato mai. 8. 14).
9. TTJV . UTpa.T1'}yia.v . 1ra.pi8ocra.v :A.aSpou~~: on the Carthaginian
urpaTT]yia in Spain see Bengtson (Aegyptus, 1952, 378-82); it was in
effect a provincial governorship. ol Kap)(1]36vwt is vague; but Diod.
xxv. 12 suggests that, like Hannibal later (cf. iii. 13. 4), Hasdrubal
was :first acclaimed by the troops in Spain and his appointment
subsequently ratified at home (iii. 13. 3). In the distorted account of
App. Hisp. 4, Hasdrubal is a popular leader who supported Hamilcar
at the time of his impeachment; for his marriage to Hamilcar's
daughter see iii. 12. 3; Diod. xxv. ro. 3; App. Hann. 4 The antiBarcine account which made him Hamilcar's minion (Livy, xxi. 3-4;
Nepos, Ham. 3) may be neglected. He had been back once to Carthage
since 237, to quell a Numidian rising (Diod. xxv. ro. 3; Frontin.
Strat. iv. i. 18); but the story of an attempted coup (iii. 8. 2) is suspect
as part of the anti-Barcine tradition adopted by Fabius. For his
later career see I3 and 36 below.
152

HAMILCA.l't IN SPAIN

II.

2.

Tc{l TPlTJpa.px<tJ: i.e. admiral of Hamilcar's fleet, a post usually

entrusted to a close friend of the general; d. i. 44 r.


2-12. The First lllyrian vVar (231-228)
This war is important to P.'s main theme (2. 2), as it first brought
the Romans east of the Adriatic. For the greater part {2-{). 8, 9~10)
his source is apparently Greek, and the narrative is strongly pre~
judiced against Aetolia (d. 2. 6-4. s); but 8 and II~I2 represent a
Roman tradition, which may well be Fabius (so most historians, e.g.
Taubler, Beloch, Gelzer, Holleaux). Bung, 184~. while accepting
Fabius as a possible source for u-rz, is impressed by Bauer, who
(AEM, r895, 136-47) rather improbably associates the pro-Roman
version of 8 with the propagandist account of the affair given by
Roman legati in Achaea (u. 4). There are secondary accounts in
Dio, fg. 49 (cf. Zon. viii. r9), very unreliable, and App. Ill.
(wellinformed on Illyria, but contaminated by annalistic inventions); see
Holleaux, 78 n. 2 (worthlessness of Dio); Fluss, RE, 'Teuta', cols.
u4o-2; Zippel, 46 ff. On the war in general see Holleaux, Etudes,
iv. 9~25 ( REG, 1930, 243-{)r), for chronology; CAH, vii. 822 ff.
(with bibliography, 931~3); E. Badian, BSR,, 1952, 72-9,3 with bibliography; G. Walser, Historia, ii, 1954. ,)o8~r8 (preferring Appian toP.);
Thiel, Hist. 344 ff. (arguing against Holleaux that the Senate was
seeking a chance to intervene).
1. 1. KaTO. 8~ Tous Kalpous TOuTous: a loose synchronism, for Hamilcar died in winter 229{8, whereas the Roman crossing (d. rr. r) was
in spring 229, a date confirmed by Holleaux (Etudt's, iv. 9--2.5) against
Beloch, who argues (iv. 2. 262-3; cf. Bung, r86) for z28, on the
assumption of two to three months' retardation in the Roman
calendar. Among other arguments, Holleaux points out that the
expedition followed close on Paxos (ro. r, rr. r), which must be in 229,
since by zz8 the Achaeans had broken with Aetolia {as Beloch later
admitted; Holleaux, op. cit., zs n. 3); also that Demetrius II died
early in 229 (44. 2 n.), about the time of the Roman expedition.
2. TTJV ,.p69eow T~V ftf.li!TEpav: i.e. to show the growth of world
affairs into an organic whole, i. 3 3 ff., 4 I ff. In ii. I. 4 rrp69ems was
rather the plan of the contents.
avs11ow Ka.t KaTaaKe.uf]v: 'formation and growth', with hysteron
proteron to avoid hiatus, cf. JI. 2, 3.5 2, 41. 6, iii. 5 3, i4 3, xxiii.
r6. 8. av~T)at> refers to the new links established by Rome in Illyria
(though there were no territorial acquisitions after this war).
4. 'Aypwv o ... J)acnAEus: the ruler over a group of tribes around
Scodra, and the Bay of Rhizon (Cattaro), who lived by piracy,
carried out in light galleys (lemhi). His expanded realm controlled
a large area from Dalmatia southwards, and included most of the
1 53

II. z. 4

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

Greek colonies on the Dalmatian islands, Pharos, Black Corcyra


(Korcula), but not Issa (cf. vii. 9 IJ). Dio, fg. 49 2-3 (cf. Zon. viii. 19)
calls Agron king of the Ardiaei, and this is accepted by De Sanctis
(ill. I. 294 n. 76) ; it is more likely than the suggestion of A. Gitti
(Historia, 1935, I83-204) that he came from the Labeates, a tribe
never mentioned at this period. The Ardiaei were, however, only
part of his realm. See Zippel, 43 ff. ; and, for the dynastic table,
Lenschau, RE, 'Pleuratos', cols. 237-8.
5. Allf.l.ll"'Piou Tou ~.Ahnrou 1Ta.Tp6~: Demetrius II, son of Antigonus
Gonatas, king of :Macedon, 240/39-229. Philip was his son by the
Epirote princess Phthia (v. 89. 7 n.).
ME8u.wiol~ lm' AlTw).wv 1TOAlopteoup.~vol~: shortly before 23I a republican revolution had swept Epirus, overthrowing the royal house
(Justin. xxviii. 3; Polyaen. viii. 52; Paus. iv. 35 3), the Epirotes
sought Achaean and Aetolian alliances (6. I), and Acarnania declared
its independence. In 231 (DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73 for the date)
the Aetolians began the siege of 1\ledion, on the frontier of central
Acarnania. (1\ledion, the 1\ledeon of Thuc. iii. Io6. 2, lay on the southeast slope of a fertile ridge, fifteen minutes south of the modern
village of Katouna; for its remains see Leake, NG, iii. 503, cf. 575-6;
Heuzey, 347 ff.). As an enemy of Achaea and Aetolia (44. I, 46. I,
xx. 5 3) it was in Demetrius' interest to send aid; but communications were difficult and he was occupied against the Dardanians
(Trogus, Prol. 28; Justin. xxviii. 3 14; Livy, xxxi. 28. 2), and so he
hired the help of the Illyrians for Medion. This device does not stand
alone; the Phocian pirate Ameinias had helped Gonatas to take
Cassandreia (Polyaen. iv. 6. 18), and the Cretan pirates were later
to help Philip V against Rhodes (xiii. 5 I).
8. auvd.ljta.VTo~ Tou xpovou Twv cipxa.lpEaW..W: the annual election of
Aetolian magistrates at Thermum was at the time of the autumn
equinox (iv. 37 2). The year is probably 231, since the fighting and
compact in Epirus is :230, and the Roman invasion 229. Autumn 232
is not impossible, but unlikely, since Agron died immediately after
the fall of 1\ledion (4. 6), yet his death was unknown to the Roman
ambassadors (Dio, fg. 49 z)~indeed App. IU. 7 makes them find
him still alive. DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73 Beloch's date of autumn
230 (iv. r. 636; 2. 531-2) assumes that the Roman invasion was in 228.
2. 9-4. 5. 1be account of the Aetolian peripeteia is developed by P. as
anexampleofasuddenchangeoffortune,andalsoasawelcomerebuffto
his old enemies, the Aetolia.ns (despite their alliance with Achaea, 6. 1 ).
2. 9. TftV E:mypa.~T)v TWV <lTTXwv: cf. i. 31. 4, T~ll lrrtypa<J>~~~ TOJII
Trpa.yp.dTwll, 'the credit of the success', for a metaphorical use; v.
42. 8, etc. E.mypa<J>Ii applies literally to inscribing conquered arms,
etc., or dedicating them to the gods (here, at Thermum). A famous
154

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 4 5

example is Pausanias' inscription on the tripod dedicated at Delphi


after Plataea:
'E>v\-,)vwv dpx7Jyo> E'TTEt trrpaTov a!.\.we M-,)Swv
Ilawav{a,; (/>o{{Jtp f-Lvfif-L' avH17)KE T<:ille (ap. Thuc. i. 132. 2).
10. 1TEpl8eiva.l TOV aTE~a.vov: for Fortune as the bestower of
(metaphorical) crowns cf. v. 42. 8.
3. l. Ka.86.1rep ~Bos icnlv AiTwXoi:s: cf. iv. 67. 1 for the taking of office
immediately on election.
1rpos rqv MeSua~va.v: though Medion is not a coastal town (xviii.
40. 5; Livy, xxxvi. n. 10), its territory may well have reached the
Ambracian Gulf between that of Thyrrheum and the valley of
Limnaea. The 'part nearest to the city' is probably the bay of
Loutraki, about 7 miles from the town.
3. 2. Ka.Ta a1Te(pa.s: i.e. in small companies (d. ii. 66. 5, iii. rg. 5),
probably kinship groups, like those envisaged in Homer, Iliad, ii.
362-3, where Agamemnon is advised
Kpiv' avllpa> Ka"Ta <fovAa, Ka.nl. <fop~7pa.>, JJ.ycff-LEf-LVOV,
w> <fop~TP'f <fop~TP'f<fo'v ap~y!). <fovAa. S <fov.\.o,,.

Likewise among the German tribes 'non casus nee fortuita conglobatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed familiae et propinquitates' (Tac.
Germ. 7 3). In recent times the Albanians, descendants of Agron's
Illyrians, fought in tribes and 'bairaq'( smaller kinship groups), and
the Montenegrin Slavs in 'bratstva' (brotherhoods).
5. T~ 1rXT)8el KO.t T~ ~dopEL TTJS O'UVTdo~EWS: the Illyrian armour was
heavy; cf. 66. 5, where Illyrian troops alternate with bronze-shielded
Macedonians; 68. 5, g, for the weight of their arms and formation
(uVvTa{L,;).

4. 3. rijs TUXTJS evSeLKVUf.LEvT)S TTJV a.uTTjS 8Uva.f.LLV: for Tyche as a


power punishing pride and delighting in sensational reversals see
i. 35 z; 86. 7; above, pp. 18-rg. For the phraseology see also xi. 5 8,
xxiii. 10. r6, xxix. 19. 2 (where, as in i. 4 5. Tyche is a play-producer).
The phrase ovva.f-L'V . ivllnKVI.If-LEVlJ appears at xxix. 21. 5 in a
quotation from Demetrius of Phalerum; and the present incident is
paralleled, reflections and all, at xxx. ro. r-2, where, after Pydna,
Aemilius Paullus appropriates and turns to his OY/11 honour the
columns Perseus was constructing at Delphi.
5. G.v8pbi1Tous l>vTa.s: a communis locus (cf. Herod. i. 32; [Soph.]
O.T. 1528-3o), cf. 7 I, iii. 31. 3, viii. 21. II, xv. 1. 8, xxi. 14. 4, xxiii.
12. 4, xxiv. ro. n, xxxviii. 20. 3. and several passages in Diodorus
drawing on P.; d. von Scala, 165--6. It is common to both Stoic (e.g.
[Heraclit.] Ep. 78. IS Bywater) and Peripatetic (e.g. Plut. Mor.
104 A, drawing here on Demetrius of Phalerum) sources.
155

rr. 4 . 6

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

6. I.I.ET~AAO.SE Tbv ~{ov: in autumn ZJI, v o>.lyatS' ~p,lpat> after the


battle.
7. T ~uTa 8lo.8Esai.I.Ev'1 Tbv xe~pLafL6v: in fact as regent and guardian for Pinnes, the young son of Agron and a secondary wife
Triteuta, who subsequently married Demetrius of Pharos; Zon. viii.
I9; Dio, fg. 49 J, 53; App. Ill. 7; Livy, xxii. 33 5 (a tradition independent of P.). In controlling the kingdom (Ta Trpri.yp,a.Ta, cf. i. zo.
::z n.) Teuta uses the normal Hellenistic council of rfoO.oL, found in the
courts of all the major powers; cf. v. :z. In. P. follows a tradition
on Teuta (d. Dio, fg. 49 2-5; Zon. viii. I9) which attributes her
policy to supposed feminine characteristics of headstrong emotion
and lack of reason (cf. 8, 8. 12), which are typical of Hellenistic
historical writing of the more sensational kind. But the collaboration
with Scerdila1das (5. 6) shows that the expedition of 230 ( 9) was
part of a policy of planned expansion into Epirus, preceded by
attacks on Elis and .Messenia, both partly under Aetolian influence
(iv. 59 I, etc., Elis; iv. 3 g, Messenia). Ill:yTian raids had extended
as far as Laconia (Plut. Cleom. Io. n). Badian, BSA, 1952, 73
Ka.n~ ciJowtKTjV: the capital of the new federal Epirote republic
(d. 2. 5 n.), a town in Chaonia about 8 miles inland from modern
Saranda; cf. Syll. 653 A, 4, Td Kowdv Twv 'H1rnpwTWV [Twv] 1Tpt
tl>owlt<TJ~" Under Pyrrhus and his house the capital was Ambracia
(xxi. 30. 9). Cf. Leake, NG, i. 20, 66 f.
4. TW\1 ra.AaTwv: Gauls, not Galatians (as Beloch, iv. I. 637); cf.
7. 6 :ff. ; and on their numbers, i. n. 4 n.
TWV tv a.uTfi: probably including both men and chattels; cf. 6. 6.
6. IKEp8LA.a.t8a.v: since his son was called Pleuratus, like Agron's
father (z. 4), Scerdila!das was probably Agron's brother (Schweighaeuser ad loc.; Lenschau, RE, 'Pleuratos', cols. 237-8).
Blc'i Twv 'ITa.p' ::.\vny6VLa.v O'TEVwv: Antigoneia lay on the site of
Tepeleni, on the left bank of the Aous (Viossa), just below its confluence with the Drynos. Scerdilai:das' route was clearly through
Atintania, along the Drynos valley; hence the aToa must be the
short gorge on that river immediately south of its confluence with
the Viossa, despite the more common application of the term to the
gorge of Klisoura on the Viossa itself (Livy, xxxii. 5 9-II; Plut.
Flam. 3 4-5. I; see Walbank, Philip, 149-5o).
'ITa.pa.cpuA.6.5ovTa.~ ~v :b.VTLy6vEta.v: 'to protect Antigoneia', i.e. against
outside attack {so Schweighaeuser, Paton, Holleaux (Rome, IIo-u),
Beloch, iv. :z. 38o n. 1), rather than 'to keep an eye on' (so Tarn,
AG, 312 n. 3, following Droysen); see xviii. 4 7 This implies that the
town was at this time Epirote, not independent (so Tarn, C AH,
vii. 744) or Illyrian (Treves, Rend. Line., 1932, 204 n. 4); and this is
confim1ed by 5 8 (Epirote survivors escaped w> 1r' J4TwTavwv; on

5. 3.

156

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 6. 8

the boundaries of Atintania see rr. II n.). However, the ceding of


the area by the Romans to Philip in 205 (Livy, xxix. 12. 13) suggests
that it had recently been Macedon ian; and Antigoneia looks like
an Antigonid foundation (cf. Jones, Greek City, 13) despite Beloch's
suggestion that Pyrrhus founded it, and named it after his late wife
Antigone, to protect the gorges and northern frontiers of his kingdom
(iv. 2. 381). Cary suggested (/Jist. 4oo) that Gonatas took Atintania
from Epirus after Alexander II's intervention in the Chremonidean
Vvar, and that Demetrius II restored it as compensation for the
divorcing of Phthia; but it is now clear that Phthia was never
divorced (Tarn, Ferguson Stttdies, 1940, 483 ff.), and Macedonian concessions to Epirus about 233 would be odd. Nevertheless, a very
recent acquisition of Atintania by Epirus is not to be excluded; it
may, for example, have been garrisoned during the period of joint
hostility against the Aetolians, and retained when Demetrius came
to terms with lli}Tia (to envisage but one out of several possibilities).
But, in any case, its possession by Epirus at this date is assured.
Twv tCaTA TdS <j>uAa~<ils Kat 1TpOtCO~Ta;: 'guard and picket duty';
Paton, 'night and day watches', but P. uses both words of night
watches in vi. 35 4-5.
6. 1. 1rpos Tous AtTwAou; tCat To Twv J\xa7lv ~vos: Epirus had perhaps established relations with the two confederations (which were
still allied against Demetrius II of Macedon) shortly after the fall
of the royal house (cf. 2. 5 n.), but there is no evidence for a treaty
before now (so Beloch, iv. 1. 635). The expedition now sent to relieve
Epirus will be dated summer 230.
2. 'EM~<pavov: this otherwise unknown spot is located by Philippson
(Thessalien und Epirus, fig. 4) north-west of Delvino and south-east
of Gjinokastra, between the hamlets of Vrysi and PavliavH; but
this is very uncertain. The presence of Scerdilaidas shows that the
Epirote force had come too late to hold Antigoneia and the pass into
Atintania.
4. To.:,s Aap8a.vis: an Illyrian people, whose western frontier was
the point where the Drilo (Drin) became navigable (Strabo, vii. 316),
and whose main territory lay on the upper Axios (Vardar), and
north as far as NiS. See Patsch, RE, 'Dardani', cols. 2155-7;
S.B. Wien, 214. I, 1932, 10 ff. Strabo (loc. cit.) says that they are
so wild that they live in holes in the ground under dung-heaps, but
are devoted to music of all kinds. On their constant raids on Macedon
see Walbank, Philip. 27o-1. At xxviii. 8. 2 they are called Llap8avot,
and other forms are found.
8. ESYJv8po1ToSU7!lE"TJ": not 'enslaved' (cf. 6), but 'plundered,
devastated', as in xxxii. 5 II, nvv T()vwTwv ~g1)vOpa1Too{craTo Tous:
f3lovs:. P. exaggerates the importance of Phoenice at this time.

157

II. 6.9

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

9. aUj.Lj.LO.XlO.V t-Ln' )\Ka.pvcivwv 1rpos Tous 'IXXupious: on the


Acarnano-Illyrian alignment see 2. 5 ff. The date of this Epirote
treaty, which will have pleased Demetrius II of Macedon, was summer or autumn 230. As its price the Epirotes seem to have ceded
Atintania to Teuta (from whom the Romans took it the next year, II.
n; cf. vii. 9 IJ); Holleaux, Rome, non. I; Beloch, iv. 2. 384; BusoltSwoboda, ii. I476 n. 4 Ambracia and Amphilochia may now have
broken away from Epirus and joined Aetolia; cf. iv. 61. 6; Beloch,
ibid.; Flaceliere, 252. P.'s didactic digression (6. 9-7. I2) is clearly
prompted by his irritation, as an Achaean, at the desertion from the
Achaeans (the Aetolians matter less) to the Illyrian side.
7. 6. TT)v a.&hoO TOO auan\j.LO.TOS ~KE(vou 1rpoa.ipeaLv: 'the conduct and
reputation of that very band'. '"poalpm's is used by P. to mean either
'reputation' (e.g. ix. 9 10) or 'conduct' (e.g. xviii. 3 3); and often,
as here, both meanings are present. avarTJp,a is 'a body of soldiers';
cf. i. 81. u, etc. On the history of these Gauls see Jullian, il. 327;
Griffith, 252-3; Launey, i. 517; how they had originally betrayed
their own friends and kinsmen ( 6) is unknown.
7. Sui. To Ka.TmEiyea8a.L 1roAt-L<tl: evidently the First Punic War (cf.
8, ri]s a~ri]s XPElas lvEKEv) ; the date is probably that of the Roman
siege of Agrigentum (262, cf. i. 17 7 f.), as Treves suggests (ad loc.).
De Sanctis is unconvincing (iii. 1. 92) when he dates the incident
shortly after Pyrrhus' departure, and identifies it with the attempted
Mamertine coup (see i. 43 n.).
8. 1rapELaa.ya.y6vrwv Ets "EpuKa.: cf. i. 77. 4 n. for their attempted
betrayal of Eryx and desertion to the Romans, who were scarcely
besieging the city (i. 58. 2 ff.). On the temple of Aphrodite see i.
55 8 n.
ll. TTJS STJj.LOkpO.TlO.S kO.l TWV VOj.LWV: cf. i. 43 8, TOVS vop,ovs Ka~ Tijv
lAEvBEplav. Here P. is thinking of the new Epirote Ko,v6v, a republican
federation like those of Achaea and Aetolia (Busolt-Swoboda, ii.
I476-7)

8. l. Tous 11'Aotto ...vous: 'traders (by sea)': see Schweighaeuser, Lex.


Polyb. s.v.; iv. 42. 7 n. These traders were mainly from the Greek
cities of southern Italy; see J. Hatzfeld (Les trafiquants italiens dans
l'orient hellinistique (Paris, I9I9)) on their activities.
3. 1ra.pa.Kouovns Twv EyKa.AouvTwv: this is the official Roman
version of their reluctance to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean,
probably received from Fabius (cf. 2-I2 n.).
r a:iov kO.l AEUkLOV KopoyKa.vious: the annalistic version (cf. App.
Ill. 7 ; Dio, fg. 49 I-z; Zon. viii. I9) tells how the people of Issa (cf.
5), molested by Agron, threw themselves on the mercy of Rome.
The Coruncanii were accordingly sent, and both a Coruncanius and
I

58

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 8.8

Cleemporus of Issa were murdered by Illyrian pirates. (There are


more fantastic details in Livy, ep. 20; Florus, i. 21. 3; Oros. iv. 13. 2;
and Pliny, Nat. kist. xxxiv. 24 calls one of the legati P. lunius.) The
annalistic account is accepted by DeSanctis (iii. I. 295) and Walser
(Historia, ii, 1954. 308-18), but looks like an example of the old
legend that the Romans waged only iusta bella, and generally to
defend allies. In fact Issa did not join the Romans until 229 (n. 12);
for Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, 143) is not convincing, when he argues that
Fabius omitted the story of lssa (like that of the Acarnanian embassy; 12. 7 n.) because it damaged his picture of Rome fighting to
avenge an outrage, and exposed her to a charge of meddlesomeness.
The object of the embassy is likely to have been a general reconnoitring visit (~1rlaKe!f;w 7TOt1Jaop.lvou~); see Badian, BSA, 1952, 76,
and in general Munzer, RE, 'Coruncanius (1 and z)', col. 1663;
Zippel, 47-50; Holleaux, Rome, 23 n. 6; Niese, ii. 281 n. 5
5. E11'0AlopteEl Tijv "lava.v: Issa is an island off the Dalmatian coast,
west of Pharos, modern Lissa; Fluss, RE, 'Issa', Suppl.-B. v, cols.
346-so. It had never formed part of Teuta's kingdom (d1re8etv is
'refused to submit'). The Roman arrival was probably in autumn,
230 (Holleaux, CAH, vii. 831), and the interview here most likely
gave rise to the false tradition (8. 3 n.) that the Issaeans provoked
Roman intervention by their appeal and deditio (Treves, Athen.,
1934, 387 n. 1).
8. teolvyj JlEv . t&'~ yf. JA-1\": Elizabeth I of England likewise gave
letters of marque to her privateers and dismissed protests with contempt (De Sanctis, iii. I. 295). Treves has argued (Athen., 1934,
388 ft.) that Teuta was making a conciliatory offer of aat!Ala, and
Badian would justify the Illyrian piracy as in order against Italian
blockade-runners. But the Italian traders were not necessarily
blockade-runners, nor could the Romans admit the Illyrian claim
to blockade all states they were attacking; and Treves' view is hard
to accept, since Teuta admitted her inability to control unofficial
piracy. Hence an offer of davAla.----even if it is to be deduced from the
equivocation P. reports--would have been farcical. P.'s account must
be read as a whole, and clearly he believed himself to be recording
an insult. The reliability of his narrative is another matter, and turns
on the reliability of the Fabian version. Certainly the retort of the
younger Coruncanius (probably Lucius; De Sanctis, iii. I. 295 n. 87)
has the appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify
the victim of the subsequent outrage and to reaffirm Roman regard
for wrongs committed upon subjects~in short it is part of the Fabian
tradition; see Treves, Athen., 1934, 389. Badian (BSA, 1952, 77),
following Holleaux (Rome, 99), argues that the Roman reply was in
fact a rerum repetitio ; but normally at this time a rerum repetitio
was preceded by a conditional war-motion in the Senate and the
!59

II. 8. 8

THE FIRST ILL YRIAN WAR

comitia (cf. CP, 1949, 15 ff.), and there is no evidence that the
Coruncanii were authorized to do more than reconnoitre (contra
Holleaux, Rome, 'f), who thinks that despite P.'s account they had
the duty of delivering an ultimatum).
Teuta's phraseology is ironically echoed by Coruncanius, e.g. KaT'
Ullav &DtK~fJ.aTa Kowfi . 1TEtpaa6fJ.l(Ja , 10.
13. itrl Tfi tra.pa.vo.-~~ TtlS yuva.~Kos: 'at the outrage committed by
a woman'.

9. 1. Tfjs l:Jpa.s ~trlYEVOf.\WrJS: i.e. spring 229. Tcuta's policy probably


represents a determination to win bases in preparation for an inevitable war (so Treves, Athen., 1934, 391; Badian, BSA, 1952, 77).
rather than evidence that she had no idea it was coming (Holleaux,
Rome, 101).
2. ~iLO. tropou: 'straight across the high sea', cf. i. 39 6. This gives a
better contrast to putting in at Epidamnus than does the translation 'through the strait (sc. of Corcyra)' (so Paton). Cf. Schweighaeuser, ad loc. Corcyra and Epidamnus were independent Greek
cities.
8. :4troAAwvui.Ta.L: the independent city of Apollonia lay just north
of the Aous mouth. Its appeal to Achaea and Aetolia, rather than
Rome, seems proof that the embassy sent to Rome c. 266 (VaL Max.
vi. 6. 5; Dio, fg. 42; Zon. viii. 7; Livy, ep. 15) had had no political
sequel; De Sanctis, ii. 428; Holleaux, Rome, 1-5.
9. Tas ... va.us Ka.Ta.+pa~eTous: on the meaning see i. 20, 13 n.
10. 1. 1Tpl TOUS Ka.Aoup.Evous na.ous: there are two islands, Paxos
and Antipaxos, lying 5 miles south of Corcyra, opposite the Acheron
mouth; cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 52. See Johanna Schmidt, RE,
'Paxoi', cols. 2437~8; Hammond, ]HS, 1945, 27 and map (Pl. I).
3. t~ru~a.vTES To us AEJ.I~ous O.vO. Tena.pa.s: lashed together in
fours, the light lembi (i. zo. 13 n.) gained in bulk and stability, and
once the enemy's beak was embedded in the side of one of the outer
ships, boarding became possible. The manreuvre is significant for the
general change over to boarding tactics about this time, and points
to considerable naval adaptability on the part of the Illyrians. Tarn
(HMND, 145) observes that in the First Punic War 'the Roman
sword beat the Carthaginian ram'; the Illyrian victory at Paxos
underlined the same lesson.
5. trAoiwv . TETp'l")plKwv: on these ships see i. 20. 9 n.; so too for
the quinquereme.
MO.pyos o Ka.puvEos: on his earlier career see 41. 14 (assassination of
the tyrant of Bura, 27 5/4), 43 2 (first holder of the single generalship,
255/4). Later overshadowed by Aratus, he is only mentioned again
here, dying a hero's death at an advanced age. As commander of the
160

THE FIRST ILL YRIAN WAR

II.

I I.

quinquereme he was probably navarch of the Achaean squadron


(Niese, ii. z83). See Kroll, RE, 'Margos (1)', col. 1709. On the phrase
-;rdvTa Td O[Ka'a Tij> KO,Vij> .. 1rf'1TO'"f/Ktf>'i (cf. iii. JI6. 9), Which iS typical
of the phraseology of contemporary laudatory inscriptions, see
Schulte, 52.
8 .AT)IJ.tlTp~ov Tov ILj)cip~ov: Demetrius was apparently a Greek (or
possibly a hellenized Illyrian) who governed Pharos (modem U:sina
or Hvar) as Teuta's vassal; Gitti (BHlt. comm. Rom., 1935, 13) argues
less probably that he was a private citizen of Pharos.
11. 1. K!lTU 8~ Tous ulJTous KaLpoos: d. 2. I n.
rvaaos }lEV 1Lj)6Xou~os A3Xos &~ noaTO}ltOS: Cn. Fulvius CnJ.
Cn.n. Centumalus and L. Postumius A.f. A.n. Albinus, the consuls
for A.u.c. 525 = 229/8 B.c. The correct praenomen is attested for
Postumius by Livy, xxii. 35 6, xxiii. 24. 3, and by the Fast. Cap.
P.'s error in giving him his father's praenomen may go back to an
error in Fabius or, more probably (cf. Bung, r86 n. 2), is attributable
to a }{S. fault. See Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (42)', coL 235; 'Postumius
(4o)', col. 912; Beloch, iv. 1. 665.
4. iv Ota~oXa'Ls wv: Treves (Athen., 19,34. 389---90) argued that
Demetrius had already made contact with the envoys of zJo, who
at Issa were not far from Pharos. But Badian (BSA, I95z, 77 n. 19)
points out that P. clearly distinguishes his contacts with Rome from
the disfavour which led to them, and suggests that Demetrius may
have been intriguing to obtain the guardianship of Pinnes (which he
subsequently obtained by marrying Triteuta; Dio, fg. 53).
5-12. Illyrian towns and tribes join Rome. Corcyra ( 5), Apollonia
( 8), Epidamnus ( ro), the Parthini ( n), the Atintanes ( u), and
lssa ( u) made acts of dedito to Rome. P. here translates fides by
1rlcrn<;, amicitia by if>,).{a; on the latter relationship, which came into
existence with the act of deditio, but did not necessarily imply the
making of a joedus, see A. Reuss (Grtmdlagen, 78-s3). All {except
Issa, on which see below) feature in the treaty of 215 between
Philip V and Hannibal as if subject to Rome (vii. 9 13). Their subsequent status is not, however, wholly clear. Taubler's belief (i. zs)
that they received libertas precaria by a Roman decree (so too
Holleaux, CAH, vii. 836) has been refuted by the arguments of
Reuss (Grundlagen), demolishing the conception of a category of
dediticii with precaria libertas. That they were free is confirmed by
App. Ill. 8, 'Pwp.a'io' .. K.!pKvpo.v p.ev KO.t l11Tolu\wvlav a<fofjKaV /..wOtpas
(which will hardly be true of just these two states alone), cf. Mac. I
(on Corcyra), 'Pwp.alot<; aw.Ip.axEt. De Sauctis (iii. I. 3or) argued that
Issa, Dyrrhachium (Epidamnus) and Apollonia were made socii,
Issa with ajoedus aequum, and Corcyra a ciuitas sinejoedere tibera et
imm1mis. But there is no evidence for any foedtfS, except with Pinnes.
M

161

II.

II.

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

Details are as follows :


Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus retained coining rights, and
minted victoriates, drachmae, those for Corcyra having the inscription ROMA (d. Mommsen, Geschichte des romischen Miinzwesens
(Berlin, 186o), 394 ff.; Zippel, 90; B.l~f.C. Rom. Rep., ii. 196-7). It is
convincingly argued by Badian (BSA, 1952, Son. 5) that these coins
were struck by Corcyra at the request of Rome, 'probably ... to pay
Roman troops in the East'; d. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 302 n. 97), who
emphasizes the Greek initials of the minting magistrate. Pliny, Nat.
hist. iv. 52, refers to Corcyra as a free city; but the coarse remark
recorded by Strabo, vii, fg. 8, Aw(Npa KopKvpa, xr o1rov 8Aetr;, may
go back to the fourth century or earlier, either 426 (Bursian, ii.
362 n. 2), 372 (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 302 n. 97) or perhaps 353, when the
anti-Athenian party was in power (Dem. xxiv. 202).
Apollonia (see above for App. Ill. 8) now became the main point
for the landing of Roman armies east of the Adriatic (e.g. Livy,
xxx.i. 18. 9, 40. 6, xlii. 18. 3, etc.), though in 205 P. Sempronius landed
at Epidamnus (subsequently called Dyrrhachium: Pliny, Nat. hist.
iii. 145), as did M. Lucretius in 171 (Livy, xxix. 12. 3, xlii. 48. 7).
Issa later contributed a useful naval contingent to the Roman fleet
(Livy, xxxi. 45 10, xxxii. 21. 27, xxxvii. 16. 8, xlii. 48. 8).
The setting up of this protectorate (the extent of which should not
be exaggerated; Badian, BSA, 1952, 78) ensured command of the
straits against further piracy. Its basis was the loose relationship of
amicitia, which applied the Roman concept of clientela in the sphere
of foreign policy. 'The freedom of the Illyrian cities ... leads directly
to the Isthmian proclamation (sc. of 196)' (Badian, op. cit. 81).
Against Holleaux's thesis (Rome, 109-12) that the Romans were
looking beyond Illyria to Macedon see the compelling arguments of
Cary (History, 406), who shows how little the Adriatic concerned the
Antigonids prior to Philip V.
5. wa.pa.KATJ9Evns: 'encouraging each other' (Emesti, Schweighaeuser, Treves, who makes it reinforce opo6vpao6v), or 'invited (by
the Romans)' (Casaubon, Paton, Niese (ii. 283 n. 2)). Schweighaeuser
argues that subsequent events showed that Roman exhortation was
unnecessary; but the Corcyraeans would not know the procedure of
deditio without some explanation and encouragement (for Greek
confusion on this matter d. xx. 9 10 ff., xxxvi. 4). Hence the second
version is preferable. (It carries no implications for a Roman policy
of imperialism, as Kolbe, 5.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4,4, 27n. 3.) The views
here attributed to the Corcyraeans (plav ... aacp6.Aetav) arc part of
the Roman propagandist version of events.
7. Roman land forces. These 2o,ooo foot and 2,ooo horse, like Fulvius'
2oo ships (II. 1), indicate the serious Roman view of the war. But
Holleaux is not convincing (Rome, 102 n. 3) in his thesis not only
r6z

THE FIRST ILL YRIA:.T WAR

II.

II.

15

that these preparations preceded the death of Demetrius II (as they


did) but that they were designed to meet a possible Macedonian
attack in support of the Illyrians; cf. Badian, BSA, 1952, 76-77.
10. Tous etO"w To1Tous Tfls 'l).i..upioos: not the inland districts, but
those parts of Teuta's kingdom lying in the farther recesses of the
Adriatic (Zippel, sr); cf. Zon. viii. Ig, Ta xwpla 11"op87]Q'&vTWV Ta
mfpa)la. The Ardiaei (the tribe to which the royal family belonged:
Dio, fg. 49 2) were at this time widely extended, and the Romans will
not have sailed as far as the Narenta (modem Neretva). their original
home; Tomaschek, RE, 'Ardiaioi', col. 6r5. The fate of the Ardiaeans
whom the Romans reduced is uncertain; they were perhaps assigned
to the Parthini or to Demetrius of Pharos (Badian, BSA, 1952,78 n. 26).
11. na.p&(vwv .. )\TWTUVW\1: the Parthini seem to have occupied the
hinterland of Dyrrhachium, as far south as the Apsus (modern
Devol), and eastward towards Lake Lychnidos (Dio, xli. 49 2; xlii.
xo. 1; App. Bell. civ. v. 75; Strabo, vii. 326; Livy, xliv. 30. 13). See
Tomaschek, RE, 'Parthini', cols. 2029 ff. The Atintanes (see 5 6 n.)
dwelt inland behind Apollonia and Oricum, as far south as Dodona
(Ps.-Scyl. z6, a corrupt passage). Thus Atintania included the lower
Aous valley, along with that of the Drynos, and the fortress-town
of Antigoneia (Tepeleni); cf. 5 6 n.
12. Tous 'IO'O'a.tous: cf. Zon. viii. rg. The siege lasted from autumn
230 (8. 5) until midsummer, 229; there is no need to assume a break
after the Roman demarche and a resumption after Paxos, with
Treves (Athen., 1934, 387 n. r). The absence of lssa from the treaty
of 215 (vii. 9 13-14) gives no grounds for accepting any part of the
annalistic account of the preliminaries of the war (8. 3 n.) (so Zippel,
47 92-93; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 301 n. g6) nor yet for assuming a joedus
aequum with Rome (DeSanctis, ibid.). See Holleaux. Rome, xo6 n. 3
13. 1TEpl NouTp(a,v: Dio, fg. 49 7, 1T<pl Tov iinfp~ol' Mmv. Both names
are unknown. Bauer (AEM, 1895, 147) regards P.'s form as a corruption of that in Dio.
14. ll.'lfOKOJUtovTW\1 TTJV ~K "TilS X~pa.s ~~EhELQV: 'Carrying a\vay
booty taken in the countryside', (Shuckburgh; Schweighaeuser s.v.
J,<f>O.E~a in his Lex. Polyb., though in his note ad loc. he translates
'qui fructus ex agris deuehebant', and is therein followed by Paton,
'which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from
pillage'). w<f>l/...,,a is very common meaning 'plunder' (e.g. i. :zo. 1, ii.
3 8, 8. 8, 22. 5. etc.) and is used as a technical expression in Philip V's
military code (Feyel, Rev. arch. 6, 1935. 3r), whereas it is not
paralleled in the sense of 'produce'. Cf. too Zon. viii. 19, 1rAofa
jLETa XP1JflrlTWV EK I1EA011"0Vvfjaou 11"p0(}'1TMoVTa (though iK TfjS' xwpas
can hardly refer to the Peloponnese).
15. ot liv TTI Ap: ~ .Papo> is the town in P. (iii. 18. 2, r8. 7, 19. 12),
.Pd.po;; the island (v. 108. 7). Polaschek, RE, 'Pharos (2)', col. 186o.

163

II.

II.

15

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

ei.~ Tov ~p~wva.: unknown. Tomaschek (RE, 'Arbon', col. 419) suggests a connexion with Albanopolis (Ptol. Geog. iii. 12. :zo), modern
Arbunr;, near Kruja (which Anna Comnena (xiii. s) calls TO }ip{Jav&v);
this would be the earliest reference to the modern name 'Albania'.
But it seems more probable that this is a distorted reference to
Narona, a Dalmatian town opposite Pharos, and near the sea (Pliny,
Nat. hist. iii. 142; further references and sketch-map in l\L Fluss,
RE, 'Narona', cols. 1743-55; 'Teuta', col. n46), as Schweighaeuser
suggested.
16. Ets Tov 'Pltova.: modern Risano, at the head of the Bay of
Cattaro, which P. (like Ps.-Scylax, 24) calls & 'Pitwv wo-rafL&s:; cf.
Apoll. Rhod. iv. 5I6; Steph. Byz.: Bov8G-'J, x1 S' E7Tt TOV fLVXOV
'Pltova 1ToAw Kat TrOTafLo" OfLciWvfLov, where, however, the gulf and the
wo-rafLos seem to be distinguished. Hence it is argued by D. Vouksan
(Albania, 193z, 77 n. r, plan on p. 78) that 'la riviere, dont la source
se trouve aujourd'hui dans une caverne situee au-dessus de Risan,
devait etre alors plus abondante que de nos jours et traverser la
ville ancienne qui s' etendait en partie sur un emplacement que la
mer a maintenant conquis'. But this hardly fits P. and Ps.-Scylax.
See in general Oberhummer, RE, 'Pl,wv, cols. 937--9 The words
dvaKexwpTJKOS dwo Tijs OaAaTTTJ> signify 'at a distance from the sea',
i.e. at the head of the gulf (or supposed river), rather than 'high up
above the sea' on a craggy eminence (Treves).
17. fLEyciX,v a.uT~ 1TpL9ilvTEs 8uva.aTEia.v: P. is clearly thinking of a
long-term settlement, and not a mere temporary arrangement (so
Badian, BSA, 1952, 79); but he exaggerates Demetrius' Svvaa-reia
(contrast App. Ill. 8, .JTJfLTJTplcp o' laTH' a xrupia jlta06v Sormv Tfj;;
7Tpoooalas). Its extent is unknown; but until he increased his power
by marrying Triteuta, Pinnes' mother (4. 7 n; Dio, fg. 53) he probably
possessed little more than Pharos and a few coastal places (Beloch,
iv. r. 666; Holleaux, Rome, 105; CAH, vii. 835; Badian, op. cit. So),
which joined Rome after Teuta's flight from Issa. These possessions
can hardly have extended as far south as Lissus (De Sanctis, iii. r.
302 n. 98); cf. Gitti (Bull. comm. Rom., 1935, 14), who, however,
includes the Ardiaei in Demetrius' domains.

12. 1-1. q,oAouLos rls T~v pWfLTJV ciw.E1rAeuae: because Fulvius celebrated a naval triumph pro cos. ex Illurieis on zr June 228, De
Sanctis (iii. r. 297 n. 89) suggested that P. has confused the two
consuls, and that it was Postumius who returned to Rome in 229.
But Holleaux, who was first inclined to reject the reference in the
act. tr. (Rome, 102 n. 6), and later accepted De Sanctis's thesis
(CAH, vii. 835 n. z), has shown (Etudes, iv. x. 22 ff.
REG, I9JO,
258 ff.) that postponed triumphs are relatively common, and may
spring from a variety of causes-illness, political opposition, etc. ;
164

THE FIRST ILLY RIAN WAR

II.

12.

in such cases there was a precedent for the late consul's taking a
purely formal proconsulship for his triumph, like L. Scipio in 189
(Livy, xxxvii. 59 6; A. M. Colini, Bull. comm. Rom., 1928, 269-74).
Postumius received no triumph at all, though P. gives him the
greater credit. Had his losses been too heavy? So Munzer (RE,
'Postumius (4o)', col. 913); but there is no evidence that he rather
than Fulvius was responsible for the losses in n. IJ.
3. Sla.1TpEaj3Euaa..,.v1J 1rpos Taus 'Pw.,.a.(ous: i.e. to Postumius at
Epidamnus ( 4).
Peace terms with Teuta. P.'s source was assumed by Valeton (:zo6) and
von Scala (:z68) to be the Achaean record office; Schulte (4o) thought it
was the Roman records. It is indeed possible, though not very likely,
that the Achaeans filed the report made to them by Postumius ( 4;
Bauer, AEM, r895, 137). But it is improbable that P. carried out
detailed research for these introductory books, and in any case be
is unlikely to have had access to the Achaean record office when he
was writing them. His most probable source is Fabius Pictor.
(r) 4>opous . olanv: probably an indemnity, payable in instalments, like that imposed on Carthage after the First Punic War
(i. 62. 9); cf. Beloch, iv. I. 666 n. 1; Holleaux, Rome, 105 n. 5 The
amount is not recorded. Livy, xxii. 33 5 probably refers to a new,
but similar, indemnity imposed in 219.
(2) 1Ta0'1'JS T' 6.va.xwp~anv '~'il'> 'l>.>.upt8os 1TA~v b>.(:ywv Tlnrwv:
according to Appian, Ill. 7, the Romans permitted Pinnes T'i]v a'M:'lv
i4ypwvos dpx~v ;X"'v, and Teuta accepted these terms. Probably this
means that Teuta agreed to surrender the regency (to Demetrius)
and withdraw to a 8vva.a-rda. (as P. here implies). Cf. Dio, fg. 49 7,
'ITaVTeAws Ka-rSEuJE Jcal T~v tipx~v &.<f>fjKIJJ. Badian (BSA, 1952, 8o)
suggests plausibly that her ouvaaTda was around Rhizon.
(3) .,.1) trAuaELV 1TAEov f) 8ual. AE.,.~o~s ~sw Toil 1\iaaou: cf. iii. 16. 3
Lissus, modern Lesh or Alessio (cf. Fluss, RE, 'Lissos (2)', cols.
731-3; J. M. F. May, ]RS, 1946, 54) lay on a fortified hill near the
mouth of the Drilo (Drin). It is generally assumed that Illyrian land
forces were required to respect the same frontier (cf. Holleaux,
Rome, 105 n. 4); but this is not certain, as Badian (BSA, 1952, 79;
cf. Oost, 12) shows-though with the Parthini and Atintanes both
included in the Roman protectorate, Illyrian access to lands south
of the Genusus must have been very restricted. This clause secured
the freedom of the Ionian Sea for Italian and Greek shipping. P.
mentions the latter especially in the general 'philhellenic' context
of the sending of envoys to the Greek states( 4-8); it will have been
stressed by Fabius, and in any case most of the Italian traders were
Greeks from southern Italy.
4-8. Roman embassies to Greece. The results and importance of these
have been exaggerated by both ancient and modern historians.
165

II.

12.

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

Zonaras (viii. r9) records how at Athens


77oAtTdas atf>wv Twv ,..,
p,vanJPlwv JhET~axov. De Sanctis (iii. z. 438 n. 98) would reduce this
to a grant of 77potevla; but it should probably be rejected outright
(d. Niese, ii. 285 n. 4; Taubler, i. zr6; Ferguson, 21o n. 3, 256 n. 2;
Holleaux, Rome, II7 n. r). There is no reason to regard these embassies as anti-)facedonian. Those to Achaea and Aetolia were a
purely formal exchange of courtesies, without any political sequel
(Holleaux, Rome, II3 ff.); and those to Corinth (an Achaean city,
not competent to engage in independent political exchanges) and to
Athens will have been motivated by the prestige and perhaps the
commercial power of these two cities (Beloch, iv. 1. 667). Moreover,
there was little to fear from Macedon in 228, when the regent Doson
(guardian to Philip since Demetrius II's death in spring 229 (44. z n.))
was facing a Dardanian invasion and the Aetolian seizure of much
of Thessaly (cf. Walbank, Philip, Io-n). In fact, our sources have
no reference to Macedon in this context.
4. -rrpos n TOu<; Ahw?.ou<; Ka.i. To Twv :A..xa.lwv (8vo<;: who had sent
help to the Corcyraeans at Paxos (9. 8 ff.). Since the death of
Demetrius II their alliance had been dissolved de facto, if not openly
denounced (below, 45-46 nn.). The purpose of the Roman visit was
partly formal, partly propagandist; Roman policy in lllyria was
portrayed as defending the ius gentium against Illyrian 11apavop,la
(n. 5) Cf. Gelzer, Hermes, H)33 I32.
7. n S' rnmAoKt, p.t:TU -rrpE:O'~ELCl<;: this statement contradicts
Iustinus' account (xxviii. 1. 5 ff.) of an Acarnanian appeal to the
Senate, and a Roman demarche in Aetolia, c. 239, which was
brusquely rejected. Iustinus' story is accepted by De Sanctis (iii.
I. zj8 n. I), Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 382 n. r), Kolbe (S.-B. Heidelberg,
1933/4, 4. 26), and Beloch (iv. r. 634 n. 3, 'P. kann seine Grtinde
gehabt haben, den diplomatischcn MiBerfolg der Romer zu verschweigen'). Gelzer (Hermes, 1933. 144) suggests that Fabius, P.'s
source, was reluctant to spoil his picture of the First Illyrian \Var
with an earlier story of Roman interference and failure; but Iustinus'
account is vague and inaccurate, and the arguments against its
authenticity are strong; cf. Holleaux, Rome, 5-22; Treves, Rend.
Line., 1932, 196-7. P. is thinking of political contacts, and this
passage does not bear on the authenticity of the tradition of a fifthcentury embassy to Greece to gather materials for the Twelve
Tables (Livy, iii. 31 ff.; Dion. Hal. x. 52, 54).
8. -rrpos KopwEILou<; Kal. -rrpos ;t!.STJva.(ous: here 'Pwp,aio means 'the
Senate' ; Holleaux, Rome, I r4 n. 2. On the purpose of the visit see
12. 4-8 n. That the Romans made a formal proclamation at the
Isthmian Games (De Sanctis, iii. r. 303) is an assumption not warranted either by this passage or by Zon. viii. r9 (which merely
confirms the admission of the Romans to the festival, adding that
166

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 13.2

Kat aTa8wv Jv airr<f! 6 ll>.airros- vtwrp). This recognition by the


Greeks is naturally stressed in P. since it was tantamount to accepting the Romans into the comity of civilized (Greek) peoples; cf.
Wilamowitz, Staat und Gesellschajt der Griechen und Romer 2 (Berlin,
1923), rso; Holleaux, Rome, I29 Reference to the Isthmia dates this
embassy to the spring of an 'even' year, and probably to 228 (nl8iws-),
when Athens was concerned with her freedom (44. 2 n.); but the
failure of the Senate to follow up the embassy shows that it had no
political background.

13. Hasdrubal in Spain (229-221)


The source remains pro-Barcine (d. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rs8-iJ).
The reference to the Ebro Treaty { 7) makes an artistic transition
to the Gallic \Vars (14-35), but leaves Hasdrubal's death and Hannibal's succession to the command for 36. I-2. On Hasdrubal's achievements see also Diod. xxv. II. I, 12; App. Hisp. 6; Zon. viii. 19;
below, iii. 13. 2 n.
13. 1. EV TOUTOLS a1TEAl-rroJ.LEV Ta KO.Ta T~V 'I~TjpLa.V: see I. 9
Illyrian events have been brought down to the date of Hasdrubal's
death (>vinter 229) and P. returns to the Spanish field. Paton's
translation, 'we have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these
years' (231-228?), is plainly absurd.
Ka.pxTJSOva. Ka.Lv~v v6ALv: P. uses both names, cf. iii. 13. 7, 15. 3,
17. I, etc. (Kmv~ 1ToAts-), x. 6. 8, IS 11, etc. (Kapx:rJ:Sdw) ; an apparent
exception is explicable as a gloss, iii. 39 6 n. The former is a translation, the latter an adaptation of the Phoenician Qart-Chadasht
'New Town' (Ehrenberg, Karthago, 13). New Carthage was founded
(cf. Diod. xxv. I2; Zon. viii. 19) about 228 on the site of the older
Phoenician settlement Mastia (d. iii. 24. 4 n.), which notably resembled that of Carthage itself. 'This city ... was better placed than
Alicante to keep in touch with Africa, because it was nearer and
possessed a magnificent harbour, the best on the east coast of Spain,
indeed one of the best harbours in the world' (Schulten, CAH, vii.
788).

2. T~v 9mv Ka.t T~v XPELa.v: cf. x. 9 ft. for the topography; in
x. 11. 4 P. states that he writes airr61TTat y"yov6ns. If he visited New
Carthage while in Spain with Scipio in 151 (cf. iii. 4-5 n., 3 (ii),
57-59 n.; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 212), that statement was probably inserted in book x before publication (for composition, though not
publication, had certainly progressed beyond book x by then). It
would not, however, follow that the present passage is also a later
insertion (Susemihl, ii. 110 n.), for P. can have intended writing an
account of New Carthage before seeing it personally. If he also
167

II.

13. 2

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221)

discussed its advantages relative to Spain and Africa, his account


has not survived.
3. wpf1TJ11C1V hrt To 11'o)\u11'payf1oV~v Ta KaTa Ti]v 'I~TJp(av: despite
P.'s suggestion that the Senate ('Pwp,atm} had hitherto neglected
Spanish affairs, Dio's account (fg. 48: probably based on Coelius
Antipater; Taubler, Vorgesch. 82) of a Roman embassy to Hamilcar
in 231, to question Punic activities in Spain, is quite credible (De
Sanctis, iii. 1. 411 n. 59; rejected by Holleaux, Rome, 123 n. 4) ;
Hamilcar justified them by the need to raise money to pay the Roman
indemnity. The Romans may have entered into their alliance with
Saguntum now; but this is far from certain (13. 7 n. (d), iii. 15. I n.).
4-5. Roman policy. P. here implies that the Senate was resolved to
act against the Punic empire in Spain, but for reasons of expediency,
connected with the Gallic danger, 'smoothed down Hasdrubal' ( 6}
and persuaded him to sign an agreement ( 7); once free to act, the
Romans would proceed against Carthage without scruple ( 5, lmTaTTHv 7} TToAEp,Ew}; cf. 22. 9-11. In both passages Hasdrubal's empire
is a threat to be countered as soon as circumstances allow. This
probably makes Roman policy more clearly defined than it really
was at this date.
4. Et5 To f-LEynATJV X~pa KaTauKw0.uau8al: 'to build up a powerful
dominion' (Paton), 'the opportunity of consolidating their power'
(Shuckburgh), 'creuisse opes Carthaginiensium' (Schweighaeuser),
'per costruirsi un impero' (Treves). But f-1-"YclA'IJ X"tp is 'a large body
of men' (cf. i. 44 7; Herod. vii. I$7. etc.; LSJ, s.v. X"tp, v). P. is
considering the danger to Rome inherent in a large army recruited
in Spain, and hence interprets Roman action as defensive; cf. iii.
10. 6, the Carthaginians ..-avTats Tais X"pai mant5aavns- .,iJ8apaws
vl.f3'rJaav .,;, T6v ... 7TOAf.WV. Translate, therefore, 'to build up and
equip a large body of troops'.
6. Ka.Tao/TjuavT5 .. Kat 1rpauvavTES Tov ~uopoul3av: in contrast to
their policy in 231 (r3. 3 n.). P.'s expression does not imply protracted negotiations (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 341), but merely proposals
which would seem acceptable to Hasdrubal.
7. The Ebro treaty: cf. 22. 11, iii. 15. 5, 21. I, 27. 9, 29. 2-3, 30. 3 This
agreement (avv8i]Kat here and (by implication) in iii. 30. 3. elsewhere,
more accurately, 6p,oAoy{at, 8w[.WAoyl)aoo:s) was made between Hasdrubal and representatives of the Senate, probably between autumn
226 and spring 225 (cf. 23. 6 n.), in view of the Gallic danger, which
culminated in 225 (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 4I2 n. 62). Controversy surrounds
both the content and the significance of the treaty, and also its
role in the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the Hannibalic
War.
(a) Content. P. mentions only one clause, 'that the Carthaginians
were not to cross the Ebro in arms'. But it has been widely argued
168

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN

(229--221)

II. 13.7

(e.g. by Otto, Groag, Hallward, Treves) that a complementary clause


limited the Romans in an identical fashion. Certainly it is hard to
believe that the Romans were not bound by such a clause; though
many of those historians who do not admit the existence of this
(e.g. De Sanctis, Momigliano, Taubler, Schulten), assume that the
treaty recognized a Carthaginian right to advance up to the Ebro
(Taubler (Vorgesch. 49-5o) argues that this right was accorded in
a separate, parallel document agreed by the Romans). Thus on either
interpretation the treaty looks like a concession to Carthage, recognizing what had been, or was on the point of being, achieved in
Spain south of the R. Ebro.
It has frequently been argued (e.g. by De Sanctis, Taubler, Altheim) that the treaty does not demarcate spheres of influence, since
this was not a Roman conception at this time; but it can hardly
have left either side free to strike alliances or develop commercial
contacts across the Ebro, merely limiting military activity (so T.
Frank; on this see :Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 363 n. 2). To be effective an
alliance must allow for the sending of military assistance, and against
this the treaty established the Ebro as a substantial barrier. Further,
if (as has been plausibly suggested, e.g. by T. Frank and DeSanctis)
the driving force behind Rome was Massilia, with which Rome had
long enjoyed friendly relations (Diod. xiv. 93 5; Strabo, iv. r8o;
Iustin. xliii. s) and had struck an alliance in the period since the
First Punic \Var (Livy, xxi. 20. 8, socii; cf. Philipp, RE, 'Massalia',
col. 2132), she would hardly view with equanimity Carthaginian
penetration in the areas around her colonies of Rhode (Rosas) and
Emporiae (Ampurias), which lay on the coast between the Ebro and
the Pyrenees. T. Frank (CAH, vii. 8ro) even suggests that Massilia
was a party to the pact, but of this there is no evidence; on the other
hand, Schulten's objection (CAH, vii. 788), that the surrender of her
colonies south of the Ebro must have left Massilia discontented, is not
very substantial, since these had probably gone already (iii. IJ. 2 n.).
On balance, therefore, it seems probable that the Romans accepted
a limiting clause like that restricting Carthage.
(b) Form and validity. The treaty was apparently agreed between
Hasdrubal and a senatorial commission. Presumably it was ratified
in Rome (contra Taubler, Vorgesch. 49), and from the Roman point
of view counted as a valid treaty. But in reply to the alleged
Carthaginian argument (see iii. zr. r n.) that it either was nonexistent, or else had never been ratified at Carthage and hence was
not valid, the Romans, instead of contradicting the assertion, merely
argued that ratification at Carthage was superfluous (cf. iii. 29. 3,
ath-OTEAW> brot~(FO.TO ras DJWAoylas }luSpov~as). This suggests that,
although the Barcids were normally accompanied by Councillors
from Carthage (cf. iii. zo. 8, TOV> fLET' ath-oiJ crvv,Spov>, 71. 5, vii. 9 I,
169

II. 13. 7

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (zzg-221)

yepovcnacrrai, signatories to the treaty between Hannibal and


Philip V), the Ebro treaty was not ratified at home; cf. Taubler,
i. 95 Probably the Barcids had power to make local agreements of
this nature (De Sanctis, iii. I. 414 n. 66), a convenient arrangement,
which would leave the Carthaginian senate free to repudiate them
afterwards. On their side the Romans were playing for time, and,
provided Hasdrubal observed the agreement until the Gauls had
been defeated, preferred not to press for any formal ratification.
Hence the treaty is to be regarded, at least on the Carthaginian side,
as a purely local arrangement, and not as an additional clause to
the treaty of 24I.
(c) Significance. For the Romans, the treaty removed the risk of
a Carthaginian alliance with the Gauls, and enabled them to reserve
the 'Spanish problem' to a later date; they could thus look forward
to rounding off their Italian frontiers, and extending their interests
to southern Gaul and northern Spain without encountering the
Carthaginians (22. Io-n). On Hasdrubal's side, the treaty recognized
the Carthaginian right to advance to the Ebro, though Punic arms
had not yet penetrated so far; De Sanctis (iii. I. 4I2) estimates that
they had not yet reduced half the area south of the Ebro. It must,
therefore, be a largely subjective judgement to decide whether the
agreement was a diplomatic triumph for Rome (Mommsen) or Carthage (Egelhaaf).
(d) The Ebro treaty and Saguntum. Some years before Hannibal
succeeded to the command (2I9) the Iberian city of Saguntum had
struck an alliance with the Romans (iii. 30. I, 1TAelouw ~Twtv 7}81)
1TpoTEpov TWV KaT' YJ.wi{Jav I<cttpwv). The date of this alliance and its
relation to the Ebro treaty are both controversiaL It is agreed that
the alliance can hardly have been made at the time of the Ebro
treaty (226/5). or indeed so long as the Romans were afraid of the
Gauls, since it could only arouse Hasdrubal's hostility. P. appears
to regard the alliance as considerably prior to the Roman interference at Saguntum in 22I (contrast iii. 30. I (just quoted) with iii.
IS. 7, which, referring to 220, dates this interference J.UKpots EJ.L1Tpou0Ev
xpovots), which perhaps points to a date before 228; and indeed it
has been suggested that the alliance was made by the embassy of
2JI (IJ. 3 n.). But the evidence is very far short of being conclusive,
and historians are divided in dating the alliance. It is placed before
the Ebro treaty by Egelhaaf, Hesselbarth, Frank (CAH, vii. 809),
Taubler, De Sanctis, Hallward, Gelzer, Otto, Oertel, and Schnabel,
after it by Ed. Meyer, Kromayer, Groag, Schulten, Holleaux, Frank
(Rl), Arnold, and Heichelheim (who adduces numismatic evidence
from Saguntum).
If the alliance was subsequent to the treaty, it seems clear that
it violated it, since an alliance carried with it the implication of
I70

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN {22g-zzr)

II. I3. 7

armed assistance; if made earlier (e.g. in 231), it is less clear how it


stood in relation to the treaty. Hallward has argued (CAH, viii. 28)
that 'the alliance was not invalidated by the Ebro treaty, which,
however, carried with it the implied obligation on Rome not to use
the town as an instrument to hinder Carthaginian expansion within
the sphere recognized as open to her'. De Sanctis (Problemi, 168 ff. ;
cf. Hesselbarth, 85, 90) believes that the Ebro treaty virtually
sacrificed Saguntum to Hasdrubal. Probably the position was never
clarified. But at bottom the Saguntine alliance and the Ebro treaty
were irreconcilable; and in the last resort the Romans had no legal
redress against a Punic attack on the town, for which the implications of the Ebro treaty were sufficient justification. W. Kolbe (S.-B.
Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4, 21 ff.) has argued that the Ebro treaty automatically included allies of both sides, and so gave Saguntum the
protection accorded to the allies mentioned in the treaty of 241 (to
which he regards the Ebro treaty as a pendant). But the Ebro
treaty contained no such clause covering allies, as far as we know
(Bikerman, Rev. phil., 1936, 284-8). Moreover, the allies in 241 were
actually specified and a list was appended to the treaty (cf. iii. 21. 5;
Taubler, Vorgesch. 63 ff.; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 368). Hence there are
no grounds for supposing that the Ebro treaty sanctioned the Saguntine alliance. Recently Carcopino has argued (REA, 1953, 258-93)
that there were two Ebros, and that Hasdrubal's treaty concerned
the southern one, the R. Jucar (Sucro); his thesis implies an unbelievable lack of clarity in P., who is supposed to have been aware
of the homonyms, and it is unlikely to win any adherents.
(e) Later distortions. In the course of the second century violent
discussions on the question of the responsibility for the Hannibalic
War gave disproportionate attention to the Ebro treaty; and it
became part of the Roman case to prove that Hannibal's attack
on Saguntum was, somehow, a breach of this treaty. This confusion
sprang from the fact that the Roman declaration of war at Carthage
(iii. 20-21, 33) gave to the attack on Saguntum, for reasons of policy,
a prominence which really belonged to the crossing of the Ebro,
especially if this (despite iii. 40. 2; cf. iii. 20. 6 n.) really preceded the
sending of the Roman embassy; and Cato's accusations against the
Carthaginians as constant treaty-breakers (HRR, i. 8r,
84) may
mean that he played a large part in shaping the Roman version
(Gelzer, Phil., 1931, 266--9 = Vom r6mischen Staat (Leipzig, 1943),
86 ff.; Hermes, 1933, 16o). To support this version the terms of the
treaty were distorted, either by the insertion of a special clause
excepting Saguntum from the treaty, or by locating Saguntum north
of the Ebro; and the words T~V J.L~V aAATJV , lfJwtav 7TaptatW1TWV
( 7) (i.e. they omitted all reference to the rest of Spain) perhaps
represent Polybian polemic against the first of these distortions
171

II. IJ. 7

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221}

(Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, so1). The second error is, however, to be found
in P.'s own discussion (in iii. 15. s. 30. 3, and perhaps iii. 61. 8 and
iv. 28. 1). Examples of these distortions are App. Hisp. 7; Hann. 2;
Lib. 6 (Saguntum and 'other Greek [sic] towns in Spain' appeal to
Rome; the Senate sends envoys to Carthage and makes an agreement
which lays down the Ebro as the frontier between the two empires,
but guarantees that Saguntum and the Greek towns shall be free
and autonomous. This version also puts Saguntum north of the
Ebro); Livy, xxi. z. 7, ' . . . Saguntinisque mediis inter imperia
duorum populorum libertas seruaretur'; cf. 44 6; Zon. viii. 21,
~atpTOvs 1rmot~Kwav. Though important as contributions to the
arguments which began soon after the Hannibalic war and reached
their climax shortly before 150 (iii. zg. 1 ff.), these versions are
irrelevant to the treaty itself. The bearing of the treaty on the
question of responsibility for the war is discussed below (iii. 21. 1 n.).
(f) Bibliography. See the works quoted in CAH, viii. 724-5, and
Scullard, His!. 197 n. 1; add: G. De Sanctis, Riv. ji.l., 1932, 426-7;
W. Kolbe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4 (cf. E. Bikerman, Rev. phil.,
1936, 284-8; P. Treves, REA, 1935. 136-7); C. J. C. Arnold, Oorzaak
en Schuld van den Tweeden Punischen Oorlog (Amsterdam, 1939);
G. Giannelli, Roma nell' eta delle guerre puniche (Bologna, 1938) (cf.
J. Vogt, Gnomon, 1940, 16-17); F. Altheim, Epochen, ii. 51 ff.; J.
Carcopino, REA, 1953, 258-93; F. M. Heichelheim, Historia, 1954,
211-19.
e1rt 'II"OAEI-1~: stressed by Taubler (Vorgesch. 61 f.) as evidence that

only military expeditions across the Ebro were meant; but this
thesis is not sufficient to reconcile the treaty with the Saguntine
alliance (above (d)). The phrase 1ri 1roMp.ftJ occurs frequently in
treaties of this period; cf. Schulte, 72-73.
14-35. Rome and the Gauls

The Gallic invasion of 225 gives P. occasion to outline the previous


history of the Gauls in Italy, prefixing a geographical survey of
Cisalpine Gaul (14-17). In i. 6. 8 the Celts were excepted from the
peoples of Italy mastered before the Roman crossing into Sicily.
Thus the present digression falls into place as part of the story of
how the Romans amassed sufficient resources to justify their ambitions for world-dominion (i. 3 10); in addition it is relevant to
Hannibal's invasion (14. 2).
14. 1. To TllS 1rpoKa.Ta.crKEu1ls otKEi:ov: on its summary character cf.
i. IJ. 8, 65 . 5 , ii. I. 4, 35. 10, 40. 4
14. 4-17. 12. The geography of Cisalpine Gaul. This account of the
district and its inhabitants is a minor masterpiece, and derives in
part from P.'s own inquiries; for the geometrical simplification of
172

ROME: AND THE GAULS

the shape of Italy and the Po valley cf. i. 42. I-7 (Sicily). It has been
argued that P. did not leave Italy during his internment, and hence
that he writes from some earlier source (Cuntz, 72 f.); but it seems
certain that some at least of P.'s western journeys took place during
his detention in Italy, and he may have \'isited Cisalpine Gaul in
ISO, accompanying Scipio Aemilianus back from service in Spain
(xxxv. 4; cf. Nissen, Rh. M1,s., 1871, 271; De Sanctis, iii. I. 2o8 ff.).
In that case his account (if based on autopsy) would be an insertion
roughly contemporary with iii. 22 ff. (on the Punic treaties). On the
other hand, P. may very well have visited Cisalpine Gaul previously
(cf. Thommen, Hermes, I885, 204), and no safe conclusions are to be
dra\.\n on the date of composition.
14. 4. T~ ax~~-ta:n TptyU~vou8ous: a very forced and schematic
description; the representation of Italy as a triangle is criticized
in an eloquent chapter of Strabo (v . .zro), who, however, speaks of
the vertex at the Sicilian strait. Evidently P.'s scheme had been
borrowed and improved. That P. was aware of the real shape of the
peninsula is clear from xxxiv. II. 2 (Strabo, v. 2n).
T~v 'lrA..:upuv . T~v 1Tpbs civa.ToAus KKAL!-tEV11V: the east coast
extends to Cape Cocynthus ( s) by ignoring the heel and the Gulf
of Tarentum.
;; T' 'lovLo'> 'ITopo'> ~ea.l b Ka.Tu Tov :.\8pia.v ~c:oArro'): on these terms
see Partsch, RE, 'Adria', cols. 417-I8; Biirchner, RE, 'Ionisches
Meer', col. 18<}7; Burr, 59-67; R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 203-4.
(a) Adriatic Sea. For the periphrasis cf. I6. 4, 7; elsewhere 6
>l8p{a,; (i. 2. 4, ii. IJ. s, etc.) or d KaTd T~v Jloptav KOA7TDS' (d. u,
where Nissen (It. Land. i. 91) wrongly sees a reference to the town).
Beaumont, loc. cit., derives the name from the R. Adrias. In the
early fifth century Hecataeus (FGH, 1 F IOI-I02 b) used it of the
whole sea south to Epidamnus; but others restrict it to the waters
around the Po estuary and the lands of the Veneti (Herod. i. I6J,
iv. 33. v. 9; Eurip. Hippol. 736). ToP. it stretched as far as Hydruntum in south-east Calabria, opposite the Acroceraunian range in
Epirus, vii. 14 d, x. I. 7; cf. Strabo, vii. 317; Mela, ii. 67; Pliny,
Nat. hi st. iii. 100.
(b) 'IOvw> 1Topo,;. For the form cf. Pindar, Nem. 4 53 (linking it
with Dodona) and P. v. no. 2. Hecataeus (FGH I F 91) uses lovto>
KOA7To> for the whole Adriatic ; and this is normal fifth-century usage.
In the fourth century the Ionian and Adriatic seas were distinguished; the latter included all waters as far south as the Straits of
Otranto, while the Ionian Sea was a subdivision, connoting that
part of it south of Mons Garganus (Strabo, ii. 123, vii. 317). Later
the Ionian Sea came to include waters outside the Adriatic, and is
used for the Sicilian Sea (see below; Mela, ii. 37; Pliny, Nat. hist.
iii. 100, iv. 9); and the term 'Adrias' also covered waters far to the
173

II. I4. 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

south of the modern Adriatic. But the distinctions were not sharp,
and Ps.-Scylax, I4 and 27, identifies the Ionian and Adriatic seas.
Here P. refers especially to the Straits of Otranto and the waters
to the south of them (d. s); in v. IIO. 2 he describes Sasona (off
Valona) as lying KaTa T~v daf3o>..~v T~v Ei<; Tdv '!6vwv 776pov (i.e. to one
approaching from the Adriatic). Beaumont, loc. cit., is incorrect in
saying that P. uses the terms Ionian and Adriatic indifferently,
though this became the usage under the Roman Empire.
Ti]v Se 1rpos f1Ea1Jflf3pta.v Ka.t Suaflas TTPO.flf1E"1J": correctly, facing
south-west.
To I~KA~Kov Ka.L T upp1JVLKOV 1TEAa.yos: on the Sicilian sea d. i. 42.
4 n. The Tyrrhenian or Etruscan sea (d. i. Io. s), the Roman mare
inferum, included those waters between the west coast of Italy and
the islands of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. To P. it extends north
to the foot of the Alps; d. I6. I, iii. 110. 9. xxxiv. Io. 18. Burr,
72-74. The Sicilian sea enters the picture only for the short stretch
between Rhegium and C. Cocynthus (see next note), which P. here
includes in the west coast.
5. TO 1TpOKELf1EVOV aKpwt"TjpLOV KoKuv9os: identified with Capo s.
Maria di Leuca, at the southern tip of Calabria, by Ziegler (RE,
I;tKAla, col. 2472; cf. Burr, ss) since in X. I. 2 the whole coastal
stretch from Rhegium to Tarentum faces the Sicilian sea. But elsewhere P. calls this cape axpa 'la7Tvyla (x. I. 8, xxxiv. II. u), and the
likelihood is that he is using a different source for his schematic
account here from that used in x. r. The most probable identification
for Cocynthus remains the Punta di Stilo, on the Bruttian promontory between Caulonia and the Gulf of Squillace, of which the Punta
forms the southern extremity; this is confirmed by Pliny, Nat. kist.
iii. 95, and by the fact that the Itinerarium Antoninum, u4, records
a place Cocintum, 22 (or I2: the reading is dubious) miles from
Squillacium (~issen, It. Land. ii. 2. 948--9). C. Cocynthus marked the
southern limit of the Ionian sea; but what P. regarded as the corresponding limit on the Epirote coast is not clear.
6. Ti]v 1TO.pa T Tas apKTOUS KO.L Ti]V f1Eaoya.~a.v 1Ta.pa.TelVOuaa.v: 'bordering on the interior to the north'. The wa6yata is the interior of
Europe (cf. iii. 47 I), not the Po valley (so Treves); the Po valley
appears as something new in 7.
1] Twv ~A1rewv 1ra.pwpe~a.: P. makes the Alps begin near Massilia (d.
iii. 47 4). This is not because he includes the hills between the Rhone
and the Var, but because (as 12 makes clear) he believes the plain
of the Po to extend to a point roughly above Massilia, where Alps
and Apennines join ( 8). The same misapprehension appears in
reference to the Anares, who live on the south bank of the Po (17. 7),
and also t.t~ t.taKpav a7To Maaaa>..{a> (32. r). Herod. iv. 49 knows of a
tributary of the Danube called Alpis, and Lye. Alex. 1361 has
I74

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. q. u

Ed)..mo.; otherwise this is the first extant historical reference to the


Alps, which probably attracted notice as a result of Hannibal's
crossing (iii. 47 ff. with references to P.'s predecessors). See Partsch,
RE, 'Alpes', cols. 1599'-I6oo.
Tov Tou 'ITO.VTOOS :.\8p(ou 11ux.6v: i.e. the Gulf of Venice (or more
specifically the Gulf of Trieste}. The gap here mentioned is probably
the coastal strip below the hills of the Carso, which lie parallel to the
shore north-east of Trieste. The Alps were usually reckoned as
running from the junction with the Apennines at the Colle di Cadibona (490 m.), north of the Vada Sabatia (modern Vado) (Cic. Ad
jam. xi. 13 2; Strabo, iv. 2or-2, v. 211; Ptol. Geog. iii. L 40}. to the
Ocra Pass between Aquileia and Emona in the east (Strabo, iv. 202,
207, v. 2ll).
7. apeTfl KO.t p.ey~Oe~ s~a.+~povTa.: 'surpassing in fertility and size'.
For this sense of &.pE"r?) cf. 15. 1, 17. I, iii. 34 2, 34 8, 48. rr, xii. 3 r.
oua. 'II'E'!TTwKev l)'l!'b TTJV ~!LETEpa.v li7Top(a.v: not unambiguous. The
analogy of the use of the phrase in xv. 9 5 and iv. 2. 2 supports the
translation 'which falls within the scope of my history'. But
Schweighaeuser takes it as 'which have fallen within the scope of my
inquiries', i.e. which I know of from autopsy or by report. Either
meaning is appropriate; and perhaps P. does not always closely
distinguish the aspect of collecting material from that of recording
it, when he uses the word l0'7'opla.
8. Tij<; . 'II'Eplypa.+ouutjs ypa.!LJ-Lils: 'of the line enclosing these
plains'. Ko.l is 'likewise'; as well as Italy as a whole, Cisalpine Gaul
is also triangular.
9. e1rt 8lO')(lAtous Ka.t 8~a.Koa(ouo; aTa.8ous: cf. xxxiv. ro. 17 2,200
stades (i.e. about 250 miles) is a serious underestimate. Coelius and
Timagenes reckoned the distance from the Varin Provence to the
Arsia on the east coast of !stria as 975-x,coo milia passuum, which is
excessive unless the watershed is followed (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 132).
Partsch, RE, 'Alpes', col. 16oo.
10. Tov :c\1TEw~vov f.1Tl TPLIYXlA(ouo; ~sa.Kou(ous: the name was originally applied to the range from the Alps to Ancona, and P. was
perhaps the first to use it of the full length of the Apennines (d.
16. 4). Here he is calculating from the supposed junction with the
Alps (see 6 n.) to the point where the Apennines leave the Po plain,
due west of Sena (43" 45' north; cf. n n.); for this distance 3,6oo
stades (4oo miles) is not far out.
11. ~mo 1roAews I~VtJ<;: as in x6. 5 and 19. IJ, Sena Gallica (modem
Sinigaglia) is the southern limit of the plain. Geographically Ariminum, sc miUa passuum farther north, makes a better limit, since
here the spurs of the mountains come close to the sea ; and in
iii. 6I. Il 86. 2, Ariminum iS the last town in the plain (cf. 2I. 5).
But for most of the second century, probably till 133, the political
1

175

II. 14.

II

ROME AND THE GAULS

boundary of Italy was the R. Aesis, between Sena and Ancona; for
the change to the Rubicon see iii. 61. 11 n. Here P. reckons the distance from Sena to the head of the Adriatic (Aquileia?) as about
2,5oo stades (c. 28o miles} ; for a closer estimate in milia passuum
see xxxiv. II. 8 n.
-TYJV 1r<i.aa.v 1repl\ieTpov: his total comes to 8,3oo stades (c. 925 miles).

15. 1. "TE"T"Tclpwv o~ohwv , laoKpL8ov: 'the price of wheat was four


obols per Sicilian medimnus, that of barley two obols, a metretes of
wine costing the same as a medimnus of barley'. A Sicilian medimnus
was c. 5I'5 litres or c. ui gallons (nearly If bushels}, a metretes
c. 8i liquid gallons. In Lusitania, either now or a little later (xxxiv.
8. 7-8), a medimnus of barley cost I drachma (i.e. 6 obols), of wheat 9
(Alexander, i.e. Attic) obols, and a metretes of wine cost a drachma,
here too being laoKpdlov. Mattingly (]RS, 1937. IOI ff.) argues that
P. equates the drachma with 12! asses (rather than Io asses, i.e.
I denarius); but this would imply that P. was reckoning with
Aeginetic drachmas, whereas xxxiv. 8. 7-8 points to the AtticAlexander standard. (Elsewhere (OCD, 'Coinage (Roman)', 210)
Mattingly equates the drachma with the denarius.) In 6 the equation of 2 asses with the obol is probably an approximation, since if
the denarius of Io sextantal asses (introduced about I87 (Mattingly
and Robinson, P BA, I932, 211 ff.) and established by 170 (Mattingly,
]RS, 1945, 76)) was equal to the drachma of 6 obols, t as would
equal 1~ obol, which could easily be translated as t obol. A century
later (Cic. Verr. iii. 72, 84, I74, etc.) the admittedly low price of
Sicilian wheat :fluctuated between 2 and 3 sestertii per modius, i.e.
12 to 18 sestertii per medimttus; this indicates clearly the cheapness
of F.'s figure of 4 obols, i.e. 2f sestertii per medimnus. These north
Italian prices, and the slightly higher ones from Spain, are partly
due to exceptional glut conditions; but in general the low price at
this date is connected with the unfavourable conditions for export,
heavy freight charges, and the Apennine barrier between the Po
valley and Rome, as well as with an undeveloped state of the world
market, which still allowedgreatlocal price-fluctuations. See Hultsch,
RE, 'Frumentum', cols. I46-8; Frank, ES, i. 196; Chilver, 129-30.
On the production of corn in Cisalpine Gaul see iii. 44 8; Strabo,
v. 218; Pliny, Nat. hist. xviii. IOI; Cassiod. Var. xii. 27; Nissen, It.
Land. i. 444 ff.
2. tM\iou yE i!YJ" Ka.t K-yxpou: 'millet and panic'. AvJ.Lo> is Italian
millet, Setaria italica (cf. Theoph. HP, viii. 1. I, I. 4; Dsc. ii. 98),
Ktyxpor; is Panicum miliaceum, common millet (d. Theoph. ibid.;
Dsc. ii. 97). Of the Po valley Strabo writes (v. 2I8} an Sk Kai KEyxpo4>6por; Sta4>pov-rwr; Std -r~v Vuiiplav (perhaps utilizing P.-so Chilver,
I3o-but he gives greater detail).
176

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. I6. a

3. -rrAtwTwv yap .:,iKwv ttpelwv K011'Toj.Lvwv: 'though large numbers


of swine are slaughtered for food'. tEpEtov can be used of any animal
slaughtered for human consumption; cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4 17 (of
game).
8~6, TE Tn!l , TrClpa.&to-E~!l: 'for the feeding both Of private individuals
and of the army'. The abstract meaning 'provisioning' (so Ernesti;
cf. P. Petr. 3, p. 133 (3rd cent. B.c.)) seems more appropriate here
than 'stores, storehouses' (Schweighaeuser, cf. iii. 102. ro).
4. Til!l KTn j.Llpos tuwvla.s KTA.: 'the cheapness of each separate
article of food'.
5. otJ uuj.L+wvouvn~; 11'epl. Twv t<T<i j.Ltpo~; ETr~TtJiiE1wv: for the normal
custom of presenting a bill enumerating the separate items cf. CIL,
ix. z689 (from Aesernia in Samnium}. On the price for full board, and
its Greek equivalent, see above, 1 n.
8. T'l!l k-rrt Tov 'Po!ia.vov 11'oTj.LOV veuoUO"I)<>: for further details of
the course of the Rhone see ill. 47 1-5. 49; Strabo, iv. r83--6. P.
correctly describes it as flowing along the north side of the Alps
(before it turns south at Lyons).
T a.upiut<o~ Ki. 'Aywves: the Taurisci (d. 28. 4, 30. 6) are identical with
the Taurini of iii. 6o. 8 and xxxiv. ro. 18, and distinct from the
Taurisd who inhabited the eastern Alps near Aquileia (xxxiv. ro.
IO); cf. Steph. Byz., s.v. Ta.vplaH:Ot, 8vos 1Tp~ TU :4A?T0. op'Yj. Alyoncu
~eal Tavptvo,, ~s IIo>.vfJtos TplTt.p. They inhabited modern Piedmont,
especially the valleys of the Dora Riparia, Stura, and Orco, and
have given their name to Turin. Strabo, iv. 204 and Pliny, Nat. hist.
iii. 123 made them Ligurian, but toP. they were Celts (cf. iii. 6o. 8);
and this is confirmed by their place-names. There were, however,
several Ligurian 'pockets' among them. DeSanctis, i. 62 n. 3; Nissen,
It. Land. i. 468 ff.; Philipp, RE, 'Taurini'; Fluss, RE, 'Taurisci'. The
Agones are otherwise unknown; but their name may have survived
in that of the R. Agunia (modern Agogna), which runs into the Po
on the left bank, west of the Ticino; if so the Agones may have dwelt
around Novara and the Valdossola. De Sanctis, iii. I. 305 n. 103;
Nissen, It. Land. ii. 173.
16. 1. A~yuO"T'ivo~ KTOtKoua~: on the geography see above 14. 6 n.,
14. ro n. The Ligurians were an Indo-European-speaking people,
whose earlier territories may have been quite considerable, but who
in historical times inhabited the Alpes mar#imae and their coast,
the mountains surrounding the upper waters of the Po, and the
northern Apennines.
2. flEXP~ 1r6Atw<; nl<rrJii KTA.: the origins of Pisa are disputed. Its
Ligurian origin (Iustin. xx. I. u) was questioned by Cato (Seru. ad
Aen. x. 179, 'qui Pisas tenuerint ante aduentum Etruscorum negat
sibi compertum'). Lycophron (Alex. 1359) also attests the Etruscan
N

177

IL 16.

:t

ROME AND THE GAULS

domination, but of it little is kno>vn. As a frontier town and natural


operational base for Roman armies attacking the Ligurians it was
counted part of Italy, and so of Etruria, perhaps from z8r onwards;
cf. 27. r. DeSanctis, iii. r. 290 n. 6o; Banti, RE, 'Pisae', cols. 1756 ff.
ews TTJS J\ppTJTlVWV xwpa.s: Arretium, modern Arezzo, lies besid~ the
watershed between Arno, Tiber, and Chiana, half-way between
Florence and Perugia, on the Umbrian march. See Nissen, It. Land.
ii. 315. Arretium was one of the twelve original cities of Etruria.
3. ~sT\s Sf: TuppTJvol: the Etruscans, who gave their name to the
Tyrrhenian sea, inhabited the region within the rivers Arno and
Tiber, from Pisa to the Tiber mouth.
1'oo-.ms Sf: cruvExeis "OJ.L~po~: the Umbrians were an Italian people
to whom, like the Ligurians, tradition accredited much wider bounds
than those they occupied in historical times (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii.
rr2; Dian. Hal. i. rg. r; DeSanctis, i. roz). Strabo (v. 214) and Pliny
(Nat. hist. iii. ns) make the Adriatic coastal towns of Ravenna and
Butrium Umbrian; and some \vriters placed the Metaurus in Umbria
(cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 565). Further, the existence of a R. Umbra
and a tractus Umbriae (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 51), together with other
evidence (cf. P. Ducati, Le problilme itrusque (Paris, 1938), 66-68)
points to their having once inhabited what was later Etruria. To
P., however, the Umbrians are an inland people dwelling between
the Tiber and the Apennines in an area which embraces the valleys
on either side of the range. Nissen, It. Land. i. soz-8.
4. a1TEXWV TTJS KO.T0. 1'0V :ASpla.v 9a.Acl.TTT)S KT~.: 500 stades are just
under 6o miles. P. exaggerates the abruptness in this change of
direction. From the beginning of the Apennines above Genoa as far
as Iguvium (Gubbio) and the head-waters of the Tiber and Metaurus
the direction is fairly consistently south-east; the range then broadens
and runs slightly east of south to the latitude of Rome, after which
it breaks up into a series of massifs continuing to Reggio di Calabria.
P.'s account places the angle north of Sena Gallica; it is in fact well
to the south of that latitude.
5. 1rl. OaAa.TTa.v Ka.t 1ro~LV I1\VTjv: on Sena as P.'s southern
coastal limit to the plain of the Po see q. I I n.
6-15. This detailed description of the l)o is the earliest extant,
accurate, account. The name Eridanus was originally given to a
fabulous amber-producing river of north Europe (Herod. iii. rrs),
which Aeschylus fg. 73 (Pliny, Nat. hist. xxxvii. 32) identified
with the Rhone. Later, under the influence of Pherecydes (FGH,
3 F 33 c), Aeschylus transferred the Eridanus to the area of the Po
(cf. Pliny, .Nat. his!. xxxvii. 31); and to many later \vriters (cf.
Strabo, v. us) it remains 1TA"f)crlov TOV Ild.oou. It was probably Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 627) who first identified the Eridanus with the
Po, perhaps misled by Euripides (Hippol. 735 ff.) into imagining a
178

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 16. ro

bifurcation of Rhone and Po. For the legends attached to the


Eridanus (and so to the Po) see Ps.-Scyl. 20, Ps.-Scymn. 395 ff.,
Diod. v. 23. 3 For full discussion see Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols.
2179 ff. R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 197, is misleading.
6 . .)vo Twv rroLTjTWV 9puhouJ.LVos: cf. iv. 70. 8 (on the Erymanthus). P. is hinting at the myth of Phaethon and his sisters( 13 ff.).
The story is told by Hesiod (fg. 199 Rzach), but P. is probably not
referring directly to his version. More probably his criticisms are
aimed at sensational historians who retailed this material borrowed
from the poets; cf. 17 6 n. See CQ, 1945, 8 n. s. and, against von Scala
(73, Son. 2}, Wunderer (ii. 45-46}.
EXEl J.LEv Tas v11yas arro Twv 1-.A.vEwv: on the course of the Po see
Nissen (It. Land. i. 183-91). It rises in a boggy valley, the Piano del
Re (1,952 m.) at the foot of Monte Viso (Mons Vesulus).
voLOUJ.LEVOS Tijv puow ws evl. J.LE<TllJ.L~pLa.v: as far as Industria, at the
confluence with the Dora Baltea, the general direction is north-east,
and subsequently east. Either P. has been misled by his overschematic triangle, with the Po rising at its apex, or he has confused
the Dora Baltea with the head-waters of the Po (so Philipp, RE,
'Padus', col. 2186).
7. 8ucr~ O'TOj.LO.O'LV: cf. iii. 86. 2. Until c. A.D. nso the Po flowed into
the Adriatic through two channels, which divided near Ferrara, after
receiving the tributaries Panaro and Reno. Of these channels the
more northerly was called the Po di Volano, the more southerly the
Po di Primaro; and between lay the Lagoon of Cornacchia. About
A.D. nso the inhabitants of Ficarolo, near Stellata, dug a ditch
drawing off the waters into a new channel to the north, the modern
Po della Maestra. As a result, the Po di Volano, the main channel
in P.'s time, has become a mere drainage dyke for the surrounding
marshes ; and the Po di Primaro has been annexed to form a new
bed for the Reno, which now makes a separate exit into the sea.
Nissen, It. Land. i. 190 f.; Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2189 ff. (map
in cols. 2183-4).
8. O.rrO.cra.s t<a.i. rra.vTa.xo9Ev: in fact several rivers, such as the Adige,
the Brenta, and the rivers of Venezia, have separate mouths. But
P. aims at broad simplification for a largely Greek public to whom
this region is wholly unfamiliar.
9. rrt:pl. t<uvos ivLToATjv: cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. n7, 'augetur ad canis
ortus liquatis niuibus'. On the rising of the dog-star see above,
i. 37 5 n.; it occurs about 28 July (Gregorian).
10. tca.Ta To crn)f-La. To Ka.Aouf-LEvov "OXa.va.: this is the northern
mouth, the Po di Volano. z,ooo stades are nearly 240 miles, and
take one to the Tanarus (Tanaro). Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. II7-18, 123)
counts the Po navigable from Turin downwards, but he may be
following an earlier source, since Strabo (v. :!17) seems to suggest
I79

II.

I6. IO

ROME AND THE GAULS

that navigability began at Placentia. Nowadays the Po is usually


reckoned as navigable from Casale. Cf. Philipp, RE, 'Padus', col. 2r88.
11. KO.Tu Touo;; ttpoaayopEuofJkvouo;; T pLya~oAouo;;: otherwise unknown,
but dearly in the neighbourhood of Ferrara. Nissen, It. Land. i. 205,
ii. 21J f.
To .,.iv llTEpov . naSOa: the name Padua or Padusa was applied to
the Po di Primaro, and more specifically (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii.
119 ff.) to a branch of it which diverged south-east from Spina to
Ravenna, and was also known as the ostium M essanicum. On the
Padua (Padusa) see Catullus (95 7-8),
'at Volusi annales Paduam morientur ad ipsam
et laxas scombris saepe dabunt tunicas',
and Virgil (Aen. xi. 457),
'piscosoue amne Padusae
dant sonitum rauci per stagna loquacia cycni'.
See Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2179, 2191-2; 'Padusa', cols. 2292-3.
12. B68Ey~eos: on the authority of Metrodorus of Scepsis, Pliny (Nat.
kist. iii. 122) states that the name is Ligurian and means ]undo
caretts; thus Bodincomagus is an older name for Industria, ubi
praecipua altitudo incipit (but magus is Celtic). Bodincus was evidently the Ligurian name for the upper waters of the Po (cf. CIL,
vi. 2613), while farther down it bore the Celtic, or more probably
Venetie, name of Padus. See Weiss, RE, 'Ligures', coL sz6; Philipp,
RE, 'Padus', cols. 2178-9; Nissen, It. Land. i. r83.
13-15. The story of Phaethon; place of myth in history. Above, 6.
The story of Phaethon, his death from Jove's thunderbolt while
driving the chariot of his father the sun-god, and the metamorphosis
of his sisters into poplars and their tears into amber {cf. Ovid,
M etam. ii. 364-{)), is found with variants from the time of Hesiod,
and was widely treated by writers and poets (Diod. v. 23). See the
discussion by Wilamowitz, Hermes, r8SJ, 3--434; C. Robert, ibid.,
434-41; G. Turk, RE, 'Phaethon', cols. rsoS ff. These stories P. (like
Strabo, v. 215) considers inappropriate to history. But so too did
Timaeus, if he is the source of Diodorus' account (cf. Diod. v. 23. 5;
Mullenhoff, i. 474-6); and in fact P.'s attack on Timaeus ( rs) is
for his ignorance of the area, not for sensationalism (cf. Pedech,
LEC, I956, 19 n. sS). For P.'s stress on the distinction between
tragedy and history see further iv. 40. 2 n.; 1 HS, 1938, s6 ff. and CQ,
1945, 8 ff., and the passages there quoted.
13. Touc; jlEAavE(.,.ovo.o;;: Treves suggests an ironical echo of Timaeus'
poetical vocabulary; but though Aeschylean (Eumen. 370), the word
appears later in prose, in Dionysius and Iosephus, and may well
have lost its poetical flavour by P.'s time.
180

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. l7.

14. TTJV Tpa.yuc-T)v Ka.l. Ta.uTfi 1rpoaeoLKu'i:a.v 6:\11v: 'material of a tragic


character and similar to this legend'.
T~ Tfj~ 1rpoKa.Ta.aKEufjo; ykvf:L: 'the character of my introduction'.
The rrpo~<:a.Ta.a~<:ev~ covers books i-ii (i. 3 ro), and being written
summarily (i. 13. 8, ii. 14. r) affords no space for detailed polemic
(a~<p,f3o>.oyia) against 'tragic historians'. Paton misses the sense.
15. SLa TTJV TLfLa.tou ilyvoLa.v: if P. reverted to the subject in his
polemic against Timaeus in book xii, the passage has not survived.
On Timaeus see i. 5 r n.

17. 1. To 1ra.Aa.Lov Evk11ovTo Tupp11voC: the problem of Etruscan


origins still arouses violent controversy. Herodotus (i. 94) brought
them from Asia Minor, and they themselves accepted this version;
cf. Tac. Ann. iv. 55 Dionysius, on the other hand (i. 27-30), claimed
them as autochthonous. Modern views are surveyed by R. S. Conway
(CAH, iv. 383 ff.), who favours an eastern origin, by H. Last (CAH.
vii. 379 ff.), who makes them a mixture of autochthonous elements
\\ith Indo-European immigrants from the north, and by DeSanctis
(i. 124 ff., 429 ff.), who supports the theory of northern immigration.
For a short summary see Scullard, Hist. 15 f.. and, for a complete
survey of the history of the problem and the evidence, P. Ducati,
Le probteme itrusqtw (Paris, 1938). Ducati argues that the Etruscans
are a mixture of native Umbrians using the Villanovan iron-age
technique with Tynhenians who brought Aegean cults, culture, and
language by sea from Asia Minor. But a recent theory of C. F. Hawkes
(Proc. Prehist. Soc., 1948, 205-r6), brings down the date of the Iron
Age in Italy to after the arrival of the Etruscans about 8oo, and
attributes the impulse of it to them. M. Pallottino, The Etruscans
(London, 1955), 46-73, restates the problem as one of ethnic formation out of mixed elements within Etruria. Livy (v. 33 7) describes
the Etruscan advance north over the Apennines into the Po valley,
and this was apparently about 525. The Etruscans occupied Felsina
(Bologna) and spread to Parma, Mantua, and Melpum (near Milan),
and to the Adriatic at Atria and Spina in the Po mouth; but their
domination was interrupted by the coming of the Gauls about 450
(cf. DeSanctis, ii. I59-<io). Archaeological remains, inscriptions, and
folk-traditions survive as testimony to the civilization they established north of the Apennines.
Ka.9' otlo;

xpovou~ Ka.t

Ta

4>Xypa.uJ. TB 'lrEpl

Ka.'lr~"lV

KO.L NwA"lv:

the Etruscans' advance south was in the late seventh century.


Seizing Rome they went by the Liris valley into Campania, and
there founded a league of twelve cities (Strabo, v. 242). In particular
their presence is attested at Nola and Capua (which they are said
to have founded: Veil. Pat. i. 7 (contrast Cato, fg. 69 Peter) ; Strabo,
ibid.; d. Heurgon, 62 ff.), at Herculaneum and Pompeii (Strabo,
I8I

II. I7.

ROME AND THE GAULS

v. 246-7), and at :Macrina, which they founded on the Gulf of Salerno


(Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 7o). But in 524 they were defeated by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. HaL vii. 3-n); and their sway in Latium was
broken, traditionally in 509, with the expulsion of the Tarquins from
Rome. On this sec Altheim, Epochcn, i. 89 ff.
To later writers the Phlegraean plain is the volcanic area between
Cumae, the Gulf of Pozzuoli, and the Gulf of Naples; but P. understands the whole Campanian plain. See iii. 91. 7, where the Phlegraean
plain leads to a discussion of the story of the battle of the gods 7ra.pil
"TOL> p:v9oyparpou,, just as the Padane plain brought up criticism of
the story of Phaethon. Here, too, Timaeus is the source; see Diod.
iv. 21. 7, d. v. 71. 4; :Nissen, It. Land. i. 267. The ferti]ity of the plain
is attested by Strabo (v. 243).
3. itc f.Htcpiis vpoTaaEws: P. appears to recall the story recorded {and
rejected) by Livy (v. 33 1-4; cf. Plut. Cam. IS; Dion. HaL xiii. 10-n;
Cato, fg. 36 Peter), that the Gauls were :first brought into Cisalpine
Gaul by a man from Clusium, named Arruns, who showed them
wine, figs, and olives, to enlist their aid against the Lucumo, who
had seduced his wife. This story implies a date a little before the
capture of Rome in 390; but the movement of Sabellian peoples down
the highlands towards Campania from c. 450 onwards suggests Gallic
penetration of north Italy by then (cf. DeSanctis, ii. r61). However,
Livy's account of a series of invasions from the time of Tarquinius
Priscus (v. 34; cf. lustin. xx. s. xxiv. 4) is a tissue of inaccuracies;
see Meyer (v. 151 ff.), and de Navarro (CAH, vii. 6off.), who discusses
the invasion in the light of archaeology.
4. 'II'Ept TclS &.va.ToAas TOV n6.8ou: 'near the source of the Po'. Paton
confusedly adds a reference to the east.
A6.m teat AE(3EKlOt . "lvao~pES: the Aaot are probably the Laeui of
Livy (v. 35 z) and Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 124), though to Pliny they are
Ligurians. The AE{31Kwt will then be the Libui of Livy (ibid. ; d.
Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124, Libicii; Ptol. Geog. iii. 1. 32). These tribes
inhabited the valleys of the lower Ticinus and the Sesites (modern
Sesia) respectively; Vercellae was the capital of the Libicii (Pliny,
Nat. hist. iii. 124). P.'s description of these tribes as the first ncar the
source of the Po supports the view (cf. 16. 6 n.) that he identified
the Dora Baltea with this source. The Insubres, one of the most
important tribes of the plain, had their capital at Mediolanum (cf.
34 10), and Philipp has argued (RE, 'Insubres', col. 1590) that they
controlled several neighbouring peoples, including the Laevi and the
Anares (cf. 7). This might explain how the Laevi, a Ligurian
people, are reckoned here as Celts, and also why Ptolemy (Geog. iii.
r. 29) counts their capital, Ticinum, an lnsubrian town. See Nissen,
It. Land. ii. 177-fJ P. makes the Insubres neighbours of the Taurini
(iii. 6o. 8).
182

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 17. 7

rovojl6.Vo': the Cenomani (d. Livy, v. 34-35; Strabo, V. 216; Ptol.


Geog. iii. I. 27) dwelt rather closer to the Alps than P. suggests. Their
lands stretched from the Ollius (Oglio) to the Athesis (Adige), and
their towns were Brixia, Verona, Cremona, and {according to
Ptolemy) Bergamum, Mantua, and Tridentum. See Nissen, It. Land.
ii. 195 f.; Hiilsen, RE, 'Cenomani (3)', cols. r899-rgoo.
5. Oa:.tveTol: the Veneti dwelt between the Adige, the Po, the
Adriatic, and {to the east) the lower waters of the Tagliamento
(Tiliaventus); to the north they reached the Alps. See Strabo, v. 214;
Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 126; Nissen, It. Land. i. 488 ff.; De Sanctis, i.
155 ff.; Whatmough, Foundations, I7I-8J. Our knowledge of Venetie
derives largely from funerary and votive inscriptions, and its origins
are still debated; the view that it is akin to lllyrian (cf. R. S. Conway,
The Prae-ItaUc Dialects, i (London, 1933), I-2oi), is now generally
rejected (cf. 1\-L S. Beeler, The Venetie Language (Berkeley 1949);
H. Crabe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1950, 3, 'Das Venetische', P. Kretschmer, Glotta, 1943, 134-68; recent survey in M. Lejeune, Rev. phil.,
1951, 202-4). The first arrival of Venetie culture in Italy is usually
dated about rooo B.C. ; see Ninck, 178.
6. ot Tpay't'SlGyp6.cl>oL: 'tragic poets', as in iii. 48. 8 (with similar
criticism). However, P. usually employs the word TEpaTela. in connexion with 'tragic' historians (d. ii. 58. 12, 59 3, iii. 58. 9, xv. 34 1),
and in vii. 7 I the whole phrase rroAvv rwa . TEpa.Tdav is repeated
of historians who have written sensational accounts of Hieronymus
of Syracuse. Here too, then, P. may be hinting at historians,
(cf. Wunderer, ii. s6-57). One legend of this area brought
Antenor from Troy, along with the Eneti of Paphlagonia, to found
Patavium (cf. Strabo, v. 212, xiii. 6o8; Virg. Aett. i. 242 ff. (with
Servius); Livy, i. I; DeSanctis, i. rs6-7) but P. may also be thinking
o[ some of the current 'wonder-tales', of hens that laid twice a day,
sheep that lambed twice a year, with huge litters, the fifty towns
of the Veneti, and the richness of the soil (:\issen, It. Land. i. 492).
7. 1l.vapes: cf. 32. r, 34 5 The MSS. give a variety of forms, and
"AvapEs- is due to Mommsen (RG, 554 and 558); recently G. Patroni
(Rend. Ac.ltalia, 4, 1942-3, uo-23) has defended 'Ananes'. Mommsen
(CIL, v, p. 828) suggested an identification with the Marici, who
helped to found Ticinum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124); but the Anares
lived south of the Po between it and the Trebia. See Philipp, RE,
'Massalia (z)', cols. 2152-3 {with the criticism below, 32. In.); Hiilsen,
RE, 'Anamares', cols. 2055-6; Mullenhoff, ii. 251"
BoioL Alyyow.:s Itjvwves: Livy (v. 35 z) relates how the
Boii crossed the Great St. Bernard (Poeninus), found the area between the Po and the Alps inhabited, and crossed the river to seize
modern Emilia, where they occupied Felsinaandrenamed it Bononia;
cf. Ruge, RE, 'Boii (r)', cols. 630 ff. (with details of other branches
I

183

II. I7. 7

ROME AND THE GAULS

in Germany). At the same time the Lingones, a branch of a people

dwelling about the head-waters of the Marne, Meuse, and Saone,


took the low land south of the Po towards Ravenna and Ariminum.
The Senones, a branch of those established between the Loire and
the Seine, reached Italy last (Livy, v. 35 3) and occupied the socalled ager Gallicus on the coast between Ravenna and Sena Gallica, driving the Umbrians into the Apennines. On their later clash with
Rome see 19. 10. Cf. Keune and Philipp, RE, 'Senones', cols. 1474 ff.
9. Til'> Aol"'l"ij<; K:a.TaaKEuils O.!loLpol: 'without knowledge of the other
arts of civilization'. For this sense of KaTaa'KEtnJ, 'instruction, acquired
skill. culture' (not in LSJ) cf. xi. 8. I, rijs EK Tot.bov (nuv 07TDJkVTjttchwv)
KaTaG'KEv~s, 'lessons from memoirs'. Paton's translation 'furniture'
is derived from that of Schweighaeuser (corrected in the Lex. Polyb.).
P. means 'civilized arts other than building walled towns' (implied
from the previous phrase). On the primitive culture of the Gauls
see C. J ullian, i. 36o ff.
10. To aTL~a.8oK:oLTE'iv: 'lying on litter', i.e. to eat as well as sleep.
Cf. Strabo, iii. 155 (of the Spanish Bastetani); Diod. v. :28 (of the
Transalpine Gauls). Diodorus (ibid.) also mentions their meateating; d. Poseidonius ap. Athen. iv. 151.
oih' E"'I"WTTJ!lTJS oun ToEXVTJ'>: an exaggeration, as Treves observes.
The Gauls had considerable skill in metallurgy; d. 33 below; Diod.
v. 27 for gold ornaments.
11. KD.T<l T<i<; "11"Epurr0.UELS K:a.Tci Til.<; a.&ridv "'!"poa.LpEO'U<;: 'whatever
their circumstances ... to suit their choice'. On the former phrase
see Strachan-Davidson, II-I2.
12. Ta<; E"Ta.LpEia.s: 'a following'; cf. Caesar, BG, vi. 12. 2, 'hi cum
per se minus ualerent, quod summa auctoritas antiquitus erat in
Aeduis magnaeque eorum erant clientelae .. .'. On the importance
attributed to their following by the Gauls see Caesar, BG, i. 4 :z;
vi. rs. :2; E. Norden, Die germanische Urgeschichte in Tacitus' Germania (Leipzig, 1920), 1:24-7 The translation 'comradeship' (Paton)
or 'friendship' (Shuckburgh) misses the point.
18-35. The Gallic Wars. 18-:20 cover the earlier conflicts (390-282),
:21-35 those from 237 to :2:2r including the tumultt~s of 225. The source
for most of this is probably Fabius Pictor (cf. i. r4. 1 n.), who himself
took part in the war of :225 (cf. Oros. iv. IJ. 6, qui eidem bella interfuit); consequently P. reproduces Fabius' tendency to depict the
Romans as the victims of aggression, and acting in self-defence. See
DeSanctis, iii. r. 305 n. 103; Leuze, Jahrziihltlng, 142-5; Beloch, RG,
139-40; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 147; Bung, 151 ff. (who, however, argues
for the use of other sources besides Fahius).
18. 1. Ta<; 6.pxns: i.e. the first invasion of Cisalpine Gaul, in the
second half of the fifth century.
184

ROME

A~D

THE GAULS

II. 18.6

2. 1-uml. 8 Twa. xpovov KT)..: on F.'s date (387/6) see i. 6. 1-2, and
below, 22. 5 n.; and on the Gallic catastrophe in general Meyer
(Kl. Schr. ii. 307 ff.), L. Homo (CAH, vii. 554 ff., with misleading
remarks on F.'s sources), F. Schachenneyr (Klio, 1930, 277-305), and
Altheim (Epochen, i. 163 ff.). F.'s account, based on Fabius, heads
the tradition. Diodorus (xiv. IIJ-I4) probably gives the early annalistic tradition (but not Fabius, as Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297 ff.)
argued). The later versions in Livy (v. 33-55), Plutarch's Camillus,
and Dionysius, Appian, and Dio, build up the figure of Camillus,
who is unimportant in Diodorus, and wholly omitted by Polybius
(cf. Momigliano, CQ, 1942, III ff.).
Tous I'T<1 TooTwv wa.pa.Ta.~a.l'evous : no other source mentions allies
at the Allia, but later tradition may well have preferred to mitigate
the disaster by stressing Roman isolation. On the battle of the Allia
(I8 July, a dies nefastus) see Homo (CAH, vii. 561 ff.), and De
Sanctis (ii. x66 ff.). To Homo's bibliography on the problem of the
battle-site (ibid. 920) add Kromayer (AS, iv. 449 ff.) and Schachermeyr (Klio, I9JO, 277 ff.), both favouring the left bank.
TpLat rijs l'a.XTIS ~p,epa.ls uO'Tpov ~ so too Diodorus (xiv. us: with
exclusive reckoning), Plutarch (Cam. 22) and Verrius Flaccus (in
Gell. v. 17. 2). Only Livy (v. 4I. 4) enlivens the story by making the
Gauls reach Rome the next day. Later legends elaborated the defence
of the Capitol (Livy, v. 43 r ff., 47 Iff.); but perhaps no serious
attempt was made against it (DeSanctis, ii. 175-6).
3. T~v 0llvTwv E:l'f3a.MvTWv: the authenticity of this attack, otherwise unattested, has been questioned; and Livy (v. 48. I) makes a
pestilence among the Gauls play a similar role in drawing them
off. But such an attack is quite plausible, and no more of a
coincidence than the Illyrian invasion which drew Antigonus Doson
north after Sellasia (below, 7o. 1). Whether true or not, the story
belongs to an earlier layer of the tradition than that which emphasizes Camillus' last-minute rescue (cf. Livy, v. 49).
wot,a6.1'VOL auv&'Y]Ka.s wpos 'Pwl'a.(ous: cf. i. 6. 3 n. for the ransom.
which was probably paid; for the Gallic claim see below, 22. 5
4. 9c;wpouvns tK wapa.9aws: 'observing from close at hand' (d.
17 3) or 'witnessing in comparison with their own' (cf. i. 86. 7 and
passim); a small distinction since proximity encourages comparison.
5. TO. K(lTcl Tovs AaTlvous a09Ls wpciyl'aTa. auvt:O'Tftaa.VTo: see i. 6.
4-6n.
6. ~TL TpLa.KoO'T~: the chronology of the fourth-century Gallic wars
is difficult. It may perhaps be assumed (though not with certainty)
(a) that F.'s intervals refer to consul years (not Olympiad years, as
Leuze, ]ahrzahlung. 125, argues), (b) that, as in i. 6. 2, l'. is here
making 387/6 the date of the seizure of Rome, (c) that he identifies
the Attic year 387/6 with the consul year 386 (cf. De Sanctis, i.
185

II. 18. 6

ROME AND THE GAULS

13 n. z). The intervals listed between the Gallic debacle and Sentinum in 295 (19. 5), viz. 30 I2
add Up to only 89 years,
whereas from 386 to 295 should be 91 years. The problem is therefore
twofold, (a) to account for the two missing years, (b) to reconcile
P.'s date of 386 for the Gallic attack with the Varronian 390. For
discussion see Niese (Hennes, 1878, 401-r3), L"nger (Hermes, r879,
77--92), Seeck (ibid.
Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297-38r),
Leuze (]ahrzahlung, r2o--45), De Sanctis (ii. 259-6o; cf. i. r3 n. 2),
Beloch (RG, 132-43, 314). The four years' discrepancy between the
Polybian and Varronian dates for the capture of Rome may be due
either to the omission by Polybius' source of the four years in which
dictators and their magistri equitum appear as eponymous in the
Fasti, viz. 333, 324, 309, and 301 (Livy omits these years), or to the
expansion of one year's 'anarchy' to five in the annalistic account of
the Licinio-Sextian rogations (viz. 375-371, cf. Livy, vi. 34-42; De
Sanctis, ii. 214). Diodorus (xv. 75 r) records only one year's O.va.pxta;
but there is no reason to associate his version of the annals with
Fabius. Consequently either explanation must be regarded as possible. The two missing years are explained by Beloch on the assumption that the date 387/6 for the capture of Rome came from Timaeus
(d. i. 6. 2 n.), but that Fabius put it in 384. In fact, Fabius' date is
not known for certain; but if he dated the first plebeian consul (366)
twenty-two years after the Gallic capture (Gell. v. 4 3, duouicesimo),
he can hardly have put the latter in 384. In 19. 5-7 P. reckons the
interval between Sentinum and the appearance of the Gauls at
Arretium as ten years; it was in reality eleven (295-284). This suggests that P.'s figures may in some cases represent a round number,
or be based on a reckoning which excludes both terms; but if so, he
is not himself awake to the discrepancy, and no distinction is to be
made between such phrases as lnt rptaKocrr(j> (r8. 6) and lrYJ Tptd.KoV"Ta.
(r9. r) (so Leuze, ]ahrzahlung, 125). Correlation with Livy and the
triumphal Fasti is of little use, since Livy at least contains frequent
doublets and improvisations. In these circumstances the following
table is merely one possible arrangement of the data:
Reference
Capture of Rome
r8. 2

Gauls before Alba


Gauls invade and retire
Peace made
Successful invasion

299

Sentinum .
Gauls at Arretium

295
284

331

18. 6 ~TL TpLaKOCfT{j>


18. 7 <TEL 8wDEKO.Tlfl
r8. 9 rpLaKalD<Ka eTYJ
19. I ETYJ rpHiKovra. (a round
figure?)
19. 5 ET<L T<Taprlfl
19. 7 Jrwv SlKa (sic)

Livy records no Gallic invasion in 356; but the ravaging of the


ager Albanus in 36o (Lh'Y, vii. rr. 3) is thirty years after his date for
r86

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. I9. 5

the seizure of Rome, and may refer to this expedition if P.'s chronology has omitted the four 'dictator-years'.
7. t~ ~TrL~oA.1ls ~TEpa.s: 'making another attempt'. This third invasion, forty-two years after the capture of Rome, has nothing
corresponding in Livy. However, Livy (vii. 23-24) records an invasion in 350, and the act. tr. assign a triumph to the consul M.
Popillius Laenas [de G]alleis; and Beloch has suggested (RG, 137-8)
a confusion with Popillius' next consulship in 348 (Beloch prefers
Diodorus' date, 347) for the invasion. If the four 'dictator-years'
are omitted, 348 becomes 344, which would fit P. But this is highly
hypothetical.
9. Tpmt<a.8et<a. ~TTJ T~v ftO'uxa.v ~O'xov: viz. 344-331. Livy has no
record of the peace which was now concluded; and attempts to link
this date with the reports of a tumultus in 332 and 329 (Livy, viii.
I7. 6, 20. 2) are unsuccessfuL The growth of Roman power resulted
from the Latin War (J40-JJ8) and the dissolution of the Latin
League (i. 6. 4 n.).
19. l. ~TTJ TpL6.t<ovTa. jLEva.vTES E1!1TE8ws: the attack which ended this
peace was four years before Sentinum ( 2-5), and this was in 295.
In 299 Livy (x. ro. 12) speaks of ajama Gallici tumultus which came
to nothing. \Vhether or no this is a distorted reference to the Gallic
campaign which P. here describes (so Beloch, RG, IJJ), it seems
likely that 299 is the date of the latter, and that here P.'s thirty
years represent a round number.
3. 1repi T~v Twv ELATJ!LilEvoov 1rAeove~a.v: 'for the larger share of the
spoils'. DeSanctis (ii. 350) suggests that the destruction of the Gallic
forces and their spoils is a Roman version designed to point to the
action of Nemesis; but Gallic indulgence in drinking was a well.
known trait (cf. Jullian, i. 342).
5. Tr6.Aw ~TEL TET6.pn~,>: in 295, the decisive year of the Third Samnite
War. Cf. Livy, x. 20 ff.
Ia.uv'i:Ta.L t<a.1 r a.A6.Ta.L: on the Samnites see i. 6. 4 n. If Etruscans and
Umbrians took part in the coalition (Diod. xxi. 6), it was on a very
small scale: see Adcock (CAH, vii. 612). The view of Beloch (RG,
421 ff.), followed by Philipp (RE, 'Sabini', coL 1579; 'Samnites', cols.
2147-8), that the Sabines, not the Samnites, took part in this movement, is contradicted
Duris (in Tzetzes, and Lycophron, Alex.
IJ78), P., and Livy,
to be rejected.
Ev TTI Ka.11epToov xti!p~: faced by the risk of a Samnite break-through
to the north to join the Gauls, and the uncertainty whether the
united force would then advance through Etruria gaining
or
march directly on Rome, the Romans split their forces, and sent an
advance force ahead under L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus, while the
main army moved on Camerinum, a likely rallying point for Gauls
187

II. 19.5

ROME AND THE GAULS

and Samnites on the east slope of the Apennines in south Umbria.


It was the advance-party which was defeated. Livy (x. 25. u,
26. 7 ff.) has transferred this battle to Clusium in Etruria, qtwd
Camars olim appellabant (25. n); but his account, which contains
other inaccuracies, cannot stand against that of P. Cf. De Sanctis
(ii. 355 n. 2), Beloch (RG, 440) and Adcock (CAH, vii. 6r2).
6. TrpoatlAovuc-ljaa.V"rES 1rpos -ro EAa-r-rw11a.: 'displaying a victorious
spirit in the face of the reverse'.
~v -rfi -r<71v IEV"rWO.TWV xwp~: Sentinum lay on the eastern slope of the
Apennines on a tributary of the Aesis, about 30 miles north of
Camerinum. The Romans employed the two consular armies of
Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus, four legions in all
(1riic~ -rofs- a-rpa-ro'tTtOots), some JO,ooo-J6,ooo men. This victory over
the 'last resistance of Italian particularism' (De Sanctis) became
famous in popular tradition, especially for the deuotio of Decius Mus
(cf. Munzer, RE, 'Decius (16)', col. 2284).
7. lha.yEvo!L~vwv 8e TraAlv ETwv 8~Ka.: the Fasti and Livy (ep. 12; cf.
Oros. iii. 22. 13) agree in making L. Caecilius MetellusDenter consul in
284, but attribute his death to a praetorship in 283. Mommsen (Rom.
Forsch. ii. 365-77) analysed the tradition and showed how the events
of Caecilius' consulship were transferred to a supposed praetorship
in 283, in the interest of a patriotic compression. This analysis
(which is not superseded by a brief and misdated reference in St.-R.
ii. 195 n. r) has persuaded both De Sanctis (ii. 376 n. 2) and Beloch
(RG, 133) to reject Livy; and indeed rrrpa:rr;yos is consul in P. (see
Lex. Pol_vb. s.v.). Against the annalistic version is the unusual
appointment ofM'. CuriusDentatus as what would be praetor suffectus
( 8), if in fact Caecilius was praetor, whereas in P.'s account his
appointment will be as consul suffectus (see further 8 n.). (In itself,
Caecilius' military command as praetor would not be unparalleled
at this date; cf. Broughton (i. r88-9), adducing the case of Ap.
Claudius Caecus, who held a military command as praetor in 295.)
That P. took Caecilius to be consul in 284, and not praetor in 283,
is shown by the present reference to ten years, which can be applied
to the period 295-284, by the exclusion of both terms, but hardly
to 295-283.
r a.XO.-ra.l . TrOAlOpK~O"OVTES Ti]v :A.pp"lTLVWV 11'0AlV: the Senones,
as the later narrative shows. On Arretium see 16. 2 n. Avoiding
Umbria, the Senones had traversed the Apennines to win allies in
Etruria.
8. AeuKou -rEAEU'I'Tjaa.V"ros: he had two legions (Oros. iii. 22. IJI4) and lost seven military tribunes and IJ,ooo men. The defeat
was followed by a general revolt of Etruscans, Samnites, Lucanians,
and Bruttians (Livy, ep. 12; Oros. iii. 22. 13-14; Augustine, CD, iii.
I7)
188

ROME AND THE GAULS

II.

2.0. I

MO.vtov hnKaTiiO'T'I'lO'a.v T6v K6pl0v: M'. Curius Dentatus was one of


the most notable figures of this period and had terminated the Third
Samnite War successfully in 290 (cf. Munzer, RE, 'Curius (9)', cols.
1841-5). The later tradition, which dated Caecilius' death to 283,
makes him praetor suffectus (above 19. 7 n.). According to this version
Caecilius' death was avenged the same year by the victory of P.
Cornelius Dolabella, the consul, at Lake Vadimo over the Senones
(cf. Broughton, i. r88-9). It has been argued by E. T. Salmon (CP,
1935, 23-31) that both the annalistic version and that of Fabius (i.e.
of P.) distort the real course of events, so as to bring the Roman
revenge immediately after the setback at Arretium; in one case
(Fabius) the revenge was moved back into 284 (and attributed
to Curius), in the other (Livy) the defeat was retarded until
283 (and Caecllius becomes a praetor). If this plausible thesis
is correct, Dentatus' victory ( u) is apocryplml; and indeed its
disappearance from the later tradition is inexplicable on any other
assumption.
9. ~'ll'awlAoVTo Tou~ Tp.!O'~LS: a not impossible, but perhaps
unlikely story; d. 8. 12. See Beloch (RG, 454) and Salmon (CP,
1935, 31 n. 39). The story is probably part of Fabius' version
leading to a bellum iustum. TaJ..arlo. is here Cisalpine Gaul; d. 24.
8, etc.
10. 0'11'0 Tov 8ull'ov EK X"'POS ~'II'LO'Tpa.Tc;uO"u!l'.!vwv: 'immediately in
their anger' ; the narrative implies that it is still 284.
11. Tfj~ . xwpa,~ ... EYKPUTELS: viz. the territory of the Sen ones,
the later ager Gallicus (see 21. 7 n., and above, 17. 8 n.).
12. 6.TotKuv ~O'TlAUV TTJV I1Jv11v: Livy (ep. n) also associates the
founding of Sena Gallica with Curius Dentatus, but dates it after
his first consulship (29o). If Curius' victory of 284 is apocryphal
(19. 8 n.), the founding of Sena drops out of this year. It may have
taken place in 283 after the victory at Vadimo ; but there must be
some good reason why both traditions associate it with Curius.
Therefore, since it seems perverse to postpone its foundation till
Curius' third consulship in 274, with which no authority associates it
(so Beloch, RG, 453-4), Livy's date is probably to be accepted. Its
foundation implies the ceding of land by the Senones, but not
necessarily their defeat and complete expulsion; and this may well
have followed the peace which must have been made after Sentinum;
see De Sanctis (ii. 358 n. r). P. mentions Sena above (&.prlws) at
14. II and 16. 5

20. 1. ol S( Boi:o,: though P. mentions no date, he is evidently


referring to the next year, 283, when the consuls were P. Cornelius
Dolabella and Cn. Domitius Calvinus Maximus. The later tradition
makes Dolabella victorious at Lake Vadimo over the Senones, not
189

II.

20. I

ROME AND THE GAULS

the Boii (on the latter see r7. 8 n. and 20. 4 n.); and if the
Boii suffered so severely in 283, it is hard to comprehend their confronting the Romans again in 282 (2o. 3). The probability is that
P.'s Fabian account, having destroyed the Senones in 284 (19. u),
required a new foe for Dolabella's victory in 283. See Sahnon (CP,
1935. 24 ff.).
1ra.pa.tmAiaa.VTES T uppTJvous: Beloch (RG, 451) argues from the site
of the battle that these were primarily from Volsinii; but the
Gauls may well have attracted allies from a wider area, as they
advanced south, and in 28o the consul Ti. Coruncanius triumphed
over Vulci as well as Volsinii, and in 281 Q. Marcius Philippus
de Etrusceis, which suggests a wider coalition.
2. T-ijv 'OO.S11-ova. ALjlVTJV: Lake Vadimo (V adimonis lac-us, the
modern Laghetto di Bassano) lies on fiat ground west of the Tiber,
some 42-43 miles due north of Rome. For a description see Pliny,
ep. viii. 20; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 342.
4. T~ Ka.T.i ,...68a.c; tvmuT~: viz. 282, in the consulship of C. Fabricius
Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus. It is recorded in Frontinus (Strat.
i. 2. 7) that 'Aemilius Paulus [sic] consul bello Etrusco apud oppidum
coloniam' fought against the Boii; and the reference is probably to
this campaign. Beloch (RG, 454) would emend coloniam to Vetuloniam or Statoniam, others to Populoniam; but Salmon (CP, 1935,
26-2i) suggests that the colonia is Sena Gallica, and locates the
battle on the fringe of Cisalpine Gaul, a possible interpretation, even
if Sena was founded not one but eight years previously (19. 12 n.).
Aemilius' campaign is also mentioned by Dionysius (xix. 13. r), who
places it in Etruria; and this is perhaps less easily reconciled with
a Roman (presumably offensive) action in the north-east.
6. Synchronisms : see i. 6. 5 n. Pyrrhus' crossing was in 01. 124, 4 =
281/o (in fact May 28o), the Gallic destruction in 01. 125, 2 = 2i9/8
(probably autumn 279). On the reasonable assumption that consul
years are equated with the Olympiad year in which they begin, the
peace with the Boii in 282 was, by inclusive reckoning, three years
before Pyrrhus' crossing and five years before the Gallic rout at
Delphi.
7. AotjlLKTJV TWa. StMeatv: 'epidemic', a medical term; cf. 31. ro,
(used literally). For this sense of Stci8mt> cf. jo. 6, viii. 12. 3. and the
examples quoted by Welles, 324-5. In afflicting the Gauls thus Tyche
is playing the role of capricious deity; cf. CQ, 1945, 6; above, p. 18.
8-10. General observations on the Gallic campaigns. The long duel
( 8, .iyc.)vwv), drawn out for over a century, had toughened the
Romans psychologically and physically; they could be neither
daunted by horrors nor worn out by hardships. This fitted them to
contest Italy with Pyrrhus, and to struggle with Carthage for Sicily;
cf. i. 6. 6 (Italy), and the parallel reflections (i. 63. 9) on the schooling
190

ROME AND THE GAULS

II.

2I.

of the First Punic War, which led the Romans to aim at universal
dominion, and accomplish that aim. Here too P. is again stressing
the function of his introduction (d. i. 3 9-ro) in explaining the basis
on which Rome advanced to world-domination. For the phrase
&.B>.TJTa.i TEA~:tat y~:yov6T~:s- cf. i. 6. 6 (and, for the metaphor, i. 59 12).
The Gallic and Etruscan wars take their place in the steady, fated
advance of Rome to world-empire; and this phase in the reduction
of the Gauls is rounded off with the words T~v TOAfLa.V . Ka.Ta.7rA7)~&fL~:vot, which recalls (and reverses) the words Tfj T6AfLTI Ka.Ta.TrmA7)yfLlvm with which it opened (18. r).
21. 1. ETTJ 'ITEVTE t<:a.i TETTa.pat<:ovTa: calculated inclusively by
Mornmsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 362) as 281-237, with the appearance of
the Gauls at Ariminum ( s) in 236. But the forty-five years must be
reckoned from 282, the year of the peace (2o. 6), and are therefore
282-238; and P.'s date for the events at Ariminum is consequently
237, which is confirmed by his dating Aemilius Lepidus' consulship
(232) five years later (21. 7). (Alternatively P. may be reckoning
exclusively, 282-237, with events at Ariminum still in the latter
year.) P.'s account of a single campaign in 237 conflicts with the
annalistic tradition of a three years' war under the consuls of 238,
5; Eutrop. iii. 2;
237, and 236 (Zon. viii. 18; Oros. iv. r2. 1; Flor. i.
Livy, ep. 20), with the Ariminum incident in 236
5 n.). P.'s dates
for the remaining Gallic incidents (cf. r8. 6 n.) are:
Reference

Gauls at Arretiurn
Vadimo .
Defeat of Boii. peace
Gauls at Ariminum .

284

19. 7

:z83

20. r-2

282

20.

237

2 I. I,

232
2 25

21.

interval omitted

4, 6 TijJ KaTd. Troaas Jv,avTij!

4-5 T7) 1TWTE Kal TET'Tapa


KOV'Ta

Division of Ager Gallicus


Gallic tttmultus

7 -r~:t 7rEf.L1t'To/
23. I l-rn ... oyoocp (sic)

The failure of the Gauls to exploit Roman embarrassment during


the First Punic War is discussed by De Sanctis (iii. r. 28o), who
suggests that it was due to a successful Roman policy of appeasement coupled with Carthaginian failure to develop the necessary
contacts and to buy Gallic help.
3. Ta Ka.6EaTWTa. KtVE~v: 'to disturb the equilibrium', viz. the peace
of 282. P. ignores the events of 238, which the annalistic tradition,
probably following Valerius Antias, magnifies into an astounding
victory (after defeat) for the consul, P. Valerius Falto.
5. ~Pll-'tvou: on its site see 14. II n. It was originally Umbrian
(Strabo, v. 2Ij), but a Latin colony was set up in 268 (Yell. Pat.

IL 21.5

ROME AND THE GAULS

i. 14. 7); cf. U. Ewins, BSR, 1952, 54 Zonaras (viii. r8) adds details
suggesting that the dispute of the Gauls, ending in a pitched battle,
was the direct result of a policy of delay and temporizing on the part
of the consuls. The Fabian account in P. is very different. Fear of
the Gauls ensured the dispatch of a legion from Rome; but on
learning of the Gallic broil it returned. Yet clearly the same occasion
is meant; and if the date is 237, Zonaras' error may derive from some
confusion between the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (237)
and P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (236).
7, iTEI 1!'f1VT'e , , , KO.TEKATJpOUXT)O'U\1 , , T~\1 nu(E\IT~\IT)\1 , , , xwpa.v:
the reference to the consulship of M. Aemilius Lepidus fixes the year
as 232. Cicero (de sen. II; cf. acad. ii. 13), drawing on Atticus, makes
it 228, perhaps confusing the second consulship of Q. Fabius Maximus
with his first, during which Flaminius entered office (Niccolini, F asti
dei tribuni della plebe (Milan, 1934), 88-89); in any case, it is agreed
that P.'s date is preferable; d. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 333 n. 181); Mommsen
(Rom. Forsch. ii. 401 n. 23); and other authorities quoted by Aymard
(REA, 1943, 219 n. 1). Cicero describes Flaminius' bill as the 'lex de
agro Gallico et Piceno uiritim diuidundo' (Brut. 57). On the ager
Galticus between the Aesis and Ariminum see 17. 8 n.; the Senones
were completely expelled after Vadimo (or, according toP., the year
before; cf. 19. n). It is described by Cato (fg. 43 Peter): 'ager
Gallicus Romanus uocatur, qui uiritim cis Ariminum datus est ultra
agrum Picentium.' The ager Picenus, as this quotation indicates, is
normally placed south of the Aesis; but it also indicates that
Picenum in this sense was excluded from Flaminius' distributions.
Nor is there any evidence for the expulsion of the Picentes (on
Strabo, v. 251 see Beloch, RG, 475). Moreover, it appears from Livy
(ep. 15, Ariminum in Piceno) that P. was not alone in identifying
the ager Gallicus and the ager Picenus. The likelihood is therefore
that, despite Cicero's formula, Flaminius' bill dealt only with the
ager Gallicus; cf. Frank (ES, i. 61) and Beloch (RG, 475-{)); contra
De Sanctis (iii. I. 333 n. 184); on the geography, Nissen (It. Land.
ii. 377).
8. r a.tou .ACI.JJ-LVlou TC.UTT)\1 TTJ\1 8TtJJ-a.ywy(a.v dO'T)YTJO'UJJ-EVOU: c.
Flaminius was a plebeian and a nouus homo. His land measure
was designed to restore the firm link between the Roman proletariat and the land, and therein foreshadowed the work of the
Gracchi. It met with strong opposition from the senate, which had
profited by the occupation of public land, and was eventually carried
by Flaminius as tribune in the popular assembly (Cic. de inu. ii. 52;
Livy, xxi. 63. 2; VaL Max. v. 4 5). On Flaminius see Munzer (RE,
'Flaminius (2)', cols. 2496ff.), and on his land bill Frank (CAH, vii.
8o6-7; ES, i. 6o-{)I), De Sanctis (iii. 1. 332-4), Meyer (Kl. Scltr. ii.
39o-3), Fraccaro (Athen., 1919, 76 ff.), K. Jacobs (Caius Flaminius

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. zr. 9

(diss. Leiden, Hoorn, 1937), 37 ff.). P.'s hostile attitude towards


Flaminius (cf. 33 7 ff., iii. 8o, 8z ff.) seems to reflect the hostility of
his senatorial opponents transmitted through Fabius Pictor (cf.
Gelzer, Hermes, I933, I5o; Klotz, Wj, 1946, 156; contra Bung, I74
n. 3). Why does he regard the land-bill as 'the first step in the
demoralization of the people'? The view of Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr.
i 2 374; cf. Unger, Phil., I88z, 6I7 n. rs), that P. inserted this passage
after the Lex Sempronia of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, has been
widely accepted by Cuntz, De Sanctis, Bung, and others. But
probably too much has been read into P.'s words. ~ 7TI. ro X"'ipov
TOV o-.jp.ov OtaCl'Tporf.'lj is simply the outburst of popular assertiveness
associated especially with Flaminius' career, which ended in the
fiasco of the aequatum imperium of Fabius and Minucius (iii. 103. 4),
and the election of such leaders as Flaminius and Varro who, at
Trasimene and Cannae, were responsible (in the eyes of the Senate)
for bringing Rome within an inch of ruin. Clearly P. had an exaggerated picture of the role of the tribunate at this time (cf. iii.
87. 8), and an exaggeration of Flaminius' maleficent role fits excellently the strange observations on the tribunate at vi. I6. 3-5
(q.v.).
Flaminius is further attacked for precipitating the Gallic tumultus
of zzs. Against this it has been urged that the tumultus did not occur
for seven years (z3. In.), and that when it did come, it took the
traditional form of a plundering expedition, not prepared to try
the final issue (z6. 4 ff.); see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 395), De Sanctis
(iii. 1. 305), and Frank (CAH, vii. 8o7). But, as Gelzer points out
(Hermes, I933. ISo), the implementation of the bill took a considerable time, the rallying of Gauls from both sides of the Alps was
necessarily slow, and the Romans had anticipated trouble for several
years (13. s); and certainly Flaminius is subsequently associated
with a policy of expansion in north Italy.
1lv s,; KO.L 'Pwfla.(o~~ Jla.TEOV apxTJYOV KTA.: 'which we must admit
to have proved for the Romans virtually .. .' (so Schweighaeuser,
Shuckburgh, Paton, Treves, taking pwp.aiotr; as dative of disadvantage) or 'which even the Romans must virtually admit .. .' ('Pwp.alotr;
dative of the agent with rf.arlov). The second is highly improbable,
but is apparently the interpretation of Frank, who writes (CAH,
vii. 8o6), 'we hear ... that the Senate considered it a measure which
began "the demoralisation of the people" '. But if 'Pwp.almr; were
'the Senate', it would be rather P.'s than Flaminius' contemporaries.
On the use of wr; e7ror; Ei7TEtv to soften an expression (here of criticism)
see Wunderer (i. 5 n. 1).
9. oux uTrp TJYEflOVLa.~ En KTA.: the motivation of the Gallic action
is probably from Fabius' indictment of Flaminius' policy; though in
fact the establishment of further colonies would have aroused Gallic
0

193

II.

21.

ROME AND THE GAULS

apprehension equally. The words rov rrpo; a.irrov; rroAEJLOV indicate


that the Gauls regarded the land distribution as a preliminary to
offensive warfare. In 22. I eUNw; is an exaggeration from the same
source.

22. 1. '11'pOaa.yopwo~vous , . . r O.LO'aTOUS: a misstatement from


Fabius; cf. Oros. iv. 13. 5 (Fabius, fg. 23 Peter), 'maxime Gaesatorum,
quod nomen non gentis sed mercennariorum Gallorum est'. The word
derives from ya.i:ao;, a javelin or throwing-spear (cf. vi. 39 3, xviii.
r8. 4; Diod. xiii. 57; P.Teb. 230 (2nd cent.)), a word of Celtic origin
(d. Serv. ad A en. vii. 664; Nonius, p. 555, quoting A en. viii. 661-2,
on the Gauls attacking the Capitol,
'duo quisque Alpina coruscant I gaesa manu').

P. uses both the -a.1 and -o1 endings, Strabo, Plutarch, and other
Greek writers use -at, and the Latin form is always Gaesati. On the
etymology, which connects with words both Celtic and Germanic,
see A. Holder (Altceltischer Sprachschatz, i (Leipzig, 1896), 1517 ff.),
and R. Much (German. Forsch., 1925, 26); cf. Irish gai, gae, 'spear';
OHG ger, etc. In Caesar (BG, iii. 4 1) the Celts of Canton Valais use
gaesa; and the Gaesatae here come from the Rhone, which may
include the uallis Poenina (cf. F. Stahelin, Die Schweiz in riimischer
Zeit 3 (Basel, 1948}, 33 n. 1}, and not merely the middle and lower
Rhone (R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 72-8o). The gaesum was always
distinct from the Roman pilum, though Greek writers often use the
word for any foreign spear; see Fiebiger (RE, 'gaesum', cols. 463-4).
That Gaesatae came to mean 'Celtic mercenaries' is true (cf. Plut.
Marc. 3}, and Much (ZDA, 1932, 43) compares the meaning 'bodyguard' acquired by oopv</>opo;. Much and other Germanists (followed
by Degrassi) have argued that they were Germans because (a) the
act. tr. record a triumph of Marcellus in 222 'de Galleis Insubribus
et Ger(manis'}, (b) Livy (xxi. 38. 8} describes the area north of the
Great St. Bernard Pass as inhabited by gentes semigermanae. But
the act. tr. here probably contain an error introduced in the time of
Augustus (cf. 0. Hirschfeld, Kl. Schr. (Berlin, r9r3). 365 ff.; Stahelin,
loc. cit.), and Livy's reference also suggests an anachronism, since
the extended use of the name Germani does not appear before the
first century (Stahelin, op. cit.}. Heuberger (loc. cit.) believes the
Gaesatae are 'warriors', who joined in the expedition for plunder,
not as mercenaries; and he rejects P.'s explanation out of hand.
In imperial times we hear of a ue[xi]llatio Retorum Gaesa[torum]
(Dessau, ILS, 2623; cf. CIL, vii. roo2, viii. 2728); and Strabo (v.
212) mentions Gaesatae who accompanied the Senones in attacking the Romans and seems to regard them (v. 2r6} as a Celtic
tribe inhabiting the Po valley. For discussion of the problems
194

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 23. 4

involved see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 229-30 n. 4), Stahelin (loc. cit.),
R. Much, Germ. Forsch. (1925), 26-Qr, 'Der Eintritt der Germanen
in die Weltgeschichte'; ZDA, 1932, 17-46 'Die Gaesaten'; H. Jacobsohn, ZDA, 1929, z2o-r; R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 6o-8o 'Die
Gaesaten'; Degrassi, Inscr. It. xiii. r. sso.
4. olJ j.t6vov EVLK"l<TilV KTA.: at the Allia; cf. r8. 2-3.
5. 8EAovTi Klli J.lETa xapLToc.;: in fact after the payment of a ransom,
r8. 3 n. The figure of seven months was well established in the
tradition. The dies Alliensis was r8 July, the siege in autumn (Plut.
Cam. z8) and the relief in February (in the calendar of Polemius
Silvius on id. feb.; cf. CIL, i 2 I,' p. 259); cf. Mommsen, Rom.
Forsch. ii. 328 n. ~

7. Ka.Tn 8E To us KllLpouc.; TOuTouc.;: a vague transitional phrase, perhaps deliberately so.


KllTilJ.lllV'I"EUOJ.lEVOL To J.lEAAov: 'surmising what would happen', i.e.
in contrast to what they heard (dKov6vTES); cf. Arist. Rhet. 1368 a 3I,
K nov 7Tpoyeyov6nuv Td. j.dlloVTa KG.TG.fW-VTEV6p.tiVOf, Kplvop.Ev. Meyer
(Kl. Schr. ii. 394 n. I) translates erfuhren durch Weissagungen, and
sees a reference to the burial alive of a Gallic and Greek couple in
the forum Boarium in response to a Sibylline oracle (Plut. Marc.
3 6; Dio, fg. so; Zon. viii. I9; Oros. iv. 13. 3) in 228 (ct. Gelzer,
Hermes, I933 ISI n. r). But this sense would be without parallel.
8. aTpa.TO'II'E81l Kll'l"a.ypaq,ELv: ten in all, two for each consul (24. 3),
two to guard Sicily and Tarentum (z4. 13), and four in reserve at
Rome (24. 9).
10. we.; KilL '11'p6a8Ev iJjiiv ELP"lTilL: IJ. s-7 (with note).
23. 1. 86va.J.lLV 'll'oAunMj KilL ~llpEillv: 'a richly-equipped and powerful army', cf. xxxi. I7. 4. ef.'Vf,K~V Xfpa. f3a.pEia.v. Naturally some were
light-armed (cf. 27. 6); hence f3a.pt'ta.v is not 'heavy-armed'.
~TEL , , oy86fl': the year is 225 (cf. ZJ. 5 n.), the eighth after 232 by
inclusive reckoning. See 2r. In., 21. 7
2. ol 8' OOEVE'I"OL KilL r OVOj.taVOL TOUTOLS EtAOVTO <TUJ.lJ.lllXELV:
probably some time before 225. The Veneti (r7. 5 n.), who had intervened so providentially in 387/6 (cf. r8. 3), were Italians; the Cenomani (q. 4 n.) were Celts, perhaps with an Alpine admixture (De
Sanctis, iii. r. 3o6), and in any case were jealous of the Insubres.
Both peoples seem to have become lasting allies of Rome: Strabo,
v. 216.
4. ws E'II'L Tupp"lv(a.s: as in 299 (r9. 2) they crossed the Apennines,
hoping to attract allies in Etruria in their march south. Though less
than Diodorus' 2oo,ooo (xxv. 13), P.'s figures are also exaggerated.
The chariots (avvwpl8ts) carried each a driver and a warrior who,
after hurling his javelin, descended to fight at close quarters (Diod.
v. 29. I; cf. Livy, x. 28. 8 ff.).
195

II. 23

ROME A ;.rD THE GAULS

5-6. AEliiCLOv Ail'iAtov KTA.: the consuls for A.U.c. 529


225 B.C.
were L. Aemilius Q.f. Cn.n. Papus and C. Atilius M.f. M.n. Regulus
{ 6). Cf. Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius (ro8)', cols. 575-6; 'Atilius (.;3)', cols.
zoBs-6. Aemilius was sent to Ariminum to defend the ager Gallicus;
he triumphed in 224 'de Galleis III nonas mart.' (act. tr.). Atilius was
son of the famous Regulus of the First Punic War (i. 26. n ff.). His
presence in Sardinia creates a problem. There seems no good reason
to question P.'s statement (so Beloch, Hermes, 1922, rz8 f., criticized
by Meyer, Kl. Sckr. ii. 396 n. 2); and though the Romans may have
been taken by surprise, either through neglect of the northern
danger (Holleaux, 123 n. 3) or because they did not foresee where
the blow would fall (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rso n. s), it seems more
likely that Atilius was sent to guard against a possible Punic attack
(d. 24. 13 n.). He will have been recalled when the news of the Ebro
treaty, sworn probably between autumn 226 and spring zzs (13.
7 n.), secured the Romans against any move by Hasdrubal (27. 1);
see Treves ad loc. Zonaras (viii. 19) records a rising in Sardinia which
may also connect with Atilius' presence there. The name of the
praetor (ita1TtAl'KVS in Greek, since he had six axes and fasces) in
Etruria is not recorded.
9. O.va.cflEf>EW , O.woypa.cJ!a~ Twv v Tals TjALKLa.ls: 'to supply lists
of men of military age', viz. of the iuniores, from 18 to 46 years
inclusive; cf. vi. 19. 5; Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 404), and StrachanDavidson (28). The details of Roman preparations do not suggest
that they were caught by surprise.
24. Roman and Italian forces in 225. P.'s figures evidently go back
through Fabius to the actual Ka-raypaat, and are mainly reliable (d.
u-r2 nn.):

(a) Troops in arms ( 3-9, 13)

Infantry
With the consuls (four legions}
Sabines and Etruscans
Umbrians and Sarsinates
Veneti and Cenomani
In Sicily and Tarentum (two
legions)
Reserve at Rome (four legions)

20,8oo

I,200

8,400
20,000

400

JO,OOO
2,000
lso,ooo+
4,ooo
20,000
20,000

z,ooo

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 24

(b) Men capable of bearing arms ( ro-12, 14)


-

Romans

Allies

--

Romans and Campanians


Latins
Samnites
Iapygians and Messapians
Lucanians .
Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani,
Vestini

Infantry

Cavalry

250,000

23,000

..
..
..
..
..

I 250,000

Total

Infantry

Cavalry

..

..

. . !!
..
..
..

8o,ooo
]0,000
50,000
30,000

r6,ooo
3,000

..

20,000

4,000

250,000

35,000

23,000

5,000
],000

--

(c) Polybius' total ( r6: for the figures in IS see ad loc.)


Infantry

Cavalry

700,ooo+

70,000

For discussion see Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 382-4o6; St.-R. iii. 575
n. 2), Beloch (Bevolkerung, 355-70; I B, 93 ff.), Strachan-Davidson
(22-32), De Sanctis (ii. 385 n. I, 462; iii. 330), T. Frank (CAH, vii.
8U-I2; ES, i. sB-59), Veith (Heerwesen, J05-7L Gelzer (Hermes, I935
273 ff.), and earlier works quoted by Liebenam (RE, 'dilectus',
cols. 6o8 ff.).
The main problem is whether the troops in arms are included in,
or additional to, those capable of bearing arms. On the assumption
that the latter is the case, the sum of the separate items adds up to
P.'s total, viz.

Romans: in arms
not summoned
Allies: in arms
not summoned

Infantry

Cavahy

49,200
250,000
I50,000
250,000

3,100
23,000
8,ooo
35,000

__T_o_ta_l____________________~__6_9_9_,2__
o~~9,IOO

Whether or no any addition be made to allow for allies with the


legions in Sicily, and for cavalry of the Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti,
and Cenomani (omitted by P.), clearly these totals correspond closely
to P.'s 7oo,ooo infantry and 7o,ooo cavalry. On this assumption,
which is M:ommsen's, the whole levy of north Italy was called out,
and therefore did not figure under (b); and the contingents actually
serving from south Italy are included in the figures of allies with
the consuls or in reserve at Rome ( 4 and 9), since these forces
197

II. 24

ROME AND THE GAULS

represented contingents from all parts of Italy in addition to the

levee en masse in the north.

On the other hand, the phrasing of IO and I4 (KaTo:ypa<{;ai. s


&.v-ryvx01JG'O.V , 'Pwttalwv o I(O.t Kattrravwv f] 7TA1J0vs ) suggests
that P. is recording the full muster for the areas in question, not
that muster less troops already serving; and the round figures
(25o,ooo Roman and Campanian infantry, 25o,ooo south Italian infantry) look like a maximum based on the Ko.Ta:ypap~ rather than
such a maximum less a specific number already serving. Further,
it is improbable that the figures under (a) represent a roo-per-cent.
turn-out, for instance, the 54,ooo Sabines and Etruscans who
marched to Rome ( 5). Consequently Strachan-Davidson supposes
the figures in (a) to be included in (b), but suggests that P. has
omitted those from north Italy who were liable to serve but not
actually on service; by subtracting the 558,ooo Romans, Campanians,
and south Italians from P.'s total of no,ooo, he reaches a figure of
2rz,ooo north Italians liable for service. 1
The truth seems to be that P. has been less logical than either
Mommsen or Strachan-Davidson demands. His totals must represent
the sum of his individual items- the correspondence is too close for
any other assumption; but what he has given is this. For the north
Italians who fought as national armies (Sabines, Etruscans, Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti, and Cenomani) he records the numbers
actually fighting {probably a high percentage of the whole) ; here
he has drawn no distinction between the number fighting and the
possible maximum. He also
the number of Romans serving
in the legions, and of the allied auxiliaries attached thereto, whether
from north or south Italy ( 3-4, 9, IJ). Further he gives the total
number of Roman adult male citizens ( 14), perhaps from the
census lists. But for south Italy, which had to be included in a
picture of the full strength of Italy at the time of the Second Punic
War( I-2), his only figures were those of the Kamypa.pal, and these
he gave unaltered (for he cannot have known how many of these
were serving as auxiliaries with legions). Finally, P. added up all
these figures to give a grand total for Italy. This total omits all
north Italians not on service and counts south Italians acting as
auxiliaries with the legions twice over; it also counts twice over
those Romans and Campanians actually serving in the legions, and
' One may ignore Orosius
7) who gives the number of Roman and
Campanian infantry as
i.e. 348,200. Mommsen emends this to
CCLXXxxvmrcc, i.e. Z99,2oo, which exactly fits his calculations. But Beloch
(Bevolkeru~tg, 363) follows Niebuhr (RG, ii'. 8r) in emending to ccxxxxvmcc,
which on the assumption that (b) includes (a) is perhaps a more accurate veTsion
of P.'s zso,ooo. And indeed Orosius' figure of 23,6oo Roman cavalry is closer to
P.'s 23,000 than the 26,roo required by Mommsen's theory.
I-<)8

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 24. 3

the Sabines may also be counted twice since they were full citizens
(24. 5 n.).
Can the real total be recovered? There are the following basic
figures:
Infantry

Cavalry

Romans and Campanians


available
South Italians available

250,000
250,000

North Italians on service .

500,000
9o,ooo+

58,ooo
S,ooo (estimating the cavalry
for Umbrians, etc., at
4,000)

59o,ooo+

66,ooo

23,000
35,000

-------

To these totals add (a) an unknown proportion of the 6o,ooo foot


and 4,ooo horse serving with the consuls and at Rome, to represent
north Italians included in those figures; (b) a similarly unknown, but
probably smaller, proportion of the auxiliaries attached to the legions
guarding Sicily and Tarentum, representing north Italians; perhaps
the total for all these auxiliaries, whatever their origin, may be
reckoned at about ro,ooo foot and r,ooo horse, though this is a guess
(Mommsen estimated the total number of north Italians under both
these heads as 19,ooo out of 75,ooo, but this is also a guess); (c) the
adult males of military age from north Italy not on service. It is
clear that these figures are past recovery; but P.'s total looks like a
slight overestimate. P.'s source was Fabius; and his total of 8oo,ooo,
as recorded by Eutropius (iii. 5) and Orosius (iv. IJ. 6) is clearly
a rounding off of P.'s no,ooo. Ultimately going back to Fabius
too are Diodorus (xxv. r3: 7oo,ooo foot and 7o,ooo horse under
arms), Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 138: 7oo,ooo foot and 8o,ooo horse
under arms) and Livy (ep. zo: 8oo,ooo in all). This suggests
that P. has followed Fabius closely, and that he too gave a picture
of the potential power of Rome at the time of the Hannibalic War.
The errors of calculation probably also go back to Fabius. For the
relation of P.'s figures to the third century census lists see 14 n.
Fabius' figures omit the Greeks of south Italy (who were exempt
from all military service) and the Bruttians (who were used in a
menial capacity); cf. Frank (ES, i. 58), who does not, however,
consider the real problems of this chapter.

3. J.lETu J.lEv 8~ T<7JV urr6.Twv TETTapa. (7Tpa.T6rre8a: i.e. each consul


had an army of two legions (Paton's error ('four legions each') is
reproduced by Frank, ES, i. 58). The normal complement at this
time was 4,ooo-4,2oo foot and 3oo horse (i. r6. 2, vi. 20. 8--9) ; these
legions are over-strength, an indication of the crisis (cf. vi. zo. 8).
199

II. 24. 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

4. au!ll..l.o.xo~ S 11e8' EKO.TEpwv .. ot auv6.Jlll>w: 'the allied forces in


both consular armies together' (not 'in each consular army': so
Paton, and Frank, loc. cit.). According to P. (vi. 26. 7) the allied
infantry normally equalled the Roman in number, and the cavalry
were three times as many; but before the Social War the allies
complained that 'duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi' (Vell.
Pat. ii. rs. 3) Here the allies provide 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse to
the Romans' 2o,8oo and r ,2oo; at Rome ( 9) the proportions are
similar, and for the infantry fit Velleius rather than P. In the second
century the later books of Livy show two allies being normally
enrolled to one citizen (cf. vi. 26. 6--9 n.; Strachan-Davidson, 27);
and calculations based on Livy, Appian, and P. (F. Frohlich, Die
Gardetruppen der romisclten Republik (Aarau Programm, r882), 6)
show that between 296 and r68 allied infantry usually preponderated.
5. eK: Tou K:a.~pou: 'at once, in haste' (cf. x. 43 g, xviii. 26. 8). Schweighaeuser corrected in his Lex. Polyb. his translation 'necessario tempore'; but this has misled Treves ('in que! frangente'), while Paton
mis-translates 'temporary assistance'. Shuckburgh's 'for that special
occasion', can be supported from vi. 32. 3
Io.~vwv Ka.t TuppTJvwv i'IT1l'el:s KTA.: the Sabines, an ancient people
of central Italy (cf. Strabo, v. 228, r.aAcuoraTov y~os ... Kai aU76x8ovES') and the reputed forebears of the Samnites, dwelt in the
Apennines east of the Tiber and Nar, and north of the Anio (Nissen,
It. Land. ii. 46.1 ff.; Beloch, RG, ssz). Since they had possessed
ciuitas sine suffragio since 290 (Livy, ep. II; VeiL Pat. i. r4. 5; Florus,
i. ro; auct. de uir. ill. 33 3) and full citizenship since 268 (Veil. Pat.
i. r4. 7), their mention along with the Etruscans (on whom see
r7. r n.) suggests that in the crisis of this year geographical considerations were paramount and led to the calling out of the Sabini
along with the socii {so Mommsen, St.-R. iii. 575 n. 2).
6. TOuTous .. 1rpoeK:6.81aa.v: an army of so,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse
(the equivalent of five legions with their auxiliaries) seems very
large to entrust to a praetor (d. De Sanctis, iii. r. 307 n. ro7 ). It is
possible that Fabius has confused the praetor's force with the maximum levy; but reductions in number (Beloch, IB, 94, would reduce
the praetor's army to two legions) must be wholly arbitrary.
7. o{ . "Oil~poL Ka.l Ia.paLV6.To~: see 16. 3 n. (Umbrians). Sarsina,
Plautus' home (d. Mostell. no), lay on the head-waters of the R.
Sapis, to the north of the ager Gall!'ezts, in Umbria; its inhabitants
(usually Sarsinates though Pliny (1\'at. h1:st. iii. II4, etc.) and inscriptions have Sassinates) were forcibly enrolled in the alliance and
separated from Umbria in 266. Perhaps they originally controlled
the whole Sapis valley, with the (later extinct) Sappinates and the
tribus Sapinia (d. Livy, xxxi. 2. 6, xxxiii. 37 x). See :Kissen, It. Land.
ii. 378, and Philipp, RE, 'Sarsina', cols. so-sr. Beloch (IB, 99)
200

ROME AND THE GAULS

would raise P.'s figure of zo,ooo for these tribes. On the Veneti and
Cenomani see I 7. 4-5 n., ZJ. z n. P. has omitted the cavalry of all these
four peoples; on the normal ratio this would come to about 4,000
horse in all. Their function in the Roman plan ( 8) was to carry
out a diversionary offensive against the Boii in Emilia.
10. ICO.Ta.ypo.cJ>a.l. S' ilVfJVEX9TtaO.\I: the aTToypwpal of ZJ. 9 The subsequent figures represent maximum levies: see z4 n.
AaTlvwv . Ia.uv~Twv: after the dissolution of the Latin League in
338, Latini (nomen Latinum, socii nominis Lat1:ni) included (a) the
original Latin and Hernican states which had not been incorporated
in Rome, (b) the Latin colonies scattered throughout Italy, whose
citizens had Latin status. 'Since the Latin Name lacked a specific
territorial unity, the term was inevitably interpreted in a political
and social sense alone, as meaning persons of a certain status'
(Sherwin-White, 95; see especially 91 ff.). It seems unlikely, therefore,
that only Latin colonies are here included (Beloch, IE, 99). Samnite
territories (cf. i. 6. 4 n.) had been much limited since the Samnite
and Tarentine Wars by the planting of Roman and Latin colonies
(Beloch, RG, 539-44); Beloch argues (IE, <)8) that their numbers
here include the Hirpini, and perhaps the people of Nola, Nuceria,
and even Sidicinum.
11. 'la.'ITuywv ~eal MEaaa'ITU.>v: terms with a somewhat fluid connotation. In iii. 88. 3 the Messapians are part of the Iapygians; here
Iapygia probably signifies Apulia (v.ith the Apuli, Daunii, and
Peucetii), and Messapia Calabria (with the Sallentini). All these
tribes are closely related in tongue and culture. See Philipp, RE,
'Iapyges', cols. 727 ff.; M. Mayer, RE, 'Messapia', cols. IIiS ff.; De
Sanctis, ii. 462 n. 3 Since 16,ooo horse is disproportionate to so,ooo
foot, it has been widely emended to 6,ooo (Beloch, Eevolkerung, i.
359; IE, 9i; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3; Treves ad Joe.).
12. AEu~eavwv: the Lucanians, Roman allies since the late fourth
century, dwelt among the southern Apennines between the R.
Silurus {modern Sele) just north of Paestum and the R. Laos (Laino)
on the west coast, and between the R. Crathis (Crati) and the
R. Bradanus (Bradano) on the Gulf of Tarentum. They had already
lost Paestum, where a Latin colony was founded in 273; and their
small levy may be due to many of the people's being subject to the
Greek cities of the gulf (Nissen, It. Land. i. 535). P.'s figure was questioned byBeloch(Rh. Af.us., r877, 247), but unjustifiably (Mommsen,
Rom. Forsch. ii. 394 n. 1z). See further Beloch, RG, 591 ff.; Honigmann, RE, 'Lucania', cols. 1541 ff.
Mapawv Mo.ppouKlvwv cj)~pEVTclVWV o.:,.,aT(vwv : tribal confederations of the central Apennines. The Marsi, of Sabine origin,
lived around the Fucine Lake and the upper Liris valley. The
Marrucini were to the north-east of the Marsi, between the mountains
201

II.

24. 12

ROME AND THE GAULS

and the Adriatic, south of the R. Aternus; their capital was Teate
(modem Chieti). The Oscan-speaking Frentani dwelt along the coast
south of the Marrucini, as far as the R. Tifernus (or the R. Frento, if
one includes the Larinates Frentani). These peoples joined the confederacy in 304 (Diod. xx. ror. 5; Livy, ix. 45 r8; Beloch, RG, 403}.
and the Vestini, who lived along and to the north of the R. Aternus,
in 302/r (Livy, x. 3 r). The Paeligni, who lived between the Marsi
and Marrucini (cf. Li-v-y, viii. 29. 4; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3), though
not mentioned here, are probably included in P.'s calculations
(Beloch, Bevolkerung, 365). Twenty thousand infantry seems a small
number for these Abruzzi tribes, and Reloch (Bevolkerung, 36o; I B,
97--98; cf. DeSanctis, ii, 462 n. 3) suggests that it should be changed
to 4o,ooo, which would restore the normal ratio of r : ro between
horse and foot. See further Nissen (It. Land. i. srs-18, 527-8).
13. Ka.l. ~v :IlKEMliJ- Ka.L T6.pa.VTl: Tarentum, the principal harbour in
south Italy (x. 1), and Sicily both needed protection in case of any
move from Carthage. These legions were slightly under strength in
cavalry.
14. 'Pw!lo.lwv 8i Kal Ka!l1Tavwv iJ 1TATJ8U'>: these figures probably indude those serving in the legions (24 n.). They must be considered
in conjunction with the third-century census figures for Roman
citizens:
292,234 (Livy, ep. 16; cf. Eutrop. ii. r8 (text
uncertain; cf. DeSanctis, ii. 425 n. 3) .}
297,797 (Livy, ep. r8.)
241,212 (Livy, ep. 19.)
26o,ooo (Hieron. in Euseb. Chron. ii. 123
(Euseb. ibid. 122 gives 25o,ooo).)
270,713 (Livy, ep. 20 (text uncertain).)
137,108 (Livy, xxvii. 36. 7; cf. Frank, ES, i.
56-57)
2q,ooo (Livy, xxix. 37 s-6.)
Against Mommsen's view that these are figures for iuniores only,
i.e. men between r8 and 46 (Rom. Farsch. ii. 398 f.; St.-R. ii. 411 n. r)
see the arguments of Strachan-Davidson (28 ff.) and Beloch (Bevolkerung, 3IZ ff., 343 ff.). Beloch discusses other theories, and recently
Schultz (Mnem., 1937, 161 ff.) has argued that the figures excluded
men over 6o. But the most probable view is that they include all
adult male citizens. The likelihood is that P.'s figures here are on the
same basis, and include both smtiores and iuniores (unlike those for
the allies: 23. 9 n.); but whether the ciues sine suffragio (Campanians,
Hernicans, etc.) were included in the census is not certain. Clearly
P. has given a round figure, and it is possible that he (or his source)
has adjusted the census figure to allow for ciues sine suffragio and
202

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 25. 6

men serving abroad (and so excluded from the census). But these
would probably more or less cancel out the number of men over
military age included in the census figures, which is what P. most
likely gives. His total would fit very well into the list of figures for
the third century, 273,000 compared with 270,713 in 234. See Frank
(CAH, vii. 8n; ES, i. 58-59), Beloch (op. cit., supra; IB, 96), De
Sanctis (ii. 463 n. r), Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, 27,3). On Orosius (iv. 13. 7)
see footnote to 24 n.; clearly it must be omitted from consideration
in this context.
15. To Kco+6.Aa.Lov T~lV !lEY trpoKa.9"1J.Livwv Tijs 'Pw!ll]S 5uv6.f1Ewv: how
these 15o,ooo+ foot and 6,ooo horse 'stationed before Rome' are to
be calculated is not clear ; and on any method this figure for thecavalry
seems too small. Beloch (I B, 94) argues that the 15o,ooo are a reduction
of the twelve legions with their auxiliaries which P. found in Fabius
(assuming two under the praetor in Etruria: see 24. 6 n.); but (a)
the total of twelve is only achieved by a forced reckoning, (b) P.
speaks of over 15o,ooo foot, (c) Beloch himself admits 6,ooo horse to
be too few. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 38g-go) observed that these
figures are not relevant to an account of the strength of the forces
facing Hannibal; hence they are best regarded as a gloss (with
Hultsch, Blittner-Wobst, and Strachan-Davidson). The words to be
bracketed are [K</J(l.Aawv ... T6 8"1 or (with Strachan-Davidson) [waT'
lvat . .. taKwxtAlov>].
17. AaTTous . 5uY!lup(wv: on Hannibal's numbers see iii. 35 1 n.;
cf. iii. 33 r8. Here P. neglects his 6o,ooo cavalry.
aa.+iuTEpov EKtrmf)uEL Ka.Ta.voEiv: 'it will be possible to win a clearer
understanding'; for the impersonal use of EK7TOt'i cf. xxix. 8. ro.

25. 2. Kl\ouaLov: Clusium (modern Chiusi) lay in the Clanis valley


(Val di Chiana) on the route from Rome to Arretium, the later Via
Cassia; at r6o km. from Rome it is a long three days' march, and De
Sanctis (iii. r. 308 n. w8) suggests emending to 'five', i.e. E for r.
But the tradition would exaggerate the proximity of the danger.
3. ol 5' ES U'ITOO'Tpo+ijs a'ITTJVTWV: cf. iii. 14. 5 The Roman forces
under the praetor (24. 6) were evidently stationed near Clusium or
Perusia, so as to keep in touch with the two legions of Aemilius
Papus, the consul, at Ariminum (23. 5). In case of need Aemilius
could march south through the Fnrlo Pass to Iguvium and Perusia
(cf. z6. r ff.).
6. ti>s etrt .. 4'a.tuoAav: 'towards Faesulae'; Faesulae is So miles from
Clusium and the Gauls obviously did not march there overnight (if
Casanbon's emendation of mho~ to ain-ov is to be accepted, P. has
not fully understood Fabius). De Sanctis (iii. 1. 3o8) suggests the
feigned retreat was only as far as Montepulciano in the Val di
Chiana. 7Tapvl{1al.ov is 'they encamped' (cf. i. 77 6) or 'they drew up
20}

II. 25.6

ROME AND THE GAULS

for battle' (d. v. 69. 7); 10 suggests that the second is the meaning
here (Schweighaeuser).
26. 1. AEuK,oc; AiJ.LiAtoc; 1Ta.pfjv ~oTJ8wv: having come through the
Cales gap into the upper Tiber valley (zs. 3 n.). His arrival ~:ifrvxws
ds- oiovra Katpov dramatically foreshadows the approaching peripeteia of T elamon.
2. O.vo1TAouc;: 'to facilitate their progress and mitigate their situation
in the case of capture' (Treves).
5. To Twv o-WJ.LclTwv Ka.i 8pEJ.LJ.Lchwv 1TATj8oc;: 'the number of prisoners
and cattle'. Paton translates awJ.tam 'slaves'; but in P. it is more
often used of prisoners, whether free or slaves. Cf. 6. 6,awJ.taTa oovAtKa and AEv8~:pa, and Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v.
7. Ka.Ta T~v ~VTJpoia-Tou yvwJ.LTJV: Fabius no doubt had information
of this conference from Gallic survivors after Telamon. But either
he, or possibly P. abbreviating his account, has failed to appreciate the extent to which the Gauls still controlled events. Their
present camp was well to the north of Clusium ; they next appear
marching north up the Etruscan coast towards Telamon, which lies
on a latitude approximately 40 miles south of Clusium. They had
thus made a vast sweep to the south-east, perhaps to avoid central
Etruria (DeSanctis, iii. r. 309), but certainly with scant respect for
Aemilius, who could do little more than hang on their heels in anticipation of 'Fabian' tactics ( 8).
1Tpofjyov 1TO.pa 86.Aa.TTO.V s,a. TTJS T uppTJVWV xwpa.c;: 'they advanced
through Etruria along the sea-coast.' The point at which they
reached the coast can only be surmised; De Sanctis (iii. 1. 309) suggests the mouth of the Albegna near Orbetello, but they may have
gone farther south. Eventually they would have returned through
Liguria or up the Arno valley.
27-30. The battle of Telamon. The source is Fabius (d. Bung, 172).
Conflicting details occur in Zonaras (viii. zo) and Orosius (iv. 13. 8),
both of whom make Atilius perish in a separate struggle. Whether
certain votive offerings discovered at Telamon are connected with
the battle is not certain: cf. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 312 n. 1n).
27. 1. EK Ia.pOOVO') ... r 6.i'oc; ~TLALO<; EL<; no-a.c; KO.T0.1TE1TAEUKWS:
cf. 23. s-6 n. Pisa (16. 3 n.) was not a natural port to use for communications v.ith Corsica, and its choice here was based on sound
strategy. By cutting off the Gauls from Liguria and the north,
Atilius made the victory of Telamon possible (though he could
hardly have foreseen their choice of the coast road).
2. TEAJ.LWVa. TTJS TuppTJva.s: the Etruscan town lay not at the
modem Talamone (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 308--9) but farther to the east

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 29. 8

at Poggio di Talamonaccio, on the right bank of the R. Osa; see


Gamurrini (Not. d. scav., r888, 682 ff.), Philipp (RE, 'Telamon (4)',
cols. 192-3).
ot 1rpovoj1EUOVTE\i: 'their foragers' (not 'their advanced guard'
(Paton)). The Romans normally sent an advanced guard to discover
a camping ground (vi. 41. r); but on this occasion it was early in the
day (cf. 6, T~v vvKm, the previous night), and though the Romans
were not strong on reconnaissance (cf. iii. 83 ff. for Trasirnene),
Atilius' 7Tporrop<v61Ln'ot are apparently a reconnaissance force. But
this would be a refinement beyond a band of Gallic marauders.
3. O.~oTepwv Twv aTpa.To'll'e8uw: i.e. the consular army of Aemilius
and the army of the Gauls.
4. T~v j1ETW'IT1')8bv 4>oSov: 'a direct frontal advance'. Cf. xi. 22. ro.
In Thucydides (ii. 90. 4) ships sailing fL<TW7T'I'}Oov, in line, are contrasted with others bri K<pws, in column. Here the sense is clear:
Atilius had his men advance straight forward in an extended acies
instead of the usual column of march, the agmen.
28. 7. Ta<; O.va.~up(Sa.<; : 'trousers', Latin bracae. They were the typical
barbarian garment, worn loose and fastened close at the ankles: they
are so represented on Trajan's Column. Cf. Strabo, iv. 196; Diod.
v. Jo-JI; Mau, RE, avatvptliEs, cols. 2IOQ-I.
Tous EU'II'ETE'i:<; Twv uciywv: 'their light cloaks'. The Gauls wore the
cloak known in Latin as sagum.
8. ot 8~ r a.~aaTa.l YU!lVOL: these wild men from beyond the Alps
still maintained the Celtic custom of fighting naked; cf. iii. II4. 4;
Diod. v. 29. 2, 30. 3 (Poseidonius); Livy, xxxviii. 21. 9, 26. 7 (from
P. on the Galatians of Asia Minor). Germans, too, occasionally fought
naked; Tac. Germ. 6. 2; Hist. ii. 22. See P. Couissin, Annates de la
faculti des lettres d' Aix, 1928--9, 65-89, 'La nudite guerriere des
Gaulois'; M. Launey, REA, 1944, 222 n. 4
Toi<; f.q,cip.JLa.O'L: !J.rr. >u:y. l<foa.f.LILa seems to include both sagum and
lrracae; Suidas, quoting this passage, calls it a rr~ptf3>.."7f-La, however,
equating it with e.f,>a7TT{';;, a Soldier's Upper garment (cf. XXX. 25. 10).
11. rslOv Kal. lla.u!lO.O'TOV: cf. 29. I tvryv Ka.l. 7TUp'I')MayfLEV'Y]V, zg. 7
eK7T>..'I'}KTtK~. The stress on the sensational in P.'s narrative may be
imported from Fabius; cf. CQ, 1945, 12; above i. r. 4 n.
29. 1. Ti)v XPEa.v Tou o-uVTETa.yJLevou: 'the movements of the
forces marshalled against each other' (Paton).
8. p.a.vuiKa.L<; Kal 11'EpLxrtpms: 'necklets and bracelets' ; the 1-Lavtdxat
(3L s) are torques, the typical Celtic adornment (cf. Euphorion,
Polychares (in Et. magtt. 22J. r6), Fat,ijTat 7T~pl s~ip~a XPVao.f,>op~VJITE>).
not, as Much (ZDA, 1932, 44) suggests, their wages as mercenaries,
drawn in advance.
205

II.

]0. I

ROME AND THE GAULS

30. 1. To us d.KovnaTas: cf. iii. 65. 3 ff., 69. 8; they are iaculatores,
javelin-throwers, whom P. often mentions as ypoa,Pof-Laxo~. the
equivalent of uelites (cf. i. 33 9 n.) .
.EvEpyo'Ls Ka.i 'II'UKvo'Ls: 'thick and fast' (not, as Paton, 'well-aimed').
3. TOU ra.Xa.nKOU 8upEou: cf. Livy, xxxviii. 21. 4 (of the Galatians),
scuta tonga ... et ... plana. The oval Gallic 8vpEo<; is frequently
represented on ancient monuments; cf. P. R. von Bienkowski, Die
Darstellung der Gallier in der hellenistischen Kunst (Vienna, 19o8),
figs. ro4, ro7, 109, nr, IIJ, 121; and other works quoted by Launey
(REA, 1944, 222 n. r). It was too narrow to cover the massive bodies
of the Gauls; cf. Plutarch (Philop. 9) on the Achaean shields, prior
to Philopoemen's reforms: dnnoTim 8ta T~v AE1rTDT'1JTa Kal aTEvwTipot<;
Tov 1TEpurriX\nv TU adJj.LaTa.
7. E'll'' !aov Ta.'Ls !Jruxa.'is: for the factor of morale cf. 35 8, i. 59 6
(where, in the rfroxoJLaxla which ended the First Punic War, the
Romans had also a worthy opponent), and iii. 9 7
8. Schweighaeuser fills the lacuna exem.pli gratia: . . . JLEya>.~v
Otatfoopav [ifxovaL 'PwJLalw;;, OLa TO TOVTWV JLiV TOV 8vpEOV oAov TO (JWJLU
aKE1TEtV, Tov 8 Ta>.aTLKov {JpaxvTEpov Elvat, Kai Dta TO T~v 'PwJLatK~v
JLEV (Kal T~v JLEV 'PwJLULK~V Hultsch) J.Ldxatpav Kal TO KlVTIJJLU 8uJ4>Dpov
KaL Kamrf>opdv N; dJL,Pov Toi:v JLEpofv {Jlawv] lxnv, KTA. For the substance of this see 33 5, iii. 114. 2 ff., vi. 23. 7, fg. 179. J.Lq6.X1Jv is to
be taken with fna<fopdv, not with 1rpfii;w (as Treves): 1rpu~tv, 'offence',
balanCeS aa,P\naV, 'safety', KUTU,Popa lS 'cutting-edge' (cf. iii. 114. 3,
vi. 23- 7); elsewhere (e.g. 33 3 33 5) it means 'cutting-stroke'.
31. 1. Gallic losses. The 4o,ooo dead appear in other sources (cf.
Diod. xxv. 13; Eutrop. iii. 5; Oros. iv. 13. ro); the ro,ooo+ prisoners
are not mentioned elsewhere. Together they account for over 5o,ooo
of the 7o,ooo with which the Gauls set out (23. 4 n.).
KoytcoXmivos: according to Diodorus (xxv. 13) he was subordinate
to Aneroestes (Tov JLEYWTov aV"Twv {JaatMa).
2. a.uTte Ka.i To'Ls O.va.y~ea.(ms: the dvayKai'ot are here the king's entourage, perhaps including his wives (cf. Caesar, BG, i. 53 4 on
Ariovistus); so Treves, ad loc. For the hysteron proteron to avoid
hiatus see 2. 2 n.
3. Ta !lEV cr~eu>..a. . T1)v o Xt:la.v: the former is the plunder and trophies talcen from the Gauls, the latter the booty they had assembled
during their expedition. o[ 1TpomJKDVTE<; are 'the owners' (a sense not
listed in LSJ).
4. ds T~\1 TCl\1 Bolwv .. xtilpa.v: i.e. into Emilia (r7. 8); on the
expedition see Diod. xxv. 13; Zon. viii. 20. Aemilius will hardly have
returned tv o>.lyat> ~f-Llpat>. Since he triumphed 'III non. mart.' (224),
and will not have campaigned in winter, evidently he crossed the
Apennines in September-October 225, and returned along the line
206

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 32.

of the Via Flaminia. Diodorus' statement that he invaded the Po


valley as proconsul may be neglected, for he triumphed as consul.
5. To Kn1TET6>Atov: Florus {i. zo) and Dio (fg. so. 4; cf. Zon. viii. 20)
have a story that the Gauls had sworn an oath not to doff their belts
or breastplates till they entered the Capitol (uncaptured in 387);
this they fulfilled as prisoners in Aemilius' triumph. The UTJJLt/iat are
Gallic standards; on the p.a.wiKa' see 29. 8 (where the definition might
have come more appropriately).
8. tenTEA1TcrnvTES' 'Pwjlnot 5uv..)crecr9nL tK~aAeiv: just as the
capture of Agrigentum inspired them with the ambition to seize
all Sicily (i. zo. In.). This schematic development of Roman ambitions is probably P.'s own, rather than the work of Fabius Pictor
(Heuss, HZ, 169, 1949-5o, 488 n. r, against Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 151).
Ko'(vTov CI>6Xoutov tent TTov M&-Atov: T. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus
and Q. Fulvius M.f. Q.n. Flaccus, the consuls of A.U.C. 530
224 B.C.
The same pair had been elected censors in 231, but abdicated owing
to a flaw in their election. That both were sent to Cisalpine Gaul is
proof of the seriousness of the Roman effort. See Munzer, RE,
'Manlius (8z)', cols. 1207--9; 'Fulvius (59)'. cols. 243-6.
9. ds n)v 'PwJ.lawv enuTOUS' 8ovva.t 1T'Lcrnv: this is an act of deditio
(n. 5-12 n.). Orosius' story (iv. 13. n), that the Po was crossed,
23,ooo Insubrians slain, and s.ooo taken prisoner, is probably an
annalistic invention (nothing to correspond appears in the act. tr.).
It is very unlikely that the Romans crossed the Po in this year. See
DeSanctis, iii. I. 313 n. 1q..
10. els TEAOS G'!TpnKTOV dxov: if T6v AoL7r6v xp&vov is the object of
11:lxov, arrpai<.'TOV is predicatiVe, if an adverbial aCCUSative, arrpaKTOV
is also adverbial. The sense is the same in either case.
32. 1. no1T'ALOS Cl>ooptos teal r<l.i:os CI>XaJlvws: P. Furius Sp.f. M.n.
Philus and C. Flaminius C.f. L.n. the consuls of A.U.C. 531
223 B.c. See Munzer, RE, 'Furius (8o)', col. 36r; and, on Flaminius,
21. 8 n.
Sta TllS' TWV 'Av<l.pwv xwpa.s teTA.: on their situation see I7. 7 n.
Philipp (RE, 'Massalia (2)', cols ..Zisz-3) argues that the Massalia
here mentioned is a town in Italy; but one does not explain the little
by the lesser known, and clearly Massalia must be Marseilles. The
various proposed emendations (see Hultsch, introd. liii-liv) are unnecessary: for it is clear from 14. 6 (cf. 14. 8) that to P. the Alps
began a little to the north of Massalia; and since the Anares were
the first people in the Po valley south of the river, they were clearly
not far from that city. P. has been misled by his own schematic
description, as Cuntz (61) saw. The Roman route lay through Liguria,
and over the Apennines by the passes north of Genoa; see Nissen,
It. Land. i. 473 The Anares also made an act of deditio ( z).

II. 32.

ROME AND THE GAULS

2. Ka.Tcl TclS auppola.s TOU T' :t\Soa. Ka.i n&Sou: they crossed the Po
at its junction with the Addua (modern Adda) between Placentia
and Cremona.
3. Aa.(3ovTt:S SE wAfJyas KTA.: this defeat and agreement {which left
Flaminius free to march away and link up with the Cenomani) make
little sense. Probably the defeat is an exaggeration and the agreement a fiction { s); and Flaminius' original object was to join the
Cenomani. The distortion, De Sanctis suggests (iii. r. 314 n. II7), is
a reflection of the senatorial hostility towards him which permeates
our sources, including Fabius; see 21. 8 n.
4. Tov KAouuLov woTJlOV: should be the modern Chiese, a tributary
of the Oglio; but this and not the Chiese formed the western limit
of Cenomani country (17. 4 n.), and perhaps the name of the tributary
has been applied to the main stream (M:ommsen, CIL, v. 413 n. 2;
Nissen, It. Land. ii. 196 n. 2), either inadvertently or following contemporary usage.
6. Tns xpuuO.s O'TJJlELs: these standards were dedicated to Minerua,
or her Celtic equivalent, of whom Caesar writes (BG, vi. q. 2) that
'Mineruam operum atquc artificiorum initia tradere'. She was, v..Tites
Jullian (L 357), 'deesse de Ia guerre et de victoire, qui rappelait ala
fois Bellone, Athene ou Minerve'. They were suspended in one of her
temples, perhaps at the Insubrian capital of Mediolanum (so
Schweighaeuser). The word dKw7}Tous has special point since KU'Ei:v
was the technical expression for removing sacred objects from
temples (cf. Thuc. i. 143. I, ii. 24. I, vi. 70. 4; see Schweighaeuser on
Appian, B.C. ii. 41). In this case the Insubres removed the standards
as a source of divine protection. \Vunderer's emendation av~K~Tou.
(i. 72-73) is to be rejected. See also R. Hercod, 87.
8. T~\1 Tt: r a.Aa.nKTjv tHlEula.v: 'the treachery of the Gauls' ; cf. iii. 49. 2.
70. 4, 78. 2. Paton translates diJw{av 'fickleness' and Treves 'instability,
inconstancy' (quoting Caesar's estimate of Gauls as ever eager for
novelty, BG, iii. ro. 3, iv. 5 r). But toP. the meaning is stronger,
positive treachery rather than negative instability. See Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. &.iJwia, commenting on fg. I a (B-W), 'certe
grauius quid P. TI)v diJwlav dicere consueuit quam rif311{5ato77jTa id est
leuitatem et inconstantiam'.
9. EVTos Tou woTO.JlOU: i.e. on the right bank of the river. This should
be the Clusius (= Oglio, 32. 4 n.), but P.'s topography here is not
very clear. The Cenomani were dispatched to the left bank.
33. The battle against the Insubres. The account follows the anti~
Flaminian tone of 21. 7--9 and 32. 3 The innovation of the military
tribunes, which is never heard of again, seems invented to contrast
with Flaminius' incompetence. On P.'s picture of 1<1aminius, which
remains consistent down to his death at Trasimene, see Gelzcr
208

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 33 9

(Hermes, 1933, 152-3); and on this passage De Sanctis (iii. 1. 315).


P. omits the sensational prodigies, and the letter of recall sent by the
Senate to Flaminius, and left unopened until after the battle, which
adorn the Livian tradition; cf. Plut. Marc. 4; Fab. 2; Zon. viii. 20;
Oros. iv. 13. 12-14; Livy, xxi. 63. z, 63. 7, 63. 12, xxii. 3 4, 3 r3. See
DeSanctis, iii. 1. 314 n. 115.
3 .,.o.is t<Q.TO.O't<t:uo.1s: 'from the way they are made' (Paton), cf.
30. 7-9 The long Celtic swords of the middle La Tene period, such as
the Insubres will have used, are well kno"'11 from excavations, and
of excellent quality, though suited only to slashing because of their
blunt points (Dechelette, M anuet d' arcMologie, ii. 3 (Paris, 1914),
II09 ff., II29 ff.). P.'s story of the swords that bent reads like 'one
of those tales told by soldiers to while away idle moments in camp'
(DeSanctis, iii. 1. 315). and also, one may add, to reassure the teller
and his audience. A modern parallel might be the story, popular in
England in the winter of 1939{4o, of a German tank which unexpectedly proved to be made of cardboard. On the Gallic sword see
Plut. Cam. 41 (about Brennus); Polyaen. viii. 7. 2 (drawing on
Plutarch). One may neglect the theory of S. Reinach (Cultes, mythes
et religions, iiiz (Paris, 1913), 152 ff.) that the story grew out of a
Celtic sepulchral rite of burying a dead man's bent sword with him.
4 . .,.a, TWv Tplo.p(wv SOpo..,.o.: instead of pila, the triarii (vi. 21. 7-10)
carried hastae,long spears. Since the triarii had only half the strength
of the other classes (vi. 29. 4), these spears suffi.ced, not for all the
hastati, but only for their TTpCinat <J7TEipat, the maniples in front.
EK fLETo.At)l(iEws: i.e. after taking up their swords instead of their
spears.
5. cl.+EAOfLEVOL TTJY Et< liLO.puEws fLO.XlJ": 'depriving them of the
power of raising their hands and cutting' (Paton). The Romans got
close in, so that the Gauls had no space to use a slashing action; cf.
iii. 114. 3, ~ ?ie Ta>.an~ 1-'d:x.mpa 1-'{av elxff XPfflav T~v tK I<CLTa,Popiis, Kat
-raV'T-rjv

;g a7Torrn:i<JEWS'.

6. Et< lho.Xt)+Ewc;: bp9o.is X~flEVOL To.ic;: fLxa.(po.~c;:: K Sw.A'lj,PEws,


punctim, 'with a thrusting stroke', see Schweighaeuser's long note
ad loc. By dp6ats P. may mean that the swords were kept straight,
i.e. that the movement, punctim, was along the line of the sword, or
alternatively that the Roman swords did not bend.
7 . .,.c, .,.Tjc;: 'PwfLO.i:t<"lc;: flGXlJi 'llhov: room to manreuvre in all directions,
including backwards, was essential to manipular fighting; cf. xviii.
25. 4 for the retreat of the Roman left 7Tt TToi'la at Cynoscephalae
(Meyer, J(l. Schr. ii. 214 n. 3). The tactic of retiring in battle against
the Gauls is discussed by Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 368 ff.).
9. va.vfiADov Eic;: TT)v 'PwfL"lv: Flaminius triumphed by a popular
vote VI idus mart. (222) de Galleis, and "Furius Jill t"dus mart. de
Gatleis et Liguribus (act. tr.). Their victories were celebrated on coins
4866

209

H. 33 9

ROME AND THE GAULS

(see B.M.C. Rom. Rep. ii. zj8, z83); and according to Livy (xxiii.
14. 4) the spoils were sufficient to arm 6,ooo men.
34. 1. MapKOS K>.uoliLOS KUt rva..:os KopYtlALOS: M. Claudius M.f.
M.n. Marcellus and Cn. Cornelius L.f. L.n. Scipio Calvus, consuls
A.U.c. 532
222 B.C. Both were to have outstanding careers against
Hannibal: see Munzer, RE, 'Claudius (z2o)', cols. 2738-55; Henze,
RE, 'Cornelius (345)', cols. 1491-2. Since the previous year's consuls
abdicated after their triumphs (Livy, xxi. 63. 2; Plut. Marc. 4 3,
6. r; Zon. viii. .zo), they probably entered office on the Ides of March;
and this seems to have remained the regular date for entry into
office until I53 See De Sanctis, iii. I. 316 n. 122; Mommsen, St.-R.
i. 598 f.; Broughton, ii. 638-9. There is some evidence that P.'s
account is somewhat weighted in favour of Cornelius, at Marcellus'
expense, perhaps because of his connexion with the Scipionic family
(Munzer, art. cit.).
4. 1T6Aw !A.xippuc.;: the Tabula Peutingeriana puts Acherrae 22 miles
from Laus Pompeii {Lodi Vecchio) and 13 from Cremona; it lay on
the Addua a little above its confluence with the Po, and corresponds
to Gera near Pizzighettone. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. rg2.
5. K>.aaTlBLOv: Clastidium, modern Casteggio, in the territory of the
Anares (17. 7, 32. 1-z), lay on the fringe of the hills south of the Po,
between I ria (Voghera) and Ticinum (Pavia). See iii. 69. I for its
capture by Hannibal; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 271.
6. Ka.t TLVas Twv m;tLKwY: 6oo, according to Plutarch (Marc. 6. 6), who
also records that Marcellus took two-thirds of the cavalry. Plutarch
(Marc. 6--7) gives a fuller account of this battle than P., very favourable to Marcellus, and probably containing annalistic accretions;
see DeSanctis, iii. r. 317 n. u.7. It may be deliberately (34 In.) that
P. omits the gaining of spolia opima by Marcellus in his duel with
the Insubrian chieftain Viridumarus (act, tr.; Livy, ep. 20; Florus,
i. 20. 5; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. r3. rs; Ampel. 2I; Val. Max. iii. 2. 5;
Frontin. Strat. iv. 5 4; auct. de uir, ill. 45 r; Plut. Marc. 7--8; Rom.
r6. 7-8; comp. Pelop. et Marc. r. z; Serv. ad Aen. vi. 855; also
celebrated by many poets including Naevius in his play Clastidium,
and Propertius (iv. Io. 39 ff.); see too B.M.C. Rom. Rep.i. 567).
8. a.thoi:s Toi:s t1T1Tilaw 1Tpoam:cr6VTwv: by extending his cavalry
line Marcellus avoided the risk of being outflanked (Plut. Marc.
6. ro).
9 . .,ts Tov 1TOTO.f10Y: its identity is not clear; the Po is 8 miles north
of Casteggio.
10. Mc;~ho>.a.vov: the Insubrian capital (17. 4 n.), modern Milan, on
the site of Etmscan Melpum (r7. r n.), which the Gauls destroyed
in 3 (Nepos ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 125). Cf. Nissen, It. I.and. ii.
r8o ff.; Philipp, RE, 'Mediolanum (r)', cols. 91-95.
210

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35 4

15. o S fvO.i:os .. To MtSt6Aa.vov ttAt: after glossing over Scipio's


rashness in advancing to Milan with only a third of his cavalry, and
underlining his success in rallying his shaken force, P. omits to
mention that it was only after Marcellus rejoined him that Milan
fell. See Plut. Marc. 7; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. 13. 15; Zon. viii. 20.
35. 1. mivTa. . hrhptljlav TOL'i 'Pwp.aoto;: by deditio; how far miv
7TOt1JaLI' vmaxvovp./vwv (34 1) had fallen Short of readineSS to Carry
this out is not clear. But obviously both consuls and the war-party
were bent on a military demonstration.
2-10. The importance of the Gallic wars. P. underlines the lesson for
the benefit of Greek readers ( 9). It is (a) that in such incidents
Fortune and the unexpected play a large part ( s. 8). cf. 4 s. (b)
that a policy based on courage and reason will outmatch one based
on passion ( 3, 8). Such digressions are a regular feature of P.'s
method; d. i. 65. 5-9 (lessons of the Mercenary War), 84. 6----9 (lessons
of Hamilcar's success), iii. 21. 9-10 (reasons for surveying the
Romano-Carthaginian treaties in full) ; these examples could be
multiplied.
2. TWV .. lmoAXufLvwv tca.L 11'a.paTa.TTOfLvwv: hysteron proteron to
avoid hiatus; cf. 2. 2 n.
oliSEvos Ka.Ta.SEaTEpos TWV ~aTOPTJfLvwv: this is a common To7To:> of
ancient historians; cf. Thuc. i. 1. 2, 21. 2 (the Peloponnesian vVar
the greatest and most memorable). P. uses it repeatedly; cf. i. 63. 4 f.
(comparison with the Persian and Peloponnesian wars), 88. 7 (the
Mercenary War the cruellest ever fought), iii. 1. ro (the period of
fifty-three years, 22o-167, more packed with serious events than any
other); on its usual character see v. 33 I. Lorenz (99 n. 228) quotes
examples from later historians.
3. 9ufL~ fLO.AAov ~ AoytafL~ ~pa.~E..)Ea9a.t: cf. 30. 4, V7ro ToiJ 8vp.oiJ Kal
ri}> .i.\oytaT{as-, 35 8. The sentiment is very typical of P. For the
metaphor of the umpire in {Jpa{J!Jw8at cf. i. 58. 1.
4. a.uTous . wa6vTa.'i: Cisalpine Gaul was pacified in the two
decades following the peace of 201; but details are not contained in
the surviving parts of P. The Boii were defeated in 191 (Livy, xxxvi.
38. s-7). and Strabo (v. 213, 216) records their expulsion to the
Danube area; but according to Livy (xxxvi. 39 3) they merely had
to cede Bononia and half their land, and Strabo's story may be a
false deduction from the presence of Boii in Bohemia. Strabo (ibid.)
also records the annihilation of the Senones and Gaesatae; but the
Insubres (who were defeated in 197, Livy, xxxii. 30-31) continued,
he says, to inhabit their own lands. Pacification was assisted by
colonization. In 190 the Latin colonies at Cremona and Placentia
(iii. 40) were reinforced (Livy, xxxvii. 46. 9-47. 2), a Latin colony
was sent to Bononia in 189 (Livy, xxxvii. 57 7-8), and two citizen
211

11. 35 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

colonies were established at Mutina and Panna in r83 {Livy, xxxix.


55 7-8). Roads too were built, the Via Flaminia from Arretium to
Bononia, and the Via Aemilia from A.riminum to Placentia, both in
187. P., like Strabo, has, however, exaggerated the extent to which
the Gauls were physically expelled. When Strabo (v. 247) says that
the Samnites gTrmov from Pompeii, he is apparently referring to
their ejection from political control; and J. Whatmough would save
F.'s credit with the argument (Harv. Stud., 1944, 8z-8s) that gwa8l!'rs has a similar meaning here. But when P. writes avv8w;p1}aavus .. lgwaflvms, there can be little doubt what he means. He
is, however, incorrect. Hundreds of tombstones with Celtic names
dating mainly from imperial times are only the most striking of the
evidence proving that the Gauls were not expelled, but romanized;
cf. Chilver, 71-8.), and on the settlement in general, De Sanctis,
iv. r. 41o-17; T. Frank, CAH, viii. 326 ff.
1TA-i]v b'Alywv T61Twv ICELfl~vwv: P. will be thinking especially of the
tribes at the head of the Po valley, the Salassi (xxxiv. ro. r8), who
were only partially subdued in 143, and perhaps the Taurini (r5. 8 n.);
see DeSanctis, iv. r. 417
TTJV -~ cipxfts i~oSov nis J.lETci TauTu 1Tpa~ELS '~'TJ" TEAEuTutuv
t~uvuaTuow: three interpretations are possible: (a) the invasion of
387, the intervening events, the final tumultus of 225 (giving lgavaO"TaaLs this sense with Schweighaeuser); (b) the invasion of 225, the
loss and recovery of Cisalpine Gaul, and the final expulsion of the
Gauls (gavaO"TaaLs as in 2r. 9: so Casaubon, Paton, Treves, LSJ, etc.);
(c) the invasion of 387, the intervening campaigns (including 225),
and the final expulsion. The last seems most probable, since it indudes the whole story of the Gauls in Italy (as P. did in this section
and the later lost parts together). Against (a) is the improbability
that gavci.O"TaaLS means tumultus, and against (b) the improbability
that the invasion of 225 would be called~ g dpxf}s lcpoSos immediately
after a survey going back to the capture of Rome.
5. Tu TmuiJ,-' ~1TELa6SLu Ti)ll TUXTJS: lusus jortunae, Schweighaeuser
(cf. Hor. Od. ii. I, 3, ludumque Forttmae), 'such episodes in the drama
of Fortune', Shuckburgh. In his commentary Schweighaeuser suggests that P. means an interlude, dravm from the material provided
by Fortune, and inserted as a digression by the author in his history.
But it is improbable that P. admitted any part of his work to be without relevance to his design (which he had already (i. 4 r) identified
with the design of Tyche). The 'episodes' are rather the interludes
provided by Fortune herself in her role as play-producer {on which see
i. 4. 4 n. and CQ, I945, 9 n. I; to the passages there quoted add fg. :nz).
Strachan-Davidson (ad loc.) suggests that 'the incident of the Gallic
invasion is looked upon as a sort of by-play coming between the
great Acts of the Punic tragedy, which is the main business of TvxrJ
212:

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35 9

at this period'. But the episodes include the whole series of Gallic
invasions of Italy from 387 to the expulsion from the Po valley. They
are interludes because they interrupt the direct development of
Roman power, to which (despite such a passage as 31. 8) they con
tribute nothing; and yet they are the work of Tyclre, since in their
ups and downs, their paradoxical and sensational features, they
reveal her typical handiwork. Such interludes, irrelevant interrup
tions, must be faced and mastered; how to meet them is P.'s lesson
here ( 8).
7. 'I"OU'ii 'ri}v nc:pawv ~cJ>o&ov 1((1,' r a.Aa.'!"WV O.ya.yOv'!"a.'ij: Herodotus (cf. i. 63. 8 n.) and Ephorus (praised in v. 33 z) both dealt with
the Persian Wars, though Ephorus' work has survived only in the
popular abridgement of Diodorus. \Vhom P. has in mind for the
Gallic attack on Delphi (cf. i. 6. 5 n., ii. zo. 6) is uncertain, for all our
accounts are secondary (Diodorus, Iustinus, and Pausanias), and
their sources are not determined. Timaeus may have touched on the
subject (so A. Schmidt, Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte (Leipzig,
r888), 3 ff.); and Demetrius of Byzantium, who wrote thirteen books
on 'the crossing of the Galatians from Europe into Asia' (Diog. Laert.
v. 83) may have included the attack on Delphi. Pausanias' source
is especially good (Tarn, AG, 439-42) and may be either Timaeus
or, as Segre thought (Historia, r927, r8-4z), Hieronymus of Cardia.
1'0U'ii inrEp Tfjs Kowfls 1'WV 'EAA.t1vwv ~AEu9Ep(a.s O.ywva.s: the old
catchword of 'Greek freedom' was as popular and as elastic in the
second century as in the fifth; since P. has no difficulty in reconciling
it with Macedonian domination in the fourth century and Roman in
the second (cf. xviii. 14. 6; CQ, 1943, 7-13), his argument here is
perhaps 'singularly frigid and rhetorical' (Treves, ad loc.). Laqueur
(275) argues that this passage (35 4 ff.) is anti-Roman in implication:
not so, for throughout the Romans are clearly the civilized element
repelling barbarism, not barbarians themselves.
8. TJ a.ipEats Ka.~ liuvnJ.ltS: 'devotion and might'; alternatively
a.tp~a<;; may be 'resolve' (consilit~m, Schweighaeuser). Schweighaeuser
takes Svvap.t;; to mean 'ability', sollertia (d. i. 84. 6). But the phrase
there is crrpa77JYLK~ Svvap.LS'; alone, ovvap.LS' seems to require the more
usual meaning. For the stress on reason cf. 3
9. c) &' a'ITO r a.Aa.1'WV cJ>6l3os .. Ka.8' TiJ.lii'ii E~~'ITATJ~E TOUS EAATJVCI.S:
P. is thinking specifically of the Galatian wars in Asia Minor in the
second century; cf. iii. 3 s. xxi. 41. z, ~x&.p71r:ra.v . brl -rij! Tdv a1r6
-rwv {Japf3dpwv ain-ot.;; cpofJov ii<fonp~cr8aL (after Cn. Manlius Vulso's
expedition in 189). Galatians had invaded Pergamum at the time of
Pydna; the subsequent settlement is given at xxx. z8; cf. xxx. 30. 2.
For inscriptions relative to that war see DeSanctis, iv. r. 363 n. 329.
In xxv. 6. 3 the Dardanians show the traditional fear of the Gauls.
All these incidents helped to form P.'s concept of the Gauls prior to
8

2Il

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35 9

his exile; they have no bearing on the date of composition of the


present passage.
10. TTjv O'ITi!p TOUTWV t~t]yqaw: Tov.rwv will be masculine, not neuter
(as Paton) ; cf. 14. r, {nrp wv (i.e. the Celts) SoKEt p.ol x.p*np.ov Elvat
1rm~uauiJa, T~v ig~'}"T}uw, to which P. here clearly refers back.
36. Hannibal succeeds Hasdrubal in Spain (zZI)
36. l. ETTJ Xt:tpiaa.s oKTw: viz. 229-221 ; cf. I. 7 for the earlier date.
Diodorus (xxv. rz) makes it nine years, but only by inclusive
reckoning.
SoA.ocj:.ovTJ8ds om) TLvos Kt:AToO To yvos: a perhaps less reliable,
but early, Greek version (Diod. xxv. 12; Livy, xxi. 2. 6; VaL Max.
iii. 3, ext. 7; App. Hisp. 8; Hann. 2; Iustin. xliv. 5 5, d. z. 4) records
that Hasdrubal was murdered by an Iberian slave {Iustinus) during
a hunt (Appian) to avenge his master (Appian, Iustinus, Livy) ;
the slave died smiling (Iustinus, Livy) under torture (Appian,
Iustinus, Livy). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 18r) attributes this story to
Coelius Antipater.
2. ollx ouTw Sul. Twv 'ITOAJliwv IIpywv KTA.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. 5, 'plura
consilio quam ui gerens, hospitiis magis regulorum conciliandisque
per amicitiam principum nouis gentibus quam bello aut armis rem
Carthaginiensem auxit'.
3. ol. Ka.pxTJSOvtot: see iii. 13. 4 n. ; Hannibal was the choice of the
troops, subsequently ratified by the people. No distinction is made
here, where oi Kapx.TJS6vw are 'the authorities at home' (not, as
Laqueur (r5) argues, the Carthaginian army; cf. iii. q. u). Laqueur
believes Fabius to be P.'s source; it must be the pro-Barcine source
followed in r and 13.
A.wi~q. .. ovTt vtr: the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca. He was 9 when
he accompanied his father to Spain in 237 (r. 6), and so about 25 now
(in 221). Cf. Diod. xxv. 19 (Tzetzes, Ch. i. 27 f.); Nepos, Hann. 3 2,
'minor quinque et uiginti annis natus'; Zon. viii. 21, et ... Kai
ErKouw e'Twv yEyovws. Eutrop. iii. 7 2 ('annum ... uicesimum') is
probably corrupt. See Lenschau, RE, 'Hannibal (8)', cols. 2323-4.
s~a. TTJV li'ITOcj:.a.woJlEVTJV nyx!vota.v KTA.: Hannibal had served
continuously under Hamilcar and Hasdrubal. The story of his return
to Carthage, whence Hasdrubal recalled him after 229 (Livy, xxi.
3 2ft.), is obviously sheer slander; and the tricnnitltn, which he is
alleged to have served under Hasdrubal (Livy, xxi. 4 ro), may be
a reduplication of the three years spent as independent general in
Spain before crossing the Pyrenees (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 415 n. 6g).
4. SiiAos ~v

etc

TWV i'ITlVOTJJlnTWV m)AEC:JlOV i~o(awv 'PWJlO.lOtS: a

view not confirmed by the evidence quoted. Hannibal's first two


campaigns (iii. r3. 5-14. ro) are merely part of the general policy of
consolidating Punic power south of the Ebro; and in iii. 14. ro P.

HANNIBAL SUCCEEDS HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (221) II. 37

insists that until his third campaign Hannibal avoided giving the
Romans any pretext for war. See Kromayer, HZ, 103, I909 252-3;
Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 504-5. P. is here giving the Roman version,
which made the 'wrath of the Barca family' the main cause of the war
(cf. iii. 9 6); hence ( 6) the Carthaginians appear as the aggressors,
'forming designs' and 'eager to be avenged for their reverses in Sicily',
and the war is treated as inevitable { 7, where the propagandist
Version is thinly disguised:unde(thelwords TOt) Op8w) f11<01TOUfL....Ot>).

37-70. Events in Greece: rise of the Achaean League; the


Cleomenean War
P. closes his 1Tpo~<a-rcr.a~<w~ with this survey of the earlier history of
Macedon and Achaea. He is clearly influenced by his own interests
as an Achaean statesman, and his reason for not dealing similarly
with events in Asia and Egypt (37 6) is not wholly convincing.
Nevertheless, his decision can be justified. Under Philip V Macedon
played a prominent part in the rise of Rome to world dominion; and
to an Achaean the growth of the League to embrace the whole
Peloponnese no doubt seemed an integral part of the story of the
unification of the oecumene. Laqueur (Io-n) and Gelzer (Hermes,
I940, 27-37) have argued that P. inserted the Achaean 1TpoKa-raaKw~
in his history only towards the end of his life, and after 146. Two
passages (iii. 32. 2-3, xxxix. 8. 4-5) speak of the recording of western
events from the First Punic War, but of Greek events only from the
end of Aratus' Memoirs, i.e. 220; and Gelzer assumes that when P.
wrote these the second half of book ii was not envisaged. Such
passages as i. I3. I-5 and iv. I. 4-<J will also, he suggests, be later
insertions; and the obvious difficulty created by references in these
chapters to the Achaean League as still existent (38. 4, 42. 2 ff.,
62. 4), which clearly date to before 146, he surmounts by the hypothesis of an earlier work composed to further the propaganda conducted for the return o1 the exiles after 166, and later incorporated
in the main history. However, this thesis fails to account for 37 & ff.,
which forms an essential part of the introductory chapters, and must
therefore, on Gelzer's hypothesis, have been written when the earlier
work was grafted upon the main history, yet clearly implies the
continued existence of the League. It is therefore to be rejected.
M. Treu (Historia, 1954/5, 219-28) has valid criticism of Gelzer's
hypothesis; but his own argument attributing this part of P.'s work
to an excursus in his Life of Philopoemen is equally unconvincing.
Granted P.'s Achaean upbringing, there is nothing in ii. 37-70 which
does not spring naturally from his original scheme; and indeed the
chapters have more relevance if composed before than after r46,
when the contribution made by the League to oecumenical unity
must have been much less apparent. On the use of the synoptic
ZI5

II. 37

EVENTS IN GREECE

method in these chapters see Lorenz, 3I; but the argument of Siegfried (Io2 ff.) that P. regards the union of the Peloponnese under
Achaea as the realization of a Stoic ideal ('ein verkleinertes Abbild
der stoischen Kosmopolis') is unconvincing.
37. 1. Ka"Ta Si "Tous au"Tous Kmpous: a loose sy'Il.chronism. The Social
War (iv. 3 I ff.) began in late spring 220. On Philip see iv. 2. 5 and
below, ii. 70. 8.
Cil-ia. "To~s lii.A.ots aui-LI-Lcixots: the members of the Kotvry avp.p.axla.
founded by Antigonus Doson; cf. 54 4 n. The so-called Social War
takes its name from this avp.p.axla which fought the Aetolians; see
i. 3 I, iv. 3 I ff.
2. Ka.1'a 1'0 auvexes 1'TJS 1TpoKa.1'a.aKeuTjs: 'next in the series of events
described in my introduction'; the phrase goes with ijKop.Ev. P. is
referring to the scheme for the introduction enumerated in i. 3 8-Io.
1'0u Seu1'pou auO""Tav"Tos . 1TOAEj.Lou : it began with the siege of
Saguntum in spring 2I9 (iii. 17 In.). On the name 'Hannibalic War'
cf. i. 3 2 n.
Ka.1'a 1'-f)v E~ apxfis 1Tpo9EO'LV: cf. i. 3 I-2, iv. 2. I.
"Tfjc:; ia.u"Twv auV'Ta~ews: 'my own narrative' (a.v-rwv = ~p.wv a.v-rwv;
cf. Thuc. i. 82. I).
3. 1'f)S a1!'0SELK1'LKfjS l0'1'0pLa.S: 'detailed history', cf. iii. I. 3, fJ.fiT
a1ToSEl~Hos-. P. uses .i7ToSHKTtK6s- to mean 'supported by full reasons,
tracing cause and effect' (cf. iii. 31. 12), and opposes 'apodeictic'
narrative to an account consisting of mere assertions (iv. 40. I) or,
as here, to the 1TpoKaTaO'KEv1} of books i-ii, which is KE</m.Aau./JS1J~
(i. 13. 7, ii. r. 4, 40. 4). On this see Schweighaeuser on i. 2. 8 (vol. v,
125-30); Strachan-Davidson, 5--tl; Walbank, CQ, I945 I6.
4. otov 1'as 'EAAT)VtKas 11 nepatKas: e.g. the 'E}.).T)VLKa of Xenophon,
Theopompus, or Callisthenes, or the IhpatKa of Ctesias of Cnidus
or Baton of Sinope; but P. merely gives two examples of 'particular'
histories. On the superiority of universal hist:Dry see i. 4 2, iii. I. 4,
4 8-13,32. Iff., viii. 2. I ff.,ix.44. z,xxix. I2; and on the faults of 'particular' historians, vii. 7. 6. In v. 33 2 P. gives Ephorus credit for
writing -ra Ka86Aov; hence o: 7Tpd ~p.wv exaggerates (i. 4 2 is more
accurate). But P. writes &p.ov, i.e. he relates together all the different
parts, whereas Ephorus wrote Ka-ra yvos, thus to some extent obscuring the chronology.
11'pos "Toiho 1'0 j.LEpos "Tfjs li1To9eaews: 'to my present purpose'. Why
P.'s own time has especially favoured the writing of universal history
is explained in i. 4 I ff., and is reverted to in many later parts of the
Histories (e.g. iv. 40. 2), some no doubt now lost. Cf. 8 n.
5. -rrpo "Tfjc:; Ka."Ta.aKeuijs: Ka-raaKEmJ signifies the main history, whence
1TpoKaTa(fKEv1] is books i-ii ( 2); but in i. IJ. 5 and iv. r. 4 KamaKfimJ
is itself used for the introduction.
n6

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR 11.378

6. Twv tea.Tel. ~v ;t..a(o.v Af.yuTrTOv tcTA.: the Seleudd and Ptolemaic


kingdoms interested P. less than Macedon and Achaea (cf. De
Sanctis, Riv. jil., 1934, u8). The reasons he gives for omitting them
(despite 3} from the 7rpoKaTao-Ke~ are: (r} their history before 220
has often been told and is therefore familiar; (z) their history after
220 has shown no surprising changes of fortune (unlike Achaea and
Macedon); 7--9
s~a. TO Ti]v LO'Toplo.v UTfO TrAeu)vwv EICOE86ae<u KTA.: for the period
c. 270-220, which books i-ii cover for the west and for Greece, P.
may be thinking of Phylarchus, whose Histories went down to the
death of Ptolemy III (cf. 56-63 n.), and Mnesiptolemus, who lived
at the court of Antiochus III and wrote a History of the Syrian
Kings (Athen. xv. 697 D; cf. x. 432 B), as well as countless other
writers whose works have also been lost.
iv oi To'i:s tca.9' t\i-'iis tca.~po'i:s: strictly speaking, in his own lifetime,
but probably conceived as covering the period from 2zo onwards.
t""'!Oev E~TJAAa.yl""~ov I""TJOE va.pli.Aoyov lnro rils TOX'Ii: paradoxical situations betray the part Tyche is playing in events (cf.
i. 86. 7, xxix. 21. 3-6, referring to Demetrius of Phalerum), and
though they are not always necessarily related to any purpose, their
absence, as from Egypt and Syria, is apparently a sign that the area
in question lies outside the main pattern of events, with which P.
identifies his own Histories (cf. L 3 3-6, 4 r-rr). In fact, the ultimatum delivered by C. PopilliusLaenas to Antiochus Epiphanes in r68
(xxix. 27. r ff.) was both sensational in itself and catastrophic in its
result; but P. is evidently contrasting the survival of the dynasties
of Syria and Egypt with the fall of the An tigonids at Pydna-apart
{rom his need to find some justification for a decision partly resulting
from lack of interest.
8. Tra.pnoo~os a.u~Tj<TLS tca.l. avf.lcpp6V1JaLs: 'a growth of power and a
political union in the highest degree remarkable' (Paton); cf. iii. 3 7,
op.ollo{as Ka~ KaTaO'TMEWS. This reference to the expansion of the
Achaean League to include the whole Peloponnese, achieved in
autumn I9I and consolidated after the revolt of Messenia in I83,
cannot have been written after the destruction of the League in q6;
for the relevance of this to Gelzer's theory of composition see 37-70 n.
As there is no specific reference earlier to this growth of Achaean
power, the words Ka.0a7rp em:J.vw 7rpOEL7TOll have caused Some difficulty.
Such a phrase, as Gelzer (Hermes, I94o, 30) observes, is generally to
a recent passage (e.g. 40. 6 refers to 37 IO and 38. 6-9; 41. II to 41. I;
41. 6 to 38. 6; so. 7 to 49 7; 71. 6 to 4r. 2); and here P. is apparently
thinking of his general observation in 4, that his own times have
made a material contribution to his purpose, by integrating the
oecumene, primarily under Rome, but also, no doubt, in occasioning
the rise of such a unit as the Peloponnese under Achaean control.
2I7

II. 37 8

EVENTS IN GREECE

Achaea is thus an illustration of the general statement there made;


and since that was accompanied by a reference forward to full treatment later (aa(f,ianpov f.v &poLc; D7JAwaop.Ev), th<C substance of this
was probably in P.'s mind when he wrote Ka8a7TEp f.rravw 7TpoE.i:rrov.
The phrase has no bearing on the date of composition.
10-ll. The unity of the Peloponnese; cf. Plut. Philop. 8 (based on P.'s
'Life of Philopoemen'), ~~~ awp.a H;at ;.tlav SVva;.ttV KCI.'T'(l.(]I(EVd.aa& ~v
liEI.orravV7Jaov. Detailed consideration of P.'s points reveals some
exaggeration.
(a) There were geographical limitations. Methana in the Argolid
never joined the League, but remained Ptolemaic (cf. Ernst Meyer,
RE, 'Methana', cols. 1377-9; Aymard, PR, 13 n. 4), and the status
of the Spartan perioecic towns was odd (Aymard, PR, 250 ff.). This
P. perhaps recognizes in II, axE.Sov T~v cnJ1t1Tao-av liEI.orraJJV7Jaov.
(b) voJJ.OL~ Tois a.uToi~: on the federal laws see Swoboda (Klio,
1912, 25 ff.); lnschr. v. Mag. 39, ll. 43-44; below, iv. 7 1, 6o. 10, v.
1. 7, xxii. 8. 3, 10. 10 ff., IZ. 6. But the separate cities also had their
own laws; d. IG, v. 1. 5, 11. 10 ff. (Sparta aftefi88}; 1. 7; Livy, xxxviii.
34 3; P. xxiv. 7 5; Aymard, ACA, 167 n. 5
(c) aTa.811ois Ka.t 11TpoLs: weights and measures were based on the
'heavy' Aeginetan system, 'With its 'stater' of about 123 gm .. a
standard already vridespread in the Peloponnese before the Achaean
League rose to importance.
(d) vo!10'Jla.<n: cf. Aymard, ACA, 167-8 n. 6. An inscription (IG,
v. 2. 345. iii, 11. 21-22) requires money to be paid [lrr' apyupl]ov
au;.t!LaXLKov Spax~t[afs-]; but all surviving coins appear to be struck
by the separate cities. Presumably the League insisted on the standard, and they were allowed to circulate throughout Achaean territory. Such 'federal' coins 'bear emblems recalling the confederation
and signs peculiar to the issuing city. All bear on the obverse the
effigy of the Federal Zeus; on the reverse, silver coins have the
Achaean monogram (:() 'Within a wreath (symbolizing a city), and
then the name, full or abridged, of the city or of a municipal
magistrate, and copper usually the effigy of a goddess, often thought,
wrongly as it seems to me (cf. Mel. Cumont (rg36), 10 n. 1), to be
Demeter Panachaia, a legend giving the two names of the Confederation and of the city (e.g. AXAION KOPIN010N), and finally the
name, complete or abridged, of a municipal magistrate; cf. R. \Veil,
ZN, r882, 207 ff.; Head, 417 ff.' (Aymard, loc. cit.). In addition certain of the cities seem to have issued distinct 'non-federal' money
while members of the League ; and for some seventeen cities there is
no evidence of coining at alL Further to confuse an obscure question
are the coins bearing the letters A P K[A .6. n N] and no federal symbol,
which were struck a little before 182, long after the Arcadian League
had ceased to exist. See M. Crosby and E. Grace, An Achaean
218

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR IL37ro

League Hoard (Num. Notes and Monographs, 74; New York, 1936),
7 ff., 30 (nos. r62-97), Plate IV.
(e) ~pxoum, ~ouAuTa.is, ~LKa,aTa.i'~ To is a.uTois: this triple distinc-

tion of magistrates, deliberative organ, and judiciary goes back to


Aristotle (Pol. vi (iv.} 14 2. 1298 a: 2v 11-~v rl To fJouA.t:u6/l-Evov 7TEpl Twv
J<:DWWV, OEVTEpov 8~ TO 7TEpt TaS' apxas TpLTOV 8~ TL TO Ot~ea,ov} and
does not correspond exactly with the modern division, popularized
by Montesquieu, into legislative, executive, and judicial (see (against
Aymard, ACA, 158 f.) Newman, Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1902},
iv. 236 commenting on Aristotle, loc. cit.); but the comparison with
Aristotle shows that under 'deliberative' are included several functions today classified as legislative.
G.pXOIIT!> (v. I. 6, I. 9, XXii. IO. IO ff., I2. j) is a general term for
magistrates; elsewhere they are called oi 7TpawTWTES' ToiJ Ttliv 11xa~wv
7TOALTEV/.LilTDS' (ii. 46. 4), al avvapxaL (xxvii. 2. II, Xxxviii. IJ. 4, IJ. 5),
and oi avvapxoi!TE> (xxiii. !6. 6). The term at avvapxLaL, suggestive of
a collegiate organization (Aymard, ACA, 322), is perhaps the official
title. A board was formed of the aTpaT'T)yo> and ten Sa/1-Lovpyo{ (xxiii.
5 r6; J. Bingen, BCH, 1954, 402-7, no. r8, ll. 3-4; for the number see
Livy, xxxii. 22. :z). In addition there were inferior magistrates, the
hipparch (v. 95 7), secretary (ii. 43- r), under-general (iv. 59 2). and
admiral (v. 94 7, 95 n). See Freeman, HFG, 219 ff.
fJovA.wml are members of the fJovAIJ (cf. Bingen, op. cit., no. 18,
l. :z); but what the Achaean {3ovA7] was is a problem linked with that
of the avvooos. The Achaeans had two kinds of assembly, the a6yd7JTos, meeting at irregular intervals, and the a6vooo<;, which met at
regular times throughout the year. Until recently the a6vo&a> was
generally held to have been a representative body, consisting of
deputies from the various cities, acting a.<; a council or fJouA~ (cf.
Tarn, CAH, vii. 738). It has, however, been argued by Aymard
that both auvoOO> and UUyi<:A7]TO> describe a primary assembly open
to all citizens, and that P. used {JavA.~ as a synonym for awoi'ios.
If this were so, {Jov"AwTal here would be merely those citizens who
attended the primary assembly (Aymard, ACA, 157-8). Against
this, Cary suggested (]HS, 1939, 154-5; cf. EHR, 1914, 209-2o) that
the a6vo8os was a 'bicameral body' consisting of a primary assembly
and a fJovA!J of the normal type; and C. A. Robinson (The Greek
Political Experiettce. Studies in honour ofW. K. Prentice (Princeton,
1941), ros) argued that a auvoSas was a joint meeting of magistrates
and {JavA~. The weak point in Aymard's case was his assumption that
a primary assembly de iure, being attended by only a limited
number. was treated as a {JavA~ de facto; and recently, starting out
from the observation (CP, 1945, 65---97) that the representative council
was regarded as normal machinery in federal states of the second
century (cf. xxxi. 2. 12, S7Jil-apaTLKijs x:a.t awopta17> 7TOALnlas)--a
219

II. 37 ro

EVENTS IN GREECE

view challenged by Aymard (CP, 1950, 103-7) as exaggerated-,


Larsen has proceeded to a new, full, analysis of Polybius' terminology,
and has produced a theory which has the merit of simplicity and
seems to cover all the evidence (Representative Government, 75-xos).
A .Wvo3os-, he argues, is simply 'a meeting'. Until about zoo, Achaean
.Wvo3ot consisted (as Cary had said) of both the boule (Council) and
the ecclesia (Assembly), but after zoo of the boule alone. In the
second century the ecclesa was summoned only to debate war or
alliance, or on instructions from the Roman Senate (xxii. 10. Io--Iz,
12. 6); in short, Achaea enjoyed representative government by a
boule perhaps elected on a system of proportional representation
(op. cit. 83-84). This boule possessed legislative, and not merely
probouleutic powers, such powers in short as were exercised by the
populus at Rome (vi. 14. 4ft.). Irregular meetings of either boule
or ecclesia (or both) were probably termed auyKJ.:qrm, though P.
does not use aVyKA'l)To> of an irregular meeting of the eccles1:a (perhaps
because it is his usual term for the Roman Senate: cf. Larsen, 91).
Achaean 3tKaaTal appear in xxxviii. 18. 3, condemning a magistrate
to death; but the federal assembly could transform itself into a court
of justice (xxiii. 4 5, 4 14, xxiv. 9 13; Livy, xxxix. 35 8, 36. z (cf.
Paus. vii. 9 2), xliL 51.8; Syll. 49o,ll. 4-5. See further Aymard, ACA,
182 n. 4). The 3tKaaTal mentioned in xxviii. 7 9 are not Achaean, but
Rhodians called in to arbitrate (cf. Holleaux, E'tudes, i. 441-3).
Naturally judicial rights within the separate cities were not suspended; d. Aymard, ACA, 167 n. 5
Siegfried (1o3) quotes, as evidence that P. saw Achaea as a
microcosm of the Stoic cosmopolis, Zeno (SV F, i. z6z) : tva fL~
l(aTd 7TdAtS" [L'l)3~ ~eanl &)[LOUS' olKwfLEV, l3lot> EKaaTot Stwpta[Livot
3t~ealm>, d.A.M 7TiiVTM aJJOpwwov<; ~YWfLEOa D'l)[LdTaS' Kat 7TDAl7'f1S, EtS' (j
fllo>

il

Kal KOCTfLO>, wcrrrep d.yiAl]S' CTUVVDfLOV Vd[L<p KOWij auVTpet/Jo[Lil''l)).

Such parallelism as exists with P.'s account of the League seems


purely coincidental, and not significant.
10. TouTo To J.L.\pos: 'this undertaking' (Strachan-Davidson), i.e. the
achieving of unity, rather than 'this land', i.e. Achaea {Treves).
11. Sta.AAnTTEW Tov flit J.LIB.~ 1TOAE!.IIS 8ui9Eaw ~xnv: it fell short of
being a single city by not having a single walled enclosure for all its
inhabitants (as for example Athens had a 1T<.plf1o.\os (Thuc. i. 89. 3)
which served the people of Attica). Aristotle (Pol. iii. 3 4-5. 1276 a)
says that it is not the wall that makes the city, since you might build
a wall round the Peloponnese. P.'s remark here looks like an answer;
but P. is not envisaging a wall all round the Peloponnese (despite
Paton's translation, cf. Larsen, Robinson Studies, Sro n. 55), and it
is doubtful whether P. knew the Politics.
TdAAa. eKUaTol<; -ra.1ha KO.L 1ra.pa.1rAT)a1a.: i.e. in all other respects
the inhabitants of the Peloponnese enjoy similar institutions both
220

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.38.6

federally and within the separate cities. On democracy within the


confederacy (of which nothing is said here) see 38. 6 n.
38. 4. vuv u8oKouaw JUiTEL>.f)<fH~TES: the Arcadians were among
the first to be absorbed, Megalopolis joining under its late tyrant
Lydiades in 235 (44. 5). The Spartans were forcibly incorporated by
Philopoemen in 192 (Walbank, Philip, rq6 n. 7), but later revolted
and were finally readmitted in r8z/r (Aymard, ACA, zo6 n. 6). The
use of vilv shows P. to be writing before 146.
5. <f!a.u>.ov yO.p: this rejection of the role of Tyche in the growth of
Achaea is in contrast with 3i. 6, where Syria and Egypt are omitted
from the 7rpoKaTa<TKwfj because 'Tyche has wrought no such surprising change as to render any notice of their past necessary' ; the
inference is that Tyche has wrought such changes in the affairs of
Achaea and Macedon. The inconsistency has given rise to much discussion; and this is one of the passages which some scholars (cf.
i. 63. 9 n.) regard as later insertions. Cuntz (45), indeed, puts its composition at the time of the Gracchi-a thesis hard to maintain since
P. clearly assumes the continued existence of the League (cf.
Svoboda, Phil., 1913, 4i6). In fact, no satisfactory chronology of the
various passages which refer to Tyche can be made on the basis of
some presumed philosophical development in the historian ; and
though not all these references are purely rhetorical (so De Sanctis,
iii. 1. 213-15), the Histories undoubtedly contain inconsistent expressions (see above, pp. r6-z6). The rejection of Tyche in this instance very largely reflects the local patriotism of the Achaean
statesman, who will attribute the whole of his country's success to
its own merits; and elsewhere, in passages in which P. rejects the
workings of Tyche (i. 63. 9 (rise of Rome), x. 5 8. (the achievements
of Africanus), xviii. 28. 5 (Roman military success), xxxi. 30. 1-3
(career of the younger Scipio : some slight concession here to Fortune)). his emotions and affections will be found already to be
engaged. On other occasions (e.g. 35 2-ro) P. has no difficulty in
combining Tyche with such human qualities as reason and courage
as joint causes of success (cf. CQ, 1945, ro-n).
6. 8f]f.LOKpa.Tla.c; a.>...,9wfjc; 'niOTl)flO. Ka.l1Tpoa.pm.v: 'constitution and
principles of true democracy' (Strachan-Davidson, ro). P.'s claim of
equality (lCJ11yopla.) and freedom of speech (m:~.pp71ala), the marks of
democracy, for the Achaean League, is repeated at 42. 3, 44 6, iv.
r. 5, xxii. 8. 6, xxiii. 12. 8 (cf. iv. 31. 4); see, too, Syll. 665, 1. 17
(though 1. 34 refers to the appointment of dicasts dpLaTMJav; cf. IG,
vii. r88, l. 9, 1rAovTlvSa Kal dpLaTMia). Now it is clear that Achaean
'democracy' was something quite other than fifth-century Athenian
democracy; and Aymard has argued (PR, q n. ro) that the word is
here used metaphorically to describe a confederation in which the
221

II. 38. 6

EVENTS IN GREECE

separate cities possessed equal rights comparable to those of the


individual citizen in a democratic 1TOAL>, a view approved by Gelzer
(Abh. Berlin. Akad., 1940, Phil.-Hist. Kl. no. 2, 5 n. r). It is true that
choice 1TAouTiv8a Kai d.purrtv8a conesponds to the method which,
Aristotle (A .P. 3 r, 3 6) says, was employed for the appointment of
magistrates in pre-Draconian Athens, and generally appears to be
the mark of an aristocracy (cf. Arist. Pol. ii. II. 8. 1273 a, vi (iv). 7 3
1293 b). Nevertheless, P.'s words here are quite precise; and the explanation seems to be rather that in the second century, though the
distinctions were still maintained in theoretical and philosophical
discussion (such as that in book vi), there was a tendency to use the
word 'democratic' loosely, without any implied contrast to 'oligarchic' and almost in the sense 'self-governing' (cf. \Valbank, Philip,
225 n. 2; Larsen, CP, 1945, 88-89). In that sense Achaea was a
democracy; but it is perhaps not without significance that Syll. 665,
1. 19 refers to EVVofLla rather than to the more democratic laovofLla. In
practice the democratic principle was modified by a high minimum
age (3o years) for access to assemblies; the absence of payment for
attendance at assemblies limited these to the richer class ; and officeholding, as at Rome, was often expensive (cf. xviii. 7 7). See further
Freeman (HFG, 205 ff.) for a valuable comparison with fifth-century
Athens, and some valid analogies between Achaean and nineteenthcentury British democracy.
7. 1Ta.pa.xpi\!J.a. 1r6.Aw e{,8otceiv ~1TOL'f}O'EV a.uTft: true perhaps of Corinth
(seized by Aratus in 243, cf. 43 4), but not of Messenia and Sparta,
annexed during the second century.
8. taoT'f}n tca.t cf>t>.a.v9pw1T~: 'equality and humanity'. la6rT)> (cf. vi.
8. 4) is equivalent to l07Jyopla ( 6) ; and both are associated with
Trapp'T)ala (42. 3). In the jargon of the Hellenistic chancelleries cfnAavfJpomla implies the bestowal of benefits upon the citizens of a state.
Identification with the liberttf, egalite, and jraternite of the French
Revolution (E. Rand, The Building of Eternal Rome (Harvard, 1943),
6) is anachronistic and misleading.
39. 1. tea.Tel. T~v Mey6.A'f}V 'E).).6.8a.: Magna Graecia signified the Greek
cities of south Italy from Locri to Tarentum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 95)
or even as far as Terina on the west coast (Ps.-Scymn. 303 ff.),
or Sicily (Strabo, vi. 253). It was in use by the fourth century (cf.
Timaeus, FGH, 566 F 13, if the phrase there goes back to him), and
here P. seems to associate it with the influence of the Pythagoreans
(cf. Val. Max. viii. 7, ext. 2), which would bring it back to the late
sixth or early fifth century. See E. Meyer, Phil. xlviii, r889, 274;
E. Pais, Storia della Sicilia e della Magna Grecia, i (Torino, 1894),
513-26; \Veiss,
'Graecia Magna', cols. 169o-r.
tca.9' oi:l; tca.tpou; ~YE1Tpl]a91} Tel. O'UYEOpta. TWY nuaa.yopdwv:
222

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.39.I

the influence of the Pythagoreans in south Italy began with Pythagoras' migration from Samos to Croton about 530 (von Fritz, 92;
Minar, 133; Dunbabin, 359). Despite opposition, members of the
association obtained positions of influence in many of the cities,
where they established governments based on the philosophical and
religious teachings of their leader. The general complexion of these
governments seems to have been aristocratic; but the sources are
so worked over, and indeed contradictory, that little agreement has
been possible about their real character. It is difficult to ascertain
how far Pythagorean government was co-ordinated between the
various cities, and how far its existence outside reflected the domination of Croton (Minar, 38), which is attested by the evidence of
coinage (Kahrstedt, Hermes, 1918, 180-7) for the early half of the
fifth century. Pythagorean rule has been compared to the 'commercial theocracy' of the Calvinists at Geneva (Thomson, Aeschylus and
Athens (London, 1941), 213 ff.; Aeschylus' Oresteia (Cambridge, 1938),
ii. 350-1), and to the role of the Freemasons in the eighteenth century,
who took part in politics as individuals rather than as a society
(von Fritz, 96 f.). Burnet (EGP4, 87-91) is inclined to regard them as
democratic in so far as they had any political colour. By the date
of the rising mentioned by P., however, they were certainly a reactionary group (von Fritz, 97--98). The burning-down of the avvBp~a.
or club-houses (for the expression cf. Plut. Mor. 583 A; Dicaearchus
in Porph. VP, 56), is also described in Iamblichus (VP, 249), who,
however, restricts it to the 'house of Milo' at Croton; and the subsequent visit of the Achaean mediators( 4) is also in Iamblichus (VP,
263). Of these two passages, Iamblichus follows Aristoxenus in the
former; and it is probably Aristoxenus' desire to minimize the extent
of the rising, which restricts it to Croton (d. von Fritz, 30-31). In
the latter, Iamblichus' source is ultimately Timaeus, via Apollonius
of Tyana (von Fritz, 33 ff.; Minar, 6o-65); but it is Timaeus in a
much worked-over and distorted form. P.'s source is also likely to
be Timaeus. He uses him elsewhere for western affairs (e.g. i. 8. 39 8 n.), and like Iamblichus he has the record of Achaean intervention.
On the other hand, Iamblichus makes this intervention lead to a reconciliation between the citizens of Croton and the Pythagorean exiles,
of which P. says nothing; and the similarity is therefore not sufficient
to allow P.'s source to be identified with certainty (cf. Minar, 76
n. 86), though Timaeus remains most probable. Delatte's argument
(Essai, 224) that P. has also used the popular version of Dicaearchus
depends on his view that it was from here that P. took the reference
to disturbances in cities other than Croton; but this may well have
been in Timaeus himself. Timaeus' account was probably based on
inquiry, but he is likely to have used also documents such as the
V1TOfLV~JLa'Ta KpoTWVLa'T(ijj) and the opKO deposited at Delphi after the
223

II. 39

EVENTS IN GREECE

reconciliation between the Pythagoreans and their opponents (Iamb I.


VP, z6z-3); his version, which also survives in part in Iustinus
(xx. 4), Diodoms (xi-xii), and Porphyry's L~fe of Pythagoras (von
Fritz, 33-67; cf. Minar, so, 54 ff.), seems to have been free from political bias and to have set the events within the general framework of
southern Italian history.
The date of the attack on the auv~8pta is disputed. But Aristoxenus
(Iambl. VP, z48-sr) describes how Lysis, Epaminondas'later teacher,
escaped from the holocaust; and from this, taken in conjunction with
Epaminondas' age (he was born not later than 4ro-4os), von Fritz
{78-79. 97-98) deduces that the revolt took place about 445; but the
material for this deduction is tenuous, and Minar (77-78) may well
be right in placing the fall of the Pythagoreans before the rebuilding
of Sybaris in 453, a view which would fit Kahrstedt's findings on the
basis of the coinage, which points to a collapse in the power of Croton
about this time. For though P. makes it clear (against Aristoxenus)
that the revolt was in many cities, the centre of Pythagorean influence and most likely the core of the revolt were at Croton (von
Fritz, 8o ff.). Iustinus' version (xx. 4), putting these events in Pythagoras' lifetime, though also derived from Timaeus, is a doublet of
the events of c. 454. inspired by the common tendency to associate
all Pythagorean details with the master (von Fritz, 87 ff.}.
2. tuvf).,.a:ro; bf.oo-xEpou;: this did not last long, and P. exaggerates
the destruction of the leaders, for while Lysis and Archippus emigrated to Greece, where they set up centres at Thebes and Phlius,
others remained active in south Italy, especially at Rhegium (Aristoxenus ap. Iambl. VP, 248-sr).
4. !A.xaw"l; o-uv~>xp'l\uav-ro: the Achaean mediation is a considerable time after the burning of the avvi8pta, for this is followed by
a period of crrcfrns in the cities ( 2-3). In 417 the Spartans set up
oligarchies in Achaea (Thuc. v. 82. I; Xen. Hell. vii. I. 43); and it is
a reasonable supposition (Unger, 5.-B. Munchen, r883, r78 ff.) that
the establishment of the League of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia,
with its imitation of Achaean democratic institutions, antedated
their destruction at home ( 6 n.). But there can well have been an
interval between the Achaean mediation and the formation of this
League. von Fritz (73-74} dates the mediation to c. 445, associating
it with the founding of Thurii. in which the Achaeans shared (cf.
Diod. xii. II. 3, one of its cpv>..al called i1xats-}; but Minar (83-84)
points out that according to Iamblichus (VP, 263: Timaeus via
Apollonius) Achaean mediation led to a reconciliation, and that this
points to a longer passage of time. He therefore prefers c. 430, a date
adopted by Delatte (Essai, 224 n.), who rightly emphasizes the lack
of precision in P.'s indications. The Achaean mediation may have
had something to do \>vith Lysis' stay in Achaea, on his way from
224

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 39.6

Croton to Thebes (Iambl. VP, 248-sr: from Aristoxenus); but more


likely it connects with the ancient bond between Magna Graecia and
the people which founded so many of her cities, including Croton.
Strabo (viii. 384) also records these events, following P.; Lenschau
(Klio, 1944, 209-10) has argued for a common source in some .:4xaiK~
for this early history of the Achaean League, but Strabo need not
have used the same source for the mythical history as for these
events, on which he gives nothing not in P. For a convenient summary of earlier suggestions for the chronology of the Achaean mediation see Delatte (Essai, 223 n. 1).
5. 4!i.'!TES~a.vTo TYJV a.tpEm.v TWV )\xa...Wv: 'approved the Achaean political system' (rather than 'their character', Strachan-Davidson, 8):
P. is concerned with Td rijs 1roAm:las lf>twp..a.
6. auJ.Lcjlpov~aa.vTES KpoTwv~O.-ra.~, Iu~a.p~-ra.~, Ka.uAwvLaTa.L: the date
of this confederation, set up in imitation of the fifth-century Achaean
League (38. 10; cf. Herod. i. 145), is uncertain. It has been associated
with the union of ol T~v 'ha),Lav KaTott<:oilvT~;;; (Diod. xiv. 91) against
the threat from Dionysius of
(Oldfather, RE, 'Kaulonia',
col. 74; Philipp, RE, 'Kroton (r)', col. 2024); and from Diodorus
(xiv. ror) E. Meyer (v. 8o4) concludes that it was earlier and against
the Lucanians. But the form of the alliance suggests that it was
made before 417 ( 4 n.). There is also the problem of Sybaris. Croton
destroyed Sybaris in 510 (Philipp, RE, 'Sybaris (ro)', col. Ioo8). It
was rebuilt in 453 (Diod. xi. go. 3, cf. xii. ro), probably following on
the fall of the Pythagorcans at Croton ( 1 n.); and its destruction
once more in 448 may signify a turn in their favour at Croton (Minar,
8o). Thurii, founded as successor to Sybaris in 446 or 445, for a time
bore its name (Vt. X arat.: Lysias, 835 D; Herod. v. 45; evidence
from coins, cf. von Fritz, 70); but the Sybarites, who shared in its
foundation, soon quarrelled, and left to form a new settlement on
the Traeis, from which the Bmttians subsequently expelled them
(Diod. xii. u, 22. I; cf. Strabo, vi. 263). The Bruttians only became
important about the time of Dion's expedition against Dionysius
in 357 (cf. Strabo, vi. 255-6; Iustin. xxiii. r); Diodorus (xvi. 15)
describes how they overran Terina, Hipponium, Thurii, Ka~ 1roAAd;;
aAt\n;;, probably including Sybaris on the Traeis. To which Sybaris
does P. here refer? It is true that Sybaris on the Traeis was founded
in feud against Thurii, in the setting up of which the Achaeans had
shared ( 4 n.); but this is no real obstacle to its having taken part
in the present alliance, if this was considerably later than the
Achaean mediation at Croton and elsewhere. von Fritz (74) is inclined to identify this Sybaris (of the confederation) with Thurii,
and quotes Diodorus' reference (xii. rr. 2) to an alliance between
Croton and the newly-founded Thurii, when it must still have been
called Sybaris. But on the whole it seems more likely that P. is
Q

II. 39 6

EVENTS I::-< GREECE

referring to Sybaris on the Traeis, and that the confederation is to


be dated about 420, perhaps to the time of the war of Croton against
Thurii (Iambl. VP, 264); cf. Minar, 82-8.4, 139. It is far more difficult
to assume that P. is referring to events of about 400 (Oldfather and
Philipp, locc. citt.; Beloch, ii. I. zoo; De Sanctis, ii. r8g n. 4), with
the implication that Achaean institutions were copied after 417.
Diodorus (xiv. 91) dates the League to 393; but this inconsistency
disappears if an original confederacy of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia
was subsequently joined by other cities such as Heraclea, Metapontum, Elea, and Tarentum, during the years preceding 393, under
the threat from Dionysius and his Lucanian allies (Diod. xiv. 91. r).
See Glotz-Cohen, iii. 398 ; E. Ciaceri, Storia della magna Grecia, ii
(Milan, 1927),4o8f.,4I3 f.; and, on Thurii, Ehrenberg, AJP, 1948, 14970. 0.1reSeL~o.v ALos o.,.a.pou ~~:owov U.pov ~~:o.t T61rov: cf. v. 93 ro. The
sacred cult centre of the Achaean League was the enclosure of Zeus
Homarios, near Aegium. On its situation see Aymard, ACA, 277~93,
resuming the arguments (d. Melanges offerts a M. Octave Navarre
(Toulouse, 1935), 453-70) for accepting Hamarios and Homarios as
permissible forms of the word; Bingen, BCH, 1953. 626-7. The
sense is probably 'who unites together' (&J.Wii' +ap-) ; see Schweighaeuser, ad loc. Zeus Homarios figures on coins of the Achaean
League. The site of the south I tali an Homarion is unknown.
TU\; 1'E auvoSous Ka.l Tel. OLa.J'ouALa.: 'meetings and deliberations'. Cf.
Strabo, viii. 3R~ (following P.). auvo8os- may have its technical sense
of 'a regular meeting' (cf. 37 Io-II n. (e)), since there were probably
no atfyKA'f/TO in the fifth century (Aymard, ACA, 35 n. 3).
7. irrro o Tfjs ALO\IUO"lOU Iupa.~~:ou(ou Suva.an:[a.s: on Dionysius' invasion of Italy see i. 6. z n. His victory at Elleporus ended Crotonian
influence in south Italy and also, apparently, the alliance on the
Achaean model. The 'surrounding barbarians' are the Bruttians (6n.).
8. An~~:t:Sa.tl-'ov[wv 1TTa.ta6.vTwv 1Tt:pi Tijv v At:~npoLs tJ.6.XTJ":
cf. i. 6. I, iv. 8I. 12; Dem. ix. 23, raxvaav 8. 'TL Kal e,{3atoL TOVTOV<TL
TO~S' T1.VTalovs- x.p6vovs J.LTIL T~v Ell' AvKTpots- J.LctX'l~' The subsequent
aKptala in Greece is also described by Demosthenes (xviii. I8), dMa
aKpLTOS" Kat 7Tapa TOUTOLS' (i.e. the pro-Spartan elements in the
Peloponnese) Kat 7Ta.p0. 'TOtS UAAOS" a7Ta0'V lpts /((),~ Tapa.x~ The uncertainty about the result of the battle is exaggerated by P. to motivate
the Achaean arbitration ; but Schweighaeuser's suggestion that this
is somehow a reference to Mantinea (362) is quite misguided and
misleading.
9. 1TEpt TWY atJ.cJltaJ3TJTOUtJ.EYWV E1TISTpeljla.v !4xa.Lo~s; cf. Strabo,
viii. 384 (probably drawing on P.: d. Honigmann, RE, 'Strabon',
col. 128). This arbitration is not otherwise attested. The Achaeans,
pro-Spartan since 417 (Thuc. v. 82. I, vii. 34 2) supported that cause
even after Leuctra (Xen. Hell. vi. 4 17 ff.), but very soon shifted over

"' ,;v

226

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 40.2

to a policy of neutrality. Hence the reality of the arbitration has


been questioned (cf. Grote, History of Greece 4 (London, I872), viii.
I89 n. ; E. von Stern, Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen
Hegemonic, Diss. Dorpat, I884, I53-5; Aymard, REA, I937. 2I n. 2);
and indeed neither its place in the picture nor the identification of
Ta afufnaf3YJT0-6fLEYU (perhaps the status of the smaller Boeotian towns)
is immediately apparent. Cary (CQ, 1925, I65-6) suggests a date
immediately after the alliance between Athens and the smaller
Peloponnesian states in autumn 37I (Xen. Hell. vi. 5 1-3), but
regards any period during the following twelve months as possible.
He answers some of the objections of Grote and von Stern; but the
whole incident remains dubious, and may go back to a piece of
Achaean falsification. In any case it had no appreciable effect on
the subsequent events.
12. ToY u"n"oOE(~a.YTa.: 'anyone making such a claim'; cf. 47 Io, v.
46. 9 for this sense, which is in Thucydides (iv. 86. 5). P. here quickly
passes over the long period of Achaean depression which lasted from
the middle of the fourth century to 28o. It included co-operation
with Agis III of Sparta against Antipater in 330, and the occupation
of Achaea by Demetrius Poliorcetes (Brandis, RE, 'Achaia (I)',
cols. I62-3). There is no external evidence of either achievement or
high principle in Achaea at this time.

40. 1. TO K~~~I.O"TOY ~pyoy, TTJY nE~O"II"OVYlJULWY bfJ-OYOLO.Y: cf. 37. 9-II'


38. 6-9. The same slogan, extended to all Greece, appears in the
famous Athenian decree recording the alliance of the Chremonidean
War (Syll. 434/5. 11. 32 ff.): the allies, including the Achaeans Kotvi'j>
6p.ovolaS" y.:;vop.lYYJS" TOtS" "EAAYjat 7rpOS" TE TOVS" vvv TjOtKYjK(JTaS" Kal 7rapEU"1ToYOYJKOTa S"Tct> TToAEt> (viz. Gonatas and his tyrants) 7rpo0vp.ot fLETa
Tov f3amAlwS" liToAEp.a{ov Kal fLET' WU.?)..\wv imapxwmv d.ywvtaTal Kai TO
..\omov fLEO' 6p.ovoia> adn{watv TaS" m)..\nS".
2. 'Apa.ToY TOY IucuwYLOY: Aratus (27I-2I3) founded the Con-

federation in the form in which it played so vital a part in the history


of the third and second centuries. For his early career see 43 3 ff.,
for his Memoirs, 40. 4, and on his character iv. 8. For discussion of
all questions relating to Aratus see Walbank, Aratos; W. H. Porter,
xiii-cv.
ci>L~ovo1fJ-EYa. ToY MEya.~owo~LTlJY: Philopoemen (252-I82) fought at
Sellasia (67. 4 ff.) in 222, reformed the Achaean army and defeated
the Spartans in 206 (xi. 8 ff.), and became the most famous Achaean
statesman of the second century. Though highly praised by P., who
wrote his biography in three books (x. 21. s-8), his policy may be
justly criticized as negative. On his character see De Sanctis, iv.
I. 243-4; and in general W. Hoffmann, RE, 'Philopoimen', cols. 76--95.
AuKopTa.v: Lycortas of Megalopolis, the son of Thearid<1s, and father
227

II.

40. 2

EVENTS IN GREECE

of P. (xxii. 3 6), first appears in 192 as hipparch (Livy, xxxv. 29. 1).
During a long political career he urged a policy of neutrality towards
Rome, and friendship with the Attalids and Ptolemies. P., normally
favourable, as one would expect, criticizes him in xxii. 9 The theory
that Lycortas married Philopoemen's daughter (cf. Hiller von
Gaertringen on Syll. 6z6; Stahelin, RE, 'Lykortas', cols. 2386-9;
von Scala, rs) is based on the fact that P.'s brother Thearidas called
his son Philopoemen (IG, v. 2. 535); but were it true, P. would not
have omitted to mention it (Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1445).
3, nEt I(Q;TQ. TtJ 1rpE1rOV TTI ypa.cflfi 'I:I'O~OUj.LEVOl TftV ~'lr~UTO.OW: 'making
mention of them from time to time in such a way as not to conflict
with the scheme of this work'; P. probably means that he will not
confound the canons of history and biography (x. 21. 8). Paton's
translation, 'without transgressing the limits I have set to this part
of my work', is misleading; he is not concerned here with the npoKa7aaKetn). On the repetition of iTT[OTauts in the sense 'beginning' in
5 see i. 14. 2~3 n.
4. Ka.l vuv t<a.& p.1ml. Ta.uTa.: 'now and hereafter' (sc. in this book).
P. is not thinking of the Social War (so Treves interprets p.erd.
'Tairra), for Aratus' ]\l[emoirs did not descend beyond the accession
of Philip V. On these see i. 3 2 (rij> 7Tap' l4p6.7ov . uvn<ff~Ews),
ii. 47 II (v7TOf.Ll-'1)f.La7a), 56. 2, iv. 2. I (-N]v J4pdTov aVV'TO.gu,); Plut.
A rat. 3 3, 32. s. 33 3, 38. 6 (v1Top.Jnjf.LaTa) ; cteom. 16. 4; Agis, 15. 2,
fragments in FGH, 23r. See Walbank, Aratos, 6-9; Porter, xvxvii.
The Memoirs, thirty books in length (FGH, 231 T I = Life of
Aratus of Soli, p. 79, 12 M), went down to 220 (i. 3 2, iv. 2. r) and
served as a political defence of Aratus' policy. P. is clearly prejudiced
in favour of his fellow Achaean ; but the work had important omissions (cf. 47 II) and was not always reliable in detail. Plutarch
indicates its character by his use of the words dpvovp.evos, &.1ToAoyetu8a.t,
and &.1To:.\oyltea8a.t in connexion with it. The style was rough and
unfinished (Piut. Arat. 3 3). Aratus' Memoirs are P.'s main source
for Achaean events in this book, and Plutarch's in his Aratus. When
they perished is unknown. Muller's statement (FHG, iii. 21), repeated by Porter (xv), that they were excerpted by Sopater for his
'Ex:'Aoya.{ in the fourth century of our era, rests on a misreading of
Photius, Bibl. cod. 161, p. 104 b {= Migne, Patrol. Graec. ciii. 450),
who merely refers to Plutarch's Life. These v1Top.Vl)f.La.Ta. are- our first
example of the loose, personal, biographical narrative of a statesman,
unless we except the llep1 ~eKa.e.,.la.s in which Demetrius of Phalerum
recounted his government at Athens (Diog. Laert. v. 81). This type
of imof.LV1)p.a7a is to be distinguished from similarly styled royal
journals or records of royal acts (Orrop.Vl)p.anup.o>, cf. xxiii. 2. 4 ; Welles,
283-4. 372; Bickermann, Aegyptus, 1933, 349~55).
5. Ka.Ta m)Alv lha.l.u9iVTo~ Tou 18vous: cf. 41. 9, iv. 1. 5, both
::Z28

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE: THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.41.5

referring to 'the kings of Macedon'; Strabo, viii. 384 (following P.).


The process, evidently protracted (41. 9 n.), was between 323 and
z8r/o. The 'kings' probably include Cassander, Demetrius I, and
Antigonus Gonatas, as well as Antipater and Polyperchon.
O.pxti wa~w tyf.vETo t<a.l O'UWEuu1~: 'the cities began once more to
approach each other'; hendiadys. avwE'va~s nowhere else has this
metaphorical sense. For details ~ee 41. 9 ff.
6. t<a.TclJ1Cpos &.pT(w~ Efwov: 'I have just given a partial account'.
See Schweighaeuser, ad loc., and Lex. Polyb. pipos for the distinction
between Ta Kani fdpos, 'in detail', and such a phrase as Kant JLlpos
E'lTrEfv, 'to speak partially, somewhat' (cf. x. 27. 7).
41. 1.

b~u~Tnas

124

284-280. Ptolemy I died sometime between

EtKoO'T,; Ka.t TETnpTTJ wpbs TO.t') EKa.Tbv: 01.


2 November 283
and I November 282, but the exact date is unknown (T. C. Skeat,
Mizraim, vi, 1937, 31). Lysimachus perished in the battle of Coru-

pedium in 281 (Tarn, CAH, vii. 98 n. 1), seven months before the
murder of Seleucus (Iustin. xvii. 2, 4), which fell between 25 August
and 24 September 281 (Sachs and Wiseman, Iraq, 1954, 202-12). The
date of Ceraunus' death is still uncertain (d. i. 6. 5 n.). Such synchronisms (which P. liked; cf. Livy, xxxix. so. 10, 52. I, deaths of
Philopoemen, Hannibal, and Scipio in one year; Livy's source is P.,
cf. xxiii. 12 f.) were a regular feature of Hellenistic histories. Thus
Duris of Samos opened his work with the deaths of Amyntas of
Macedon, Agesipolis of Sparta, and Jason of Pherae (Diod. xv. 6o,
3-6), and may have ended with a general dynastic shuffle (FGH,
76 F 55, an episode from Lysimachus' funeral; Lorenz, 86 n. 89,
contra Jacoby, FGH, ii C 117). P. opens his main narrative with the
deaths of Ptolemy III, Seleucus III, and Antigonus Doson in 01. 139
(71. 3-4); and it seems clear that in such coincidences he saw the
working of Tyche (cf. iv. 2. 4 ff., xxxix. 8. 5 f.: simultaneous changes
affect Macedon, Cis-Taurus, Syria, Egypt, Cappadocia, Sparta, and
Carthage). See Lorenz, :u. On Patrae and Dyme see 8 and Iz.
4-5. Awo . . Tlua.~evou ~ws 'fiyuyou: cf. Strabo, viii. 384.
Tisamenus was the son of Orestes and Hermione (Paus. ii. r8. 6).
In the tradition here followed he led the Achaeans from Argos and
Laconia, at the time of the 'return of the Heraclids' (the Dorian
invasion), to the north coast of the Peloponnese, and drove out the
Ionians (Apollod. ii. 8. 2 ff.; Paus. ii. 18. 6 :ff., 38. 1, vii. 6. 2) who,
after holding out in Helice, eventually retired to Attica; see D.M.
Leahy, Hisforia, r9ssf6, 32. The tradition of a Tisamenid dynasty
is also in Pausanias (vii. 6. 2), but its details were probably a later
compilation. Ogygus (cf. iv. r. s) is not mentioned elsewhere.
5. ~ETEO'TT!O'O.V ds ST!~oKpa.T(a.v Ti}v 'ITO~tTda.v: cf. Strabo, viii. 384.
Aristotle (Pol. vii (v). r2. 7 :ff., 1316 a) envisages the possibility of any
229

II. 4I. 5

EVENTS IN GREECE

type of constitution turning into any other; but primitive monarchy


would hardly become democracy without the intervening stage of
aristocracy which normally followed both in reality and in F.'s
mvn scheme in book vi (vi. 4 8, 8. I). This scheme is suggested by the
story of Ogygus' sons ruling p,~ vop,lp,w>, &M..t 8w1ro-rH<:w> (cf. vi. 7 6--9
contrasted v;ith vi. 6. 9-7. 5). The Achaean cities were in fact
democracies in the fifth century, but after the setting up of oligarchies by Sparta in 4!7 (39 4 n.) they remained devoted to these,
and a Theban attempt to restore democracy violently soon failed
(Xen. Hell. vii. L 41-4, :z. 18, 4 17, 5 1-3, 5 18; Diod. xv. 75);
throughout most of the fourth century the Achaeans are tools in
the hands of Thebes or Sparta. P.'s claim that the democracy was
maintained is therefore false, unless indeed he is using the word
'democracy' in the loose sense indicated in 38. 6 n. (cf. Aymard, CP,
1950, 102 n. 33; Larsen, 26-27).
6. J.LEXP' Tfjs 1t.At:~iw6pou Kat CfJtAC1T1rou: on the hysteron prater an to
avoid hiatus cf. 2. 2 n. By its adhesion to the League of Corinth the
Achaean League lost its freedom in external affairs (Sytl. 26o,U. n ff.) ;
and internally the existence of the tyrant Chaeron at Pellene, supported by Alexander ([Dem.] xvii. 10; Athen. xi. 509 B), is indicative
of the pressure exercised from Macedon. Antipater's victory over
Agis at Megalopolis in 331 may also have been followed by interference in the cities of Achaea, which had supported Sparta (Aeschin.
Ctes. 165). See Aymard, REA, 1937, :zo n. 4
7-8. The trtelve cites of Achaea. Lists are given by Strabo (viii.
385-6) and Herodotus (i. 145); the latter states that the Achaeans
took them over from the Ionians they displaced, and both give
Aegae and Rhypes in place of Leontium and Ceryneia. Pausanias'
list (vii. 6. 1) is the same, except that it omits Patrae and includes
Ceryneia. Aegae and Rhypes were evidently abandoned before the
rebirth of the Confederation in 28rjo (Strabo, viii. 386-7; Paus. vii.
23. 4, 25. I2); on the site of Rhypes, on the hill above Kumari, 7 km.
west of Aegium, see Bolte, RE, 'Rhypes', cols. 1288-92, with map,
(hesitant); E. Meyer, Pel. JiVand. 123 ff. The disappearance of Oloms
and Helice is widely attested (Strabo, viii. 385; Paus. vii. 22. 1, 24.6 f.;
Diod. xv.48 etc.). Olen us lay just over 4miles (4o stades) east of Dyme,
in west Achaea, Helice about 5 miles east of Aegium, on the right
bank of the modem Vuphusia (Meyer, Pel. Wand. qo). Meyer has
explored all this district and locates Olenus on the coast, somewhat
west of Tsukale!ka (op. cit. n9-22). Helice perished in 373 after an
earthquake and tidal wave, and its territory went to Aegium (Strabo,
viii. 385, following Heracleides Ponticus; Paus. vii. 25. 4). It had been
the political centre of the 1ww6v, and the Homarion (39 6 n.) perhaps
lay on what was originally territory of Helice (Ayrnard, ACA,
284 ff.; see however, Bingen, BCH, 1953, 626-7). Olenus declined to
230

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 41.7

join the Confederation in 281/o (Strabo, viii. 384); it had disappeared


by P.'s time (for BtaJJ.1vw) will be 'exist', not 'remain in the confederacy', as Schweighaeuser takes it).
Leontium andCeryneia are not in Herodotus and Strabo, Leontium
not in Pausanias. Ceryneia (spelt locally Kapvvla.) lay on the hillside
between the rivers Vuphusia and Kalavryta, just north of the
modern village of Mamousia, on a site long thought to be Bura;
d. Meyer, Pel. Wand. 127 ff. Bura itself must have been in the hills
around Diakophto, east of the Kalavryta (Meyer, op. cit. 133 ff.);
Strabo (viii. 386) puts it 40 stades, i.e. 7 km., above the sea, and
in the fuller text of Vat. gr. 2306 (see below) he puts Ceryneia
equally far from Bura and the sea (viii. 387). Leontium lay in the
hills about 30 km. south-west of Aegium, at Kastritsi, ruins 3 km.
north of Vlasia, commanding the pass between Mt. Olonos (Erymanthus) and Mt. Kalliphoni; see F. BOlte (AM, 1925, 71-76, with map),
who argues against Leake's view that Leontium \Vas the ruin of
H. Andreas near Guzumistra. Bolte's view i<> confirmed by Meyer
(Pel. Wand. TII ff.), who describes the site from autopsy. A text of
prime importance for this part of Achaea (in addition toP. v. 94 34)
is now Strabo viii. 388 with additions from the palimpsest (Vat.
gr. z3o6) published by G. Cozza-Luzi (Della geografia di Strabone
frammenti scoperti in membrane palinseste (Rome, 1887), iii. 19
fg.
lxxYi, ll. 25 ff.), ~ ()~ t!>apd avvopEi p.~v lv Tfj LJvp.a.lg (KAet[TO]ptKfi Kat
AeovT"r]a{'} ~v f1VTlyovo> Eh 'Tof> ftxmof> c{JK71uev (read c{JKtaev)). For
KAEL[TD]ptKfj Bolte read Kat TptTa'iKfj (AM, 1925, 73), emended later
to Ka~ Ila-rpLKfj (RE, 'Phara, Pharai (1)', col. 1796), followingW. Aly,
5.-B. Heidelberg, I9JI/z, 1. 14). Leontium seems to have inherited
the territory of Rhypes (see above) ; but whether this statement of
Strabo that Antigonus (Gonatas) founded it merely means that he
strengthened it and put it under one of his men (so Bolte) is dubious.
This text is also relevant to the situation of Pharae; add CozzaLuzi, ibid. 23 (= fg. lxxvi, u. 37 ff.),
o TptTala Tfj:; t!>apatKfj<;
&:rrrua.t Ka.[t AE]oVT"r]aia> Kat Aa.cnwvla> . .. Pharae lay on the
middle course of the R. Pierus (modern Kamenitsa) near Lalikosta,
south-east of !sari (cf. Bolte, RE, 'Phara, Pharai (r)', cols. 1796-8).
Tritaea was successfully located by A. Wilhelm (]ahresh., 19<JI, 74;
Neue Beitrage, I9II, 37) near H . .Marina, west of Mt. Olonos, on the
plateau of Vundukla, which lies south of the upper waters of the
R. Picrus. In placing it rzo stades (i.e. 21-23 km.) above Pharae,
Pausanias (vii. zz. 6) is on the high side. See E . .Meyer, RE, 'Tritaia
(1)', cols. 237-41. Dyme lay near the frontier \lith Elis, on the site
of modern Kato-Achaia; d. Bolte (RE, 'Hekatombaion (r)',col. 2785;
'Olenos (4)', col. 2436) following Duhn (AM, r878, 75-78). For
epigraphical evidence confirming the identification see Bingen, BCH,
1954, 396, nos. 7-8. Patrae occupied the site of the modern town.

IL 4I. 7

EVENTS IN GREECE

Pellene, the most easterly city towards Sicyon, pursued a separatist


course in the fifth and fourth centuries. She joined Sparta independently at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. ii. 9 z), in 4I8
she was the only Achaean state to send her help {Thuc. v. 58. 4, 59
3, 6o. 3). and in 413 she again acted separately (Thuc. viii. 3 2). In
394 the men of Pellene fought beside the other Achaeans as Spartan
allies {Xen. Hell. iv. 2. r8, 2. 2o), but were not necessarily in the
League. After Leuctra they supported Sparta enthusiastically for
longer than the other Achaeans (Xen. Hell. vi. 5 29, vii. 2. 2), had
gone over to Thebes by 369 (Xen. Hell. vii. I. r8, 2. II ff.), but later
expelled the democrats and rejoined Sparta (Xen. Hell. vii. 4 r8).
In 345/4 Pellene treated separately with Athens (IG. ii-iiP. 220; SEG,
iii. 83); and in 331 she was the only Achaean state not to support
Agis (Aeschin. Ctes. 165), perhaps under the tyrant Chaeron (4r. 6).
This separatism is not apparent in the third century. The site of
Pellene (Paus. vii. 26. I2 ff.) has been identified near the modern
village of Zugra, on a 6oo m. terrace between the rivers Trikkaliotikos
and Phonissa, some 1o6 km. from the sea (cf. Strabo, viii. 386,
6o stades). See E. Meyer, RE, 'Pellene (I)', cols. 354-66.
Aegeira lay on a hill (Strabo, viii. 386) about 27 miles west of
Sicyon; its remains still stand on a spur of the Evrostina, about
20 minutes from the sea (cf. Hirschfeld, RE, 'Aigeira', cols. 950- I).
In iv. 57 5 P. puts it only 7 stades from the sea, but there has no
doubt been silting from the river since then. Aegium occupied the
site of the modern city of that name.
P.'s omission of Olenus and inclusion of Leontium suggests that,
despite his reference to the period before Philip and Alexander, his
list is really that of the third-century cities; cf. Bingen, BC H, 1954,
404-6.
9. tc:a.TA S TOu<; lHTTEpou<; ttTA.: i.e. between 323 and 281. Until
recently Alexander was commonly believed to have dissolved all
Greek Kotvd in 324. That view, which runs directly counter to this
passage, depended on the combination of a fragmentary passage in
Hypereides' speech against Demosthenes (i. r8-rg, Jensen) with
41. 6 above. It was rejected by Tarn (]HS, I92Z, 205) and refuted by
Aymard (REA, 1937. 5-28).
10. TUS 1:1v ~Jlq,poupous .. yEvEa8a.L . , TUS S tc:a.t TupavvEta8aL:
Demetrius Poliorcetcs, son of Antigonus I, was powerful in Greece
and Macedon from 307, and held the title of king from 294. Cassander,
the son of Alexander's viceroy in Macedon, Antipater, was powerful
from about 317 to his death in 297. Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius'
son, was king of Macedon from 283 to 240{39 A few details from the
wars of the Diadochi in Achaea survive in Diodorus (xix. 66. 3-6,
liberation of Achaean cities in 314 from Cassander's garrisons by
Aristodemus, a general of Antigonus I ; xx. ro3. 4, capture of Bura

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 41. I3

from Cassander by Demetrius in 303). These passages mention


Cassander's garrisons in Dyme, Patrae, Aegium, and Bura; this
system and that of installing friendly tyrants were employed by
Demetrius and Antigonus. Cf. ix. 29. 6, where Chlaeneas of Aetolia
speaks of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus tlv oi f.L" rppovpas
dt:raj'OVTf<; ds Tas 7T(JAHS I o[ [j~ Tvpawovs ij.Lrp!Yrr;VOJ)'T<; oOSEJ.L{av 7TOAW
aj.LOtpov iTTo{:ryaav 'TOU rijs OOVAlas 6v6j.La'TO<;,
rr~E(uTovs

~ovapxous o~Tos Erui>uTEuua.~ lioKE'i To'Ls "E~~TJut:

a strong case has been argued by W. Fellmann (Antigonos Gonatas,


Konig der Makedonen, und die griechischen Staaten, Diss. Wiirzburg,
1930, 56-{i3; cf. Porter, xxv-xxvii) for the view that Gonatas' system
of tyrants was first established after the death of Alexander of
Corinth about 245. But the evidence is inconclusive; for though not
every tyrant was Gonatas' man, once in power a tyrant would be
likely to look to Macedon, and if Gonatas was interested enough to
maintain a garrison at Aegium ( 12) and to found a strong-point at
Leontium (41. 7-8 n.), he may have been not wholly without interest
in what happened at Ceryneia and Bura ( 14}. The metaphorical use
of iJ.Lrpv-refktat is not uncommon (cf. Plato, Tmaeus, 42 A) and there
is no reason to think P. borrowed it fromAratus' Memoirs (so Treves).
11. KO.Ta T~V nuppov Sta~aaw: d. i. 6. 5 n., ii. 20. 6 n.
12. AujLO.LOL, na.TpEis, T PLTO.LELS, 4>apa.uil's: cf. iv. 6o. IO, dpxTJYOUS
Tofi Twv 11xaww uvrrr-TjJ.LaTos. All four of these western towns are
small, though Dyme and Tritaea were probably larger than the other
two (Plut. Arat. 11. x); on their sites see 4r. 7-8 n. Their union is
probably to be connected V>ith the rising of Areus of Sparta and
various Peloponnesian states against Macedon (Justin. xxiv. x),
following on Gonatas' naval defeat at the hands of Ptolemy Ceraunus
in z8o (Memnon, FGH, 434 F I (8. 4 ff.); Justin. xxiv. 1. 8). See
Tarn, AG, 131-3; CAH, vii. 99-1oo; Beloch, iv. I. 249
lhorrep ov8~ O'TIJ~TJV TllS O'Uj11TO~lTE(ag: since they did not enter
the League, but formed it; and in any case until Aegium entered
the League they had no access to the federal sanctuary and could
not set up a stele there (Aymard, Melanges Franz Cumont (Brussels,
1936), 12). Swoboda has argued (Staatsaltertumer, 375 n. 2) that
UVJ.LTToAtnla is here rather less than full federal union, and nearer to
luono.\tn[a. It is true that in 279 the people of Patrae, llxat<Vv J.L6voL,
sent the Aetolians help against the Celts (Paus. vii. x8. 6, zo. 6); and
this suggests that the earliest constitution allowed more latitude of
action to the separate cities than would later have been possible.
But that the Lt>.ague was not constituted in z8o is an hypothesis
running counter to the whole of P.'s narrative. Cf. Busolt-Swoboda,
ii. 1537 n. I; Niccolini, 6 n. 6.
13. J16.A,uT6. 1TIIl'i TE~ 1TEjLrrT~: Aegium expelled its Macedonian garrison and entered the League in the fifth year after its foundation in
233

IL .p. 13

EVENTS IN GREECE

Ol. 124, 4 = 28rjo. But for his dates in 41-43 P. seems to be using
the Achaean aTparqyia year, which at this time began with the rising
of the Pleiades, in May (v. r. 1). The following table can be con~
structed on the basis of exclusive calculation:
Achaean Year
Foundation of the League {01. 124, 4 = 28rjo}
First year .
. May 28ofMay 279
Aegium joins five years later (4r. 13}
275{4
Margus elected sole general after twenty-five
years (43 2}
255/4
Aratus frees Sicyon four years later (43 3)
251/0
Corinth freed eight years later (43 4}
243/2
i.e. one year before the battle of the Aegates
Islands (43 6) which was in spring 24r (cf. i.
6o-6I n.}.

Cf. Beloch, iv. 2. 226-7; other discussion in Mommsen, Rom. Forsch.


ii. 36o (unconvincing); Niccolini, 267 ff.; Niese, Hermes, rgoo, 53 ff.;
Leuze, ]ahrziihlung, 137 n. r68.
f.~fjs S.l TOuTOlS Bouplol Ka.puv'i:s: whether, like Aegium, in 275/4
is not known. On the site of Bura and Ceryneia see above, 4r.
7-8 n. !seas, the tyrant of Ceryneia, is otherwise unknown.
14. Su1 MO.pyou Kal TWV ~Xa.lWv: Margus (ro. 5 n.) was evidently
active in the Confederation as a refugee from Ceryneia. !seas will
have anticipated just such an attack as Aratus carried out against
his own city of Sicyon in 251/o (43 3).
42. 4. TT)v TWv ~xa.lwv 1rpoa.ipt::ow: 'the political principles of the
Achaeans', as in 2. Strachan-Davidson (n), followed by LSJ, assumes a special meaning 'advice, policy advocated' here and in three
other places; but in vii. IJ. 4 and vii. q. r 1TpoalpEatS is 'principle,
character', and in xxxix. 3 9 (as he admits) 'intentions' or 'attitude'.
P. is claiming that in so far as Achaean allies have helped (a) to
extend equality and liberty, (b) to crush those who would enslave
their native cities on their own behalf or on behalf of 'the kings', the
credit should go to Achaea. The implication of 5 would be that
Achaea deserved the credit for the Romans' achievements in this
direction, e.g. the extension of equality and liberty in Flamininus'
declaration at Corinth in rg6 (xviii. 46. 5), the crushing of Nabis, one
of those who enslaved cities St' a{JTwv (Livy, xxxiv. 22 ff.: source P.),
or of the Aetolians, allies of Antiochus (xx. r ff.), who did the same
8ta TWV f3aatMwv. On Achaean independence relative to Rome at
that period cf. xxii. ro. g.
' EKUO'TWV
' '
,.._ n , KO.l\ TTJV
'
' ,
nE/\O'ITOVVTJO'lWV:
\.
'
6 TTJV
E/\EUvEpUlV
KOLV,J.1V OfJ.OVOla.V
a very favourable picture of the Achaean policy of uniting the
Peloponnese, willy-nilly, under the Confederation. For the op.ovow.
134

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 43 3

of the League cf. 37 n, 40. 1, iv. I. 7; it was frequently used as the


slogan of middle-class stability against the demands of social revolution, cf. Tarn, HC. goff., 1.2:2 ff.
43. 1. e'LKoaL ~TTJ T4 1rpwTa Kat 1TEvTE: i.e. 280/79-256/s inclusive.
Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 36o) assumes all P.'s calculations to be
based on inclusive reckoning, and calculates these twenty-five years
from the accession of Aegium; but Ta 1rpwTa. is against this, as
also is the fact that Strabo (viii. 385), who adds the detail that
meetings were at this time held at the Homarion, allows only twenty
years, i.e. from the accession of Aegium, in whose territory the
Homarion lay (Aymard, 111elanges Cumont, 19-20).
ypa"'p.a.Tta. KOLVOV EK 1TEptoSou 1TPOXELptt6~-LEVaL teal 8uo aTpaT1'JYOU~:
iK 1TEpt68ov, 'in rotation' (not 'for a certain period', Paton); cf. vi.
20. 7 Secretary and generals were chosen from a fresh city each year,
on a rota (though probably each from a separate city). 7rpoxetpt{6p.evat, agreeing with 1r6Aets, may mean that the citizens of the city
in question elected, and not the federal assembly (Aymard, ACA,
390 n. 3) ; but the point is a fme one, and in any case such a manner
of election can have existed only until the reorganization of 256/5
(cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1537 n. 3). One may not press the prefix
7rpo- in 7rpoxnpt{w8at (with Aymard) to indicate prior designation;
P. uses it regularly for 'to appoint' (cf. L II .3, iii. 106. 2, etc.).
2. ~va Ka8taTavuv KTA.: i.e. in 255/4, with Margus. This reform
probably implied a diminution in the importance of the grammateus,
as the League became increasingly preoccupied with problems of
external and military policy (Aymard, Melanges offerts aM. Nicolas
Iorga (Paris, 1933), 96-ro3), and was accompanied by the transfer of
rnJvoSot from the Homarion to Aegium itself (Aymard, ACA, 294 ff.).
3. TETapTtt~ 8' uaTepov ~TEL aTpllTTJYOUVTo~: 'four years after his
term of office', not (as Paton, following Casaubon) 'during his term of
office'. The present participle is used for the aorist, as in iii. u4. 6;
cf. i. 1. I, Toi:s dvayp&.povm, ii. 2. II, T{jl 1Tpoii1Tapxovn. See Schweighaeuser, ad loc.; and Porter, 54 (on Plut. Arat. 9 6). This passage
dates Aratus' birth to :271; cf. Walbank, ]HS, 1936, 65 n. 9; Porter,
loc. cit., against Beloch's argument (iv. 2. 228) that he was born in
276 or 275.
Tupa.vvoup.EVTJV 8' ~Xw8epcilaa.~ T,;v 1TilTpt8a.: cf. Plut. A rat. 5-9;
Walbank, Araios, 31-.34 The tyrant of Sicyon was Nicocles, who had
seized power after Pascas' murder four months previously (Plut.
A rat. 4 r); neither can be shown to be a creature of Antigonus. The
liberation took place on 5 Daisios, i.e. May (Plut. A rat. 53 5; cf.
Cam. 19; Alex. 16 for equation with the Attic month Thargelion);
but P. does not give the year, as indeed he had no occasion to do.
Porter (xxxiii-xxxiv), who favours 252, lists the events between the

235

II. 43 3

EVENTS IN GREECE

liberation and the accession to the League. But Plut. Arat. 9 6,


o(hv JK 'TWV TTO.povrwv apW'TO. Kptva.s TTpoa/p.~f~v a.iJrryv r/Jepwv (i.e.
'promptly') Tots .lixawis, is rather in favour of making the liberation
May 251; and the straightforward interpretation of P. would put
both events in the same year. Sicyon will then have joined the
Confederation in autnmnfwinter 251. See }HS, 1936, 67 for a table
of dates, 251-248.
4. oybo<tl 8( 'ITI:Huv ETEL: i.e. 243/2. Aratus' first crrpo.nryta. was in
245/4 (Plut. Arat. r6; Walbank, Aratos, 42). Corinth had slipped from
Gonatas' grasp when his governor Alexander revolted and declared
his independence in 250/49 (on the date see De Sanctis, Klio, 1909.
1-9; Porter, Hermath. zo, 1930, 293-3n; Plutarch's Aratus, xxxvixlii; Walbank,JHS, 1936, 67). On Alexander's death in 245 Antigonus
tricked his widow out of the stronghold by a proposed marriage with
the heir Demetrius. In 243 Aratus liberated both the city and the
citadel (in midsummer, Plut. Arat. :ZI. 2, TJ TTEP~ Olpos aKfLa~ov wpa).
See Plut. Arat. 16. 2-24. 1; Walbank, Aratos, 45-47; for the topography Porter, Hermath. xxi, I9JI, 54-6o; W. P. Theunissen, Ploutarchos' Le11en van A ratos (Nijmegen, 1935), 184-97.
5. T~v Twv MEyapEwv 'IT6Aw: Troezen and Epidaurus also joined the
League now; cf. Plut. A rat. 24. 3; Paus. ii. B. 5, vii. 7 2. Dta7Tpo.g&.fLt:vos may suggest the use of intrigue or trickery (cf. Aeschin. Ctes.
232); but Schweighaeuser translates 'sua industria'.
6. 1'~ 'ITpoTEpov E1'L T~S KapxtJ8ovlwv ~TTT]S: if the battle of the
Aegates Islands was in March 241 (i. 6o-6r n.), it fell in the Achaean
OTpa.rrtylo. year May 242-May 241, and so in the year after the liberation of Corinth, May 243-May 242.
7, blET~hEL 'ITPOcrTI:lTWV Tov TW\1 ;ll,.xau';lv i9vous:: cf. Plut. A rat.
24. s. OUTW S' raxvaev v TOtS .lixa~ors, wcrre .:l fLry Ka'T' Jvazvrov l~fjv,
TTap' Jv~o.vrov alpd:aOat crrpa'TTJYOV o.tl-r6v, ;pycp 8 Ka.~ yYWJl.TJ Sui 1ravros
apxEw. Normally Aratus held office alternate years until his death

in :ZIJ/I:z; for details and discussion of the general list see Beloch,
iv. z. 219 ff.; Tarn, CAH, vii. 863; Ferrabino, 272-5; Walbank,
Aratos, 167-75; d. CR, 1937, 224; Niccolini, 267 ff.; Porter, lxxviilxxxi.
8. To MaKE8ova.s 11v ~IC~a.A~tiv KTA.: this paragraph summarizes
Aratus' aims down to the time of the Cleomenean War, when the
Spartan threat caused their radical revision. This threat revealed
the inadequacy of Aratus' programme when faced by a determined
enemy combining social and patriotic slogans in support of a powerful army. Faced by Cleomenes Aratus recalled the Macedonians into
Greece, and handed over the Acrocorinth. On this issue see Treves,
Rend. Line., 1932, 177 ff., 188-9; Athen., 1935, 30 ff.
TfJ\1 ICOlVTJV Ka.i 'IT~lTpLov ~Au9Epla.v: cf. 42. 6; freedom both as individual cities, enjoying their ancestral institutions, and as a federal body.
236

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II-441

9. -rrpos 'T1,v At'TwAwv -rrAEovE~La.v: the Aetolians, ancient enemies of


Achaea, are harshly criticized by P.; cf. 3 3, 4 6, 45 I, 46. 3, 49 3,
iv. 3 I, 3 5, 67. 4, v. 81. I, ix. 38. 6, xviii. 4 I, 34 1. The Aetolians
were allied with Antigonus, and on his recovering the Isthmus in
245 invaded the Peloponnese. Triphylia was seized from the Arcadians and annexed to Elis; Arcadia was raided, the temple of
Artemis at Lusi was plundered, and the Arcadian League disintegrated. At Megalopolis Lydiades seized the tyranny, probably with
Aetolian and Elean help. See Walbank, JHS, 1936, 67 ff. 11'Aeov~;gia
is 'lust for plunder' (cf. I9. 3, 45 I, iv. 3 5, Vi. 56. 3), not 'lust for
power' (as Paton).
10. wcrn -rro~T)cra.cr9a.L cruv9T)Ka.s K'TA.: cf. 45 I, ix. 34- 6, 38. 9 Aratus
countered this proposed partition, 'in a statesmanlike fashion'
(11'payp..anKwc;), by an alliance with Agis of Sparta in autumn 243
(Plut. Agis, I3). Only in summer 24I, in Aratus' third C1'TpaT1]yia,
did the Aetolians cross the Isthmus, to be decisively defeated at
Pellene (Plut. Arat. 31. 3-5, 32. s--6). That invasion was probably
a reply to Aratus' policy of expansion against the allies of Aetolia
in Arcadia, which he initiated with an unsuccessful attack on
Cynaetha in the spring (ix. 17); but by now it was clear that Antigonus had no real help to give. See]HS, I936, 69-70.
44. 1. cruv9eJ.dvwv . cruJ-1-JJ-a.x(a.v -rrpos At'TwAous: for Aratus' alliance
with Pantaleon of Aetolia see Plutarch (Arat. 33 I); it seems to have
followed immediately on Gonatas' death, which was in the Olympiad
year 240/39 (for a closer approximation is impossible on the evidence
available; Tarn, Ferguson Studies, 490 n. 3 It follows from the date of
Demetrius' death, 2). The subsequent war between the two confederacies and Gonatas' successor, his son Demetrius II, sprang from
Demetrius' marriage to Phthia; this involved the sending of help to
her mother, Olympias, the queen of Epirus, against the Aetolians who
were trying to annex the Epirote half of Acarnania. On the Achaean
side it sprang from the policy of unifying the Peloponnese. The Demetrian War broke out in the Attic year 239/8 (JG, ii 2 I299, 1. 57 = Syll.
485: archonship of Lysias; cf. Meritt, Hesperia, I938, I23-36). P. exaggerates the self-sacrifice and generosity of the Achaeans in this war
(cf. 46. I}. Demetrius was occupied during most of this obscure war
against the nearer foe, Aetolia, and successfully, judging from his
title Aetolicus (Strabo, x. 45I). Meanwhile, the Achaeans made considerable gains in the Peloponnese (d. 5, Megalopolis, who brought
Orchomenus and Mantinea with her), despite Aratus' defeat at the
hands of the Macedonian general Bithys at Phylacia: both place
and date are unknown (it may lie near Kryavrysi between Tegea and
Sparta (cf. Walbank, Aratos, 64 n. 5), and Feyel (Ioo) gives strong
arguments for dating it in 237/6 before Demetrius entered Boeotia,
237

II. 44

EVENTS IN GREECE

xx. 5 3). On their side, the Aetolians supported the Achaean campaign against Macedonian-occupicd Athens with piratical raids on
the coast of Attica (IG, iiz. 834, 844; Wilhelm, Attische Urkunden,
iii, 1925, 57-58). See in general Tarn, CAH, vii. 744 ff.; Walbank,
Aratos,
; Treves. Rend. Line., 1932, I67-zos; Feyel,
Only when the Aetolian alliance began to involve Achaea in serious
struggles (cf. 9 9 ff.) did the compact break down; but the alliance
was never formally cancelled (iv. 7 4).
2. ATJV.TJTptou 8t! ~ac:nAeuaa.vTos 8Ka ~J.ovov ~T"J: so, too, Porphyry
in Eusebius' lists; FGH, z6o F 3 (13). Demetrius II's death and the
accession of Antigonus III (Doson) is to be dated to spring 229. See
Holleaux (REG, 1930, 255 ff. = Etudes, iv. 19 ff.) against Beloch (iv.
I. 637; 2. II2; 2.
; Dinsmoor's date (Archmts, I08), autumn 230,
is due to a misapplication of Beloch's theory of the Roman calendar.
On the date of the Roman crossing into Illyria (summer 229) see
z. I n. A termintts ante quem for Demetrius' death is further furnished
by the fact that it preceded May 229, since Aratus, who was general
229/8, initiated negotiations for the surrender of Athens before the
expiry of Lydiades' year (Plut. A rat. 34 6; Walbank, Aratos, 189go; Feyel, 123 n. 3). De Sanctis' statement that Demetrius died
fighting against the Dardanians (iii. I. 297) rests on a false deduction
from Trogus (pro/. xxviii).
5. Au8u~.8a.s b MeyaAo'll'oALTTJS: Lydiades, the son of Eudamus
(Syll. 504). had seized the tyranny shortly after Gonatas recovered
Corinth in 245 (43 9 n.). For his gift of Alipheira to Elis 1rpo> nvas
lSlos 1TpagEt> see iv. 77 ron. Previously Lydiades had led the Megalopolitan detachment along with Leotychidas at the battle fought at
Mantinea against Sparta in 251, shortly after the liberation of Sicyon
(Paus. viii. ro. 5, a poor text but not wholly false; see Schoch, RE,
'Lydiadas', col. 22o2). Lydiades was a man of considerable political
talent, and his tyranny had brought some real benefits at a time of
weakness in Arcadia. On his motives in joining the Achaean Confederation (less disinterested than Droysen {iii. 2. 39) and Freeman
(HFG, 315 ff.) thought) see Walbank (Aratos, 62--63) and Treves
(Rend. Line., 1932, r9o-1). On the annexation of Megalopolis to the
League in 235 (Walbank, Aratos, 169), see Plutarch (Arat. 30. 4;
Mor. 552 B). For Lydiades' death see 51. 3
6. ~p~aTOIJ.IlXOS ::evwv . KAEwvuv-os T6T' a'!l'o9EtJ.EVOL Tas
Jlovapx(a.s: Aristomachus had seized Argos in 235. after the tyrant
Aristippus, his brother, had fallen trying to recoVCI Cleonae from
Aratus (Plut. A rat. 27-29; for the chronology, Walbank, Aratos,
186-7). He joined the League in 229/8 {6o. 4; Plut. A rat. 35 r ff.),
and was elected general for 228/7 (as Lydiades had been rewarded
\'lith the (]'Tpar7Jyla for 234/3). On his family see 59 r n. On Xenon of
Hermione (in the Argolid) and Clconymus of Phlius see Plutarch
238

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 45.1

(A rat. 34 7. 35 5}. Plutarch links the accession of Hermione to the


League with that of Aegina, which had been among llia -rd TaTT0/-1-Eva
,UTa TOV Ilepat~W> (IG. ii2 1225, 11. 9-Io}; hence it is likely that
both came over after the liberation of Athens (which was in 229: cf.
44 2 n.). Phlius seems to have come over at the same time as Argos.
On Aristomachus' subsequent career and fate see 59-60.

45-46. E11ents leading up to th13 Cleome-nean War. P. reproduces the


tendentious account of Aratus' M emors, designed to justify Achaean
policy and throw the blame for its failure upon the Aetolians. To
this end the chronology is obscured and the facts are therefore unreliable. The best analysis is that of J. V. A. Fine (A]P, 1940, 130 ff.,
!44 ff.).
45. 1. D11rlaa.vTES Ko.T0.81EAa6a.~ TUS 1TOAELS: that the Aetolians compacted with Antigonus and Cleomenes to partition Achaea is wholly
improbable. The thesis is contradicted (a) by the fact that the
Achaean embassy to Antigonus (47-49: date 227{6) spoke only of the
possibility of a coalition between Sparta and Aetolia, (b) by Cleomenes' abuse of the Aetolians at the time of his coup (Plut. Cleom.
ro. 6: date 227). (c) by Aratus' appeal to the Aetolians (Plut. A rat.
41. 3: date, winter 225{4); see Fine (A]P, 1940, 134}. Further, the
Aetolians would not have attempted an alliance with Antigonus
after his recovery of much of Thessaly from them in 228 (Fine,
TAPA, 1932, 140-3); and 47 3-9 makes it clear that they did not
do so. P. is giving Aratus' version, which was intended to justify
the Achaean appeal to Macedon. Aratus' real enemy was Cleomenes;
but many in Achaea preferred Cleomenes to Antigonus. Hence
Aratus misrepresented the danger as one of combined attack from
Sparta, Aetolia, and Macedon, to partition the League, whereas
in reality Aetolian policy throughout this decade was one of strict
neutrality (Fine, A]P, 1940, I45-<J).
'l'a~ 11~v !6.Ko.pvO.vwv l>u;veL!l<lVTO 1rpos )\).~av8pov: cf. ix. 34 7, 38. 9
(confused); Iustin. xxvi. 3 r, xxviii. I. I. Alexander II of Epirus
succeeded his father Pyrrhus in 272; but the partitioning of Acarnania cannot be dated with certainty. It is one of a series of events
falling together: (a) a treaty of mutual assistance and isopoliteia
between Acarnania and Aetolia (IG, ix 2 I. 3 = Syll. 421), (b) the
expulsion of Alexander of Epirus by the crown prince Demetrius
of Macedon during the Chremonidean War (Iustin. xxvi. 2. n-3. r),
(c) Alexander's restoration (Iustin. ibid.), (d) the partitioning of
Acarnania between Alexander and the Aetolians. A good discussion
will be found in G. N. Cross (Epirtts (Cambridge, 1932), 128 ff.),
and G. Klaffenbach (Historia, 1955{6, 46-5r, modifying his earlier
theory in Klio, 1931, 223-34). It is dear that Alexander lost his throne
during the Chremonidean War (267/6-263{2), c. 263, and clear too that
239

II. 45

EVENTS IN GREECE

the Acarnano-Aetolian treaty must date between 2 71 fo (an Aetolian


officer referred to in it comes from Doris, which may have joined
the Aetolian League in that year, if Bousquet (BCH, 1938, 388 ff.)
is right in counting six Aetolian hieromnemones at the spring Pylaea
of 270) and the partitioning of Acarnania, though whether before or
after Alexander's flight from his kingdom (c. 263) is not attested.
In 1931 Klaffenbach argued that the fugitive Alexander granted
the Acarnanians independence in return for help in mediating with
Gonatas. On this assumption the treaty with Aetolia was an Acarnanian insurance against a renewed attempt at Epirote domination,
and the partitioning (dated c. :z6o by Klaffenbach) Alexander's reply
to the treaty. But such a reversion to an aggressive policy seems
improbable so soon after Alexander's recovery of the throne (cf.
Treves, Riv. fil., 1932, 276-7); and this would be no moment to
challenge a successful Macedonia by absorbing its Acarnanian allies.
Moreover, the existence of a treaty between Acamania and Pyrrhus
(mentioned on a now lost Acarnanian inscription; d. Tarn, AG,
rzr n. 2o; Klaffenbach, Historia, 1955/6, 47-8) is evidence that
Acarnania was already independent of Epirus before Pyrrhus'
death in 272. Hence Klaffenbach has put forward a new and more
convincing arrangement of these events. The Acamano-Aetolian
treaty and the partitioning of Acarnania, he suggests, both fall
after Alexander's flight. The former, dated to 263 or 262, will have
been engineered by Alexander himself as a move against :Macedon,
and probably led to his restoration in 262. The partitioning, as
Cross had already seen, is most likely to have occurred some considerable time after the Acarnano-Aetolian treaty, and will have
coincided with some period of Macedonian weakness. This would
give two possible dates: the revolt of Alexander, the governor of
Corinth, in 249 (43 4 n.; dated by Cross to 252), or Gonatas' loss of
Corinth to Aratus in 243 (43 4 n.). If 243 was the date, the partition
coincided with that proposed between Gonatas and the Aetolians
for the partition of Achaea; if in addition it was with his connivance,
P.'s error in ix. 38. 9 would be easier to comprehend.
The Aetolians took eastern Acarnania with Stratus, Oeniadae,
Metropolis, and Phoetiae; Epirus western Acarnania and Leu cas
(Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1466-7; Beloch, iv. I. 596 n. r). The statue
erected by the Aetolians at Delphi in celebration of this success
IG, ix 1 1
(Paus. x. r6. 6) has been identified (F D, ii. 3 312
18o).
TO.s Se TWV :Axcuwv . npos :AvTiyovov: d. ix. 34 6, J8. 9; above,
43 10 n. Paton's translation is misleading; it suggests that the proposed partitioning of Achaea is previous to that of Acarnania. P.
does not say so.
2. TOT 1Ta.pcnrA1Jalcns A1rtaw ~na.p9eVTES: the date of this pretended
240

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEO:MENEAN WAR II-455

compact is, at the earliest, winter 229/8; since (a) it follows the
accession of Argos, Hermione, and Phlius to the League (44- 6), (b)
Doson is undisputed master of Macedon ( 3), which is true only
after his recovery of Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Hestiaeotis from
the Aetolians, who had seized them on Demetrius' death (Walbank,
Philip, I I nn. 2-3). Perhaps the agreement between Doson and the
Aetolians which followed this recovery, and apparently left Phthiotic
Achaea in Aetolian hands, is behind P.'s distorted version. For an
apparent difficulty see 45 6 n.
~VTLYOV<tJ n . . . hnTpont:uovTL 41LMnnou: Antigonus Doson,
grandson of Demetrius Poliorcetes and cousin of Demetrius II, succeeded first as guardian of the young heir Philip, and husband of
Demetrius' widow Phthia, in 229; cf. xx. 5 7; Livy, xl. 54 5; Plut.
Aem. 8. 3 (suggesting that his original position was that of strategos);
Iustin. xxviii. 3 9-10; Euseb. Chron. i. 238 Schoene. After his
victories over the Aetolians (above) and the suppression of an army
revolt (Tustin. xxviii. 3 u), probably in the late winter of 2z8i7, he
assumed the full rights of kingship. On the chronology see Dow and
Edson, Harv. Stud., 1937, 172ft.; Walbank, Philip, I I n. 4, 295-6;
on the regency and marriage to Phthia (Chryseis} see Tarn, Ferguson
Studies, 483-sor; Aymard, Aegyptus, 1952, 9o--92. Doson reigned until
his death, c. July 221 (7o. 6 n.).
Kll.t:Op.evu Tii! !3a.cnll.ei Aa.Kt:Sa.tp.ov(wv: Cleomenes III succeeded his
father Leonidas on the throne in 235. Married to Agiatis, the widow
of Agis IV, whom Leonidas had murdered in 241 (Plut. Cleom. r. 1-3),
Cleomenes inherited Agis' revolutionary programme, which he linked
with a policy of Spartan predominance in the Peloponnese. On
Cleomenes' policy, which clashed with that of Aratus, see Walbank
(Aratos, 72ft.); and on his blend of romanticism and political realism
see Treves (Athen., 1935, 32-33).
3-4. Aetolian considerations: quite fictitious. In 228 Doson had certainly established his position in Macedon by expelling the Aetolians
from most of Thessaly (45 2 n.) and had repelled the Dardanians,
probably with a decisive victory (Iustin. xxviii. 3 14; Bettingen,
17-18) ; but of active hostility towards Achaea because of the
capture of Acrocorinth fifteen years earlier (43 4} there is no evidence
(cf. Fine, A]P, 1940, 135 n. 25}. On the other hand, Cleomenes had already moved against Achaea with his seizure of the fort of Athenaeum
in the Belbinatis (Plut. Cleom. 4- 1-2) in summer 229. Thus there
was no interval when Doson was securely established in Macedon
but Cleomenes not yet at war with Achaea.
4. t:t To us Aa.KcoSa.tp.ovl.ous . . . npoep.!3t!30.cmtev KTA.: 'if they could
first excite the Lacedaemonians to hostile action'. U:rrlxfhtav is virtually 7T6Aq.1.m: cf. 46. 6.
5. Suvcip.evov uciaT)s IEUaToxeiv neptaTaaEw<;: 'capaoie of meeting any
R

11. 45 5

EVENTS IN GREECE

emergency' (Paton). Thus the non-fulfilment of these imaginary


plans is turned to the greater glory of Aratus, a theme clearly reproduced from his Memoirs.
6. 1t..pa.Tov TOTE vpoeo-TwTa: 'who was then general' for the ninth
time, 229j8. The supposed pact will date to winter 229/8 or 228
(45 2 n.); but inch. 46 P. gives as its result events which occurred in
the summer of 229. This is a further argument against the reality of
the pact.
46. 1. Tiw j.LEV TroAEj.LOV alo-xuvo11vou, civaA.a.JkLv: a suggestion
hard to reconcile with P.'s usual picture of the Aetolians. On
Achaean d.!pywta, see 44 r n.
2. KA.eo11~vou, vapnpTJj.LEvou Teyiav, MavTfve~av, 'Opxo11evov:
to these towns, annexed by Cleomenes in 229, add Caphyae, which P.
omits because Aratus recovered it by a coup in 228 (Plut. Cleom.
4 7). Their previous history is controversial (Swoboda, Staatsaltertiimer, 350 n. r) and best considered separately.
llfantinea lay in the east Arcadian plain r 2 km. north of modem
Tripolis. That she was a member of the Achaean League at the time
of the battle of Mantinea in 251 (44. 5 n.) is not proved (despite
Beloch, iv. 2. 525); and the fact that Man tinea was asked to arbitrate
between Aratus and Aristippus of Argos, after Aratus' attack on
Argos (c. 240) (Plut. Arat. 25. 5), shows that Mantinea was not then
Achaean, though she was not necessarily Aetolian either (Bolte, RE,
'Mantinea', col. 1327). At some time between this date and 229 the
city joined Achaea, since it was Achaean before it joined Aetolia
(57 r), and the present passage makes it clear that it was Aetolian
in 229.
Orchomenus, which lay 17 km. north of Mantinea, had also previously belonged to Achaea (iv. 6. 5; Livy, xxxii. 5 4), and is likely
to have shared the fortunes of Mantinea. The treaty of alliance between Orchomenus and the Achaean League (IG, v. 2. 344 = Syll.
490) contains certain stipulations in favour of Megalopolis, which
date it after the accession of that city to the League in 235 (44. 5 n.).
Orchomenus like Mantinea was Aetolian in 229 ; hence it seems certain
that Orchomenus (and likely that Mantinea) went over to the
Aetolians with Achaean consent between 234 and 229, perhaps in
compensation for the Aetolian losses in central Greece (Tam, CAH,
vii. 747). On the site of Orchomenus see R. Martin, Rev. arch., r944,
107-14.

Tegea lay 20 km. south of Mantinea and 8 km. south-east of


Tripolis. Several proxeny decrees (IG. v. 2. ro-rs) show Aetolian
influence in the magistrates and in their phraseology, but they cannot be accurately dated.
Caphyae lay at the north-west end of the east Arcadian plain,

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 46.5

8 km. north-west of Orchomenus, near the modern village of


Kotussa. Of its history between the collapse of Aristodamus' tyranny
at Megalopolis and 229 nothing is known.
It seems reasonable to assume that despite P.'s silence on Caphyae,
these four cities, which had learnt to act together at the time of the
Chremonidean War (cf. IG, iiz. 687, 11. 24-25), followed the same
fortunes now; what these probably were has been indicated under
Orchomentls. But there is no agreement among scholars on this
question. See E. Meyer, RE, 'Orchomenos (4)', cols. 889-95 (site),
899-90; Bolte, RE, 'J'I.fantinea', cols. 1292 ff. (site), 1327-8; von
Geisau, RE, 'Kaphy(i)a(i)', cols. r896-7 (site), r898; Hiller von
Gaertringen, RE, 'Tegea (1)', cols. 107 8 (site), II5; Busolt-Swoboda,
ii. 1539 n. 5, 1540 n. r. Against Beloch's view (i\'. 2. 524-5; d.
Treves, Athen., 1934, 4og-ro) that Mantinea and Orchomenus joined
Achaea c. 251 and were seized by the Aetolians in one of their raids,
243-240, is Syll. 490, which indicates (see above) that Orchomenus
(and so probably the other three towns) followed Megalopolis into
the Achaean League.
O'UJ.L'IToXtTEOOJ.1EV<lS TOTE 'ITOXELS: this should mean full membership
of the Aetolian Confederation with corresponding limitation of independence (cf. 43 r; xxii. 8. 9). But occasionally P. uses uvp:rrot"TEvEaea,
in a more limited sense, to indicate a treaty of lao7ToAtTt.la (d. xvi.
26. 9), which implied an
of citizenship under certain specified
conditions. Thus Phigaleia is avp.7Tol\tTwoldVIJ 70" AlTwl\oiS' in 220
(iv. 3 6, 31. r); but a treaty of lao7ToAtnta between Phigaleia and
Messene (Syll. 472: date, c. 24o) makes the Aetolians allies of the
former. Similarly, Lysimachia, Cius, and Calchedon were members
of the Aetolian avp.p.ax,la (xv. 23. 8) but elsewhere their relationship
is described by the word avp.7ToAm:vop..!vovS' (xviii. 3 r2). Here, too,
the link between Aetolia and the eastern Arcadian towns was one
of lao7Tol\mda (Busolt-Swoboda, ii. rsu nn. 1-3; Flaceliere, 312 n. 3;
Walbank, Philip, n6 n. 5 (reading Cius for Perinthus)), which was
more appropriate than full League membership for overseas allies.
3. (3Ef3cuouVTas auT\! T~v 'ITo.pcl.X'l"'tv: in the absence of other evidence
that the Aetolians were encouraging Spartan expansion, one should
consider the possibility (d. Fine, AJP, I94o, 138) that in 229 the
Aetolians were too occupied in Thessaly (45 2 n.) to pay much
attention to the defection of the Arcadian cities.
4. ot 'ITpOEO'TWTES: i.e. ot apxov-rES' (cf. 37 ro-n n. (e)). If this decision
to adopt a policy of resistance was ever really taken, it is to be dated
to the summer or autnmn of 229, since it precedes Cleomenes'
seizure of the Athenaeum ( 5).

5. TOV KXEOJ.LEV'l i'ITou<o8oJ.10UVT<l To KO.AOUj.LEVov :.\9f)vo.tov:


d. Plut. Cleom. 4 r-:z. This temple of Athena stood on the Megalopolitan frontier, in the Belbinatis, the district about the upper
243

EVENTS IN GREECE

waters of the Eurotas, on what is now Mt. Khelmos; cf. 54 3, iv.


11. It is not to be confused with the Athenaeum near
Asea (Paus. viii. 44 z f.), as by Oberhummer (RE, 'Athenaion (2)',
col. 2023). On its location see Loring, ]HS, 1895, 36-4o, 72 (with a
plan); Frazer on Paus. iii. 21. 3; Bolte, RE, 'Sparta', cols. 13o9-1o.
At this time Megalopolis held the area as a result of the decision of
the Synedrion of the Hellenic League, which arbitrated on the
frontier disputes of Messenia, Megalopolis, Argos, and Tegea with
Sparta (d. ix. 33 12, Kowdv EK 1rav-rwv -rwv 'l!.'AA{;vuw KaOlaa'; Kpt-n}pwv;
Syll. 665, 11. rg-zo (quoted, 48. 2 n.); Roebuck, 53-56} after Philip II's
invasion of Laconia in 338. When Livy (xxxviii. 34 8) makes the
transfer follow ex decreto uetere Achaeorum he is confusing Achaei
with "EM7JI'"' (cf. Livy, xxvii. 30. 6, where concilium Achaeorum
seems to be an assembly of the allies); see \.Veissenborn-Mi.iller,
ad loc.
6. auva.9potaa.vTES To~s !A.xa.to~s ~Kpwa.v p.ET(!. Tijs ~ou>.fts: this
passage appears to describe an extraordinary meeting of the
Achaean assembly. In the second century such an extraordinary
meeting would have been termed a m)yKAlJ-ros (cf. xxix. 24. 6); but
Aymard (ACA, 4IJ-ZI} has demonstrated that the avyKAT)TOS' was
not differentiated as a separate meeting until about zoo, and it was
only after zoo that competence in such matters as peace and war
was removed from the regular aV~o8os to a auyK,\7J-ros (xxix. 24. 5).
What term was employed for an extraordinary meeting in this
century is not recorded. Aymard has further argued (ACA, 68-75)
that P. here identifies the {JovAf) with 'the Achaeans', hence that
this is simply an extraordinary meeting of the primary assembly.
But this thesis involves some strain on the Greek, which seems to
distinguish clearly between ot M.xaw and the fJovih}. On Cary's theory
(]HS, 1939, 154-5), this is a joint meeting of a bicameral body
consisting of the primary assembly and a normal council; and this
view, as integrated by Larsen (78-9, 165, 217 n. 24} into his
general theory of the Achaean assemblies (cf. 37, ro-n n. (e)), seems
convincing. This will be an irregular meeting of the ecclesia and the
boule, at which the latter, acting in a proboulcutic capacity, prepared a war-motion which the primary assembly approved.
civa.>.a.p.~6.vnv cpa.vepws Ti}v . o:rrex8Emv: this declaration of war
took place in autumn 229 or spring 228, and before the expiry of
Aratus' ninth a-rpa-r7Jyla in May 228 (Holleaux, REG, I9JO, 249 n. 1
Etudes, iv. 14 n. r; against Tarn, CAH, vii. 753; Treves, A then.,
1935, 24; Fine, A]P, 1940, 137; and Porter, lxvii, who put the wardecision in the arpa-r7Jyla of Aristomachus, 228/7). Plutarch (Cleom.
4) records an attempt by Aratus to seize Tegea and Orchomenus by
night, which failed, and shortly afterwards the successful capture of
Caphyae. These events belong to Aratus' ninth a-rpa-r7Jy{a, and the
37 6, 6o. 3, 81.

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 473

attack on T egea and Orchomenus at least seems to have preceded the


Achaean declaration of war (Aymard, ACA, 72 n.). Attempts have
been made to treat this decision as less than a full declaration of war
(cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 156on.), often to avoid the supposed dilemma
which arose if such a declaration was made by a o-VvoSos. But P.'s
rather odd phraseology is probably chosen to counter the accusation
(cf. Phylarchus in Plutarch, Cleom. 3 r-8) that the personal responsibility was that of Aratus; P. of course follows the iU emoirs. See
Aymard, ACA, 70-72.
7. ;, ... K).EOJ.I-EVLKOS vpoaa.yopeu9EtS ,.6).EJ.LOS: cf. i. IJ. s. ii. s6. 2
(-ra KA.Eop.evtKd), iv. 5 5 The date of its beginning is thus autumn 229
or spring 228, and it continued till 222.
47. 1. TO J-1~" 1TpwTov 81t.. TllS l8~a.s 8uvO.J.1ews: the period of independent Achaean resistance goes dov.'11 to Cleomenes' coup at Sparta
(winter 227/6). The stress on Achaean isolation is meant to extenuate
Achaean defeats.
2. Tt)v 1TpOS nTo).EJ.LO.iov quMa.v: i.e. Ptolemy III Euergetes. By
an arrangement made with Ptolemy II Philadelphus, after a visit
to Egypt in 251 (Plut. Arat. 12. I; Cic. off. ii. 82), Aratus received an
annual subvention of 6 talents (Plut. A rat. 41. 5; Cleom. 19. 8) until
well into the Cleomenean War (5r. z n.).
TtLS 1TpoyeyE\IT}J.I-EVO.S eu~:pyeata.s: as well as the pension, the ISO
talents given by Ptolemy II to Aratus in 251, after a preliminary
zs talents (Plut. Arat. II. z, where the {JaatA.eus- is Ptolemy, not
Antigonus (Porter, xli); 13. 6) given to solve an economic problem
arising out of the return of exiles to Sicyon.
3. Tou K>.eoJ.LEvous To TE vO.Tpwv 1TOMTEuJ.La. ~ta.Ta.>.uaa.vTos: cf.
Plut. Cleom. i 1 ff. Cleomenes' revolution was in autumn 227 (Tarn,
C AH, vii. i54; Beloch, iv. I. 702; Walbank, Philip, 14). After tiring
out the army, which included his opponents of the rich party, by
long and apparently purposeless marches, Cleomenes left it at its
own request in Arcadia, and descending one evening upon Sparta,
fell on the Ephors (of whom he slew four) and seized power. He
then carried through the 'Lycurgan' programme, on which Agis had
fallen. Property was put into a common pool, debts were cancelled,
the land was divided into 400 Spartan lots, and the citizens were
made up to this number by additions from perioeci and metics.
Eighty of the leading opponents were proscribed and went into exile;
the ephorate was abolished; and the old common training with its
classes for boys and messes for citizen soldiers were reinstituted.
Behind all this was the ambition to establish a Spartan hegemony in
Greece. Cf. \Valbank, Aratos, 84-86, 165-6. Plutarch's account follows
Phylarchus, who supported Cleomenes (56 ff.); but to Aratus, F.'s
source, Cleomenes' reforms are a threat to social stability and signify
245

EVENTt~;

II. 47 3

IN GREECE

not a return to but an overthrow of the Tr<hpwv TroAlTEVJUL (ct. iv. Sr.
14). The justification for describing Cleomenes' new power as a
lies in the abolition of the dual kingship and the use of
violence ; for Cleomenes' methods and character are the reverse of
those attributed to the TVpawor who succeeds the {3aatAV> in vi.

Tupawls

7 6-8.
XPW!LEvou

oe Ka.~ T voAE!L<tJ vpa.KTLKWS Ka.l va.pa.j36>.ws: cf. Plut.


Arat. 35 6, T~ K.Aeof.dJJf.t 8pauos EXOJJTt Kat 7Tapa{36'Awr; aveaJJOf.LEVcp
(Aratus' words in a letter to Lydiades). 7Tapaf36'Aws here is 'with great
daring' (Paton) or 'in a remarkable way' (cf. i. 58. I); Schweighaeuser
turns it 'acriter', and Porter, commenting on the passage in Plutarch,
renders 'in a dangerous manner', i.e. to the enemy. In fact the word
has all these nuances. P. refers to Cleomenes' capture of 1\lethydrium,
and his victory at Pallantium, where Aratus persuaded the general
Aristomachus to decline battle (Plut. Arat. 35 7 ; Cleom. 4) in n8,
and his victories at Mt. Lycaeum (Plut. Arat. 36. I; Cleom. 5 1) and
Ladoceia (51. 3; Plut. Arat. 36. 4-37. 5; Cleom. 6) in 227.
5. Tous OE ~a.aLAi<; Ta.is . -rou au!L~~povTo; ljti)~ot; a1.El. J.L~
TpouvTas K'I"A: cf. Thuc. vi. ss. I, avSpl SJ Tvpawte ~ 7TOAH apxTiv lxor5Uf1
ovo~v riAoyov

on

tv~pov ovS' olK.eiov Ch-t f.L~ r.<O'Tov r.pds lKaaTa ()~

()*'' ~ lxfJp6v 7} ,PO..ov f.J.f.Td. Katpofi ytyvfiufJcu. For the phrase which A
and R give as OVT lxBpov oifu r.oM.f.Ltoll, either Hultsch's reading,
olin aVf.Lf.Laxov oVTE 'lTOAtf.Ltov, or that of Bfittner-'Nobst, ovn
<aw<:)pydv oi1TE TroMf.Lwv, gives the required sense and the variation
and chiastic balance to Tas lx8pas Kai. nls ,Pt'Alas; Biittner-Wobst's
reading is slightly closer to the MSS. The sentiments (like the reference to Aetolian audacity and Antigonus' merits, 4-5) may come
from Aratus.
6. tvt:~ciAETo Aa.AE'tv vpoc; Tov ~aalAEa.: this decision and the
opening of negotiations through the Megalopolitans (48) are to be
dated autumn 227, after Cleomenes' coup. See Fine (A]P, 1940,
137 ff.), Koster (lxxviii), and Walbank (Philip, 12-14, superseding
Arato.';, 74 ff., 190 ff.), against Tarn (CAH, vii. 756) and Dow and
Edson (llarv. Stud., 1937, qg), who date the first negotiations
early in 225. Presumably Doson had returned from his Carian
expedition of summer 227, though the comparative chronology of
this and the Achaean embassy is not to be deduced from 49 6
(see note).
7. 1rpo8f)Awc; , vpciTTEW O.au11~opov T)yei-ro: this seems to imply
private diplomatic contacts separate from the Megalopolitan embassy, which must have been a more or less public enterprise; so
Treves, ad loc. This is how Plutarch (A rat. 38. n-12) read P.; and
he says that Phylarchus had the same version. After Hecatombaeum
(5I. 3) Aratus entered on time-gaining negotiations with Cleomenes
(Plut. Arat. 39 I ff.); but one need not assume, \>iith Treves, that
1

246

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 48.4

resistance to Cleomenes and attempts to enlist outside support in


Aetolia, Athens, and Eg-ypt (Plut. A rat. 41. 3; P. ii. 51. 2) were not
genuine efforts to avoid calling in Antigonus. See so. 7, a fair statement of Aratus' position.
11. EvLO. TOUTWV ou8' EV TOL<; il1TO!-LVTJf'O.O'L KUTETO.~Ev: he did not suppress the Megalopolitan embassy, for it was an essential part of his
apologia to show the Megalopolitans taking the initiative, independently, in the course for which he had been criticized (cf. 8
Ka.Ta.<j>vywv brt To us ix8povs-; Plut. A rat. 38. 6; Cleom. 16. 3-4). What
he suppressed was (a) his own prior negotiations( 7 n.), (b) the fact
that he had instigated the Megalopolitan embassy to Pella (d. Plut.
Arat. J8. II, Tovs MyaMmoAlTa.> 7rpoKafhlvat 3oJ.L&ovs ~xatwv imKa.Aeta8a.L Tov liVT{yovov). These two details P. added, either from an
independent Megalopolitan source connected with his own circle
(Walbank, Aratos, 12; Treves ad ii. 48. I ; Gelzer, A bh. Berlin. A kad.,
1940, no. 2, r3) or possibly (despite 56. 1-2) from Phylarchus (cf. Plut.
A rat. 38. rz, dJ.Lofwc; o~ Ka.~ ([>VA.a.pxo> tO"T6p"ljKE m:pt ToJ..rwv).
48. 2. olKELW'il 8La.Ku.,.Evouc; EK Twv EuEpyt:uLWv: close relations
existed between Megalopolis and Macedon throughout the third
century until Lydiades resigned his tyranny in 235. The r:vEpymlat
conferred by Philip II {cf. ix. 28. 7, 33 8-12, xviii. 14. 6-7) were territorial additions taken from Sparta after Chaeronea and the invasion
of the Peloponnese in 338 ; these assignments were made through the
Hellenic League (d. 46. 5 n.), as an inscription confirms for Megalopolis; cf. Syll. 665, 11. I9-20 (a second-century arbitration settlement
between Megalopolis and Sparta)' arT' f.v Tof[c;J"Ellauw Ka.i O'VJ.LJ.Laxot~
)'E)'IEV"ljJ.Llva.t 7rpor1Epov [K]p[l]aELS f31J3ata.L t] K(J.' aK~paTOL S[t ]aJ.LlvwVTt
r:ls rov d.d XP6vov. The districts concerned were Sciritis, Aegytis, and
Belbinatis {46. 5 n.).
4. N~Ko<PO.vu Kai KEpK~8ij: Nicophanes is unkno.'!1, Cercidas (d. 65. 3)
is the famous Cynic .Titer of satirical verse with a social content
(cf. Gerhard and Kroll, RE, 'Kerkidas (2)', cols. 294-3o8; Wilamowitz, S.-B. Berlin, 1918, IIJ8 ff.; J. U. Powell, Collectanea Alexandrina
(Oxford, 1925), 201 ff. for frag-ments; G. Pasquali, Orazio lz'rico (Florence, 1920), 2Io ff., 220, 226 f.; D. R. Dudley, Hlstory of Cynicism
(London, 1937), 74-84; E. A. Barber in Powell-Barber, New Chapters
in the History of Greek Literature, i (Oxford, 1921), 2 ff.; Walbank,
CQ, 1943, n f.). Cercidas was descended from the Cercidas attacked
by Demosthenes (xviii. 295) as a pro-Macedonian traitor (d. Theopompus, FGII, II5 F ng), and defended by P. (xviii. 14); d. Hiller
von Gaertringen, IG, v. 2, p. 130, lL 104, 157. Further, like Nicophanes,
Cercidas was a "TTaTptKO> glvos of Aratus, whose father Cleinias, an
eminent Sicyonian, enjoyed ties with the rulers of Macedon and
Eg-ypt (Plut. Arat. 4 2-3). The Megalopolitan embassy was to raise
247

EVENTS I)[ GREECE

the matter before the Achaean synodos (Aymard, AC A, 352--4),


probably that which met between mid-September and early November 227 (d. Porter, lxxii), with a view to obtaining federal consent
to its proceeding to Pella. The embassy, however, remained Megalopolitan, not Achaean ( 8, so. z; Freeman, HFG, J6,)--6; Bikerman,
REG, 1943, 290 ff.)-whatever the ultimate implications of this move.
'L'habilete supr~me d' .t\ratos fut done de provoquer les negociations
entre Megalopolis et Antigonos pour traiter sous leur couvert de
I' alliance generale entre la Confederation et la Macedoine' (Bikerman,
loc. cit. 294).
49. The embassy to DosotJ. In general P.'s source is Aratus' }'yfemoirs,

though he stresses \\ith his other source (whether Phylarchus or a


private Megalopolitan informant, 47 n n.) that Nicophanes and
Cercidas were acting as figure-heads for Aratus. The stress on the
Aetolian menace is of course from Aratus. But this was meant for
internal Achaean consumption: did the Megalopolitans really use
these arguments to Doson? He will have known well enough hm.v
slight was the danger of an Aetolo-Spartan alliance; nor is there any
evidence that Spartan domination in the Peloponnese would have
been a real threat to Macedon. We must conclude (despite the arguments of Bikerman, REG, 1943, 299 ff.) that this chapter presents
arguments ex eventu, and reproduces the tendentious form of Aratus'
apologia. The earlier legend (cf. 45 z) of a triple alliance of Cleomcnes,
Doson, and the Actolians has now receded, an indication that this
alliance never really existed.
6. J.Ln' -xa~wv Kat BolwTi:JV: for Boeotian policy at this time cf.
xx. 5 r ff. The Boeotians had formed a close tie with Macedon under
Demetrius II (xx. 5 3), but from the time of his death maintained
a friendly, but independent, attitude; however, to placate the
Aetolians, who temporarily occupied much of Thessaly, they sent
hieromttemones to Delphi (Flaceliere, 257 ff.). The fact that the proMacedonian Neon was hipparch in Boeotia in Z2j (xx. 5 8) indicates
the predominant sentiments in the country. The present passage
implies, however, that in 227/6 Boeotia was allied with Achaea, and
that her support could be promised in part-exchange for Doson's
help; the alternative assumption that it indicates an already existing
alliance between Boeotia and Macedon (cf. Dow and Edson, H arv.
Stud., 1937, 179-8o; Fine, A]P, 1940, 142) cannot be sustained in
view of the absence from xx. 5 n-r2 of any reference to such an
alliance (cf. Feyel, 121 t). This Achaeo-Boeotian alliance was evidently concluded between 228 and 227/6, since Syll. 519, celebrating
honours bestowed on certain hostages deposited in Achaea by
Boeotia ar..d Phocis, will refer to hostages deposited when alliances
were struck between Achaea and Boeotia, and Achaea and Phocis,

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR l1.5o.ro

and returned either in spring 224, when Boeotia adhered to the


general alliance against Cleomenes (cf. 52. 7 n., xx. 6. 8) or, as Feyel
suggests, in winter 224/3 when the Symmachy was established (54
4 n.). The striking of these two alliances was probably simultaneous;
if so, since eastern Phocis became independent of Aetolia in zz8
(Feyel, rrs, IZI-4; Treves. A then., 1934 4o6-7). this will be a terminus
past quem for the alliances. See Feyel, ro6~Js, for a full discussion of
Boeoto-Macedonian relations during this period.
u11"ep n]5 Twv 'H.Xfjvwv ~YEf.Lovlo.s: cf. 4 This counterposing of
Antigonus and Cleomenes is part of Aratus' propaganda, which seeks
to limit the alternatives to two, and so to justify his policy of
rapprochement with Macedon. But in fact there was no clash between
Antigonus and Cleomenes until the former came to the help of
Achaea. The 'hegemony over Greece' is Aratus' magnification of his
O\Vn dilemma.
tv 0ETTaAlc,t: most of Thessaly was now back in Antigonus' hands,
though Aetolia still held Phthiotic Achaea, Dolopia, and Athamania:
see Fine, TAPA, 1932, '33 ff.; Walbank, Philip, II.
7. Eav . TTJV Eiivomv ~VTpE11"0f.LEVOL TTJV ~auxlav ayEw
u1l"oKpLvwVTm: 'if. through respect for the goodwill ... they should
pretend to maintain the peace ... .' Here P. reveals the truth, that
Aetolia was neutral at this time (KaO&.rrEp Kal vvv).
1-1~ BEia6at xpElas Twv ~o11811a6VTwv: unconvincing, Treves argues
(ad loc.). in a speech of envoys sent orrF.p {3o7J8dai; (48. 5). But why
doubt P.'s statement (so. 7) that Aratus' object was to ensure Macedanian help if it proved necessary, and that Doson was sufficiently
realistic to discuss the situation on that basis? At the same time, if
Aratus doubted the power of the I"eague to survive without Macedanian help, his actions must have been directed towards inveigling
the Achaean authorities into taking the steps he judged to be
necessary.
50. 2. l:O.v Kat Tois :AxatOL5 ToiiTo f3ouAOf.LEVOl!l ii: i.e. the invitation
must come from the whole Confederation, not merely from Megalopolis.
9. TTJV . ciBlKLuv 11"Ept Tov :A.KpoKopLVSov: 43 4 n., 52. 4 The seizure
was an d&~da, because in 243 Macedon and Achaea were at peace,
10. ds TO Kmvov ~ouAEuT/jptov: probably at the spring at5vo8os, zz6
(Porter, lxxiii; Fine, AJP, 1940, r4o n. 47). The phrase Kowov
{3ouAeurr)pwv is discussed by Aymard (ACA, 65-67), who argues that
{JovAEv-r~pwv is hardly more than an alternative to {3ouil~. itself a
synonym for avvo&os. But PouAe!J7'1/pLDV is normally 'council chamber'
(cf. xi. 9 8, xxii. 9 6) ; and 'what was theoretically a meeting Of
a primary assembly might at times be held in a council chamber'
(Larsen, 77). In using the adjective Kow6v P. is contrasting the federal
249

II. 50. to

EVENTS IN GREECE

chamber with the Megalopolitan assembly to which the envoys had


first reported (so. 3-4). The terms Td 1rAfj8os- and ol 1roAAot ( rr) are
properly used of a meeting open to all citizens; see Aymard (ACA,
Sr ff.).
12. Ka.mc!>EuyEw brt n1.s TW\1 4>Awv ~o,&Eia.s: cf. 47 8, Kt:J.Tac/>Evywv
e1Tt TOVS' ix8pov<;, also referring to Antigonus. Treves (A then., 1935 26)
underlines Aratus' adroitness in turning the accusation made against
him. His duplicity as counsellor of resistance shows through despite
P.'s admiration and an account based on his Memoirs.
51. 2. nToAEj.LO.LOS KAEoj.Lf.vEt XOP'I'JYEL\1 l'II'E~uAETO: see 47.

2 n. for
Egyptian subventions to Aratus. The date when they were discontinued was probably winter 226/s (Beloch, iv. r. 709 n. I; Walbank,
Aratos, 200-1; against Ferrabino's view (84, 258) that it was summer
227). P. mentions this first, since he had held up the Ptolemaic tie
as a moral obstacle to an Achaeo--Macedonian rapprochement (47 2).
Later Cleomenes was driven to rely increasingly on Ptolemy, who
extracted his mother and sons as hostages and a promise not to make
peace without his consent (Plut. Cleom. 22. 4-9), yet withdrew his
subsidies at the critical moment (63. r ff.).
3. To AuKa.tov f.v Tois Aa.8oKEiots 'E~eam!'fL~O.lOV: Aratus, in his
tenth rnpa.TI)yta. (227 /6), while retiring from an assault on Elis, was
attacked by Cleomenes on the slopes of Mt. Lycaeum (modern
Diaphorti, south-east of Andritsaena) and heavily defeated (227);
d. Plut. Cleom. 5 I; Arat. 36. r-2. Pausanias (viii. 28. 7) mentions
the monument to the Achaean dead as standing near Brenthe, at
the foot of the hill of Karytaena; cf. E. Meyer, RE, 'Lykaion', col.
2236. Later in 227 Cleomenes seized the fortress of Leuctra near
Megalopolis. Aratus drove him back from the walls of Megalopolis.
but would not follow up the victory. Lydiades (44. 5 n.) charged with
the cavalry against orders, and was killed near the village of Ladoceia
on the Asea road, an incident which brought considerable obloquy
on Aratus; cf. Walbank, Aratos, 83-84; Plut. Cleom. 6; A rat. 36. 437 5 In early summer 226 Cleomenes, now supreme at Sparta (47
3 n.), took the Arcadian town of Mantinea, invaded western Achaea,
and brought Hyperbatas, the general for 226/s. one of Aratus' supporters, to battle between Dyme and the Hecatombaeum. Cleomenes
was wholly victorious, and Achaean losses were heavy, the whole
federal force being engaged (7ra.v87Jp.el). See Plut. Cleom. r4. 4-5; Arat.
39 I ; Paus. \ii. 7. 3 Though the first two of these disasters preceded
Cleomenes' coup and the sending of the Megalopolitans to Antigonus,
P. has enumerated all three to underline the extent of the Achaean
collapse; cf. Bettingen, 37 n.; Treves, Athen., r935, 27; Fine, AJP,
1940, 140 n. 48.
4. Twv,.pa.yj.Lcl.Twv oOKlTt lh86vTtt.JV &.va.o-Tpocl>i}v: 'the situation no longer

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.y~. 2

giving any respite', i.e. for recovery (not 'circumstances no longer permitting any delay', i.e. in appealing to Doson, as Paton; cf. Porter,
lxxiv). &.vaaTpo~~ is 'a breathing-space to do something'; d. i. 66. 3,
ii. 33 3, etc. The appeal op.o8vp.aoov is part of Aratus' apologia.
5. v ~ Ka.lp~: 'in this crisis'. From a little after Hecatombaeum
until] unef July 225 there was a truce and ne-~otiations with Cleomenes
(Plut. Arat. 39; Cleom. 15). A first conference, fixed for early in 225,
was postponed owing to Cleomenes' illness. Meanwhile Aratus refused to stand as general for 225/4, letting a supporter Timoxenus
stand and be elected in his place. There is little doubt that during
this period he had secretly resumed conversations with Doson. After
the breakdown in the negotiations with Cleomenes in summer,
the king carried out a series of campaigns in Arcadia and Achaea
which shook the League to its foundations (see 52 ff.). Meanwhile, at some unascertained date (probably late summer 225, cf.
Porter, lxxv) the Achaeans decided to send the younger Aratus to
Doson to discover his final tem1s. On the younger Aratus see iv.
37 r (general for 219/18), vii. 12. 9 (relations with Philip V). First
Philip's lo\er, he became his enemy when the king carried off his
wife Polycrateia to Macedon (Plut. Arat. 49 2, so. 2; Livy, xxvii.
31. 8, xxxii. 2r. 23-24; \Valbank, Philip, 78-79). Later rumour attributed his madness and early death (probably falsely) to Philip's
poison (Piut. Arat. 54 2-3; Walbank, CQ, 1943, 4 n. J).
(3Ej3a.u:,O"o.To Ta m:pt Tfjs ~o,&E(a.s: 'confirmed the details of assis~
tance', cf. 49 9 The younger Aratus was sent to learn the exact
price Doson demanded for his help; and this ( 6) proved to be the
depositing of hostages and cession of Acrocorinth. Presumably
Aratus junior reported back these terms, for they at first proved
unacceptable ( 7). The final decision to accept was not taken until
spring 224 (52. 4), when the younger Aratus again made the journey
to Macedon, this time as one of the hostages (Plut. A rat. 42. 3; Cleom.
19. 9). Treves (ad loc.) refers this passage to the final acceptance of
Doson's terms in 224; Aratus junior thus makes only one journey
to Pella, to convey the Achaean decision (P.), and to remain as a
hostage (Plutarch). and sr. 6-7 is parenthetical, describing Achaean
hesitation before sending the younger Aratus. It is clear, however,
that at some point an embassy had to go to Macedon to establish the
details hitherto left vague (49 9); and the likelihood is that it is to
this embassy P. is here referring.
7. U1T~p8EO'lV EO'XE TO fila~ouAlov: if TO a~afiouAoV, 'the deliberations',
implies a uwollo5', this will be the autumn meeting of 225, at which the
younger Aratus reported Doson's terms. It was probably Achaean
reluctance to pay the price demanded that led Aratus to make his
unsuccessful appeals for help to Aetolia and Athens (Plut. A rat. 41. 3).
52. 2. 1rpoO'Aa.~wv S . . . Ka.4>ua5 KTA.: after the collapse of

H. 52. 2

EVENTS IN GREECE

negotiations in summer 225 (51. 5), Cleomenes again declared war and
invaded Achaea (Plut. Cleom. 17. 3 ff.; A rat. 39 4 ff.). From Tegea he
marched towards Sicyon which he almost captured; then, swerving
west, he seized Pellene, and returned south to take Pheneus in
Arcadia (and the citadel of Penteleium: Plut. Cleom. q. 6; A rat.
39 4). \\'bet her he continued south to Caphyae, or the town went over
of its own accord is not known. These successes carried Spartan
territory to the gulf of Corinth, and split the Confederation in two.
Cleomenes now concentrated on the eastern half. Argos was taken
during the Nemean truce, and a garrison sent to occupy Cleonae and
Phlius (Plut. Cleom. 19. r ; A rat. 39 5) ; meanwhile, in a campaign in
the south-east of the Argolid Cleomenes took Hermione, Troezen,
and Epidaurus. Finally, on the invitation of its people he occupied
Corinth. The whole campaign was very rapid (Plutarch (Cleom.
17 5), following Phylarchus, stresses the appeal made by Cleomenes'
social programme of debt-cancellation and land-division to the
masses in Achaea) and the capture of Corinth will be about August
225. See Walbank, Aratos, 95~; Porter, lxxiv-lxxv.
'11'poaEaTpa.To'll'e8EuaE TU TWv I,Kuwvlwv 'II'OAEt: the narrative must
again be supplemented from Plutarch. Aratus, having been invested
with special judicial powers for the 'purging' of pro-Spartan elements in Sicyon and Corinth (Plut. Arat. 40. 2, t1T1. ToVTovs- Jf,ovatav
&.vV1Tv8uvov . . >.a{idw), had already carried out his mission at Sicyon,
and received news of the fall of Argos while at Corinth. The people
of Corinth tried to kill or arrest him, but he escaped to Sicyon.
Cleomenes occupied Corinth, but could not expel the Achaean garrison from Acrocorinth, and so threw a palisade around the mountain.
Later he made two attempts to strike a bargain with Aratus (Plut.
Cleom. 19. 4. 19. 7; Arat. 4I. s) and, when these failed, he laid siege
to Sicyon, probably in January 224 (Porter, lxxxi-lxxxii).
3. T~ f.LEV )\paT~ OTpttTt)yoiivTl Kat Tots )\xa~o'ls: i.e. Aratus and the
garrison. Since the general of the Confederation for 225/4 was not
Aratus, but Timoxenus (Plut. Arat. 38. 2}, and since Cleomenes'
capture of Corinth cannot be as late as 224/3, we must assume (a) that
aTpa77JyoiJvn here refers to Aratus' position as head of the military
tribunal, i.e. a de facto command and not the official aTpa77Jyta (Tarn,
CAH, vii. 863---4; Walbank, Aratos, I7o-3), or (b) that the office of
aTpa77]yO<; auTOKpd.Twp which (Plut. Arat. 41. r) was allegedly given
to Aratus at Sicyon after the fall of Corinth, was in fact one to whicl1
he was appointed several months earlier; in which case the l~ovala
dvv'lT(v8vvos held at Sicyon and Corinth was probably held by virtue
of Aratus' supreme power (Porter, lxxviii-lxxix). This second view
is on the whole the more satisfactory. Aratus was at Sicyon both
before and after the debacle at Corinth, and Plutarch mav well have
attributed to the second visit what in fact belongs to the first. In

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 5 2.8

this case the appointment of Aratus as mpaTI}yos aihoKpbwp was


the Achaean response to Cleomenes' renewal of the war and the
internal crisis within the eastern cities of the Confederacy (cf. Plut.
Arat. 39 s, opwvTa T~V JI,),07TOVVYJ<TOV KpaOatvop..lVYJV Kai TOS 1TOAH>
JfavwTap..lvas v1ro TWV vewTEpt~ovrwv TTavrax68ev; Cleotn. Ii 5).
4. Ka1"Exov,-wv :O..xmwv TOTE ,-ov TO'ITov ,-oihov: this the Achaean
garrison under Cleopater held after the loss of Corinth (Plut. Arat.
40. 5). The decision to accept Doson's terms was taken at Aegium,
probably at the spring avvooos, about April 224; Plut. A rat. 41. 742. 1 (the meeting follows a three months' siege of Sicyon); Porter,
lxxxi-lxxxii. For Aratus' lyKA:1Jp..a TTpo> ,. olK{av, the seizure of the
Acrocorinth, see so. 9 n.
5. &.vateu~as a'ITo Toil ILtwwvos: after three months' siege (Plut.
Arat. 41. 7), and on news of Aratus' escape and the decision at
Aegium ( 4; Plut. A rat. 42. 2, KaAefv TOV .llv,.[yovov J.f7JrplaavTo Kat
TTapaot})6vat Tov .:4KpoKoptv8ov) ; on the order of events in Plut.
Cleom. I9 see Larsen, r66.
s~aAa~wv xapaKL KOL TnJlp'l:J KTA.: for the method cf. v. 99 9 The gap
thus fortified is the valley of the R. Leuka between Acrocorinth
(575 m.) and Mt. Oneia (582 m.), where the modern road and railway
to Argos run. North of the Acrocorinth (\vhich the Achaeans still
held) the fortifications of Corinth and Lechaeum completed Cleomenes' lines; naturally Oneia was also fortified (Plut. Cleom. za. I).
See Kromayer, AS, i. 2oi-J.
7. oaov o1lmo.~ 'ITapeivaL TOV KAEOfLEVTJ ... els 0eTTaAiav: in the highest
degree improbable; and this reading of Antigonus' mind is evidently
part of Aratus' version designed to fit his prophecy that Doson
might have to fight in Thessaly (49 6), and so to represent the compact as less one-sided than it really was.
SLa rijs Eu~oias i'ITi. Tov 'la811ov: this route avoided Thermopylae, in
Aetolian hands( 8), but passed through Boeotia, which was friendly
to Macedon and allied with Achaea (49 6 n.). Aratus and the
Achaean damiourgoi met Antigonus at Pagae in the Megarid, sailing
there (Plut. Arat. 43 I, 44 r). Megara had recently transferred itself
from the Achaean League to the Boeotian, when Cleomenes occupied
the Isthmus line (xx. 6. 8); and Feyel (I29-3o) has suggested that
although P. says this was done p..~ml riJ> Twv L'txatwv yvwp..7J>, it was
perhaps the quid pro quo for which the Boeotians agreed to adhere
to the new alliance :ith Antigonus against Sparta (49 6 n.). Doson's
forces amounted to 2o,ooo Macedonian infantry and I,3oo horse
(Plut. Arat. 43 I).
8. ot yap AhwA.ol. . . . ~ouAOfLEVoL KwAuaaL Tov :t\v,-(yovov Tijs
~oTJ9eias: that the Aetolians were unwilling to see Antigonus crush
Cleomenes is likely, since this would give the Achaeans (though
under Macedonian supervision) supremacy in the Peloponnese; see
253

II. 52. 8

EVENTS IN GREECE

Fine, AJP, 1940, 149-50. But their action is no evidence for P.'s
thesis of an earlier aggressive policy towards Achaea.
53. 1. Tfis ~v auToi.s tAtrSa.s; an echo of Aratus' Memoirs; for what
was the invitation to Antigonus but a failure of self-reliance?
O.~a. T~ TOV ;6.pL0'1'0TAYJ TOV ;6.pye'Lov ltravaaTl]Val TOLl> KAeot.U::VlaTai.s: cf. Plut. A rat. 44 2 ff.; Cleom. zo. 6 ff. Aristoteles was a friend

2.

of Aratus and exploited Cleomenes' failure to carry through the


social revolution at Argos. Aratus sailed with 1,5oo men to Epidaurus; and meanwhile the Argives rose, trapped the Spartan garrison on the citadel, and were reinforced by Timoxenus and the
Achaean army from Sicyon. Aratus' arrival is mentioned only by
Plutarch (Arat. 44 4). It was argued by M. Klatt (6-39) that P.'s
silence on the role of Aratus here shows him to be using a source
other than the lvfemoirs. But Plutarch omitted Timoxenus because
he was writing a biography of Aratus; it does not follow that the
.o/1emoirs omitted him too. P. is here giving an outline sketch, and
may well have left Aratus out of an event in which his role was
insignificant. Hence Klatt's theory can be rejected.
~ETa TL~o5vou Toll 0'1'flO.TTJyoO: d. Plut. Cleom. zo. 8. This reference
to Timoxenus as general has created a difficulty. On the assumption
that the battle of Sellasia was in 222 (below,
n.), the following
possibilities arise:
(a) Timoxenus is general for 225/4. and his position has not been
abrogated by Aratus' appointment as crrpa.'TTJYD> a.il'1'oKpa'1'wp.
In that case the revolt of Argos is before May 224 (so Porter,
Ixxix. n. 45; Ferrabino, z68; Walbank, Aratos, 172}, and there
is little information on the rest of the campaigning season of
224 (cf. 54 3 n.).
(b) Timoxenus is general for 224/3. His crrpa'TTJyta for zzs/4 was
suspended on Aratus' extraordinary appointment ; but he held
office again in 224/3 (what happened to Aratus' office?). This
scheme, adopted by Treves (Athen., I935. ss) in modification
of one proposed by H. Frank (Arch. Pap., 1933, r ff.). fails to
explain why Timoxenus had to resign in 225 but could be
re-elected under the same av'ToKpchwp six months later; also
it fails to connect satisfactorily with the section of the Achaean
General List beginning 'Timoxenus, 221/o' (iv. 7 10). Beloch
(iv. 2. 222) also makes Timoxenus general in 224)3; but his
theory that Hyperbatas resigned after the defeat at Hecatombaeum, and Timoxenus' first crrpa'TTJyla was for the remainder
of 226/s, has nothing in its favour (Walbank, Aratos, 170).
(c) Timoxenus is not general of the Confederation, but holds a
de facto command under Aratus as ati'1'oKpd'1't1Jp; so Tam (CAH,
vii. 863-4). but such a use of crrpa'1'1)ya> is unparalleled.
254

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.543

On present evidence the problem is not soluble with certainty. That


Aratus remained a;pa:rryyo> avToKp&.;wp till after Sellasia is possible;
but we do not know precisely what that entailed. We cannot argue
from the powers given to Critolaus and his successors in 146 (xxxviii.
13. 7), since there was no question then of prolonging office. It seems
likely that Aratus may have been especially concerned with relations
with Antigonus; and in that case it would be necessary for someone
(like Timoxenus on this occasion) to command the Achaean forces.
But whether such a commander would be comparable in powers to
the normal crrpa;ryyo> we do not know. On the whole we may accept
Tarn's hypothesis as the most satisfactory.
6. 1ra.pa.1reu~w S' dt; :Apyos KTA.: cf. Plut. A rat. 44 3-4; Cleom. 21.
According to the latter passage Cleomenes first sent Megistonous, his
stepfather, with 2,ooo men; but upon Megistonous' falling in battle
he abandoned his Isthmus line, fearing for Sparta itself. He cleared
part of the city, but was cut short by Doson close on his heels. P.
obscures the role of the Macedonians (and not merely Achaean
courage) in completing Cleomenes' withdrawal from Argos.
cptAoTLp.ws . e~e flETO.flEAEia.s: 'pertinaciter ... ex paenitentia prioris
consilii' (Schweighaeuser). Paton gives the \\'TOng emphasis in his
version 'with the zeal of renegades'; toP. the Argives were renegades
v.ho had repented.
e1ra.vTjAeev ds TtlV I1rcipT"1V: via Tegea, where he heard of the death
of his wife, Agiatis (Plut. Cleom. 22. r).
54. 2. 1(0.T0.!7TlJ!7ap.evos Ta Ka.Ta TtlV m~Aw: cf. Plut. A rat. 44 s.
/1pao> St a;par'lyo> alpe0e1s tm' Mpyelwv (on this phrase see Aymard,
ACA, II3-14, n. 2) l1retaEv aV.ov<; Mvnyovtp T&. Te Twv ;vp&.wwv Ka~
T& ;wv 1rpo8oTwv XP~fLaTa 8wpE&v SoiJva,. On Aristomachus' execution
see 59 1 ff.; and for the massacre which followed cf. v. 16. 6.
3. Ttl" AtyuTLV Ka.l BeAJJ.LViinv xwpa.v: Aegytis in north-west Laconia,
a district lying around various tributaries of the Alpheius, rising
in the north of Taygetus, took its name from an ancient town
Aegys, destroyed, tradition reported, by the Spartan kings Archelaus
and Charillus, who suspected it of Arcadian sympathies (Paus. iii.
2. s, viii. 27. 4, 34 s; Strabo, viii. 364, x. 446; Bolte, RE, 'Sparta',
cols. IJIO-I2). On the Belminatis (Belbinatis) see 46. 5 n.; among the
forts handed over to Megalopolis will be the Athenaeum, and, in the
Aegytis, Leuctra (Plut. Cleom. 6. 3; cf. Thuc. v. 54; the exact site
is disputed). Doson must have marched near Tegea to reach Megalo~
polis, but postponed its capture till the next year (54 6 ff.).
-ijK 1rpo; Tl}v TWV ;b.xa.~wv a.)voSov: probably September 224, since
.t\ntigonus goes on to winter quarters. That there are so few events
in this campaigning season is possibly due to Antigonus' having been
held up at the Isthmus longer than P. suggests; in which case the

255

II. 54 3

EVENTS IN GREECE

revolt of Argos may have been as late as midsummer 224. Ferrabino


(z6z-8) compresses Doson's Arcadian campaign into the early months
of 224 and dates this o-vvo8o> to February-March 224; but this chronology is only likely in conjunction with his date of 223 for Sellasia, and
on other grounds this cannot stand (65-69 n.). See Aymard, ACA, zG9
n., 'on concluera ... que l'automne est probable, mais non certain'.
4. I<O.Ta.~na.9eis i]ye..,.wv O.miVTwv Twv auilJlnxwv: cf. 37 r n. Besides
the Achaeans there were evidently present representatives of the
various states which now united to form the Symmachy under the
presidency of the king of Macedon. The Symmachy was a League
of Confederacies, following in other respects the example of the
Leagues of Alexander and Demetrius Poliorcetes. The original members were the Achaeans, Macedonians (but see below}, Thessalians,
Epirotes, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Phocians (cf. iv. 9 4, 15. r},
Euboeans (xi. 5 4; perhaps directly subject to Macedon} and possibly
Opuntian Locris (xi. 5 4; unless it was subject to Boeotia (\Valbank,
Philip, r6 n. 3) or Macedon (Feyel, 172 n. z)). For the relations of
these states to Macedon immediately before 224 see Fine, AJP, 1940,
151 n. 92 (with the note to 49 6 above on Boeotia and Phocis). The
form of Doson's dedication at Delos after Sellasia (Syll. sr8 = IG,
xi. 4 1097, Bao-,).Eti> AVTlyov[O> ~ao-tMws] !LJT)p.T)Tplov Ka[~ MaKe86ves] I
a~ o[ o-vp.p.axo' [a7To ri)s 7TEpl] I EeJJ..ao-lav p.ci.[>..'TJ> :4m:\.:U.wvt].) suggests
that the Macedonians were not members of the Symmachy except
through their king (as one might expect) (cf. Treves, Athen., 1935,
52-53). 'The Council or Synedrion of the Symmachy could be summoned by the king of Macedon in his capacity of president, and had
the power to decide questions of war and peace, the voting of supplies
and the co-opting of new members; moreover, the king of Macedon
was ex officio commander-in-chief. But the Symmachy possessed no
treasury, and all decisions were subject to ratification by the legislative bodies of the separate leagues, which thus maintained a considerable measure of independence. Eventually the Symmachy was
to prove a failure; but what should have been immediately clear
was that, so long as the king of Macedon was prepared to abide by
its terms, the domination which it offered him was largely illusory;
on the other hand, Achaea and the other small federal states would
profit by Macedonian military protection, without sustaining any
appreciable loss of autonomy' (Walbank, Philip, rs-16; bibliography
there). At this meeting Antigonus was probably elected hegemon of
the Achaean League, a position formerly held by Ptolemy (Plut. A rat.
38. 9, cf. 24. 4), and a law was passed enjoining the Achaean magistrates to summon an assembly whenever the king of Macedon required them (cf. iv. 85. 3, v. r. 6).
5. XPOVOV f1f.V TLVO. 1TO.pO.XELJla~WV: i.e. winter 224/3 xp6vov Ttva need
not imply an abnormally short stay in winter quarters.
256

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.jj.I

7. or TEyEciTa.l va.pMioaa.v a.hous: cf. Plut. Cleom. 2J. I. Doson


may have installed a garrison; cf. 8, dcr4>a)..wdJ-LEVos r~l Ka:rd. -r~v
n6A.w. See, further, 70. 4 n.
11. T~lV J.1EV 'OpxotJ.EVov dAE: in 226 (for the date see Walbank,
Aratos, I94-s), after defeating Megistonous and the Spartans near
Orchomenus (Plut. Arat. 38. I), Aratus had failed to recover the
town; and Phylarchus (Plut. A rat. 45 I) retails the complaint that
he now allowed Antigonus to plunder Orchomenus and to garrison
it (cf. iv. 6. s).
TT]v Twv Ma.vTwEwv m5Alv: cf. 46. 2. Mantinea was taken by
Cleomenes from the Aetolians in 229, captured by Aratus in 227
(Plut. Arat. 36. 2-3; Cleom. 5 I), recaptured with the connivance of
the pro-Spartan party in 226 (Plut. Cleom. I4 I), and now (223)
taken by Doson and the Achaeans. For Phylarchus' sympathy for
its fate, and P.'s reply, see 56. 6 ff.; cf. Plut. A rat. 45 6--<J; Cleom.
23. I ; F ougeres, soo ff.
12. TTJV tcf 'Hpa.la.s ~ea.l TEA~ouoTJs: Heraea lay on the right bank of
the Alpheius, IS stades east of the Ladon (Paus. viii. 26. I-3); cf.
Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 295--6; Ziegler, RE, 'Heraia (I)', cols. 407 ff.
(with map). Telphusa was about IO miles north of Heraea on the
left bank of the Ladon; cf. Frazer, op. cit. iv. 286 f.; E. Meyer, Pel.
Wand. 86. Heraea had been taken by the Achaean general Dioetas
in 236, and this presupposes the Achaean possession of Telphusa;
d. Beloch, iv. I. 632 n. 2; Walbank,] HS, I9J6, 66. Cleomenes had
seized Heraea prior to his coup in 227 (Plut. Cleom. 7 5), and Telphusa either then or in 225.
13. 1ra.pa.A.a.~wv 8E 1ea.l Ta.uTa.s: Doson put a Macedonian garrison into
Heraea, as he had done at Orchomenus; for Philip held it in 208,
when he offered to restore it to Achaea (Livy, xxviii. 8. 6, cf. xxxii.
5 4 for the actual restoration in I99/8). Aymard's suggestion (PR,
25-27 n. 5), that the Macedonian garrison dated only from a postulated recovery by Philip from the Aetolians in 2o8, seems overcomplicated; d. Walbank, Philip, I7 n. 2.
auva1TTOVTO'i TOU XElJ.1WVO'i: 'since winter was now at hand'. In fact
P. uses no word for autumn, and this phrase indicates a time around
the autumnal equinox, the beginning of the bad season. Cf. Holleaux,
REA, I92J, 354 (=Etudes, iv. 286); REG, I924, 3I4 n. I (=Etudes,
ii. I6I n. I); BCH, I9J2, 534--6 (=Etudes, iv. 338-4o); Aymard,
Melanges Glotz (Paris, I932), i. 53 n. I. (For the period from early
October to early December P. uses the phrase XHJ-LWV Ka-rapxot-L~vos; cf.
xvi. 24. I.) Hence the synodos was the regular meeting of autumn 223.
55. 1. J.1ETc!.. Twv J.1la9ocJ115pwv: o?J noUot5s, according to Plutarch
(Cleom. 25. 4). The next year Doson had J,Ooo mercenaries (65. 2 n.),
but he was relying less on his citizen troops {IJ,ooo as against 2o,ooo
s

257

II. 55

EVENTS IN GREECE

when he ftrst marched south, sz. 7 n.). For further discussion see
Griffith, 65, &)-7o.
2-7. Cleomenes' capture of Megalopolis. This event, which took place
in autumn 223, while the Achaeans were still at the o-Vvooos at
Aegium (Plut. Cleom. zs. z), is also described by Plutarch (Cleom.
23~25), who follows Phylarchus, as is clear from a comparison with
P.'s criticism of Phylarchus at 61-62. Cf. also Plut. Phil. 5; Paus.
viii. 27. 15-16. Plutarch relates how Cleomenes began with a feint
march towards Argos, then turned west to descend via Asea on
Megalopolis. After taking the city he was persuaded by Lysandridas
to send him and Thcaridas as envoys to those who had escaped to
Messene, with an offer to spare the city if they would join him; but
the Megalopolitans, at Philopoemen's instigation, rejected the offer,
whereupon Cleomenes sacked the city. These details P. omits here,
but discusses them in his polemic against Phylarchus.
2. s,a. TO !-1Eye9os Ka.t TftV EPT)!-LlD.V: cf. v. 93 s. Ka~ yd.p viJv 7rapd. Tt.l
p.iyEOos arh-ijs Ka1 T~v f.p1Jp.la.v f.r:rcpd.AOa., (217, when the dispute on
rebuilding Megalopolis turned on its size). As a federal centre for
Arcadia, originally garrisoned by the League, Megalopolis was prob
ably planned on too large a scale from the outset; its area of 4,o9o,jz4
square yards (Bury, ]HS, 18<}8, zo) was even larger than that of
Messene. On the battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia see 51. 3 n.
3. Twv fiK MeaaTjvT)s ~wyO.Swv: the reception of Megalopolitan refugees
at Messcne after the capture of Megalopolis proves that relations
between the cities were good (61. 3-4; Phylarchus in Plut. Cleom.
24. I; Fine, A]P, 1940, 154 ff.). Perhaps, therefore, these Messenian
exiles were of the popular democratic party, opposed alike to the
neutral oligarchs (cf. iv. 32. 1) and the pro-Achaean, but wealthy,
party of Gorgus (cf. vii. 10); this element, to which Philip V later
appealed (Plut. A rat. 49 4-5; d. Walbank, Philip, 72), may have
been attracted by Cleomenes' programme. As Roebuck notes (69-7o),
the Tritymallus who conveyed Cleomenes' offer to Aratus in 224
(Plut. Cleom. 19. 8; cf. A rat. 41. 5) was also a Messenian, probably of
the same party.
4. s~a, Tft'l' euiJtux(av TWV Meya.A01TOA.LTWV: in fact, the escape of all
but I,ooo inhabitants, who fought a covering action, suggests that
hope of saving the city was abandoned once the Spartans were
inside.
5. Ci Sf) Ka.t Tp~at 1-LT)ut 7rpoTEpov a.vT~ auve~T) 1fa.9ei:v: P. gives details
in ix. 18. 1--4, where the first attack is dated Trepi T~v Tijs llAmiBos
~mToA~v, i.e. about 12 May (Strachan-Davidson, 20). But this would
make the second attack August, whereas it was clearly in autumn
(54 13 n.). Either P. has miscalculated, or 7pr:r{ is an error for TrEVTE
(Beloch, iv. I. 715 n. 2). Clearly the two attacks were just before and
just after the Macedonian campaign of 223.
258

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II. 56

tcaTtt TOV KwAaL~W 'll'poaayopEuo~-LEVov TO'Il'OV:

cf. ix. r8. I, Tb Kanl TOV


1/>w>.eov KaAoup.evov. The word cfow>.eo> is found in the sense of Sd>aaKaAeiov (Poll. iv. 19, ix. 41; Suidas and Hesych. s. v.), and this may
be the correct form and meaning here; cf. Bolte-Meyer, RE,
'Pholeos', col. 513.
7. o(hw~ . 'll'tKpw~ lhE<f>9npEv Kat oua...,Evw~: Phylarchus, however
(Plut. Cleom. 25. 1), explains Cleomenes' action as provoked by
Philopoemen's intransigence.
8. KaT A 1'a~ TWV ~eaLpwv 'll'EpLaTaO'EL~: 'in all their vicissitudes', nullo
unquam tempore, quantumuis dijjidli (Schweighaeuser), rather than
'in the varied circumstances of his career' (Paton).
1-'~a alpE1'LaTTJV 1-'~TE 'll'pooo'"lv: implicit polemic against Phylarchus, who (cf. Plut. Cleom. 24. 2 ff.) had stressed the readiness of
Lysandridas and Thearidas, avSpes f!vSogoL Kat OVVCI.TOt p.aAurra. TWY
Mf.ya.Ao1ToAtrwv, to compromise and collaborate with Cleomenes. If
this Thearidas was P.'s grandfather, who bore that name (Syll. 6z6;
von Scala, 15 n. I; Stahelin, RE, 'Thearidas {1)', col. 1382), P.'s disavowal is even more understandable. Stymphalus, in north-east
Arcadia, south ofMt Cyllenc, had probably joined the Achaean League
in 235 (Niccolini, 28-29; Beloch, iv. I. 415, dates its accession c. 251).
9. KAELTopwv: Pausanias (viii. 21. I) places Cleitor 7 stades (emended
to 17 by Curtius, Peloponnesos, i (Gotha, I85I), 398 n. z6) west of
the conjuncture of the R. Cleitor, on which it lay, with the Aroanius
(modem Katsana); cf. Geiger, RE, 'Kleitor', col. 66r; Meyer, Pel.
Wand. ro9-ro; Papandreou, IIpa.KTLKa, I92o, 95 ff. It probably joined
Achaea about 236/5. but whether before or after Megalopolis is unknown; cf. Niccolini, 29; Beloch, iv. I, 632 (at the time of the conquest of Heraea in 236). Of Thearces nothing more is known.

56-63. Criticism of Phylarchus: a digression in fact inspired by


Phylarchus' version of Cleomenes' capture of Megalopolis, which P.
has already tacitly combated in 55 8 and to which he reverts in
6I-<5J. Phylarchus, who is known mainly from these chapters and
from fragments preserved in Athenaeus, came from Athens or
Naucratis (Suidas, 1/>v>.a.pxo> l!Orwa.fos ~ NavKpa:rlrr;s ot o Euwwvwv,
d.\Ao, 8 Alyt)1TT~ov <&v)lypa.t,/Jav)-he was perhaps a Naucratite who
settled as a metic in Athens~ and was probably contemporary with
Cleomenes and Aratus (56. In.). He wrote twenty-eight books of
larop{a.L, covering the period from Pyrrhus' invasion of the Peloponnese (272) to Cleomenes' death (2zo{I9), as well as other works known
to us only by name (Suidas). P. polemizes against Phylarchus,
not only as a representative of the 'tragic' school of historians,
following the fashion of Duris, but also as a partisan of Cleomenes
against Aratus (cf. Plut. Arat. 38. rz). (For criticisms elsewhere of
sensational historians see r6. 14 (unnamed historians), iii. 4i 6-48.
259

II. 56

EVENTS IN GREECE

I2 (writers on Hannibal), s8. 9. vii. 7 I-2, 7 6 (writers on Hieronymus of Syracuse), x. 2. 5-ti (writers on Scipio), xii. 24. 5, 26 b 4
(Timaeus), xv. 34 r-36. II (Ptolemy of Megalopolis), xvi. r2. 7-9
(Theopompus), 14. r f., 17. 9, r8. 2 (Zeno of Rhodes), xxix. 12.
r2. 8 (unnamed historians); for his own concessions to this style
composition see CQ, 1945, 8 ff.) Phylarchus was Plutarch's source,
especially in the Agis and C/eomenes, and to a lesser extent in the
Aratus and Pyrrhus, and he was also used by Pompeius Trogus
(perhaps via Timagenes). Plutarch recognized his faults; cf. Them.
32. 3; Arat. 38. r2. The fragments are collected by Jacoby,
81,
See also Walbank, Aratos, 4-ti; ]HS, 1938, 56 ff.; B. L. Ullman,
TAPA, r942, 4r-42; Oilier, ii. 88-93
~
' uuTous
' ' Ka.Lpous
' '",...puT~
.
.I.'
'those
KUTa.' Tous
yEypu't'oTwv;
56 1 Twv
writers who were contemporary with Aratus'. Treves (ad Joe.) translates 'those who wrote upon the same period as Aratus'; but this
would require rwv ('Td.) Kant rou<; au'Tou,; KTA.
2. :ApaT! 1TPOTIP"1tLEVOtS KUTa.KoJ..ou9Ei'v: cf. 40. 4 n. For this use of
KamKo.\ovOefl, 'to follow an authority', see \Velles, 342. In fact P.
also uses Phylarchus in default of other sources; cf. 47. II n., 70. 6;
Susemihl (i. 632 n. s6o), however, exaggerates this use. For P.'s stress
on truth in history see i. 14. 6 n.
5. 1rpoa.lpeow KUL SuvutLw ev Tfi 1rpa.yjLuTE'~: 'the general purpose
and character of his work' (Paton). 7rpoalpHM refers to Phylarchus'
prejudice for Cleomenes, ouvarus to his methods of composition;
in the immediate case of Mantinea, the criticism of Phylarchus'
7rpoalpwt> is in 6, of the oularu> of his work in 7.
6. Toos Ma.VTLVEUS yEvo.,..Evous u7TOXEtp1ous: in 223 (cf. 54 II-12). An
echo of Phylarchus' charges appears in Plut. Arat. 45 6-9. Of the
men many were massacred, and the rest enslaved along with the
women and children; and the wealth of the town was divided between Achaeans and Macedonians, in the proportion of one to two.
Subsequently, as general, Aratus refounded the tovvn under the
name Antigoneia. This name is common on coins and inscriptions
(BOlte, RE, 'Mantinea', col. 1291); but a Delphic list of fhwpoo6~<:o,,
dating between 192 and 172 (IG, v. 2, p. xxxvii; cf. Haussoullier,
BCH, r883, rgo), mentions the name :Mantinea, which clearly survived. (For discussion of this list and of Achaean coins with tridents
which may belong to Mantinea at this time see Crosby and Grace,
15 ff., 25 (1\os. 73-95), Plate II.) In A.D. 125 Hadrian restored the
old name (Paus. viii. 8. 12). The fate of Mantinea caused a sensation
throughout Greece; it marked a reversion to a standard of warfare
which had been mitigated during the third century (d. Tarn, CAH,
vii. 2n, 76o), and Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better
than P., who writes from the harder background of the second

260

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE

CLEO~ENEAN

WAR II.56.Io

century, when the fate of Mantinea had become the common lot of
captured towns (cf. Paus. vii. 16. 8 for Corinth in 146).
rf]v &.pxcnoT6.TTJV Ka.t ~:u;ylaTTJV 1ToAw: despite a reference to Mav-nvlYJv
l.pa-retv'>]v in Homer, Iliad, ii. 607, the synoecism of historical Man tinea
in the plain, out of five demes (Strabo, viii. 337) is comparatively
late. Beloch (i. I. 335 n. 4) puts it back into the early sixth century.
other scholars (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1396 n. 2; Bolte, RE, 'Mantinea', coL 1318) make it as late as just before 450. But in any case
the present passage is tendentious in Phylarchus, and ironical in P.
7. da6.yeL 1TEpmAo~e:O..,; yvva.LKC!v: i.e. probably embracing altars or
statues of the gods like Hecuba in Virgil, Ae'lt. ii. 515-17. HaayHv
sometimes means 'to bring a play on the stage'; cf. Plato, Rep.
ii. 381 D; Ap. 35 B.
9. To .. Tij.,; hnopla.s ol.ce'Lov 0.~-ta. Ka.t xpTjalp.ov: 'the nature and use
of history' (not, with Paton, 'how far it (i.e. Phylarchus' treatment)
is proper or serviceable to history'). P. proposes to distinguish between history and tragedy after the manner of Aristotle.
10. lh;'L , ou~e ~1Tt1TATJTTEW KTA.: so MSS., B-\V. 2 ; but Casaubon's emendation lK'1TAo/'retv is wholly convincing, d. II.
P.'s vocabulary, as Ullman points out (TAPA, 1942, 41-42), both
here and in similar passages recalls the traditional function of
tragedy. Thus the anagnorisis is lK'lrk')KnKov (Arist. Poet. 14. 8.
I454 a 4; d. 16. 8. I455 a I7; Vit. Aesch. 7. 1rpos lK1rAYJgw -rpa-rwoYJ, 9,
lK1rA~gat -rov ofjfLov; [Longinus] Subl. I. h avv l1mA~gt -rofJ mOavoiJ
KpaTt TO OavfLd.cnov). See below, xvi. r8. 2 (criticism of Zeno), vr.ep{JoA~Ji

Tpa-rdas . lK7TATJgLv -rwv 1roAAwv.


Taus i.vSexop.f.vou.,; 'Aoyous tlJn'Lv: 'to seek after men's probable
utterances'. P. opposes the traditional procedure by which his predecessors (cf. Thuc. i. 22) invented speeches to put into the mouths
of their characters; cf. xii. 25 b (contrasting -rove; Ka-r' d.)o.7]8~:tav
dp1]fLlvovs and ifiw8ij lmx<tp~fLa.Ta Ka OLgootKovs Myovs}, xxxvi. 1. 7
(only what was said is to be reported). P. regards speeches as important (cf. xii. 25 a J, a axeoov ws Kcpd.Aata 1'WV 7rpagWV em KaL
avvlx<t ~v oA1Jv laToplav; xxxvi. I. 3), and includes many at critical
points in his history (cf. iii. 63. 2-14, 64. 2-10, 108. 4-109. 12, 111. 2-u,
V, I04. I-II, ix. 28. I-31 6, 32. 3~39. 7, X. 6. 1-6, 25, xi. 4 I-6. 8,
28. 1-29. I3, XV. I. 6-I4, 6. 4-7, 9, 8. 1-14, IO. 2-7, II. 6-I2, I7. 3-7,
19. 3-7, xviii. I-12 (Locrian conference), 23. 3-7, 36. 2-39. 7 (Tempe
conference), xxi. 10. 5-IO, 14.
IS s-11, 19. I-21. II, 22. s-23. 12,
JI. 7-I5, xxii. 8.
8. 9-12, xxiii. n, xxiv. 9 I-IS, xxix. I, 20,
xxx. Jr. 3-18). Of these some are based on authentic material, while

others, despite the principles here laid down, seem to give a mere
rhetorical exposition suitable to the occasion. Wunderer (ii. g--II)
sees a development from the position of the present passage to that
in xii. 25 i 4 ff.; but the argument there, if properly understood, is
261

II. 56.

IO

EVENTS IN GREECE

completely in agreement with that here. See also La Roche, 66 ff.;


Susemihl, ii. II4; and above, pp. 13-14.
Ta 1Ta.pe1rbp.eva. To is .'11ToKelp.evots a.pt9p.e~o-tla.t: 'to enumerate the
possible consequences of the events under consideration', i.e. whether
they are in fact known to have happened or not. Cf. Arist. Poet. 9 I.
1451 a 37 f., lfoallep6v St ... on oo Tb Ta yellbfLElla Mynv, TOVTO 7TOHJTOV
lpyov ~aTlv, d,\,\' ola Civ ylllotTo Kal Ta SvvaTa KaTa To ElK6s ~To allayKaiov, ibid. 1451 b 4-5, the difference between the historian and the
tragic poet---Tl[) TOll p.v n:l. yevbjLeva AEy<w, TOll S ola i'ill ylllotTo. But

P. rejects Aristotle's conclusion that tragedy is therefore a higher


thing (a7Tovoat6Tepoll) than history; cf. u-12, where this judgement
is implicitly rejected from P.'s utilitarian, didactic standpoint.
Ka.00.1Tep ot Tpa.y't'Stoypa~ol: 'like tragic poets', cf. I7. 6 n.
11-12. Difference between tragedy and history. Tragedy seeks EK7TAfjga,
Ka t/Jvxaywyfjaat, to thrill and charm the audience, an Aristotelian
conception; on EK7TM]gat see 56. Ion., on t/Jvxaywyfjaat cf: Arist. Poet.
6. 13. 1450 a 33 (on peripeteiai and anagnoriseis), 6. 19. 1450 b 17
(of the actual spectacle, ot/Jt>). History, however, seeks Sto&.gat KaL
1rdaat Tovs lfotAop.aBoiJvTa<;, to instruct and convince serious students
(cf. iii. 21. 9, xi. 19 a z for the contrast between what charms the
casual reader, Tovs aKovoVTas, and what benefits the serious student).
Further the charm of tragedy is only KaTa To TTap6ll, the profit of
history el> TOll 1r&.vm xp6vov, a distinction which, in its rhetorical
formulation, recalls Thucydides' famous claim (i. 22. 4, KTfjp.d TE s
ald p.iiMov ~ dycfmap.a t<; TO 7Tapaxpfjp.a aKOVELJl gtlyKHTat) ; cf. iii.
31. 12 n. In tragedy the governing element is Tb 7Tt8av6ll, Ki'lll ii t/JuSo<;which is Aristotle's Ttt 8vvaTtt KC1Ttt TO elK6<; (d. 56. IOn.); cf. Poet.
9 6. 1451 b r6, arnov S' on mBav6v an Tb ouvaTb!l. In history it is
truth. This contrast P. somewhat overstates, so as to limit history to a
record of all (7rttp.7Tav) that happened, however commonplace (56. Io,
Keill 1rdvv p.hpta Tvyxcillwmv ol'Ta) ; whereas in practice his very urge towards didacticism forces him to apply some principle of selection.
12. s,a TTJV lmaT'TJV TWV 9ewp.evwv: 'to beguile the spectator'. For this
non-Attic sense of a7TclT1J cf. iv. 20. 5, music was not introduced l1r'
dmhn Kat Y01JTdq.. Schweighaeuser quotes Josephus, AI, viii. s6, fL1JOv
.. gw TfjS d,\7JBe{as Myop.ll, fL1}0t 7Tt8aliOLS nat Kai 7Tpos a7TiiT1Jll Kal
nfpt/Jw l1raywyos rryll iaToptall OtaAap.{3dliOVTES, T~ll p.v lgiTaatll lfovy<tv
TTtpwp.e8a, 7TtaT<vw8at S <OBts dgwup.v.
13. oux {11Ton9ei.s a.h(a.v Ka.i. Tp01Tov Tois ywollevots: 'without suggesting why things are done and to what end'; that Tpcmos here
means 'direction' is confirmed by 16, tv Tats ahlats Kat 1rpoatplawt
Twv TTpaTTbVTwll, 'in the reasons and purposes of the doers'.
ti>v xwpts ouT' "AEE~V .. olh'' bpy(~eo-tla.t . Suva:rbv: by simply
relating peripeteiai shorn of their causes and purposes Phylarchus
fails to arouse legitimate (EtlA&yws) pity or proper (KaB1JK6vTws) anger.
262

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 58.1

P. here implies that both these emotions are legitimate for an historian in certain conditions; these were fulfilled when the emotion
was harnessed to a didactic purpose. In that case the end justified
the means. Ullman, TAP A, 1942, 30-31, would trace this theory back
to Ephorus, (d. Strabo, vii. 302); but see Walbank, Bull. Inst. Class.
Stud., 1955, 9
15. Tov KAE1TTT]V T] f10Lxov &.1ToKTe(vas: both in Greece and at Rome
an adulterer caught in flagranti delicto might be killed with impunity; d. Lysias, i. 26; Cato ap. Gell. x. 23. 4-5. A similar right
existed to kill a thief apprehended at night, or in the daytime if he
attempted self-defence with a weapon; this was laid down in the
Twelve Tables (Riccobono, Fontes, i. 57-59) and in various Greek
codes (d. Hitzig, RE, 'furtum', col. 391).
Tov 1rpoSOTT]V f1 Tupavvov: for P.'s views of tyrannicide see 59 4 ff.
Greek opinion traditionally condoned tyrannicide (d. Arist. Pol.
ii. 7 13. 1267 a 12 ff.), and there may have been an actual law at
Athens; d. An doc. de my st. 96-97, o8~ d7ToK-relvas -rdv -raiJ-ra 7TO~aav-ra
Ka1 0 GVf.Lf3ovAi;Vaas oaws l!a-rw Kat day~> See von Scala, 44 n. I, 140.

57. 1. AhwAois evexe(p~aav QUTOUS: d. 46. 2 n. for the earlier fortunes


of Mantinea.
2. ~Te~ TeTapn(:l 1rpoTEpov TTJS i\vnyovou 1rapouatas: Aratus' capture
of Mantinea (d. iv. 8. 4; Plut. A rat. 36. 2; Cleom. 5 I-2; Paus.
ii. 8. 6) was in spring 227, during his tenth a-rpa-rYJyla, and immediately
after the defeat at Mt. Lycaeum. Antigonus' presence is probably
his presence in the Peloponnese (Beloch, iv. 2. 223, against Ferrabino,
269, who applies the phrase to Antigonus' appearance outside Mantinea); d. 55 2, 8,0. -r~v .:4v-rty6vov 7Tapovaav. From spring 227 to late
summer 224, when Doson entered the Peloponnese (d. 54 3 n.), is
over three years, hence Aratus' capture of Mantinea took place t-re
-re-rapTttJ 7Tp6-repov -rij> .:4v-rty6vov 7Tapovalas.
O~a TTJV , . , iJ.f1apT(av: We do not knOW the circumstanCeS in which

3.

the Mantineans left the Achaeans for the Aetolians; but it is possible
that it was with Achaean consent (d. 46. 2 n.), despite P.'s censure
here. Normally secession would count as rebellion; d. Aymard, ACA,
2o8. P. exaggerates Achaean leniency. From 58. 2-3 it appears that
the Achaeans sent 300 Achaeans chosen by lot and 200 mercenaries
to Mantinea. Plutarch (Arat. 36. 3) says that Aratus -rovs f.LETolKovs
7TOA-ras l7TOLYJGi;V av-rwv, whence Fougeres (494) infers that the
Achaeans were settlers and received Mantinean citizenship. See 58.
4 n. P.'s picture of the Mantinean 'conversion' ( 6 ff.) represents
the ascendancy of a party as a change of mind in the community.
58. 1. Tas . . . O'TaO'E~S KQL Tas {m' AtTwAwv . . . em~ouAas: the
pro-Achaean faction, probably the rich landowners (d. Bolte, RE,
263

II. 58.

EVENTS IN GREECE

'Mantinea', col. 1328), evidently distrusted their authority, and asked


for a garrison. The reference to Aetolia is part of the falsified Aratean
version of the Cleomenean \Var; cf. 45 I n., 46. 1-3, 49 7.
4. aTa.a16.cra.vrEs npos aifO.s: 'becoming involved in internal struggles'
(not 'they fell out with the Achaeans' (Paton)). The popular, proSpartan, party gained the ascendancy, and called in Cleomenes (Plut.
Arat. 39 r; Cleom. 14. r); the date was early summer 226 (5r. 3 n.).
TOUS na.pa. TWV !1\xa.lWV Ola.Tp(~ovra.s KO.T~o-+a.sa.v: i.e. the 300
Achaean settlers. Plutarch's statement (Cteom. q. r), that Tijv t{>povpcw T~V Axataw (J'!JV<'!Kj3aAovTfi<; lvexdpt(J'aV avTOU<;, either represents an
alternative account (Phylarchus ?) or refers to the garrison proper
of 200 mercenaries, who may well have been expelled while the hated
settlers were reserved for a more violent fate. See Niccolini, 40 n. r.
6. KO.TCL TOUS KOWOUS TWV av9pwnwv vop.ous: cf. ro TOV<; TOV TTOAEJ.LOV
voJ.Lov;, 8. 1.2. The concept of general rules governing men's conduct
as men (not merely as Greeks) appears in Herod. v'ii. r36. z, the
killing of heralds violates Tel 1TUVTWV av8pw1TWV VOJLLJ.La; but in practice
the fifth century concerned itself mainly with a code of conduct
common to Greeks (cf. Thuc. iii. 58. J, 67. 6 (6 Twv 'EM.~vwv v&JLo;),
iv. 97 3; Eurip. Med. 536 ff., r339 ff., Hec. II99 ff., A~~dr. 173 f.,
Heracl. 130 ff., roro, d. 965 ff., Supp. 3n, 526). The problem of international laws exercised !socrates' school; cf. Diod. xiii. 2o-2i
(probably Ephorus; d. Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros', col. 6Br), with references to both Tov; nov 'E>..>..~vwv lBL(J'f.WV<; (23. 4) and rli KOtvO. VOJLLJ.La
(26. 2). Likewise the Aristotelian school, which produced the famous
study of comparative law, Theophrastus' Laws, reached out towards
a concept of law embracing more than Greeks (Arist. Nic. Eth. viii.
r. 3 1155 a 21 f.; Cic. Fin. v. 65 (peripatetic source)). Cf. von Scala,
299 ff. But whether conceived as applying to Hellenes or to all men,
the concept of natural law is one of great importance from early
times. 'Though .. repeatedly challenged ... the idea persisted of
an absolute, universal standard of right behind and above the laws
of particular political societies' (Calhoun, i4). It is to the principles
implied in such a concept that P. refers back in pa5sagcs like this;
but the fact that the actual details of what is permissible are so
vague prevents our constructing a system out of P.'s incidental
remarks, such as von Scala attempts. Here, for example, he demands
far greater leniency for an Achaean garrison than he will accord to
opponents; cf. ro, where 'the laws of war' allow the enslavement of
men, women, and children in a captured city (cf. 56. 6 n.). Moreover,
how do the rules of war apply to a popular revolt inside a city?
Clearly P. has no scientific or consistent answer to such questions,
but approaches them in the light of party and patriotic prejudices
so strong that they lead him to such callous judgements as appear
in 12 and 6o. 8.
264

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 59 6

12. Tous A.ev9Epous: 'the free population' (not, as Paton, 'the male
citizens') ; the masculine form covers both sexes; cf. 9 fLETd TlKvwv
Ka~ yvva~Kwv; Plut. Arat. 45 6 (from Phylarchus), 1rafoas- o Kat
yvvaiKas-

~vSpa1ToO[uavTo.

TO lj!eu8os chr19a.vov: cf. 56. 12, n\ m8av6v, KUV


zfor=iJoos-. Phylarchus,
to secure npaTda (cf. 59 3, and 17. 6 n.), discards the criteria even of

his own 'tragedy'' since his work is a1Tl8avov.


13. To "'ra.pa.ttE(}levov uuvemcrrftua.l: 'to pay attention to an
example close at hand'.
Kupleuua.vTes TEyea.Twv: cf. 54 7; the date was late spring or early
summer 223.
59. 1. )\pLcrroJ.J-a.xov: cf. 44 6 n. for his earlier career. In 272 the leader
of the pro-Macedonian faction at Argos was Aristippus (I) (Plut.
Pyrrh. 30. r). At the time of the revolt of Alexander, son of Craterus,
at Corinth in 249, the tyrant of Argos was Aristomachus (I) (JG,
iiz. 774), who was murdered in 241/o and succeeded by Aristippus (II)
(Plut. A rat. 25. 4), who was succeeded in turn by Aristomachus (II),
who joined the Achaean League. Since this man was the son of
Aristomachus (Syll. 5IO, cf. IG, iv. IIII), he appears to have been
brother to Aristippus (II), son of Aristomachus (I) and grandson of
Aristippus (I), who perhaps became tyrant as a result of Pyrrhus'
defeat and death. On Apia, daughter of Aristippus (II), and wife
of Nabis of Sparta, see xiii. 7. 6. Cf. Beloch, iv. 1. 579-80 n. 3; Freeman, HFG, 297 n. 2.
v"'roxe1pLov )\vnyov<tl tta.t To 'is )\xa.LO'Ls yEvo~-tevov: 'falling into the
hands of .. .',i.e. in 224 after the fall of Argos; cf. 53 2. There is no
evidence that he surrendered voluntarily (so Treves on 6o. 2); cf.
6o.

2,

Aaf36vus- KaTrt 1TOAEfLOV fm.oxelp~ov.

ets KeyxpeO.s crrpe~Aou~-tevov ci."'ro9a.vel:v:

cf. Plut. A rat. 44 6


(following Phylarchus), v Kr=yxpmts- uTpE{3Awuavn:s- KaTm6vnuav.
Cenchreae was the Corinthian port on the Saronic Gulf. Plutarch
alleges that Aratus was much blamed for the incident; he would be
doubly responsible, as UTpaT7Jyos- a?JToKpaTwp of the League, and also
since he had been elected general at Argos after its recovery (Plut.
Arat. 44 s)-unless, indeed, Plutarch here refers to a purely military
commission (Aymard, ACA, 114 n.).
4. Ka.Ta ye TftV Tou ~iov "11"poa.1peuLV: 'in his political conduct throughout his life', i.e. as a tyrant. The argument is illogical; in accepting
Aristomachus into the Confederation and electing him general the
Achaeans had condoned his earlier career. And if he had resumed
his tyranny after Cleomenes took Argos, P. would surely have said
so explicitly.
6. Ta.uT"l'i Se ~-tei~w tta.T"lYop(a.v KTA.: cf. Cic. de re pub. ii. 48,
'tyrannus, quo neque taetrius nee foedius nee dis hominibusque
265

II. 59 6

EVE)l'TS l)l' GREECE

inmsms animal ullum cogitari potest: qui quamquam figura est


hominis, morum tamen immanitate uastissimas uincit beluas'; off.
iii. 32, 'quem (sc. tyrannum) est honestum necare ... ista in figura
hominis feritas et immanitas beluae'. For Cicero the question had
achieved a new significance in the career of Caesar, culminating in
the Ides of March 44 See 56. rs n.
7. flt&s .qflEpas: in 235 Aratus forced an entry into Argos by night,
but on receiving no help from the Argives had to withdraw at the
end of the next day, wounded through the thigh. Plutarch (Arat.
27. 3-4) refers this to Aristippus' tyranny, probably rightly; the
punishment inflicted by Aristomachus will have been after his seizure
of the tyranny on Aristippus' death near Cleonae the same summer
(Plut. Arat. 29.
; cf. Walbank, Aratos, r86-7). P.'s indignation
probably reflects the polemic of Aratus' lvf emoirs.
9. O.<jlopflfi TaVT!J Kat vpo<jluaet XPTJC"Uflevos: the new tyrant thus
rid himself of his political opponents, some of whom were no doubt
Aratus' confederates (despite P.'s emphasis on their innocence).
10. TO. . athou Kat Twv npoyovwv aa~E~fJflaTa: the offences of Aristomachus' ancestors are unknown, and may derive largely from the
rancour of Aratus, who was condemned by a court of arbitration to
pay 3o minae for invading Aristippus' territory in peace-time (46.
2 n.). Aratus' Memoirs are probably also the source of Plutarch's
statement (Arat. 25. 4) that Aristippus was e~wl.iaTepo<; Tvpavvos
than Aristomachus.
60. 2. on ... anEKn'LVav: P. does not admit this accusation, which
is made by Phylarchus (d. 8). He merely argues that Phylarchus'
charge, if true, would not expose Antigonus and Aratus to any
recrimination, since Aristomachus deserved an even more horrible
fate ( 7).
4, O.veA.niOTws 5i Tfj~ 6.cr<jlaA.e1a~ ~Tuxe: untrue. \Vhen Aristomachus
laid down his tyranny in 229/8 (44. 6 n.), the Achaeans made definite
terms, guaranteeing his safety (Plut. Arat. 35
5. iJY'flova Kai O"'TpaTT)yov KaTaaTfjcra.vTES: d. Plut. A rat. 35 5
This ~yEp.ovla probably means merely that Aristomachus commanded
the Achaean forces during his UTpaTT)yta of 228/7, e.g. at Pallantium
(Plut. Arat. 35 7), it is not to be confused with the honorary
~ycp.ovlu. of Ptolemy Euergetes (cf. Plut. Arat. 24. 4, ~yEp.ovlu.v
xm'Ta 'TToAEfLOV Ka1 Ka-rd. yfjv Kat KaTa 8\arrav), and the double title
is used mainly for rhetorical effect, like the inaccurate use of '"ap(i
m5Sas ( rr) to describe a desertion which took place in summer 225,
more than two years after Aristomachus' aTpaTYJyla.
7. flETa TlJ.LWp(a~ napa5etyJ.LaTt~6J.Levov: 'tortured as a deterrent
spectacle'. On P .' s callousness here cf.
6 n.
266

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 62.4


1

61. 1. f1ET a.li-TJaews tta.i Sta.Oeaews: 'with exaggeration and rhetorical


elaboration'.
2. 1repl. Tous a.l~To(/s Katpo6s: in fact, autumn 223 (54 13), a year
after Aristomachus' execution.
3. ~TJAWTWV cjleuKTWV: cf. Livy, praef. Io, 'in de tibi tuaeque
reipublicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu
quod uites'. For P.'s moral and didactic attitude towards history
cf. i. I, 2.
4. eis Tt,v Meu<nlv"lv: on these events see 55 2-7 n.
5. OUK eciamev ds TH\Os ava.yvwuOijva.t: 'they would not allow it to
be read to the end' (rather than 'they would not allow it to be read
at all').
f1tKpou oe Ka.Ta.Aeuumev Tous ypa.f1f1<1Tocjlopous: a breach of international law (cf. 8. IZ) which, as Treves notes, does not stir P.'s
indignation.
7. KatTot y' tf11ToOwv 1\v: 'and yet the instance was there to hand'
(cf. 58. 13), not, 'this was obviously demanded here' (Paton).
9. 1TpWTOV f1EV Tt,v xwpa.v 1TpoeivTo: not when Megalopolis fell
(for this was quite sudden), but previously in the loss of Belbinatis
(46. 5 n.)
11. 1TpOS aAf]8LVWV 1Tpa.yflaTWV Ka.l. ~E~Q.tWV KOtVWVl<lV: 'to share the
enterprises of an honourable and well-established state' (on -r.i 1Tpayp.am, 'the state', see i. 20. 2 n.; cf. xxx