EJ Pircinles of rtematonalPoitios doves in that analysis, they found that they behaved as predicted The statist ‘between the probability of victory, estimated asthe initiator’s capabilifts divided by the sum of capabilites of the initiator and the target and the ikelibood that «pacific dove wil initiate ‘alae proved highly sigicant ere isa pester probably dat pacific dover wil atack ‘when their probability of viciory is low (Le, they are weak) For initiators of violent Wisputes that were aot pacific doves, the fr more common circumstance higher probability of ‘icoy—was astocated with the iation of violence The diference i sak, This result like the resurrection hypothesis, the audience cost hypothesis and so many others, llustrates the importanes of dentifng the contingent conditions under which one or anther alae Seip epee whol ng suse ev ost cy ‘more violent statesis often true, iis notalways true fpr pacific doves, grabbing the initiative nd engaging in violence helps make their demarids more credible in a negotiation| but it also males getting negotiations under way more dificult.) (hat pacific doves are more likely to engage in violence when they are weakcrather than _ strong raises dificlt questions about conflict resolution) Terrorist organizations, for example, typically are smell and weak compared with the military might of their enemies. | We observe terrorists as terrorists only when they engage jn violent action. In such circum ‘stances, we emnot ell them apart fom hala, Both hawks end weak pacicdanes (but ‘not powerfl pacific doves) behave in the same way when they are sufficiently uncertai ofthe response hey can expet if they pure peacefal cutions to thei disp smental problem nei that its dangeout ar ma pr to geile on yng ‘negotiate if the foe ie a hawk that will seize the initiative and try to destroy them Gambling ‘on negotiation can be fatal (a point highlighted in chapter 13 on terrorism), yet feiling tn. gamble on negotiation can ean giving up the opportunity fora peaceful end succesful ‘end to 8 dispute. In thinking about conflict revolution, we mut always be eateful ot 10 underestimate the risks associated both with aggression and with gembling on peace, ither can be deadly, SELECTORATE THEORY AND THE CONDUCT OF WAR vary argument we have examined inthis chapter thus reminds ws tht space deta Demos Sure ara de rca, Bis lames D, Moron Randsigh M.Skanon and Aa Sth 2606 “ting el tens mS Tony of Wac™ Ho PoP SER pS {conne Unisys 20 hepand wt permion liom tenons ae eng pe, Si: Democrat awe ead ave nen, exper eyo be Wo alo hyde et fg Atos dose ete sme expectation since yw ht ny Wl Wield "ours tht cold hve been se inthe wart contin obo oa ley nnd. Bybee of ies yar of ng, etc lave ned op abut mach ey evel (oid the war doe ne tito a war for pla aril ei ‘vo tly wher the hing dos ot ale ates one coi Ty se Bot sari by the cal thy ar ving winning becuse thy ar at fey sect south wars thy Spt a the sco and sabequnt yes (fey) hi ert ermine no fren fo what vs in the a ear oF ung ‘Democrat are sarpsed when wctry proves esi By the scond ‘as ey Have scons tat the wer ber own tn they eect They cose Sp (ote than ste en te expen of ncn cha viceroy baving lee tat ‘tor tougher than expected they hae fo choise (1) bal onto (2 ty sser Baling {ut say an option for deme adr seuss win anos erly elo ‘her bngemone rom ofc gue 62 show ws ht demowas cing prlonged wr Sr pn tele tem bain oo San ey we ag, vere sped bra, ate so pend at moe a hey ee ‘he Beat year of fighting when they ail tought victory would prove sdatly coe erocraty in hors try ae to win ifit wars thn do store ‘ute 62 op wat apenas re Demat ct ack modely nny spending, ile wos eso ble ele even bowl 1a which nds post-war word onde, epics denocet it cron malty spending tan do ioc. The eit idence apport the war ert ogi They tematic evidence nd logic a be hypo ae {bereft expences of ey beligeret in Weld War, ge loth mia xe ofthe rar conf in Wost Wr. ccf i Rai pth st thug war ey lg cu itn wes pt ‘ounty Beata ems wth ow pe pin expends te cox af wer tame ely ‘spelt the wero, dang wi er cneideraton poled the Orbe ey, ‘Reson eda om he war Gey and Ais ingame deo de sa Bein an Franc Thy we bth demncrces We ep ‘pel onthe hu hay ld bending bfoctand om 91805 when mt (leh wc wat ong she ae afr aye we ee emp wy no more nh th cepon of Geman The German war er fi he = vel iowon: Te lat wl ee yen cs ‘asad and ht nt ment ene of aes Wit colt dnc. ‘sa tt th doors contd a eres he penn oer. The "Pun sth fr Mls VT Gamany rts, nor bdr iatPiincbies 6 ntemational Polos Case Study of War Effort: Per Capita Mijtary Expenditures in the First World War 8 a Por Capita Mittary Expenditure Source: ene de Mesglta an Smith 2011, {oxthe worefot een tthe eve schieved in World Wr I) Alber Spee meanber of Hits jnner cel reported in his memoir, Hier ered the lw of upporife asked hisbaces to so ‘Se lanipat home per 1997))\axy more ustratve example ofthe rest variation in war crt canbe found in The Digatrs Handtoak (Bueno de Mexquta aod Smith 2011) for those Inne to pcr ase anasto sane evidence Hower veces eae ons ven tat hrge-oaton rege and pchap other repmes witha large rato of W to Sake a este fort to preva once a wari der end victory proves more eit than exec Wear Effort, Wer Loss, nd Leader Deposition ‘Mayer ket rerio re rhe een od sol eps wnge eet ine Tee at nore ee Sader a ceesa ease ae wien aan led et iang operas te sue tae oe hearer bat unless mee a ae larger and smaler-coaiton leads, Thus to ily grasp leader choi in wax we need to une loge en a lo endear depen lo ny ‘cat waging aga at ebcngornorn amc aes aelak abe sintaaaictaones macy loreahiaes se Se pee sere ater heer eens ees co ayaa ogee ae eS ] | i 7 ] a ‘hey try bard to negotiate setlements for their dsptes f doing so means siting private remuisayayfom thls cones and othe frig ial (Bueno de Mesquite 2004, Morow tf al 2006 fora counterargument, se Debs and Goemans 2010 and fr a challenge to their claims se Soli 209 and Bak and Palmer 2011), Le probe this argument moe dept} Tf clectorate theory i ight then, 281 bve suid lenders have to weigh the Hits of being deposed ba Torti rival aid by a domestic foe when they are called upon to male choices about twarandpesce The ample proion of pubiegoods reduces the domescristo democrats The “mpliprovson of prise goodr edocs the domestic ko enteral, Since vicorions demo- asc reasons epsined in chapter 1 are more tly to depose end replace vanglsed als th aze victorious astocrats smal coalition dicators mast be especialy nervousaboot deat at thebands of democrat If hey los to an atoeat they probably wi ave soars tan fom an yh reskin sl oon but ey ol wisp SS ek sy domes challenger wil have the resources ter dios athe deeied ic tor domestic challengers donot gin much advantage fom the military fuze ofthe incumbent kato edo gin advantage he vanquished lender"squendered” resources om the war that ‘would have more wseflly been spent on buying cony loyalty) Tor democrats, the picture is quite dierent. Since competition for power in lage- coattonseitngs san arm race in policy dew, a democrat who loses wars Ukely tobe replaced by a domestic competitor; ence Schultz’ observation thatthe loa opposition in democracies constrains the Toreiga policy choices ofthe incumbent, emphasizing those that a ly to lead to a foreign policy succes rather than failure. Therefore, while ll sorts of leaders face circumstances when they wil try very hard to win «was the impact of selection ects isto enconrage democrats to fight “easy” ware os dacovering thatthe war isnot ey, to trrharder than eutocras. This means tat democas are Hey to win more ofen and ‘therefore face the isk of being deposed by forcga rivals Jes often For democrats, defeat and ‘he associated failure to produce the public good of victory heightens the rik of electoral Gefen; for autocrat, spending theixcoaltion’s money on anything—inciding victory in ‘rar—other than the coalition heightens the risk of domestic outer. ‘Democrats and autorats both hav song incentives to engage in backward indtion, figuring out the expected consequences ofa war for thee ellie and then acting according to that strategic lpi. The evidence saggess that they rly on that strate logic in deciding ‘wether to ight or sete thei putes and, ifthe choice ist fight, how hard they mus try to win versus how much they ned to reserve resoures for their domestic coalition members. summaRy “We savin this chapter that dliferenes in domestic politics can profound alte the risks, oss, conduct and stermath of wa, None of the central lypotbses examined here, nor the strong cvidenc in ther fivor, could be right if we focu on states rer than leaders and internal pol- tics We saw thatthe expectation of high audience costs influences which dsputs are pursued and which never rise Wes tht audience oss ls infinence the Hlinood that fegime, once